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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF *India*

VOLUME 1

A-D

Stanley Wolpert

Editor in Chief

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Encyclopedia of India
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India's strategic power and economic prosperity have grown so swiftly since the 1990s that no one will wonder why the vast country is the subject of this four-volume encyclopedia. Countless Americans who have had their computer problems solved by young Indians—at work for General Electric, Microsoft, or Dell, “outsourced” in air-conditioned offices in Bangalore, Pune, Mumbai, and Kolkata—will hardly be surprised to learn of the precocious mathematical brilliance and scientific genius of India's civilization. So many of us have read books by Salman Rushdie, V. S. Naipaul, Rohinton Mistry, and Arundhati Roy, and delighted in watching the movies of Satyajit Ray, Mira Nair, and Merchant-Ivory, as well as musicals or films about “monsoon weddings” and “Bombay nights,” that none will be amazed to learn that America's some 2 million Indians are, in fact, the best educated, wealthiest minority in the United States. India has not only erased its former stereotypical global image as a land of poverty and snake charmers, but has surpassed its old superpower patron, Russia, in gross national product as well as average life expectancy. India's nuclear-powered modern army is second in size and might only to those of the United States and China.

As one of the world's greatest and oldest civilizations, India has also been the source of several major religious systems, giving birth to Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, the multifaceted faith to which some 80 percent of India's more than 1 billion people adhere today. The Sikh faith, which emerged from northwest India's Punjab in the sixteenth century, has also now grown to global dimensions. Yoga and Vedānta, two of India's ancient systems of philosophy, have of late acquired millions of adherents throughout the United States and in Europe as well as in other parts of Asia and Africa. Hinduism's noblest doctrine of nonviolence (*ahimsa*) has—thanks to Mahatma Gandhi, who equated it to “God”—won respect and admiration for India from countless millions.

All of us who enjoy playing chess or gaming with dice, moreover, are indebted to India's ancient wit as well as wisdom. There are, indeed, at least as many reasons for wanting to learn more about India as there are articles, nearly 600, and pages, some 1,400, in this new encyclopedia. More tourists fly into New Delhi and Mumbai every year, or sail into one of India's beautiful ports, from Mumbai to Goa to Trivandrum on the west coast, and from Pondicherry to Chennai to Kolkata on the east coast. More American and multinational corporate businesses have opened offices in hundreds of Indian cities, hiring bright English-speaking Indians, and more Indian doctors, nurses, and scientists work as heart and brain surgeons in our best hospitals, and on pure research in university as well as industrial laboratories, than any other Asian-born residents. India has thus arrived as our global partner, in so many more ways than the best-publicized “strategic” one, that we might well

ask why it has taken so long for our *Encyclopedia of India* to be published? I am perhaps most to blame for being so slow to master my computer, without which, however, a project as large as this one might have taken fifty years, rather than five.

I must first of all thank Thomson/Gale executive vice president Frank Menchaca, whose persistence persuaded me five years ago to accept his invitation to tackle this job, after having just refused a similar invitation from another publisher. It was a tempting challenge, for if done properly it could be a most useful educational tool, one I should certainly be proud of helping to produce for the use of students and adults throughout the world interested in learning about India's remarkable civilization.

Frank persuaded me to fly to New York to meet with him and developmental director H el ene Potter in their Scribners/Macmillan office in 2000, and by the end of our lunch I tentatively said yes. But first I had to put together my editorial team of experts in those fields of Indian scholarship of which I knew much less than I did about Indian history. Happily, I was able to convince Distinguished Professor Raju ("George") Thomas to work with me, and he agreed to recruit scholars to write on India's government, politics, and military strategy. Soon after Raju joined, we were able to get Dr. Deena Khatkhate, who had served on the Board of the Reserve Bank of India and had worked for the World Bank, to cover the important fields of economics and finance. Professor Robert Brown, who teaches Indian art history at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is also a curator of Indian art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), kindly agreed last year to write several key articles himself and to recruit some of America's finest Indian art history scholars, such as Professor Walter Spink of the University of Michigan and Dr. Stephen Markel, curator at LACMA, who, despite urgent and pressing prior commitments, agreed to help us. Let me thank them, since without their selfless assistance this project could not have been completed.

I must also thank each of the other fine author-scholars, numbering more than 200, who have written the 580 articles published in these four volumes. Organized alphabetically from Abdul Kalam to Zoroastrianism, the topics embrace all of India—not just its history of over 4,000 years, or its geography and ethnography, but its Buddhist art and Deccani painting, the economic burden of its defense and external debt policy, its Hindu Tantric deities, human rights, industrial growth, judicial system, languages and scripts, medical science education, modern and contemporary art, nuclear programs and policies, planning commission, R am aya a, Mah abh arata, *satyagraha*, scheduled tribes, secularism, theater, trade liberalization, women's education, and Yoga. We have tried our best to fill these volumes with the most accurate, comprehensive, readable series of articles on India, each of which is signed by its author and includes a bibliography and cross-references to related pieces for readers eager to delve deeper into any topic, all of which are ultimately related, each but a facet of India's singularly scintillating, remarkable civilization. More than 300 images illustrate the articles and there are four unique color inserts, one per volume, highlighting Indian art, architecture and sculpture; contemporary life; handicrafts; and the physical environment. Readers will also find supplementary materials to aid their research: The front matter includes a thematic outline of contents and chronologies detailing India's long history, and the back matter in volume four includes a selection of primary source documents, a general bibliography, a glossary of terms, and a comprehensive index.

Not all the scholars with whom we started this educational journey long years ago have remained with us till the end. Several old friends were unable to write the pieces they contracted for, and I regret that they could not be with us at the finish line. Dr. Pran Chopra—who together with his brilliant wife, Dr. Prabha Chopra, kindly agreed to write the important article on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whose papers they both so carefully edited—died last year in New Delhi, before he could see a final copy of their biography. Dr. Prabha Chopra courageously worked on to complete the task they had begun together,

and I thank her for her karma-yogic cooperation, as I regretfully posthumously thank her dear husband, my good friend, Doctor Pran.

I want specially to thank all my former students, now dear colleagues and friends, who so generously gave of their energies and talents in writing many articles for this encyclopedia. Some were more prompt than others in completing their pieces, yet all did at last finish, and each article was well done. Our publisher's first editor, Sarah Turner, was most helpful for two years, when she had to fly home to England. I thank Sarah for her hard work and hope she finds time to read these final versions of articles she helped launch. For the past two years, Andrea K. Henderson, our brilliant and efficient senior editor at Thomson/Gale, who replaced Sarah, has been so diligent, kind, and helpful in every aspect of this arduous, time-consuming job of contracting for and editing 1 million words, that I can hardly thank her enough. I must also thank our meticulous copyeditor, Dorothy Bauhoff, proofreader Amy Unterburger, and senior editors Dana Barnes, Shawn Corridor, and Jan Klisz, who all helped us to finish on schedule.

Hélène Potter has been deeply committed to this *Encyclopedia of India* from its conception to completion, and her brilliant creative intellect and wealth of practical experience have been invaluable to us at every stage in this process.

Finally, let me thank my dearest wife, Dorothy, without whose confidence, unfailing support, and ever-cheerful love throughout the last five years, I should never have undertaken or been able to complete this most challenging job of my life.

Stanley Wolpert
28 July 2005



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Mangeshkar, Lata
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Mandal Commission Report

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British East India Company Raj
British Impact
Curzon, Lord George
India's Impact on Western Civilization
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Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Two (1878–1880)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Three (May–August 1919)
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Clive, Robert
Cornwallis, Lord
Dufferin, Lord
Dundas, Henry
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 Dubois, Jean-Antoine
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 Pandita Ramabai
 Paul, K. T.
 Singh, Sadhu Sundar
 Xavier, Francis

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 Nyāya
 Pānini
 Patanjali
 Pingala
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 Dance Forms: Kathakali
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 Dance Forms: Manipuri
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 Dance Forms: Odissi

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Babur

“Bande Mataram”

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Bengal

Burma

Humayun

Jahangir

Kabir

Khan, Liaquat Ali

Madurai

Magadha

Meghalaya

Mizoram

Music: Karnātak

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 Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam
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Bhave, Vinoba

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Bimbisara
Dalhousie, Marquis of
Gujarat
Guru Nanak
Jamshedpur
Jodhpur
Kanpur
Karnataka
Mysore
Naoroji, Dadabhai
Rajneesh, Osho
Simla
Singh, Maharaja Ranjit
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Political System: Parliament

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Media

Menon, V.K. Krishna

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Khan, Ali Akbar

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Khayal

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Music: An Introduction

Nātya Shāstra

Qawwālī

Rāga

Sarod

Shankar, Ravi

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 Anand, Mulk Raj
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
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 Bose, Subhas Chandra
 Brahma Samaj
 Cabinet Mission Plan
 Chatterji, Bankim Chandra
 Chelmsford, Lord
 Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart
 Fitch, Ralph
 Forster, E. M.
 Galbraith, John Kenneth
 Gandhi, Indira
 Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.
 Gokhale, Gopal Krishna
 Gujral, Inder Kumar
 Hardinge, Lord
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 Kipling, Rudyard
 Krishnamurti, Jiddu
 Linlithgow, Lord
 Macaulay, Thomas Babington
 Minto, Lord
 Montagu, Edwin S.
 Morley, John
 Mountbatten, Lord
 Nehru, Motilal
 Ranade, Mahadev Govind
 Reading, Lord
 Ripon, Lord
 Satyagraha
 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar
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chronology: India

EARLY HISTORY

| | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| c. 500,000–10,000 B.C. | Paleolithic culture | <i>Homo Sapiens Sapiens</i> emerge in Africa, c. 100,000 B.C. |
| 10,000–4000 | Mesolithic culture | |
| c. 4000 | Neolithic period | Sumerians establish first civilization, c. 3200 b.c. |
| c. 3000–2600 | Beginning of Harappa civilization | |
| c. 2600–2500 | Harappa civilization at its most developed | Chinese civilization emerges, c. 2200 B.C. |
| c. 2000–1900 | Collapse of Harappa civilization | |
| c. 2000–1500 | Aryan invasion of northwest India | |
| c. 1500–500 | Vedic age | |
| c. 1200–900 | Composition of the four Saṁhitās: Atharva Veda, Rig Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur Veda | Hebrew civilization emerges, c. 1200 B.C. |
| c. 1000 | Aryan migration to Ganges Valley | |
| 8th–7th centuries | Composition of the Upanishads | |
| c. 600 | Earliest date for written form of the Rig Veda | |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

NORTH INDIA AND MAURYAN DYNASTY

| | | |
|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| c. 600 | Rise of sixteen great states (<i>mahājanapadas</i>) | |
| c. 563–483 | Life of the Buddha | |
| c. 540–493 | Reign of Bimbisara | Roman Republic founded, 509 B.C. |
| c. 540–c. 468 | Life of Mahāvīra, twenty-fourth Jain Tīrthānkara (teacher) | |
| c. 527 | Preaching of First Sermon by the Buddha | |
| c. 517 | Achaemenid empire of Persia captured Gandhara | |
| c. 500 | Rise of Magadha at Pataliputra | |
| c. 490–459 | Reign of Ajātasatru | |
| c. 400 | Composition of the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa | |
| c. 362–321 | Rule of the Nanda dynasty in north and central India | |
| 326 | Alexander crosses the Indus Battle of Hydaspes | |
| 321–297 | Reign of Chandragupta, founder of the Mauryan dynasty | |
| 321–296 | Composition of <i>Artha Shāstra</i> | |
| c. 302 | Greek Ambassador Megasthenes at the court of Chandragupta | Great Wall of China erected, c. 3rd century B.C. |
| 297–272 | Reign of Bindusāra | |
| 268–231 | Reign of Ashoka | |
| c. 260 | Conquest of Kalinga | |
| 257–256 | Ashoka's 14 Rock Edicts, Kalinga Edicts | |
| c. 251 | Buddhist mission of Mahendra to Ceylon | |
| c. 250–240 | Third Buddhist Council at Pataliputra | |
| 242 | Ashoka's 7 Pillar Edicts | |
| 240–232 | Minor Pillar Edicts | |

184 Death of Brihadratha, the last Mauryan king
Accession of Pushyamitra of the Shunga dynasty

73 Devabhuti, the last Shunga king killed

INDO-BACTRIANS AND NORTHWEST INDIA

c. 250 Bactrian Greeks establish kingdom on Oxus River plains

c. 200–190 Demetrius "King of the Indians"

c. 166–155 Rule of Menander, the most famous Indo-Greek ruler

c. 150 Gandhara art flourishes

c. 140–130 Heliokles, last of the Indo-Bactrian kings

c. 94 Maues, the Shaka or Indo-Parthian in northwest India

c. 78 Kanishka establishes Kushan power as "King of Gandhara"

72 Foundation of Kanvayana dynasty by Vasudeva Kanva

SOUTH AND CENTRAL INDIA

c. 50 B.C.–A.D. 50 Height of trade with Roman Empire Life of Jesus and rise of Christianity, 5 B.C.–A.D.29

27 B.C.–2nd century A.D. Satavahana (Andhra) dynasty

c. 68 Martyrdom of St. Thomas at Mylapore, Madras

150 Rudraman establishes Shaka power in western India

c. 174–203 Height of Andhra kingdom under Yajña

c. 225 End of Satavahana dynasty

c. 255–mid-6th century Vakatakas of Bundhelkhand

c. 325 Foundation of Pallava dynasty

GUPTA DYNASTY

320–335 Chandragupta I establishes Gupta empire

c. 320 Origin of Purāṇas

335–375 Reign of Samudragupta

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

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|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 375–415 | Golden age of the Guptas under Chandragupta II Kālidāsa at court of Chandragupta II | |
| 405–411 | Chinese pilgrim Fahsien in India at the Gupta court | |
| 454 | Council of Vallabhi | |
| 455–467 | Reign of Skandagupta when Hunas invade northwest | |
| SOUTH INDIA | | |
| 543–566 | Chalukyas of Badami established under Pulakeshin I (r. 535–566) | |
| c. 560–574 | Simhavishnu establishes Pallava power at Kanchi | |
| 600–630 | Pallava power develops under Mahendravarman | Life of Mohammed 570–632, rise and spread of Islam 7th–8th centuries |
| 609–642 | Chalukya power extends under Pulakeshin II (r. 610–642) and struggle for dominance of the south with the Pallavas begins | |
| 752–10th century | Rashtrakutas at Ellora | |
| c. 756–757 | Creation of Kailasanatha Temple at Ellora | |
| NORTH INDIA | | |
| 606–647 | Harsha Vardhana of Kanauj | |
| 629–645 | Chinese Buddhist Hsieun Tsang pilgrimage in India | |
| c. 630 | Defeat of Harsha Vardhana by Chalukyas | |
| 711 | Arab conquest of Sind establishing Islam in India | |
| 736 | Delhi first established as “Dhillika” | |
| c. 750–770 | Gopala establishes Pala dynasty in Bengal | |
| c. 752 | The Pallava king defeats Chalukyas | |
| c. 780 | Gurjara-Pratiharas established at Ujjain | |
| c. 788–836 | Life of Shankaracharya | |
| 814–840 | Reign of Amoghavarsha, the most powerful Rashtrakuta king | |
| c. 836–885 | King Bhoja establishes Pratihara empire | |

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|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 885–910 | King Mahendrapal extends Pratihara empire | |
| 1077–1120 | Pala kingdom becomes powerful under Ramapala | Crusades result in greater East–West contact, 11th–13th centuries |
| 1148 | <i>Rajatarangini</i> written by Kalhana | |
| SOUTH INDIA | | |
| c. 897 | King Āditya establishes Chola kingdom | |
| c. 907 | Cholas become powerful under Parantaka I | |
| 939–968 | Rashtrakutas dominate Deccan | |
| c. 973 | Taila, a Chalukya of Kalyani, defeats Rashtrakutas and establishes later Chalukya dynasty | |
| 985–1016 | Rajaraja I establishes Chola empire | |
| 1016–1044 | Reign of Rajendra Chola | |
| 1025 | Cholas conduct naval raids in southeast Asia | |
| c. 1025–1137 | Life of Rāmānuja, Vaishnava teacher | |
| 1077 | Chola merchants travel to China | |
| c. 1100 | Rāmānuja leads <i>bhakti</i> movement | |
| 1246–1279 | Rule of Rajendra III, the last Chola king | |
| GHAZNAVIDS AND GHURIDS IN NORTH INDIA | | |
| 971–1030 | Reign of Mahmud of Ghazni | |
| 973–1048 | Life of Alberuni Firdawsi | |
| 997–1014 | Mahmud of Ghazni in Afghanistan invades northern India in annual plundering raids | |
| | Muhammad Ghuri defeats Ghaznavids and captures the Punjab | |
| 1175 | Muhammad Ghuri's first raid into India | |
| 1179 | Capture of Peshawar by Muhammad Ghuri | |
| 1186 | Capture of Lahore by Muhammad Ghuri | |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

1192 Muhammad Ghuri defeats Rajputs under Prithviraja Chauhan at Battle of Tarain

1193 Muhammad Ghuri captures Delhi and north India

1206 Muhammad Ghuri assassinated in Lahore

DELHI SULTANATE

1206–1210 Qutb-ud-Din Aibak found Mamluk (Slave dynasty, or Delhi Sultanate)

1211–1136 Reign of Shams-ud-din Iltutmish

1221–1222 Mongol raids begin in northwest

1231 Capture of Gwalior

1235 Capture of Ujjain

1236–1240 Reign of Raziyya

1240–1246 Rule of “the Forty”

1246–1286 Rule of Balban

1266–1286 Balban establishes Delhi as center for Muslim arts and scholarship

1290 Khalji dynasty established

1290–1296 Reign of Jalal-ud-Din Firuz Shah, the first Khalji ruler
Mongol invasions repelled

1296–1326 Reign of Ala’-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji

c. 14th century Emergence of Chishti, Suhrawardi, and Firdawsi Sufi sects Height of Aztec civilization, c. 1300

1301 Ala’-ud-Din Khalji captures Rajput fort Ranthambhor

1303 Ala’-ud-Din Khalji captures Rajput fort Chitor

1309–1311 Ala’-ud-Din Khalji captures south India

1316 Reign of Shihab al-Din Umar

1316–1320 Reign of Qutb-al-Din Mubarak Shah

1320 Tughluqs replace Khaljis as sultans of Delhi

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|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1320–1324 | Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Tughluq I Shah | |
| 1324–1351 | Reign of Muhammad Tughluq Shah | |
| 1334 | Malabar breaks free of Tughluqs | |
| 1336–1646 | Vijayanagar empire | |
| 1337 | Bengal under Malik Shams-ud-din breaks free of Tughluqs | |
| 1347–1526 | Bahmani dynasty | |
| 1351 | Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud Shah | |
| 1351–1388 | Reign of Firuz Shah | |
| 1388–1389 | Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Tughluq II Shah | |
| 1389–1390 | Reign of Abu Bakr Shah | |
| 1390–1394 | Reign of Nasir al-Din Muhammad Shah | |
| 1394 | Reign of Ala al-Din Sikandar Shah | |
| 1394–1412 | Reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah | |
| 1398–1399 | Tamburlaine's sack of Delhi | |
| 1414–1450 | Sayyids rule as sultans of Delhi | |
| 1440–1518 | Kabir preaches the unity of all religions | |
| 1450 | Lodis replace Sayyids at Delhi | |
| 1469–1539 | Life of Guru Nanak, founder of Sikhism | |
| 1480–1564 | Life of Karnataka music composer Purandara Dasa | |
| 1482–1673 | Deccani Sultanates of Ahmadnagar, Berar, Bijapur, Bidar, and Golconda | |
| 1486–1533 | Life of Chaitanya, <i>bhakti</i> Hindu teacher | Columbus makes first voyage to the Americas, 1492 |
| 1498 | Vasco da Gama establishes Portuguese presence in India | |
| 1509–1529 | Reign of Krishna Deva Raya at Vijayanagar | |
| 1510 | Afonso de Albuquerque captures Goa for the Portuguese | |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

MUGHAL DYNASTY

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|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| 1526 | Babur (1483–1530) defeats the Delhi sultan Ibrahim Lodi at first battle of Panipat | |
| 1530 | Death of Babur and accession of Humayun | |
| 1532–1623 | Life of Tulsi Das | |
| 1540 | Defeat of Humayun by Sher Shah and exile in Persia | |
| 1551–1602 | Life of Abu'l Fazl | |
| 1555 | Return of Humayun and recapture of Delhi | |
| 1556 | Death of Humayun and accession of Akbar Second battle of Panipat | |
| 1556–1605 | Reign of Akbar | Elizabeth I ascends the throne of England, 1558 |
| 1563 | Abolition of pilgrimage tax on Hindus | |
| 1564 | Abolition of <i>jizya</i> (poll tax on non-Muslims) | |
| 1571 | Building of new capital at Fatehpur Sikri | |
| 1573 | Conquest of Gujarat | |
| 1575 | Building of <i>'Ibādat Khāna</i> (House of worship) | |
| 1576 | Conquest of Bengal | |
| 1581 | Conquest of Kabul | |
| 1582 | Creation of <i>Dīn-i-Ilāhī</i> (Divine religion) | |
| 1584 | Abandoning of Fatehpur Sikri | |
| 1592 | Conquest of Orissa | |
| 1595 | Conquest of Baluchistan | |
| 1600 | Charter given by Queen Elizabeth I to East India Company | |
| 1605–1627 | Reign of Jahangir | |
| 1612 | East India Company establishes trading post at Surat | |

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| 1616–1618 | Sir Thomas Roe's embassy to Jahangir; East India Company receives permission to trade in India |
| 1619 | Establishment of British “factory” at Surat |
| 1628–1658 | Reign of Shah Jahan |
| 1630–1680 | Life of Shivaji, founder of Maratha dynasty |
| 1642 | Establishment of British trading post at Fort St. George, Madras |
| 1643 | Taj Mahal completed |
| 1658–1707 | Reign of Aurangzeb |
| 1664 | Establishment of La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes (French East India Company) |
| 1674 | Shivaji crowned Chatrapati (Lord of the universe) |
| 1679 | Aurangzeb reinstitutes <i>jizya</i> on non-Muslims |
| 1681 | Aurangzeb begins conquest of the Deccan |
| 1686 | Bijapur conquered |
| 1689 | Golkonda conquered Shambuji captured and executed |
| 1690 | Job Charnock establishes British trading post at Calcutta |
| 1699 | Sikh <i>Khalsa</i> established by tenth Guru, Gobind Rai |

MUGHALS IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

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| 1707–1712 | Reign of Bahadur Shah |
| 1713–1719 | Reign of Farrukshiyar Domination of Sayyid brothers, Hussain Ali and Abdullah, the “king makers” |
| 1714 | Rise of Maratha power under <i>pesbwa</i> Balaji Vishwanath |
| 1719 | Reign of Rafi-ud Darajat, Rafi-ud Daulat, and Nekusiyar |
| 1719–1748 | Reign of Muhammad Shah |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

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| 1723 | Creation of Nizami of Hyderabad by Nizam al-Mulk (1669–1748) | |
| 1739 | Battle of Karnal Sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah of Iran | |
| 1748–1754 | Reign of Ahmad Shah | Industrial Revolution, c. 1750 |
| 1754–1759 | Reign of Alamgir II | |
| 1759–1806 | Reign of Shah Alam II | |
| 1806–1837 | Reign of Akbar II | |
| 1837–1857 | Reign of Bahadur Shah II | |

BRITISH IN EIGHTEENTH- AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDIA

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| 1742–1763 | British and French fight for domination of south India as part of global war | |
| 1746 | Joseph François Dupleix (1697–1764) captures Madras | |
| 1746–1794 | Life of Sir William Jones | |
| 1748 | Madras restored to the British | |
| 1751 | Robert Clive (1725–1774) captures Arcot | |
| 1756 | Black Hole of Calcutta | |
| 1757 | Clive wins Battle of Plassey | |
| 1760 | British defeat French at Battle of Wandiwash | |
| 1761 | Haidar Ali establishes Muslim power at Mysore | |
| 1764 | British win Battle of Buxar | |
| 1765 | East India Company granted the <i>diwani</i> of Bengal | |
| 1772–1785 | Warren Hastings (1732–1818), 1772–1773 governor-general of Bengal; 1784–1785 governor-general of India | |
| 1774 | Rohilla War | |
| 1778 | First Maratha War | |
| 1784 | Bengal Asiatic Society founded | |

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| 1786–1793 | Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805), governor-general of India |
| 1793 | Cornwallis establishes the permanent <i>zamindari</i> settlement |
| 1789–1805 | Richard Colley Wellesley (1760–1842), governor-general |
| 1799 | Tipu Sultan of Mysore defeated by British at Seringapatam |
| 1801–1839 | Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) establishes Sikh empire |
| 1802 | Treaty of Bassein |
| 1803 | Second Anglo-Maratha War |
| 1805 | July–October, Charles Cornwallis, governor-general |
| 1805–1807 | George Hilario Barlow (1762–1846), acting governor-general |
| 1807–1813 | Gilbert Elliott, 1st earl of Minto (1751–1814), governor-general |
| 1813 | Entrance of Christian missionaries |
| 1813–1823 | Francis Rawdon Hastings, 1st marquis of Hastings, 2nd earl of Moira (1754–1826), governor-general |
| 1814–1816 | Anglo-Gurkha War |
| 1818 | Defeat of Marathas in Third Maratha War |
| 1817–1898 | Life of Sayyid Ahmed Khan |
| 1823–1828 | William Pitt Amherst (1773–1857), governor-general |
| 1826 | Treaty of Yandabo with Burmese |
| 1827 | Simla first established as summer retreat |
| 1828 | Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) founds the Brahmo Samaj |
| 1828–1835 | William Cavendish Bentinck (1774–1839), governor-general |
| 1829 | <i>Sati</i> becomes illegal |

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| 1835–1836 | Charles Theophilus Metcalfe (1785–1846), acting governor-general | |
| 1836–1842 | George Eden, earl of Auckland (1784–1849), governor-general | |
| 1838–1842 | First Afghan War | Opium War, 1839–1842 |
| 1842–1844 | Edward Law, 1st earl of Ellenborough, 1st viscount Southam (1790–1871), governor-general | |
| 1843 | Sind annexed by East India Company | |
| 1844–1848 | Henry Hardinge, 1st viscount Hardinge (1785–1856), governor-general | |
| 1845 | First Sikh War | |
| 1848–1856 | James Andrew Broun Ramsey, 10th earl and 1st marquis of Dalhousie (1812–1860), governor-general | |
| 1848–1849 | Second Anglo-Sikh War | |
| 1849 | Annexation of Punjab by East India Company | |
| 1852 | Second Burmese War | |
| 1853 | First railway line opens between Bombay and Thane Telegraph between Calcutta and Agra | |
| 1856 | Annexation of Oudh | |
| 1856–1861 | Charles John Canning, 1st earl Canning (1812–1862), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1856–1920 | Life of Bal Gangadhar Tilak | |
| 1857 | 10 May, Indian mutiny | |
| 1858 | Queen's proclamation | |
| 1862–1863 | James Bruce, 8th earl of Elgin and 12th earl of Kincardine (1811–1863), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1864–1869 | John Laird Mair Lawrence, 1st baron Lawrence (1811–1879), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1865 | Telegraph connection between England and India | |
| 1866–1915 | Life of Gopal Krishna Gokhale | |

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| 1867 | Press and Registration of Books Act |
| 1869–1872 | Richard Southwell Mayo, 6th earl of Mayo (1822–1872), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1869–1948 | Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi |
| 1872 | First census of India |
| 1872–1876 | Thomas George Baring, 1st earl of Northbrook (1826–1904), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1875 | Muhammad Anglo-Oriental College founded at Aligarh |
| 1875 | Mayo College opens at Ajmer |
| 1875–1950 | Life of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel |
| 1876 | Royal Titles Act makes Queen Victoria (r. 1837–1901) empress of India |
| 1876–1880 | Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, 1st earl of Lytton (1831–1891), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1876–1948 | Life of Mohammad Ali Jinnah |
| 1878 | Vernacular Press Act Second Afghan War |
| 1880–1884 | George Frederick Samuel Robinson, 1st marquis of Ripon (1827–1909), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1880 | Battle of Maiwand and Lord Roberts's march to Kanadahar |
| 1882 | Foundation of headquarters of Theosophical Society near Madras |
| 1883–1884 | Ilbert Bill controversy |
| 1884–1888 | Frederick Temple Hamilton Temple, 1st marquis of Dufferin and Ava (1826–1902), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1885 | Indian National Congress founded at Bombay Third Burmese War |
| 1886 | Burma annexed |
| 1888–1894 | Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th marquess of Lansdowne (1845–1927), governor-general and viceroy |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

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| 1889 | Ahmadiya sect founded in the Punjab |
| 1889–1964 | Life of Jawaharlal Nehru |
| 1891 | Age of Consent Act |
| 1892 | Indian Councils Act |
| 1894–1899 | Victor Alexander Bruce, 9th earl of Elgin and 13th earl of Kincardine (1849–1917), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1895–1951 | Life of Liaquat Ali Khan |
| 1899–1905 | George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859–1925), governor-general and viceroy |

TWENTIETH CENTURY TO 1947

| | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1900 | North-West Frontier province created |
| 1904 | Younghusband expedition to Tibet |
| 1905 | Bengal partitioned |
| 1905–1910 | Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond, 4th earl of Minto (1845–1914), governor-general and viceroy |
| 1906 | Foundation of All-India Muslim League |
| 1907 | Congress split between “moderates” and “extremists” at Surat |
| 1908 | Newspapers Act |
| 1909 | Tilak convicted of sedition Councils of India Act (Minto-Morley reforms) Lord Sinha appointed to governor-general's council |
| 1910 | Sri Aurobindo (Aurobindo Ghose, 1872–1950) establishes ashram at Pondicherry |
| 1910 | Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act |
| 1911 | Delhi Durbar Capital of India moved from Calcutta to Delhi Partition of Bengal revoked |
| 1911–1916 | Charles Hardinge, 1st Baron Hardinge of Penhurst (1858–1944), governor-general and viceroy |

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| 1913 | Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) wins Nobel Prize for literature | |
| 1915 | Defence of India Act | World War I, 1914–1918 |
| 1916 | Lucknow Pact between All-India Muslim League and Indian National Congress Home Rule movement | |
| 1916–1921 | Frederic John Napier Thesiger, 3rd baron and 1st viscount Chelmsford (1868–1933), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1917 | Montagu Declaration | |
| 1917–1984 | Life of Indira Gandhi | |
| 1918 | Government of India Act (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms) | |
| 1919 | Rowlatt Acts Amritsar (Jallianwala Bagh) Massacre | |
| 1920 | Ravi Shankar born Mahatma Gandhi begins first noncooperation movement | |
| 1920–1924 | Khilafat movement | |
| 1921–1926 | Rufus Daniel Isaacs, 1st marquess of Reading (1860–1935), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1921–1992 | Life of Satyajit Ray | |
| 1922 | Chaura Chauri incident Gandhi sentenced to six years' imprisonment Swaraj Party formed | |
| 1924 | Gandhi released from prison | |
| 1925 | Muddiman Committee Report Sikh Gurdwaras Act | |
| 1925–1931 | Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st earl of Halifax (1881–1959), governor-general and viceroy | |
| 1927 | Simon Commission appointed | |
| 1928 | Nehru Report Death of Lala Lajput Rai (1865–1928) at Lahore | |
| 1929 | Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Fourteen Points | |

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

- 1930** 26 January, Independence Day proclaimed by Indian National Congress
Salt March
Simon Commission Report submitted
First Round Table Conference
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) calls for creation of Muslim state
- 1931** First Indian film made at Bombay
Gandhi-Irwin Pact
Second Round Table Conference
Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act
- 1931–1936** Freeman Freeman-Thomas, 1st marquess of Willingdon (1866–1941), governor-general and viceroy
- 1932** 16 August, Communal Award
Third Round Table Conference
- 1935** Government of India Act
- 1936–1943** Victor Alexander John Hope, 2nd marquess of Linlithgow (1887–1952), governor-general and viceroy
- 1937** General elections
Indian National Congress formed government in seven provinces
- 1939** Defence of India Act
Indian National Congress resigned from provincial governments
22 December, All-India Muslim League “Deliverance Day”
- 1940** August Offer
- 1941** 23 March, All-India Muslim League moved Pakistan Resolution
- 1942** Cripps mission
Indian National Congress “Quit India” campaign
- 1943** Bengal famine
Subhash Chandra Bose (1897–1945) organizes Indian national army
- 1943–1947** Archibald Percival Wavell, 1st earl Wavell (1883–1950), governor-general and viceroy
- World War II, 1939–1945

- 1944** Gandhi-Jinnah talks
- 1945** Desai-Liaquat Pact
27 June–14 July, first Simla Conference
General elections
- 1946** Cabinet mission
16 August, All-India Muslim League “Direct Action Day”
Noakhali riots
Second Simla Conference
Interim government formed
- 1947** Prime Minister Clement Attlee's 20 February statement
Louis Francis Albert Victor Mountbatten (1900–1979),
governor-general and viceroy
3 June plan announces independence and partition of India
14 August, independence of India and Pakistan

INDIA SINCE 1947

- 1947–1948** Louis Mountbatten, governor-general
- 1947–1964** Jawaharlal Nehru serves as prime minister of India
- 1948** 30 January, assassination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
Invasion and annexation (“Police Action”) of Hyderabad
- 1948–1950** Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (1878–1972), governor-general of India
- 1950** 26 January, Indian Constitution comes into force
Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), first president of India
National Planning Commission established
Death of Vallabhbhai Patel
Mother Teresa (1910–1997) founded Missionaries of Charity
- 1951** First Five-Year Plan
- 1952** First general election
- 1955** Bandung Conference
- 1956** India's first nuclear reactor begins operation
States Reorganization Act
Second Five-Year Plan

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

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| 1957 | Jammu and Kashmir incorporated into India Second general elections |
| 1959 | Dalai Lama flees to India from Tibet |
| 1960 | Doordashan broadcast from Delhi Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan |
| 1961 | Goa invaded and annexed |
| 1962 | State of Nagaland formed Border war with China in northeast India |
| 1962–1967 | Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975), president |
| 1964 | 24 May, death of Jawaharlal Nehru |
| 1964–1966 | Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–1966), prime minister |
| 1965 | War with Pakistan |
| 1966 | Tashkent Agreement with Pakistan Indira Gandhi becomes prime minister |
| 1967 | Fourth general elections |
| 1967–1969 | Zakir Husain (1897–1969), president of India |
| 1968 | “Green Revolution” begins |
| 1969–1974 | Varahagiri Venkata Giri (1894–1980), president of India Man walks on the moon, 1969 |
| 1971 | Princes’ privy purse abolished Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 4 December, war with Pakistan in East Pakistan |
| 1974 | 5 May, India explodes nuclear device |
| 1975 | 26 June, “National Emergency” declared by Indira Gandhi |
| 1977–1979 | Morarji Desai (1896–1995), prime minister |
| 1980 | Indira Gandhi reelected prime minister |
| 1984 | June, “Operation Bluestar” in Amritsar 31 October, Indira Gandhi assassinated by Sikhs Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), prime minister |

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| 1985 | New Economic Policy | |
| 1987 | Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and Goa became states July, Indian–Sri Lankan treaty signed | |
| 1989 | Vishwanath Pratap Singh (b. 1931) becomes prime minister | |
| 1990 | Chandra Shekar becomes prime minister | |
| 1991 | 21 May, Rajiv Gandhi assassinated P. V. Narasimha Rao becomes prime minister | |
| 1992 | October, Babri mosque demolished | |
| 1996 | Atal Bihari Vajpayee prime minister for thirteen days H. D. Deva Gowda becomes prime minister | |
| 1997 | Inder Kumar Gural becomes prime minister | The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invites Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance, 1997 |
| | Kocheril Raman Narayanan, president of India 29 September, India launches space rocket | |
| 1998 | 20 March, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, prime minister 11–13 May, India explodes first nuclear devices 13 May, United States imposes economic sanctions on India Violence against Christians begins | |
| 2004 | General elections return Congress to power | |
| 2005 | India and Pakistan agree to give advance warning of missile tests | |



chronology: Pakistan

| | | |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1947 | 14 August, Mohammad Ali Jinnah becomes governor-general; Liaquat Ali Khan becomes prime minister 1947 | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is signed by major world powers, 1947 |
| 1947–1948 | War with India in Kashmir | |
| 1948 | 11 September, death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894–1964), governor-general | |
| 1949 | 7 March, Objectives Resolution | |
| 1951 | 16 October, assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan | |
| 1951–1953 | Khwaja Nazimuddin, prime minister | |
| 1951–1955 | Ghulam Mohammad (1895–1956), governor-general | |
| 1953–1955 | Mohammad Ali Bogra (1909–1963), prime minister | |
| 1954 | Pakistan joins Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 24 October, dissolution of Constituent Assembly | |
| 1955 | West Pakistan Act Pakistan joins Central Treaty Organization | |
| 1955–1956 | Choudhry Mohammad Ali (1905–1980), prime minister | |
| 1956 | Syed Iskander Ali Mirza (1899–1969), first president Constitution of Pakistan promulgated | |

CHRONOLOGY: PAKISTAN

| | | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1956–1957 | Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1893–1963), prime minister | |
| 1957 | October–December, Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (1897–1960), prime minister Foundation of the Awami League Party | |
| 1957–1958 | Malik Firoz Khan Noon (1893–1970), prime minister | |
| 1958 | 7 October, military coup by General Ayub Khan (1907–1974), chief martial law administrator | |
| 1960 | Indus Water Treaty | |
| 1962 | Promulgation of Constitution | |
| 1963 | Pact with China | |
| 1965 | War with India | World population reaches 3.3 billion, 1965 |
| 1966 | January, Tashkent Declaration | |
| 1967 | Pakistan People's Party founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) | |
| 1969–1971 | Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917–1980), president | |
| 1970 | First national elections | |
| 1971 | Secessionist war with East Pakistan Bangladesh created from East Pakistan | |
| 1971–1977 | Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prime minister | |
| 1977–1988 | Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), president | |
| 1985–1988 | Mohammad Khan Junejo, prime minister | |
| 1986 | Foundation of Mohajir Qaumi Movement | |
| 1987 | Siachen Glacier incident | |
| 1988–1990 | Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953), prime minister | |
| 1990 | August–November, caretaker government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi | Hubble Space Telescope is launched into outer space, 1990 |
| 1990–1993 | Mian Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949), prime minister | |

| | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1993 | April–May, Balakh Sher Mazari, prime minister May–July, Mian Nawaz Sharif, prime minister July–October, Moeen Qureshi, prime minister | |
| 1993–1996 | Benazir Bhutto, prime minister | |
| 1997–1999 | Nawaz Sharif, prime minister | |
| 1998 | May, detonation of six nuclear devices | |
| 1999 | June–July, Kargil War | |
| 1999–2001 | Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943), chief executive | |
| 2001 | Pakistan becomes a frontline state after 11 September Agra Summit | |
| 2001– | Pervez Musharraf, president | |
| 2002 | Referendum, Legal Framework Order, general elections | |
| 2002–2004 | Zafarullah Khan Jamali (b. 1944), prime minister | North Korea withdraws from the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 2003 |
| 2004 | Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain (b. 1946), prime minister | |
| 2004– | Shaukat Aziz (b. 1949), prime minister | |
| 2005 | Pakistan and India agree to give advance warning of missile tests; Pakistan fires its first cruise missile | |



chronology: Bangladesh

- 1971** 26 March, independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh First microprocessor introduced, 1971
- 4 December, invasion of East Pakistan by Indian army
16 December, surrender of Pakistan army
18 December, Indian recognition of Bangladesh
- 1972–1975** 10 January, Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), prime minister
- 1972** 4 November, Bangladesh constitution institutes cabinet government
- 1975** 7 June, constitution amended to a presidential system, Rahman president
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People's Party) formed by Mujibur Rahman
15 August, Mujibur Rahman assassinated in “majors’ plot”
Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed president
3 November, military coup by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf; Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, president
7 November, Musharraf assassinated, Sayem chief martial law administrator
- 1976** Zia-ur Rahman military coup
- 1977** 21 April Zia-ur Rahman president
- 1978** Bangladesh Nationalist Party founded by Zia-ur Rahman

CHRONOLOGY: BANGLADESH

| | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1981 | 30 May, Zia-ur Rahman assassinated 2 June, Major General Manzur Ahmed killed Justice Abdus Sattar, the vice-president, becomes acting president November, general election, Abdus Sattar president | AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) is officially recognized by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 1981 |
| 1982 | 24 March, military coup conducted by chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad | |
| 1984 | Land Reforms Ordinance | |
| 1985 | Jatiyo Party formed by Muhammad Ershad | |
| 1986 | November, martial law lifted General elections won by Jatiyo Party 7–8 December, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation inaugural meeting at Dhaka | |
| 1988 | General elections won by Jatiyo Party | |
| 1990 | 6 December, resignation of Muhammad Ershad | |
| 1991 | 27 February, Khaleda Zia (b. 1945) elected prime minister | |
| 1996 | 15 February, Khaleda Zia reelected 12 June, Sheik Khaleda Hasana Rahman (b. 1947) elected prime minister | South Africa adopts democratic constitution ending apartheid, 1996 |
| 2001 | 10 October, Khaleda Zia reelected prime minister | |



chronology: Nepal

KIRATA DYNASTY

- c. 1100 B.C.–A.D. 400** Rule of the Kirata dynasty in Kathmandu Valley Classical Greek civilization emerges, c. 800 B.C.
- 400–879** “Golden Age” of Nepali history under Licchavi dynasty

LICCHAVI DYNASTY

- 400–425** Reign of first Licchavi Vrasadeva
- 875–879** Reign of last Licchavi Mandeva IV
- 879–1200** Medieval period of historical obscurity Greenland discovered by the Norseman Gunbjorn, 900

MALLA DYNASTY

- 1200–1216** Reign of Ari Malla, founder of Malla dynasty
- 1345–1346** Raid on Kathmandu by Shams ud-din Ilyas of Bengal
- 1382–1395** Rule of greatest Malla, Jayasthiti
- 1428–1482** Reign of Yaksha Malla, last powerful Malla
- 1482–1769** Creation of three kingdoms of Kathmandu, Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur), and Patan (Lalitpur) from breakup of Malla dynasty

GURKHA RULE

- 1559** Gurhka principality established

CHRONOLOGY: NEPAL

1743–1775 Expansion of Gurkha principality by Prithvi Narayan Shah

1769 Unification of Malla kingdoms and creation of Shah dynasty by Prithvi Narayan Shah

SHAH DYNASTY

1769–1846 Expansion of Shah territory

1775–1777 Reign of Pratap Singh Shah

1777–1799 Reign of Rana Bahadur Shah French revolution begins, 1789

1788 First Nepal–Tibet War

1789 Nepal–Tibet Treaty

1791 Second Nepal–Tibet War

1792 Signing of Nepal–East India Company commercial treaty

1793 Kilpatrick Mission

1799 Abdication of Rana Bahadur Shah

1799–1816 Reign of Girvana Yuddha Bikram Shah

1801 Treaty with East India Company

1803 Expansion of Nepal in Garhwal under Amar Singh Thapa

1804 Unilateral termination of 1801 treaty with East India Company by the British

1806–1837 Prime ministership of Bhim Sen

1814–1816 Anglo-Nepal War

1816 Treaty of Segauli leads to loss of half of Nepal to East India Company and stationing of East India Company Resident at Kathmandu

1816–1847 Reign of Rajendra Bikram

1846 Massacre of 29 court nobles by Jang Bahadur Kunwar

RANA RULE

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1846 | Forced abdication of Rajendra Bikram by Prince Surendra Shah | |
| 1846–1877 | Prime ministership of Jang Bahadur Rana | London is world's largest city with population of 2.37 million, 1851 |
| 1847–1881 | Reign of Surendra Shah | |
| 1854 | Promulgation of Muluki Ain, modern administrative, legal, and civil codes | |
| 1857–1858 | Some 6,000 Nepali troops side with British during Indian mutiny | |
| 1858 | Anglo–Nepali entente and beginning of recruitment of Gurkhas to Indian army | |
| 1877–1885 | Prime ministership of Rannodip Singh Rana | |
| 1881–1911 | Reign of Prithvi Bir Bikram | |
| 1885–1901 | Prime ministership of Bir Shamsheer Rana | |
| 1901 | One-month rule of Prime Minister Dev Shamsheer Rana | |
| 1901–1929 | Prime ministership of Chandra Shamsheer Rana | |
| 1911–1955 | Reign of Tribhuvan Bir Bikram | |
| 1914–1918 | 200,000-plus Gurkha troops join British in World War I | |
| 1918 | Tri-Chandra College founded | |
| 1923 | Anglo-Nepali treaty and independence of Nepal | |
| 1929–1932 | Prime ministership of Bhim Shamsheer Rana | |
| 1932–1945 | Prime ministership of Juddha Shamsheer Rana | |
| 1934 | Massive earthquake damages Kathmandu | |
| 1936 | Foundation of first political party, the Praja Parishad (People's Council) | |
| 1939–1945 | Some 160,000 Nepalis recruited for British during World War II | |
| 1940 | Arrest of 43 Praja Parishad leaders | |

CHRONOLOGY: NEPAL

| | |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1941 | Execution of four Praja Parishad leaders |
| 1945–1948 | Prime ministership of Padma Shamsher Rana |
| 1947 | Foundation in exile in India of All-India Nepali National Congress Nepal legation in London becomes an embassy |
| 1948–1951 | Prime ministership of Mohan Shamsher Rana |
| 1949 | Foundation of Communist Party of Nepal |
| 1950 | Foundation of Nepali Congress Party |
| 1951 | Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Treaty of Trade and Commerce signed with India |

SHAH RULE

| | | |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1951 | Demise of Rana power and return of Shah monarchical rule | |
| 1955–1972 | Reign of Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah | |
| 1959 | New constitution institutes parliamentary government First general elections held and victory of Nepali Congress and prime ministership of B. P. Koirala | |
| 1960 | Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah assumes absolutist power, abolishes parliamentary government and bans political parties | |
| 1962 | New constitution institutes <i>panchayat</i> system | Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 |
| 1972–1990 | Reign of Birendra Bir Bikram Shah | |
| 1980 | National referendum on <i>panchayati</i> system | |
| 1981 | First elections to <i>panchayats</i> | |
| 1983 | Foundation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, consisting of seven South Asian nations including Nepal | |
| 1986 | Second elections to <i>panchayats</i> | |
| 1989–1990 | Trade dispute leads to closing of border with India | |
| 1990 | Creation of Movement for the Restoration of Democracy by United Left Front and Nepali Congress Party | |

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|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| 1990 | National strikes and demonstrations against King Birendra lead to dissolution of <i>panchayati</i> system and creation of new constitution | |
| 1991 | Creation of Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), Unified Marxist-Leninist Party (UML) General elections and victory of Nepali Congress Party | |
| 1991–1994 | Prime ministership of Girija Prasad Koirala | |
| 1994 | General elections and victory of CPN-UML | |
| 1994–1995 | Prime ministership of Man Mohan Adhikari of CPN-UML | |
| 1995–1997 | Prime ministership of Sher Bahadur Deuba leading three-party coalition government | |
| 1996 | “People's War” declared by Maoist faction of CPN | |
| 1997 | March–October, prime ministership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand leading three-party coalition government | |
| 1997 October–April 1998 | Prime ministership of Surya Bahadur Thapa | |
| 1998 April–1999 | Prime ministership of Girija Koirala | |
| 1999 | Third general elections | |
| 1999–2000 | Prime ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai | |
| 2000–2001 | Prime ministership of Girija Koirala | |
| 2001 | 1 June, massacre of King Birendra and his immediate family by Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah, who later kills himself | DNA mapping of the human genome is completed, 2001 |
| 2001– | Reign of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah | |
| 2001 July–October 2002 | Prime ministership of Sher Bahadur Deuba | |
| 2001 | 26 November, declaration of State of Emergency with 30 percent of Nepal controlled by Maoists | |
| 2002 | U.S. military advisers sent to Nepal 16–17 February, biggest attack by Maoists leads to death of 142 people | |

CHRONOLOGY: NEPAL

- 2002**
- 7–14 May, Prime Minister Deuba in United States and Great Britain, asking for increased military and economic assistance
 - 22 May, Parliament dissolved by King Gyanendra
 - 27 May, state of emergency reimposed
 - 19 June, international two-day conference for assistance to Nepal begins in London
 - 4 October, Prime Minister Deuba dismissed
 - 11 October–May 2003, prime ministership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand
- 2003**
- Launch of Joint People's Movement by five political parties against the king
 - June, prime ministership of Surya Bahadur Thapa begins



chronology: Sri Lanka

| | | |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| 483 B.C. | Migration of people from north India | |
| 377 | Establishment of city of Anuradhapura | Mayan civilization emerges, c. 4th century B.C. |
| 240–210 | Introduction of Buddhism | |
| 210–161 | Cholas rule from Anuradhapura | |
| 161–137 | Dutugemunu unifies Ceylon | |
| 103–89 | Pancha-Dravida south Indian rulers in Anuradhapura | |
| 48 | Queen Anula ascends to throne | |
| 67 A.D. | Founding of Lambakanna dynasty | |
| 112 | Gaja Bahu becomes king | |
| 276–301 | Reign of Mahasena | |
| 301–328 | Reign of Sirimevan; Tooth Relic brought to Ceylon | |
| 400–500 | Compilation of <i>Visudhimagga</i> , <i>Dipavamsa</i> , and <i>Mahavamsa</i> | Middle Ages and rise of feudalism, 5th century |
| 411–413 | Visit of Fahsien | |
| 429–455 | Sad-Dravida rulers reign over Anuradhapura | |
| 455–477 | Reign of Dhatusena | |

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

| | | |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 477 | Reign of Kasyapa, Sigiriya palace built | |
| 623 | Silameghavanna ascends to throne | |
| 684–718 | Reign of Manvamma | |
| 769 | Aggabodhi IV moves government from Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa | |
| 833–853 | Reign of Sena I | |
| 993 | Chola king Rajaraja I destroys Anuradhapura | |
| 1070 | Vijaya Bahu expels Cholas | |
| 1153–1186 | Reign of Parakramabahu I | |
| 1187–1196 | Reign of Nissanka Malla | |
| 1200–1300 | Independent Tamil kingdom established in Jaffna peninsula | |
| 1232–1236 | Reign of Vijayabahu III | |
| 1287–1293 | Reign of Parakramabahu III | |
| 1341–1351 | Reign of Bhuvanekabahu | Bubonic Plague (Black Death) spreads across Europe, 1347–1350 |
| 1450 | Unification of Ceylon by Parakramabahu VI | |
| 1477–1489 | Reign of Vira Parakramabahu | |
| 1479–1519 | Jaffna regains independence | |
| 1505 | Portuguese Don Lourenço d'Almeida arrives in Ceylon | |
| 1571–1582 | Portuguese build fort at Galle | |
| 1580 | Ceylon bequeathed to Portuguese | |
| 1587–1588 | Great Siege of Colombo | |
| 1595–1596 | Arrival of Dutch | |
| 1619 | Portuguese capture Jaffna | |
| 1623 | Portuguese capture Trincomalee | |

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|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1656 | Dutch capture Colombo | |
| 1658 | Dutch capture Jaffna | |
| 1665 | Dutch capture Trincomalee | |
| 1722 | Coffee cultivation introduced by Dutch | Industrial Revolution, c. 1750 |
| 1764 | Dutch destroy Kandy | |
| 1780 | Dutch build Star Fort at Matara | |
| 1796 | British defeat Dutch and rule Ceylon from Madras | |
| 1797 | Frederick North becomes governor of Ceylon, Ceylon Civil Service established | |
| 1801 | Supreme Court established | |
| 1802 | Ceylon ceded to the British by the Treaty of Amiens, Ceylon becomes a Crown Colony | |
| 1805 | London Missionary Society established in Ceylon | |
| 1806 | British naval yard established in Trincomalee | |
| 1815 | Kandy annexed by the British | |
| 1818 | Church Missionary Society established in Ceylon | |
| 1828 | Immigrant laborers begin arriving from India | |
| 1831 | Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of Enquiry report | |
| 1832 | <i>Colombo Journal</i> newspaper published | |
| 1834 | <i>Ceylon Observer</i> newspaper published | |
| 1846 | <i>Ceylon Times</i> newspaper published | |
| 1858 | Undersea cable links Ceylon and India | |
| 1860 | <i>Lanka Lokaya</i> , Sinhalese newspaper established | |
| 1864 | <i>Udaya Tarakai</i> , Tamil newspaper established | |
| 1866 | Municipal councils established in Kandy and Galle | |
| 1870 | Tea exported for the first time | |

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

| | | |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1905 | First Sinhalese novel, <i>Meena</i> , by A. Simon Silva published | |
| 1921 | University College, Colombo, established | Chinese Revolution, 1911–1949 |
| 1928 | Donoughmore Commission report published | |
| 1931 | Elections to first State Council | |
| 1935 | Lanka Sama Samaja Party established | |
| 1936 | Elections to the State Council | |
| 1938 | Radio Ceylon starts Sinhala service | |
| 1942 | University College becomes University of Ceylon | |
| 1943 | Communist Party of Ceylon founded | |
| 1944 | All Ceylon Tamil Congress founded | |
| 1945 | Soulbury Commission Report published | |
| 1946 | United National Party founded, new constitution promulgated | |
| 1947 | First parliamentary elections held | |
| 1947–1952 | Prime ministership of D. S. Senanayake | |
| 1948 | 4 February, independence of Ceylon | |
| 1949 | Ceylon army created, Central Bank of Ceylon established | |
| 1951 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party founded | |
| 1952 | National anthem adopted, second parliamentary elections | |
| 1952–1953 | Prime ministership of Dudley Senanayake | |
| 1953 | General strike | |
| 1953–1956 | Prime ministership of Sir John Kotelawala | |
| 1954 | Asian Prime Ministers Conference inaugurated at Colombo Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, first Ceylonese governor-general | |

| | | |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1955 | Ceylon becomes member of United Nations | |
| 1956 | Sinhala-only bill passed | |
| 1956–1959 | Prime ministership of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike | |
| 1957 | Trincomalee air and naval base and Katunayake air base handed over to Ceylon by British | |
| 1958 | Communal riots | |
| 1959 | 25 September, Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike assassinated | |
| 1959–1960 | Prime ministership of W. Dahanayake | |
| 1960 | Fourth parliamentary elections March–July, prime ministership of Dudley Senanayake July, fifth parliamentary elections | |
| 1960–1965 | Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike | |
| 1961 | Bank of Ceylon nationalized | |
| 1963 | Sinhala made official language of Ceylon | |
| 1965 | Sixth parliamentary elections | |
| 1965–1970 | Prime ministership of Dudley S. Senanayake | Martin Luther King Jr. assassinated, 1968 |
| 1966 | Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act | |
| 1970 | Seventh parliamentary elections | |
| 1970–1977 | Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike | |
| 1971 | State of Emergency, Senate abolished, Court of Appeal replaces Privy Council | |
| 1972 | Sri Lanka declared a republic and republican constitution promulgated; name of country officially changes from Ceylon to Sri Lanka; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam founded | |
| 1974 | Women jurors selected for first time | |
| 1975 | Land Reform Law | |
| 1976 | Fifth Non-Aligned Summit inaugurated at Colombo | |

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1977 | Eighth parliamentary elections |
| 1977–1978 | Prime ministership of Junius R. Jayawardena |
| 1978 | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam proscribed, second republican constitution promulgated with president elected for six-year term |
| 1978–1988 | Presidency of Junius R. Jayawardena |
| 1978–1989 | Prime ministership of Ranasinghe Premadasa |
| 1979 | Prevention of Terrorism Act, State of Emergency declared in Jaffna |
| 1980 | Open University commences operations |
| 1982 | First Test Match in cricket between Sri Lanka and England held in Colombo, Sinhala–Muslim communal clashes in Galle, referendum to extend eighth parliament for six years |
| 1983 | Anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, curfew imposed, anti-Tamil riots spread nationwide, national curfew imposed |
| 1984 | Bombs explode in Colombo |
| 1985 | Ethnic peace talks |
| 1987 | Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord, Indian Peace Keeping Force arrives in Sri Lanka |
| 1989 | Ninth parliamentary elections held, All-Party Conference held in Colombo, Indian Peace Keeping Force withdraws from Sri Lanka |
| 1989–1993 | Presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa Prime ministership of Dingiri Banda Wijetunga |
| 1993–1994 | Presidency of Dingiri Banda Wijetunga |
| 1993–1994 | Prime ministership of Ranil Wickremesinghe |
| 1994 | Tenth parliamentary elections August–November, prime ministership of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga |
| 1994– | Presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga |
| 1994–2000 | Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1995 | Operation Leap Forward in northern Sri Lanka, capture of Jaffna | |
| 1996 | Shirani Bandaranayake becomes first woman on Supreme Court | |
| 2000–2001 | Prime ministership of Ratnasiri Wickremanayake | |
| 2001–2004 | Prime ministership of Ranil Wickremesinghe | U.S. space shuttle “Columbia” explodes reentering atmosphere, 2003 |
| 2004– | Prime ministership of Mahinda Rajapaksa | |



ABDUL KALAM, AVUL PAKIR JAINULABDEEN (A. P. J.) (1931–), president of India (2002–). Born in Tamil Nadu in 1931 to a poor working-class Muslim family, Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam became India's eleventh president in 2002, the third Muslim to serve as the head of India's republic. A distinguished prominent scientist and administrator, Abdul Kalam had no political experience prior to his election as president. His unpretentious, low-keyed manner and simple clothing and lifestyle initially raised concerns about his ability to meet the demands of his high office, but he has ably managed the heavy duties of the presidency of India and guided the transition from the Bharatiya Janata Party–led coalition government to the Congress Party–led coalition government following the 2004 general elections. His simplicity has won the respect of visiting dignitaries from around the world.

President Abdul Kalam is one of India's most distinguished and well-known scientists, though much of his work was as a science and technology administrator, laying the groundwork for the growth of India's missile and nuclear weapons programs. He studied aeronautical engineering at the Madras Institute of Technology. Known as the "rocket man of India," he made significant contributions as project director to develop India's space rocket program, beginning with the first indigenous satellite launch vehicle (SLV-III), which successfully launched the *Robini* satellite into Earth orbit in July 1980, making India a member of the international "space club." Abdul Kalam was the chief executive for the development of the indigenous guided missile program at the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of the Indian Ministry of Defence. He was briefly a professor of astronautics at Anna University in Tamil Nadu before his election as president of India.

Abdul Kalam is also credited with the development of the intermediate-range Agni and short-range Prithvi missiles, and for promoting indigenous technologies through the networking of India's main technology institutions. He was scientific adviser to the minister of defence, and secretary of DRDO of the Ministry of Defence from 1992 to 1999. During this period he supervised the transformation of peacetime space rockets into strategic missile systems and prepared the groundwork for India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in collaboration with the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, which made India a nuclear weapons state. He vigorously promoted self-reliance in several other defense fields, including the development of India's light combat aircraft.

President Abdul Kalam is the author of four inspirational books that encourage Indian youth to aspire to higher achievements and the eradication of poverty in India. These are *Wings of Fire*; *India 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium*; *My Journey*; and *Ignited Minds: Unleashing the Power within India*. These books have been translated into many Indian languages. He has also written Tamil poetry. A strict self-disciplinarian, he is a vegetarian, abstains from alcohol, and is unmarried.

Raju G. C. Thomas

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ADVANI, LAL KRISHNA (1927–), *Indian politician.* Former deputy prime minister of India and in 2004 the leader of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), Lal Krishna Advani was born on 8 November 1927 in Karachi (now in Pakistan). Advani came to the center stage of Indian politics with the Ram Rath Yatra (Chariot Procession) he led from Somnath to Ayodhya as the leader of the Hindutva movement.

Advani began his political career as secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in Karachi in 1942. After independence, he migrated to India and joined the Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) Party as the joint secretary of Rajasthan province. In 1958 he was promoted to party secretary in Delhi. Since then, he has remained a central figure in the party, along with former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. During the “National Emergency” imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975, Advani fought for the restoration of democratic rights, and as a result, he was jailed for eighteen months. Subsequently, when the

Janata Party came to power (1977–1979), Advani was made the cabinet minister for information and broadcasting. During his tenure, he worked to ensure freedom of the press. When the BJP was born out of the BJS, Advani was made its general secretary. As president of the organization from 1986 to 1989, he brought the debate on communalism to the center of Indian politics with his Rath Yatra. Following the Rath Yatra, BJP’s representation in Parliament jumped from two members in 1984 to 181 members by 1999. Advani was instrumental in striking strategic alliances at the state level, then in the formation of the National Democratic Alliance government, led by the BJP, in 1998. He was appointed as the minister for home affairs in 1998 and was promoted to the post of deputy prime minister in July 2002. Following BJP’s defeat in the 2004 general elections and Vajpayee’s withdrawal from active politics, Advani was made leader of the opposition in India’s Parliament.

According to Advani, all Indians are bound by a single religion—Hinduism—irrespective of their personal



Lal Krishna Advani. Advani surrounded by a throng of supporters just prior to the 2004 general elections. Following BJP’s defeat and Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s withdrawal from active politics, Advani became leader of the opposition in India’s Parliament. MUNISH SHARMA/REUTERS/CORBIS.

religious practices. Advani was always convinced about his Hindutva (“Hindu first”) stand, even though this ideological position may have deprived him of the post of prime minister, and even while it intensified the debate over secularism. As a constitutional reformist, he called for an overhaul of the electoral system. His initiatives on curbing defection and criminalization are noteworthy in this regard. Restricting the number of ministers in both union and state cabinets is one of the most evident steps in realizing his vision of Indian politics. Advani has remained a controversial figure, but his contribution to India’s polity will be remembered for his clarity of thought and his capacity to build alliances for forming coalitions, including the National Democratic Alliance, which governed India from 1999 to 2004.

Prafulla Ketkar

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindutva and Politics**

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AESTHETICS The term “aesthetics” has no equivalent in Indian thought. One could perhaps coin a word *Saundarya Shāstra*, roughly translated as “treatise on beauty,” or use *Alamkara Shāstra*, “treatise on rhetoric.” Can a single theory be used as a criterion for judging and understanding the arts of India—written, visual, and performing? Is there any underlying unity to the arts, since no one text can be said to encompass all art forms? Although some classical arts do derive their antecedents from Bharata’s *Nāṭya Shāstra*, the earliest extant text on the arts, this text, as the name suggests, was concerned with dramaturgy and, by extension, dance and music. The problem is exacerbated in the visual arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting, since these disciplines have individual texts dedicated to their exposition. However, furrowing through this mass of textual prescriptives and descriptives, some concepts and terms seem to emerge as common. Of these, beaconlike, is *rasa*—that word which brings to mind a multitude of sensations through taste, emotion, and delight.

The term *rasa*, in its most widely employed sense, means the sap or juice of plants, an extract or fluid. In its secondary sense, *rasa* signifies the nonmaterial essence of



Rural Rajasthan Village Home. Home of an affluent family (evidenced in its two stories) in rural Rajasthan village outside the city of Udaipur. With its deeply symbolic wall paintings, construction from natural local materials, and pleasing simplicity, it becomes an intriguing metaphor for the larger Indian aesthetic: craft elevated to fine art, pure emotion (*rasa*) as distilled by art. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

a thing, the best and finest part of it, like perfume. As essence, it is described as *ātman* (soul), or the giver of life to a literary work, which is the body. In its tertiary sense, it denotes taste, flavor, or relish, often yielding pleasure. As in the case of a taste like sweetness, there is no knowing of *rasa* apart from directly experiencing it. The final and subtlest sense, however, is the application of the word to art and aesthetic experience, in which it becomes synonymous with *ānanda*, the kind of bliss that can only be experienced by the spirit.

Rasa, as one of the foremost criteria of art criticism, has been theorized, developed, and commented upon by innumerable savants and rhetoricians over the centuries. Starting with Bharata, author of the supposed second-century *Nāṭya Shāstra*, and ending with that intellectual giant of the eleventh century, Abhinava Gupta of Kashmir, *rasa* runs through a gamut of meanings.

It is sufficiently clear that *rasa* for the early thinkers has only an aesthetic form. It is, on one level, the content of art, as a sentiment, mood, or emotion. This led to the development of the eightfold scheme of *rasa*. On the other level, *rasa* is the joy resulting from an indescribable aesthetic experience, variously called *alaukika* (other-worldly) and *chamatkara* (wondrous). The purpose of art creation is clearly entertainment and moral instruction. By the time of Abhinava Gupta, *rasa* takes on a metaphysical dimension. By championing a ninth *rasa* based on the mood of equanimity and tranquillity, in which the knowledge of one's soul forms the fulcrum, Abhinava's philosophical leaning is evident. Art now has the power to give a sense of liberation, or *moksha*. The experience of *rasa*, or what is called *rasānubhava*, transforms from mere joy to a state of undifferentiated bliss called *ānanda*, analogous to Brahman, the Supreme Reality in Vedānta. To these aesthetic and metaphysical aspects of *rasa*, the *bhakti* (devotion) resurgence, spearheaded by the fifteenth-century Bengal Vaishnava saints, added a new impetus. This movement, characterized by a deep passionate love for the divine, expressed itself in terms of human relationships. Lover and beloved, sacred and profane, mystical and carnal merge into a vocabulary of distilled adoration. Krishna becomes the conventional lover, heroic warrior, and religious Godhead, and Rādhā is the beloved, the cowherdess, and the divine soul. Rupa Goswamin, follower of the fifteenth–sixteenth century saint Chaitanya, borrowed the existing *rasa* phraseology to create his own version, making it into a tenfold scheme, which, however, did not survive the scrutiny of the rhetoricians.

The fountainhead of the *rasa* theory is Bharata's *sūtra* or aphorism in the *Nāṭya Shāstra*: "*Vibhāva Anubhāva Vyabhichāri Samyogāt Rasa Nishpattib*" (the coming together of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhichāri bhāva* creates *rasa*). The implicit term is *bhāva*, which means "mood" or "mental state." Each of these factors makes up a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Vibhāva is any condition that excites or develops a particular state of mind, which then becomes the actual cause or determinant of the creation of art. There are two kinds of *vibhāva*: *ālambana*, or stimulants, and *uddīpana*, or excitants. Examples of *ālambana vibhāva* are characters in a work of art such as heroes and heroines, messengers, villains, companions, jesters, servants, and so on. Thus the heroes and heroines poetically called *Nāyaka* and *Nāyikā*, as chief protagonists in a work of art, are decisively classified and codified in infinite detail. Based on minute observation and experience, their physical, emotional, and mental states, especially in various situations of love, are tenderly captured and conventionalized, thus becoming essential subjects for all art forms.

Poets, dancers, and painters alike favor the *Abhisārikā Nāyikā*, or "one who boldly goes out to meet her lover to keep her tryst." *Uddīpana vibhāva* are factors that enhance the underlying mood or sentiment. The actions and behavior of the characters, their ornamentations, manners, and body language are all examples. Deflections, postures, and gestures are suggestive of an inner state. Metaphors and similes from nature used to express a mood are also examples of *uddīpana vibhāva*, such as the languorous caress of a gentle breeze or dark monsoon clouds as poignant reminders of past togetherness. *Anubhāva* are the consequences, the physical reactions, and the external manifestations or indications of a feeling by appropriate gestures. Some *anubhāva* include *līlā* (when one imitates a loved one), *vibhrama* (extreme flutter), and *lalita* (gentleness in behavior). The eight *sāttvika bhāva*, or temperamental states, are also part of the *anubhāva*. These include becoming rooted to a spot, perspiration, shock, goosebumps, change of voice, trembling, change of color, weeping, and fainting. *Vyabhichāri bhāva* are mental reactions, ancillary or subordinate feelings, and moods that are transitory. These are also called *sanchāri bhāva* and are generally thirty-three in number. Some examples are *nirveda* (mental anguish), *mada* (intoxicated state), *moha* (perplexed condition), *garva* (extreme pride), and *vidā* (shyness).

An artwork, according to this theory, would have one major mood permeating it, with the other transitory moods serving only as embellishments. This dominant mood is called *sthāyī bhāva* and is both universal and latent. When the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, *vyabhichāri bhāva* come together in an appropriate manner in an artwork, this predominant, latent, and universal *sthāyī bhāva* is aroused and transformed into *rasa*. The principle of *auchitya*, or appropriateness, governs the rules of technique such as line, proportion, measure, color, and design. These, if correctly followed, would necessarily lead to the proper delineation of a mood, as illustrated in Table 1. *Rasa* is therefore both the aroused *sthāyī bhāva* as well as the experience of the arousal. To the eight *rasas*, a ninth was added. This was *shānta*, or tranquillity, its *sthāyī bhāva* being *shama* (to be calm) or *nirveda* (world-weariness). The tenth *rasa*, championed by the Bengali saints, is *bhakti rasa*, with its *sthāyī bhāva* as *madhurā rati*, or mystical love. Of all these, one sentiment dominates; a work of art propels a spectator forward, or becomes the occasion of a *rasa* experience.

Of all the *rasas*, the early rhetoricians and later writers on poetics give preeminence to *sbringāra*, calling it *rasa rāja* (king of the sentiments) or *rasa pati* (lord of the sentiments). The depiction of the amorous sentiment in all Indian art—visual, performing, and literary—is bold, uncompromising, and celebratory of life. From the works

TABLE 1

| The eight-rasa system | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>Sthayi bhava</i> | <i>Rasa</i> |
| <i>Rati</i> : Love | <i>Shringara</i> : Amorous |
| <i>Has</i> : Laughter | <i>Hasya</i> : Humorous |
| <i>Shoka</i> : Sorrow | <i>Karuna</i> : Compassion |
| <i>Krodha</i> : Anger | <i>Raudra</i> : Wrathful |
| <i>Utsaha</i> : Energy | <i>Vira</i> : Heroic |
| <i>Bhaya</i> : Fright | <i>Bhayanaka</i> : Fearful |
| <i>Jugupsa</i> : Disgust | <i>Bibhatsa</i> : Revulsion |
| <i>Vismaya</i> : Astonishment | <i>Adbhuta</i> : Wondrous |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

of Kalidasa, the renowned fourth-century Sanskrit poet, to Konarak and Khajuraho (medieval temples), one sees a plethora of this sentiment in all its subtle nuances and in the infinitely varied forms of love, both in union and separation.

The Jain rhetoricians have declared the primacy of *vīra rasa*, or the heroic sentiment. The firmness, patience, determination, and fortitude of the characters portraying this sentiment reaffirm Jain values. The *jina* (one who has conquered) images in sculpture and painting convey an air of quiet authority and energetic dignity.

The chief goal of creativity, literary or otherwise, is to produce *rasa*, which is not raw emotion but emotion depersonalized, divested of all the accidents of circumstance; it is emotion represented and distilled by art. Those artworks that are found wanting of *rasa* are considered flawed. As a result, all the techniques enunciated in the manuals of each art form are based on principles through which these *rasa* states can be evoked. These principles are evident in the rules of proportion in architecture; in the detailed formulations of the principles of *tāla* (measurement) and *bhanga* (stance) of Indian sculpture; in the relative disposition and proportion of color and perspective in painting, in the patterns of the division and combinations of the movements of the major limbs (*anga*) and the minor limbs (*upānga*) in dancing; and in the use of *sbruti* and *swara* (notes) in a given mode (*rāga*) to create a particular mood in Indian music (Vatsyayan, p. 6).

The artist, through his or her *pratibhā*, or creative genius, endeavors to create a form through the language of structure, arrangement, and composition. The possible choices are often minute, the prescribed form strict. But for the greatest of them, these prescriptions lead to enormous creative energy. A point to be remembered is that *rasa* necessitates the use of symbols and the power of suggestion. Permeated with emotion, these creative works then find a resonance in the empathetic critic.

Such a sensitized spectator or reader, called *sabridaya*, must be both a *rasika* (an emotionally mature individual) and a *rasajna* (a discriminating aesthete). The act of detached contemplation of a mood is what makes the artistic experience delightful.

Rasa, according to traditional definition, is thus the aesthetic experience of an artistically engendered emotion. It cannot be experienced at the level of the mundane or empirical because it belongs to the world of art. Life provides the raw material, and actual experiences are the springboard for the artist, whose creation is unique and unlike anything in real life. Yet, like emotions in real life, aesthetic emotion too needs a cause. It too expresses itself through different shades of reactions, and it is built up through different shades of the dominant mood. There is a crucial difference, however, between actual emotion and the aesthetic one: while the cause and effects of worldly emotions are personal, the aesthetic mood suggests the universal through stylized depiction. An important point to be noted is that *rasāsvāda*, or the tasting of an aesthetic mood, is always pleasurable, regardless of the emotion portrayed. Therefore *rasa* is one, or *ekarasa*. The nine variants are based on the human responses to a situation.

The nature of aesthetic experience has been pursued within the framework of recognized schools of philosophical thought, leading to a view that the state of being which art experiences evoked was a state akin to that of spiritual realization (*Brabmānanda sabodarab*). The experience is not a phenomenal happening or a perception induced by cognitive processes operating in the empirical context, but one in which the mind finds full repose. The beautiful is the experiencing of any mental process at its most intense point. According to Abhinava Gupta, who combined the best of aesthetics and philosophy within the Kashmir Shaivist framework, even though there is at times an objective consciousness, there is also a state of complete self-forgetfulness, since the subject is fully merged and absorbed in the objective factor. One who experiences this is infused with the throbbing pulsation of a mysterious and marvelous kind of enjoyment, which is uninterrupted, ceaseless, and replete with a feeling of satiety. This is how Abhinava describes *chamatkāra*, or wonder.

The followers of Vedānta have described *rasa* in negative terms. It is not an object of knowledge, not an effect, not permanent, not known in the present or future, and the experience is neither direct nor indirect. The validity of its existence is its experience. This is neither an ordinary worldly one, nor a false one, nor indefinable, nor resembling a worldly apprehension, nor anything superimposed upon that. In other words, it is *alaukika*, or otherworldly.

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See also **Dance Forms; Kashmir Painting; Literature; Miniatures; Music; Nātyashāstra**

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AFGHANI, JAMAL-UD-DIN (c. 1838–1897), *journalist, political activist, one of the leaders of the Pan-Islamic movement*. Sayyid Jamal-ud-din, known outside Iran as Afghani and in Iran as Asadabadi, was born in Asadabad, in northeast Iran, in 1838 or 1839. Although he usually claimed to be from Afghanistan, primary documents establish beyond doubt that he was born and educated in Iran. In his teens he continued his education in the Shi'a shrine cities of Iraq and then went to India via the Iranian port Bushire. He was in India at the time of the 1857 "mutiny" and possibly this trip helped to cause his lifetime hostility to British imperialism. From India he went, via Iraq and Iran, to Afghanistan, where he tried to persuade the amir to fight the British. Expelled by a new amir, he went to Istanbul, where the ulama (religious scholars) attacked him for a talk comparing prophecy and philosophy, which reflected his background in the Islamic philosophers. He spent eight years (1871–1879) in Egypt, where he educated a group of young reformers, including Muhammad Abduh and others who were later prominent, teaching them elements of Islamic reform, aimed at strengthening Egypt

and other Muslim countries. In 1878 and 1879 he entered Egyptian politics with fiery speeches against the khedive and the British; the new khedive, Taufiq, expelled him from Egypt.

He returned to India for over two years, during which he gave a number of well-attended talks in Hyderabad. There he published in Persian his famous work, usually translated as "A Refutation of the Materialists." It attacked the pro-British reformer, Sayyid Ahmed Khan, implying he was an irreligious materialist. Before this work, Afghani was as known for religious heterodoxy as was Sayyid Ahmed, and the real basis for his attack was Sayyid Ahmed's cooperation with the British, whom Afghani strongly opposed.

In Hyderabad, Afghani published in Persian a series of journal articles, later published as *Maqalat-e Jamaliyeh*. During the Urabi movement in Egypt, he left Hyderabad and was apparently kept under surveillance by the British in Calcutta until Urabi's defeat, when he left for Paris. There he wrote his "Answer to Renan," which implies a view of revealed religion as untrue but useful for the masses. Abduh joined him in Paris and together they published the pan-Islamic newspaper, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, distributed free throughout the Muslim world.

After a stay in Britain with Wilfrid Blunt in 1884 and 1885, Afghani returned to Iran, then went to Russia to try to promote a Russian war against Britain, then back to Iran, where he influenced Iranians to publish leaflets against the shah's concessions to Europeans. He was expelled from Iran to Iraq in 1891, where he influenced the leader of the Shi'a ulama, who supported a successful mass Iranian movement against a tobacco concession to the British by decreeing an Iranian boycott of tobacco.

Afghani then went to England, working with the Iranian-Armenian Malkom Khan in his reformist newspaper, *Qanun*. In 1892 he accepted an invitation to Istanbul from the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, but there, after helping the sultan to gain supporters in Shi'a regions, he was confined to virtual house arrest. He died of cancer in 1897. Stories of the sultan's having him poisoned, like many stories about him, are untrue.

Afghani left a mixed legacy of Western-inspired reform of Muslim countries for self-strengthening, hostility to (British) imperialism and, from 1883 on, a pan-Islamic idea of uniting Muslim countries against the West. He sometimes worked with rulers and sometimes agitated against them. Different parts of his legacy have been emphasized by different groups down to today, and he remains a major symbolic figure in the Muslim world.

Nikki Keddie

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AFGHANISTAN The Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919, ending the Third Afghan War and restoring Afghanistan's control of its foreign relations, opened a new chapter in relations between Afghanistan and India. To the government of India, Afghanistan was a pathway for a Soviet advance and subversion, or a source of instability from internal unrest or actions by Kabul or tribal or religious leaders who could exploit the cross-border sympathies of the Pathan population. To Indian nationalists, Afghanistan provided an attractive destination, whether Deobandi-educated Muslim clergy, Communists enroute to Moscow, or deserting soldiers. Indian and Afghan nationalism developed many links. Extensive ties of culture and commerce between Afghanistan and India included the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Afghanistan, while Afghan traders were long established throughout India.

The accession to the Afghan throne of the anti-British modernizing nationalist Amanullah Shah in 1919 ended Afghanistan's buffer state relationship. But after the Soviets, establishing power on the northern border, concluded their 1921 treaty with Afghanistan, Amanullah became more receptive to cooperation with Delhi. He signed the 1921 Treaty of Kabul. Under its provisions a British envoy—the first since 1879—arrived in Kabul in 1922. A trade agreement followed in 1923. However, Amanullah's modernization of Afghanistan had dissolved into civil war by 1929.

After the war, the weakened Kabul government of Nadir Shah needed support from Delhi, a policy continued by his brother and successor Hashim Khan, and by Zahir Shah (acceded 1933) throughout the 1930 and 1940s. Delhi supported the government in Kabul as a counterweight to the actions of Afghan religious figures and tribes and as a barrier against the Soviets. During the 1940s, agreements were made to equip and train Afghan troops from India.

With independence and partition, relations between India and Afghanistan became inescapably shaped by Pakistan. Afghanistan had first supported independence for a united India, and then called for extension of referendum options to the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan

provinces rather than compelling accession to Pakistan. Afghanistan claimed that any border agreements signed with British authorities did not apply to successor states. In September 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, citing this issue.

The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, starting with Maharaja Hari Singh's indecision over the issue of accession, escalated in October 1947. A traditional *lashkar* (army) of Pathans—raised on both sides of the Durand Line with Pakistani military leadership—was sent into Kashmir, only to be defeated by Indian armed forces. This established the importance, for India, of the need to separate Afghanistan from Pakistani control.

India used diplomatic and commercial relations to deflect Pakistani rhetoric, placate India's Muslim population, support Afghanistan's Hindu and Sikh minorities, and continue contact with Pathan nationalist leaders, some of whom, such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "frontier Gandhi," had been close to Jawaharlal Nehru and the leadership of the Indian National Congress before 1947. A treaty of friendship, signed in New Delhi in 1950, was followed by repeated Afghan prime ministerial visits.

India's inability to provide substantial aid to Afghanistan, as the British had done, encouraged the emergence of the Soviet role as an aid donor in Afghanistan. India joined with the Soviets in urging Afghanistan to continue to press the Pushtunistan issue and avoid security relations with the United States and the West.

Pakistan saw India-Afghanistan relations as hostile, aimed at encirclement. However, Afghanistan's neutrality in the 1965 India-Pakistan war led to an abatement of Pakistani hostility and Pushtunistan tensions. India provided aid during Afghanistan's 1970–1971 drought. Afghanistan was again neutral in the 1971 war. The 1973 seizure of power in Afghanistan by Prince Mohammed Daoud was accepted; his pro-Soviet stance was consistent with India's growing security relationship with Moscow. India was now an aid donor to Afghanistan, primarily developmental but including military training.

India's 1971 victory led Pakistan to plan on Afghanistan as a source of "strategic depth," capable of providing potential bases and also acting as a source of pan-nationalist Islamist fervor and ideology, as well as guerrillas who could be used—with plausible deniability—against India as well as against Daoud. In 1978, Daoud looked to India (along with Iran) for aid and support, distancing himself from the Soviet Union. This helped motivate the violent 1978 putsch by Communist military officers. India, following the Soviet lead, recognized the



Terraced Fields in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's terraced farming, depicted here, is largely dependent on irrigation, and irrigation works require constant maintenance. Ravaged by years of conflict, many of the country's farms are only now being restored. INDIA TODAY.

new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This regime's brutal policies led to widespread resistance, motivating increasing Soviet military involvement, culminating in the invasion of December 1979.

The 1980 decision of Indira Gandhi's government not to openly oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflected the importance of the security relationship with the Soviet Union. Abstaining in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Non-Aligned Movement votes was unpopular domestically (especially with Indian Muslims) and internationally. It undercut Indian claims to a leadership role in the developing world and strained relations with the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and China. It was resented by most (except the pro-Soviet minority) Afghans.

From 1980 to 1986, India became increasingly concerned about the apparently permanent Soviet occupation. Acquiescence to invasion undercut policies stressing noninterference in the region and peaceful coexistence. India used its relationship with the Soviet Union to

privately push for a peaceful settlement, earning little gratitude in Moscow. India was also concerned at the acquisition of modern weapons by Pakistan—threatened by Soviets along the Durand Line—and the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance. The war caused many of Afghanistan's estimated 20,000 Hindus and 10,000 Sikhs to become refugees or to emigrate; the communities in Kabul and Jalalabad, though diminished, remained. India received over 100,000 Afghan refugees of all backgrounds.

By 1986–1987, changes under the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and negotiations in Geneva led India to believe the Soviet military would withdraw. India wanted the Soviets to leave a pro-Moscow government in Kabul, strong enough to prevent the rise to power of the Pakistan-based resistance parties. India recognized the new Republic of Afghanistan (with the former secret police chief, Najibullah, as head of state) formed in 1986. It received some Indian medical and financial aid plus a small military assistance mission, but remained illegitimate in the eyes of most Afghans as well as in the international community.

In the late 1980s, responding to Indian accusations of involvement in the insurgency in the Punjab, and following the 1987 Brass Tacks exercise crisis (when Indian forces deploying to the border area were seen as a possible preparation for invasion), Pakistan used Afghanistan to internationalize the conflict in Kashmir. The goal of some in the Pakistani security services was that Afghanistan would be replicated in Kashmir, using weapons supplied for Afghans. Kashmiris, Afghans, and Islamic foreigners alike were trained in camps (run by Pakistani intelligence or foreign organizations) on Afghan territory.

India supported many abortive approaches for peace—by the United Nations and others—in 1989–1992, but Pakistan aimed to exclude Indian participation. The Republic of Afghanistan, militarily strong enough to endure beyond the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, collapsed only with the end of the Soviet Union. Kabul fell to the resistance in April 1992.

India recognized the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), which replaced the Republic of Afghanistan, in 1993. (Najibullah had tried, unsuccessfully, to flee to India.) The importance of the relationship with India to the ISA was shown by the selection, as ambassador, of Massoud Khalili, one of the most skilled political officers of the Afghan resistance and a close associate of internal resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. India desired good relations with Kabul and opposed the Pakistan-backed Islamic radical and fundamentalist Afghan groups that waged a proxy war against it, the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from 1993 to 1996 and, after 1994, the Taliban.

India sought to use Afghanistan to help build ties (aimed at energy sources and economic growth) to former Soviet Central Asia and to combat radical Islamic support for Kashmiri insurgents and destabilization in Central Asia. India's policy on Afghanistan remained consistent with that of Moscow. India also sought to work with Iran in limiting Pakistani ambitions in Afghanistan, agreeing with Iran to develop a north-south corridor, the ultimate goal being expansion of the Iranian port of Chahbahar, connecting it by rail to Afghanistan at Zaranj.

Pakistan saw this as a continuation of Indian encirclement. An Indian airlift of a limited amount of military aid (helicopter parts) in 1995, plans to reopen consulates, and provision of developmental aid were all seen as threats. Pakistan defined a friendly government in Kabul as one that excluded Indian influence, and achieved considerable success in barring India from the UN “six-plus-two” process and from most international forums dealing with Afghanistan, except for a few meetings under UN auspices and others organized by Iran and Kazakhstan.

The Indian mission in Kabul was forced to close by the civil war in 1994. Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban against the ISA, which moved its capital north. India did not recognize the Taliban regime, keeping the ISA embassy in New Delhi open and providing them with support. Unlike Iran, India did not provide identifiable military supplies. The type and volume of Indian support for the ISA from 1996 to 2001, while not publicly revealed, was obviously considerably less than Pakistan's extensive support to the Taliban.

The Taliban, influenced by al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations, allowed the use of training camps to support violence in Kashmir, Central Asia, and elsewhere. These groups also persuaded the Taliban to repress the remaining Hindu and Sikh minorities in Afghanistan. The hijacking of an Indian airliner to Britain in 1999 by



Man Manufacturing Headgear in Afghanistan. Afghani craftsman examining his wares, hats created from the hides of local livestock. Though liberated from the oppression of the Taliban regime, with a significantly damaged infrastructure, Afghanistan remains extremely poor and highly dependent on foreign aid, including that from India with whom diplomatic relations have just been recently reestablished. INDIA TODAY.

Afghans demanding the release of prisoners strengthened India's opposition to the Taliban. Al-Qaeda's assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001 also badly wounded Ambassador Massoud Khalili, in Afghanistan for consultation. In the ensuing fighting in 2001–2002, India supported the ISA forces that, with U.S. and allied military participation, defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda. India provided monetary rather than overt military aid, reestablishing its mission in Kabul soon after the Taliban's defeat.

The Indian special envoy to Afghanistan, S. K. Lambah, played a facilitating role in the post-conflict Bonn conference. India pledged a U.S.\$100 million developmental aid package in the January 2002 Tokyo conference. Medicine, transportation, and communications were among the areas of Indian aid. The new Afghan government responded with ministerial visits and, in February 2002, Hamid Karzai—educated in India—made his first trip as acting president. This visit elicited the announcement of a further \$10 million in aid, cooperation in antiterrorist measures, and long-term programs, including Indian training for Afghan security and governmental personnel. Massoud Khalili, recovering from his wounds, returned to India as Afghan ambassador.

High-profile terrorist attacks from groups with links to Afghanistan in 2001–2002 and the continuing Kashmir conflict kept the end of the civil war in Afghanistan from benefiting other Indian relations. Despite Pakistan's opposition to Indian participation in multilateral forums on Afghanistan—such as the 2002 Kabul Declaration on regional security—India remained committed to supporting the government in Kabul. Following 2003 bilateral and transit trade agreements with Afghanistan, India in 2004 asked for U.S. support to secure access through Pakistan. India has supported Afghanistan's membership in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).

India's policy goals toward Afghanistan, consistent since 1919, have focused on good relations with the government in Kabul, irrespective of its nature. Only in 1996–2001, under the radical pro-terrorist Taliban, was India willing to support the opposition, when it constituted the internationally recognized ISA government. In the future, Kabul is likely to continue to value relations with India. This is likely to align India with Moscow, as before, but now also with the United States and Europe, though tensions with Pakistan over relations with Afghanistan remain. India remains concerned that Pakistani economic and Pathan ethnic links could exert control over Kabul's policies. Indian relations with Afghanistan have value as a model for Muslims, domestic and international. Afghan resentment over Indian policies from 1979 to 1992 and unhappiness over Kashmir have not affected relations. Delhi's 1919 objectives—to

support an independent and cohesive Afghanistan and to defend it against nonstate threats—are likely to remain consistent in the future.

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See also **Anglo-Afghan Wars; Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier; Islam's Impact on India**

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AFGHANISTAN, MILITARY RELATIONS WITH, 1994–2001

In the mid- to late 1990s, New Delhi together with Tehran joined a long line of nations, including the United States and Russia, united in their common goal of curtailing the Taliban's activities in Afghanistan, by providing material and diplomatic support to the Northern Alliance's United Front (UF). The Taliban movement, which materialized in mid-1994 under the direction of Mullah Mohammed Omar, had grown strong with Pakistan's support in reaction to widespread lawlessness in the south. By late 2000 the Taliban controlled around two-thirds of Afghanistan, although in many areas this amounted to little more than a small armed presence in the major towns. The support the UF received from India and other nations steadily grew and became increasingly desperate in the years before 2001, as regional powers sought to avert the capitulation of the UF who were operating in northern Afghanistan, and to prevent the Taliban from gaining complete control of the country.

The Tehran-New Delhi Axis

Tehran and New Delhi viewed the containment of the Taliban as essential to their national security interests. Besides India's determination to contain Taliban trained terrorist groups and factions from Afghanistan, which they believed were fueling the Kashmir conflict, New Delhi had grave concerns over the spread of Taliban fundamentalism into Pakistan and the training of personnel who could fight in Kashmir against Indian forces and interests. Should, for whatever reason, the moderate Pakistani regime collapse, India was concerned that an Islamic fundamentalist regime, backed by the Taliban, might take power. Even the remote possibility that such an extreme regime might inherit Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles was a scenario that New Delhi wanted to avoid. India also feared that an extreme Islamic government coming to power in Pakistan could destabilize South Asia, risking a full-scale war, possibly involving nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the prospect of Islamic fundamentalists taking power in Pakistan remains remote. Despite unease in Pakistan and continuing sectarian conflicts in Karachi, any attempt to develop a fundamentalist government in Islamabad would encounter little support in that country.

In an attempt to contain the spread of the Taliban, India admitted in October 2001 that for two years New Delhi had covertly assisted the UF, providing technical assistance, defense equipment, and medical aid. India's involvement began shortly after the hijacking in 1999 of one of its domestic airliners, with 155 passengers and crew, by Pakistan-backed terrorists who forced the aircraft to fly to Kandahar. In a humiliating deal with the Taliban, India secured the release of the hostages and aircraft in exchange for three Kashmiri terrorists held in an Indian jail, and an undisclosed sum of money. For over a year the Indian army had been running a field hospital near Farkhor on the Afghan border south of Dushanbe; the UF's charismatic commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated by a two-man suicide commando on September 9, 2001. Through Tajikistan, India also reportedly supplied the UF with high-altitude warfare equipment worth some U.S.\$8 million to 10 million. A handful of Indian defense "advisers" were reportedly based in Tajikistan to assist the UF in its operations against the Taliban. Technicians from the secretive aviation research center operated by India's Research and Intelligence Wing helped repair the UF's Soviet Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. India also purchased Russian helicopters from Moscow to pass on to the UF. There were also unconfirmed reports of Indian Special Forces assisting UF forces and of New Delhi providing cash grants to the UF via its embassy in Tehran.

Indian-Iranian cooperation to counter the Taliban was codified in April 2001 with the signing of new strategic pact during Indian prime minister Atal Vajpayee's visit to

Tehran. Had it not been for the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in October 2001, India was expected to provide further assistance to anti-Taliban forces via Iran, and to fight Taliban-sponsored insurgents operating in Jammu and Kashmir. To some extent, remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are understood to be still actively involved in Kashmir. The northern tip of Kashmir shares a border with Afghanistan.

India had further incentives to curtail the Taliban's activities in Afghanistan in view of their treatment of Hindus. From May 2000 until their fall, the Taliban ordered all Hindus in their controlled areas to wear a piece of yellow cloth to, as they put it, protect them against Taliban religious policemen enforcing Muslims to attend mosques daily and to ensure that they did not cut their beards. Hindus and Muslims were prohibited from sharing the same house. Observers could argue that these practices were similar to the Nazis' treatment of Jews in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s.

India found Iran to be a willing partner in its fight against the Taliban, since Tehran had viewed the Taliban as an irritant since the mid-1990s. In 1998, Iran and Afghanistan came close to full-scale war, following the murder of Iranian diplomats and journalists during the Taliban's seizure of Mazar-e Sharif that August. In September 1998, Iran mobilized around 200,000 troops along its border with Afghanistan, which led to a number of minor skirmishes. Relations did thaw in November 1999 with the reopening of the Iranian-Afghanistan border, but Iran continued to provide military assistance to anti-Taliban factions. Assistance extended to airlifting freshly trained troops from Iran to neighboring Tajikistan. Iran had been at the forefront of providing weaponry to anti-Taliban factions since 1994, when the Taliban first appeared in Afghanistan.

Iran viewed the Taliban with concern since its inception, initially fearing the Sunni force as a Western-backed operation designed to rid Afghanistan of its Shi'a minority, the same branch of Islam that is dominant in Iran. After the Taliban's success in taking control of Herat in 1995, Iran commented that the Taliban had been "conceived" by America, was funded by Saudi Arabia, and was logistically supported by Pakistan in order to crush Afghanistan's Shi'as and to contain Iran.

Moscow's Involvement

India's involvement in the anti-Taliban alliance was coordinated by Moscow, which had a vested interest in curtailing the spread of fundamentalism throughout Central Asia, since Russia believed that the Taliban was training and sheltering guerrillas fighting for independence in Chechnya and in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russian deputy

foreign minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov coordinated efforts in the Central Asian states to combat the Taliban. Trubnikov held talks with Iran, India, and China on ways and means to coordinate their policies toward Afghanistan. An Indian-Russian working group was organized in October 2000, following President Vladimir Putin's visit to India.

The Threat of a Proxy War

The need to combat “Afghan terrorism” was viewed in New Delhi with great concern because of Pakistan's heavy involvement in backing Taliban forces with funds and arms. There were increasing concerns that forces trained by Taliban and al-Qaeda were becoming involved in the Kashmir dispute. There thus developed a proxy conflict in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan, each backing opposing forces, as their long conflict over Kashmir extended to Afghanistan.

Prior to 11 September 2001, the proxy war in Afghanistan appeared ready to deepen with the increasing involvement of regional powers in the attempt to prevent the fledgling UF from collapsing. Pakistan continued to play a crucial role in the Taliban's military campaign. The assassination of UF leader Ahmad Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001 threatened the survival of the fragile alliance of rival factions Massoud had achieved only months before. Massoud's efforts at providing an effective opposition to the Taliban had been compounded by the political differences among Shi'a factions, preventing the development of an effective national army and alliance. Massoud was succeeded by General Muhammad Fahim, who faced a tough battle to hold the alliance together and to avoid defeat at the hands of Taliban forces prior to the arrival of U.S. troops.

Pakistan's involvement. To understand why India seemed ready to become more deeply involved in Afghanistan, it is necessary to briefly examine the extent of Pakistan's involvement in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's military support of the Taliban was a major reason for the Taliban's military successes during the 1990s. Islamabad maintained and operated many of the Taliban's aircraft and tanks, providing training, planning, advice, weapons, ammunition, and logistical support. In addition, military advisers attached to Islamabad's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate assisted the Taliban with the provision of religious volunteers. It is understood, however, that no regular Pakistani army personnel were involved in backing the Taliban. Pakistan's assistance proved critical and decisive in the Taliban's July–August 1998 defeat of the opposition Jombesh-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Movement) headed by rivals Rashid Dostam and Abdul Malik.

Significantly, the Taliban benefited from the flow of volunteers from Pakistan's religious schools (*madrasabs*)

who were willing to fight and die for the Taliban. As long as the Taliban continued to exist, hard-line Pakistani Islamic organizations appeared likely to continue providing personnel to fight alongside the Taliban in their struggle against Indian/Iranian backed anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Since the inception of the Taliban in 1994, the Pakistan based Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam organization and its *madrasab* network provided thousands of generally ill-trained Muslim youths deployed in assault roles, with Afghan Taliban moving in behind them to secure areas. By mid-2001 it was estimated that around 30 percent of the Taliban military were Pakistani and Arab units.

There appeared to be no shortage of Pakistanis willing to fight for the Taliban, nor of finances from abroad to fund the *madrasabs* supplying these fighters. Prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Pakistan insisted they would not go along with any campaign against the Taliban. Pakistan argued that the United Nations sanctions imposed against the Taliban, following their refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, did not cover “religious volunteers” fighting alongside the Taliban. Washington's closer ties to New Delhi, together with the lifting of many sanctions imposed following India's 1998 nuclear tests, did nothing to encourage Islamabad to abandon the Taliban. Many in Pakistan believed that the West had betrayed and abandoned them, denouncing Washington's “double standards approach.” It took the shock and horror of the events of 11 September 2001 to jolt Pakistan to officially end its support for the Taliban, in return for U.S. military support and desperately needed economic aid.

The World Trade Center terrorist attacks thus significantly changed the strategic landscape of South Asia, with a sudden increase in the number of nations willing to join the cause of defeating the Taliban—although some nations, including Iran, refused to support U.S. military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The prospect of the Americans becoming militarily involved in Afghanistan gave General Muhammad Fahim's UF an immediate and unexpected incentive to remain united. As the United States became so heavily involved following 11 September 2001, the Taliban lost the support of its only regional ally, Pakistan.

Ben Sheppard

See also **Kashmir; Pakistan and India**

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AGNI The name of both the Vedic Hindu god of fire and sacrificial fire itself, *Agni* is an Indo-European word cognate with Latin *ignis*. The Rig Veda, the oldest text of ancient India (c. 1000 B.C. at latest), places his name as the initial word in the first of its 1,028 hymns: "Agni I praise . . ." as *purohita* (domestic priest), as god of *yajña* (sacrifice), as invoker of gods. Of all deities, only Indra is addressed more often; Agni is celebrated in some 200 hymns. The mystery of Agni is the mystery of fire that appears miraculously from churning fire sticks, but may as suddenly disappear. The hidden Agni, even his concealment in the depths of cosmic waters or plants (Rig Veda 10.51), is a constant theme, for he must be recovered to maintain both the fire for household daily offerings and the great world-maintaining sacrificial fire. As receiver of offerings, he is mediator between human and divine realms. Agni's heat and brightness frequently relate him to the fiery solar orb, Sūrya or Savitr.

The Vedic student does *agnikārya*, daily offering to Agni and, according to tradition, after completion of Vedic study, when Agni is established in the house by a married couple the god is present in one, three, or five offering fires. The single fire is *aupāsana*, but *tretāgni*, a triple form, is standard for a sacrificer. If the householders maintain ritual fires routinely for the daily morning and evening offerings of fresh milk, a ritual known as *agnibotra*, both husband and wife are eligible to project the fires onto a larger arena in order to perform solemn soma and animal sacrifices or other large-scale rituals involving as many as sixteen or seventeen priests. The initial, paradigmatic soma ritual, *agnishṭoma*, is "praise of Agni," following which householders are entitled to perform other soma sacrifices such as *agnicayana*, the creation of a cosmic Agni, reintegrating all of time and space into an eagle-shaped altar with five layers of a thousand or more bricks, a rite requiring a year or more in antiquity, as much as forty days in contemporary performance by some Vedic Brahmins still active in South India. The sacrificer carries a pan of embers and is thereby identified with Agni and another Vedic god, Prajāpati, as world-creator.

In post-Vedic classical Hinduism, Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas (e.g., the Agni Purāṇa) continued some of Agni's

mythic roles, often in connection with Indra, Varuṇa, Vishnu, Shiva, Skanda, Soma, and Yama. His ritual centrality, however, gradually diminished, and temples, sculptures, or paintings of Agni are rare. Domestic and temple *pūjā* (worship) prominently maintained *ārati*, the waving of burning incense or camphor before a god or goddess, although *homa* (offerings) into an actual fire still continued. Yoga and other ascetic practices became prominent, many involving *tapas*, an interior heat or fire that could replace Agni with a cosmic-human body, simultaneously sacrificer, medium, and recipient.

Although not always recognized ritually by name, Agni still is present in contemporary Hinduism in life-cycle rituals, particularly marriages and cremations, both involving circumambulation of fire. The latter is *antyesṭhi*, a "final offering" to Agni *kravyād*, "consumer" of the body. In addition to a long history in Hinduism, Agni and *homa* rituals are evident in Jainism and Buddhism, and in the latter have been carried in various guises across Asia.

David M. Knipe

See also **Ashvamedha; Brahmanas; Hinduism (Dharma); Indra; Soma; Varuṇa; Vedic Aryan India; Yajña**

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AGRA A city in the southwestern part of Uttar Pradesh, Agra is located on the river Jumna (Yamuna) and is linked by the Grand Trunk Road to Mathura and Etawah and to the rest of India by train. An ancient site, modern Agra was founded by Raja Birbal Singh in 1475; Sikandar Lodi (r. 1489–1517) made it his capital. Along with Delhi, it was the preeminent capital of the Mughal dynasty. In 1526 the first Mughal ruler Babur (d. 1530) made Agra a co-capital, with Delhi, and built the first of the Mughal gardens, the Ram Bagh, along the river Jumna. His grandson Akbar the Great (r. 1556–1605) made Agra his capital before shifting temporarily to Fatehpur Sikri, 23 miles (37 km) from Agra, between

1571 and 1585, and he is buried at Sikandra, 6 miles (10 km) northwest of Agra. Under Akbar's son Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) and his Persian wife, Nur Jahan (Light of the World), Agra became a magnificent center of Indo-Persian culture, but it was under the third of the Great Mughals, Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), that Mughal style became “crystallized” and Agra became one of the most renowned cities in the world as the site of a building considered to be one of the wonders of the modern world, the Taj Mahal (Crown Palace). Shah Jahan was the most lavish spender of the Mughal rulers. He demolished almost all of the structures inside Agra Fort, built between 1565 and 1571, replacing them with white marble and stucco-covered buildings, considered by some to be more delicate and exquisite than even the Taj Mahal. The fort's walls are one and a half miles long, faced with dressed stone, and the main entrance was through the Delhi Gate. The emperor's private buildings were built in marble along the river; the public buildings such as Moti Mosque and the Public Audience Hall (Diwan-i Am), which originally housed the famous Peacock Throne, were in stucco or plaster and were located farther away. The Tomb of Itimad al-Daula (d. 1622), Jahangir's father-in-law, is another of the city's architectural wonders.

The Taj Mahal, considered the greatest of Agra's exquisite buildings, is the mausoleum of Shah Jahan's third wife, Mumtaz Mahal (Exalted of the Palace), who died in 1631. Shah Jahan's grave was also added. Designed by Ustad Ahmad and completed in 1648, it took some twenty thousand workers twenty-two years to build. Many consider it the most sublime Mughal building ever created. Built of white marble and designed using the interlocking arabesque plan, it stands on a raised, square platform, 186 by 186 feet (57 m x 57 m). The central dome is 58 feet (18 m) in diameter and is 213 feet (65 m) tall. Inside and out it is inlaid with designs of flowers and calligraphy, using precious stones such as agate and jasper. Four reflecting pools in the large garden create an ethereal effect. In the extensive grounds are a mosque, a guest house, and several other buildings. In the eighteenth century the city was occupied by Jats, Marathas, the Mughals again, and Gwalior; in 1803 the British made it their capital of Agra (North-Western) province. Though it is now an overcrowded and polluted industrial city, it remains a popular tourist destination.

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Babur; Jahangir; Shah Jahan**

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AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION SINCE 1991

India has recorded high rates of growth in overall gross domestic product, at about 5.5 to 6 percent per year since the 1980s. With falling rates of growth in population, this led to a significant growth in per capita incomes, at about 3.8 percent annually from 1980 to 2000. At purchasing power parity (a mechanism that allows comparison between the standards of living of different countries), although the per capita income of an average Indian is still quite low (about \$2,850 per annum), a strong middle class of at least 150 million to 200 million people enjoys an annual income of more than \$13,750.

This overall growth and prosperity sustained over a long period has led to a change in the consumption basket of Indians, more rapidly at the upper end of incomes and more gradually at the bottom. There are indications that many Indians are moving away from staples and toward high value agriculture of fruits and vegetables, dairy, fish, and meat. Since an average Indian still spends about 55 percent of his or her expenditures on food, any change in the consumption preferences has significant repercussions for India's farm economy as well as food industry, including its marketing, handling, and trade. Within this framework, one of the key questions to explore is what happens to the small farmer.

The Changing Structure of Indian Diets

The revolution in high value agriculture is driven by changing domestic consumption patterns and, to a lesser extent, increasing high value exports. Growth in Indian demand for cereals is slowing down, while demand for other foods, including fruits, vegetables, fats, and livestock products, is showing relatively high growth. On the domestic front, rising incomes, urbanization, changing relative prices, and shifting preferences are leading to dietary diversification.

How fast has the consumption basket of an average Indian changed? The per capita consumption of cereals from 1977 to 1999, for example, declined from 423 to 335 pounds (192 to 152 kilograms) per year in rural areas and from 324 to 275 pounds (147 to 125 kilograms) per year in urban areas. The consumption of fruits, on the other hand, increased by 553 percent, of vegetables by 167 percent, of milk and milk products by 105 percent,

and of meat, eggs, and fish by 85 percent in rural areas over the same period. Similar changes occurred in urban diets. These changes are dramatic, though from a small base, and indicate a structural shift in Indian diets. This shift opens a window of opportunity for farmers to raise their incomes; it is also an opportunity for agribusiness to add value and generate employment in India's economy.

Consumption of high value commodities, namely fruits, milk, meat, eggs, and fish, was substantially higher among upper income groups than among lower income groups. The pace of decline of cereal consumption in upper income groups was faster than in lower income groups. Though lower income groups consumed less quantity of high value commodities than higher income groups, their consumption of these commodities did increase. For lower income groups, the consumption of milk increased by 30 percent, of vegetables by 50 percent, of fruits by 163 percent, and of meat, eggs, and fish by 100 percent from 1983 to 2000.

Urbanization is another factor affecting consumption patterns. The consumption of pulses (edible seeds of certain crops), edible oil, vegetables, fruits, milk, meats, eggs, and fish was higher in urban areas than in rural areas in 1999–2000. Only cereal consumption was greater in rural areas than in urban areas in 1999–2000, and between 1983 and 1999–2000, it decreased in both zones. In addition to rising incomes and urbanization, other forces shaping consumption patterns include changes in relative prices of cereals and noncereal foods, and in tastes and preferences. During the 1970s and 1980s, the price of cereals relative to the general price index showed a declining trend, but in the 1990s increased at the rate of almost 1 percent per annum. Meanwhile, the price of noncereal food items declined in the 1990s relative to general prices. Dietary diversification with better nutrients may help to explain the reduction in malnutrition in India for children between the ages of one and five. The incidence of moderate malnutrition fell from 45.1 percent to 41.3 percent between 1991–1992 and 2000–2001. Severe malnutrition fell from 11.1 percent to 6.4 percent over the same period.

Changing Exports and the Production Basket of High Value Agriculture

Indian exports during the 1990s grew at an annual rate of 10.1 percent, compared to 7.4 percent during the 1980s. The exports of agricultural commodities during the 1990s, however, grew at an annual rate of 8.1 percent, compared to an annual rate of 3.3 percent during the 1980s. The share of agriculture in total exports declined from 24 percent during the 1980s to 18 percent in the 1990s.

The export basket has also diversified in favor of high value agriculture. Historically, there was virtually no

Indian export of fruits, vegetables, livestock, or fish. Exports of fish shot up from U.S.\$320 million in 1981–1982 to \$1,125 million by 1999–2000, a growth of 350 percent. Exports of processed fruits, meat, and fruits and vegetables more than doubled since 1981 (reaching values of U.S.\$145 million, U.S.\$198 million, and U.S.\$263 million, respectively, in the triennium ending 1999–2000). Exports of eggs, although erratic, increased from U.S.\$0.4 million in 1981–1982 to U.S.\$25.3 million in 1999–2000.

Changing consumption preferences and export outlets provide good incentives to farmers to risk changing their production baskets in favor of high value agriculture. During the 1990s, for example, the production of cereals grew at a rate of 2.3 percent annually, against that of fruits and vegetables, which had a growth rate of more than 6 percent. Unlike the “Green Revolution” of the late 1960s, the 1990s was a decade of “golden revolution,” with a major breakthrough in the production of fruits, and “blue revolution,” with the dramatic growth of inland fisheries. This growth has also resulted in much faster exports of fish and fruits, raising hope that India's farmers might increase their incomes by exploiting more lucrative markets in India and abroad.

Innovative institutions such as contract farming and vertical integration from “the farm to the firm to the fork” have the potential to benefit producers and consumers alike. Contract farming can reduce transactions costs and risk, and can lessen resource constraints for smallholders. A vertically integrated supply chain can respond quickly to consumers' changing tastes and preferences, and can ensure that quality and safety standards are met.

At the macroeconomic level, if India is an efficient producer of high value agricultural products, greater integration into the global marketplace will open export opportunities. But integration into the global marketplace will require that India certify the quality and safety of its high value agricultural exports. What are the implications for the smallholder? Can they be linked in such a way that a regime of grades and standards, and food safety norms, can be implemented?

Diversification to High Value Agriculture and the Smallholders

In India, 81 percent of farm holdings are of less than five acres (two hectares). Smallholders face several challenges that—unless addressed—will limit their ability to gain from the revolution in high value agriculture. High value commodities are often perishable in nature, and their markets can be fragmented, thin, and distant. Each smallholder may have only a tiny marketable surplus, for which the price is highly volatile and can fall steeply with only small

increases in supply. These factors raise the transaction costs and risk to the smallholders in the production and marketing of high value agriculture. Transactions costs are the costs incurred in the exchange of goods and services between trading partners. They include the costs of information search, negotiation, monitoring, and contract enforcement. In addition, high value agriculture may require greater capital investment than the production of cereals, a constraint for smallholders. Experiences from developed countries and developing countries in Southeast Asia reveal that innovative institutions such as cooperatives, producers' associations, and contract farming have the potential to reduce transactions costs by vertically integrating production, marketing, and processing. Vertical coordination through contract farming, beyond the cooperative model for milk and sugarcane, is a relatively recent phenomenon in Indian agriculture. In this model, farmers are contracted to produce a commodity for a company. The company may have a level of control over the production process (for example, by supplying inputs or technical assistance) without owning or operating the farm, and the practice assures procurement of output at predetermined prices that may be subject to minimum quality standards.

To understand the implications of vertical integration on the smallholder, it would be worth looking at some case studies. Three such case studies, undertaken jointly by NCAP (National Center for Agricultural Research and Policy) and IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), are: Nestle India Limited for milk and milk products, Venkateshwara Hatcheries Limited for broilers (young chickens), and Mother Dairy Fruits and Vegetables Limited for vegetables. The results are based on primary field surveys of contract and noncontract producers (152 and 22 producers respectively for dairy; 25 and 25 respectively for broilers; and 150 and 50 respectively for vegetables). The studies quantify the differences in tangible transactions costs and profits for contract and noncontract producers of milk, broilers, and vegetables in India.

The results indicate that as a result of contract farming, transactions costs were reduced by over 90 percent in the case of milk, 70 to 90 percent in the case of vegetables, and 60 percent in the case of broilers. For milk and vegetables, the transactions costs were less on farms that had contract arrangements due to savings in time, cost for transportation of the product to a market, and labor in marketing the product. Collection of milk and vegetables by the firm from the village itself is the main reason for the savings in time and transportation costs. For broiler production, the lower transactions costs on contract farms were mainly due to the elimination of need for extension services, and communication and transportation costs for inputs, as the company supplied chicks, medicines, and feed to farmers under contractual arrangements.

In addition to high transactions costs, price and yield risk can also be significant for many high value agricultural products. The study also examined the implications of the risk sharing between the producer and firm in the case of broiler production. Under the contractual arrangements, the firm bears the full market risk. The producer and firm share in the production risk, including the broiler mortality risk. The study found that the coefficient of variation of profit (a proxy for risk) for noncontract farmers was very high (from 50 percent to nearly 300 percent, due to seasonal differences in mortality rates) compared to that of contract farmers, which ranged from 20 to 26 percent for the entire year.

In terms of profit, the study showed striking differences in the profit between contract and noncontract farmers. The contract farmers received substantially higher profits compared to the noncontract farmers. The milk contract farmers attained 85 percent higher profits than the noncontract farmers. For vegetables and broiler production, the profit difference was 78 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Given the opportunities for producers to increase profits by tapping into innovative institutions such as contract farming, some have expressed concerns that smallholders may be left out. Firms may reduce their transactions costs by contracting with a few large farms rather than many smallholders. For example, in a case of contract farming with two multinational firms to grow tomatoes, chilies, and potatoes in Punjab and Haryana, it was found that the average size of the contracted holding was 72 acres and ranged from 53 to 90 acres. On the other hand, the studies found that small farmers were well represented (45 percent, 32 percent, and 37 percent of the total farms involved in contract farming of dairy, broiler and vegetables, respectively). To take advantage of economies of scale, dairy and vegetable firms organize farmers into groups or cooperative associations to gain efficiency in the distribution of inputs and technical advice and the collection of output. This innovation helps the firm to reduce transactions costs associated with many geographically scattered smallholders. In the case of smallholder dairy and vegetable contact farmers, the total costs of production were 25 percent and 27 percent less, respectively, than for noncontract small farmers, due mainly to lower transactions costs. For large contract farmers, costs of production were 17 and 21 percent less than noncontract large farmers.

Linking the Supply Chain from Farm to Firm to Fork

Given the rapid changes in consumption patterns in India, it is not just the production sector that is adopting a new system, but also the retail sector. Supermarkets are

starting to serve the growing urban food demand in Asia. The rate of supermarket growth in China in 2003 was three times that of Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2001, supermarkets' share of urban retail food sales rose from 30 to 48 percent in China, which in 2003 had 3,000 supermarkets, with investments planned for five to ten times as many in the next five to seven years. In India, Food World was the largest supermarket chain in 2003, with 80 outlets in South India and plans for 20 more by the end of the following year.

From the farmer's perspective, the three major incentives to vertically integrate are to reduce transactions costs and risks, and to reduce resource constraints. In India, the institutional framework must safeguard the interests of smallholders without impeding the progress of vertical integration in high value agriculture and the rise of supermarkets, which can be mutually beneficial to small scale producers, wholesale and processing firms, retailers and consumers. India's small farmers can ride this new wave and exploit its potential benefits, provided that proper institutions protect them, while helping to develop vertical integration between the farm, the firm, and the fork.

Asbok Gulati

See also Contract Farming; Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952

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AGRICULTURAL LABOR AND WAGES SINCE 1950

Agricultural labor households are among the poorest segments of rural society in India. The Population Census, conducted every ten years, and the quinquennial sample surveys of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) on Employment and Unemployment are two sources of data on overall employment and unemployment in India. In the post-independence period, decennial census data are available from 1951. However, it is not possible to gather detailed information on employment-related aspects through this census. The quinquennial surveys of NSSO, on the other hand, provide reasonably detailed information, and the concepts used have remained similar in the various rounds of surveys on employment and unemployment it has conducted since 1972–1973.

Regarding wages for agricultural laborers, there are mainly four sources: Agricultural Wages in India, National Sample Surveys, Rural Labor Enquiries, and Cost of Cultivation Studies. In India, the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) declined from nearly 60 percent in the 1950s to less than 25 percent in the 1990s. However, as shown in Table 1, the share of agriculture in employment declined slowly since the 1960s. The share of agriculture in employment for males declined from 75.9 percent in 1961 to 60 percent in 1999–2000. The decline is much slower for females. Still, 75 percent of females depended on agriculture for their livelihood in 1999–2000.

The agricultural workers in the table consisted of both cultivators and agricultural laborers. The growth of agricultural laborers over time was much faster than that of cultivators. In fact, some cultivators became agricultural laborers in the last few decades. The share of agricultural laborers among total agricultural workers was less than 25 percent in 1961, but it increased to 42 percent in 1993–1994 and to 45 percent in 1999–2000. The number of cultivators declined sharply, over 6.5 million

TABLE 1

| Agricultural and total workers (rural and urban): 1961 to 1999–2000 | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|
| Sector | Number of workers (millions) | | Percentage share | |
| | 1961 | 1999–2000 | 1961 | 1999–2000 |
| Male | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry, and fishing | 143.28 | 237.79 | 75.9 | 59.9 |
| Total workers | 188.68 | 397.02 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Female | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry, and fishing | 51.02 | 93.21 | 85.7 | 74.9 |
| Total workers | 59.51 | 121.60 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: Compiled from Sundaram, K. "Employment–Unemployment Situation in the Nineties: Some Results from NSS Fifty-fifth Round Survey." *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 11 (2001): 931–940.

between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. On the other hand, the number of agricultural laborers increased by 3 million during the same period.

Agricultural households increased significantly between 1963–1964 and 1983. The number of rural households increased by 49 percent, while that of agricultural labor households increased by more than 100 percent. The percentage of agricultural labor households among all rural households increased steadily, from around 21 percent in 1963–1964 to 31 percent in 1983. In 1993–1994, the share declined to 27 percent but rose again to 31 percent in 1999–2000. Thus, the share of agricultural laborers in total rural households hovered around 30 percent over the last two and a half decades. There were about 45 million agricultural labor households in the country in 1999–2000.

There have been changes in the composition of rural workers. Attached labor has declined, while casual labor has increased. The share of agricultural self-employed among total rural workers for males declined from 51.5 percent in 1977–1978 to 42.5 percent in 1999–2000, while the corresponding share of agricultural regular workers for males declined from 4.9 percent to 1.8 percent. On the other hand, the share of casual agricultural (temporary daily) workers among total rural workers for males increased from 16 percent to 20 percent. Similarly, the share of casual agricultural workers among the total for females increased from 25 percent to 30 percent from 1977–1978 to 1999–2000.

Trends in Wages for Agricultural Laborers

The annual earnings of agricultural laborers depend on the number of days of employment and levels of wages. Increasing wages is very important for improving the standard of living of agricultural laborers. There have

been a number of studies that have examined the trends in agricultural wages, showing that agricultural wages fell during the 1960s. The trends in wages in different parts of India were studied to explain the process of wage determination. Wages seem to have increased in all states since 1974–1975. However, only Andhra Pradesh and Assam displayed consistent rises in wages during the period. In all other states, there was considerable fluctuation in real wages.

Real wages increased in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the growth rates differ from period to period. All the sources showed that highest growth rate of real wages were achieved during the period from 1983 to 1987–1988. The lowest growth was achieved during the period from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000. In states like Punjab, Haryana, and Kerala, wage rates were more than 70 rupees per day, with Kerala showing 110 rupees in 1999–2000. On the other hand, states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa recorded less than 45 rupees in 1999–2000. Many states recorded high growth rates during the period from 1983 to 1987–1988, while the period from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 witnessed low growth rates.

Minimum wages. The major legislative instrument for fixing and enforcing minimum wages for the unorganized sectors, including agriculture, is India’s Minimum Wages Act of 1948. Under this act, minimum wages for an eight-hour workday are fixed for certain types of jobs where, in the judgment of the government, market conditions leave the workers particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Many studies have shown, however, that actual wages were generally lower than statutory minimum wages, and that the minimum wage laws are generally ineffective. Only in the case of Kerala were wages high, thanks to state-guided statutory minimum wage controls. However, the implementation of minimum wages can prove counterproductive for the generation of employment, as Kerala’s experience also has demonstrated.

Poverty of Agricultural Laborers

Estimates of the incidence of poverty among agricultural labor households during the period from 1963–1964 to 1983 place it around 52 percent in 1963–1964, with an increase to 56 percent in 1977–1978, then a decline to around 46 percent in 1983, a good year for agriculture.

Poverty ratios in different sectors provide a less direct but equally valuable indicator of the relative productivity of work in different sectors of the economy. Head count poverty ratios by sectors, available for rural areas, show that the three poorest segments are: agricultural laborers, construction workers, and persons in households mainly engaged in manufacturing, in that order; followed by cultivators, then households mainly engaged in transport,



Woman Hand-plowing a Field, Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh. This drought-prone region continues to face environmental degradation (deforestation and soil erosion), which has diminished the productivity levels, and wages, of its many marginal farmers. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

trade, and services other than health and education; and finally, far below all others, households engaged in rural health and education services. The numbers show that agricultural laborers who shift to any other sector seem to be better off. The poverty ratio among agricultural laborers in 1987–1988 and 1993–1994 was the highest among all the sectors. Around 55 percent of agricultural laborers were below the poverty line in 1993–1994.

Recent estimates by K. Sundaram and S. D. Tendulkar (2003) also show that agricultural labor households reported the highest incidence of poverty in 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. According to their estimates, poverty among agricultural laborers declined from about 58 percent in 1993–1994 to 45 percent in 1999–2000. However, the share of agricultural laborers in total rural poor population increased from 43 percent to 48 percent during the same period. In other words, nearly 50 percent of the rural poor belong to agricultural labor households.

Policies for reduction in poverty of agricultural laborers. Around 45 percent of agricultural laborers were still below the poverty line in 1999–2000. There is thus a need for a multipronged strategy to raise rural

employment and real wages. Agricultural growth will in itself generate more employment and higher wages, particularly in high poverty regions, but raising real wages through increase in agricultural labor productivity is an essential condition for poverty reduction. There are mainly two approaches for raising employment. One is through sectoral programs, and the other is through direct employment programs. Development of agriculture and rural nonfarm sectors will improve employment and wages. Labor-intensive public works programs, if properly designed and implemented, hold high promise as instruments for addressing both short-term relief and long-term asset creation. Agricultural labor households generally do not have assets. Provision of assets through self-employment can also reduce poverty. Priority must be given to increasing public investment in rural infrastructure and to creating environments for private investment. The infrastructure includes irrigation, electricity, agricultural research, roads, communications, and new technology. This initiative will provide incentives for the growth of the private sector. Investment in education and skill improvements is also crucial to producing rural diversification and reducing poverty among India's agricultural laborers.

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See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of

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AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND PRODUCTION, 1757–1947 Agricultural data for late-eighteenth century India are not of adequate quality to permit us to say much about production or prices. The few British Indian agricultural products that emerged as major commodities of global trade were cotton, indigo, opium, and rice. Production of the more commercialized of these crops, indigo and opium, tended to be restricted, and in any case, their quantitative significance for peasant income remains obscure.

The second half of the nineteenth century, however, saw significant expansion of land under cultivation. In new crops that emerged as major exportables, such as cotton and wheat, there was also a steady rise in yield per acre. National income estimates confirm that agricultural production expanded in the late nineteenth century at the average rate of about 1 percent per year, thanks to an increasing area under cultivation and the availability of wasteland made cultivable by canal irrigation. Large-scale expansion in cropped area usually involved the relocation of capital and labor on a large scale as well. Important regions of agrarian expansion were the Punjab, the Narmada valley, western part of the United Provinces, and coastal Andhra.

For the period 1890 to 1947, the data are richer, based on returns from villages and district officials. These statistics can be used to construct provincial and all-India series on crop output. This data set, however, has problems. The official method of estimating crop output was to multiply cropped area by two figures: a "standard" yield, and a "condition factor" that measured the deviation of actual yield from the standard or the long-term norm. The standard yield was estimated by crop-cutting experiments in sample plots in a normal season, and did not change from year to year. In each season, the village officials gave figures for the area cultivated and the condition factor, the latter almost always reported as less than one, whereas in theory it should have exceeded one in a good season. The standard yield might have been set too high. It is also possible that some element of pessimism or underreporting was built into the system. That


being said, the data are still usable, given that the over-estimation in standard yield gets partly offset by a low condition factor. Agricultural performance in the interwar period (1918–1939) was dismal. From 1891 to 1946, the annual growth rate of all crop output was 0.4 percent, and food-grain output was practically stagnant. There were significant regional and intercrop differences, however, nonfood crops doing better than food crops. Among food crops, by far the most important source of stagnation was rice. Bengal had below-average growth rates in both food and nonfood crop output, whereas Punjab and Madras were the least stagnant regions. In the interwar period, population growth accelerated while food output decelerated, leading to declining availability of food per head. The crisis was most acute in Bengal, where food output declined at an annual rate of about 0.7 percent from 1921 to 1946, when population grew at an annual rate of about 1 percent.

After 1918 land scarcity relative to population pushed cultivation into inferior lands. This "diminishing-returns" scenario explains why the growing land-shortage and deceleration in yield tended to occur together, and why the crisis was particularly acute in regions like Bengal, where population pressure was greatest. It is not easy, however, to separate the effect of diminishing returns from that of institutional differences. Property rights structure varied between the major regions; and agricultural performance tended to be poorer in Bengal's absentee landlord "permanent settlement" areas.

Investment

The question of investment in agriculture is an important one. In monsoon-dependent India, nearly 90 percent of the annual supply of moisture occurs during the three "monsoon" months, from June to September. Even those months of rain are barely adequate for cultivation in many parts of peninsular India and in the semiarid northwest. Extension of cultivation, therefore, depended on manmade systems to increase the supply of water. Some systems, such as tanks and canals, were bulky and costly, requiring either state or community effort. Others, such as wells, could be privately funded. While pre-British regimes did supply such public goods, they rarely supplied them on a satisfactory scale. Community efforts worked better in some regions of India. Private investment in irrigation seemingly accelerated when market incentives were strong.

India's irrigated acreage increased from around 5 to 6 percent of all cropped area in the early nineteenth century to 22 percent in 1938. That expansion occurred mainly in government canals and private wells. Canal construction and the restoration of older works started from the early nineteenth century in Punjab, Madras, and



Onions at a Local Market (*mandi*) Awaiting Purchase. With India's agricultural transformation from scarcity to excess, exports have risen but at a loss: Surplus is often exported at half the actual cost of procurement, warehousing, and transport. AMIT PASRICHA.

the western districts of the United Provinces. The pattern of growth in Madras and the United Provinces suggests that canals and wells were complementary investments, rather than being substitutes. Usually, government canals encouraged a change in cropping pattern and raised the value of land, which in turn stimulated private investment in wells.

Prices

Reliable price series begin from the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to that point, considerable price data exist, but only for a few commodities. Agricultural prices experienced pronounced cycles in the first half of the nineteenth century, but from the third quarter began to rise steadily and significantly until around 1920. For example, the price of wheat in 1920 was roughly three times what it had been in 1870. The expansion of the global economy and greater overseas demand for primary commodities account for the relatively greater rise in prices of exportable food grains as compared to other commodities. The steady devaluation of the rupee between 1873 and 1893 due to global depreciation in silver (the

rupee was a silver coin and could be freely minted until 1893) was another factor. From the mid-1920s world commodity prices began to fall, and they fell precipitously in India. Once again, the monetary policy of the colonial government was faulted, this time for its politically motivated persistence in maintaining an overvalued rupee.

The longer price trends and cycles were frequently interrupted by violent short-term fluctuations. The size of every harvest was the immediate cause of these fluctuations. Several contemporary analysts credibly argued that the expansion of India's railway network and consequent exports reduced the amplitude of harvest-induced price fluctuations over time. Until 1920 the commercialization of Indian agriculture did induce growth. After that, the world market diminished and land became increasingly scarce, imposing hardships on peasants and landless laborers, in some areas, like Bengal, leading to famine.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947**

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AGRICULTURAL WAGES, LABOR, AND EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1757

Agricultural labor has always represented the largest occupational group in India. It has also seen the deepest concentration of poverty in the region. British colonial India introduced the beginnings of India's modern economy, with a larger role for capital, information, and the market than in earlier periods. Did these changes improve the economic conditions of India's peasants? In one view, colonial policies intensified landlessness and poverty, but the overall picture remains controversial.

Employment: Broad Trends

According to the Indian censuses, between 1881 and 1931 the share of agriculture in the workforce and the share of landless laborers in the agricultural workforce both increased. Together, these two trends suggest a “de-industrialization,” or a progressive shifting of workers in British India from declining industry back to agricultural labor.

On closer look it is revealed that these processes had a pronounced gender bias, since it was mainly women who experienced the pronounced shift from nonagricultural to agricultural labor in the early twentieth century. The labor-peasant ratio increased dramatically for women but more modestly for men. Changes in industrial organization from households to factories drove many women, formerly employed in household industries, into agricultural labor markets. At the same time, in these latter markets, long-term contracts were replaced by casual or spot transactions, offering easy entry and exit to women. Men could more easily gain access to urban-industrial labor markets. This hypothesis is indirectly validated by data on the decline of household industry and qualitative data on institutional changes in the market for agricultural labor.

Conditions of Work

Conditions of labor varied greatly by region, ecology, crops, and social history, yet, throughout rural India, “labor” conveyed some invariable features. There was, first of all, an indeterminate margin between “labor” and “peasant.” Small tenants and cultivators routinely supplied

wage-labor, as did peasants without secure titles to the lands they held. Such people often preferred to record themselves as “tenants” or “cultivators” rather than as laborers.

The census divided agricultural work into a few broad categories, such as plowing, sowing and transplanting, weeding, and reaping. Usually, the same person performed all these tasks, though sowing and reaping were seasonal tasks that required extra hands. Transplantation of paddy was generally women's work, as was carrying the crop to the threshing floor. Sowing, weeding, and harvesting were done by both men and women, whereas plowing was exclusively men's work. Cotton and groundnut picking and tea and coffee plucking were done by both men and women. Women's work had one constant characteristic in the early twentieth century, in nearly every environment in which women worked: the worksite had to be one to which they could bring their children.

Wages varied according to gender, task, area, and season. Wages tended to be higher in irrigated land, in lands near cities, in the hills, and in areas with relatively high emigration. Migration, both internal and overseas, was a powerful influence on the labor market of colonial India. The prospect of migration did not necessarily mean access to higher wage rates, but it did mean access to more employment as well as reduced risks. A great deal of overseas migration, especially for South Indian laborers, was seasonal and shortterm. In these cases, the wage incentive was probably stronger. With longer duration and long-distance migration, the elevation of economic and social status was marked. Returnees were known to make powerful impressions at their places of origin.

Rural wage “contracts” in the early twentieth century fell in two broad classes: time and piece. Within time, there were daily-wage earners in the peak season, and laborers on annual contracts available for both farm and nonfarm work. Those bound by annual contracts were called “farm servants” in British India's census, and those under daily wage or piece-rates were called “field laborers.” All these categories were internally heterogenous. Among the so-called farm servants were some who received product-wage payments, fixed for long intervals by custom. They were not only on annual contracts but were bonded to the plot of land, or to a master or village, and were available for general labor. In the early twentieth century, such serfdom was in general decline, as were product-wages and general labor. At the same time, a new type of long-term contract began to appear, that of debt-bondage. The debtors promised to repay a loan by supplying labor services. They were not necessarily bound for life to particular employers or plots of land, nor were they always available for general labor.

Rural laborers have never been exclusively agricultural laborers. Indeed, in most parts of India, agricultural operations rarely provided more than 180 to 200 days of employment in a year, if that. A whole variety of occupations engaged those who were primarily laborers in the agricultural seasons. The 1901 census listed the following nonfarm occupations for the *chamars* of North India: “provision and care for animals, menial service, dealing in food and drink, weaving, working in metals, wood, glass, stone, canes, bamboos, leaves, etc.” In this respect, there was no significant change in the economic profile of laborers between the early and the later colonial period. There was, however, a significant change in the conditions under which farm and nonfarm works were combined. Whereas earlier there was an element of compulsion, or *corvée*, in the supply of nonfarm labor by specific castes, that element weakened over time, and the choice of occupations became more deliberate and more flexible by the end of colonial rule.

Wages

Agricultural wage data come from two main sources: the government of India’s *Prices and Wages in India*, covering the period from 1873 to 1923; and the sizable *Report on the Enquiry into Rise of Prices in India* (1914). These data sets are not readily usable, however, for wages can vary according to individual capacities, contractual status, and peak or lean season. In the Indian case, wages in kind also create a problem. Rural wages typically contained both cash and a “product” (later called “perquisite”) component.

For the longer part of the nineteenth century, wage data are fragmentary and unsystematic. Collating what exists for several major regions, historians have noted the absence of a clearly discernible tendency in real wage, though in some cases a rising tendency after 1840, continuing until the mid-1870s, has been observed. But the two decades thereafter saw a steady fall in real wages, derived from monetary stagnation together with rising prices.

There was sustained upward pressure in food prices in the 1880s, because of exports as well as a depreciation of the currency. Yet the Indian nationalist argument that these circumstances intensified a subsistence crisis seems far-fetched. By all indications, real income in agriculture was increasing, as were food availability per capita, agricultural production, migration, labor demand, and employment. Except for two famines, the last quarter of the nineteenth century hardly fits a theory of rural crisis. The 1914 report suggests that, in the 1890s, money wages rose sufficiently to register a healthy increase in real wages. Prices and peasant incomes rose, while customary wages apparently did not.

All regions of India shared in a rise in wages from 1900 to 1912. In some cases a mild rising trend continued until 1920 or 1925. Not surprisingly, the fastest growth in the last phase was in Punjab, Madras, and the United Provinces—the regions that experienced the “Green Revolution” in the early twentieth century. The first half of the 1920s saw no significant change in money or in real wages. From the second half of the 1920s through the 1930s, as prices began to fall precipitously, money wages were pushed down. Real wage decline started within a few years. Real wages at the end of the period (1935–1936) were usually below those at the beginning of the trend (1929–1930). World War II brought massive inflation, further depressing real wages, though some adjustments in money wages did occur after 1941.

Studies on wage trends in the 1950s and the 1960s reported very little increase in the low averages that were established during the mid-1930s. The deadlock was broken only after the “Green Revolution” of the early 1970s. These studies generally find a positive correlation between labor productivity and real wage growth across space. Not surprisingly, the regions where acute rural poverty, landlessness, agricultural stagnation, and wage stagnation persisted—Bihar and West Bengal—exploded in violent rural unrest around 1970.

One of the striking features of real wage data are its sharp fluctuation, a feature that persisted well into the independence period, reflecting variations in the quality of monsoonal rainfall. Money wage adjustments happened less frequently, and sometimes not at all if the rainfall improved quickly. The most disastrous fall in real wages, therefore, occurred during years of famine.

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
See also **Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947**

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AHIMSA. See **Buddhism in Ancient India; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

AHMEDABAD Ahmed Shah, the second ruler of the Ahmedabad sultanate, founded Ahmedabad on the banks of the Sabarmati River in the western state of Gujarat in



Tree of Life. Elaborate window from Ahmedabad's Sidi Saiyad Mosque, edifice carved from stone in the 1570s. In Sufism and other spiritual traditions, the popular tree of life motif seeks to suggest the energies of the universe. JYOTI BANERJEE / FOTOMEDIA.

1411 as his capital, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the city came under the control of Jain and Vaishnava Bania merchants. The present city is believed to be on the site of a much older Hindu trading center, Asaval (Karnavati), replacing the historic capital of Hindu Gujarat at Anhilwada Patan, 70 miles (113 km) to the northeast. G. W. Forrest, the director of records for the government of India, in his *Cities of India* (1903), described Ahmedabad as “a citadel of much strength and beauty . . . and laid out . . . in broad, fair streets. Bringing marble and other rich building materials from a long distance [the sultan] raised magnificent mosques, palaces and tombs, and by encouraging merchants, weavers and skilled craftsmen he made Ahmedabad a centre of trade and manufacture.” Ahmedabad continued as Gujarat's center of trade and manufacture, its skilled workers in time raising the city to rival Manchester, U.K., in textile production. Trading and manufacturing activities created a hereditary bourgeois elite early in the history of Ahmedabad, the city developing a corporate culture and a class of indigenous bankers and financiers who helped it survive England's *laissez-faire* practices. Still, Ahmedabad

has remained socially, culturally, and politically conservative, even though it had one of the earliest municipal organizations in India. Essentially, the merchant community of Ahmedabad remained fiscally too conservative to embrace industry: it considered industry riskier than trading and banking, to which it was long accustomed. It should be added that Ahmedabad remained architecturally stagnant as well, its many old Hindu and Muslim monuments notwithstanding.

The British occupied Ahmedabad after crushing Maratha power in 1818. Until then, the city's fate had alternated between benign neglect at the hands of Mughals and economic exploitation at the hands of the Marathas. John Andrew Dunlop, the first British collector of Ahmedabad, found the city in a shambles and its economy in ruins. Nevertheless, Ahmedabad's mercantilist spirit experienced economic renaissance under the British as a result of a series of measures introduced by the East India Company: reduced tariff and taxes, infusion of capital in the hand-loom and handicraft industries, introduction of the railways (1864), the establishment of Western institutions and education, and better law and

order—arguably making Gujaratis more conscious of Indian culture in this transformation to Westernization, which would help stoke the fires of nationalism and groom Mahatma M. K. Gandhi as a nationalist leader. Ahmedabad also generated income through the opium trade (which picked up after 1819 with increasing British exports of the commodity to China), gambling, and speculation. By the end of the nineteenth century, the city's population had rebounded to 150,000 from a paltry 80,000 in 1818. With the improved business climate, the city also acquired a more cosmopolitan character, attracting Parsis, Jews, and Christians, although correspondingly the size of the Muslim population declined.

The combination of improved business climate and Gujarati entrepreneurship resulted in the transformation of the merchant capital into the industrial capital, which made its debut with the establishing of the Ahmedabad Spinning and Weaving Mill in 1858. The timing proved fortuitous as the U.S. Civil War broke out in 1861, increasing demand for Indian cotton, and the Indian textile industry was well established by the end of the nineteenth century. The newly rich merchants, financiers, and mill owners invested their wealth in English-style bungalows with wide glass windows, and even adopted Western dress—the visible, if superficial, emblems of modernization that follow economic success. But the acceptance of Western higher education was slow in Ahmedabad, slower than in Bombay (Mumbai), which explains the different paths of development taken by the two cities and why Bombay became, and remained, the beacon of higher education for middle-class Gujaratis well after independence.

All these changes notwithstanding, when Gandhi elected to settle in Ahmedabad upon his return from South Africa and established his Satyagraha Ashram (later renamed the Sabarmati Ashram) there in 1915, the city looked and felt very much like a medieval Indian city—predominantly bucolic in appearance, rather than urban and industrial in shape, despite mill chimneys belching smoke into the sky. Gandhi had elected to live in Ahmedabad precisely because Ahmedabad was representative of India and its culture. Moreover, Gandhi was drawn to Ahmedabad's utilitarian and materialistic qualities; its multireligious population, particularly the presence of a large Muslim population; its large working class and legions of peasants in surrounding villages, from which he could recruit his *satyagrahi* soldiers; its wealthy Jain and Bania merchant communities, which would bankroll his *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) campaigns in return for the profits promised by his doctrine of *swadeshi* (indigenous goods); and the coarse homespun cloth that was popular with its residents, which Gandhi would use to generate national pride.

In the decades immediately following independence, Ahmedabad witnessed a flurry of building projects by European and Indian architects, including Le Corbusier, who built four buildings in the city: the Millowners Association Building, the Ahmedabad Museum, and the Sarabhai and Shodhan houses (the Shodhan house plan was originally drawn for Surettam Hutheesingh, but later sold to mill owner Shyamubhai Shodhan)—all Ahmedabad patrons of Le Corbusier eager to transform their city into a modern metropolis. In fact, Mayor Chinubhai Chimanbhai, a nephew of the respected industrialist Kasturbhai Lalabhai, had invited Le Corbusier to Ahmedabad. In the 1960s, U.S. architect Louis Kahn built the Indian Institute of Management after Harvard University's School of Management model. The respected Indian architect Charles Correa, who completed his studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, built the Gandhi Smarak Sanghralaya, and Balakrishna Doshi, who had worked with both Le Corbusier and Kahn, built the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology. Gautam and Gira Sarabhai, from the distinguished industrial family of Ambalal Sarabhai, built the Calico Museum in the city.

Ahmedabad's urban renaissance in the second half of the twentieth century was fueled by industrial capital. The arrival of Le Corbusier, Kahn, and other messengers of the international modern movement to Ahmedabad held out the promise of transforming the decaying urban structure of the city into a modern metropolis, and possibly the capital of Gujarat. In the end, however, the overcrowded character of Ahmedabad would force the Gujarat government to locate the capital at Gandhinagar.


Ravi Kalia

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gandhinagar**

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AIDS/HIV Ever since India's first AIDS case was reported from Mumbai in 1986, the HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus; acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) epidemic has posed a huge threat to the country. Many of India's 1.3 billion people do not as yet understand how potentially dangerous a health issue AIDS has



Poster Reads: "Learn about AIDS and Be Safe." The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in India (some health organizations have estimated the number of the infected at 10 million) is especially troubling because of its rapid spread to the general population. It is no longer an urban disease contracted only by high-risk groups. POPULATION COUNCIL.

already become, despite the fact that five million Indians have been infected by HIV/AIDS, according to official estimates. Prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS among the working age population (between the ages of 15 and 59) is 0.9 percent. Close to 90 percent of the cases reported fall within India's working age population; 25 percent are women. As reported by the United Nations (UNAIDS), India also houses around 170,000 HIV-infected children, most of whom are either already orphans or will soon become orphans.

India's National AIDS Control Organisation has arrived at these figures by using sentinel surveillance data collected from several sources: women attending antenatal clinics; STD (sexually transmitted disease) clinic attendees; injecting drug users; and men who report having sexual relations with men. However, the data do not include rural areas, private hospitals, or other groups of people, including those with cases of full-blown AIDS, sex workers, and people who do not fall into the age group of 15 to 49. This deficiency has caused widespread

criticism of the reliability of the figures supplied by the government of India. Other sources put the figures much higher. Various health workers in the country have estimated the current number of HIV/AIDS-infected Indians as close to 10 million.

Indian states have been divided into three groups according to their HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Group I states, called high prevalent or generalized epidemic states, include Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, and Nagaland; in these states, infection rates have risen over 1 percent in antenatal women. Group II states, called moderate prevalent or concentrated epidemic states, include Gujarat, Goa, and Pondicherry; infection there is 5 percent or more among high-risk groups but is below 1 percent among antenatal women. Group III states, called low prevalent states, include all the other states of India; the HIV infection rate in this group is less than 5 percent in high-risk groups and less than 1 percent in antenatal women.

HIV/AIDS in India is transmitted through unsafe sex, from mother to child, and among injecting drug users. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in India is especially troubling because of its rapid spread to the general population. It is no longer an urban sickness contracted only by high-risk groups. It is, on the one hand, spreading to the general population through bridge groups such as truckers (about 4 million men). Its spread is geographic as well, reaching far-flung villages of the vast country. It is thought that the disease will continue to spread at an even faster pace.

The future scenario of India's HIV/AIDS epidemic is especially grim. According to official accounts, approximately 25 percent of Indians live below the poverty line. Poverty increases the incidence of HIV/AIDS in several ways. Poor people are not able to afford medical treatment, either for HIV or for other infections. Poverty also forces some people to sell sex in order to earn a living; others sell their blood, which is often contaminated. Ignorance and lack of awareness about the AIDS epidemic has also increased India's vulnerability. The National Behavioural Surveillance Survey in 2001 found overall awareness of HIV/AIDS in India to be only 76 percent. The survey also noted that nearly 7 percent of the adults of the country reported having sex with non-regular partners in the previous twelve months. Only 33 percent of these people reported consistent condom use. The stigma attached to AIDS, and to the people infected by it, further contributes to the suffering of those infected, and discourages people from seeking testing and treatment. Many people will not even discuss the disease. Attacks against HIV/AIDS patients are widespread, and in some villages, HIV-infected people are treated as outcasts.

The AIDS control program in India receives help from the United Nations, the World Bank, major international nongovernmental organizations, and other private organizations, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. However, it remains to be seen whether such initiatives, bereft of a vigorous, pro-active, and open public campaign, will be able to eradicate the disease from India; even those countries that have carried out nationwide campaigns have achieved only limited success after a very long period.

The government of India, after some initial hesitation, has realized the need to urgently address the HIV/AIDS situation in the country. The government-led initiative to bring the situation under control has focused on the following areas among others:

- Ensuring blood safety
- Implementing programs to reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
- Promoting condom use
- Emphasizing the importance of information, education, communication, and social mobilization
- Giving care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS
- Training the public on HIV/AIDS/STD prevention and control (through workshops, etc.)
- Targeted interventions (among the most vulnerable and marginalized populations)
- Providing facilities for voluntary counseling and testing

Happymon Jacob

See also **Health Care**

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AJANTA The thirty Ajanta caves are laid out in an arcing ravine cut by the Waghora River in the mountains of west central India. Although now designated a World Heritage monument by the United Nations, Ajanta had been totally forgotten until nearly two hundred years ago. It was then that some English soldiers, tiger hunting in the region, chanced upon the remote site. Their startling discovery is confirmed by a record scratched on a pillar in the spacious cave 10: “John Smith, 28th Cavalry, 28th April, 1819.”

Ajanta had two distinct periods of patronage. The first was its Hinayana Buddhist phase, dating from approximately 50 B.C. to A.D. 100. The severe *chaitya* halls 9 and 10, used for worship, and the *viharas* 12, 13, and 15A, dormitories with cells for the monks, were excavated during that period. Inscriptions recording “the gift of the facade” or “the gift of a wall” or “the gift of a cell” prove that these early caves were community efforts, as were many contemporary sites in western India, where Buddhism flourished during the period of Satavahana rule.

After about 100 B.C., Ajanta lay dormant for over three centuries. The Chinese Buddhist traveler Fahsien reported shortly after A.D. 400 that monks still lived at the site. However, he did not visit it, finding the region hostile, and that “the (local) people all have . . . erroneous views, and do not know the . . . Law of Buddha.”

However, the situation changed dramatically in the 460s, when a remarkable renaissance took place at Ajanta under the aegis of the powerful emperor Harisena of the Vakataka dynasty. Having already inherited extensive domains, including the Ajanta region, at his accession, by the time of his unexpected death in 477, Harisena controlled all of central India from the western to the eastern sea. In fact, during his all too brief reign, this “moon

among princes” was surely the most illustrious ruler in India, bringing India’s famed “Golden Age” to its apogee, which Ajanta’s Vakataka phase, completed in less than twenty years, directly reflects.

By about 465, less than five years after work had begun, twenty sizable caves were already underway, sponsored by a select group of courtiers, whose piety was happily matched by their financial resources. Thousands of excavators and artisans must have been drawn to the site by its growing fame, with skilled sculptors and painters being sent there from the major cities to work on the courtly donations. Even while learning how to excavate caves in the recalcitrant basaltic cliffs, their goal was to make monuments that would “rival the palaces of the lord of gods,” and “endure for as long as the sun and the moon continue,” as the site’s inscriptions tell us.

Among these major sponsors, besides the emperor Harisena himself, whose sumptuous cave 1 is the finest in India, we know of his prime minister Varahadeva, who chose the most central location for his influential cave 16, and King Upendragupta, the pious but spendthrift feudatory who ruled ancient Rishika (the Ajanta region) and “expended abundant wealth” on no less than five impressive excavations. At the same time, the ambitious monk Buddhahadra oversaw the creation of a dozen caves. The lavish funds at his disposal surely came from his connections with the rival province of Asmaka, with whose chief minister he had been “connected in friendship through many previous existences.”

Ajanta’s inauguration was exuberant, but in about 468 a serious “recession” occurred, caused by the threatening stance of the troublemaking Asmakas. Therefore, to conserve resources for military purposes, the feudatory ruler of the Ajanta region suddenly ordered work stopped on every cave, except for his own undertakings and the emperor’s cave 1. But by about 472, war must have flared in the region, for now work stopped on these “privileged” royal caves as well.

Significantly, when activity began again in about 475, after that local war, which probably involved Rishika and Asmaka alone, the Asmakas were the new feudatory lords of the region. At this point Ajanta’s craftsmen, who had briefly departed to more secure sites such as Bagh, returned to Ajanta, full of useful new ideas. Excavation and decoration now went on even more vigorously than before, even though the defeated local king, Upendragupta, was never heard from again. Indeed, as a signal of victory, the Asmakas forbade worship in his beautiful *chaitya* hall, cave 19, even though their own rival hall, cave 26, was still being developed.

Ajanta’s final florescence, when most of the site’s renowned murals were created, began about 475. However,

this last phase of consistent patronage was tragically short-lived. In 477, the great emperor Harisena mysteriously expired—probably due to the machinations of the perfidious Asmakas—and as a result the site rapidly went into its own deathly convulsions. All general excavation work was now abandoned as the worried patrons, expecting trouble and eager to acquire merit while they could, rushed to get their shrine Buddhas completed and dedicated.

It soon was clear that such anxiety on the part of the great patrons was justified; no sooner had Harisena's inept son ascended the throne than the warlike Asmakas boldly asserted their independence, even while plotting to take over the vast Vakataka empire for themselves. In the ensuing conflict, according to pertinent evidence from Dandin's *Tale of the Ten Princes*, the new emperor, Sarvasena III, "became mincemeat" on the field of battle, while the Vakataka house itself—like the caves it had sponsored—never recovered from the assault of its revolting feudatories.

Surprising as it may seem, while Ajanta's established patrons were in control of the site, no one else was ever allowed to make a single votive donation. It was only when the old elitist controls were gone, after 478, that the monks still living at the site, along with impatient local devotees, began eagerly donating a spate of intrusive Buddha images, to make merit for themselves. These helter-skelter donations, carved or merely painted, appear in great numbers in or on every excavation in which the shrine Buddha had been previously dedicated, and thus brought to life.

However, this frantic pious activity did not last long. It was suddenly disrupted, leaving dozens of the very latest images in various stages of completion, as if work had been abruptly cut off on a particular day—surely because the flames of the insurrection were now scorching Ajanta itself.

This was the end of votive offerings at Ajanta. After 480, not a single image was ever again made at the site. A few monks remained in residence briefly, but then they too were gone, leaving the site totally abandoned. By the last decade of the fifth century, in the aftermath of the war that had so thoroughly shattered the empire, the region had apparently been taken over by a Hindu power with no interest in such a Buddhist retreat. Ajanta, in its remote ravine, now lay forgotten, remarkably preserved by its very isolation.

Walter Spink

See also **Buddhism in Ancient India**

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
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AKALI DAL. See **Sikh Institutions and Parties.**

AKBAR (1542–1605), "the Great" Mughal emperor (1556–1605). Born Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad in 1542,

Akbar became the most powerful and the most tolerant of the Mughal emperors. For Muslims he is a controversial figure because of his unorthodox religious eclecticism. He was crowned Mughal *padishah* (emperor) at the age of fourteen in the Punjab on the sudden death of his father, Humayun. The Mughal position was so precarious, however, that all but Bairam Khan, a seasoned soldier who had also loyally served his father, advised Akbar to leave India for Kabul. India was dominated by the Afghan amir Mohammad Shah Abdali of Bengal, Sikandar Sur, and the Rajput princes. A number of states were independent. Akbar was thus initially ruler in name only. Through military conquests, marriage alliances with Hindus, and tolerant religious and social policies, however, Akbar created one of the greatest empires of the age—one that was supported by Indians, not merely a ruling foreign minority.

During the first years of young Akbar's reign, Bairam Khan, now Vakil-i-Mutlaq (prime minister), was de facto emperor. Then, Hemu, Shah Abdali's prime minister, captured Agra and marched into Delhi, proclaiming himself "King Vikramjit." At the second Battle of Panipat in November 1556, Hemu's giant force was defeated by the Mughal army, and Hemu was captured and executed. In 1557 Sikander Sur surrendered, and Muhammad Shah Abdali was killed in Bengal. Bairam Khan then conquered Gwalior and Jaunpur in 1559. In 1560, however, Bairam Khan fell from grace and was murdered; the "Petticoat Government," led by Akbar's foster mother, Maham Anga, exercised veiled authority until Akbar put himself at the head of Delhi's civil and military administration.



In 1561 Akbar assumed control of the empire and his court and began allying himself with the Hindu Rajputs, making them partners in the empire. He married Jodh Bai, the eldest daughter of the mighty Hindu Rajput

house of Jaipur. By 1570 all but a few Rajputs swore allegiance to him, and that year he also married princesses of Bikaner and Jaisalmer; in 1584 he married his son Jahangir to a Rajput princess as well. Rajputs were also

taken into his administrative service. Akbar also married a Christian and a Muslim. He endeared himself to Hindus by abolishing the pilgrim tax in 1563 and the hated *jizya* (poll tax) in 1579, ending discriminatory taxation against Hindus. He put an end to the enslaving of war prisoners and forcible conversions to Islam. He welcomed Hindus at his court, sought their advice, appointed a court poet for Hindi, and patronized Hindu artists. He employed Hindus in the revenue service and taxes were lower than in previous eras. Hindu laws were applied in disputes involving Hindus, and in times of poor harvests Akbar ordered the remittance of taxes. Raja Birbal, a Hindu courtier, became one of his confidants, and Raja Todar Mal of the writer caste (Kayasth) was responsible for all revenue settlements in North India.

As an annexationist, resolving to recapture the empire of Babur, his grandfather, Akbar proved to be an audacious general noted for his swift marches and intrepid assaults. He quashed an Uzbek rebellion and captured Gondwana. In 1561 Malwa, in the heart of India, was captured, and in 1568 he began his onslaught against the fortresses of Chittor and Ranthambor. Only Mewar defied him. In 1569 the central Indian fortress of Kalinjar fell. The rich province of Gujarat, with its port of Surat, the main outlet for trade with the West, fell in 1573. Akbar then marched east against Bengal, conquering it in 1576. A few years later he renewed his campaigns, annexing most of Afghanistan in 1585, and Kashmir in 1586. Kashmir's Srinagar became the summer home of the Mughals. Between 1592 and 1595 Sind and Baluchistan were added to Akbar's empire; in 1592 Orissa was joined to Bengal. Two years earlier, in 1590, Akbar had begun his conquests of the south, adding Berar and Khandesh and part of Ahmednagar. The Deccan, however, proved to be much more difficult because of the terrain and because of determined Maratha resistance. On his death, Akbar bequeathed an empire of fifteen provinces (*subahs*), stretching from the Himalayas in the north to the River Godavari in the south.

The third distinguishing feature of Akbar's rule was his administrative reforms of 1574. He inherited a feudal system depending on personal loyalty and created a bureaucracy built upon regulations and a service of imperial officers arranged in thirty-three grades with fixed salaries that were initially paid in cash. These officers, called *mansabdars*, were ranked by the number of cavalry each was obliged to raise when the emperor called, ranging from a few hundred to thirty thousand. Revenue from lands assigned to each rank was used to support both soldiers and their horses. The *mansabdars* performed both civil and military duties. This created the opportunity for men to achieve honor, fame, and prosperity through service to the state, and it enabled the state to exercise its will in every corner of the empire. The empire was

organized in districts (*sarkars*) that were grouped into provinces (*subahs*), each ruled by a governor (*subadar*) who, with his body of troops, was responsible for law and order. A revenue collector (*diwan*) collected land taxes, remitting them to Delhi, and disbursed money from the center to pay the troops in the province. In this manner the *subadar* had no money and the *diwan* no troops, allowing the central government to maintain control. Provincial officers were rotated, and few stayed in one place more than four years. The last of Akbar's administrative reforms was his land revenue settlement, in which Todar Mal's *bandobast* (arrangement) practically remeasured and more fairly graded all of North India. Land was taxed according to productivity. The system was later adopted by the British, thus lasting for three hundred years.

Akbar was desperate for a son. When his wife gave birth to Jahangir in Sikri in 1569, Akbar was so pleased that he moved the capital there from Agra, renaming it Fatehpur (Victory) Sikri. Either for strategic reasons, or because it lacked sufficient water, he moved the capital to Lahore in 1585. Fatehpur Sikri remains a magnificent ghost town.

The most controversial aspect of Akbar's rule was his religious policy. In 1575 he built a house of worship (*ibadat-khana*) at Fatehpur Sikri in which representatives of different Muslim sects, Jesuits, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and yogis gathered to discuss religion with Akbar. In 1579 a declaration (*mazhar*) gave Akbar the authority to interpret Islamic dogma. After 1582 he created a new syncretic faith composed of ideas and observances of Sufism and Zoroastrianism, with himself as the spiritual leader of the "divine faith" (Din-i-Ilahi). In art and architecture Akbar gave the Mughal empire a distinctive Persian style.

Roger D. Long

See also **Aurangzeb; Babur; Jahangir**

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AKKAMAHĀDĒVI, *twelfth-century bhakti (devotional) saint*. Akkamahādevī, or "elder sister" Mahādevī, was born in Udutadi, Karnataka. She became enamored



You can confiscate
money in hand;
can you confiscate
the body's glory?
Or peel away every strip
you wear,
but can you peel
the Nothing, the Nakedness
that covers and veils?
To the shameless girl
wearing the White Jasmine Lord's
Light of morning,
you fool,
where's the need for cover and jewel?

(vacana 124; A. K. Ramanujan, transl.,
Speaking of Siva, 126–127)

of Shiva's icon in the village shrine when she was a young girl. Akkamahādevī composed about 350 *vacanas* (spoken free verse hymns) in Kannada, a Dravidian language. The *vacanas* of Kannada *bhakti* saints (*Shiva saranas*) are scripture for the Virasaiva sect, which does not accept Sanskrit *Vedas*. However, the *vacanas* also reflect a blend of local Dravidian and elite Aryan cultures, a hallmark of the *bhakti* movement in South India. Akkamahādevī was the first female *sarana*, and about fifty other women yogis followed her path. Akkamahādevī's *vacanas* express her radical views on women's roles, caste, and Hindu ritualism, a testimony to this female mystic's spiritual struggles in a patriarchal society. Her verses end with her *ankita* (signature) line calling Shiva by the name Chennamallikārjuna, or the "Beauteous Lord of (Goddess) Mallika." It has also been translated poetically as "Lord as White as Jasmine" by A. K. Ramanujan.

Young Akkamahādevī's beauty attracted the attention of the Jain king Kaushika, and she probably married him. However, soon realizing that she could not serve both Shiva and an earthly husband, she became an ascetic in search of Shiva, naked yet covered by her long hair. After many tribulations, including the unwanted attentions of lustful men, she reached Kalyāna where the Virasaiva saints Basavanna (1106–1167) and Allamaprabhu resided. To the sages' queries about her female methods of renunciation, she replied that it mattered little what happened to the body, that she was chaste as her soul belonged to Shiva, her true husband.

In this preoccupation with God as a divine lover, she resembles Āndāl (ninth century), and Mīrabai (sixteenth century), both of whom wrote hymns to Krishna vibrant with images drawn from nature. However, unlike these

Vaishnava *bhakti* saints, Akkamahādevī was a yogi infatuated with Shiva, the Lord of Dissolution–Creation. Some of her early *vacanas* describe Shiva's physical beauty, his shining red locks, and his even teeth (*vacana* 68). However, most poems have a searing quality. They are razor-sharp declarations of her desire for one without limitations of form and who transcended desire and illusion.

To probing male questions, this female mystic replied that worldly passions must be experienced before one discards them for spiritual goals (*vacana* 104). In other verses, she compares the triviality of rituals, caste, and worldly preoccupations with her love for Shiva.

Virasaiva Movement

Bhakti saints uniformly asserted that devotion was superior to Brahmanical ritual, and they composed hymns in their regional languages instead of Sanskrit. Belonging to many castes, they drew upon local traditions marginalized by Sanskritic Hinduism. One of the most radical challenges was posed by Basavanna, the Kannada saint. A Brahman versed in the Sanskrit scriptures, he is revered as the founder of the Virasaiva sect. Under his tutelage, Virasaivas rejected Hindu rituals and caste as well as Jainism, whose members were commercially dominant in the region. Virasaivas affirm a personal connection to Shiva by wearing an *ishta lingam* (favored icon of Lord Shiva) around their necks. Basavanna's egalitarian attitude encouraged Akkamahādevī, who found a space for women yogis in the hermitage at Kalyāna. The four major Virasaiva saints were Basavanna, the weaver Dēvara Dāsīmāyā, Akkamahādevī, and Allamaprabhu; their radical *vacanas* shaped the sect's ideology. Akkamahādevī is believed to have finally entered a cave near Srīshaila. Meditating alone, she is believed to have gone through six stages before attaining *Aikyās sthāla*, the final point of yogic union with Shiva.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Bhakti; Devī; Hinduism (Dharma); Karnataka**

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ĀLĀP *Ālāp/Ālāpa/Ālāpana* (Sanskrit, *lāp* “speaking”; Hindustani, “dialogue,” or “talk”) in Indian classical music is an unmeasured musical form focusing on pitch; it either acts as the complement to metered music or stands alone. *Ālāp* (in North India) and *ālāpana* (in South India) is the primary medium by which a performer illuminates *rāga* (underlying melody). This illustration can follow the shape of an existing melody (with each pitch of the melody shown in its relationship to the pitches around it) or systematically elaborate each of the pitches of a *rāga*’s scale. In the latter—the *svar-vistār ālāp*—the most common approach is to start at the primary tonic (*sā*) of the *rāga* and first explore the pitches below that pitch (usually for an octave, but sometimes more) and then, ascending note by note, each of the notes in a *rāga* as high above the fundamental tonic as the performer cares to elaborate. Ultimately, an *ālāp/ālāpana* is an opportunity for the performer to show the nuances of the *rāga* without the constraints of meter. For many melodic instrumentalists and listeners, the *ālāp/ālāpana* is the most important part of the performance, the part in which the *rāga* appears most clearly.

In North Indian practice, the *ālāp* can be the entire unmeasured “first movement” of a performance as well as, more specifically, the opening unmeasured and unpulsed section. That is, the word “*ālāp*” refers both to all of the music that functions without meter (and, by implication, has no drum accompaniment) and, more precisely, to the opening music that not only lacks meter but has no pulse. Within the context of this temporal freedom, the performer is free to explore the entire range of the voice or instrument through the *rāga*. Indeed, singers will commonly use the note names (*sā*, *re*, *gā*, etc.) so that the listener can better appreciate the shapes. (Performers call these musical elaborations *sārgam tāns*.)

North Indian performers mark each section of the growing pitch *ambitus* with a form of rhythmic-melodic punctuation called a *moharā* (Hindustani, “opening” or “something formed in a matrix”), a musical phrase that—for a few seconds—gives the temporary notion of a pulse with notes that focus around the principal tonic.

Very often, a second section, which performers still broadly refer to as part of the larger *ālāp*, follows the



SVAR-VISTĀR ĀLĀP (MELODIC SOLOIST ALONE)

| Section | Event |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>ālāp</i> | meterless, pulseless develops note-by-note subdivisions are marked by <i>moharās</i> begins in <i>madhya sthān</i> descends through <i>mandra sthān</i> rises back through <i>madhya sthān</i> rises into the <i>tār sthān</i> |
| <i>jor</i> | pulsed, but meterless developed in all three <i>sthāns</i> (similar to <i>ālāp</i>) |
| <i>jhāla</i> | pulsed and intensely rhythmic meterless developed in all three <i>sthāns</i> |

unmeasured-unpulsed *ālāp*. In instrumental music, the *jor* (Hindustani, “pair”) features a recurring and constant pulse with alternations between a note and a simple strummed drone. In vocal *dhruṣpad*, singers perform this same kind of pulsed but meterless section with nonlexical syllables and refer to this music as *nom tom*.

Sometimes in instrumental music, the rhythm of the *jor* intensifies in a frenetic concluding section called the *jhāla* (Hindustani, “web”). In this part of an instrumental performance, not only is a recurring pulse present, but the performer sets up a fast, intricate rhythmic pattern on the instrument’s drone strings (*cikāri*) and weaves the melody into that framework.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Dhruṣpad; Music; Rāga**

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ALBUQUERQUE, AFONSO DE (1459–1515), viceroy of the Portuguese empire in India and Asia (1509–1515). Born to a family that traced its origins to an illegitimate son of King Dinis of Portugal (r. 1279–1325), Afonso de Albuquerque was indisputably the founder of the Portuguese empire in India and Asia. Before sailing to India in 1503, he had served King



Afonso de Albuquerque. Albuquerque's imperial zeal was matched by his religious fanaticism and ruthlessness that had few equals, even among his contemporary conquistadores. STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Manuel I (r. 1495–1521) in Morocco, where he developed a fanatical hatred for all Muslims after a Moroccan Muslim killed his younger brother there. Returning in 1504 to Lisbon, Albuquerque convinced the king of the desirability of establishing a monopoly of trade with the East by building forts at strategic ports around the Indian Ocean. Two years later the king approved his plan and dispatched him to the East. In a secret letter, he promised Albuquerque an appointment as viceroy of the Portuguese possessions at the expiration of the term of the incumbent, Francisco de Almeida. During the next nine years, Albuquerque established Portuguese maritime supremacy over the Indian Ocean, seizing crucial bases on the Asia-Europe route to Goa in 1510. A year later, he took Malacca, the principal distribution port for spices in Southeast Asia, and in 1515 he captured Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Portugal's share in the Asia-Europe trade rose to three-quarters of the total, causing major losses for the Venetians, who had previously maintained a quasi-monopoly over the Asiatic trade through ties with Arabs and Persians. Albuquerque made Goa the headquarters of the extensive Portuguese empire in the East.

In 1509, he was made viceroy, a position he held until his death in 1515.

Albuquerque's imperial zeal was matched both by religious fanaticism and a ruthlessness that had few equals even among his contemporary conquistadores, both Portuguese and Spaniards. In a letter to the king of Portugal, Albuquerque boasted "I leave no town or building of the Mussulmans. Those who are taken alive, I order them to be roasted." One of Albuquerque's major initiatives was to encourage mixed marriages between Portuguese soldiers and sailors and the widows and abducted wives and daughters of the fallen combatants. He forcibly converted the women to Catholicism, gave them dowries of land and cash, and encouraged them to settle down and produce offspring, who he hoped would be loyal pillars of Portuguese power in the East. The policy failed in several ways. The "half-castes" it produced never lent effective strength to Portuguese imperial power. In Western India, his policy of religious intolerance produced hostility between Muslims and Hindus, who had, during the preceding centuries, lived in peaceful coexistence along the coast, promoting gainful trade.

Albuquerque's many detractors, both among his contemporaries and later historians, have condemned his excessive ambition in building an overextended empire of ports and forts while simultaneously pursuing a policy of forcible conversion. There is no doubt, however, that he was the founder of the Portuguese empire and initiator of the "Portuguese century" in Asia, making his country (along with Spain) an object of envy among contemporary European states.


D. R. SarDesai

See also **Gama, Vasco da; Goa; Portuguese in India**

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ALEXANDER THE GREAT (356–323 B.C.), *king of Macedon, conqueror of vast empire that included Greece, Persia, Egypt, and (briefly) parts of India*. Alexander the Great, son of King Philip II of Macedon and a student of Aristotle, was the ancient world's greatest



general. In the spring of 326 B.C. he led his Macedonian army across the Indus at Attock, conquering Punjab with only 30,000 foot soldiers and cavalry. Alexander’s ambition was to conquer all of India, but he was blocked by his own soldiers, who refused to advance beyond the Beas River. Alexander’s brief interlude in India proved a potent catalyst for change, probably inspiring the founder of India’s first imperial dynasty, Chandragupta Maurya, and opening trade and cultural highways of intercourse between Hellenistic and Indic civilizations.

Raja Ambhi of Taxila, the first Indian prince to confront Alexander, wisely opened the gates of his capital to Alexander’s army. Hellenistic coins and fragments of Gandharan art and a small Greek temple, visually reflecting the impact of Alexander’s invasion, are preserved in modern Pakistan’s Taxila Museum. We know from Strabo’s account (XV,C.715) that just outside the gates of Taxila, Onesicritus, one of Alexander’s officers, found fifteen Hindu yogis sitting stark naked on blazing rocks in the sun. He tried, through three interpreters, to learn the “secret” of their endurance, but failed. The one yogi whom Alexander took away with him died of food poisoning, as would Alexander himself, before returning home.

The most important impact of Alexander’s brief conquest of Punjab, however, appears to have been the inspiration it provided to Chandragupta Maurya, a “young stripling” Alexander met after he had conquered the Punjabi kingdoms of Porus (Puru) and his neighbors.

Chandragupta returned to his Eastern Gangetic Kingdom, Magadha, soon after meeting with Alexander, inspired by Alexander’s dream of universal conquest, to overthrow its raja; less than two years later Chandragupta established North India’s first great empire, which lasted 140 years, as long as the British Raj would.

In addition to his martial prowess and bold vision of global conquest, Alexander was a builder of cities and bridges, his engineering corps arming him with the capability of crossing the mighty Indus. His brilliant Greek scientists brought a number of Western ideas, in medicine as well as philosophy and astronomy, to North India, some of which were adopted by precocious Indian scientists, whose own unique discoveries in those fields antedated most of those known to the Greeks. Multicultural interaction between the Hellenistic West and India would remain an important legacy of Alexander, who was so impressed by Raja Puru’s elephant corps that he brought several of those earliest “tanks” back with his own army.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Guptan Empire; Punjab**

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ALIGARH. See Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement.

ALLAHABAD One of India's holiest cities, Allahabad was built at the confluence of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers. It is the ancestral home of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister. The Nehrus, Kashmiri Brahman pandits, were originally the Kauls, but because the family home fronted the river, or *nebar*, they came to be called the Nehrus. The city was earlier named Prayag and Kausambi, and was a thriving Buddhist center. Its name was changed to Illahabas, or "city of Allah," in 1584 during the reign of the Great Mughal emperor Akbar. The brilliant Akbar was committed to winning the hearts of his Hindu subjects, and what better way to do so than to build a beautiful city at the confluence of India's two most sacred rivers. Thus he founded Illahabas in 1575, which quickly became Allahabad.

Allahabad is surrounded by sites dating back to ancient times: to its east lies Jhusi, ancient Pratisthanpur, the capital of the Chandras; to its west lies a medieval Kara fort, bearing testimony to the Rajput Jayachand's influence. Recognizing the commercial potential of the city and the social and religious importance of its rivers, Akbar elevated Allahabad to the status of a Mughal *suba*, or provincial capital, building a fort overlooking the Yamuna. The presence of an Ashokan pillar there also testifies to the much earlier influence of the Mauryans.

The marauding Marathas pillaged Allahabad before the British declared it their capital of the North West provinces in 1834. The British decision to place a high court there soon turned the city into a thriving center for legal studies, as well as the home of a fine university. However, the British moved their capital to Agra a year later. In 1857 mutinous Sepoys captured the city. In 1888 Allahabad hosted the fourth session of the Indian National Congress. Thereafter, it became a center of India's freedom movement, and Anand Bhavan, the Nehru ancestral home, was donated to the Congress as its headquarters. Besides the Nehrus, other Congress nationalists from the city included Mangla Prasad, Muzzaffar Hasan, Kailash Nath Katju, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Purshottam Das Tandon. Allahabad proved to be the urban cradle of four of India's prime ministers: Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Nehru Gandhi, her son Rajiv Nehru Gandhi, and Lal Bahadur Shastri. Allahabad remains an important city as a political and religious center. Its population in 1991 was approximately 800,000.

Ravi Kalia

See also Akbar; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Nehru, Jawaharlal

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ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE In 1885 the All-India National Congress (INC or Congress) was created as a political party. It was ostensibly noncommunal, but Muslims soon regarded it as a Hindu organization. Accordingly, Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk (1841–1917) in 1901 attempted to establish a political organization that would represent Muslim political opinion in India. In October 1906 a deputation of Muslims—the Simla Deputation, led by the Aga Khan (1877–1957)—met the viceroy of India, Lord Minto (1845–1914; viceroy 1905–1910), who encouraged British India's Muslims to create their own political party. He saw it as a moderating influence in the increasingly radical body politic of India, especially among a group of "extremists" in the Congress. Thus encouraged, Viqar ul-Mulk and the Aga Khan invited leading Muslims to meet in Dacca (now Dhaka) on 30 December 1906 to launch a new organization, the All-India Muslim League (AIML or League). The League's first meeting was held at the conclusion of the All-India Muslim Educational Conference (founded in 1886), which was cut short by one day. Its members were asked to attend the new meeting to discuss the creation of a "political association," the aims of which were:

1. To promote among the Muslims of India feelings of loyalty to the British government, and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of government with regard to any of its measures.
2. To profit and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India, and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.
3. To prevent the rise, among the Muslims of India, of any feeling of hostility toward other communities, without prejudice to the aforementioned objects of the League.

The organization was to present "Muslim views" to the government on the eve of the new constitutional developments that were about to take place (the Councils of India Act, 1909). At the League's inaugural session, two joint secretaries and thirty-one members were appointed

to represent six areas of northern India from Bengal to the North West frontier province. Two years later a branch of the AIML was established in London under the presidency of Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928) to act as a pressure lobby to influence British policy regarding India. Syed Wazir Hasan played a prominent role in the party in its early years, serving as joint secretary (1910–1912) and secretary (1912–1919), while the Aga Khan was president until 1913.

In its first five years the AIML met annually, except for 1909, in various cities of India to express Muslim views on the political issues of the day, to counter anti-League organizations, and to convince the British government of its loyalty. It established a few provincial and district Leagues and published a few brochures in various languages; its leaders toured India from time to time, giving talks on the platform and aims of the party.

League leaders presented the British Indian Muslim political community's views to the government. It maintained this pattern of limited activities for most of the first thirty years of its existence, though the League was active enough to enter into an agreement with the Congress in 1916 on a joint political postwar platform, the Lucknow Pact. This agreement established constitutional principles to be followed in future constitutions, which were reflected in the Government of India Act of 1918. Few of the League's followers paid any annual dues, and many of its members and officials were also members of other political parties. Apart from informal contacts with the government, the major event for the AIML was its annual meeting, where a number of resolutions were moved and discussed. These resolutions concerned the political and social questions of the day and, on occasion, events overseas, especially political crises that affected Muslim countries in the Mideast.

From 1906 until 1910 the central office was located at Aligarh. It then moved to Lucknow, and the raja of Mahmudabad (1879–1931) maintained the office through an annual donation of 3,000 rupees. In 1936 it was moved to Delhi, where it remained until 1947. The party membership in 1927 was only around 1,300 members, and in 1930 in Allahabad, when the philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) made his famous call for the creation of a state for the Muslims of South Asia in the north-western part of India, fewer than seventy-five people attended the meeting. To encourage membership, the admission fee of five rupees was abolished, and the annual subscription was reduced from six rupees to one rupee.

The League was often divided by the claims of different leaders who each wanted to assume the role of spokesman of Muslim India. These divisions at times

reflected genuine differences of opinion but were also based merely on personality clashes. In the early years, a clash developed between Fazl-i-Husain (1877–1937), who represented rural interests in the Punjab, and Muhammad Shafi (1869–1932), an urbanite from Lahore. In 1927 the conflict was between Muhammad Shafi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), who had formally joined the League in 1913; Shafi opposed joint electorates, while Jinnah and his increasing number of followers supported them. A decade later the Punjab leader Sikander Hayat Khan (1892–1942) challenged Jinnah for the leadership of the League.

From 1934 until 1947 the name of Mohammad Ali Jinnah was synonymous with that of the AIML, but it was not until 1943 that Jinnah was the undisputed "great leader" (Quaid-i-Azam) of the party. Nonetheless, even after that date Muslim leaders from Bengal and the Punjab, especially Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana (1900–1975; premier of the Punjab 1942–1947), attempted to act in an independent manner, favoring provincial interests over the national ones that the League represented. For his opposition, Khizr was expelled from the League in 1944.

The introduction of the Government of India Act of 1935 ushered in a new phase of politics in India. The election of candidates to provincial assemblies became crucial as Indians, not the British, would dominate provincial legislatures. As a result, the AIML, for the first time in its history, began to be organized as a viable national party. On 4 March 1934 the forceful and charismatic Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a wealthy self-made lawyer who had been a prominent Muslim politician since 1909, became the president of the party. Jinnah nominated the Parliamentary Board, which chose party candidates for the general elections in 1936. Even at this time only three rich supporters kept the party functioning, and it was opposed both by the Congress and regional Muslim parties, especially in Bengal and the Punjab; nonetheless, the party began its slow ascent to national importance.

The rise of the League was due to the national leadership of Jinnah and the organizational work of the independently wealthy general-secretary, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), who, like Jinnah, devoted most of his time over the next ten years to the party. The president of the AIML was elected annually, the general-secretary for three years. Under the president was the Working Committee of a dozen or so members chosen to represent all parts of India; then came the AIML Council, whose members could vote on League policy; and then came the primary party members. This organizational structure was also followed, in theory, in the provinces. However, it was only at the national level that the party had a viable organization, and that evolved only in the years after 1937. The League also had parliamentary parties in the

legislative assemblies both at the center, where Jinnah was the leader, and in the provinces.

In the General Elections of 1936 the League contested half of the seats reserved for Muslims. It obtained some 60 percent of those seats but won practically none of the seats in the Muslim majority provinces, except for Bengal where it gained 39 out of 117 seats. These electoral defeats, however, were to lead to a complete change in League fortunes, as Congress ministries governed in most of the provinces of India in a manner that was viewed as favorable to the Hindu community and detrimental to Muslim interests. As a result, there were a large number of Muslim defections from the Congress. In 1939 the League published two widely discussed reports, *The Pirpur Report* and *The Sharif Report*, that detailed “Congress misgovernment,” further inflaming Muslim feeling toward the Congress and mobilizing Muslims for the League.

In October 1937 at Lucknow, Jinnah initiated a new combativeness in Indian politics by declaring that there were now three political entities in India: the Congress, the British, and the League. Later, the League chalked out a Five-Year Plan for the Muslim community and organized the All-India Muslim Students Federation. At Lahore on 23 March 1940, at its annual meeting, the League moved the “Pakistan Resolution,” which called for the creation of a separate state for the Muslims of India in the northwest and northeast of India. (The term “Pakistan” was first coined in 1930.) An estimated 100,000 people attended that famous session in Lahore. Nearly 90,000 people were then members of the party, and membership would continue to rise. A weekly party newspaper, *Dawn*, was created in 1941, and the following year it became a daily, acquiring national readership. In 1943, the League created a Planning Committee that would plan economic development in the Pakistan areas, and a Committee of Action was established to enforce party discipline and its will among the provincial League parties. In 1944 a Committee of Writers was created; over the next two years it produced ten pamphlets in its Pakistan Literature Series, a considerable number of newspaper articles, and election campaign material, written primarily by students and professors of Aligarh Muslim University—most notably professor Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (1914–1970), who also arranged for League pamphlets to be published by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore, who became the official publisher of the League. The League also actively recruited student workers, especially from Aligarh Muslim University and Punjab University, who would propagate the demand for Pakistan both in the cities and in the rural areas and would campaign for League candidates in election campaigns. With the rise in communal violence in the 1940s, the

League created the paramilitary Muslim National Guard to protect League meetings and to act as bodyguards for Muslim leaders, especially Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

All of the organizational work between 1937 and 1946 led to a tremendous League victory in the 1946 general elections, when it won one-third of the seats in the Punjab, 115 of 250 in Bengal, and almost all of the Muslim seats it contested in other parts of India. Membership of the party was in the millions. This victory supported Jinnah’s claim that he spoke for the Muslims of India and that those Muslims demanded Pakistan. The British increasingly treated him as the spokesman of Muslim India, despite the claims of Congress—especially by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and Mahatma M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948)—that the Congress spoke for all of India, Muslims included. As a result of this electoral victory, an increasing number of Muslim politicians joined the League, while those who did not lost a great deal of credibility among Muslims. The League had demonstrated that it was the party of the Muslims of South Asia. In 1946 the League agreed to enter the interim government, claiming parity with the Congress. Liaquat Ali Khan gained one of the most important positions in the government, that of finance member.

By early 1947 both the Congress and the British agreed that upon independence India should be partitioned into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan. With the creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, Jinnah became governor-general and Ali Khan, prime minister of the new state of Pakistan. The AIML then split into two parties, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Muslim League.

Roger D. Long

See also Congress Party; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Khan, Liaquat Ali; Muslims

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AMBEDKAR, B. R., AND THE BUDDHIST DALITS Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956), independent India’s first law minister, was a leader, scholar, and activist of the “depressed classes,” or untouchables, who are now known as Dalits (meaning the “oppressed” or “crushed”). In 1935 Ambedkar announced that he would not die a Hindu. He encouraged his followers to convert as well, yet left open the question of which religion he and his followers would ultimately choose. After two decades of religious study, negotiation, and deliberation, Ambedkar and approximately 400,000 to 600,000 of his followers converted to Buddhism in Nagpur, India, on 14 October 1956, followed by many more conversions in the ensuing years.

B. R. Ambedkar

Born into the depressed classes, Bhimrao (“Babasaheb”) Ambedkar was educated in Mumbai (Bombay) at Elphinstone College, then in New York at Columbia University, and in London at the London School of Economics and the Inns of Court before returning to India to eventually become the greatest leader of the Dalits. During the independence movement, he and Mahatma Gandhi disagreed over the best approach to gaining rights for lower castes. Gandhi preferred to keep the depressed classes within the Hindu fold, to reform Hinduism from within, and to avoid special rights for depressed classes. In contrast, Ambedkar wanted to ensure rights and representation for lower castes. After representing lower castes at London’s pre-independence Roundtable conferences on constitutional reforms, Ambedkar became law minister under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and was one of the major authors of India’s 1950 Constitution. Building on the nineteenth-century anticaste movement and early-twentieth-century non-Brahman movements, Ambedkar brought Dalit issues to the attention of the new Indian nation.

Mass Conversion of 1956

Ambedkar fearlessly argued against the tyrannies of Hinduism’s caste system, insisting that you “must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, in short with Democracy” (Ambedkar, “The Annihilation of Caste,” 1936, p. 100). His speeches make clear that conversion for anyone born an “untouchable” meant conversion to a new life. “To get human treatment, convert yourselves,” he urged his followers. “Convert for securing equality. Convert for getting liberty.” Ambedkar ultimately



Celebrating Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s Birth Anniversary. Buddhist Dalits carry the image of Ambedkar through the streets on the anniversary of his birth. Ambedkar fearlessly argued against the tyrannies of Hinduism’s caste system, insisting that you must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, in short with Democracy. INDIA TODAY.

chose to convert to Buddhism, finding the egalitarian aspects of Buddhism appealing, as well as its moral and ethical dimensions.

Maharashtra’s outcaste community of Mahars, to which Ambedkar was born, formed the majority among the Dalit converts in Nagpur. A large, relatively well-organized community, the Mahars were particularly receptive to Ambedkar’s arguments against Brahman oppression, thanks to his own Mahar background. Other lower castes revered Ambedkar as well, but his leadership faced powerful competition from Gandhi, who called himself “untouchable by choice” and who argued against outright rebellion or rejection of Hinduism and called for reform within. Nevertheless, Ambedkar ultimately rejected Gandhi’s arguments; after Ambedkar’s own adoption of Buddhism in the last year of his life, conversions continued, resulting in 3 million new Buddhists in the next few years, some from outcaste communities in other states. Statues of Ambedkar have been erected throughout India.

Dalit Movement

After the 1956 conversion and the death of Ambedkar, the Dalit movement grew in popularity and political power. There was a Dalit renaissance in literature, renewed political activism, and a constitutional legacy in the form of affirmative action policies, including university entry positions and service appointments, for Dalits. Although the majority of Dalits are still landless or near-landless agriculturalists in rural areas, Ambedkar's two-pronged strategy—political and administrative representation via affirmative action and personal empowerment via conversion—has kept the Dalits' concerns on India's public agenda.

Reservation, or affirmative action policies for Dalits, officially called the Scheduled Castes, continue to ensure Dalit representation in all legislatures, including Parliament, in government jobs, and at universities. At the local level, some legislative seats are also reserved for Scheduled Caste women. Although Scheduled Caste converts' eligibility for such reserved places was long restricted, Scheduled Caste converts to Buddhism are now eligible for those positions.

Dalit literary contributions keep criticism of the caste system and the treatment of Dalit women in the public eye. Ambedkar stressed the importance of not only religious liberation by conversion and political liberation via agitation and organization, but of social liberation through education. A Dalit literary movement rooted in the Marathi language spread to other Indian languages, verbalizing the growing awareness and rebellion associated with the Dalit movement. A surge of writing in the decades after Ambedkar's death gave voice to Dalits reflecting on their experiences and their new aspirations. The Dalit Sahitya Movement included scathing poetry of protest and blunt condemnation of the religious underpinnings of caste.

Movements such as the Dalit Panthers, modeled in part after the Black Panthers of the United States and primarily active in the early 1970s, challenged caste through protest, agitation, and at times violent confrontation, in addition to literature. Although Ambedkar's Scheduled Castes Federation, later the Republican Party of India, did not become a major political force, lower caste parties have more recently become major players in Indian politics. In short, the Dalit movement has not solved problems of caste discrimination but has empowered many Dalits, mobilized others, and raised awareness, both in India and globally, of the problems and perspectives of modern India's Dalits.

Laura Dudley Jenkins

See also **Caste System**

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AMRITSAR A city in the state of Punjab with a population of 780,000 (in 2001), Amritsar was founded in 1577 by Ram Das, the fourth guru of the Sikhs. Arjun, the fifth guru, is said to have compiled the Adi Granth, the sacred book of the Sikhs, in Amritsar around 1603, placing it in the central Sikh temple, Har Mandir, surrounded by a sacred tank. This temple, still the most sacred place of the Sikh faith, is called the Golden Temple, after its gold-plated cupola. The sixth guru, Hargobind, added the Akal Takht, a stronghold tower of worldly power, to the temple complex. That tower served as a bastion for the defense of the Har Mandir.

Amritsar is the site of a national calamity, the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919. This Bagh (garden) is a central square surrounded by walls. A political meeting was being held here when the British brigadier Sir Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to shoot without warning at the unarmed crowd, which could not disperse. More than 400 dead were found at the end of this massacre, some 1,200 left wounded. The general had intended to "cow down" the rebellious Punjabis in this way, in a calculated act of martial terror. Indian nationalists, however, turned Jallianwala Bagh into a national shrine, marking the decline of the British Raj. Mahatma Gandhi chaired a Congress committee appointed to investigate and report

on the massacre. He was careful to state only proven facts, but his factual report clearly showed that Jallianwala Bagh was a trap, deliberately set by a brutal British officer.

Many years later, Amritsar was marred by another national tragedy. Separatist Sikhs led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale captured the Golden Temple and converted its Akal Takht into a well-defended stronghold. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initially supported Bhindranwale, hoping to weaken Sikh opposition to her Congress Party rule. But he had soon outgrown her tutelage, and she finally felt compelled to order the Indian army to storm the Golden Temple in June 1984. Bhindranwale and his followers died in the Akal Takht, which was destroyed when troops and tanks entered the temple. Indira Gandhi was subsequently assassinated by two of her own Sikh bodyguards in her New Delhi garden.

Dietmar Rothermund

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ANAND, MULK RAJ (1905–2004), prominent Indian novelist. Mulk Raj Anand was one of India's greatest novelists, dubbed by some critics as the “father” of the Indian novel in English. His two greatest novels were *Untouchable*, first published in 1935, and *Coolie*, published a year later. He published many more works, including *Two Leaves and a Bud* (1937), *The Village* (1939), *Black Waters* (1940), and *The Sword and the Sickle* (1942). But none of his later works, including his seven-volume autobiography, *Seven Ages of Man*, had the power or impact of those two brilliant, singularly simple first fruits of Mulk Raj's prolific pen.

He was born in Peshawar, where his father served the British Raj as a soldier, and was educated at Amritsar's Khalsa College, from which he graduated with honors in 1924. He then sailed off to London, where he completed his doctorate in 1929, by which time he was a devout Marxist, volunteering to teach evening classes about India's poverty and the plight of its coolies and untouchables for London's Workers Educational Association. His passionate commitment to Mahatma Gandhi's struggle against the dreadful blight of Hinduism's untouchability was poignantly reflected in the illiterate “untouchable” hero of his first novel, who was moved by the sight of the Mahatma's naked dark torso, as “black” as his own skin,

which gave him a new sense of “national” pride. Anand himself followed Gandhi's revolutionary call to boycott the British Raj and all of its institutions until full freedom was granted to India.

His later works focused less on social issues, turning more inward, as did his last novels, *Morning Face* and *Confessions of a Lover*, published in 1968. He founded the successful Mumbai magazine of the arts, *Marg*, which he initially edited, chaired the Lalit Kala Academy of Arts in New Delhi, and wrote several film scripts and broadcasts. But his first love was the novel, and to that he devoted his best years of creative work, articulating with what he called the “fiery voice of the people,” their cries of pain and frustration, born of poverty, discrimination, and hunger. If a politician should always be judged by his worst work, a writer should be remembered by his best; and at his best Mulk Raj Anand was brilliant.

Stanley Wolpert

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ANANDAMA, MA. See *Devī*.

ĀNDĀL The *bhakti* (devotional) movement began when itinerant Tamil saints composed hymns to Vishnu, Siva, and Dēvī the Goddess in the sixth century A.D. The twelve Vaishnava mystics (*āzḥvār*s) and sixty-three Saiva mystics (*nāyanār*s) were of many castes, from the Brahman to the untouchable. Two women “saints,” the *nāyanār* yogi Karaikkāl Ammaiyār (sixth century) and *āzḥvār* Āndāl (ninth century), left scriptural legacies in Tamil.

Āndāl was the only woman *āzḥvār* and is unique in that she is venerated as an incarnation of goddess Lakshmi. Āndāl-Lakshmi's tenth-century bronze icon is housed in a shrine within Srīvilliputtūr temple. Āndāl's adoptive father Vishnu Chitta, a weaver of garlands and an *āzḥvār*, visited the court of Srimara Srivallabhadeva Pandya (815–863 A.D.).

Āndāl wrote *Tiruppāvai* and *Nācchiyār Tirumozhi*, two elegant, sensuous, erotic compositions to her divine lover



“VĀRANAM ĀYIRAM”

The velvety red
of the ladybirds
whose flutter fills the air
in the dark grove of Maliruncōlai
brings to mind
the glowing red
of the kumkum powder
on my dark lord's forehead.
Once he churned the ocean
for the nectar of the gods
using Mandara mountain
as a churning rod.
I flounder in the net
of that lord
of the handsome shoulders.
Can I escape
alive?

(*Nācchiyār Tirumozhi* [9,1],
Vidya Dehejia, trans., 107)

Vishnu-Tirumāl. Āndāl's work reflects the influence of both Tamil and Sanskrit literature. Together with Periāzhvār's cradle poems devoted to the “infant” Krishna, Āndāl's hymns constitute a sizable portion of the Vaishnava scriptures, the *Nālāyira Divya Prabandham* (Four thousand sacred verses).

Life and Legend

Āndāl's life is shrouded in a myth similar to that of Sītā in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Lakshmī was supposedly born as Āndāl as she wished to be Vishnu's greatest devotee on Earth. Periāzhvār discovered the infant beside a *tulasi* (basil) bush, and he called her Kōdai for her magnificent hair. As a child, Kōdai-Āndāl seems to have been enchanted with his garlands for Tirumāl, wearing them in his absence and peering at her reflection in a well near the shrine. Although the flowers were strangely fragrant, her father chided her as he could not offer desecrated flowers for the deity. That night, Tirumāl visited Periāzhvār in a dream and told him that he wished to wear only Āndāl's used garlands; the saint realized that his daughter was Lakshmī herself. Āndāl's love for Tirumāl grew, and she urged her father to recite the names of his sacred shrines, and she refused to marry anyone else. This absorption in a divine lover, her ecstasy, and final disappearance into the icon presage myths about the women *bhakti* saints, Akkamahādevī (twelfth century), and Mīrabai (sixteenth century). Legend states that Tirumāl visited Āndāl in a dream when she was fourteen, inviting her to Srīrangam temple, where he is worshiped as Lord Ranganāthā. She

is believed to have worn her bridal finery and to have merged beatifically into the icon. A twelfth-century inscription states that a garden was created in Srīrangam in her name.

Tiruppāvai and Nācchiyār Tirumozhi

In *Tiruppāvai*, Āndāl assumes the role of a *gopi*, or milkmaid, in love with Krishna. Its thirty stanzas realistically depict human emotions and village customs. They are popularly sung by women in the month of Mārgazhi (December) prior to the Tai (January) festival of Pongal. *Tiruppāvai* is in the genre of a *pāvai pātal*, and it describes women bathing in the river, anointing themselves with turmeric, and fashioning clay images of Lakshmī, to whom they prayed for a fruitful life. These female folk rites are described in the sixth-century Tamil Paripatal, and in the tenth-century Sanskrit Bhagavata Purāṇa. *Tiruppāvai* has been translated into Telegu and Kannada. Āndāl is also the chief character in the sixteenth-century play *Amukta Mahyada*, by Krishna Dēva Rāya of Vijayanagar. Her more mature work, *Nācchiyār Tirumozhi*, consists of fourteen hymns in 143 stanzas, pulsating with the mystic's emotions of hope, yearning, separation, and final joy at salvation. One canto, “*Vāranam āyiram*,” describing her dream of being wedded to Tirumāl, is sung at weddings even today.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Bhakti**

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ANDHRA PRADESH A state in Southern India, Andhra Pradesh has a population of 75.7 million (as of 2001); its area is 106,000 square miles (275,000 sq. km.); its capital, Hyderabad. The major language is Telugu, which belongs to the Dravidian family of languages. The state in its present form was established in 1956, when it merged with the territory of the former princely state of Hyderabad. The other parts of the state had earlier belonged to the Madras Presidency of British India. Madras Presidency was a multilingual province in which the Telugu speakers felt subordinate to the political dominance of the Tamil speakers. They stressed their historic linguistic identity by referring to the Andhra (Satavahana) dynasty, whose realm had expanded across the Deccan, along the Godavari River, from about the second century B.C. to the second century A.D. The Telugu linguistic movement spread in the early twentieth century and had its first visible success in the establishment of Andhra University at Waltair. Although Telugu is a Dravidian language, the movement for Dravidian solidarity, emanating as it did from Tamil Nadu, never appealed to the Andhras.

When Mahatma M. K. Gandhi reorganized the provincial committees of the All-India National Congress in 1920, the Telugu speakers demanded one of their own. Their activities remained restricted to the British Indian areas, however, because the princely state of Hyderabad was under autocratic rule until India achieved independence in 1947. Unlike other rulers who acceded to the Republic of India in 1947, the Muslim nizam of Hyderabad refused, hoping to win British support for his claim to independence based on the large size of his state and his own fortune and exalted princely status. Since this state was completely surrounded by Indian territory, however, there was no hope that either Britain or India would allow Hyderabad to live in splendid isolation. A "police action," as the government of India called it, forced the nizam to accede to India in September 1948, when the Indian army moved in.

From 1946 to 1951 the Telengana region of the state of Hyderabad was shaken by a militant mass peasant movement against their landlords. This movement, directed by Indian Communists, was finally called off in 1951. Meanwhile the Telugu speakers in the coastal areas had intensified their struggle for an independent linguistic state, which culminated in 1953 in the fast-unto-death of one of their leaders, Potti Sriramulu. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who had until then resisted the

formation of linguistic states, feeling that they would pose a threat to national unity, relented, approving the formation of Andhra Pradesh, which thus became the first linguistic state in India in 1953, soon to be followed by many more. The amalgamation of Andhra with the erstwhile state of Hyderabad and the rise of the city of Hyderabad as the state capital shifted the political center of gravity from coastal Andhra to the western part of the state. Most people of the impoverished region of Telengana felt, nevertheless, neglected due to the preponderance of wealthier and more assertive coastal people. Recently the demand for a separate state of Telengana has been revived, particularly in view of the excision of neighboring Chhattisgarh from the state of Madhya Pradesh.

In the assembly elections of 2004 a new party, the Telengana Rashtra Samiti, led by K. Chandrasekhara Rao, scored a great success which was also reflected in the simultaneous elections to the central Parliament (Lok Sabha). Chandrasekhara Rao became a cabinet minister in the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. The excision of Telengana from Andhra Pradesh now seemed to be a foregone conclusion. The new state would include ten districts around the present state capital Hyderabad.

The Rise and Fall of the Telugu Desam Party

Andhra Pradesh long remained a bastion of the National Congress Party. A Congress politician from Andhra Pradesh, P. V. Narasimha Rao, became the first South Indian prime minister of India. But while his career flourished in Delhi's national politics, a new, vigorous party challenged the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh. This was the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), led by the charismatic film star N. T. Rama Rao. TDP put an end to Congress rule in Andhra in the 1980s. In the 1990s the TDP was led by Rama Rao's son-in-law, Chandrababu Naidu, who emerged as a vigorously charismatic and efficient chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. He is a pioneer of "e-governance," impressing even Bill Gates, who visited him, with the information system stored in his laptop. Naidu literally has all of Andhra's vital facts and figures at his fingertips. Fascinated with information technology, Naidu neglected the poor peasants of Andhra Pradesh who obviously voted for the Congress Party in the assembly elections of 2004. The Congress leader, Dr. Y. S. Rajashekar Reddy, replaced Naidu as Chief Minister. The TDP won only 49 seats whereas the Congress Party and its allies captured 226 of the 294 assembly seats. The sudden fall of the TDP was as dramatic as its previous rise.

Andhra Pradesh is one of the poorer agricultural states of India. Its industrial base is still very small, mostly concentrated in Hyderabad. Naidu hopes to make Hyderabad an Information Technology-center to rival Bangalore.

But this will not be achieved easily. In terms of per capita income, Andhra Pradesh is close to the national average, but its literacy rate is much below the national average. As far as urbanization is concerned, Andhra Pradesh is also far behind most other states of India. It has only three centers with more than 1 million inhabitants: Hyderabad, Vishakapatnam, and the Vijayawada-Guntur region.

Dietmar Rothmund

See also **Hyderabad**

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ANDREWS, C. F. (1871–1940), religious leader and social reformer, one of Mahatma Gandhi’s closest followers. Charles Freer (“Charlie”) Andrews was born in 1871 at Newcastle upon Tweed, U.K. In 1893 he graduated from Pembroke College, Cambridge, and in 1897 was ordained into the ministry of the Church of England. Subsequently he was both lecturer and chaplain of Pembroke College and then, in 1903, was appointed by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) as a member of the Cambridge Brotherhood in Delhi. In March 1904, Andrews arrived in India to take up a teaching assignment at St. Stephen’s College. Andrews and the Indian educator Gopal Krishna Gokhale became friends, and it was Gokhale who first acquainted Andrews with the wrongs of the system of indentured labor and the sufferings of Indians in South Africa. Andrews decided to go to South Africa at the end of 1913 to assist Mahatma M. K. Gandhi in his nonviolent resistance movement, or *satyagraha*. Upon his arrival in Durban he was met by Gandhi, whereupon Andrews bent down and touched his feet. Of the occasion, Andrews later wrote, “Our hearts met from the first moment we saw one another, and they have remained united by the strongest ties of love ever since.”

Another of Andrews’s friends was Rabindranath Tagore. Andrews was attracted to Tagore’s deep concern for social reform, and eventually Andrews made Tagore’s experimental school, Shantiniketan, the “abode of Peace,” near Calcutta (Kolkata), his own headquarters. Though Andrews never departed from the Church of England, he did resign from the Brotherhood of the Cambridge Mission. In his own spiritual pilgrimage

Andrews was convinced that the cause of Christ was the cause of exploited laborers, rejected outcasts, and those who struggle for work and bread.

After leaving South Africa in July 1914, Andrews traveled to many countries, including Fiji, Japan, Kenya, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), mostly on behalf of Indian laborers. In the 1920s, he became closely involved with the affairs of the All India Trade Union Congress, of which he became president in 1925. In the early 1930s, Andrews assisted Gandhi in preparations for the Round Table Conference in London. But it was Andrews’s idea of a minister of reconciliation, first promulgated from Cambridge in 1935, that was unique. Andrews himself was widely acknowledged as a minister of reconciliation wherever he went. Many across the religious spectrum were influenced by Andrews. When he died in Calcutta, on 4 April 1940, his friend Mahatma Gandhi had traveled across India to be at his side.

C. F. Andrews was the author of numerous works, including three books on Mahatma Gandhi. His writings include *The Oppression of the Poor* (1921); *The Indian Problem* (1922); *The Rise and Growth of Congress in India* (1938); and *The True India: A Plea for Understanding* (1939).

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

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ANDY, S. PULNEY (1831–1909), first Indian recipient of a British medical degree. Born in Tricinopoly of Hindu parents in 1831, Pulney Andy completed studies in Madras Christian College before going to England in 1859. He was the first Indian student to register for a British medical degree. He became a fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons and returned to India in 1862. He was baptized in Calicut, 3 May 1863, but did not join a church.

On the recommendation of the secretary of state, the Madras government created a special appointment for him as superintendent of vaccination and posted him to Malabar. Among other accomplishments, he published a widely accepted pamphlet, “The Protective Influence of Vaccination.” He also edited a newspaper, *Eastern Star*, and was involved with the social and political journal *Cosmopolite*.

After his retirement, Andy conceived the idea of a National Church of India (NCI), acknowledged at the time as “the first indigenous movement of Christianity.” His desire was to unite the various denominations into one church, suited to Indian culture and sensibilities, and to encourage independence, self-reliance, and self-government in the ministrations of a church that was not dependent on foreign aid. He devoted both purse and energy to this cause.

At the inauguration of the NCI, on 12 September 1886, he said; “we [Indian Christians] should look about to maintain ourselves instead of idly continuing to depend on the charitable support chiefly contributed by the people of Europe. Let us not play the part of the professional beggar any longer.” Pulney Andy was equally forthright with his missionary friends. While acknowledging the good they had done, he believed they lacked a knowledge of the intricate social and religious practices of the Hindus and failed to present Christianity in a way conducive to the development of the church in India. He was convinced that there was a need for an Indian church that did “not reflect Scotch Presbyterianism, nor English Anglicanism, nor German Lutheranism,” but that would “combine into a harmonious whole the best features of all denominations” (*NCI Third Annual Report 1888–1889*: 101).

The idea of a national church received very little encouragement from the missionaries or from Indian Christians. In 1900 the publication *Harvest Field* referred to Pulney Andy as one who had the misfortune to live ahead of his time. He did not live to see his dream fulfilled. It was not until 1947, in fact, that a union of churches took place to create the Church of South India. Pulney Andy died in September 1909 in his seventy-eighth year.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS

This entry consists of the following articles:

WAR ONE (1838–1842)

WAR TWO (1878–1880)

WAR THREE (MAY–AUGUST 1919)

WAR ONE (1838–1842)

Throughout the nineteenth century, the British government watched with concern as the Russian empire expanded across Central Asia. The British hoped to enlist the Persian government in what soon came to be known as the “Great Game,” the Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of the strategic approaches to India. However, when Britain had declined to aid Persia during its own conflict with Russia in 1826, Persia chose to entertain Russian diplomats in Tehran in 1838, launching what Britain assumed to be a Russian-inspired attempt to seize Herat, the gateway to southern Afghanistan and thence to India via the Bolan Pass.

Related events in the Afghan capital, Kabul, the northern gateway to India via the Khyber Pass, gave further cause for alarm. By 1835, the Afghan amir, Dost Mohammad Barakzai, had finally thwarted the efforts of his predecessor, Shah Shuja Sadozai, to reclaim the country Dost Mohammad had seized from him almost a decade earlier. Only Herat was still in Sodozai hands, but Ranjit Singh, Shah Shuja’s Sikh ally, had taken Peshawar for himself. In 1837 and 1838, Dost Mohammad assured a visiting British East India Company envoy, Alexander Burnes, that he would welcome an alliance with the British if the company returned Peshawar to him. Because Ranjit Singh was then a close ally of the company, Burnes could hold out little hope for such a concession, leaving a disappointed Dost Mohammad open to a “treaty” with the Persians and Russians.

A Russian diplomatic mission arrived in Kabul just as Burnes was departing. On his return to India, Burnes used news of the Russian mission to encourage the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to do whatever was necessary to secure an alliance with Dost Mohammad. However, the Russophobic Auckland and his political secretary, William Macnaghten, were convinced that this Russian presence in Kabul constituted a threat to India. In the spring of 1838, Auckland dispatched an Indian force to take the Persian island of Karrak, and that July, he laid plans to forcibly replace Dost Mohammad. This was to be accomplished by a tripartite alliance between the East India Company, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja. The latter, a now pliant and penniless exile in India, pledged to supply Auckland’s government with troops to help reinstall him as amir in Kabul, where he promised he would be warmly welcomed. Auckland regarded the idea of installing a willing client like Shah Shuja in Kabul as too good an opportunity to miss, and on 10 December 1838, he ordered his British and Afghan “Army of the Indus” into Afghanistan. Ranjit Singh refused to let that army pass through his state, so it entered Afghanistan by crossing Sind and entering the country through the Bolan Pass.

By August 1839, the Army of the Indus had fought its way to Kabul, installed a less-than-welcome Shah Shuja as amir, and accepted the surrender of Dost Mohammad, who was sent into exile in India. Auckland, lauded as a hero in Britain, was given an earldom. Macnaghten, then serving as the British political agent in Kabul, was rewarded with the governorship of Bombay; however, before he could leave to assume his new post, conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated.

In the fall of 1841, an insurgent war led by Dost Mohammad's son, Akbar Khan, made Macnaghten desperately call for reinforcements. Auckland, pressed for money elsewhere, not only denied this request, but also cut the British subsidies to the Afghan leaders Macnaghten was employing to keep Akbar Khan at bay. These decisions triggered an uprising in Kabul that led to the murder of Macnaghten and Alexander Burnes, then serving as his assistant. It also paralyzed the Army of the Indus. In January 1842, its Kabul garrison was forced to withdraw to its similarly hard-pressed garrison in Jalalabad. The retreating British-Indian units, some 16,000 soldiers and camp followers, were ambushed by Afghans in the Khurd-Kabul Pass; only one wounded doctor survived to reach Jalalabad. One hundred other hostages had been taken by Akbar Khan.

Auckland had by then been replaced by Lord Ellenborough, who dispatched a British column to retake Kandahar and another to retake Kabul. They completed their missions and linked up in the Afghan capital. There they secured the release of the survivors of the Army of the Indus, blew up the commercial and administrative heart of the city, called the Bala Hisar, and then returned to India. Shah Shuja, who had remained in Kabul, was assassinated in April 1842. Dost Mohammad Khan returned to Afghanistan the following year. He ruled as amir until his death twenty years later.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Afghanistan; Auckland, Lord**

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WAR TWO (1878–1880)

The Afghan amir, Shir Ali, had barely survived a prolonged war of succession that followed the death of his

father, Dost Mohammad, in 1863. In the 1870s, he sought to avoid repetition of that struggle by allying himself with the British East India Company which, in return for his following its guidance in foreign affairs, would guarantee his country's independence, providing British arms and money in the event of a Russian invasion, and recognizing his lineage's claim to the throne of Kabul. These terms, however, were twice rejected by Britain's Liberal governments in London as an unwarranted and costly expansion of imperial commitments. Thus rebuffed, Shir Ali sought similar terms from Russia, sparking another Anglo-Afghan confrontation.

Benjamin Disraeli's British Conservative Party ousted William Gladstone's Liberals in the elections of 1877, just prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to 1879. The new Conservative government was committed to a more active imperial policy and was in no mood to permit Afghanistan to slip under Russian influence. It directed the Indian viceroy, Lord Lytton, to send a mission to Kabul that would offer Shir Ali the alliance he had long desired, though it would also provide for a British Resident in Herat. Lytton's demand that Shir Ali receive a British mission and Resident was matched by a Russian demand that he receive a mission led by General Count Stolietoff.

Caught between two such powerful suitors, Shir Ali sought to keep both at bay, declining to receive either mission. He turned back the British mission at the Khyber Pass, but was not able to prevent an unbidden Russian delegation from forcing its way into Kabul. Rightly fearing that its arrival would alienate the British, Shir Ali sought from the visiting Russians a pledge to defend his country from British attack. Soon after, Stolietoff withdrew from Kabul, but too late for Shir Ali to meet an ultimatum from Lytton that he receive a British mission by 20 November 1878. Shir Ali's reply was dated 19 November, but reached Lytton only at the month's end.

On 21 November, Lytton launched a multipronged invasion of Afghanistan, quickly occupying the country; facing exile, Shir Ali died in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1879. By the Treaty of Gandamak in May of that year, Shir Ali's sole surviving son, Yaqub Khan, was placed on his throne under the watchful eye of Lytton's agent, Louis Cavanagri, who was expected to dominate Afghan affairs after the fashion of a Resident in an Indian state. Four months later, Cavanagri was killed in an Afghan insurgency that for a second time made a shambles of what initially seemed a great British military and political success in that country. On this occasion, however, the British military response was rapid and decisive. General Frederick Roberts brutally suppressed the Afghan resistance around Kabul. With logistical help from Shir Ali's

nephew, Abdor Rahman, Roberts rushed to Kandahar, where, on 29 July 1880, Ayub Khan, the brother of the now discredited Yaqub Khan, had crushed a British force at Maiwand, just outside that city. Roberts defeated Ayub's forces there in September, after which Abdor Rahman drove Ayub out of Herat and into exile in India. But in April 1881, under orders of the newly returned Liberal government, Roberts handed Kandahar, and effectively the rest of the country, over to Abdor Rahman, who was then confirmed as amir. The new amir pledged to have no relations with Russia, and received an annual subsidy, which he used to start transforming his tribal state into a nation.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Afghanistan**

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WAR THREE (MAY–AUGUST 1919)

From the end of the Second Afghan War until his death in 1901, Afghan amir Abdor Rahman preserved his slowly modernizing buffer state against Russian and British machinations along his frontiers. He chafed, however, at the British interpretation of his receipt of a subsidy as a mark of dependency, and he sought to gain British recognition of Afghan national sovereignty. Though he failed in these efforts, he remained a loyal British ally on the most practical of grounds: whereas Russia entertained notions of conquering Afghanistan en route to India, the British were not bent on conquering Afghanistan to facilitate the building of an empire in Central Asia. Abdor Rahman's son, Habibollah, continued to pursue his father's policies.

During and after World War I, Habibollah sought to aid the Ottoman Empire and those Muslims resisting the Russian revolution, but he was careful to avoid any step that might provoke a break with British India. His failure to offer greater support to these doomed Muslim enterprises further raised the ire of fundamentalist forces within Afghanistan already opposed to the modest steps he and his father had taken toward modernization and led to his assassination on 20 February 1919. That May,

Habibollah's third son and ultimate successor, Amanollah, diverted the energies of his father's political opposition into what proved to be a quixotic invasion of British India. Though much depleted by the demands of World War I, the Indian army responded with its entire arsenal of modern arms, including aerial bombardment. Amanollah sued for peace after a month of unequal combat. The war had, however, achieved his most cherished objectives. It discredited the Muslim conservatives in Kabul and, through the 21 November amendments to the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 8 August 1919, it secured Britain's acknowledgment of Afghanistan's status as an independent sovereign state in full control of its own foreign affairs.

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See also **Afghanistan**

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ARJUNA. See **Mahābhārata**.

ARMED FORCES The Indian armed forces have long enjoyed the respect and confidence of the country for the professionalism of its officers and men and women. The Indian army, navy, and air force still retain the basic organizational and rank structure prevalent in the British armed forces. India's armed forces are all-volunteer services, and recruitment is on a countrywide basis. The supreme command of the armed forces is vested in the president of India. The Ministry of Defence, run mostly by civil servants, is responsible for both formulating policy and for the administration of the armed forces. In 2002 the ministry was renamed the Integrated Headquarters of Defence. As in most democracies, the minister of defense is a senior political figure and not a serving military officer. All three service headquarters, commanded by four-star officers, are located in New Delhi.

Following India's nuclear tests (1998), the Kargil conflict (1999), and major mobilization (2001–2002), India's defense and intelligence establishments have undergone extensive reorganization, with an emphasis on integrated staff structures involving civil servants. The Indian



Indian Army on Duty in Kashmir. Soldier walks the calm waters in Kashmir, a scene of periodic bloodletting between Pakistani and Indian troops. INDIA TODAY.

defense budget (\$16.73 billion for 2004–2005) is comparatively transparent and amounts to approximately 2.5 percent of gross domestic product. This percentage is similar to Indian defense spending from 1947 to 1962. Though all three services list reserves, little operational planning is based on the call-up of reservists. Hence, the value and significance of reserves is doubtful. This budget does not include expenses of the greatly enlarged paramilitary forces and some costs of the country's missile and nuclear weapons programs.


The Army

The army is the largest and the most senior of the defense services. Approximately 54 percent of the defense budget is allocated to it. At independence in 1947, India received 66 percent of the British Indian Army, amounting to 310,000 officers and men. Over the next five years, the army made up for the loss of Muslim units and British technical staff, stabilizing at around 400,000 and remaining at that level until the setback of the Sino-Indian War (1962). The army was thereafter enlarged to 825,000. Its strength increased further as a result of the Kargil War and the mobilization of 2001–2002 to an estimated 1.3 million, the second-largest army in the world. Despite growth in armor,

mechanization, and firepower, it is basically oriented toward the infantry, both in numbers and in tactical doctrine.

At the behest of General K. N. Cariappa, the first Indian to head the army, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru furnished the mandate for the army as: “primarily to defend India against external aggression; secondly to assist the government, when asked to give such assistance,” commonly referred to as “aid to civil authority.” The army was also expected to cooperate fully with the navy and the air force both in war and peace. The army is headed by its chief of army staff (COAS). He is assisted by the vice-chief and principal staff officers (PSOs), consisting of two deputy chiefs of army staff, adjutant general, master general of ordnance, quartermaster general, military secretary, and the engineer-in-chief. The general staff is headed by a three-star general, the vice-chief, and includes the directorates of military operations and intelligence.

Five field armies, called commands, led by army commanders (lieutenant generals), carry geographical names. Northern Command is at Udhampur, Western Command at Chandi Mandir, Central Command at Lucknow, Eastern Command at Kolkata, and Southern Command



Republic Day Parade, New Delhi. A Sikh army regiment in perfect formation at the Republic Day Parade, New Delhi. AMIT PASRICHA.

in Pune. A Training Command (ARTRAC) is located at Shimla. The country is also divided into administrative formations called areas (under a major general) and sub-areas (commanded by brigadiers).

Each command consists of one or more corps. Of the twelve corps, three are designated as strike corps, the other nine as holding corps. Each corps consists of two or more divisions, along with additional engineers, medical services, aviation assets, artillery, and logistics. Each strike corps has an air defense group. Divisions are classified as armored (3), infantry (18), mountain (10), RAPID (semimechanized infantry divisions, 4), and artillery (2). About a third of the infantry divisions have more brigades than the standard three, and the brigades may have more than the traditional three battalions. Each infantry division includes an artillery brigade and an armored regiment. The mountain divisions have reduced motor transport.

Combat forces. The army is divided into “arms” (combat) and “services” (support units). Arms are cavalry (armor), mechanized infantry, infantry, artillery, signal,

combat engineers, army aviation and air defense units. The primary unit is the battalion, though it is designated as a regiment in armored, artillery, engineer, and signal units. Each armored regiment has 45 tanks. The upgraded T-72 and the newly inducted T-90 form the bulk of Indian armor. Slow induction of the indigenous Arjun Mk I is proceeding as well.

The Indian army’s air defense forces are considerable, with at least 50 units divided into 35 gun and 15 missile regiments. Virtually every type of operational Russian surface to air missiles (SAMs) are in India’s inventory. More than 4,000 pieces of towed artillery, with calibers ranging from 155 millimeter to 105 millimeter, are in service. Lighter artillery (105 millimeter, 122 millimeter, and 130 millimeter) is being replaced by the 155 millimeter gun. The latter, manufactured by Bofors, proved to be exceptionally effective especially in the mountains. However, the weapon is tainted by the high cost of spares and ammunition, and a scandal associated with its purchase. Reportedly, six Artillery Groups of the surface to surface missiles, the Prithvi and the Agni, were to be inducted into the army by 2005.

Most of India's infantry still moves into battle on foot, though about 2,300 infantry combat vehicles, consisting of the tracked BMP-1 (700) and BMP-2 (900) and the wheeled BRDM-2s, are in service. Infantry's basic weapon, the 7.62 millimeter FN-FAL rifle is being replaced by the lighter, equally effective 5.56 millimeter INSAS assault rifle. The belated modernization of the infantry includes induction of handheld thermal imagers, long range observation systems, night vision goggles, antimaterial rifles, battle surveillance radar, and body armor for the troops.

The army's engineers perform the traditional functions of bridging and breaching, land survey, the laying and clearing of mines, and civil engineering works.

Cyberspace is the crucial new element in war. Accordingly, the Information Technology Road Map 2000 envisaged all officers to be computer literate by 2002. The Army Radio Engineering Network and Army Static Communications Network were upgraded using UHF, fiber-optics, and communications satellites. The Low Intensity Conflict Operations Very Small Aperture Terminal system for direct voice and data communications is in limited service. Field trials of Akash, a secure tactical battlefield communications network, are in progress. Two other systems are under development: the Army Strategic Operational Information Dissemination System and the Defence Communications Network.

The army has about 2,000 men trained and equipped in NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) warfare. The army's attack helicopters are piloted by the air force. In 2003 the army undertook a five-year modernization plan. Acquisition of more precision guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, weapon locating radars, self-propelled artillery, ground sensors, and a reduction of the different types of artillery guns and mortars is planned.

History. During the seventeenth century, three ports were the nuclei for the creation of both the British Indian Empire and the Indian army. Watchmen and doorkeepers in Madras, two companies of Rajputs in Bombay, and an ensign and thirty men in Bengal were the first armed men raised by the British to protect the factories of the British East India Company. The three areas became eponymous presidencies, each with its own army. In 1748 Major Stringer Lawrence founded the Indian army when he organized the watchmen and others into permanent companies under European officers. In 1757 Robert Clive further systemized the force by providing it with scarlet uniforms, standardized weapons, and equipment at company expense. Clive was also among the first to recognize that the collection of land revenue was far

more lucrative than mere trade. However, to receive land revenue, the right had to be acquired by conquest, perfidy, or purchase. As conquest was often the favored option, the East India Company, a commercial venture, concluded that the cost of bringing European or American mercenaries for fighting in India would greatly reduce profits. Hence, Indians, paid substantially less than their European or American counterparts, but drilled, trained, and equipped to their standards, and led by ambitious and avaricious British officers, routed much larger forces of the decaying Mughal empire in two lopsided victories at Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764). During the hundred years of piecemeal conquest of India, the army also fought in other imperial wars ranging from the Philippines (1762) to China (1840–1854). Not all wars were victorious. The First Afghan War (1838–1842) was an unmitigated disaster.

In 1857 the total strength of the army was 234,500. The largest was the Bengal army (137,500). Regiments of this army were at the forefront of the Struggle of 1857 (called the First War of Independence by Indians and the Great Mutiny by most British). This event changed the nature of Indo-British relations, the administration of the country, and the composition of the army. India had a long established warrior caste (Kshatriyas). Others, especially Brahmans and the Muslim tribes of Central India, were well-known for their military prowess. The British had largely recruited from these groups, especially among those from the lower Indo-Gangetic Plain. After 1857 enlistment from this area was drastically reduced, and the concept of the "martial races" was advanced. Classes that had cooperated with the British during the uprising of 1857 were declared martial. Future enlistment was largely limited to these groups: Sikhs, Punjabi Mussalmans, Rajputs, Jats, Ranghars, Pathans, and the hill-men from Kumaon, Garhwal, and Nepal (Gorkhas). Field artillery was placed exclusively with British forces. Generally, for every two Indian units a British unit was stationed in the same cantonment or field formation.

In England, uproar followed the dispatch of Indian army units to Malta and Cyprus in 1878; was perceived as inappropriate for colonial troops of color to kill or defeat Europeans in battle. Consequently, the Indian army was not sent to South Africa during the intermittent Boer Wars (1881–1901).

In 1895 the three presidency armies were amalgamated to form the modern Indian army. By then, ambitious British officers competed to join the Indian army because of its higher pay, quicker promotion, and more chances of active service than in the British army or other colonial military units. Accordingly, the Indian army was well managed and the troops well motivated through a

system of rewards. There were cash awards, decorations, land grants, and special privileges for soldiers and their families. However, despite dazzling uniforms and landscaped cantonments, the army was neither trained nor equipped to fight a major war outside India.

At the onset of World War I (1914–1918), the army's strength was only 155,000 men. To stop the Germans in France, the policy of not pitting Indians against Europeans was hastily suspended. Two ill-equipped infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade were rushed to France, and the Germans were stopped. Nevertheless, the performance of the army was not outstanding. This, too, was the case in Mesopotamia and East Africa. Altogether, 1.3 million Indians served. The dead, wounded, or missing totaled 113,743. For the first time, large numbers of Indians saw for themselves incompetence and cowardice among British and other Europeans. The soldiers also found Britain to be cold and shabby, not quite the glamorous country of their imagination. In addition, they found the French warm and hospitable to both their own colonial forces and to Indians. Not unexpectedly, increased political awareness and national consciousness entered the minds of the soldiers (especially Sikhs and Pathans). Religion was no longer an understated factor, as many Muslim Pathans deserted to their coreligionists, the Turks and their allies, the Germans. Great changes were inevitable. Slow and reluctant induction of Indians into the officer corps was undertaken as a result of a pledge given by the British government in 1917. The army was reorganized: a number of new supporting organizations ("Services") were added; infantry battalions were amalgamated into larger regiments of four or five units each, and cavalry regiments were standardized (1921–1922).

During World War II (1939–1945), the Indian army ballooned from 205,000 to 2,181,960 men, the largest volunteer army in history. It fought with distinction in Abyssinia, Eritrea, Italy, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sudan. Unfortunately, it was defeated in Malaya and Singapore (60,000 were taken prisoner). Then it fought back in the steamy jungles of Burma to become the only army to defeat the Japanese by ground fighting alone. However, only the operations of the PAI (Persia, Arabia, Iraq) Force, consisting of about three divisions, were conducted by the General Headquarters of the Indian army. Elsewhere, Indian army divisions and units constituted parts of British or Allied armies. Indians held no significant staff appointments, and only one commanded a brigade in battle. Clearly, the Indian army, the most complete of all colonial forces, functioned only as an adjunct to other imperial forces, and Indians had little experience in higher staff or command. The army lost 36,092 dead, 64,350 wounded, and 79,489 prisoners.

Increased political consciousness manifested itself in the latter. Prisoners in Germany formed the 2,000-man Indian Legion to fight for the country's independence. Under the charismatic leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose, a former president of the Indian National Congress, an astonishing 40,000 prisoners of war (POWs) in Japanese hands initially volunteered to join the Indian National Army. Ultimately 16,300 POWs served in this poorly led, poorly equipped, but well-meaning renegade army.

The end of World War II did not bring peace to the Indian army. There was an internal upheaval on how to deal with men who had carried out the treasonable though patriotic act of joining the German- and Japanese-sponsored forces. Eventually some nominal punishments were meted out, but the men were not allowed to return to the army. The final bizarre act in the age of colonialism was the dispatch of more than four divisions of this colonial army to Indonesia and Indochina to restore colonial Dutch and French rule and sustained considerable casualties. Indian independence and partition followed in 1947.

In August 1947 the army, disorganized by its own vivisection and the withdrawal of British technical and other ranks, was tasked to manage the movement of 14 million refugees between India and the newly created Pakistan and to prevent communal bloodletting in what quickly became a humanitarian disaster. An additional responsibility fell in September on the western edge of the country. The army had to pacify the Junagadh region, where a popular revolt against the *nawāb* had broken out. In October, troops were hurriedly airlifted to the northern edge of the country, where Pakistan-assisted tribals had invaded the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Fourteen months of desultory, sometimes desperate fighting followed. The state was left divided between India and Pakistan. In September 1948, the army accelerated the integration into India of the recalcitrant princely state of Hyderabad. During the 1950s the army restored the coherence of units, administrative, training and command structures weakened by partition. Some civil works, disaster relief, peacekeeping with the United Nations, and counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast region and in Andhra Pradesh were also carried out.

The momentous decade of the 1960s began with the liberation of the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman, and Diu after protracted negotiations for the peaceful return of these territories to India had failed (1961). Indian troops formed the largest contingent in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in the Congo (1960–1963). Hubris followed. The famous 4th Division was defeated in the Northeast region during the Sino-Indian border

war of October–November 1962. Despite incomplete expansion and modernization in the wake of the 1962 debacle, national confidence was restored by creditable military performance in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. The army sent troops from three infantry battalions to Sri Lanka in April 1971 to quell a sudden Marxist uprising. Further triumph followed later in the year. In a lightning multipronged campaign in December 1971, Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) was liberated. Still more challenges emerged: Sikh recruits mutinied after the army's intervention in Sikhism's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar (June 1984), and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka (1987–1990) failed.

There were successes as well: in 1989 a combined arms intervention prevented a coup in the Maldives; in 1999 the Indian army achieved a remarkable victory against entrenched Pakistani forces in the desolate frozen heights in Kargil. Periodic bloodletting between the two armies still continues in another similar region of Kashmir, the Siachen glacier (since 1984). The army is active in UN operations and in quelling a rebellion in Kashmir and the varied, long-standing insurgencies in the small northeastern states of the country. The protracted deployment in remote border areas and in insurgency-ridden regions has made the profession less attractive for the officer corps than in earlier years.

Enlistment, especially in pre-independence combat regiments with “fixed class” (only one caste or ethnic group forms the unit) and “mixed class” (two or three castes or ethnic groups in a unit) battalions is by selective recruitment. Hence, troops in about 60 percent of arms are still selectively recruited. There are no such restrictions for officers, though in general no more than a third of officers in a unit are from the same ethnic group or caste as the troops. The tradition of the son following in the father's footsteps by joining the army is still alive, but with a difference: sons of junior commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers form an increasing portion of the officer corps. Since 1991, female officers (50 to 100 per year) have joined the army. They, too, are often from military families. Marriages are also common within military families.

Training. Recruits are trained at the applicable regimental training centers. Advanced training in all arms and services is imparted by pertinent institutions, including the Armed Forces Medical College, the Armored Corps School and Center, the Army Air Transport School, the Army Educational Center and School, the Army Ordnance Corps Schools, the Army Signals School, the Army School for Physical Training, the Army War College, the Artillery Center and School, the College of Military Engineers, the Counter Insurgency and

Jungle Warfare School, the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Center and School, the High Altitude Warfare School, the Infantry School, and the Military Intelligence Training School.

Officer training is at three levels: pre-cadet, cadet, and staff. The government established feeder schools like the Rashtriya Indian Military College and “Sainik Schools” for preparing young men for entry into the army as cadets. However, the majority of officers are not from these institutions as any boy after twelve years of schooling (aged 16–19) can apply for admission to the academies. Cadets are selected after a competitive written examination, interviews, and physical tests before entering the tri-service National Defence Academy (NDA) at Khadakvasla, near Pune. An eighteen-month course for slightly older cadets (19–24 years) is at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun. NDA cadets and others like engineering graduates, attend one year at Dehra Dun. Soldiers serving in the ranks who qualify for the officer cadre train at the Army Cadet College Wing of the IMA and short service commission officers (5–10 years service liability) receive instruction at the Officers Training Academy, Chennai.

Reserves and paramilitary forces. There are 300,000 first-line reserves (men and women with five years of full-time service) and 500,000 second-line reserves (up to age 50). The 40,000 person Territorial Army, founded in 1920, consists of full-time workers, doing part-time military service.

Of the nine main police and paramilitary forces, seven interact with the army. The oldest, the Assam Rifles (founded 1835), and the youngest, the Rashtriya Rifles (founded 1990), are entirely officered by the army. The former draws most of its recruits from the sub-Himalayan population and is permanently stationed in the Northeast region; the latter is a counterinsurgency force, entirely manned by the army, deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The National Security Guard and the Special Frontier Force have substantial numbers from the army. The Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, as the first line of defense, work closely with the army. During war, both come under the army's operational control. So does the Central Reserve Police Force.

Indian Air Force

Military aviation in India began with a military flying school at Sitapur, in Uttar Pradesh, in December 1913. Thirty years later, on 1 April 1932, the formation of the “A Flight” marked the beginning of the Indian air force (IAF). Four Westland Wapiti Mk II biplanes, six officers, and twenty-two airmen was its total strength. Seventy years later, the IAF was the fourth-largest air force in the world,

with 120,000 men and 1,700 aircraft and an allocation of 24 percent of the defense budget. The air force was initially created for supporting the army against tribes in the North-West Frontier province. From punitive attacks against tribals (1936) to the ouster of entrenched Pakistani troops at the forbidding heights in Kargil (1999), the IAF has provided close ground support to the army.

Like Britain's Royal Air Force, the IAF's commands were based on function (Bomber Command, Fighter Command, etc.). After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, it was apparent that the vast country faced threats from different directions. Accordingly, the commands were reorganized, with geography as the main consideration. The five operational air commands, each under an air marshal, have geographical names: Western Air Command, headquartered in New Delhi; Eastern Air Command at Shillong; Central Air Command at Allahabad; South Western Air Command at Gandhinagar; and Southern Air Command at Trivandrum. Maintenance Command at Nagpur and Training Command at Bangalore are non-operational commands. The latter controls the more than thirty major training institutions. Most are located in three south Indian states.

Forces and equipment. The IAF operates 774 combat planes, 34 armed helicopters, 203 transport aircraft, and 133 helicopters organized as the following squadrons.

- 18 squadrons of fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft (30 Su-30k, 53 MiG-23 BN/UM, 88 Jaguar, 147 MiG-27, and 69 MiG-21 MF/PFMA)
- 20 fighter squadrons (66 MiG-21 FL/U, 169 with MiG 21 bis/U, 26 MiG-23 MF/UM, 64 MiG-29, 35 Mirage 2000H/TH, and 16 SU-30Mk aircraft)
- 3 attack helicopter squadrons (Mi-25)
- 12 transport squadrons (105 AN-32 Sulej, 45 Do-228, 28 BAe-748, and 25 IL-76 Gajraj) and 5 IL-78 tankers
- 11 helicopter squadrons (73 Mi-8, 50 Mi-17, and 10 Mi-26)
- 38 missile squadrons and 4 missile flights

The Prithvi Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) and the Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, the Electronic Counter Measure, Electronic Intelligence, Airborne Early Warning, and various reconnaissance, survey, tankers, training, and miscellaneous aircraft complete the inventory. Three Airborne Warning and Control Systems IL-76 aircraft, with the Israeli Phalcon system, and 66 BAe Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers are on order. Inventory includes air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, mostly of Russian and French origin, laser-guided and free-fall bombs. The Su-30, the upgraded MiG-23/27, Jaguars, and Mirage 2000 are the most nuclear capable planes.

History. Five years after its inception, the first full squadron (No. 1) was finally formed. World War II led to its expansion to nine combat squadrons and one transport squadron. Virtually the entire small air force saw intense action in Burma during the war. For instance, No. 1 Squadron went in with twenty pilots. Within a year, only four of the original twenty survived, and the squadron had received ten decorations for valor. With partition, the IAF was reduced to six fighter squadrons (five Tempest Mk II, one Spitfire), one transport (C-47) squadron, and one Air Observation (Auster) Flight. Most permanent bases and other establishments ended up in Pakistan. The IAF rose to its first challenge in October 1947, when it managed to assemble 100 civilian and military transport aircraft to airlift the army to the airstrip in Srinagar (Kashmir) to repel the tribal invasion. Within a month, Tempest Fighters (No. 7 Squadron) in support of the army won the critical battle of Shelatang, thereby saving the Srinagar Valley for India. The pilots of transport planes continued to play a decisive role. In May 1948, a C-47 Dakota, flying along an uncharted route through peaks averaging 25,000 feet (7,625 m) landed on a small airstrip in Leh (Ladakh). Indian army troops were thereafter airlifted to secure Ladakh. In similar fashion, an air-bridge for seven months assured the survival of the garrison and citizens of the besieged town of Poonch (1947–1948).

The IAF carried out some air strikes during the Goa operation. However, combat aircraft were not committed against the Chinese in 1962. Air strikes may have made a difference. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, both air forces were used extensively, with mixed results. India lost about 55 planes to Pakistan's 25. However, 18 to 20 of the Indian planes were destroyed on the ground by surprise attacks early in the war on airbases at Pathankot and Kalaikunda. In April 1971, six helicopters were committed in a low-key but intensive operation against Marxist insurgents in Sri Lanka. During the 1971 Bangladesh war, the IAF quickly gained total air superiority over East Pakistan and provided considerable close support for the army. The first heliborne operation was carried out in the same sector. The coup de grace was delivered by precision bombing by a MiG-21 on the governor's residence during a high-powered meeting. The roof collapsed on the high-ranking civil and military officers, and with it fell the will to fight. On the western front the IAF was not caught on the ground, despite Pakistani preemptive air-strikes leading to the formal outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971. The next day, both the navy and the IAF carried out spectacular attacks in and around Karachi harbor. In another dramatic performance, four aging Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers caught Pakistan's 22 cavalry without air cover near Longewala (Rajasthan). The regiment was decimated, losing nineteen T-59 tanks.

The IAF's airlift capabilities were in evidence in the evacuation of 200,000 Indians from the Gulf before the 1991 war and the transportation of 50,000 men and material after a devastating earthquake in Gujarat in 1998. The IAF has also successfully lifted tanks in and out of Leh (11,600 feet [3,538 m] above sea level). Air strikes using precision guided munitions during the Kargil conflict (1999) played a critical role in the Indian victory.

Indian Navy

For a large peninsular country like India, with a coastline of more than 4,660 miles (7,500 km) and ownership of some 1,280 islands, a substantial navy is to be expected. Instead, the Indian navy is the smallest of the three defense services. Its current strength is 53,000. It includes 5,000 in naval aviation, 2,000 marines, and 2,000 women. It accounts for 15 percent of the country's defense budget.

India's semiofficial nuclear doctrine envisaged a triad of land-based missiles, aircraft, and seaborne or submarine-launched missiles for retaliatory strikes. Arguably, submarine-based ballistic missiles are the most flexible and secure means of delivery. A more limited option is cruise missiles.

The navy's major vessels are 26 principal surface combatants and 16 submarines. The carrier *Viraat*, the 7 destroyers (5 Rajput-Kashin, 2 Delhi), and the 4 larger frigates (1 Brahmaputra, 3 Godavari) are not grouped into squadrons.

The Indian navy has 79 aircraft (30 Sea Harrier attack planes, maritime reconnaissance planes including 8 IL-38, 11 Tu-142), 83 helicopters (antisubmarine warfare: 26 Chetak, 7 Ka-25, 18 Ka-28, 31 Sea King), and air-to-air, air-to-surface missiles (R-550 *Magic* I and II, *Sea Eagle*, *Sea Skua*). The indigenous short range ballistic missile (SRBM) Dhanush and the supersonic Indo-Russian short range cruise missile Brahmos are in developmental trials. The antimissile Barak and the antiship KH-35 were in service in 2003. The status of three other indigenous missiles, Koral, Lakshya, and Sagarika, is unclear. The Marine Commando Force (MCF) was created in 1987. The 2,000 man unit has participated in special operations in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Kashmir.

History. In 1830 ships of the British East India Company were designated as the Indian navy. However, in 1863, it was disbanded when Britain's Royal Navy took control of the Indian Ocean. About thirty years later, the few small Indian naval units were called the Royal Indian Marine (RIM). In the wake of World War I, Britain, exhausted in manpower and resources, opted for expansion of the RIM. Consequently, on 2 October 1934, the RIM was reincarnated as the Royal Indian Navy (RIN).

During World War II, the navy grew twentyfold to 27,650 sailors and 2,700 officers. This rapid expansion was marred by nine minor mutinies in 1942–1945. The stage was set for the “Great Mutiny” of 1946. Ratings onboard 74 of 84 ships and at 20 of 22 shore establishments across the country mutinied. The magnitude shook London and probably hastened Britain's departure from India. The mutiny was defused by masterly intervention by the senior Congress Party leader Sardar V. Patel. Thereafter, the navy was swiftly halved to 49 ships. Doubts about the reliability of the navy were to persist into the 1960s. In 1947, India's share was 33 ships, and Pakistan's 16. Of 538 officers, captain was the senior-most rank held by Indians. Consequently, plans drawn up by the still-serving British officers were largely ignored in New Delhi. All the same, the navy was used in national integration by ferrying troops and securing the coast during the Junagadh state operations (October 1947). The 1950s were marked by annual Joint Exercises Trincomalee with other Commonwealth navies and by Britain's begrudging sale of warships: London refused to sell modern submarines to India, and the aircraft carrier *Vikrant* was sold without the long-stroke catapult, thereby greatly reducing its capabilities. Nevertheless, during the liberation of Goa, the Indian navy, among other actions, sank the Portuguese frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque*.

The Indian loss in the Sino-Indian War (1962) was a further reverse for the navy, since in its wake funds were directed toward the army and the air force. The 1965 war, Indonesia's threat to seize the Nicobar Islands, and the smaller Pakistan navy's attack on the holy city of Dwarka all triggered naval expansion. Indigenous warship design and production and the acquisition of Soviet warships followed. The navy's fortunes were greatly restored in 1971. After East Pakistan (Bangladesh) seceded, leading to civil war between Pakistan's two wings, the Indian navy trained four task forces of riverine guerrillas. Those frogmen sank or damaged over 100,000 tons of shipping in four months and disrupted ports and inland waterways, the lifeline of the country. In December, after the war formally started, an imaginative, daring raid by Osa missile boats on Karachi harbor sank two warships, damaged others, and ignited oil storage facilities. The Indian armed forces conducted amphibious landings for the first time toward the end of the war. The threat of U.S. naval intervention on behalf of Pakistan led to the Advanced Technology Vessel project to produce nuclear submarines in India. Further emphasis on aviation, technology, missiles, and submarines followed.

In the late 1980s, India's regional assertion of power included the use of the navy in Sri Lanka (1987–1990) and in the Maldives (1988). In anticipation of adding a fleet of nuclear submarines, India leased a Charlie-I class

nuclear submarine, the *Chakra*, from the Soviet Union. Plans changed. The submarine was returned to the Soviet Union. Indigenous warship design and production (destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and submarines) was also accelerated, partly due to the difficulty of obtaining spare parts from the successor states to the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the navy was active under the United Nations in Somalia, escorting Indian ships in the Gulf, and repatriating Indian nationals from Kuwait. Exercises with other navies, especially the U.S. Navy, were initiated. During the Kargil War (1999), the aggressive posture adopted by the navy played a role in convincing Islamabad and Washington that a larger conflict loomed unless Pakistan withdrew from the heights. A year earlier, nuclear tests added another strategic dimension to the navy. Warming ties with Israel and the United States led to the acquisition of cutting-edge missiles and to joint patrolling of the Straits of Malacca.

The navy has about ten major training establishments. Most are located in Maharashtra, Cochin, Goa and Vishakhapatnam.

The Coast Guard

On 19 August 1978, India's Coast Guard Act was passed. This new paramilitary force was to police and superintend the seas, the coastline, and fishing craft. Control of pollution was another major peacetime responsibility. Two frigates and five patrol boats from the navy formed its nucleus. One of its critical functions, the protection of offshore oil facilities, was transferred back to the navy in 1986. Nevertheless, the service has grown to 5,500 men, with about 50 vessels, more than a dozen Dornier aircraft, and an equal number of Chetak helicopters. Its effectiveness has steadily improved, as evidenced by its performance during operations in Sri Lanka and antiterrorist duties since the 1990s.

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See also **Civil-Military Relations; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Strategic Thought; Wars**

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ARTHA SHĀSTRA A work on statecraft, the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya advises the king on the running of the state, foreign policy, and war. In ancient India, the three ends of man were *kāma* (love), *artha* (wealth and political success), and *dharma* (religion), and for each of them there was a *shāstra*, or “science,” made up of a body of written works. *Artha Shāstra*, then, is the science of economics and politics, though in practice works of this science are largely about kingship. The *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya is one of the books of this science, and it makes reference to a great many previous works of *artha shāstra* that have not survived; it appears that it eclipsed its predecessors.

The *Artha Shāstra* was composed by someone named Kauṭilya, who is usually identified with Chāṇakya, the able Brahman minister of Chandragupta Maurya. However, there are many features of the text that show it belongs to a later period, about 150 A.D. But it is the culmination of a long tradition of theorizing about statecraft, by Brahmans who worked for the king as ministers rather than as priests or religious teachers, codifying their wisdom about statecraft and putting it in writing to pass on to succeeding generations. Thus the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya is put in the form of advice to a king, as if given by a Brahman minister. The roots of this science certainly go back to the period of the Mauryas, and probably long before.

The *artha shāstra* tradition is notable for the cool, rational pursuit of interest, and this realpolitik is especially

characteristic of the *Artha Shāstra* composed by Kauṭilya. For example, according to the doctrine of the “four means,” the king should consider conciliation, gifts, sowing dissension, and force, in that order of preference, as ways of dealing with an adversary. Force or warfare is the least desirable, not because of moral considerations but because it entails loss of men and treasure, so that even the winner is poorer at the end; and conciliation is the most desirable for the opposite reason, that it costs nothing. Another concept, that of the “circle of states,” has the same effect. A king desirous of conquest should take into account that the neighboring king in whose direction he hopes to expand is a natural enemy; that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s natural ally; that the next two states are the enemy’s ally and the ally’s ally; and so forth. To the rear is a neighboring king who is also a natural enemy, the “heel-catcher” who trips one up from behind; his neighbor, one’s natural ally, a “rescuer” to whom one calls for help; the heel-catcher’s ally; and the rescuer’s ally. A king whose territory touches both one’s own and the enemy’s, the middle king, is in a position to tip the balance one way or the other by a very small expenditure of force. Finally, a large, powerful kingdom in the region, at a distance from the conqueror and his enemy, called the neutral king, is also able to affect the outcome of a contest by a small interjection of force. The doctrine of the circle of states identifies the fields of force that an expansionist king must take into account when taking action. This atmosphere of cool rationality, in pursuit of greater power and territory by the king, pervades the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya. It presupposes continuous conflict of interest among neighboring kings seeking empire, and advises the king how to act under such circumstances, including the use of spies and secret practices as well as the threat of military force.

Kingship is the political norm for the *Artha Shāstra*, but it devotes one of its fifteen books to the “republics” (*gaṇas* or *saṅghas*), in which political power was not centralized in the hands of a king but was broadly diffused across a warrior class, which formed policy in deliberative assemblies. Kauṭilya recognizes that the strength of these republics lies in their strong sense of unity and collective responsibility, making them the hardest of adversaries and the strongest of allies. He advises the king to use secret agents to stir up trouble among them by sowing false rumors, as a way of undermining the republic at the source of its strength. Republics of this archaic kind had a long history in India, and continued at least until the Gupta period. In the *Artha Shāstra* they are seen not from within, but from the viewpoint of a king trying to get the better of them or to recruit them as allies.

About half of the fifteen books of the *Artha Shāstra* are concerned with running the kingdom, and half with

foreign affairs and war. The treatment of internal affairs begins with Book 1 on the training of the prince. It shows the life of the king to have been very strenuous (at least in this ideal portrait), continuously considering matters of state or hearing petitioners adjudicating disputes, and it allows only four and a half hours for sleep. A great deal of attention is paid to the appointment of government servants, and the testing of their integrity by the use of secret agents, as well as the use of spies to report on the temper of various factions within the kingdom and in that of the enemy. There are large numbers of spies and secret agents, disguised as students, monks, nuns, ascetics, householders, and traders. The king must be continuously on guard against disgruntled princes and queens whose affections have strayed elsewhere. The *Artha Shāstra* makes cautionary mention of kings killed by a brother, a son, or a queen, the latter using such means as a poison-smearing anklet or belt-jewel or mirror, or a weapon concealed in a braid of hair. Great care is taken to check the king’s food for poison, and birds whose behavior indicates the presence of poison should be kept on the palace grounds. The overall impression is that the king has a strenuous life, living under carefully guarded conditions and relying, therefore, very heavily on spies to take the pulse of popular feeling. The strength of kinship is its centralization of power in the hands of one man, but that makes it vulnerable to being overturned by killing that one man, the inverse of the condition of republics, in which power was diffused and shared by many; coup d’état was a common fate of ancient kingdoms. This vulnerability made for an intense concern with security arrangements, and the heavy use of spies to overcome the king’s isolation.

Book Two

The most valuable part of the *Artha Shāstra* is Book 2, the longest of the fifteen books, which lays out the duties of the heads of government departments in great detail. There are several overall tendencies of this section. One of them is that the king is to be an economic manager, not only taxing every kind of produce, but acting to promote the growth of production. Thus at the outset of Book 2 we read about means of settling the countryside with taxpaying farmers, by shifting people from the city to the country or by attracting peasants from neighboring kingdoms, providing them with land, seed, and cattle for plowing, and a tax holiday for bringing new land under cultivation. Agriculture was the largest sector of the economy, and the king’s share of the crop made up the largest part of his revenue, so that a policy of extending agriculture was a matter of enlightened self-interest for states. In terms of manufacturing, the royal household was itself a large producer of goods, such as textiles, for its own use but with a surplus sold in the market. As the protector of widows and orphans in the absence of

kin, the king had a body of people that constituted a workforce of his own and that produced for the palace, making it largely self-sufficient, and for sale.

Another tendency in Book 2 is to oversee the market and regulate it in detail. The overall goal we can infer from the passages on the superintendent of the market is not so much to maximize the king's take in taxes—although that is a constant consideration—as to prevent what are seen as “evils” of a free, price-making market, namely the evil to consumers of high prices in the case of a shortage of goods and the evil to merchants of low prices in the case of a glut. In both cases, the superintendent of the market is to sequester all supplies of the commodity and establish a single market at a fixed price deemed to be fair to buyers and sellers, for the general good. When foreign merchants bring goods to the city gate, they are to declare them for sale at a certain price, three times, and the superintendent of trade is to confiscate the excess if a competition of buyers raises the prices. A sense that everything has a fair price, which the king should endeavor to enforce, governs the sale of land as well. Such attempts to restrain the ability of supply and demand to set prices inevitably provoked various kinds of evasion, and measures against them are addressed at length.

A third tendency we can identify in this book is the royal oversight of forests, and the care taken to assure the supply of forest products of all kinds, especially elephants, which were a critical element of military might. A census of wild elephants was kept, and mature elephants were trapped and trained for labor and for war. The four canonical elements of the army (foot, horse, chariot, and elephant) plus the logistical section (oxcarts) each had their superintendents. The importance of the forest to the king was both economic and military, and it was necessary to husband it rationally, taking a long view.

A final tendency in Book 2 is a frank recognition of the problem of misappropriation of funds by government officers, who were in charge of large amounts of money. Just as it is not possible not to taste a drop of honey or a drop of poison placed on the tongue, it is not possible for government officials not to taste of the money that passes through their hands, if only a little bit, the *Artha Shāstra* says; just as one cannot tell when a fish in water is drinking, it is impossible to tell when government officials are embezzling. A considerable amount of attention is given to the problem of detecting those who are peculating and identifying those who are promoting the growth of the royal wealth and who deserve, therefore, to be rewarded.

Books Three and Four

Books 3 and 4 are devoted to law. The first of these gives the eighteen topics of disputes at law that may come before the king or his judges for adjudication, which

consist of what may be thought of as a law of contracts, concerning marriage contracts and those between buyers and sellers or employers and employees. The second, called “Removal of thorns,” is a kind of rudimentary criminal law, in which the state acts on its own initiative to redress an act deemed to affect the general good. Book 5 (“Secret conduct”) continues this theme, but in respect to the king's officials and the detection of treason.

The remainder of the *Artha Shāstra* has to do with foreign policy and war. Book 6 is on the circle of states doctrine; Book 7 on the six measures of foreign policy, namely peace, war, staying quiet, marching, seeking refuge, and the dual policy of making peace with one and war with another; Book 8 on calamities of state. Books 9 and 10 concern the preparation and execution of battle, with a list of battle arrays for the army with descriptive names like “staff,” “snake,” and “circle,” and subtypes such as the undulating line called “moving like a serpent” or “cow's urination.” Book 11 is about republics; Book 12 on the policies a weaker king should adopt; Book 13 on besieging a fort; Book 14 on “secret practices” used in warfare, including various potions to increase endurance or cause the enemy harm. The final Book 15 is a brief analysis of the “method of the science,” that is, the logical or rhetorical devices of *artha shāstra*.

Thomas R. Trautmann

See also **Guptan Empire; Mauryan Empire**

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ARUNACHAL PRADESH Arunachal Pradesh, “Dawn's Province,” is the most northeasterly and most sparsely populated state in India, containing just over 1 million people. Carved out of Assam, it is nearly 84,000 square miles (about 217,500 sq. km); it borders Assam and has an international border with Bhutan, China, and Myanmar. The state is mountainous, with the Himalayas along its northern border, and mountain ranges running north-south, creating five river valleys: the Kameng, Subansiri, Lohit, Tirap, and the Siang, containing the mightiest river. With the heaviest rainfall in India, the state is hot and humid, with temperatures as high as 107 degrees Fahrenheit (42°C) in the summer in the valleys but considerably cooler in the higher altitudes.

Arunachal Pradesh is populated by some twenty main tribes, divided into numerous subtribes mainly of Mongoloid and Tibeto-Burmese stock. The principal tribes are the Adi, Nishi, Apatani, Tagin, Misaim, Monpa, Aka, Nocte, Wancho, Singpho, Tangsha, Khampti, Padma, Miris, and Sherdukpen, speaking over twenty dialects, fourteen of which are used as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level. The tribes are patriarchal and the inheritance is based on primogeniture. The tribes follow endogamy and the clans are exogamous. Polygamy is also practiced. Many of the tribes are Buddhist, although animism is widely practiced; some practice Vaishnavism, and Christianity is spreading. The tribes practice shifting slash-and-burn cultivation, known as *jhuming*. Rice is the main crop. With few roads and little arable land, about 95 percent of the people live on subsistence farming in rural areas, although the state is a food deficit area. The literacy rate is just over 50 percent.

References to the state are found in the Mahābhārata and Kalika Purāṇa, although little is known of its early history. In 1826 the British took control of the Brahmaputra Valley as a consequence of the Treaty of Yanabo with Burma (present-day Myanmar), and in 1838 absorbed the area, appointing an agent to exercise a semblance of control. Recognizing the special character of tribal culture and the backwardness of the area, the British in 1874 enacted the Scheduled District Act and in 1880 the Assam Frontier Tract Regulation. They created the North-East Frontier Agency in 1913, but its control remained very limited. The following year, the 550-mile (885 km) border with Tibet was created as the McMahon Line, an international border that was never recognized by China. Until the eve of World War II, the area was declared off-limits to visitors.

Under India's Constitution, adopted 26 January 1950, the area remained autonomous under district councils. In 1954 the area became the North-East Frontier Area under the governor of Assam. In 1962 China invaded India through the state, and New Delhi realized how vulnerable it was to attack from the north. Accordingly, India absorbed Arunachal as a union territory on 20 January 1972, and it was renamed Arunachal Pradesh. An elected legislative assembly was constituted, and the first general election was held on 3 January 1980. On 20 February 1987 it became the twenty-fourth state of the Indian union. Divided into sixteen districts, the capital is Itanagar.

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See also **China, Relations with**

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ĀRYABHATA (476–c. 550), the first of the great astronomers of the classical age of India. Āryabhata was born in A.D. 476 in Ashmaka but later lived in Kusumapura, which his commentator Bhāskara I (A.D. 629) identifies with Pātaliputra (modern Patna). It appears that he was the *kulapati* (head) of the University at Nalanda in Magadha.

There is no agreement about the location of Ashmaka, but since the Āryabhatian school has remained most strong in Kerala in South India, many believe that he may have belonged to that region. In addition, Āryabhata employed the Kali era (3102 B.C.), which was most popular in South India.

He wrote at least two books: the *Āryabhatīya* and the *Āryabhata-siddhānta*, of which the latter is known only through references in other works. Bhāskara I (seventh century), who wrote a commentary on Āryabhata's work, tells us that Āryabhata's disciples included the astronomers Pāduranga-svāmi, Lātadeva, and Nishanku.

Āryabhata's main contributions to mathematics included the good approximation of 3.1416 for π , a table of sine-differences, and a method to solve indeterminate equations of a certain type that are important in astronomy. He used a novel representation of numbers as words. His figure for the sidereal rotation of the earth was extremely accurate. Āryabhata made important innovations in planetary computations by using simplifying hypotheses, and he presented a method of finding the celestial latitudes of the planets. The *Āryabhatīya* presented Āryabhata's astronomical and mathematical theories, in which the earth was taken to be spinning on its axis and the periods of the planets were given with respect to the sun. In this book, the day was reckoned from one sunrise to the next, whereas in his *Āryabhata-siddhānta*, he took the day from one midnight to another. There was also difference in some astronomical parameters.

It appears that the *Āryabhatīya* used the earlier *Paitāmaha Siddhānta* as a model, whereas the *Āryabhata-siddhānta* used the conventions of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*. The *Āryabhata-siddhānta* was incorporated with some emendations into the *Khanda-khādyaka* by the celebrated seventh-century astronomer Brahmagupta (born 598).

The later Kerala school of astronomy and mathematics followed Āryabhata. Nīlakantha Somayāji (1444–1545) made significant contributions to the Āryabhata system of astronomy.

The *Āryabhatīya* was translated into Arabic as *Araj-babara*, and in turn it influenced Western astronomers. The *Khanda-khādya* was translated into Arabic under the title *Zij-al-Arkand* and *Az-Zij Kandakatik al-Arabi*. From the Arab world, this book reached Europe.

Subhash Kak

See also **Āryabhatīya; Astronomy**

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ĀRYABHATĪYA The *Āryabhatīya*, the astronomical text written by Āryabhata (born 476), is one of the landmarks of the history of astronomy. The *Āryabhatīya* is divided into four parts. The first part provides basic definitions and important astronomical parameters. It mentions the number of rotations of Earth and the revolutions of the sun, moon, and the planets in a period of 4,320,000 years. This is a partially heliocentric system because it presents the rotation information of the planets with respect to the sun. The second part deals with mathematics. The third part deals with the determination of the true position of the sun, the moon, and the planets by means of eccentric circles and epicycles. The fourth part deals with planetary motions on the celestial sphere and gives rules relating to various problems of spherical astronomy.

The notable features of the *Āryabhatīya* are Āryabhata's theory of Earth's rotation and his excellent planetary parameters based on his own observations made around A.D. 512, which are superior to those of others. He made fundamental improvements over the prevailing *Sūrya-siddhānta* techniques for determining the position of planets. Unlike the epicycles of Greek astronomers, which remain the same in size at all places, Āryabhata's epicycles vary in size from place to place. Āryabhata expressed relativity of motion very effectively thus: "Just as a man in a boat moving forward sees the stationary objects (on the shore) as moving backward, just so are the stationary stars seen by the people on earth as moving exactly towards the west."

Āryabhata took the sun, the moon, and the planets to be in conjunction in zero longitude at sunrise at Lanka on Friday, 18 February 3102 B.C. In a period of 4.32 million years, the moon's apogee and ascending node too are taken to be in conjunction with the planets. This allowed him to solve various problems using whole numbers.

The theory of planetary motion in the *Āryabhatīya* is based on the following ideas: the mean planets revolve in

geocentric orbits; the true planets move in eccentric circles or in epicycles; planets have equal linear motion in their respective orbits. The epicycle technique of Āryabhata is different from that of the Greek astronomer Ptolemy and it appears to be derived from an old Indian tradition.

Āryabhata made important innovations on the traditional *Sūrya-siddhānta* methods for the computation of the planetary positions. The earlier methods used four corrections for the superior planets and five for the inferior planets; Āryabhata reduced the number of corrections for the inferior planets to three and improved the accuracy of the results for the superior planets.

Āryabhata considers the sky to be 4.32 million times the distance to the sun. He and his followers believed that beyond the visible universe illuminated by the sun and limited by the sky is the infinite invisible universe. Rather than taking the universe to be destroyed at the end of the "Brahmā's day" of 4.32 billion years, he took Earth to go through expansion and contraction equal to one *yojana* (approximately 7.5 miles [12 km] according to Āryabhata; 9 miles [14.5 km] by the mainstream Indian tradition).

Āryabhatīya's mathematics includes the decimal place-value system, various problems of arithmetic and geometry, sums of arithmetic series, and the solution of the linear indeterminate equation using the pulverizer method.

Many passages in the *Brāhma-sphuta-siddhānta* of Brahmagupta (born 598) are strikingly similar to that of the *Āryabhatīya*, showing the influence of Āryabhata. His commentator Bhāskara I (seventh century) declared that Āryabhata's theories were the best, and they were widely thought to be so all over India, especially in Kerala.

Subhash Kak

See also **Āryabhata; Astronomy**

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ĀRYA SAMĀJ The Ārya Samāj (literally, "society of the nobles") was perhaps the most influential of the many reform movements that sprang up in nineteenth-century India in reaction to the double challenge Hinduism had to face: Christian missionary zeal and European modernity in the shape of British colonialism. The impact of the movement can be measured not only in terms of the number of its adherents—by 1947 the Samāj counted almost 2 million members—but also by the fact that many of its leaders

became prominent in Indian politics, academia, journalism, and other spheres of public life throughout the twentieth century. Clearly, the religious association provided an ideology that was attractive to certain strata of (North) Indian society in a particular historical situation.

Origins, Doctrinal Basis, and Early Development

The first branch of the Ārya Samāj was founded in Bombay in 1875 by Swāmi Dayānanda Sarasvatī (1824–1883). Dayānanda, a Gujarati Brahman with a Shaivaite background, had grown dissatisfied with the polytheism and shallow ritualism that characterized the varieties of Hinduism he had experienced in his youth. During his wandering years as a *sanyāsin* (ascetic world renouncer) in the 1850s and 1860s he built his own vision of a reformed and “purified” *ārya dharma*. In his view, arbitrary and selfish Brahmans were the root cause for what he saw as a degenerate state of Hinduism: the prevalence of idolatry, “blind faith” and “social evils” like child marriage, the abuses of the caste system, and the suppression of women in Hindu society. The *pandits*, he maintained, had neglected the study of the Veda, which contained the guidelines for a perfect society, and had instead imposed morally corrupting texts like the Purāṇas. Only a return to the sober and rational monotheism he believed to find in Vedic scripture would provide the solution to India’s spiritual, social, and political problems, ensuring that the Hindus could carry on where their proud Aryan ancestors left off.

Making use of the new technologies of mass communication, the swāmi expounded his textual revisionism in various pamphlets and in his book *Satyārth Prakāśh* (The light of truth), published in Hindi in 1875. The book also contained a polemical critique of Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, and Hindu “orthodoxy,” a fact that made the Ārya Samāj a rather controversial body from its inception. Nonetheless, in a period where many educated Hindus found it hard to reconcile their religious tradition with the new Western knowledge they had acquired, Dayānanda’s reformatory message became particularly popular with the emerging Anglicized middle class in the urban centers of the Hindi-speaking regions, particularly in the Punjab.

The death of the founder in 1883 did not stop the movement from expanding further and becoming conspicuous in various fields of public activity. In 1886 the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic High School (DAV) was founded in Lahore, and it became the nucleus of a tremendously successful network of educational institutions, which continues to blossom today. Already at this early stage it was obvious that one of the strengths of the Āryas was their efficient organization, energetic fund raising, and propaganda. Their techniques were partly inspired by Christian missionaries and partly by recycled elements of Hindu tradition.



Ārya Samāj. Portrait of Dayānanda Sarasvatī, founder of the Ārya Samāj in the nineteenth century, graces a contemporary Indian postage stamp. With the teachings of the Vedas as his inspiration, he called for Indians to embrace the ideals of equality and education, especially for women. Dayānanda championed these reforms at a time when barely 2 percent of women in India could read or write, and most in North India still wore the *purdah* (veil). KAMAT’S POTPOURRI.

A Religious Movement in the Age of Nationalism

In 1893 the movement split over the question of doctrinal purity. Swāmi Shraddhānanda (1857–1926), the second charismatic figure to emerge from the movement, accused the faction running the DAV School of being too Westernized and thereby betraying the founder’s ideological legacy. From 1900 onward, he established his own network of schools, the Gurukulas, which were outwardly modeled after ancient Hindu seats of learning and which placed more emphasis on the study of the Vedas. Yet at the same time, they also borrowed heavily both from the curricula and the pedagogical practices used in British public schools.

Both factions became politically active from the 1890s onward, albeit in completely different ways. Whereas some of the prominent leaders of the DAV wing joined the Indian National Congress and became part of the mainstream national movement (e.g., Lālā Lājpat Rāi), Shraddhānanda and his followers for decades advocated an “evolutionary nationalism” based on a Spencerian perception of society as a “social organism.” Political self-rule, far from being a birthright, had to be earned through an arduous learning process. Only the gradual perfection of the individual through education, it was believed, could pave the way for

independence. It was only after the nationalist agitation had reached new heights in the wake of the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in 1919 that the Gurukul Āryas joined the mass campaigns organized by Mahatma M. K. Gandhi.

Education for both men and, crucially, for women, thus certainly was the cornerstone of Ārya activity, but their reformatory zeal expressed itself also in other fields. From the 1880s they undertook various experiments in “untouchable uplift” with the final goal of breaking all caste barriers. Orthodox distrust of the Āryas and their general reluctance to accept “purified” untouchables in their midst, however, soon produced a backlash. *Shuddhi*, the purification ritual used to “reclaim” outcastes, was also employed to reconvert (neo-)Muslims who had left the fold of Hinduism during Islamic rule. Such endeavors soon brought the Samāj into conflict with Islam. Communal tensions were further acerbated by the Ārya fight for the ban of cow slaughter and the propagation of Hindi (instead of Urdu, spoken by most Muslims) as the administrative language in large parts of North India. In the context of steadily worsening relations between Hindus and Muslims during the 1920s, the Āryas seem to have deliberately cultivated their image as pugnacious, avant-garde defenders of Hinduism in the hope of gaining greater acceptance among their conservative Hindu brethren. Some of today’s scholars, therefore, see the organization in the first place as a forerunner of contemporary Hindu chauvinist parties and organizations. However, the picture seems to be more complex, as the movement was quite heterogeneous, and militant Hindu chauvinism was but one of the many strands accommodated within the regionally diverse Ārya movement.

Reaching its peak from the 1920s to the 1940s, the popularity of the organization waned steadily after independence. Nowadays, it is no longer the vital movement it used to be for almost a century, even in its former strongholds in the Hindi belt of North India. However, in some of the homelands of the Hindu diaspora (like Guyana, Fiji, and Mauritius), where the Samāj had spread with the immigration of indentured laborers from India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ārya Samāj brand of “purified” Hinduism is still very much alive.

Harald Fischer-Tiné

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Hindutva and Politics**

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ASHOKA. See **Mauryan Empire**.

ASHRAMAS. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

ASHTĀDHYĀYĪ Pānini’s *Ashtādhyāyī* (The eight chapters; fifth century B.C.), provides four thousand rules that describe completely the Sanskrit of his day. The great variety of linguistic ideas used in the text mirrors the complexity of cognitive relationships, and this is the secret of its power and success. It is remarkable that Pānini set out to describe the entire grammar in terms of a finite number of rules. Scholars have shown that the grammar of Pānini represents a universal grammatical and computing system.

The *Ashtādhyāyī* deals ostensibly with the Sanskrit language. However, it presents the framework for a universal grammar that can apply to any language. Two important early commentaries on this grammar are by Kātyāyana and Patanjali. Its philosophical basis was examined in an important work by Bhartrihari in the fifth century A.D.

Pānini’s grammar begins with “metarules,” or rules about rules, using a special technical language, or “metalanguage.” This is followed by several sections on how to generate words and sentences starting from roots, as well as rules on transformation of structure. The last part of the grammar is a one-directional string of rules, where a given

rule in the sequence ignores all rules that follow. Pānini also uses recursion by allowing elements of earlier rules to recur in later rules. He thus anticipates by more than 2,500 years the idea of a computer program, both in form and spirit.

In Pānini's system, a finite set of rules is enough to generate infinity of sentences. The algebraic structure of Pānini's rules was not appreciated in the West until the mid-twentieth century, when a similar generative structure was proposed by Noam Chomsky. Well before this, in the nineteenth century, Pānini's analysis of roots and suffixes and his recognition of ablaut led to the founding of the subjects of comparative and historical linguistics.

Pānini took the idea of action as defined by the verb and developed a comprehensive theory by providing a context for action in terms of its relations to agents and situations. This theory is called the *kāraka* theory and stipulates these categories: that which is fixed when departure takes place; the recipient of the object; the instrument, or the main cause of the effect; the basis, or location; what the agent seeks to attain, deed, object; and the agent.

These definitions do not always correspond to the nature of action; therefore, the *kāraka* theory is only a *via media* between grammar and reality. It is general enough to subsume a large number of cases; where not directly applicable, the essence of the action/transaction can still be cast in the *kāraka* mold. To do this, Pānini requires that the intent of the speaker be considered. Rather than being based on conventions concerning ways to string words together, Pānini's system is based on meaning. The *kārakas* do not have a one-to-one correspondence with grammatical cases. Grammars based on Pānini's ideas also have been devised for languages other than Sanskrit.

Subhash Kak

See also **Pānini**

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ASHVAMEDHA The Ashvamedha, or the “horse sacrifice,” is one of the most significant rituals of ancient India. The horse in Indian mythology represents the sun, and the sea is taken to be its stable and its birthplace, since it emerges every day from the primal “waters” surrounding Earth. The Ashvamedha is the sacrifice of the annual renewal of the sun at the New Year and that of the accompanying renewal of the king's rule. At the spiritual level, the celebration evokes a reconnection to the “inner sun.” This rite is a great state function in which ritual

elements are woven together with secular ceremonies to create an assertion of monarchical authority.

The use of the word “sacrifice,” with its common meaning of “killing to offer to God or gods,” is cause of much misunderstanding of the Vedic ritual. Vedic *yajña* (sacrifice) need not involve any killing of animals. It is a highly symbolic performance, and the animals of the sacrifice may be clay images or grains, specific utterances, or a sacred song. When an animal is sacrificed in the ritual, the sacrifice is a mock killing within sacred theater. The word “killing” is described in the texts to apply equally to the pressing of the soma stalks and the grinding of the grain. This is not to say that “animal” sacrifice has never been taken literally in India, but that the normative meaning of the term is symbolic.

The Vedic rites were meant to help the participant transform himself. This was accomplished through sacrifice. The *rishis* (Hindu sages) saw the universe as going through unceasing change in a cycle of birth and death, potentially free yet, paradoxically, governed by order. This order was reflected in the *bandhu* (connections) between the planets, the elements of the body, and the mind. At the deepest level, the whole universe was bound to, and reflected in, the individual consciousness.

The place of sacrifice represents the cosmos, and its three fires stand for the three divisions of space. The course of the sacrifice represents the year, and all such ritual becomes a part of continuing annual performances. The rite culminates in the ritual rebirth of the *yajamāna* (sacrificer), signifying the regeneration of his universe. It is sacred theater, built upon paradoxes of reality, in which the symbolic deaths of animals and humans, including the *yajamāna* himself, may be enacted.

The early texts indicate that in sacrifice some people substituted a clay or gold image of the victim. The Atharva Veda says that the inner *yajña* is superior to the outer one. For some, sacrifice only meant singing a Sāman, which is a song, with its various movements, from the Sāmaveda. The upward and downward movements of the Sāman may be interpreted as having five or seven parts. When divided into five parts, they are called *hinkāra*, *prastāva*, *udgītha*, *pratibhāra*, and *nidhana*. But these five movements are also the five animals of sacrifice: the *hinkāra* is a goat, the *prastāva* a sheep, the *udgītha* a cow, the *pratibhāra* a horse, and the *nidhana* a man. The specific identification may be owed to etymological considerations as well as animal traits. *Aja*, goat, means the unborn; sheep climb up the mountainside; the cow represents prosperity; the horse, speed, appropriate for fast movement; and (the cosmic) man is the objective of the song.

The Ashvamedha is performed by a consecrated king. The horse chosen for the sacrifice is worth a thousand

cows. It is black in the forepart, white in the rear, with a mark on its forehead. It is set free to roam, protected by attendants from the four different classes of society. Together with these people, it creates a linkage with the three kinds of beasts: those who live in the air, in the forests, and in villages. The horse has a unique position: it is the sky-bird; it lives in the forest and in the village.

In the beginning, a “four-eyed dog” (a dog with markings above its eyes) is made to float under the sacrificial horse. The “four-eyed dog” is Sirius, the Dog Star, the brightest light of Canis Major, whose orbit is below (to the south) that of the sun. The ascent of the sun puts an end to the light of Sirius, the brightest star in the sky. The reference to the thousand cows recalls that the sun’s splendor is a thousand times that of Earth, since *gaub* (cow) also means the planet. The first step of the initiation thus mirrors sunrise.

But how long is the horse supposed to be free? In later enactments of the ritual, the horse roamed for one year. But the Rigvedic and the Shatapatha accounts suggest that the rite took place just over a few days. It appears that the original meaning was to consider the day of the sun as symbolic of its annual circuit.

The texts prescribe that the queen must lie down with the “dead horse” (*ashvaka*). This was the time spent with a fire called *ashvaka*, which represented the sun dead in the sky during the night, preserved in a small fire in a lamp.

There is a threefold drama of change and renewal suggested here. First is the cosmic layer, related to the preservation of order in spite of precession and the stars losing their bearings. Second is the strengthening of the sun in the spring after its weakening in the winter. Third is the mirroring of these processes in the spirit of the sacrificer. The king, by virtue of his authority and responsibility, sees the dangers to his position magnified many times over those faced by the commoner.

It appears that the prototype of this rite required just a few days and was relatively simple. The later pageantry of 101 horses, and hundreds of soldiers and attendants, arose in an embellished version prescribed for kings. Even now, the householder ritual, that consists of a simple fire sacrifice or breath-control, is declared to be thousands of times superior to the Ashvamedha—a comparison that preserves, no doubt, a memory of the times when it was performed more widely.

Subhash Kak

See also **Brahmanas; Vedic Aryan India**

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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), RELATIONS WITH

Established in 1966, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was created as a multilateral development bank for the Asia-Pacific region, with India as one of the thirty-one founding members. However, India has sought assistance from ADB since only 1986. The bank’s development assistance consists of loans to support investment and policy adjustments, technical assistance grants, political and credit risk guarantees, and a limited volume of investment in the private sector. Loan operations in India are funded exclusively from the ADB’s Ordinary Capital Resources. These loans are linked to LIBOR (London Interbank Offer rate), with a five-year grace period and a twenty-year repayment period. In 2004 the rate of interest amounted to around 2.2 percent. India does not have access to ADB’s concessional window, the Asian Development Fund. However, India does have access to a large volume of bilateral grant assistance as well as concessional International Development Agency (IDA) financing from the World Bank. The cost of ADB funds relative to loans and grants from other multilateral and bilateral development agencies active in India impacts on the profile of ADB’s operations in India.

ADB’s Operational Strategy and Quantum of Assistance

ADB’s first “Country Operational Strategy” for India, prepared in 1986, and the second strategy, launched in 1996, both focused on combining infrastructure investments with assistance for reforms to strengthen growth. A major innovation of the 1996 strategy was the introduction of state-level operations in addition to loans and technical assistance at the federal level. The current operational strategy was introduced in April 2003, the first such strategy for India after adoption of ADB’s own Poverty Reduction Strategy in 1999. The current India strategy recognizes that achievement of the global Millennium Development Goals by 2015 will depend significantly on outcomes in India, given its enormous size. Hence, the central organizing theme of the strategy is mainstreaming poverty reduction. The three pillars of the current strategy are “pro-poor” growth, social development, and good governance.

High growth is the main instrument for reducing income poverty. This is being addressed primarily through infrastructure-led growth. A large body of evidence in India and elsewhere, including studies by the ADB, the Department for International Development of the United

Kingdom, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Overseas Development Institute, and the World Bank, shows the strong poverty-reducing impact of infrastructure development. Accordingly, infrastructure—primarily energy, transport, and urban infrastructure—accounts for more than 80 percent of ADB's assistance pipeline. The pro-poor aspect of growth is being strengthened by extending assistance, including infrastructure investment loans, for agriculture and rural development. Since most of the poor depend on this employment-intensive sector, extending ADB assistance to this sector greatly strengthens the poverty-reducing impact of ADB operations in India. Support for pro-poor growth is being further strengthened by extending ADB's state-level operations to some of India's poorer states.

Social development is the main instrument for reducing human poverty. India prefers to use its own resources and external grants, or concessional funds such as IDA, for social development projects in education and health, and for environmental protection. Hence, ADB does not directly provide assistance for these sectors. However, the ADB program attempts to address these social and environmental goals mainly through specific components of its infrastructure projects, its projects in the rural sector, and public resource management projects in selected focal states.

ADB's financial assistance is quite small compared to India's total investment needs. However, the current assistance program of approximately U.S.\$2 billion per year is being significantly leveraged through strong governance components, such as policy reform and capacity building, to maximize the development impact of every dollar of assistance. The government has often indicated that it looks to ADB to play a leading catalytic role in introducing international best practices in development projects, programs, and policies.

Programmed annual ADB assistance to India of around U.S.\$2 billion per annum in loans, plus about \$14 million in technical assistance grants, is the largest among all countries borrowing from ADB. As of 31 December 2003, ADB had cumulatively provided 72 public sector loans amounting to \$12.9 billion. Investments in the private sector included 13 projects totaling \$222 million. ADB also provided grants for 192 technical assistance projects for a total of \$102 million.

Sectoral Interventions

Transportation sector. Transportation sector operations are primarily directed at strengthening rural-urban connections, linking poor rural producers to their markets in towns, cities, and ports. Accordingly, the ADB program includes investment for networks of rural roads, state

roads, and national highways. ADB also leads the external assistance program for reforms being undertaken by the Indian railways. Projects are also being prepared to improve inland water transport systems as an energy-efficient and cost-efficient mode of transportation to link producers in poor, remote regions with their markets.

Energy sector. The main thrust of ADB's energy sector operations is to protect the environment by promoting the use of clean fuels across major Indian cities, and by supporting the government's efforts to increase hydropower generation. The program supports only those hydropower projects in which the potential for adverse social and environmental impacts, such as loss of biodiversity or displacement of people, is minimal. Several energy sector interventions are designed to help the state governments undertake reforms in the power sector, a critical issue in most states.

Urban sector. In its urban sector operations, ADB undertakes projects to improve water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management. Projects are also undertaken to build the capacity of municipal bodies for better service delivery. Urban projects also include components to create livelihood opportunities for the urban poor, for example, microcredit projects for women living in slums.

Agriculture and natural resources development. An important challenge in Indian agriculture is the distorted structure of incentives, which encourages overproduction of food grains. Marketing opportunities for fruits, vegetables, floriculture, and other agricultural products are very underdeveloped. Accordingly, ADB assistance is being directed to agribusiness development in several states in India. Another major constraint for agriculture, highlighted in India's tenth Five Year Plan, is inadequate development of irrigation and continuing dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Irrigation development is essential to support multiple cropping as the only means of increasing cropped acreage, given the virtual exhaustion of available cultivable land. It is also essential to protect farmers from the production instability associated with rain-fed agriculture. Hence, ADB is also providing assistance for environmentally friendly irrigation and water resource management projects in the poorer states.

Financial sector operations. In its financial sector operations, ADB is focusing on development and reform of the capital market, and improved access to financial services for the poor. The latter involves strengthening rural finance institutions, reforming cooperatives and regional rural banks, and restructuring the credit system for small and medium enterprises.

Fiscal consolidation. A large fiscal deficit, around 10 percent of gross domestic product, is one of the most serious risks that need to be addressed in India's macroeconomic

management. About half of this is accounted for by the budgets of state governments, many of which are saddled with large stocks of debt and contingent liabilities. ADB's public resource management programs help states implement fiscal reforms by financing a part of the adjustment costs, which typically include costs of debt restructuring, government voluntary retirement schemes, social safety net payments, and initial revenue loss due to tax reforms. Public enterprise reforms under ADB's program loans encompass restructuring, privatization, or closure, with emphasis on social safety net mechanisms. These programs also include state-level tax reforms and expenditure rationalization, such as the reallocation of expenditure toward improved delivery of pro-poor social services.

Strengthening governance. ADB's efforts to support improved governance has four elements: fiscal consolidation at the central government level; sector-level policy reforms combined with capacity building for better service delivery in the sectors where ADB is active; state-level fiscal policy reforms combined with interventions to strengthen state and local governments to ensure greater accountability, transparency, and efficiency in service delivery, especially for pro-poor services; and core governance interventions such as support for enhancing efficiency in the justice administration system, which will play a key role in the next generation of reforms in India.

Private sector development. ADB's support for private sector development addresses three critical impediments: poor infrastructure, policy distortions that deter entry as well as exit in different sectors, and weaknesses of the financial system. The program also includes interventions to support public-private partnerships and direct investment in the private sector by the Private Sector Operations Department of ADB.

Social development and environmental protection. It was noted above that India does not directly borrow for social and environmental projects from ADB. Hence these concerns are being addressed through urban social infrastructure projects, such as supply of potable water, sanitation, sewerage, and solid waste management, which will directly improve public health, especially women's health. Similarly, in promoting the use of clean fuels, ADB is assisting in reducing pollution and also contributing to health protection. ADB's assistance for physical infrastructure projects also includes components that address relevant social issues, such as the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), transportation safety, trafficking of women and children, and livelihood programs for poor communities in project areas. The objective is to go beyond ADB's policies on resettlement and indigenous peoples to ensure that in addition to promoting growth, all ADB interventions, including growth

projects, are socially inclusive and proactively address the issue of gender equity and other social obligations of the development community.

Sudipto Mundle

See also **Gender and Human Rights; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947; World Bank (WB), Relations with**

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ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF BENGAL AND BOMBAY Despite frequent disclaimers in their archives, the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Asiatic Society of Bombay had close and valuable links with the government, particularly at their inception and in the early decades of their growth. High officials of the East India Company (EIC), including successive governors-general in Calcutta (Kolkata) and governors of Bombay



Town Hall, Bombay. Built by the British in 1804 in the grand neoclassical style, Town Hall, home to the Asiatic Society of Bombay. In the twenty-first century, with the wide availability of scholarly information on the Internet, membership in the still prestigious society has markedly declined. CHRISTINE PEMBERTON / FOTOMEDIA.

(Mumbai), were associated with those two societies as president or patrons, and the government, directly or indirectly, helped them with funds and space to house their books and antiquities.

The question of such association is important to the debate over whether the objectives of these societies was to understand India with a view to better administer an alien people with a rich past or whether the societies were purely learned bodies in pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal

The intellectually oriented among the early elites of the EIC in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were motivated both by a genuine academic interest in India's past as well as the practical value of such knowledge in their administration. The Asiatic Society of Bengal's famous founder, Sir William Jones (1746–1794), who had arrived in India to take over as judge only a few months earlier, admitted that he wanted to study ancient Hindu law to help him in his work. At the same time, he told the gathering of thirty at the society's inaugural event on 15 January 1784 that the society's object of

inquiry would be “Man and Nature . . . whatever is performed by one or produced by the other.” The society's focus would be Asia, not Europe. The company's governor-general, Warren Hastings, was elected patron, while Jones became its first president, a position he held until his death a decade later.

Among the fine scholars who presented research papers at the society's first meetings were the leading lights of Indology: William Jones, Henry Thomas Colebrooke, H. H. Wilson, William Carey, and James Prinsep. They translated the most important texts from Sanskrit and several from Persian, commenting on them and devising systems of transliteration, as well as deciphering scripts. Their combined labors would not only introduce India's rich heritage to the West but to subsequent generations of English-educated Indians who lacked proficiency in Sanskrit. Such knowledge of India's past has had an impact on the Indian Renaissance and on the growth of a new spirit of nationalism.

The society's extensive early research was published from 1788 to 1839 in twenty volumes of *Asiatick Researches*. In 1832 the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of*

Bengal began publication; it was integrated in 1904 with *Proceedings of the Asiatic Society*, begun in 1869. Renamed the *Journal of the Asiatic Society* in 1953, the journal continues to be published. Additionally, the society published between 1905 and 1933 a serial called *Memoirs*, which included archaeological and geological surveys, census reports, and treatises on law and revenue systems.

In 1808 the society moved into its own building, constructed on a plot gifted by the government. In the same year, the government also gave the society the invaluable Tipu Sultan Library collection, seized after the fall of Seringapatnam. That famous collection includes an illuminated manuscript of the Qur'an and of the *Padshahnamah*, bearing the autograph of Shah Jahan. The society also received Surveyor-General Colonel Colin Mackenzie's large personal library, a collection principally on South India, as well as N. Wallich's botanical library and the entire library of the government's Fort William College. Over the years, gifts to the society from all over the world have included about five thousand various journals (only about one hundred are subscribed), comprising over 110,000 volumes. Donations of personal libraries such as of Nirmal Chandra Chunder, Prafulla Chandra Sarkar, Nirmal Kumar Bose, C. R. Cama, and Jnananjan Niyogi form but a part of what is probably the best collection in Asia on premodern India as well as India in the British era.

In 1833, 1843, 1856, 1884, 1910, and 1934, the society published catalogs of its collections. Since independence, several catalogs have been added: Arabic-Persian materials by Muliar Rahman in 1958; Hindi books by G. N. Bhattacharji in 1967; and Bengali books by S. Chaudhuri in 1968. Plans have been underway for a comprehensive catalog of all books, manuscripts, inscriptions, coins, drawings and antique objects in the library and museum.

The tradition of governmental assistance to the society continued after India's independence. In 1961 the governments of India and of West Bengal financed the construction of a new building for the society, which, on its completion in February 1965, was inaugurated by President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. In 1984, at the time of the society's bicentennial, the Indian Parliament designated it as an Institution of National Importance, making the central government responsible for the full funding of its operations. One of the last acts of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was to participate in the celebration and to announce a special grant of fifty million rupees. Both central and state governments nominate representatives to the society's executive body.

The Asiatic Society of Bombay

The Asiatic Society of Bombay was first established in 1804 as the Literary Society of Bombay by Sir James Mackintosh, the recorder of Bombay, at the official

residence of Governor Jonathan Duncan. Among those present at the event were historian William Erskine, Sir Charles Forbes, the much-acclaimed artist Henry Salt, and Viscount Valentia, whose journals of travels in the East with sixty engravings by Salt, would be published in 1809. The inspiration for founding the Bombay society may have been provided by the older Asiatic Society of Bengal, since two attendees at the Bombay conclave, Duncan and Erskine, were among the founders and active participants of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Mackintosh defined the Bombay society's objective as "promoting useful knowledge particularly such as is more immediately connected with India."

In 1829 the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain (established in London in 1823) invited the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the Literary Society of Bombay, and the Literary Society of Madras (established in 1812) to join it, assuring them that their administrative and fiscal independence would be respected; the societies in Bombay and Madras agreed. Known thereafter as the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, the organization moved into the northern wing of the magnificent new town hall between 1830 and 1833.

The first phase of the society's history ended in 1840, when the membership, thus far restricted to Europeans, was opened to Indians. In that year, Sir Maneckji Cursetji, a Parsi philanthropist from Bombay, joined the Royal Asiatic Society during a visit to London, which entitled him to use the facilities of its branches anywhere in the world. Having admitted Cursetji, the Bombay Branch was obliged, reluctantly, to open its doors to other Indians. Scores of educated, affluent Indians, fluent in English, applied for membership. Several prominent citizens, among them Jagannath Shankarshet, Premchand Roychand, and Sir Jamsetji Jeejibhoy, joined the society. Scholarly works by Englishmen were complemented by the research of brilliant Indian scholars like Pandit Bhagwanlal Indraji and Bhau Daji Lad. The third phase of the society's development, from about 1885 until India's independence in 1947, was dominated by Indian scholars like Kashinath Trimbak Telang, the first Indian to serve as president of the Bombay Branch, a judge of the High Court and vice-chancellor of Bombay University. Equally important was the research of society members Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar, Jivanji Mody, and K. R. Cama.

Although scholarly papers read at the society's meetings were published periodically as *Transactions*, the society started a journal in 1841, which with changes of name continues to be published annually as the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*. The society's valuable collection includes a 1350 A.D. manuscript of Dante Alighieri's *Divine Comedy* (Benito Mussolini offered one million pounds sterling for it and was refused), an illustrated

Shabnama, *Kalpasutra*, *Aranyaka Parvan* and many other valuable rare volumes; fifteen thousand coins, including gold coins of Samudra Gupta and Akbar; fifteen hundred maps and charts; and several thousand manuscripts in Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian.

In 1947, with the advent of independence, the Bombay Branch dropped its royal links, becoming simply the Asiatic Society of Bombay. In 1954 the society agreed to the government's proposal to designate it one of the four "central" libraries under the Delivery of Books Act with responsibility to receive, catalog, and preserve books published in all Indian languages anywhere in India. The society regained its independence after four decades of fiscal dependence on government through a court-ordered separation of the Central Library effective 1 July 1994. Arguably the greatest achievement of the society during the fourth phase of its history was the publication of Mahamahopadhyaya P. V. Kane's multivolume *History of Dharmashastra*, which brought him the highest honor in India, the *Bharata Ratna* (jewel of India).

In the decade beginning 1989, when the undersigned was president of the society, it launched a massive fund-raising campaign to implement initiatives to prepare the society for its bicentennial. Nearly 60 million rupees were collected, including 20 million from the central government—the bulk of the balance coming from Bombay's philanthropists: foundations and trusts, corporations, and individuals. The reserve fund was reconstituted and a corpus fund created, enabling the society to fund a number of fellowships, endowed lectures, and research projects. Among the new facilities created were microfilming and conservation laboratories and renovation of the society's famed Durbar Hall, adorning it with oil portraits of some of the greatest scholar-members of the society. Bharat Ratna Mahamahopadhyaya, in whose name the society had already established a center for research in 1972, was singled out for a bronze bust in the vestibule.

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ASSAM The state of Assam in northeast India had a population of nearly 27 million in 2001. An overwhelmingly agricultural state, producing over 50 percent of India's tea, Assam has one of India's lowest literacy rates and highest poverty rates. The capital is Dispur, and the state is divided into twenty-three districts.

Assam was known in ancient times as Pragjyotisha or Pragjyotishpura ("the City of Eastern Lights"), and as Kamarupa. Asom (Axom), or its Anglicized version, Assam, is a modern name. It derives from the Bodo word *Ha-Cham* (low or level country) or *Asama* ("unequaled" or "peerless") and was used to describe the Ahoms, a Shan tribe of Mongoloid abstraction, who ruled the state from 1228 for six centuries, recording their activities in the *Buranjis* (the "store-house of unknown things"). Perhaps the first people to populate the state were Austroloids, none of whom remain, followed by Mongoloids and Caucasoids. The people of the state are broadly classified as nontribals, or plains people, and the tribals, who mostly live in the hills. A variety of ethnic groups make up the "Assamese" because the British brought in people from Orissa, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala to work on the tea plantations in the nineteenth century, as indigenous labor was scarce. About 70 percent of the nontribal population, concentrated in the Brahmaputra and the Barak Valleys, are Hindus who are divided into castes and subcastes (though caste barriers are not as pronounced as elsewhere in India), and they speak Assamese. Renowned Hindu temples are the Kamakhya at Guwahati and the Kechaikhati at Sadiya. They are both *shakti* temples in the tantric tradition. Muslims are the second-largest group (about 29%), followed by Christians (about 3%), Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains.

There are twenty-three different tribes, most of whom practice animism with elements of Hinduism, although a number are Christian and a few Muslim. The Bodo Kacharis, Karbis, and Lalungs are patriarchal; the Khasis, Jaintias, and Garos are matriarchal, while the Dimasas have a patriarchal family structure but also have male and female clans who accord exclusive rights to women. Like other tribes in northeastern India, the Hmars, Rengma Nagas, and Garos have youth dormitories where young males are educated in tribal customs. The Zeme Nagas have dormitories for both males and females. In the Official Language Act of 1960, English and Assamese became official languages in the Brahmaputra



River Brahmaputra in Assam. Assam is dominated by the mighty Brahmaputra, river of legend that has its origins in Tibet. Commonly referred to as the “sorrow of Amman,” this river has brought raging floods and agricultural devastation to the region in recent years. IPSHITA BARUA.

Valley, while Bengali and English, along with Assamese, were official languages in the Barak Valley and the hill districts. The tribal people speak Tibeto-Burman, Austro-Asiatic, and Tibeto-Chinese languages, while the immigrant tea garden laborers speak Oriya, Mundari, Santhal, Tamil, and Telegu.

Some 800,000 looms are at work in Assam, and handloom weaving is a way of life. Assamese weavers produce such textiles as clothing, shawls, and quilts. Over 30,000 looms produce silk, and they are concentrated in the township of Sualkuchi, the “Manchester of Assam.” Each ethnic group has its own distinctive design, depicting everything from animals and human figures to the galaxy. Jewelry, especially of gold, has also been a tradition in Assam. One tribe, the Sonowal Kacharis, specialize in panning for gold in the rivers that flow down from the Himalayas. The abundant cane of Assam is made into the renowned furniture of the state, and bamboo is used for a variety of products, including the *japi*, the colorfully decorated hat worn by Assamese peasants as they toil in the fields. Hajo, in Kamrup district, is the center of the important cottage brass industry, and nearby Sarhebari produces

distinctive bell-metal objects. The Hira and the Kumar are two communities of pottery artisans, and the Khanikar are practitioners of the ancient art of woodcarving; the painted woodwork of Golaghat is prized by tourists. Fiber weaving, *kubila koth*, is a renowned handicraft in Nagaon and Dhubri districts, and cork toys of gods, animals, and birds have been made for centuries in Goalpara.

The Varman dynasty ruled Assam from A.D. 400 to 1228; the Chinese pilgrim Hsieun Tsang visited around A.D. 630. The Ahoms ruled after 1228, repelling seventeen military expeditions by the Mughals until, in a weakened state at the end of the eighteenth century, the Burmese invaded. They were in turn beaten back by the British in 1824 who, with the Treaty of Yandibo of 1826, absorbed Assam into the Raj. The British passed the Assam Clearance Act in 1854, which allowed any European planter up to 3,000 acres of prime land to create tea plantations. Within twenty years, there were nearly three hundred plantations in India, many of them in Assam. After Indian independence, a number of states were carved out of Assam. They included Nagaland in 1963, Meghalaya and Mizoram in 1971, and Arunachal Pradesh in 1972.

In 1979 and 1980 separatism raised its head in Assam and the six other neighboring tribal states (Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura). In Assam the movement began with sporadic nonviolent protests against the influx of some 5 million Bengali immigrants, who had been migrating into the state in increasing numbers since 1947, especially after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Assamese Liberation Army increased the insurgency, and violence intensified, adversely affecting the tea and jute industry and bringing the Assam oil industry practically to a halt. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent troops to the area and flew there to try, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a settlement. Unrest increased, and the Seven United Liberation Army, led by Naga, Mizo, and Assamese tribals, called for independence from India. Ethnic resentment of the Bengalis continued as the Assam Movement (1979–1985), led by the All-Assam Student Union and the All-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, a coordinating committee representing several political parties and associations, attempted to preserve the cultural identity of Assam and of the Assamese, represented by the term *Asamiya*. This led to the Assam Accord of 1985 with the government and the cessation of violence, though resentment of Bengalis and fear of Bengali domination continues.

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See also **Arunachal Pradesh; Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Peace Accords; Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Tripura**

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ASTRONOMY There are astronomical references of chronological significance in the Vedas. Due to precession of Earth, the seasons shift at a rate of about a month every

two thousand years. Some Vedic notices mark the beginning of the year and that of the vernal equinox in Orion; this was the case around 4500 B.C. There are other astronomical references from the subsequent millennia, which indicates the memory of a long period over which astronomy developed into a science. Fire altars, with astronomical basis, have been found in the third millennium cities of India. The texts that describe their designs are conservatively dated to the first millennium B.C., but their contents appear to be much older.

Vedic ritual was based on the times for the full and the new moons, the solstices and the equinoxes. There were two years: the ritual year started with the winter solstice (*mabāvṛata*), and the civil one started with the spring equinox (*vishuva*). The passage of the rising of the sun in its northward course from the winter solstice to the summer solstice (*vishuvant*) was called *gavām ayana*, or the sun's walk. The solar year was divided into two *ayanas*: in the *uttarāyana*, the sun travels north; in the *dakshināyana*, it travels south.

The movement of the moon was marked by its nightly conjunction with one of the 27 or 28 *nakshatras* (stars or star clusters). The Rig Veda 1.164 also speaks of another tradition of dividing the zodiac into twelve equal parts. It appears that these divisions were called the *Ādityas*.

The incommensurability between the lunar and the solar reckonings led to the search for ever-increasing cycles to synchronize the motions of the sun and the moon. This is how the *yuga* (world cycle) astronomical model was born. In the lunar month, there were separate traditions of counting the beginning of the month by the full-moon day and the new-moon day.

During the earliest times in India, there existed a centennial calendar with a cycle of 2,700 years. Called the Saptarshi calendar, it is still in use in several parts of India. Its current beginning is taken to be 3076 B.C. Notices by the Greek historians Pliny and Arrian suggest that, during the Mauryan times, the calendar used in India began in 6676 B.C. It is very likely that this calendar was the Old Saptarshi calendar with a beginning at 6676 B.C. Other major Indian eras are that have wide currency are Kaliyuga (3102 B.C.), Vikrama (58 B.C.), and Shaka (A.D. 78).

The shifting of seasons through the year and the shifting of the North Pole allow us to date several other statements in the Vedic books. Thus the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa statement that the Krittikās never swerve from the east corresponds to 2950 B.C.

The Maitrāyaniya Brāhmaṇa Upanishad refers to the winter solstice being at the midpoint of the Shrivishthā (Delphini) segment and the summer solstice at the beginning of Māgha. This indicates 1660 B.C. The Vedānga



Observatory in Jaipur. In Jaipur, one of five Jantar Mantar (literally “instrument for calculation of the heavens”) constructed at the behest of Maharajah Sawai Jai Singh II between 1727 and 1734. These national observatories incorporate multiple buildings of unique form (each with a specialized function for astronomical measurement), monumental scale, and lavish materials. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Jyotisha, the text that describes some of the astronomical knowledge of the times of altar ritual, has an internal date of circa 1350 B.C.

Astronomical Ritual

The year was known to be somewhat more than 365 days and a bit less than 366 days. In one tradition, an extra eleven days were added to the lunar year of 354 days. According to one text, five more days are required over the nominal year of 360 days to complete the seasons.

The central idea behind the Vedic system is the notion of *bandhu* (connections) between the astronomical, the terrestrial, and the physiological. The connections were represented in sacred ritual and sacred books. This knowledge was also coded in the organization of the Rig Veda, which was taken to be a symbolic altar of hymns. The examination of the Rig Veda is of unique significance since this ancient book has been preserved with incredible accuracy.

Vedic ritual was generally performed at an altar. The altar design was based on astronomical numbers related

to the reconciliation of the lunar and solar years. The fire altars symbolized the universe, and there were three types of altars representing the earth, the space, and the sky. The altar for the earth was drawn as circular, whereas the sky (or heaven) altar was drawn as square. The geometric problems of circulature of a square and that of squaring a circle are a result of equating the earth and the sky altars. These problems are among the earliest considered in ancient geometry.

The fire altars were surrounded by 360 enclosing stones; of these, 21 were around the earth altar, 78 around the space altar, and 261 around the sky altar. Thus the earth, the space, and the sky are symbolically assigned the numbers 21, 78, and 261.

The main altar was built in five layers. The basic square shape was modified to several forms, such as that of a falcon and a turtle. These altars were built in five layers, of a thousand bricks of specified shapes. The construction of these altars required the solution to geometric and algebraic problems. The main altar was an area that was taken to be equivalent to the nominal year of 360 days.

The altar ritual dealt with the difference between the two years: lunar, which is a fraction more than 354 days (360 *tithis*); and solar, which is in excess of 365 days (between 371 and 372 *tithis*). A well-known altar ritual says that altars should be constructed in a sequence of 95, with progressively increasing areas. The residual excess in 95 years adds up to 89 *tithis*; it appears that this was distributed in some manner over the 95-year period. The 95-year cycle corresponds to the tropical year being equal to 365.24675 days.

The Vedic astronomical system as given in the Vedānga Jyotisha is a luni-solar system. It considers a five-year *yuga*, employing two intercalary lunar months, with the condition that at the beginning of each *yuga* both the sun and the moon would be at the Shraivishthā *nakshatra*, and it will be the winter solstice. For these conditions to be met, several corrections had to be made at the end of the *yuga*. For example, an additional day was needed to make sure that the new *yuga* would start with the new-moon day.

Nature of the Planetary System

The *Āryabhatīya* of Āryabhata (b. A.D. 476) is a milestone of astronomy for two reasons. In it Earth is taken to spin on its axis, and the orbits of the planets are considered with respect to the sun. This idea of a spinning Earth causing night and day was a major advance in astronomy. Since the inner planets were already seen close to the sun, it made it easy to refer their orbital motions with respect to the sun. In contrast to this, in the Greek view the planets and stars were on concentric crystalline spheres centered on Earth. Each planet, the sun, and the moon were on their own sphere; the stars were placed on the largest sphere surrounding all of the rest.

A pure heliocentrism is to be found in the following statement in the Vishnu Purāṇa: “The sun is stationed for all time, in the middle of the day. The rising and the setting of the sun being perpetually opposite to each other, people speak of the rising of the sun where they see it; and, where the sun disappears, there, to them, is his setting. Of the sun, which is always in one and the same place, there is neither setting nor rising.”

By examining early Vedic sources, the stages of the development of the earliest astronomy become apparent. After the Rig Vedic stage comes the period of the Brāhmaṇas, in which we place the Vedānga Jyotisha astronomy. The third stage is early Siddhāntic and early Purāṇic astronomy.

The concepts of the *shīgbrocca* and *mandocca* cycles are peculiar to Indian astronomy. They indicate that the motion of the planets was taken to be fundamentally around the sun, which, in turn, was taken to go around Earth. The *mandocca*, in the case of the sun and the moon,

is the apogee where the angular motion is the slowest; in the case of the other planets, it is the aphelion point of the orbit. For the superior planets, the *shīgbrocca* coincides with the mean place of the sun, and in the case of an inferior planet, it is an imaginary point moving around Earth with the same angular velocity as the angular velocity of the planet around the sun; its direction from Earth is always parallel to the line joining the sun and the inferior planet.

The *mandocca* point serves to slow down the motion from the apogee to the perigee and speed up the motion from the perigee to the apogee. It is a representation of the nonuniform motion of the body, and so it can be seen as a direct development of the idea of the non-uniform motion of the sun and the moon. The *shīgbrocca* maps the motion of the planet around the sun to the corresponding set of points around Earth. The sun, with its winds that hold the solar system together, is, in turn, taken to go around Earth. The antecedents of this system can be seen in the earlier texts.

Astronomical Siddhāntas

In these standard texts of Indian astronomy, which became popular about two thousand years ago, the calculations are not done with respect to the *nakshatras* but rather with respect to the twelve signs of the zodiac. There is speculation that this change arose out of the interaction with the Greeks, but the twelve-division zodiac was a part of the early Indian astronomical tradition.

The mean longitudes were computed from the number of days elapsed from the beginning of long periods called the *kalpa* and the *yuga*, with the current *yuga* (Kaliyuga) having commenced on 17/18 February 3102 B.C. Planetary motions were computed using epicyclic and eccentric circles. Eclipses were computed more accurately by applying corrections due to parallax. Computations were based on arithmetic, geometric and algebraic techniques; plane and spherical trigonometry was also used.

The problems dealt with in the *siddhāntas* include: the determination of the longitudes of the planets and also of the ascending and descending nodes of the moon; corrections of these computations with the passage of time; lunar and solar eclipses; problems relating to the shadow; the phases of the moon; helical rising and setting of the planets; occultation of stars and planets; and astronomical instruments.

The astronomical texts may be divided into three types: *siddhāntas*, *karanas*, and *koshthakas*. While the *siddhāntas* are comprehensive and commence the calculations from the *kalpa* or a *yuga*, the *karanas* are practical manuals to facilitate calculations from a specific epoch with zero corrections at that point. The *koshthakas* or *saranis* are astronomical tables for the casting of horoscopes by astrologers. There are also texts that focus only on instruments.

The prominent astronomers after Āryabhata include his later rival Brahmagupta (seventh century), Bhāskara II (b. 1114), and the many mathematician-astronomers of the Kerala school that flourished during the years of the Karnataka (Vijayanagara) empire. The two most prominent names of this school are Mādhava (c. 1340–1425) and Nīlakantha (c. 1444–1545). Their contributions include power series for trigonometric functions, demonstration that π is irrational, and contributions to calculus. Nīlakantha presented an improved version of the Āryabhata's scheme in which the five planets orbit the sun and in turn they all orbit Earth.

Size of the Universe

The Brāhmaṇas consider noncircular motion of the sun and, by implication, of the moon, and the sun is taken to be about 500 Earth diameters away from Earth. Much later, Āryabhata considers the orbit of the sky as 4.32 million times greater than the orbit of the sun. Clearly, this was inspired by cosmological ideas. The Purāṇas consider the size of the universe to be 500 million *yojanas* (or over 4.5 billion miles). They also speak of other universes beyond ours. The conception of such a large size, and the noncentrality of Earth for the universe sets this tradition apart from Western astronomy.

Subhash Kak

See also Āryabhata; Āryabhatīya; Brāhmaṇas; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedānga Jyotiṣṭa

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ATMAN. *See* Upanishadic Philosophy.

ATOMIC POWER. *See* Nuclear Programs and Policies.

AUCKLAND, LORD (1784–1849), governor-general of India (1836–1842). George Eden, second baron and first earl of Auckland, arrived in India after

long, if undistinguished, service to the Whig Party, previously rewarded by appointment to the Board of Trade (1830), and as First Lord of the Admiralty (1834). As governor-general, he established the universal applicability of general rules for appointments, pensions, and legislation, thus obviating continual recourse for guidance by provincial administrators. He also supported the spread of education, particularly Western medical knowledge, if to little effect. Such minor service was, however, entirely overshadowed by the First Afghan War of 1838 to 1842.

There has been much speculation as to why Auckland waged a disastrous war to remove the Afghan amir Dost Mohammad Barakzai, against the advice of British envoy Alexander Burnes, who had held amicable negotiations with the amir in 1837. It has been argued that the easily led Auckland was persuaded to override Burnes's sound advice by his political secretary, William Macnaghten, who was fatally overconfident in India's military prowess. Auckland had previously acted precipitously in suppressing unrest in Oudh, deposed the rebellious rajas of Satara and Karnul, and annexed the lands of the latter. In a prelude to the Afghan war itself, he had forced the amirs of Sind to accept violations of their sovereignty precluded by previous agreements. He also seized Persian territory in the Gulf, insisting that such aggression was justified by the need to provide for the "safety and integrity of the Anglo-Indian empire."

The sources of Auckland's bellicosity may well have been more political than personal, if also more illusory than real. These included not only fears of Russian intrigues in Herat and Tehran as well as Kabul, but also the presence in India of Shah Shuja Sodozai, a weak refugee-claimant to the throne of Afghanistan, who was expected to be more pliant than Dost Mohammad. Auckland, like most British officials, also harbored an almost pathological fear of a Russian invasion of India.

In December 1838, Auckland's "Army of the Indus" marched off with much ceremony for Afghanistan. Its operations began well enough to earn Auckland an earldom, but by late 1841 Macnaghten, in Kabul, was pleading for reinforcements. Auckland delayed the dispatch of a more British forces until Macnaghten had been killed and the Army of the Indus, forced to withdraw from the country, had been virtually annihilated in the Khurd-Kabul Pass. This event is generally considered one of the most ignominious defeats of British arms in India and darkened Auckland's departure for home. Nonetheless, he was reappointed in 1846 as First Lord of the Admiralty, a post he occupied until his death.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842)

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AURANGZEB (1618–1707), sixth and last of the Great Mughal emperors of India. Born Muhi-ud-Din Muhammad, Aurangzeb was renowned for his long war in the south (the Deccan) and for his religious orthodoxy. He expanded the Mughal empire to its greatest extent but bankrupted the empire, impoverishing the land and most of its people, by trying to conquer and control the vast Deccan, which rebelled against his rule. After his father, Shah Jahan, fell ill, Aurangzeb captured and imprisoned him in Agra Fort in June 1658, securing vast treasures and armaments in the process. He was crowned emperor in Delhi the following month, and gave himself the title "Alamgir" (World Seizer). He then defeated and killed his three brothers in a murderous civil war. His victory was assured by his skilled generalship, acquired while serving in his father's army in Gujarat and in the south for over ten years.

For the first twenty-five years of his rule, Aurangzeb maintained his capital at Shahjahanabad (Delhi). Later, his encampment became a movable capital as he waged war in Rajasthan. In the final years of his life he moved with his army across the Deccan. The setbacks in the north in the 1660s and 1670s convinced him of the need to expand and enrich his empire in the south and to end the defiance of southern rulers.

Aurangzeb's initial attempts to expand his empire in the 1660s and 1670s met with mixed success. In 1660, in the northeast, he began to reclaim territory lost in the war of succession. The capital of Bengal was moved east from Rajmahal to Dacca, and Assam was subdued by 1663. In 1664 Chatgaon, the fortified pirate and slave-raider port on the Bay of Bengal, was captured and renamed Islamabad. In south Bihar he defeated the raja of Palamau in 1661 and annexed his kingdom. He incorporated Chittagong in 1666. In 1679 he went to Ajmer to annex Marwar, a campaign that lasted two and a half years.

In 1667, in the Swat Valley in the northwest, the Yusufzai tribe rose in rebellion, and that revolt was harshly put down, but in 1672 an Afridi chief declared himself king and closed the Khyber Pass. He then surprised and massacred a Mughal army, and destroyed another one the following year. Finally, in 1674, Aurangzeb himself led the imperial army north and, using both a show of force and numerous bribes, restored Mughal authority along the northwest frontier, though at a very high cost. Only lavish and frequent subsidies over the next twenty years kept the Khyber Pass open.



Aurangzeb's Coin. Coin minted during the reign of Aurangzeb in the seventh century. A devoutly conservative Muslim, Aurangzeb was harshly intolerant of Hinduism (he banned many of its religious practices), and this intolerance sparked rebellion among Hindus and other similarly oppressed groups, soon leading to the dissolution of the Mughal empire. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Aurangzeb had a strong sense of duty and he was self-restrained, never having more than four wives. He sired ten children, five boys and five girls, half of them with his first wife. He was filled with puritanical Islam zeal. A follower of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, he devoted seven years while emperor to memorizing the entire Qur'an. His cold reserve, his simplicity, and his cruel and suspicious nature made him very unpopular, even hated. He ended just over a century of tolerant Mughal policy when in 1679 he reestablished the poll tax (*jizya*) on non-Muslims, which Akbar had abolished in 1564. He forbade the building of Hindu temples, and allowed old ones to be destroyed. This exclusionist and hated policy alienated Hindus and Sikhs and led directly to rebellion by a number of groups. Aurangzeb's ultra-orthodox policies shattered the harmony of India's multicultural polity that had allowed non-Muslims to serve the Mughal dynasty faithfully and honorably. The ultimate decline of the Mughal empire began with Aurangzeb, whose harsh intolerance helped create a strong Hindu nationalism and led to revolts by Marathas, Rajputs, and Sikhs, as well as others farther south. Many conservative Muslims, however, considered him the greatest of the Mughal emperors because of his extreme piety, especially toward the end of his life.

Aurangzeb's imperial army was huge and cumbersome, with thousands of elephants, large numbers of

guns and cavalry, and an enormous number of followers, and could stretch some thirty miles (48 km) from end to end. In order to wage war in the south, Aurangzeb moved his capital to Aurangabad in the Deccan in 1682 and for the most part remained there for the rest of his life. This huge, moving army was highly vulnerable to attack. The great Maratha Hindu leader Shivaji Bhonsla (1627–1680) developed highly successful guerrilla tactics. Shivaji had sacked the Mughal port of Surat in 1664, and it was only after his death that Aurangzeb was able to capture Bijapur (1686) in the west and Golconda (1687) in the east. Yet many of the territories Aurangzeb conquered would soon be lost. The longer the Deccan war went on, the weaker the Mughals became, as the Marathas got stronger. It was said that Aurangzeb “chased his own shadow,” and morale in the Mughal army plummeted.

In the very last phase of his campaign in the south, Aurangzeb personally led his army after every rainy season, and between 1698 and 1707 he captured over a dozen strongholds. He also created two highly mobile field armies, which actively sought out the enemy. Nonetheless, the Marathas continued to attack, capture, and plunder Mughal allies, as in Hyderabad in 1702. This war in the south devastated the economy, and long-distance trade with the north was completely shut down between 1702 and 1704. Aurangzeb’s obsession with the war and his absence from Delhi also enabled the English, Dutch, and French to greatly strengthen their positions at the expense of the Mughals. In many areas of the empire, governors, landlords, and peasants successfully defied imperial laws. The increasing number of revolts by such groups as the Jats around Agra, the Sikhs in the Punjab, and especially the Marathas of the Deccan, were made possible, in part, by the illegal but widespread production of light firearms.

Aurangzeb died, nearly ninety years old, in 1707 and was buried in a modest tomb by the side of a road in Aurangabad. The empire did not long survive his death.

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Babur; Shah Jahan**

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AUROBINDO, SRI (1872–1950), Indian poet and philosopher. Sri Aurobindo was born Aurobindo Ghose. The change in name reflected a profound transformation



Sri Aurobindo. Sri Aurobindo’s belief in higher consciousness as the path to individual perfection, social transformation, and human unity continues to hold sway. TIME LIFE PICTURES/GETTY IMAGES.

in the person: from a poet of patriotism, committed to India’s freedom, to a philosopher-visionary of the New Age, heralding the ultimate stage of human evolution.

Ghose was born on 15 August 1872 in Kolkata to K. D. Ghose, a physician, and Swarnalata Bose, the eldest daughter of Rajnaryan Bose, a nationalist pioneer. Dr. Ghose was an Anglophile: he loved everything Western. When Aurobindo was seven years old, Dr. Ghose took his wife and three sons to England. Aurobindo was educated at St. Paul’s School in London, and graduated from Cambridge University with a first in Classics Tripos, winning all the top prizes the university offered in his field. While attending high school, he developed a passionate interest in the Classical world and its languages, Greek and Latin. Later, he not only mastered these two classical languages, but also learned French, German, Italian, and Spanish in order to read Johann Goethe, Dante Alighieri, and Pedro Calderón in the original texts.

He sat for and passed the Indian Civil Service examination. But he decided not to work for the British government in India. Instead, he accepted an appointment in the Baroda (a princely state, semiautonomous under the Raj) state service in 1893. He spent thirteen years in Baroda and rose to the post of principal of the Baroda State

College (later University). These were years of preparation for the work to be done in the near future. He learned Sanskrit and read the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the epics; he learned Marathi, Gujarati, and brushed up on his native language, Bengali. He married Mrinalini Basu in 1901 according to strict Hindu rites.

The partition of Bengal in 1905 brought Ghose into the public limelight. He went to Kolkata and accepted the post of principal of the newly established National College, later Jadavpur University. He started the Bengali daily *Yugantar* and joined the English daily *Bande Mataram*, edited by Bipin Chandra Pal. He published in the pages of *Bande Mataram* his doctrine of passive resistance and the methods of *swadeshi* (the first major phase of a militant nationalist movement protesting against the British authorities' decision in 1905 to divide the province of Bengal in two parts—one with a Muslim majority, the other Hindu) and boycott. In the 1906 Indian National Congress session held in Kolkata, he declared “complete autonomy free from British control” to be the nationalist agenda, with Bal Gangadhar Tilak as the leader. Ghose was arrested in 1907 for publishing inflammatory articles in *Bande Mataram*. His bold and dignified self-defense prompted Rabindranath Tagore to pen one of his most famous congratulatory poems, which begins, “Aurobindo! Accept the salutations of Rabindra.”

Ghose was arrested again in 1908 and he spent a year as an under-trial prisoner. The experience totally transformed him. Nationalism seemed to acquire a deeper, more integral meaning to him. In the English weekly *Karmayogin* and the Bengali weekly *Dharma*, he wrote articles on the transcendental significance of Indian nationalism. In 1910 at the office of the *Karmayogin*, he received word that he would be arrested for sedition. He made a quick decision, took a boat to Chandernagore, a French concession outside Kolkata, and from there to Pondicherry, the French concession in South India, on a French boat under an assumed name. The British attempted to get him out of Pondicherry but failed.

In Pondicherry, Ghose withdrew from political activity altogether. Instead, he devoted himself to yoga, meditation, and intensive study of the sacred texts. His patrons were a French couple, Paul Richard and his wife Mirra Alfassa Richard (later the Mother of the Pondicherry Ashram). With assistance from his French friends, Ghose started to publish the monthly journal *Anyra*, in which he articulated his basic philosophical positions: the divine destiny of humankind, unification of the human race, and the spirit and significance of Indian civilization and culture. Later, these articles appeared in Ghose's magnum opus *The Life Divine*. Soon after, Aurobindo wrote his supreme epic poem *Savitri* in

23,813 lines of blank verse, the longest poem in the English language. It prompted Sir Herbert Read to call the epic poem “great by any standard.”

In 1926 Aurobindo retired to complete seclusion. He broke his isolation a few times. In 1928 he met the poet Rabindranath Tagore, who saw Aurobindo's face radiant with inner light. Many others followed Tagore to seek his counsel or urge his intervention in nationalist politics. Aurobindo turned down all requests, pleading that few in the popular platform would understand his ideals and ideas.

Aurobindo in his complex and extensive body of writings privileged consciousness from within over material, economic, and political spheres. His system of yoga empowers the individual to transform life, mind, and body. It is a dynamic of integral cultural consciousness that helps bring about the transformation, and the only power that can transform is the supreme one, above the mind, which he calls “supermind.” It will manifest itself in a class of “supermen,” the truth-conscious beings. Following Charles Darwin's trajectory to its deterministic future, Aurobindo predicts this to be evolution's ultimate destination for humankind.

Aurobindo had a five-part vision. He wished to see a free and independent India, which he witnessed on his birthday on 15 August 1947. His second vision was the resurgence of Asia, the third a “world union,” the fourth the spiritual gift of India to the world, the fifth “a step in evolution which would raise man to a higher and larger consciousness.”

On 5 December 1950, Aurobindo left this world. His work was continued by the Mother, and after her death by her successors at the Pondicherry Ashram. Auroville, an international community established on the outskirts of Pondicherry, to this day celebrates Aurobindo's revolutionary utopian vision. His collected works, written in an elegant inimitable prose and verse, have inspired authors and scholars to probe their metaphysical and philosophical wealth. One such scholar, the late Haridas Chaudhuri, founded the Institute of Integral Studies in San Francisco in 1971. It is now a full-scale accredited graduate school with a curriculum modeled on Sri Aurobindo's cultural and East/West integral philosophy.

Dilip K. Basu

See also Tagore, Rabindranath; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

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AVATĀRAS. See *Vishnu and Avatāras*.

AVATĀRAS OF VISHNU, IMAGES OF In Hinduism, the trinity of gods—Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva—are believed to be responsible for creation, preservation, and annihilation of the Universe, respectively. Although Vishnu appears second in the triad, he is very popular because of his identity as the supreme being. In the Vedic period, he was not placed in the foremost rank, but in the post-Vedic period, Vishnu was identified as the supreme God who from time to time descends from heaven, assuming many *avatāras* (incarnations), to put an end to evil and to establish Dharma (religious law).

Incarnations of Vishnu are of three categories: *avatāra*, *āveśa*, and *amsa*. In the *avatāra*, Vishnu incarnates in complete form, whereas in the *āveśa*, he incarnates partially; this can be more or less temporary in nature. The *avatāras* of Rāma and Krishna are “complete,” whereas the incarnation of Parashurama is only partial. In *Amsa*, by order of Vishnu, his attributes and aspects are occasionally born on Earth in the form of saintly beings to improve the lives of ordinary human beings.

The Purāṇas (ancient texts) enumerate ten to twenty *avatāras*, of which ten are major: Matsya (fish), Kūrma (tortoise), Vārāha (boar), Narasimha (man-lion), Vāmana (dwarf), Parashurāma, Rāma, Balarāma, Krishna, and Kalki. There are three different versions concerning the eighth and ninth incarnations. According to the first tradition (Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa), Balarāma and Krishna are accepted as the eighth and ninth incarnations. The second tradition (Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Matsya Purāṇa) treats the eighth and ninth as Krishna and the Buddha. The third tradition (Agni Purāṇa) regards Balarāma and the Buddha as the eighth and ninth incarnations. Chronologically, this belief is of later origin. The second tradition, which regards Krishna and the Buddha as the eighth and ninth incarnations, came into vogue only after the Buddha was adopted as an *avatāra* of Vishnu, dropping Balarāma, who then was recognized as an *avatāra* of Sesha rather than Vishnu.

Matsya Avatāra

Matsya, the first of the ten *avatāras* of Vishnu, originated from the ancient flood legends. The earliest account of this myth is found in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, which does not, however, mention Matsya, the fish, as an *avatāra* of any god. All that the fish did was to save Manu,



Narasimha. Massive stone sculpture from Hampi depicting the fourth avatar of Vishnu, the all-powerful Narasimha (half-man, half-lion) sent to slay the errant ruler Hiranyakashipu. Regardless of what form his manifestation takes, Vishnu's pervasiveness in Indian culture is never far from mind. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

the first man of Hindu mythology, from the flood, thereby helping him to become the progenitor of the human race. The epic Mahābhārata notes that Prajāpati assumed the form of a fish, whereas later Purāṇas speak of the fish as an *avatāra* of Vishnu, who saved Manu from floods.

As Manu was performing his rites in the river, a small fish fell into his folded hands. Manu first put it into a jar, then into a lake, and later into the sea because the fish grew so rapidly. Then the fish (Matsya) warned Manu of the coming deluge, which was to take place on the seventh day because the demon Hayagrīva had stolen the Vedas. Matsya instructed Manu to gather various seeds of creation and to enter a boat that would be waiting for him on the appointed day, along with the seven Rishis (Sages). On that day Manu entered the boat and tied it to a large fish that had one stupendous horn. This fish revealed himself to Manu as Vishnu, who later killed Hayagrīva and recovered the Vedas.

Iconography and images. The Matsya Purāṇa and Agni Purāṇa, Abhilashitārthachinthāmani, Rūpamandana, Shilparatna and Shilparatnākara prescribe the iconographic features of Matsya Avatāra in natural fish form. The Vishnudharmottara is the only text that describes it as horned fish. In the Meru Tantra, Śrītattvanidhi, and Chaturvargachintāmani (compendium), the image is described as only partly zoomorphic. The upper part of the body is represented as that of Vishnu with his usual attributes, and the lower part is that of a fish.

No independent shrine of this *avatāra* has yet been found in India. But images of a fish with one or two attributes of Vishnu are rarely represented in the Dasavatāra (ten avatars) panels in the temples and in the *prabhavalis* (arches) of sculptural images of Vishnu. The zooanthropomorphic images of Matsya Avatāra are found on the pillars of all Vishnu temples.

Kūrmavatāra

The earliest reference to this *avatāra* is found in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, which indicates that Kūrma, the tortoise, was an incarnation of Prajāpati. But several Purāṇas, including Vishnu, Bhāgavata, and Agni, proclaim Kūrma as an *avatāra* of Vishnu. According to them, Vishnu assumed the form of a tortoise to support the sinking Mandara Mountain at the time of the churning of the milky ocean to obtain ambrosia for the gods, so that they could retrieve their glory and power, which had been taken away by demons.

Iconography and images. The Purāṇas (Matsya, Agni, and Vishnudharmottara) and the Shilpa Shāstras (Rūpamandana Abhilashitārthachinthāmani and Shilparatna) describe Kūrma in zoomorphic form. The Śrītattvanidhi describes it as half tortoise and half man, with two hands, the right hand holding a *gada* (throne), the left hand with a *chakra* (wheel).

There are very few shrines for Kūrmavatāra. However, the images of Kūrma, in both forms, are found in the Dashavatāra panels and in the *prabhavalis* of Vishnu dating to the medieval period.

Varāha Avatāra

The Varāha (wild boar) myth, which originated in the Vedic period, gradually developed in different phases over time and took final shape in the Puranic period. The myth of Varāha as the uplifter of the earth developed in two stages. The first stage, a long period from the Vedas to the Purāṇas, accepted the boar as the creator of Earth. According to Vedic tradition, the creator Prajāpati assumed the form of a boar to bring the earth from the waters; the cosmogonical section of the Purāṇas states

that Lord Nārāyana, in his role of Brahmā, assumed the form of a boar to raise the earth.

The earliest reference to the boar called Emusha Varāha is found in the Rig Veda. The earliest reference to Varāha's association with goddess Earth is found in Bhūmi Sūkta of the Atharva Veda. The Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas identify Emusha Varāha with the creator Prajāpati, who brought up soil exactly the size of his snout. This soil became the earth.

In the second stage, the myth of Varāha was transformed into the *avatāra* cycle of Vishnu. According to Puranic legend, while Brahmā was engaged in the process of creation, the earth had merged in the Garbhodaka Ocean. Brahmā wondered how he could lift the earth out of the waters. In the meantime, a small boar, no larger than the upper portion of a thumb, emerged from his nostril. It quickly became gigantic, making a roaring sound as it ascended into the sky. The denizens of different *lokas* (the worlds above and below earth), realizing that the boar was not only a form of Vishnu but also a form of divine speech (Vāk), started chanting auspicious verses from the Vedas. The boar, smelling the earth, which had been hidden by the demon Hiranyāksha, entered the ocean, killed Hiranyāksha, then lifted the earth on his tusk and brought it to the surface.

Iconography and images. The Vaikhānasāgama prescribes the iconography of Varāha in three forms: Adivarāha, Nrvarāha, or Bhūvarāha; Yajnavarāha; and Pralayavarāha. In the forms of Bhūvarāha, Yajnavarāha, and Pralayavarāha, the image is depicted with a boar's head and a human body. While the image of Bhūvarāha is shown standing in the *ālidhāsana* pose, resting his right leg on the hoods of the cosmic snake Sesha, the other two forms of Varāha are shown seated in *lalitāsana* (sitting posture in which one leg is folded and the other is hanging and resting on the ground) on a *simbasana* (lion throne). An Earth Goddess figure is shown in the right hand of Bhūvarāha. In the Yajnavaraha form, both Lakshmi (Goddess of Wealth) and Bhūdevī (Earth Goddess) are represented. In the case of Pralaya Varāha, Bhūdevī alone is shown.

The Purāṇas, Vayu, Matsya, Vishnu, Bhāgavata, Brahmānda and Brahmā compare each and every limb of Adivarāha with various components of Yajña in the light of Vedic cosmogony. They, therefore, call it Yajnavarāha and this is purely in animal form. The Purāṇas describe the images of Nrvarāha and Bhūvarāha. They do not describe the iconography of Pralayavarāha and Yajnavaraha mentioned in the Vaikhānasāgama.

The images of Bhūvarāha are found in different parts of India. The earliest image of a colossal and majestic Bhūvarāha, datable to the fifth century A.D., of the Gupta

period, can still be seen in cave number five, popularly known as the Varāha court, on the hill of Udayagiri, nearly 3 miles (5 km) southwest of Besnagar in the district of Vidisha in Madhya Pradesh. The whole panel on the wall depicts the legend of the Varāha *avatāra* in great detail. Depicted with a human body but the head of a boar, and standing in *ālīdhāsana* pose, his left foot rests on the thirteen-hooded cosmic serpent, and his right foot is on the body of Kūrma. His right hand rests on his hip and his left hand is on his knee. Bhūdevī is shown seated on his left shoulder, holding his right tusk with her right hand.

The earliest image of Yajñavarāha in zoomorphic form, belonging to the Gupta period, is still standing majestically in Eran in the Vidisha district of Madhya Pradesh. The colossal image, measuring nearly 14 feet (4.2 m) long, 6 feet (1.8 m) wide, and 12 feet (3.6 m) high, is depicted with Bhūdevī, who is shown hanging from the right tusk. The huge body, with a long and wide vertebral column, is meticulously carved with 1,185 figures of sages in twelve rows. On the snout, a striking figure of the two-armed Vāk is shown, standing in *samabhanga* position, keeping her hands at her sides. This is the only form of Varāha that includes the figure of Vāk. In later years, when Vāk was merged with Sarasvatī, she came to be depicted in the form of seated Sarasvatī, with Vina in her hands, on the snout of Varāha. The depiction of Vāk on the snout of Varāha, which began in the fifth century A.D. in the Gupta period, continued into the periods of the Pratiharas, Chandellas, and Paramaras, until the fourteenth century in Madhya Pradesh. A few images of Yajñavarāha have been found in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan, but none earlier than the twelfth century. A rare depiction of Yajñavarāha, measuring nearly 6 feet (1.8 m) long, 2 feet (.6 m) wide, and about 4 feet (1.2 m) high, datable to the eighth century and the Pratihara dynasty, from Badoh-Pathari in Vidisha, is preserved in the Gurjaramahal Museum of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh. Starting from the vertebral column of Varāha, the entire body is carved with figures of various creations in nine rows, indicating four aspects of the Supreme God. A fine Chandella specimen of Yajñavarāha, datable to the tenth century, still stands majestically in the Varāha shrine at Khajuraho, in Madhya Pradesh. It is nearly 9 feet (2.8 m) long and 6 feet (1.8 m) high, carved with 689 figures in eleven rows. In this image the symbolic representations of various components of Yajña (sacrifice) in the form of gods and goddesses proclaim Yajñavarāha as the supreme creator and the depiction on the vertebral column reveals three important factors: pure creation; emanations of Vyūha (concept of Vaishnavism); and synchronization of the emanations with the trinity of Gods of the Purāṇas. Among the *avatāras*, Varāha *avatāra* is the only one assumed by Vishnu for the purpose of creation.

Narasimha *Avatāra*

The incarnation of Narasimha (lion's face with human body) constitutes the transition from the stage of beast to the human form. The earliest reference to this *avatāra* is found in the epic Mahābhārata, which informs us that in order to protect the Devas (gods) and the people, Lord Madhusudana took the *avatāra* of Narasimha. The myth of this *avatāra* is described in the Harivamsa. The demon Hiranyakasipu obtained a boon from Brahmā, according to which he could be killed by no gods, no Asuras (demons), no Rishis (sages), no *astras* (weapons), no dry or wet object. He could be killed neither in heaven nor on earth and neither by night nor by day. He could be killed with only one stroke of the hand. Once he was granted the boon, he became a terror to gods. Hence, answering the prayer of Brahmā to rescue them, Vishnu assumed the form of Narasimha and killed the demon by tearing off his chest with his long, sharp nails. However, the Purāṇas, including the Kūrma, the Padma, the Vishnu, and the Bhāgavata, narrate the myth differently. The most popular form of the myth relates that, in answer to the prayer of Prahlada, son of Hiranyakasipu, Vishnu emerged out of a pillar in the form of a man-lion (lion's face with human body) and killed the demon with his nails.

Iconography and images. The image of Narasimha is described in two forms: Girija Narasimha, or Kevala Narasimha, or Yoga Narasimha; and Sthauna Narasimha. In the first form, the deity is shown in the form of a lion coming out of a mountain cave. In the second, the deity is shown emerging from a pillar. Images of Narasimha are found in both standing and seated postures. A sixth-century image of Narasimha, with mane hanging to the shoulders and a fierce face with a lolling tongue, is found in the Varāha temple in Kadvar in Gujarat. He is seated, resting his right bent leg on the back of Prahlada, and his two human hands are shown tearing off the belly of the demon. There are innumerable images of Narasimha found throughout India, and several temples are dedicated to him.

Vāmana *Avatāra*

Vāmana-Trivikrama, the fifth incarnation of Vishnu, occupies a very significant place in the evolution of Vaishnavism. In this *avatāra*, Vishnu reveals himself in human form in two sizes, dwarf and gigantic. The Vāmana myth had its origin in the Rig Veda, which refers not only to the three steps of the solar deity Vishnu, but also to the two forms, that of a young dwarf and that of a giant. The earliest legend of this *avatāra* is found in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The Purāṇas narrate that Bali, the grandson of Prahlada, through his penances acquired enough strength to vanquish the gods, including Indra.

So Vishnu, who was born to Indra's mother, Aditi, went to Bali at the time of sacrifice and asked him to give the gift of as much space as could be measured by his three footsteps. Bali confirmed it by the ceremonial pouring of water, in spite of warnings by his guru, Sukracharya. At once Vishnu, as Vāmana, assumed a gigantic form and encompassed Prithvi (Mother Earth) with one step and *svarga* (heaven) with the second step; he lifted his foot as high as Satva loka (upper region), where Brahmā worshiped the foot. The third step he kept on the head of Bali and sent him to Patala loka (Nether region).

Iconography and images. The iconography of Vāmana and Trivikrama is given in the various Shilpa Shāstras. The Vaikhānasāgama classifies the images of Trivikrama into three categories, based on the level to which the foot is raised. The Naishadhīyacharita, in its description of the Trivikrama image, says that the raised foot of Trivikrama is shown as touching the image of Rāhu, who is holding the foot of the deity like a shoe. The black Rāhu, with a severed head, is compared to the shoe. A fine specimen of this description is found in a niche in the Sūrya Kunda, opposite the Sun Temple at Modhera, in Mehsana district, Gujarat. A similar representation exists in the Ghanadvara Harihara Temple at Osia in Rajasthan. There are a few temples dedicated to Vāmana and Trivikrama.

Parashurāma Avatāra

In this *avatāra*, Vishnu incarnates as the son of Jamadagni and Renuka to suppress the haughtiness of the Kshatriyas. Parashurāma (Rāma with an ax) possessed divine power for only a short time. Hence his *avatāra* is considered to be *avesa*. Parashurāma is also called Bhargava and Jamadagneya. The legend of this *avatāra* is found in the Mahābhārata, Agni Purāṇa, Vishnu Purāṇa and Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

Iconography and images. The image of Parashurāma is described in every Shilpa Shāstra as holding a bow, an arrow, a sword, and a battle-ax. Kerala is known as Parashurāma *kshetra* (country). His images are represented in the Dasāvātāra panels.

Rāma Avatāra

Among the *avatāras*, Rāma and Krishna are considered to be *sampoorna* (complete). Rāma, the son of King Dasharatha of Ayodhya, was first regarded as an ideal person, a hero. It was only later that he was deified. The legend of Rāma is given in seven *kandas* (sections) in the epic poem Rāmāyaṇa, written by Valmiki. The main purpose of this *avatāra* was to establish Dharma in the universe. Valmiki relates the legend, in which Rāma forsakes the throne and goes to the forest to fulfill the promise

given by his father to his stepmother Kaikeyi. His wife Sītā is abducted by the demon Ravana, and eventually Rāma battles Ravana, defeating and killing the demon. Thus the legend emphasizes the triumph of right over wrong, and of virtue over vice.

Iconography and images. The iconography of Rāma is given in the various Purāṇas and Shilpa Shāstras. He is always represented holding a bow and arrow. The story of Rāma has universal appeal and has been told in almost every language. There are innumerable temples dedicated to Rāma. In these temples, the image of the standing Rāma is accompanied by his wife Sītā to his left and his brother Lakshmaṇa to his right.

Balarāma Avatāra

Balarāma is known as Baladeva, Balabhadra, and Samkarshana in the Shilpa texts. He is the elder brother of Krishna. In the Harivamsha, Balarāma is described as the manifestation of Ananta, the cosmic Sessa. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa narrates that in the womb of Devaki a part of the luster of Lord Vishnu, known as Ananta, entered as the seventh child. Then, under the command of Vishnu, Yogamaya transferred Ananta from the womb of Devaki to that of Rohini, the second wife of Vasudeva at Gokul. Because of such transfer, the child came to be known as Samkarshana. He was called Bala as he would be the mightiest of men, and Rāma as he would give delight to the world. In the Mahābhārata he is called the plowman, Langalin, or Halayudhadeva.

Iconography and images. The various Purāṇas and Shilpa Shāstras describe Balarāma as holding a *bala* (plow) and a *musala* (pestle). The images of Balarāma are very rare. They are generally shown in the Dasāvātāra panels in the *prabhavali* of Vishnu.

Krishna Avatāra

Krishna *avatāra* is also considered to be the *sampoorna avatāra* of Vishnu. However, in Gujarat, Krishna is regarded as the incarnator, rather than as an incarnation. The legend of Krishna is enumerated in the Vishnu Purāṇa, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and the Brahmavaivārtha Purāṇa. The Vishnu Purāṇa narrates that in order to relieve the earth of the burden of demonic *asuras*, Vishnu incarnated himself in the eighth conception of Devaki, and at his command Yogamaya was born to Yasoda, the wife of Nanda at Gokul. Devaki was the cousin of King Kamsa, who had imprisoned her and her husband Vasudeva, fearing the prophecy that he would be killed by their eighth child. He killed all six children of Devaki as soon as she gave birth to them. The seventh child, however, was Balarāma, and the eighth was Krishna, who was taken away to Gokul, where he was exchanged with the female child of

Yasoda, to whom Yogamāya was born as a baby girl, as ordained by Vishnu. When the baby girl was thrown upon the floor by Kamsa, it sprang up high and, after warning Kamsa that his destroyer was already born, disappeared. Krishna was so called because of his dark complexion. His many childhood pranks are described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Krishna plays a major role in the Mahābhārata war, helping the Pandavas to win over their Kaurava cousins, who had denied them justice. The Bhagavad Gītā, which is the dialogue between Arjuna and Krishna at the battleground of Kurukshetra, speaks of the relationship between Jeevatma (man's soul) and Paramatma (god).

Iconography and images. The Vaikhanasagama, Agni Purāṇa, Visnudharmottara, and Chaturvargachintamani all describe Krishna. The most popular image of Krishna is that in which he holds a flute in his two hands. He is also depicted in the form of a child. He is then called Balakrishna. There are innumerable temples dedicated to Krishna throughout India.

Kalki Avatāra

Kalki is treated as the last *avatāra* of Vishnu. He is predicted to appear on a white horse toward the end of the Kaliyuga (the current "Black Age"). The Purāṇas (the Vishnu, Agni, and Bhāgavata) narrate that a portion of the divine being will be born as Kalki in the family of one Vishnu Yasas, an eminent Brahman of Sambala village, and will be endowed with eight superhuman powers. He will put an end to wrong and will establish Dharma. According to the Vaikhanasagama, Kalki should be depicted with the face of a horse and the body of a man, with four hands holding *shankha* (mace), *chakra* (wheel), *khadga* (sword), and *khetaka* (shield).

Images of Vishnu

In addition to the images of the *avatāras* of Vishnu, the Shilpa Shāstras provide detailed descriptions of the image of Vishnu himself, shown in standing, sitting, and reclining positions. In the first two postures, Vishnu's images are described as having from two to twenty hands, with a single face or four faces. The four-armed images of Vishnu with a single face are prescribed with twenty-four specific names chosen from the Vishnusahasranama. Though the images are alike, the order in which the attributes of *shankha* (mace), *chakra* (wheel), *gada* (throne), and *padma* (lotus) are placed differs according to the nomenclature. The four-faced Vishnu with eight and ten hands is called Vaikuntha Chaturmurti (four-faced), twelve- and fourteen-armed is Ananta, sixteen-armed is Trailokyamohana, and twenty-armed is called Vishvarupa. The Shilpa Shāstras do not describe an eighteen-armed Vishnu. In the reclining position, Vishnu is represented lying on the coil bed of Seshanaga.

Avatāra (earthly incarnation) is the instrument through which Vishnu fulfills his function of protecting the universe and Dharma.

Haripriya Rangarajan

See also **Krishna in Indian Art**

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AYODHYA Called the city of temples, Ayodhya is considered in Hindu tradition to be one of the seven most important cities of Hindu India. In its long and contentious history, however, the city has been home not only to Shaivism and Vaishnavism sects of Hinduism but also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Islam. Ayodhya covers a little over 4 square miles (about 10 sq. km) in area; at the 1991 census, it had a population of 40,642 (more recent population estimates put the number at a little over 50,000). Ayodhya is well connected by bus and rail, but the nearest airports are in Amausi, Bumrauli, and Babatpur, at a distance of about 93 miles (150 km). Situated on the banks of the Ghagra or Saryu River in the Faizabad district of Uttar Pradesh, the heartland of Hinduism, Ayodhya's importance in Hindu tradition is the belief

that the city is the birthplace of Lord Rāma, the seventh incarnation of Lord Vishnu, one of the Hindu trinity.

According to Hindu legend, the mythic man Manu founded Ayodhya, as recorded in the Hindu epic Rāmāyaṇa. Later, it became the capital of the Suryavanshi (Sun) dynasty, of which Lord Rāma is the most celebrated king. References to Ayodhya are also contained in the Atharva Veda. Jain traditions claim that five Tirthankaras (Jain equivalents of Hindu gods) were born at Ayodhya. The city is also believed to have served as the capital of the ancient Kosala kingdom, a sixth-century tribal oligarchy and rival to the mighty Magadha kingdom based in modern Bihar in the east (mentioned in the Buddhist sources), as well as of medieval Awadh, or Oudh.

Ramkot, in the western corner of the city, is the most sacred site of worship, attracting Hindu pilgrims throughout the year, but particularly on Rām Navami, the birth anniversary of Lord Rāma, which falls in the Hindu month of Chaitra (March–April), when as many as 500,000 pilgrims descend on the city. Other important religious sites include Hanuman Garhi in the center of the city, Nageswarwarnath Temple, a Shaivite temple, and Rām Janmabhumi, the site of Lord Rāma's birth, where a small Rām temple stood alongside the now demolished Babri Masjid, built in the sixteenth century by Mir Baqi, commander of the Mughal emperor Babur. Hindu extremists destroyed the mosque in 1992, maintaining that it was built on the ruins of an earlier temple of Rāma, the most revered deity in the Hindu pantheon. After the demolition of the temple, which was politically manipulated by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, there ensued a series of Hindu-Muslim riots throughout India, belying Ayodhya's very essence as a place of peace.

In 1993 the Indian History Congress voted overwhelmingly against destruction of monuments on the grounds that a religious structure of another community once stood in its place. Such postfacto rationalization, the historical body concluded, would set a dangerous precedent for religious structures throughout the subcontinent and would fan the fires of communal violence in cities like Mathura, the birthplace of Lord Krishna, and Varanasi, where hundreds of temples and mosques stand side by side.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindutva and Politics**

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ĀYURVEDA Āyurveda, the Vedic system of medicine, views health as harmony between body, mind, and spirit. Its two most famous texts belong to the schools of Charaka and Sushruta. According to Charaka, health and disease are not predetermined, and life may be prolonged by human effort. Sushruta defines the purpose of medicine as curing the diseases of the sick, protecting the healthy, and prolonging life. The beginnings of medicine may be traced to the Rig Veda, since it speaks of the *bhishaj*, or physician, in connection with setting a broken bone. From other references the *bhishaj* or *vaidya* emerges as a healer of disease and an expert in herbs. The twin gods Āshvins are particularly associated with the healing of blindness, lameness, and leprosy. Soma is another healing deity.

According to the Charaka tradition, there existed six schools of medicine, founded by the disciples of the sage Punarvasu Ātreya. Each of these disciples—Agnivesha, Bhela, Jatūkarna, Parāshara, Hārīta, and Kshārāpāni—composed a *Sambhitā*. Of these, the one composed by Agnivesha was supposed to be the best. The *Agnivesha Sambhitā* was later revised by Charaka, and it came to be known as *Charaka Sambhitā*. Āyurveda is traditionally divided into eight branches which, in Charaka's scheme, are: *sūtra-sthāna*, general principles; *nidāna-sthāna*, pathology; *vimāna-sthāna*, diagnostics; *sharīra-sthāna*, physiology and anatomy; *indriya-sthāna*, prognosis; *chikitsā-sthāna*, therapeutics; *kalpa-sthāna*, pharmaceuticals; and *siddhi-sthāna*, successful treatment.

In the Charaka school, the first teacher was Bhāradvāja. In the Sushruta school, the first person to expound Āyurvedic knowledge was Dhanvantari, who then taught it to Divodāsa. The *Charaka* and *Sushruta Sambhitās* are compendiums of two traditions, rather than texts authored by single authors. A third tradition is that of the Kāshyapas. The beginnings of these traditions must go back to the second millennium B.C., if not earlier, because of the parallel information obtained in the Vedic *Sambhitās* and the description in the *Mahābhārata*. There is much that is common in the texts, except that the *Sushruta Sambhitā* is richer in the field of surgery. Part of the original *Charaka Sambhitā* is lost, and the current version has several chapters by the Kashmiri scholar Dridhabala.

An attempt to reconcile the texts of Charaka and Sushruta was made by Vāgbhata the Elder in the second century B.C. in his *Ashtānga Sangraha*. The works of Charaka, Sushruta, and the Elder Vāgbhata are considered canonical and are reverentially called the Vriddha Trayi, "the triad of ancients." Later, Vāgbhata the Younger wrote the *Ashtānga Hridaya Sambhitā*, which is a lucid presentation of the Āyurveda giving due place to the surgical techniques of Sushruta. In the eighth century, Mādhav wrote his *Nidāna*.

The Principal Ideas

The idea that breath (*prāna*) is central to health occurs very early in the Vedic literature. In Āyurveda, which is one of the secondary sciences associated with the Atharva Veda, health is seen as balance of the three *doshas*, or primary forces of *prāna* or *vāta* (air), *agni* or *pitta* (fire), and soma or *kapha* (water). *Vāta* was taken to represent the principle of motion, development in general, and the functions of the nervous system in particular. *Pitta* signifies the function of metabolism, including digestion and the formation of blood, and various secretions and excretions that are either the means or the end product of body processes. *Kapha* represents functions of cooling, preservation, and heat regulation. The imbalance of these elements leads to illness. The predominance of one or the other *dosha* leads not only to different physiological but also to different psychological types. Just as the body mirrors the entire universe in a recursive fashion, the three *doshas* are defined recursively within the body.

Each of the *doshas* is recognized to be of five kinds. *Vāta* appears as *prāna* (governing respiration), *udāna* (for uttering sounds and speaking), *samāna* (for separating the digested juice), *vyāna* (carrying fluids including blood to all parts of the body), and *apāna* (expelling waste products). *Pitta* appears as *pāchaka* (digest and impart heat), *ranjaka* (impart redness to the chyle and blood), *sādhaka* (increase the power of the brain), *ālochaka* (strengthen vision), and *bhrājaka* (improve complexion). *Kapha* appears as *kledaka* (moisten food), *avalambaka* (impart energy and strength), *bodhaka* (enable tasting), *tarjaka* (govern the eye and other sensory organs), and *shleshma* (act as lubricant).

Every substance (animal, vegetable, or mineral) is a *dravya* with the following properties in different proportions: *rasa*, *guna*, *vīrya*, *vipāka*, and *prabhāva*. The *gunas* are qualities such as heat, cold, heaviness, and lightness, in a total of twenty types. Of the twenty *gunas*, heat (*ushna*) and cold (*shīta*) are the most prominent. *Vīrya* is generative energy that may also be hot or cold.

Vipāka may be understood as the biochemical transformation of food, whereas *prabhāva* is the subtle effect of the substance on the body. Food is converted into *rasa* by the digestive action of *jātharāgni*, or the fire in the stomach. *Rasas* are six in number: *madhura*, *āmla*, *lavana*, *tikta*, *katu*, and *kashāya*. Each *rasa*—which is recognized by taste—is a result of the predominance of two elements. Knowledge of the *rasas* is important in therapeutics.

The five elements in various proportions are said to form seven kinds of tissue (*dhātu*). These are: *rasa* (plasma), *rakta* (blood), *māmsa* (flesh), *medas* (fat), *asthi* (bone), *majjā* (marrow), and *shukra* (semen). The activity of the *dhātu* is represented by *ojas* (vitality) or *bala*

(strength). *Ojas* is mediated through an oily, white fluid that permeates the whole body. The functions of the vital organs like the heart, brain, spleen, and liver are explained on the basis of the flow and exchange of tissues. The heart is considered the chief receptacle of the three chief fluids of the body: *rasa*, *rakta*, and *ojas*.

The body has 107 vital points or *marmas*, which are points of vulnerability where important vessels, nerves, muscles, and organs are situated.

Physiological References in the Vedic Texts

The Garbha Upanishad describes the body as consisting of five elements (with further groups of five as in the *Sāṅkhya* system of philosophy), supported on six (the sweet, sour, salt, bitter, acid, and harsh juices of food), endowed with six qualities, made up of seven tissues, three *doshas*, and twice-begotten (through father and mother). It further adds that the head has four skull bones, with sixteen sockets on each side. It says that the body has 107 joints, 180 sutures, 900 sinews, 700 veins, 500 muscles, 360 bones, and 45 million hairs.


In Chhandogya Upanishad, organisms are divided into three classes based on their origin: born alive (from a womb), born from an egg, and born from a germ.

Training a Vaidya

The Āyurvedic physician was trained in eight branches of medicine: *kāyāchikitsā* (internal medicine), *shalyachikitsā* (surgery, including anatomy), *shālākya-chikitsā* (eye, ear, nose, and throat diseases), *kaumārabbriya* (pediatrics), *bhūtavidyā* (psychiatry, or demonology), *agada tantra* (toxicology), *rasāyana* (science of rejuvenation), and *vājīkarana* (the science of fertility).

Apart from learning these, the student of Āyurveda was expected to know ten arts that were indispensable in the preparation and application of medicines: distillation, operative skills, cooking, horticulture, metallurgy, sugar manufacture, pharmacy, analysis and separation of minerals, compounding of metals, and preparation of alkalis. The teaching of various subjects was done during the instruction of relevant clinical subjects. For example, teaching of anatomy was a part of the teaching of surgery, embryology was a part of training in pediatrics and obstetrics, and the knowledge of physiology and pathology was interwoven in the teaching of all the clinical disciplines.

The initiation ceremony of the Charaka physician was called *upanayana*, and it involved the teacher leading the student three times around the sacred fire. This ceremony made the student thrice-born (*trija*), distinguished from the twice-born (*dvija*) nonphysicians.



Ayurvedic Massage. In the late twentieth century, Ayurvedic practices became increasingly popular in the West. Ayurvedic massage, shown here, is believed to enhance circulation and help the body naturally expel toxins. AMIT PASRICHA.

At the closing of the initiation, the guru gave a solemn address to the students in which the guru directed the students to a life of chastity, honesty, and vegetarianism. The student was to strive with all his being for the health of the sick. He was not to betray patients for his own advantage. He was to dress modestly and avoid strong drink. He was to be collected and self-controlled, measured in speech at all times. He was to constantly improve his knowledge and technical skill. In the home of the patient he was to be courteous and modest, directing all attention to the patient's welfare. He was not to divulge any knowledge about the patient and his family. If the patient was incurable, he was to keep this to himself if it was likely to harm the patient or others.

The normal length of the student's training appears to have been seven years. Before graduation, the student was to pass a test. But the physician was to continue to learn through texts, direct observation (*pratyaksha*), and through inference (*anumāna*). In addition, the *vaidya* attended meetings where knowledge was exchanged. The doctors were also enjoined to gain knowledge of unusual remedies from herdsmen and forest-dwellers. The *vaidya* was assisted by nurses (*parichāraka*). Sushruta describes

the ideal nurse as devoted, friendly, watchful, not inclined to disgust, and knowledgeable.

There is reference to free hospitals in ancient India. They were called Bhaishajya Griha, Ārogya Shālā, or Chikitsā Shālā. The best account of the workings of such a free hospital has come down to us from the Indianized Khmer kingdom of Cambodia.

Dissection and Surgery

Sushruta laid great emphasis on direct observation and learning through dissection (*avagharshana*). Sushruta classified surgical operations into eight categories: incision (*chhedana*), excision (*bhedana*), scarification (*lekhana*), puncturing (*vedhana*), probing (*eshana*), extraction (*āharana*), evacuation and drainage (*visbrāvana*), and suturing (*sīvana*). Sushruta lists 101 blunt and 20 sharp instruments that were used in surgery—instructing that these should be made of steel and kept in a portable case with a separate compartment for each instrument—and describes fourteen types of bandages. Surgical operations on all parts of the body were described, including laparotomy, craniotomy, cesarian section, plastic repair of the torn ear lobe,

cheiloplasty, rhinoplasty, excision of cataract, tonsillectomy, excision of laryngeal polyps, excision of anal fistule, repair of hernias and prolapse of rectum, lithotomy, amputation of bones, and many neurosurgical procedures.

Medications were used for preoperative preparation, and medicated oils were used for the dressing of wounds. Ice, caustics, and cautery were used for hemostasis. Medicated wines were used before and after surgery to assuage pain. A drug called *sammobini* was used to make the patient unconscious before a major operation; another drug, *sanjivani*, was employed to resuscitate the patient after operation or shock.

Diagnosis

It was enjoined that diagnosis be made using all five senses together with interrogation. The diagnosis was based on: cause (*nidāna*); premonitory indications (*pūrvārūpa*); symptoms (*rūpa*); therapeutic tests (*upashaya*); and the natural course of development of the disease (*samprāpti*). Sushruta declares that the physician (*bhishaj*), the drug (*dravya*), the nurse (*parichāraka*), and the patient (*rogī*) are the four pillars on which rest the success of the treatment.

Different methods of treatment, based on the diagnosis of the patient, were outlined. The drugs were classified into 75 types according to their therapeutic effect. For successful treatment, the following ten factors were to be kept in mind: the organism (*śarīra*); its maintenance (*vritti*); the cause of disease (*hetu*); the nature of disease (*vyādhī*); action or treatment (*karma*); effects or results (*kārya*); time (*kāla*); the agent or the physician (*kartā*); the means and instruments (*karana*); and the decision on the line of treatment (*vidhi vimishchaya*).

Sushruta considers the head as the center of the senses and describes cranial nerves associated with specific sensory function. Based on the derangement of the *doshas*, he classifies a total of 1,120 diseases. Charaka, on the other hand, considers the diseases to be innumerable. The *dosha*-type diseases are called *nija*, whereas those with an external basis are called *āgantuka*. The microbial origin of disease and the infective nature of diseases such as fevers, leprosy, and tuberculosis was known. According to Sushruta, all forms of leprosy, some other skin conditions, tuberculosis, ophthalmic and epidemic diseases are borne by air and water and may be transmitted from one person to another. These diseases are not only due to the derangement of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*, but are also of parasitic origin. He adds: "There are fine organisms that circulate in the blood and are invisible to the naked eye which give rise to many diseases."

One of the most impressive innovations arising out of later Āyurveda is that of inoculation against smallpox. It

is believed that this treatment arose before 1000 A.D. From there it spread to China, western Asia, and Africa, and finally, in the early eighteenth century, to Europe and North America. The Indian treatment was described by John Z. Holwell in 1767 to the College of Physicians in London in a report titled "An account of the manner of inoculating for the smallpox in the East Indies." It not only described the system in great detail, it also provided the rationale behind it.

It appears that the idea of inoculation derived from *agada-tantra*, one of the eight branches of traditional Āyurveda that deals with poisons and toxins in small dosages, and application of specific concoctions to punctures in the skin for treatment of certain skin diseases (Sushruta *Sambitā in Chikitsāsthāna* 9.10). The Charaka *Sambita* speaks of how deadly poisons can be converted into excellent medicine and how two toxins can be antagonistic to each other.

An Āyurvedic classification, based on etiological factors, divided disease into seven categories: hereditary conditions based on the diseased germ cells (*ādibala*); congenital disease (*jammabala*); diseases due to the disturbance of the humors (*doshabala*); injuries and traumas (*sanghātābala*); seasonal diseases (*kālabala*); random diseases (*daivabala*); and natural conditions such as aging (*svabhāvabala*).

Menstrual disturbances, diseases of the female genital tract, and their treatments were classified. The clinical course and the various stages of labor, the management of puerperium, miscarriage and abortion, and difficult labor were discussed in detail. The different malpositions of the fetus were well understood. Many diseases of children were described.

The diseases of the head and the nervous system were given in detail. Among the nervous disorders described are convulsions, apoplectic fits, hysteric fits, tetanus, dorsal bending, hemiplegia, total paralysis, facial paralysis, lockjaw, stiff neck, paralysis of the tongue, sciatica, St. Vitus's dance, paralysis agitans, and fainting. Four kinds of epilepsy were described; it included an instruction that, once the attack was over, the patient should not be rebuked but should be cheered with friendly talk. Sushruta devoted one complete chapter to interpretation of dreams, believing that the dreams of the patient, together with other omens, can be an indication to the outcome of the treatment.

Āyurveda was also applied to animal welfare. Texts on veterinary science describe the application of the science to different animals. Refuges and homes for sick and aged animals and birds were endowed.

Indian medical texts had currency in lands far beyond India. A fourth-century medical manuscript from

Chinese Turkistan, known as the Bower Manuscript, is based on Indian texts. Burzuya, the court physician to the Persian emperor Khusrau Anushirvan (sixth century), visited India, bringing back Indian texts and physicians. The Weber Manuscript is a translation into Kuchean of a collection of Sanskrit medical recipes. The ninth-century Arabic medical compendium by Tabari mentions the texts of Charaka, Sushruta, Vāgbhata, and Mādhava. In the eighth century, *Amritabridaya*, a large text in four parts, was translated into Tibetan. It embodies the teachings of Buddha Bhaishajyaguru. From Tibetan this text was translated into Mongolian and later into Russian, achieving great popularity. Other Āyurvedic texts were also translated into Tibetan; these included the *Ashva-āyurveda* (the horse ayurveda) of Shālihotra. In the late twentieth century, Āyurveda became increasingly popular in India and the West.


Subhash Kak

See also **Ashvamedha; Upanishadic Philosophy; Yoga**

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AZAD, MAULANA ABUL KALAM (1888–1958), *president of Indian National Congress (1923, 1940–1946), India's first minister of education (1947–1958)*. Mohiuddin Ahmad, known as Abul Kalam “Azad” (the free) was born in Makkah in 1888. His mother was an Arab who died in Calcutta (Kolkata) when his father, Khairuddin Dehlavi, returned to India after several years in Makkah. Azad was educated by his father, a Sufi, learning religious sciences as well as classical Arabic, Persian, and Urdu at home. Azad wrote mostly in Urdu, the language of his passion and to which he made a lasting contribution through his commentary of the Qur’an. Azad was also interested in learning other systems of knowledge beyond his training in the traditional Islamic learning. He was open to Western knowledge and values that seemed to be in accord with Islamic ethical teachings. Intellectually, Azad saw himself following in the footsteps of such Indian scholars as Shaykh



Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The scholarly Azad was a key link between Mahatma Gandhi and the Muslim community, as both men sought greater support for *sarvodaya* (“the uplift of all”) among India’s Muslims. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), a reformer of Indian Islam who is mostly remembered for his opposition to a kind of Sufism that appeared to be closer to Hindu monistic philosophy than to Islamic orthodoxy. Another intellectual and reformer whom Azad lauds in his writings is Sayyid Ahmed Khan (d. 1898).

In 1912 Azad started his weekly journal, *al-Hilal*, and in 1915 he began publishing *al-Balagh*. The purpose of these journals, as well as his other activities, was to inculcate among Muslims a sense of religious calling that could be placed in the service of nationalism and to draw them to the political movement for independence from the British. In 1916 his presses were shut down by British authorities. Azad was imprisoned for his activities, and during this period he produced an autobiographical work, *Tazkira*.

Azad’s political activism and his membership in the Indian National Congress brought him in contact with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Azad first worked with Gandhi during the noncooperation and the Khilafat movements, which began after Gandhi’s return from South Africa in 1919. Azad became a key link between Gandhi and the Muslim community, as they both sought greater support among Muslims for Gandhi’s brand of nonviolent activism. Azad was the youngest person to be elected president of the Indian

National Congress in 1923. He was later reelected and served from 1940 to 1946.

Azad is most remembered for his scholarship, his intellectual ingenuity, and his originality. During his second imprisonment, between 1921 and 1923, he wrote a commentary on the Qur'an, which was later published as *Tarjuman al-Qur'an* (Lahore, 1931). The commentary is incomplete but is best known for its first volume, which is entirely devoted to the first chapter of the Qur'an, "al-Fatiha." He also wrote several other works, including a longer autobiographical work, *India Wins Freedom*, the full manuscript of which was deposited in the National Archives, to be revealed thirty years after his death. Thus a much anticipated revised edition of *India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version* was published in 1988.

Azad died in New Delhi in 1958, while he was still in office as India's first minister of education. His tomb lies within the confines of the Jama Masjid, facing the Red Fort, in the old city of Delhi.

Irfan A. Omar

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AZARIAH, VEDANAYAKAM SAMUEL (1874–1945), *Indian prelate, first Indian bishop of the Anglican Church*. V. S. Azariah was born in Tinnevely, 17 August 1874, the son of an Anglican pastor. He studied in the local Church Missionary Society College and at Madras Christian College. In 1902, he visited Jaffna (Ceylon) and was so impressed with the vigor of the Christian community there that on his return he organized, with K. T. Paul, the Indian Missionary Society (IMS), convinced that an indigenous mission would revitalize the local church. They met in Calcutta, 25 December 1905, and founded the National Missionary Society

(NMS)—their objectives to unite all Protestant Christians and to evangelize all of India. Azariah was the first general secretary.

In 1904 the IMS had sent missionaries to work in Dornakal, a very impoverished location, east of Hyderabad. Azariah himself became so concerned with this work that in 1909 he resigned his post as general secretary of the NMS and took charge.

In 1910 Azariah was invited to the Edinburgh Missionary Conference. He addressed the gathering, appealing for a much deeper level of cooperation between foreign missionaries and Indian Christians. Azariah reminded the audience that the Indian church would always be grateful for the heroism and self-denying labor of the missionaries. "You have given us your goods to feed the poor. . . . We also ask for your love. Give us friends!" Azariah believed that to make a significant impact, a genuinely Indian church must emerge and the role of foreign missionaries must diminish.

On 29 December 1912, Vedanayakam Samuel Azariah was consecrated the first Indian bishop of the Anglican Church. Over the next thirty years, he was instrumental in what came to be known as a mass movement to Christianity among the poor and the exploited in the districts around Dornakal. In 1904 there were almost no Christians. By the time Azariah died, their number exceeded 250,000.

Azariah was not active in the nationalist freedom struggle. Rather than political independence, he was most concerned with the self-determination and self-expression of the Indian church. Azariah did take a stand against communal based electoral reforms; in this he agreed with Mahatma M. K. Gandhi.

Bishop Azariah of Dornakal died after a brief illness on 1 January 1945.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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BABRI MASJID. *See Ayodhya.*

BABUR (1483–1530), founding emperor of the Mughal dynasty in India. A Chaghtai Turk, Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad, known as Babur (“the Tiger”), was a fearless soldier, adventurer, poet, and diarist. His *Tuzu-i-Babri* (Memoirs of Babur), written in Turki, the diary he kept throughout his life, is one of the great works of historical literature. Babur’s father was a petty chief of Farghana, one of five principalities of Central Asia; he was descended from Genghis Khan and Timur. In 1494, when his father died, Babur, aged eleven, became king of Farghana. He immediately came under attack, but survived the assault, and in November 1487 captured Samarkand, the heart of Central Asia. Driven out of Samarkand the next year, Babur recaptured it in 1499, lost it again in 1501, held it briefly in 1511, and for the rest of his life dreamed of reconquering it and ruling Central Asia.

After losing Samarkand in 1501, he found refuge with his uncle and wandered around Central Asia seeking his fortune before capturing Kabul in 1504. He held Kandahar briefly in 1507. In Kabul, Babur adopted Ottoman firearms and became a powerful ruler, although the struggle for power in the region between the Ottomans, the Persians, and the Uzbeks prevented his recapture of Samarkand. Thus, he turned to India. In 1519 he marched over the Khyber Pass, down across the Indus to the Punjab, as far as the River Chenab, before returning, richly laden, to Kabul a few months later.

In 1520 he captured Badakhshan and in 1522, Kandahar. In 1524 he briefly controlled Lahore. Then, on 20 April 1526, Babur won his first great battle of Panipat against the mighty army of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, achieved through superior cavalry tactics and Central

Asian artillery, establishing Mughal rule over North India. Delhi and Agra were captured, and on 27 April, in Delhi, the Khutba prayer was read in Babur’s name as ruler. He crippled the Hindu Rajput confederacy after breaking his wine cups and vowing that he would never drink again, rallying his outnumbered troops. His days of wandering were over; he was now the dominant power in northern India. In January 1528 he finally crushed the Rajputs. His last great battle was on 6 May 1529, when he won the Battle of Ghagra.

As the first Mughal ruler, Babur substituted the Afghan confederacy with divine right absolutism, acting through a prime minister and introducing Persian language and manners into his court. He was renowned for his alcohol- and opium-laced parties and for his cruelty to his victims. Though not a good administrator or organizer, Babur built a large number of palaces, baths, gardens, and *daks* (postal stations), through which he maintained contact with distant regions, and he was recklessly generous to his soldiers and officers, bankrupting the state. He practiced religious tolerance, marrying his sons to Hindu Rajput princesses, and brought the Rajputs into his government.

In 1530 Babur died, after walking around his sick son Humayun’s bed praying that the seemingly fatal illness would be transferred to him. Humayan recovered, and Babur fell ill and died. A king for thirty-six years, he was just forty-eight years old. At Ayodha, the Babri Masjid (Babur Mosque) was erected to commemorate the founder of India’s mightiest pre-British empire.

Roger D. Long

See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; Jahangir; Shah Jahan

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BACTRIA The region between the Hindu Kush Mountains and the river Amu Darya (Oxus) is called Bactria. Its old capital, Bactra, was located near the present city of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Another important center of this area is Balkh, a town 15.5 miles (25 km) to the west of Mazar-e-Sharif. The Mughal prince Aurangzeb ended his attempt to reconquer the homelands of his dynasty in Fergana and Samarkand at Balkh.

Bactria had been coveted by conquerors throughout history, since it served as an important link between East and West. The Persian kings had tried to control this region, and Alexander the Great captured it on his march toward India. In subsequent years it was ruled by the Greeks, and later by the Scythians. The Silk Road passed through this area, connecting China with Europe. Traveling traders needed transport animals, the sturdy two-humped camels (*Camelus bactrianus*) of the region that were so well suited for this purpose.

While the area around the ancient town of Bactra was the heart of Bactria, its territorial dimensions varied a great deal over the course of time. In the best of times it would include the northern part of Afghanistan and all of present Tajikistan. Under Darius it was the eastern bulwark of the Achaemenid empire. For some time it was the heartland of the Kushan empire, which then expanded so as to include a large part of northern India. It remained of strategic importance for many centuries, until the Mongols swept through it in the early thirteenth century. It then lost much of its pivotal position. In modern times it became once more of importance in the "Great Game" when Tsarist Russia penetrated Central Asia. With the capture of Merv in 1884, the Russians came very close to the region of Bactria, and the British tried their best to keep Afghanistan firmly under their control. Being far from Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, this region has in recent times emerged as the stronghold of warlords who cannot be easily controlled by Afghanistan's government.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Afghanistan; Alexander the Great; Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier**

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BAHADUR SHAH I (1643–1712), Mughal emperor (1707–1712). The eldest son of the Great Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Bahadur Shah's original name was Mu'azzam. He was sixty-three years old when he succeeded his father in 1707, ruling for less than five years. Since there was no designated crown prince according to Mughal tradition, most successions had led to bloody struggles for power. This kind of dynastic Darwinism had guaranteed that only strong contenders could prevail. Aurangzeb's most ambitious son, Akbar, had rebelled against his father and had died in exile long before Aurangzeb's death. Mu'azzam, who was governor of Kabul when Aurangzeb died, had to fight and kill his brother, Azam Shah, before he could ascend the throne as Bahadur Shah I. He was a mild ruler confronted by determined enemies, among them the Rajput rulers of Jaipur and Udaipur. The Sikhs of the Punjab had also long resisted Mughal rule. Their tenth and last guru, Gobind Singh, had established the Khalsa in 1699 as a kind of martial order, with rites of initiation and visible marks of distinction. Bahadur Shah I had to fight against these indomitable warriors. Gobind Singh was killed in 1708, and there was no further guru, but Banda Bahadur emerged as a powerful Sikh military leader, whom the Great Mughal could not subdue.

Bahadur Shah I tried to make peace with the Marathas, the greatest threat to Mughal rule under Aurangzeb, who had kept Shahu, the grandson of Shivaji, as a hostage at his court. By installing Shahu as raja of Satara in the heart of Maratha country, Bahadur Shah I hoped to pacify the Marathas. Shahu was a mild courtier and seemed to serve the Great Mughal well, but he appointed as *peishwa* of Pune the wily Chitpavan Brahman Balaji Vishvanath, whose son Baji Rao then emerged as the greatest challenger to Mughal rule. Thus Bahadur Shah's policy ended in failure, and he precipitated the decline of the Mughal empire. He was succeeded by his son Jahandar Shah, whose reign was even less fortunate than his father's. Nevertheless, Mughal rule lingered on. Baji Rao commented, regarding Mughal rule, that once the trunk was cut, the branches would also fall. Rather, the Mughal empire simply became hollow, with many parties using it for their own purposes, and the successors

of Bahadur Shah I became mere pawns in the power game of eighteenth-century India.

Dietmar Rothermund

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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

This entry consists of the following articles:

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Foreign exchange scarcity was a chronic feature of most of India's post-independence history. This was both cause and consequence of India's inward looking (and quasi-socialistic) choice of development model, with concomitant negative implications for its economic performance, especially in comparison to emerging economies in East and Southeast Asia.

At independence in 1947, India was left with strong sterling balances arising from its wartime contributions. The prewar exchange rate arrangements continued, with the rupee being pegged (or fixed) to the British pound sterling at the prewar parity. In 1949, when the pound was devalued, the rupee-sterling parity was left unchanged, creating an effective devaluation. During the 1950s low inflation kept the exchange rate competitive. The first major foreign exchange crisis in India came as a consequence of the second Five Year Plan in 1957, which, with its ambitious heavy industry import substitution industrialization strategy, led to a sharp increase in imports. Growing external imbalances resulted in the imposition of severe foreign exchange and import controls, which would persist over the next three and a half decades. A deep distrust of the price mechanism extended to the principal levers of macroeconomic policy, exchange rates and interest rates.

India's Five Year Plans were based on the premise that prices would be constant and that the exchange rate, as one of myriad prices, must remain fixed. Adherence to a fixed exchange rate was necessary (from the narrow perspective of the plan's model) because any change in its level would have upset the careful balance that was part of the plan's design. Indeed, when it did just that (in 1966), the Five Year Plans had to be temporarily suspended. This was the rationale behind the government's

aversion to changing the fixed exchange rate, even though conditions had vastly changed. Throughout its history there has been a close link between the health of India's foreign exchange reserves and the stringency of foreign trade and payments controls. The periods of severe tightening (1957–1962, 1968–1974) and moderate relaxation (1966–1968, 1975–1979, 1982–1989) followed this pattern.

Exchange Rate Regime

Table 1 gives the currency regimes prevailing in India during the twentieth century. From being pegged to the pound sterling, the rupee moved to a peg to a basket of currencies in the mid-1970s and a de facto crawling band around the U.S. dollar by the end of the decade. It switched to a floating exchange rate regime in 1993 after a transitional phase of dual exchange rates for two years. The postfloat period is distinguished by remarkable exchange rate stability, which is contrary to commonly observed experience, as countries that switch from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes typically experience a rise in exchange rate volatility. The floating of the rupee has also been accompanied by a rise in the frequency and scale of intervention by the central bank in the foreign exchange market.

The post-independence exchange rate regime, while formally an adjustable peg Bretton Woods-style regime, operated in practice as a fixed nominal exchange rate. (Between 1946 and 1971, under the Bretton Woods system, each country's exchange rates were fixed to the U.S. dollar and could be changed only if the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed that the country's balance of payments was in a state of "fundamental disequilibrium." Countries settled their international balances in U.S. dollars, and the U.S. government promised to redeem other central banks' holdings of dollars at a fixed rate of U.S.\$35 per ounce.) By the end of the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, a fixed nominal rate and mounting inflation led to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER), and despite severe trade and capital controls and foreign aid, India's balance of payments problems mounted. REER is a measure (index) of the degree of competitiveness of a country relative to its trading partners, where weights are chosen to correspond to the relative importance of each trading partner. In June 1966, under pressure from the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions, India undertook a large nominal devaluation (36.5%), but due to a complex tax regime and high inflation, the REER depreciation was only about 7 percent. The devaluation of 1966 is widely regarded as having been a political disaster that severely shaped India's macroeconomic policies and political economy over the next two decades.

TABLE 1

| India's currency regimes | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Time period | Classification | Comments |
| August 1914–March 1927 | Peg to pound sterling | Convertibility into sterling was suspended |
| March 1927–September 1931 | Peg | Gold standard |
| September 1931–September 1939 | Peg to pound sterling | Suspension of gold standard adherence to sterling area |
| September 1939–October 1941 | Peg to pound sterling | Introduction of capital controls |
| November 1941–October 1943 | Peg to pound sterling; “freely falling” | |
| November 1943–October 1965 | Peg to pound sterling | |
| October 1965–June 1966 | De facto band around pound sterling; parallel market | There were multiple exchange rates; band width was +/-5% |
| June 1966– August 1971 | Peg to pound sterling | |
| August 1971–December 1971 | Peg to U.S. dollar | |
| December 1971–September 1975 | Peg to pound sterling | |
| September 1975–February 1979 | De facto crawling band around pound | Band width was +/-2%; officially sterling pegged to a basket of currencies |
| March 1979–July 1979 | Managed float | |
| August 1979–July 1989 | De facto crawling band around U.S. dollar | Band width was +/-2%; officially pegged to a basket of currencies |
| August 1989–July 1991 | De facto crawling peg to U.S. dollar | |
| August 1991–June 1995 | De facto peg to U.S. dollar | One devaluation in March 1993; black market premia rose to 27% in February |
| July 1995–December 2001 | De facto crawling peg to U.S. dollar | During this period black market premium consistently in single digits |

SOURCE: Compiled from Reinhart, C. M., and Ken Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Re-interpretation,” NBER Working Paper 8963, Cambridge, Mass.: June 2002.

With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in August 1971, the rupee was briefly pegged to the dollar, but after December 1971 it was pegged to the pound sterling until 1975. This proved to be an astute move, as it led to an automatic depreciation of the rupee (due to the weakness of the sterling) without drawing political attention. In the early 1970s India weathered the first oil shock because the sterling peg led not only to a nominal effective devaluation but to a real devaluation as well (see Figure 1 for India's nominal effective exchange rate [NEER] and REER series, 1970–2003). NEER is an index of the value of a country's currency with respect to a group of countries, usually trading partners (as opposed to only one country). Thus the effective exchange rate depreciated by 20 percent by 1975, although there was no explicit devaluation. In September 1975 the peg was altered from the pound sterling to a basket of currencies. Tight monetary and fiscal policies reduced inflation sharply, resulting in a steady depreciation of the rupee and an export boom.


For reasons that are not entirely clear, India's exchange rate policies faltered in the immediate aftermath of the second oil shock in 1979. There was no nominal depreciation, and mounting inflation led to an appreciation in the REER. However, in 1983 the exchange rate management changed direction (a crawling basket peg). The REER became the explicit indicator for exchange rate policy

with a nominal effective exchange rate managed so as to keep the REER at about the 1982 level. By the mid-1980s, the exchange rate policy became much more active, leading to a depreciation in the nominal rate of 47 percent and the REER of 35 percent.

Over the 1980s, while India's economy grew more rapidly, its fiscal performance worsened significantly. The growing fiscal deficit spilled over into the current account, and when India was hit by a succession of external and domestic shocks at the turn of the decade, a full blow balance of payments crisis erupted. The wide-ranging reforms ushered in at the wake of the crisis attacked the plethora of economic controls that had characterized India, both on external sector and domestic policies.

The rupee was devalued by 9 and 11 percent in two stages between 1 and 3 July 1991. A new system of exchange rate management in 1992–1993, the Liberalised Exchange Rate Management System (LERMS) made the rupee partially convertible on the current account. Initially a “dual exchange rate” system was introduced to ease the transition from an onerous trade regime to a market-friendly system encompassing both trade and payments. Under this system, 40 percent of exporter receipts and remittances had to be sold to authorized dealers at the official exchange rate, while the balance were converted at the market rate, which

FIGURE 1



effectively meant that export proceeds were taxed at 0.4 times the difference between the market and the official exchange rate. All capital account transactions (except IMF and multilateral flows against rupee expenditure) were also at the market rate. The success of LERMS in restoring India's external health brought enough confidence to move to a market-based exchange rate system, and the two rates were unified in March 1993.

During the 1980s, India had been losing substantial remittance receipts because of links between gold smuggling and remittances. To address this, tariffs on gold imports were lowered and gold imports gradually liberalized, which led to a shift of a substantial foreign exchange market from the underground (Hawala) to the open market.

The liberalization of the trade and payments system culminated in August 1994, with India finally accepting the IMF Article VIII; thus the rupee officially became convertible on the current account. By the end of the decade (in 2000), India replaced its draconian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (passed in 1973) with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, moving from a system of administrative controls to a regulatory framework.

Balance of Payments

For the better part of four decades, economic policy making in India was hemmed in by the specter of balance of payments vulnerability. The second Five Year Plan, with its focus on heavy-industry import-substitution industrialization, soon ran into balance of payments problems. The formation of the India Consortium in 1958 and the International Development Association gave India access to considerable concessional foreign aid and foreign exchange. Nonetheless, a series of shocks in the mid-1960s increased India's dependence on foreign

donors. As the rupee weakened, India had little choice but to accede to the pressures exercised by the consortium, devaluing the rupee in 1966.

With India's outward orientation from the early 1990s underpinned by continuing trade and payments liberalization, prudent debt management and market-determined exchange rate policies driven by the goal of maintaining competitiveness, the scope for external vulnerability has since declined. By virtually any relevant indicator—foreign debt service ratio, external debt–gross domestic product ratio, and months of current payments—India's situation has improved markedly. When storm clouds threatened, as in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and India's nuclear tests in 1998, India raised funds from its diaspora: U.S.\$4.2 billion from the India Resurgent Bonds issued in 1998 and another U.S.\$5.5 billion from the India Millennium Deposit program in 2000.

The reversal of decades of inward-looking policy to one of gradually (but decisively) opening up the economy to external competition and acceptance of a more flexible exchange rate regime helped India to increase its share in world trade of goods from about 0.5 percent at the beginning of the reforms to 0.8 percent a decade later, and of services from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent in the same period. India's current account receipts were especially boosted by the country's emergence as a proven powerhouse of service exports. The export of relatively unskilled services to the Middle East, coupled with outflows of skilled labor to industrialized countries, has brought growing remittances. Information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services, particularly business process outsourcing, continue to post exceptionally high year-on-year growth, and the prognosis continues to be bright. The years 2001–2002 to 2003–2004 were

watershed years: the only time since independence that India has had three successive years of surplus in the current account of its balance of payments.

Capital Account Liberalization

A singular change that epitomized India's post-1991 integration with the global economy, compared to its dirigiste past, was the two-way opening of the capital account that unfolded over a decade. Growing confidence in India's balance of payments situation, as well as a different intellectual and political climate, led the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1997 to constitute a committee for drawing up a road map for full capital account convertibility (CAC). It specified elaborate preconditions—indicators of vulnerability—including, among others, fiscal consolidation, permissible current account imbalances, foreign reserves cover, and a mandated inflation target. The committee recognized that the health of the financial system was particularly important, emphasizing that strengthening the financial system was an important precondition to the move to CAC. Since the release of the CAC report in 1997, all “pure” balance of payments conditions have been attained, indeed exceeded. However, two key conditions remained unmet. The fiscal deficit worsened between 1997 and 2003; and the health of the financial system improved only modestly in the absence of any serious steps toward changing incentives that were blunted by public sector ownership and the concomitant regulatory forbearance that this inevitably entailed. Nonetheless, the RBI gradually went ahead fairly single-mindedly toward CAC, driven by a realization that not moving to a more liberal CAC stance would increase reserves even more and make monetary and exchange rate management more difficult. By 2004 hardly any onerous controls on the capital account remained, other than those pertaining to short-term debt creating flows and borrowing by financial intermediaries. Most recently, Indian residents have been allowed to open bank accounts abroad.

Foreign Exchange Reserves and Its Management: From Drought to Flood

By the late 1990s, India's foreign exchange reserves began climbing rapidly, crossing an unprecedented \$130 billion by December 2004, driven mainly by a respectable surplus on the current account, portfolio capital inflows, revaluation of reserves on account of depreciation in the value of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies, and continuing net inflow of nonresident Indian deposits. For decades Indian policy makers had devoted their energies to coping with an endemic droughtlike situation on foreign exchange reserves. In the new millennium they faced a completely new challenge: how to cope with a flood.

The accumulation of reserves was in part a conscious decision. With the RBI committed to liberalizing the capital account on the one hand, and the country's continued inability to address long-standing macroeconomic (especially fiscal) problems on the other, a high level of reserves had become a necessary insurance cover to counter the resulting enhanced risk perceptions of the Indian economy.

Policy circles usually adopt a normative consumption, smoothing-type approach for assessing the “appropriate” level of foreign currency reserves. Consumption smoothing occurs when the temporal profiles of income and desirable consumption do not coincide; then, by using saving and borrowing, purchasing power available in one period is transferred to an earlier (borrow) or later (save) period. Often the demand for reserves is investigated in terms of a buffer stock model, whereby the macroeconomic adjustment costs without reserves are balanced with the cost of holding reserves. Another way of looking at a reserve buildup is analogous to the precautionary motive for savings traditionally put forward. In India's case, the high level of reserves appear to have been affected by three factors: strategic considerations arising from prevailing and likely geopolitical realities; domestic political realities in India that increase its risk and susceptibility to economic shocks; and the high prospective political price that the government of the day will have to pay if the country faces an external payments crisis, that is, if the country runs out of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, India's high accumulation of reserves appears to be driven by its internal economic and political weaknesses and global uncertainties. In other words, its high reserves have been a signal that the country is compensating for its weaknesses in some areas.

Increasing foreign exchange inflows led to new pressures on the RBI. In order to maintain competitiveness, the central bank aggressively bought foreign exchange to stem upward pressure on the rupee. Unlike the past, keeping the exchange rate from appreciating to maintain India's export competitiveness emerged as a key goal of exchange rate management. The real effective exchange rate showed no depreciation on average during the post-crisis period, after depreciating by an average of 2 percent per annum during the 1980s. To check the resulting liquidity growth (and contain inflationary pressures) on account of its intervention in the foreign exchange market, the RBI sought to sterilize using its stock of government bonds. However, the increased supply of perceived risk-free assets in turn contributed to crowding out bank lending to the private sector, contributing a much higher (sometimes around 40 percent) share of commercial banks' assets in government securities than was warranted by the mandated Statutory Liquidity

Ratio (25 percent). By 2003, mounting foreign exchange inflows meant that even this strategy had run out of course as the RBI exhausted its holding of government bonds. This led it to establish a Market Stabilisation Scheme, comprising a “war chest” of 600 billion rupees of intervention bonds. India’s failure to contain large fiscal deficits meant that the burden of coping with the impact of large foreign currency inflows from spilling over into prices and inflation has had to be largely borne on the monetary side.

Political Economy and Analytical Issues

The economic debates on India’s exchange rate policies have focused on three questions.

The first concerns the relationship between trade and exchange rates. Indian economic thinking had long been characterized by “export pessimism”; however, it later became apparent that India’s exports have been quite responsive to exchange rates, with short-run elasticity of about 0.7 and long-run slightly greater than 1. However, these estimates were valid for goods exports; as India’s export basket becomes more services-weighted, this is likely to change. A second debate has centered around the inflationary consequences of devaluation stemming from a belief that India’s import basket was relatively inelastic, especially because of India’s dependence on oil imports for its energy needs. It was long argued (and not just in India) that since devaluation was inflationary, real devaluation would have little effect. However, by and large the REER has been responsive to nominal exchange rate depreciation in India, although the REER has usually been less than the nominal rate depreciation. The inflationary effects of devaluation have been muted in India by the simple reality that until very recently, India’s trade sector was small, relative to the size of the economy.

Exchange rate policies affect different parts of the economy in very different ways. Consequently, they can become a major target of political conflict. Pre-independence Indian industrialists consistently argued for monetary and exchange rate policies that would afford them some degree of protection. The demand for fiscal and monetary policies that would promote their interests was seen not as mere capitalistic interest, but as a general national interest. Indian industrialists joined nationalists, insisting that the rupee was overvalued. As this lifted exports and curbed imports, it was natural for the industrialists to identify with this “nationalist” demand for a devaluation of the currency. Industrialists and nationalists pressed for a gold standard in preference to the gold exchange standard, arguing that the latter facilitated the drain from India through the mechanism of council bills and reverse council bills.

Following the breakdown of Bretton Woods, monetary policy, and especially exchange rate policy, became gradually depoliticized even as fiscal policies became more politicized. In the 1970s India’s devaluation was done by stealth (under the cover of the sterling peg); by 1983 the exchange rate policies moved in the direction of a crawling basket peg. Exchange-rate management policies became increasingly overt and active by the end of the decade, when India began operating a discretionary crawling peg regime. An observer trying to understand the political economy of exchange rate management in India is faced with two puzzles: 1) why did India not adopt an undervalued exchange rate as an explicit instrument to promote its hallowed goal of import substitution industrialization? and 2) why, despite the lack of strong interest groups as well as external pressure, India’s exchange rate policies in the 1970s and 1980s were reasonably sound (at least as compared to many other developing countries)? The first question is somewhat puzzling in that pre-war, India’s industrialists and politicians had opposed a strong exchange rate. It is possible that the anomaly of high foreign exchange reserves at the time of independence (arising from India’s contributions to the Allied war effort) led to the par value of the rupee being set too high; but once it was fixed, it was hard to change. Not only would it upset the planning process but new interest groups had formed that had a vested stake in promoting foreign exchange shortages. As regards the second question, it should be emphasized that during this period the small size of the export sector also meant that there were no strong lobbies in favor of maintaining competitive exchange rate regime. However, by the end of the 1990s, the growing importance of trade in the Indian economy and the particular economic and political importance of the IT sector meant that pressures grew from the private sector to maintain a “competitive” exchange rate.

In the new millennium, India’s overflowing foreign exchange coffers have mitigated pressures to rectify India’s fiscal mismanagement. In the past, when reserves were much more modest, India’s policy makers were quite aware that large deficits sustained over a long period would either inevitably spill over into higher levels of inflation (if the deficit was monetized) or a balance of payments crisis (if the country drew increasingly on external savings). Since both outcomes had harsh political repercussions, it forced policy makers to act with due caution (most of the time). Now, with high levels of reserves, policy makers are much less worried about either concern. Liberalization has eased supply-side weaknesses, and monetization has not yet been seriously resorted to, thereby attenuating inflationary pressures. Indeed, the increasing disjuncture between large internal fiscal imbalances on the one hand and improving external

balances on the other is analytically relatively unexplored territory in India.

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See also **Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE

The balance of payments of colonial India was characterized by certain distinctive features that disappeared or weakened after the end of colonial rule in 1947. For example, the economy of India was more open in the nineteenth century than it became later. There was close integration between the world economy and the domestic economy. There was also a close relationship between balance of payments and the currency and exchange system. Further, government remittances abroad made public finance and external transactions mutually dependent, and this was an area of potential conflict between Indian and British economic interests. For this reason, the balance of payments became a politically charged issue, one that figured prominently in nationalist critiques of colonial rule in India. Finally, there was a large transaction in gold and silver in the external

accounts. Much of this gold and silver was normally imported for private consumption.


Balance of Payments and Foreign Investment

In the 1920s there were two major types of net inflow: net export of goods and net inflow of foreign investment. These two together were as large as about 4.4 percent of national income. These were balanced by three types of net outflow: private remittances (2.7 percent of national income), government remittance (0.4 percent), and net purchase of gold and silver (1.3 percent).

Estimates available for the middle of the nineteenth century suggest that the pattern was not fundamentally different from the beginning of Crown rule in India in 1858. The five items above were even then the principal items in India's external account, and in most years carried the same signs as these did later. Balance of trade was usually positive, whereas remittances and precious metal transactions were usually negative. The relative magnitudes, however, were different. The total size of external transactions relative to national income was smaller in 1858 than in 1914. And within total payments, the shares of private remittance and gold purchase were smaller as well, while the share of government remittance was larger.

The five principal items—trade, capital flows, factor income flows, government remittance, and gold—need fuller description. Foreign trade (export plus import) increased significantly in value, from 123 million rupees in 1834 to 3.8 billion rupees in 1939, and as a ratio of national income, from possibly 3–4 percent around 1800 to 20 percent in 1914. It did not rise any further in the next thirty years until the end of colonialism in the region. The ratio declined subsequently to 7–8 percent in the early 1970s, rising again to 18–20 percent in the mid-1990s. India's presence in the world economy was small, however. India accounted for no more than 2–3 percent of world trade in 1914. Yet, India played a significant role in the international settlements system. Colonial India usually maintained a trade deficit with Britain, but a trade surplus with the rest of the world. This pattern facilitated Britain to meet its international settlements on the current account. In turn, that enabled Britain to use the income from its investments abroad to make further investments.

The composition of India's exports changed in the long run. In the nineteenth century, semiprocessed natural resources accounted for more than 70 percent of exports, the principal items being raw fibers, seeds, food grains, indigo, opium, and hides and skins. The percentage declined to 30 in the mid-1930s, whereas textiles and tea accounted for another 30 percent. Imports, likewise, underwent a change. Cotton textiles constituted almost



Kamal Nath, Cabinet Minister for Commerce and Industry. Since Kamal Nath became Minister of Commerce and Industry in May 2004, the Indian government has announced a host of major economic initiatives. Included is the comprehensive Foreign Trade Policy for 2004–2009 (a bound copy of which Nath proudly displays for the camera), with its focus on increased exports. INDIA TODAY.

half of India's imports in the mid-nineteenth century. Late in the interwar period, the major items were machinery and intermediate goods. The change in composition, in other words, partly reflected the advancement of a textile-based industrialization. This process accelerated in the interwar period, when import tariffs on a range of manufactured goods were raised.

Direction of trade in this period steadily moved away from the dominance of Britain as a market and as a source of imports into India, even though there was a slight reversal in the trend in the 1930s as a result of Britain's attempts to establish preferential trade arrangements within the empire. The two countries that emerged as major trading partners were the United States and Japan. The increasing importance of Japan was a reflection of a relatively new intra-Asian commodity exchange pattern involving Japan, China, Southeast Asia, and India, driven to a large extent by Japan's own rapid industrialization.

India received several types of capital flow, short term and long term. The usual type of short-term flows, which are not adequately captured in the annual accounts, went to meet the seasonal demands of trade. The India Office sold bills in London (called council bills) redeemable in India, which went to meet export transactions that peaked in the harvest seasons. Interest rates in India varied greatly by season, and these capital flows were evidently influenced by the high interest rates that prevailed in the busy season. The business of council bills was mainly conducted by the exchange banks, which were a group of banks licensed to conduct the foreign exchange business. All of them had headquarters outside India. In the 1920s, there was another kind of inflow of short-term foreign capital for investment in the government of India's rupee debt, but as the Great Depression began, the flow reversed.

Long-term capital came in two forms: net private foreign investment, and net increase in public debt. Private

foreign investment remains the weakest link in India's balance of payments database. Based on what data are available, net foreign investment was usually positive, but a rather small item (well below 1 percent of national income). Private investment was dominated by railways in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and toward the century's end, by the formation of tea, jute, and mining companies. Such investment was initially in the form of shares sold in London by companies based in India. In the interwar period, the pattern changed into direct investment in subsidiaries of foreign firms. At least some of these multinational firms were attracted by the substantially higher import tariffs introduced from the 1920s. At independence, foreign capital accounted for between a quarter and a third of capital stock in the private corporate sector, according to different estimates. Plantations, jute textiles, and engineering had 70 percent of the capital stock. Seventy-seven percent of foreign capital was owned by British companies, the bulk of which had come in as portfolio investment. Of the remaining amount, the major part came from the United States, all of it as direct investment.

The government of India sold two types of securities, one denominated in sterling, and the other denominated in rupees. In the nineteenth century, the former exceeded the latter in value. By 1910 the two were of roughly equal magnitude. In the 1930s sterling securities were being retired rapidly, and for new issues, the government relied entirely on the Indian money market. The events of the Great Depression weakened confidence in London in India's sterling bonds. But there was also a long-term factor behind the decline of sterling bonds. Between 1880 and 1930, the average buyers of government securities had changed as well, from "old India hands" in Britain to Indian banks and the Indian public, who accepted rupee debts more easily. Public debt went to finance the railways, irrigation, roads, and buildings in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, these productive expenditures declined in importance. On the other hand, World War I led to a significant accumulation of debt.

Net factor income flows were consistently negative. Both private flows and government remittances were individually negative items. The ratio between these was roughly 3:2 in the 1860s, and probably increased marginally toward the end of colonial rule. The largest item in private flows (about half in the 1920s, and increasing) was repatriated income earned on foreign investment. Other items included insurance and freight charges, and dividends of railway companies, which progressively declined as the railways became increasingly state-owned.

In any normal harvest year, a large quantity of gold and silver was imported into India. This bullion was converted into jewelry and ended up as the private hoarded

assets of the peasant households. The quantity of non-monetary gold absorption by Indians was so large that the world financial circles, and especially the City of London, were often fearful that a good year in India might interfere with monetary expansion elsewhere in the world. The demand for precious metals can be seen as a response to exceedingly high risks of livelihood in Indian agriculture. Financial assets fluctuated in value given the rather extreme movements in prices and interest rates. Gold and silver were traded the world over, and therefore were more stable assets. This preference for precious metals took a toll on the savings available for productive private investment. By a rough calculation, had the acquisition of precious metals been zero, private investment in interwar India could have risen by as much as 2 to 3 percent as a proportion to national income.

A politically controversial element in the balance of payments was government remittance. Every year, the government in India paid to Britain a sum of money in sterling, which were called the "home charges" in the nineteenth century. About half of the home charges in the prewar years consisted of interest payment on loans raised to finance construction of railways and irrigation works. The second most important item was payment for the maintenance of army and marines. A third major component was pension payments for officials who had served India and retired to Britain. India Office expenses and stores purchased were the other considerably less important items of expenditure.

These payments, it was argued by Indian nationalists, compromised the capacity of the domestic economy to generate savings and investments. In principle, if such payments were financed from taxes, domestic consumption or savings could fall. If such payments were financed out of government's own investment funds, public investment could fall. If such payments were financed out of foreign borrowings, the volume of payments would increase by interest obligations. All three methods were used to meet these charges. For example, the regressive salt tax was used to finance increased government obligations in sterling in the 1890s. However, none of these adverse effects might result if these charges corresponded to factor services that in turn increased national income, or that supplied public goods that the government ought to provide anyhow. The potential adverse effects, in other words, depended on the "quality" of these charges. Whether or not government remittance enhanced national income, and to what extent it did, remains difficult to determine. To take one example, Indian nationalists alleged that the charge on account of the British Indian marines, who normally guarded trade routes, was unproductive because the marines were sometimes deployed for purposes other than the defense of Indian

waters. On the other side, it was suggested that the British public, which paid ten times more than their Indian counterpart on average toward the maintenance of the marines, in fact subsidized Indian defense.

A second problem with these payments was that they compromised the government's capacity to follow a stabilization policy independent of British economic interests. This effect was in evidence whenever the Indian currency was under pressure, for example, during the Great Depression. This issue leads to an examination of the currency and exchange system.

The Exchange System

The primary objective of monetary policy in colonial India was to stabilize the exchange rate. The government wished to ensure that the exchange rate remained stable, and did not fluctuate with balance of trade. An appreciation hurt commercial interests exporting from India, and depreciation made it difficult for the budget to meet its sterling obligations.

Between 1835 and 1893, the Indian rupee was a silver coin. The British East India Company in 1806 chose silver as the standard of value, and pushed silver coins into circulation in Madras, where the gold "pagoda" was still in circulation. In 1835 the government declared the silver rupee as the legal tender, and announced an exchange rate (15:1) between the rupee and the pound sterling. There were two ways that money could be transferred between India and the rest of the world. As mentioned before, the India Office sold council bills in London at an announced exchange rate, which the exchange banks purchased, sent to India, redeemed at the Treasury, and financed trade demands for money. The receipts in London were used to meet the home charges. Alternatively, traders could buy silver in London, ship to India, and have these minted into silver coins for a fee. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, excess supply of silver in the world led to a fall in silver prices, which made the second mode of payment the more profitable. The council bill system came under threat unless the government devalued the rupee. Depreciation did occur, but at considerable cost to the budget. On the recommendations of a committee of inquiry headed by Lord Herschell, the Lord Chancellor, free coinage of silver was abolished in 1893. The next few years saw shipping of silver bullion for payment, and yet, the rupee did appreciate somewhat. In 1898, on the recommendation of another committee under the direction of Sir Henry Fowler, a gold exchange standard was introduced in India.

The gold exchange standard was in force between 1898 and 1916. The rupee was convertible against sterling and not against gold, at a ratio of 16 pence per rupee,

or 15 rupees for a pound sterling. These years witnessed an animated discussion on the merits of a full gold standard for India, within India and in London. The desire for a gold standard was strong in India, and the view that the gold exchange standard was adequate for India was strong in London. In effect, the autonomy of Indian monetary policy was at stake here. For many contemporaries, the gold standard represented the freedom for India to settle her obligations directly by means of flows of metals. In any case, World War I suspended these debates on the gold standard.

To support the exchange, the India Office now sold council bills in weekly auctions at the Bank of England. Until 1905 the volume of these sales was limited to the home charges. The limit was removed thereafter, and the sale of these bills effectively became a strategy to stabilize the exchange by preventing the free movement of metals for settlement of balance of trade. An official gold standard reserve was created. It was transferred to the India Office in 1902. The reserve thereafter consisted of mainly British government securities, Treasury bills, Exchequer bonds, and consols, in turn contributing in no small measure to keeping interest rates low in Britain. The India office also used the gold standard reserve of India in the call money market, leading to a closer alliance between the office and the financial world of the City of London. The only occasion in the prewar period when the government needed to draw on the currency reserve occurred in 1907, when a trade deficit threatened a depreciation of the rupee. On this occasion, the government also used the reverse council bills, a counterpart instrument that facilitated supply of sterling.

The gold exchange standard faced its first serious crisis toward the end of World War I. The first years of the war saw a loss of confidence in the rupee, due to inflation in silver prices. From 1916 to 1917, the inflation threatened a disappearance of silver rupee coins from circulation. An appreciation of the rupee seemed inevitable. Between 1917 and 1919, the rupee was allowed to float. By December 1919, the rupee had appreciated by 75 percent. A committee of inquiry was established to study the situation, which recommended an exchange rate at 2 shillings, provoking a strong minority report from the Indian member, who advocated a return to the prewar ratio. Silver prices, however, eventually stabilized, and confidence in paper currency returned in the next two years, with the result that early in the 1920s, the rupee depreciated somewhat. In 1925 another committee of inquiry endorsed the then prevailing ratio, 18 pence, to be the basis for a return to a modified gold exchange standard. From 1926 on, the rupee was again closely controlled to remain near 18 pence, the rate that was to prevail for the next several decades.

The next twelve years, until the outbreak of World War II, saw what has been described in historical scholarship as the “ratio controversy.” In the emerging political environment of 1930–1931, Indian commercial and political opinion had united in the belief that the rupee was overvalued at 18 pence. The demand for a full gold standard and autonomy with regard to the exchange rate grew strong again.

The conduct of Indian monetary policy during the Great Depression, which seemed to serve British interests at the expense of Indian ones, worsened the controversy. The beginning of a fall in world commodity prices in the second half of the 1920s turned the terms of trade adverse for India, and weakened the balance of payments. Further, the fear that the rupee might devalue eroded confidence in the rupee. Official and nonofficial opinion in India strongly favored depreciation of the rupee against sterling. But depreciation was neither easy nor acceptable to London, for that step would have changed the volume of home charges measured in rupees, and might lead the government of India to default on its external obligations. None of the options usually available to the India Office for dealing with a financial crisis—fresh borrowings in London, or drawing on the reserves—seemed practicable in the prevailing economic and political climate. The options available to the monetary authorities in India were even more limited and inflexible. A postponement of India’s sterling obligations was discussed, but did not materialize.

Eventually, on London’s insistence, the government of India carried out monetary contraction, in the hope that this would reduce prices and raise demand for Indian goods. The goal was not easily attainable, for the demand depression was not specific to India but was a global phenomenon. The contraction, therefore, had to be a deep and sustained one. Furthermore, as the contraction continued, and the less it seemed to work, the harder it became to return to devaluation; the expected devaluation would have had to be larger than before, causing larger-than-before adjustments in budget. The government of India feared that the resultant decline in prices would raise real interest rates and rents, causing hardship. These fears were borne out. The financial situation did cause widespread transfer of assets from debtors to creditors in rural India, and led to rural unrest in some cases.

One principal mechanism used for such transfer was the sale of gold jewelry. As mentioned before, a significant part of rural assets was held in the form of gold and silver jewelry. These now began to be liquidated. At the same time, the British government’s decision to leave the gold standard in 1931 depreciated the pound, and with it the rupee, against gold. These circumstances led to a rise

in the price of gold in terms of rupees. On the basis of an 18 pence rupee, the price of gold was lower in India than in the international market, causing a great quantity of this gold to be sold abroad. In the next five years, these gold exports reflat the Indian economy, restored balance of payments, and provided the government of India with enough remittance to meet its sterling obligations. Nevertheless, these exports were widely seen as a sign of distress and a lost opportunity to build a currency reserve for India, and thus left Britain-India relations seriously strained.

The establishment of the Reserve Bank of India in 1935 was the first step in the dissociation of monetary policy from balance of payments in India. Balance of trade in World War II was in surplus. At the same time, a massive monetary expansion was allowed to take place to meet the needs of war financing, even as severe shortages of essential commodities developed. The result was massive inflation. On the more positive side, India’s contribution to the war effort accumulated in a “sterling balance” account, which became available for liquidation in the late 1940s. For the newly independent nation, the balance came in handy in its efforts to consolidate the balance of payments.

By contrast with the colonial pattern, the general pattern of balance of payments after colonial rule was very different. Restrictions on gold import brought the share of gold transactions close to zero almost immediately after 1947. Government account showed a net receipt due to foreign aid. The relative shares of trade, foreign investment, and private remittance all declined as India withdrew from an open to an autarkic regime from the 1950s onward. Also, balance of trade turned consistently negative, due to the need to import capital goods, oil, and sometimes food. Over the next fifty-odd years, several major changes took place. Two of these are noteworthy. As the number of expatriate workers increased, remittances of the private account turned into a net receipt item. And as India ended its autarkic policies in the 1990s, the shares of trade and investment in national income increased again.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947**

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BĀLASARASVATI, T. (1918–1984), classical dancer and musician. T. Bālasarasvati, or Bāla, as she is affectionately called by her admirers, is widely regarded as the greatest exponent of the dance form now referred to as Bharata Natyam. Like her ancestors, most notably her grandmother Vīnā Dhannammal and her mother Jayammal, she was also an accomplished musician, whose “singing exhaled serenity, tranquility and poise” (Mahadevan).

Kandappa Nattuvanar, a descendant of Ponnayya, was her guru. Ponnayya (one of the four brothers known as the Tanjore Quartet) is credited with systematizing the Bharata Natyam repertoire in the nineteenth century. On similar lines, Kandappa Nattuvanar did not hesitate to introduce major changes to Bālasarasvati's presentation, as he “felt the need for imminent reform if dance were to regain social esteem. He dispensed with the *ottu* or pipe-like drone in favour of a pair of tanpuras. He bade his men in the orchestra give up their old-fashioned attire and take their seats on the right edge of the concert platform instead of moving forwards and backwards with the dancer . . . abolishing anything crude” (Sankaran, p. 56). The foundation of major institutions, most notably the Music Academy Madras (where Bālasarasvati taught) and Kalākshētra (founded by dancer and educationist Rukmini Dēvī), enabled women from any social background to study and perform dance.

Bālasarasvati embodied the ideal of a refined personality for whom dancing was an art that consecrates the body. She postulated that by controlling his breath and by modifying his body, a yogi may acquire sanctity, as does the dancer who dissolves her identity in rhythm and music, making her body an instrument for the expression of her spirit. Bala's international fame notwithstanding, she remained rooted in Tamil Nadu, where her ancestors had shaped the art of dance and music as part of temple and court culture in Tanjāvūr. In her talks, she often referred to the environment in which the fine arts, dance, music, and poetry had enhanced one another and flourished as “a Great Temple: we enter the outer tower of *alārippu*, cross the half-way hall of *jatisvaram*, then the great hall of *sabdam*, and enter the holy precinct of the

deity in the *varnam*. This is the place, the space, which gives the most expansive scope to revel in the rhythm and moods and music of the dance. The *varnam* is the continuum which gives ever-expanding room to the dancer to delight in her self-fulfilment, by providing the fullest scope to her own creativity as well as to the tradition of the art” (Bālasarasvati in Vatsyayan, 1997, p. 81).

Her daughter Lakshmi Knight (1943–2001) was her foremost disciple.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Music: South India**

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BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

India possesses one of the most advanced missile programs outside the original five declared nuclear states (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States). With its sophisticated missile and space programs, New Delhi is technically capable of indigenously developing long-range nuclear-tipped missiles. India's research into ballistic missiles began in the 1960s. In July 1983 India created the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), with the aim of developing an indigenous missile infrastructure. The IGMDP's first indigenously developed missile was the Prithvi (Earth). India's second ballistic missile system is the Agni (Fire) missile series, which is longer in range than the Prithvi.

Ballistic Missiles

The short-range Prithvi was developed in Hyderabad, starting in 1983, and was first tested in February 1988. There are two versions of the Prithvi ballistic missile, an SS-150, designated P-1, with a range of 93 miles (150 km), and an SS-250, designated P-2, with a range of 155 miles (250 km). The SS-150 missiles are used by

the Indian army, and the SS-250 by the Indian air force to attack enemy airfields and by the Indian army for battlefield support. A third version was reported to be in development in 1994, an SS-350, designated P-3, with a range of 217 miles (350 km), but it is not known if this development has continued. A nuclear warhead was originally planned for the Prithvi missile, probably for the SS-250 and SS-350 versions. With the successful introduction of the Agni I missile, it is no longer expected that nuclear warheads will be fitted to Prithvi missiles.

In the early years of the 21st century, there were reports that a solid-propellant motor was being developed. Solid-fueled Prithvi missiles would have the advantage over liquid-fuel variants of being able to be readied for launch in a shorter time. Liquid-fuel missiles have to receive their fuel prior to firing, while solid-fueled missiles are manufactured with their fuel in place, enabling a shorter preparation time to launch. A ship-launched version, named Dhanush, believed to be similar to the SS-250, was tested from a naval vessel *INS Subhadra*, in April 2000 and 2004. It is believed that this program is a technology demonstrator, and that this missile might be fitted to future destroyers and frigates, or to India's new nuclear-powered submarine. The Dhanush may be converted into a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The SS-150 was first test flown in February 1988 and entered service in 1994. User trials were completed in June 1994, carried out by the 333rd Indian Army Missile Group at Secunderabad. The 444 Missile Group was reported to have been formed in May 2002, with a mixture of Prithvi and Agni I missiles. The SS-150 missiles are kept in storage and can become fully operational at short notice. Production of the SS-150 version began in 1993 and continued until 1999, with around sixty missiles built and some thirty-five transport erector launcher (TEL) vehicles constructed to launch the missile. The TEL vehicles can also fire the SS-250 missile.

A first reported trial of the SS-250 was carried out in January 1996, with further tests in June 2000, March 2001, and December 2001. The SS-250 entered service with the Indian air force in 1999, and it is believed that around seventy missiles will be built. In 2002 the control of the SS-250 was transferred from the air force to the army, but with the air force retaining responsibility for providing target data.

There are unconfirmed reports that the SS-350 was first tested in November 1993, and then in April 2001. It is not clear if this program has been discontinued, although it is possible that some design work continues as a later upgrade option, probably entering

service around 2010. The ship-launched Dhanush was first tested from *INS Subhadra*, a Sukanya class offshore patrol vessel, in April 2000. The test failed after about 30 seconds of flight. A second test was made in December 2000, and a third in September 2001. The last test is reported to have been over a range of 93 miles (150 km).

Agni I, II, III, and IV, and Surya

By late 2003 three Agni versions were in production or development: Agni I (435-mi. or 700-km range), Agni II (1,243-mi. or 2,000-km range), and Agni III (2,175-mi. or 3,500-km range). The Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile program began around 1979 and first test launched in 1989. No further tests were carried out on the Agni I in the early and mid-1990s by successive governments, in light of international pressure. Partly to placate international concerns, the early Agni I was referred to as a technology demonstrator. This changed with the electoral victory of Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998. In April 1999 the BJP authorized the launch of Agni II. The Agni I was flight tested in January 2002.

Development on a shorter-range Agni (currently called Agni I) began in 1999. The system uses the first stage of the original Agni, developed in the early 1990s, and its warhead assembly. A reduced payload would enable the missile to strike targets 746 mi. (1,200 km) away, sufficient to target all of Pakistan. Agni I has been designed to provide a short reaction time nuclear capability.

The 1,243 miles (2,000 km) range Agni II, first tested in April 1999, is a two-stage solid propellant design, developed from the original Agni demonstrator program from 1997. Agni III is believed to be a two- or three-stage missile, with an official maximum range of 1,864 miles (3,000 km). Agni III could, however have an increased range capability of 3,107 to 3,728 miles (5,000–6,000 km) with improved motors and reduced payloads. A range of around 2,796 miles (4,500 km) would enable India to target Beijing.

It was reported that an Agni IV was on the drawing boards, with a possible range of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), making this an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It was unclear whether this missile was also the Surya (Sun) that India was working on to create a series of ICBMs, building on the experience of the Agni family. Like the Agni missiles, the Suryas would incorporate propulsion systems developed for India's satellite launch vehicle programs. There were reported to be three variants under consideration: Surya I (or 3,107–3,728 mi. or 5,000–6,000 km) and Surya II (between 4,971–7,456 mi.

or 8,000–12,000 km), and possibly a Surya III (12,427 mi. or 20,000 km). Although there was ambiguity surrounding the designation and range of the ICBMs, India was technologically capable and intent on developing ICBMs.

The first Agni successful test launch was made in May 1989, when a trial missile flew about 621 miles (1,000 km). A second test flight was made in May 1992, which failed. A third test flight was made in February 1994, with a range reported to be 901 miles (1,450 km). In 1995 it was reported that a further five flight tests were planned and that a nuclear warhead design had been prepared.

The Agni II's development began in 1997. The maiden launch occurred in April 1999 from a railcar launcher with a payload of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg) over a range of 1,429 miles (2,300 km). A second test flight was made in January 2001. Low-rate initial production of the Agni II version began in May 2001. Around five were operational from late 2001. Ten to twelve missiles are produced a year and are operated by the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 555 Missile Group. The nuclear warheads are stored at separate locations from the missiles.

The 435-miles (700 km) range Agni I was first flight tested in January 2002. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that the reentry did not separate as planned. A second test was made in January 2003 from a transport erector launcher vehicle, and was reported to have been successful. The Agni I missiles are planned to be delivered to the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 444 Missile Group, which also operates the short-range SS-150. Agni III is in full development, and has been ready for its first test flight since 2003. Information on the ICBMs (Agni IV and Surya) is limited.

Cruise Missile

India is placing extensive resources into the development of air- or ship-launched cruise missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads. The development of nuclear-armed cruise missiles is a natural progression for India, which is seeking to develop various platforms for its nuclear deterrence. Although it is likely to be the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century before nuclear-tipped cruise missiles enter service, the technologies are in place to develop this capability in the form of existing programs, notably the antiship PJ-10 BrahMos missile, jointly developed by Russia and India. This appears set to be developed into a nuclear-armed land attack cruise missile launched from air, submarine, and surface ships. BrahMos comes from the Indian and Russian companies Brahmaputra-Moscow Pvt. The

airframe and engine will be manufactured by Machinos-troyeniye of Russia.

The antiship version (carrying a high-explosive warhead) incorporates an Indian-developed guidance system and a Russian ram-jet propulsion system. Official Indian sources state that the missile can be launched from a container that can be fitted onto a ship, a submarine, and after modification, to an aircraft. The air-launched version of BrahMos is likely to be carried by Indian air force Su-30MKI fighters. The submarine-launched variant is referred to as the Sagarika, and is likely to be deployed on the new nuclear-powered submarine advanced technology vessel (ATV) that is under development. Some reports refer to Sagarika as the sea-launched ballistic missile (Dhanush). Five ATV vessels are under development and are due to be operational in 2008. Originally the name Sagarika was applied to a project started in 1994 that was canceled in 1996. With the advent of the PJ-10 BrahMos program on the antiship missile front, India now has the option of applying proven Russian technology to the Sagarika project. With the capability to carry a warhead weighing 441 pounds (200 kg), a nuclear-armed version would require what is called "miniaturizing" the nuclear device to fit atop the cruise missile. Nuclear warheads have been developed for the Prithvi and Agni missiles, weighing in the region of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg).

In November 2004 the antiship BrahMos missile was successfully tested for the sixth time. The first test took place in June 2001 and the missile was scheduled to enter production in 2005. Initial production will focus on the antiship variants carrying a high-explosive warhead, before the land-attack version equipped with a nuclear warhead is developed. In 2005 a nuclear land-attack version, capable of being delivered by sea or air, based on the PJ-10, could be operational, if India can develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead without conducting further nuclear tests. India clearly is capable of and intent on developing a nuclear-tipped air- and sea-launched cruise missile. The delivery mechanism should be in place for India to add this weapon to its nuclear arsenal once it has developed a suitable warhead.

National Security Concerns

Ballistic missiles offer India, as with any other country possessing this capability, certain advantages on the battlefield. Compared to manned aircraft, ballistic missiles cannot be brought down by antiaircraft artillery or surface-to-air-missiles. Once a missile is launched, it is almost certain to reach its target, as long as it does not suffer a technical malfunction. To India, the development of missiles provides an assured means of attacking fixed targets in Pakistan or China. The only real constraints are the range of the missile, the accuracy of the missile,

and the size of the warhead (payload). Consequently, the possession of ballistic missiles by India remains a highly effective means of deterring its opponents. India has ordered from Russia the Antey-2500 SAM ballistic missile defense system for itself, and this system could be complemented by the Israeli Arrow missile defense system, for possible use against missiles with a range of around 932 miles (1,500 km).

Ballistic missiles are most vulnerable during transportation to and preparation at their launch sites. For instance, if the Pakistani military, through their ground and aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, know the location of India's possible Prithvi launch sites near along their border, they could attack these locations before any missiles are launched. The short range of the Prithvi missiles means they would have to be deployed fairly close to the border with Pakistan—around 62 miles (100 km), depending on the variant used. Such close proximity to Pakistan thus raises the spectre of their movements being detected and easily attacked. The Agni, however, could be deployed much deeper inside Indian territory.

There are, however, a few drawbacks to India's ballistic missile capability. Because missiles are not that accurate, they are therefore suited to strike large targets, like cities or known troop concentrations. This is particularly the case for missiles armed with a high-explosive (conventional) warhead. The Prithvi missiles, for instance, have an accuracy of only around 164 feet (50 m). In addition, unlike an aircraft, a ballistic missile cannot search for its target or alter course during its flight. Missiles are thus suitable only for static targets whose location is known prior to launch. Second, ballistic missiles are not reusable, unlike aircraft that can be used for multiple missions (although used armaments must be replaced). Third, aircraft can be recalled during their mission. A ballistic missile, once launched, has only one option: to reach its predetermined target.

Despite these drawbacks, New Delhi considers its missiles of great value as a nuclear deterrent. Since the early 1990s, India and Pakistan have made considerable progress in developing ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. As was the case with the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, India and Pakistan both view their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as essential nuclear deterrents and thus as a source of maintaining stability in South Asia.

Were they ever to launch a nuclear strike, India and Pakistan would likely target each other's cities. Pakistan is also capable of launching a significant nuclear strike, having developed two main ballistic missile programs. First, there is the Shaheen family based on Chinese designs: 466-miles (750 km) range Shaheen

I/Hatf IV (operational); 1,553-miles (2,500 km) range Shaheen II (ready to flight test); and possibly a 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Shaheen III (in development). Second are the North Korean-based Ghauri missiles: 932-miles (1,500 km) range Ghauri I/Hatf V (operational); 1,429-miles (2,300 km) range Ghauri II/ Hatf VI (flight tested); and the 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Ghauri III (in development). In addition, Pakistan received from China in 1992 around 30 M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) missiles with a range of 174 miles (280 km). It is believed that Pakistan is indigenously developing this missile as the Hatf III/Ghaznavi. All these missile systems can carry nuclear warheads.

Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad seeks an arms race in the cold war sense: their ongoing ballistic missile programs are more of an arms "crawl." The key goal has been and remains the ability to convince each other that one could launch a nuclear attack against the other's city, if required, even if one had already been attacked by a nuclear weapon(s). The ability to strike back after first succumbing to a nuclear strike is known as "second strike capability" and requires effective nuclear command and control mechanisms that could survive a nuclear strike. This is an important issue, since Islamabad has stated that it reserves the right to launch a nuclear attack first (most likely by a ballistic missile to ensure a successful strike) should it believe the attack necessary for its survival. Should, for instance, Indian troops cross into Pakistan, New Delhi would be justified in fearing that Pakistan might be tempted to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, should Islamabad perceive its national survival under threat. Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as essential to compensate for its weakness in nonnuclear forces, where India holds a numerical and technological advantage. Islamabad's refusal to follow India's decision to adopt a policy of "no first use" in 1998 was due to Pakistan's concerns that such a stance could create a destabilising military imbalance between the two nations.

An intriguing dimension to India's missile developments is the strong influence of the nation's missile scientists in continuing to develop longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles because they can and desire to build them. The process in which technology drives developments is known as technological determinism. The pursuit of technological achievements may have worked well in India's initial pursuit of ballistic missiles, but now that a minimum nuclear deterrent has been accomplished, maintaining and augmenting the existing capabilities is arguably all that is required. But India's scientists do not want to stop there, thinking rather of developing longer-range nuclear-tipped missiles, including ICBMs.

Indian officials are already speaking openly about work on the Agni IV, which could have a range in excess of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), providing India with an ICBM capability and a nuclear warhead of at least 160,000 tons (160 kilotons). India's development of such long-range missiles runs the risk of initiating a dangerous new round of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

Ben Sheppard

See also Ballistic Missile Defenses; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Weapons Production and Procurement

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES Ballistic missile defenses constitute the strategic paradigm that introduces new possibilities of evolving strategic defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads, known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The post-cold war strategic environment is a transformed landscape of new nuclear powers who have acquired the requisite technical capabilities, with varying sophistication and diverse strategic intents and interests. The new strategic environment has replaced the previous deterrence logic of mutual assured destruction with a focus on war-fighting capabilities and intents. Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have become the new means to accentuate military escalation and brinkmanship, available to the new nuclear missile powers, which include India and Pakistan.

The Strategic and Technological Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defenses

Ballistic missile defense systems in their evolving technological architecture constitute a layered defense that can be divided into four distinct areas. First, the lower-tier systems are designed to defend against short-range threats, such as short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and aircraft deployed in the land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 the Israeli Arrow system, the Russian S-300V and S-300VM systems, and S-300 PMU and the sea-based systems of the SM-3 class and its derivatives of the Navy Area Wide Missile Defenses. The second, upper-tier systems are designed to defend against medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) intercepting at the edge of or outside Earth's atmosphere, or the Theater High Altitude Air Defense and the Navy Theater Wide Missile systems. Third, the U.S. National Missile Defense system features deployment of interceptors of longer range and speed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks and defend the homeland. These systems would intercept offensive missiles at the apex of their ballistic curve above the atmosphere.

Finally, the Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) systems are designed to attack a missile shortly after it is launched, before it exits into the atmosphere. The range of BPI systems includes an airborne laser, with a converted Boeing 747 and an oxygen-iodine chemical laser to shoot down missiles in their ascent phase. The second BPI system would be an unmanned aerial vehicle to launch high-speed airborne interceptors now being developed by the United States and Israel. The third system is a space-based laser that could be deployed in a constellation of twenty satellites, each equipped with a hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser and onboard sensing and surveillance equipment, employed to shoot down targeted missiles in their boost phase. The fourth option would be the forward-deployed Aegis ships deploying the Navy Theater Wide system, which would be deployed in conjunction with Navy Area Wide Missile Defenses.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 had envisaged a limited antimissile capability for the United States and the Soviet Union. It was abrogated unilaterally by the United States, citing the emergence of foreign missile threats. U.S. missile defense efforts have been designed to neutralize the missile arsenals of the states of concern, which may attempt to redress their comparative declining national power and their containment by U.S. strategic power through missiles and weapons of mass destruction.



Missiles aloft an Indian Naval Vessel. In India, the debate on missile defenses continues, with the present government hoping to strike a balance between adequate conventional weaponry and a robust nuclear force in the face of any threat from nearby Pakistan or China. INDIA TODAY.

South Asian Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Balance

South Asia features a triangulation of nuclear and missile deployments by China, India, and Pakistan that are enmeshed in a high-intensity strategic arms buildup, premised on stubborn national policies that defy attempts at stabilization. China and Pakistan would be the revisionist powers opposed to missile defenses that neutralize their nuclear status quo. India is more subtle, and would welcome stabilization measures emanating from an optimal missile defense system that would be technologically proficient, inducing a psychological deterrent against Pakistan's potential missile rattling. India is, however, concerned about the ramifications of a U.S. Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) in Northeast Asia, as that could spur Chinese missile modernization and quantitative buildup of its intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ICBMs, having targeting consequences against India.

The regional cascade dynamics in the Middle East and Northeast Asia and its spillage into South Asia has resulted in second-tier nuclear missile proliferation, and it

could trigger quantum revisions of the prevalent nuclear missile asymmetries to India's disadvantage, spurring India to further nuclear and missile tests and activating serial deployment options of its IRBM and ICBM missiles of the Agni class. Missile defense deployments by India at the lower tier would lead to its saturation by large numbers of SRBMs in the Pakistani inventories, transferred by China. Cruise missiles constitute the next template in ballistic missile defenses. Cruise missiles are faster air-breathing vehicles that are capable of carrying WMD payloads. The BrahMos, C-801 and C-802 are the emerging types that would equip the Indian and Pakistani arsenals that are sea- and air-launched variants with antiship attack roles. The possibilities of their technological adaptation into land-attack modes with nuclear/WMD payloads are not ruled out. The Novator 3M-54E1 Klub-S (SS-N-27) to be inducted into the Indian navy in 2008 would be a dedicated land-attack cruise missile.

The nuclear missile forces of India, Pakistan, and China that constitutes the South Asian Triangulation are small and medium arsenals, with the Chinese nuclear missile arsenal being a medium-sized force with triad charac-

teristics. The impact of a limited Theater Missile Defense in the region would have a triangulation of consequences: India's acquisition of a limited missile defense capability would likely erode the Pakistani nuclear deterrent and would prompt Pakistan to increase its number of missiles and nuclear warheads. Pakistan resolutely opposes the missile defense technology, and given its limited resources would prefer more offensive missiles than any missile defense system. Indian preference for an Arrow-2 and the S-300 V, S-300 VM, and S-300 PMU, along with its Akash missile, could provide a layered defense that might erode Pakistani air-deliverable nuclear warheads by F-16 fighter-attack aircraft, and could force Pakistan to deploy more transferred Chinese and North Korean missiles of deeper range and faster reentry speed in quantities to overwhelm any Indian advantages.

China could react to an India-U.S. convergence on missile defenses by: preference of a joint missile defense network with Russia, employing the proven S-300 V and S-300 VM systems; simultaneously increasing the number of its deployable nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles by adopting multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle technology. The cumulative impact of these would erode any limited Indian missile defense and could prompt India to resume testing and to increase its deployment options of the Agni IIB IRBM, with ranges targeting China.

India and China would prefer to safeguard their respective second-strike capabilities and assets with a limited missile defense system, and would respectively prefer the Russian missile defense network with other options. India and China would prefer to engage with the United States on its missile defenses plans in terms of diplomatic and strategic postures.

India's Nuclear Doctrine and Its Force Posture

India's nuclear posture is premised as a force-in-being and rests on a quartet of deterrence that would be credible and minimalist; disarmament that seeks eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons; diplomacy premised on multilateralism and de-alerting of nuclear forces with a "no-first-use" (NFU) treaty. India's NFU policy is entwined with its assured retaliatory capability premised on a triad structure for its nuclear forces. Its premise of employment would arise out of nuclear coercion or use by its adversaries. India's assured retaliatory capability would emerge from a high degree of mobility and dispersal of its nuclear warheads. India prefers to employ nuclear weapons in a mode of deterrence or punishment, using procedures that are reliable and suitable to Indian conditions, ensuring high levels of civilian custody, with a secure role for the Indian armed forces. India prefers an effective nuclear targeting strategy to determine the nature and quantum of any retaliatory strike.

India's nuclear doctrine emphasizes delayed but assured retaliation. India's nuclear deterrent hinges on its credibility and certainty of retaliation. It is also defined by the quantum of retaliation. This certainty factor would be assured by the extent of dispersal of India's nuclear forces, and their ability to recover from a first strike and to deliver unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

India's nuclear missile force posture has been reinforced into operational effectiveness by the constitution of the Strategic Forces Command and the National Command Authority in January 2003. However, India's NFU policy would be notional, given the dynamics of its operational milieu. In the context of a limited missile defense shield, India's nuclear missile posture could graduate into a first-strike force with assured retaliatory capabilities.

Options for Ballistic Missile Defenses: A Net Assessment for India

India's options for ballistic missile defenses widen with the growing nuclear missile proliferation in its region. An arc of multiple missile threats confronts India. The arc ranges from China in the north, to the U.S. missile-armed fleets in the Indian Ocean, to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the west, all equipped with MRBMs and IRBMs that could target India. India's quest for missile defenses emanates from prevalent instability introduced by Pakistan's missiles, and the missile rattling of its coercive diplomacy against India. Pakistani readiness for a first strike undermines the Indian force-in-being posture that has its emphasis on the de-alert status of its nuclear missile forces. The rapid escalation spiral and the persistent Pakistani initiative to escalate induce considerable irrationality, undermining the deterrence logic.

Geographical contiguity, brief missile flight times, the lack of omnidirectional surveillance, and the lack of institutionalized nuclear risk reduction measures with verification and monitoring systems in place necessitate the imperative for a limited ballistic missile defense system that has inbuilt components of tracking and surveillance to act as a rapid response system in the event of any surprise or inadvertent launches by Pakistan.

The challenge of strategic offense versus strategic defense has been a universal dilemma that has plagued the deterrence debate. India's dilemma increases with the increase of hostile multiple missile threats with nuclear payloads. India's inevitable resort to ballistic missile defenses remains a crucial necessity; its challenge lies in potential priorities for India between a robust minimal nuclear deterrence built around its manned aircraft and its land-based missile force with sea-based deterrence to be in place in the long run. India's priorities would therefore have to be with the certitude of assured retaliation,

along with a credible conventional force posture that could dissuade Pakistan of any escalatory potential and effectively deter China. The Indian debate in missile defenses and its nuclear force posture would concern maintaining an optimal balance between conventional weapons and a robust nuclear force with limited missile defense capability and technological affordability.

W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar

See also **Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Weapons Production and Procurement**

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BALUCHAR SARI The Baluchar sari derives its name from the village of its origin, which is situated on the banks of the river Bhagirathi in the Murshidabad district of Bengal. Patronized by the aristocratic Jain traders and merchants who settled and flourished there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Baluchar style acquired a special place among the traditional saris of India.

The uniqueness of this sari is as much in its design concept as in its weaving technique. Multicolored motifs emerge on the ground through the introduction of extra wefts of floss silk with the help of small shuttles. The weavers could create the desired pattern on the draw loom (*naqsh* loom) with the help of several draw boys, who would lift the thread with harness cords, to pass the extra weft. Later, these looms were replaced by the jacquard. What distinguishes the Baluchar from other brocades is the complexity of its design, executed in silk on silk without gold or metal thread, setting it apart even among the various rich brocades of India.

The most distinguishing feature of the Baluchar sari is the intricate design of its large *pallu* (end of the sari). Most saris produced and worn in Bengal have a comparatively simple *pallu*, which is arranged vertically from the shoulder when draped. The Baluchar, on the other hand, has an elaborate *pallu*, more like the heavy *pallu* of the saris from Gujarat, where women preferred to exhibit the richly decorated *pallu* in the front, and where the Jain patrons of Murshidabad had originally lived. These saris were also exported to Gujarat. The plain or *butidar* (with a small floral motif) ground is bounded by a floral border along the entire length of both sides. The *pallu*, at the end, is decorated with an elaborate design, arranged in rectangles around a row of large *kalga*, or paisley motifs. The decorations on these rectangles consist of human figures, such as noblemen smoking a *buqqa*, a king or a nobleman riding an elephant, or a lady holding a flower; some even depict couples, wearing European dress, seated in a railway carriage, or European soldiers carrying cannons, revealing the influence of European trade contacts. In

some cases, the row of figures is repeated on all four sides of the rectangle; the figures change direction so that they will be in the correct position when the sari is worn, involving a great deal of work on the part of the weaver, who had to retie the leashes of the pattern harness. One of the central paisleys is sometimes a different color from the rest, functioning as a *nazarbattu* to ward off the evil eye. Generally, these saris are purple, maroon, red, blue, or yellow, but occasionally they are made of two tones, using different colors of warp and weft.

Later, other important centers of Baluchar saris also developed at Kasimbazar, Ajimganj, Jiaganj, and Baharampur in West Bengal. The tradition of the Baluchar sari almost disappeared in the early twentieth century after the death of the famous master weaver Dubraj Das and his contemporaries. However, it was revived in the late twentieth century with incentives offered by the government. A much simplified version of the Baluchar sari is now in vogue.

Kalpna Desai

See also **Brocade**

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BALUCHISTAN AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER When Abdul “Badshah” Ghaffar Khan’s son Wali Khan, one of the best-known leaders of the North-West Frontier province, was asked to define his identity, he replied: “I am first a Pukhtun tribesman, then a Muslim, and finally a Pakistani.” He explained that the Pukhtun tribe was several thousand years old, while Islam was just fourteen hundred years old, and Pakistan a mere half century in age. The tensions between ethnicity, religion, and state create tensions in the tribal groups of this area and have never really been resolved.

Historical Background

The tribal groups who inhabit the Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier provinces are largely Baluch and Pukhtun, or Pushtun (the southern tribes pronounce “kh” as “sh”). They have rightly gained a reputation for being fiercely independent people. At the height of the British Empire, Rudyard Kipling wrote his famous poem

“The Ballad of East and West” in which he pointed out “the twain shall never meet.” Yet Kipling made an exception to his own imperial rule in the people of this area:

But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor
Breed, nor Birth,

When two strong men stand face to face,
though they come from the ends of the earth.

Baluch and Pukhtun tribes have resisted the authority of central governments from the time history was first written. Delhi, before the creation of Pakistan, and Islamabad afterward have had to face the reality of turbulent tribes along a largely undefined international border. Some of the world’s most renowned historical figures have therefore played their part on this stage—Alexander the Great, Timur, Babur, Aurangzeb, Lord George Curzon, Sir Winston Churchill, Mahatma M.K. Gandhi, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Pukhtun tribes in the Khyber Pass shattered the imperial army of Aurangzeb, the great Mughal emperor, in 1672. Ten thousand Mughals were killed and twenty thousand captured. Across the border in Afghanistan, Pukhtun tribesmen decimated an entire British army called the Grand Army of the Indus. One sole survivor, half-demented and half-dead, appeared on a cold January morning at the Jalalabad garrison.

Treaties and Agreements

By the end of the nineteenth century, the British had enough experience of the tribes of this area to introduce significant administrative changes. Treaties and agreements, which guaranteed a large degree of autonomy, were signed with Baluch and Pukhtun tribes in order to pacify them. The Durand Boundary Commission was formed in 1894 to demarcate the borders between Afghanistan and British India. It came to be called the Durand Line after the British officer who was responsible for its demarcation. As the boundary passed through tribes, often cutting them in half, Afghanistan has disputed the Durand Line. The North-West Frontier province was created in 1901. Within the province there would be a special administrative category called the Tribal Areas. The civil and criminal procedure codes of British India would not apply to the Tribal Areas. The government’s writ extended to a hundred yards on either side of the main road. Tribesmen could live their lives according to their own custom and tradition, or *riwaj*.

The Tribal Areas helped to contain but could not eliminate the problem of recalcitrant tribesmen for the British. A policy of “carrot and stick” was administered by some of the finest political officers drawn from the elite Indian Civil Service. Nonetheless, the tribes were

inclined to launch a tribal or religious war at the slightest provocation. During the 1930s there were twenty-eight British battalions in Waziristan—more troops than on the rest of the subcontinent.

In contrast to the Tribal Areas in the new province, there were also settled districts with regular laws and administration. New districts were created such as Hazara. The people of Hazara were a mixture of Pukhtun and Punjabis. In time the district of Hazara created a distinct ethnicity called after the district itself—Hazarawal. The creation of a wholly new ethnicity is a phenomenon, suggesting the need for study by social scientists.

A certain romance developed in British literature regarding these tribesmen. They were seen as independent, courageous, and even honorable. While the British treated other Indians as little more than subjugated natives, the tribesmen along the Durand border were cast in a different light; indeed, they were considered the nearest thing to the “noble savage.”

British officers grew to respect these tribes. John Masters, who served in Waziristan and later became a well-known novelist—his *Bhowani Junction* was made into a film with Stewart Granger and Ava Gardner—described these tribes as “physically the hardest people on earth” (Masters, p. 161). The following note, written as a confidential memorandum by a senior political officer, illustrates this respect:

I spoke above of political officers as the custodians of civilization dealing with barbarians. Against this definition, if he were to hear it, I am sure that Mehr Dar, or any other intelligent Mahsud Malik, would emphatically protest. Their argument, which is not altogether in a subconscious plane, may be stated thus—“A civilization has no other end than to produce a fine type of man. Judged by this standard the social system in which the Mahsud has been evolved must be allowed immeasurably to surpass all others. Therefore let us keep our independence and have none of your *qanun* [law] and your other institutions which have wrought such havoc in British India, but stick to our own *riwaj* [custom] and be men like our fathers before us.” After prolonged and intimate dealings with the Mahsuds I am not at all sure that, with reservations, I do not subscribe to their plea. (Howell, p. xii)

The jostling for power between imperial Britain, Russia, and China naturally involved the tribes of this area because of the undefined nature of the international border, the toughness of the terrain, and the fierceness of the tribes. Besides, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province contained the two important passes into India:

the Bolan Pass in the former province and the Khyber Pass in the latter. The government in Delhi based its military and political policy on the assumption that Russia would be tempted to drive through these passes in its search for the warm water ports of the Indian Ocean.

Great Game

The British called the political contest between the imperial powers the Great Game. The Game became an analogy and even extension of the public school ethos that dominated the elite ruling class of Victorian England. Every government in the region in one way or the other was involved in playing the Game. Even the boy Kim in one of Kipling’s most famous novels becomes a player. The tribesmen too maneuvered within the Great Game. It was not difficult for them to play off Delhi, later Islamabad, against Kabul. A tribal leader summed it up thus: “We are like men with two jealous wives—both pulling us in their direction. Sometime we prefer one, sometimes the other.”

Their participation in the Great Game allowed the tribesmen to continue political maneuvering after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The Baluch have never quite given up the dream of an independent Greater Baluchistan, nor have the Pukhtun abandoned that of Pukhtunistan. Baluch leaders like the Khan of Kalat claim that Baluchis live in an area of over 3 million square miles (7.8 sq. km), the core of which is the province of Baluchistan itself, and total about 30 million people in number. Although the idea of creating a new state based on ethnicity remains a powerful one, the states from which it would be carved—Pakistan Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran—have vigorously opposed it.

The British, on the basis of trial and error, had several policies toward these two provinces and what lay beyond. At first, the British more or less left the tribesmen to their own devices. They called this policy one of “masterly inactivity.” This was followed by greater involvement, and the policy was named “conciliatory intervention.” A more aggressive “close border policy” followed. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the British were implementing what came to be called the “forward policy.” Some of these policies created a straightforward clash between two different civilizations. Villages, water tanks, and grain stores were destroyed in what came to be known as “butcher and bolt” raids. The tribesmen therefore rejected modernization—schools, electricity, and roads—as they associated it with the imperial British.

The reluctance to accept modern development schemes did not change once the political dynamic was revamped after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. But the fact that Pakistan was a self-consciously Muslim country

helped to ease the tension in the relationship between the state and the tribes. Thousands drifted to the cities. In time, Karachi would become the largest Pukhtun city in the world in terms of population. Pakistan's policy toward Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province has alternated between benign neglect and crude aggressiveness. In the 1970s the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan saw a particularly brutal military adventure. This has not prevented Baluch and Pukhtuns from emerging as prominent figures in Pakistan itself. Indeed, at least two heads of state have come from the North-West Frontier province. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, from Baluchistan, was elected prime minister in 2002.

Economy and Society

Both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province are sparsely populated. Temperatures can go beyond 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49°C) in the summer and below freezing in the winter. It is a land of high mountains and deep ravines. Although there are valleys with limited agricultural land, the terrain is usually harsh and rainfall is limited to a few inches. Settlements are few and far between. The geography of these areas cannot sustain standing armies or feudal social structures headed by affluent leaders. Taxes are neither demanded nor given. An egalitarian ethos is therefore prevalent among the tribes.

A developed code of behavior, sometimes called the code of honor, pervades Baluch and Pukhtun society. Among the Baluch this code is called the Baluchiat and among the Pukhtun it is called Pukhtunwali, or "the way of the Baluch" and "the way of the Pukhtun," respectively. The idea and practice of hospitality, revenge, and upholding the honor of the tribe are important elements in these codes. Folk literature is replete with references to these codes. There is a Baluch war ballad going back to the sixteenth century that sums up the sense of tribal independence backed by formidable terrain: "The lofty heights are our comrades and the pathless gorges our friends."

Baluchistan harbors a sense of grievance against Islamabad. In size Baluchistan is about 44 percent of the total area of Pakistan. Its population, however, is only 5 percent of the entire population of Pakistan. Islamabad bureaucrats, quick to seize an advantage, have tended to ignore the first fact and concentrate on the second when allocating funds to the province. In addition, the dominating province of Punjab, which has about 60 percent of Pakistan's population but only 26 percent of the area, has tended to send people to settle in and administer Baluchistan, causing further resentment.

There are, however, differences between Baluch and Pukhtun social structure. The chief, called the sirdar,

dominates the Baluch tribes. Although he has little economic power to back him, tribal tradition ensures his status and authority. He provides a rudimentary form of justice in disputes. He provides leadership against the enemy and protection in challenging times. In time the sirdar became identified with the tribe itself. Some, like the khan of Kalat, were able to convert a tribal base into a full-fledged state recognized by the British. Some sirdars are called after the tribe itself, like the Marri and the Bugti in the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan.

Among the Pukhtun, leadership is quite different. There is a stronger tradition of individual independence. While certain elders may emerge through their wisdom or bravery, their authority still remains restricted. Decisions are made on the basis of the Jirga, or the council of elders. This makes for independent tribesmen who fiercely guard their independence but also for a perpetual state of anarchy. Anthropologists have referred to this kind of society as "ordered anarchy."

There are non-Muslim groups living in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province. Hindu groups have lived in Baluchistan for a long time, even in the Tribal Areas. The tribe protects these groups, and their honor is identified with the honor of the tribe. The Bugti tribe has a prominent Hindu group attached to it, which has adopted the dress and code of the tribe. At one stage, the tribe successfully fielded a Hindu for the provincial assembly seat. He was known by his Hindu name, with his tribal affiliation as an honorary Bugti attached to it.

In the North-West Frontier province, the Kalash, usually called the Kafirs or unbelievers, have not been so fortunate. A small group who according to legend are descended from Alexander's troops, they are constantly subject to attempts at conversion to Islam. Earlier Amir Abdur Rahman, the "Iron Amir" of Afghanistan, converted the Kafir living on the Afghan side of the border by the sword. He renamed their land from Kafiristan, the land of the Kafirs, to Nooristan, the land of light. Kipling's *The Man Who Would Be King*, which was made into a film starring Sean Connery and Michael Caine, is set among the Kalash. The group faces an uncertain future in a region which itself is on the threshold of major change.

The Future of Tribal Society

In the early part of the twenty-first century, the tribal societies of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier provinces are facing serious challenges to their identity. These challenges are both external and internal. Modern technological developments have succeeded in penetrating even the most inaccessible areas. Many of the bigger

settlements now have generators for electricity and therefore access to television, computers, and the Internet. Thus modern images, alien and often disturbing, are now available locally. These images clash with traditional ideas of behavior and attitudes toward social life.

The war in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviets and the ongoing war of the United States against the Taliban, which began in 2001, have affected these areas. The Baluch generally and the Pukhtun in particular are sympathetic to the local tribesmen and are opposed to any foreign intervention. There are strong rumors of American incursions in the Tribal Areas, which has caused deep unrest. The Pakistan army, aiding the Americans, has set up posts in large numbers for the first time in history along the international border in the Tribal Areas. This intrusion has caused deep resentment and heated discussion in the areas.

One result of the unhappiness with Pakistan's alliance with America was the vote given to the religious parties in the two provinces in the elections held in 2002. Religious parties have never made significant inroads traditionally because of the nature of the social structure of the tribes. This time, however, religious parties swept the polls, particularly in the North-West Frontier province. Religious leaders have once again gained ascendancy over the traditional tribal elders by talking of a holy war against the infidel. This has encouraged the mood of defiance against America—and by extension, anything associated with Westernization, such as films and videos.

Internally, members of the young generation want more change and more authority. Many would like to benefit from the educational system of the rest of the country. Some would like to be involved in the mainstream politics of the nation. In particular, the role of women will act as a catalyst in the future. Most women would like to preserve their traditions but want to assert their right to be educated and participate in social and even political life.

Tribalism in these areas appears to be a blessing and an affliction. While it has provided stability through unstable times, it has also created dilemmas and sometimes impossible challenges. Now that the twenty-first century is poised to penetrate one of the most closed societies of the world, it is to be seen whether the tribesmen can remain “men like our fathers before us.”

Akbar Ahmed

See also **Islam's Impact on India; Pakistan**

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“BANDE MATARAM” Written between 1872 and 1875 by the Bengali author Bankim Chandra Chatterji (1838–1894), “Bande Mataram” (Hail to thee, mother) was a poem consisting of twelve lines in two stanzas. It was expanded when it appeared in his Bengali-language novel *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss) in 1882. The novel was first serialized in the literary journal *Bangadarshan*, which Chatterji founded in 1872, between 1880 and 1882. Chatterji was from an orthodox Brahman family and was educated at Hooghli College, Presidency College, and the University of Calcutta, where he studied law and was one of the first graduating class. From 1858 until his retirement in 1891, he was a member of the Indian Civil Service, retiring as a deputy magistrate.

Chatterji, the author of over a dozen novels, wrote first in English, then in his native Bengali. *Anandamath* was a patriotic tale of Hindu rebellion against the British by the Sannyasis (Shudras who usually worshiped Shiva) in Bengal and Bihar between 1762 and 1774. Their slogan was “*Om Vande Mataram*.” *Anandamath* was made into a play in 1883 and translated into Hindi in 1905, and then into English in 1906 by Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) before being translated into other Indian languages. Music was composed for the poem by Jadu Bhatta, who was the music teacher of future Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). Tagore himself is usually credited with composing the music in 1882. He sang it on a phonograph record that was first produced in 1905.

For Chatterji, Hinduism and nationalism were synonymous, and his novels and essays became an inspiration to nationalists at the turn of the century, especially at the time of the partition of Bengal in 1905. The song was banned in Bengal by Sir Bampfylde Fuller (1854–1935), the lieutenant-governor of East Bengal and Assam (1905–1906), on 7 November 1905, as it was considered an incitement to violence. The ban was imposed until 1911 and it was reimposed between 1930 and 1937. It was first sung by the Indian National Congress at their twenty-first annual meeting held in 1905 at Benares (Varanasi). It became exceedingly popular among Hindus and was described in 1907 by Sri Aurobindo in the journal *Vande Mataram* as a “mantra”: “The *mantra* had been given and

in a single day a whole people had been converted to the religion of patriotism.” It was sung outside the courthouse by supporters at the sedition trial of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920) in 1909 and became the national anthem of the Indian National Congress during the nationalist struggle for independence and was sung at its meetings. As its author, Chatterji is considered one of India’s nationalist heroes.

The controversial nature of the song lay in the fact that the identification of the “mother” with India, which was redolent of Hinduism, was found objectionable by Muslims. The criticism was taken to heart by the Indian National Congress at a time when there was a great deal of discussion about what should be the national anthem. At Calcutta on 28 October 1937, the Congress Working Committee recommended that only the first two stanzas of “Bande Mataram” should be sung at national gatherings and that the organizers of the conference could substitute or add any other song that was “of an unobjectionable character.” Nonetheless, “Bande Mataram” continued to offend Muslims and constituted one more piece of evidence that Congress rule would mean “Hindu rule” in an independent India. It therefore played a role in the Pakistan movement.

When it came time for India to decide on a national anthem, “Bande Mataram,” in spite of its popularity and its role in the freedom movement, was not chosen. Instead, “Janaganamana Adhinayaka” (The morning song of India), written by Tagore in 1911 and sung at the second day’s sitting of the Indian National Congress Annual Session at Calcutta the same year and published in 1912, became India’s national anthem in 1950. It had been adopted by Subhash Chandra Bose’s (1897–1945) Indian National Army, founded in 1943. It was, ironically, claimed that “Janaganamana” was composed to commemorate the visit of King George V to India in 1911 and was sung at his *durbār*. This claim was denied by Tagore, and the song is not mentioned in the *durbār* program. “Bande Mataram” was, however, according to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) in a speech in 1950, honored equally and accorded equal status. This decision met with considerable opposition at the time by people who favored “Bande Mataram” as the national anthem. In the 1990s the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party called for its adoption as India’s national anthem.

Roger D. Long

See also **Bose, Netaji Subhash Chandra; Chatterji, Bankim Chandra; Tagore, Rabindranath**

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
BANDHANI The earliest form of surface decoration using dyes on textiles was based on the technique of tying the cloth with threads before dyeing. Though the tie-dye technique, called *bandhani*, may have originated accidentally, it evolved into an art, perfected by dyers who created intricate patterns. The antiquity of this tradition (c. 1000 B.C.) was established by the location of a textile fragment showing evidence of the technique found by Aurel Stein during his expedition to Central Asia in the early twentieth century.

The art of *bandhani* is currently concentrated in desert areas from Kutch in Gujarat, through Saurashtra, Rajasthan, and Haryana, to the environs of Delhi. The finest tie-dye is produced by the Khatri community in Kutch, Gujarat. Madhya Pradesh also produces tie-dyed fabrics, used by peasants and tribal communities, in its areas bordering Rajasthan. Another minor center is Madurai in Tamil Nadu.

Technique

The traditional technique followed for making *bandhani* is by first bleaching the cloth, then folding it across its length and then across its width, thus making four folds. The dyer next demarcates an 18-inch-long (45 cm) area on one side of the width so as to cover both ends of the cloth, which for a sari forms both the *pallu*, the cross border, and a narrower border at one end. The wider area is subdivided into panels, with a wider central panel and two narrower panels on each side. Using charcoal, the dyer creates the basic design that will be followed for tying the knots. In the same way, the border of the sari is outlined at the two edges of the cloth, folded lengthwise. The cloth is then passed on for the tying of knots on the outline in the border, as well as on the pattern for the body of the sari. The tying is generally done by women. In the Khatri community, the very fine tying is done by men. The left hand is used for pinching the cloth and the right hand holds a long thread, which is wound around the cloth and knotted. This is repeated with the same thread with rapid dexterous movement. The knots must be handled carefully when dyeing, as they can unravel easily by tugging at the open end.

Initially, the sections that are to remain white are tied. The fabrics are then collected by the dyer and are dyed in a light yellow color, after which the fabrics are again returned for tying; the next set of knots is tied to retain the yellow color. The process continues from lighter



Man Wearing Turban, Rajasthan. His tie-dyed turban has a pattern and deep red hue common to the region. AMAR TALWAR/FOTOMEDIA.

colors to the final dark color, which is either a brilliant red, purple, black, dark green, or deep blue. This procedure is the traditional technique for tie-dyeing and is followed in all the major centers of Saurashtra, Kutch, and parts of Rajasthan.

Rajasthan has, however, developed another technique, called *lipai*, in which the fabric is given a light background color. The fabric is folded and designs marked as described above. The border designs, which will be in a dark color, are marked. The dyer proceeds to color sections of the inner cloth with different colored dyes according to the design, with the help of a felt. The tied border is then dyed and covered fully and the body of the sari is bleached, removing the surplus dye. The fabric is then immersed in dye for the background color. After drying, the sari is opened and the fabric emerges with dark tied designs on a light background and a contrasting dark border and cross border.

Kutch creates the finest tie-dyed fabrics; Mandevi and Bhuj are the main centers. The famous *gharcholas*, an

important ritual cloth of Saurashtra, are actually prepared by the Khatri community of Kutch but are dyed in Jamnagar in a brilliant red. It is the Khatri community that creates *bandhanis* for different communities living in the area. The *bandhanis* prepared for the rich Mahajan community are of a finer design; among the finest are *gharchola*, a grid pattern, and *bavanbagh* (fifty-two gardens). Almost all Hindus use *bandhani* for weddings. The bride's sari is pale yellow, signifying her status as a virgin, and only the border and the cross border are red. *Gharcholas*, auspicious patterns worked into a grid, are given to the bride by her husband after marriage or after the first child is born. Tie-dyed turbans are worn by the bridegroom and by the men participating in the celebrations.

Special types of *bandhani* are made for the Muslim Bora community, as well as for the Khatri's own families. The Bora women wear an *abho* (a loose shirt) and *salwar* (pantaloon), as well as *ordhani* (veils). These are mostly in silk with black backgrounds and motifs worked in red. Thick cotton cloth with bold tie-dyed patterns were made for the seminomadic Rabaris, as well as for the skirts of the Meghvals, the craftsmen's community. Woven woolen shawls were also tie-dyed and embellished with embroidery.

In Rajasthan's Jodhpur and Jaipur, in addition to the traditional fine *chundris*, tie-dyed veils, and saris, special turbans were made for the men. Each season required a change in the color of the turban and the veil. *Vasant*, the season of spring, required *basanti* (lemon yellow) colored turbans; *Haryali Amawasia*, the rainy season, was the time for sage green and pink turbans. Pink and saffron were auspicious colors for marriages. The red bridal veil was never dyed with permanent colors, as that was considered inauspicious.

Jodhpur specialized in distinctive techniques of tie-dye, called *lebriya*, a pattern of diagonal lines in multiple colors, and *mothra*, a checkered pattern. The cloth is stretched from opposite corners, then tied with strings and dyed in stages from light to dark shades. When opened, it reveals its diagonal pattern. For the *mothra*, the other side is stretched, thus creating a checkered diagonal pattern.

Sikar of Shekhawati Rajasthan produces the finest quality cotton *bandhani* fabrics for urban clients. They also create bold patterns for the agriculturists of Bikaner, Jhunjhunu, Rewari, and Rohtak in Haryana. The background of deep maroon has large sections in lemon yellow with bold tie-dyed patterns in red and green.

Madhya Pradesh also has a tradition of *bandhani*, which is quite distinct from that of Rajasthan. The patterns are simple dotted patterns interspersed with bird and animal motifs. These were made for the local peasantry as well as

the tribal community. Each community had its own distinctive patterns.

Another center, which is isolated from the main tie-dye center, is at Madurai's temple complex in Tamil Nadu, where a community of Khattris had migrated from Saurashtra. They produced tie-dyed saris, known as *sugardi* saris, using locally woven gold-bordered saris dyed a deep red with patterns in off-white. The motifs used—conch shell, lamp, lotus, and stars—were influenced by the *kolam*, ritual floor designs. Plain unbleached cotton with a gold border was bleached and folded double on the length. The patterns were then blocked and the fabric was passed on for tying. The sari was then dyed a maroon color; the border was dyed in black by covering the main body. This tradition survived because the *sugardi* sari was considered essential bridal attire. By the early part of the twentieth century, the demand had diminished, but the tradition was later revived as part of a national program supporting the development of handicrafts.

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BANERJEA, SURENDRANATH N. (1848–1925), Indian politician and nationalist leader. A pioneer of moderation in nationalist politics, Surendranath Banerjea infused the English-educated middle class with ideals of communal harmony, faith in British rule, and belief in progress. Widely admired for his eloquence and oratory as well as his unshakable political and personal convictions, he was nicknamed "Surrender Not."

Banerjea was born in 1848 in a Kulin, high-ranked Brahman family in Kolkata. His father, Durga Charan Banerjea, was a medical practitioner. Surendranath was introduced to Western ideas by his liberal-minded father,

and at the Presidency College where he received his education. Upon graduation, he went to England to sit for the Indian Civil Service examination. He passed and qualified for an administrative appointment in the British Indian government. He was posted at Sylhet in Bangladesh as an assistant magistrate. He was, however, soon dismissed from the post on the grounds of a technical impropriety in a report on his age, prepared by a subordinate, that Surendranath had failed to correct. It was a severe punishment for a minor oversight. Banerjea traveled to London to appeal his case in vain. He decided to try the next best course open to young educated Indians—to sit for the Bar examinations. He was denied admission. Convinced that the personal wrong done to him was evidence of the "impotency of a people" under British rule, he decided to dedicate his life to political awakening in Bengal and in India, in accordance with his faith in the Western ideals of fairness and justice.

Upon his return from the failed mission in England, he chose teaching as his profession. He became a professor of English at the Metropolitan Institution, then at the Free Church College. Seeking an educational forum where he could articulate his reform ideas, he helped establish a college of his own. He named it Ripon College after the marquis of Ripon, the viceroy of India from 1880 to 1884. (The college is now called Surendranath College.) With his stirring eloquence, he inspired students, intellectuals, and the educated public in Kolkata and other major metropolitan cities of India. He became the editor of the *Bengalee*, an English-language newspaper that became the mouthpiece of his measured, moderate political views. He founded the Indian Association, the political platform that battled the landholders' British India Association. He traveled the length and breadth of India promoting his brand of nationalism. In the process, he became a leading figure in the Indian National Congress, and the champion of Indian demands in England, which he visited from time to time. In the 1900s, he was without doubt the most important leader in the Calcutta Corporation and the Bengal Legislative Council. When Lord George Curzon announced the partition of Bengal, Banerjea's commanding figure, with striking white beard and baritone voice, took up the cry of protest at public meetings and rallies. This was his finest moment.

The slide began in 1907. Banerjea could not control the passions he had roused in India's youth. The political movement he led, based on newspaper articles, public meetings of protest, petitions, and deputations, was now of no avail. Extremist violence had gripped the *swadeshi* movement. In a remarkable about-face, Banerjea found himself joining hands with landlords and Muslim leaders to meet with the viceroy to seek his intervention. "It was

simply marvelous to see . . . the ‘King of Bengal’ sitting on my sofa with his Mohammedan opponents,” quipped Lord Minto, the viceroy (Broomfield 1968, p. 67).

From 1912 until his death in 1925, Banerjea participated in all the major political developments: the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms, the *satyagraha* (noncooperation) movement of 1921. But his influence was on the wane. The extremists dismissed Banerjea and his ilk of upper-middle-class moderates as irreligious, luxury-loving blind followers of British institutions and recipients of titles and honors given as rewards for loyalty. He also had formidable opponents in men like C. R. Das, Ashutosh Mookherjee, and young leaders of the day like Subhash Chandra Bose and Dr. B. C. Roy. Dr. Roy defeated Banerjea with a large margin in the 24-Parganas Municipal constituency during the elections to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1923.

Banerjea’s career in the last fifteen years of his life comprised tireless efforts to deflect the British from their course of action, and to stem the rising tide of militancy in the neonationalists. His efforts met with an equal lack of success on both fronts.

Dilip K. Basu

See also **Bengal; Congress Party; Curzon, Lord George; Minto, Lord; Satyagraha**

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BANGALORE The capital of Karnataka, Bangalore, once the capital of the princely state of Mysore, had a population of 4.2 million in 2001. The city was founded in the early sixteenth century by Kempe Gowda, a military officer (*amaranayaka*) of the kingdom of Vijayanagar. It thus owed its origin to the pattern of urbanization under military feudalism as it combined the functions of a cavalry garrison, an administrative headquarters, and a marketplace. After the demise of the Vijayanagar kingdom, Bangalore became the capital of the Wadiyar dynasty of Mysore, and then of the military commanders Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, who usurped the Wadiyar throne. After Tipu Sultan’s defeat and death in the Third Mysore War in 1799, the victorious British reinstated the maharajas of Mysore as puppets. In the twentieth century, these maharajas devoted much attention to the growth of industry in their state and to the development of Bangalore. The great Indian industrialist

Jamseti N. Tata (1839–1904) endowed the Indian Institute of Science, which started its work in Bangalore in 1907. (Tata did not live to see its inauguration.) Initially, Tata had thought of the institute as a center of research and development for Indian industry, but since that industry could not progress much under British colonial rule, the Institute of Science concentrated on fundamental research. The Nobel laureate C. V. Raman (1888–1970) worked there.

Located about 2,300 feet (700 m) above sea level in a rather dry region, Bangalore became known for its “rustproof” climate, which was attractive to many industries. Hindustan Aircraft Limited was established there just before World War II and contributed a great deal to the British war effort. After India achieved independence, the government of India selected Bangalore as the site for Hindustan Machine Tools. In the private sector, a joint venture (MICO) of the German company Bosch and the nizam of Hyderabad started manufacturing automobile parts, particularly spark plugs. In addition to supporting these various engineering industries, Bangalore also retained its reputation as a center of production of excellent silk. With the rise of information technology, Bangalore became the metropolis of software production in India, home to firms such as Wipro and Infosys. Foreign companies established their own data processing centers there for such activities as bookkeeping, reservation of airline tickets, and “outsourcing” of every kind. Some firms also built centers of research and development in Bangalore, which houses a growing community of highly trained specialists.

Bangalore is the Indian city with the highest population growth rate; its population may well reach 7 million by 2011. Thus far it has retained its spacious urban structure and wonderful parks, such as the Lalbagh Botanical Garden.

Dietmar Rothermund

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BANGLADESH When India was partitioned in 1947 into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, Pakistan comprised two wings: East Bengal, with its capital at Dacca (Dhaka); and West Pakistan, with its capital at Karachi (later Islamabad). Though Pakistan was created on the basis of a common religion, Islam, the Bengali

language and ethnic identity proved to be much stronger than religious affiliation. Resentment by Bengalis toward West Pakistanis surfaced almost immediately over the question of the use of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), was heckled in March 1948 in Dacca when he insisted Urdu should remain the only national language of Pakistan. Resentment over what Bengalis regarded as economic, financial, and political domination of the East by West Pakistan's minority, Bengalis also led to increasing antagonism. Bengalis resented what they viewed as arrogance, rooted in racism, on the part of West Pakistanis, especially Punjabis. Demonstrations in support of Bengali as a national language became violent on 21 February 1952 and led to the shooting death of Bengali students. The day came to be celebrated as “Martyrs’ Day.” In 1954 Bengali finally became an official language. East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan the following year, but continuing indignation over perceived economic injustice—mostly concerning the proceeds from the export of jute and tea being used disproportionately to benefit West Pakistan—continued to inflame discontent among Bengalis.

Bengali nationalist Huseyn Suhrawardy (1892–1963), who had attempted to establish a united Bengal as an independent sovereign state in 1947, founded the Awami League (People’s League) Party in 1949. Sworn in as prime minister of Pakistan in 1956, he attempted to give East Pakistan greater autonomy and more financial resources, but was forced out after only thirteen months, dying in Lebanon in 1963. Bangabandhu (“Nation Unifier”) Mujibur Rahman (known as Sheikh Mujib; 1920–1975) succeeded Suhrawardy as leader of the Awami League. Mujib had been imprisoned without charges for eighteen months in 1958. In 1962, when he refused to abstain from politics for five years, he was imprisoned for another six months. The Pakistani Constitution, adopted that year, gave greater power to West Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan. In 1966, Mujib proclaimed his party’s Six-Point Program, the Mukti Sanad (Charter of Freedom), which demanded a federal government that would control only foreign affairs and defense. There would be a separate currency or separate fiscal accounts, and taxation would be exacted only by the provincial governments, which would control all provincial foreign exchange earnings. A militia would be established for each province. Mujib was imprisoned in 1967 and again in 1968 in the Argatala conspiracy case when he was named as the leading figure in a conspiracy to bring about the secession of East Pakistan through the assistance of the Indian government. He was one of thirty-five accused, which included high-ranking East Pakistan civil servants. It was called Argatala because Mujib held discussion with Indian army officers there.

The trial, held in open court, was a public relations disaster for the government and the case was dropped.

With the fall of the Ayub Khan (1907–1970) government (1958–1969), Mujib returned to East Pakistan a hero. In December 1970 he led the Awami League to victory in the general elections in East Pakistan, winning 167 of 169 seats. On 26 March 1971, the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh was announced by radio from Chittagong. Mujib was imprisoned, convicted of treason by a military court, and sentenced to death. Civil war against the Pakistani army followed, led by the Indian-trained Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force), the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistani police, and civilians, especially students. Atrocities against Bengali civilians were committed by the Pakistani army, and some 10 million refugees fled to India. War between India and Pakistan followed, with India’s invasion of East Pakistan on 4 December 1971. India recognized the new state of Bangladesh two days later. The Pakistani army, isolated and overwhelmed, surrendered on 16 December. Bangladesh became a sovereign state with its own parliament, the Jatiyo Sangsad, the following day and adopted the taka as its currency. It was nevertheless a country near economic breakdown.

Mujibur Rahman was released from prison and received a rapturous welcome as the founder of his nation on his return. On 10 January 1972 he became Bangladesh’s first prime minister. A constitution was adopted on 4 November 1972, and on 16 December he created a cabinet form of government. It was based on the four principles of Mujibbad (Mujibism): nationalism, secularism, democracy, and socialism. He amended it on 25 February 1975 to create a presidential system, with himself as president. On 7 June 1975 he made Bangladesh a one-party state and banned all existing parties. A new party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People’s Party), was formed on the basis of his Awami League, but Mujib lost the support of the urban and military elite when he established an autocratic state, curtailed freedom of speech, installed his relatives in high government positions, and even created his own private army, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force). He was assassinated on 15 August 1975 in a military coup, the “Majors’ Plot,” along with over twenty members of his family and political allies. Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, a former colleague, was installed as president.

On 3 November 1975, Mujib loyalist Brigadier Khaled Musharraf staged a military coup, and the elderly Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem was appointed president. Four days later, Musharraf was killed, and Sayem became chief martial law administrator. A year later, in November 1976, the charismatic

Zia-ur Rahman, whom Musharraf had displaced as chief of staff, staged his own military coup. On 21 April 1977, Zia became president, suffered an unsuccessful army mutiny in October 1977, and in 1978 founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In the election of that year he became president of the new Islamic republic. He finally reestablished law and order, and conditions in Bangladesh improved markedly. On 30 May 1981, Zia was assassinated in Chittagong by Major General Manzur Ahmed, who was killed two days later. Justice Abdus Sattar, the vice president, became the acting president. A general election was held in November 1981 and Sattar became president, but he was ousted in the military coup conducted by the chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, on 24 March 1982. Martial law remained in place until November 1986, during which time Ershad consciously Islamized the culture and politics of Bangladesh. The Land Reforms Ordinance of 1984 gave new and significant rights to tenants for the first time.

General Ershad created his own Jatiyo Party in 1985, and it won control of Parliament in the elections of 1986 and 1988. During his presidency, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, an organization of seven South Asian nations, was founded at a meeting of foreign ministers in New Delhi in August 1983, and the inaugural meeting of heads of state and government was held in Dhaka in December 1986.

Khaleda Zia (b. 1945), the wife of Zia-ur Rahman, entered politics after his murder. She was appointed vice chairman of the BNP in March 1983 and was elected chairperson in September 1983. Over the next nine years, she led the seven-party opposition to Ershad and was detained seven times. Ershad resigned on 6 December 1990 in the face of massive movement against his administration. A caretaker government presided until the elections of 27 February 1991, when Zia was elected as the first female prime minister of Bangladesh. She won a landslide reelection on 15 February 1996, but that election was boycotted by all other parties. She then lost the election of 12 June 1996 to Sheikh Hasana Wajed's Awami League. She remained in Parliament with the largest opposition party.

Sheikh Hasana Wajed (b. 1947) is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. She and her sister were in Germany in 1975 and had thus escaped being murdered along with their father, mother, and three brothers. She remained in exile for six years before returning in 1981 to a hero's welcome to head her father's Awami League. She was one of the leaders of the opposition until the Awami League victory in the general elections of 1996 made her prime minister. Following this victory, she became prime minister. Her government was noted for its introduction

of liberal measures, including free primary education, free education for girls up to the tenth grade, and a stipend for female students, but she was faced with the determined opposition of Khaleda Zia, whose BNP formed a four-party alliance with the Jatiya Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Islam Oikya Jote. In the election of 10 October 2001 Khaleda Zia was returned to office as prime minister and Sheik Hasana entered into the opposition.

Conditions of life for Bangladeshis remain extremely difficult. The country, one of the poorest in the world, is characterized by being located mostly on the Bay of Bengal's delta. The Ganges joins the Jamuna, the main channel of the Brahmaputra, and then joins the Meghna to empty into the Bay of Bengal. About one-third of the country is flooded every year during the summer monsoon. With a population of some 145 million in 2005 and a high population growth rate, many people are landless and live on and cultivate land prone to flooding. Rice is the main crop. Two-thirds of the people are agriculturists. Water-borne diseases are prevalent, and the country suffers from a variety of serious environmental problems. Overseas Bangladeshis working in the Middle East and Malaysia remit around \$2 billion annually. The cheerfulness and strength and energy of the Bangladeshis in the face of these harsh conditions is a testament to their remarkable human spirit.

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See also **Pakistan; Pakistan and India; Wars**

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BANK AND NON-BANK SUPERVISION The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country's central bank, carries out the supervision and regulation of banks and non-bank finance companies under the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 and the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934. The High Level Coordination

TABLE 1

| Main supervisory agencies in the Indian financial sector | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Agency | Jurisdiction |
| Reserve Bank of India (RBI) | Commercial banks, urban cooperative banks, local area banks, non-bank finance companies, financial institutions, primary dealers |
| Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) | Stock exchanges, merchant bankers, market intermediaries, rating agencies, mutual funds |
| Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) | Insurance companies |
| National Bank for Agriculture Development (NABARD) | State and central cooperative banks, regional rural banks, agricultural and rural development banks |
| National Housing Bank (NHB) | Housing finance companies |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

Committee of the government of India provides a forum in which banking, securities, and insurance supervisors can address policy differences. The main supervisory agencies in the financial system and the institutions in their jurisdiction are given in Table 1.

Banks

India's banking system dominates its financial sector, with over 60 percent of the combined assets, and is the focus of prudential supervision, the framework for which has evolved since the establishment of the RBI in 1935. Earlier, both banking and non-banking companies were governed under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act of 1913, which was amended in 1936 to include a chapter on banks. This evolved into the Banking Companies Act of 1949 was renamed the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 from 1 March 1966, at which date certain provisions were extended to cooperative banks.

The Banking Regulation Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation which provides the RBI with the authority and the instruments to make supervisory interventions through the life cycle of banking companies. The RBI can issue directions, obtain information, inspect the books and accounts, appoint nominees to boards, effect change in management, impose monetary and other penalties, cancel the license, and cause merger, amalgamation, or closure of banks. The act also incorporates a powerful enabling clause to issue directions to banks on matters of policy and administration.

Traditionally, on-site inspection has been the main instrument of supervision, with a comprehensive off-site surveillance system introduced only in 1995. Under this system, banks submit quarterly data, which are processed and stored electronically and used for supervisory analysis and intervention. The RBI had, however, begun limited inspection of banks with their consent as far back as 1940 to arrive at their "free and exchangeable value of assets" for the purpose of determining their eligibility for scheduling under the RBI act. In 1946 the objective was widened to include a determination of "whether the

affairs of the bank were being conducted in a manner detrimental to the depositors," thus adding a qualitative appraisal of management and operations to a quantitative assessment of solvency.

Since 1958, banks have been inspected annually to ensure their compliance with directions and regulations. These inspections now also aim at assessing the risk management capabilities of the banks. With the implementation of Risk Based Supervision, which is currently being tested, supervisory resources (including inspection frequency and focus) will be based on the risk profile of individual banks.

The approach followed has been one of gradual strengthening of the prudential framework, with creeping targets normally announced well in advance to prevent sudden shocks. For example, the capital adequacy ratio was increased from 4 percent to 9 percent over a five-year period while the contraction of the delinquency period for nonperforming loans to ninety days was announced three years before scheduled implementation in 2004.

The position of compliance with standards and practices dispensed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, which is based in Basel, Switzerland) has been evaluated by three groups since 1998: internally; through a group of outside experts set up by the Committee on Standards and Codes; and by the International Monetary Fund. The assessments have found the supervisory system for banks largely compliant with the Twenty-five Basel Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision and identified gaps mainly in the areas of consolidated supervision, country risk management, and interagency cooperation.

There have been no systemic crises in the commercial banking system since India's economic liberalization of 1991, despite instances of individual institutional stress. The challenges now arise from the difficulty that the supervisors may face in taking appropriate action in a system dominated by state-owned banks.

Non-banks

Traditionally, non-bank trading and manufacturing companies accepted public deposits to finance their working capital requirements and were subject to the provisions of the Companies Act. In the 1950s, there was an expansion in the deposit-taking activities of financial non-banks, notably hire-purchase companies. Bankers protested the “diversion” of potential bank deposits by unregulated entities. This led to the Banking Laws (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act of 1963, which authorized the RBI to specify the terms and conditions applicable to public deposits, to call for information about these deposits, and to issue directions, conduct inspections, and impose penalties. In 1966, by which time non-bank deposits had reached 8 percent of bank deposits, the RBI issued comprehensive directions.

The prudential framework for supervision is more focused on the deposit-taking non-bank finance companies, and by an amendment to the RBI act in 1997, the RBI now has legislative authority to give such companies directions on prudential norms and take corrective action including prohibiting them from accepting further deposits or alienating assets; imposing penalties and filing for their winding up. The instruments of supervision are similar to those of banks and include periodic on-site inspection, off-site reporting, and surveillance. A market intelligence function and forums for coordination with other regulators and enforcement agencies are integrated into the supervisory response. The introduction of the strengthened framework that incorporates strict minimum requirements for registration has led to a meltdown in the industry, with a large number of companies having been denied permission to commence or continue business.

Aditya Narain

See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991**

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BANKING SECTOR REFORM SINCE 1991

Banking sector reforms were an important part of the broader agenda of structural economic reforms introduced in India in 1991. The first stage of reforms was shaped by the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial System (Narasimham Committee), which submitted its report in December 1991, suggesting reforms in banking, the government debt market, the stock markets, and in insurance, all aimed at producing a more efficient financial sector. Subsequently, the East Asian crisis in 1997 led to a heightened appreciation of the importance of a strong banking system, not just for efficient financial intermediation but also as an essential condition for macroeconomic stability. Recognizing this, the government appointed a Committee on Banking Sector Reforms to review the progress of reforms in banking and to consider further steps to strengthen the banking system in light of changes taking place in international financial markets and the experience of other developing



Branch of ICICI Bank, India's Leading Private Sector Bank. By the end of March 2003, private sector banks boasted an almost 20 percent market share, up from approximately 4 percent a decade before. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.



Customer Withdrawing Money at a Kotak Mahindra ATM in Mumbai. With the reforms of the 1990s, many Indian private sector banks, including Kotak, fully modernized their operations and today flourish, with electronic capabilities comparable to those of foreign banks. INDIA TODAY.

countries. The two reports provided a road map that has guided the broad direction of reforms in this sector.

Pre-reform Situation

India's commercial banking system in 1991 had many of the problems typical of unreformed banking systems in many developing countries. There was extensive financial repression, reflected in detailed controls on interest rates, and large preemption of bank resources to finance the government deficit through the imposition of high statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), which prescribed investment in government securities at low interest rates. The system was also dominated by public sector banks, which accounted for 90 percent of total banking sector assets, reflecting the impact of two rounds of nationalization of private sector banks above a certain size, first in 1969 and again in 1983. These banks were nationalized because of the perception that it was necessary to impose social control over banking to give it a developmental thrust, with a special emphasis on extending banking in rural areas. The system suffered from inadequate prudential regulations, and nontransparent accounting

practices. Supervision by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was also weak.

Broad Approach to Reform

The strategy for banking reforms was broadly similar to that followed in other countries, but with some important differences. It was similar to the extent that it focused on imposing prudential norms and improving regulatory supervision to meet Basel I standards (standards that were formulated by the committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, based in Basel, Switzerland), and it aimed at increasing competition to promote greater efficiency. However, there were two important differences compared with reforms in other countries. First, the reforms in banking were much more gradualist than in most countries, a course of action that was in line with the general strategy of reforms in India, made possible by the fact that the reforms were not introduced in the midst of a banking sector crisis, which might have entailed greater urgency. Second, unlike the case in many other countries, there was never any intention to privatize public sector banks. It was clearly recognized

that competition was desirable, and this implied that both private sector banks and foreign banks should be allowed to expand their market share if they could. However, the government also declared its intention to strengthen public sector banks and enable them to meet competition.

There was also a great deal of progress in introducing prudential norms for income recognition, asset classification, and capital adequacy in a phased manner. As a consequence of this gradualist process, income recognition norms and capital adequacy norms have been fully aligned with Basel I standards, while asset recognition norms, though still falling short of international best practice, are now close to existing international standards.

Decontrol of Interest Rates and Credit

There has been a significant liberalization of interest rate and credit controls on commercial banks. Earlier, there were detailed restrictions on interest rates that could be paid on different types of deposits and rates that were charged to various categories of customers. These have been extensively liberalized. On the deposit side, interest rates paid on term deposits have been decontrolled, except that the RBI prescribes a maximum interest rate on short-term (15-day) deposits and also prescribes the interest rate on savings deposits. On the lending side, the detailed structure of interest rates prescribed for different types of borrowers and for different sizes of loans has been abolished; the RBI prescribes only the interest rate to be paid under the differential rate of interest scheme a very small window for loans to individuals below the poverty line. For the rest, individual banks fix lending rates with reference to the prime lending rate fixed by the bank. The reforms also abolished the requirement that banks needed to obtain RBI approval for individual credit limits fixed for large customers. With these changes, decisions on the cost of credit and the volume of credit to be extended have been left to bank management, subject to internal guidelines and procedures for credit approval and general prudential limits on single borrower and single project exposure.

Directed Credit

Reducing directed credit requirements is a common feature of banking reforms, and this was the case in India as well. A major directed credit requirement was constituted by the high levels of the SLR, which preempted bank resources to finance the government deficit at low interest rates. Preemption of credit by the government also occurred indirectly because the RBI followed a practice of automatically issuing ad hoc Treasury bills to meet any shortfalls in the government's balances with

the RBI. Since this implied a mechanical transmission of fiscal expansion to the monetary side, it was offset by imposing a high cash reserve ratio (CRR) in the commercial banks, thus effectively crowding out private sector credit.

At one stage, prior to the reforms, the combined effect of the high CRR and the SLR was such that only 35 percent of the increment in bank deposits was actually available for commercial advances, the rest being either impounded by the RBI in the form of cash reserve deposits or absorbed by the government. The practice of automatic monetization was abandoned in 1994, and both the CRR and the SLR were reduced over time from 15 percent and 38.5 percent, respectively, before the reforms to 5 percent and 25 percent by 2005. The fiscal deficit is now financed through the auction of government securities conducted by the RBI, and in that sense, the interest rate on government borrowing is market-determined. However, it is interesting to note that, despite the reduction in the SLR from 38.5 percent to 25 percent, the proportion of government securities held by the banks to their total assets has actually increased from 30.4 percent at the end of March 1994 to 34.5 percent at the end of March 2004. This has occurred because of the combined effect of the inability to reduce the fiscal deficit—a key weakness of the reforms to date—and the fact that the prudential norms give sovereign debt a very low risk weight. In other words, while statutory preemption of bank resources was steadily reduced in the 1990s, the banks' appetite for government debt has remained high because the prudential norms contain a built-in regulatory bias in favor of government debt in preference to commercial credit.

The other major form of directed credit was the requirement that 40 percent of commercial credit has to be extended to the priority sector, which includes agriculture, small-scale industry, small transport operators, artisans, and so on. It applies to Indian commercial banks but not to foreign banks because the latter do not operate in rural areas and therefore cannot engage in agricultural lending. In their case, the requirement is that 15 percent of advances must be for exports and for the small-scale sector. These provisions have not been altered by the reforms. However, although the priority sector target for Indian banks has not been changed, the provision has been liberalized indirectly to some extent by definitional changes that expand the range of borrowers that are eligible. It is also worth noting that while banks are subject to sectoral direction of credit, they are not required to lend to particular borrowers; the credit decision of lending to a particular borrower is left to the bank on the basis of normal creditworthiness analysis.

Banking Supervision

Improved prudential regulation must be supported by strong supervision, and several steps have been taken in this area since 1991. A Board of Financial Supervision, with an advisory council and an independent department of supervision, was established in the RBI. Traditional on-site supervision was supplemented by a system of off-site supervision, which allows a closer and more continuous monitoring of asset quality. A new supervisory reporting system was introduced in 1995, using the CAMELS approach (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and system for risk assessment) to assess the financial position of banks. More recently, the RBI has moved from the Basel I risk-based approach to a system of risk-based assessment for selected public sector banks.

In 2003 the RBI introduced a framework of prompt corrective action under which banks falling short of predetermined critical levels of capital adequacy, percentage of nonperforming assets (NPAs), and return on assets would automatically trigger some mandatory corrective action and possibly also further nonmandatory actions. Properly implemented, this should ensure that banks falling below a certain standard would be forced to correct their market share. An effective framework for corrective action is particularly important in the Indian context, where there are a number of weak public sector banks, and in which corrective action is the best way of preventing regulatory forbearance.

Increasing Competition

Increasing competition within the banking sector was an integral part of the reforms as a means of promoting efficiency in the sector, and important steps were taken in this direction. New banking licenses for Indian private sector banks, which had not been granted for many years before the reforms, were granted, and several new Indian private sector banks were established in the 1990s. While some have fared poorly, others have prospered. Some of the best Indian private sector banks have modernized their banking operations commendably and have developed electronic banking capability fully comparable with foreign banks. They have also expanded their market share. Foreign banks, which were earlier subjected to a very restrictive policy, were allowed more liberal expansion opportunities. New foreign banks were licensed to enter the market, and existing banks were allowed to expand branches more liberally.

These changes had an impact on the banking system. At the end of March 1991, 90 percent of the assets of the banking system were accounted for by public sector banks, with the private Indian banks accounting for 3.7 percent and foreign banks 6.3 percent. By the end of

March 2003, this had changed to 75 percent, 18.5 percent, and 6.9 percent, respectively. The major expansion in market share has been on the part of Indian private sector banks, though the extent of the increase is exaggerated because they include the effect of the merger of a major nongovernment development financing institution (ICICI) with its banking subsidiary to create a new bank, leading to the inclusion of its assets in the total for private bank assets.

The share of foreign banks has increased only marginally, despite a more liberal policy of branch expansion of this sector. This reflects the fact that these banks are focused primarily on high-end corporate clients, who are in any case moving away from bank financing, relying increasingly upon the capital markets to raise finance. The income-earning strategy of foreign banks is correspondingly oriented toward greater reliance upon fee-based income.

Public Sector Banks

Unlike banking reforms in most developing countries, India's banking sector reforms abjured privatization; the strategy from the very outset was that public sector banks would remain publicly owned but would be made to improve their performance by a combination of better supervision and greater managerial autonomy.

While ruling out privatization, public sector banks were encouraged to raise capital from the market, which diluted government equity, a dilution that was allowed as long as the government share remained 51 percent. The induction of private shareholders was expected to help the banks meet capital adequacy requirements without putting a strain on the budget. It was also expected to create a more commercial environment and thereby also to condition the attitude of government, even though the government remained a majority shareholder. Twenty of the public sector banks were able to raise capital from the market, and by 2005 the private shareholding in these banks varied from 20 percent to 46 percent.

A number of steps were taken to improve the efficiency of public sector banks, including rationalizing the branch network and reducing the labor force through voluntary retirement plans. Productivity enhancement through information technology application was also pursued, though public sector banks were slower than others in introducing electronic banking. However, some of the better public sector banks now offer online banking facilities at a large number of their branches. The fact that public sector banks have to observe the public sector salary structure remains an important limitation, and this is likely to become more of a constraint as the size of the private banking sector expands. However, within this

constraint, public sector banks have made efforts to improve recruitment and develop better human resource development policies.

Skeptics remain unconvinced that public sector banks can ever be managed in a way that distances government from individual banking decisions. The problem in India is not so much political intervention in individual credit decisions as the imposition of procedures that make it difficult for bank managers to take initiative in making commercial decisions without being accused of having extended undue favors. This is primarily because the law equates the employees of any entity in which the government has a 51 percent stake with civil servants, making them subject to the same standards of accountability for their actions. This places a great deal of emphasis on compliance with procedures, which forces bank management to be cautious and rule-bound rather than innovative.

Despite these constraints, the evidence suggests that public sector banks have improved their performance in the postreform period. Gross nonperforming loans of public sector banks declined from 17.8 percent at the end of March 1997 to 9.4 percent at the end of March 2003. Net nonperforming loans as a percentage of total assets declined from 3.6 percent to 1.9 percent over the same period. Net profit in public sector banks as a percentage of total assets increased from 0.6 percent in 1996–1997 to 1.0 percent in 2002–2003, and operating expenses as a percentage of total assets declined from 2.9 percent to 2.3 percent in the same period.

Banking System Performance

The impact of the reforms on the efficiency of the banking system in performing its twin roles of financial intermediation and resource allocation is not easy to evaluate. As far as the scale of bank intermediation is concerned, the ratio of total credit extended by the banking system to India's gross domestic product has increased, but it is still relatively low compared to countries such as China or some of the other East Asian countries. The ratio in India increased from 51.5 percent in 1990 to 53.4 percent in 2000, whereas in China it increased from 90 percent to 132.7 percent in the same period. The figures over the same period are also much higher for Malaysia (75.7% and 143.4%) and Thailand (91.1% and 121.7%), though many Latin American countries have figures closer to those of India.

There is evidence of significant improvement in several dimensions in recent years. Gross nonperforming assets (NPAs) as a percentage of total advances have fallen from 15.7 percent in 1996–1997 to 7.3 percent in 2003–2004. Gross NPAs as a percent of total assets are much lower because Indian banks typically have a large proportion of their assets in sovereign debt; this ratio has

also declined from 7 percent in 1996–1997 to 4 percent in 2002–2003. More importantly, the financial strength of the banks is actually better than it appears from these ratios because Indian banks do not write off assets, even though large provisions have been made. Net nonperforming assets, calculated after taking account of provisioning, are 3 percent of total advances and only around 2 percent of total assets. There has been a general improvement in other financial indicators, such as net profit as a percentage of total assets, interest spread as a percentage of assets, and operating expenses as a percentage of total assets, for public sector banks, old private sector banks, new private sector banks, and foreign banks. The financial strength of the banks, as measured by the capital to risk adjusted assets ratio (CRAR), shows distinct improvement in the postreform period. The required CRAR was increased in phases, to 8 percent at first (which is the Basel I minimum) and then to 9 percent in 1999–2000. Initially, banks with insufficient capital had to be capitalized by the injection of government equity from the budget, but subsequently several banks were able to raise capital from the market, and this, combined with plowing back of profits, led to a substantial improvement in capital adequacy. At the end of March 2003, out of the 93 commercial banks operating in India, 91 were above 9 percent and as many as 87 were above 10 percent, compared with only 54 out of 92 banks above 9 percent and 42 above 10 percent at the end of March 1996.

It is noteworthy that the Indian banking system did not suffer from any contagion effect in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis. However, this is not so much due to the improvements brought about after 1991, as the fact that the capital account was not fully open. Banks were not allowed to undertake excessive foreign currency exposure, and external borrowing (especially short-term borrowing) was strictly controlled. This cautious policy helped insulate India from the severe reversals of external flows witnessed in many emerging market countries in the 1990s.

The Future Agenda

The agenda for banking reforms in the future involves the continuation of the process of aligning prudential norms and supervision systems to the best international practices. This is bound to be a moving target since the banking system internationally is shifting from Basel I to Basel II (standards formulated by the committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, based in Basel, Switzerland), which involves use of much more sophisticated and bank-specific methods of risk assessment. An immediate challenge facing the public sector banks relates to the case for merging some of the banks to create stronger banks with a larger capital base and therefore

correspondingly larger capacity to finance large projects. Given the size of the economy and its projected growth, there is a case for having at least two banks at a scale comparable to the larger Asian banks.

A general problem affecting the banking system (both public sector and private sector banks) is the efficacy of the legal system in enforcing creditor rights. At present the legal procedure is dilatory, and there are difficulties associated with enforcing recovery through seizure and sale of collateral or through forced liquidation. Recent changes in the law enable banks to seize collateral, but the process of the sale of collateral remains difficult. Legislation was introduced in 2003, though not yet enacted, to make it easier to force liquidation in cases where bank debts are overdue and no agreement is reached between the creditor and the borrower on restructuring the debt. There is also a need for a credit information bureau that would enable banks to access information on the credit standing of prospective borrowers based on their status with other banks. The Credit Information Bureau of India was set up for this purpose in 2000, and the government has announced that it will introduce legislation to enable the bureau to obtain information from participatory banks with suitable safeguards protecting privacy. Improvements in the legal environment for recovery of bank dues and institutionalization of information sharing among banks will make a major contribution to increasing the efficiency of bank intermediation.

Montek S. Ahluwalia

See also **Capital Market; Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Economic Reforms of 1991; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets**

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BARAHMASA The Indian seasons have been the subject of beautiful descriptions in poetry, prose, and drama since ancient times, and the relationship between man and nature has been fundamental to India's worldview. The paintings of *barahmasa* (the depiction of twelve months in painting) appear to be modest attempts to cor-

relate the artistic and literary endeavors of Indian poets and painters, portraying the cycle of seasons. At the same time, music, which also forms an important part of India's way of life, is closely associated with *rāgas* and *rāginis* (representations of musical modes in color) painted by Rajasthani artists, which ring in consonance with the above theory.

Indian literary references to *ritus* (seasons) are as ancient as the great Indian epic *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which experiences of the changing seasons were mentioned for the first time. In the forest, Rāma laments the loss of his abducted wife, Sītā. He observes the changes in nature, which aggravate his passionate longing for his beloved wife. Throughout classical Indian literature, we find men pining for their loved ones, taking cues from nature, as the seasons manifest their effects on the heros and heroines in *samyoga* (union) and *viyoga* (separation).

The Vishnudharmottara Purāṇa, (c. 3rd–4th centuries A.D.) indicates the features of different seasons, as they should be painted. For example, the severity of summer is indicated by the heat of the sun and its tormenting effect on human beings. Spring is suggested by trees in bloom, humming with bees and resounding with the sweet call of the cuckoo. The rainy season is represented by dark, heavy-laden clouds, bent by their aquatic burden, beautified by rainbows and frequent flashes of silver lightning in the sky.

In the Gupta period (c. 3rd–4th centuries A.D.), Kalidasa, India's foremost playwright and poet, wrote his *Ritusambara*, a poetic work of both seasons and love. He describes each *ritu*, observing as well the passionate responses of the lovers. Although there is a total absence of visual representation of this emotional drama during the early period, Kalidasa composed some of world's best classical works. In yet another notable work titled *Kumarsambhava*, he elaborates on the seasons, and his description of spring is particularly noteworthy.

Sbrada ritu, or spring, was the favorite season of the poets and painters of the medieval period in Jain and secular literature, as well as Sufi romances, including the *Laur-Chanda* of Mullah Daud, the *Mirgavat* of Qutuban, and *Padmavat* of Malik Muhammed Jaysi, which proved most popular. They excelled both in poetic content and in the simple and attractive pictorial language of the Delhi Sultanate school of painting. The scroll of *Vasanta Vilasa (phagu)*, painted at Ahmedabad, in Gujarat, in A.D. 1451, reached a peak of excellence in both verbal and visual imagination. It primarily describes Vasanta (spring), and though painted in the Jainesque, hieratic manner, opens up a panorama of love, romance, and erotic splendor, highlighted by an appropriate landscape.

In the wake of the Vaisnava renaissance in Rajasthan, in the seventeenth century, Vallabhacharya propagated the *Pushti-marg* (path of grace), and his followers, the *Asta-chhap* (eight poets) wrote in the Vrajabhasha language, spreading the gospel of *bbakti-marg* (“path of devotion” to Krishna). Poets and painters at this juncture offered their hearts and souls to Krishna (worshiped as Sri-Nathji at Nathadwara, near Udaipur in Rajasthan), producing painting, poetry, *sangeet* (music), and literature. Prominent among the poets was Keshavadasa, the court poet of Maharaja Madhukarshah of Orchha (central India), who composed the *Rasikapriya* (Connoisseur’s delight), an account of the twelve months as *barabmasa*. The tenth chapter of the *Kavipriya* (Poet’s delight) and depicts the life of people in different seasons, their ceremonies and rituals, and describes how a *nayika* (heroine) should prevail upon the *nayaka* (hero) to stay with her instead of beginning a journey. He gives an account of the months mentioning the delightful spring (*Chaitra* and *Baisakh*), the heat of summer (*Jyestha* and *Ashadha*), the showers of *Shravan* and *Bhadon*, the clear sky and brightness of *Aswin* and *Kartik*, the pleasant *Agabana*, chilly *Pausba*, and the pleasant *Megha*.

The earliest pictorial representation of *Rasikapriya* is in the popular Mughal style, from about A.D. 1600 (now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York). Though most of the Rajasthani schools favored this theme in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the sets produced by the Amber-Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Malwa and Bundelkhand, and Bundi and Kotah are noteworthy. They give prominence to the changing of nature, showing its connection to social customs, festivals, and traditions, as well as to the behavior of animals in the forest. Among the complete sets, the one of the Bundi Kotah school, in the Prince of Wales Museum, Mumbai, is fairly representative of the theme.

In the nineteenth century, the popularity of the subject reached the Hill States of Himachal Pradesh. Patronized by the Hindu rajas, painters from different schools such as Garhwal, Kangra, and Guler took up this theme, and a good number of *barabmasa* sets came to light. Unlike the stylized Rajasthani idiom, the Pahari artists excelled in the realistic rendering of nature in the hill states. They depicted as well delicate and slender figures, the ardent lovers of the Kangra style, looking into each other’s eyes with passion and love, announcing their desire to unite and remain indoors. A depiction of a couple, standing on an open terrace against a backdrop of looming rain clouds and white cranes in flight, or witnessing the first rain from the balcony, is a common theme among the Pahari painters. Thus, the changing of the seasons and the natural atmosphere affect the minds of the hero and the heroine, prevailing upon them to experience the pangs of separation and the ecstasy of

union, in the company of the chain of seasons known as *barabmasa*.

Sbridhar Andhare

See also **Miniatures**

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BARODA The name “Baroda” derives from the older “Vatapadraka,” literally, “a dwelling by the banyan.” Situated today at the division of the Bombay-Delhi and Bombay-Ahmedabad railway lines (244 mi., or 392 km, north of Mumbai and 62 mi., or 100 km, southeast of Ahmedabad), Baroda (present-day Vadodara) first gained its prominence in the region in the eighteenth century. It was not until the reign of its fourteenth ruler, Sayajirao Gaekwad III (r. 1881–1939), however, that the city witnessed a large-scale building effort, growing to its full urban character in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was during those six decades that several large-scale building complexes were erected in Baroda: palaces, including the sprawling Laxmi Villas Palace, Baroda College and Kalabhavan (an art school), the Nyaya and other temples, the Mandavi tower, parks and gates, and bridges across the Vishwamitri River.

The Gaekwads trace their origin to Poona (Pune) to a Maratha Kshatriya clan by the name of Matre, which was corrupted to Mantri, meaning “minister.” Legend has it that in the seventeenth century a prosperous farmer, Nadaji, became a militant protector of cows, gaining the nickname *gae-kaiwar* (one who protects cows). The label stuck to the family and was simplified into Gaekwad. It was Pilaji Gaekwad who “rescued” Baroda from the clutches of an oppressive Mughal governor in 1725 and restored order. Pilaji is believed to have lost his life fighting both the Mughals and the *pesbwa* (the Maratha prime minister, who had his power base in Poona) to defend Gujarat against exploitation by these outsiders.

It was not uncommon for Indian rulers and princes to undertake public works projects, and even to develop an abiding interest in city beautification, at least in their capitals. The Mughal passion for parks, gardens, and lakes had survived into the British period, and it received a fresh impetus from Ebenezer Howard’s “Garden City” movement, which in late-nineteenth-century England aimed at intermarrying town and country. Such urban plans and new architectural designs were not lost on the Anglophile Indian rulers, and they did not hesitate to imitate them in their own territories.

Sayajirao Gaekwad (also spelled Gaikwad or Gaekwar) was born into a modest peasant branch of the Gaekwad family in Kavhana village, some 300 miles (483 km) from Baroda in 1853. In May 1875, at the age of thirteen, Matushri Jamnabai Saheb, widow of the late Khanderao Gaekwad, adopted Sayajirao, changing his life from that of a farmhand into that of a crown prince.

One of the duties of the British Resident of an Indian princely state was to protect British interests; what better way to ensure them than to provide an English education to the local rulers? Sayajirao's English biographers, Stanley Rice and Edward St. Clair Weeden, confirm the young prince's insatiable appetite for books and new ideas. His Indian teachers (including Diwan Sir T. Madhav Rao and the Parsi Dadabhai Naroji, who later became the first Indian elected to the British Parliament and served three times as president of the Indian National Congress, earning the sobriquet "Grand Old Man" of Indian nationalism) and his English teachers (including F. A. H. Elliot) instilled a love for literature and an appreciation for the arts in the young prince. Another influence on Sayajirao was Maharaja Chamarajendra Wodeyar (r. 1863–1894) of Mysore. In early 1876, the princes met in Bombay (present-day Mumbai) on the occasion of the visit of Edward, the Prince of Wales, Queen Victoria's eldest son, who would succeed her as Edward VII. The Wodeyars, with the assistance of able *diwans* (ministers) who recruited European architects and planners, contributed richly to the urbanization of Mysore and, by example, to that of Baroda.

Sayajirao's travels to Europe and the United States in 1906 and 1910 deepened his interest in education and architecture. On his first visit to the United States in 1906 he met Booker T. Washington, the African American social reformer who had risen from slavery to complete his education at the Hampton Institute, Virginia, later founding the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. On both his visits to the United States, Sayajirao traveled extensively throughout the country, visiting Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco, frequenting museums, art galleries, and libraries. On a visit to Europe in 1923, Sayajirao met King Victor Emmanuel and Benito Mussolini. Sayajirao was impressed by Italy's recovery after World War I and by Rome's postwar buildings, stadiums, parks, and wide roads.

These exposures to America and Europe left Sayajirao with the conviction that education was the basis of all reform; his belief prompted him to introduce free compulsory primary education and a state-supported free public library system in Baroda. He even committed state support for the promotion of industry, albeit with limited success. Sayajirao recruited British engineers R. F. Chisolm and Major R. N. Mant as state architects to



Facade of the Laxmi Villas Palace in Baroda (also known as Vadodara). Constructed in 1890, the palace, like so many others in the city, is a sterling example of the elaborate Indo-Saracenic style, with a distinctly Islamic influence. AMIT PASRICHA.

implement his architectural vision, and appointed a custodian for the upkeep of his capital's public buildings. Drawing on Saracenic sources (domes; *chhatris*, or umbrellas; towers; and courtyards) and on classical schemes, they produced unusually diverse architectural forms, spaces, scales, and imagery. Their work included the Laxmi Villas Palace, Kamati (Committee) Bagh, and the Residency (home of the British Resident). Chisolm and Mant may have influenced the Indo-Saracenic vocabulary that Edward Lutyens later employed in his architecture in New Delhi. In the belief that India could not make progress without industrial development, Sayajirao approved the use, wherever possible, of new industrial materials such as steel and glass, in place of the old brick and mortar.

The modernization and urbanization of Baroda was put on firmer ground with the founding of Baroda

College and the art school Kalabhavan, which heavily emphasized engineering and architecture while teaching art, representing a synthesis of ideas borrowed from America's Tuskegee Institute and Europe's Staatliches Bauhaus. Western ideas continued to influence Baroda even after Sayajirao. In 1941, Herman Goetz, a German émigré, took over the directorship of the Baroda Museum. Goetz supported contemporary Indian art and used the museum to promote visual arts education in Baroda. The Maharaja Fatesinghrao Museum was founded in 1961, the year that Gujarat state was created, in the Laxmi Villas Palace complex. By any measure, Baroda's credentials for becoming the capital of Gujarat in the 1960s were impressive, given its museums, parks, playgrounds, colleges, temples, hospitals, industry (albeit nascent), progressive policies, and cosmopolitan population. However, Baroda's princely heritage and the Gaekwads' Maratha origins prevented the city from being chosen as a state capital in democratic India.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Gandhinagar; Gujarat**

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BENARES. See **Varanasi**.

BENE ISRAEL The largest and, perhaps, the oldest of the India's Jewish communities is known as the Bene Israel (children of Israel). Though in numbers they rank among the smallest of Indian minority groups, their long history on Indian soil, their dispersion throughout the subcontinent, their steadfastness in preserving their identity for centuries—much of that time beyond the perimeters of Jewish learning and law—and the peace in which they lived amidst their neighbors make the Bene Israel unique among the Jewish diasporas. The use of the term “Israel,” rather than “Jew,” to self-designate may be an indication of the antiquity of their presence in India. Israel was the name of the northern kingdom, which broke away from Solomon's kingdom in the tenth

century B.C. It was subsequently conquered and absorbed by the Assyrians in 723 B.C., leaving the smaller Kingdom of Judah to survive until it was conquered by the Babylonians in the early sixth century B.C. The term “Jew” came into use only after the Babylonian exile. There are biblical and Talmudic references to India (*Hodu*) and evidence of loanwords in Hebrew from Sanskrit and Tamil, indicating familiarity with the region as early as the first millennium B.C., when the Hebrew texts were canonized. The lack of Hanukkah celebrations in the traditional Bene Israel annual holiday cycle suggests that the founders of their earliest community might have left ancient Israel prior to the Macabean Revolt of 165 B.C.

Disaster, Deliverance, and Discovery

According to their oral traditions in Marathi tales—which were later recorded, translated, and studied by visitors, missionaries, and scholars—the ancestors of the Bene Israel reached the shores of the Konkan coast after having been blown off course by a storm. The seven couples who survived the shipwreck struggled ashore near the village of Navgaon, having lost all their belongings in the sea. These fourteen founding fathers and mothers were able to survive by adopting a trade that they had, perhaps, plied before arriving in the Konkan: oil pressing. Since oil was a commodity very much in demand, and since the necessary ingredients were not difficult to obtain, providing a needed service and maintaining a low profile proved a successful method of adapting to the Indian environment. Jewish oil pressers alongside Hindu, Muslim, and even Christian craftspeople were not unusual in the Konkan. Over time the Bene Israel tradesmen came to be known as the Shanwar Teli (Saturday oilpressers), indicating that they refrained from work on that day. Certain striking similarities to Hindu tales and practices are evident in elements of the traditional Bene Israel origin story. There are resonances with the origin tale of the Chitpavan Brahmans of the Konkan and Shani (the deity of the planet Saturn whose day of observance is Saturday) holds special significance for people in the region.

Despite their accommodation to life in the Konkan villages, another tale relates that the Bene Israel were different enough from their neighbors so that a visiting Jew from abroad, known as David Rahabi, could recognize them as such. The local Bene Israel women took him to the market to assure him that the meal they were preparing in his honor would conform with the laws of kashrut (Jewish dietary requirements). Rahabi was so impressed with their fastidiousness and by their repetition of the Hebrew phrase *Shemah Israel, Adonai Eloheinu, Adonai Ehad* (the Hebrew credo “Hear, oh Israel, the Lord our God is One”) that he took these Konkan oil pressers to

be preservers of cultural ties to a Jewish past. So, the tradition relates, Rahabi selected three heads of families from among the *тели* folk and taught them the Torah Laws from which, he concluded, they had been estranged for a long time. Although his identity, place of origin, and date of arrival remain subjects of controversy, it is acknowledged that Rahabi initiated the first religious revival among the Bene Israel.

Life in Konkan Towns and Villages

Gradually the Bene Israel population extended throughout the northern Konkan, settling in villages and towns, earning their livelihood, along with oil pressing, in country trade and military service with the Hindu forces of the Marathas and the Muslim forces of the Siddis (the rulers of Janjira). The tax files of the local Konkan administrators (the Peshwah Daftar) contain names such as Eloji (Elijah) *тели*, Samsen and Abhram *тели*, along with Aron and Sileman Israil in the record for the mid-eighteenth century. Toward the end of the century, surnames are linked to villages with a suffix *-kar* such as Naogaonkar, Waskar, and Chordekar. By the late twentieth century, there were over 140 village-linked surnames. Subdivisions within the Bene Israel village communities, perhaps reflecting accommodation to Indian patterns of endogamy, recognized two groups: the Gora (fair) and Kala (dark) Israel, the distinction based on descent from either two Bene Israel parents, in the former case, or only one in the latter. These patterns were brought to the cities when, in the eighteenth century, the Bene Israel began migrating first to the Maratha capital, Pune, in the plain beyond the Western Ghats and then to Bombay, which had been acquired by the British East India Company and was being developed as a factory and port for goods procured by company agents.

The British: Military, Missionaries, and Renewal

After the defeat of the Marathas in 1818, the British were in control of much of the Konkan, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, and the ensuing policy changes brought new opportunities to the Bene Israel. Even prior to British hegemony, some Bene Israel had begun enlisting in the British East India Company's Native Regiments, continuing the tradition of military service they had maintained in the Konkan. This brought Bene Israel families to the cities. (Samuel) Hassaji (Ezekiel) Divekar, a captain in the company army who had been taken prisoner in the Mysore wars, came in contact with the Jews of Cochin. Upon his release, he built the first Bene Israel (Gate of Mercy) Synagogue in Bombay in 1796. Subsequently synagogues were constructed in a dozen towns and villages throughout the Konkan.

By the early nineteenth century, the company lifted its ban on missionaries, which led to the arrival of American missionaries in Bombay and the Konkan. The education now made available to the Bene Israel launched the second religious revival in the community. The Old Testament was translated into Marathi, and the Hebrew taught to them at Mission schools enabled the brothers Haeem Samuel Kehimkar and Joseph Samuel Kehimkar to open the first Bene Israel school in 1875. Jewish instructors there taught Hebrew and Bible classes to Bene Israel children. By mid-century, Iraqi Jewish merchants and entrepreneurs began arriving in Bombay, providing a further boost to the Bene Israel community there and in Pune. The Bene Israel were eager to send their boys and girls to school. Dr. Rebecca Reuben (1889–1957) studied at the High School for Native Girls at Pune, while teaching herself Hebrew. She went on to study at Bombay University, graduating first in her class, the first Indian female to do so, and continued her studies in England. After her return to India, she contributed greatly to the fields of education and community service. Dr. Jerusha Jhirard (1890–1984) obtained her medical degree in England, returning to serve as superintendent of Bombay's Cama hospital. She also founded the Bene Israel Women's Association and, in 1925, brought Liberal Judaism to Bombay—introducing modern Western ideas into traditional Bene Israel identity. Dr. Jhirard was honored with the prestigious Padma Shri Award (the fourth-highest civil award for national distinction) in 1966.

By 1948 both India and Israel had won independence from Britain, emerging as new nations in the world community. In the aftermath, some Bene Israel found themselves in Pakistan, where the surroundings were hostile both to Israel and to India. Many Bene Israel began to emigrate from their ancient homeland: some found their way to Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and the United States. Others went to Israel. The Bene Israel community, which had reached its peak in the decade between 1941 and 1951 at approximately 20,000, has declined dramatically. As of 2004 approximately 4,000 Bene Israel remained in India.

Brenda Ness

See also Jews of India

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BENGAL The name "Bengal" (or Bangla) comes from Vanga or Banga, the name of the ancient deltaic kingdom. The state of over 100 million people is fructified by the Ganges-Brahmaputra river system, has a humid climate; an intense and vibrant cultural, literary, and educational life; and a dynamic financial hub, all centered around one of the world's largest and most vital cities, Kolkata. Bengali had developed a distinct body of literature by the eleventh century.

Early History

Bengal is mentioned in the Purāṇas and other ancient Sanskrit literature and was known to the Romans, mentioned in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (first century A.D.) and in Ptolemy's *Geography* the following century. According to the Buddhist text *Anguttara Nikaya*, Magadha was one of sixteen major states (*mahajanapadas*, "great tribal regions") in North India between about 770 and 450 B.C.; Anga, in the northwest of Bengal, was the easternmost of these. With its capital at Rajagriha (later Pataliputra), Magadha became prosperous due to its fertile land, the timber and elephants from its forests, and control of the eastern Gangetic trade through its command of the River Ganges. Attacking the force to its east, Magadha incorporated Anga, thereby controlling the ports of Bengal and trade from the east coast.

References to Bengal, however, became more numerous after it became part of the first great empire of India, the Mauryan empire (c. 322–180 B.C.). The Mauryas supplanted the Nandas and built an empire that controlled much of India. Its founder was Chandragupta Maurya (reigned c. 321–297 B.C.), and the Mauryas built their capital at Pataliputra. Chandragupta controlled his empire with the assistance of his Brahman minister Kautilya, whose *Artha Shāstra* tells us a great deal about the period. Chandragupta Maurya also appears in Jain and Buddhist traditions and in the Greek account of

Megasthenes. He brought Bengal firmly into the imperial orbit, as the province served as the main port for coastal and overseas trade. Chandragupta abdicated in favor of his son Bindusara (r. 298–273), but it was his grandson, Ashoka (r. 273–232), who was the most famous ruler of the dynasty. One of Ashoka's minor rock edicts was located north of Bengal's delta at Mahasthan.

Between the collapse of the Mauryas and the rise of the Guptan empire created by Chandragupta I (r. 320–c. A.D. 335), the history of Bengal remains hazy. Bengal was brought within the imperial Guptan order by its second emperor, Samudragupta (reigned c. 335–375), as the Guptas re-created much of the empire of the Mauryas in the North India. The Guptan period is considered the classical age of India, when a flourishing trade developed and Sanskrit literature reached its peak. Buddhism and Jainism coexisted with Hinduism, and all thrived. The dynasty came to an end in the middle of the sixth century, perhaps as a result of internal weaknesses and the Huna invasions, but the Guptan agrarian economy, religious tolerance, and a number of political units, of which Bengal was one, and Brahmanical social institutions continued much longer.

After the collapse of the Guptas, an independent kingdom arose in the south of Bengal in 507–508 called Vanga-Samatata, with the first king being Vainyagupta. In northern Bengal another kingdom was based at Gaur. The first king was Shashanka (c. 600) and he fought against Harsha Vardhana, who came to power in 606. After Shashanka's death sometime before 637, the kingdom's history becomes obscure once again until the first Pala became king of Gaur. The eighteen kings of the Pala dynasty controlled much of the eastern Gangetic plain as one of three major kingdoms controlling India. The Rashtrakutas were in the Deccan and the Pratiharas were in western India. The area was rich, as land was cleared for rice cultivation and settlement. As settlement expanded, priests were recruited into the Brahman caste and the grants of land to them were recorded on copper plates. The origin of the dynasty was unusual because the first king, Gopala (r. 750–770), was elected as the monarch. Legend states that he was given a club by the goddess Chanda, a consort of Shiva, and he used this to kill a female demon that had killed off previous kings. The capital of the early Palas was at Pataliputra. Gopala's son Dharmapala (r. 770–810) claimed legitimacy, stating that his father's election had ended a period of anarchy, and he made the Pala kingdom a powerful one in North India, dominating eastern India. The third Pala king, Devapala (r. 810–850), extended the Pala domain; gold was panned in the eastern rivers, and the Palas benefited from the trade with Assam, Burma, and Southeast Asia, receiving an embassy from Sumatra. He moved the



Gateway to Kolkata. The imposing Howrah Bridge over the Hooghly River (a tributary of the Ganges, where all life is said to begin). It is one of the finest examples of a cantilever bridge. AMIT PASRICHA.


capital to Monghyr. After Devapala, the kingdom came under increasing attack. The Buddhist universities of Nalanda in south Bihar and Vikramasila at Patharghata, Bihar, where the famous Buddhist monk Atisha (c. 981–1054) taught, were patronized by the Palas.

Later, the exploits of the powerful king Ramapala (1077–1120) led to a revival of Pala power. His relations with his tributary rajas were detailed in Sandhyakaranandin's Sanskrit *kavya* (lyric) *Ramacharita*, although the central event of his reign was a revolt by the Kaivartas. Pala authority was maintained by the assertion that the king was an incarnation of Shiva or Vishnu or received instructions directly from the god. The Palas made alliances with the kings to the north and also ensured a modicum of peace through sponsorship of Buddhist as well as Hindu temples. This was a policy that the more orthodox Hindu Senas maintained after they defeated the Palas around 1155.

The first king of the Sena dynasty was Vijayasena (1095–1158), and the Senas extended their power before all of North India was swept up by the invading Turks, Afghans, and an assortment of mercenary soldiers from the whole region, including India, who had superior

central Asian horses and Asian military tactics emphasizing speed, after Muhammad Ghuri captured Kanauj in 1192. The Khiljis defeated the Senas, and Bengal was captured in 1199. The Senas fled east and continued to rule in eastern Bengal until 1245, when they too fell to the forces of Islam.

Islam spread into Bengal and developed its own syncretist pattern. Bengali Muslims were cut off from direct access to Islamic tradition as it developed in Arabic and Persian literature because of their lack of knowledge of Arabic or Persian; therefore, they remained steeped in local traditions, and Islam in Bengal was a fusion of the two. During the five dynsties of the Delhi Sultanate, established by Qutuddin Aibak (d. 1210) in 1206 and overthrown three centuries later by Babur (1483–1530) in 1526, control of Bengal was only sporadically maintained. It was in the Mughal period that Bengal became a part of an empire for the third time in history. Sher Shah Suri (1472–1545) of Bihar captured Bengal, and he and his successors ruled Bengal until Akbar (r. 1556–1605) invaded Bengal in 1575 and brought it into the orbit of the Mughal empire. Bengal became ruled by Mughal governors when Murshidkuli Khan became the *nawab* of



Murshidabad (r. 1717–1727), instituting a period of autonomy. He was followed by Sujauddin Mohammed Khan (r. 1727–1739), Sarfraz Khan (r. 1739–1740), Alivardi Khan (r. 1740–1756), and Siraj-ud-Dawla (r. 1756–1757), the last independent ruler of Bengal.

British Rule

The agent of the British East India Company, Job Charnock (1631–1693), was assigned to Kasimbazar, the site of the company's factory (trading post). The Portuguese had posts at Chittagong and Saptagram since 1517 (the post on the Hughli established in 1580 was destroyed by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan in 1632), the Dutch at Chinsura since 1653 (until 1825 when it was exchanged with the British for Bencoleen in Sumatra), and the French at Chandanagore in 1673 (it changed hands a number of times between the French and the British before it was returned to the French in 1815, who maintained possession until 1952), the Danish at Serampore since 1699 (it remained in Danish hands until 1845). In 1686 Charnock was posted to Hughli but came into conflict with the *nawāb* of Bengal. The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) awarded the company a tract of land to the south, about 100 miles (161 km) upriver from the coast, and there Charnock founded the city of Calcutta, perhaps named after Kālī-ghat (the steps of the

goddess Kālī). It was located at the highest point at which the river was navigable to oceangoing ships. Fort William was built on the spot, and by the end of the sixteenth century Calcutta had just over a thousand English residents. In 1707 the East India Company declared Bengal a separate presidency, accountable to the company directors in London. Calcutta, however, was subject to the predations of the Mughal governors of Bengal, and so in 1717 the Calcutta Council sent a successful embassy to the Mughal emperor in Delhi to establish their rights and for permission to buy property. The result was that the growth of British trade in Bengal and the growth of Calcutta was spectacular, with the British and rich Indians living in the north of the town and poorer elements in the south. By 1756 some fifty ships visited Calcutta and trade was worth 1 million pounds annually. The city was, however, in a precarious military position. Fort William was by no means impregnable. In 1741 the Marathas launched an expedition into Orissa (a sub-province of Bengal), and they were threatening Calcutta the following year. The British responded by digging the "Maratha ditch" around the city as a defensive measure.

On 20 June 1756, Siraj-ud-Dawla (1733–1757), *nawāb* of Bengal, attacked Calcutta from Murshidabad with an army of some 50,000 troops and captured it. His biggest grievance against the company was their misuse of trading

privileges, which deprived him of much-needed revenue, but he also resented the fortifying of Fort William without his permission or even knowledge, for giving sanctuary to a trader who owed the *nawāb* tax money, and for expelling one of his officials. The British also did not acknowledge his accession to the throne of Bengal, and ignored his notes to the company, or answered them in an offensive manner. After the capture of the fort, it was reported by one of the survivors, John Zephaniah Holwell, in his *A Genuine Narrative of the Deplorable Deaths of the English Gentlemen and others who were suffocated in the Black Hole*, published in London in 1758, that 145 men and women had been imprisoned in the airless fort dungeon. The following morning they were released, but only twenty-three staggered out. The rest had suffocated or died of wounds or shock. The incident of the Black Hole of Calcutta, however much it was exaggerated, inflamed the British, entered their vocabulary, and started a series of events that led to a fundamental change in Bengal and the rest of India as the British sought their revenge. Geopolitics also played a part, as the Seven Years' War had broken out between the British and the French, and Siraj formed an alliance with the French.

Robert Clive (1725–1774), who had first arrived in Madras in 1743, had been lieutenant-governor of Fort St. George at Madras since 1753. With 900 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, he arrived in Calcutta in December 1756 and the next month recaptured Fort William. He attacked the French first before moving north against the *nawāb*, as removal of the French was one of the aims of the attack in Bengal. French posts at Chandanagore and Hughli were captured. Clive had allied with the Hindu banker Jagat Seth, a supporter of Mir Jaffir, who was jealous of his great-nephew Siraj and wished to replace him as *nawāb*, and Clive moved on Murshidabad with their support. On 23 June 1757, Clive's vastly outnumbered 800 European troops and 2,000 sepoys defeated Siraj's rump army as Mir Jaffir and many others were paid off by Seth and Clive; three-quarters of Siraj's army refused or had been paid not to fight. After the victory, Clive escorted Mir Jaffir to the throne at Murshidabad, and Siraj was murdered on 2 July on orders from Miran, one of Mir Jaffir's sons. In 1760 Mir Jaffir was succeeded by his son-in-law Mir Kasim, who handed over to the British the districts of Chittagong, Midnapore, and Burdwan. He attempted, however, to recover Bengal from the British by enlisting the military assistance of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II and *nawāb* Shuja ud-Dawla of Oudh. The allies were defeated by East India Company forces under Hector Munro (1726–1805) at the Battle of Buxar in 1764.

Clive became known as “Clive of India,” one of the founders of the British Empire in India. He reaped a

personal fortune of £234,000, was made a *mānsabdār*, and the recipient of £30,000 of the rent of the Twenty-four Parganas of Bengal. The British were also allowed to establish a mint in Bengal. The British Company had now become the most powerful force in Bengal, and the state was denuded of its wealth by Company merchants who spread out from Calcutta, which, henceforth, enjoyed great wealth and prosperity, especially after 1765 when, on 12 August, the Mughal shah Alam granted to the East India Company the *divāni*, the right to collect and administer the revenue of the state (which incorporated Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa) in exchange for an annual payment of 2,600,000 rupees. The wealth of the province fell into the clutches of the British and their Indian business partners. Clive in 1765 reported that Bengal had become the “scene of anarchy, confusion, bribery, corruption, and extortion” and that fortunes were being acquired in a rapacious manner, with little money actually ending up in the company coffers. In 1769 the monsoon rains failed, and famine struck the following year, killing a quarter of the peasant population.

What prompted the British government to interfere in this state of affairs was the East India Company's failure to pay its annual tax of £400,000, while many of the company's officials were returning to England with fortunes. In 1772 Warren Hastings (1732–1818) was appointed governor of Fort William. He redesigned the revenue system in Bengal so that revenue flowed directly to Calcutta, and an attempt was made to cut out the middlemen. The *nawāb* lost half his stipend and all his power, and payment to the Mughal emperor ceased. Hastings made the company profitable again, and the British government lent the company one and a half million pounds but passed the Regulating Act of 1773 and Pitt's India Act of 1784 which, among other things, brought the presidencies of Madras and Bombay under the control of Calcutta. Bengal was now the capital of British India and under the control of a governor-general. Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805, governor-general 1786–1793), introduced the Permanent *Zamindari* Settlement in his Cornwallis Code of Forty-Eight Regulations, or the Cornwallis Code, of 1793. It fundamentally changed the relationship between the peasant tiller and the *zamindar* by introducing the concept of private property in landowner relationships and creating a class of landowners that would be the backbone of the British Raj and a middle-class Hindu professional class. These were the *bhadralok* (respectable people). The *zamindars* often became bankrupt, and a great deal of land was transferred from Muslim to Hindu hands. Cornwallis also introduced British circuit courts to replace *faujdari* courts, introducing the principles of British law into Bengal.

The economy of Bengal was also transformed, most notably with the creation of the jute industry, the destruction of its homespun cotton industry because of imports from England, and as the center of the opium trade with China. The tea industry of Assam also contributed to the prosperity of Calcutta. Bengal's incorporation into the global economy was also accelerated with the Charter Act of 1833, which abolished the East India Company's monopoly of trade. During this period the Marwaris, from the Bania or Vaisya caste, prospered in Calcutta and began their eventual rise to wealth and prominence in twentieth-century India.

From its center in Bengal, the company expanded its influence up the Ganges as the activities of the "man on the spot" and the pressures of the "turbulent frontier" induced the British to continually expand its empire in India. Its wars in the Carnatic and Mysore and against the Marathas and later in the Punjab against the Sikhs, and in Afghanistan, were all directed from Calcutta. Assam was incorporated into Bengal in 1826, and three wars were fought against the Burmese until that area was incorporated in 1886; the British also expanded their influence and territories in Southeast Asia, directing their activities from Bengal. Until 1935 Burma was governed from Calcutta. Bengal became the axis of a rampant British Empire in Asia.

Bengali Intellectualism

Bengal also became the leading intellectual center of British India and the heart of its educational activities until the capital was moved to Delhi in 1911. The British established a number of educational institutions that transformed the intellectual climate of India. At the request of a number of Muslims, Warren Hastings arranged for the creation of the Muhammadan Madrasa in 1782 and encouraged the creation of the Bengal Asiatic Society founded by the jurist Sir William Jones (1746–1794), the first of the great Orientalist scholars who translated the laws of Manu and other Sanskrit works into English and helped to spread Indian learning in Europe. The missionary William Carey (1761–1834) preached Christianity in Bengali and other indigenous languages, and his Serampur printing press helped to lay the foundations of Bengali literature. Fort William College was founded in 1800 and it encouraged science, literature, and Oriental languages. This began the start of a number of schools and colleges in Bengal. Hindu College, founded in 1817, was the citadel of English education in Bengal. Its most famous lecturer was the Anglo-Indian Louis Henry Vivian Derozio (1809–1831) whose patriotic poem, "My Native Land," was an inspiration to a generation of young Bengalis. Calcutta University was founded in 1857. The result of this

introduction of Western learning and science, along with the encouragement of Indian learning in Sanskrit, Persian, and contemporary indigenous languages, led to the worldwide dissemination of Buddhist and Hindu scriptures. It also created a remarkable multilingual intellectual class that was versed in both Indian and Western learning. The launch of such newspapers as *Sambad Kaumudi* (1821), *Partbenon* (1830), and *Reformer* (1833) began Bengal's vigorous journalistic tradition.

Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) is known as the father of the Hindu renaissance, or the father of modern India. He was born to a prosperous Brahman family at Radhanagar in west Bengal. Educated at home, he learned Persian, Arabic, and Sanskrit, and then English, Latin, and Greek. His studies of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu religious books led him to become a renowned critic of superstitious and idolatrous religious practices. From 1804 until 1814 he served the East India Company, retiring to Calcutta in 1815, after which he increasingly established himself as the leading Bengali intellectual, meeting weekly at his home with other members of the Bengali *bhadralok* in their Amitya Sabha (Friendly Society). He attained a new appreciation of Hinduism through his studies of the Upanishads, and he achieved fame through his efforts to revitalize Hinduism by being the first upper caste Hindu to advocate social reform. He wrote extensively and founded the Brahmo Samaj (Society of Brahma) in 1828; the organization was to have a significant effect in Bengal and throughout India. Roy died in England and he was buried in Bristol. He died as a Hindu but he insisted that no religious ceremony be conducted at his funeral. As a person who was educated in Western thought and who remained a Hindu while critical of many Hindu caste and social and religious practices, he was the model for many future Indian modernists.

There were many other great figures of the Bengali intellectual tradition who flourished in this maelstrom of ideas from East and West. They included Aksayakumar Datta (1820–1883), who was a student of science and had pictures of Charles Darwin and Isaac Newton in his rooms. A social scientist, he was also renowned for his Bengali prose. He was a proponent of education and industrialization and a harsh critic of the treatment by British indigo planters of their indigenous workers. Iswarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), the son of a rural Brahman Sanskritist, was a "people's hero" who was educated and later taught at Sanskrit College, becoming principal. He also taught at Fort William College. He advocated the reform of the educational system, for without reform there could be no social progress. He supported the propagation of Bengali literature in the Bengali language and traditional subjects such as history,

mathematics, and natural philosophy. The riches of Bengali culture would be informed with Western learning. Among his many books were a history of Bengal and books for children. He devoted a great deal of his energies toward the establishment of vernacular schools and social reform, including the advancement of women. Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay (1827–1894) was the son of a Brahman Sanskritist but he was educated at Hindu College, became a teacher, and was the first Indian to rise through the ranks to become inspector of schools in the Department of Education. He was a sociologist who decried the loss of tradition in India, especially among the Western-educated, and sought to rationally defend the virtues of traditional Hindu culture and Hindu social organization. He was also a journalist, a novelist, and a writer of children's textbooks. Romesh Chander Dutt (1848–1909) assessed the impact of British rule on India, and his studies showed how British capitalism disrupted the Indian economy. Michael Madhu Sudan Dutt (1824–1873) was a poet and dramatist who introduced the Bengali sonnet (*amitraksar*). He is considered the first great poet of modern Bengali literature.

Bankinchandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), a Brahman and one of the first graduates of Calcutta University, was a government official from 1858 until his retirement in 1891, but he was also a journalist and novelist whose novel *Durgeshnandini* established the Bengali novel. His Hindu heroes roused the nationalist spirit in India, and Hinduism and nationalism became linked in the eyes of many Hindus. His patriotism was expressed in the song *Bande Mataram*, with the words “Hail to thee, Mother,” which appeared in the novel *Anandamath* (1882); the song became the hymn of the Indian nationalist movement after the poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) composed a musical accompaniment.

Tagore, hailed as a poet, is one of Bengal's and India's greatest cultural and intellectual figures. He was mostly educated at home in Calcutta by his wealthy father in Sanskrit, English, the sciences, and ancient Hindu religious texts. He also spent a year in 1878–1879 at University College in England. A precocious talent, he published his first poem in 1874. He also developed a talent in music, and his songs became very popular. He managed the family estate in Jessore for ten years, and this was his most creative period. In 1901 he opened a school at Santiniketan and moved there. In 1903 his collected poems were published in thirteen volumes. He also wrote short stories and novels. He translated *Gitanjali* (song offerings) of lyrical and devotional poems into English and in 1912 took them to England, where he became lionized by the English literati class. The following year he received the Nobel Prize for literature. In 1915 he was awarded a knighthood. By the end of his life he had written over

1,000 poems, 2,000 songs, and a host of short stories, plays, dance dramas, essays, literary criticism, novels, pieces of translation, and a book of early reminiscences (1917). His musical compositions became known as “Rabindra Sangeet.” He was also a humanist, believing in the importance of education, and a nationalist whose writings on economics stated that economic and social progress could only come through rural rehabilitation.

Sri Aurobindo (Aurobindo Ghosh; 1872–1950) was first an activist on behalf of India's independence and an early advocate of noncooperation before he became renowned as a Hindu spiritual leader. In 1902 he started an organization along with Margaret Elizabeth Noble, known as Sister Nivedita (1867–1911), to generate anti-British literature. For a time he served as principal of Bengal National College (Javadpur University). He advocated the boycott of British trade, and the substitution of British courts and institutions by indigenous ones. His slogan became “no control, no cooperation.” The Bengali newspaper *Jugantar*, with which he became closely associated, was dubbed seditious by the government, and by 1910 the British were describing him as the most dangerous man they knew. He was, along with Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), one of the “extremists” of the Indian national movement. He not only demanded independence for India, he also advocated a spiritual and moral regeneration of the individual. He was imprisoned for a year as he was found guilty of conspiracy. In March 1910 he left Bengal for the French enclave of Pondicherry, where he set up an ashram and devoted himself to yoga, writing, and his devotees, and to the conception of a world society and the unity of humankind. In 1926 he went into seclusion, but his ashram became a large center, attracting devotees from around the world.

The Rise of Nationalism

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded in Bombay, and Womesh Chandra Bonnerji (1844–1906) of Calcutta became its first president, a role he performed again in 1892. A member of the wealthy *bhadralok* class, like so many of the modern intellectual and political leaders of modern Bengal, he was educated at one of the Inns of Court in London (Middle Temple) and established himself as a successful and exceedingly prosperous lawyer who maintained a lavish lifestyle. He was the first Indian to be appointed standing counsel to the government. In 1886 he became president of the Law Faculty at Calcutta University in 1886. He was a “moderate” who believed that personal relationships could overcome barriers of race, class, and caste. He moved to England in 1902 and practiced before the Privy Council. He also advised the Standing Committee on India in the British Parliament.

In 1905 Bengal was partitioned, as it was felt by the governor-general, Lord George Curzon (1859–1925, viceroy 1899–1905), that the province had become too large to administer under a single administration, especially due to poor communication facilities in east Bengal. Accordingly, Bengal was split into two provinces: Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in the west, with the capital remaining at Calcutta; and eastern Bengal and Assam, mostly a Muslim province, in the east, with the capital at Dacca. This was a turning point in India's history, as the Hindu commercial classes who dominated Bengal regarded this as an attempt to destroy the growing nationalist movement in Bengal and in India. It smacked of British *divide et impera* policies, an attempt to make Hindus a minority in the province, and an attack on the unity of Bengali language and culture. Opposition to the partition was manifested in mass demonstrations in Calcutta, agitation in the rural areas to rouse the peasants, and a *swadeshi* (self-rule) movement whereby imported goods from Britain were boycotted in favor of indigenous products. The effect was to mobilize Indians in opposition to the British and to transform the incipient nationalist movement from a middle-class debating society into a national movement against the British. Along with the Amritsar Massacre of 13 April 1919, when General Reginald Dyer marched fifty troops into Jallianwala Bagh (Park) and ordered them to open fire on unarmed civilians, killing 379 and wounding 1,200 (according to official figures), it included the development of a terrorist movement that led to assassinations and bomb attacks on British officials. Kudiram Bose (1889–1908) attempted to assassinate a magistrate, but he murdered two British women instead. He was hanged by the British but he is not forgotten in Bengal.

Bengal became the leading center of opposition to British rule in India. Rashbehari Ghosh (1845–1901) and Surendranath Banerjea (1848–1925) led the early nationalist movement. Banerjea founded the Indian Association in 1876 and became the first political prisoner of British India. Tagore and Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) were also critical of British rule and respected nationalists. Tagore returned his knighthood in protest of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919 (also known as the Amritsar Massacre). Visva Bharati, Tagore's school at Santiniketan, became a nationalist symbol. Vivekananda's speech about Hinduism at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 helped bring public attention in the West to the Indian situation; his Ramakrishna Mission, which he established in 1898, became an important educational center. Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932) believed in armed struggle against the British.

Bengal saw the organization of the first all-India Muslim political party with the foundation of the All-India

Muslim League on 30 December 1906 at Dacca. This came about as a response to the creation of the All-India National Congress in 1885, and as a result of the efforts of *nawāb* Viqar ul-Mulk (1841–1917), who had been attempting for the previous five years to create a political organization for Muslims to press the views of the Muslims with the British administration, especially as plans for constitutional development were in place. The move was encouraged by the viceroy, Lord Minto (1845–1914, viceroy 1905–1910), who envisaged a moderate Muslim party led by Muslim grandees as a counterbalance to the increasingly radical Congress.

In 1911 the partition of Bengal was reversed, and at the same time, the capital of British India was moved from Calcutta to Delhi. This shifted the center of national politics from Bengal to Delhi, and Bengal began to lose some of its political importance. In the Government of India Act of 1919, Bengal received a legislative council, and the leading Congress figure in the province became *Deshbandhu* (Friend of the Country) Chittaranjan Das (1870–1925), a lawyer who had served as the mayor of Calcutta in 1924 and 1925. He resigned as Congress president to establish the Swaraj Party in December 1922 with Motilal Nehru (1861–1931). The Swaraj Party was opposed to Mahatma M. K. Gandhi's noncooperation tactics and was designed to acquire the legislative power given by the Government of India Act of 1919 and at the same time to fight for Dominion status for India within the Legislative Councils of India.

In the Government of India Act of 1935, Bengal was designated an autonomous province. After the general elections of 1937, an elected ministry assumed office on 1 April 1937, although the governor retained a considerable amount of authority, both formal and informal. Due to the preponderance of Muslims in eastern Bengal, Muslims could dominate the elected government. Between 1937 and 1943, A. K. Fazlul Haq (1873–1962), the Sher-i-Bangla (Lion of Bengal), the leader of the Krishak Praja Party, headed a coalition government. Four of the six Muslims in his ministry were from the Muslim League. They included Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894–1964), Nawab Habibullah (1895–1958), and H. S. Suhrawardy (1892–1963) who were powerful politicians in their own right and who helped to bring Muslim politics in Bengal under the sway of the League. After the Simla Conference of July 1945, the League acquired increasing support in Bengal as it became increasingly difficult for Fazlul Haq, or any other political leader, to maintain viable cross-communal political alliances.

During World War II, Calcutta had become the headquarters of Southeast Asia Command, and the Japanese bombed the city several times. The renowned Howrah

Bridge was built in 1943, the same year that a terrible famine hit Bengal, when over 2 million people died of starvation. Haq was dismissed by the governor in 1943 and a Muslim League ministry under Nazimuddin was in office until March 1945, when Suhrawardy headed the government. During his ministry the All-India Muslim League called for a Direct Action Day on 16 August 1946. This was aimed at demonstrating the League's authority and to remind the British government that it could only be ignored at the risk of civil war; it unleashed a carnage of communal rioting in Calcutta that left several thousand people dead. The 1946 elections proved to be a great victory for the Muslim League, which won 95 percent of the urban Muslim vote and 84 percent of the rural Muslim vote and was calling for partition of India and of Bengal as well. Many Muslims in east Bengal supported the partition of Bengal, but Suhrawardy, whose support came from Calcutta, opposed it. He worked with the most important Bengali Congress leader Sarat Chandra Bose (1889–1950), who formed his own Socialist Republican Party in 1946, for an independent Bengal separate from both India and Pakistan, but this was opposed by Congress leaders. Accordingly, Bengal was partitioned when India became independent on 15 August 1947. The history of Bengal since the coming of the British had seen increasing communal feeling and increasing communal antagonism. Most importantly, class antagonism between Muslim cultivators and Hindu landlords became seen not as class conflict but as communal conflict. Bengal was split into East Bengal and West Bengal in 1947 as a result of Muslim identity gaining more prominence than class identity.

One of Bengal's most popular leaders, revered in Bengal as a national leader, was Sarat Chandra Bose's charismatic younger brother, Subhash Chandra Bose (1897–1945). He was born in Cuttack and studied at Calcutta and at Cambridge in England. He joined the Indian Civil Service but resigned and returned to India in 1921. He was imprisoned for several years for his opposition to the British. A leading member of the Indian National Congress, he was elected president of the Congress in 1938 and again in 1939, but he was hounded out of office because he came into conflict with Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), as for Bose *ahimsa* (nonviolence), the leitmotiv of Gandhi's political philosophy, was merely a tactic. He organized his own Forward Bloc in 1939. In 1940 he was placed under house arrest in Calcutta. He escaped in 1941 and made his way to Germany, met Adolf Hitler, and then was sent to Japan in 1943. In Singapore he became leader of the Azad Hind Fauj, Indian National Army, made up of freed Indian prisoners-of-war, and on 21 October 1943 the head of a provisional government, at which time he declared war against the British. His army marched on India through Burma to the cry of "*Chalo Delhi!*" (Let's Go to Delhi!), but they were defeated

in 1944. On 18 August 1945, he disappeared as result, it is believed, of a plane crash. His body has never been found. For many Bengalis he is more beloved than Gandhi.

After Independence

After India became independent on 15 August 1947, the first chief minister of West Bengal was Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghosh (1891–1983), but he resigned in January 1948. The greatest problem for the province was the communal violence that broke out between Hindus and Muslims as the state was broken into two, with the eastern part of the province becoming East Pakistan with its capital at Dacca. There was large-scale migration, riots, and lawlessness. Though it was quickly brought under control, the human tragedy has never been forgotten. With the Constitution of India taking effect on 26 January 1950, West Bengal received a governor, appointed by the central government, who is advised by the chief minister and his Cabinet, who are members of the Vidhan Sabha, the unicameral state legislature. Calcutta maintains its municipal corporation.

In the post-independence period, Bengal continues to be the center of enormous artistic and intellectual creativity. Among a long list of artists and thinkers, Satyajit Ray (1921–1992), the filmmaker, is one of the most renowned. His first film *Pather Panchali* (1955), the first in his "Apu Trilogy," established him as one of the world's great directors. The music for the film was composed by Ravi Shankar (b. 1920), the most renowned sitar player in the world and an ambassador of intercultural understanding. In 1998, Amartya Sen (b. 1933) received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on welfare economics, and he was the first Indian Master of Trinity College at Cambridge University (1998–2004). Mother Teresa, born Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu in Albania in 1910, arrived in India in January 1929. Between 1931 and 1948 she taught at St. Mary's High School in Calcutta; she then left the convent to work among the poor of Calcutta. In 1950 she established the Missionaries of Charity, which became a worldwide organization. She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979, by which time she had become an Indian citizen. After her death in 1997 she was given a state funeral by the government of India.

Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghosh was replaced by Dr. Bidham Chandra Ray (1882–1962) in 1948; Ray remained the chief minister until his death. In 1956 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) reorganized the states along linguistic lines, and the princely state of Cooch Behar was incorporated into the state of Bengal, and just over 3,000 square miles (7,770 sq. km) was added from Bihar. Prafulla Chandra Sen (1897–1990) governed Bengal from 1962 until 1967. These administrations were all Congress ministries.

During this period, leftist parties took advantage of the disaffection with Delhi and the poverty of the state and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) splitting off from the Communist Party of India that had been formed in 1920. In a United Front with other parties, it came to power in 1967 under Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee (1901–1986) of the Bangla Congress. This short-lived government was replaced by Prafulla Chandra Ghosh, the first chief minister, in a Progressive Democratic Front. In 1969 the United Front returned, and the government survived until 1971.

That same year, the war in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh led to the flight of massive numbers of refugees to Bengal, causing enormous problems for the state in housing and feeding the homeless. Fort William became the headquarters for the Indian army during its war with Pakistan in East Pakistan. A Congress coalition ruled in Bengal in 1971, before Siddhartha Shankar Ray took over in 1972 and governed in a Congress ministry until 1977. During that time the Naxalite movement (named after Naxalbari) arose in opposition to the government. Naxalbari is in Darjeeling district in the northern part of Bengal and on 25 May 1967 the Naxalbari movement began when an *adivasi* (tribal) had been given land by the courts under the tenancy laws. He was attacked by local *goondas* (thugs) but the tribals responded by attacking landlords and seizing land. Great publicity was given to this “Naxalbari Uprising.” The Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) was created in 1969 to continue the fight for the oppressed in a people’s war and the movement spread to a number of other states as well. The Naxalites started a number of journals including the Bengali weekly, *Deshabrati*. The movement lost momentum but not before most of the leaders of the party and the movement were killed in clashes with the police. In the meantime, however, it gained large numbers of adherents from disaffected urban youth and led to demonstrations, instability, and lawlessness, which impelled a number of major companies and businesses to close down and move to other states. In 1977 Jyoti Basu (b. 1914) became Bengal’s longest-serving chief minister in a Communist Party (Marxist) and Left Front coalition ministry. In 1999 the name of Calcutta was changed to Kolkata, and the name was accepted by the central government the following year. In November 2000 Jyoti Basu was replaced by Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, who maintained the coalition government.

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See also **Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay; Aurobindo, Sri; Bose, Subhash Chandra; Brahma Samaj; Clive, Robert; Cornwallis, Lord; Guptan Empire; Hastings, Warren; Mauryan Empire; Roy, Ram Mohan; Tagore, Rabindranath; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar**

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BENTINCK, LORD WILLIAM (1774–1839), governor of Madras (1803–1808) and governor-general of India (1828–1835). William Bentinck was born on 14 September 1774, the second son of the duke of Portland. In 1803 he was appointed governor of Madras Presidency; he was recalled in 1808 after what London authorities deemed a mishandling of a rebellion by Indian soldiers in the company’s army. In 1828, however, he was appointed as governor-general. During his administration, financial retrenchment in the military and civil service moved India toward a modern government, as did judicial reforms that made it possible for more Indians to serve as magistrates and judges. He regarded it as a “monstrous absurdity” that only Europeans could hold high office in British India.

The two most celebrated acts of his administration were also the most controversial: the abolition of the practice of widows burning themselves to death on their husbands’ funeral pyres (known to Europeans as *sati*, and regarded by them as a mark of Indian barbarity); and the introduction of English as the medium of higher education. In the case of the abolition of *sati*, he was under significant pressure from Great Britain, with Christian activists insisting it was the duty of a Christian government

to reflect Christian and British values in the Indian administration. Though *sati* was common only in North India, and only among upper castes, Bentinck was initially reluctant to take any action; although he personally favored abolition, he was told that the practice was sanctioned by Hinduism and would provoke fierce resistance from the Hindu population. Convinced, however, by Indian intellectuals that the custom was not enjoined by the Hindu scriptures, he issued a regulation in 1829 proscribing it throughout British India. That there was no adverse reaction suggests, as Bentinck said, he was “following, not preceding public opinion” (Philips, vol. 1, p. xxviii).

The other great innovation of Bentinck’s administration, and one with enormous implications for modern India, was the decision in 1835 that the government would give support only to institutions of higher education that used English as the medium of instruction. Bentinck had decided that the use of English would make possible the

“improvement” he so desired. In this he was supported by the most prominent Indian intellectual of the time, Ram Mohan Roy, as well as by Calcutta businessmen.

He retired in 1835 and died in 1839. While his administration did not, as he had hoped, greatly “improve” Indian society, it probably began its modernization.

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Homi Bhabha. A formidable advocate for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (in this instance, an atomic reactor), Bhabha here signs a 1956 contract authorizing the U.S. sale of 21 tons of heavy water to India. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (right), and Gaganvihari L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to the United States (rear), look on. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

BHABHA, HOMI (1909–1966), physicist, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India. Born in Mumbai (Bombay) as the son of a distinguished Parsi family, Homi Jehangir Bhabha proved to be exceptionally talented, reading Albert Einstein's theory of relativity at the age of fifteen. At Cambridge University, he first completed studies in the mechanical sciences in 1930, then switched to physics. He did research on cosmic rays and became known for the Bhabha-Heitler cascade theory of electron showers (1937) and for his classical theory of spinning particles. In 1939 he returned to India for a holiday but was prevented from returning to England by the outbreak of World War II. He was appointed to a professorship of cosmic rays research at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, where he worked with Nobel laureate C. V. Raman. In 1940 he was elected fellow of the Royal Society. In 1944 he approached the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and asked for support for an institute of fundamental research, which was established in Mumbai as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1945. In his letter to the Tata Trust, he had already referred to the importance of nuclear energy. His talent and vision attracted the attention of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; Bhabha became the first chairman of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission and started building reactors at Trombay near Mumbai. The first one, called Apsara, was started in 1955, soon to be joined by Cirus, a Canadian-Indian joint venture. The Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment was thus already in operation before it was formally inaugurated in 1957. It was renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1967.

Bhabha was not an advocate of the atom bomb, influenced perhaps by Mahatma M. K. Gandhi's strong aversion to the bomb. He suggested to Nehru in 1955 that India should unilaterally renounce the production of atom bombs. Nehru replied that India should first have the ability to make a bomb—otherwise the renunciation would not be very convincing. Ten years later, Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri asked Bhabha, in view of the Chinese tests of 1964, whether Indian scientists could manage an underground test. Bhabha did not live to see any further development in this field; he was killed in an air crash in 1966 in Mont Blanc, Switzerland.

Dietmar Rothenmund

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BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ The title of the Bhagavad Gītā is now generally rendered as the "Song of the Blessed One," but it originally meant the "Upanishads sung by the Blessed One"—a philosophical, rather than a lyrical poem. Together with the old Upanishads and the philosophical "aphorisms of Vedānta," it forms the "triple canon" (*prasthāna-traya*) of Vedānta (End of the Vedas) philosophy and has thus been a mainstay not only of Vedānta, but of Hinduism in general for more than two millennia. Part of the gigantic epic Mahābhārata, the Gītā was composed sometime around the third or second century B.C. Whether it was an early or later episode in that epic as it evolved in the oral tradition, it is now a central element of that entire work. Attempts by some scholars to show it as an interpolation are now generally regarded as oversimplifications, attributed to a lack of appreciation for the character of oral literature.

The Bhagavad Gītā comprises eighteen chapters in the sixth book of the Mahābhārata, which described the beginning of the great battle between the armies of the rival cousins: the five Pāndava brothers against the one hundred Kauravas. Krishna, a prince of a local tribe—known only to a few insiders as the god Vishnu descended in a human form—had taken the side of the Pāndavas, but only as an adviser, not as a combatant. In this battle of the righteous Pāndavas against the devious Kauravas, a struggle of good against evil that was really part of a larger divine scheme in which all men played their assigned roles, Krishna assumed the role of the trusted charioteer to his friend Arjuna, one of the five Pāndavas and the commander of their army. As the battle was about to commence, Arjuna realized that he would fight and kill his relatives and his former teachers for the sake of the kingdom. He sat down in his chariot and refused to start the battle. After first appealing without success to Arjuna's pride and sense of honor as a soldier, Krishna turned to philosophy, the vanity of bodily existence, and finally to the ethics of action and the love of God. As Arjuna still hesitated, Krishna overwhelmed him with a display of his divine glory and authority. It is this code of ethics that gave the Gītā, as the text is commonly known, its prominent role, spawning innumerable commentaries and becoming the guiding light for many prominent people, among them Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Mahatma M. K. Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

In the Gītā, Krishna went beyond earlier philosophic concepts that sought bliss and liberation through ritual acts, metaphysical insight, or total renunciation and inactivity, proposing the new paths of "disinterested selfless action" (*karma yoga*) and fervent "devotion" (*bhakti*). Activity out of a sense of duty (*dharma*, which includes

the notions of law, righteousness, and functional identity) leaves no residue of karma to create painful rebirths, since it is not the act itself, but the emotions and thoughts behind it that create karma. Arjuna must fight because it is his princely duty, not for the sake of the prize of victory. Better still is the path of total devotion (*bhakti*, “sharing, taking part”) to God. There are few antecedents to this new theism before the Gītā, but it flourished later, especially among the millions of devotees of Krishna/Vishnu.

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See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Mahābhārata; Vishnu and Avatāras**

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BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, or “The Ancient Tales of the Blessed One,” stands in a long tradition of such “ancient tales” (Purāṇas) that dealt with the genealogy of gods, seers, and kings, the repeated creation of the world, and the aeons of human existence, along with a multitude of myths. Much of Hinduism’s sectarian movements have found their expression and ideology in these texts, dating from the last centuries B.C. down to premodern times. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa summarizes the world view of Vishnu/Krishna devotees as it developed in the Bhagavad Gītā and the late Vedic Vaikhānasa school, and may, as a result, be regarded as the most prominent of all the Purāṇas. It incorporates material from the Vishnu Purāṇa regarding the creation of the world and shows in its philosophy a strong affinity with Vedānta, blended with Sāṃkhya concepts and perhaps a hint of Buddhist compassion. Its form is metric, with the exception of a few prose chapters, mostly *ślokas* (poetic stanzas), and its language occasionally imitates archaic Vedic usage, giving it the patina of venerable age. Its presentation of myths is more restrained than that of other Purāṇas, putting more emphasis on the miraculous rather than the gruesome features. It was most likely composed in the ninth or tenth century A.D. in South India’s Tamil Nadu.

Ten “descents” (*avatāras*) of Vishnu into this world are mentioned or described in this work in detail, including his appearance as a fish, a turtle, a boar, the Man-Lion (Narasimha), Rāma, Krishna, Buddha, and Kalkin, who is yet to come. Especially popular has been the tenth book, in which the amorous plays of the young



Scene from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Painted c. 1550. The most popular and widely circulated of all the Purāṇas, its strong emotional and erotic imagery has been a continual source of inspiration for Indian artists. BURSTEIN COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Krishna with the wives of the cowherds (*gopis*) are described—an inspiration to countless Indian painters. Its most pervasive feature is its emphasis on the intense devotion (*bhakti*) to Vishnu as Krishna, which seems to reflect the powerful influence of the Tamil poets known as the Ālvārs (diving deep), whose devotion to Vishnu is expressed in strong emotional and erotic images. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa has frequently been commented on by authors from all regions of India, and numerous translations and adaptations in various regional languages were produced. The appeal of this text was not limited to one school. On the contrary, authors of various schools have tried to prove themselves as the true heirs to the Hindu doctrines propounded there. These include the clear formulation of Vishnu’s presence in everything (as when he emerged out of a pillar to kill the blasphemous counter-god Hiranyakashipu) and a “theology” of devotion (*bhakti*) that is based on worship of Krishna, selfless deeds, praise, and devout thoughts, rewarded by Vishnu with his divine grace.

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See also **Bhagavad Gītā; Vishnu and Avatāras**

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BHAJAN *Bhajan* (Sanskrit, from *bhaj*, meaning “to serve, to love, to share”) is a Hindu devotional and ritual song performed either privately or communally by a soloist or (more commonly) by a soloist (or soloists) with responding chorus since probably the first millennium A.D. *Bhajan*, both in terms of practice and etymology, is associated with the *bhakti mārṅ* (*bhaj* is also the root of the word *bhakti*). The genre’s vernacular texts and regional musical idioms help to make it one of the most popular modes of worship, serving as a vehicle for the expression of devotion to a personal deity. Consequently, the repertoire is vast and diverse, with some examples hundreds of years old and others composed freshly for Bollywood.

Bhajan texts are often didactic and autobiographical. The former suggest idealized behaviors for *bhaktas* (devotees) to imitate, while the latter cite examples from the lives of famous *bhaktas* such as Mirabai. Sometimes, deities such as Krishna or Rāma are the subject of *bhajan* texts, with stories from their lives as examples for devotees.

Bhajans generally consist of two musico-poetic parts: *dhruva-pada* and *pada*. The *dhruva-pada* is the identifying couplet refrain sung at the beginning of the *bhajan* and after each succeeding *pada* or verse (also a rhymed couplet). Commonly, performers repeat each *pada* and *dhruva-pada*. As in many other South Asian musical forms, pitch register generally defines structural sections (*pada* and *dhruva-pada*).

In many traditions, singers use the same tunes for several *bhajans* so that a single tune can serve as a vehicle for a number of different texts. Sometimes, this melody is simple and standardized; however, in some traditions (Gujarati *dhāl*, for example) and in concert performances, the melodic materials and the concept itself can be more complex. Devotees often refer to these melodies by the title of a particularly popular *bhajan*.

The musical and textual transmission of *bhajan* materials is usually oral and communal, with singers learning from each other in performance contexts. Devotees can also purchase *bhajan* texts in small booklets (sometimes called *bhajanāvalis*) in the bazaar or at bus and railway stations, or they can hand copy texts compiled by devotees. Increasingly, *bhajans* composed for the popular film industry are also making their way into local repertoires through cassettes.

Praxis

Performances can be as simple as a single devotee singing to him- or herself during a quiet moment, or as formal as a classical musician closing a program in a concert hall. A stereotypical performance involves a gathering of devotees (a *bhajan mandal*) led by a singer (a *bhajanik*) who knows and can perform many *bhajans*. In different traditions, Hindu women and/or men (sexually segregated groups are more common in the north) get together on a weekly basis. Mixed groups also perform in special contexts (such as family performances).

Bhajan performance reflects other South Asian models in which a principal singer and group of responsorial singers (*jbelā*) participate in communal song (*samāj gāyan*). In *bhajan*, anyone can lead; he or she needs only have the devotion and conviction to begin and others will follow and support. *Bhajan* performances are common at temples, but neighbors and relatives engage in communal performances of *bhajan* in the home and, since neighborhoods have historically tended to be caste-defined, domestic *bhajan mandals* tend to be caste-defined. However, an individual (a *bhajanik*) may become so proficient, or may come to know such a specialized *bhajan* repertoire, that others will invite him or her to their community to lead the singing. Increasingly, in modern urban and suburban settings—and especially in the Indian diaspora—*bhajan mandals* are ethnically diverse and class consistent, thus reflecting social developments in modern India.

Reflecting the widespread popularity of *bhajan*, performers will employ whatever instruments they have available, especially those that are small and portable. Historically, performers prefer an unpitched drum such as the *dholak* or *dhul* for the purpose of providing the basic rhythmic accompaniment, with singers striking metal cymbals such as the *jhāñjh*, *kartāl*, or *mañjira*, if not clapping. As music education has grown, classical drums such as the *tablā* (in the north) and *mrdangam* (in the south) have become more common. Performances might also include the harmonium, a portable keyed bellows organ introduced into India by Europeans in the eighteenth century but widely adopted and adapted by Indians. In the late twentieth century, small electronic keyboards also appeared in homes to accompany singing.

Many communal *bhajan* performances begin with an *ārathī* (an invocation) asking to make the ritual auspicious and successful. An image of the god is placed before the singers, and a plate with a flame (usually from an oil lamp) is passed around the room. Commonly, devotees pass their outstretched hands over the flame and then touch their closed eyes in a symbolic gesture. After the completion of the *ārathī* the singers begin their first *bhajan*.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Bhakti; Music; Rāga; Tāla**

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BHAKTI *Bhakti* (“sharing” or “devotion”) denotes an intensely personal devotion to one’s deity. Religious devotion in a general sense can be found in the earliest Indian literature, the poems of the Rig Veda. But the devotion known as *bhakti*—and the word itself—first appears in the last two or three centuries B.C. The Shvetāshvatara Upanishad preaches devotion to Shiva, the Bhagavad Gītā to Vishnu/Krishna. Other, later texts are dedicated to the worship of the Great Mother Goddess or to a more abstract deity, as in the scripture of the Sikhs. Much of the *bhakti* movement was distinguished by its links to the rich Purāṇic mythology, questions of righteousness and spiritual liberation, and to India’s Hindu social structure, either defending or criticizing the system of castes (*jati*) and classes (*varna*).

A common feature of *bhakti* worship is the acceptance that spiritual liberation is open to members of all social orders, including women, even by those who maintain the traditional divisions of castes and classes. The devotion manifests itself in various ways: through ritual offerings, by listening to stories of Krishna’s deeds, by consorting with pious people, and by chanting the deity’s name or merely thinking about it. Even hatred or fear of Vishnu/Krishna may lead to liberation, because one’s mind is fixed on him. *Bhakti* is the preferred path to liberation (*moksha*) in this degenerate age, rather than meditation, Vedic sacrifice, or temple worship, which dominated in ages past; *bhakti* is a special blessing and opportunity for our otherwise miserable age. In the sixth through the tenth centuries the level of emotional involvement was raised dramatically in the poetry of the Ālvārs, who were devoted to Vishnu, and that of the Nāyanārs, who were devoted to Shiva, all written in Tamil. There were also hymns centered on yoga composed by the Siddhas (perfect masters). An idea that developed among the later Vishnu devotees was that *bhakti* is difficult and really plays only a secondary role, since salvation depends ultimately on Vishnu’s grace.

During the following centuries, what appears to have been a wave of popular *bhakti* movements spread north, expressed often in regional languages and carried by ordinary people. Late highpoints included the songs of

Kabīr, many of which entered the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy scripture of the Sikhs, with their focus on an abstract nondenominational deity; and the popular Rāmāyaṇa epic of Tulsīdās and the Gītagovinda, both works of intense devotion to forms of Vishnu, (Rāma and Krishna). The modern International Society of Krishna Consciousness traces its roots to Chaitanya, a fifteenth-century devotee of Krishna in Bengal.

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See also **Bhāgavata Purāṇa; Bhagavad Gītā; Vishnu and Avatāras**

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BHARAT The Constitution of India begins with this sentence: “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.” Written in English and adopted in 1950, the Constitution uses the name “India” throughout, but nevertheless provides the Sanskrit alternative to a name that is essentially foreign. Persian kings had named the eastern province of their large empire *Hindu* after the river Indus (Sanskrit *Sindhu*, Iranian *Hindu*); then, in the mouth of Greek-dialect speakers, the initial consonant was lost, and the people were called *Indoi* and their land *India*. These foreign forms were introduced as *Hindustan* (Land of the Indians) by the Muslims and *India* by the Europeans. In the oldest Indian texts, the country was simply called “the Earth,” later also *Jambū-dvīpa* (continent of the rose-apple tree). After the emergence of a powerful tribe, the Bharatas, in the Punjab toward the end of the second millennium B.C., the name *Bhārata Varsha* (the continent belonging to the Bharatas), or simply *Bhārata*, appears first in the great epic Mahābhārata, where it denotes more or less the Indian subcontinent, that is, the world region south of the mythical Mount Meru, which was ideally (but never in reality) ruled by an Indian “world ruler” (*cakravartin*). Later the name appears also as a compound, *Bhārata-varsha*.

India’s great epic, the Mahābhārata (The Great Tale of the Bharatas), deals with the dynastic conflict within the ruling family, which resulted in a gigantic battle and ultimate unification under the model king Yudhishtira. Though many of the events in this epic may be fictional, Indians have always regarded them as part of their early history, a time of great conflict but also of glory and the triumph of good over evil. It is often claimed that karma “matures” only in Bhārata-varsha, meaning that a man’s soul can only be cleansed and achieve spiritual liberation

there. The people living in this land were supposed to observe the four social orders or classes (*varna*) and the four stages of life (*ashramas*), following thus the code of inherited customs and ethics. Outsiders were considered *mlecchas* (barbarians), and contact with them was to be avoided. Historical events, however, resulted in many compromises, such as the acceptance of foreign rulers and extensive political and commercial interactions. But the ideal of Bhārata-varsha ruled by a righteous king like Rāma was never forgotten, and the mythology held out the hope that at the end of this decadent aeon Vishnu, in the form of Kalkin, born in a Brahman family, will arrive on a white horse and restore the world to its proper order.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Mahābhārata**

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BHARATA NATYAM. See **Dance Forms**.

BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP) Generally regarded as the party of Hindu nationalism, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the largest, dominant partner in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government that rose to power in India after the general elections of 1990 and that governed in 1998 and again from 1999 to 2004. Although the BJP still has a significant political presence in the populous north and west of the country, it is weaker in the south and the east.

The BJP was formed in 1980, the successor to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which was founded in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mookherji. The BJS had been established with the reluctant acquiescence of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which had rapidly become the preeminent “Hindu-first” national organization after its creation in 1925. The BJS remained on the margins of Indian national politics until the RSS launched a renewed campaign against cow slaughter in 1966, under the aegis of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. That campaign proved rewarding for the BJS in the parliamentary elections of 1967. A decade later, the BJS merged with a disparate umbrella group of political parties that united to form the Janata Party. They defeated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party, following her “National Emergency” of 1975. The Janata coalition itself, however,

swiftly succumbed to internal divisions soon after coming to power in 1977.

The Hindu nationalists of the newly formed BJP reentered the fray of Indian politics in the 1980s with new strategies, led by party president Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who later became prime minister. The Congress Party, which had led the struggle for Indian independence and had dominated national politics for three decades, resumed its decline despite a brief revival in fortunes, creating an opportunity for the BJP, which invoked “Gandhian socialism” and adopted the symbolically significant green, identified with Islam, as well as the saffron of the old Jana Sangh in its flag.

L. K. Advani, who later served as deputy premier and home minister in the BJP-led coalition government, was identified with a more traditional conservative, Hindu-first outlook. He took over the leadership of the BJP from Vajpayee in 1984. His invocation of cultural nationalism appealed to the growing Hindu middle class. The BJP called for a uniform civil code, which would end both Islamic personal law and the special status for the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir embodied in India’s Constitution. In addition, the implementation in 1990 of sweeping affirmative action quotas proposed by the Mandal Commission for deprived communities angered upper caste Hindu voters, whose support for the BJP grew. Advani, as the new president of the BJP, combined his critique of the anomalies of secularism in Hindu-Indian society and politics with an espousal of religious symbolism that captured the public mood. He began his symbolic *rath yatra* (chariot pilgrimage) across northern India to rally support for the party. It culminated in the BJP’s campaign for the construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya over the site of the Babri Masjid, which appealed to zealous Hindus.

The fortunes of the BJP advanced rapidly, its paltry two members in Parliament in 1984 rising to over 119 by 1991. It thus became the largest single party in Parliament. In 1991 the BJP captured of 21 percent of the vote in the India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, and had more than a third in Gujarat state, as well as over 28 percent in its southern stronghold, the state of Karnataka. By 1998, when it joined a coalition government, it had over a quarter of the vote, but it fell by a single vote thirteen days later in a vote of no-confidence in Parliament. But the BJP-led government managed to carry out nuclear tests during its tenure, dramatically turning India into a nuclear weapons state and winning public acclaim. The BJP alliance regained power in 1999 after expelling Pakistani invaders from Indian bunkers in Kargil in a highly televised summer war. Prime Minister



BJP Rally at Ramleela Grounds in New Delhi. The rally, 1 December 2004, intended to protest escalating prices, coincided with the first day of Parliament's most recent winter session, disrupting morning traffic in several parts of the capital. INDIA TODAY.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was then returned to power, with two additional seats, commanding a total of 182 in India's 540-member Lok Sabha.

During the following years, when the BJP led the NDA government, Indian politics experienced dramatic changes. The liberalization of the Indian economy continued in fits and starts, but with ever greater resolve, as it seemed to spur economic growth, structural transformation, and exports. The major change was India's abandonment of familiar foreign policy postures and its espousal of a new pragmatism that involved a much closer relationship with the United States and Israel. Relations with Pakistan remained tense, and the armed conflict over Kashmir continued unabated, worsening after India formally became a nuclear weapons state in 1998. Pakistan followed suit, and used its nuclear status to intensify covert warfare. But the BJP's reputation suffered a setback when its members and others from associated Hindu-first organizations were implicated in widespread attacks on Muslims in Gujarat.

Despite its ideological Hindu nationalist moorings, the BJP as a political party was compelled to make pragmatic electoral calculations. As a result, tensions arose with zealous Hindutva organizations, which had provided manpower for its election campaigns and had inspired Hindu voters. Historically, the RSS had preferred to engage with civil society to reform Hinduism, and generally disparaged political activity despite, inconsistently, arguing in favor of a robust modern Indian state.

Three interrelated factors complicated this tension between electoral imperatives and ideological issues. The first was the need to raise money, requiring distractions for government policy that constrained populist measures and disappointed voters. Another problem was corruption, fueled by the need to fund elections and finance the party apparatus, which compromised its members and the organization itself, and proved impossible to conceal from voters. The third was the growing criminalization of Indian politics, especially in regions experiencing economic stagnation, or indeed regression, making politics the most attractive vehicle for personal enrichment. The

BJP has been unable to escape these hard realities, which threaten its identity more than does its narrow ideological vision. In the elections of 2004, the BJP was defeated by the Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi.

Gautam Sen

See also Ayodhya; Hindu Nationalism; Hindu Nationalist Parties; Hindutva and Politics; Vajpayee, Atal Bihari; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

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BHAVE, VINOBA (1895–1982), Indian reformer, disciple of Mahatma Gandhi. A Chitpavan Brahman from Maharashtra, Vinoba Bhave showed remarkable aptitude in mathematics as a young boy, but he also mastered several languages and could have done well in any field. Instead he left home for Varanasi at the age of twenty, studied Sanskrit and meditated, but also took an interest in national affairs. When he heard of Mahatma Gandhi, he made up his mind to join his Sabarmati Ashram, where he was readily accepted. Soon after, Gandhi asked him to assume a significant responsibility. Jamlalal Bajaj, a rich Marwari businessmen from Wardha in central India, had joined Gandhi's movement and had requested him to set up a branch of the Sabarmati Ashram at Wardha. Gandhi sent Bhave to Wardha in 1921, where he organized an ashram in a very disciplined manner. In 1923 he joined Bajaj in the Nagpur



Vinoba Bhave. Bhave, Gandhi's spiritual heir, 1960. His Bhoodan (land gift), Jivadan (life gift), and Gramdan (village gift) movements were the natural extension of Gandhi's program of national reconstruction. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

National Flag Satyagraha, and they were both jailed. Their offense was that they had participated in a procession waving the Congress flag in Nagpur. They were released after a few months, and Bhave took up his work in the new ashram, which he called Sevagram (service village). Gandhi was impressed with the ashram when visiting there in 1928. In 1930, when Gandhi left the Sabarmati Ashram to begin his Salt March, he vowed not to return to his ashram until independence was achieved. He therefore settled in Bhave's ashram outside Wardha after he was released from prison. Bhave was again arrested in 1932, together with Bajaj, and they spent time together in Dhulia jail. Bajaj, who did not know Sanskrit, urged Bhave to translate the Bhagavad Gītā into Marathi, which he did; Bajaj later got it published, and it proved to be a great success. In 1940, when Gandhi launched a campaign of individual *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) against the British war effort, he selected Vinoba Bhave as his first disciple to break the law by public protest to be followed by Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi commented that Bhave was breaking the law as a representative of the pacifists who object to all wars, whereas Nehru represented those who objected to India's participation in this particular war.

The Bhoodan (Land Gift) Movement

Bhave was a self-effacing man who never gained prominence as a politician, but after Gandhi's assassination he embarked on a campaign that revealed him as the spiritual heir of the Mahatma. Bhave launched the Bhoodan (Land Gift) Movement in 1951, walking barefoot about 28,000 miles (45,000 km) throughout India, imploring landowners to give him one-fifth of their village land, "adopting" him as their son, so that he in turn could gift that acreage to the landless poor. He touched the hearts of the people and many promises were made, but when he left the scene few of them were kept, even though some land was eventually turned over to the poor. The Bhoodan Movement reached its zenith in 1956, then declined. Bhave then shifted the emphasis from Bhoodan to Gramdan and Jivandan. Gramdan (village gift) implied that a whole village would pledge to give all its land to Bhave for equal redistribution among its tillers of the soil. The first village of this kind took the pledge in 1952, and many others followed, but there was more lip service than practical consequence. Jivandan (gift of life) called for volunteers to devote their lives to the movement. Jaya Prakash Narayan, one of India's leading socialists, was the first to become a Jivandani. Bhave's decision of 1956 to stress Gramdan and to get along without paid organizers must be seen in the context of the political atmosphere of this time. In 1955 the Congress Party had passed a resolution recommending

joint collective farming at its annual meeting at Avadi. This radical resolution frightened the peasants, who subsequently supported the Swatantra Party founded by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. Vinoba Bhave did not favor the socialist idea of collective farming. His Gramdan emphasized voluntary cooperation based on individual autonomy. But most of the land surrendered to Bhave, entrusted to the government for distribution among the landless, was of poor quality, and government officials often did not know what to do with it. Bhave's faith in individual conviction, self-help, and prayer, and his disregard for institutional support for his movement led to its decline. His charismatic appeal could not suffice to give land to all of India's landless, but he had tried his best, hoping to see his dream, and that of his Mahatma, come true.

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BHOPAL The capital of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal (population 1.4 million in 2001) was founded by the Afghan Dost Mohammad in 1709, and was attacked by the Marathas in the late eighteenth century. The local Muslim ruler, the *nawāb* of Bhopal, entered into an alliance with the British in 1817, shortly before they defeated the Marathas in 1818. The small state, which had only about 730,000 inhabitants in 1931, survived under British rule. For several decades it was ruled by a succession of remarkable ladies. In 1926 Sultan Jahan Begum abdicated in favor of her son, Hamidullah, who then played a very active role in Indian politics prior to independence. In 1931, before Mahatma Gandhi left for London to attend the Second Round Table Conference, Hamidullah tried his best to promote a Hindu-Muslim compromise, with Gandhi's blessing. He could not achieve much at that time; he was later eclipsed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who after 1938 emerged as the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslims. In 1947 the princely state of Bhopal acceded to the Indian Union, and in 1956 it was integrated into the new central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh.

The area around Bhopal is known for its rich historical heritage. The famous Buddhist stupa of Sanchi, built in the third century B.C. and embellished in subsequent centuries, is situated at a distance of about 12 miles (20 km) from Bhopal. The old capital of this region,

Vidisha, where the Mauryan emperor Ashoka served as viceroy in his youth, is located about 30 miles (50 km) to the northeast of Bhopal.

In independent India, Bhopal became an industrial city. The U.S. company Union Carbide built a major factory for chemical pesticides there. The plant attracted worldwide attention in 1984, when thousands of people died due to a leak of its poisonous isocyanate gas, and thousands more became ill. Union Carbide was sued for damages, and it was requested that Warren Anderson, the chairman of the company, be extradited to India to be tried for homicide. (The Bhopal city court based the request for the extradition on Section 304, Indian Penal Code, which refers to “causing death by rash or negligent act.” The U.S. government rejected the request on technical grounds.) Union Carbide argued that the leak was caused by the negligence or even “sabotage” of its Indian workers, but those accusations could not be proven. The case dragged on for years and was finally settled out of court, but the meager compensation paid by the company hardly reached those who were actually affected by the disaster. Thus Bhopal became a symbol for the carelessness with which multinational companies handle their operations in Third World countries. The Bhopal disaster has tended to make people forget that this city is currently a thriving industrial center that manufactures a great variety of products, including cotton textiles, electrical goods, and jewelry. It is also known for its cultural activities.

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BHUBANESWAR Before becoming the capital of Orissa in 1948, Bhubaneswar had been a temple town. As such it prospered and thrived, becoming an important Hindu cultural center. It has remained an important Hindu center, notwithstanding the influx of Buddhism, Jainism, Shaivism, and Vaishnavism—religions that found a home in Bhubaneswar at one time or another, with the changing dynasties of Kalinga (the ancient name of present-day Orissa). It is generally believed that the town probably developed around the Lingaraja temple, erected to Lord Shiva. Thus the name Bhubaneswar derives from the Lord of the Three Worlds, Tribhunesvara.

The religious character of Bhubaneswar ultimately became responsible for its selection as the new capital of Orissa, although the city had never been the political capital of the region. But the Oriyas, in their search for a city that exemplified Oriya spirit and unity, strongly felt that Bhubaneswar was best suited to be the capital of their new province, the eleventh province of British India, in 1936. Before Orissa was created as a separate province, it had been administered from Calcutta and Bihar, in complete disregard of its ethnic and linguistic imperatives. Overshadowed first by the Bengalis and later by the Biharis, the Oriyas under the banner of the Utkal Union Conference launched a successful struggle to unify the scattered Oriya territories into a single province, Orissa.

Bhubaneswar was selected over the neighboring Cuttack by the Maharastrian Brahman B. K. Gokhale, special adviser to Governor Hawthorne Lewis, who, visiting it on 13 April 1945, strongly felt that the site was best suited for the capital of the new province. He was supported in his choice by the rising young Oriya Congressman Harekrushna Mahtab. Gokhale and Mahtab were attracted to Bhubaneswar because of the presence of the airport, which had been carved out of scrub jungle west of the temple town by the Allies during World War II. Certainly if the Allies could succeed in taming the jungle, they felt, the Orissa government could take the rest of the land which belonged to itself and build a new city. Moreover, Bhubaneswar had a mild climate throughout the year, and the main railway line connecting Calcutta and Madras ran past the site. The urban vision that formed in the mind of Gokhale looked to Bhubaneswar becoming an educational and cultural center of the region, with Cuttack retaining the commercial functions, and Chowdwar (a Cuttack suburb) growing into an industrial center.

To implement their urban architectural mission, the Oriyas hired the German-Jewish planner Otto Koenigsberger. From the beginning, Koenigsberger and the Oriyas disagreed on their visions of the capital city. Reared in a tradition of German secularism, Koenigsberger viewed the development of new Bhubaneswar along secular lines, having political autonomy, organized commercial relationships, and brave new architecture that would accommodate the requirements of modern life. The Oriyas, given their tendency to idealize antiquity, harkened back to their glorious religious past.

Also, from the beginning, the temple town and the capital city (which are located adjacent to each other) each sought to establish dominance over the other. The final shape and style of Bhubaneswar bears as much the imprint of religion as that of rational scientific knowledge imported from the West. Governor Asaf Ali clearly

instructed the Public Works Department (PWD) that “the architecture of the new capital should conform to the . . . ancient art of Orissa.” Koenigsberger, on the other hand, maintained that since the new India was intended to be a secular state, there was no place for temple architecture in the capital city—although he was prepared to include important religious monuments of the old town in his master plan to “form interesting viewpoints at the end of the main road.”

Although such divergence of interests created mixed results in Bhubaneswar, the Indians were able to work out their ideas far more freely in Bhubaneswar than in Chandigarh, where Swiss-born French architect Le Corbusier retained close control of all architectural developments. Other than the master plan that was provided by Koenigsberger, the architectural developments in Bhubaneswar were carried out by Julius Vaz, a graduate of the J. J. School of Art, Bombay, and his PWD staff.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Chandigarh**

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BHŪTA In Sanskrit, *Bhūta* (*bhūt* in modern Indic languages) means a “supernatural being,” a ghost or spirit, sometimes beneficent but more often malevolent and a source of anxiety for individuals and communities. In the late Vedic period, two original meanings—a living being or a cosmic element—shifted to include “disembodied spirit.” *Bhūtas* became a broad category of beings worthy of daily sacrifices, usually a scattering of grains, but sometimes a more deliberate offering known as *balī*. The untimely dead, including suicides, victims of murder, drowning, fire, snakebite, and falls from trees are likely troublesome ghosts haunting the sites of death. Persons with improper funeral rites may vex living relatives by lingering as *bhūtas*. From the Vedic period to the present, a Hindu funeral and succeeding rites (*sbrāddha*) serve to transform a *preta*, the continuing spirit released from the body after death, into a *pitṛ* (“father” or “ancestor”) abiding in an otherworldly realm, avoiding *bhūta*-hood. *Bhūta* is often conflated with *preta*; in modern Hindi, *bhūtpret* is a common term for “ghost.” Every region of South Asia has vernacular equivalents to *bhūta* or *preta*. In Tamil, *pey* is a derivative of *preta*. A Telugu colloquialism, *gāli-dbūli*

(wind and dust), signifies omnipresent, dangerous, invisible spirits. Muslims in South Asia speak of jinn with the authority of the Qur’an (surah 55.15) to describe similar phenomena: a jinn, acting for good or evil, may represent the haunting presence of the deceased as well as other supernatural powers.

Classical Sanskrit medical treatises on Āyurveda understood *bhūtas* broadly to include malevolent *grabhas* (seizers), possessors of humans with ill effects to mind and body. Chapter 60 of the Uttarantra appendix to Sushruta Saṃhitā covers *bhūtaavidyā*, “the science of *bhūtas*,” including prescriptions for a patient seized by ancestors, demons, ghouls, or other ghosts. Recitation of mantras, offerings of meat, blood, milk, fermented beverages, and even clothes, incense fumigations, and applications of unguents to the patient are recommended by the physician in this text, still considered authoritative.

Folklore holds that a *bhūt* or *pēy* is likely to jump on a person at night, or high noon in the hot season, particularly someone passing a cremation site or burial ground or a well (a venue for suicides), under certain trees, or obeying calls of nature. Following a death, a house may be closed for a time, or sold, because of dangerous ghosts. Those who do not fear *bhūts* are said to be immune from attack. Most every village or town has specialists in exorcisms laboring with the aid of favored goddesses, gods, and saints to identify and dispatch *bhūts* or jinn from the bodies of their clients. Brahmans and Brahman-imitating high castes profess little credence in *bhūt* phenomena, yet at times they too become victims, forced to consult generally low caste exorcists. In some locales, both Hindus and Muslims have recourse to the same healer, shrine, or tomb of a saint.

There are many categories. In North India, a *brahm* is a powerful Brahman male ghost, liable to exact vengeance on enemies with diseases such as leprosy. A *bhavāmi* is the spirit of an unmarried girl. The *curail*, the ghost of a vengeful barren woman, causes miscarriages. Aborted fetuses may terrorize their kin. *Bhūts* are supposed to be invisible, yet many describe them as hideous humans dressed in white, feet turned backward, palms of hands reversed, noses clipped, fingernails grossly long.

On the other hand, not all “ghosts” are malevolent or undesired. Male or female children who die before marriage may be installed as household guardian-deity images, credited with the well-being of the family, worshiped and fed daily, paraded in processions, where they possess and speak through mothers or other relatives. In the Vīrabhadra cult of coastal Andhra, possessions are deliberately sought to maintain contact, ease the pain of loss, and satisfy an infant or child deprived of a full life span. The *bīr* (from Sanskrit *vīra*, “hero”) cults of North

India honor heroes, particularly those who died an early, violent death. *Bhūta* cults of coastal Karnataka also welcome heroic and other spirits, who ritually possess and speak through dancers and priests, receive offerings, and provide blessings to the community.

David M. Knipe

See also **Āyurveda; Hindu Ancestor Rituals; Hinduism (Dharma); Śaṃskāra**

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BHUTTO, ZULFIKAR ALI (1928–1979), president (1971–1977) and prime minister (1973–1977) of Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was Pakistan's most popular political leader and its only prime minister to be hanged. Born in Sind's Larkhana, Zulfi was the youngest son of wealthy Sindi "landowner" (*wadero*) and princely state premier Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and his second wife, young Hindu Lakhi Bai, who converted to Islam, changing her name to Khurshid. Zulfi's formal education started in Bombay's Cathedral High. In September 1947, a few weeks after partition tore India apart with the birth of Pakistan, he flew from Bombay to New York and Los Angeles, enrolling at the University of Southern California (USC).

Impact of Study Abroad

Zulfi was less interested in USC course work than in fraternity pranks and parties. After two years at USC, he transferred to Berkeley, majoring in political science, fascinated by Napoleon Bonaparte, his role model. Though he had been married as a boy to one of his Larkhana child cousins, Zulfi met his true wife, Nusrat Ispahani, at his sister's wedding on his first trip to Pakistan from Berkeley. Two years later they married in Karachi, flew to London and then to Oxford, where Zulfi enrolled at Christ Church College. A year later, their first of four children, Benazir, was born. Zulfi taught his daughter everything

he loved about realpolitik; eventually, Benazir would follow in his footsteps to the pinnacle of Pakistani power.

Lincoln's Inn Barrister Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 1953, briefly practicing law in Karachi before abandoning it for politics. Soon after General Ayub Khan's coup in 1958, Bhutto became his foreign minister, urging his older martial "president" in 1965 to ignore the "cease-fire line" in Kashmir and quickly "liberate" that state's Muslim majority from India's army "of occupation." Bhutto assured Ayub that Kashmir's people would "rise up" as soon as Pakistan's tanks moved east. No popular welcome awaited them, however, only Indian bombs, floodwaters unleashed by India's engineers, trapping Pakistan's heavy armor in deep mud. India's tanks then rolled west to the outskirts of Lahore, and Ayub was forced to accept a cease-fire, flying with Bhutto to Tashkent for a peace conference with Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, hosted by Russian premier Aleksey Kosygin. The frail Shastri died the day after the armistice agreement was signed in January 1966, succeeded by Indira Gandhi. Ayub, depressed by the war he had lost, soon succumbed to heart failure, turning over his martial rule to General Yahya Khan.

Bhutto alone emerged after Tashkent stronger than ever. He started a new Pakistan People's Party (PPP), winning popular acclaim wherever he spoke in West Pakistan. But East Pakistanis showed little interest in anything Bhutto said. Most Bengalis understood none of his Urdu or English rhetoric. Bengal's Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, head of his Awami (People's) League, was the only politician supported by most Bengalis. They voted overwhelmingly for him in Pakistan's first nationwide election of 1970. Bhutto's PPP won a majority in West Pakistan, but East Pakistan had 10 million more people, so Mujib's Awami League won a majority of National Assembly seats. Mujib should have become Pakistan's first democratically elected prime minister, but Bhutto refused to accept him and persuaded Pakistan's weak-minded martial "president" Yahya Khan to launch a bloody war against "Bangla-Desh" (Land of Bengalis) in March 1971 instead. Pakistan's army suffered a humiliating defeat as Indian troops, supported by heavy Russian artillery and tanks, rolled across Bangladesh in early December. Bhutto blustered to the United Nations Security Council that Pakistan would "never surrender." But two days later it did.

Bhutto flew home in the aftermath of that debacle to take Yayha's job as "martial law president," vowing to "pick up the pieces" of battered Pakistan. He soon nationalized Pakistan's banks, took control of Pakistan's shipping, and began funding the development of a secret nuclear arms program. In midsummer of 1972, Bhutto flew with his daughter to Simla for a summit with Indira Gandhi. They agreed to turn Jammu and Kashmir's cease-fire line into a redrawn "line of control" and formally ended the



Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto at the height of his power and popularity, 1973. Just six years later, he was found guilty of murder and hanged. The Pakistani population remains divided in its assessment of his legacy. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Bangladesh War. Pakistan soon recognized the totally independent “nation of Bengal,” losing more than half its population and most of its foreign-currency earnings from jute. India promised to return its more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners. Bhutto flew home to cheering crowds and a hero’s welcome in Lahore, Karachi, and Larkhana, where he kept his huge arsenal of guns and ammunition for festive annual shooting parties.

Pinnacle of Power

In 1973 Bhutto persuaded his National Assembly to adopt a new Constitution for the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” over which he would preside as its first prime minister. He then flew to Washington, welcomed warmly by his patrons, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as Pakistan’s “savior.” February 1974 marked the peak of Bhutto’s power. He regally hosted an Islamic summit of thirty-eight Muslim heads of state in Lahore, including Bangladesh’s prime

minister, and every “king, royal highness and excellency” of the Islamic world.

But that May 1974, Indira Gandhi triggered India’s first underground nuclear explosions in Rajasthan, close enough to Pakistan’s Sind to be felt by Bhutto himself. Zulfi inveighed against such “nuclear blackmail,” vowing that his people would sooner “eat grass” than allow India to use its bombs against a less powerfully armed Pakistan. South Asia’s most lethal arms race thus moved into high gear. The Peace of Tashkent and the harmony of the 1972 summit at Simla were buried under nuclear bomb blasts and angry rhetoric.

Decline and Fall

Before year’s end, the father of one of Bhutto’s outspoken critics and political opponents, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, was gunned down inside a car driven by his son. The son accused Bhutto of murdering his father by “mistake,” aiming to kill him instead. Bhutto denied it, but on the

night of 4 July 1977, Bhutto's handpicked choice for Pakistan's chief of army staff job, General Zia ul-Haq, ordered Prime Minister Bhutto arrested. Zia's midnight coup was followed a few months later by Bhutto's trial for the "murder" with which he had previously been charged. In March 1978 Bhutto was found guilty as charged, sentenced to death, and after a series of appeals, all of which failed, was hanged before dawn on 4 April 1979.

Bhutto was hailed by millions of Pakistanis as Shaheed (martyr)—"Zulfi Bhutto lives on!" they cried. His daughter, Benazir, began her first term as Pakistan's prime minister a decade later, shortly after Zia ul-Haq and most of his loyal staff went down in flames in 1988 in a mysterious crash of their C-130 plane almost immediately after it took off.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Pakistan**

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BIHAR Bihar (*vibar*, Sanskrit, meaning "monastery") is one of the most populous states in India, bordered by Nepal on the north, and by the states of West Bengal in the east, Jharkhand in the south, and Uttar Pradesh in the west.

Bihar has an area of 36,357 sq. miles (94,163 sq. km), after losing approximately 45 percent of its territory and the rich mineral resources of its southern part when the new state of Jharkhand was created in November 2000. Bihar is on latitude 24°20'10" to 27°31'15" north and longitude 83°19'50" to 88°17'40" east. The state is

dominated by the middle Ganga Plains, divided into the north and the south plains. The north Bihar Plain is flat alluvial country, less than 250 feet (76 m) above sea level and prone to flood; the south Bihar Plain is more diversified, with many hills rising from the level alluvium. The rivers Kosi and Gandak from the north and Son and Punpun from the south join the Ganga. In Bihar's fertile plains, rice, wheat, oilseeds, maize, gram, barley, and various fruits and vegetables are cultivated. Among the important cash crops are chilies, tobacco, jute, potatoes, and sugarcane.

May is Bihar's hottest month, when temperatures average 81° to 102° Fahrenheit (27° to 39°C). The normal annual rainfall varies from 40 inches (1,016 mm) in the west central part to more than 60 inches (1,524 mm) in the far north and in the northwest.

Bihar enjoyed a prominent position in Indian history, as several kingdoms flourished there. The first Indian state was formed at Vaishali by about 700 B.C. From the sixth century B.C. to the fifth century A.D., this region was the seat of major empires and the cradle of Indian civilization. Magadha, in the sixth century B.C., was the main center of the Buddha's activities, and also of his contemporary Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. The fourth century B.C. saw the rise of the Mauryan dynasty, of which Ashoka was the third monarch. Magadha reemerged to glory during the Guptan dynasty in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. After the onslaught of the Hunas in the mid- and late fifth century, Bihar lost its former glory, regaining it during the era of the Palas of Bengal (A.D. 775–1200). Under Muslim rule (12th–18th century), Bihar had little independence. It was conquered by the British in 1765 and remained part of the Bengal presidency until 1912, when the province of Bihar and Orissa was formed. The two provinces were separated in 1936.

Bihar played a significant role in different phases of India's struggle for independence. It was an important center of the "mutiny" of 1857–1859, during which Kuer Singh emerged as a hero in Bihar. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, launched his first *satyagraha* (devotion to truth), or passive resistance movement, against European indigo planters in the Champaran district of northern Bihar. Rajendra Prasad, the first president of independent India, came from Bihar.

The population of Bihar in 2001 was almost 83 million. It is one of India's most rural states, with only about 13 percent of its people being urban. Patna, Gaya, Bhagalpur, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, and Munger (Monghyr) are the major cities. Hindus constitute about 83 percent and Muslims about 14 percent of Bihar's population. The literacy rate is very low, only about 47 percent for males and 33 percent for females.



Cooking Outside a Village Hut, Bihar. In the densely populated and largely rural state of Bihar, a typical scene unfolds: outside a thatched home, woman preparing her family's meal atop a *chullab* (mud stove). AMAR TALWAR/FOTOMEDIA.

Bihar's cultural and linguistic regions are closely integrated. Maithili, in the area of Mithila in north Bihar, and Bhojpuri and Magahi in the central plains, are of the Bihari group of languages. Hindi is spoken by over 90 percent of Biharis and is Bihar's official language, with Urdu being its second language. Madhubani line paintings, done originally by the women of Mithila to decorate the facades of their village homes, are perhaps the most famous works of folk art in Bihar.

Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Muslim, and Sikh shrines abound in this ancient land. Patna (Pataliputra), the capital of Bihar, is one of the most ancient cities of the world. Gaya, about 62 miles (100 km) south of Patna, is a great center of pilgrimage for Hindus. Nine miles (15 km) from there is Bodhi Gayā, the world's greatest pilgrimage site for Buddhists, where over 2,500 years ago, Gautam, the prince of Kapilavastu, attained enlightenment and became the Buddha, the "enlightened one." The ruins of the world's earliest university, the celebrated Nalanda Buddhist monastic university (founded in the fifth century A.D., flourished until the twelfth century), lies 56 miles (90 km) south of Patna. Rajgir, a pre-Pataliputra town of Magadha, and a very important

center for both Hindus and Jains, lies 9 miles (15 km) west of Nalanda. Pawapuri, 24 miles (38 km) from Rajgir, is the place where the founder of Jainism, Mahavira, died.

Biharis of different sects and faiths celebrate their festivals with much gaiety and devotion throughout the state. Holi, the spring festival of colors, is the most buoyant of all Hindu festivals. At the festival of Dussehra, prayers are offered to the Mother goddess Durga, symbolizing the victory of good over evil. Diwali (Deepawali) is celebrated by illuminating houses to commemorate the return of Lord Rāma after fourteen years of exile. However, the most revered festival in Bihar is Chhat, in which the Sun God is the object of veneration. Muslims observe Eid (Eid-al-Fitr) and Bakrid (Eid-al-Zuha) with great devotion and zest. Jayanti (birthdays) of Buddha and Mahavira are celebrated by Buddhists and Jains, and Guru Gobind Singh's birthday is celebrated by Sikhs on a grand scale.

The governor of Bihar, appointed by the president of India, is the head of the state, who functions on the advice of the chief minister, who heads the council of ministers of the state government. The legislature in

Bihar is bicameral. The upper house, or Legislative Council, and the lower house, or Legislative Assembly, are called Vidhan Parishad and Vidhan Sabha, respectively. The state judiciary is headed by a high court at Patna, with a chief justice and several other judges. The state is divided into 9 administrative divisions, 38 districts, 101 subdivisions, and 533 blocks. Its bureaucracy is headed by the chief secretary, below whom are the secretaries of various departments.

Yuvaraj Prasad

See also **Bengal; Guptan Empire; Patna**

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BIMBISARA (c. 555–493 B.C.), *king of Magadha*.

Bimbisara, the king of Magadha (southern Bihar), made his capital, Rajagriha, the splendid center of the first empire in eastern India. Having added to his realm both Koshala, to the west of Magadha, by matrimonial alliance, and Anga, to the east, by conquest, he ruled over a large territory with fertile rice fields and access to iron ore and other natural resources in the adjacent forests. By controlling the River Ganges (Ganga) from about the present-day western border of Bihar to its mouth, he could profit from the river trade of eastern India. Bimbisara introduced a land-revenue system and an efficient administration and could thus support a strong army. It is said that in his administrative policy he may have been influenced by that of the Persian emperors Cyrus II and Darius I. Cyrus had founded an empire that extended from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan when he died in 530 B.C. The brilliant usurper Darius, who ruled from 522 to 486 B.C., then held sway from the Nile to the Indus. Bimbisara must certainly have been aware of their grandeur.

Bimbisara is a prominent figure in the Buddhist legends (Jataka tales), which portray him as a contemporary of the Buddha, whom he is said to have admired and protected. He may also have extended his support to Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. His ambitious son, Ajatashatru, forced Bimbisara to abdicate, and then imprisoned him and starved him to death. According to the Jataka tales, the motive for this crime was that Bimbisara was a staunch follower of the Buddha, which was resented by his son's

evil advisers. Bimbisara had founded the first great royal dynasty of India, and the territory that he ruled also served as the base of the empires of the subsequent dynasties, the Nandas and the Mauryas.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Guptan Empire; Magadha; Mauryan Empire**

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BINDUSARA. See **Mauryan Empire**.

BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION Modern

biotechnology originated in the mid-1970s with new advances in genetics, immunology, and biochemistry. Biotechnology includes all techniques that use living organisms or substances from organisms to produce or alter a product, cause changes in plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for specific purposes. Biotechnology encompasses several techniques and methods, including genome mapping, gene splicing (or the transfer of one or more genes with certain prospectively useful qualities to plants, domestic animals, fish, and other organisms), and molecular breeding. Although genetic modification of crops and domesticated animals has been occurring for over a thousand years, using tools such as selective breeding and hybridization, modern biotechnology speeds up the process enormously, incorporating new traits from virtually any species at will. Indeed, biotechnology's unprecedented ability to move genes within and across species, including the ability to move genes across distantly related species, and potentially even between animals and plants, makes it a powerful tool for modifying nature.

Although the first biotechnology-based foods entered the marketplace in 1994, by 2001 over 50 modifications involving 13 crops had been approved and produced on more than 128 million acres (52 million hectares) in at least 14 countries. The bulk of commercial applications of biotechnology are concentrated in agriculture and food processing, particularly in the development of new varieties of food plants, diagnostics for plant and animal diseases, and vaccines against animal diseases, including reduced herbicide and pesticide use through the utilization of biological control agents. One of biotechnology's first applications included staple crops such as corn and cotton that were bioengineered to make toxins capable of killing insect pests. For example, "Bt maize" has been genetically modified to make it produce a protein from



Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw of Biocon India. Mazumdar-Shaw, managing director and founder of Biocon India, a pioneer in the manufacture of specialty industrial enzymes and active pharmaceutical ingredients. Biocon, like other Indian biotechnology companies, is increasingly serving as a research arm to major multinational corporations. INDIA TODAY.

the bacterium *Bacillus thuringiensis* that kills the corn borer insect, a major threat to maize crops. Similarly, crops such as squash, potatoes, wheat, papaya, and raspberries have been successfully engineered to resist common plant diseases, and to be kept much longer in storage and transport. Transgenic tomatoes and bananas have been developed with slow ripening properties. Genetically modified soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton have been developed with resistance to the herbicide glyphosate and are now widely used in the United States.

Biotechnology has successfully enhanced the quality of food by increasing the levels of essential amino acids and vitamins to foods traditionally lacking in those nutrients. For example, the incorporation of two daffodil genes that produce vitamin A to a rice variety (called golden rice) is a major breakthrough. If used widely, it has the potential to substantially increase the nutritional

quality of diets and to reduce blindness and other threats to health in millions of adults and especially children in the developing world. Similarly, enhancing fruits and vegetables to contain vaccines against deadly and debilitating diseases, such as hepatitis, cholera and malaria, may help developing countries where such infectious diseases are rampant, especially among children. Of course, the key will be the ability to grow and distribute foods containing these edible vaccines locally and at relatively low cost.

Modifications to tissue culture, marker-assisted selection, and DNA fingerprinting now allow a faster and more targeted development of improved genotypes for crop varieties. This has enabled crops to grow in difficult environments such as those that have irregular water supplies or poor soils, to greatly reduce postharvest losses, and to strengthen a crop's own ability to defend itself against destructive insects, thereby reducing the need for chemical pesticides. Biotechnology and genetic engineering therefore have the potential to help increase productivity in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. It could lead to higher yields on marginal lands in countries that today cannot grow enough food to feed their people. These developments have been hailed as the coming of a second Green Revolution, giving farmers a powerful tool in their struggle against the vagaries of nature and the age-old scourge of pestilence and disease.

Despite the potential gains, opposition to biotechnology ranges from concerns regarding the dangers of gene splicing and objections to the patenting of living organisms on religious and ethical grounds to fears of unanticipated health and environmental consequences. The harshest opposition is reserved for the "unregulated" production of genetically engineered or modified foods—dubbed Frankenfoods by some. Critics argue that there has been insufficient testing on genetically modified (GM) foods and that the benefits of such foods have not been adequately demonstrated. They point out that the potential risks of adulterated GM foods may include toxic reactions, food allergies, increased cancer risks, antibiotic resistance, and even death, as the recent outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in Britain tragically illustrated. Moreover, many also see a clear potential for ecological disaster as a result of wholesale genetic pollution resulting from cross-breeding and gene transfer to nontarget plant and animal species, the creation of new viruses and bacteria, and the mutation of weeds and pests into "superweeds" and "superpests," either by accidental transfer of the herbicide-resistant genes from the crops to weeds, or as weeds and pests eventually develop resistance to pesticides and vaccines in the genetically engineered crops. Critics claim that over the long run, biotechnology will

serve to greatly reduce biodiversity by deliberately promoting certain species over others, thereby reducing the genetic pool of plant and animal life, making the planet even more dependent on a handful of food varieties. Some environmental activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Greenpeace, have called for a complete moratorium on further development of biotechnology, while others have urged developing countries to refrain from producing GM foods because they may lose export markets in industrialized countries where consumer anxiety over genetically engineered foods remains palpable. Indeed, despite reassurances by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other national and international agencies that biotech foods currently on the market are safe for human consumption, the European Union in April 1998 banned the use and import of GM crops. Consumers in the European Union, Japan, the United States, and India remain deeply wary of GM foods.

Most agricultural biotechnology research has concentrated primarily on commercial agriculture and on industrialized nations' staple crops, rather than on the food needs of developing countries. Investments in crops consumed by the vast majority of people in developing countries, such as cassava, millets, sorghum, sweet potatoes, yams, legumes, lentils, pigeon peas, chickpeas, traditional rice varieties, and groundnuts, remain insignificant. Critics maintain that such a bias is deliberate, as private investment in biotechnological research is oriented toward agriculture in higher-income countries, where there is purchasing power for its products. Of equal concern, the development of substitutes for major developing country export crops such as cocoa and sugarcane could have a devastating impact on these economies. Unlike earlier Green Revolution technologies, which were developed mainly by publicly funded institutions in both developed and developing countries, and philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, modern agricultural biotechnology remains the monopoly of multinational corporations, in particular, those in the pharmaceutical and food-processing industries. At present, biotechnology applications remain concentrated among a few large corporations, including Aventis, Monsanto, AgrEvo, Syngenta, DuPont, Zeneca, and Dow. Unlike the philanthropic organizations, which literally gave away high-yielding seed varieties to developing countries, corporations have agreed only to transfer proprietary technologies at a cost—some even demanding royalties up front. Such actions inevitably raise concerns that property rights protection on the processes and products of biotechnology may prevent cultivators in developing countries from benefiting from the new technologies.

The Development of Biotechnology in India

In 1986 the Indian government established a Department of Biotechnology (DBT) under the Ministry of Science and Technology to give impetus to the development of modern biotechnology in India. The DBT has a mandate to promote biotechnology throughout the country by collecting and disseminating relevant information, developing safety guidelines, and promoting education, research, and development by establishing research institutes. India's national budget provides significant increases for research and development spending on biotechnology; since 2001, biotech firms enjoy a 150 percent tax deduction for research and development. This has resulted in the proliferation of biotech parks (high-tech industrial complexes), like the Marine Biotech Park in Chennai. States like Punjab, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh are collaborating with private promoters to build or expand biotech parks in their respective states. Currently, both the Indian private sector and government are investing heavily in the agricultural and medicinal applications of biotechnology.

India now has a fairly advanced infrastructure in both fields, and has made important scientific contributions in several areas: biological control of plant pests, diseases, and weeds; development of new vaccines and veterinary products from medicinal and aromatic plants; and enhancement of the nutritional value of staples such as Basmati rice, mustard, mustard oil, wheat, mangoes, cardamom, chickpeas, potatoes, vegetables, bananas, oil palm, and coconut. Moreover, India has a great deal of expertise in critical areas such as microbiology, chemical synthesis, immunology, and biotech equipment manufacturing. Also, patenting of innovations, technology transfer to industries, development of transgenic plants, recombinant vaccines, and drugs are now quite advanced. Several universities and colleges now have biotechnology programs, and the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology have launched advanced degree programs in biosciences, biomedical engineering, bio-informatics, and applied biotechnology. As a result, the country not only has developed a strong base of indigenous capabilities, it is well prepared to benefit from foreign collaboration. Indeed, India's biotechnology industry is increasingly serving as a research arm to major multinational corporations, with growing potential for further strategic alliances.

However, there are some major challenges. India's regulatory system for biotechnology products is bureaucratic and secretive. Currently, biotechnology products must be reviewed by both district and state monitoring committees. Then the products are reviewed by committees at the national level, including those from the DBT, the Department of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture,

and the Ministry of Environment. The industry has called for expediting revisions, proposing a single national regulatory agency for all biotechnology products under direct authority of the prime minister, independent of various government departments and ministries. Similarly, inconsistent policies regarding intellectual property rights in India limit the growth potential of the biotechnology industry.

Clearly, both India and the international community need to formulate a consistent policy on intellectual property rights. Consider the case of *haldi*, or tumeric. *Haldi*, an essential ingredient in curry powder, has been used in India for centuries as an antiseptic on wounds. In 1993, when two American scientists registered a patent for *haldi*'s wound-healing properties, the Indian government mounted a successful challenge and had the patent revoked after proving (using ancient Sanskrit texts) that this was no discovery. However, such "success" has been rare. For example, despite protests by the Indian government and NGOs that basmati rice was the product of informal breeding by Indian farmers, the U.S. company Ricetec was granted patent rights for developing "Basmati 867." Ricetec successfully argued that it had developed a new higher-yielding strain. Similarly, *sarson* (mustard seeds), used for centuries in Ayurvedic medicine, was patented by a number of Western laboratories who had successfully extracted the mustard oil used for certain medicines. An extract from the leaves of the neem plant, used as toothpaste and as an antiseptic for centuries in India, was patented by several American and European laboratories, despite challenges by the Indian government. A broad global agreement on intellectual property rights related to biotechnology is clearly critical.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, India achieved dramatic increases in food production by developing high-yielding rice and wheat varieties, increased irrigated areas, and enhanced fertilizer and pesticide use. However, intensification of agriculture and reliance on irrigation and chemical inputs has led to severe environmental degradation with problems of salinity and pesticide abuse. To meet its food demand, India must attend to these challenges immediately. With the potential to increase India's agricultural productivity, biotechnological applications in agriculture could help address India's food availability challenges while preserving fragile land areas. Biotechnology may substantially increase productivity in major food crops, without reliance on chemicals, fertilizers, or pesticides. It also offers possible opportunities for better soil, water, and nutritional management as well as productivity of livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture. Biotechnology offers both promise and perils. Appropriately monitored and integrated with other technologies for the production of food, agricultural products, and

services, biotechnology could be of significant assistance in meeting the needs of India's expanding and increasingly urbanized population.

Shalendra D. Sharma

See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)


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BOLLYWOOD. *See Cinema.*

BOMBAY India's modern metropolis of Bombay, known for its fashions, films, financial industries, cotton mills, skyscrapers, and squalor, was once an archipelago of seven sleepy islands, inhabited only by Buddhist monks and the tribal deep-sea fishermen called Kolis, whose stone goddess, Mumbadevi, gave the principal island its present name, Mumbai. For the British, Bombay was their main harbor and the nucleus of the British East India Company's fort on Mumba Island, from which the modern city grew. Present-day Bombay, or Mumbai, stretches from Dongri (the congested inner city, one of the oldest parts of Bombay) on the east to Malabar Hill on the west. The other islands include Colaba—the most expensive real estate in the world in 2005; Old Man's Island, also called Old Woman's Island; Mazagaon, famous for its mango groves; Worli, known for the Haji Ali Dargah, a mosque-tomb named after a Sufi saint; Parel, which is possibly named after the Shaivite Parali Vajjanath Mahadev temple of the thirteenth-century kingdom of Raja Bhimdev (the island is also called Matunga, Sion, and Dharavi); and Mahim, the capital of Raja Bhimdev to the west of Parel, north of Worli, named after the Mahim River.

Bombay changed hands many times, from the Buddhist Mauryan emperor Ashoka to the Muslim rulers of Gujarat to the imperial Mughals, remaining marginal to Indian history because neither the Hindu rajas nor the Muslim rulers placed much importance on maritime



Bombay's Diverse Environs. A world apart: In the island city of Bombay a narrow stretch of water separates a slum from towering luxury high-rises. VIVIANE MOOS/CORBIS.

trade—and whatever maritime trade flourished between the ninth and thirteenth centuries in the Indian Ocean was limited to Aden (Yemen), west coast cities of Africa, and Calicut, south of Bombay on the Malabar coast. However, under both the Ahmedabad sultans and the Mughals, Bombay experienced Islamization. The oldest surviving Hindu structures in the archipelago are the Elephanta Caves containing fresco paintings and, possibly, a portion of the Walkeshwar Temple Complex, both dating back to the late thirteenth century. The mosque in Mahim dates back to the Ahmedabad sultanate period.

With the advent of the Europeans in the sixteenth century in the Indian Ocean, Bombay was soon pushed from the margins of Indian history to center stage. Soon after Francis Almeida in 1534 sailed into the deep-water natural harbor of the island that the Portuguese called Bom Bahia (the “good bay”), the Portuguese realized Bombay’s potential importance. The Portuguese, who already controlled Goa, Daman, and Diu off the west coast of India, forcibly occupied Bombay until 1662, when it was given to England’s King Charles II in dowry on his marriage to the Portuguese princess Catherine of Braganza. Under the Portuguese Jesuits, Christianity

came to Bombay, with the building of churches and vigorous attempts to proselytize the indigenous Kolis. The Portuguese built a fort in Bassein. Still, the Portuguese never realized Bombay’s full potential as a strategic natural harbor or a vital commercial center of imperial power.

The British first reached Gujarat on 24 August 1608, when Captain William Hawkins of the East India Company dropped anchor off Surat, at the mouth of the Tapti River. Hawkins found the port city crowded with Indians, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Portuguese, Dutch, and other merchants engaged in a trade of goods encompassing luxuries as well as necessities: indigo, cotton, carpets, and satin, ready for export. Hawkins feared that Portuguese Jesuits “had helped convert Indian apathy and neutrality toward Englishmen into a positive aversion.” But the Anglo-Portuguese rivalry culminated in Hawkins’s victory over the Portuguese fleet off Surat in November 1612. However, the growing demand for indigo and saltpeter, combined with the famine of 1630 in Surat, persuaded the British to look for a new location. The archipelago of Bombay, considered worthless by the British, was turned over by Charles II to the East India Company for an annual rent of only £10 in 1668.

George Oxenden became the first British governor of Bombay, but it was Gerald Aungier, the second governor, who had the vision to turn the archipelago into a trading port that would rival other ports in the Indian Ocean. He first secured the island by building a fort (a small portion of the wall has survived), and through a variety of inducements he attracted skilled workers and traders from Gujarat: Parsis, Bohras, Jews, and Hindu Banias. Bombay's population soared from 10,000 in 1661 to 60,000 in 1675. Bombay soon displaced Surat as the western gateway to India.

After finally defeating the Hindu Marathas in 1818, the British embarked upon reclamations of land and large-scale public works projects in Bombay. From 1784 to 1845 the British successfully fused Bombay's seven islands into a single landmass. In 1850, Thana (a suburb) was linked with Bombay by a 21-mile (35 km) railway line, and in 1854, the first cotton mill was built. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, cotton exports from Bombay became an important part of the colonial economy. The Bombay Municipal Corporation was founded in 1872 and its Stock Exchange opened in 1875. The city witnessed the erection of several imperial monuments well into the twentieth century, including the Flora Fountain, Victoria Terminus, Hanging Gardens, Gateway of India, General Post Office, and the Prince of Wales Museum. The British employed High Victorian and Edwardian architectural language, fused with features derived from twelfth- to fifteenth-century English, French, and Venetian Gothic, augmented by elements of the Indo-Saracenic style.

As a result of the efforts of Governor Mountstuart Elphinstone in the 1820s, Bombay became India's center of English education and social reform. The establishment of the Bombay University in 1857 provided a new impetus to English-language education: Indians gained proficiency in English in the hope of economic success and social mobility. With the spread of English education came printing presses, newspapers, periodicals, libraries, and cultural and political associations that would initiate reform movements whose impact would be felt throughout India. Inevitably, Bombay became an important center of Indian nationalism; the first meeting of the Indian National Congress was held there in 1885.

In postcolonial India, Bombay witnessed a surge in its population as its economic growth attracted Indians from all parts of the country. In 1960, Bombay state was bifurcated into Maharashtra and Gujarat, based on linguistic differences, with Maharashtra retaining Bombay city as its capital. With the completion of the back-bay reclamation project in the early 1970s, Nariman Point (named after the former mayor K. F. Nariman) became the hub of commercial activity. Bombay itself was renamed Mumbai

in the late-1990s, which also witnessed the computerization of its stock exchange. The Bombay Stock Exchange itself was shifted to the twenty-eight-story Phiroze Jamsheedjee Jeejeebhoy Towers, named after its former Parsi chairman. Bombay was also the home of the famous Parsi industrialist Sir Jamsetji N. Tata and several nationalist leaders, including Dadabhai Naoroji.

How this city of over 18 million people will cope with overcrowding, health problems, pollution, and sanitary issues is difficult to predict. But the Mumbaikars are completing Navi Mumbai (New Bombay) across the bay as a possible solution to overcrowded old Bombay, much as the British built New Delhi as an alternative to overcrowded Old Delhi.

Ravi Kalia


See also **Urbanism**

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BONNERJI, WOMESH C. (1844–1906), first president of the Indian National Congress. Barrister Womesh C. Bonnerji of Calcutta presided over the first meeting of the Indian National Congress on 28 December 1885 in Bombay. Seventy-three professional men, representing British India's major cities and far-flung districts, gathered during that Christmas week in Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit College, a self-selected inchoate "Parliament" of New India's elite. Bonnerji, born in Sonai to a Bengali Christian family, was educated at the Oriental Seminary in Calcutta, and in 1864 sailed to England, where he studied law and was called to the Bar of London's Middle Temple. He returned home to join Calcutta's High Court in 1868. Inspired by his visits to London's Parliament and Temple of Justice, he became one of young India's most eloquent advocates of representative government.

Surely never before had "so important and comprehensive an assemblage" gathered on Indian soil, President Bonnerji told his compatriots at that first session of the Congress. Though not popularly "elected," they



Portrait of Womesh C. Bonnerji. Relocating to London in 1902, he eloquently argued the case for self-rule before the Privy Council, convinced to the very end that the British Empire might be swayed by higher ideals. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

were uniquely qualified to speak for India's voiceless masses, since all Congress delegates shared their "sentiments," "feelings," and "community of wants." In 1892 Bonnerji was again invited to preside, over a larger seventh session of India's National Congress in Allahabad. He was also elected that year to represent the University of Calcutta's Senate on Bengal's Legislative Council.

In 1901 Barrister Bonnerji moved to London and established his practice there, pleading before the Privy Council, until he lost his vision in 1904. He died in July 1906, half a year after his brilliant young friend, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, presided over the Benares Congress. In his eulogy to Bonnerji, Gokhale hailed him as a man whose wisdom and political integrity should have elevated him to the position of prime minister of India, had India been an independent nation-state. Bonnerji, like Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi's "political guru," was one of New India's bravest and best political leaders.

Stanley Wolpert


See also Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna

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BOSE, SUBHASH CHANDRA (1897–1945), Bengali political leader. Hailed as *Netaji* (Leader) of the Indian National Army he founded, with Japanese support, during World War II, Bose is considered by many to be India's greatest Bengali leader. Born in Cuttack, Orissa, brilliant Bose entered Calcutta's Presidency College at the age of sixteen, launching his revolutionary career by leading a student protest against a racist English teacher. Bose was suspended as a result, but he was able to complete his education a year later in Bengal's Scottish Churches College. In 1919 his successful father sent young Bose off to London, where he learned enough Latin to pass the Indian Civil Service examinations, shortly before Mahatma Gandhi launched his first *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) movement against the British Raj. Bose decided then to abandon his ambition of joining the British Service, sailing home instead to join Gandhi's revolutionary opposition to British rule. He met with Gandhi in Bombay, but found him too nebulous about the goals of his movement, and too worried about avoiding all violence in the national protest he led in 1921.

Bose returned to Calcutta, where he organized a student boycott against the Prince of Wales in 1921, and worked under Bengal's great "nation-unifier," Deshabandhu Chitta Ranjan Das, who became his political guru. When Das was elected as Calcutta's mayor, he appointed Bose to serve as his chief executive officer, and together they began work to clean up the slum districts of that "City of Dreadful Night," as Rudyard Kipling called it. Bose, however, was accused of "aiding terrorists" by the British and was shipped off to Mandalay prison for three years. After 1927, he returned to Calcutta a popular hero, elected to preside over Bengal's Provincial Congress Committee. A decade later, Bose was elected president of the Indian National Congress, which met in 1938 in the village of Haripura. Mahatma Gandhi, along with a majority of more conservative members of the Congress Working Committee, had expected Bose to step down after his presidential year ended, but fiery Bose wanted another year in office, urged by many of his devoted Bengali supporters to contest the National Congress elections held in Tripura in 1939. It was the first contested election since the Congress was created in



Handwritten Message from Subhash Chandra Bose. A message written in his official capacity as president of the Indian National Congress in 1938–1939. Bose subsequently flirted with fascism as an answer to India's woes. Before long in collaboration with the Nazis (in exchange for their promised support of Indian autonomy), he broadcast daily appeals, from Berlin via Radio Free India, in Bengali and Hindi, urging his countrymen to rebel against "British tyranny" and support the Axis powers. KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

1885, and Bose won, despite Gandhi's silent disfavor and the open opposition of his Working Committee, which immediately resigned. Bose was then obliged to step down, his health failing him in the aftermath of that exhausting struggle.

Bose had lived for several years in western Europe during the early 1930s, and was attracted to the ideals of socialism and communism. He later preferred fascism and Nazism, which he thought he could humanize with an admixture of Indian philosophy, then introduce to India as a potent form of national Indian socialism, first forcing the British out, then eliminating poverty and the inequities of caste and class. His Forward Bloc Party, which he started with his brother Sarat Bose after leaving the Congress, was very popular in Bengal, but when World War II started, the Bose brothers were placed under house arrest in Calcutta. Subhash escaped, however,

moving by night across North India to Afghanistan. He managed to fly to Berlin, met Adolf Hitler, and adopted as his title Netaji, "Leader," hoping someday to become India's "Führer." He broadcast daily appeals to India in Bengali and Hindi, urging those who heard him to rebel against "British tyranny," insisting that the Axis powers were winning the war and that the Allies would soon be routed.

After Singapore fell to the Japanese, the British Indian army of some 60,000 troops surrendering without a fight early in 1942, the Nazis decided that Bose would be much more useful to them there than he was in Germany. He was sent by submarine in the spring of 1943 from Hamburg, around the Cape of Good Hope, to Singapore, and when he arrived was given command by the Japanese of all Indian troops willing to join his Indian National Army (INA). In October 1943, Netaji inaugurated his Provisional Government of Azad (Free) India, leading his army on its epic march up the Malay peninsula and Burma to Rangoon, where they began their advance toward eastern India, his battle cry taken from the 1857 Sepoy Mutineers: "*Chalo Delhi!*" (Let's Go to Delhi!). Bose and his INA reached the outskirts of Manipur's capital, Imphal, in May 1944. Had heavy monsoon rains not bogged them down long enough for British and American planes to fly in troops and arms, forcing them back, Bose might have reached Bengal, where Netaji would have been welcomed as his nation's savior. Instead he marched back to Saigon, flying off to Taiwan (Formosa) on the last, overloaded plane to escape the Allied army that recaptured Burma and Malaya and routed the INA in May 1945. His plane crash-landed and burned, and Bose died in a Taiwan hospital. His ashes were taken to Japan.

So many Bengalis and ardent Indian patriots believed, however, in the myth of Subhash Chandra Bose's "immortality," refusing to think of him as dead, that as late as 1957 the government of India sent a special deputation of members of Parliament to Japan to examine his ashes, reporting that they were in fact those of Netaji Bose.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Congress Party; Das, Chitta Ranjan; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

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BRAHMA. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

BRAHMACARYA The *Brāhmacārīn* student “doing (religious) formulation” in the older Vedic literature denoted men who devoted their lives exclusively to religious duties. Later, this Sanskrit term came to refer to young Indians of the three higher social orders during their time of study, which typically began at the age of eight and ended at age sixteen. The young men stayed with their teacher’s family, trained to follow a strict discipline that included sleeping on the ground, simple food and dress, and obedience. Another disciplinary feature was absolute celibacy. Graduation from this period of study was immediately followed by marriage and the setting up of a household, with ensuing economic and sexual obligations. Much later, as an old man, the higher caste Hindu would, according to standard doctrine, retire with his wife to a celibate life in the forest, eventually renouncing the world as an ascetic. Celibacy was seen as such a prominent feature of a man’s life in his student years that *brāhmacārya* (life of a Veda student) acquired the secondary meaning of “celibacy.”

Indian society, on the one hand, placed a high priority on the production of offspring, especially sons, both for religious and economic reasons: only sons could make the offerings to ancestors, and sons were required to work the fields and to defend and support the family as well as the community. At the same time, there was admiration for those who resisted the temptations of worldly life and lived a life of religious devotion in poverty and celibacy. In some instances, the inability to get married and function sexually due to physical defects may have been a factor, but mostly the decision was based on religious fervor, a belief that restrictions and mortifications helped to destroy bad karma, and a conviction that the retention of semen increased a man’s potency. The ascetic is often called *ūrdhva-retas* (whose semen is up), which in tantric texts is explained as retaining it in the head; tantric rituals included intercourse without orgasm. Male orgasm was often seen as the effluence of power, weakening the man. The celibate ascetic was credited with great powers that he could unleash in terrible curses or could use to bestow blessings. God Shiva is typically seen in a yoga pose as an

ascetic or as a virile dancer. He is described alternatively as the ultimate celibate ascetic and as the passionate lover of his wife Pārvatī. In modern times there are reports how, in his old age, Mahatma Gandhi extolled the virtues of celibacy and imposed on himself exercises to test and strengthen his powers of restraint.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma)**; **Shiva and Shaivism**; **Yoga**

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BRAHMAN. See **Caste System**.

BRĀHMAṆAS Brāhmaṇa is derived from the Vedic Sanskrit word *brāhman* (formulated speech, mantra) and signifies the genre of texts that deal with mantras, their use in solemn Vedic ritual, and, extensively, with the explanation of the secret meaning of the ritual itself as well as its component parts. The Brāhmaṇas are composed in stark, archaic prose and include the incidental discussion of a large variety of additional topics: etymology, customs, beliefs, proverbs, semihistorical legends, mythological tales, many asides, and much incidental speculation about the Vedic ritual. The oldest preserved Brāhmaṇa texts are part and parcel of the Yajur Veda Saṃhitā of the Black (Krishna) Yajur Veda. The Brāhmaṇas proper are linguistically younger, independent texts that are attached to the four Veda Saṃhitās. The Āraṇyakas and the older Upanishads also belong here, as they continue the discussion in the same style and language. The Āraṇyakas are “wilderness (texts),” not “forest texts,” which discuss, outside of the settlement, the secret and dangerous rituals; the older Upanishads contain the secret teaching, presented in dialogue fashion, on the nature of the soul and its ultimate identity with *brāhman*, the force underlying the cosmos. They frequently continue to rely on Brahmanic ritual data and their discussion.

The Brāhmaṇa-style text constantly emphasizes correct knowledge of the hidden meanings of the ritual (“he who knows thus,” *ya evaṃ veda*). The Vedic Brahmins strove to discover that meaning by correlations (homologies, or identifications). The underlying technique correlates certain items in the three spheres: microcosm (humans, society), mesocosm (*yajna*, i.e., ritual), and



Contemporary Brahman Blesses a Devotee at the Hanuman Ghat in Varanasi. Located in Uttar Pradesh, this temple and others in Varanasi remain an important destination for religious pilgrims, drawn to the centuries-old city situated on the banks of the sacred Ganges. AMIT PASRICHA.

macrocosm (gods, universe). By performing certain actions in ritual, both the human and divine spheres can be affected, but only “if one knows thus.” This correlation was possible as the ritual ground, its layout, its objects, and the very participants have corresponding counterparts in both the human and the divine or cosmic realm. Actions in ritual space therefore give the priests control over society and the cosmos outside it. Such ritual actions must be accompanied by ritual speech (mantras in verse and prose), used by the three major priests, and occasional silence, represented by the Brahman priest. Action, speech, and thought (*shrāddhā*, “trust [in the efficacy of ritual]”) are integral parts of any ritual, which, by its correlations, works like sorcery and magic, as seen in the Atharva Veda and outside the Vedic sphere. The same system of correlations, allowing the control of macro- and microcosm, is also at work, with straightforward magic, in solemn Shrauta rituals.

This “ritual science” works with strictly logical applications of cause and effect, even where we would see co-variation, that is, several “causes.” We can also not accept the initial propositions (e.g., “fire is semen,” “the sun is gold”). In order to establish such correlations, it is enough that two entities have just one thing in common, be it an attribute, phonetic similarity in designations and names, or even just a number. Preferably, multiple links are established. Use is made of facts drawn from everyday observations of nature and society (“cattle are thin in spring”; “nobility and Brahmins depend on the ‘people’”), of mundane and sacred speech (“the gods love the recon-dite,” and other proverbs), etymologies, details of ritual (a piece of gold = wealth, the sun), traditional legends (a certain king did not offer to Indra, disaster followed), myths (Indra opened the Vala cave, slew the dragon), and specially fabricated ritual myths that often restate older (Rig Vedic) ones (the gods feared the glowing Pravargya vessel and asked Prajāpati for help). Wherever possible, such data are correlated to establish multiple relationships that “explain” the ritual and empower the performers. A typical, involved argument, playing with etymologies, runs like this: “Prajāpati did not know to whom to give the offering fee (*dakshinā*). He put it in his right hand (*dakshinā*). He took it (pronouncing the mantra) For fitness (*daksha*) I take you, the offering fee (*dakshinā*). Therefore, he became fit (*adaksbata*). The one knowing this who receives the offering fee (*dakshinā*) becomes fit (*dakshate*).”

The constant employment of such procedures in the Brāhmaṇa-style texts has created a complex, amorphous, still not completely described web of “hidden” interrelations, known only to the contemporary ritual specialists. Over time, many new sets of parallel and interlinking correlations were discovered, stated in sets of three or five, and increasingly brought to higher levels of abstraction, so that in the Upanishads, certain truths could be stated in abbreviated form, such as “*tat tvam asi*.” Traditional esoteric Brāhmaṇa investigation thus resulted in Upanishadic speculation, a fact not always recognized, and it also is a predecessor of early Buddhist thought.

All of this is based on the important role of “classical” Vedic ritual, first seen in Brāhmaṇa-style texts, that is after the so-called Kuru reforms of Rig Vedic ritual. These transformations were due to a combination of political, social, and religious changes. The relationship between the development of Vedic ritual and changing social and political structures is a promising field for further inquiry. Ritual had been part of the Rig Vedic cycle of exchange of “food” (*annā*) between men and gods; after the Kuru reforms, in Brāhmaṇa-style texts, ritual became the center of religious life in the more elevated echelons of society. Its proper and increasingly complex

performance allowed the nobility (and other wealthy persons) to be prosperous in this world: having many sons, cattle, long life, achieving dominance in clan and society, or reign over the tribe in case of chieftains, and to “reach heaven” after death. The priests performing the rituals strove after the same goals, and after expected, ritually correlated donations from their noble sponsors.

Always nervous about their purity, which cemented their (theoretical) highest position in society, an all-important point of discussion was how to avoid evil (*agha*, *enas*, *pāpa*) and pollution. This—and not the avoidance of violence as such, which has always remained involved in the classical ritual, until today—is one of the important aspects of the Kuru Shrouta reform. The myth of Indra cutting off the head of Dadhyanc is the “charter myth” of the main priests acting in classical ritual, the Adhvaryus, who want to avoid direct involvement in the evil and pollution, caused by killing, that is necessary in ritual. They fear pollution by *pāpa*, the “evil” of being stained with blood and being “touched” by death (working through *meni*, “revenge” that “sticks” to perpetrators) but cannot object to the killing and force that is necessary in many rituals. Rather, they delegate such actions to helpers, working outside the sacrificial ground, to avoid direct contact. Killing is not even referred to overtly: the animal is “pacified” (*sham*) and “agrees.” This attitude has been copied by other religions, such as Buddhism and Jainism. The Dadhyanc tale thus is the main myth of justification of the priestly class. The Ashvin, doctors and latecomers to the ritual of the gods, become their Adhvaryu priests, after having gained the secret of the “(cut-off) head of the sacrifice.” This they received from Dadhyanc, whose head they had replaced with a horse’s head to save him from Indra’s wrath. In ritual, likewise, the killing of sacrificial victims is done by helpers, outside the sacrificial ground. Because of its foundational character, the entire line of thought is in need of detailed treatment.

The Brāhmaṇa texts also offer considerable insight into the society and history of the period before 500 B.C. While the earlier texts, the Yajur Veda Saṃhitās, were confined to western North India (mainly eastern Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh), the Brāhmaṇas cover most of North India, from the eastern Punjab to the western border of Bengal, and from the Himalayas to the Vindhya, and they even provide a few glimpses of areas beyond it. The cultural center, among the Kuru-Pancāla, began to shift eastward, to Kosala (Oudh) and North Bihar (Videha), with emerging kingdoms that claim Ikshvāku lineage (like the Buddha). The late Brāhmaṇa texts provide legends about links with Rig Vedic poets (Vishvāmītra, in Aitareya Brāhmaṇa) and Kuruksheṭra origins (Videgha, who founded Videha, in Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa). Some of the more complex royal rituals, necessary for social stratification and legitimization

in these emerging large kingdoms, have been added to the core of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (1–5). While the earlier Yajur Veda texts overlap with the Painted Grey Ware archaeological culture (though the peripatetic pastoral Indo-Aryans cannot have been the actual bearers of this settled, agriculture-oriented culture), the later Brāhmaṇas overlap with the widespread Northern Black Polished Ware culture and the beginnings of the first Indian empire in Magadha.

The oldest Brāhmaṇas are contained in the Saṃhitās of the Black (Krishna) Yajur Veda (Maitrāyaṇī, Kaṭha, Kapishṭhala-Katha, Taittirīya S.), while the Brāhmaṇas proper include the following: the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa is merely an addition to the Taittirīya Saṃhitā; a further, very interesting addition, with much cultural information and otherwise unknown myths, is the late Vādhūla Brāhmaṇa (or Vādhūla Anvākhyāna. There is no Maitrāyaṇī Brāhmaṇa, and only fragments of the original Kaṭha Shatādhyāya Brāhmaṇa, mostly referring to domestic rituals, have been preserved in Kashmiri Ṛcaka ritual handbooks. The extensive “Brāhmaṇa of the Hundred Paths” of the White (Shukla) Yajur Veda is available in two closely related versions, the Mādhyandina and Kāṇva Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, with a complicated mutual relationship. The Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa is one of the Vedic texts first edited and translated; though it is a late Vedic text, which sums up much of the earlier discussions, it occupies a central position in Indian studies, in spite of the existence of similarly important texts such as the Jaiminīya and Vādhūla Brāhmaṇas. Most of these Brāhmaṇas belong to the schools of the Yajur Vedins and therefore explain the work of the Adhvaryu priests, the main priests acting in Vedic ritual, at great length, offering deep insights into the structure, sequence, and meaning of contemporary ritual actions.

The two Rig Vedic Brāhmaṇas, the Aitareya and the Kaushītaki (or Shāṅkhāyana) Brāhmaṇa, mostly deal with the recitation of Rig Vedic mantras by the Hotṛ priests, but the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa also contains important additions that offer a glimpse of the rituals and society of the emerging larger kingdoms of the Vedic East, in Kosala and Bihar.

The Sāma Veda Brāhmaṇas deal with the proper recitation of Sāman melodies but also offer a large amount of legends connected with the “authors” of such melodies. These are the Jaiminīya, Pancaviṃsha (or Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa), and Shaḍviṃsha Brāhmaṇa. The Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa is an extremely important text with many otherwise unknown myths, legends, and a wealth of cultural data. It has only partially been edited, translated, and studied. The Pancaviṃsha Brāhmaṇa is available only in uncritical editions. The Minor Sāma Veda Brāhmaṇas, often called the Sāma Veda Sūtras, have

been edited by B. R. Sharma: Shaḍviṃsha Brāhmaṇa, Sāmavidhāna, Ārsheya, Devatādhāya, Upanishad Brāhmaṇa (or Mantra Brāhmaṇa), Saṃhitopanishad Brāhmaṇa, Vaṃsha Brāhmaṇa, Kshudra Sūtra, and Mashaka Kalpa Sūtra.

The Atharva Veda has a very late Brāhmaṇa, the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, which is in fact an additional Brāhmaṇa (*anubrāhmaṇa*) of the Paippalāda school of the Atharva Veda. Fragments of lost Brāhmaṇas have been compiled by B. Ghosh.

Michael Witzel

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedic Aryan India**

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Vedas. Harvard Oriental Series. Opera Minora, vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1997. Available at <<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ewitzel/canon.pdf>>

BRAHMO SAMAJ The “Society of Brahma,” or the Brahma Samaj, was founded by Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) in Calcutta in 1828. Roy, revered as the father of India’s nineteenth-century Hindu Renaissance, a Bengali Brahman by birth, studied English, Latin, and Greek as well as Sanskrit, Persian and Bengali, while employed as a young man in the British East India Company’s Revenue Department. He read Vedic Sanskrit, and Western classics in Greek and Latin. A brilliant student of religion, Roy focused first on Hindu texts, several of which he translated into English, and then on mastering Christianity. He considered the monistic equation of every individual’s “soul” (*atman*) with the universe’s transcendental “soul” (*Brahman*), as articulated in Upanishadic Vedanta texts, the apogee of Hindu philosophy, only millennia later “adopted” by Deists and Unitarian Christians. He easily confounded and, in the profundity of his philosophic arguments, defeated every Christian missionary who tried to convert him.

In 1815 Roy started to meet regularly with an elite group of brilliant Bengali friends, who at first simply called their discussion group a “Friendly Association” (Amitya Sabha). Roy had published his first Upanishadic translation that year, an *Abridgement of the Vedant*, and he discussed with his friends the enlightened wisdom of India’s ancient Upanishadic philosophy, rejecting as an “aberration” all later “idol worship” that so “debased” Hinduism as to leave India at the mercy of every Western conqueror, first Muslims who abhorred all images, then European Christians, the wisest among whom adhered to Vedantic monism, focusing as did enlightened Jews and Muslims on the transcendental power of the One God, whose spirit pervaded the universe, and was reflected in every person’s soul.

Meetings of the Brahma Samaj were rarely attended by more than fifty members of that elite Bengali brotherhood, which included the wealthy and singularly creative Tagores as well as the brilliant Sens and remarkable Roys. Their passionate reborn pride in Hindu philosophy and faith, and in the great civilization that had nurtured and sustained it from the dawn of human history, inspired millions of others, including countless Western as well as Indian leaders and thinkers, who long before century’s end came to recognize India’s unique cultural genius and the wisdom of its greatest ancient seers and yogic sadhus. That Bengali Hindu Renaissance thus launched the intellectual revolution, small in its numbers

at first, but most profound in its ultimate impact, inspiring India's nationalist demands for independence as well as several social reform movements by the last decade of the nineteenth century, long after Roy and his *bhadralok* (intelligentsia) contemporaries had passed on.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Roy, Ram Mohan**

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BRAZIL–INDIA RELATIONS The relations between Brazil and India as sovereign countries began in 1948, just a few months after India gained independence in 1947. The historical platform on which the new political dialogue was to be staged was by no means devoid of earlier inscriptions. From the fifteenth century onward, European overseas expansion was instrumental in generating symbolic and real connections between the regions. From the “discovery” of the Americas as “Indias” to the direct exchanges that took place from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries between Brazil and the present-day Indian state of Goa, the colonial period was responsible for bringing into the formative melting pot of Brazilian people (Europeans, Africans, and Amerindians) a South Asian component. The independence of Brazil in 1822, and the neocolonial compulsions that followed, led to a decrease in communication with Asia. Indirect exchanges, however, continued to take place through studies of Indian philosophy and politics, and through the influence of leading Indian figures, especially Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi.

The dialogue between Brazil and India as sovereign countries was initiated after World War II, when Brazil and India emerged as giant nation-states, both in terms of territory and population—respectively, the world's fifth and seventh largest territories and the world's fifth and second most populous countries. The new nations shared commonalities: similar processes of postcolonial nation building, a multicultural society, and a predominantly tropical geography with vast natural resources;

both had also adopted a federal system to accommodate their democratic ideals. The 1940s signaled the beginning in both countries of aggressive state-led processes of industrialization, which sought to reverse colonial and neocolonial poverty and dependency. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in India and President Getúlio Vargas in Brazil played decisive roles in nation building, both projecting a vision of a society committed to eliminating the causes of underdevelopment and seeking to ensure social inclusion. Thus, despite gaps in cultural genealogy and political independence—Brazil, a young civilization, born politically in 1822, and India, an ancient civilization, born politically in 1947—the concomitance of their industrialization laid the ground for a dialogue on the challenges posed by their similar models of economic development.

The First Stage: Multilateral Dialogue, Cold War Predicaments

One could roughly divide the history of sovereign relations between Brazil and India into two periods: from 1947 until the 1980s, and from the 1990s onward. The first period was dominated by a set of ambivalent forces. On the one hand, the need to effectively challenge an international system hostile to peripheral or “southern” industrialization brought emphasis to the so-called south-south dialogue. On the other hand, dependency on the “north” for transference of technology and financial assets, and the inward character of the developmental model, based on import-substitution, did not, at least in the initial stages, augur significant commercial and technological exchanges among southern nations. Perhaps more important, the dominant geopolitical scenario of the cold war threw Brazil and India into opposite camps: Brazil in the U.S. bloc, and India in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, a look at India's major role in the nonaligned movement and at Brazil's independent foreign policy adopted from 1961 onward clearly suggests that convenience and compulsion, rather than ideological affiliation, informed their respective interlocutions with the superpowers.

Thus, the first period of India–Brazil relations was essentially characterized by efforts at joining multilateral organizations, such as the G-77 (The Group of 77 at the United Nations), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), whereby the two giant nations provided leadership to developing and underdeveloped countries in their common struggle to bring fairness to trade and economic relations with the rich “north.” From the 1970s onward, when environmental and nuclear issues became prominent in international affairs, Brazil and India worked closely to prevent international interference in their forest and biodiversity

assets and to defend their right to pursue their own nuclear and space programs. Their timid steps in bilateral relations included the signing of general framework agreements on commerce (1968), culture (1968), nuclear energy (1968), science and technology (1985), and the prevention of double taxation (1988), with minimal impact on trade. There was one visit by Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi to Brazil in 1968.

The India-Brazil cultural dialogue did not expand much beyond the previous parameters, with “mysticism” and “poverty” continuing to dominate Brazilian perceptions of India, while “carnival” and “football” dominated Indian ideas of Brazil. Some intellectual exchanges on contemporary matters began, however, in the 1960s and 1970s. They included: the impact on India of Brazilian studies on “dependent development” by Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Theotônio dos Santos; the influence of Jawaharlal Nehru’s principles of international relations on Brazil’s conceptualization of an independent foreign policy in the 1960s; and the creation of the first department of Sanskrit in Latin America at the University of São Paulo in 1968.

The Second Stage: Strategic Partnership and Globalization

The transformations that engulfed the world and, particularly, South America and South Asia, after 1990 functioned as a wake-up call to both political leaders and civil society. A new phase of sovereign relations between Brazil and India had begun, within an international arena freed from the dichotomies of the cold war and marked by the intensification of the process of globalization, which compelled developing countries to adopt more liberal economic postures. The vast state bureaucratic machinery earlier put in place in both countries had not only generated mismanagement and corruption but had also achieved very limited results in terms of poverty alleviation and the reduction of inequality. The processes of economic liberalization in India and Brazil, which started practically at the same time in 1991, combine policies suited to an increasingly integrated global economy with the mobilization of civil society, calling for good governance and decentralization. In Brazil, the political changes led to the re-democratization of the country after over twenty years of military dictatorship. After over half a century of industrialization and the development of human, scientific, and technological resources in space, nuclear, chemical, and genetic fields, by 2003 the gross domestic products of India and Brazil ranked fourth and ninth in the world, respectively.

India-Brazil relations since 1990 have been marked by the exponential growth of bilateral relations, which augurs well for the formation of what Brazilian president

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described as a “strategic partnership.” Figures of bilateral trade show that in a span of just six years (1997–2003) the total trade between the two countries increased by over 300 percent. In 2003 that total reached U.S.\$1.04 billion and, according to Brazil’s minister of industry and trade, Luiz Fernando Furlan, had the potential to grow fivefold in the next five years. India exports diesel oil, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, engineering goods, and textiles to Brazil, which sends crude oil, soya, and iron ore to India. Aircraft, footwear, furniture, and food items are potential future markets for export by Brazil. The establishment of an Indo-Brazilian Commercial Council in 1998 has enabled both governments as well as private investors to coordinate efforts to develop bilateral trade.

Favored by agreements on nuclear energy (1996), phyto-sanitary measures (1997), health and medicine (1998), information and technology (2000), blending of ethanol (2002), biotechnology (2002), and space research (2003), capital investment and transfer of technology in Brazil have made immense progress. Several Indian private corporations in the pharmaceutical, software, and engineering sectors have established joint ventures with local counterparts in Brazil. Similarly, Brazilian companies are operating in partnership with electronic and alcohol distillery sectors in India. A government program to blend ethanol with gasoline in Brazil has proved successful. Technological collaboration is also being explored in the areas of satellite construction, climate, marine sciences, biotechnology, e-banking, and e-governance.

The current phase of India-Brazil friendship and cooperation began in 1992 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for Consultations of Mutual Interest by both governments. That was followed by the first official visit of Brazil’s head of state in 1996, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso met with Indian leaders, and both parties vowed to give high priority to their bilateral relations. In 1998 Indian president K. R. Narayanan made an official visit to Brazil. In 2004, Brazil’s newly elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, traveled to India to sign a number of important trade agreements. Reflecting the new bilateral dynamics, those agreements helped to consolidate concerted action at multilateral World Trade Organization meetings, where India and Brazil supported joint initiatives to promote the interests of developing countries and to resist indirect forms of protectionism in the spheres of trade, intellectual property, and public health. An aggressive campaign to democratize the Security Council of the United Nations and persuade world leaders of their legitimate claims to permanent seats prompted Brazil and India in 2004 to constitute, along with two other candidates (Germany and Japan), a core group aiming at

reform of the Security Council. Equally significant were two other initiatives of “south-south” cooperation. The first was the creation in 2003 of G-3 (The Group of 3) or IBSA (The India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum), a forum to promote dialogue between three of the major developing economies (Brazil, India, and South Africa) to enhance trilateral cooperation across three continents. The second was the signing in 2004 of a framework agreement on trade between India and all partners of the Mercosur (Common Market of the South; Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), which sets the principles for the adoption of preferential tariffs among the parties.

The World Summit on Environment met in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the World Social Forum met in Mumbai in 2004, with nongovernmental organizations from both India and Brazil developing fruitful exchanges at both conferences, confronting common problems of environmental degradation, the rights of indigenous peoples, land conflicts, and urban issues. Similarly, their academic and intellectual dialogues have grown with the creation and consolidation of several institutional mechanisms of cooperation. In India, the Latin American Department and the Center for Spanish and Portuguese Studies were established at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and endowed chairs of Brazilian Studies were created by the Ministry of External Affairs of Brazil at Jawaharlal Nehru University and at Goa University. In Brazil, their academic counterparts are the Center for Afro-Asian Studies at Cândido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro, the Center for Asian Studies at Brasília University, and the Center for Afro-Asian Studies at Londrina State University. In 2001 the first bilateral interuniversity agreement was signed between Goa University and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

The enlargement of mutual perceptions beyond inherited stereotypes has also been boosted by major cultural initiatives, including film festivals, book publications, and exhibitions of dance, music, and photography. Finally, the recently signed India-Brazil Cultural Exchange Program (2004) and the Agreement on Tourism (2004) both have the potential to accelerate bilateral cultural exchanges and to further consolidate the immense gains made since 1990 in what is destined to be a vibrant and geopolitically crucial partnership.

Dilip Loundo

See also **Economic Reforms of 1991**

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BRITISH CROWN RAJ During the period from 1858 to 1947, called the British Crown Raj, all of the territory that is now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was directly ruled from Great Britain by Parliament in the name of the British Crown. This article is mainly concerned with the organization of political power and its direct relations with Indian society; other articles will examine the British and Western impact in more cultural terms.

The Organization of Power

In 1858 Parliamentary control replaced the East India Company, which had gradually gained control of this territory, and had ruled it as the proxy of the British government. While the company’s rule had long been regarded as an inefficient anachronism, the uprising in 1857–1858 against the company by Indian soldiers in its armies and by many groups in North India was the immediate cause of the takeover. There is no way of assessing Indian public opinion at that time, but the general impression given by Indian commentators is that the transfer of power was welcomed by Indian elites, especially in the great urban port areas of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. They seemed to have taken seriously the proclamation issued in 1858 by Queen Victoria stating that Indians would be placed on equality with all the subjects of the British Crown, with everyone freely admitted, on the basis of merit, to all offices in India. The realities during the next ninety years of British rule were very different, marked by the exclusion of Indians from most positions of political power, although many achieved high economic and cultural status. The ideals of the proclamation, however, later were adopted into the manifestos of Indian nationalists as the legitimate rights and demands of the Indian people.

The “Home” government. In Great Britain, control of Indian affairs was vested by Parliament in the secretary of state for India, whose position as a cabinet member made clear that the final control and direction of the affairs of India rested with the Home government, and



Curzon Ganges Bridge, Allahabad. Under Lord Curzon's rule as viceroy, the Raj initiated the development of an extensive rail and bridge network throughout India, partly to stimulate trade, partly to facilitate troop movements. The result was that by 1910 India had the fourth-largest railway system in the world. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

not with its appointees in India. This legal position was strengthened by the ease of communications made possible by the telegraph, the opening of the Suez Canal, and by steamships, all of which brought the government of India in Calcutta and Simla under close scrutiny.

The government of India. The actual administrative structure in India, however, was not basically changed from what it had been under the East India Company, with the governor-general remaining the head of the government of India, but with the additional title of viceroy, indicating he was the personal representative of Great Britain's monarch. He was assisted by an Executive Council of five members, each of whom had specific portfolios. A Legislative Council, established in 1853, was made up of officials and nonofficials nominated by the governor-general. This was expanded to include Indian appointees in 1862, and their numbers were increased in 1892, when a small measure of representation, based on a very narrow franchise, was introduced. A momentous change took place in 1909 with the passage of the Indian Councils Act,

which gave a wider, but still very limited, franchise for elections to the councils. The great innovation, however, was the decision to reserve seats for Muslims in the legislatures. The argument for reservations and separate electorates was that otherwise the Muslim minority would have no chance of election in the face of the Hindu majority, but Indian nationalists, then and now, saw this as a move to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, thus weakening the nationalist movement.

Below the central government of India were the various provincial governments, each of which had versions of executive councils and legislative councils modeled on that of the central government. The provinces were in turn divided into districts, which were grouped under a commissioner. The district officer, often referred to as the "collector," reminiscent of his former function as the chief revenue officer, was also in some periods the chief magistrate and in charge of police. This structure echoed in many ways the administrative system that dated from the Mughal empire.

These formal administrative structures of British power were dependent for their control of the vast Indian population on three institutions: the army; the civil bureaucracy; and the legal system.

The army. The continuance of British power ultimately depended upon the Indian army, and there was general agreement among the British authorities that the mutinies in the army in 1857 reflected basic weaknesses, making reform essential. Under the East India Company, each of the three presidencies—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay—had separate armies under the general control of a commander-in-chief, and this cumbersome system was revised by unifying all the armies under the civilian governor-general, but with a commander-in-chief of the army as the second most important person in the government. This recognition of civilian, not military control of the government was a basic element of British power in India and remained a fundamental characteristic of the government of independent India. The most significant clash between the rights of the civilian and military chiefs took place during the administration of Lord Curzon (1899–1905).

Another issue of special concern, after the uprisings of 1857–1858, was the proportion of Indians to British soldiers in the Indian army. In 1856 there had been a total of about 238,000 Indians in the three armies and about 45,000 British. By 1863 this ratio had been changed to 205,000 Indians and 65,000 British. This remained fairly constant until the beginning of World War II, when it shifted to 177,000 Indian soldiers to 43,000 British. Another important issue was the regional and caste composition of the Indian soldiers. Since it was high caste soldiers from the Bengal army who had taken part in the mutinies, enlistment from Bengal was drastically curtailed. In this context, British officers insisted that certain Indian regional and religious groups belonged to “martial races,” identified as Rajputs, Muslims (especially from the Northwest), Sikhs, and Gurkhas from Nepal, and that Indian soldiers should therefore come only from these groups. While there is no historic evidence for the theory of martial races, it was widely accepted by Englishmen and is still influential in India. All the officers of the Indian army were British, but by the end of the nineteenth century, the British officers and the Indian soldiers seemed to have developed mutual respect for each other.

After 1858 the army was mainly used to guard the frontiers, both on the northwest and northeast, against militant groups, and only occasionally did it have to be used within India proper. It was also used, however, to support British foreign policy in China, East Africa, and the Middle East, where there was little direct Indian concern. During World War I, over a million Indian soldiers



served overseas, mainly in France and the Middle East. In World War II, the Indian army was used in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. Both wars saw an increase in the number of Indian officers in the army, but its traumatic moment came with the defeat of the British at Singapore in 1942, when the Japanese persuaded a number of Indian officers and men to join the Indian National Army to fight with them against the British under the leadership of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, who had been a leading figure in India’s nationalist movement.

The army was an important element in the transfer of power from the British to Indians in 1947, despite mass outbreaks of violence among the civilian population. It continues to be a vital element in the preservation of the new nation against insurrections and movements for self-determination in its borderlands, notably in Kashmir, Nagaland, and in Punjab, as well as in wars with Pakistan and China.

The Indian Civil Service. While the Indian army was the ultimate guarantor of British power in India, its maintenance as an authoritarian regime based upon laws

depended upon another institution, the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Originally known as the “covenanted service” of the East India Company, most of the young men who signed contracts to serve in its commercial and political branches were relatives or dependents of East India Company directors or shareholders. In 1853 the great innovation was made of appointment to the service through competitive examinations. Indians could have competed, but the examinations, based entirely on English subjects, were held in England, and it was not until 1864 that an Indian succeeded in passing. After 1923 the examinations were held in India as well as England, making it easier for Indians to compete; by 1947 the majority of ICS members were Indians, and it was this group that moved into the successor service of independent India, the Indian Administrative Service. Never numbering more than four thousand, the members of the Indian Civil Service held all the important executive posts in the bureaucracy and were the real rulers of India’s vast population, which by 1900 numbered about 285 million people. Its members were generalists, expected to fulfill any position assigned to them, whether in agricultural, financial, or legal administration. They were revenue officials, magistrates, police superintendents, and district commissioners. They have been much lauded for their fairness and efficiency, but some have judged them wanting in imagination and sympathy for the people they governed.

The legal system. When the East India Company took control of Bengal in the 1770s, its officials intended to make use of the existing legal systems of the Mughal empire, following what was often described as the “ancient institutions and usages,” but when they discovered that there were no codes of law or courts of the kind they expected, they began to improvise. The result was ad hoc construction of a complex mixture of courts and laws, often different in the various provinces. The new system included laws and regulations made by the central and provincial governments and by municipal authorities, laws devised in England that applied only to India, and English common law. European residents, never a large body, were subject to some courts but not to others. Gradually, a body of criminal law was created that applied to all residents, and commercial codes were also constructed that had applicability throughout the country. What was most difficult to codify was personal law, that is, matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption. All of these were perceived to be sanctioned by religious beliefs, and British officials were wary of any actions that seemed to come in conflict with matters of religion. The fateful decision was therefore made that personal law would be decided on the basis of the religion of the persons concerned. This added new complications, for there were no universally applicable Hindu or Muslim laws, and the British in effect codified laws for court usage that were more rigid than the

usages that had been in existence. This system, subject to much acrimonious criticism, was the material with which officials of the Crown had to deal, much of which forms the basis for contemporary India’s legal system.

At the same time, British India’s courts were increasingly modeled on British patterns, and lawyers came to occupy a very important place in Indian life, making India an extremely litigious society. This new class of lawyers played a very important role as India’s national movements developed. Though at first all the judges were British, by the end of the century many Indian judges had been appointed. The judiciary was remarkably independent of governmental control, and the new legal system, along with the modernized army and the ICS and its ancillary bureaucracies, proved of fundamental importance to the development of modern India.

Major Government Policies

The major policy concerns of the British Indian government after 1858 can be summarized under four main headings: foreign policy, taxation and economic policy, education and social welfare, and internal security.

Foreign policy. The immense archives of the government of India indicate that foreign policy excited more interest than any of the other policy concerns, since India’s security was central to Great Britain’s role as a world power in the nineteenth century. The foreign relations of the government of India were focused, therefore, on its contiguous neighbors. Two general principles guided these relations: first, the government of India was unwilling to permit any genuinely independent country to exist on its borders; second, the imperial designs of Russia in Central Asia were considered a major threat to British power in India. The corollary of acting on these principles was that throughout the nineteenth century, British India was, in a very real sense, an expansionist state. The rulers of unstable Afghanistan, with its ethnic links to the whole northwest area of Punjab, were a constant threat to the British attempt to control the mountainous region. Then there was a fear, undoubtedly overblown, that Russia in its conquest of Central Asia would move into Afghanistan, either through conquest or alliance with its chieftains, thus posing a threat to India. As a result of these fears, the British government of India invaded Afghanistan in 1838–1842 and again in 1878–1880, but both times its troops were forced to withdraw in the face of popular resistance. To the east, the government of India fought wars with Burma in 1824 and 1852, finally annexing the whole country in 1885. In the Himalayan region, a border known as the McMahon Line was defined in 1913–1914 between India and China, claiming vast areas for India, though it was never acknowledged by China. Indian claims for this as the



British India Postage Stamp. Letter posted to one Alexander Wyatt in February 1856 (two years prior to the official proclamation of the British Crown Raj). The Indian stamp bears image of the then reigning British monarch, Queen Victoria. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

legitimate border in 1962 became the occasion of war between India and China, another instance of the legacy of the imperial era in foreign policy, as in other areas of contemporary Indian life.

Taxation and economic policy. The right to collect the revenues of Bengal, taken by the East India Company from the decrepit Mughal empire in 1765, marked the beginning of British imperial power in India, and the collection of taxes remained at the heart of the policies of the British Government of India. A third of the government's revenue, which came mainly from land taxes, was used to pay for the army, in contrast to three percent of the revenues in the other colonies. Indian revenues paid for military expenses even when the army was used for British wars elsewhere, including in China and Africa. The very high salaries paid to members of the ICS were mainly remitted to Great Britain, as were the profits of British companies in India. All expenses incurred in London that were connected in any way with India were charged to the Indian account.

After 1858, as Indians became more publicly vocal in criticizing British rule in India, the burden of taxation was

a constant theme. The most famous of the critics was R. C. Dutt, one of the first Indians to be accepted into the ICS, who wrote the first economic history of India. His major argument was that the poverty of the Indian people was due to the economic policies of the British. The British, he argued, suppressed the Indian textile industry in order to facilitate their own, and used Indian raw materials to produce manufactured goods in Great Britain, which were then sent to India. His conclusion was that although Britain gave India internal peace and political unity, at the same time its economic policies destroyed the Indian economy. Although modern economic historians are more nuanced in their analysis of British economic policies, his arguments were widely accepted by generations of Indians and by many critics of British imperialism in the West. While not denying that foreign rule almost inevitably meant the implementation of policies that favored Great Britain, not India, current economic analysis tends to emphasize the disadvantages of having Britain's free trade policies imposed on India, which gave no protection to India's own industries. Furthermore, capitalists, both Indian and British, could get better returns from trade than from investing in new industries.

While the Indian government did not actively promote economic development, preferring to leave it to private enterprise, it took the lead in the development of railways, partly to stimulate trade, partly to facilitate troop movements. The result was that by 1910 India had the fourth-largest railway system in the world. The government built some lines itself, but it encouraged private investors by assuring them subsidies if the railways did not yield a minimum rate of 5 percent return on investment. This new system of transportation served to unify the country both economically and socially.

Education and social welfare. One policy of deliberate social intervention by the British in India that had enduring results was the decision made by the East India Company in 1835 to grant support only to those institutions of higher education that used English as the medium of instruction. The motivation for this decision was not, as was often said, to supply the British with clerks for their government offices, but was the result of joint pressure from British and Indian groups. For Indian leaders like Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), the English language was key to the useful knowledge of the West that could transform Indian society. From the British side, the famous *Minute* by T. B. Macaulay, who was in Calcutta working on the legal system, summarized another case for the English language. It would, he wrote, create among the Indian higher classes, “persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect,” who would be the interpreters between the British and the millions whom they

governed (*Sources*, p. 601). This attitude tied in with the decision in 1854 to set up provincial universities in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, based on the model of the new University of London. These new universities were not teaching bodies, but they were responsible for curricula, examinations, and awarding of degrees. Teaching colleges were affiliated to the universities. This set the pattern for the other provincial universities established after 1858 in Allahabad, Lahore, Pune, Patna, and Agra, each with many affiliated colleges with the same standards. The system had many faults, but out of it came India's educated classes for all the new professions, such as law, journalism, and medicine; it also provided the leaders of the nationalist movement that eventually ended British rule in 1947. The students came mainly from the old elite classes, so the dominance of India's traditional ruling classes was perpetuated.

Because of the belief that a primary cause of the uprisings of 1857–1858 had been interference in Indian religious customs, the British government of India became very hesitant to legislate social change of any kind. Coupled with this was the widespread belief in British official circles that Indian society, although possessing a great culture, was by its very nature resistant to the progress so highly valued in Great Britain in the nineteenth century. The obvious path for a foreign government, uncertain of its support among the people, therefore, was not to innovate but to move with extreme caution, an approach that served the British Raj very well. Its police, army, bureaucracy, and law courts could preserve society without disturbing it.

Internal security. While the army was the ultimate guarantor of British power, it was only called upon for internal security in times of major disturbances, which, after 1858, were remarkably few. In Amritsar, in 1919, Brigadier Reginald Dyer opened fire on an unarmed crowd that had gathered in an enclosed garden (Jallianwala Bagh) to listen to nationalist speeches; 400 people were killed, 1,200 wounded. The army was also used in 1942, during the "Quit India" movement, opening fire in Bihar and along the North-West Frontier, where British control of large areas appeared to be threatened. Otherwise, internal security was left in the hands of the police, who were under the control of provincial authorities. At the dawn of the Crown Raj in 1858, however, the police had a reputation for oppression and corruption, which led to a series of attempted reforms. Police were organized in each district under a British superintendent, with Indian constables. By 1902 a police commission reported, however, that the police were still feared almost as much as criminals.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, internal security took on a new urgency as the government became more concerned about the increasing spread of

nationalism sentiment, which the British usually referred to as "sedition" or even "terrorism." As a result, in 1904 Criminal Intelligence Departments were set up to maintain stricter watch over the nationalists. Censorship of the press also increased after 1857, the government monitoring all Indian-language papers as well as those printed in English. The Indian press, nevertheless, was usually left free to criticize the government, though publishers might be treated with suspicion as "seditious agents" and might face the loss of their deposits or their presses.

Challenging British Rule: The Rise of Nationalism

The Indian National Congress. The founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 must be understood in the context of this century of change. Many local associations had been formed in different parts of the country seeking government action for social change, but the Bombay meeting of representatives from all parts of India in 1885 was the first of its kind. The Congress delegates in the early years thereafter met annually; they were almost all drawn from the new English-speaking professional classes. Their speeches and resolutions were hardly hostile to British rule, primarily expressing that they wanted to share in India's administration and direction in collaboration with the British. They asked for a modest portion of representative government, entrance into the Indian Civil Service through examinations to be held in India as well as in England, and the right for Indians to serve as officers in the army. They argued that the poverty of the masses was due to exorbitant taxes and Britain's free-trade policy, which deprived Indian industries of protection from foreign competition.

Opposition to the moderate and conciliatory proposals of the Indian National Congress leadership soon developed from at least three directions. The British viewed them as a threat to their power; British officials insisted at the time (and many of them continued to do so right up to 1947) that democracy was an impossible dream for India, because of its deeply rooted divisions of caste, language, and religion. Democratic institutions, they argued, could not be transferred to India, which had known only autocracy throughout its history. From Muslim leaders, like Sayyid Ahmed Khan, came somewhat similar conclusions, fortified by their convictions that representative institutions, based on the Western model of "one person, one vote," would keep Muslims permanently subjected to India's Hindu majority. In subsequent years, a growing estrangement between Muslims and Hindus became a characteristic of Indian political life, especially as Hindu leaders identified Hindu culture as Indian culture.

A third source of tension surfaced within the Congress itself when the moderate stance of its early leaders was questioned. This was done most effectively at the end of the nineteenth century by Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), a Poona (Pune) journalist, who denounced the Congress policy of moderation as humbly “begging” the British for favors. In a slogan that soon became famous, he declared that “*Swaraj* (freedom) is my birthright and I will have it.” More fateful for the subsequent history of India, however, was his linking of nationalism with a revival of Hindu military glories, harking back to Shivaji’s struggle against the Mughal Muslims centuries earlier. Charged with “sedition” and inciting violence, Tilak was sentenced to jail and deported to Mandalay.

The All-India Muslim League. While the Indian National Congress always insisted that it stood for the freedom of all Indians, Muslim leaders saw Hindu leaders like Tilak as spokesmen for a Hindu nationalism that threatened the Muslim minority. In 1906 this sense of unease led a group of prominent Muslims to form the All-India Muslim League to protect Muslim social and political interests. The League had little influence before the late 1930s, however, when Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) began his campaign for a separate homeland for Muslims.

The rise of nationalism. In the aftermath of World War I, Indian political life gained a new momentum, following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar and Mahatma Gandhi’s return from South Africa to lead the first nationwide *satyagraha* (“hold fast to the truth”) movement. British Liberal Secretary of State Edwin Montagu also inaugurated new reforms with the passage of his 1919 Government of India Act, admitting more Indians to councils and offering much wider franchises for elections to all legislatures, central as well as provincial, the latter including Indian ministers. That act fell far short, however, of what the Congress nationalist leaders wanted, and the retention of separate Muslim electorates expanded the growing divide between the Muslim League and the National Congress.

In 1920 Mahatma Gandhi persuaded the Indian National Congress to adopt his method of nonviolent noncooperation (*satyagraha*) to win freedom from British rule. This was a rejection of both the constitutional gradualism of the moderates and the violent militancy that was being increasingly advocated by young revolutionaries demanding an immediate end to British rule. Gandhi’s devout belief was that confrontational politics based only on nonviolence could win true freedom for India.

Gandhi was an idealist and visionary, but he was also a superb political organizer, and under his leadership

the Indian National Congress became a carefully articulated body, with grassroots committees in most of India’s towns and villages, as well as provincial committees, and, at the top, an All-India Congress Committee, with its supreme Working Committee “cabinet.” Mahatma Gandhi urged people to refuse to obey unjust laws and to be willing to go to jail for having done so. He called for multiple boycotts of British goods and institutions, asked students not to attend government schools, lawyers not to practice in courts, and Congress not to participate in government elections. He stopped short, however, of asking Indians not to serve in the army, recognizing that the soldiers were not free agents.

Gandhi’s success in revising the agenda of the India National Congress depended upon many factors, including his unique personality, his profound spirituality, his teachings, and his organizational abilities. A basic one, relating to all these, was the loyalty he evoked in the numerous very able men and women, both Indians and foreigners, who made his work possible. He was especially proud of having mobilized Indian women to take an active part in the dangerous work of confrontational politics.

The most famous of Gandhi’s followers was wealthy Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who was the son of a wealthy family, educated in England, strongly influenced by Marxist thought, and sharing little of Gandhi’s religiosity. Frequently elected president of the Congress, Nehru remained Gandhi’s chief supporter through the long and tortuous developments of the 1930s, which led to the next great constitutional landmark, the Government of India Act of 1935. This act gave a larger measure of autonomy to Indian political leaders at the provincial level, and when elections were held in 1937, Congress won enough legislative seats to form the government in seven provinces, leaving the Muslim League out in the cold. This opportunity to serve as ministers and elected officials before independence was an important asset to the success of the Indian democratic system after 1947.

In 1939, when Great Britain declared war, India’s viceroy also proclaimed that India was at war, without consulting any Indian leaders. Congress’s Working Committee ordered all its provincial ministries to resign. The gulf between Muslims and Hindus was dramatized in 1940, when the League made its momentous announcement in Lahore that its goal was the formation of a separate nation, to be called Pakistan, as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. In 1942 Gandhi launched his last great campaign against British rule, known as the “Quit India” movement. The government acted decisively,

arresting all Congress leaders, including Gandhi. As World War II ended, the Congressmen were all released, but now Nehru, not Gandhi, was at the center of the complex negotiations on behalf of the Congress that led to independence and to the partition of the British Raj into the two states of India and Pakistan. Jinnah alone spoke for the Muslim League.

Independence and partition. By 1946 the issue was no longer whether Britain would give India her freedom, but when. Though Great Britain had won the war, her resources were depleted, and there was no will to fight to hold India by force. Nehru and Jinnah had very different visions of South Asia's future. Nehru's vision, shared by Gandhi and all the leaders of Congress, was that the British should transfer their power to a single Indian nation-state with a strong central government and relatively weak provincial governments, with all decisions to be made by democratic process. Jinnah's vision appeared initially to be that he might accept an undivided India, but with a weak central government and strong state governments, a number of which—including the key states of Punjab, Bengal, North-West Frontier, and Sind—would all have Muslim majorities. This solution was completely unacceptable to Nehru. In the end, the last British viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, opted for India's partition along religious lines, to which Nehru agreed, despite Gandhi's adamant rejection of any "vivisection" of Mother India. As for Jinnah, he initially opposed the partition of Punjab and Bengal, knowing how disastrous that would be, hoping as well for a corridor across the thousand miles of North India that were to separate West from East Pakistan. But Lord Mountbatten made the decision that the partition should take place on 15 August 1947, and he directed his staff to accelerate the final plans to place full responsibility for dividing India conspicuously on the Indians themselves. As the news spread of the imminent partition, violence on an unprecedented scale broke out; Muslims were murdered as they fled from India, Hindus and Sikhs murdered as they tried to escape from Pakistan. No one is sure of the numbers, but it is estimated that half a million to 1 million people died, as 13 million fled, the rest becoming refugees. India's struggle for freedom is often represented, because of Gandhi, as a nonviolent struggle, but in truth few nations have been born with greater loss of human life. The horror reached a dramatic climax when Gandhi himself was assassinated in Delhi on 30 January 1948 as he led a prayer meeting for the end of the violence. The assassin was a militant Hindu who wrongly blamed Gandhi for the partition and for favoring Muslims.

Ainslie T. Embree


See also **British East India Company Raj; British Impact; Curzon, Lord George; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar**

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BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY RAJ In the late eighteenth century the British East India Company gained control of much of the territory that is now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other territories in Southeast Asia for Great Britain. The company carried on an extensive trade throughout a vast area, including China, but in this article attention will be given almost wholly to India, where its activities had a decisive role in India's economic and political life and in its relationships with Great Britain and the rest of the world. Its activities in India will be noted in three main periods: from 1600 to 1750; from 1750 to 1798; and from 1798 to 1858, when, as proxy for Great Britain, it became the major political power throughout India, finally losing its position in 1858. In examining these time spans, major consideration will be given to the establishment of British control, the fate of indigenous political powers, and the creation of new military, administrative, and revenue systems.



British East India Company's Coat of Arms. The coat of arms reads, "Under the Auspices of the King and Senate of England." Long before the company evolved into a territorial power in the late eighteenth century, it was an actor within the Indian financial institutions that made political conquest possible. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

1600–1750: The British East India Company in the Mughal Empire

Trade and monopoly. The British East India Company became a legal entity when a charter was granted on 31 December 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I to a group to trade to the East India Indies, by which was meant countries on the Indian Ocean. They also were granted a monopoly of the trade between England and all the countries defined as part of the East Indies. This restriction of the home market for Asian products to the British East India Company was to remain a subject of fierce controversy for the next two hundred years, but the monopoly was defended by the company as absolutely essential for its financial success. Such monopolies were common features of contemporary European economic life, but the company had three great problems to overcome before it could make a profit. One was that two European rivals—the Dutch East India Company, or the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, which was already established, and the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales, which would soon be set up—were hostile to the British attempt to enter their trading areas. Another difficulty was getting the Mughal government, both at the center and in the provinces, to grant permission and to provide protection to the company's traders. This permission was not easily obtained, because the Mughals were not interested in European trade, but in 1615 Sir Thomas Roe, as an ambassador from the English king to the emperor's court, was given permission to set up trading posts not only at the port of Surat in Gujarat but inland at a number of towns, including Agra and Patna. A third, and fundamental, problem was finding items to trade. The English soon discovered that their great staple of trade—woolens—would find no market in India, and that the only product for which there was a demand was bullion, gold and silver. Throughout the company's long association with India, imports into Europe, not exports to India from Europe, would be the key to its successes and failures. The traditional European demand associated with the Indian trade had been spices, particularly pepper, but by the middle of the seventeenth century demand was peaking. Indigo, valued as a dye, brought a good profit in Europe, as did raw silk for the French and Italian weaving industries. Saltpeter was used in the flourishing munitions industry. By far the most important Indian exports for the company, however, were Indian textiles, especially Indian cotton cloth, which was cheaper than the linens and woolens of England. Expensive Indian patterned fabrics, such as chintz and calico—words of Indian origin, as are the names of most specialized cotton fabrics—became fashionable among the wealthy.

The British East India Company's ventures were an important link in bringing Mughal India and the entire

Indian Ocean littoral into the world trading market while making England a dynamic force in the emerging capitalist economy. Various aspects of the British East India Company's activities in India contributed to its influence. The bilateral trade between England and India based on its monopoly of imported Indian goods was basic, but their reexport to the rest of Europe gave the company a solid, and expandable, base for its profits. The goods imported from India had to be paid for in bullion, with more than 75 percent of the value of the company's exports to India being in bullion, not in goods; one source of this money was the reexport trade. The bullion was made into coinage by the Mughal authorities and was then used by the European traders in their dealings with the Indian merchants. Another source of profit for the company was what was known as the "country trade," port-to-port trade in Indian goods within India itself and with other Asian regions. Java and Sumatra, for example, willingly accepted Indian textiles instead of bullion.

The rise of the port cities. The British East India Company's trade is closely linked with the emergence of new urban centers in India. At first, it sought a foothold in existing trading centers on the coast for its "factories," as its trade depots were called after the official in charge: the factor, or agent. He and his assistants bought goods from Indian merchants, storing them until the company's ship's arrived, or if the factory was inland, arranging for transport to the port. The first factory was set up in 1611 at Macchilipatnam, on the southeast coast, a center for the manufacture of chintz, where the Dutch already had a factory. Then in 1613 the company established a factory at Surat in Gujarat, which for centuries had been a trading center for Indian goods to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.


Surat exemplified the close connection between political power, long-distance trade, and a high level of commercial activities. Its wealthy bankers financed trade throughout India and the Persian Gulf, and they lent money to the foreign multinationals, including the British and the Dutch East India companies. At all times, but especially in the seventeenth century, the company's trade depended on Indian merchants as well as Indian government officials. This may serve as a reminder of how different India was from North America, where the English were penetrating at approximately the same time. As the Portuguese had reported when they arrived in 1497, India was a land of "large cities, large edifices and rivers, and great populations, among whom is carried on all the trade in spices and precious stones" (Lach, p. 96). Surat was an entrepôt that had all these items and more to trade. The factory in Surat set a basic pattern that was to be followed elsewhere. The factor, or senior

merchant, was in charge of the depot, with English assistants, some of them in their teens; the depot was in a compound with living quarters, store houses, and offices for doing business with Indian traders and merchants. They were protected by both European and Indian guards, the embryo of the later armies of the company.

Long before the British East India Company became a territorial power, it was embedding itself into the Indian financial and economic institutions that made political conquest possible. Three of these early settlements—Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta—became great modern cities, centers of economic and political power, which were retained in independent India but under names that reflect their pre-British origins: Chennai, Mumbai, and Kolkata. Their origin and growth, so intimately connected with modern India, demonstrates, as a foremost authority on trade and politics in the region insists, that "the historical connection between long distance trade and the process of urbanization was a simultaneous phenomenon, a source of both strength and weakness to the towns and cities of the Indian Ocean" (Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe*, p. 367).

The British East India Company established the settlement that later became Madras, one of the three great port cities of India, in 1639 on the southeast coast. That the center of the settlement was known as Fort Saint George is a reminder of how trade and military security were linked. It became the capital of Madras presidency, as all of the British East India Company's factories that were established in the region were brought under the control of its chief official. Until late in the eighteenth century, the presidency was linked directly with the company's officials in London, giving it an autonomy that was jealously prized.

The establishment of a settlement at Bombay was in part a result of the growing instability in Surat, occasioned by attacks from Shivaji, the great Maratha warrior, in his rebellion against the Mughals. Consisting of a group of islands, Bombay had come under Portuguese control in 1534. It was given to the English king as part of his dowry when he married a Portuguese princess in 1661, and was ceded to the British East India Company in 1668. Bombay was not of much importance at first, as it was remote from market sources, but it began to flourish in the eighteenth century when the company built a wall to protect its own traders and Indian merchants from Surat and elsewhere. An important shipbuilding industry was started by a Parsi, a member of the small Zoroastrian minority from Gujarat that soon became a dominant factor in Bombay's industrial, commercial, and cultural life. It was, like Madras, the capital of the company's presidency, consisting of the areas that are now the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. In the nineteenth century it



became a center of trade, manufacturing, and educational enterprises, as well as political power. In all these enterprises, except for political power, Indians were prominent.

Calcutta, the third of the great urban centers, was founded by the company in 1690 in an area that was chosen because it had direct access to the sea by the Hugli River. The site had little importance to the Mughal rulers, so the company was given proprietary rights to three villages. The fortification the company built was called Fort William, and in 1700, when it became the third of the presidencies, it was known as the presidency of Fort William in Bengal. Calcutta was to play an even larger role in modern India's history—as the second city of the British empire after London—than would the other two port cities. It was the political capital of the vast British Indian empire until 1912, when the capital was moved to Delhi. It was also the dominant center of trade and culture, as well as original home of the national political movement that later gained independence for India.

One feature of the new urban areas that had great significance for the future was that they were all magnets for migration from areas hundreds of miles from the cities themselves. Another was that the cities became centers of European influence, as well as for new professions such as journalism and medicine. The thousands of Indians employed by the new government and by the traders and merchants were also concentrated in the port cities.

Decline of the Mughal empire. Historians have long speculated on the reasons for the decline of the power of the Mughal rulers in the first half of the eighteenth century; the general conclusion must be that there was no one cause, but rather a multitude of factors working together. These included the expenses of wars that had depleted the treasury; a crushing burden of taxation that some authorities believe led peasants to flee the land in despair; rebellions and uprisings by the Marathas and the Sikhs; and invasions by the Persians in 1739 and by the Afghans in 1748. The empire might have survived these shocks, but many of the governors of the Mughal provinces, while never formally denying allegiance to the emperor, in fact became virtually independent. It was this situation of weakened central authority and competing regional leaders that made possible the realignment of powers throughout the region that saw the British East India Company emerge as a dominant actor.

1750–1798: The British East India Company Seizes Power

The armies of the British East India Company. While the search for trade took the British East India Company to India, it was its armies that kept it there,

both as a trader and later as a ruling power. The story of those armies is complex, but each of the presidencies had its own army raised in India. It was the French *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, not the British, that made two crucial discoveries. One was that Indians could be hired as soldiers for far less than Europeans and that they made excellent soldiers if given modern European military discipline and weapons. The other discovery was that it was possible to gain influence and even control at the courts of Indian princes through the use of the armies to support activities of the princes or their rivals. In addition to its own armies, the British East India Company had regiments and officers from the English army sent to assist them. All these armies were paid for by the company from its Indian profits. The superiority of its military forces was demonstrated in a number of conflicts in South India with the Indian princes, especially the *nawāb* of Arcot, but also by its defeat of the French forces in various engagements from 1740 to 1748, and then, more decisively during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), when the English effectively excluded France from India. While the seizure of power by the company in Bengal was partly due to financial and political intrigue, its armies were always the potent force that established and maintained its power.

Regime change in Bengal. The appointment of Siraj-ud-Dawla as *nawāb*, the Mughal governor of Bengal, in 1756 marked a new direction in the history of modern India. His predecessor had given the British East India Company trading privileges that exempted its traders from certain taxes, but the company had grossly abused them, hindering Indian merchants and depriving the government of revenue. The company had also increased the fortifications around Calcutta. When Siraj-ud-Dawla was appointed in 1756, he understood, perhaps better than any other Indian ruler, the danger the British East India Company posed. The capture of Calcutta in 1756 by his army created one of the most famous episodes in the Indo-British relationship, when British captives were imprisoned in a small room overnight and many of them died because of the heat and overcrowding. This event passed into British historical myth as “the Black Hole of Calcutta,” becoming a symbol of the barbarity of Indians, with Siraj being pictured as a monster of cruelty, a threat to his own people as well as to the English traders. The decision was made, therefore, to replace him with a ruler who would be an ally of the company. At the battle of Plassey in 1757 the company's army, under Colonel Robert Clive, defeated and killed Siraj, replacing him with their candidate. One of the greatest Indian merchants of the time, Jagat Seth, had also helped in the overthrow, hoping to profit from a British victory, though he was in turn cheated by Clive. The company had hoped to rule through the new *nawāb*, but they soon

found, in their terminology, that he was “disloyal” and had to be replaced.

The next important move in the transfer of political power came in 1764, when the company’s army defeated the combined armies of the *nawāb* of Bengal and the Mughal emperor at the battle of Buxar. Then, in 1765, the company’s agents forced the emperor to give them control of the revenue systems of the heavily populated areas of Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. This meant that the British East India Company had become the largest territorial power in India, and that it would be able to use the tax revenues of a vast area of India to buy the goods for its export trade. These events fundamentally altered the position of the British in India.

For the people of Bengal, the next decade was a bitter time, when the Mughal system of administration collapsed. The English were ignorant of the complexities of the system, but eager to extort as much money as possible from the peasants and Indian merchants. They were guided by the remnants of the old system, which were equally corrupt and rapacious. The effect of these years on the land and its people was summed up by one of the company’s servants in a report to London in 1769. “It must give pain to an Englishman,” he wrote, “to have reason to think that since the accession of the Company to the Diwani the condition of the people has been worse than it was before. . . . This fine Country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards its Ruin” (Muir, pp. 92–93). Such reports, of which there were many, of what the British were doing in India to its people led to great criticism of the British East India Company. There was also a fear that the company’s servants, like Clive and others, returning to England with their great ill-gotten fortunes, would buy their way into Parliament. The result was the passing of regulations to control the company, culminating in a series of acts, including what is known as Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which gave Parliament control over the company’s affairs in London but left the administration of the India territories in the hands of the company. Indians had no role in this first constitutional act, but its linkage to the constitution of independent India in 1950 is direct. The three Residencies were linked under a governor-general, appointed with the approval of British government. The first appointee was Warren Hastings (1774–1783), one of the most famous names in Indo-British history, who carried on wars against the Indian powers that substantially increased British power.

The major changes in the administrative structure that tightened British control while moving India toward a Western state model—albeit an authoritarian one—began during the governor-generalship of Lord Cornwallis

(1786–1793), the British general who had been defeated by the American rebels at Yorktown in 1781. The central issue for the Bengal government was the establishment of a revenue system for the collection of taxes on agricultural land, the major source of revenue. There were three main problems to be solved. The first was to decide who actually owned the land: the rulers; the *zamindars*, or tax officials; or the peasants. There was an enormous discussion as the officials studied the Mughal records, and in the end it was decided, largely because it was the simplest thing to do, that the *zamindars* would be recognized as the “owners” of the land. The second problem was the amount that the *zamindars* had to pay in taxes, and it was agreed that the current assessments would be accepted, with some adjustments. The third issue was the duration of the assessment: would it be fixed for a ten-year period, or would it be annually variable. Again, it seemed simplest to decide that the amount they were paying in 1793 would be fixed as the permanent tax. Probably, in the short run, this was good for the government, assuring a fixed income, and it was certainly good for the *zamindars*, as they became a wealthy class as land increased in value. The peasants were left, however, without protection as *zamindars* increased their rents at will. The Bengal system was not introduced elsewhere; various systems, such as direct taxation of the peasants or of the village, were used as British collectors realized that there were many different systems of land taxation in the different regions of India.

Another great change of the last decade of the eighteenth century was the establishment of a new kind of bureaucracy that would eventually be uniform throughout India. By this time, there was widespread belief among Englishmen that Indians could not be trusted with positions of influence and control. This belief was based partly on experiences with Indian tax officials after 1765 but also on the growing prejudice that both Hindu and Muslim societies were so corrupt that Indians could not be employed at the highest levels of government. As a result, after 1793, only British were employed in higher posts. This new Indian civil service, extremely well-paid, with security of tenure and the ability to retire to England in late middle age, was very attractive to sons of the English middle classes. The army, strengthened by new technology and new discipline, followed the same pattern, with only Europeans being commissioned as officers. Eurasians, people of mixed parentage were also excluded. It became, however, one of the best and one of the largest standing armies in the world in the nineteenth century. This new ruling class was remarkably small, with about two thousand in the civil service and fifty thousand British officers and men in the army, for a population that in 1850 probably numbered about 200 million. Its rule was only made possible by the hundreds of thousands of

Indians who served in the lower ranks of both the civil and military services.


Important changes were also introduced in the legal system. At first, the British tried to work through existing Indian laws and systems of courts, but they soon discovered that the legal system was particularistic to regions and that what they thought were Hindu law codes were abstract principles and ideal religious practices that had never been uniformly followed. By the end of the eighteenth century, English law began to be applied and an English system of courts was created, with the judges of the higher courts all being British. Here, as elsewhere, Indians were divested of real authority, and specifically Indian laws disappeared, with one very important exception. Personal law, that is, matters relating to marriage, inheritance, and adoption, were defined by religious usage: Hindu practices for Hindus, Muslim usages for Muslims, and Christian ones for Christians. This remains one of the most controversial aspects of the British legal inheritance.

1798–1858: Territorial Conquest

The great period of territorial conquest that began in 1798 depended on the powerful armies that the British East India Company had built up at the three presidencies, using

its control of the Indian land revenues and the profits generated by the English and Indian traders. The chief architect of this expansion was Lord Wellesley, governor-general from 1798 to 1803, along with his even abler and more famous brother, Arthur Wellesley, later the duke of Wellington. Wellesley defended his conquests on various grounds. One was that the Indian rulers were tyrants who had overthrown legitimate rulers; conquest was therefore justified to restore to “an ancient and highly cultivated people their religious and civil rights” (Bayly, p. 81). He also stressed, however, that conquest was necessary to bring more tax revenues to support the large army. Finally, conquest would guard the company’s territories against what he referred to, without irony, as the restless ambition of Asiatic rulers that led them to seize other ruler’s lands.

These conquests were made either quickly or easily. Although by 1798 the British East India Company controlled large areas in the hinterlands of Bombay and Madras and almost all of the huge Mughal *subas* of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, three formidable organized military powers challenged British hegemony in the period from 1798 to 1858. In the south, Mysore was the site of an ancient Hindu kingdom that had been taken over by a Muslim commander, Hyder Ali, and he and his son, Tipu



Last battle of Tipu Sultan. Print depicts Tipu Sultan’s final stand against the British in the South of India. After his death in this skirmish in 1799, he was replaced by a compliant descendant of the earlier Hindu leaders. Such regime change became a familiar pattern in the British East India Company’s dealings with Indian rulers. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

Sultan, endeavored to counteract the British East India Company's influence by building a strong army and adding new territories to secure more revenue. Tipu also threatened the company by seeking an alliance with the French. Wellesley decided that he must be removed, and after a bitter fight, he was defeated and killed, and a compliant descendant of the former Hindu rulers was made the ruler under British control. This became a familiar pattern in dealing with Indian rulers. In western and central India, the Marathas, with a number of powerful chieftains, rebelled against the Mughals and now became the chief threat to British power. Many of them were defeated and forced to sign treaties, known as "subsidiary alliances," making them, in effect, vassal states. Wellesley's wars were very expensive, and the British East India Company recalled him in 1805. Wars with the Marathas continued, however, until 1818, when their organized resistance to the sweep of British power ended.

With the Marathas defeated as a military threat, British power turned its attention in the 1830s to the area, now western Pakistan and Afghanistan, that remains in the twenty-first century a contested region of national and international ambitions. With a range of motivations—including hope for increased trade, fear of Russian advance into the region, and desire to overthrow an unfriendly ruler to be replaced with a more pliable one—the company's officials promoted the invasion of Afghanistan in 1839. At first the British were successful, but three years later they were driven out by an uprising of irate Afghans. Of the nearly 20,000 company troops, mainly Indian soldiers and camp followers, who fled in the dead of winter under fire by Afghan tribesmen, only one, a British army doctor, reached India. This event was the greatest disaster in British military history, and it must have encouraged Britain's enemies in India.

The officials of the British East India Company had begun to believe that great trading opportunities could be found by using the Indus River as a channel of communication into the Punjab and beyond that to Central Asia. The result of this ill-founded idea was the conquest in 1843 of Sind, of the vast region controlled by a number of Muslim chieftains stretching from the Arabian Sea northward along the Indus.

The next great challenge came from the Sikh kingdom in Punjab, the last independent power of any size in the subcontinent, that had been conquered by the Sikh warrior Ranjit Singh at the end of the eighteenth century. Conquest of the Gangetic Plains during the Wellesley era brought the British into conflict with the Sikh kingdom, which was decisively defeated in 1849. Punjab was annexed by the British, becoming a major center of British power. Many of the Sikh soldiers were quickly recruited into the company's army.

In addition to these wars of resistance fought by major Indian rulers, there were many local groups, often called "tribal people," living in the hilly and marginal areas of the country, who resisted the intrusion of the British—as they had all previous rulers—into their territories. While many of these groups fought valiantly, they were not able to match the military superiority of the British, nor could they form alliances with each other. Often after defeat they were co-opted by the new rulers into military service. In Central India, for example, the Bhils, tribal people living in impoverished hilly areas, were recruited into a military unit, the Bhil Corps, which was used against other recalcitrant groups.

By 1848 the entire subcontinent had come effectively under British control, either directly as "British India" or indirectly as "Princely India" through subsidiary treaties. While there had been great political upheaval in the previous eighty years, the period under the new governor-general, Lord Dalhousie (1848–1856), saw many modernizing or Westernizing innovations. These included the building of railway and telegraph systems, as well as new roads and improvements in the postal service. Three universities modeled on the new University of London were established, determining the pattern of Indian higher education up to the present time, based on the use of the English language and an English curriculum. The first cotton mills were established, the beginning of an immense industry. In 1853 it was decided that all entrance to the Indian civil service would be through an examination system, ending the patronage system of the British East India Company. While technically Indians could compete in the new civil service system, the examinations were held in England and were based on an English curriculum, and thus very few Indians managed to pass them before the end of the nineteenth century. Another important change, and a cause of much dissatisfaction, was the policy of getting rid of some of the quasi-independent Indian states that had resulted from the subsidiary alliances of earlier wars. To Dalhousie and his officials they seemed medieval backwaters that served no purpose in a progressive age.

Many of these changes were applauded by Indians in the great port cities and other urban areas, but elsewhere, particularly in North India, there was smoldering resentment by influential segments of the population. These included descendants of Maratha rulers who had been defeated and members of the Mughal elites who watched the Mughal emperor become a virtual prisoner in his Delhi palace-fort. It also included both Muslim and Hindu religious leaders who saw the British encouraging the spread of Christianity by allowing missionary activity. The incident that ignited an explosion came, however, from Indian soldiers in the company's army, the group on which British power had depended for a hundred years.

What became known to the British as the “Sepoy Mutiny” started when the rumor spread that new guns issued to the Indian troops used bullets that were greased with cow and pig fat, a mixture contaminating to both Hindu and Muslim soldiers. The soldiers believed this to be an attempt to pollute them so they would abandon their religions and accept Christianity. Whatever the causes, on 10 May 1857, soldiers at Meerut murdered their officers, marched to Delhi 30 miles (48 km) away, and proclaimed the aged Mughal emperor their leader. Indian nationalist historians later called these events the beginning of the “First War of Independence.” Whatever its name, the war was fought with tenacity and great brutality on both sides; in the end the British won because of superior military equipment and discipline, as well as unified leadership.

There were a number of results from the uprising that had long-range consequences. One was that most English rulers now believed that Indians were “disloyal” and could not be trusted. For many Indians, the success of the English in putting down the uprisings showed that the English were too powerful to be defeated by recourse to revolutionary violence. These points are debatable, but what is not debatable is the fate of the British East India Company as the ruler of India. In debates in the House of Commons in 1858 there was almost unanimity in blaming the uprisings on the mismanagement of the company, and its role as the government of India was abolished. Henceforth, government would be vested in the British Crown. Queen Victoria issued a proclamation declaring that she desired no extension of territory, promising freedom for all religions without any interference by government, and ensuring Indians the right to serve the government in all capacities. None of these promises were carried out completely, but the proclamation was received by educated Indians as a sign of hope for the future. After more than a century of involvement in ruling India, change and progress had made the company irrelevant.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also Bentinck, Lord William; British Crown Raj; British Impact; Clive, Robert; Cornwallis, Lord; Dalhousie, Marquis of; Hastings, Warren; Shore, Sir John; Wellesley, Richard Colley

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
Indian Office Collections are in the British Library in London, in the National Archives in New Delhi, and in the state archives of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. In the United States, the most extensive collection of printed materials is to be found in the Library of Congress. Three books by K. N. Chaudhuri fit the British East India Company into the dynamic world of Asian commerce: *The English East*

India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company, 1600–1640 (London: Frank Cass, 1965) fits the company into the economic life of early capitalist enterprise; *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) gives the large picture of Asian trade; and *The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) is a detailed study of its commercial activities in India and surrounding countries. For the complex social and political changes taking place in India in the period from 1750 to 1858, four volumes in *The New Cambridge History of India*, published by Cambridge University Press, present interpretations based on contemporary scholarship: John H. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*; Om Prakash, *European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India* (1998); P. J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740–1828* (1987); and C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (1988). Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders* (New York Schocken Books, 1964), is a laudatory, but interesting, celebration of the achievements of many of the individuals involved in the establishment of British rule.

BRITISH IMPACT The British impact on Indian civilization began when Great Britain became an intrusive colonial force in India in the middle of the eighteenth century. To arrive at some reasonable indication of the British influence, it must be recognized that this was not a one-way process, but rather a complex interaction of adaptation and appropriation by both civilizations that can never be completely unpacked. There were many areas in which British political power and culture intersected with Indian society in formative ways that became part of the legacy of modern India. These included: the demarcation of the territorial borders of British India; the impact on the economy; the use of English as the medium of instruction in higher education; new urbanization; religious movements; the position of women in civil society; and constitutionalism.

Defining Borders: Territorial Sovereignty

One of the most decisive changes that Great Britain introduced into the Indian subcontinent was its insistence that the British Raj’s bureaucracy must exercise its sovereignty up to a clearly defined linear boundary. The external frontiers of India’s pre-British Mughal empire were areas of shifting control, buffer zones rather than borders, without the precise definition or demarcation that became the mark of national sovereignty in the nineteenth century. The British always spoke of their “unification” of India from an aggregation of states into a single political unit as their greatest achievement, but this was only made possible by the boundaries that they created for their centralized Raj. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, disputes between India and her neighbors



Victoria Terminus, Mumbai. In Mumbai, the Victoria Terminus—recently renamed Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus after a Maratha warrior—is an important symbol of India’s past (as a subject of British imperialism) and its present (as a leader among developing nations). Atop the Gothic edifice’s central dome stands the triumphant figure of Progress. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM / FOTOMEDIA.

over the boundaries that were created as a result of British rule remain one of the most difficult legacies of British imperialism.

The Economic Impact of Foreign Rule and Free Trade

Although there is no scholarly consensus on the nature of the impact of British rule on India’s economy, there is general agreement that the economy, and the population upon which it depended, had been stable for some centuries before the period of British rule, “fluctuating within narrow limits in response to non-economic factors like the level of peace and security and adjusting with ease to limited expansion in demand” (Kumar, p. 35). Few modern historians would dispute that, especially in its early years, British control worked to India’s economic disadvantage, as the industrial revolution was transforming England itself from an agricultural economy to the world’s leading industrial and military power. With an enormous demand for raw materials and its ability to supply manufactured goods more cheaply and in greater quantity than any other country, Great Britain adopted

free trade, without import or export tariffs, and without subsidies, in nineteenth-century India as well as in Great Britain. India’s existing industries thus had no protection from British competition, and new ones did not receive the kind of tariff protection that was given new industries elsewhere in the world throughout the nineteenth century. India’s already large population, which doubled in the nineteenth century, provided cheap labor for an essentially subsistence economy that gave no encouragement to industrial development, since everything could be imported so cheaply from England without duty. For the advocates of the new British theory of “comparative advantage”—that is, that a country should produce what it can more cheaply than another—this combination of the Indian and English economies seemed a vindication of their ideas. For Indian nationalists, however, it only proved that India was being exploited by the combined political and economic power of British imperialism. In a famous judgment on the British economic impact on India, Karl Marx argued in 1853 that the traditional forms of economic life in India were being destroyed, not by the soldier and the tax collector, but by the steam engine and free trade, thus producing “the only social revolution ever

heard of in Asia.” Although the British were motivated, he said, by “vile self-interest,” they were “the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution” (Marx, pp. 19–20).

English as the Medium of Instruction in Higher Education

One of the most distinctive features of modern India is that English is the language used by most leaders in every field—from journalism to medicine, in the legal system, in higher education, in the higher ranks of the immense bureaucracy, among officers in the armed services, business leaders beyond the local level, and politicians, at least those who aspire to national leadership. The vast majority of India’s people, however, can neither read nor speak English. This dominance of English as a medium of communication had its origin in a number of conflicting pressures on the British East India Company’s government in India. The precipitating pressure for the government’s involvement came in a clause in the Parliamentary act of 1813, renewing the East India Company’s charter, that £10,000 a year should be spent by the Company for “the encouragement of the learned natives of India” for “the improvement of literature” and for “the promotion of the knowledge of the sciences.” The sum was piddling, but it became central to a great controversy that is still of vital concern in modern India, namely, what should be the primary language of higher education, English or Sanskrit? A number of the company’s officials, known as “Orientalists,” argued in favor of promoting the traditional cultures of Hinduism and Islam through their respective classical languages, Sanskrit and Arabic. In the other camp were the “Anglicists,” who argued that what India needed most was the teaching of English and modern scientific subjects. They were a varied lot; they included some officials who viewed the Indians who had learned English as a cheap source of tax collectors and other minor bureaucrats needed to run the expanding government. The most potent argument for English came, however, from members of India’s own upper classes, who saw the English language as the key that would put the learning of the West at their disposal. In 1835 the decision was made that all government expenditures on higher education would go to institutions that taught through the medium of English.

The impact of English as the medium of instruction has been enormous. It undoubtedly delayed the development of Indian languages, but those Indians who mastered English were in a position to claim the leadership of India. Eventually, those fluent and educated in English could gain positions of influence throughout the English-speaking world and, more widely, in a world in which English was rapidly becoming the language of diplomacy, business, and science.

New Urbanization

India was a land of cities and towns long before the advent of British rule, with great religious centers, like Madurai, and administrative and military capitals, like Vijayanagara in the south, Delhi and Agra in the north, and great trading ports like Surat in western India. For a variety of reasons, however, the urban centers had almost all entered a period of stagnation or decline when the British arrived in India as sea-borne traders, establishing their mercantile toeholds on the fringes of the Mughal empire. In the eighteenth century, three great port-cities—Calcutta in Bengal, Madras on the southeast coast, and Bombay on west coast—became dominant in their regions, first as centers of trade, then as the seats of British political power. Their populations were overwhelmingly Indian, who, while taking goods from the West, maintained their own cultural traditions. The new presidency capitals became the centers of India’s cultural life, with flourishing colleges, universities, newspapers, and Indian-owned businesses, and inevitably emerged as the heartlands of the new politics of nationalism.

Religion and the State in British India

One of the most important aspects of British rule was its relationship to the institutionalized religions of India, which first emerged as a public problem in 1793, when the East India Company’s charter was up for renewal by Parliament. Evangelical Christian spokesmen among the company’s directors and members of Parliament demanded that the company drop its long-standing prohibition against Christian missionaries working in its territories in India, arguing that the only justification for British rule in India was the improvement of the lives of its “heathen” people. This could be done only if the company was required to send teachers and missionaries to India to teach the people and advance their religious and moral improvement through the spread of the Gospel. This move was defeated, but the pressure continued in two other ways. One was an attack on the company’s support of Hindu institutions of any kind, and the other was a demand for the company to forbid certain Hindu practices—such as *sati*, the immolation of widows on their husbands’ funeral pyres—which many British Christians condemned as immoral.

The demand for Christian religious activity in India was based on a reading of Indian religion and society that began late in the eighteenth century, which has colored the perception of India in the Western world almost to the present time. An extreme, but unfortunately not uncommon, belief in England was that Indian society was degraded and degenerate, and that Hindu caste restrictions prevented social mobility and progress. This dark condition of society was due, it was argued, to Hinduism,

the religious beliefs that the Brahmans, the priestly caste, through “fraud and imposture,” had imposed upon society. The mark of Hinduism was the worship of idols, fiercely condemned in the Hebrew Bible, so central to the faith of Christians in nineteenth-century Great Britain and America. British missionaries therefore sought to replace “blasphemous” Hinduism with the “pure truth” of Christianity, creating a torrent of criticism of Indian religion and society in Great Britain and North America that affected not only the way Westerners thought about India, but also the way Indians thought about their own society.

The most telling argument against government interference was the fear, expressed by many British officials, that any attack on Hindu customs would lead to such resistance from Indians that British rule would be threatened. The company’s government therefore tried to exclude itself from any appearance of official support for Christianity or hostility to Indian religions by initially adopting a policy of neutrality, the “colonial compromise.” Soon after 1818, however, when the British achieved paramount power over India, they became bolder, and were more openly committed to reforms like the abolition of *sati* (1829); the Caste Disabilities Act (1850), allowing Hindu converts to Christianity to inherit property; and the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act (1852). Sepoys of the company’s Bengal army believed that it was the British intention to convert them to Christianity that inspired the order to bite the new Enfield rifle cartridges, greased with “cow” or “pig” fat, issued to them by the British in 1857. That issue triggered the “Mutiny War,” after which Queen Victoria, in her proclamation in 1858, declared that the British Crown Raj would replace the old company, and that while she relied on the truth of Christianity, she would now forbid any interference with the religious beliefs or worship of any of her Indian subjects. It was this compromise that held, more or less, until the end of British rule.

The impact of British rule in religious matters nonetheless proved powerful, not in official policy but in the building and growth of Christian churches and other institutions, funded by congregations from the United States and Britain, which in a variety of ways served mainly a Hindu and, to a lesser extent, a Muslim constituency. These included schools of all kinds, hospitals, orphanages, and above all, the Christian colleges that still occupy a preeminent place in Indian education. They produced very few Christians, but their influence was reflected not just in their own activities but in the establishment of similar institutions by Indian religious organizations. Powerful religious movements were also begun within both Hindu and Muslim communities to counteract what their leaders saw as the threat to their own faiths from the onslaught of Christian propaganda.

The Arts and Literature

The impact of British rule, so great on many aspects of Indian life, was surprisingly small in the arts. Western classical music was not introduced to any significant extent, and its popular modern varieties, especially American forms, attracted a following only in post-independence India. The explanation for this probably lies in the very rich tradition of Indian music, both classical and folk. The fact that music did not play a large part in British life may also have been a factor, along with the fact that the number of British residents in India was always small. Influence on painting was more direct, since the government did encourage the establishment of art schools in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, which inspired painting that showed influence of Western styles and techniques. Western influence was also revealed in the growth of cheap lithographed illustrations of religious myths, following the success of painter Ravi Verma (1848–1906). One of the most intriguing British impacts on Indian art and culture came, however, late in the nineteenth century in the form of interest and encouragement given to the traditional arts of India, especially folk art. This interest was revealed in the extraordinary exhibition of Indian art of all kinds in Delhi in 1903, in which no work with any European influence was allowed to be shown (Watt, p. xv).

The Position of Women

The improvement of the condition of Indian women has been a favorite topic in discussions of the impact of British rule on India, contrasting it with the treatment of women without the ameliorating influence of British rule. It is impossible to render any kind of fair reckoning, on the one hand, of just how oppressed women were by Hindu and Muslim social customs, including child marriage, female infanticide, discrimination against widows, the difficulty of divorce for women, and polygamy, or, on the other hand, how their condition improved during the period of British rule. All that can be done is to note some of the many attempts made by interested groups and individuals, including missionaries and liberal British officials, to bring about change in civil society or, through pressure and publicity, to get the government to legislate social change that affected women. Such activities are among the clearest markers of modernity. A historian of modern women in India summarizes the numerous influences that were at work as Christian criticism of Indian religion, humanitarianism, utilitarianism, social Darwinism, and nationalism, with all basically insisting on the need for “a new gender ideology and modification of the actual treatment of women” (Forbes, p. 14).

The earliest and the most famous act of social legislation was the criminalizing of *sati*, the practice, fairly

common among higher Hindu castes in Bengal, of widows immolating themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres. In the West, this had become symbolic of Indian treatment of women, leading to demands for its abolition by the government. The British government of India had hesitated to take such action, believing that the custom was prescribed by religion, and that forbidding it would lead to great resentment. In 1829, however, when it was declared illegal, there was no apparent popular outcry. Another symbolic piece of legislation came in 1856, under the leadership of the Hindu reformer Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), with the passage of an act permitting Hindu widows to remarry. One of the most famous Indian reformers of the century, Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), had always argued that such customs were not integral to true Hinduism but were “corruptions” that had evolved through the centuries and that should be abolished. An issue that aroused far more support as well as opposition was child marriage, that is, the marriage of girls before puberty. In 1860 an act made ten years the age at which marriage could be consummated, but it was rarely enforced. In 1891 the age of consent was raised to twelve, but it was hardly enforced either. The landmark legislation did not come until 1929, when the Hindu Marriage Restraint Act raised the age of consent for girls to fourteen.

The activism of Indian women behind such social legislation was as important as the acts themselves. Numerous local groups of women organized throughout the country by the beginning of the twentieth century, and after World War I, three major organizations were formed: the Women's Indian Association, the National Council of Women in India, and the All-India Women's Conference. This last of these had the widest influence, probably because of the high social status of its leaders as well as their willingness to engage in serious political work and to organize lower-class women. It was especially influential in organizing support for the Hindu Marriage Act and for the education of girls.

The emergence of women as an important force in the nationalist movement came with the ascendancy of Mahatma Gandhi as the leader of the Indian National Congress in 1920. He insisted on the equality of men and women, and urged women to join in the difficult and dangerous work of opposition to British rule. Women could play a special part, he argued, in the fight for freedom because by nature they were accustomed to self-sacrifice. Women have had an extraordinary place in modern India, matched by no other country in the world, serving as prime minister of the country, leaders of the opposition, chief ministers of the states, ambassadors, and doctors and lawyers in very large numbers, as well as in the traditional role of teachers.

Constitutionalism

In terms of the interaction of the indigenous traditions of India with the political, economic, and cultural power of Great Britain, perhaps the most conspicuous and enduring was the development of the constitutional framework of modern India and the emergence of various forms of nationalism in competing political parties. In the 1890s, at the high noon of British imperial power in the subcontinent, most knowledgeable British officials, if they had been asked to speculate on the major impact of Great Britain on India, would almost certainly have answered, “law and order.” Although electoral politics had barely begun, most of the leaders of the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, would, curiously enough, have given somewhat the same answer. So would many prominent Indians who were not identified with the Congress. In the next thirty years, Indian nationalists and historians would argue that ancient India had not only possessed republican forms of constitutional government, it had also had the military power to protect itself. Indians were thus able to accept the constitutional and legal framework that had been created by British rule in India as consonant with their own history. Armed revolution was not necessary in order to drive out the British, but rather a melding of the formal structures of British power with the force of India's own traditions. In 1922, when Mahatma Gandhi was sentenced for sedition against the British government, he told the judge, “I believe that I have rendered a service to India and England by showing in non-cooperation a way out of the unnatural state in which we are now living” (Brown, p. 118). In 1947, as he moved the bill in the House of Commons that would end British rule in India, Prime Minister Clement Attlee in effect assented to this, from the British perspective, when he claimed that while there had been mistakes and failures, British rule in India could “stand comparison with that of any other nation which has been charged with the ruling of a nation so different from themselves” (*Parliamentary Debates*).

Ainslie T. Embree

See also **British Crown Raj; Christian Impact on India, History of; Women and Political Power; Women's Education**

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BRITISH INDIA OFFICE, THE From 1858 to 1947 the India Office, in London, was the home government for Britain's largest and most complex overseas possession. Its diverse responsibilities were carried out collaboratively by a secretary of state for India, permanent officials, a mélange of departments and petty officials, and the Council of India—that unique imperial institution designed to provide "currency" and represent the Indian ethos in the policy-making process in London. Established formally by the Government of India Act of 1858, the India Office, in its first decade, was not markedly distinguishable from the "dual government" that had evolved under the Court of Directors and Board of Control of the East India Company. In its first years, the personnel and internal committee system were carryovers from the company, and for all intents and purposes, the new India Office was a change in form but not substance.

The act of 1858, however, did mark out new objectives that would, over time, change completely the functioning of the Office. The most significant overarching change articulated in 1858 was a new alignment of India Office responsibility to Parliament, and thus both implied and real control of Indian affairs from London. The secretary of state for India, now a member of the Cabinet, could, in fact, overrule the Council of India on "urgent" and "secret" matters, something his predecessor, the president of the Board of Control, could not do. However, secretaries of state for India rarely used this power, and de facto, the home government of India operated as a corporate entity, with the secretary of state "in council"—especially important since all matters involving expenditures of funds required council approval.

Although Parliament possessed the technical wherewithal to involve itself routinely in Indian affairs, it by and large remained apathetic to India and the India Office

until well into the nineteenth century. As the currents of both British domestic and foreign policy debates brought Indian management (both at home and in India) to the fore, the India Office staff worked meticulously to minimize what they construed as parliamentary "interference." The office had, over time, developed a collective administrative psyche among its permanent officials that often encouraged them to circumvent what seemed an obvious fact: they were, after all, a British department of state. While it was true that secretaries of state rotated the seals with each shift of British administration, and that the India Office was always obligated to liaise with U.K. departments, the unique funding circumstances of the India Office mitigated Parliament's control of the office. From 1858 to 1919 (although a few minor exceptions were left unaffected until 1937), the salary of the secretary of state for India, the permanent undersecretaries, and office operating expenditures were paid for with Indian, not British revenues. The India Office was not subject to the usual Treasury pressures until well into the twentieth century.

The first secretary of state for India, Sir Charles Wood (1859–1866), effected the first structural reorganization of the India Office in 1859. Increasingly concerned that the old system of handling office business was too cumbersome, he designed reforms to streamline the processing of paperwork among the permanent and parliamentary undersecretaries, the departments, and the committees of the Council of India. In particular, he designated specific subjects to be handled by each of the undersecretaries, and he refined the process of dispatch writing to reside primarily with department heads. Gradually, the departments of the India Office and the committees of the Council of India were brought into alignment. As the office ended its first decade, the correspondence departments of the office had become the linchpins for coordinating the flow of paper among the departments, the Council of India, the permanent undersecretary, and the secretary of state for India. The six correspondence departments of the India Office were: financial; judicial and public; military; political and secret; public works; and revenue, statistics, and commerce. This division of labor was further codified and institutionalized by Arthur Godley when he became permanent undersecretary in 1883.

In mid-nineteenth century—a pre-photocopy, pre-carbon paper age—the India Office processed nearly 100,000 documents annually. This paperwork increased significantly as the telegraph reached India in 1870, and in the 1890s, when the typewriter was introduced in the office. Increasingly, the office was consumed not only with spiraling amounts of official paperwork related to Indian affairs, but it also became the focal point of much lobbying by emergent Indian political parties and their allies in Britain. As the India Office tended to shy away

from public comments and posturing—especially during the long permanent undersecretaryship of Godley (1883–1909)—it was castigated in the Indian press as the “great manufactory of lies.”

The Indian Council Act of 1909 added a new presence in the India Office. For the first time, two Indians joined the Council of India. Perhaps sensing a harbinger of things to come, Lord Crewe introduced a new Council of India Bill to Parliament in 1914 designed to strengthen the power of the secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. Oddly, it was defeated when Lord Curzon, former viceroy of India, championed the Council of India as a bulwark against India Office browbeating of the Government of India in New Delhi. Curzon was reacting to the “Simla versus Whitehall” tensions (such as the differences in perspective between Calcutta and London) that had been writ large in his tenure in India, but was hardly ever absent from Indian governance since 1858. In that context, however, the India Office almost always held the upper hand.

World War I accelerated the intensity of Indian affairs on many fronts, and no less so in the internal organization of the India Office. Paramount among these was the change effected in the Government of India Act of 1919. Insofar as the home government of India was concerned, it was shifting the expenses of the office from Indian revenues to the British estimates, thus opening the door for active involvement of the Treasury and Parliament in the day-to-day operation of the India Office, which was seminal. The ineptitude of the Mesopotamia campaign in World War I also subjected the India Office to the kind of public scrutiny it had largely avoided in its first half century, and a significant reordering of the office structure was put into place. In the interwar period, the number of Indians on the Council of India was increased from two to three. Further, the six traditional correspondence departments were submerged into three larger units: services and general; public and judicial; and economic and overseas. In response to the new, more direct Treasury link, an establishment officer assumed personnel matters from the accountant general’s operations. The Council of India historically met weekly, a practice now cut to once a month, and new requirements were effected to update “currency” in Indian affairs to the council—now, more than ever, moved to periphery of the policy-making process as a purely “consultative” body. The coup de grâce for the Council of India came with the Government of India Act of 1935, implemented in 1937, which transformed the Council of India into a group of “Advisers” to be consulted only at the secretary of state’s discretion. Finally, in 1937, Burmese affairs were slivered off from the India Office, although Burmese Office officials tended to simply wear two hats in serving both India and Burma.

During World War II, the India Office coordinated its activities with an assortment of British, Indian, and Allied bureaucracies. Such cooperation was necessary in order to prosecute the war effectively and carefully monitor the increasingly intense and complicated Indian nationalism of the 1940s. In pursuit of these goals, the India Office perspective was not always the same as that of other agencies, and considerable bureaucratic rivalry was evident. When Britain withdrew from India in 1947, the India Office ceased to exist; it was merged with the newly formed Commonwealth Relations Office.

Arnold P. Kaminsky

See also **British Crown Raj**


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BROCADE Brocade is fabric with a woven pattern that is purely decorative and independent of the structure of the cloth. The brocade weaving technique is also defined as loom embroidery. Brocade patterned fabrics can be made using any fiber, such as cotton (*jamdani*) or wool (for shawls), but the term generally refers to the richly patterned fabrics woven in silk, together with decorative gold or silver threads.

History

Sanskrit terms like *hiranya drapi* (golden drape), *hiranya chandataka* (golden skirt), or *hiranya pesas* (gold embroidered) are first mentioned in sacred ancient Indian sources as ancient as the Rig Veda and the Atharva Veda. Those are the earliest references to Indian gold brocade garments, either woven or embroidered with gold. Other terms are mentioned in ancient Indian literature referring to silk fabrics: *kausheya*, *kitsutram*, *pattasutra*, or *patron*. Gold and silver brocades, referred to as *kinkhab* or *kamkhwab* in later periods, may be related to the ancient fabrics like *debag* or *stavaraka*, described as rich material of Persian origin, woven with gold and silver, to be used by gods and kings. Traditional Indian dress, such as the sari, *dupatta* (veil), sash, *dboti* (men’s lower garment), and turban, had exquisite brocade borders and end pieces (*pallu*). These were usually woven with silk and gold and silver threads (*zari*) while the remaining ground (which usually remained in folds when worn) was woven with fine cotton or silk. The style was perfect for India’s climate. Heavier material with brocade work throughout was used mostly for home furnishings and stitched garments like coats, jackets, and trousers.



Nawāb of Bahawalpur, 1868–1900, Wearing Brocade Coat. Garments of heavy brocade were often reserved for royalty or conquerors. This late-eighteenth-century photo was possibly taken in the princely state of Bahawalpur, now part of modern-day Pakistan. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Brocade weaving centers developed in the capitals of ancient kingdoms, holy cities, and the trade centers. The raw material used in weaving silk brocades were costly, and the weavers had to depend on royal patrons to either provide the raw material or finance its purchase. Some of the best silk weaving centers were in Gujarat (Ahmedabad, Surat, and Patan), central India (Chanderi and Burhanpur), Maharashtra (Paithan, Aurangabad, and Yeola), South India (Kanchi, Tanjore, Arcot, and Trichinapally), North India (Agra, Jalalpur, Mau, Mubarakpur, Azamgarh, and Varanasi), Bengal (Murshidabad), and Assam. Banaras (Varanasi), which today is India's leading brocade weaving center, has been known for its fine cotton weaving since ancient times. Silk brocade weaving in Varanasi probably began in the mid- or late seventeenth century. Fabrics made here were used only for royal dress, palace furnishings, as gifts to political envoys, or as robes of honor for meritorious courtiers. Most ancient Indian dynasties supported weavers who created fabrics of the highest quality. The royal workshops established by the Mughals at Agra, Lahore, Delhi, and Ahmedabad had the greatest influence on the craft. Fabrics made here were used only for royal dress, palace furnishings, as gifts to political envoys, or as

robes of honor for meritorious courtiers. In addition to Indian weavers, these workshops employed the best weavers from Persia, Central Asia, and Turkey. Persian brocades, renowned for their quality and beauty, clearly influenced Mughal brocades. The international fusion of design and technique resulted in some of the finest examples of Indian brocades, and its effect can be seen in later Indian brocades, including those of the present day.

Materials and Techniques

Indian varieties of silk, known as *tassar*, *eri*, and *muga*, are grown in the jungles of Assam, Upper Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh. Compared to Chinese silk, Indian silk is rougher, less lustrous, and has shorter fibers; it was referred to as wild silk. *Muga*, the costliest and the best, is usually used in its original color, cream or golden. The most commonly used Indian silk is *tassar*. Fine mulberry silk is made as well, but the quality is inferior to that of Chinese silk. For this reason, a large percent of silk used in India is imported from China (in Varanasi, 80 percent of the silk is imported).

The gold and silver (*zari*) threads used for brocade weaving are of two different types. The flattened gold or silver wire (*badla*) is more difficult to weave. The more common type (*kalabattu*) is made by winding the metal wire around a core thread of silk, cotton, or even rayon. The metal wire is made of silver or gold-plated silver. The metal thread used is called artificial *zari*, which is silver-coated copper wire. Lacquer is used to give the golden hue.

Silk has a remarkable affinity for dyes. India was long famed for using a variety of natural dyes, including indigo, turmeric, saffron, pomegranate skin, catechu, lacquer, iron rust, and a number of flowers. In modern times, only chemical dyes are used.

The traditional simple pit loom is still used for handloom brocades. Jacquard was introduced in India in the late nineteenth century. The power loom is also used for mass production. The three main techniques used for creating the pattern are tapestry, *lampas*, and brocade. If more than one technique is applied to form a pattern, it is called a compound weave (e.g., the decorative panels of Mughal sashes).

Tapestry and *lampas* are more ancient than the brocade technique. Paithan, Aurangabad, and Chanderi were known for making saris, sashes, or *dupattas* with intricately woven borders in tapestry weave. Colored threads were used with gold or silver *zari*, creating a jewel-like look. In this weave, the warp is stretched on the loom and weft threads of different colors are woven into it—not across the entire width of the warp, but each one only in the specific areas where it is needed to form the pattern.

The different sets of weft threads are interlocked together, giving a geometrical outline to the pattern.

In *lampas*, two or more warps are used, one to make the background and another to make the pattern. The weft is used as a binding yarn. Assam is known for making figured *lampas* (e.g., Vrindavani Vastra, depicting scenes from Hindu mythology). Remarkable home-furnishing fabrics and curtains woven with large floral patterns are beautiful examples of Mughal *lampas*. Agra, Mau, Azamgarh, and Varanasi were known for making *lampas* using mixed yarns (cotton and silk warp and weft), usually with a striped pattern. Well-known varieties included *sangi*, *galta*, and *illaycha* or *alacha*.

Brocade, the most popular pattern-making technique, is used in most of the centers. The most intricate and beautiful pattern is called *kadwa* (embroidered). This pattern requires as many shuttles of differently colored silk as will appear in a pattern, and each pattern has its own set of shuttles. The use of different colors of silk and *zari* gives the pattern an enameled look called *minakari*. Brocades made in Gujarat usually had a ground of gold or silver threads on which patterns were created using colored silks. Some of the finest examples are the end panels and borders of Ashavali saris and the Mughal *patkas* (sashes). In Varanasi, the background is usually of silk or organza, with *zari* and colored threads forming the pattern.

An easier and cheaper way of weaving the pattern, commonly used in modern times, is called *fekwa* (to throw). Here the pattern weft is not broken, as in the *kadwa*, but runs fully across the warp, appearing on the surface as required by the pattern. The loose weft threads running between the patterns on the reverse are cut away to make the patterns clearer on the front. The work is known as *katraua*, or cutwork.

Motifs

The study of ancient Indian decorative motifs reveals an amazing persistence of certain motifs for thousands of years. These motifs appear in architecture, pottery, jewelry, metalware, and textiles. Most brocade weaving centers use traditional patterns, though each center has unique characteristics. The saris made at southern centers are known for their long and rich gold brocaded *pallu* (end piece), showing a predominance of animal or bird motifs, including the bull, deer, horse, tiger, elephant, peacock, parrot, swan, twin-headed eagle, and a mythical animal called *yali* (having a lion's head and a bird's body) or a combination of peacock and swan. Similar architectural decorations are found on the walls of southern Hindu temples.

Gujarati brocades, also famed for their animal and bird representation, also incorporated human figures

with elephants, tigers, peacock, and parrots. Intricate floral borders and trellis patterns were also used. *Carrie*, the mango-shaped pattern (better known as paisley), became a widely used motif from the eighteenth century onward. It became the standard corner motif (*Konia*) in saris and *dupattas* (veils) in most of India's centers. A number of Persian floral patterns were copied in Gujarati brocades and can be seen on the exquisite end panels of Mughal sashes and Ashavali saris.

Mughal brocades were known for their elegance and symmetry; their patterns, which were mostly floral, included iris, poppy, tulip, and narcissi. A number of geometrical patterns, including zigzag, diagonal, or straight lines, squares, chevrons, circles, trellis, and lozenges, were also used. Early brocade is known for its bold and realistic compositions. Later patterns are more complex, the space between the main patterns filled by additional motifs. Specialty Banaras brocades included *Shikargah* (a hunting scene, a combination of vegetal, floral, animal, birds, and human figures), *latifa buti* (an inverted or swaying floral pattern), and *zal* (a trellis, incorporating floral and geometrical patterns). Western patterns also influenced the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Varanasi brocades. Designs like meandering creepers, abstract motifs, ribbons, and open borders were incorporated into traditional patterns.

Special brocades were made for different religious uses, like the backdrops or rosary covers with figures of Lord Krishna surrounded by cows, made in Ahmedabad for the devotees of the Vallabh cult. *Gyasar*, used in Buddhist monasteries, include dragon motifs and floral patterns and are made in Banaras.

Types of Fabric

Fabrics are classified as either loom-finished or as yardage. Yardage is used as dress material and for home furnishings. Loom-finished fabrics are saris, *dupattas*, sashes, caps, or borders. Varanasi was also known for weaving garments such as *lehnga* (a woman's skirt) and *choga* (the long and loose man's coat).

Besides *kinkhab* the other best-known brocade fabrics are *kinkhab*, the splendor and elegance of which, combined with its cost, gave it that name, which means "little" (*kim*) "dream" (*khab*). *Alfi* is another exclusive and expensive brocade, used mostly in ceremonial outfits. Gold or silver patterns are outlined with single or double colored silk threads; the pattern is called *minakari* (enameling). *Tasbi* is a fabric in which flat golden or silver metal wire (*badla*) is used as pattern weft along with colored threads, creating ashiny, luxurious appearance. The *bimru* variety of brocade pattern is woven with only silks, without the use of gold or silver threads. *Baluchari* saris and

dress materials woven at Murshidabad are the finest examples of this technique.

Masbru is mixed fabric, in which cotton and silk are used as warp and weft, usually creating a striped or floral pattern. *Masbrus* were used mostly for trousers, jackets, or the lining of garments.

Varanasi remains the premier center of brocade weaving. Both hand and power looms are used. The number of weaver families was, according to the 1995–1996 census, approximately 125,000. Of these, 60 percent were Muslim, residing mostly in and around urban areas, and 40 percent were Hindu, working mostly in villages near Varanasi. The metal threads used are mostly artificial, made either in Varanasi or Surat. Other well-known weaving centers are Kanchipuram, Tanjore, Bangalore, and Mysore in the South; Aurangabad, Yeola, Chanderi, and Maheshwar in mid-peninsular India; and Murshidabad and Guwahati in eastern India.

Yashodhara Agrawal

See also **Textiles**

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BRONZES

This entry consists of the following articles:

EARLY IMAGES

SOUTH INDIAN

EARLY IMAGES

A figure made from an alloy of metals is generally described as “bronze.” In the Indian context, the common term for such items is *ashtadbatu*, meaning eight metals. As gathered from ancient canonical texts (Shilpa Shāstras), the mixture of metals included gold, silver, copper, bronze, brass, tin, lead, and iron, though an alloy of even two metals was called bronze. In the southern part of the country, five metals (*panchalauba*) made a bronze; the ingredients were gold, silver, copper, brass, and white lead. Iron, being considered impure, was

avoided for shaping divine figures, and costly metal like gold was sparingly used. With the passage of time, an icon made of even a single metal was called bronze.

Bronzes, or metal figures, have been used for worship, meditation, cult purposes, aesthetic admiration, and as prized possessions. These also served as substitutes for large consecrated images (*dbruvaberas*); they were called *chalaberas*, mobile images that were used on festive occasions and in processions. These became popular in India among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and in folk cults.

As works of art, Indian bronzes are highly esteemed, equal to the best stone sculpture, displaying a high degree of workmanship, exquisite beauty and charm, rhythm, posture, and expressions. Chronologically, these works first emerged in the Indus Valley dating back to the middle of the third millennium B.C.; their production has continued to the present, with a fascinating journey of development through the ages and in different regions.

Indus Figures

The lumps revealed from sites like Mehargarh, Baluchistan (in Pakistan) prove the prevalence of metal, particularly copper, by about the sixth millennium B.C., although the earliest use of bronze or metal hails from Mohenjo-Daro and belongs to the third millennium B.C. Small in dimension (4.3 in. [10.8 cm] high), the figure of a dancing girl is of great aesthetic merit. Looking like a young indigenous maiden with horizontally enlarged eyes, she stands in rhythmic pose, with her left leg flexed forward, balancing the weight of her body on the right leg, with her right arm resting on her hip and her left arm on her thigh. While no trace of drapery is marked, she wears a triple-beaded, single-stranded necklace around her neck, double bangles on her right wrist and arm, and a row of thick bangles covering her entire left arm. The hairdo terminates into an elongated tuft (*juda*) resting on the nape. The use of drapery and sometimes decorated textiles is attested by terra-cotta figurines (particularly a stone bust of a so-called priest with trefoil motif scarf), but this female bronze is bare bodied except for these ornaments, which do not conceal her nudity. It may perhaps be presumed that the young girl (*sbodashi*) served some cult or ritual purpose. Alternatively, it may simply be a demonstration of ornaments on the body for decorative purposes. At the same time, the naturalistic treatment of the human figure suggests an advanced stage of production of metal sculpture in the early phase of Indus culture.

Another female figure in metal was revealed from the same site (Mohenjo-Daro). With her right arm on her waist, she bears some similarity to the dancing girl, wearing some ornaments on her unclothed body, but the workmanship lacks grace and elegance, and the figure is

weather worn. The buffalo from Mohenjo-Daro (2.8 in. [7.1 cm] long) is another excellent product of the Indus bronze atelier. It is notable for its anatomical rendering as well as its projection of vitality and strength. The bull from Kalibangan (2.76 in. [7 cm] long) is also a fine specimen. The little dog from Mohenjo-Daro (.7 in. [1.78 cm] long), probably made as a toy, must have come from the hands of a skilled smith. Its raised ears and tail bespeak realism, and a collar-type projection around the neck is an interesting feature. Whether it indicates a domestic breed of pet or something else is unknown. All the above objects are housed in the National Museum of New Delhi. From Mehri were recovered several bronze specimens, but the mirror (4.9 in. [12.5 cm] diameter) is outstanding. The handle is shaped like a standing female figure, with suspended arms alongside an unusually elongated body. The object also suggests the application of shining polish for reflection.

Daimabad. Bronze casting not only continued to be practiced in the late or post-Indus culture, but it was considerably improved. This is evidenced by a hoard unearthed at Daimabad, on the left bank of the Pravara River in the Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra in western India. Four large bronzes are of immense significance, particularly for the fact that they have been dated between 2000 and 1800 B.C. Of these, three represent animals (an elephant, buffalo, and rhinoceros) and the fourth is a chariot driven by a standing male figure. All the statues are made in solid bronze (*ghana dhatu*), but each is a different size. The animals stand on three separate pedestals, which have wheels for movement.

The elephant (14.4 x 10.4 in. long [36.5 cm high, 26.5 cm]) is the highest of all four, though the wheels of its pedestal are missing. The large holes on the four pegs conspicuously explain its use for a procession. The anatomy is robust and the twist of the tip of its trunk and a curved cavity between the hind legs and stomach befit the representation. The buffalo (10.8 x 9.7 in. long [27.5 cm high, 24.8 cm]), resembling a bison with large horns, bears the natural projection of front knees and stands on a four-wheeled chariot. The front two wheels are smaller than the rear ones. The rhinoceros (11.2 in. [28.5 cm] high) lacks naturalism, as the pleats of thick skin, legs, mouth, and horn are stylistically treated, similar to the depiction of a rhinoceros on some Indus seals. All four wheels of the base are of equal dimension.

The most fascinating object of the hoard is certainly a chariot driven by a standing young man. There are several remarkable features of this unique piece. With a length of 19.7 inches (50 cm) and a height of 9.2 inches (23.3 cm), this is the largest item from Daimabad hoard. The chariot has two components; the front part is dominated by a driver in commanding attitude. The two parts are joined

by a thick string, terminating in a yoke on the necks of a pair of bullocks, whose front and hind legs are supported on two separate pedestals. The animals have a composite appearance: while the horns, hoofs, and midsections are suggestive of bulls, the mouths, tails, and hind portions give the impression of horses. The fabrication of the back unit is rather complicated but exciting. Its basic structure is composed of a flat base with two vertical rods terminating in loops on top. A triangle of rods gives it strength and, along with a curved rod, rests on the back of an animal (probably a tiny horse). The young charioteer holds a whip. This may also be conjectured as a section of a broken rein, which controlled the running or galloping animals. This part of the carriage has two wheels for movement. The exact purpose of this extraordinary object is unknown. The posture of the charioteer and the shape of the cart, allowing no room for cargo or a passenger, encourage us to think that it was meant to depict a racing cart. Thus, the object on one hand is a rare example of advanced metallurgy and on the other suggests the prevalence of sports like cart racing in the early second millennium B.C.

Technology. The finds from the Indus and late or post-Indus sites attest to the popularity of the lost wax (*cire perdue*) method of bronze casting in India. This process continues to the present with slight variations in different parts of India. Medieval period textbooks refer to it as *madbuchchbishhta-vidhana*, which could be applied either for solid (*ghana*) or for hollowed (*sushira*) figure. The different stages of bronze casting for a solid (*ghana*) figure are as follows:

- Preparation of model image in wax;
- Application of several coats of clay;
- Perforation, especially on top and bottom;
- Drying of casket-type mold in shade and sun;
- Heating of mold for melting the wax, which is then "lost";
- Top holes are closed;
- Preparation of an alloy of metals in molten form;
- Pouring of liquid metal through top hole;
- Allowing liquid to spread thoroughly in space created by lost wax figure;
- Cooking of the lump;
- Outer clay cover to be broken;
- Cast figure is ready;
- Finishing and filing.

The different stages of bronze casting for a hollow (*sushira*) figure are:

- Preparation of mold image in clay;
- Coating of wax;
- Coating of clay;
- Remaining stages the same as for solid (*ghana*);

Lightweight hollow figure ready;
Finishing and filing.

The details of the process of metal casting are recorded in the canonical texts, like *Manasara* (68.20–23), *Manasollasa* or *Abhilasitarthachintamani* (1.77–97), and *Vishnu-sambita*, *Aparajitaprichchba* (199.13–14). We are yet to come across a hollow metal figure from the Indus or late Indus culture, and it may be presumed that it was a later innovation. The last process of bronze casting, the finishing and filing, became so elaborate with the passage of time that the finished figure looked quite different from the cast model.

Vedic Period

It cannot be said with certainty whether the Vedic people preceded or followed the Indus culture, although historians generally subscribe to the view that the Vedic age is later. While material remains of the period are wanting, the Vedas furnish ample testimony regarding the artistic renderings and use of metals. Tvashta remains busy in creating different forms (Rig Veda 3.60.4) and Vishvakarma produces beautiful figures (ibid., 10.81.7). He is compared with a smith who uses furnace for smelting metals (ibid., 10.72.2). When a person (a smith artist) asks for ten cows in exchange for Indra (ibid., 4.24.10), he must be in possession of a costly figure of the deity, probably made in gold. The process of metal smelting was known as *sandhamana*.

Copper Implements

Archaeology is silent for about eight centuries, and no metal figure is found up to the eleventh or tenth century B.C., when some copper implements resembling a human figure (anthropomorphic) emerge from several parts of India, like Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. Their purpose and the lifestyle of their users remain a mystery. Some do bear the incised marks of fish, but these do not seem to be art objects. There is again a big gap of time when bronzes or metal figures disappear. It is only in the Shunga age (2nd–1st century B.C.) that we find a unique gold *repoussé* sculpture from Patna, now in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. It represents a male and a female, and the sad expression of the female figure suggests that it is Sītā, kidnapped by Ravāṇa. A gold plaque depicting Karttikeya, found at Hulaskheda near Lucknow by the State Archaeology Department, is also a rare piece of the early first century A.D.

The Kushana Period

Excavations at Sonkh, near Mathura in Uttar Pradesh, conducted from 1968 to 1974 by German archaeologists under the guidance of Herbert Härtel, revealed metallic

items from the ninth or eighth century B.C. The bronze sculptural specimens, however, come from the Kushana layers only. One, a standing young man holding a spear (*shakti*), has correctly been identified as Skanda or Karttikeya. Wearing a high diadem with a central jewel, rings in the ears, and a single pearled necklace (*ekavali*), he stands with his left arm akimbo. The sculpture was cast in two flat pieces that were then joined (3.7 in. [9.3 cm] high). The second bronze (4.2 in. [10.6 cm] high, 3.3 in. [8.5 cm] wide) also hails from the same levels of the Kushana period and represents a standing couple within a frame. The male, with high matted hair, raises his right hand in a protective (*abbaya*) pose, while his left hand holds a bowl. He wears a *dboti* (lower garment), the folds of which are seen between the legs. Beside double earrings (now seen on the left side only), he also wears a loose flat necklace. The woman to his left (probably his spouse) has her right hand raised, while the left one holds a child. The head has been shaped like an animal (perhaps a cat). The plaque may represent Kubera and a mother goddess like Shashthi or Charchika. The frame gives the impression of a gateway (*torana*) with brackets on both sides and a central decorative motif, a variation of Shrivatsa or Nandyavarta. The above two are the earliest bronzes from the stratified levels in India and are similar to the contemporary stone sculptures for which Mathura was famous. There are two small bronze figures in the collection of Vinod Krishna Kanoria of Patna of the early Kushana period. One represents a young man with high fluted headgear, probably blowing some musical instrument and supporting a clublike object behind his raised left hand. The other is a female blowing a wind instrument. It retains the archaic appliqué ornamental technique.

Satavahana bronzes. A good number of metal items were found in a hoard at Brahmapuri, near Kolhapur in Maharashtra, belonging to the Satavahana period (2nd century A.D.), contemporary with the Kushanas. The most striking is a small bronze (2 in. [5 cm] high) representing four riders on an elephant. The two on the front may be explained as a royal or noble couple, as presumed from their jewelry, headgear, and garments. The remaining two on the back may be a female attendant and a page. Their positions are those prescribed by code, that is, the chief, followed by his spouse, her female attendant, and the page at the end. They are, perhaps, going to a shrine for worship. The elephant has been rendered beautifully and may be compared with the depiction in some early western rock-cut sites like Karle. The posture of the animal is noteworthy, as it seems it is about to rise to begin the journey.

The mythical lion from the same site, belonging to the same period (2.4 in. [6 cm] high) is also interesting.

This specimen of *repoussé* technique is significant for its vigor and movement, as indicated by its prancing front right leg. The head is shaped like an eagle; such fabulous figures are also found in early Indian architecture. Another item is a metal ring, which is surmounted by the heads of four mythical beings. The purpose of this piece cannot be explained exactly, but it might have been used as *dharmachakra* (the “Wheel of Law” set in motion by the Buddha in his first sermon at Sarnath).

The Buddha from Amaravati (17.1 in. [43.5 cm] high) in the Government Museum at Madras (Chennai), belongs to the late Satavahana or early Ikshvaku phase (c. 3rd century A.D.). With locked hair, protuberance, elongated ears and eyes, the Buddha wears *ekansika sanghati* (drapery covering the left shoulder only), the hem of which is held in the raised left hand. The right arm is half suspended in a posture of *varada* (bestowing a blessing). The Archaeological Museum, Nagarjunakonda, Andhra Pradesh, houses an excellent bronze figure of a prince (3.3 in. [8.5 cm] high) from the third century A.D. Standing stylistically, the young man wears a fluted headgear, a pair of bangles, earrings and a *dboti* (lower garment). The right arm is held akimbo with some object in the hand; with the left hand he supports a long scepter or a bow. He stands gracefully in a curved (*tribhanga*) pose with his right foot forward.

Chausa bronzes. A hoard of sixteen bronzes was found at Chausa in Bihar. These magnificent sculptures are related to the Digambara (sky-clad) sect of Jainism and are dated from the second century to the third century A.D., a period that can be termed the Kushano-Gupta epoch. Curiously, these figures follow the Mathura idiom in stylistic rendering. The motif of Shrivatsa on the chest, a conspicuous feature of Mathura Jinas, is also noticed in Chausa bronzes. Most figures represent the Tirthankaras, of whom Rishabhanatha (the first Jina) can be identified by locks of hair falling on the shoulders. They stand in a stiff pose of penance and austerity (*katyotsarga* or *danda*), generally on a pedestal. The size varies from 7.9–18.9 in. (20 to 48 centimeters).

Aesthetically, a *dharmachakra* (12.8 in. [32.5 cm] high) is a unique piece within this group. The sixteen-spoked wheel is encircled by a rim decorated with a band of *nandipada* (taurine) motif. It terminates on the tail of crocodiles that support the female bracket figures (*shalabhanjika*) with their lower jaws. This decorated *dharmachakra* rests on a plain pillar. The Chausa bronzes are housed in the State Museum at Patna.

The Gandhara region. Kushana period or even somewhat earlier bronzes have been recovered from the Gandhara region (now in Pakistan and Afghanistan) as well. These include bold reliefs on caskets from Taxila,

Bimaran, and Shahji-ki-dheri. The figure of Horous Harpocrates from Taxila is an excellent citation of the pre-Kushana era. From the same period came an amorous couple in *repoussé* work. The bronze casting continued for several centuries in the Gandhara region, and some remarkable specimens are on view in the Indian Art Museum of Berlin.

The Guptan Golden Age

The period of a century and half following the disintegration of the mighty Kushana dynasty is shrouded by darkness, and the horizon becomes clear only in the early fourth century when Shrigupta of the Gupta family assumes power of Magadha in A.D. 319. An unbroken chain of success, consolidation of power, expansion of empire, firm administration, peace, religious harmony, and flourishing trade culminated in prosperity and grandeur, and the age of Guptan rule is rightly termed as the golden period or classical age of Indian history. All the components of culture—literature, music, dance, drama, arts, architecture, iconography, coins, garments, and social values—bear the imprint of richness and ascension.

Bronzes fashioned between the late fourth and sixth century narrate the same story of grace and elegance. Even technology was considerably improved, and this is evidenced by the metals used in figures, coins, and especially in the production of the excellent iron pillar installed at Mehrauli (Delhi) by Chandragupta I (r. 320–c. 330). This has not been affected at all by rust, even though it has stood open to the sky for about sixteen hundred years. Produced in any part of India, the bronzes of the Guptan period bespeak a national phenomenon in art creation. We are informed by the travelogues of Chinese pilgrims Fahsien (early 5th century), Hsien Tsang (mid 7th century), and Itsing (late 7th century) that the metal images were kept in the cells of monks at the Nalanda *vihara* (place of learning, stay and worship for Buddhist monks and students) for daily worship.

The noble conventions of art renderings by the great school of Mathura in stone, especially at Sarnath, are also seen amply reflected in the metal sculptures. The youthful, slim and slender body, curly or long hair terminating in curls (*kakapaksha*), light drapery with or without pleats covering the left shoulder (*ekansika sanghati*) or both shoulders (*ubhayansika sanghati*) in case of the Buddha, inexpressive anatomy and masculinity, elongated earlobes and a blissful expression are some of the remarkable features. The harmony of physical beauty and spiritual elevation was the hallmark of Guptan art. It appears that all the endeavors and trends of Indian art reached a stage of fulfillment. The Guptan art innovations were, therefore, practiced, followed, furthered, and imitated in different ways in diverse regions in the following centuries.

Gupta-Vakataka Bronzes

Like the Guptas in northern and eastern India, the Vakatakas in central and western India, from the mid-third to the early sixth century A.D., patronized art, architecture, and painting. With the marriage of Prabhavati Gupta, daughter of Chandragupta II, to the Vakataka prince Rudrasena II, cultural and administrative ties strengthened and expanded. Consequently the art in the Deccan is generally known as Gupta-Vakataka art. The early Guptan bronzes have been discovered from different places, including Phophnar (Madhya Pradesh), Ramtek (Vidarbha, Nagpur, Maharashtra), Akota (near Vadodara, Gujarat), and Buddhapada (Andhra Pradesh). In the main area of the Guptas, northern and eastern India, the important site is Dhanesar Khera (eastern Uttar Pradesh). Some other bronzes from eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are reported, but their exact provenance is unknown.

Phophnar. Seven bronzes were found at Phophnar. All represent the Buddha standing, with the right hand in the *abhaya* (protective) pose and the left hand holding the hem of transparent *sanghati*. The head has full curls of hair with topknot (protuberance). The earlobes are elongated and the eyes are half open, suggesting serenity. Out of seven, two have drapery of *ubbayansika sanghati* (garment covering both the shoulders) and five have drapery of *ekansika* (covering left shoulder) only. The figures have a raised pedestal; one is surmounted by a full-blown lotus and above the head there is a canopy with celestial beings carrying a wreath. Some items display a classical style, while others suggest a folk art touch. The size varies from 10.2–25.4 in. (26 to 64.5 centimeters). The best piece is in the collection of the National Museum of New Delhi. The Brahmi letters on its base resemble the inscriptions of Ajanta.

Eastern Uttar Pradesh. Two Buddha figures from Dhanesar Khera are interesting for their contrasting characteristics. One, now in the Nelson Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, Missouri, represents the Buddha standing on a pedestal in *abhaya* (protective pose) with a large nimbus. Some Gandhara influence is discernible in the fabrication. The other, now in the British Museum, London, shows the Buddha seated cross-legged on a multitiered pedestal in a preaching pose. The drapery is smooth and transparent, a feature for which the Sarnath school is known. The facial expression imparts a thoughtful but simple appearance. The inscription on the pedestal records that it was the gift of a Gupta queen. The State Museum of Lucknow exhibits a gold-plated iron head of the Buddha, recovered from Azamgarh, in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

The standing Buddha in *abhaya* pose (27 in. [68.5 cm] high), now in the Asia Society of New York, wears a



Bronze Buddha, 5th or 6th Century. The refined harmony of physical beauty and inner spirituality is the hallmark of all sculpture—whether metal or stone—dating to the heralded Gupta period. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

garment with schematic folds, following the Mathura tradition. The other Buddha (19.5 in. [49.5 cm] high), in the same collection, wears smooth drapery in the Sarnath fashion. The figures of the Buddha from Nepal, now in the Norton Simon Foundation, Pasadena, California, and the Cleveland Museum, have similar features. The largest statue (7.4 ft. [225 cm] high), now in the collection of the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, hails from Sultanganj, Bihar, and belongs to the late Guptan or post-Guptan phase.

The figure of Brahma from Mirpur Khas, Sind (Pakistan), housed in the National Museum of Pakistan, is another superb product of the age. The four-headed deity with matted hair is in the recitation posture. He wears a *dboti* (lower garment) and a deerskin on the left shoulder.

Akota. The bronze figures unearthed in 1951 from Akota, near Vadodara, Gujarat, belong to the Shvetambara sect

of Jainism and are of special interest, as they represent a regional style: Mairaka of the late or post-Guptan phase. In addition to Tīrthānkaras, the hoard also includes other figures of the Jain pantheon, like Ambika, Sarasvati, *yakshas*, and *yakshinis*. Mahavira, the twenty-fourth Jina, has been shown as Prince Jivantasvami. The Akota bronzes are dated to the late sixth to the eleventh century A.D. and should not be treated as Guptan period works.

R. C. Sharma

See also **Ajanta; Guptan Period Art; Indus Valley Civilization; Mohenjo-Daro**

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SOUTH INDIAN

The majority of the Tamil bronze sculptures of South India were made to be processional images. Every temple would have a central image that was usually made of stone and was referred to as “immovable” (*achala*). This image would reside in a small dark sanctum in the center of the temple, serving as the conduit through which the divine would manifest themselves to receive the offerings and homage of the devout. As only a small number of people would be privileged by caste to enter the temples and receive the blessings from these images, temples developed yearly ritual cycles in which the deity would manifest in portable bronze images that would be carried out for rituals in different parts of the temple, as well as in processions around the temple and the surrounding city during festivals. Each of these images was fitted onto a pedestal base with either lugs or holes to permit them to be fastened to poles, a cart, or palanquin when they were carried in processions. While individual images were made, there were also processional images made as iconographic groups. These would usually consist of a male deity, his consort, and various attendant figures, depending upon the story being presented.

Persons of stature would have small bronze images of their tutelary deities (*ishtadevata*) in their private residences, which would be worshiped by the head of the family for the well-being and prosperity of the family. These were usually small, a few inches in height, but could be larger depending on the status of the patron.

Development of Style

The earliest Tamil bronze processional images that have been identified were produced by the Pallava dynasty and date from the eighth century A.D., though seventh-century Tamil saints composed songs mentioning processional images. Pallava images are generally smaller than the images produced under the succeeding Chola dynasty, usually no larger than 10 or 12 inches (25–30 cm) in height. Under the Chola dynasty, temples became larger and more elaborate, and the processional images became larger, reaching an optimum size for viewing as they were transported on palanquins and wooden temple carts. The processional images produced under the Chola dynasty range from 2 to 5 feet (.6–1.5 m) high. Tamil metal craftsmen continue to produce processional images for use in religious festivals and ceremonies.

Relatively few Pallava bronze images have survived, and the bronze processional images are generally only 10 or 12 inches in height. Stylistically, they follow the forms of Pallava stone sculpture, but are more fluid and sensual, as the sculptors were able to take advantage of the more malleable medium of wax in fashioning the image before it was cast in bronze. The forms of the garments, jewelry, and sacred thread are often large and clear. As if the sculptors were still learning how to master the new medium, some details like the width of the sacred thread and the garment “tassels” at the waist are much larger and more pronounced than those of the succeeding Chola dynasty. Though there is a sense of grace and ease about many of the figures, they are composed more compactly than their Chola dynasty successors. This is most notable in the images of Shiva as the “Lord of Dance,” Shiva Nataraja. In Pallava examples, the nimbus surrounding the figures rises up in a “keyhole” shape, and the image is fully contained and compressed within it. By the tenth century, when the Shiva Nataraja in the Los Angeles County Museum was cast, the nimbus had opened up more, and Shiva’s arms and legs extend more fully into space. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the nimbus had developed into a full circle, and the form of Shiva’s dance determined the space and radius of the nimbus, rather than the nimbus constraining the form of Shiva’s dance.

Only recently has there been a serious attempt to define regional styles within Chola sculpture. Art historian Vidya Dehejia has proposed four main regional groups: Chola Nadu, Pondai Nadu, Kongu Nadu, and Pandi Nadu. Chola Nadu is the region around Tanjavor, the Chola heartland. In this style, the faces are oval, and the shoulders gently and sensuously slope into long slender arms and legs. The figures convey a sense of serene, dignified majesty. The Shiva Nataraja mentioned above exemplifies these characteristics. The



Ardhanarishvara, Chola Bronze Sculpture. Chola bronze sculpture of Ardhanarishvara (form of Shiva that is half-male, half-female), from ninth- or tenth-century South India. Western scholars and collectors alike continue to respond to the naturalistic modeling of Chola bronzes, their deft merging of the sensuous and the sacred. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Pondai Nadu style is centered on the region around Madras and north of the Kaveri River basin. These figures are generally more angular and less sensuous than those of the Chola Nadu region. Kongu Nadu is the western region centered around Coimbatore. Images from this region display different bodily proportions than those of Tamil Nadu. Their faces tend to be rounder, and their shoulders are very wide and almost parallel to the ground. Their appearance is not as refined or as elegant as the Chola Nadu images. Pandi Nadu is the region around Madurai. Images made there tend to have bodily contours similar to those from Kongu Nadu, but their proportions are more elongated, like those from Chola Nadu.

As the Chola period progressed, there was a tendency for the images in all regions to become more and more stylized, and more conservative in their forms. Generally, the noses tend to become more pointed and sharp. Crowns become more standardized and less ornate.

Process of Manufacture

In order for an image to be a suitable vehicle for a deity to manifest within, it needed to be made according to precise iconographic requirements and exact, prescribed measurements. These requirements are described in minute detail in the class of texts known as *Silpasastras*. By the Chola period, these same texts also forbade the making of hollow images. They warned that an artist who tried to reduce costs in making an image would bring misfortune not only upon himself, but also upon the entire kingdom.

In Tamil Nadu, more than any other part of India, metal images were made out of a special alloy of five metals (gold, silver, copper, lead, and iron) called *panchaloha*. This alloy polishes to a bright, warm golden surface and resists tarnishing. While prized for its bright lustrous surface by priests, when the images were buried in the ground, the surface often corroded into a deep green patina that is now greatly valued by Western museums and collectors.

Tamil artists have traditionally cast processional images using the lost wax method. Following the precise proportions prescribed in the *Silpasastra* texts, a sculptor would form a torso, arms, and legs from wax. Molding them individually and then joining them together, the sculptor would then add wax to create the image's garments and jewelry. Heating the wax as necessary to keep it workable, the sculptor would raise and incise as many of the final details as possible on the wax core. Tubular struts of wax would then be added to the figure to serve as channels through which the wax and gases could escape and the molten metal enter the mold. The completed figure in wax would then be coated, first with a very fine textured clay, and then with successive layers of fine clay, until it was totally encapsulated. After the clay had dried, the mold would be heated over a fire so that the wax would first melt and then be burned out, leaving a negative space into which the molten *panchaloha* alloy would next be poured. When the pouring was complete, the clay mold would be submerged in water and broken away from the new image. Throughout the Chola dynasty, the wax images were so finely modeled and cast that the only finishing work required was to saw away the struts and to polish the surface of the image. At some point after the fall of the Chola dynasty, the finer details were no longer cast, but were chiseled into the surface of the image after casting.

Worship

During the reign of Rajaraja Chola (r. 985–1016) and his son Rajendra Chola (r. 1016–1044), there was both an elaboration of the rituals surrounding bronze processional images and a dramatic increase in their production. The inscriptions of Rajaraja Chola on the pillars and walls of his Bridesvara temple at Tanjavur document not only the commissioning of bronze processional images, but also the gifts of gold jewelry and silks to adorn the images, and ritual lamps and objects to be used in their worship. Even before the reign of Rajaraja Chola, inscriptions show that when they were employed as a host for a deity during a ritual, processional images were fully robed, garlanded in flowers, adorned with precious jewelry, and shaded from the sun with parasols with all the honor, pomp, and ceremony possible. Processional images would never be displayed unadorned; only their hands, faces, and feet would be visible. During the Chola period, thin plates of silver or silver gilt with gold (*kavachas*) were fashioned and affixed to cover not only the hands and feet of processional figures, but also the central images in temples. Very often it is possible to see only the face of an image carried in a procession or otherwise under worship. Ritual bathing of processional images also assumed a new prominence under the Cholas. Special bathing pedestals, often very elaborate, were created, upon which the images could be bathed with a series of substances: perfumed water, sandalwood paste, milk, and honey. As the images' faces would receive special cleaning, lustration, and anointing every day, the delicate lines delineating the eyes would often wear down. As perfect eyes were required to make the image suitable for worship, the eyes would be recut as needed. The eyes of images that have been under continual worship have often had their eyes recut many times. Many images that were buried in the face of invasions, which have now been placed in museum collections, also have had their eyes recut in the distant past, after generations of use.

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
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BUDDHA, LIFE OF THE The historical Buddha's life is recorded in numerous texts, depicted in art, and told orally in stories. There is no one narrative, as the stories vary with time and place—with the types of Buddhism, the local languages, and the cultural traditions. Nevertheless, the overall sequence of events and their significance to the Buddha's understanding and ultimate insight are shared by the various versions of the story. There is no way for us to know to what extent these narratives might actually or historically reflect the life of Shakyamuni (Siddhartha Gautama). Even the dates of Shakyamuni's life are not known for sure, with current scholarship placing his death later than many traditional dates (generally c. 563–483 B.C.), perhaps to around 400 B.C. The earliest evidence we have of his life narrative is some three hundred years later, in the relief carvings on the stone fence at Bharhut in northern India, dating to around 100 B.C. It is assumed that various oral versions of his life were circulating at about this date, but the span of three centuries between his death and our earliest evidence makes any assumptions of historical accuracy impossible. This is not to say that the Buddha's historical existence is in doubt, only that the details of his life cannot be historically reconstructed.

Key Events

Most versions of the story of the Buddha's life share these key events: his conception, birth, youth, palace life, departure, asceticism, enlightenment, teaching, and death. In addition, there are a number of miraculous events that became of singular importance and were told and depicted over and over. Each key life event is briefly outlined below, followed by descriptions of two of the more important miracles.



Life Scenes of the Buddha, Stone, 5th Century. At a park in Sarnath, he delivered (around this same time) his first sermon: It set the “wheel of law” in motion. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Conception. The Buddha’s mother, Maya, had a dream that a white elephant descended from the sky and entered her womb, conceiving the future Buddha. The metaphor is to the white elephant as the monsoon rain cloud that brings the rain, the male element that fertilizes the female earth.

Birth. The pregnant Maya was on her way to her parental home to give birth when she was overcome by contractions and stopped in a garden at Lumbini. The baby Buddha was born out of Maya’s side while she was standing and holding onto a tree branch. Maya’s unusual posture derives from that of women who performed rituals in spring to bring trees into blossom, and to the worship of female deities (*yakshis*) who were depicted performing the same ritual.

Youth and palace life. The Buddha grew up as the son of a local king, and was given an elite education in preparation for his becoming a ruler. After the Buddha’s birth, he had been taken by his parents to a soothsayer, who read certain unusual signs on his body to say that he would either be a great secular ruler or a great religious teacher. His parents, concerned that he choose the secular life of kingship, built for him a pleasure palace in which he lived separated from all of life’s pain and unhappiness. The gods conspired, however, to show Shakyamuni four sightings that greatly troubled him: a sick man, an old man, a dead man, and an ascetic who had abandoned the householder’s life, and who displayed a gentle beatific countenance. The Buddha thus began to think about leaving the pleasure palace.

Departure. In most versions of the Buddha’s life, he is married, but also has a large harem when living in the palace. Having begun to think about renouncing his secular life, the Buddha wakes one night and looks around his bedroom, where he is surrounded by sleeping women, lying in awkward postures, their heads thrown back, snoring, with spittle dribbling from their open mouths. He realizes one of the most important Buddhist insights: that everything changes. That which is at first fresh and beautiful will inevitably fade and become old, decrepit, and ugly. What we see as attractive and a source of desire is only the surface, which covers what is in reality all that is corruptible and decaying. Shakyamuni calls for his horse and groom. He leaves his wife and sleeping courtesans, and rides his horse out of the palace. Distant from the palace, he dismounts, removes his kingly ornaments and clothing, cuts off his topknot of hair, and dons the clothes of an ascetic.

Asceticism. The Buddha spent six years performing intense ascetic practices and studying with several different teachers. He accomplished each of the goals, at one point reducing himself to a mere skeleton by living on a few dried beans and a sip of water a day, but he then realizes that extreme asceticism cannot bring him to spiritual enlightenment. It is this understanding that leads him to advocate the middle way—that is, neither the indulging of the senses (as in his palace life) nor withdrawing from them (as in his life as an ascetic) will lead to enlightenment.

Enlightenment. Abandoning radical asceticism, there is a long and involved cycle of events that eventually leads to Shakyamuni’s enlightenment. He sits under a tree, the *pipul* or *bodhi* tree, and vows not to move until he reaches enlightenment. At the break of dawn, insight is accomplished, and Shakyamuni becomes a buddha (the enlightened one). This core event of the enlightenment story is preceded and followed by many other episodes, such as

the attack of the king of Karma, Mara, and his army as the Buddha sat below the tree, that are popular in both textual and artistic depictions.

Teaching. After he attained enlightenment, the Buddha was unsure whether to stay on Earth and teach his insights or to go immediately into Nirvāṇa. He decides to find pupils and teach them the newly understood Law (*dharmā*), and he walks from the site of enlightenment (Bodh Gayā) to Sarnath, where some ascetics with whom he had spent time were residing in the Deer Park. When he arrives, he teaches them the Law, thus forming the first brotherhood of monks (*sangha*). The Buddha spent the next forty years traveling through northern India, converting monks and teaching laypeople.

Death. The Buddha decided to die in a small village (Kushinagara) at about the age of eighty. After his body is cremated, his bodily relics from the cremation are divided into eight portions and given to different groups of people, who then use them to worship the now absent Buddha. Relics were venerated in several ways, among them placement in reliquaries and in relic mounds (called stupas). Relic worship is of the greatest importance in Buddhism.

Miraculous events. Interspersed throughout the Buddha's life, but particularly during the forty-year period of teaching, are miraculous events, some of which became extremely popular. Once, while walking on a city street with a group of monks, the Buddha's cousin Devadatta, who in the life stories is frequently depicted as at odds with the Buddha, released a large male elephant named Nalagiri who was in a fit of rage (and thus "mad" and dangerous). The elephant thundered down the street, terrifying the people. The Buddha merely raised his hand and spoke some words of his Law, at which the elephant knelt at his feet. This story underlines that the Buddha's Law is intended for all sentient beings, including animals. A second popular miraculous event took place at Saravastī, where the Buddha performed a series of miracles in a battle of magic with a rival band of ascetics. Included at Saravastī were the Buddha's instant creation of a mango tree from a seed, and the display of rising into the sky with fire springing from his shoulders and water from his feet. This Buddha is frequently shown performing miracles in order to convert people and to defeat rival teachers.

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See also **Buddhism in Ancient India**

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
BUDDHISM IN ANCIENT INDIA Buddhists believe in "three jewels": the Buddha, or the Enlightened One; Dharma, or doctrine combining both truth and law; and Sangha, the order of monks and nuns. Buddhism traces its origins to a historical founder, Siddhartha Gautama Buddha, who preached in the middle of the first millennium B.C., between 550 and 450 B.C., though the precise dates are far from clear. Born a prince in the community of the Sakyas, he left his life of opulence and luxury. Having seen an old man, a sick man, and a corpse, Siddhartha was awakened to the fragile nature of life and worldly pleasures, and he went forth from the palace, leaving behind his beautiful wife and son, in search of a solution to human suffering. After many trials and tribulations, he attained enlightenment at the age of thirty-five. Urged by the gods, he decided to preach the Dharma and chose his five erstwhile companions as his first disciples.

The Buddha's first sermon, delivered in the Deer Park of Sarnath, just outside Varanasi, is known as *dharmacakra-pravartana*, or "setting the Wheel of Law in motion," and the Buddha is often depicted in sculptures as touching a wheel to indicate this event. His message brought him several rich disciples, and he spent his life preaching for over forty years in the urban environment of the middle Ganga valley. An analysis of two collections of religious poems, the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*, attributed to monks and nuns, respectively, provides data on Buddhism's early patrons. This survey of the biographies of over three hundred monks and nuns reveals that two-thirds of them came from large towns; of these, 86 percent were from just four cities. These early converts belonged to rich and powerful families, and at least 40 percent of them were Brahmans. The Buddha died at the age of eighty, and after cremation his ashes were divided among his followers, who built stupas over the relics.

Some historians regard the Buddha as a social reformer, but it is evident from his teachings that his emphasis was on reforming the individual rather than the world, since he viewed life in the world as suffering, or *dukkha*. To regard him as a socialist who fought against inequality would therefore be a serious anachronism.

The Buddha and His Teachings

The central doctrine of the Buddha came as a response to the teachings of the Upanishads, notably the Brhadāranyaka, in which one of the central issues of



Buddhahead Stone, 5th Century, Buddha enlightens his followers, as depicted in this fifth-century stone carving. Also excavated at Sarnath, an ancient site still revered by religious pilgrims. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

debate and discussion was the notion of karma, or *kamma*. In the Upanishadic teachings, man is reborn according to the quality of his “works” (*karman*; “works” refer here to ritual prescriptions). Buddha redefined “action” as “intention” and thus, by turning Brahman ideology upside down, ethicized the universe. In the Amagandha text of the Sutta Nipāta, the Buddha argued that defilement comes not from eating this or that, prepared and given by this or that person, but from evil deeds, words, and thoughts.

There were several tenets of karma in existence at the time of the Buddha, though we know very little about them. The only data that we have on the concept of karma are that of the Jains. In contrast to the Hindu concept of ritual act, the Jains also held that karma had an ethical value. For the Jains, however, karma was not either good or bad; it was essentially bad. They conceptualized karma as a kind of dust or dirt, and they argued that for attaining liberation, one had to expunge all karma from the soul. The

transfer of good karma, or merit, was known to Hindu thought and occurs in the Sanskrit epic the Mahābhārata. In Buddhism, however, the concept of karma became a crucial turning point, transforming Buddhism into a religion in which one could be saved by others.

The basic tenet of early Buddhist teachings was the emphasis on “the Middle Way”; this principle, located between indulgence and asceticism, molded the Buddhist approach to life. After enunciating the Middle Way, the Buddha revealed the four Noble Truths that he had realized. These included the awareness that life is unsatisfactory and that *dukkha*, or suffering, arises from desire or want. Suffering can, however, be overcome by following the eightfold path stressed by the Buddha, which helps eradicate desire.

Though the Buddha himself had shown the path of homelessness, Buddhist monks and nuns were enjoined to stay in one place during the three months of the rainy season, and monastic living soon became the norm. This congregation of monks and nuns and the demands of community living required that rules be framed regarding the permitted size and location of monastic buildings. A complex organization evolved to appoint officials to assign rooms, look after stores, and organize the acceptance of meals from the laity. Most important, the Buddha is credited with framing an elaborate set of rules of monastic discipline that governed not only life within the monastic complexes, but also the personal conduct, behavior, and decorum of monks and nuns in public.

Ashoka and the Institution of Buddhist Sacred Geography

Literary references record that within the lifetime of the Buddha as many as twenty-nine sites and buildings had been donated to him: 18 in Rajagaha, 4 in Vaisali, 3 in Kosala, and 4 in Kosambi. Further support for the early association of some of the sites with the life of the Buddha comes from one of the earliest Buddhist texts, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (V. 16–22), which mentions four places to be visited and revered. These include: the Buddha’s birthplace (identified with Lumbini); the place where he attained enlightenment (Bodhi Gayā); the site of his first sermon (Sarnath); and the place where he passed away (Kushinagara). The textual references, however, do not match the archaeological data, since a majority of the structures associated with early Buddhism are shrines, which date from the Mauryan period onward; perhaps the only example of a pre-Mauryan stupa is the one from Vaisali.

One of the long-debated topics in Indian history is whether the Mauryan emperor Ashoka himself was a Buddhist, or whether his policies were rooted in the

Hindu tradition, or whether he instead propagated a nonsectarian ethical concept, set within an imperial framework. Some scholars have suggested that it may be useful to view the rock inscriptions of his reign not as historical facts, but as pieces of political propaganda. The major indicators of Ashoka's ideas are the inscriptions or *dbammalipi*, dated between his eighth and twenty-seventh regnal year, corresponding approximately to 264–245 B.C. A majority of these are written in Brahmi script in the eastern or western (Gandhari) dialects of Prakrit, the exceptions being the northwestern edicts in Kharosthi and those in Greek and Aramaic. The inscriptions may be classified as rock edicts (major and minor), cave inscriptions, and pillar edicts (major and minor). Major pillar edicts have been found at six sites, mainly in central India, while minor pillar edicts were usually situated at Buddhist pilgrimage sites such as Sarnath, Sanchi, Lumbini, and Nigalisagar. Fourteen major rock edicts have been found in peripheral areas including Girnar, while minor rock edicts have been discovered at seven sites in central and southern India. It is generally accepted that Ashoka's minor rock edicts were issued earlier than his fourteen major rock edicts and that the pillar edicts were the last to be promulgated. This then makes the inscriptions of Ashoka in peninsular India the earliest inscribed by the king, thus making them particularly significant for a study of the *dbharma* of Ashoka.

As compared to the diversity of records in the north, a majority of the inscriptions from peninsular India are the minor rock edicts. The homogeneity is particularly noticeable in the cluster in Karnataka, though there are exceptions elsewhere in the Deccan. In his minor rock edicts, Ashoka refers to himself as a Buddhist lay follower, or *upāsaka*, and expresses his desire that Buddhism percolate down to the lowest level to include elephant trainers, charioteers, teachers, and scribes. It would seem that the southern versions all belong to a single recension, which was issued for engraving extensively on the hills at one specific time, as indicated by the reference to 256 nights. The *dbharma* of these records is largely ethical, with injunctions to obey mother and father, obey teachers, have mercy on living beings, speak the truth, and propagate the *dbharma*.

This stress on ethical and moral values in the minor rock edicts of Ashoka is in keeping with Buddhist teachings to the laity. The canonical Nikāya literature makes a concerted attempt to inculcate a sense of moral and ethical values among the laity, based on Buddhist ethics and loyalty to the Triratna (three jewels), that is, the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Discourses contained in the Brahmajāla Sutta and the Samannaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya emphasize the importance of adhering to the five *sbīlas*, or moral values, and stress that the lay devotee

should concentrate on religious talks on the fortnightly *uposatha* days.

Though the Buddhist canon was written down in Sri Lanka around 100 B.C., it is generally accepted that major portions of the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas belong to the pre-Ashokan period. The Bhabhra edict of Ashoka provides evidence for this in that it refers to specific passages for study by monks and nuns. Four of the passages have been identified as forming part of the first four Nikāyas.

The involvement of Ashoka with the *dbharma* was by no means limited to propagation of an ethical way of life, as is evident from his records. Minor Rock Edict III was addressed to the Sangha and the laity, and it contains an unequivocal expression of the emperor's respect and faith in the "three jewels." In the Bairat rock edict, Ashoka recommends the study of seven texts of the Buddhist canon (*dbammāpaliyāni*) as a way of ensuring that the *dbharma* would last forever. Rock Edict VIII dates his pilgrimage (*dbarmayātrā*) to Sambodhi, or Bodh Gayā, ten years after his coronation. Minor pillar inscriptions at Allahabad, Sarnath, and Sanchi (Minor Pillar Edict III), generally referred to as schism edicts, warn monks and nuns against creating schisms in the Sangha. In his edicts Ashoka praises ceremonies performed for religious purposes (*mabā-[pha]le [e] dhamma-mangale*), but decries those performed on the occasion of births, illnesses, and weddings (Major Rock Edict IX). At Bodh Gayā the installation of a polished sandstone throne (*vajrāsana*) in a shrine at the foot of the *bodhi* tree is attributed to Ashoka.

Archaeology of Buddhist Sites in South Asia

In contrast to the scattered shrines of the Mauryan period, large interconnected monastic complexes emerged in the post-Ashokan period. Sanchi and its neighboring sites, including Sonari, Satdhara, Bhojpur, and Andher, provide a good example of this development. A study of the inscriptions on relics and reliquaries shows that these locales were all linked to the person of Gotiputa and formed a tightly knit community that owed allegiance to the Hemavata School. Archaeological surveys conducted in Raisen and Vidisha districts led to the recovery of 120 settlements and 35 previously unrecorded sites and an impressive database incorporating finds of 15 embankments within about 154 sq. mi. (400 square kilometers) around Sanchi. It is suggested that the extensive water system around Sanchi may have been associated with irrigation and rice cultivation, rather than domestic supply.

Perhaps the transformation was nowhere as fundamental as in the western Deccan in the second and first centuries B.C., just prior to the rise of the Satavahana dynasty. In the western Deccan, more than eighty sites

have been recorded, with 1,200 rock-cut monastic centers. While the average number of excavations at a majority of these sites varies from twelve to fifteen, the largest concentrations of more than a hundred are at Kanheri and Junnar. Junnar lies on the Kukdi River, in a cup-shaped valley surrounded by hills, 56 mi. (90 kilometers) northwest of Pune; Kanheri, near Bombay (Mumbai) on the west coast, is located in the fertile basin of the Ulhas River. This divergence in location is also reflected in the nature of donations. Inscriptions at Junnar record the grant of land to the monastic establishment in the nearby villages, and archaeological exploration has led to the recovery of several settlements in the vicinity. Inscriptions at Kanheri recording donations were placed on the side wall of the courtyard and refer to gifts of money by traders, financiers, goldsmiths, blacksmiths, physicians, housewives, stone polishers, and others. Visitors included residents from neighboring coastal settlements such as Sopara, Kalyan, and Chaul, as well as inhabitants of inland centers such as Nasik.

In the eastern Deccan, rock-cut excavations are few, and structural monuments dominate, with concentrations in coastal Andhra and Telengana. Unlike the monuments of the western Deccan, there is no evidence of paintings in Andhra. The Andhra stupas, on the other hand, have yielded a rich treasure of relic caskets in a variety of materials. Another characteristic feature of the Andhra monuments, perhaps in keeping with their status as centers of pilgrimage, is the presence of congregation halls. It is significant that few urban centers have been identified in coastal Andhra, and pilgrimage may have provided an alternative strategy for the mobilization of resources.

Archaeological excavations unearthed a hall measuring 253 sq. ft. (23.5 square meters), with sixty-four pillars, at Thotlakonda on the north Andhra coast. To the southeast of the stupa was a kitchen complex, comprising four rectangular halls of varying dimensions. Three of these may have been used as storerooms, while the fourth was perhaps a refectory. About 2 mi. (3 kilometers) from Thotlakonda lies the site of Bavikonda, where twenty-six structural units have been identified, including stupas, *caitya-grhas* (stupa or place of worship), an *uposathagāra* (hall in a monastery used for ordination ceremonies, measuring 307 sq. ft., or 28.5 square meters), *viharas* (Buddhist monastic residences), and kitchen-cum-store complexes. Two other sites that have provided evidence for the presence of assembly halls are the sites of Ramatirtham, located 43 mi. (70 kilometers) from Visakhapatnam, and Salihundam, near Srikakulam.

An equally impressive series of Buddhist sites is located along the transpeninsular route connecting the lower Krishna valley via Nelakondapalle, Kondapur, and

Dhulikatta to Ter and Paithan. The village of Dhulikatta is located 6 mi. (10 kilometers) west of Peddabankur and is marked by a habitation site 44 acres (18 hectares) in extent. About .6 mi. (1 kilometer) to its north lies a stupa constructed of large-sized bricks decorated with carved limestone slabs. Archaeological excavations at Nelakondapalle in Khamam district of Andhra Pradesh have brought to light an extensive Buddhist site of the fourth to fifth centuries A.D. comprising *viharas*, a *mahacaitya* (great stupa or place of worship), brick-built water troughs, votive stupas, and a profusion of imagery. A large number of Visnukundin coins were found from the site, as were standing images of the Buddha in limestone and bronze.

Nor are these examples limited to India. Inscriptions from Sri Lanka indicate that as early as the second century B.C., land and irrigation works were transferred to the Sangha. In some cases, arrangements for irrigation were also made along with the transfer of land, but in other cases the monastery enjoyed privileged access to irrigation facilities. Fiscal rights and administrative and judicial authority that the king had traditionally enjoyed were transferred to the monastic authorities. The autonomy that these religious institutions enjoyed changed the nature of interaction between them and the lay community.

How does one explain the discrepancy between monastic rules, which disallowed the practice of agriculture by monks, and the presence of clearly identified structures used for agrarian purposes in the vicinity of monastic sites? The dichotomy between theory and practice was easily resolved by employing several laypeople for undertaking and supervising various jobs in the monasteries. In addition, some of them were placed in charge of irrigation reservoirs that belonged to the monasteries to collect the water dues. While this may have resolved functional issues, the philosophic and doctrinal aspects of this change still needed to be addressed and internalized.

From the fifth century A.D. onward, an interesting development in architecture, epigraphy, and literary texts was the unambiguous notion that the Buddha himself was the legal head of the monastery and that donations to monasteries were conceived as gifts to the Master. The language used in the inscriptions suggests the personal presence and permanent residence of the Buddha in Indian monasteries, further corroborated by changes in plans indicating that specific accommodations for the Master was being provided in the monastic sites. For example, while in the early monasteries there was separation between the residence of the monks and the shrine, the later monasteries combined the two. These changes correspond with another development: abstract theories

regarding the person of the Buddha were beginning to take definitive shape. This development provides an interesting example of the intertwining of diverse strands that were associated with functions as varied as agrarian expansion and management and abstruse philosophical discussions.

Buddhism in Sri Lanka

Nowhere, however, does the legacy of Ashoka survive as strongly as in the Buddhist literary tradition, both from North India as well as from Sri Lanka. As with today's historians, there was no unanimity in the past regarding the contribution of Ashoka, and divergent views emerged. One is the Pali version of the legend of Ashoka, preserved in the Sri Lankan Chronicles; the second is the North Indian version, known from Sanskrit and Chinese sources. Few of the missionary activities of Ashoka find mention in the North Indian tradition as preserved in the Sanskrit Avadānas. Instead, these focus on Ashoka's relationship with the Buddhist monk Upagupta, who accompanied him on his pilgrimage to the different sites associated with the life of the Buddha. The Ashokāvadāna is known to have been compiled in the second century A.D. in the Buddhist milieu of north-west India. In the Ashokāvadāna, Ashoka is said to be physically ugly, to have a rough skin, and to have been disliked by his father and the women of his harem. The overall perspective on Ashoka's kingship remains ambiguous. The Theravādin tradition associates the dispatch of missions to the different regions not with Ashoka, but with Tissa Moggaliputta. This is further supported by the finds of relic caskets from Vidisa (Bhilsa), on which have been inscribed names of three of the monks whom the Chronicles credit with missions to the Himalayan region. There is, however, no unanimity among scholars on this point.

In his Major Rock Edict XIII, Ashoka refers to Sri Lanka as one of the countries that received the *dharmā*. This mission of propagation and conversion could only have been possible through monks and nuns, since establishment of the local Sangha, with its traditions and ecclesiastical rites, was outside the scope of a ruler. The inscriptions from Nagarjunakonda provide a somewhat different perspective, and the monks from Sri Lanka are credited with the expansion of Buddhism to various regions, including Kashmir, Gandhara, Cina, Kirata, Aparanta, and Vanga. A Sihala-vihara (Sri Lankan monastic residence) is mentioned at the site, presumably for the residence of monks from the island.

The importance of the clergy in the establishment of the local Sangha is evident in the earliest Pali Chronicle of Sri Lanka, the Mahāvamsa (XV, 181) dated to the late fourth or early fifth century A.D. The Mahāvamsa traces

the history of the island from the advent of Vijaya in 483 B.C. Its authorship is attributed to a Buddhist monk, Mahanama, who wrote under the patronage of a Sri Lankan king. The Buddha himself is said to have traveled to the island, and the Chronicle presents detailed accounts of the three visits. Ashoka's concept of Dharmavijaya is restated in the Chronicle, leading to a symbiosis between the monarch and the Sangha. There are references to Devanampiyatissa (r. 250–210 B.C.) being reconsecrated by envoys of Ashoka, thus marking an integration of the concepts of the universal monarch (*cakkavatti*) and the great man (*mahāpurisa*, the Buddha himself).

This is a model that is known to have been emulated by several sovereigns in Sri Lanka, the most prominent being Dutthagamini (r. 101–77 B.C.). In Burma, kings constantly invoked Ashoka's example, and the Khmer ruler Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1215) saw himself as the living Buddha. In the Chronicles, the emphasis is on the purification of the Sangha by Ashoka and the dispatch of Buddhist missionaries not only to different parts of the subcontinent, but also to Suvarnabhumi, or Southeast Asia.

Despite the emulation discussed above, the nearly 1,300 inscriptions from Sri Lanka, incised just below the drip ledge of slightly enlarged natural caves donated to Buddhist monks, present a marked contrast to the Ashokan records. The early Brahmi script used for the inscriptions in the oldest Sinhalese language is the same as that used for the Ashokan edicts. Though there is uniformity in script, there is a marked difference in the language and contents of the inscriptions, and there are no parallels to Ashoka's *dharmmalipi*. Instead, the inscriptions of Ashoka's contemporaries on the island, Devanampiyatissa and his successor king, Uttiya, record gifts of caves to the Sangha and incorporate the stereotyped formula of dedication to the Buddhist monks. The formula reads: *āgata anāgata catudisa sagasa* (of the Sangha of the four quarters, present and not present).

Expansion across the Bay of Bengal

It is crucial to emphasize that the communities that traveled across the Indian Ocean were diverse, including sailors, traders, craftsmen, pilgrims, religious clergy, adventurers, minstrels, and others. The epigraphic record indicates the presence of several Indic languages in Southeast Asia, from the early inscriptions in Prakrit and Sanskrit on carnelian seals, dated to the first and second centuries A.D., to Pali inscriptions from the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. A Tamil inscription of the third or fourth century was identified on a small flat rectangular stone, reading *perumpatan kal* (this is the touchstone of Perumpatan), in the collection of Wat Khlong Thom in south Thailand. The scripts used also varied from

Brahmi and Tamil-Brahmi to Kharosthi. Given this wide range, it would be simplistic to expect neat categories in terms of language, caste, or religious affiliations, though in the past many of these categories have been subsumed under the blanket term of “Indianization.”

The archaeological data also provide a counterposition to this theory, as it is apparent that several competing centers, based on rice agriculture, bronze and iron production, developed in the major river valleys of mainland Southeast Asia dating between 2000 and 200 B.C. It is significant that several aspects of the material culture present similarity across the Irrawaddy, Chao Phraya, and Mekong river valleys. This uniformity is paralleled by the use of artifacts obtained from India and China, and it is through these trade networks that religious ideas and beliefs spread and were adopted, and adapted, by the large polities that evolved in the river valleys. Three large political entities dominated mainland Southeast Asia: the Pyu in the Irrawaddy valley, the Dvaravati in the Chao Phraya, and the Oc Eo culture in the Mekong. A common thread that united them was the belief in Buddhism, as evidenced by the statuary and religious architecture.

A cluster of fifth-century inscriptions of unequivocal Buddhist affiliation was found in Kedah on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Three of these inscriptions are made of local stone and bear similar illustrations of Buddhist stupas. Texts very similar to these inscriptions have been found on the island of Borneo and on the coast of Brunei. The most interesting of these inscriptions in Sanskrit is that of Buddhagupta, which refers to the setting up of the stone by the mariner Buddhagupta, resident of Raktamrttika, on the successful completion of his voyage.

The Sarvastivadins are one of the sects of Buddhism known to have developed missionary activity outside India, and one of the missionaries who stayed for many years in Indonesia, as described in the Chinese sources, was Gunavarman (A.D. 367–431). About one and a half centuries after Gunavarman’s visit, the Chinese monk Yijing confirmed that the Sarvastivada school was flourishing in the lands of the South Sea.

This missionary activity was paralleled by pilgrimage to sites associated with the life of the Buddha not only within South Asia, but also by groups from across the Bay of Bengal. One of the monuments that holds an important position in the context of pilgrimage is that of Borobudur. On the basis of the paleography of the fragmentary inscriptions covering the base, the monument has been dated to the late eighth or ninth century A.D. The monument is elaborately carved, with 1,460 sculpted panels, a majority of these depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha. Not only did Borobudur spread the message of acquisition of knowledge and merit, it also became the

center of pilgrimage itself. In the ninth century, central Java had acquired a reputation for being a treasure house of sacred learning, as evident from an inscription from Champa. An indication of the importance of the site of Borobudur for pilgrimage is provided by the finds of more than 2,000 unbaked clay votive stupas and 252 clay tablets to the southwest of the Borobudur hill.

Religious communication continued across the Bay of Bengal, as is evident from gifts of Sanskrit Mahayana and Tantric texts from Bengal to monasteries in Myanmar as late as the fifteenth century. This raises the final question: did Buddhism decline in South Asia in the seventh century, as argued by Marxist historians, or was it reinvented and appropriated?

Transformation or Decline?

In the past, scholars have often suggested a phased development of Buddhism from the early Hinayana form to Mahayana and Vajrayana, but it is increasingly evident that these three vehicles shared more than is usually assumed. For example, even as late as the seventh century, followers of Hinayana and Mahayana lived together in monasteries and maintained the same monastic vows. It is also apparent that, despite the Buddha’s incorporation into the Hindu pantheon as an incarnation of Vishnu, Buddhist monastic centres continued to maintain a separate identity.

The data from inscriptions and textual sources indicate the continuation of several monastic centers well into the thirteenth century, such as the monastic settlement at Ratnagiri in Orissa and those at Nalanda and Bodh Gayā in Bihar. In addition, there is evidence for the repair and renovation of several other Buddhist sites in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Gadaladeniya rock inscription from Sri Lanka, dated to 1344, records the restoration of a two-story image house at Dhanyakataka, identified with Amaravati in Andhra, by a monk named Dharmakirti. Another contemporary of Dharmakirti, the minister Sena Lankadhikara, is said to have dispatched men and money to the site of Kanci in Tamil Nadu to establish a Buddhist shrine in that city. No Buddhist monuments have survived at Kanchipuram, though several images dated between the seventh and fourteenth centuries have been discovered in and around the city. However, the time gap between the fifteenth century and the nineteenth, when a revival of Buddhist learning was spearheaded by European, Sri Lankan, and Indian scholars, has yet to be bridged. In 1956 Buddhism entered its latest Navayana phase, when B. R. Ambedkar administered Buddhist vows to the low caste masses in their quest for a new world order.

Himanshu Prabha Ray

See also Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; Sculpture, Buddhist; Sculpture, Mauryan and Shungan

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BUDDHIST ART IN ANDHRA UP TO THE FOURTH CENTURY

Andhra Pradesh has one of the longest and richest traditions of Buddhist art, with its reliefs in white limestone representing a distinctive sculptural and religious tradition. The principal sites in Andhra are Amaravati, Nagarjunakonda, Goli, Gummidi-durru, Jaggayyapeta, Bhattiprolu, Ghantasala, and Chandavaram. Within each site, sculptures are made in sets with matching borders for decorating individual stupas, some small, some quite large. Each of the sites are satellites of Amaravati, which through its long tradition and many surviving works can document each of the more peripheral styles. It is probable that Amaravati trained a majority of Andhra sculptors. Toward the last phase of the sculptural tradition, artists shifted to other sites, principally Nagarjunakonda and Goli. Andhra sculpture is important in its own right, and it is equally important for the stylistic influence it had on Buddhist art throughout Southeast Asia and even in East Asia.

Buddhism had already come to Andhra Pradesh by Mauryan times, but the second and third centuries A.D. brought a florescence of Buddhist activity. A rising mercantile community brought a great deal of wealth into Andhra, which in significant part resulted from trade with the Roman Empire. This is attested to by numerous Andhran finds of Roman coins and some Roman works of art. It is probable that even a broader range of foreign works of art were known to Andhra artisans than we can ascertain from extant finds. Indian stupa decoration had then reached a high point, and this, combined with new ideas gleaned from Roman imports and knowledge of foreign techniques, produced monuments and stone carvings of unsurpassed beauty.

Second-century patronage of stupa construction coincided with Satavahana rule in Andhra. The Satavahanas were succeeded in the early part of the third century by the Ikshvakus, who ruled through the early part of the fourth century. The bulk of the patronage at Amaravati was by the Buddhist nuns, monks, and laity, while the women of the Ikshvaku royal house, whose husbands were actually Hindus, were active donors to the Buddhist faith at Nagarjunakonda and hoped to attain their own Nirvāṇa through their good works. A final phase of the tradition, extending into the fourth century, may be seen at Goli, a site about which little is known but which has produced fine narrative reliefs.

The Early Andhra Tradition

A four-sided fragmentary pillar, an early work belonging to the second or first century B.C., illustrates scenes from the life of the Buddha. They are labeled, just as in Bharhut, leaving no doubt as to their identification. One side of the pillar illustrates the events that took place in the last three months of the Buddha's life, from his stay at Vaishali to his *parinirvāna* (final attainment of enlightenment and passing away of the Buddha, after which he will not be reborn) at Kushinagara. It is done in an unusual form of continuous narrative, reading from bottom to top. The carving of the relief is exceedingly shallow. Another scene on the same pillar takes place at Dhanyakataka, the ancient name for Amaravati. Amaravati did not have a place in the biography of the Buddha. Nevertheless, the pillar may have something to do with the founding of the stupa there, an event that was given sanctity by placing it near the scenes from the life of the Blessed One.

Another significant early monument is the stupa at Jaggayyapeta, even though it is known from only a few surviving fragments. It must have been extremely important, as it stands on top of a hill and could probably have been seen from a great distance. A stately relief of the Chakravartin (Universal Monarch) with his seven jewels (wheel, elephant, horse, gem, treasurer, wife, prime minister) is the first and finest example of the many Chakravartin representations developed in Andhra. The relief is extremely shallow and the figures unusually tall and slender, features often considered characteristic of the early phase. It is possible, however, that they represented an actual physiological type who lived in the region. The composition uses hieratic proportions so that the seven jewels, even the elephant, are much smaller than the king. The awkward feet of the monarch show no knowledge of perspective, as is common in early phases of Indian narrative.

The Mature Phase Represented by Amaravati

Most of the sculpture that survives from the Great Stupa at Amaravati, one of the most magnificent stupas of ancient India, was made during the second and third centuries A.D. Amaravati was excavated many times, and a large number of reliefs are preserved in the British Museum, the Madras Government Museum, and the Archaeological Museum at Amaravati. These, along with drawings made by early excavators, have enabled us to reconstruct the structure.

Around the entire Amaravati drum (161.7 ft., or 49.3 m, in diameter) was a series of slabs depicting various types of stupas that were then in current use. An example currently in the Madras Government Museum has been one of the sources for reconstructing Amaravati itself. Four

projections, known as *ayaka* platforms, projected from the drum, with each projection bearing five pillars. These are unique to Andhra Pradesh and certainly indicate a change in stupa ritual. Springing from the drum was a huge dome with a series of decorated slabs about 11 feet (3.4 m) high.

The entire stupa compound was set apart from the secular world by the 9-foot (2.7 m)-tall railing, enclosing the *pradakshina* (circumambulation) path. The railing was decorated with enormous lotuses on the outside and crowned by a stone coping. The inside of the railing had magnificent narrative reliefs, often placed in lotus roundel or in surrounding areas. As a worshiper performed *pradakshina*, he was encased between two states of the Buddha's being. On his left are the many events in the present and former lives of the Buddha, issuing forth from lotuses, the symbol of the Buddha's birth. This is contrasted on the right by the stupa, surrounded at its base by numerous stupas, and simple reliefs of the major events in the life of the Buddha on the dome slabs, emphasizing the goal of Nirvāṇa. Consequently, while the reliefs of the stupa itself clearly culminate in the Buddha's final goal, the relief panels on the railing are extremely sensuous, reflecting courtly life.

The dome and drum slabs at Amaravati are in low relief on a flat ground, a technique descended from the earlier Andhra tradition. The railing shows much more variety. In one group of reliefs, the ground is not flat, but is carved in several distinct planes. This strikingly innovative technique lasted only for a brief time, and was probably confined to only one or two sculptors. However, it makes Amaravati unique. Multiplane relief was then abandoned for the traditional mode, only sometimes showing remnants of the multiplane system.

One of the finest examples of the multiplane relief is the Presentation of Rahula on a railing crossbar. In it, the Buddha's son Rahula is being presented to his father to ask for his inheritance. His father is represented by an empty throne with a flaming pillar behind it and a footstool with an impression of the Buddha's feet upon it, common symbols used to represent the Blessed One. Although the pillar and feet are abstract symbols, the throne is naturalistically represented in an approximate single point perspective, with its vanishing point somewhere at the top of the pillar. The perspectival illusion is enhanced by the fact that the back of the throne is at the deepest level of the picture surface. Although not a fully coherent space, the composition is well ordered, for it is anchored by an inverted "v" (or a wedge) created by the central empty throne of the composition, the surrounding figures overlapping and remaining calmly in place. We are reminded that such formulas were used in the classical paintings of Pompeii

and Herculaneum, and it is possible that the artist was trying to reproduce a painting technique by actually carving into the stone, just as was done many centuries later in the Italian Renaissance. There are many variants of this compositional formula throughout the railing.

We know that Amaravati artists were aware of Roman art, for a small Buddhist stone relief panel from Amaravati, showing a woman in classical dress with Indian ankle bangles, was clearly copied with modification from a Roman import. These high points of Amaravati sculpture are almost an anomaly, as later sculptors seem to have lost their sense of depth, and have reverted to single plane compositions, with elongated figures stretched to their limits, but clearly inherited from Jaggayyapeta.

The Final Phase of Andhra Buddhist Art at Nagarjunakonda and Goli

The final phase is marked by the sculptural art of Nagarjunakonda, the capital of the Ikshvakus, with its greatest period of production belonging to the latter part of the third century A.D. It culminates during the fourth century at the site of Goli village. Nagarjunakonda (ancient Vijayapuri) was submerged by the construction of the much-needed Nagarjunasagar Dam. The sculptures in the valley were salvaged and brought to an island museum, which also contains a model of the submerged site. While several of the architectural monuments were reconstructed on the island and on the surrounding hills, others only survive as small models in the museum. In contrast to the Amaravati stupa, the Great Stupa at Nagarjunakonda was only sparsely decorated. However, the stupas in the monastic compounds were decorated fully. There were no railings around the Nagarjunakonda stupas, although they had drum and dome slabs. The most interesting of the sculptures were long low friezes on the *ayaka* platforms that protruded from the drums, illustrating current and former lives of the Buddha. These *ayaka* beams were symbolic substitutes for railings, thus belonging to the world of *saṃsāra*, the cycle of birth and death. Each individual panel was separated by pilasters, and further separated from each other by coquettish *mitbuna* couples, many of them illustrating Sanskrit poetry. These couples appear at the beginnings of a long tradition of *mitbuna* couples used in Indian temple architecture. Magnificent female bracket figures cap the ends. In the current example, with scenes from the Buddha's life, the scenes read from right to left.

While multiplane carving and western perspective are absent in Nagarjunakonda sculptures, a battle scene whose function on the stupa is unexplained is clearly a reverse copy of a Roman battle scene belonging to the time of Trajan (A.D. 2nd century), now on the Arch of Constantine.

While we know of Roman coins found at Nagarjunakonda, and a stadium using bricks of a standardized Roman size, further research is still needed to explain the presence of this composition and its inexplicable subject.

Perhaps the most beautiful panel from Nagarjunakonda reflects a knowledge of Sanskrit poetry, Canto X of the *Saundarananda* by Ashvaghosha, a first-century poem often illustrated in Andhra Pradesh from the second to the fourth centuries. The story concerns the conversion of the Buddha's half brother Nanda, who consequently rejects his bride Sundari. In a quirky detail, the Buddha and Nanda are seen flying up to heaven to inspect the celestial maidens.

This same theme remains popular in Goli village, whose sculpture represents the last major phase of the Andhra Buddhist tradition, extending it into the fourth century. Goli is also known for its *ayaka* panels. In the Goli variant of the story we see Nanda in the grove of Indra staring at the beautiful Apsaras. While the Nagarjunakonda and Goli panels emphasize slightly different episodes of the *Saundarananda*, the Goli artist was clearly conversant with the Nagarjunakonda version. However, the architectural pilasters used as dividing scenes are here almost balloonlike, losing their rigid sense as dividers. The multiplane carving is now a thing of the past, and the shallow relief with elongated figures of the early Andhra tradition has reasserted itself in the final phase of Andhra Buddhist art.

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BURMA Characterized by its riverine system and the river valleys of the Salween, Sittang, and, especially, the Irrawaddy, Burma is a country of villages with few large cities. The Burmese people, ethnically related to the Tibetans and the Chinese, are some 70 percent of the estimated population of 43 million in 2005. There are a large number of hill tribes with their own languages and customs. They include Chins, Kachins, Karens, Lahus, Nagas, and the Shans, who organized a Shan State National Army to fight for independence. The country is rich in such products as copper, tin, silver, tungsten, and precious stones, and in rice, rubber, cotton, and teak. Hinduism and Buddhism, via Sri Lanka, came to Burma and mixed with local animistic practices. Ninety percent of the people are Buddhist, 4 percent are Christian, 4 percent are Muslim, and 3 percent are animist. Chinese people make up 3 percent and Indians 2 percent of the population. Since 1989 the military government has called Burma the Union of Myanmar (or Myanmar Naingandaw, “country of Myanmar”). The capital, Rangoon, is known as Yangon. The literacy rate is claimed to be about 80 percent for females and 90 percent for males. The currency is the *kyat*. Burma is the world’s second-largest producer of illicit opium.

British Colonial Period

The Toungoo dynasty (1531–1752) came to an end as Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) established the Konbaung dynasty, the last dynasty in Burmese history, which, with its capital at Rangoon, was of an imperialistic nature; it attacked Thailand and conquered Arakan. Arakenese refugees fled to India. In 1819 King Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819) expanded into Manipur and Assam, frontier territories for India, triggering alarm from the British, who were apprehensive about the security of India on both its northeast and northwest frontiers and across the Bay of Bengal in Malaya and the Indian Ocean in south and east Africa. In addition, warlike tribes from both sides of the border were not averse to raiding in each other’s territories, creating unsettled conditions. There was also great concern about the conditions of investment and trade for British traders in Burma, who felt they were badly treated by the Burmese. Cultural practices also embittered relationships between the British and the Burmese. The British resented the Burmese custom of removing their shoes before entering the royal palace and flatly refused to do so. This angered the Burmese, as proud a people as the British. Before Hong Kong became a British territory, there was hope that a lucrative trade with China would develop through Burma. Finally, the British were wary of diplomatic and economic competition from the French, who were based in Vietnam. All these factors impelled the British to an increasingly interventionist position in Burma and the

absorption of Burma into the empire through three Anglo-Burmese Wars.

The First Anglo-Burmese War broke out in March 1824 after King Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1837) invaded Manipur and annexed Assam. The British pushed 10,000 troops, led by steam-powered gunboats, up to the Burmese capital of Mandalay. The Burmese were forced to sign the Treaty of Yandabo on 24 February 1826 with a number of humiliating conditions, including a £1 million indemnity; the control of Arakan and Tenasserim ceded to the British East India Company; the promise not to interfere in Assam, Manipur, and Cachar; and the stationing of an ambassador in Calcutta and a British Resident at Ava. These conditions, however, did not appease the insatiable Victorian appetite for wealth and power, not to mention missionary impulses for greater freedom to proselytize. The *cassus belli* for the Second Burmese War in 1852–1853, however, was conflict between British traders and the Burmese governor of Rangoon. The result was British annexation of Pegu province, which they renamed “Lower Burma,” the deposition of the king, Pagan (r. 1846–1853), and control of Burma’s access to the sea.

King Mindon (r. 1853–1878) was a modernist, reforming king who introduced in his new capital of Mandalay a measure of industrialization and economic development and the creation of coinage, newspapers, and the building of the telegraph. However, he also attempted to establish diplomatic and trade relations with France, angering the British, who were in competition with the French for influence in neighboring Thailand. His successor King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885) imposed a heavy fine on the Bombay-Burmah Trading Company for its failure to pay for all the teak they had extracted from Burma. His biggest crime in the eyes of the British, however, was his opening of diplomatic negotiations with the French. This was the justification for an attack in November 1885. The conquest of Burma took twenty days. It was absorbed on 1 January 1886 and was ruled from Calcutta as a province of India. Thibaw was exiled to India, his throne was placed in a museum in Calcutta, and his palace in Mandalay became a British officers’ club.

The British brought a modern administrative and police system to the country and its economy was brought into the global system of finance and trade. Rangoon, rather than Mandalay, became the nation’s center. The British also transformed Burma with the clearing of swampland in the south and the creation of a new non-hereditary, urban, Western-educated elite landlord class (the University of Rangoon was founded in 1920), who acquired more and more land as small owner-cultivators fell into debt and lost their land to larger, often absentee, landlords and investors. Indian moneylenders and Chinese

businessmen moved into Burma to provide the credit for this growing market-driven economy. The effect was devastating, as the British attempted to introduce the Indian system of village government and taxation. It was alien to Burma and led to social deterioration and cultural disintegration. The deplorable condition of Burma under the British is famously and realistically depicted in George Orwell's novel, *Burmese Days*. A resistance movement led by monks and ex-monks developed. Until 1942, Burma was under martial law in one form or another, with as many as 40,000 army and police in the field at one time.

Burma's nationalist movement. The Young Men's Buddhist Association was established in 1906. It was a modernist organization concerned with cultural and religious revival but became increasingly political and nationalistic during the next decade. In 1909, when the British introduced the Minto-Morley Act, Burma was given a Legislative Council with a nonofficial majority. The country was excluded from the reforms of the Government of India Act of 1919, but the uproar was so great that the British introduced the Indian system of dyarchy in 1923, and Burma received five seats in the Indian Legislative Assembly in Delhi. Fifty percent of the recruits to the Burmese civil service were also reserved for the Burmese. A peasant rebellion was led by former monk Saya San, originally Ya Gyaw (1874–1931), who crowned himself king of Burma in 1930. His Galon Army tried to resist British machine guns with amulets and charms. It was snuffed out after two years. Saya San was captured, tried for sedition, and hanged, but his trial and death were rallying cries for nationalists. Also in 1930, a nationalist organization the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmese Association) was founded by a group of students who were graduates of the University of Rangoon. They called themselves Thakin (Master) and they, most notably Aung San (1915–1947), became the leaders of the nationalist movement in 1936. In the Government of India Act of 1935, Burma was separated from India and received a fully elected assembly.

When World War II broke out, Aung San fled to China and came into contact with the Japanese, who took him and twenty-nine others, the "Thirty Comrades," to Japan for military training in their Burma National Army. By May 1942 the Japanese had captured all of Burma, and the British retreated to Imphal in India. The Burma National Army was disbanded and the Japanese formed a smaller Burma Defense Force, still with Aung San as its head. A civil administration was set up by Ba Maw (1893–1977) and on 1 August 1943, Burma was declared an independent state. Aung San became the war minister and U Nu (1907–1995) foreign affairs minister. The Burma National Army was formed by Ne Win

("Brilliant as the Sun"), born Shu Maung (1911–2002), in 1943 and later, in March 1945, was led by Aung San. Aung San also formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which was recognized as the leading organization in Burma. The Japanese retreated in May 1945, and in October 1946 Aung San and his allies were appointed to the Governor's Council. In the general elections that followed, Aung San and his party received an overwhelming victory for his proposal for the Union of Burma. In September 1946 he headed a provisional government and reached an agreement with British prime minister Clement Attlee on 27 January 1947 that Burma would become independent. On 19 July 1947, he and six of his colleagues were murdered at a Cabinet meeting. U Nu then headed the government, and on 17 October 1947 he signed a treaty with the British, under which Burma would become independent on 4 January 1948.

Independent Burma

A western parliamentary system was created, with separate states for the Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Kayah, and a division for the Chin peoples. Burma was one of the first states to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949, and it declined to become a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954. In October 1958, U Nu resigned in favor of General Ne Win, who had remained in the army after the war and had built a loyal following in the 4th Burmese Rifles. U Nu, however, was allowed back as prime minister in April 1960 after general elections swept his "Clean Wing" section, later named "Union Party," of the AFPFL into power. However, on 2 March 1962, Ne Win and the military arrested U Nu and assumed power in an anticommunist Revolutionary Council whose policies were outlined in a manifesto, *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, published on 3 April 1962. Its guiding principle was an isolationist "Burma for the Burmese." Private enterprise was abolished, enterprises were nationalized, and thousands of Indians and other foreigners were expelled from Burma. All political parties were banned in March 1964, and their leaders arrested and imprisoned, except for the sole legal party, the Burma Socialist Program Party, which had been founded by Ne Win on 4 July 1962. Its power was enshrined in the new constitution of 2 March 1974. This began the military domination of every aspect of Burmese life.

Between 1962 and 1988, Ne Win dominated Burma as military ruler until 1972, as president until 1981, and as party leader until 1988. He withstood the antigovernment demonstrations in 1974 that broke out at the funeral of the former United Nations secretary-general U Thant (1909–1974) who was a symbol of opposition to the

military regime. In 1986 and again in 1988 widespread demonstrations against the government led to the death of tens of thousands of protesters. On 18 September 1988, the army seized power and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council, six days before Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), the daughter of Aung San (and the future 1991 Nobel Peace Prize recipient for her fight for human rights in Burma), who had lived outside the country between 1960 and 1988, became the general secretary of the National League for Democracy. In 1987 Burma sought relief from its massive foreign debt and received Least Developed Nation status from the United Nations. On 27 May 1990, multiparty elections were held for the 485-seat unicameral People's Assembly, and the National League for Democracy won a landslide victory, but the military refused to relinquish power. Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest from 1989 to 1995, 2000 to 2002, and from 2003. Since 3 March 1992, Burma has been subject to annual reports written by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights concerning the lack of human rights for many of Burma's citizens, and in April 1998 Amnesty International published a major

report on human rights violations in Burma. The United Nations, the European Union, the International Labor Organization, and the U.S. government have all condemned the Burmese government. The material, health, and environmental conditions of the people continue to worsen, with a quarter of Burma's people believed to living below the poverty line in a land blessed with abundant natural resources.

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See also **Southeast Asia, Relations with**

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CABINET. *See* **Political System.**

CABINET MISSION PLAN Great Britain's final attempt to transfer its waning imperial power over India to a single independent constitutional entity was launched in March 1946, by three members of Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Cabinet: Secretary of State for India Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Board of Trade President Sir Stafford Cripps, and First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander. Their Cabinet Mission Plan, had it been accepted in good faith by the leaders of India's National Congress and Muslim League, could have saved millions of lives and averted three disastrous South Asian wars, and more than half a century of constant conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.

The plan was to create a complex confederation of British India's provinces and princely states, all divided into three groups: A, B, and C. Most of independent India's Union would have been integrated into Group A, with its overwhelmingly Hindu majority. To the west of Group A would have been Group B, modern Pakistan, mostly Muslim but also including millions of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus from the eastern districts of Punjab, not just its Muslim-majority western districts, as well as all of Sind and the North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan. Group C would have included all of Bengal and Assam, with a very narrow Muslim majority, and the much richer real estate of West Bengal's Calcutta, rather than what became impoverished East Pakistan in 1947 and has remained Bangladesh since the 1971 South Asian war.

Those three groups, the modern sovereign states of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, would have been the most powerful, virtually autonomous units within the three-tier plan of a South Asian confederation. Elected representatives from each group would join the new federation's constituent assembly as soon as the British left,

roughly one member elected for each million inhabitants, as was later the case for India's Parliament. At the bottom of the plan's three-tier pyramid, provincial officials (elected within the former British provinces and the princely states) would collect most taxes and supervise the administration of local services, as do local governments in Britain and the United States. At the pyramid's top would be a Union umbrella with key representatives from all three groups sharing power only over foreign affairs, defense, communication, and to raise finances enough to run those three central departments. The Cabinet Mission worked tirelessly, trying to persuade the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League of the brilliance and impartiality of their plan, the last best hope for keeping South Asia unified. It almost worked.

But neither side really trusted the other, Congress leaders suspecting that Muslim Leaguers agreed only in order to buy time until they felt strong enough to break free and establish their state of Pakistan; the League feared that once the British left, Congress would ignore the plan's communal checks, undermining both powerful Muslim-majority groups to bolster the central powers of a Hindu-dominated union. Soon after the Mission went home, its plan fell apart, and by midsummer of 1946, only ashes remained. A year later, the hasty, incompetent partition of Punjab and Bengal shattered South Asia's unity, and during the months of Britain's withdrawal of its forces, over 10 million Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees fled their ancestral homes, leaving almost a million dead.

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
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CALCUTTA Once the capital of British India and the second-largest city of the empire after London, Calcutta is completely a British creation. Calcutta is a city that defies description, overwhelming each visitor with kaleidoscopic images and scenes from its checkered history, its extremes of wealth and poverty, and its punishingly hot and humid climate. In fact, the British found Calcutta's climate so oppressive that for the better part of each year they shifted the official work of the Raj to Simla (Shimla), north of Delhi, the queen of India's hill stations. After ruling India from Calcutta for 150 years, the British permanently shifted their capital to New Delhi in 1912.

Rudyard Kipling called Calcutta the "City of Dreadful Night"; the Frenchman Dominique Lapierre named it the "City of Joy"; and the Indian novelist Anita Desai described it as the "graveyard of the British Empire." The early British administrators called it the "City of Palaces" because they believed that India could only be ruled from palaces and thus constructed monumental buildings. More recently, V. S. Naipaul declared, "All of [Calcutta's] suffering are sufferings of death. I know not of any other city whose plight is more hopeless."

Calcutta emerged from the union of three villages—Kalikata, Govindapur, and Sutanuti—the first of which housed the shrine of the Indian goddess Kali, hence the name Calcutta. In 1680 Job Charnock, a British agent and head of the English factory in Cassim Bazaar, received permission from the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb to establish an English factory at Sutanuti. In 1698 the British East India Company bought the *zamindari* (rights for land revenue) of Kalikata, Govindpur, and Sutanuti from Subarana Chowdhury. Fort William (named after King William I) was completed in 1699, thus founding Calcutta as the bridgehead of the company's commercial and administrative operations in Bengal. As the Mughal empire started its decline after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the East India Company acquired duty-free trading rights in Bengal from the financially strapped Mughal Faruksiyar for the paltry sum of 3,000 rupees in 1717, much to the chagrin of the *nawābs* (Muslim governors) of the region. By 1735 Calcutta had become an important port and a trading center, and its population burgeoned to over 100,000. Calcutta now rivaled Dhaka (traditional Dacca) and Murshidabad, the two historical capitals of Bengal.

Other Europeans had vied for a foothold in Bengal as well. As early as 1517, the Portuguese had set up a trading



Market in Calcutta. Calcutta was originally planned by the British for a population of 1 million, but today the city and its environs support a population of over 14 million. Two-thirds of its population live in slums, or *bustees*, like that depicted in this chaotic market. EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS.

post in Chittagong (modern Bangladesh's principal port) and Saptagram. In 1580 the Portuguese secured permission from Emperor Akbar to set up Bandel de Hoogly on the Hoogly River, which was later demolished by Emperor Shah Jahan in 1632. The Dutch set up a factory at Chuncura in 1653, but in 1825 ceded it to the British in exchange for Bencoleen in Sumatra (Indonesia). In the early 1670s, the French established Chandannagar (old Chandernagore).

In an effort to bolster their position, the British intervened in wars of succession in Bengal, inviting the wrath of Siraj-ud-Dawla, who marched south to capture Fort William in June 1756, placing 145 Englishmen (and one woman) in the fort's lockup, called the "Black Hole," an airless room measuring 14 by 18 feet (4 × 5 m). By the next morning many of the prisoners had died from asphyxiation, an event that not only served to perpetually prejudice the British against the Indians but that also cast a lingering dark shadow over Calcutta.



Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta. Throughout India, particularly in centers of commerce such as Calcutta, architectural relics of the British colonial past remain. Here, the Victoria Memorial Hall (built between 1906 and 1921 at the behest of Lord Curzon). Combining elements of Italian and Greek architecture while incorporating the Islamic dome common to the region, it is constructed of marble from the same quarry that supplied the builders of the Taj Mahal. GRAEME GOLDIN; CORDAIY PHOTO LIBRARY LTD./CORBIS.

Colonel Robert Clive and Admiral Charles Watson recaptured Fort William in January 1757. In June of the same year, Siraj-ud-Dawla was defeated in the Battle of Plassey, and Clive installed Mir Jaffar as the *nawāb* of Bengal in return for £234,000 and an annual salary of £30,000. In 1765 the British defeated an alliance of Shah Alam II and Mir Kasim, then *nawāb* of Bengal, at Buxar. The East India Company was then given the *diwani* (land revenue collection rights) of Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. To better fortify Calcutta, a new fort was completed in 1773; in the same year, Calcutta became the capital of the British Raj in India. Clive returned to England a rich man in 1767, but committed suicide in 1774.

British buildings in Calcutta, as in other presidency towns and later in New Delhi, celebrated the British triumph in India through monumentality. The British designs, however, appropriated several architectural languages, from Classicism to Baroque to Gothic to Indo-Saracenic. Calcutta's landmark buildings include the National Library of India, the Indian Museum (the oldest in Asia), Victoria Memorial, High Court, Writer's

Building, Marble Palace, Ochterlony Monument (modern Shahid Minar), Kalighat, Government House (the residence of the governor of Bengal, inspired by Curzon's Kedleston Hall), Esplanade Mansion, Howrah Station, and the buildings around Calcutta's Maidan. Under the neonationalist movement, many of these buildings have acquired Indian names, just as Calcutta itself was renamed Kolkata in 2001. Nouveau riche Bengalis imitated Western architecture, even as they cultivated British customs and mastered the English language.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1784 by Sir William Jones, the introduction of the printing press in 1799 by missionary William Carey, and English-language education produced a class of Bengali intellectuals (*bhadralok*) in Calcutta. The city itself became the center of the Bengal Renaissance that embodied English liberalism and indigenous revivalism, both of which contributed to social reform and political activism in the nineteenth century. The Bengali Brahman Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) was a pioneer of that Renaissance, promoting new ideas and syncretic cultural concepts that blossomed

in the warrens of Calcutta. Roy's Brahma Samaj, founded in 1828, and in combination with English education, influenced generations of young Bengali intellectuals, from Rabindranath Tagore to Satyajit Ray to Arundhati Roy. Calcutta thus became an important center of both Hindu reform and the Indian nationalist movement.

Calcutta's dark side has always been in full view—its slums and overcrowded tenements, grinding poverty, and decaying infrastructure—producing popular political support for leftist political parties and the unionization of labor. It has also attracted humanitarians such as Mother Teresa, who founded the Missionaries of Charity in 1950 to help abandoned children and the dying. For her care of the poorest of the poor, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979.

Those who despair over modern Calcutta's misery forget that British interests from the beginning in Bengal were primarily pecuniary. The plunder of Bengal and its complete mismanagement of the province led to a major famine in the early 1770s in which a third of the population died. Famine and drought became a running theme of Calcutta's history, producing widespread disaffection among the peasantry. As everywhere else in agricultural British India, the fundamental source of official finance was land revenue. The British were not prepared to surrender this vital source of income, and the peasants had to borrow at such exorbitant rates to fulfill their tax obligations that many became bankrupt. As a result, many were forced to flee to the city to eke out a living. These rural-urban migrations started early in the British period, and Calcutta's population soared to 200,000 by the late 1770s. Calcutta also became a principal port for the opium trade, from which the British East India Company reaped huge profits, exporting Indian opium to China.

Many of Calcutta's modern problems result from the fact that the city was originally planned by the British for a population of no more than 1 million, whereas by 2004 it supported a population of over 14 million, with over 30,000 people per .4 sq. mi. (square kilometer). Two-thirds of Calcutta's population live in unofficial slums, called *bustees*. A reported 2,000 people migrate daily to Calcutta in the hope of making a living there. The city's overburdened infrastructure dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, its sewerage system was established in 1859, filtered water was introduced in 1860, its telephone exchange was created in 1882, and the electricity supply was started in 1899.

Calcutta, with all its ills, remains one of the most intellectually vibrant cities in India. Bengalis, through their endless heated discussions and political activism, keep hope alive. This eternal optimism helped the city to survive its staggering refugee crisis, produced by the

partition of India in 1947, and again when Bangladesh was created from East Pakistan in 1971. In its three-hundred-year history, Calcutta, or Kolkata, has offered endless possibilities to its millions, along with sorrow and disappointment for others. The dance of hope and despair, of possibilities and misery, continues. Calcutta has always recovered from its worst disasters, moving forward in the footsteps of Roy, Tagore, and Ray. The residents of Calcutta of the past and the present—from all classes—have never failed to take the full measure of their city.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Bengal; British Crown Raj; Clive, Robert; Urbanism**

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CAPITAL MARKET India has had a history of securities trading stretching back almost two hundred years, making it one of the oldest capital markets in Asia. The American Civil War of 1861–1865 (which led to the emergence of an affluent community of brokers who profited from the ban on the import of American cotton) resulted in the capital market becoming more organized, and in 1874 a group of brokers congregated in Bombay's Dalal Street to begin trading in securities. A year later the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association was formally inaugurated, a precursor to the establishment in 1895 of the first stock exchange, which in 1899 moved to premises at Dalal Street, a name which ever since has been synonymous with the Indian capital market.

The Early Years

Indian brokers profited from the U.S. Civil War, with over two hundred emerging in Bombay alone, but the war proved disastrous for financial investors. Share prices rose rapidly, and fell with equal ferocity by the end of the war. It has been recorded, for instance, that the price of the Bank of Bombay share fell from its high of 2,850 rupees to 87 rupees during this period. Investors experienced, and not for the last time, the familiar sequence of a share mania, generating the seeds of its own destruction, leading to dramatic price volatility and subsequent erosion of investor wealth.

While the capital market through most of the nineteenth century grew in response to the resource needs of



Traders on Dalal Street, Bombay Stock Exchange. With a history of robust securities trading spanning some two hundred years, India is one of the oldest capital markets in Asia. INDIA TODAY.

trade and commerce, and of property development, toward the close of that century it began to provide finance to emerging industrial enterprises. Thus, shares traded in the 1830s were largely of banks and cotton presses; four decades later they encompassed trading enterprises in agricultural commodities such as jute in the 1870s and tea in the 1880s; and by then shares were also issued by joint stock companies which were floated to reclaim and develop land from the sea around Bombay. These were uncertain businesses with the possibility of high returns, and share prices of these companies were accordingly volatile. But by the 1880s, India's textile industry had emerged, with cotton mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad and jute mills in Calcutta set up by domestic entrepreneurs, to be followed in the first decade of the twentieth century by the first Jamsetji Tata iron and steel plant at Jamshedpur. Capital demands of this new industrial entrepreneurship, together with the rise in urban prosperity, led to additional stock exchanges being set up, at Ahmedabad in 1894 and Calcutta in 1908. The Indian industrial class had not merely arrived, but grew profitably

during World War I, diversifying into paper, sugar, and the processing of other agricultural commodities, all of which provided breadth to the capital market.

From Independence to the Late 1980s

Firms were free of controls in raising capital from securities markets until World War II, when controls were first introduced through the Defence of India Rules. Controls continued thereafter with the enactment in 1947, the year of India's independence, of the Capital Issues (Control) Act. The emergence of an increasingly dominant public sector in the first three decades thereafter—underpinned by barriers to entry in certain sectors for companies not owned by the government, barriers to growth in the form of industrial licensing, and the nationalization of several large and listed companies—led to a subdued primary market for equity. Well-capitalized companies in sectors such as banking, insurance, petroleum, power, transportation, and coal were in the public sector and had no need to access the market for capital. With interest rates administered, the bond market also remained undeveloped, and firms typically raised debt from the predominantly nationalized development banks and commercial banks. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973, which required firms from overseas to substantially dilute their foreign shareholding to the level of a minority stake, did however funnel shares into the Indian capital market, and the shares of such companies were much sought after, consequently providing much needed trading momentum to the market. Several rapidly growing and privately owned Indian companies also accessed the market for equity: the most publicized in the 1980s was Reliance Industries, then a textiles company, which first successfully popularized the convertible bond in India. The Unit Trust of India, established in 1964, also helped in reaching out to a wide body of investors by intermediating household savings into the capital market, and enjoyed a mutual fund monopoly until other institutions were permitted to enter the sector in 1987.

Reform: Regulation of the Market

By the time liberalization and reform of the Indian economy began in the early 1990s, the capital market thus rated impressively in terms of the many institutions that had grown around it, and yet was seen as poorly regulated. Volumes of share trading were dominated by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), ostensibly a self-regulatory organization that periodically resembled a closed cartel of broker-members who acted purely in their own interest with little concern for other stakeholders in the market. In 1991 the BSE's market capitalization rose by 130 percent within seven months, when it was discovered

that funds had been diverted from commercial banks to the stock market by one broker, and the bubble burst. That episode raised crucial questions about the design and enforcement of financial market regulation. The formal regulation of India's capital market can thus be said to have begun in 1992, when a four-year-old regulatory authority, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), was empowered by statute to regulate market intermediaries. This included regulating the market for equity issuance, until then directly controlled by the government, which computed the issue price on the basis of an accounting formula rather than what the market might bear, signaling the notion of "fair value" to investors. In practice, however, initial public offerings of equity were severely underpriced in relation to the price upon listing and were accordingly oversubscribed. While the transfer of powers to SEBI led to the removal of price controls when firms sought to raise capital from the market, the early years of pricing autonomy occasionally saw prices swing to the other extreme, with firms overpricing their equity issuance. It took the better part of a decade to correct pricing anomalies, aided by more responsible investment banks and a further reinforcement of SEBI's powers in 1995, transferring to it virtually all capital market regulatory powers formerly vested in the government.

Market Microstructure

The reform of stock exchanges has proved more contentious. The regulatory thrust has been to initially induce, and ultimately coerce, stock exchanges to reform their trading, clearing, and settlement practices. Success in the reform of stock exchange practices in India has been strongly facilitated by changes in market microstructure, best typified by the National Stock Exchange (NSE), an exchange set up in 1994 that created a new microstructure for equities trading. Over four thousand companies now provide for the electronic dematerialization of their shares, encompassing over 90 percent of the market capitalization of listed companies, and trades of such dematerialized shares account for over 99 percent of trades settled by delivery. Problems no longer arise of "bad deliveries" associated with the earlier trading of paper shares. Further, with rolling settlements, trades are now settled on day T+2, where T is the date of trading.

Overall, the first decade after capital market reforms began in the early 1990s appears to have greatly improved the efficacy of regulation. For brokers, SEBI has signaled firmer regulatory intolerance of insider trading and front-running, and faster detection of circular trades on illiquid shares that result in price manipulation. For mutual funds, disclosures compare well with the best international practices, and an elaborately crafted regulatory straitjacket

defines the bounds within which fund managers must discharge their obligations to investors. Finally, investment bankers are also required to display adequate due diligence in the manner in which capital raising and merger deals are structured.

Uncertainties in Raising Capital

Despite the transformation of the market, companies continue to face uncertainties in their ability to raise capital from the market at valuations that they consider fair, except when liquidity surges in the market occur. Very long-term financial savings are also not being intermediated through the market, leading to a paucity of private domestic equity and debt for infrastructure investment, in the absence of pension fund reform. Consequently, commercial banks continue to finance very long-term debt, at some risk to the matching of their assets and liabilities, while private equity funds, typically from overseas, have begun taking an increasing stake in well-managed companies to facilitate their growth. A significant proportion of fresh equity and debt is placed privately, rather than being offered publicly, reflecting the higher transaction costs of public offerings.

Companies similarly face constraints in raising acquisition finance. As competitive pressures have increased consequent to the liberalization of trade and investment in the early 1990s, companies have sought to restructure themselves in ways that have included ramping production capacities and divesting noncore businesses. This has been fertile territory for mergers and amalgamations, and banks have been restrained by regulation from providing such finance, though that restraint has been eased in financing the privatization of government companies.

Globalization of the Market

Economic reforms of the 1990s also liberalized access to overseas capital by Indian firms, the greatest impact being on the structure and depth of the Indian capital market. Portfolio investments were permitted by SEBI-registered Foreign Institutional Investors which discretionarily manage funds of common pools of money. Soon, however, such funds began issuing synthetic instruments overseas to attract wider pools of money to be invested in the Indian market. In addition, Indian companies have been permitted to access capital overseas, initially through the issuance of global depository receipts, and subsequently in the U.S. market (where stronger disclosure standards are mandated) through American depository receipts. So while it is still not legally possible for every investor overseas to hold shares in an Indian company willing to issue its shares, in practice surrogate markets facilitating such investments have arisen.

Another offshoot of financial integration with overseas capital markets has been the rapid change in the capitalization and practices of domestic market intermediaries. There have been several collaborations and strategic alliances since 1993 between domestic financial services companies and investment banks abroad. Overseas brokerage houses, through Indian affiliates, have become members of the larger stock exchanges and thereby entered the domestic broking industry. The financial services industry grew rapidly through the 1990s and is better capitalized than it was at the start of capital market reform.

While the Indian rupee is still not fully convertible on the capital account, portfolio investment from overseas has become large enough to significantly impact the capital market, be it in trading volume, share valuation, or the structure of trading liquidity across stocks. Although India was well insulated from the currency and capital market turmoil that affected East Asia in 1997, periods during which surges have occurred in overseas inflows into the capital markets in the last decade have seen prices of frontline and liquid stocks depart significantly from their fundamental valuations computed on the basis of discounted cash flows. Reversals in these surges have led inevitably to steep erosion in investor wealth. Opportunities for hedging against such a fall in prices, hitherto restricted, are expected to improve as markets for derivatives on stock indexes and select individual stocks become increasingly liquid.

The resident investor is still not permitted to invest overseas, though a limited window has been opened for mutual funds to do so. If India moves closer to full capital account convertibility, overseas funds can also be expected to become a source of investors in the country. It is at this stage that financial product innovation, market liquidity and stock market clearing and settlement efficiencies will need to be internationally competitive if markets are not to move overseas. The compulsions will be strong for regulators and market participants alike to be sensitive to the importance of market microstructure.

Linkages with Other Financial Markets

Further liquidity and depth in the capital markets require the development of a more diversified fund industry. While the liberalization of the insurance sector in the early twenty-first century will provide an impetus to such diversification as new, privately owned insurance companies grow in size, it is the reform of the pension sector that will be more critical. The government has recently initiated a shift in policy for pensions payable to a segment of its own employees with the acceptance of two instrumentalities. The first is the notion of “contracting out,” allowing pension monies to be managed by

other asset managers, and to permit employees to switch between asset managers at very low cost. The second is to permit diversification across asset classes (which for the first time are to include equities), so as to enhance returns in the longer term. While the transformation of the pension fund sector is not customarily viewed as an integral part of capital market development, even a modest proportion of retirement savings being invested in the equity markets would significantly impact liquidity in the latter, thereby also reducing the undervaluation of several stocks. This is in addition to other benefits that a diversified pension industry could provide: enhancing earnings at retirement, and so mitigating old-age financial distress; providing long-term funds for the development of infrastructure; and thereby increasing the domestic savings rate. A well-structured reform of the pension fund market provides the opportunity to reach out simultaneously for growth and distributional equity in the next stage of India’s capital market development.

P. Jayendra Nayak

See also **Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI); Stock Exchange Markets**

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CASTE AND DEMOCRACY Caste has been a major basis of solidarity, stratification, and conflict in South Asia for many centuries, and it continues to play an important role in Indian politics. While caste was and continues to be a basis of social dominance, mobilization behind caste banners since the nineteenth century has often aided the democratization of Indian society. The important role of caste in democratic India is in some ways similar to the relevance of other axes of historically rooted inequality, such as race and gender, in other democratizing societies.

Anthropologists once understood the caste system mainly with reference to Hindu texts, which prescribe a hierarchical and seemingly static society. According to this view, caste was fixed by ancestry, and it determined a very wide range of rights and responsibilities related to occupation, social status, ritual status, and permissible



BJP- JDU Joint Press Conference. At a press conference before the 2005 assembly election in Bihar, a region steeped in caste politics, Nitish Kumar (activist JDU leader on the left) and Ravi Shankar Prashed (BJP official on the right). The growing political empowerment of the middle and lower castes has not yet resulted in widespread social equality. INDIA TODAY.

forms of social interaction with others. The relevance of caste did mean that Indian society was hierarchical and that for a long period the avenues of social mobility were narrow. However, historians and anthropologists more recently showed that some groups were able to use economic, political, social, and military power to move up the caste hierarchy at different points, while others moved down the caste hierarchy, in ways that Hindu texts did not suggest was possible. Religious texts did not determine how caste operated as a category of social stratification; caste divisions were therefore relevant among most of India's non-Hindu groups—Christians, Buddhists, and Sikhs, and to some extent Muslims—even though the religious texts of these groups do not recognize caste.

The social reality of caste changed in some ways during British colonial rule. Colonial legal institutions understood caste much as the Hindu religious texts did, making the caste system more rigid in some respects than it had been before the onset of colonial rule. For instance, colonial regulation often increased the control of the upper castes over Hindu temples and limited the

space for some religious rituals that departed from upper caste orthodoxy. However, some changes under colonial rule widened avenues of social mobility. The colonial state adopted preferential policies to give the lower castes (called the untouchables, the ex-untouchables, the Harijans, and later the Dalits) and the middle castes greater access to education and the growing bureaucracy. Some middle caste groups gained from the commercialization of agriculture and the growth of trade. The colonial censuses enumerated caste groups, much as they did religious groups, encouraging the widening of networks linking members of particular castes. The state was receptive to claims made on behalf of caste groups, urging the growth of caste associations, which demanded greater resources, status, and dignity for the castes they claimed to represent. Social reform movements emerged, many of which demanded a reduction or end to inequalities based on caste. The growth of mass politics and associational activity increased the political participation and to a lesser extent the political representation of the middle castes. Some leaders of the Indian nationalist movement and the Congress Party, the strongest political forces of the late colonial period, promised to reduce



Political Rally in Delhi. Supporters of V. P. Singh and the Janata Dal (People's Party) rally before the 1989 national elections. With the victor, Congress Party leader Rajiv Gandhi, forced to resign after failing to form a majority government, Singh became prime minister. However, his dependence on a broad coalition of often alienated factions proved untenable and his government collapsed after only four months in office. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

or eradicate caste-based inequalities once India became independent. However, forces to defend caste privilege remained strong both in society and in the Indian nationalist movement.

Caste associations have been an important part of civic life in India since the nineteenth century. While groups from different points in the social hierarchy formed these associations, the associations of the lower and middle castes became much stronger than those of the upper castes, which account for a much lower portion of the population. Caste associations claimed that the castes they represented once had, and ought to once again enjoy, higher social status. But, they also claimed that these castes were historically underprivileged, to demand greater access to resources. These associations grew through the twentieth century with the growth of mass politics, which often drew upon preexisting caste solidarities.

As the weight of numbers was crucial to their success, caste associations defined caste affiliation in increasingly expansive ways, sometimes bringing together different groups of formerly unequal social status under new caste labels. In the process of claiming greater shares in resources, higher social status, and an end to various social restrictions, caste associations implicitly or explicitly challenged caste as a basis of social inequality. Claims to shares in resources proportionate to their population distribution highlighted implicit claims by the less privileged castes to equal worth. Such claims and mobilization to pursue them were conducive to political equality, but certainly did not end the continued role of caste as a basis of social dominance.

India's postcolonial rulers proclaimed commitments to build democracy and to reduce different forms of social inequality. An important dimension of these tasks was the need to address caste-based inequalities. The postcolonial political elite chose to retain caste rather than shift to income as the basis of eligibility for "affirmative action" preferences and required preferences for the lower castes, but left similar preferential treatment for the middle castes to the judgment of state governments. It was claimed that all preferences would be phased out as the social mobility of the lower and middle castes increased. Preferential policies, however, benefited only a small proportion of the middle and lower castes, partly because they were restricted to education and government employment, the latter accounting for a significant but declining share of the workforce. Caste quotas increased rather than declined after decolonization. This increase was not due to the limited effect of these quotas in promoting social mobility, but because the subsequent growth in the mobilization of the middle and lower castes placed pressures on governments to maintain or expand caste preferences. Eligibility for these preferences became more expansive, and came to include many middle castes that had already experienced much social mobility. The introduction of more tiered preferences in some states partly counteracted the expansion of eligibility, reserving a share of seats in colleges and within the bureaucracy for the less well-off groups among the middle castes.

India's Constitution accorded citizens the fundamental right of protection from discrimination on the grounds of caste, and the practice of untouchability was made punishable. Indeed, the executive and the legislature swiftly initiated official efforts to end caste discrimination in postcolonial India. However, the bureaucracy and the police did not follow up the legislative commitments to any significant extent, especially regarding the practice of untouchability, partly because of the inadequate promotion of the lower castes to the upper echelons

of these institutions. For instance, police officials pursued cases of violent discrimination against Dalits only in a sparing manner, mainly in regions where the lower castes had some political power. Indeed, police officials themselves often discriminated against the lower castes, showing a tendency to imprison and physically abuse them more readily than they did other citizens. The enumeration of castes in censuses changed after decolonization. The earlier practice of counting specific castes was stopped, supposedly to give caste affiliation less official recognition, but the lower castes (now called the “scheduled castes” in official language) continued to be enumerated because of the state’s stated concern to attend to the condition of these groups. Growing pressures from middle caste groups led to a minor revival in the enumeration of all castes in the census of 2001, and this practice seems likely to be fully revived in the next census.

Caste has been among the major criteria governing the choices of many voters since electoral politics began in India in the early twentieth century. Voters focus on various aspects of caste in their political preferences: the caste of individual candidates, the representation of particular castes in the membership or leadership of parties, the castes with which parties might explicitly identify themselves, or the extent to which parties address the demands of particular castes. The significance of caste as a criterion in the choices of many voters did not, however, ensure that the numerically preponderant lower and middle castes enjoyed considerable political power. The political participation of the lower castes remained low in the first two decades after independence. The reservation of many parliamentary and legislative constituencies for lower caste candidates increased the political representation of these groups. It did not, however, give these groups much of an independent political voice, as parties dictate much of the behavior of legislators in India, and many lower caste legislators until recently had little political clout.

The political power of the middle castes grew more rapidly than that of the lower castes. They acquired a strong and independent political voice, mainly in regions in which movements and parties representing these groups became significant. This happened through the 1950s and the 1960s in much of southern India, but the political power of the middle castes grew comparably only from the 1970s onward in northern India, where the middle castes remain weaker than they are in southern India even into the twenty-first century. In other regions, such as West Bengal in eastern India, radical peasant mobilization increased the power of the largely middle and lower caste peasantry, although the Communists and other radical parties did not mobilize behind caste banners.

Parties that either explicitly mobilize a coalition of the less privileged castes, or that draw their support primarily from the middle and lower castes, ruled various states at different points—notably Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. While such parties have not ruled India on their own, some of them were members of the multiparty alliances that ruled India at different points from the late 1980s onward.

The growing political power of the middle and lower castes urged some publicists and scholars to proclaim that this would prove an effective route to social equality. The increased political power of these groups certainly opened routes to social mobility through such means as the expansion of caste quotas, the increased distribution of patronage to the middle and lower castes, and greater receptivity in the bureaucracy to the demands of some of these groups. However, the middle and lower castes did not experience an increase in their income and property comparable to their increased political representation. Besides, the improvements in opportunity resulting from the political empowerment of these groups were concentrated among small sections of these castes. Increases in economic power did not bring about commensurate improvements in social status and reductions in social restrictions. The political empowerment of the middle and lower castes has not as yet made caste irrelevant as an axis of social dominance, nor has it brought in its wake widespread social equality to India.

Narendra Subramanian

***See also* Caste System; Development Politics; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of**

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CASTE SYSTEM The 90th verse of the tenth chapter of the Rig Veda, dating back at least to the second millennium B.C., described the origins of the universe from Purusha's (the Cosmic Being) sacrifice of himself on the funeral pyre. From Purusha's mouth came the Brahman, from Purusha's arms the Rajanya (later referred to as Kshatriya), from Purusha's thighs the Vaishya, and from Purusha's feet the Shudra. By implication, Rig Veda X, 90 assigned status rankings to these four categories of humans. The terms "Brahman" (as priest) and *rajan* (as ruler) were defined in other passages of the Rig Veda, as when the *rajan* was enjoined to respect the Brahman, who might ritually improve the *rajan's* chances of success when the *rajan* conducted cattle raids or waged war. Subsequent Vedas described how Brahman priests could enhance benefit and reduce harm when performing large public rituals as well as sacred sacrifices (*yajñas*) sponsored by individual sacrificers (*yajamanas*).

The four categories of humans who emerged from the sacrifice of Purusha came to be referred to as *varnas* (colors), a term also used to categorize timber and precious stones. The four categories were not referred to by other contemporary terms such as *kula* (family), *sabha* or *samiti* (assembly), or *sbreni* (occupational guild). By the end of the Vedic period, the Brahman authors of the sacred texts agreed that the four *varṇa* divisions of society were cosmically ordained, with Brahmans outranking the other three *varṇas*. This Brahmanical view of society did not go unchallenged. Some persons claiming Kshatriya status maintained Kshatriyas outranked Brahmans. Others denounced the four-*varṇa* system in its entirety as a device conceived by Brahmans to perpetuate their domination over the rest of society. Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, and Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, were both identified as Kshatriyas, and both taught paths to enlightenment that bypassed Brahman priests and the four *varṇa* ranks.

Instructions in the Sūtras and Shāstras Regarding *Varṇa* Conduct

The sūtras ("threads," brief Sanskrit prose aphorisms) and *shāstras* (more elaborate Sanskrit verse instructions) were composed presumably by Brahmans during the centuries following the sixth century B.C. Some sūtras and *shāstras* provided instructions regarding the acquisition of wealth and power (e.g., the *Artha Shāstra*, attributed to Kautilya). Others provided erotic instructions (e.g., the *Kāma Sūtra*, attributed to Vatsyayana). Still others provided instructions regarding morally correct behavior (*dharmā*).

The *Dharma Shāstra* attributed to the sage Manu assigned occupations to each of the *varṇas*. Brahmans were to study, teach, perform sacrifices, and have little to



Nineteenth-Century Lithograph of Butcher or Tanner. In the Indian caste system, such workers are members of the lowest caste, the Shudras or untouchables. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

do with temple priests. Kshatriyas were to rule, wage war, sponsor sacrifices, and study. Vaishyas were to farm, breed cattle, trade, lend money, and study. Shudras were to serve the three higher *varṇas*. Men in the three higher *varṇas* were considered "twice-born"; their second birth ceremony (*upanayana*) occurred when they received the sacred thread (*janeō*) and could study the Vedic texts. Shudras (who were considered "once-born") and women were barred from studying the Vedic texts. According to Manu, men of the "twice-born" *varṇas* should observe four stages (*ashramas*) of their lives: celibate student, economically active married householder, retiree, and wandering mendicant. As outlined, the *varṇa* system consistently privileged the men of higher ranks over men of lower ranks. Men who failed to follow their prescribed occupations sank in social rank. Men of each *varṇa* were to marry women of the same *varṇa*—thereby making *varṇa* hereditary. In times of distress, men could marry women in lower *varṇas*. Those who engaged in the most serious offenses (e.g., drinking spirituous liquor) were to be treated as outcasts. Relatives were to perform their funeral rites and then neither converse with, nor marry, nor share any inheritance with them. Those who had been "outcasted" could be restored among their relatives only after performing appropriately severe penances.

Manu identified *mlecchas* as barbarians outside the four-*varṇa* system characteristic of the *aryas* (noble

ones). Inside the four-*varṇa* system, men of “twice-born” rank who failed to carry out their sacred duties descended to the status of *vratyas*. Kshatriyas who sank to the ranks of *vratyas* produced offspring like the *yavanas* (Greeks), *shakas* (Scythians), *pahlavas* (Parthians), and *dravidas* (southerners)—all identifiable groups living in various parts of the Indian subcontinent. Higher-*varṇa* men impregnating lower-*varṇa* women “in accord with the direction of the hair” (*anuloma*) received more approval than lower-*varṇa* men impregnating higher-*varṇa* women “against the hair” (*pratiloma*). Offspring of these alliances were stigmatized accordingly.

According to Manu, the mixing or confusion of *varṇas* (*varṇa samkara*) seriously endangered society. Disapproved sexual activities between *varṇas* generated new birth groups (*jatis*) with their own names and occupations. In one Manu sequence, if a Shudra male impregnated a Vaishya female, their offspring was a carpenter. If a Brahman male impregnated a Shudra female, their offspring was a fisherman. If a carpenter male impregnated a fisherman female, their offspring was a boatman (a plausible combination of carpenter and fisherman). According to Manu, one of the most offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Shudra male impregnated a Brahman female. Manu labeled the offspring of such miscegenation a Chandala. According to Manu, Chandalas were to live apart from other people and never enter villages or towns after dark. They were to eat from broken dishes, carry out the corpses of unclaimed dead, execute criminals, and wear the clothes of the executed and the dead. According to Manu, the *varṇa* into which one was born was a direct consequence of how one performed one’s morally correct behavior (*dharmā*) in one’s previous lives. The concept of reincarnation (*samsāra*) and the doctrine of karma (the moral order whereby every virtuous act is rewarded and every evil act is punished) provided an ethical foundation for the four-*varṇa* system and its permutations.

The Four-*Varṇa* System and Oral and Written Narratives

The Jataka tales (stories of Buddha’s previous births) described Chandalas as persons so polluting that a high-status maiden had to rinse her eyes with perfumed water after catching a glimpse of a Chandala. Sanskrit poems like those by Kalidasa, plays like those by Shudraka and Bhavabhuti, and the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* epics in their multiple-language versions all referred to the four *varṇas* with their assigned ranks and responsibilities. The *Bhagavad Gītā* described the origin and separate duties (*dharmas*) of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras, and declared: “Better to do one’s own duty imperfectly than to do another man’s well.” Although access to the

written four-*varṇa* heritage was restricted to a literate minority, the concepts of the four-ranked *varṇas*, their assigned duties, and their levels of pollution were widely recognized throughout North India by means of oral transmissions. In South India, similarly, Tamil narratives and instructional texts such as the *Tirukkural* described Brahmans, kings, ministers, warriors, merchants, artisans, musicians, and plowmen. But the South Indian narratives largely ignored the four-*varṇa* system. In fact, the presence of Buddhist and Jain teachers in the Tamil narratives sometimes overshadowed the spiritual stature of Brahmans.

Eyewitness Accounts of the *Varṇa* System Through History

Around 300 B.C., Seleucus Nicator, one of Alexander the Great’s generals, appointed Megasthenes as ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya’s court in Pataliputra. According to Megasthenes, the people of India near Pataliputra were divided into seven groups with fixed occupations and mandatory within-group marriages. First in honor were philosophers, who officiated at sacrifices to the gods and the dead. Three of the remaining six groups were maintained by the royal treasury. Although Megasthenes’ description of fixed occupations and mandatory within-group marriages paralleled the *śāstras*, the fit between Megasthenes’ seven groups and the four *varṇas* was not clear.

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D., a Chinese Buddhist monk, Fahsien, traveled through northern India. In his journals he described Chandalas as fishermen and hunters who sold meat. In a land where, according to Fahsien, people did not kill living creatures or drink intoxicating liquor, Chandalas were considered wicked. They lived apart from others and struck a piece of wood when they entered a city or marketplace so that people could avoid them.

Two centuries later, another Chinese Buddhist monk, Hsien Tsang, traveled throughout much of India. Hsien Tsang described four classifications of ranked families that paralleled the *śāstras*: Brahmans lived purely, observed the most correct principles, and studied and taught the *Veda Śāstras*; Kshatriyas governed; Vaishyas engaged in commercial exchange and sought profit; and Shudras plowed and tilled the land. Purity and impurity assigned people their places in the four ranks. When people married, they rose or fell according to their new relationships. Hsien Tsang reported that, in addition to the four classifications, “there are other classes of many kinds that intermarry according to their several callings. It would be difficult to speak of these in detail.”

In the eleventh century, Alberuni, a Muslim from the court of Ghazni (in Afghanistan), traveled in India and

wrote in Arabic a description of the four-*varṇa* system. Below the four *varṇas* came eight craft groups who lived outside the towns of the four *varṇas*. Five of these craft groups freely intermarried but refused to marry three of the groups: shoemakers, weavers, and woolen-cloth thickeners. Below these eight craft groups came four groups considered “degraded outcasts” (among them Chandalas) who did “dirty work, like the cleansing of the villages” and who were thought of as illegitimate children of a Shudra male and a Brahman female.

In the early 1600s, al-Badayuni, a historian serving the Mughal emperor Akbar, wrote about a delegation of Brahmans who presented the emperor with Sanskrit verses describing the emperor as a reincarnated Hindu deity, predicted by ancient sages to be a conqueror who honored Brahmans and cows. Al-Badayuni also reported the emperor’s decision to have “learned Brahmans” (rather than Muslim judges) decide Hindu court cases, thereby instituting the Brahman-Kshatriya component of the four-*varṇa* system. In 1674, despite the objections of some Brahmans, the Maratha ruler Shivaji arranged for other Brahmans to perform his sacred-thread ceremony and declare him a Kshatriya, enhancing his authority over rival Maratha nobility.

In the sixteenth century, when Portuguese were settling on India’s southwestern coast, they labeled the local intramarrying groups *castas*. In Brazil and elsewhere in the New World, *castas* referred to groups that were identified by the proportions of Portuguese, Indian, and African “blood” they had in their veins. In time the French and British modified the Portuguese term *casta* to “caste” and applied it to the many intramarrying lineages they found in India.

In 1676 a Frenchman, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, published his journal of several trips he had made to India between 1641 and 1668 as a jewel merchant. He described the common belief that there were seventy-two castes in India, all of which, according to the most accomplished priests, emanated from four original castes: Brahmans (philosophers and astrologers, with a university in Banaras [varanasi]); Rajputs (meat-eating warriors, including all *rajas*) and Ketris (former warriors but currently merchants); Baniyas (vegetarian traders, money hangers, and bankers with extraordinary business acumen); and Shudras (foot soldiers). People who belonged to none of the four castes followed hereditary trades and married their sons and daughters to members of the same trade. The lowest of these castes ate pigs, removed refuse from people’s houses, and consumed other people’s leftover food.

More than a century later (between 1792 and 1823), a French Jesuit missionary, the Abbé J. A. Dubois, described India’s four ancient castes, the Brahmans, Kshatriyas,

Vaishyas, and Shudras, and their ordained occupations. He then reported that in South India each of the three or four principal divisions of Brahmans was further divided into at least twenty subdivisions. The few Kshatriyas and Vaishyas who existed in South India were also divided and subdivided (although South Indian Brahmans maintained that no true Kshatriyas existed any longer). The Shudras were the most numerous of the four castes. When added to the Pariahs and outcastes, the Shudras represented nine-tenths of South India’s population. The highest Shudras were cultivators, who looked down on and refused to eat with such occupational castes as weavers, carpenters, and barbers. Some castes existed in certain districts but not in others. Some castes observed customs no other castes observed, such as the Nairs (whose women had lovers but no husbands), the Nambudiris (who observed special funeral rites for their unmarried women), and the Kallars (some of whom were rulers, while others were robbers). Groups despised in some districts were held in esteem in other districts, depending on their local conduct and power.

The Abbé Dubois also described the “universally and invariably observed” South Indian custom of cross-cousin marriage, wherein one could marry a cousin from one’s mother’s brother or father’s sister, but not a cousin from one’s mother’s sister or father’s brother. South Indian Brahman marriages included the requirement that the bride and groom be descended from different *gotras* (remote priestly ancestors). Although, according to the Abbé Dubois, castes were the paramount distinctions among Hindus in South India, Hindus were also divided into sects (defined by their worship of Shiva, Vishnu, or a large number of other deities). In South India, Hindus were also divided into right-hand and left-hand factions (unknown in North India and with no known scriptural base). The right-hand factions included most of the higher caste Shudras supported by the lower caste Pariahs. The left-hand factions included the Vaishyas, the artisan castes, and the lowest caste leather workers. Clashes between the right-hand and left-hand factions could suddenly explode with shocking violence over matters of privilege. The Abbé reported one near-violent confrontation (settled peacefully) that was incited when a left-hand-faction leather worker inserted red flowers into his turban—a privilege Pariahs maintained belonged exclusively to the right-hand faction.

The British and the Caste System

The caste system became an object of serious British concern when the East India Company established law courts in its Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta presidencies. In civil cases (involving such matters as marriage, adoption, and inheritance), the company courts hired Muslim

and Hindu advisers to help the British judges apply Shari'ah laws to Muslims and *śāstra* laws to Hindus. In 1794 William Jones published his English version of Manu's *Dharma Śāstra* (in which he translated *varṇa* as "caste" and *Dharma Śāstra* as "laws"). The "Laws of Manu" soon acquired almost-canonical status in the company courts. British judges recognized the discrepancies between Manu's and other *śāstras*' instructions for the original four "castes" and the observed practices of the hundreds of "castes" and "subcastes" appearing before them in their courts. After the 1858 transfer of authority from the East India Company to the British crown, British judges decided civil cases on the basis of precedents (as occurred with common law in Britain) and "native customs." Only if precedents could not be found would British judges turn to English translations of Hindu and Muslim "law" books to make decisions.

British officials were encouraged to prepare ethnographic manuals and gazetteers of the people in their districts, including their race, caste, religion or sect, habits, and customs. These materials could be useful when recruiting for military service, identifying "criminal" groups, and controlling the land markets of "agricultural" and "merchant" groups. Starting in 1872, the Reverend M. A. Sherring published his three-volume *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, listing Brahmans and Kshatriyas at the top and continuing down the ranks of the *varṇas* to the lowest castes.

The British recorded their first all-India census in 1871 and 1872. They noted respondents' caste identities and tribal affiliations and tried, often with considerable difficulty, to place each group within the four-*varṇa* framework. W. C. Plowden, who had been responsible for the census report from the North-West provinces, later wrote that securing correct information from the castes and tribes in his region had been so confused and so difficult that he hoped no census would try to obtain similar information in the future. Government offices began receiving hundreds of petitions and memorials by castes and caste groups claiming higher status than that ascribed to them by the census. The 1881 census rendered a population of Brahmans, Rajputs, 207 "other castes" with minimum populations of 100,000 each, and 65 castes with lower populations spread over two or more provinces. The 1891 census abandoned *varṇas* and reported 60 subgroups divided into six broad occupational categories. In 1891 Herbert Risley published his two-volume *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, and in 1896 William Crooke published *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*. Both authors identified castes, subcastes, tribes, and subtribes, and described their manners, customs, kinship systems, and occupational patterns. The 1901 census, under the supervision

of Risley, reintroduced castes and fit them into a British-constructed eleven-rank *varṇa* system, including four subdivisions of Shudras, three subdivisions of polluting castes, and ending with castes that denied the sacerdotal authority of Brahmans. The 1901 census included measurements of nasal and cranial indices to test the hypothesis that India's highest castes represented the purest racial types (i.e., the "invading Aryans") while the lowest castes reflected the greatest racial intermixing with the "original Dravidian inhabitants." The data failed to support the hypothesis.

The 1911 census commissioner suggested that perhaps the census should record India's lowest castes (referred to as untouchables, outcastes, or depressed classes) as not even Hindus, arousing considerable public agitation. Following the 1921 census, increasing dissatisfaction with the changing figures and overall accuracy of the caste returns and the "pestiferous deluge of representations" by caste groups throughout India filing for higher caste status led J. H. Hutton, the 1931 census commissioner, to announce that beginning with the 1931 census, in most instances castes would no longer be recorded. The 1931 census did report that Brahman castes (about 6% of India's total population) were most concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir (34%) and less concentrated in Madras province (3%). The census also mentioned that during caste enumerations Brahmans were sometimes "manufactured on the spot" from tribal and other local kinds of priests. M. W. M. Yeatts, superintendent of the 1931 Madras census, reported that castes' nomenclatures were changing so fast that exact comparisons could not be made between one census and another.

By 1931 a new factor had entered caste record keeping. E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker, Mohandas Gandhi, B. R. Ambedkar, and others had drawn the wider public's attention to the fact that approximately one-fifth of India's population (variously called untouchables, outcastes, backward castes, exterior castes, *adivasis*, *adi-Hindus*, depressed classes, and in South India *adi-Dravidas*) were being systematically discriminated against. Gandhi referred to them as *harijans* (children of God) in an effort to reverse their designated stigma. Reformers called on the British government to identify these disadvantaged groups in order to end their longstanding historical disabilities. Hutton, the 1931 census commissioner, instructed provincial superintendents to draw up their own lists of groups handicapped on account of their "degraded position in the Hindu social scheme." Handicaps generally included such ritual disabilities as denial of admission to Hindu temples and the perceptions by higher castes that members of these groups caused ritual pollution. Groups meeting local "degraded" criteria were

listed (i.e., “scheduled”) in 1936 to enable them to receive special electoral representation according to the Government of India Act of 1935. Their official designation became “scheduled castes” (SCs) and, later, “scheduled tribes” (STs).

The Caste System after India’s Independence

Through its Constitution, the government of India initiated a policy of affirmative action referred to as “protective discrimination” or “compensatory discrimination.” Article 17 of India’s Constitution declared that untouchability was abolished and that any disability arising out of untouchability was an offense “punishable in accordance with law.” Articles 330 and 331 reserved seats in the national Parliament and state assemblies, and Article 335 reserved “posts” (jobs) in the central and state governments for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. To address the constitutional guarantees in Article 16 of equal rights for all Indian citizens, the Constitution stipulated that the policies of reserved seats and reserved posts for scheduled castes and tribes would end after ten years. Every subsequent decade, Parliament amended the constitution to extend the scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe reservations another ten years.

In 1960 the government of India published a nationwide list of 405 scheduled castes and 225 scheduled tribes, arranged in alphabetical order. Some of them were “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities. Some were called by different names in different linguistic regions of India (suggesting that these castes were not actually intramarrying groups). In 1976 the government of India published an amended state-by-state list of 841 scheduled castes and 510 scheduled tribes. Some castes were still “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes were called by two or more names in the same and neighboring localities. When caste identities were unclear, India’s Constitution assigned to Parliament and the president the final decisions regarding a group’s “scheduled” or “nonscheduled” status. According to the published lists, scheduled castes comprised about 17 percent of India’s population and scheduled tribes comprised about 7.5 percent, for a total of 22.5 percent. Members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes throughout India began labeling themselves Dalits, a Marathi term for “oppressed” used by Dr. Ambedkar. Soon references were being made to Dalit activism and agitation as well as Dalit poetry, literature, drama, art, and film.

Article 15(4) of India’s Constitution authorized the state to make special provisions “for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.” Article 16(4) of India’s Constitution authorized the state to provide equal opportunities of public employment for

“any backward class of citizens” inadequately represented in state services. The term “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs) was already in official use to identify groups in different parts of India that were entitled to educational concessions. The Constitution, however, gave no formal criteria to identify the “backward classes” to which it referred.

In 1978 the ruling Janata Party appointed B. P. Mandal to head the Backward Classes Commission. The Mandal Commission’s task was to determine the criteria for identifying India’s “socially and educationally backward classes” and to recommend steps for their advancement. Between 1978 and 1980 the commission generated an “Other Backward Class” (OBC) list of 3,743 castes and a more underprivileged “Depressed Backward Class” list of 2,108 castes. On 31 December 1980, the Mandal Commission submitted its report, recommending that 27 percent of central and state government jobs should be reserved for OBCs. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that “caste” could be used to identify “backward classes,” that “backward classes” could include non-Hindus such as Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and that the “creamy layer” (i.e., the wealthiest members) of the backward classes could not receive backward-class benefits.

Ever since India’s first elections in the 1950s, party strategies and electoral outcomes were explained partly in terms of castes and caste groups. Castes were sometimes described as “vote banks.” The years following the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations saw the emergence, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, of candidates and political parties specifically representing the backward classes or scheduled castes.

Prior to India’s independence, a number of anthropologists, including G. S. Ghurye, had suggested that India’s caste system stemmed from the efforts of Brahmans (and “invading Aryans”) to maintain their racial purity among the “resident Dravidians.” India’s many contemporary castes resulted primarily from fission and segmentation of the original four *varṇas*. After independence, anthropologist Irawati Karve, applying the categories of castes, caste clusters, and groups of caste clusters, used physical anthropological data to argue that some members of the same caste clusters (e.g., Brahmans, Kumbhars) could not be biologically related to other members of the same caste clusters (challenging the fission-segmentation hypothesis).

In 1953 H. N. C. Stevenson presented the thesis that in India a caste’s ritual status rested on its purity and pollution behavior patterns. Louis Dumont, McKim Marriott, and others extended and elaborated upon Stevenson’s purity and pollution thesis. An awkward nonfitting

observation was that third-ranked Vaishyas consistently observed purity and pollution behaviors more strictly than second-ranked Kshatriyas (who often transgressed purity and pollution norms).

In 1952 sociologist M. N. Srinivas defined “Sanskritization” as low castes’ (and other lower groups’) efforts to raise their status by emulating Brahmans’ (or other *varṇas*) beliefs and ways of life by becoming vegetarians, prohibiting their widows from remarrying, and so on. An alternative to “Sanskritization” was “Westernization”—a many-layered concept extending from Western technology to the experimental method of modern science. Subsequent studies of castes and caste clusters suggested that the *varṇa* hierarchy was one of several widely acknowledged South Asian hierarchies, according to which *jatis* (birth groups, lineages) were ranked by others and ranked themselves, using often-contested ranking criteria. In addition to whichever *jatis* may have evolved from fission and segmentation, *jatis* also became defined through economic and political gains and losses, status manipulation (sometimes involving revised genealogies and Brahmans’ endorsements), “outcasting” by one caste segment of another caste segment (and failures of the “outcasted” segment to be reinstated through apologies, fines, feasts, etc.), alliances between groups seeking larger numbers, migrations, relocations, sponsorships, and a host of other social dynamics associated with groups seeking higher status and other collective advantages within culturally shared status hierarchies.

The Future of the Caste System

Buddhists and Jains have criticized Brahmanical rituals and the four-*varṇa* hierarchy since the fifth century B.C. Between the seventh and tenth centuries A.D., South Indian poets, some from the lowest castes, bypassed Brahman intermediaries and addressed their devotions directly to representatives of the divine who could ignore their low caste origins and release them from their endless cycles of rebirths. In twelfth century Mysore, Basava started the Lingayat movement, whose followers renounced caste, only in the end to become much like an intramarrying caste themselves. In the fifteenth century in North India, Ramanand and Kabir called for the abolition of castes. In sixteenth-century Punjab, Guru Nanak and his Sikh followers stressed interdining and the breaking down of castes. In nineteenth-century North India, both the Brahmo Samaj and the Ārya Samāj denounced caste hierarchies. In 1919 in Tamil Nadu an anti-Brahman “Justice for Non-Brahman” political party was founded, followed in 1925 by the “Respect Movement,” which called for Hindus to stop using Brahmans to conduct their marriages. Mahatma Gandhi denounced caste as a “travesty” of the classical four-*varṇa* system and

called for the “absolute social equality” of the *varṇas* and the abolition of untouchability.

When India became independent, many hoped for a “casteless, classless” society. India’s Constitution called for “equality of status and of opportunity.” Yet throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, India’s caste system continued to flourish socially, economically, and politically. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, India’s caste system was still reflected in employment and voting behavior, the activities of castes negotiating for different SC, ST, and OBC statuses, and in marriage negotiations. The matrimonial sections of newspapers’ classified advertisements continued to list “brides wanted for . . .” and “grooms wanted for . . .” with references to specific castes and *gotras*.

Westerners from philosopher Georg Hegel on foresaw the end of the caste system in India. Karl Marx predicted that the Indian railway system and modern industry would “dissolve” the hereditary occupations “upon which rest the Indian castes.” Christian and Muslim missionaries hoped that conversion to a faith denying reincarnation would undercut the moral legitimacy of the caste system, thereby ending castes at least among Muslims and Christians. Yet scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward classes continued to exist among India’s Muslims and Christians. Castes and the caste system also continued to exist outside India in neighboring Nepal and Sri Lanka. And castes and the caste system played various complex roles in the diaspora of Indian communities around the world.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the term “caste” continued to describe three different phenomena in India: the four *varṇas*; the thousands of publicly identified kinship groups referred to as “castes” in census tracts and other official documents; and lineages of related families from among which parents arranged their children’s marriages. India’s caste system will continue to exist as long as individuals feel that the *varṇa* or census rankings of their castes are important; that their castes are their final bases for educational, sickness, and old-age support; and that their responsibilities as parents include finding suitable brides and grooms for their children from within designated castes.

Joseph W. Elder

See also *Brāhmaṇas; Dalits; Hinduism (Dharma); Mandal Commission Report; Sabhas and Samitis*

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CENTRAL BANKING, DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF India, like other developing countries, has had a late start in central banking, which evolved under the influence of both international banking practices as well as the imperatives of the emerging domestic economy. Since the overriding focus has been on achieving rapid economic development, inevitably, central banks in emerging economies have had a distinct developmental orientation. Unlike several other developing economies, however, in India the central bank was established before independence from British colonial rule in 1947. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was established as a private shareholders' bank in 1935. After independence, the subsequent developmental orientation necessitated the conversion of the RBI from a private shareholders' bank into a nationalized central bank.

The primary developmental challenge for the RBI during the 1950s and 1960s was to build a financial network with a wide geographical spread and deep socioeconomic reach. Extending beyond the conventional objectives of central banking, the First Five-Year Plan (1951) noted that "central banking in a planned economy . . . would have to take on a direct and active role, firstly in creating or helping to create the machinery needed for financing developmental activities all over the country and secondly, ensuring that the finances available flows in the directions intended."

An important step toward this objective was the formation of the State Bank of India in 1955. In addition, the RBI promoted long-term industrial financing by establishing term-financing institutions, including the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (1948), State Financial Corporations (1952) and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI; 1964), as well as a mutual fund entity, the Unit Trust of India (UTI; 1964). In accordance with its statutory mandate, the RBI also promoted an appropriate structure of policies, procedures, and institutions in rural financing, including the creation of the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation (1963). At the same time, efforts were made

to strengthen the cooperative credit structure and to improve credit delivery at the grassroots level, with the goal of eliminating exploitative informal sources of financing. Furthermore, the RBI offered a number of sector-specific refinance facilities, including export credit and food credit, and established three national funds in order to finance long-term operations in agriculture and industry and to support agricultural stabilization. These measures were supported by the necessary legislative framework for facilitating reorganization and consolidation of the banking system, including the enactment of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the challenge was to ensure that the financial system was able to channel resources from the saver to the investor, in tune with the wider objectives of developmental planning. A major step was the nationalization of fourteen large commercial banks in 1969. Banks were given "priority" sector targets for agriculture and small-scale industries in the 1970s. Special schemes were introduced for the weaker sections, such as the Differential Rate of Interest plan in 1972 and the Integrated Rural Development Programme in 1980. In continuation of the earlier phase of institution building, new specialized institutions were created for rural credit, including Regional Rural Banks (1975) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), as well as export financing, in the form of the Export and Import Bank of India, both in 1982.

The objective of creating a large financial, especially banking, network was satisfied by the 1980s. Following nationalization, banking in India acquired a broad mass base and emerged as an important instrument of socioeconomic change. The difficulty, however, was that the imperatives of "social control," in the form of credit controls and concessional lending, segmented financial markets and blunted the process of price discovery, thereby impinging on the efficiency of resource allocation and thus the profitability of the banking industry. At the same time, the sharp increase in the government's budgetary gap had to be funded initially by raising resources from the banking system by fiat, first by raising statutory liquidity requirements and later by monetizing the fiscal deficit. In order to neutralize the inflationary effect of deficit financing, the RBI had to raise reserve requirements, thus imposing an indirect tax on the banking system. By 1991 statutory stipulations came to account for as much as over 60 percent of the deposit mobilization by the banking system, further limiting the scope for portfolio optimization by the banking system. Furthermore, the imperative of maintaining low interest rates in order to contain the interest rate cost of public debt and to provide concessional credit to various sectors resulted in a degree of financial repression in the economy.

This repression led to the challenge of rejuvenating the process of price discovery so as to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, without compromising social imperatives. This involved a three-pronged strategy of dismantling the regime of administered interest rates and directed credit, introducing new financial instruments and making financial markets capable of allocating resources in line with market signals, while at the same time ensuring credit delivery for the relatively disadvantaged sections of society.

A series of policy initiatives were taken in the 1980s, mainly aimed at consolidation and diversification, and to an extent, at deregulation. The consolidation measures included rationalization of branch expansion while emphasizing coverage of spatial gaps in rural areas, institution of comprehensive action plans of organizational development by individual banks, and greater focus on balance sheet strength. Banks were accorded greater operational flexibility in terms of greater discretion in portfolio allocation, especially with the abolishing of the Credit Authorisation Scheme in 1988, as well as fresh business opportunities in equipment leasing (1984) and mutual funds (1987). The process of financial liberalization in terms of rationalization of the interest rate structure and development of financial markets, especially money markets, took root in the late 1980s. The RBI also promoted the Discount and Finance House of India in 1988 to act as a market maker in the money markets. The Small Industries Development Bank of India was set up in 1990 to provide finance for small-scale industries.

The process of financial sector reforms gathered momentum in the 1990s, as a part of the overall program of reforms in the aftermath of the unprecedented balance of payments crisis in 1991. In line with the increasing market orientation of the economy, the very form of the developmental orientation experienced a dramatic change. The earlier regime of administered interest rates and credit controls was replaced by an incentive structure to channel funds in accordance with the spirit of financial liberalization and the imperatives of poverty eradication. The RBI has since spearheaded the modernization of the financial system through the development and diffusion of information technology, and improvement in trading and settlement practices, including the gradual migration to a real-time gross settlement system. At the same time, the conventional monetary policy objective of price stability, which had acquired an important dimension in developing economies, especially since inflation tends to hurt the poor the most, was no longer as relevant. By the mid-1990s, inflation had been reined in, decelerating to around 5 percent between 1995 and 2004 from over 8 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. The challenge is now to consolidate the hard-won gains against inflation by stabilizing inflationary expectations.

The RBI now accords substantial freedom to banks in optimizing their portfolios as well pricing their products, except in specific cases such as interest rates chargeable on small loans and priority sector advances. Statutory pre-emptions have been progressively reduced to the minimum (25% in case of statutory liquidity ratio) or close to the minimum 3 percent (in case of cash reserve ratio). The RBI is gradually divesting its investments in term-lending institutions—including phasing out concessional finance in the form of national funds—and is doing away with sector-specific refinance facilities, which have often resulted in market segmentation. At the same time, prudential norms have been instituted and supervisory framework strengthened for financial institutions to ensure financial stability. The RBI now offers incentives to banks in the areas of infrastructure financing and housing loans.

The RBI has undertaken several measures to strengthen the credit delivery system, especially to the disadvantaged sections of Indian society. Although banks are still required to earmark 40 percent of their advances for the priority sector, the definition of the priority sector has been considerably widened—and besides, the shortfall, if any, can be deposited with NABARD's Rural Infrastructure Development Fund. Another new development is the experiment of micro-finance, through self-help groups funded directly by banks or through intermediaries, such as nongovernmental organizations. The RBI is strengthening the supervisory framework of cooperative banks and nonbanking financial companies, which are able to meet localized and sometimes specialized financing requirements through their local network because of their relative flexibility.

The concept of central banking in India has thus shifted course over the years, responding to the contemporary challenges of economic development. Just as it was necessary to build institutions to monetize the economy in the 1950s, the very process of financial deepening prompted the financial institutions to function efficiently by the 1990s. The RBI thus continues to play a key role in the progress of economic development in India in tune with the changing macroeconomic environment.

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See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990; Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of**

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CHAITANYA (1486–1533), Vaishnava mystic. Chaitanya, the Bengal Vaishnava mystic and “saint” who gave distinctive emotional flavor to the worship of Krishna, is worshiped by many as the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna in the present degraded age of Kali. Born as Vishvambhara Mishra into a Brahman family in Navadvīpa (West Bengal) in 1486, he received training in the complex logical system (Navya-Nyāyā) that had made Navadvīpa an intellectual center. His pursuit of a scholarly career ended in 1508, when he journeyed to Gayā to perform the rites for his deceased father; he returned home immersed in praise of Krishna. In Navadvīpa, he quickly became the leader—and shortly thereafter the focus—of a Vaishnava group that met in courtyards to chant the names of God (*nāma-sankīrtana*) with an intensity that led to dancing and ecstatic experience of the presence of Krishna. The influence of Vishvambhara’s group increased as the chanting and dancing moved from private homes into the streets (*nagara-sankīrtana*), where all could join the experience.

After only two years, in 1510, despite pleas from his wife and his mother, Vishvambhara became a *sannyāsi* as Krishna Chaitanya and departed for the pilgrimage center of Puri in Orissa. In 1512 he left on pilgrimage to South India, where he had a significant meeting with Rāmānanda Rāya, in which he learned to appropriate the feelings of Rādhā (*Rādhā-bhāva*) as she lovingly yearned for the absent Krishna (*viraha-bhakti*); this participation in the love of both Rādhā and Krishna led to the belief that he was the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna. In 1514 he journeyed to Vrindāvana, site of Krishna’s early life as described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa; there he lived his ecstatic participation in the divine play. His devotional focus on the holy sites in Vraja (a region spanning western Uttar Pradesh and eastern Rajasthan) paralleled that of other sixteenth-century Vraja “saints”—Nimbārka, Vallabhācārya, Hit Harivansh, Swāmī Haridās—who transformed the meaning of that region and of Krishna devotion itself. By 1516 Chaitanya had settled in Puri, where his increasingly intense ecstasies probably hastened his mysterious death in 1533. Although he was not a theologian and wrote little or nothing himself, Chaitanya directed and inspired an outpouring of poetry, drama, and theological works, which constituted a distinct Vaishnava path or *sampradāya*. After his death, three groups, associated with his Bengali disciples Advaitācārya and Nityānanda and with six theologians (called Goswāmīs) who lived in Vrindāvana, developed

Chaitanya’s legacy in diverse ways. Three of them, the brothers Rūpa and Sanātana, and their nephew Jīva, wrote the core theological texts for the movement; another, Gopāla Bhatta, provided its devotional and ritual basis.

The biographical tradition reflects the various layers of Chaitanya’s character and influence. He was an ardent *bhakti* “saint” (simply called *Mahāprabhu*, “great Lord,” by Bengalis) who taught the practice of chanting the divine name (*Hari nāma*), the devotion most apt for the present age. By his ecstatic devotion, he entered Krishna’s divine play, tasted the Lord’s emotions, and not only communicated this to others but enabled them to participate as well; Chaitanya made Krishna incarnate once again so that his followers could enter their own proper roles in Krishna’s divine play. Chaitanya himself focused all of Rādhā’s frenzied yearning (*viraha*) for Krishna and thus is Lord *Gaurāṅga*, the “Golden *avatāra*.” The biographical traditions in the decades following Chaitanya’s death reflected all these dimensions: saint and savior, model of devotional practice, avatar of Krishna for the present age. The final stage appears around 1615 in the Bengali biography *Chaitanya-caritāmṛita*, by a follower of the Vrindāvana Goswāmīs, Krishnadāsa Kavirāja, who incorporated their theology and devotional aesthetics to show Chaitanya as the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna.

Chaitanya’s enduring missionary impulse in Bengali Vaishnavism led to three waves of teachers to the West: Bābā Premānanda Bhārati (1859–1914) in 1902; Mahānāmbṛata Brahmachāri (1904–1999) in 1933; and A. K. Bhaktivedānta Swami (1896–1977), founder of the Hare Krishna Movement (ISKCON), in 1965.

Gerald Carney

See also **Devī; Hinduism (Dharma)**

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CHALCOLITHIC (BRONZE) AGE After the initial domestication of plants and animals during the Neolithic period, settled communities in different geographical areas of South Asia began to develop regional cultures that archaeologists group together on the basis of shared pottery styles and technology, subsistence strategies, settlement organization, economic structure, and sociopolitical organization. Although these cultures continued to use stone tools, they also developed copper and eventually bronze metallurgy, leading early scholars to coin the term “Chalcolithic” (copper-stone) to differentiate them from earlier Neolithic and Paleolithic cultures. Some regional cultures remained basically unchanged for hundreds of years, but in other areas they developed trade networks with adjacent regional groups and eventually became integrated into complex chiefdoms or state-level society. Baluchistan and the piedmont along the western edge of the Indus Valley saw the emergence of numerous different regional cultures around 5500 to 4500 B.C. The regionalization process began around 3500 to 3200 B.C. in Gujarat and Rajasthan and 2200 B.C. in the Deccan region of peninsular India. During and after the decline of the Indus civilization (1900–1300 B.C.), copper-using cultures were present in the upper Gangetic Plain, such as the Ochre Colored Pottery culture, the enigmatic Copper Hoards culture, and the early phases of the Painted Grey Ware Culture. The final phases of the Painted Grey Ware culture see the introduction of iron and represent the final stage of Chalcolithic cultures in the northern subcontinent around 1200 to 800 B.C.

Northwest Region

The regional cultures of the greater Indus Valley and Baluchistan, as well as parts of Kutch, Saurashtra, and Gujarat, all contributed to the eventual emergence of the Indus Valley civilization. Because no single site can produce all of the relevant information needed to understand the larger region, archaeologists often group the information of different sites together and refer to them collectively as a cultural phase. For example, many distinctive cultural phases based on pottery styles, figurines, and burials can be identified at Mehrgarh and Nausharo. These sites are located at the interface between Baluchistan and the Indus Valley and some of the cultural phases (Kechi Beg, Damb Sadaat, Faiz Mohammad, etc.) relate to the Chalcolithic cultures of Baluchistan, while others (Hakra, Amri, Kot Diji) relate more to the Indus Valley. Since no state-level society emerged in Baluchistan, the following discussion will focus only on the Indus Valley, using examples from specific sites and phases.

The Ravi Phase (3500–2800 B.C.) is named after the earliest occupation levels at the site of Harappa, located on the Ravi River. The processes represented in the Ravi Phase are found throughout the northern Punjab, but similar

processes are seen at sites in Cholistan, Sind, Baluchistan, and Gujarat, each of which can be identified as distinct phases (Hakra, Bannu, Balakot, Amri, Sothi, Anarta, etc.). The Kot Diji Phase (2800–2600 B.C.) is named after a site that is located just across the Indus from Mohenjo-Daro in Sind. The cultural processes represented in the Kot Diji Phase are found at sites throughout the central and northern Indus Plain, including the regions along the Sarasvatī-Ghaggar-Hakra River that flows to the east of the Indus. During this period of regionalization, Chalcolithic cultures developed the essential subsistence and resource base needed for urban society as well as the trading networks and technologies needed to maintain a complex economic system. Eventually they evolved into highly stratified societies, probably organized as chiefdoms, with the ability to control access to essential resources and maintain a strong political and religious structure, setting the foundation for the formation of urbanism and state-level society.

Ravi Phase (3500–2800 B.C.)

Excavations in the lowest levels at the site of Harappa in the Punjab have provided evidence for the early Chalcolithic communities who lived on the alluvial plain. The early village grew to around 10 hectares and was possibly divided into two settlements separated by a gully. Houses were oriented north-south and east-west, and were constructed using wood and reeds with mud-plastered walls. Hand-formed irregularly shaped mud bricks appear to have been used for pottery kilns in the early period; later, more uniform mud bricks were used for building houses. The bricks measured $4 \times 9 \times 16$ inches ($11 \times 23 \times 40$ centimeters), which corresponds to the ratio of 1:2:4. The Ravi Phase may be interpreted as the beginning of a long tradition of brick proportions that became widespread throughout the Indus Valley.

Wheat, barley, and possibly wild grasses similar to millets were cultivated on the fertile alluvium. The most important domestic animals were the humped cattle, the sheep, and the goat. Some pigs and other wild animals were hunted, and there is evidence for fishing and hunting of small game and birds. A wide variety of crafts were developed at the site, including textiles, probably made from cotton or wool. Specialized crafts include bead making, using locally available terra-cotta and exotic stones, such as carnelian, various types of agate and jasper, amazonite, and lapis lazuli. Steatite beads (yellowish to gray colored steatite) were bleached and fired with both clear and blue-green glazes. The range of objects produced in different varieties of raw material (either terra-cotta or hard stone beads) demonstrates the presence of some social stratification.

All pottery from the early Ravi Phase was hand formed, but in the later levels some of the pottery was made using

a slow potter's wheel. The forms include heavy coarseware cooking vessels and finely made pots with polychrome decorations, using white, brown, red, and black pigments. Painted motifs include fish-scale and intersecting circle designs as well as the pipal leaf motif that becomes diagnostic of later Kot Diji and Harappa Phase pottery. Grayish black to gray brown chert from Baluchistan was used to make blades and blade tools, including microdrills for the perforation of stone beads, wood, or shell. Bone tools, such as spatulas, awls, arrow points, and perforated disks were also produced. Copper was not very common, but some fragmentary arrow points and awls have been found. Terra-cotta bangles and shell bangles from the marine shell *Turbinella pyrum* (identical to the shell used in the Neolithic at Mehrgarh) were also made at the site. Terra-cotta bull figurines and a fragment of a terra-cotta cart suggest that the people of Harappa were among the first to develop wheeled carts for transporting goods across the plains. The numerous varieties of raw materials from distant areas provide evidence for extensive trade contacts with the seacoast, which was over 500 miles (800 km) to the south, and sources of copper, grinding stone, and semiprecious stones that were 60 to over 300 miles (100 to over 500 km) to the north and west.

No burials have been found in the Ravi Phase at Harappa, but early burials with a few ornaments and pottery have been found in the early Chalcolithic levels at Mehrgarh (Period III, 4000 B.C.). Terra-cotta animal and female figurines at Harappa may represent votive images. A bone button seal with a geometric pattern that resembles a swastika may be the earliest evidence for the use of this motif in the Indus Valley. Prefiring "potter's marks" have been discovered on the base and lower body of some vessels and generally consist of single or double strokes or "v" or "x" motifs. Postfiring graffiti that includes many single and some multiple signs represents an early form of the Indus. Some of these graffiti signs are unique to Harappa, while others are common throughout the Indus Valley during this same time period.

During this same general time period, many other sites with similar cultural developments were established along the edges of the Indus Valley and also in the core regions: Amri to the south, Mehrgarh and Nausharo in the Kachhi Plain, Gumla and Rehmandheri in the Gomal Plain to the north, and Sarai Khola in the Taxila Valley. In Gujarat the local Chalcolithic cultures were also emerging and have been discovered at the sites of Loteshwar, Datrana, Nagwada, and Prabhas Patan.

Kot Diji Phase, 2800–2600 B.C.

This cultural phase is very important because it represents the initial phase of urbanism in the Indus Valley, prior to the establishment of the major Harappa Phase cities. Numerous sites throughout the central and northern part

of the Indus Valley provide evidence for this phase. At Harappa, the Ravi Phase settlement grows to over 25 hectares in area, and there are two distinct walled mounds. The perimeter walls were constructed from mold-made mud bricks, 10 × 20 × 40 centimeters (1:2:4 ratio), using clay collected around the site, as well as from more distant sources. Bullock carts would have been needed to bring mud bricks from surrounding villages, and the presence of many different types of toy carts and wheels indicate that this technology was well developed at Harappa. Mud-brick houses were also made with smaller mold-made bricks (1:2:4 ratio) and were oriented along the cardinal directions. Houses were arranged along the sides of wide streets with large sump pots and hearths located in specific areas of the houses, often adjacent to the street. Although no formal drains have been found at Harappa, they are reported from the site of Kalibangan during the Kot Diji phase and were made from baked brick. Most pottery was made on the wheel, and new vessel forms and decorations at Harappa are similar to styles found over a very large area of the Indus Valley. Short-rimmed globular vessels with sandy slip on the exterior are one of the diagnostic forms found at Amri, Mohenjodaro, Dholavira, Kot Diji, Harappa, Kalibangan, and Rehmandheri. The use of polychrome decorations declined and a new style of red-slipped pottery with bold black painted designs became widespread. The most common motifs are the intersecting circle, fish-scale design, pipal leaf, and a distinctive form of buffalo-horned deity.

Trade networks expanded to the south to bring gray-brown and tan cherts from the Rohri Hills to the northern Indus Valley. Larger grind-stone fragments indicate the increase in shipping of heavy goods along the rivers and plains using boats and bullock carts. Copper objects became more common, with distinctive copper arrow points that may have been traded from the Ganeshwar-Jodhpura culture in the northern Aravalli Hills to the west. Bead making, bangle production and other specialized crafts begun in the Ravi Phase became more highly refined, and new technologies were developed at Harappa and other sites during the Kot Diji Phase. The first high-quality faience beads were produced during this period, along with large quantities of white steatite disk beads. Trade in carnelian, agate, lapis lazuli, and marine shell continued to grow, and new varieties of colored stones indicates the demand for more diverse and exquisite objects. During this period the earliest gold sequins and beads are found at Harappa. Other sites such as Kunal in India have revealed hoards of gold and silver jewelry that demonstrate the emergence of highly stratified social and economic communities.

Economic stratification is also reflected in the use of weights and seals. A cubical limestone weight corresponding

to the standard weights that became widespread during the Harappan period has been found at Harappa, indicating control of trade and possibly taxation. Glazed square steatite button seals with geometric designs have been found at Harappa and most other Kot Dijian sites. A unique find at Harappa is an unfinished, broken square seal with an elephant motif and a perforated knob on the back. Another important discovery in the same levels is a clay sealing of a square seal with script. This sealing indicates that inscribed seals were being used to seal containers or storerooms. Seals with both animal motif and script have not yet been found, but they become the standard form of seal during the later Harappa Phase. Potter's marks continue to be produced using many of the same signs found in the Ravi Phase. A new type of potter's mark, incised on the outside of molds for making large jars, consists of multiple signs that may in fact be a form of script. The emergence of an early Indus script has been identified at Harappa based on the fact that postfiring graffiti becomes more standardized, and for the first time we see single and multiple signs that appear identical to later Indus script.

During the Kot Diji Phase there is evidence for the emergence and spread of regional ideologies that show important similarities in terms of painted motifs on pottery, styles of terra-cotta animal and human figurines, and geometric designs on seals. Very distinctive styles of female figurines, often referred to as Mother Goddesses, have been reported from the Chalcolithic levels at Mehrgarh and Nausharo and throughout the Zhob and Loralai Valleys in Baluchistan. Some female figurines found at Harappa show distinctive painted ornaments and patterned textiles, but others are almost identical to figurines from the sites of Gumla and Rehmandheri in the Gomal Valley, as well as from Sarai Khola in the Taxila Valley. Painted bull and wheeled sheep figurines may have been used for votive offerings or as toys for children.

Although no burials from the Kot Diji Phase have been found at Harappa, burials at Mehrgarh date to the same general period. In contrast to the earlier Neolithic burials, the Chalcolithic (Period III, c. 4000 B.C.; and Periods V–VII, c. 3500–2500 B.C.) burials show decreasing amounts of burial ornaments. At the same time, the figurines are depicted with many necklaces and elaborate headdresses. The changes in burial tradition may represent a major shift in beliefs about the afterlife or the need to keep wealth in circulation for the benefit of the living.

Chalcolithic of Western and Central India

The Chalcolithic cultures of western India are found in a vast geographical area covering the Deccan Plateau, the entire Gujarat, and parts of southern Rajasthan. Earlier

discussions of pottery sequences have now been replaced with a grouping of major sites and cultural developments according to phases, similar to those discussed for the Indus Valley region. The Chalcolithic period is broken down into three subdivisions based on the most recent excavations. The Early Chalcolithic (3200–2600 B.C.), which includes the early Ahar and Banas cultures of central Rajasthan, as well as the early Ganeshwar-Jodhpura culture in the north. The Mature Chalcolithic (2500–2000 B.C.) is best represented at sites such as Balathal and Gilund, but also includes the Ganeshwar-Jodhpura culture in the north. The Late Chalcolithic (2000–1700 B.C.) corresponds to the final phases of the Harappan and the Late Harappan period of the Indus Valley. Other cultural phases that represent regional aspects of the Chalcolithic in Gujarat and the Malwa and Deccan Plateaus are the Savalda Phase (2200–1800 B.C.), Gujarat Late Harappan Phase (1800–1600 B.C.), Malwa Phase (1600–1400 B.C.), Early Jorwe Phase (1400–1000 B.C.), and the Late Jorwe Phase (1000–700 B.C.). This last phase overlaps with the Iron Age Megalithic cultures and eventually the Early Historic Period.

The geographical diversity of western India, the variable rainfall patterns, and the orientation of major river systems allowed the development of regional cultures that were distinct, but that shared some basic similarities in technology and subsistence as well as levels of social complexity. Most of the region is covered by fertile black cotton soil (*regur*) that is highly water retentive; agriculture can be practiced as a result of the summer monsoon without additional irrigation, though there is some evidence for the construction of small irrigation canals at some sites. Slash-and-burn agriculture may have been practiced in some regions, and opportunistic agriculture was probably carried out along oxbow lakes and riverbanks.

The subsistence economy was based on a combination of farming (wheat, barley, and millet) and animal husbandry (cattle, with some sheep and goat), supplemented by hunting and gathering. The major ceramic tradition is painted black on red pottery, but there are also numerous regional pottery styles that serve to differentiate each major phase. Lithic technology included a stone blade industry, using agate and chalcedony as well as locally available cherts, and ground stone objects such as adzes and axes, as well as mortars and grinding stones. There is only a limited use of copper, and in the absence of any furnaces or manufacturing evidence, it is thought that the copper objects were traded from the Ganeshwar culture of the northern Aravalli or obtained from Harappan sites in Gujarat and Sind. Evidence for cotton, flax, and silk have been discovered at Inamgaon. As at Harappa, the silk thread was used for stringing beads and was made from local wild tussar silk.

During the Chalcolithic, houses were generally built using either a rectangular or a circular floor plan. The lower walls were packed mud and stone, and the upper part of the building was made with reed walls, plastered with clay, and thatch roofs. In some sites such as Kaothe there are circular pit structures for dwelling and storage, as well as for keeping chickens. At the site of Balathal, a monumental fortified enclosure dating to around 2400 B.C. (the same time as the Harappa Phase) was discovered at the center of the settlement. Massive walls constructed of stone rubble with clay and mud-brick filling enclosed an area of approximately 600 square yards (500 square meters). Several large residential structures, found outside the fortified building, have small rectangular rooms used for hearths or storage. A north-south street runs through the settlement and would have accommodated two-way cart traffic. Evidence for the use of carts is based on an inscribed pot from Inamgaon that shows a two-wheeled frame cart pulled by a pair of humped bulls. A fortification wall made of stones set in mud mortar may have enclosed the entire settlement. At the site of Gilund, a large enigmatic building with numerous internal divisions is dated to the Mature Chalcolithic. It was made with parallel internal subdivision or walls that may have been used for storage but were later filled with debris. The precise function of the Gilund structure is unknown. A later pit dug into the building during the Late Chalcolithic period contained numerous clay sealings from geometric stamp seals, and this may indicate that some communities at the site were involved in the control of trade. At present it is not clear what the trade items may have been or with whom they were trading.

Terra-cotta bull figurines, as well as male and female figurines, have been found at most sites and may have been used as votives, as was common throughout the Indus Valley. Chalcolithic burials are quite simple, and during the Savalda Phase at Kaothe, both adults and children were buried beneath or between the huts, laid in extended supine position, in an oval pit with no grave goods. During the Malwa Phase, burials found scattered in the habitation areas of the site at Inamgaon and Daimabad consist primarily of children interred in urns with pottery, ornaments, and tools as burial offerings. In the Jorwe Phase, urn burials became more common, but only a few examples of adult burials have been found. During this phase we also see extended burials oriented north-south, with small pottery vessels as offerings. The feet of adults were usually cut off below the knee, except for the elite burials, which were placed in four-legged clay coffins with pottery offerings.

None of these communities developed into state-level society, but some sites such as Inamgaon, Balathal, and Gilund appear to have been stratified, and possibly were politically organized as chiefdoms. The Chalcolithic cul-

tures of central India show a sudden decline around 1000 B.C., probably due to increased aridity. Though some settlements, such as Inamgaon in the southern Deccan, continue to be inhabited until around 700 B.C., many other regions appear to have been abandoned. Iron-using peoples who built megaliths began to arrive in the Deccan around 800 B.C., and they may have been instrumental in the final demise of sites such as Inamgaon.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also Harappa; Indus Valley Civilization; Mohenjo-Daro; Neolithic Period

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CHALUKYAS. *See History and Historiography.*

CHANDIGARH Chandigarh, called the "City Beautiful" by its residents, was built to replace the Indian state of Punjab's loss of its old capital, Lahore. Lahore, the



Secretariat Building in Chandigarh. To the right, the Secretariat, one of a series of government buildings on the northern fringe of Chandigarh designed by Le Corbusier, the French modernist architect, in the 1950s. The buildings' monumental size and scale were consonant with both the aspirations of Prime Minister Nehru who was eager for symbols of greatness for the new capital, and the splendid Himalayan landscape in which they are set. TIME LIFE PICTURES/GETTY IMAGES.

quintessentially Islamic city with its warrens of streets and colorful bazaars, had successfully served for several centuries as the capital of Punjab until India's partition in 1947. The loss of Lahore to Pakistan was felt intensely by Sikhs, Hindus, and Indian Muslims alike.

Chandigarh represents the best urban hopes of independent India. Indian leaders shared a common vision concerning the character of Chandigarh. The charismatic, urbane Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru provided the urban-architectural framework for the new capital city: "Let this be a new town symbolic of the freedom of India, unfettered by the traditions of the past . . . an expression of the nation's faith in the future." Other Punjabi leaders enthusiastically echoed Nehru's sentiment. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Nehru's minister of health, noted that as a Punjabi, she wanted "the new capital of the Punjab to be the last word in beauty, in simplicity and in standards of such comfort as it is our duty to provide to every human-being." Punjab's chief minister, Gopichand Bhargava, hoped that Chandigarh would be "the world's most charming capital."

Chandigarh bears the imprint of several Western architects and planners testing out the prevailing trends in architecture and urban planning. The American Albert Mayer drew the initial plan for the city; Matthew Nowicki, a Polish-American architect, was to design the capitol buildings. Nowicki's death in a plane crash in 1950 forced the Indian government to find a new team. In the end, the city has come to be associated with Swiss-born French modernist Le Corbusier. Whereas Mayer had looked to India's villages as his inspiration for the city's plan, Le Corbusier looked to India's industrial potential in detailing the plan, although he made only superficial changes in Mayer's plan. His cousin Pierre Jeanneret and English husband-and-wife architects Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew assisted Le Corbusier. In Chandigarh, Le Corbusier had argued that India's great civilization was essentially agrarian in character, and much of India's building efforts had been directed to building temples and mosques. Through his modernist designs for Chandigarh, he was proposing to expose India to an industrial civilization that celebrated business, industrial

complexes, and modern buildings. This was inherently more appealing to Prime Minister Nehru.

In 1966 Indian Punjab underwent yet another bifurcation: between Hindi-speaking Haryana and Punjabi-speaking Punjab. Chandigarh became the joint capital of both states, while the city itself came to be administered as a Union territory. Because of its relatively new urban infrastructure, clean environment, and good services (including medical), the city has grown rapidly, attracting both corporate enterprises and private citizens. Originally planned for 500,000, the city in 1999 had an estimated population of 800,000 and was still growing. Assuming a conservative 4 percent annual growth rate, Chandigarh's population is expected to grow to 1, 942,329 by the year 2021.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Punjab; Urbanism**

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CHANDRA GUPTA. See **Guptan Empire**.

CHATTERJI, BANKIM CHANDRA (1838–1894), Bengali novelist and social reformer. Bankim Chandra Chatterji was born in Kantalpur, near Calcutta. He graduated from British Bengal's Presidency College, and then was one of only two Bengali students to receive bachelor of arts degrees from Calcutta University's first graduating class in 1858. He was immediately appointed a deputy magistrate in British Bengal's government, and he remained in the British Indian service for more than three decades, serving as assistant secretary to Bengal's government, and subsequently honored by the British Raj, first with the title of Rai Bahadur (Great Person), and several years later elevated to Companion of the Indian Empire (CIE) before his retirement in 1891.

Bankim Chandra wrote his first novel in English, a romance titled *Rajmohan's Wife*, published in 1864. After that, however, he wrote all fourteen of his other novels and social commentary in Bengali, from *Durgeshnandini*, published in 1865, to *Kamalakanter Duptar*, published in 1885. His greatest novels were social critiques, disguised as romances or fictional history, the most famous of which was *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss), published in 1882. That story of a Hindu abbey's *sannyasi* revolt against the



Portrait of Bankim Chandra Chatterji. From Chatterji's famous *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss), the story of a Hindu abbey's revolt against its tyrannical Muslim rulers, came the words for "Bande Mataram" (Hail to Thee, Mother). With nationalist fervor ignited by Britain's partition of Chatterji's Bengali homeland (1905–1910), the song became India's national anthem. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

tyrannical pre-British Muslim rulers of Bengal gave India its first national anthem, "Bande Mataram" (Hail to Thee, Mother), which Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) set to music during the nationalist struggle ignited by Britain's first partition of Bengal from 1905 to 1910. The words, however, remained those of Bankim Chandra, who has since been hailed by countless millions of Indians as one of the grandfathers of their nation:

Mother, I bow to Thee!
 Rich with thy hurrying streams,
 Bright with thy orchard gleams . . .
 Mother of might, Mother free . . .
 Mother, I kiss thy feet . . .
 Who hath said thou art weak in thy lands,
 When the swords flash out in ten million hands,
 And ten times ten million voices roar
 Thy dreadful name from shore to shore? . . .
 Thou art wisdom, thou art law,
 Thou our heart, our soul, our breath . . .

the love divine . . . that conquers death . . .
 Mother sweet, I bow to thee,
 Mother great and free!
 (Translated from Chatterji's Bengali original by
 Sri Aurobindo)

None of his British colleagues in the Bengal service understood how truly “subversive” a Hindu-Indian nationalist Bankim Chandra was, for unlike his *sannyasi* heroes he never drew a sword against the British Raj, yet his pen proved mightier, inspiring generations of young Indians to march and die, proudly singing his hymn to their “Mother India,” demanding “freedom” (*swaraj*) from foreign rule of any complexion or faith. Chatterji also started a Bengali literary magazine, *Bangladarshan*, in 1872, which helped restore faith in Hinduism among many Bengalis who had been educated in English schools, where they were taught to appreciate the primacy of Western science and philosophy, and to denigrate not only their faith but the genius of India's civilization and the glories of its ancient culture. Afflicted with diabetes, Bakim Chandra died on 8 April 1894, only a few years after he retired, almost a decade after he published his last novel. In Bengal he has never been forgotten.

Stanley Wolpert

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CHAUDHURI, NIRAD C. (1897–1999), renowned Indian writer. Nirad C. Chaudhuri was arguably the greatest writer of nonfiction among Indians in the twentieth century. A self-taught polyglot, vastly learned, he claimed to have “read Shakespeare before I learned to walk.” With the publication of his magnum opus, *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, in 1951, however, he became widely known for his unabashed admiration for Western, especially British, culture and his acerbic, contrarian views of Indian civilization.

Chaudhuri was born in 1897 in Kishurganj in the Tangail district of present-day Bangladesh. He spent the first twelve years of his life in Kishurganj, and the next thirty years in Kolkata as a student and intellectual with an endless thirst for knowledge. Already proficient in

Bengali and Sanskrit by the time he graduated from college with a first-class degree in history, he had also mastered English, French, German, Greek, and Latin. His scholarly interests ranged from art, architecture, anthropology, and archaeology to biology, geography, classical Western music, and military history. A dropout from graduate school despite his outstanding undergraduate record, he devoted most of his time to studying in the Imperial (now National) Library in Kolkata while supporting himself with a modest job in the Military Accounts Department. He was published in the noted English-language journal *Modern Review* in Kolkata, and later worked briefly as its assistant editor. In Bengali letters, he became known for his conservative views as the editor of *Shanibarar Chitthi* (The Saturday letter). He married Amiya Devi in 1932, and they had two sons.

Mostly unemployed in the 1930s, Chaudhuri battled poverty and insecurity while trying to make ends meet. He later recorded the struggles of these years in the sequel to the *Autobiography*, called *Thy Hand, Great Anarch*. In 1939 he became personal secretary to Sarat Chandra Bose, a leading nationalist figure in Bengal and the elder brother of Subhash Chandra Bose. In 1941 Sarat Bose was arrested and sent to prison, and Chaudhuri again became unemployed. In 1942 he went to Delhi with a job at All India Radio.

Chaudhuri published his first book in 1951, at the age of fifty-four, from Delhi—his celebrated and much-maligned *Autobiography*. It was accorded the status of an instant classic as an elegantly written record of life in small-town Bengal and in Kolkata, and a record of the far reaches of the Anglo-Bengali encounters beyond the upper echelons and elites of the social order. It was maligned and reviled in India because Chaudhuri dedicated the book to the British for the blessings of their two-hundred-year rule of India. In 1955 a British Council grant enabled Chaudhuri to travel to England for the first time. He recorded the experience in *Passage to England* (1959). In 1965 he published *The Continent of Circe*, his critical introspection of independent India and its many ills. His first Bengali book appeared in 1968. A handsome advance from the publisher persuaded him to write *Bangali Jivaney Ramani* (Representation of women in Bengali life). The project to work on a biography of Max Müller, the great Sanskrit scholar, took him back to England in 1970. He settled in Oxford, never to return to India. During the last thirty years of his long life, he was remarkably productive, writing both in Bengali and English, and generating storms of controversy with each work.

His books include: *The Scholar Extraordinary* (1974), *Hinduism* (1979), *Thy Hand, Great Anarch* (1987), *From the Archives of a Centarian* (1997), *Three Horsemen of the New Apocalypse* (1997), and four books in Bengali. He was

honored by Oxford University with an honorary doctorate in literature in 1989, and the queen conferred on him the title “Commander of Order of the British Empire” in 1993. In 1996 Visva Bharati University honored him with Desikottama, the equivalent of a doctorate in literature.

Chaudhuri considered the Bengal Renaissance (1860–1910) the high point of Anglo-Bengali encounters. His Anglicist side emphasized steeping oneself deeply in contemporary English and European letters. Chaudhuri quotes from Bankim Chandra Chatterji’s novel *Rajani* to describe a casual conversation between two friends that includes references to classical historians Tacitus, Plutarch, and Thucydides, and the philosophy of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, T.H. Huxley, G.E.L. Owen, Ludwig Buchner, and Arthur Schopenhauer. His Bengali side showed a certain hubris and pride in the acquisition of Occidental knowledge and its articulate expression in modernist literature. In one of his last pieces of writing in Bengali, Chaudhuri says, “I always introduce myself as a Bengali Hindu or a Hindu Bengali, not as an Indian.” Impeccably dressed in European clothes when he went out, Chaudhuri always wore *dboti* and *kurta* at home. He did not give up his Indian passport in the thirty years he lived in England. In his will, he asked his heirs to give his personal library to the Calcutta Club in Kolkata, not to Oxford University or the National (formerly Imperial) Library in Kolkata. The Calcutta Club was established in the colonial style in 1920 by the elite Bengali professionals who had been denied membership in the European-exclusive Bengal Club.

Dilip K. Basu

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CHELMSFORD, LORD (1868–1933), *British politician, viceroy of India (1916–1921)*. Viscount Chelmsford, Frederic John Napier Thesiger, was viceroy of India from 1916 through 1921. Born in London, the eldest of five sons of the second Lord Chelmsford, he was educated at Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford, and was called to the Bar from London’s Inner Temple in 1893. A fellow of All Souls College, elected to London’s County Council in 1904, Chelmsford was a brilliant student of jurisprudence who served with distinction as governor of Queensland from 1905 to 1909, and of New South Wales from 1909 to 1913.

He returned to England before World War I and joined his 4th Dorset Territorial Regiment, in which he was a captain, sailing with it to India, where in the spring of 1916 he took over as viceroy from Lord Hardinge, who had been wounded by a bomb thrown earlier into his howdah in Delhi. Chelmsford’s name has been historically linked to that of his brilliant Liberal secretary of state, Edwin Montagu, who took Joseph Chamberlain’s job at Whitehall in July 1917, promising Indian reforms in his first important speech to Parliament, to which he and Chelmsford agreed in 1918. Those Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919, expanded the Imperial Legislative Council in India, making it more representative, transferring several departments of India’s central government to elected Indian members, rather than appointing British officials to run them. Provincial councils of British India would all thereafter have elective majorities, moreover, and elected Indian members were to run their various departments. The separate Muslim electorate formula, however, introduced with the Morley-Minto Reforms (the India Councils Act of 1909), were not only retained, but expanded. Yet British fears of increasingly vocal and violent Indian nationalism led to the extension of the wartime martial law suspension of civil liberties during this postwar period, provoking the boycott of elections by Mahatma Gandhi and his Congress Party followers, thus reducing the value of those “reforms” intended to bring India close to independent Dominion status, leaving it more autocratically ruled and disaffected than ever. Before elections could even be held under the new Government of India Act, Brigadier Dyer’s massacre of unarmed peaceful Indians trapped inside Amritsar’s Jallianwala Bagh in April 1919 radically changed the nature of Anglo-Indian relations, revolutionizing millions of Congress members and converting thousands of hitherto loyal Anglophile Indian professionals into ardent nationalists demanding *swaraj* (freedom).

Despite his fine legal training, Lord Chelmsford’s martial mentality prevented him from promptly and firmly rebuking Dyer for his brutal action in launching such deadly fire at close range against so many innocents, murdering over 400, wounding some 1,200, leaving them all without medical attention as he marched his troops away from that dreadful Punjab garden, over which India’s sun of trust and respect for the British Raj swiftly set. Viscount Chelmsford returned to chair a committee of London’s University College in 1921, briefly served as first Lord of the Admiralty in 1924, and died of heart failure on 1 April 1933.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Amritsar; Government of India Act: 1919; Hardinge, Lord; Montagu, Edwin S.

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CHENNAI. See *Madras*.

CHIDAMBARAM The great temple of Chidambaram, south of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, dates back to at least the tenth century. The oldest inscriptions from that era speak of covering its roof with gold, and literary sources indicate that its construction may have begun several centuries before that. Its humble origins are indicated by its old Tamil name Chirrambalam (Little Temple), which was later sanskritized as Chidambaram (Abode of the Spirit). The temple grounds include smaller shrines to Vishnu, Brahma, and Pārvatī/Durgā, but the imperial Cholas, who were its patrons from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, were ardent devotees of Shiva and sponsored major expansions of the shrine devoted to Shiva. The contribution of the Pallava dynasty to the temple is not clear, but the subsequent Chola, Pandya, and Vijayanagar dynasties added shrines and four giant gateways called *gopuram*, and local rulers finally built a hall with a thousand pillars around A.D. 1600. The temple is unique in that it is owned jointly by the trustees, numbering now about 250. They are an endogamous clan that rules by majority decision, though each trustee has a veto right. The ritual in the shrine is equally unique in that it follows the forms of the Vedic domestic rituals in the Vaikhānasa tradition.

The central shrine marks the place where Shiva, as Natarāja (King of Dancers), is said to have danced the cosmic dance of global creation and annihilation that is celebrated in literature and countless statues in stone and bronze. There are early references to various dances of Shiva at Chidambaram, but the *ānanda tāndava* pose, in which Shiva has four arms (each with a symbolic function) and in which one of his feet stomps on a dwarf symbolizing human depravity, became popular only in the tenth century. It is now the dance closest identified with the Chidambaram temple. An ancient cult of the lingam (phallic symbol) and local cultic dance have been amalgamated in new powerful and popular rituals.

The Chidambaram temple, often considered the “heart” of the earth, was one of the five sites where Chola

kings were consecrated, and it has been a major center of pilgrimages through the ages. It played a central role in the *bhakti* movement from the seventh to the ninth centuries. Several of the *nāyanār*, who composed ardent devotional poetry in worship of Shiva, lived at the temple or addressed their poetry to the deity enshrined there. Their poems are recited or sung regularly in the temple, along with other musical and dance performances in honor of the deity.

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See also **Chola Dynasty; Hinduism (Dharma); Shiva and Shaivism**

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CHINA, RELATIONS WITH India and China, two great civilizations and the two most populous countries in the world, launched popular mass movements and became independent nation-states in 1947 and 1949, respectively. Relations between the two countries have ranged from post-independence bonhomie to armed conflict in 1962 to a state of armed peace. Despite a shared Buddhist religious history and an established trade along the Silk Road, there was historically little political interaction between the two. The notable exceptions were during the Han Empire in China (202 B.C. to A.D. 220) and the Kushan Empire in India (A.D. 1–225), when they shared a common border. The boundaries of the Mongol or the Yuan Empire in China (A.D. 1271–1368) also included parts of China and India.

The Early Years

Upon independence, China and India's mutual perceptions were competitive, since they were the largest countries in Asia, each with a glorious past and a shared history of successful anticolonial struggle. Both countries aspired to the leadership of the world's “developing countries” and provided competing models of economic and political development. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India established a parliamentary democracy and opted for an economic model that combined socialist and capitalist principles. The Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, set up a revolutionary political order with state ownership of all economic assets. The two countries adopted vastly different foreign policies—India embracing a policy of nonalignment, and



Pranab Mukherji, Defense Minister of India. Current Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee of India welcomes his Chinese counterpart (uniformed man in foreground). Warm greeting notwithstanding, the military relationship between China and Pakistan remains a stumbling block in the development of better relations between New Delhi and Beijing. INDIA TODAY.

China the export of revolution—which brought them into conflict on global issues.

This rivalry came to the fore amid the protestations of Sino-Indian amity during the Bandung Conference of developing nations held in 1955. The major difference between the two sides was on the question of war in international politics. Nehru advocated that war must be avoided at all costs and that the developing countries should not align themselves with either side in the cold war, while Chinese premier Zhou Enlai expounded the doctrine of revolutionary war to fight against imperialism. The personal rivalry between Nehru and Zhou also contributed to the rivalry between the two states. Moreover, since China was allied with the Soviet Union at that time, China was implicitly excluded from the leadership of the nonaligned movement being promoted by India.

Geopolitical concerns. Geopolitics has dominated Sino-Indian relations, with major disputes in the Himalayan region. India perceived the South Asian region—stretching from the Himalayas in the north to the India Ocean in the south and from Persia in the west to Central Asia in the northwest—as a cohesive cultural

unit strongly influenced and defined by Indian culture. China identified Inner Asia, the Far East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia as traditional tributaries paying homage to China's political and cultural supremacy. India and China therefore each considered the region comprising Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia as part of its own historic sphere of influence. Both India and China regarded Bhutan and Nepal as strategically placed buffer zones vital to national security. Given these competing geopolitical perceptions, India and China have had numerous disputes in South Asia. Dominant among these are the status of Tibet, Aksai Chin, and the Indian provinces of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

Tibet. Of all the disputes in the Himalayan region, the status of Tibet has had the greatest impact on the Sino-Indian relationship. Historically, India and China have viewed Tibet differently. India considered Tibet a distinct ethnic, cultural, and political entity that shared a cultural and religious identity with India. The spread of Buddhism from India to Tibet created strong historical and cultural links between them. Tibet had also served

as a strategically vital buffer zone, insulating the Indian heartland from invasions from Mongol tribes to its north. India inherited and continued the British policy of simultaneously supporting Tibetan independence while recognizing Chinese suzerainty over it.

China, on the other hand, regarded Tibet as an integral part of its territory, to be reclaimed from Western imperialist forces by the full assertion of its sovereignty, freed from the exploitative feudal rule of the Tibetan Lamaist order. The British-recognized suzerainty was seen as a compromise of Chinese sovereignty, and in 1951 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved into Tibet to establish full Chinese control over the region. Chinese forces also occupied the Aksai Chin plateau, claimed by India, and later built a vital road through it linking Tibet to the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. In May 1951, Beijing signed a seventeen-point agreement with the Dalai Lama's government in Lhasa that proclaimed Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while promising autonomy to Tibet. This was followed by the Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) agreement between India and China in 1954, which reiterated an autonomous status for Tibet within Chinese sovereignty. Since improving relations with China was a high priority for Nehru, India did not demand a delineation of the disputed Sino-India border in exchange for India's de jure recognition of Tibet as part of China.

During the 1950s, Chinese forces consolidated their administrative and logistical position in Tibet, causing much alarm in India. Massive road building opened new routes from the Chinese mainland to Tibet, facilitating the movement of troops, administrative officials, and the supplies required by them. Along with the security implications arising from the massive Chinese military presence along its northern borders, the destruction of Tibetan culture and heritage at the hands of the PLA also became an issue for India. Popular Tibetan opposition to Chinese rule continued to grow, and in 1959 broke into an uprising. The Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa to India, setting up his government-in-exile in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. Tibetans fleeing the Chinese military crackdown were welcomed by the Indian government and were given refugee status. China considered this a violation of the 1954 agreement and protested against India's support of the Dalai Lama as interference in China's internal affairs. India, on the other hand, accused China of not upholding its end of the bargain concerning autonomous status for Tibet. Relations steadily worsened, culminating in war in 1962.

The Border Dispute and the 1962 War

The 1962 war had its roots in the conflicting definitions of the Sino-Indian border. The two states share a 2,520 mile-long (4,056 kilometers) Himalayan border,

large tracts of which are disputed. While China claims almost the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (34,749 sq. mi, or 90,000 sq. km), India claims the Aksai Chin plateau (2,000 sq. mi, or 5,180 sq. km) currently under Chinese jurisdiction. China has also not recognized the Indian state of Sikkim as part of Indian territory and considers it a separate country.

At a meeting of British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives held in Simla in 1914, the McMahon Line was concluded to be the border between British India, Tibet, and China. Upon independence, India recognized the McMahon Line as the border between India and China. However, neither the Nationalist nor the Communist governments of China had ratified the 1914 agreement. The People's Republic of China dismissed the McMahon Line as an imperialist imposition on China and called for renegotiation of its border with India. India insisted that since the border was already delineated, there was no question of renegotiation. After China moved militarily into Tibet, the Indian government stressed its territorial claims with greater urgency, taking measures especially in the North East Frontier Agency, or Arunachal Pradesh, to enforce its jurisdiction there. India set up check posts along the McMahon Line and published maps with a clearly demarcated border as claimed by New Delhi.

In the mid-1950s, when the Chinese press published reports of the construction of a road from Xinjiang through Aksai Chin in Ladakh, India protested the construction as violation of its territory. In 1958, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, offered that while the border had to be renegotiated, both sides could continue to administer the areas under their control until the dispute was peacefully resolved. Meanwhile, China was facing rising popular discontent in Tibet and blamed India for providing support to the Tibetan "rebels." The Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India further complicated matters. China sharply criticized Indian support of the Dalai Lama and responded by being aggressive on the border. There were armed clashes between the two sides at the Kongka Pass in the western sector and in the Longju sector of the eastern border. As the Chinese advanced beyond Aksai Chin deeper into western Ladakh, Indian concerns mounted. China proposed a withdrawal of troops on both sides to a distance of 12 miles (20 kilometers) from the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and to the areas under jurisdiction by each side in the western sector. India rejected this proposal. Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi in 1960 and proposed an exchange of the territory claimed by India in the eastern sector with the territory claimed by China in Ladakh. This proposal was made again by China in 1980 but was again rejected by New Delhi.

In 1961, in the face of mounting evidence of a growing Chinese presence in Ladakh, Nehru decided to establish military posts along the border to enforce India's claims. In some places, these posts were north of the McMahon Line. The tension on the border continued to rise, and in September 1962 the Chinese captured the Indian post of Dhola in the eastern sector. Thereafter, Chinese troops advanced into the western and eastern sectors, overrunning Indian posts. The Indian army, ill-prepared for such an offensive, was badly defeated. In November, before winter snows closed the northern passes, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew its troops to 12 miles (20 km) behind the McMahon Line. After the war, China controlled the area it claimed in Ladakh, and India was left in control of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. Formal talks for the delineation of India's northern border began only in late 1980s.

At the initiative of Sri Lankan prime minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, a six-nation Afro-Asian conference was convened at Colombo in December 1962 to negotiate a settlement between India and China. The Colombo Proposals were, however, unsuccessful in brokering an agreement. India and China broke off diplomatic contacts, and no further border negotiations were held between the two parties for the next two decades.

Impact of the war. While this war was essentially a border war, its political impact was tremendous, both in bilateral relations and in cold war politics. Mao Zedong was critical of Nehru's policy of nonalignment, considering it part of a stratagem to move India closer to both the United States and the Soviet Union in order to exert pressure on China. Soviet support to India on the border conflict contributed to the deteriorating relations between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's supply of transport planes to India in 1960 for use in the Ladakh region strengthened Chinese suspicions of an anti-China front. China also accused India of supporting a covert U.S. operation in Tibet to help the insurgents in their fight against Chinese occupation. The John F. Kennedy administration had concluded an agreement with New Delhi to help in the war effort, deepening China's adverse perception of India.

For China the 1962 war was simply another incident in the series of conflicts that occurred while China renegotiated its borders with its neighbors; for India, however, the war meant a loss of lives and of territory and brought national humiliation. Nehru's policy of "India-China Brotherly Friendship" turned into a policy of suspicion and fear of future Chinese invasions. India thus embarked on a program of military modernization, with U.S. and Soviet help, raising many newly equipped mountain divisions to protect its northern border. In 1987 a dangerous new confrontation in the Sumdorong Chu valley in the

eastern sector was triggered when China reemphasized its claim to the eastern sector of India's northern border after Arunachal Pradesh was granted statehood by Delhi. However, barring this incident, the Sino-India border has been largely peaceful since the 1962 war.

The Pakistan Factor

Growing friendship between Pakistan and China paralleled the deterioration of Sino-India relations. In March 1963 Pakistan and China concluded a border agreement under which Pakistan ceded part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China. After the 1962 war, China offered qualified support to Pakistan in the event of a clash with India and also supported Pakistan concerning its claim to Kashmir. Encouraged by the debacle of the Indian army and the promised Chinese support, Pakistan adopted a more aggressive policy regarding Kashmir. In 1963, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar to foment a brewing local uprising in Kashmir, infiltrating large numbers of armed and trained Pakistanis into Kashmir. War broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965. During the war, China was critical of India's actions and made several statements supporting Pakistan. As the brief war progressed, China's stand hardened, and it issued an ultimatum to India to dismantle its military installations along the Sikkim-China border. This amounted to a "threat" to attack India's eastern front while the Indian army was engaged in war on its western front. With the threat of Chinese involvement in the Indo-Pak war looming large, the United Nations (UN), along with the United States and the Soviet Union, moved quickly to negotiate a cease-fire after three weeks of heavy fighting.

The 1965 war proved to be a turning point in the geopolitical history of South Asia, establishing a new global alignment of power. After the war, China and Pakistan collaborated on the construction of the "China-Pakistan Friendship Highway" connecting Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. The construction of this road raised security concerns in India regarding direct Chinese military support for another Pakistani attack on India. However, in 1971, when India and Pakistan were yet again at war, this time over East Pakistan, the Chinese failed to support Pakistan. China was extremely critical of Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, and voiced full support of Pakistan at the UN, but it did not pledge or provide any military support in the field. The Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty of 1971 and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement of 1970 restrained China from involvement in the 1971 war, which resulted in the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh.

China-Pakistan military relationship. After the 1965 war, China became Pakistan's primary supplier of military

technology and arms, and has since consistently supplied Pakistan with defense technology and training. When the United States withdrew its military aid to Pakistan in 1965, and again in 1990, China stepped into the breach. China also provided arms to Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and helped rebuild its army after its defeat in 1971. China helped Pakistan modernize its armed forces and through the 1980s supplied it with modern combat aircraft, including F-5A and F-7A fighter planes and T-59 tanks.

China conducted nuclear tests in 1964, becoming a nuclear weapons state. India conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, underground at Pokharan in Rajasthan. Following the Indian test, Sino-Pakistani military and scientific cooperation intensified. While China consistently denied providing any assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program, U.S. intelligence indicated regular interaction of nuclear scientists and technologists between the two countries. According to intelligence reports in the 1980s, China provided Pakistan with weapons-grade uranium, ring magnets, the design for a nuclear device, help with centrifuge technology for Pakistan's plant in Kahuta, and the design for a reactor using enriched uranium. China also built a nuclear power plant at Chashma in Pakistan, which both sides insisted was for peaceful purposes, run according to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In 1990 the United States suspended all military aid to Pakistan over the issue of nuclear proliferation from China to Pakistan, and thereafter China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. While China insists that it has not violated the NPT, Indian concerns regarding transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan continue to be a thorn in Sino-Indian relations.

Along with the transfer of nuclear technology, China-Pakistan cooperation in missile and delivery systems is also an issue in Sino-Indian relations. Reports in India and the United States claim that Chinese assistance to Pakistan's missile program has been extensive. U.S. intelligence reports claim that China supplied Pakistan with nuclear capable M-11 ballistic missiles and related technologies, and provided training to Pakistani technologists and military personnel in the operation of those missiles. Under an agreement signed in 1988, China apparently agreed to build an M-11 missile factory in Pakistan. Satellite intelligence detected the arrival of these missiles in Pakistan in 1995 in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which China had agreed in principle. These concerns added to India's perception of a nuclear threat from Chinese missiles stationed in Tibet since 1971.

In 2001 the United States imposed sanctions on both China and Pakistan for violation of the MTCR. The China-Pakistan military relationship was at its height in

1988 and 1989, coinciding with the beginning of normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Given this fact, India insists that the China-Pakistan military relationship continues to hamper the development of trust between China and India. China maintains that India must not try to regulate relations between other sovereign nations, as this violates the 1954 Panchsheel agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). China has repeatedly urged India to separate Sino-Indian relations from Sino-Pak relations.

The Normalization of Relations

India and China tentatively began a process of normalization of relations in 1969 but exchanged ambassadors only in 1976. In 1979 the Janata Party, then in power in India, diverged from the Congress Party's practice of nonalignment and close relations with the Soviet Union. The Janata government offered to exchange ministerial visits, a proposal accepted by China; External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in February 1979. While China and India still differed on many issues, Vajpayee's visit started a dialogue between the two countries. His Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua, reciprocated Vajpayee's visit in June 1981, resulting in annual dialogues between delegations from both sides to discuss regional and international issues. In the mid-1980s, the changes in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and the impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan altered the strategic situation in South Asia and facilitated the process of rebuilding Sino-Indian relations. The Sumdorong Chu valley incident in 1987 was a setback to this process of normalization. But with Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, negotiations on the boundary question were reopened. A Joint Working Group was established to promote peace along the border. Following Prime Minister Gandhi's visit, China and India exchanged a number of high-level visits between 1991 and 1996. These included Chinese premier Li Peng's visit to India in 1991 and Indian prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to China in 1993. It was during the latter's visit that the two sides signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, renouncing the use of force to settle the border dispute. From then on, relations steadily improved, and Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996, the first Chinese president to do so. During his visit, the two sides signed an Agreement on Confidence Building Measures on the border, providing for further troop reductions. Cultural and educational cooperation was also expanded. Trade between the countries resumed, and by 1998 stood at approximately \$2 billion U.S.

For India, a significant change in its improved relations with China was the change in the Chinese stand on

Kashmir. While China's relations with Pakistan were still very strong, Chinese rhetorical support to Pakistan on Kashmir was waning. China adopted a neutral stand during the 1999 Kargil "war" between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. However, India's nuclear tests in 1998 proved a serious setback to Sino-Indian relations.

Pokaharan II and After

In May 1998, India again conducted nuclear tests in Pokhara in Rajasthan and declared its nuclear weapons capability. In a letter to U.S. president Bill Clinton, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee identified China as a major threat to India and justified India's tests in light of this threat. Indian defense minister George Fernandes had earlier identified China as the greatest potential threat to India. The initial Chinese reaction to India's tests was restrained, but after Vajpayee's letter was published in the *New York Times*, China was furious at being called the "reason" for India's nuclear tests. China denounced India for endangering peace and security in South Asia and the world. In response, India launched a damage control mission, led by Brajesh Mishra, the principal secretary to the prime minister, and President K. R. Narayanan, reassuring China that India did not consider it a threat. Indian external affairs minister Jaswant Singh visited China. That diplomatic visit initiated a security summit between the two countries, which focused on vital issues of mutual concern. Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan reciprocated Singh's visit in July 2000. Indian president K. R. Narayanan and Chinese leaders Li Peng and Zhu Rongji also exchanged visits over the next two years. In 2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China and concluded two important agreements, opening a trade route from Sikkim to Tibet and setting up institutional mechanisms to resolve the boundary dispute. Under the new institutional arrangement for border talks, India's national security adviser Brajesh Mishra and Chinese senior vice foreign minister Dai Bingguo were appointed as special representatives to explore the overall bilateral framework for a boundary settlement. The first meeting between the two representatives was held in New Delhi in October 2003.

There is now a greater convergence of interest between India and China on many global issues, including their concern with growing U.S. unilateralism. Both countries have a strong interest in strengthening the UN as a counterbalance against U.S. unilateralism. China has been highly critical of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and especially of the invasion of Iraq. India has been more moderate in its official comments on U.S. interventions, but public opinion throughout the country has strongly condemned the U.S. action in Iraq. However, both India and China consider their respective bilateral

relations with the United States as the most important part of their foreign policy and hence are not open to any anti-U.S. alliance. The huge volume of trade between the United States and China (\$90 billion) is the firm foundation of their bilateral relationship, while India and the United States are currently building a relationship based on their democratic politics and rapidly growing trade. On the nuclear front, both China and India have a declared no-first-use policy. The U.S.–China–India equation is especially significant in the development of the National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense systems by the United States, which could set off a potentially dangerous domino reaction involving not only China and India but possibly Pakistan.

Sonika Gupta

See also Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Pakistan; Pakistan and India; Sri Lanka; United States, Relations with; Wars

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CHOLA DYNASTY The most successful of the royal houses of southern India, the Cholas were first mentioned in the rock inscriptions of the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the middle of the third century B.C., together with their perennial rivals, the Pāndyas and Cheras. The Cholas figure prominently in the "preclassical" Tamil literature of the Sangam age of the first three centuries A.D. Two rival branches, one centered on Uraiur, the other on the port city of Pukar in the fertile Kaveri River basin, seemed to compete for Chola supremacy. Under their greatest king, Karikāla, the Cholas dominated their rivals as a regional power. From the sixth century on, the Cholas played a minor role between the Pāndyas to the south and the powerful Pallavas in the north; one branch of the royal family, known as the Telugu-Cholas, probably moved north into Andhra country.

Imperial Cholas

Around A.D. 850 the Cholas gradually shook off the supremacy of their rivals and reemerged as powerful South Indian rulers. Their core territory comprised the cities of Tanjore (Tanjāvur), Kāncīpuram, Chidambaram, Kumbhakonam, and Kāverippattanam. After a period of shifting fortunes, two outstanding rulers led the Cholas to imperial status: Rājārāja I (r. 985–1015) and his son and successor Rājendra I (r. 1012–1044, initially with his father) gained control of their traditional South Indian rivals and expanded their realm northward. Their campaigns also took them to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), of which they conquered the northern part; for a short time, they controlled the entire island. They were a rare example of Indian power overseas; Chola ships sailed to Sumatra and Malaya and as far away as southern China. Their relations with the kingdom of Srivijaya on the island of Sumatra were generally quite friendly, and one Srivijaya monarch even endowed a monastery in the "land of the Cholas." In 1025, however, a naval expedition was sent to Malaya and Srivijaya, perhaps to secure free passage of Indian shipping, perhaps only in search of plunder. The kings of Cambodia and Burma sent delegations, and a large Chola delegation traveled to China. At home, they dominated their rivals, the Pāndyas and Cheras, controlling thus the maritime trade on both coasts of South India. Their ships visited and conquered the Maldiv Islands off the western coast and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. On their northern border, they were engaged in constant warfare against northern dynasties, and Rājendra I led an expedition to the north, reaching the



Brihadeshvara Temple in Thanjavur. Granite divinities adorn the walls of the Brihadishvara temple at Tanjore, whose central shrine rises some 216 feet (66 m) to its finial. Completed in A.D. 1009 and declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, this temple remains the premier example of Chola architecture. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM / FOTOMEDIA.

Ganges (Ganga). The eastern seacoast was secured through a marital alliance with the eastern Chālukyas, and Kulotunga I, an offspring of that alliance, succeeded to the throne when it fell vacant after some dynastic disturbance. In the thirteenth century the Cholas, under pressure from the reinvigorated Pāndyas, held onto their core territory only with the help of the Hoysalas in Karnataka, then vanished toward the end of that century. Only their name survives in the Coromandel coast in southeastern India, originally Chola-mandala (Circle of the Cholas).

An empire as large as that of the Imperial Cholas at the height of their power could not be administered with a rigid central bureaucracy; much authority was delegated to dependent rulers and governors. It would be an overstatement, however, to call them merely a regional state that depended for sustenance on warfare and plunder rather than tax revenue. There is evidence of royal

inspection and interference in local matters. Their internal administration financed large irrigation projects, fostered overseas trade, and had an impressive program of temple construction.

Religious and Cultural Contributions

The Cholas were ardent devotees of Lord Shiva. They built large temples dedicated to Shiva and expanded the Shiva shrine at the temple complex at Chidambaram, covering the roof of the shrine with solid gold. Their greatest architectural achievement is the Rājārājeshvara or Brihadīshvara temple at Tanjore, whose central shrine rises 190 feet (216 feet with the finial) and is topped by a capstone 20 feet in diameter, said to be a granite monolith weighing perhaps 20 tons (estimates vary). It was completed about A.D. 1009 under Rājārāja I. A few years later, his son Rājendra I founded a new capital called Gangaikkonda-Colapuram (The city of the Chola who took the Ganges) and built an even larger Shiva temple there (though not quite as tall). Images and statues of a dancing Shiva in various postures are attested from the middle of the first millennium, but only in the tenth century did Shiva's cosmic dance (as Nata-Rāja, "King of dancers") receive major attention. A special school of artisans produced numerous Shiva Nata-Rāja bronze statues that are among the finest specimens of Indian metal sculpture.

Most Chola rulers, while devotees of Shiva, were not only tolerant of the beliefs of others but even supported the building of temples to Vishnu and Jina. Exceptions are rare: one ruler, possibly Adhirājendra, persecuted Rāmānuja, the famous scholar, and his followers in the tradition of Vishnu worship, and Kulottunga II tried to end the long-established coexistence of the Vishnu and Shiva shrines in great temple of Chidambaram. Both attempts ended in failure, but the old harmony between the sectarian beliefs was never fully recovered. The kings were seen as the earthly representatives of Shiva, and idols and lingams (phallic symbols of Shiva) are sometimes named after a ruling monarch, leading to the mistaken notion that they were themselves worshiped as "god-kings," when they were, in fact, devout worshipers of Shiva. Mausoleums (called *palli-padai*) were built for several rulers and their family members, where memorial services were held; later disapproval of the practice led to the attempted erasure of the word *palli-padai* in one such structure.

Some of the crowning achievements of Tamil literature fall into this period. Kamban's Irāmāvatāram, his Tamil version of the ancient Rāmāyaṇa, is a massive epic in an ornate style of great emotional intensity. Though Kamban was a Vishnu devotee and the Rāma legend belongs to the Vishnu mythology, the work is not sectarian but centers on

the human values of valor, generosity, and righteous action. Tamils consider it the highpoint of Tamil literature. Sekkilār's Periya-purānam is an extensive hagiography of saints devoted to Shiva, and the Jīvaka-cintāmani is an epic by a Jain poet who tried to blend a sensuous narrative with the austere teachings of Jainism.

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See also **Bronzes: South Indian**

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CHRISTIAN IMPACT ON INDIA, HISTORY OF

It is widely believed that St. Thomas, the disciple of Jesus, first introduced the Christian faith to India nearly two thousand years ago. The subcontinent would not experience the influence of Christianity, however, until the much later arrival of the Europeans. The Portuguese began to settle in Goa from 1498. In 1542 the Jesuit Francis Xavier, a papal ambassador, arrived, and the work of the Roman Catholics began in earnest. Protestant ministry in India was first established in Tranquebar by two German pietists, Bartholomew Ziegenbalg and Henry Plutschau.

Education

Christian missionary activity in India generally involved the establishment of high-quality schools. Obviously the Christian community's impact does not end there. Accompanying the schools came printing presses, which were helpful in the dissemination of literature of all kinds. In fact, the early overseas missionaries were responsible for pioneering English and modern vernacular education. R. L. Rawat, in his *History of Indian Education*, suggests that India will forever be indebted to the missionaries for the production of textbooks, dictionaries, and grammars, and for their zealous pursuit of educational advancement.

The "good works" carried out by missionaries and Christians have always been understood to be an expression of their love and obedience to Jesus. The underlying motivation, of course, was their obligation to proclaim the salvation of God through the Christian faith. Indians have by and large been willing to receive the former, but many have rejected the need for the latter, particularly



Velangani Christian Church in Pondicherry. Completed in 1791, the Church of Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception in the city of Pondicherry was built in the medieval architectural style of other Jesuit constructions of that period. It is known as the Velangani church in Pondicherry because it is an alternate for worshipers unable to visit the Basilica of Our Lady of Good Health in Velangani, about 250 kilometers away. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

upper caste Hindus, who would say, “we have our own saviors.” Still, the Christian community has felt that it has contributed to the building of the nation and to an upward social mobility that has changed lives and benefited families and communities, particularly among the Dalits (the former “untouchables”).

In the sixteenth century it was the Jesuits who first established Christian institutions of learning. They were followed by the German Tranquebar missionaries. Later the renowned Friedrich Schwartz began Christian schools in both vernacular languages and in English. William Carey and the British Baptists who arrived in Calcutta in the late eighteenth century pioneered modern education in North India. By 1818 there were 111 schools located as far away from Calcutta as Shimla and Delhi in the north, and Rajputna in the south.

With the renewal of the British East India Company’s charter in 1813 and the arrival of a host of British mission societies, there was a proliferation of schools and printing presses across the country. The first Western-type postsecondary school, Serampore College, was organized in 1818. The American Mission opened schools for boys in Bombay from 1815 and in 1829. John Wilson saw to it that a school was also set up in Bombay for girls.

The arrival in Calcutta of Alexander Duff in 1830 marked the beginning of a new approach to learning, namely, English-language education. Duff was captivated with “the glowing prospects of Christianity in [India],” and with what he referred to as the “ultimate evangelisation of India.” Duff pondered the question of what was to be the future language of learning in India, wondering which would prove to be the “most effective instrument” of a liberal and enlightened education? Not surprisingly, Duff’s idea to set up an English-language school was, at first, controversial. There was significant opposition, but soon Duff’s modest experiment began to catch the imagination of the upper classes and those who possessed aspirations for their children. Duff’s work was a great success and resulted in the expansion of English-language educational institutions throughout British India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at the primary, secondary, and university levels; in time English became the veritable lingua franca of India. The widespread and popular adoption of English by people of all language groups and classes has certainly given India an advantage in today’s global economy, as well as in diplomacy, politics, and technology.

Christians were also pioneers in the field of female education. Much of this work was taken up by the wives of early missionaries, and by single women missionaries, of whom there were many. In the nineteenth century the commonly accepted view in India was that formal education was not for women of any kind, much less for those from respectable families. In 1834 it was reported that only 1 percent of Indian women could read and write.

Yet by 1900 an impressive number of schools and colleges had been opened in major cities, towns, and even villages throughout India for both men and women. Christians also went to live and work among both the tribal groups and the Dalits. The former were animists who lived outside the Hindu fold, while the latter were from the “untouchable” caste and were therefore excluded from the orthodox Hindu social structure. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Christian missionaries began to take more seriously the needs of the tribals and the Dalits and went to minister to them. The missionaries began schools and created written forms for many of the languages. In response, people from these

groups converted to Christianity in great numbers. This was particularly so in the Northeast and in the mass movements of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

In 1997 the reputed and secular weekly *India Today* reported on the top ten colleges in the nation. Five of these were Christian: St. Stephen's, New Delhi; St. Xavier, Mumbai and Kolkata; Loyola College, Madras; and Stella Maris College (for women), Madras. There are others equally prestigious: Madras Christian College; Isabella Thorburn College (for women), Lucknow; Sarah Tucker College, Palayamkottai; and Mount Carmel Women's College, Bangalore. Certainly one way to measure the impact of Christianity in India is to observe the masses of people of all religious communities and social classes who use whatever influence they have at their disposal to get their children admitted to Christian schools. The rush begins at lower kindergarten and proceeds through to university colleges. This occurs even when parents—whether Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh—must agree to have their children study the Bible as an integral part of the curriculum.

Language and Literature

Christians have also made a significant contribution in India in the fields of languages, literature, and journalism. Constanzio Beschi (1680–1747) reformed Tamil alphabetical characters, making them more suitable for the printing press. He also produced a fourfold Tamil dictionary, which was divided according to words, synonyms, classes, and rhymes. Bishop Robert Caldwell's (1815–1891) *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages* and G. U. Pope's (1820–1908) translations of classics of Tamil literature into English are noteworthy. Vedanayagam Pillai (1824–1889) and H. A. Krishna Pillai (1827–1900) are two other Christian writers who produced some of the first Tamil novels.

The French priest Francis Mary of Toure began work on Hindustani as early as 1680, composing a massive dictionary titled *Thesaurus Linguae Indianae*. Modern Hindi, the national language, developed out of Hindustani. Henry Martyn and a Dr. Gilchrist, a professor of Hindustani and an American Presbyterian missionary, and the Reverend S. H. Kellogg all contributed to the formation and popularization of Hindustani. Kellogg, in fact, drew more than a dozen dialects together to assist in creating what is today known as Hindi. He produced in 1893 *A Grammar of the Hindi Language*, which is still in circulation. William Carey and his Baptist colleagues, beginning in 1818, were the first to produce periodicals, journals, and a newspaper. Their publication, the *Friends of India*, lived on and is now an English daily, the *Statesman*, published from Calcutta and New Delhi.

Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Discovery of India* acknowledges the contribution of the early missionaries, especially the Baptists of Serampore, concerning the shift from the dominating influence of both Sanskrit and Persian. The printing of books and newspapers by the missionaries, together with English-language education, no doubt broke the hold of the classics, says Nehru, and allowed regional languages to emerge and blossom. While Nehru saw no difficulty in missionaries dealing with the major languages, he notes that they, “even laboured at the dialects of the primitive hill and forest tribes. . . . The desire of the Christian missionaries to translate the Bible into every possible language thus resulted in the development of many Indian languages. Christian mission work in India has not always been admirable or praise worthy . . . but in this respect, as well as in the collection of folklore, it has undoubtedly been of great service to India” (Nehru, pp. 317–318).

Social Reform

From the very first, missionaries were shocked at the social evils that persisted in India, including the practice of *sati* (the immolation of widows on their husbands' funeral pyres), the killing of lepers, and the sacrifice of children.

William Carey was active from his arrival in 1793 in any issue that he felt needed change or reform. Within a year, near Malda, he reported having found the remains of an infant that had first been offered to a god as a sacrifice and then abandoned to be eaten by white ants. Moreover, children were thrown into the Ganges in fulfillment of vows taken for answers to prayer. Carey used his connections to those in authority and power to campaign for the outlawing of such practices. Governor-General Lord Wellesley asked him to submit a report on the matter and subsequently, in 1802, declared infanticide to be an act of murder; those who performed such horrible deeds, if caught, would themselves be put to death.

Carey employed his publications to educate public opinion on matters of humanitarian concern. The first issue of the *Friend of India* carried an exhaustive report of an actual *sati*. Subsequently he kept the practice before the public eye and did all he could to see *sati* abolished. By 1814 Ram Mohan Roy joined Carey in the campaign against *sati*. Armed with accounts of 438 widow burnings, Carey and his Serampore colleagues implored the government to forbid the rite by law. At first very little progress was made, due to strong opposition from high caste Hindu leaders. The Christians kept up the pressure, and eventually public opinion turned against the orthodox Hindus. In 1829 Lord William Bentinck finally signed an order prohibiting *sati* in the occupancies of the East India Company.

The field of medicine is another area in which Christians have made a significant contribution to the welfare and the common good of India. Jesuits in the late sixteenth century opened infirmaries attached to their living accommodations. John Thomas, an associate of William Carey, began his work in 1799. In the nineteenth century medical establishments of various kinds were created throughout India, set up by almost every missionary society. Two have been internationally recognized. The first, the Christian Medical College Hospital, Ludhiana, was founded by Dr. Edith Brown in 1893; the other, the Christian Medical College Hospital, Vellore, grew out of Dr. Ida Scudder's roadside clinics, first begun in 1895. In time both of these hospitals added to their facilities, becoming the first government-recognized medical colleges for women and subsequently for men.

There have also been programs set up for the mentally challenged and the disabled. The first institution for the deaf was organized by an order of nuns in Bombay in 1884. Since then, Catholic and Protestant Christians have established numerous homes throughout India for the abandoned, the abused, and the exploited. Two of the most impressive of these centers are the Mukti Mission in Kedegoan, near Pune founded by Pandita Ramabai in 1898 for orphaned girls and abused women. The other, the Dohnavur Fellowship, was first organized in 1901 by Amy Carmichael in South India. Its object was to rescue girls who had been forced into temple prostitution.

Another matter of concern among Christians over the years has been the practice of child marriage, whereby alliances are made among Hindus between children as young as five years of age. Carey's solution was to promote female education. Child marriage was legislatively banned in 1929. Christians since then have made a concerted effort to promote the approval of widow remarriage.

Christian reform efforts also included establishing sanatoriums for tuberculosis patients and for those who had contracted leprosy. The Schefflin Research and Training Centre in Karigiri, near Vellore, has carried out much original creative work in the area of leprosy reconstruction and rehabilitation.

While most of the early expressions of Christian social initiatives were pioneered by foreign missionaries, Indian Christians have carried on and even multiplied the legacy handed down to them. This has been so much the case that well into the late twentieth century a preponderance of doctors and nurses in any area of health care and medicine were Indian Christians. Moreover, many Hindus and Muslims still prefer to go to Christian hospitals.

Christians were also involved in rural development. Typical have been the Allahabad Agricultural College, organized in 1910, and the Bethel Agricultural Fellowship

near Salem, Tamil Nadu, in the early 1960s. Their aims were to assist and improve the productivity of farmers. K. T. Paul had similar concerns and came up with the idea of what he called "rural reconstruction." The Basel Mission, which began its work from its headquarters in Mangalore, is well known for introducing into India the manufacture of cheap terra-cotta tiles and other related products to improve village house construction. Such tiles are still popularly known, no matter who produces them, as mission tiles.

Disaster relief is another area in which the Christian community has made an impressive impact. Over the years the Churches Auxiliary for Social Action, the Evangelical Fellowship of India Commission on Relief, Catholic World Relief, World Vision, and others have all been in the forefront of nongovernmental organizations willing to assist in providing both immediate and long-term reconstruction to people and places wherever the tragedy of disaster has struck.

Indian Christians did not participate as much as might have been expected in the national movement for freedom. On the other hand, Kanakarayan Paul was one who deeply regretted the isolation of the Indian Christian community from the political events surrounding them. Bishop Paul Appaswamy added that if the Indian church was to exert any influence upon the life of India, it should take a "definite part in the social and public activities of the country." The *Christian Patriot*, the church's leading Indian weekly newspaper, conceded that with a few notable exceptions Indian Christians kept away from the nationalist movement. It urged Christians to recognize they had a duty toward India and then declared that "a real Christian cannot help being at the same time, a true Indian patriot" (cited in Houghton, p. 203).

V. Chakkarai, a lawyer and a Christian convert, was not surprised that the uneducated masses of Christians took practically no interest in political affairs. What troubled him was that the educated demonstrated so little concern, while he felt they ought to be shining examples of patriotism, leading the way in all movements of national welfare. Bishop Henry Whitehead of Madras explained the very likely reasons for the general Christian apathy toward the freedom movement. He challenged the validity of the Christian church becoming caught up in what he referred to as a "whirlpool of political unrest." Moreover, he felt political agitation was contrary to the spirit of Christ. Even Chakkarai recognized that the Christian community, like all other minorities was, "intensely afraid of being swamped by the Hindu majority."

Nevertheless, there were a number of Christians involved in the freedom movement, including K. T. Paul,

V. Chakkarai and his colleagues, Bishop Paul Appaswamy, Bishop Waskom Pickett, E. Stanley Jones, and to a lesser extent Bishop V. Z. Azariah. In addition, several Christians played an important role in framing the Indian Constitution. There were six appointed to the Minority Advisory Committee by the Constituent Assembly: Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, Elbar D' Souza, P. K. Salvry, H. C. Mukherji, J. J. M. Nichols Roy, and J. N. P. Roch Victoria. The committee met under the leadership of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in late 1947. To the surprise of many, the Christian representatives expressed their commitment to the Christian ideal of oneness and their eagerness to participate in the building of the nation, therefore turning down the need for any political safeguards to protect any parochial interests they might otherwise have had. They also gave up any claim they may have requested regarding seat reservations in the new Parliament. To their credit, and on behalf of a majority of the Christian community, they believed that the reservation of seats was not necessary, and in the interests of national integration merged with the constituency at large to become part of the general electorate.

Christians were perhaps less flexible when it came to those sections of the Constitution that dealt with religious prerogatives. Their concerns were threefold: the right to practice and propagate one's faith; the freedom to offer religious instruction in aided schools; and the right of conversion from one religion to another. Obviously, all of these issues generated considerable discussion and debate. Ultimately the Constituent Assembly approved these provisions, which became law on 26 January 1950. The Christian representatives were convinced that these were constitutional rights essential to Christian freedoms and central to the strengthening of India's secular democracy and the Christian contribution to it.

At the center of India's struggle for freedom from the British was the towering figure of Mahatma Gandhi. He was well acquainted with Christianity. However, it was Jesus Christ, more than Christians, that touched his heart. In 1920 he wrote "I revere the Bible. Christ's sermon on the mount fills me with bliss even today. Its sweet verses have even today the power to quench my agony of the soul." Writing in the *Harijan* in January 1939 he said, "Though I cannot claim to be a Christian in the sectarian sense, the example of Jesus' suffering is a factor in the composition of my undying faith in non-violence which rules all my actions, worldly and temporal."

Understandably Gandhi had a host of friends. Among those who were Christians, and most cherished, were Charlie Andrews and the principal of St. Stephen's College, Sushil Kumar Rudra. In earlier times Gandhi wrote of his being a guest in Rudra's home whenever he visited Delhi. When writing a condolence letter upon his death

in 1925 Gandhi said, "[Rudra] and Charlie Andrews were my revisionists. Non-cooperation was conceived and hatched under his hospitable roof."

Christianity in India Today

The 1991 census indicated that there were 23 million Christians in India, making up 2.3 percent of the total population. However, Christian executives and demographers estimate the number of Christians at 50 million, or 5 percent of the population. Whatever the correct figure, the number of Christians in India is growing. This is supported by the fact that there are more than six hundred churches in Delhi, with services conducted in almost any major language. In Bangalore, a city of 6 million, there are 970 churches and at least twelve accredited theological institutions, with three or four offering doctoral degrees. In Chennai (Madras) 10 percent of the population is Christian, worshipping in more than two thousand churches. Some of these congregations are small (60 to 100 people), and some meet in residences rather than churches. However, there are many congregations whose attendance is above a thousand, even five thousand in all of the three cities noted. At the same time there are two churches in Chennai, the New Life Assembly of God and the Apostolic Christian Assembly, whose average attendance on Sundays as of 2004 is 23,000 and 15,000, respectively. Christianity is thus making an impact on India's urban populations as well as on the rural and tribal peoples.

The idea of conversion from one faith to another does not sit well with many Hindus, who are upset by the Christian claim concerning the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the one and only Savior. Christians, however, believe in the proclamation of Jesus Christ, which can take many forms: social, educational, works of compassion, disaster rehabilitation, and offering forgiveness.

Nita Kumar, writing in September 1993 in the *Economic Times* (Bangalore), took a rather different perspective when expressing her concern that India had not until then been able to successfully forge a path to modernity. The missionaries organized their institutions, she says, in such a way that they did succeed where others had failed in modernizing those who studied in them. The central contribution of Christian missionaries then, she asserts, has not been so much conversion to Christianity as it has been conversion to modernity. This she describes as a no-nonsense rationalistic and humanistic approach to life. Those who are thus converted are what Kumar refers to as "true 'modern' Indians." Moreover she reckons it is they who are "the builders of the new India."

The fact that the Christian community has contributed positively to nation building is uncontested. Today there are Christians integrated into the very fabric

of all areas of Indian society, both in the public and private sectors, from members of Parliament, chief ministers, corporate executives, physicians, engineers, and down to chauffeurs, chefs, and guards at the gate. To paraphrase the late Bishop Stephen Neill of the Trinelveli Diocese, Church of South India: for the Christian Church and its mission in India, the task has been challenging, and along the journey a number of mistakes have been made, but equally surprising, perhaps, is the fact that such a considerable measure of success has been accomplished.

Graham Houghton

See also **Andrews, C. F.; Azariah, Vedanayakam S.; French Impact; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Paul, K. T.; Portuguese in India; Wellesley, Richard Colley; Xavier, Francis**

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CINEMA The development of India's film industry—one of the world's largest—is as old, as varied, and as exciting as the history of the medium itself. The Lumière moving pictures that took Paris by storm at end of 1895 were enthralling Bombay audiences by the next July. Shooting for the first Indian feature film, *Raja Harishchandra*, started in 1912, coinciding with the



Poster for SHREE 420, Popular Film. Directed by Raj Kapoor and released in 1955, SHREE 420 is a classic Hindu tale of the struggle between good and evil. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

appearance of full-length features in the United States. The first Indian "talkie" was shown in 1931, two years after the first British and French talkies made their bow.

The Early Years

At the turn of the twentieth century, when cinema dawned, India was poised for major social and political reform. Technological innovations, such as cars, planes, and gramophone records that took classical music to the masses, were transforming urban Indian society. Encouraged by the response to the first Indian films, the exhibitors moved the cinema shows to Novelty Theater and introduced a wide range of prices, appealing to both patrician and plebeian. The cheapest tickets cost four annas (a quarter of a rupee), creating the "four-anna class" audience that in decades to come would dictate the form and content of Indian commercial films.

Enterprising young Indians began to film local events (ranging from wrestling matches and extracts from plays

to the return of Wrangler Paranjpye from Cambridge) with cameras imported from London. With the rise of film magnates in India like Jamshedji Framji Madan and Abdullally Esoofally, films from all over the world were jostling for a slice of the Indian market. But these stagy dramas and comics were not to the tastes of the Indian multitude. The time was ripe for a truly indigenous filmmaker.

In 1910 a depressed Dhundiraj Govind Phalke, whose partners had withdrawn financial support from his fine-art printing business seated himself in the America-Indian cinema showing *The Life of Christ*. This run-of-the-mill production of the silent era, however, had a magical effect on Phalke. As Phalke watched the film unfold, he had a clear vision of his goal: to re-create the world of the rich mythic lore and epic tales of India, peopled with gods, demons, and humans. A Sanskrit scholar, architect, painter, photographer, and amateur magician, Phalke was certainly equipped to do so.

Phalke was his own scriptwriter, cameraman, director and even projectionist and distributor. *Raja Harishchandra*, the story of a king renowned for telling the truth, took six grueling months to complete and was released commercially in May 1913. With subtitles in Hindi and English and 3,000 feet long, the film ran for an unprecedented twenty-three days, or six times the normal run of an Indian film. When Phalke finished *Lanka Dahan* (The burning of Lanka), his box office collections had to be hauled away in bullock carts with police escorts. Many hardheaded businessmen now stepped into the picture, churning out films in the roofless studios (or “factories”) of the early years. Calcutta theater owner J. F. Madan built a chain of cinemas that covered India, Burma, and Ceylon and produced ten films a year.

After World War I, the British colonial regime appointed an Indian Cinematograph Committee of Enquiry, headed by an Indian member, Dewan Bahadur T. Rangachariar. But as many Indians feared, the British authorities were concerned mostly about expression of nationalist sentiments, banning films such as *Bhakta Vidur* (1921) and R. S. D. Choudhury’s *Wrath* (1930) in which actors appeared as Mahatma Gandhi. World War II saw the tightening of censorship as never before. Even oblique references to Gandhi or other leaders brought instant censorship and reprisals.

But the silent film industry that Rangachariar so meticulously studied was itself poised for a revolutionary change. The day the committee was appointed—October 6, 1927—was also the day the world’s first talkie, *The Jazz Singer*, premiered in New York.

The first foreign talkie in India was released by Madan Pictures in Calcutta in 1928. The first Indian talkie was

made a few years later: *Alam Ara*, an Arabian Nights-style drama, produced by Bombay’s Imperial Film Company and directed by Ardeshir Irani. Released on 14 March 1931, the first Indian talkie, with ten songs, featured Zubeida, Master Vithal, and W. M. Khan. On opening night, black-market vendors sold tickets for its premiere at twenty times their actual price.

In Bombay, sound literally changed the complexion of the film industry. Most female stars of the silent era were “Anglo-Indians,” who could not handle Hindi. Even the silent era’s “star of stars,” Sulochana (Ruby Meyers), whose salary reportedly exceeded that of the Bombay governor, was toppled from her throne. More liberal attitudes made upper caste actresses available to the once-taboo film industry. In a 1932 version of the Harishchandra story, the female lead was played by a Brahman, Durga Khote.

For dialogue, Indian filmmakers turned to popular playwrights, such as Agha Hashr Kashmiri, who wrote ornate dialogue and flowery verses. But as filmmakers realized that a different craft was evolving, they looked to novels for original material, a practice that seems to have originated in Bengal.

Dialogue has always had a special hold over Indian audiences. Actor-director Sohrab Modi’s spirited speech as a Rajput warrior in *Pukar* (1939) had viewers showering coins on the screen. In 1975 over half a million records of the dialogue of the “curry-western” *Sholay* were sold. But film songs were to become even more popular than dialogue—to the extent of acquiring more importance than the films themselves.

Songs above All

A typically Indian result of the coming of sound was the central importance that music and songs acquired in film. By the mid-1930s, movie music was big business. *Indra Sabha* (1932) had nearly seventy songs. In *Devi Devyani*, beautiful Gohar, then in her early twenties, was cast against nearly seventy-year-old Bhagwandas, a famous singer. While the predominance of songs is seen as a continuation of the essentially musical nature of Indian theater, others suggest that songs and music were a means to overcome a linguistic splintering of the Indian audience. The merry mixing of Indian and western traditions, classical and folk, was condemned by some as “hybrid” but the very vitality of film music and its desire to experiment broadened the basis of Indian music.

In film dance too, choreographers combined Western styles with distorted *mudras* of Indian classical dance forms. Two serious attempts to put Indian dance on film were Uday Shankar’s *Kalpana* (Imagination, 1948) and

V. Shantaram's *Jhanak Jhanak Payal Baje* (Jangle of anklets, 1955), one of the early Technicolor films in India.

The first two decades of talkies were dominated by "singing stars" like Saigal, Pankaj Mullick, Kanan Devi, Noorjehan, and Suraiyya. But good singing was no guarantee of good acting. "Playback" (or ghost) singing came to the rescue. The most successful playback singer was Lata Mangeshkar (the "Nightingale of India"), whose 30,000 solo, duet, and chorus-backed songs recorded in twenty Indian languages between 1948 and 1987 were noted in the *Guinness Book of Records*.

The Emergence of Studios

From the 1920s to the 1940s, film technicians and performers in India were on the payroll of a studio, making up one large joint family under its roof. The port cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta had become the major centers of commerce and industry—including film production. Major studios developed a personality of their own but by the 1930s, three had attained a prestige that set them above the rest. New Theatres in Calcutta was started by B. N. Sircar, who collected a group of talented men around him. They captured the all-India market with *Devdas* (1935), based on the well-known novel, directed by P. C. "Prince" Barua, who also played the (eponymous) lead role. Many Indian language versions followed.

Himansu Rai and his wife Devika Rani, who made silent films with German backing, followed with an Anglo-Indian coproduction, *Karma*. In 1934 the couple set up Bombay Talkies. Its products were carefully tailored to meet the tastes of its varied audiences, mixing glamour, music, and melodrama with a certain amount of political and social consciousness.

Prabhat Studios in Pune had no elitist pretensions. V. Shantaram directed a majority of its films, notably *Duniya na Mane*, about an elderly widower who marries a young woman, then regrets it. But Prabhat's most successful film was *Sant Tukaram* (Saint Tukaram), directed by Shantaram's copartners Damle and Fatehlal. Made in Marathi, it was a great success throughout India.

Inflation, unleashed by World War II, pulled out the supports of the studio system, already tottering from internal jealousies. Successful directors and actors sought to breakaway and amass personal fortunes. Fly-by-night producers with money made on shady wartime deals lured stars away to work in individual films. Leadership of the industry passed from established producers into the hands of leading stars, exacting financiers and calculating distributors/exhibitors. The *masala* film—which wrapped all salable ingredients together, comedy, melodrama, song, dance, romance—became the widely accepted recipe for success.

As it became economically unfeasible to shoot in the north, studios equipped for sound started coming up in the south. In 1936 Madras United Artists Corporation and Modern Theaters were both founded, soon followed by Vauhini, Gemini, AVM, and others. But till the late 1940s, most Indian cinema was blissfully unconcerned with Madras, capital of the mammoth south Indian film industry. In 1948, however, S. S. Vasan's spectacular *Chandralekha*, with its unforgettable drum-dance sequence, became a stunning success all over India.

At the time, almost half of all Indian theaters were in the four southern Dravidian states (Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu) and almost 50 percent of all films made were in the Dravidian languages. Most of these films were from Tamil Nadu, where films wielded a power in the social, cultural, and political spheres unequalled in India. The credit for realizing the enormous potential of the medium goes to the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) Party, which advocated a revival of Dravidian culture.

The 1947 partition of Bengal into India's West Bengal and East Pakistan threw the Calcutta film industry, which had always demonstrated political awareness, into turmoil—and politics continued to influence subsequent films. Nemaï Ghosh's *Chinnamul* (The uprooted, 1951), on the refugee influx into partitioned India, was one such powerful drama. Activist Ritwik Ghatak, of the leftist Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) who acted in *Uprooted* went on to make *Nagarik* (Citizen) in 1952, an exhortation to the working class to keep up its struggle.

French director Jean Renoir had visited Calcutta in 1949 to scout locations for his forthcoming film *River*. One of his guides there was Satyajit Ray, a young graphic artist and aspiring filmmaker—who would go on to show a generation of Indian filmmakers that it was possible to be successful outside of India's film bazaar.

Satyajit Ray and Bengali Filmmaking

Metaphorically and literally Satyajit Ray towered over Indian cinema. His *Pather Panchali* (Song of the road, 1955) ran to packed houses in Bengal and won the Best Human Document award at Cannes. He showed aspiring filmmakers that it was possible to make a different kind of cinema with amateur actors, without make up, shoot mainly on location and interpret Indian reality in non-melodramatic style.

Rooted firmly in the literary and artistic tradition of the Bengal Renaissance, Ray had studied at Rabindranath Tagore's Shantiniketan (Abode of Peace) University. He went on to prove himself a master storyteller and observer of the human predicament in classics such as the *Apu Trilogy* (1955, 1956, 1959), *Jalsaghar* (The music

room, 1958), *Charulata* (1964), *Devi* (The goddess, 1960), and *Aranyer Din Ratri* (Days and nights in the forest, 1969).

Another Bengali genius, Ritwik Ghatak, was a passionate practitioner of epic cinema, investing melodrama with tragic depth as he probed the personal and collective impact of Bengal's partition. From this pain were born his masterpieces: *Meghe Daka Tara* (Cloud-capped star, 1960), *Komal Gandhar* (E-flat, 1961), and *Subarnarekha*, (1962). Mrinal Sen graduated from his initial agit-prop essays to sensitive explorations of middle-class guilt in well-crafted films such as *Ek Din Pratidin* (And quiet flows the dawn, 1979), *Akaler Sandhaney* (In search of famine, 1980), and *Kharij* (The case is closed, 1982).

Uttam Kumar, who played a film star in Ray's *Nayak* (The hero, 1966), was long Bengal's beloved matinee hero, starring with the inimitable Suchitra Sen. Bilingual filmmakers based in Bombay, like Bimal Roy and Shakti Samanta, lured the two to act in Hindi films. Later popular Bengali stars who made it good in Hindi cinema were Sharmila Tagore and Mithun Chakravorty.

The Golden Age of Hindi Cinema

In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominance of Hindi cinema was unparalleled commercially and critically. V. Shantaram's 1957 film, *Do Aankhen Bara Haath* (Two eyes, twelve hands), about a benevolent jailor who tries to reform six condemned prisoners, won a Silver Bear at Berlin. Journalist-filmmaker K. A. Abbas was one of the few socially committed filmmakers of the day, his brilliant *Dharti Ke Lal* (Red earth) focused on the 1943 Bengal famine. When Nitin Bose and then Bimal Roy moved from Calcutta's New Theatres to Bombay, they brought their social awareness into Hindi films. Bose's *Gunga Jumna* (1961), about the conflict between two brothers, is among the all-time hits of Indian cinema.

Mehboob Khan, who ran away from home to become an actor, emerged as one of Bombay's most distinguished producer/directors. His most popular film, *Mother India* (1957), created an enduring icon of the mother as a symbol of national identity in his protagonist Radha (played by Nargis, who won India's first international acting prize at Karlovy Vary). Bimal Roy made films about social evils. *Do Bigha Zamin* (Two acres of land, 1953) depicting the poignancy of the peasants' losing battles against avaricious landlords won prizes at Cannes and Karlovy Vary. Memorable in the leading role was one of the great actors of Indian cinema, Balraj Sahni, an IPTA member. In Roy's 1955 version of *Devdas*, he cast the reigning tragedy king, Dilip Kumar, as Saratchandra's self-destructive hero.

Raj Kapoor's career coincided with the birth of a new nation state. The early Raj Kapoor, with his romanticized idealism, sought to be the bardic voice of the Nehruvian dream. When he made *Awaara* (The vagabond, 1955), introducing in homage to Charlie Chaplin the lovable Indian "Tramp," his tremendous appeal at home and abroad seemed endless. His songs are still sung in Russia. Kapoor and Nargis shared an electrifying screen chemistry, epitomizing romance for an entire generation of Indians.

Guru Dutt was Indian cinema's tragic poet. He had a superb understanding of the camera and a fine ear for melody. His master films, including *Pyaasa* (Thirsty, 1957), which delved into the despair of a poet unrecognized in his lifetime, and his autobiographical *Kaagaz Ke Phool* (Paper flowers, 1959), have attracted a cult following.

If there is a truly Indian "genre," it is the mythological. Mythology has been a source material for Indian films right from Phalke's *Harishchandra*. In later years, one of the most successful "mythos" was *Jai Santoshi Maa* (Hail to Goddess Santoshi Maa, 1975). Cheaply made and featuring an erstwhile heroine of mainstream cinema, the film was bountifully blessed at the box office. The lives of saints was also a recurring theme in films.

Another typically Indian film genre was the costume drama of refined manners and poetical language—a seeking to evoke a golden glow of nostalgia for the Mughal court. Among the most popular were Guru Dutt's *Chaudvin ka Chand* (Full moon, 1960), Kamal Amrohi's *Pakeezah* (The pure one, 1971), and K. Asif's *Mughal-e-Azam* (The great Mughal, 1960).

New Heroes

The Swinging Sixties brought about a sea change. Icon of the times was Raj Kapoor's younger brother, the exuberant Shammi, who broke the mold of the traditional gentlemanly hero and won for himself the title of "Rebel Star." Reworking his earlier soulful/romantic image in the style of James Dean and Elvis Presley, sporting T-shirts and leather jackets, dancing uninhibitedly to highly hummable numbers, Shammi Kapoor led Hindi cinema's first concerted attempt to woo the Westernized teenage audience. His 1961 color film *Junglee*, set in picturesque Kashmir, elevated him to cult status; his exulting cry of "Yahoo" (part of the theme song) captured the imagination of a whole new generation.

Shammi Kapoor's successor was rather his opposite. He hardly conformed to India's prevailing ideal of robust Punjabi good looks, crinkled his eyes and shook his head vulnerably in what were to become trademark gestures. Yet Rajesh Khanna was dubbed India's first superstar as one sentimental romance after another swept the box

office. The gallant smile with which he faced death guaranteed a collective lump in the audience's throat (*Anand*, 1970; *Namak Haram*, 1973). Coincidentally enough, the rising star who was soon to unseat Khanna was the second lead in both of these films—the lanky, brooding Amitabh Bachchan, blessed with the most seductive baritone of them all.

Bachchan became India's longest ruling star, starting with a series of author-backed roles that cast him as an angry young man. Prakash Mehra's *Zanjeer* (Chains, 1973) and Yash Chopra's *Deewar* (The wall, 1975) were great box office successes. But the curry western *Sholay* (Burning embers, 1975) by director Ramesh Sippy was the biggest hit, chosen in a recent British Film Institute poll as the "best Indian film."


Versions of the vigilante hero, as the upright cop fighting a corrupt system or the avenging outsider free from establishment rules, sprang up everywhere. The films reflected India's turbulent 1970s, when the Nehruvian dream of an egalitarian, secular India collapsed, followed in June 1975 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's imposition of a "National Emergency" and the suspension of civil rights, after she was found guilty by Allahabad's High court of electoral malpractice. After the "Emergency," Amitabh Bachchan kept the film industry buoyant, delivering hit after hit, spun out by the "Masala moghul" Manmohan Desai (*Amar*, *Akbar*, *Anthony*, 1977), or articulating the anger of youth in *Kala Patthar* (Coal, 1979).

The Southern Connection

The highly politicized Tamil Nadu cinema created real-life rivals. M. G. Ramachandran's swashbuckling "Robin Hood" image won him a large fan following, which propelled him to the post of chief minister of the state. Stage thespian Sivaji Ganesan (who later joined the opposing Congress Party) wowed masses and critics alike with his matchless oratorical skills. Writers great and small, including future Chief Minister Karunanidhi, vied to pen breathless passages of prose for this new star.

The directors who rescued Tamil movies from excessive theatricality were K. Balachander and Bharatiraja. Balachander added a psychological edge to bold themes, creating new stars such as Kamal Haasan (one of India's best actors and dancers, who went on to become a successful writer/director/producer in the 1980s and 1990s), Rajanikant (his mannerisms have a cult following, with new converts in Japan), and the talented Sridevi, whose child-woman image made her an all-India star.

Traffic between Bombay cinema and that of Madras climaxed with Mani Ratnam's *Nayakan* (1987), based on



Indian Film Star Shahrukh Khan. Heartthrob Shahrukh Khan, the "king of Bollywood," with his wife Gauri. INDIA TODAY.

the life of a Bombay organized crime boss, and his 1992 *Roja*, a love story in the time of terrorism in Kashmir.

Andhra Pradesh's Telugu cinema was long dominated by the rivalry between the "godly" N. T. Rama Rao (or NTR) and the more down-to-earth A. Nageshwar Rao. NTR breathed declamatory fire into the Sanskritized phrases of the epic mythologicals, playing the Hindu god Krishna no fewer than seventeen times. Thanks to his godly screen presence and faithful fan following, he led a Dravidian political party, espousing Telugu identity, and became chief minister of Andhra Pradesh.

Telugu and Tamil films reveled in family melodramas, in which modernity (in the form of an educated son or daughter-in-law) threatened the idealized traditional family. That "Madras Formula" was soon applied with equal success to teary Hindi films. Telugu directors Bapu and K. Vishwanath succeeded in Bombay as well. Vishwanath's celebrated ode to Carnatic music in his *Sankarabharanam* (Shiva's raga, 1979) was imitated by northern directors.

Malayalam and Kannada cinema were latecomers. Like Bengal, Kerala is a stronghold of Marxism, and it boasts the highest literacy in the country. Given its thriving film culture too, it was no surprise that many acclaimed directors of art (or "parallel cinema" as it was known) came from Kerala.

A New Wave Touches Indian Shores

Ray had shown the way, and international film festivals opened the doors to worldwide developments. The government of India was alive to the needs for funding non-formula filmmakers, and the Film Finance Corporation or FFC (which was reincarnated as the National Film Development Corporation two decades later) was inaugurated in 1960. In 1961 the Film and Television Institute of India (FTII) rose from the ruins, as it were, of the Prabhat Studios. A National Film Archive followed in 1964. FFC produced *Bhuvan Shome* (1969), an engagingly subversive work, directed by Mrinal Sen. The film marked the arrival of a “New Wave” of filmmaking on Indian shores.

Quite independent of institutional support, a southern theater group made *Samskara* (Funeral rites, 1970) in Kannada, an indictment of Brahman hypocrisy and meaningless ritual. The Kannada cinema now became the hub of “new cinema” developments. Eminent playwright and Rhodes scholar Girish Karnad and theater genius cum music composer B. V. Karanth made memorable films together and on their own. Soon, Girish Kasaravalli, a young pharmacist who chose to train at FTII, surged to the forefront with an accomplished first work, *Ghatasbraddha* (The rite, 1978), which explored the anachronistic world of Brahmanical rituals, with sensitivity and integrity.

From Kerala, an early graduate of the FTII, Adoor Gopalakrishnan, is today India’s most distinguished filmmaker, acclaimed nationally and internationally. On his shoulders rests the mantle of Ray. Adoor has created demanding masterpieces that explore the human condition with detachment and delicacy. *Elipattayam* (The rat trap), focusing on Kerala’s decaying feudal society, is as disturbing today as it was in 1982, when the British Film Institute Award cited it as “the most original and imaginative film” of the year. Other filmmakers from Kerala include cartoonist turned filmmaker Aravindan, Shaji N. Karun, director of *Piravi* (Birth, 1988), perhaps the mostly widely seen Indian film on the international festival circuit.

In Bombay, two of Ritwik Ghatak’s devoted students, Kumar Shahani and Mani Kaul struck out in defense of “pure cinema,” eschewing the strong narrative and emotional drama of the conventional cinema. Far less esoteric but equally experimental was FTII’s Ketan Mehta whose debut film *Bhaani Bhavai* transposed the folk idiom to the screen.

The New Wave created its own icons to challenge mainstream melodramatics: the luminous Smita Patil, who died tragically young; the perfectionist Shabana Azmi, who combined brilliant acting with activism; the mercurial Naseeruddin Shah and the solid-yet-sensitive Om Puri, both immensely talented, both graduates of the National School of Drama and the FTII.

The director who created and projected these icons worldwide was Shyam Benegal. His early films, starting with *Ankur* (The seedling, 1974), are searchingly humane explorations of the conflict between feudal traditions and modernity, filtered through women placed at the heart of each drama. Benegal is a rarity in that his films do not compromise his integrity and yet pay for themselves. Benegal’s cinematographer Govind Nihalani graduated to become one of India’s most politically conscious directors with the hard-hitting *Ardh Satya* (Half truth, 1983), a study of the brutalization of an idealistic young policeman (Om Puri). Nihalani continues his explorations of violence, individual and societal; his latest big-budget *Dev* (2004) brings together the two most famous “cops” of mainstream and offbeat cinema: Amitabh Bachchan and Om Puri.

Political engagement is also the hallmark of another distinguished director, Saeed Mirza. His famed quartet (including *Why Does Albert Pinto Get Angry?*) voices the plight of the marginalized minorities. His *Naseem* (1994) cast poet Kaifi Azmi as the despairing Muslim patriarch who remains in India at partition because of his profound belief in India’s secular ideals, only to find himself and his family threatened by the demolition of the Babri Masjid by Hindu fundamentalists in 1992.

A trailblazer in this regard was M. S. Sathyu, whose 1973 *Garm Hava* (Hot wind) dared to look at the plight of Muslims in North India after partition. The film was a critical success—accepted at Cannes, recipient of a National Award—but did not succeed financially. Another powerful partition film was Nihalani’s *Tamas* (Darkness), which appeared as a television serial.

The New Wave threw up new filmmaking centers with no cinematic tradition to speak of. Assam’s Jahnu Barua (*Halodia Choraye Baodhan Khai*, 1987; *Hkbagoroloi Bobu Door*, 1995) carved a niche for himself, exploring the many facets of his seemingly idyllic land torn apart by ethnic strife. Barua has brought Assam into national focus, underlining the feeling of isolation. From Manipur, Aribam Syam Sarma’s seemingly simple films (*Imagi Ningthem*, *Ishanou*, *Sanabi*) conceal many layers, with strong heroines who reflect the prevailing matrilineal system. One of Indian cinema’s enduring mysteries is what happened to Nirad Mohapatra after his brilliant *Maya Miriga* (Illusion, 1983) a bittersweet unfolding of the disintegration of a traditional family in an Orissa township.

The vigor of the New Wave drew into its fold professionals from the sister arts, like the Pune-based theater director (and pediatrician) Jabbar Patel, who gave shape to a new Marathi cinema with his political and social dramas, *Saamma* (1975), *Sinbasan* (1979), and *Umbartha* (1981), starring Smita Patil as a women’s rights activist.

Fellow Maharashtrian and theater enthusiast Amol Palekar first became famous as the “boy next door” in Basu Chatterjee’s light-hearted romances but went on to make serious films tackling unusual themes.

Talented artists from all over the country made their mark in cinema: photojournalist and theater director Gautam Ghose adopted a semidocumentary approach in many hard-hitting political films like *Dakhal*, *Patang*, and *Dekha*. A memorable scene in his *Paar* (The Crossing, 1984) has the heroic couple (Shabana Azmi and Naseeruddin Shah) herding swine across the swirling waters of the river to earn their fare back to their village. Academic poet Buddhadeb Dasgupta combined a lyrical sensibility with politically conscious humanism in films like *Neem Annapurna*, *Bagh Babadur*; and *Uttara*, which won him the Best Director award in Venice in 2000.

The New Wave’s liberating influence brought women filmmakers to the fore. In Bangalore, Prema Karanth’s *Phaniyamma* (Kannada, 1982) was a moving portrayal of a child widow; Bombay-based Sai Paranjpye (*Sparsb*, *Chashme Buddoor*, *Katha*, and *Disha*) constantly sought to conquer new territory, from sensitive love stories and comedy to a journalistic look at Bombay’s hopeful migrants. Noted theater director and actor Vijaya Mehta extended her formidable talents to films (*Smriti Chitre*, *Rao Sabeel*, *Pestonjee*), and, in Calcutta, Aparna Sen grew from mainstream star to accomplished director. Her first, and India’s first English film, *36 Chowringhee Lane* (1981), was a poignant study of the loneliness of an Anglo-Indian teacher. The latest, *Mr. and Mrs. Iyer* (2003), is a brief and tender encounter between strangers caught amidst intercommunal violence.

The Wave Recedes

Around the 1980s, India’s New Wave cinema seemed to run out of steam. Over the years, the progressive agenda of the filmmakers lost its niche audience. FFC and National Film Development Corporation tried without success to set up an alternative distribution system. Many New Wave films survived on the oxygen of the festival circuit and screenings on national television. Independent cinema nevertheless lives on, with new talents joining the established. In Calcutta, the prolific Rituparno Ghosh has established himself as a sensitive director of women-centric dramas; in Kerala, Murali Nair’s black satires and surreal humour have won accolades worldwide (Camera d’Or for *Marana Simbasanam* at Cannes). In mainstream cinema, too, a next generation arose, technically savvy and daring enough to take risks (Farhan Akhtar, Madhur Bhandarkar). Ramgopal Varma, yesterday’s whiz kid from Hyderabad whose 1995 *Satya* (a noir thriller on the Bombay underworld) catapulted him to the top, is currently backing experiments by newer entrants.



Mira Nair, Indian Filmmaker. Her 2000 *Monsoon Wedding* examines the growing phenomenon of “global” Indians, a world where young and upwardly mobile Indians must coexist with their tradition-minded parents and family elders. INDIA TODAY.

In the 1990s, globalization raised the demon of cultural dilution and contamination. The conservative Right echoed the fears of Hindu fundamentalists, who saw the exposure to Western entertainment as detrimental to the “purity” of Indian culture. Mainstream cinema, attuned to these conservative forces, responded with two brands of patriotism: hard and soft. Soft patriotism reinforced the traditional virtues of filial obedience. Bright, glossy films increasingly courted the rich Indian diaspora settled in the West, which looked to India for its cultural identity and value system—values that were often regressive when it came to women’s rights.

Hard patriotism was packaged in films like *Border* and *Gadar* (Chaos), which had a ready audience in a country hit by terrorism and militancy. The message was: how can you love your country without hating your neighbour? In the mainstream cinema, there was no place for introspection, political or social, to probe the roots of

violence. Rare exceptions were Gulzar's *Maachis* (Matches), which explored how young men turned to terrorism under police brutalities in Punjab, and Kamala Haasan's *Hey Ram!* (in Tamil and Hindi), which tried to probe the roots of religious hatred at the time of partition.

Indian cinema is now looking beyond national borders. The urban success of Dev Benegal's *English August* (based on a first novel by a bureaucrat), the international success of Shekhar Kapoor's *Bandit Queen* on a notorious woman dacoit, and Aamir Khan-Ashutosh Gowariker's *Lagaan*, a film that married two of India's great passions, cricket and movies, all fueled Indian filmmakers' ambitions to capture world audiences. Meanwhile, the mushrooming of multiplexes in Indian cities has achieved what years of muddled strategies could not: creating niche audiences for small films that are made in a mix of languages. It seems that the all-India, all-in-one film has become even more of a mirage, like the Rāmāyaṇa's elusive golden deer.

Rani Day Burra
Maitibili Rao

See also **Filmīgīt; Film Industry; Lata Mangeshkar; Ray, Satyajit**

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS India is one of the few countries in the developing world never to have been under military rule. It has had democratic governance for

over fifty years. Even when a national emergency was declared in June 1975 and democracy remained suspended for over two years, the military remained entirely neutral. Civil-military relations in India have been somewhat atypical. The British kept the military separate, both physically and ideologically, from the rest of the nation and from politics, a tradition that has endured in India. In neighboring Pakistan and in many other postcolonial countries, the military has often taken over governance.

Civil-military relations are not merely about military intervention. It is the interaction between the government, represented by political leaders, and military authorities in the management of national security. The challenge lies in ensuring that the military, while remaining strong, cohesive, and responsive to deal with external aggression and internal threats, is guided and controlled entirely by political leadership. This calls for building structures, procedures, and institutional norms, carefully developed and scrupulously observed by all.

The First Phase

Independent India inherited a large army bred in the colonial tradition and a system of civil-military relationship that was out of tune with a democracy. The new government wisely retained the military precisely as it was and began to set up a structure of civilian control modified to the new requirements. It adopted the liberal model of civil-military relations, with total parliamentary accountability.

Four conditions determined the way in which India's civil-military relations evolved. The first was the ignorance of the political leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (in office 1947–1964), about military affairs, and hence their reluctance to deal with them. Second was Nehru's towering personality and his dedication to democracy and its elective institutions, which ensured that the military could never dare to challenge them. Third, the war in Jammu and Kashmir ensured that there could be no major changes in military affairs. Finally, senior military commanders agreed that the military had no role in civil governance and must remain subordinate to democratic political leadership.

Two options were available to India's government at independence to structure higher command functions. One was to adopt the integrated Joint Chiefs of Staff system with the three services reporting directly to a strong defense ministry, through integrated service councils, as in the United Kingdom. The other option was that service chiefs should function as independent commanders of their respective services, with civilian control exercised over them through a system of committees under a

ministry of defense. The government adopted the latter approach.

The service heads, therefore, initially retained their ranks of commanders in chief. Though the nomenclature was changed in 1955 to “chiefs of staff,” it made no substantive difference. Without simultaneously creating integrated service councils, the chiefs continued to function much as before, which meant that the chiefs retained nearly total autonomy in all purely military matters, including organizations and operations. In all other aspects—finance, policy, and civilian affairs—the services were guided entirely by the Ministry of Defence.

Civilian control was implemented through two committees: the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the prime minister, with selected ministers as members and service chiefs, cabinet secretary, and selected secretaries in attendance; and the Defence Minister’s Committee with the three service chiefs, the defense secretary, and the financial secretary as members. For the first decade of independence, these two committees met as required, but very infrequently, as no major issues of policy challenged the nation. Meanwhile a small army of civil bureaucrats entered the Ministry of Defence and studied all military proposals. That committee was headed by a secretary from the civilian administrative service, who in all probability had no military experience. He emerged as the defense minister’s trusted adviser on all military issues, exercising a role, therefore, that should normally have been served by either the senior military commander or the elected political executive.

Civil-military relations were severely strained from 1957 to 1962, when V. K. Krishna Menon was appointed defense minister. Self-confident to the point of “megalomania,” in the opinion of some senior generals, Menon argued angrily and bitterly with his most experienced and popular army chief, General Thimayya, playing favorites in his own appointments to higher military ranks. He was wrongly convinced that China would never attack India. When the Chinese army poured over the Northern Tier and India was roundly defeated, Krishna Menon was forced to resign. Nehru died a year and a half later, shattered by the defeat.

The Second Phase

After the Chinese aggression, the strength of India’s armed forces was increased by more than three times, and there was substantial reorganization in all services. The Ministry of Defence expanded as well, but the changes in higher management were slow. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet never met again and was discontinued. Instead, defense and foreign policy issues were discussed at the Cabinet Committee on Political

Affairs, where service heads were seldom if ever present. A Defence Planning Committee was created, under the Cabinet Committee, consisting of a number of key secretaries and including the three service chiefs. The Defence Minister’s Committee was replaced by the Defence Minister’s morning meetings, attended by the service chiefs, and defense and production secretaries. Those largely informal meetings proved useful for the coordination of major issues and provided a high-level forum for periodic discussions.

Civil-military relations that emerged in the decade following the Chinese invasion and the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, has been defined as a Clausewitzian bargain. The political leadership was to set the goals and provide its strategic vision. The military was left to deal with operational matters, virtually without supervision. This allowed the political and bureaucratic leadership to avoid blame if things went wrong and permitted freedom of operations to the military, for which its high command had long clamored. As an example, it was General Chaudhury who recommended the expansion of the war in 1965 to the Punjab, to which Prime Minister Shastri entirely agreed. In 1971 India’s next prime minister, Indira Gandhi, accepted Field Marshal Manekshaw’s advice against those of many members of her Cabinet, to wait for nine months before moving India’s army into the newly independent Bangladesh.

Over India’s first three to four decades, the military’s position steadily declined against their civil counterparts. First to be affected was pay. The special allowances that the military had enjoyed under the British were removed without compensatory benefits, making military salaries distinctly less favorable. Some of these anomalies were corrected only in the 1990s. The other factor was the official “order of precedence,” which, though viewed by many as a superficial matter of protocol, is still quite important in India. The military’s position has declined steadily in both of these areas over the years.

Operational delegation to the military was accompanied by intrusive monitoring by the civil bureaucracy on all other areas of military functioning. The civil bureaucracy vetted all significant troop movements. All officer promotions above the rank of colonel, recommended by a purely military board, had to be approved by the Ministry of Defence. Initially, these were routine vettings ensuring adherence to established norms and precedence. In later years, political connections would lead to special recommendations and waivers, altering the original lists. Civilian officials also emerged as a front-end of the defense establishment. With the object of insulating the armed forces from political interference, civil bureaucrats answered questions from Parliament and the media, and negotiated with the rest of the government on military

issues. Comparatively junior civilian officers were to clear service proposals sent by the chiefs. Civilians would head weapons acquisition negotiating teams and formulate and approve military acquisition contracts. Finally, the civilian defense secretary was made responsible to coordinate interservice issues and report directly to the minister, assuming in fact the responsibilities associated with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

This was possible because in retaining operational autonomy, the armed forces also opted to stay away from the government, becoming in fact a department of the government. All financial authority lay only with the Ministry of Defence. A chief's itinerary for inspection visits within the country had to be cleared by a lowly clerk in the ministry, since such visits had financial implications. Political oversight was also implemented through Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee and the Parliamentary Defence Committee were both entitled to oversee military expenditure and the functioning of the ministry. In recent years, these committees have raised serious questions in their reports, though they have not yet become full-fledged watchdogs.

Other stresses emerged in civil-military relations in the 1980s. Failure of governance caused severe disaffection in the country, leading to a number of internal crises requiring military intervention. The most serious of these was in the Punjab in the 1980s. In June 1984 the army was ordered to assault the Golden Temple, a sacred shrine of the Sikhs, who then constituted some 15 percent of the army's strength, and a higher percentage of its officer corps. The aftermath of the attack led to mutiny by some 2,600 Sikh soldiers. This necessitated a reorganization of the army's regimental system. The army was also called upon to assist the civil government in Assam in 1990 and 1991 in operations Bajrang and Rhino. From 1990, the army would be deeply involved in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

These situations reflected a breakdown of civil policy, and such repeated use of the army was often resented by the military, though they never opposed it. It also required arrangements for civil-military coordination at the provincial level. A system of unified command was established in the affected provinces. The governors of these troubled states were often retired soldiers or else had senior military officers as advisers. This arrangement, though not always very satisfactory has functioned reasonably well.

Another challenge to civil-military relations has arisen from what has been called the "new militaries." A very large number of police and paramilitary forces have been created in India in recent years to deal with growing internal instability. Their number at independence was below 100,000. By 2004 they were over 1.4 million strong, larger collectively than the army, and may be developed into an

alternate force. At the same time, the army's internal role, always unpopular, will perhaps be reduced in this process.

After 1998

Nuclear tests in the subcontinent required major alterations in higher defense. A Cabinet Committee on Security was established to address all security issues. Individual service chiefs are now likely to be consulted more often. A National Security Council (NSC) was set up, to report to a national security adviser, who is also the principal secretary to the prime minister. Military representation on the NSC is not high.

The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to a major review of the national security system, carried out by a Group of Ministers (GOM) in 2000, facilitated by four task forces. The report of the GOM on "management of defense" comprehensively reviewed organizations and implemented major changes. It decided to create a permanent Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), replacing the principle of rotation among service chiefs. A Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) was established, with a senior three-star general at its head and a large interservice staff. Interservice rivalry has not made it possible to agree on a CDS, so the post remains vacant. In turn this has made the CIDS rudderless and somewhat ineffective. A number of boards have been set up facilitating procurement, defense production, and research and development. Defense intelligence has been integrated and brought under a single agency. Finally, much greater financial authority has now been delegated to the military service chiefs.

These changes have helped integrate the services into New Delhi's decision-making structure, accommodating them in policy-making functions. Over fifty years after independence, it was thus clear that civil-military relations had reached a state of cooperative maturity; even where differences may exist between some of these institutions, issues can be resolved firmly within the ambit of democratic governance.

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See also **Armed Forces**

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CIVIL SERVICE, BRITISH INDIAN. See **British Crown Raj.**

CLASS. See **Caste System.**

CLIMATE. See **Geography.**

CLIVE, ROBERT (1725–1774), the first baron Plassey, governor of Bengal (1758–1760 and 1765–1767). At the time of his birth, Robert Clive’s once-respected Shropshire family was in decline. They were, however, able to secure him a clerkship in the British East India Company in 1744. Shortly after his arrival in Madras, war broke out between France and England. Madras fell to the French, and Clive found himself a prisoner of war. This experience gave him an incentive to reflect on the success of the French in outmaneuvering the British by playing the “nabob game,” supporting rival claimants to contested thrones of Indian states and thus expanding European influence. Clive then embarked on a military career in the company’s service, during which he mastered and then bested the French at their own game. He helped topple a key French ally, Chanda Sahib, their *nawāb* of the Carnatic, through bold military actions that restored British prestige and earned him great wealth.

When Clive returned to England in 1753, he was lionized as a military genius. However, after expending virtually all his Indian fortune restoring his family to its former estate, he had little choice but to accept the company’s offer of promotion to lieutenant colonel and appointment to the governorship of Fort St. David. Clive arrived in Madras just in time to hear of disastrous events in Bengal. There, the company agents’ attempt to use the recent wars with France as a cover for expanding the company’s financial interests had become transparent. The young *nawāb* of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Dawla, had retaliated by moving against the British factories in his province. With characteristic speed, Clive sailed to Bengal and quickly found rivals in Siraj-ud-Dawla’s court, eager to supplant him. When an intermediary, the Hindu financier Umichand, threatened to reveal their treachery unless rewarded for his silence, Clive seemingly agreed to his demands, then defrauded him. On 23 June 1757



Robert Clive. In the service of the British East India Company, first as a military officer and then its governor in Calcutta, Clive mastered the art of the “nabob game.” Eventually the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, he later committed suicide on 22 November 1774. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

Clive’s three thousand mixed European and Indian troops confronted Siraj-ud-Dawla’s fifty-thousand-strong force near the village of Plassey. Though Clive had some last minute doubts, all ran according to plan. The *nawāb*’s army turned against their ruler, who was promptly executed by elements loyal to Clive’s co-conspirator, Mir Jafar, who was then installed as *nawāb*. Clive next secured for the company the twenty-four *parganas* (villages) that were to become Calcutta, while openly arranging for an amount equal to its revenue (£30,000) to be assigned to him by Mir Jafar as his personal *jagir* (feudal land grant). He and other corrupt company officials then gorged themselves on the prostrate state’s treasury, which made many of them “nabobs” but eventually left Mir Jafar bankrupt. Clive then defeated a Dutch assault in Bengal, ending their role in the province, and soon eliminated French influence in the neighboring northern Circars.

In 1760 Clive once again returned to England in triumph and was given an Irish peerage. But tragic events in

Bengal so darkened the company's future that he was asked to return there as governor. In Clive's absence, Mir Jafar had been deposed by company officers. His successor, Mir Qasim, had rebelled and ultimately fled to Oudh where he allied himself with its ruler, Shuja-ud-Dawla, and the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II in a bid to regain Mughal control of the province. However, before Clive's arrival, their combined forces were defeated by British troops at Buxar in 1765. Clive's skills at playing country politics were equal to the challenges that remained. He restored Oudh to Shuja-ud-Dawla in return for the latter giving two of his districts to Shah Alam II, to whom the company then gave a 26 lakh (£30,000) tribute in return for the emperor's grant of the lucrative *diwani* (collector of revenue) for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The settlement of the *diwani* on the company led to a notoriously corrupt "dual government," by which avaricious company agents controlled the civil administration and acted as revenue collector, while the cowed Indian nobility was left with the burdens of the *nawābi*, or executive authority (now virtually reduced to the enforcement of criminal law). The number of "nabobs" multiplied, the company now commanding the affairs and revenues of more than 20 million people, with no money left to those burdened with "governing" them.

Clive did not exploit India's condition to the extent he had previously, which made it easier for him to address his other assigned task: to stop the abuse of company resources by its own agents. Clive had the company's servants sign covenants prohibiting bribery and other corrupt practices, though he stopped short of eliminating their lucrative private trade. He also reduced the allowances enjoyed by officers in the company's army and suppressed a mutiny that this economy spawned. Though limited in scope, these reforms laid the earliest foundation of the Indian Civil Service.

Clive left India in 1767, having established the company as a power on the subcontinent and having initiated its administrative structure; by that time, however, he had made enemies within the company's directorate and in Parliament, which convened a committee of inquiry. Some members of Parliament may have been legitimately alarmed by Clive's situational ethics and self-enrichment. However, since the charges brought against him pertained to events that had occurred a decade earlier, some suggested that the accusations were motivated by a personal or political vendetta rather than genuine reformist zeal. Clive was defiant in his own defense. Questioned as to his acquisition in India of rewards totaling over £234,000 from 1757 to 1759, he declared that, considering the potential wealth he could have acquired by his overthrow of Siraj-ud-Dawla, he was "astonished at my own moderation." The inquiry closed on 21 May 1773

with an ambiguous Parliamentary resolution that censured him for misappropriating company funds but praised him for having done "great and meritorious service to the state." Disheartened by the mixed results of the Parliamentary inquiry, Clive fell into one of the many bouts of depression he experienced throughout his life. He committed suicide on 22 November 1774.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Nabob Game**

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COMMODITY MARKETS Organized markets for agricultural commodities, which drive price discovery and enable risk management, are of great importance in the modernization of Indian agriculture. India's government plays a major role in the operation and regulation of the "spot markets," called *mandis*. Each state has a state *mandi* board, which in turn governs district-level boards. These district boards authorize the creation of new markets. A market, or *mandi*, is typically a yard with concrete platforms where farmers collect to sell their produce to wholesale dealers at harvest time. Transactions are intermediated by designated brokers. The brokers act as competing market makers who can offer a price to the farmers and take possession of the commodity before selling it to wholesale traders. Farmers generally do not sell directly to retailers and instead sell their products only through *mandis*.

Price discovery at *mandis* takes place by open outcry. Since there is little standardization of the commodity, there is an open-outcry auction for practically every grade of the commodity brought in by farmers. Each *mandi* employs commodity inspectors, in addition to clerical staff. Inspectors, experts on the commodities traded at a *mandi*, certify the standard of a commodity when it is brought to market. If a dispute arises between parties, *mandi* inspectors play the role of arbitrators. Trades generally take place on the same day that a farmer comes to the *mandi*, and settlement is made immediately. There is no strong link between a *mandi* and an organized warehousing facility.

Price discovery across the *mandis* is fragmented, particularly owing to the distances between *mandis*, the lack of grade standardization, and the lack of price



Wheat at a Haryana *Mandi* (Wholesale Market). For an agricultural country like India, trading in over 100 crops, issues of price dissemination, standards, certification, and warehousing abound. But since the 1999 dissolution of regulations preventing futures trading in commodities, the public, and government and industry leaders alike, have become increasingly optimistic about the ability of commodity markets to tackle such problems. INDIA TODAY.

transparency. Farmers are price takers at *mandis* and have traditionally been unaware of prices prevailing elsewhere in the country. A government-run system named Agmarknet tries to capture prices from *mandis* and disseminate the information using computer networks. However, there are serious difficulties in the mechanism of recording prices, and dissemination takes place with a lag of one day, which reduces its importance to farmers selling goods.

Two recent developments have helped alleviate the difficulties of price transparency. First, the dramatic growth of mobile phones in recent years has helped farmers acquire better information. In addition, in 2003, the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy and the National Commodities Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX) have embarked on a process of polling dealers across the country, using the “adaptive trimmed mean” methodology to compute reference prices for standardized grades of many commodities. This polling is done three times a day, and price dissemination takes place within the same day.

Futures

Commodity futures markets have been present in India since 1875. These markets traded forward contracts on spot commodities such as cotton, spices, oilseeds, and food grains. In 1952 the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act was put into place, giving the government powers over commodity futures trading. It banned cash settlement and options trading. In addition, extensive trading by the government on many markets—such as wheat and rice through the minimum support price (MSP) policy—stifled price flexibility. MSPs came to exist on rice, wheat, pulses (legumes), oilseeds, cotton, and sugarcane. Large-scale public sector procurement and storage led to a shriveling of the private sector in trading, storage, and transportation of commodities. These restrictive policies were accompanied by numerous other interventionist policies, including barriers upon movement of agricultural goods, and an extensive system of state intervention for agricultural inputs. These factors created a situation in which the agricultural sector became one of the most repressed sectors of the Indian economy.

As a part of this philosophy, and using the powers obtained under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, commodity futures trading was banned on most commodities in the 1960s. In the 1970s trading was permitted on only six commodities: peppers, potatoes, jute, jaggery (unrefined sugar), castor oil, and turmeric. These commodities traded at futures exchanges, which were open-outcry markets that traded a single commodity and that were governed by the brokerage community.

The Forward Markets Commission (FMC) under the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) regulated these markets. The exchanges had to obtain prior approvals before they could trade any new contract, including those in which the old contract had matured and the exchange wished to create a new contract for the next period.

When this restrictive framework was imposed upon the futures market, the liquidity for these contracts went underground. A vibrant set of “illegal” futures markets sprang up, which catered to users in the economy while violating laws that banned commodity futures or imposed stringent restrictions upon them. Illegal markets had the additional advantage of avoiding direct tax and indirect tax provisions, which were often designed in a ways that were incompatible with a modern agricultural sector. At centers like Bhabar in Gujarat, active commodity futures and forward trading took place while violating laws requiring registration and regulation by the FMC.

Recent Initiatives

In 1999 government restrictions that prevented futures trading on commodities were removed. From 2000 onward, the FMC worked on the liberalization of existing rules in an effort to foster new kinds of institutional development. The major focus has been upon “national multi-commodity exchanges,” which would trade in multiple products, for a community of brokers and market participants from all over the country. By December 2003, there were three exchanges—the NCDEX, the Multi-Commodity Exchange, and the National Multi-Commodity Exchange (NMCE)—trading futures on multiple commodities using order flows from across the entire country. The traded products include futures on twenty-two agricultural commodities, as well as on gold and silver. The trading is done using an anonymous, electronic limit order book, with orders being matched using price-time priority. The contracts are cash-settled on the prevailing spot commodity price.

In cases of commodities that were not legally traded earlier, such as gold and silver, the newer exchanges have escalating growth in volumes. When there are local

markets with large volumes on a commodity, the liquidity on the electronic exchanges is much lower. Some exceptions are futures on guar seed trading, in which the liquidity has moved to NCDEX from local exchanges, or pepper, in which NMCE now has a significant share. Overall, futures volumes on the electronic exchanges grew from 1.5 billion rupees in January 2004 to 8 billion rupees in August 2004. This growth in business is likely to continue with new commodities and new products such as options.

Regulatory Architecture

Regulation of spot markets in each state is done by the state *mandi* board, which also acts as a record keeper of the number of *mandis*, commodities traded, and so on. The governance of each *mandi* rests with representatives from the local community of farmers. At the central government, the DCA tracks traded prices and volumes of commodities from the regional markets. The FMC regulates commodity futures exchanges.

Since Indian commodity derivatives share the same contract characteristics of Indian equity derivatives, their regulation and supervision requirements are also similar to those for equity derivatives markets. Due to the overlap in the regulatory requirement, there was a proposal in 2003 to merge the FMC and the securities market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India.

Susan Thomas

See also Debt Markets

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COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES, PAST AND PRESENT

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, extremely limited areas of land were used for cultivation. The rest of the land remained uncultivated and was used as grazing and forest land by villagers

and sometimes by nonresident pastoral people. In this sense, the uncultivated land can be considered a common property resource. In addition to uncultivated land located near villages, large tracts of land and forest, remote from villages, were open to common access by pastoral people and forest dwellers.

The use of uncultivated land, in particular land attached to villages, was generally controlled by communities of landowning villagers. In North India control of such “common land” was exercised by village proprietary bodies. In South India contemporary documents claim that *mirasidars* (influential landowners) had the right to use common land. Villagers who did not own land were not completely excluded from grazing cattle on common land or collecting firewood from it, but they could use this land only under the regulation of the dominant villagers.

Decrease in Uncultivated Area and Deforestation

After 1860 a drastic decrease in the extent of such uncultivated areas (called “wastelands” by British colonial officers) occurred, as well as a decline in other common resources. The British administration demarcated village boundaries. This demarcation of settlements cut across open-range grazing previously used by nomadic pastoralists, reducing the area available for grazing outside villages, and shortened long fallow in open ranges by establishing sedentary cultivation on them. The British Raj declared all the land beyond those boundaries the property of the state. Hence in the montane districts of North India, a large tract of “state property” was carved out of waste and forest land after the enactment of the Indian Forest Act of 1878. The resulting shortage of grazing land made it very difficult for the pastoral people to survive. Many nomads were obliged to seek wage labor, and some became part-time peasants. Others concentrated on trading, though some struggled to continue their earlier pastoral activities.

Eager to increase land revenue, the British promoted an expansion of the cultivation of wasteland. Furthermore, the commercialization of agriculture and its increasing profits, as well as an increase in population, induced more farmers to transform village wasteland into cropped land. The result was a radical shrinkage in the extent of uncultivated land by the end of the nineteenth century. In South India the initiative to convert was taken by the dominant landowning villagers, who had asserted preferential rights to village wasteland. A report from a district in South India has shown that the area of wasteland in the unirrigated area decreased from 42 percent to 26 percent between 1880 and 1911. In the Punjab the population grew between 1855 and 1881 by 24 percent and, responding to irrigation from canals, cultivation

increased by 50 percent between 1868 and 1921, with a considerable decline in uncultivated areas.

This process was accompanied by a rapid deforestation of woodland. Under the 1878 Indian Forest Act, the government classified a large tract of woodland as “reserved forests” and “protected forests.” People’s customary rights to use forests came under the strong regulations and restrictions set by the Raj, against which local people protested. In spite of the declared policy of “scientific” management of forests, a large amount of wood was cut for the construction of railways, shipbuilding, and other imperial interests, resulting in serious deforestation. Developing urban areas also demanded a large amount of wood for construction and fuel.

Changes in the Management of Common Property Resources

The trend to divide and privatize common land was accelerated by a weakening of cohesion among land proprietors and a decline in communal control over common land, as reported from the Punjab. The government regulated the user rights of tenants and service groups on common land, leading to conflicts between landowners and other residents. In South India a growing number of high caste landowners started moving to urban areas to seek white-collar jobs, weakening their control of village common resources.

Another trend was witnessed in South India from the end of the nineteenth century. A large number of landless agricultural laborers started to migrate to overseas estates. Migration not only provided them with alternative job opportunities but also stimulated the growth of their sense of independence. A new phase in the occupation of wasteland appeared in the 1920s when Dalits (untouchables) and other landless people began occupying wasteland for cultivation, partly under grants from the government. After independence, the Tamil Nadu (Madras) government continued to expand cultivation by encouraging the reclamation of wasteland and assigning wasteland to Scheduled Caste (untouchable) and landless people. Maharashtra witnessed a similar pattern of development. Since the 1960s, Dalits have encroached upon village common land to establish private ownership, and from time to time their encroachment has been regularized by the state governments.

Surveys of village common properties point to differences in the impact of land-assigning policy by region, revealing that villagers, in particular the poor, depend heavily on village common land as a source of fodder, fuel, and food. In most areas, the poor met 66 to 84 percent of fuel requirements and about 80 percent of fodder from common land. Village common land has, however,

been increasingly privatized, and a large portion of land once assigned to the poor was either sold or mortgaged and acquired by the rich. The extent to which the lower strata of village society have attained socioeconomic independence from elite groups is an important factor in areas where there have been movements by the lower classes; encroachment has been an expression of their independence that, with its regularization, reinforces their bargaining power.

In more egalitarian villages with less differentiation by class structure, all segments of the village population participate in controlling and preserving village common resources. An acute class differentiation in the local economy, on the other hand, creates apathy among the landless toward reserving common resources. The empowerment of the landless and other subordinate groups, and their greater participation in the control and use of the village common resources, can be seen as a positive development in terms of environmental preservation. Recent cases of joint forest management and other community-based management of natural resources in various areas in India suggest the growth of such environmental protection, as exemplified by a case in Midnapore district, West Bengal, where small farmers and agricultural laborers of tribal and Dalit origins took initiatives in developing forest protection committees.

In addition to the changes in the local managing system, other factors also have influenced village common resources. The rapid expansion of farm forestry since the 1980s has led to an increased supply of wood, lowering market prices of fuel woods. The main energy sources used by urban households have switched from fuel wood to liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, and others, leading to a reduction in urban demand for wood and contributing to a decline in the incentive to collect fuel wood from village forest lands. The spread of yield-increasing technologies in agriculture has lessened the pressure to expand cropped areas; the expansion of nonagricultural employment opportunities also has mitigated the pressure on agricultural expansion. Together with the rapid expansion of joint forest management all over India, these factors have contributed to preventing a rapid reduction in the total extent of forest land since the 1980s, and to mitigating the decline in common property resources.

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See also **Environmental Consciousness since 1800**

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COMMUNIST PARTIES OF INDIA. See **Political System.**

CONGRESS PARTY Founded during Christmas week of 1885 as a "native parliament" for political expression and debate for the educated classes of British India, the Indian National Congress (commonly, the Congress Party of India) became one of the world's major political institutions of the twentieth century. It is one of the world's oldest political parties, having been established two decades before the British Labour Party, which ironically constituted the British government at the time of India's independence on 14 August 1947. Straddling three centuries, Congress continues as a major force in Indian politics.

Few political parties have demonstrated the capacity to persist and govern as has Congress, and it has done so in a system of enormous scale and complexity. In eleven of the fourteen national elections held through 2004, Congress returned the largest number of representatives to the Lok Sabha (House of the People), the lower house of India's Parliament. It received the largest number of votes in all but two elections; in all but five, it received at least twice the vote of the next party. Congress has formed the government at the national level for 45 of the years since independence, while five former leaders of the party have served as short-lived prime ministers for five of the remaining years.

This longevity has occurred in the context of a highly complex political system and diverse society. In the



Portrait of Sarojini Naidu Spinning Yarn. A well-known image from picture postcard, c. 1945. Among India's most visible leaders, the elegant Naidu was president of the Indian National Congress and the first woman governor of a free India, and helped mobilize support for independence abroad. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

parliamentary elections held in May 2004, for example, the 671 million Indian voters, 58 percent of whom went to one or another of over 600,000 polling stations, were faced in one or another constituency by 5,435 candidates representing 261 different political parties, plus numerous independent candidates, contesting for 543 parliamentary seats. Elections were held in twenty-six states and Union territories, the five largest states of which, were they sovereign nations in the international system, would be counted among the ten most populous nations of the world. Many of the states comprise distinct languages, cultures, and social systems, the kinds of social formations that have frequently given rise to nationalism and the creation of sovereign states. The more than 1 billion people who call India home profess a wide variety of religions, Hinduism being the confession of some 80 percent, but with substantial divisions. Muslim communities in

India are more populous than those in all but two other countries, Indonesia and Bangladesh. The character, role, and functioning of the Congress Party has been central in the creation and maintenance of this extraordinary experiment in democracy, though other parties and factors have been important as well.

An understanding of this political phenomenon that is the Congress Party requires an examination of its development, adaptation, leadership, and transformation in its pre-independence and nationalist phase, as well as in its postindependence and governance phase. In the nationalist phase, five dimensions were critical: development of consensus on political strategy, purpose, and creation of a democratic regime; creation of a complex and adaptive party organization; recruitment of successive generations of social groups into its fold; development of a distinctive and effective system of conflict management; and participation in governance. These dimensions became manifest and were prominent in different measure within three general periods: 1885–1920; 1920–1937; and 1937–1947. There are, of course, important demarcations within each.

The Pre-independence Period: Nationalism

1885–1920. For its first two decades Congress served to voice concerns and complaints to the colonial administration and to petition for expanded formal participation for Indians in the civil service and the councils of government. This early generation of activists, which included such luminaries as Dadabhai Naoroji, the first Indian elected to the British Parliament, Surendranath Banerjea, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, advocated evolutionary political reforms (benefiting largely the Western-educated, professional, and propertied classes) and constructive and cooperative engagement with the British. While the colonial government was slow to reform, party sessions, mail service and the telegraph, and increased travel assisted this generation in their discovery of India and their discovery of themselves as Indians. They came to be known as the Moderates.

Another group, known as the Extremists, came to the fore in the first decade of the twentieth century. Led by the able and learned Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the *Lokmanya* (Leader of the People), they advocated radical action and noncooperation with the British, the selective use of violence for political ends, and the importance of mass support and action, and they portrayed themselves under the banner of Hindu symbols. While barred by the Moderates from participation in Congress after 1907 through the imposition of restrictions on membership and with the “assistance” of the British through arrests and incarceration, the Extremists reentered the party in 1916, less extreme than before, but with greater influence. They



Congress Party Meeting. At a recent meeting of the still powerful Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi (left), its president and widow of Rajiv, makes her entrance. Many had doubted her ability as an outsider (she was born in Italy) to hold the party together. INDIA TODAY.

joined the erstwhile Moderates, who had become less moderate than before with the entry of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the Mahatma, who was bent on using his confrontational experiments with truth developed and used so effectively in South Africa, and who saw Gokhale as his political guru.

1920–1937. A new consensus emerged within the Congress Party between 1916 and 1920. In 1920 the party declared *purna swaraj* (complete independence) as its ultimate objective, within the empire if possible, outside if necessary. It also accepted noncooperation and mass civil disobedience campaigns as appropriate strategies to achieve that end, the use of *satyagraha* (soul force), in Mahatma Gandhi's evocative language and deeply original formulation, movements that were to be conducted only under his leadership. Further, there was continued consensus on the institutions of representative democracy as being the appropriate form of government for India, but the Congress leadership found repressive actions by the British, such as the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in 1919 and its aftermath, as being so egregious that cooperation and participation in political reforms would

have to await another day. Thus, by 1920, the two strands that had both defined and divided Congress in 1907 were joined through Gandhi's genius, achieving consensus on complete independence for the Indian political community and representative democracy as its system of government, with noncooperation and civil disobedience as legitimate strategies for their achievement. These dual elements defined the party's national consensus and were manifest in subsequent political agreements, the political reforms of 1935, the "Quit India" Movement of 1942, and the elections of 1945–1946.

Unlike all other parties of undivided India, the Congress Party arrived at independence with a nationwide organization and web of political affiliations that reached across all geographical regions with organizational connections from nationalist leaders at the center to activists in the village. While its annual meetings drew representatives from the various provinces of British India, at its meeting at Nagpur in central India in 1920, and enshrined in what is known as the Nagpur Constitution, the Congress leadership created a formal party organization for British India (those provinces where the British

imposed direct colonial rule) that established regular membership with dues, formal procedures for selecting delegates to the All-India Congress Committee, an organizational hierarchy that reached from the national to the state to the local (municipal and district) level, and rules that governed the election of representatives from one level to the next. It also set forth the functions and authority of various party committees, leadership positions, and rules for the selection of party candidates for public office. It was here, too, that provincial party institutions in relevant areas were organized on the basis of major language groups, rather than according to the artificial administrative boundaries drawn by the colonial power. The party organization also determined policy and strategy to be pursued by its members elected to legislative bodies. And in 1936 the Congress Party formally extended its domain into the major states of princely India (where the British practiced indirect colonial rule) through creation of the All-India States' People's Congress. Well before the achievement of independence, Congress had established a complex and effective mass party organization throughout the Indian subcontinent.

1937–1947. Congress recruited successive generations of groups into its fold as it launched campaigns to remove the British from Indian soil and as it looked forward to the need for electoral support in a free and independent India. While effective in raising political consciousness and recruiting new groups into politics, civil disobedience campaigns were difficult to sustain. To develop sustained support, Congress pursued three major strategies. The first was to recruit people directly as regular dues-paying members, many of whom came through party portals from mass campaigns. A second was to establish support from various functional groups through the creation of organizations such as the All-India Trades Union Congress, the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association), and the Harijan Sevak Sangh (Untouchable Service Society). A third and critically important strategy was to act as an entrepreneurial franchise, selectively and adroitly associating the party with a complexity of relatively autonomous provincial and local political and social movements that ranged from caste and depressed classes associations to secular political organizations. The Congress Party provided the latter with the legitimacy of the party's mantle, broader visibility, and an avenue of access to seek favor or redress from the colonial administration, while the latter provided Congress with access and political support at the grass roots. Congress avoided association, however, with movements over which it had limited control, and it did not extend support to others, such as peasant agitations against landed interests well-positioned in the party or strikes against business interests that were a source of financial support for party activities.

The party, in conceiving itself as an “open umbrella,” was also home to a wide range of ideologically oriented groups, some of which operated more or less autonomously within the party fold. These groups included the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party of India, and for a period of time leaders of the All-India Muslim League, as well as Hindu revivalists of the Hindu Mahasabha, Pan-Islamic and educated Muslim elites, and Gandhian advocates of a communitarian and village-oriented society. In this way, Congress became a composite of much of Indian society and its vast array of caste and communal groups. Its leaders at independence included Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and while the elite came primarily from higher castes, there were representatives from those lower in the caste hierarchy as well. It included leaders representing political ideologies that ranged across the political spectrum.

Almost sixty-two years old at independence, the party had “learned” to manage internal conflict, and to recruit and socialize new generations of leaders and activists. By 1947 three generations of leaders had passed through the party. The founders had passed away long before independence, most before the party became a mass organization after 1920. Major divisions in the party, such as that between the Moderates and Extremists, were healed. Outcomes for leadership positions in party councils were determined by election, though mediation and arbitration were important elements of the procedural mix. A formal appellate system was established within the party organization, but except for a few notable instances, outcomes were accepted by winners and losers alike.

Conflict resolution was also managed within the party through a distinctive system of arbitration, the origins and legitimacy of which derived from norms and practices of conflict resolution in traditional society. In this system, a highly regarded leader of the party would hear petitions and complaints and render a decision that to the fullest extent possible had only winners, where “victory” for a loser in a particular contest would be postponed or would occur in a different forum. This system, with Gandhi the primary arbiter at the national level until shortly before his death, was maintained for two decades after independence with Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Kamraj Nadar, and their authoritative designees effectively performing this role.

With the approach of independence, however, and the prospects of contesting elections and governing imminent, some groups left Congress, some to return, but some to enter into intense opposition. The Muslim League left Congress before independence, its opposition and demands leading to the creation of Pakistan. During World War II, with Congress leaders jailed,

Communists left to establish centers of support in areas where Congress was not strong. Shortly after independence, as the first national elections approached, socialist groups left the party to pursue their political fortunes outside. In many cases, those who left, returned; and in most cases, those who left were not accompanied by all their brethren.

Before independence, a large stratum of the Congress Party had the experience of participating in elections and in legislative institutions. A smaller but significant group had also served as members of provincial cabinets. Congress, of course, had been the principal petitioner of the British to create the institutions of representative government with provision for effective Indian participation. While these demands, even more so the reforms that followed them, were elementary at the beginning, they successively became more consequential. While minimal legislative participation at the provincial level had been established under the Indian Councils Act of 1892, the Morley-Minto Reforms incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1909 were the first of much consequence. A decade later the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms extended authority by the Government of India Act of 1919, providing for elected majorities in provincial councils with representatives elected from territorial constituencies, and for the appointment of elected representatives to Cabinet positions, with control over such “transferred” policy areas as education, public health, and local government, while control over major “reserved” policy areas such as the police, land revenue, and agriculture was retained by members of the colonial administration. Many members of Congress, calling themselves “Swarajists,” contested the elections, while others chose not to participate but to stay outside the legislative process and protest British policies and actions.

The Government of India Act of 1935 was a watershed in the development of representative institutions, and with a number of amendments and elaborations later became the Constitution of India. Congress’s approach to this new political order had antecedents in the Nehru Report, drafted by Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal, presented to the All-Parties Conference of 1929. The report advocated those institutions and set forth the principles that would be established to serve as the fundamental law of a democratic India. The principles established in the party’s Karachi Resolution of 1931 would ultimately be enshrined in the Constitution as the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The Congress Party contested the elections held in 1937 and 1945–1946 under this act with considerable vigor and success, forming the governments in a number of provinces in 1937 and again in 1946. Leaders of the party were able to hone their skills in the matters of cre-

ating and maintaining legislative majorities, implementing important measures of public policy, and developing facility as political managers in a format of democratic governance. This continuum of demands for democratic political reforms and experience in elections and in governance resulted in a fundamental reservoir of knowledge and political skill.

Thus as Congress assumed the mantle of governance at independence it had established a sense of national political community, consensus on the creation of a democratic regime, a vast national organizational network and communications system, a stronger base of political support than any competitor, and experience as political entrepreneurs mobilizing social groups and as leaders and managers of the institutions of a democratic government. Congress was the embodiment of a new national political class adept in political bargaining, well schooled in the ways of party organizational management and parliamentary government, a class of political leaders and aspirants who had come to pursue politics as a vocation.

After Independence: Governance

As the Congress Party experienced change and transformation before independence, so it did thereafter, facing as it did the challenges of governance, a mass and increasingly demanding electorate, dissidence within its own ranks, new claimants for access to power, the rise of religious and regional sentiment in politics, and ultimately a changed international system with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of globalization and free markets. The phases of this transformation can be divided into the following periods: party institutionalization, 1947–1967; party division and the rise of the “personal party,” 1967–1989; and the party as core of a shifting national coalition, 1989–2005. Subdivisions, of course, attend each.

1947–1967. Throughout the first period, the Congress Party was the core of a one-party dominant system, the “party of consensus,” as political scientist Rajni Kothari named it, surrounded by “parties of pressure” that attempted to influence policies through contact with like-minded groups within the party, and to serve as a critic though not as an alternative governing party. Party strategy was one of responsiveness and accommodation of various interests within the polity. Cabinets immediately after independence included important non-Congress representatives, members of major religious groups, and leaders representing the wide ideological spectrum within the party. The national government was sensitive to issues that divided the national political community. It withdrew from its commitment to create Hindi as the sole national language, given that this was the mother

tongue of less than half the population and was resisted by many, especially in South India, who insisted, some violently, that this would be akin to a form of internal colonialism. The government also acceded to strong regionalist demands, which were attracting mass support and siphoning party members into the opposition, that the states in India's federal system be reconstituted on the basis of linguistic cultures, a demand seen in some circles as undermining the very idea of a national political community. The government was deeply committed to integrating the more than five hundred princely states into the Indian Union, and did so in some cases by using coercion but also by providing the erstwhile princes with transitional formal positions of public authority, with "privy purses" (provision of public funding for their personal needs), and, continuing the party's long-time commitment to the right to private property, providing for retention of some of their estates. Each of these objectives was of fundamental consequence and required uncommon resolve and political astuteness; the integration of the princely states was one of a number of accomplishments of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the major contender and alternative to Jawaharlal Nehru for the prime ministership, and the primary leader of a strong conservative wing within the party.

Responsiveness and accommodation was further demonstrated in Congress's efforts to continue to mobilize and absorb the broadest possible scope of social groups into the party, thus continuing to fulfill its pre-independence claim that it and it alone represented the Indian nation. The Congress Party was successful in this regard, and normally enjoyed the "option of first refusal" with respect to new groups entering politics. To expand avenues of access, it increased the size of state legislative assemblies, and established a system of institutions in rural areas, avowedly committed to economic development, called *panchayati raj* (literally, "rule of a council of five").

The expansion of participation within the Congress Party, together with the reality of governance and the absence of effective opposition, resulted in the creation of a two-party system, "bi-factionalism" as it was sometimes called, within the party at the state level. Often, one factional coalition formed the government, while the "opposition" coalition controlled the party organization, awaiting an opportunity, whether through legislative defections or future elections, to replace the governing coalition.

Another major element of the Congress strategy of governance and party-building was public policy. In anticipation of the second national elections, and with socialist parties attracting substantial media and public attention, at its Avadi Session in 1955 the Congress Party adopted a resolution declaring itself committed to "a socialist pattern of society." At the same time, the

government created a system of tariff protection to facilitate the development of Indian business and industry. An aspect of the socialist pattern of society was the establishment of a large public sector, within which the national government established ownership of the "commanding heights" of the economy, areas such as steel, transportation, and natural resources, in which capital investment requirements exceeded the capacity of domestic private resources. As part of its policy of economic protection, and with the avowed intent of encouraging efficient resource utilization, Congress also established a system of permits and licenses that were required in order to conduct business and that had the added result of providing the party with control over public resources, which proved instrumental in developing support at the polls.

1967–1989. With the death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 and that of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, the party had lost its two major arbiters of intraparty disputes. Nehru's death marked the end of the "tall leadership" of the party, leaders who had lived their lives almost exclusively in national politics rather than in the politics of provinces and states. Just as consequential was the rise of dissent within the party. Given the social basis of the Congress Party, which had increasingly become a state-level aggregation of locally based factions, conflicts within the party were initially manifested at the state level. What was so striking and had such far-reaching consequences for the Congress, particularly at the time of the 1967 elections, was the magnitude and the simultaneity of factional departures from the party. As a consequence, in the 1967 elections Congress governments were turned out of office in eight of India's sixteen major states.

These state-based defections were encouraged by the intensification of particularistic group identity. With the expansion of the range of public goods allocated and affected by the state, and given the relative scarcity of positions, groups within Congress began to perceive politics increasingly in terms of particularistic interests rather than in terms of a collective good. The party was increasingly seen in instrumentalist terms rather than as an institution with a purpose and role that transcended their own. A series of national surveys clearly established the erosion of party identification over the next two decades and in its stead an increase in voter identification with principal party leaders, initially Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, until her assassination in 1984, and then with her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, until his assassination in 1991.

The elections of 1967 thus mark a watershed in the transformation of the Congress Party from an institutionalized organization to one that started to experience division and organizational decline, the dominant successor

being a “personal party,” the cohesion of which was assisted by the actions and aura of Indira Gandhi as prime minister and president of a fictional formal party organization buoyed by mass appeals, the threat of prime ministerial actions to unseat state governments, and the selective use of state resources to attract electoral support. This “new” Congress Party, created in the context of an erosion of voter identity with Congress as an organization, was hastened by the first of a succession of splits in the national party. Congress split in 1969 between Prime Minister Gandhi and a coalition of powerful state leaders known as the Syndicate, who controlled the party organization and who had become disturbed at their inability to control a prime minister whom they had placed in power on the assumption that she would be submissive and attentive to their interests. This division resulted in the creation of two national Congress parties: the Congress (O), for Organization, the party of the Syndicate, which maintained control over most state and local party organizations as well as national party institutions; and the Congress (R), for Ruling, composed of a majority of Congress members of Parliament and which, with the support of Communist members of Parliament, continued to govern until the national elections of 1971.

With the prospect of facing the electorate and selecting party candidates without a party organization, the prime minister and her senior advisers in the Congress (R) Party and the government developed a three-prong strategy. The first was to hold national elections separate from state elections, which had always been held simultaneously in the past. The immediate impact of this arrangement was to de-link local issues, which were the primary basis of voter mobilization, from national ones and to thus buffer national politics from state-level conflicts. A second was to create an informal arrangement of political support through selected leaders at the state and local level, an arrangement that was ultimately formalized with organizational scaffolding for public consumption and for purposes of selecting candidates to contest the elections. The third was to focus the election campaign on the person of the prime minister, the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, the “founding” prime minister of India. This effort to develop direct mass support for creation of a new “personal party” included a campaign of public and media events that focused on the person of the prime minister and the use of a new and resonant slogan that had particular appeal to minorities and the dispossessed: *Garibi Hatao!* (Abolish Poverty!).

The Congress (R) Party was returned to power with a two-thirds majority in Parliament on the crest of 44 percent of the popular vote. The Congress (O) Party, on the other hand, which ran 238 candidates, saw only 16 of its candidates return victoriously, with the party attracting

only 10 percent of the vote. After this turn of events, the Congress (O) Party for all practical purposes disappeared, its leaders and activists merging into opposition parties, others being accepted as prodigals back into Congress (R).

The Congress Party during the last three decades of the twentieth century underwent three additional splits. Congress (R) suffered its first major division in the 1977 national elections, which marked the end of Indira Gandhi’s two-year “National Emergency,” during which not only leaders of the opposition parties but also leaders of Congress (R) were jailed for alleged illegal activities or for what was believed to be their proclivity to act in a manner inimical to the public interest. A national coalition that included many former leaders of Congress (R) was established under the banner of the newly formed Janata Party to contest the elections. The results were a ringing indictment of the policies pursued by the national government during the “Emergency.” Congress (R) won but two of 225 parliamentary seats in the Hindi-speaking states of North India. The party lost all ten state elections held three months later.

Subsequent to this severe electoral setback, which witnessed the prime minister and many of her ministerial colleagues going down to defeat, a segment of the party led by some senior members formed a new Congress Party—the Congress (U), named after its leader and chief minister of Karnataka, Devraj Urs. This splinter from Congress (R) contested the elections of 1980, winning but 5 percent of the vote and 13 parliamentary seats, compared to the 40 percent of the vote and 67 percent of the seats for the newly named Congress (I), for Indira, the former Congress (R). Still another split occurred after these elections with the creation of Congress (S), named after Sharad Pawar, former and future chief minister of the state of Maharashtra, its founding leader, along with a number of other “young Turks” who felt their mobility severely thwarted by the iron-fisted control of the prime minister. Each party, however, had but a short life, the first disappearing after the death of its namesake and the latter after its dismal performance in the 1984 elections, where it won less than 2 percent of the vote and 5 parliamentary seats against Congress (I), which received just under 50 percent of the vote and won three-fourths of the parliamentary seats. Again, members of these “opposition” Congress parties in many cases found their way back into Congress (I).

In November 1984, after the apogee of her electoral success, Prime Minister Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, who were angered that she had ordered the Indian army to invade the Golden Temple in Amritsar to prevent it from continuing as a base harboring Sikh separatists and terrorists. While in deep mourning and with concern for its political future, the leadership of the

Congress (I) Party elected her son, Rajiv Gandhi, as her successor, thus ushering in the third generation of Nehrus as India's preeminent leader. The new prime minister had been a reluctant recruit into politics, having had a career as an airlines pilot, and had agreed only after the death of his younger brother, Sanjay, who had demonstrated an extraordinary appetite for politics. The party declined in popularity under his leadership given his lack of political acumen, his lack of a compelling public presence, and his limited skill in management and in effectively articulating policy initiatives that could excite public interest and imagination. Thus, while winning 40 percent of the vote in the elections of 1989, Congress (I) won under 40 percent of the seats, and forfeited its claim to governance to a minority coalition of parties known as the National Front, led by a former leader of the Congress, Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

1989–2005. The election of 1989 marks the commencement of a tendency toward a two-party coalition in India's national politics. In each election from that time, no single party has won an outright majority of the seats in Parliament. A similar tendency has developed as well in the states. National coalitions for the two years after 1989 were unstable, with two different governments in power before the instability of coalitions prompted a call for new elections in 1991. And while these resulted in the Congress Party receiving the largest number of votes and seats, the party did not win a majority but continued in power for five years with the support of opposition parties. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in the election campaign of 1991, a tragic event that had the perverse consequence of benefiting his party at the polls. He was succeeded by P. V. Narasimha Rao, the first person from South India to serve as prime minister. A central cabinet minister of long standing, he initiated what would become far-reaching economic reforms. He selected Dr. Manmohan Singh as finance minister, a highly regarded economist who would himself become prime minister in 2004. The government under their leadership moved to dismantle the socialist infrastructure that had developed over the past half-century and which in their judgment had had a stultifying effect on economic growth. The government acted to remove many bureaucratic constraints placed on entrepreneurship, fostered privatization and private investment, and supported freer entry of the Indian entrepreneur into the global economy. The consequences of these actions included the beginning of sustained and substantial economic growth, as well as the deleterious effect of contributing to the maldistribution of wealth in a country already home to a multitude of the severely impoverished and poor.

The party also faced an increase in communal tension and violence between the Muslim and Hindu communities

and was punished at the polls in its loss of electoral support within the Muslim community for its temporizing response to the destruction of a historically important mosque, Babri Masjid, in northern India, by Hindus who claimed that the mosque had been built on the ruins of a Hindu temple of no less historic and religious importance

to the Hindus. This conflict, which resulted in riots and several thousand deaths in the aftermath, served to alienate important segments of the Muslim community from Congress, as did the inimical economic impact of government economic policy in important agricultural communities. The result in the 1996 election was the defeat of Congress at the polls and the rise of the Hindu-centric Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which for the first time controlled a larger number of seats in Parliament than did Congress. Given that no party could sustain a majority coalition, new elections were held in 1998, at which time the BJP again won more seats than Congress, though not a majority; the BJP was successful, however, in putting together a coalition that proved effective in maintaining governmental stability while pursuing policies not unlike those of its Congress predecessor. The Congress in opposition, however, was without strong and effective leadership, and was divided over the question of whether Sonia Gandhi, the widow of Rajiv and Italian by birth, would enjoy popular legitimacy.

Commentary and analysis during its years in opposition and in its preparations for the 2004 elections portrayed Congress as a party in its terminal phase, a party without a distinctive program, without effective leadership, without any justifiable claim to recent accomplishment, and without the electoral base that would enable it to play a significant role in national politics, much less form the national government. While in opposition at the center, however, the Congress had fared better than other parties in elections held in sixteen major states from 1999 to 2004. In seven of these elections, voters gave Congress the largest number of members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), while the BJP and state parties had the most in four, with the Communist Party of India (Marxist; CPM) being first in one. State-level parties came in second in eight states, while Congress was second in five, the BJP in two, and the CPM in one. In only eight states, however, was a single party returned with a majority of MLAs. Thus the electoral success of the Congress Party in the 2004 elections came as a surprise. A national coalition of state parties, themselves often fluid coalitions, the party continues as the major "left-of-center" coalition, with the BJP and its allies as the major "right-of-center" coalition in India's national politics.

Richard Sisson

See also Banerjea, Surendranath N.; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gandhi, Rajiv; Gandhi, Sonia; General (National) Elections; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna; Government of India Act of 1919; Government of India Act of 1935; Naoroji, Dadabhai; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nehru, Motilal; Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai; Satyagraha; Singh, Manmohan; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar.

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CONSTITUTION. See **Political System.**

CONTRACT FARMING Contract farming may be defined as a system for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements. The main feature of such agreements is to obtain a commitment from farmers to provide an agricultural commodity of a specific type, at a specified time, price, and quantity, to a buyer. The arrangement generally requires the buyer to provide a



EFFECT OF ASSURED MARKETS: TOMATO PRODUCTION IN INDIA

Hindustan Lever issued contracts to 400 farmers in northern India to grow selected varieties of tomatoes for paste. A study of the project confirmed that productivity yields and farmers' incomes increased as a result of the use of hybrid seeds and the availability of an assured market. An analysis of the yields and incomes of the contracted farmers, compared with farmers who grew tomatoes for the open market, shows that yields of the farmers under contract were 64 percent higher than those outside the project.

Source: Eaton and Shepherd, 2001.

degree of production support through, for example, the supply of inputs, credit, or the provision of technical advice. Contract farming is becoming an increasingly important aspect of agribusiness, whether the products are purchased by multinationals, smaller companies, government agencies, farmer cooperatives or individual entrepreneurs

Indian Experience

In India, contract farming can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when commercial crops like cotton, indigo, and tobacco were grown under contract. In the late twentieth century, there were contracts for sugarcane and seed production. At the turn of the twenty-first century, some form of contract arrangements existed for several agricultural crops, including tomatoes, potatoes, chili peppers, cucumbers, baby corn, onions, cotton, wheat, basmati rice, groundnuts, flowers, and medicinal plants. Large corporations like Hindustan Lever, Pepsi Foods, A. V. Thomas, Daburs, Thapars, Marico, Godrej, Mahindras, and Wimco used contract farming for many crops, but the coverage is as yet small compared to the potential. Experiences in a few states are discussed below.

Punjab. The state of Punjab has largely grown wheat and rice for many decades. The Johl Committee Report of 1986 recommended that at least 20 percent of the area under wheat and paddy should be brought under new crops, especially fruits and vegetables. Contract farming in Punjab started in the early 1990s with the entry of Pepsi Foods into the production of tomatoes and chilies and Nijjer Agro Foods, a local firm, into tomatoes. Pepsi sold its tomato facility to Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) in 1995 and entered potato contracting in the mid-1990s. HLL works with 400 contract farmers, while Pepsi Foods works with a few farmers in both chilies and potatoes. The HLL experience shows that contract farming helped both farmers and the processing industry.

Andhra Pradesh. Contract farming has been increasing in Andhra, and is most prevalent in crops like cucumbers, oil palm, and some fruits and vegetables. There is also contract farming between poultry companies and the corn producers. In the Kuppam area of Chittoor district, farmers are practicing the Israeli type of cultivation in 10,000 acres, using little water and reaping higher yields. In the future, it is expected that the cultivated area using this technology will be increased to 55,000 acres. The introduction of cucumber cultivation on a contract basis in the Kuppam area is being undertaken by the Bata Hachita Company Agro India (BHCAI), whose field staff collects a list of farmers willing to take up cucumber cultivation. The processors assess the demand for exports and inform farmers of their requirements. They also supply seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides to the allotted farmers on loan, without interest, at market prices. The BHCAI also advances money if the farmer requires it. This crop attracted considerable attention in Andhra state and became quite popular.

Tamil Nadu. This state is now supporting many new initiatives in contract farming for agricultural exports, particularly sugarcane, cotton, and horticultural crops. Contract farming has also begun for cultivation of medicinal plants, and it is now practiced in the poultry sector as well, with companies supplying chicks, feed, medicines, and technical guidance to the farmers. The firms then buy the birds when they are eight weeks old at a predetermined price. Beginning in a limited way in 2002–2003, EID Parry took tentative steps toward establishing contract farming in rice. EID Parry sold approximately 60 tons of improved seeds for fine quality *ponno* rice and provided extension services to sugarcane farmers who sold sugarcane to the firm's sugar mill and were also willing to grow rice. With improved rice technology, paddy yields were approximately 25 percent higher than normal yields of 3.75 tons/hectare. EID Parry later purchased the output.

Benefits and Problems

Contract farming provides credit, inputs, and technology to farmers, and its pricing arrangements may reduce risk and uncertainty. Some contract farming ventures have led to better crop diversification from cereals to horticulture and floriculture. They have also opened up new markets that would otherwise be unavailable to small farmers. Because of technological improvements, there is improvement in the yields and profits of farmers. In the case of sponsoring companies, contract farming provides a guaranteed supply of agricultural produce in the required quantity and desired quality.

Offsetting the above benefits, there are many problems associated with contract farming. From the farmers' perspective, there are risks of market failure and production problems while growing new crops. The sponsoring

companies may be unreliable, may exploit their monopoly position, and may have inefficient management and marketing teams, resulting in the manipulation of quotas or the nonfulfillment of commitments. Contract farming in India is regulated neither by law nor by an efficient legal system—the most serious constraint to its widespread use in India. Contract farming in Africa, Latin America, and in several Asian countries “has led to many ill-effects in the spheres of livelihoods of producers, community organizations and institutions, environment and gender. . . . Most of the studies which are in the context of relatively less developed regions find contracts inequitable, short-term, and ambiguous” (Singh, 2000).

Requirements needed for successful contract farming include the support of contracts by law and by an efficient legal system. There also must be a reasonably long-term commitment between sponsoring companies and farmers. There must be a market for each product that will ensure profitability.

According to the World Bank, the Indian legal system can be improved with the following legislative measures:

Model contract and code of practice. The governments in different states may wish to prepare and disseminate a model contract and outline a generic code of practice for farmers as well as for the sponsors.

Registration of contracts with marketing committees. Contracts can be registered with the local Mandi Parishad (Marketing Committee) and entered in the revenue records, providing the necessary legal backup.

Local tribunal as the last resort of dispute resolution. If the above two policies do not address the concerns of the farmers and sponsors, the governments can constitute local tribunals, which will have the power to arbitrate and settle disputes about the contract.

Contract farming has become a dominant mode of production in agriculture worldwide. With liberalization and structural changes, it is expected to increase in India over time.

S. Mabendra Dev

See also **Land Tenure since 1950**

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CORNWALLIS, LORD (1738–1805), second earl and first marquis of Cornwallis, governor-general of India (1786–1793 and 1805). Charles Cornwallis was a soldier and Whig politician whose distinguished military career almost ended during a campaign to which he was politically opposed: the repression of Britain's American colonists. Though his command was forced to capitulate at Yorktown, Virginia, Cornwallis was lauded for the strategic vision he had exhibited in the Americas and the loyal and stoic manner in which he bore this defeat. This behavior led to an offer from the Tory Party to succeed his friend Warren Hastings in India. Cornwallis accepted only after receiving pledges of government support and greater authority over his subordinates, which Hastings, to his great cost, had not enjoyed. Cornwallis used this expanded authority to alter the tenor as well as the structure of the British East India Company rule. Whereas Hastings had struggled to find a middle path between Indian and Western political traditions, Cornwallis acted to Europeanize the company's administration.

Much of what was wrong with the company's affairs at that time resulted from the need of its agents to support themselves and provide for their retirement by trading on their own behalf, while ostensibly doing the same for their employer. This conflict of interest encouraged a host of fraudulent practices and was a major drain on the company's profits. Cornwallis's chosen remedy was the creation of what became known as the Covenanted Civil Service. Cornwallis directed the company to provide its agents with a salary generous enough to discourage private trade, which would be strictly forbidden. These agents would also be given commissions on the revenues they collected, and their judicial and executive functions were to be separated as a further check against corrupt practices. All remaining Indian officials of any significant rank were dismissed.

Cornwallis's most controversial measure was the Permanent Settlement of the land revenues of Bengal. This step conferred British rights of land ownership on local *zamindars*, mere tax-gathers. It was taken over the objections of John Shore, a veteran company official and later governor-general (1793–1798). Shore begged Cornwallis to limit the settlement to a preliminary ten-year period. Shore feared, rightly as it turned out, that in time this change might prove disastrous for both the Bengali peasantry and the *zamindars*. For Cornwallis, however, there

were to be no half measures. The settlement was made in perpetuity in 1793.

Cornwallis then turned his attention to ensuring the efficiency of Bengal's judicial system. He largely built upon the hierarchy of civil and criminal courts established by Hastings, but swept away the last vestiges of Indian control over criminal jurisdiction. Further, a Code of Regulations was promulgated to ensure that British standards of uniformity, as well as efficiency, were met.

Cornwallis earned his marquissate, not for these internal reforms, but for his success in following up Hastings's efforts to diplomatically isolate and cripple Mysore, the company's chief remaining rival in the South. Cornwallis personally led the combined forces of the company, several Maratha leaders, and the nizam of Hyderabad against Tipu Sultan in the Third Mysore War (1790–1792), which compelled Tipu to cede half of his territory. This ultimately proved fatal to his later efforts to drive the British from India.

Cornwallis resigned his office in 1793, but in 1805, at the age of sixty-six, he was returned to India to calm the waters roiled by the expansionist policy of Lord Wellesley. He died shortly after his arrival and was buried at Ghazipur.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Hastings, Warren; Wellesley, Richard Colley**

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COWS, SACRED. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

CRIPPS, SIR RICHARD STAFFORD (1889–1952), British politician and diplomat. Stafford Cripps, socialist leader of Britain's Labour Party, undertook two impossible Constitutional "missions" to India in the last painful decade of his life. A nondogmatic Christian Socialist, Stafford initially focused his brilliant mind on chemical science at Winchester and Oxford, but later turned his creative powers toward devising formulas to help resolve thorny issues of international law and diplomacy. Cripps was called to the Bar from London's Middle Temple in 1913, elevated to King's Counsel in 1927, and was knighted in 1930. He joined J. Ramsay MacDonald's first



Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (1889–1952). In 1946 the British government dispatched Cripps to India to negotiate the terms of independence, but the failure of his mission is often seen as the point at which partition became inevitable. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Labour Cabinet in 1929, but refused to serve on MacDonald's subsequent national coalition ministry, preferring to start Labour's radical Socialist League in 1932, advocating a united front with Communists in 1936.

In May 1940, Cripps went as Britain's ambassador to Moscow, where he remained until January 1942. A month later, Prime Minister Winston Churchill invited him to join his War Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons. Then, the shocking fall of Singapore to Japanese invaders induced Churchill's Cabinet to ask Cripps to fly to India to try winning the support of India's National Congress for Britain's global war effort. Cripps had met and befriended Jawaharlal Nehru during one of Nehru's prewar visits to England, and he admired Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on truth and nonviolence as the greatest twin forces for good. Churchill and Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee agreed that if any Englishman could convince India's nationalist leaders that their decision to oppose the war effort was ethically wrong, as well as contrary to India's own best interests, Cripps was the man to do so.

Cripps flew to India in late March 1942 and flew home from Delhi on 12 April, confessing that he had "failed" in

his most important mission. His failure, however, was written into the "nonnegotiable" terms of the Cabinet's offer to India's leaders. India was promised "Dominion Status" after the war ended, but any province of British India that preferred to "opt out" of independent India's Commonwealth Dominion would be free to do so. That option paved the way for M. A. Jinnah's Muslim League to demand a separate Muslim "Pakistan." To Nehru's Congress, that League demand was "madness," and Cripps's offer was viewed as nothing less than "treachery," or, as Gandhi called it, "a post-dated cheque on a bank that is failing!" When he met Cripps, in fact, the Mahatma asked, "If you had nothing better to offer, why have you come so far?" None of Sir Stafford's answers could dispel the Congress leaders' outrage and sense of betrayal at Cripps's "duplicity" in bringing them the British Cabinet's offer.

In 1946, after the end of the war, Cripps returned with Labour's three-member Cabinet Mission, nominally led by the elderly secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, but intellectually Cripps's own brainchild. A year before the British Indian Empire expired, Cripps made this last brilliant effort to save South Asia from the dreadful tragedy of partition, which would cost India and Pakistan no fewer than a million innocent refugee lives in 1947, and more than half a century of no fewer than three wars. This time the formula he devised was an independent Confederation of India, comprised of three powerful "clusters" of provinces (which are now essentially the independent nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), all of South Asia held together by a weak "center" with an almost equal number of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh ministers to keep the peace, guarding the borders and communication networks. It almost worked. Both Congress and the League initially agreed to Cripps's remarkable constitutional formula, but human weakness, mistrust, and ancient fears swiftly shattered the fragile agreement, and for India and Pakistan tragic chaos ensued.

Cripps returned home to serve as Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1947 to 1950, forced to resign soon after launching his rigid austerity program, devaluing the pound. His health broken, he died two years later.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali**

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CURZON, LORD GEORGE (1859–1925), governor-general of India (1899–1905) and British foreign secretary (1919–1924). The son of Lord and Lady Scarsdale, George Curzon was born on 11 January 1859 at Kedleston, the vast family estate in Derbyshire. He believed, as he wrote in the dedication to his book, *Problems of the Far East*, that Great Britain had been chosen by Providence to be “the greatest instrument for good the world has ever seen.” Elected to parliament as a Conservative in 1886, in 1887 he began to travel to Asia with the intention of making himself the country’s leading expert on Asian affairs. In his personal life, Curzon was known for his many affairs with prominent women, but these seem to have ended with his first marriage in 1895 to a wealthy, beautiful young American, Mary Leiter.

When he was appointed governor-general of India, Queen Victoria wrote to him that he should not, like many British officials in India, be “overbearing and offensive” toward Indians; these qualities, however, were often attributed to him regarding his manner of dealing with not only Indians but British officials as well (Gilmour, p. 137). Curzon’s main objectives, carried out with extraordinary energy, were to reform what he regarded as an inefficient British administration, to rule for the good of the people of India, and to preserve British power, rejecting with contempt the idea that Indians might some day rule their own country. Foreign affairs were a special concern for him, and he forged new links with the Afghan ruler to prevent Russian influence. In internal affairs, he reformed the selection and training of police officers. Confronted by massive famines, he ordered the construction of new irrigation works, and to encourage agriculture and industry, as well to facilitate troop movements, his administration added 6,000 miles of railways to the existing 27,000 miles. He regarded the Indian universities, which had been established in the middle of the nineteenth century, as badly in need of reform; this was carried out under the Universities Act of 1904, but it aroused great animosity because it replaced Indians with government appointees in administrative posts. One of Curzon’s lasting achievements during this period was the preservation of Indian monuments, especially the Taj Mahal and other buildings at Agra, through the Department of Archaeology.

When Curzon’s first term ended in 1904, he was reappointed, but two momentous problems confronted him. One was his decision to partition Bengal into two



Lord George Curzon. As the sitting viceroy of India, Curzon made the momentous decision to partition Bengal into two provinces, a decision that stirred the flames of nationalism. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

provinces, East and West Bengal (one with a Muslim, the other with a Hindu majority); the partition was fiercely denounced by Indian nationalists as a measure designed to foment conflict between the two groups. He insisted that the change had been made strictly for administrative convenience. The other problem was a quarrel with the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, Lord Kitchener, over civil versus military control. Kitchener was supported by the British government, and Curzon resigned in anger in 1905. He served as foreign secretary from 1919 to 1924, but he was bitterly disappointed when he was not appointed prime minister.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also **Bengal; British Crown Raj**

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George N. Curzon, *Problems of the Far East* (London: Longman, 1894), gives his views of Britain’s place in the world. Ian Gilmour, *Curzon* (London: John Murray, 1994), is the most complete biography. David Dilks, *Curzon in India*, 2 vols. (New York: Taplinger, 1970), provides a detailed study of his policies.



DALHOUSIE, MARQUIS OF (1812–1860), governor-general of India (1848–1856). James Andrew Bourn Ramsay was born at Dalhousie Castle, Midlothian, Scotland, and graduated from Christ Church College, Oxford, in 1833. After his elder brothers and his father died, Dalhousie succeeded to his father's title of earl of Dalhousie in 1838. Dalhousie attained high office at a young age (member of Parliament, 1837; House of Lords, 1838; member of the Privy Council, 1843; president of the Board of Trade, 1845). As governor-general of British India, he followed an expansionist policy, annexing the Punjab (1849) and Lower Burma (1852). The First Anglo-Sikh War of 1846 had resulted in the British annexation of Punjab's eastern districts, and Dalhousie annexed the rest of Punjab in the Second Anglo-Sikh War. He supported the brothers Henry and John Lawrence who imposed a tough policy of direct rule on the Punjab. The Second Anglo-Burmese War, which started in 1851, owed its origin to the interests of British traders in the region, which Dalhousie endorsed. In India he curtailed the princely states, whose support seemed to be no longer required after the consolidation of British rule. According to his "doctrine of lapse," states whose princes died without male heirs were merged with British India. This rule was applied to Jaitpur, Jhansi, Nagpur, Sambalpur, Satara, and Tanjore (Thanjavur). Princely "mismanagement" could also be used as a pretext for such mergers, as it did in Oudh in 1856.

When Dalhousie became governor-general, he also held the office of governor of Bengal, as had all his predecessors. He saw to it that the post of lieutenant-governor of Bengal was created in 1854, thus putting an end to this double tenure. Dalhousie had been in charge of railway policy at home and drafted a plan for 5,000 miles of railway track in India when he became governor-general.

The first lines started operating when Dalhousie was still in India. The first telegraph line from Kolkata to Delhi was also installed during his period of office, in 1854. His aggressive policies contributed to the outbreak of the Mutiny of 1857, which had to be faced by his successor, but the telegraph line helped to coordinate the British fight against the rebels. Dalhousie was an enthusiastic "modernizer"; subsequent British administrators of India were more inclined to respect the Indian princes and great landlords as "natural leaders of the people" and shelved the doctrine of lapse. The hill station Dalhousie in Himachal Pradesh is named for him.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Princely States**

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DALITS The Rig Veda, which dates back at least to the second millennium before the common era, described the origins of the entire universe from the self-sacrifice of Purusha, the Cosmic Being, on the funeral pyre. From Purusha's body emerged the four categories of humans: from his mouth, the Brahman; from his arms the Rajanya, or Kshatriya; from his thighs the Vaishya; and from his feet the Shudra. These categories were subsequently referred to as *varnas* (colors), a term also used to categorize timber and precious stones.



Dalits March in Khola. Dalits rallying through Khola 6 December 2003. Increased awareness of the plight of “untouchables” has prompted numerous human rights organizations to appeal to the United Nations on their behalf. ANTOINE SERRA/IN VISU/CORBIS.

During and after the sixth century B.C., Brahmans composed sūtras (“threads,” brief Sanskrit prose aphorisms) and *shāstras* (more elaborate Sanskrit verse instructions) regarding morally correct behavior (*dharmā*). The sūtras and *shāstras* saw the four *varṇa* divisions of society to be cosmically ordained, with Brahmans outranking the other three *varṇas*. The *varṇa* into which one was born was seen as a direct consequence of how one had performed one’s morally correct behavior (*dharmā*) in one’s previous lives. The *Dharma Shāstra*, attributed to the sage Manu, assigned occupations to each of the *varṇas*. Brahmans were to study, teach, and perform sacrifices. Kshatriyas were to rule, wage war, sponsor sacrifices, and study. Vaishyas were to farm, breed cattle, trade, lend money, and study. The disadvantaged Shudras were to serve the three higher *varṇas*.

According to Manu, men of each *varṇa* were to marry women of the same *varṇa*. Men of the three higher *varṇas* were considered “twice-born”; their second birth ceremony (*upanayana*) was performed when they received the sacred thread (*janeu*) and could study the Vedic texts. Shudras, considered “once-born,” were not permitted to

undergo the second-birth ceremony, wear the sacred thread, study the Vedic texts, or marry according to the four highest forms of marriage. According to Manu’s *Dharma Shāstra*, Shudras were created to be the slaves of Brahmans; a Shudra who insulted a twice-born man with “gross invective” should have his tongue cut out; if a Shudra taught Brahmans their duty, the king should order hot oil to be poured into that Shudra’s mouth and ears; Brahmans could confidently seize a Shudra’s property; and a Brahman who killed a Shudra needed to perform only the same penance as if he had killed a cat or crow. Manu’s *Dharma Shāstra* predicted that a kingdom with a shortage of twice-born inhabitants and a surplus of Shudras would soon “entirely perish.” The Bhagavad Gītā provided some comfort for Shudras. It stated that Shudras who faithfully fulfilled their assigned duties in this life could be reborn in higher *varṇas* in their later lives. Furthermore, a Shudra who worshiped Lord Krishna with sufficient devotion (*bbakti*) in this life could at the end of this life be freed from the bonds of reincarnation.

The sūtras and *śhāstras* agreed that Shudras were the lowest of the four *varṇas*. Nevertheless, Manu's *Dharma Śhāstra* identified groups that were even lower than Shudras. These lower groups included the offspring of the mixing or confusion of *varṇas* (*varṇa samkara*), that is, sexual activities between *varṇas*. This mixing of *varṇas* endangered society. According to Manu, these activities generated new birth groups (*jatis*) with their own names and occupations. One of the most offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Shudra male impregnated a Brahman female. Manu labeled the offspring of such miscegenation a Chandala, considered to be the "lowest of men." According to Manu, Chandalas were to live apart from other people, never entering villages or towns after dark. They were to eat from broken dishes, carry out the corpses of unclaimed dead, execute criminals, and take for themselves the clothes, ornaments, and beds of the executed criminals. They should not look at an eating Brahman or touch a Brahman's sacrificial offerings.

Another offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Brahman male impregnated a Shudra female. Manu labeled the offspring of their miscegenation a Nishada (also a "living corpse") who subsisted by killing fish. Lower than even a Chandala or a Nishada was an Antyavasayin, the offspring of a Chandala male impregnating a Nishada female. According to Manu, Antyavasayins were employed in burial grounds and were "despised" even by other groups excluded from the four *varṇas*. By establishing morally reprehensible origins for such groups, Manu's *Dharma Śhāstra* provided justification for their rejection by much of society and their continuing disadvantages.

Manu's *Dharma Śhāstra* also listed occupations "reviled by the twice-born." These included managing horses and chariots, medical healing, doing things for women, trading, fishing, carpentry, hunting, snaring, working with leather, and drumming. Persons subsisting by these occupations were to live near burial grounds or in mountains or groves of trees. Brahmins were not to accept any food from outcastes or persons engaged in "reviled" occupations (although Brahmins could receive uncooked food from Shudras). Those among the twice-born who engaged in the most offensive behavior (e.g., drinking spirituous liquor) were to be branded as outcastes and left to wander over the face of the earth. Relatives were to perform their funeral rites and thereafter neither converse with them, nor marry them, nor share inheritance with them. Only after performing prescribed penances could such outcastes be restored to their former positions among their relatives.

One of the Jataka tales (a collection of stories in the Pali canon about Buddha's former births) described an

occasion when the yet-to-be-Buddha was born as a Chandala in a Chandala village. When he went to the city as a young man, having learned to be a sweeper, he discovered that people called him a "vile outcaste" and that high-*varṇa* women rinsed their eyes with perfumed water after seeing him. He discovered later, when he disguised himself as a Brahman, his inadvertent use of a Chandala form of speech revealed his true identity to a group of genuine Brahmins, who drove him away. In the epic Mahābhārata, during a devastating famine, the great Brahman seer Vishvamitra begged a Chandala to let him eat the dog meat hanging in the Chandala hamlet. In the end, with considerable reluctance, the Chandala gave the dog meat to Vishvamitra. In one well-known narrative, King Harishchandra, fulfilling his promise to a sage, donated his entire kingdom to the sage and left, with his wife and son, for a neighboring country. There a Chandala chief hired Harishchandra to collect the cremation-ground fees and burn the bodies brought for cremation. Harishchandra's subsequent profoundly moral behavior led to his restoration (with his wife and son) to his original kingdom.

Eyewitness Accounts of Disadvantaged Groups

Around 300 B.C. Seleucus Nicator, a general under Alexander the Great, sent an ambassador, Megasthenes, to attend Chandragupta Maurya's court in Pataliputra (present-day Patna). Although none of Megasthenes' writings have survived, in later years other Greeks cited him when reporting on the lands and peoples of South Asia. According to Megasthenes, no one in India had slaves, although a companion of Alexander the Great reported that slavery existed in the Indus River region.

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D., Fahsien, a Chinese Buddhist monk, traveled throughout northern India. In his journals he described Chandalas as fishermen and hunters who sold meat and were considered wicked. They lived apart from others. When they entered a city gate or marketplace, they struck a piece of wood so that people could avoid them. Two centuries later, another Chinese Buddhist monk, Hsieun Tsang, traveled throughout much of India. He reported that meat eating was forbidden. Those who ate meat were "despised." They lived outside the town walls and were seldom seen.

In the eleventh century, Alberuni, a Muslim from the court of Ghazni (in Afghanistan) who had traveled to India, wrote in Arabic his descriptions of the four-*varṇa* system. Below the four *varṇas* he described eight craft groups who lived outside the *varṇas*' towns. Five of these craft groups freely intermarried but refused to marry three of the groups: shoemakers, weavers, and woolen-cloth

thickeners. Below these eight craft groups came four groups considered “degraded outcastes” (among them Chandalas) who did “dirty work like the cleansing of the villages” and who were thought of as illegitimate children of a Shudra male and a Brahman female.

In the 1500s the Portuguese settling on India’s southwestern coast labeled the local intra-marrying groups *castas*. Later the French and British modified this term, calling the groups “castes.” In 1666 M. de Thevenot, a French traveler, reported that in Kerala, if a high caste Nair felt the breath of a Polea, the Nair considered himself polluted and was obliged to kill the Polea; otherwise the local ruler would put the Nair to death or sell him into slavery. Poleas, when working in the fields, called out “Po! Po!” to warn Nairs of their presence. Poleas could not enter towns. If they wanted to buy some commodity, they called it out and left money in a designated spot; a local merchant then left the commodity at the spot and collected the money.

More than a century later, a French Jesuit missionary, the Abbé J. A. Dubois, described Pariahs in South India as lower than Shudras and abhorred by other castes. Pariahs were village scavengers who cleaned the public latrines, swept the streets, and removed the rubbish. A Brahman had to purify himself by bathing if a Pariah’s shadow fell on him. On the Kerala coast, many Pariahs were lifelong serfs of their landlords, who could sell them to other local landlords. Highest among the Pariahs were the Valluvas, who presided over Pariah marriages and other religious ceremonies. Valluvas married only other Valluvas. Among the slightly higher castes regarded as Shudras, the various cultivating castes looked down on, and refused to eat with, occupational castes who were “dependent on the public” such as barbers, washermen, and shoemakers.

The British Colonial Period

In 1871 and 1872, the British recorded their first all-India census, in which they noted respondents’ castes and tribes and tried, often with difficulty, to place each group within the four-*varna* framework. Shortly after the first census, government offices began receiving petitions from castes and caste groups claiming higher status than that ascribed to them in the census. For example, during the 1891 census in Madras presidency, Shanars (a “polluting” caste whose occupation was tapping the sap of palm trees) claimed to be Nadars of the Kshatriya *varna*. The census commissioner rejected their claims. Ignoring the rejection, in 1897 fifteen Shanars entered a temple in Kamundi and worshiped the Goddess Meenakshi. The court case filed against the Shanars demanded financial payments to purify the “defiled” temple. The British courts at every

level, including the Privy Council in London, ruled against the Shanars, resting their case on the fact that no Shanars had entered such a temple before.

The census revealed that significant portions of India’s population were disadvantaged. They were referred to as depressed classes, backward castes, tribes, *adivasis*, *adi-Hindus*, and *adi-Dravidas*. They were also called by the English term “outcastes,” even though few of them had been cast out by their relatives. They were also called by the English term “untouchables.” However, except in a few South Indian locations, pollution by touching was seldom the issue. In most cases, higher castes felt polluted if they ate food cooked by those labeled “untouchables” or used eating or drinking utensils that had been used by them.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, widely varying groups, including Christian missionaries, the Ārya Samāj, the Servants of India Society, the Justice Party, the Theosophical Society, and the Self-Respect Movement, advocated various forms of uplift for disadvantaged groups. These included admission into temples, access to education and employment, representation on decision-making bodies, and the right to interdine and intermarry. Champions of uplift, though often disagreeing on strategies, included E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker (a non-Brahman from South India), Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi (a Vaishya from Gujarat), and Dr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar (a Mahar “untouchable” from Maharashtra).

Reformers called on the British government to identify the disadvantaged groups in order to end their longstanding historical disabilities. J. H. Hutton, the census commissioner in 1931, instructed provincial superintendents to draw up lists of groups handicapped by their “degraded position in the Hindu social scheme.” Criteria by which groups were identified varied from province to province but generally included such ritual disabilities as denial of admission to Hindu temples and higher castes’ perceptions that members of these groups polluted higher castes. The Government of India Act of 1935 entitled the “degraded” groups to special electoral representation. In 1936 provincial governments prepared lists (“schedules”) of local groups meeting the “degraded” criteria, and the official designations of these groups became “scheduled castes” (SCs) and “scheduled tribes” (STs).

Untouchability after India’s Independence

Dr. Ambedkar was appointed chairman of the drafting committee for India’s Constitution. Under his leadership the constitution initiated a policy of affirmative action referred to as “protective discrimination” or “compensatory discrimination.” Article 17 declared that untouchability

was abolished and any disability arising from untouchability was an offense “punishable in accordance with law.” Article 15(2) guaranteed to all castes (including scheduled castes) access to public restaurants, wells, tanks, bathing ghats, and roads and places dedicated to the use of the general public. Article 15(4) declared that the state could make “special provision” for the advancement of scheduled castes and tribes. Articles 330 and 331 reserved seats in the national Parliament and the state assemblies for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. The percentages of seats in the legislative bodies were to match as nearly as possible the proportion of scheduled castes and tribes living in the represented territory. Article 325 declared that all voters—not just SCs and STs—could participate in the election of candidates for the SC and ST reserved seats. Article 335 reserved state- and central-government jobs for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. To address the guarantees in Article 16 of equal rights for all Indian citizens, the Constitution stipulated that these reservations of legislative seats and government jobs for SCs and STs would end after ten years. Over subsequent decades, Parliament periodically amended the Constitution to extend the SC and ST reservations for another ten years.

In 1960 the government of India published an all-India list of 405 scheduled castes and 225 scheduled tribes arranged in alphabetical order. According to this list, some castes were referred to by many different names, some castes were “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes (often referred to by different names) existed in India’s different linguistic regions. In 1976 the government of India replaced its 1960 all-India list with an amended state-by-state list of 841 scheduled castes and 501 scheduled tribes. Some castes and tribes were still “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes and tribes were still referred to by various different names. When designations were unclear, India’s Constitution stipulated that Parliament and the president were to make the final decisions regarding a group’s “scheduled” or “nonscheduled” status. According to the published lists, scheduled castes formed about 17 percent of India’s population, and scheduled tribes about 7.5 percent, for a total of 22.5 percent.

The Identification of “Dalits”

After the adoption of India’s constitution, Dr. Ambedkar became increasingly disillusioned with trying to legislate significant changes for India’s “untouchables.” Following his failure to gain passage of the Hindu Code Bill in 1951, or to be elected to parliament in 1952, he turned to Buddhism as a solution to untouchability. In earlier writings he had argued that India’s contemporary untouch-

ables had once been Kshatriyas and Buddhists, whom hostile Brahmans had relegated to the bottom ranks of society. Convinced that Hinduism inherently incorporated caste discrimination, Ambedkar urged India’s untouchables to abandon Hinduism and become Buddhists. In 1955, the year before he died, he himself converted to Buddhism. The millions of untouchables, many of them members of Ambedkar’s Mahar caste, who followed his example were called neo-Buddhists. By becoming Buddhists, they sacrificed their legal benefits as members of the scheduled castes. They and other members of scheduled castes and tribes called themselves Dalits, a Marathi term for “oppressed,” preferring this term to many demeaning alternatives such as “untouchables,” “backward classes,” or even to Gandhi’s term *barijan* (children of God). Non-Hindu (e.g., Christian, Muslim) castes, who as such did not qualify as scheduled castes, also called themselves Dalits. Soon references were being made to Dalit activism and agitation as well as Dalit poetry, literature, drama, art, and film. Dalits’ efforts to assert their rights sometimes met with deadly violence, as higher castes punished them for their assertiveness. Human rights groups became involved, and Dalit organizations appealed to the United Nations to include “caste” with its already established categories of race, color, and sex, to which all human rights applied.

The 1990s saw the appearance of candidates and political parties specifically representing SCs and other backward classes as defined in 1980 by the Mandal Commission. The appearance of these political parties generated reorientations of voting behavior (especially in the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) and the election of candidates, parties, and ministries privileging the Dalits and other backward classes.

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See also Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; Caste System; Mandal Commission Report; Scheduled Tribes

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DANCE FORMS

This entry consists of the following articles:

AN INTRODUCTION

BHARATA NATYAM

KATHAK

KATHAKALI

KOODIYATTAM

KUCHIPUDI

MANIPURI

MOHINI ATTAM

ODISSI

AN INTRODUCTION

The multifaceted dance forms of India—both classical and regional—have evolved from the earliest times to the present. Indian dance has permeated all other forms of art, including poetry, sculpture, painting, music, and theater. It is a composite art with distinctive characteristics, reflecting the Indian civilization's worldview, philosophy, religion, life cycles, seasons, and environment. As a dynamic art, dance forms continue to evolve, growing with the imagination of creative artists exploring human movement.

Evidence found in cave paintings and statues—from the “dancing girl” of Mohenjo-Daro to a wealth of later sculptures—and literary references from the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the epics clearly attest to India's flourishing tradition of dance performance. *Nāṭyashāstra*, the classical text of dance and drama (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.), codified India's ancient theatrical arts. With its roots in Hindu religion, as a temple offering to the gods, Indian dance inspired sculptural artists for millennia, from the simple dancing girl to the brilliantly complex and symbolic depiction of Shiva as Nata-rajā, “king of the dance.”

Classical dance forms evolved along with a tradition of tribal, folk, and social dances in all parts of India. The

Abhinaya Darpana, a text solely devoted to dance, followed the *Nāṭyashāstra*, indicating that by the tenth century classical dance flourished. Many kings supported the arts, and dance developed in the royal courts as well. An inscription from the eleventh century A.D. in the Brihadiswara temple mentions four hundred *dēvadāsī* (slaves of the gods) dancers, retained there for the entertainment of Brahman priests. *Dēvadāsī* emerged as an institution, its female members cultivating classical dance and sustaining it as a living tradition.

Classical Indian dance forms are governed by the codification and the aesthetic principles set forth in the *Nāṭyashāstra*. A vigorous “masculine” type of dance is called *tandava*, while the more graceful “feminine” style is *lasya*. There are specific divisions: *nritta*, or pure dance, is performed with abstract movement and rhythm patterns; *nriṭya*, or expressional dance, includes mime, facial expressions, and hand gestures, used to convey the meaning of a song to which the dance is performed; *natya* is drama, in which four elements of *abhinaya*, the histrionic representations are utilized to communicate a theme.

Those four elements of *abhinaya* are: *āṅgika*, bodily movements; *vācika*, speech and dialogue; *abārya*, the costumes, stage settings, and properties; and *sattvika*, the mental states. In *āṅgika*, an important role is given to the *hastas*, or hand gestures, popularly known as *mudras*, considered the most distinctive feature of classical Indian dance. A dancer narrates a story using facial expressions and bodily movements; he or she also uses hand gestures that have specific meanings, complementing the facial expressions.

The *Nāṭyashāstra* has also codified all human emotions into nine *rasas* (sentiments): *sringara* (love); *vira* (valor); *raudra* (ferocity); *bhaya* (fear); *bibhatsa* (disgust); *hasya* (laughter); *karuna* (pathos); *adbhuta* (wonder); and *śhānta* (tranquillity). The aim of any representational dance or dance-drama is to evoke *rasa*, a state of sentiment, in the spectator according to the *bhava* (emotions) created by the dancer. This evocation is called *rasanishpatti*, or eliciting the aesthetic flavor.

Pure dance numbers with abstract movements are decorative, creating patterns in space and time. In expressional dance, however, a solo dancer assumes the role of narrator as well as various characters, impersonating many roles. This multifaceted performance is known as *ekabārya lasyanga*.

As one line or a single word may be interpreted in many ways to enhance the basic mood, improvisation further enhances the audience's enjoyment of the themes presented. Since dance dramas are taken from Hindu mythology and the epics, the stories are well known. The emphasis is therefore on the manner in which the dramas are enacted.

Most of the classical dances have close links with religion. Therefore the content of the dance usually concerns gods and goddesses, who behave much like human beings. Though temple dancing is now banned, the spirit of *bhakti* (devotion) permeates classical dance, and exceptional dancers always evoke it. A variety of folk dances and social dances are also performed on festive and religious occasions.

Bharata Natyam is the oldest classical dance style, but seven other regional styles have emerged: Kuchipudi (southeast coast); Kathak (north); Kathakali, Mohiniattam (southwest coast); Odissi, (east coast); Manipuri (northeast); and Sattriya (Assami northeast). Each of these dance forms has its own kinetic dance language, with codification of the hand gestures, movements, specific regional classical music, costumes, and conventions. Mohiniattam is performed only by women dancers, but all the other forms are performed by both men and women. They are neoclassical dance forms, based on oral and shastric traditions. Indian modern dance has also evolved, as classically trained dancers explore contemporary themes. Classical and modern dance exist side by side, continuing to attract modern audiences to the beauty of Indian dance.

Sunil Kothari

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BHARATA NATYAM

India's classical Bharata Natyam dance form dates back to the Rig Vedic hymns, and even earlier in visual form to the figurine of a dancing girl from Mohenjo-Daro. *Nātyashāstra*, the compendium on dance, theater, music, and prosody (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.) refers to Lasya, which includes a solo dance, depicting ten to twelve emotional numbers performed by a dancer. Bharata Natyam is performed today as a solo dance and therefore appears to be a direct derivation of Lasya.

Bharata Natyam was nurtured and developed in South India, where magnificent Hindu temples, built during the reigns of the Pallavas and the Cholas (4th century A.D.–12th



Bharat Natyam Dance Form. Today, the once banned Bharat Natyam is India's most popular form of dance. Meaning is conveyed through stylized hand gestures and facial expressions, mime and action—with the choreography having an almost geometric pattern. BARNABAS BOSSHART/CORBIS.

century A.D.) bear testimony to their love of architecture, sculpture, and paintings, as well as to their devotion to the gods. The Chola kings maintained hundreds of *dēvadāsi* (servants, or slaves, of the gods) dancers in their temples. That tradition was sustained by successive Pandya, Nayaka, and Maratha rulers until the end of the nineteenth century. The *dēvadāsi*s were female dancers who performed their ritual dances before the temple idols and the Brahmans, who provided for their care.

British Christian missionaries and officials of the British Raj stigmatized the *dēvadāsi*s as "prostitutes" and undermined their position as "servants of the gods," thereby severing the tradition of Hindu classical dance. In 1927 the Devadasi Act banned all dancing in temples in Madras (Tamil Nadu).

The early decades of the twentieth century saw the revival of classical Hindu dance through the pioneering

work of dancers such as Rukmini Devi, an upper-class Brahman woman who studied Bharata Natyam at a time when it was considered unworthy of practice. During the session of the Indian National Congress in 1927 in Madras, E. Krishna Iyer, a lawyer and freedom fighter, organized the first All-India Music conference. The Music Academy was established in 1928, and in defiance of the Anti-Nautch movement (which opposed Indian dances) he presented two *dēvadāsi* dancers on its platform. Rukmini Devi performed before an international gathering at the Theosophical Society in Madras in 1935. She established her Kalakshetra Academy in 1936, institutionalizing training in Bharata Natyam. Since then, the stigma against it diminished, and within a few years Bharata Natyam gained unprecedented popularity. Today it is India's most popular dance form.

According to the *Nātyashāstra* treatises, the art of classical dance has three major divisions: *nrītta*, which is pure dance; *nrītya*, expressional dance; and *natya*, the drama. *Nrītta* consists of bodily movements and patterns of dance that are purely decorative. In *nrītya*, meaning is conveyed through the *hastas*, stylized hand gestures and facial expressions, and *abhinaya*, mime and actions that heighten emotions and sentiments, conveyed by the dancer in a code language.

The basic dance unit is called *adavu*, a combination of steps and gestures. The basic dance position of Bharata Natyam is *ardhamandali*, similar to the *demi-plié* position in ballet. Movements in Bharata Natyam are geometrical, creating a series of triangles and other forms and patterns with straight lines, diagonals, and cartwheel movements over the head.

Natya, the drama, is seen in dance-drama form known as Bhagavata Mela Nataka, staged traditionally during religious festivals in Tanjore and its environs. The repertoire consists of numbers of pure dances like *alarippu*, *varnam*, and *tillana*. In *sabdam*, *varnam*, *padam javali*, and *sloka*, expressional dances are enacted to a song. A *nayika*, a heroine pining for her lover, symbolizes the desire of the soul to merge with the "super soul" of Brahman.

The most famous dancers were Balasarasvati, Rukmini Devi, and their contemporaries Ram Gopal, Mrinalini Sarabhai, Shanta Rao, and Kamala. The next generation included Yamini Krishnamurty, Sonal Mansingh, Padma Subrahmanyam, as well as the younger generation of Alarmel Valli and Malavika Sarukkai, who have contributed much to the tradition. Chandralekha introduced martial art to her dance, rejecting sentimental themes and creating a new contemporary form.

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KATHAK

Katha means "a story," and one who tells a story, reciting and dancing, is called a Kathak. Prevalent in North India, Kathak dance has a long past. Nurtured in the holy precincts of the Hindu temples, over the centuries Kathak has refined and enriched itself with various hues. References to Kathak are found in the epics Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. In the medieval period, with the rise of devotional *bhakti*, the Kathaks began to recite and dance in the temple courtyards, performing various dance-dramas, such as Akhyana, Pandvani, Harikatha, Kalakshepams, and Wari-liba, from different parts of India. Kathak developed as a solo dance form in the North. People belonging to the Kathak caste live throughout eastern Uttar Pradesh.

The great Mughal emperors patronized Kathak artists at their courts, but the content of the dance changed dramatically.

Instead of depicting love stories of Rādhā and Krishna, emphasis shifted to pure and abstract dance. The Mughals brought with them Persian cultural influences as well. The Hindu kings of Rajasthan also patronized Kathak dancers, who enacted epic and purāṇic Hindu tales of divine folly. The *dēvadāsi* courtesans played a role in sustaining this Hindu courtly tradition.

Kathak's most striking features are footwork (*tatkar*) and pirouettes (*chakkars*). The dancers perform on a vertical axis, to exacting time measures. Kathak includes *nrītta*, or pure dance; *nrītya*, or expressional dance; and *natya*, or drama. In the last category we see the relation between Kathak and the Rasalilas of Brindavan and Mathura, keeping alive the ancient tradition in which divine love stories of Rādhā and Krishna are enacted through dance, dialogue, and music. Many Kathak dancers create the illusion of miniature paintings of Krishna springing to life.

Wajid Ali Shah, the last *nawāb* of Oudh, (r. 1847–1856) introduced *thumri*, a light, poetic musical form, to which dancers performed with mime and improvisation. *Ghazals*, poems in the Urdu language recited to music, were also introduced at this time.

Tode, *tukde*, *tibai*, and *parans* are intraforms, recited with mnemonic syllables of the tabla and *pakhavaj*, the accompanying percussion instruments, and a specific



Kathak Dancer. In this 1988 photo, Saswati Sen, perhaps the most famous Kathak dancer trained by Birju Maharaj. Maharaj is a master of the Lucknow school that stresses delicacy of movement, gracefulness, and expression. LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS.

tala, a time measure to which each Kathak is danced. The emphasis is on virtuosity. The music accompanying a Kathak dance is Hindustani classical music. Some gifted dancers also sing while performing *abhinaya*. Both male and female dancers perform Kathak.

Kathak flowered into two major schools (*gharanas*), in Lucknow and in Jaipur. The Lucknow school lays emphasis on delicacy of movement, gracefulness, and expression. Kalka and Bindadin and their descendants Acchan, Lachhu, and Shambhu Maharaj were great performers of the Lucknow school. Achhan Maharaj's son Birju Maharaj contributed graceful new bodily movements to further embellish the Lucknow form of Kathak. The Jaipur school stresses vigor and more forceful movements. It has an astounding quality of rhythmic innovation. Its greatest exponents were Hanuman Prasad, Mohan Prasad, Narayan Prasad, and Sundar Prasad.

Other schools similar to Kathak developed at the court of Raja Chakradhar in Madhya Pradesh and in

Banaras (Varanasi; also known as Janaki Prasad *gharana*), though with stylistic differences.

Kathak, practiced as it was by courtesans, was usually looked down upon by India's upper classes. Under British rule, Kathak was contemptuously referred to as "Nautch" and fell into disrepute. Though it was performed in temple courtyards for wealthy landlords, it was denigrated as the vulgar dance of prostitutes.

When Madam Menaka, an upper-class Brahman dance-artist, embraced Kathak dance, she introduced many reforms and refinements that helped to remove the stigma, bringing social approbation to Kathak. After independence, it received government patronage. Children studied Kathak under great masters, moving its modern performances to the proscenium stage. Ancient Hindu religious stories have, however, remained a part of the Kathak repertoire. Both the pure dance and the expressional numbers are now performed, and new choreographic group creations are also part of its modern development.

Sitara Devi, Birju Maharaj, Roshan Kumari, Durgalal Rohini Bhate, Kumudini Lakhia, Uma Sharma, Urmila Nagar, Ram Mohan, Saswati Sen, and Rajendra Ganagani, are all well-known exponents of this art. Kumudini Lakhia has introduced further innovations by choreographing contemporary themes in Kathak.

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KATHAKALI

Kathakali is a dance-drama form from the state of Kerala. It is the culmination of a long process of evolution and assimilation of different theatrical forms and of both the highly stylized form of theater called Koodiyattam and the martial art form called Kalaripayattu. The most supernatural and mythological aspects concerning the lives and affairs of celestial beings, deities, demons, and sages form the content of Kathakali. Though Koodiyattam can be traced back to the ninth and tenth centuries, contemporary Kathakali emerged as an independent, highly formalistic and elaborate dance-drama form only in the seventeenth century. In Kathakali the actors do not speak. The libretto is sung in Manipravalam, a type of Malayalam enriched with a large number of Sanskrit words.



Kathakali Performance, Kerala Dance Form. Contemporary Kathakali dancer, Kerala. Besides Bharata Natyam (the oldest form of classical dance in India), seven regional forms exist, including Kathakali on the southwest coast. Each has its own technique, style of music and costume. ADITYA ARYA.

Kathakali has an elaborately defined code of body kinetics, combined with eloquent but amazingly elaborate hand gestures, popularly called *mudrās*. During the monsoon months, the actors are massaged with oil to make their bodies more pliable. Kathakali training is strenuous and lasts for nearly ten years, after which time an actor is given a small role to play. It is further enhanced by stylized makeup and costumes to provide the appropriate symbolic nuances that typify Kathakali performance.

A striking feature of Kathakali is its body kinetics accompanied by movements of the facial muscles. No other dance form uses the movements of the eyebrows, the eyeballs and the lower eyelids, as described in the *Nāṭya Shāstra*, as does Kathakali. The face becomes a playground of various conflicting *bhavas*, or emotions.

The principal characters are well-known types, and the elaborate makeup used to identify them is Kathakali's

most famous feature. For the *sattvika* (noble) characters, the make up is *paccha*, a green color. The jaw-bone is exaggerated by white paste. Along the arc of this white paste, paper cut-outs of a false chin and jaw are adhered, enlarging the dimensions of the face. Such dramatic makeup and costuming transform the actor from human proportions to superhuman stature.

For *rajasik* (violent) characters, like the epic Ramayana's demon-villain Ravana, the green makeup is broken by red patches. An oval red-and-white design is added to the nose and the upper cheek. His upturned moustache is called *katti*. Three types of red, black, and white *thadis* (beards) typify antiheroes, villains, and demons: red for characters like Dussashana; black for the *tamasik* (dark) characters like aborigines and forest dwellers; and white for divine allies like Hanuman. *Mudis*, the headgear for the *sattvika* characters, are large, but the demons wear even larger crowns. Women, Brahmins, and sages fall into *minukku* types, whose makeup is only one basic pink color. Except for those of the *minukku* types, all the costumes are elaborate.

In *nritta*, the pure dance, *kalasams* (dance units) alternate with the *nritya*, the expressional aspect, enhancing the *natya*, or drama. Characters appear from behind a curtain held by two stagehands. The music that accompanies Kathakali is known as the Sopanam style of music. There are four musicians; two vocalists, who also play cymbals; and two drummers, one playing a *maddalam*, held horizontally, and the other playing a *chenda*, a conical instrument held vertically. They stand behind the actors. Acting follows the sung libretto, elaborated upon and often improvised; the singing then stops, and only cymbals and drums are played.

The repertoire consists of *purappadu*, a pure dance piece that introduces the characters without mime. Then the play begins. The female roles are traditionally played by men. Women have, however, begun to study Kathakali and to play female roles. Kalyan Sougandhikam, Bali Vijayam, Lavanasuravadham, Nala Charitam, and Sita Swayamvaram are among the well-known plays.

In 1936 the institute Kerala Kala Mandalam was established by the poet Vallathol Narayan Menon to revive Kathakali; he invited renowned masters, like K. P. Kunju Kurup, T. K. Chandu Panikkar, T. Ramunni Nair Guru Gopinath, V. Kunchu Nair, Chengannur Raman Pillai, M. Vishnu Namboodri, and Kalamandalam Krishnan Nair, to teach there. Contemporary Kathakali performers include Ramankutty Nair, K. Chatunni Panicker, Kalamandalam Padmanabhan Nair, and Kalamandalam Gopi.

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KODIYATTAM

According to Kerala tradition, King Kulashekhara Varman (fl. A.D. 900) was responsible for reforming and popularizing the Sanskrit theater in Kerala, assisted by his Brahman minister Tolan. They introduced the use of Kerala's Malayalam language on stage, where only North India's Sanskrit had been spoken. Lay audiences flocked to those plays, which included humorous elements and parodies of the four classical Hindu stages (*asbramas*) of life.

By meticulous elaboration, Koodiyattam offers limitless possibilities of aesthetic enjoyment. Enactment of one seven-act play would take several months to complete, the staging of a one-act play eight to nine days.

The actual staging of an act is preceded by preliminary rites, and an introduction, which has no direct connection to the theme of the play. The plays employ wit, humor, and sarcasm in brilliant Malayalam, entertaining the audience by making fun of everyone. At the end of the introduction, dancing begins, and verses in Sanskrit are chanted by the characters in monotone. The female roles are enacted by Nangyar women, who also play cymbals to keep *tala*, the time measure. The Nambyars play the large copper drums, called *mizhava*. The plays are staged in temple theatres, known as Koothampalam.

The Chakyars (actors) have through the centuries evolved a superb technique of *abhinaya* (expression), using a threefold presentation of the play. First there is *angika*, the gestural interpretation, followed by the *vachika*, the words or speech, and lastly a repetition of *angika*. Though separate and independent, they complement and amplify each other. The process is rather a long one.

A curtain is held by two persons standing in front of the stage. The actor stands behind it. After the introduction of the main character-hero, the next day begins with a description of his earlier life, prior to the incidents that will be actually staged. The play lasts for many days, with freedom given to the hero to move freely in time—past, present, and future. Dramatic ideas are also explained through hand gestures and bodily poses, as noted in the classical Sanskrit drama text, the *Nāṭyashāstra*, and the theatrical manual of gestures and poses, *Hastalakshanaadipika*. Each word is uttered slowly, the gestures defining it, shown both for its stem and suffix; there are

special gestures to indicate the number and gender, as well as the tense and the mood. Minute facial expressions and the movements of the eyes are also developed to a great extent. Kerala's Kathakali dance-drama has borrowed many of these techniques from Koodiyattam.

Makeup in some respects is similar to that of Kathakali. *Paccha*, a green type, is used for noble heroes like Arjuna and Rāma; *pazhukka* makeup, with the face painted a reddish color, is reserved for kings of magnanimous nature; villains or demons like Ravana have the *katti*, or upturned mustache; and Shurpanakha has *kari*, a black makeup. There are the texts, like *Kramadipika*, which explain the procedure to be adopted in staging the plays, including stage directions. *Attaprakaram* texts explain the methods of acting and the meanings of the verses.

Formerly there were eighteen families of Chakyars. Now there are only six, and their number is dwindling. Ammanur, Kitannur, and Painkulam are well-known Chakyar families. Rāma Chakyar, Chachu Chakyar, and Mani Madhav Chakyar were great artists of the past. The living national treasure of Kerala is Ammanur Madhav Chakyar; G. Venu and his daughter Kapila are fine exponents from Kerala's younger generation of actors.

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KUCHIPUDI

Legend has it that in Andhra Pradesh at Kuchipudi village, Siddhendra Yogi, a devotee of Lord Krishna, devised this dramatic dance, and a number of Brahman male actors vowed that they would perpetuate this Kuchipudi tradition as *bhakti*, or devotion, for Krishna. Several inscriptional and literary sources support the existence of this form of dance-drama, which seems to have evolved in the sixteenth century from earlier musical dramas called *yakshagana* that combined elements of opera and dance. A performance was arranged for the *nawāb* of Golconda, Abdul Hasan Tahnishah, in 1678. He was so pleased that he gave Kuchipudi village to the Brahmans who took part in the play. Their families and descendants have carried on the tradition to the present day.

The most popular Kuchipudi drama is the story of Lord Krishna's most jealous wife, Satyabhama, who so

hates having to share her divine husband with any of his sixteen thousand other consorts that she petulantly sulks and enters the “anger-closet” in Krishna’s palace, vowing never to emerge. Sutradhara, the musical conductor, plays the role of Madhavi, the good and wise mediator who works so hard to reconcile Satyabhama and Lord Krishna, finally bringing him down to lure Satyabhama back up to his bed chamber with sweet promises. *Vachikabhinaya*, spoken dialogue, is articulated by the participants in this drama, known as *Bhramakalapam*, the most popular dance-drama of modern India. Traditionally, the female roles are all played by men. Satyabhama’s role is the most coveted one. Other popular Kuchipudi plays are Usha Parinayam, Prahlad Charitram, and Golla Kalapam.

Kuchipudi, like all classical dance forms, has elements of *nritta* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressional dance), and *natya*, (drama). There are songs for the entrance of each main character, in which the actor introduces him- or herself. The tradition is a living tradition, and members of the society in Kuchipudi village continue to stage their plays annually. The movements are quicksilver, lively and sensuous, with a delightful grammar all its own. It has moved from its first tiny South Indian rural temple to the largest urban and metropolitan centers of modern India, including New Delhi.

Lashminarayan Sastri, the great master of dancing and *abhinaya*, or expressions, taught this dance-drama to female exponents. He personally introduced several new numbers, like *tarangams*, balancing on the rim of a brass plate while dancing. These solo performances were introduced as entertainment between acts. His disciple Vempati Chinna Satyam followed in his footsteps, moving to Chennai (Madras) and opening schools for young female dancers. Vempati devised a solo dance form, on the lines of Bharata Natyam, beginning with *rangapravesha*, entrance on the stage; then *jatiswaram*, a pure dance number; followed by excerpts from the dance-dramas, like Satyabhama; and then *javalis* and *padams*, expressional numbers for *abhinaya* (mime), *tillana* (pure dance), and *tarangams*. He has also choreographed several dance-dramas.

Vedantam Satyam is well known for traditional female impersonation, but that tradition is slowly fading. Yamini Krishnamurthy, Sobha Naidu, Raja Radha Reddy, Swapna Sundari, and Mallika Sarabhai are some of the best-known exponents of Kuchipudi.

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MANIPURI

Manipur is a small state situated in the northeast corner of India. A centuries-old tradition of dance and music survives in close coexistence with religious life. There is not a single social occasion in Manipur that is not celebrated with dance and music. The ancient Manipuri traditional festival *Lai Haroba*—the merrymaking of the gods—is dedicated to the animistic pre-Hindu deities. *Maibis*, the priestesses, invoke the village gods as ancestors of the various Manipuri subclans. Their ritualistic dance describes a primitive cosmology: the creation of the world, of the human body, and of human activities.

The fifteenth-century Bengali Vaishnavism, a devotional cult of Hinduism, found expression in Manipur in 1764, during the reign of King Bhagyachandra, becoming the state religion. Hence Vaishnavite religious themes—the stories of the childhood pranks of Lord Krishna and of his divine love with Rādhā—form the content of the two classically evolved Manipur dance forms, Sankirtana and Rasalilas.

Manipuri dances are performed in the temple courtyards as night-long performances, attended by the devout. Sankirtana is performed on such occasions as the birth of a child, giving food for the first time to a child, piercing of the ears, the marriage ceremony, and funerals. A collective prayer and a highly codified ritual, it is the strong foundation on which Manipuri dances have been structured. The style is imbued with delicate lyricism and fluid grace, as the movements are rounded, circular, and flowing. It is divided into *tandava*, the masculine and forceful, and *lasya*, the feminine and delicate.

The elements of *nritta* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressional dance), and *natya* (drama) are all found in Manipuri. Human emotions have been codified by the *Nāṭyashāstra* into nine *rasas* (sentiments): love, valor, anger, fear, disgust, pathos, laughter, wonder, and tranquillity. *Sringara*, the sentiment of love, is predominant in Manipuri, and the other sentiments are present in subordinated form. *Sringara* is further divided into two: *vipralambha*, in separation, and *sambhoga*, in union; each is further divided into thirty-two divisions, reflected in the performances of the Rasalilas and Sankirtana. Manipuri gurus have created fascinating varieties of their own *tala*, or time measures, enriching the music for dance. The singing is typical, with women singing in very



Manipuri Dance Form. The ritualistic dance of Manipuri describes a primitive cosmology: the creation of the world, of the human body, and of human activities. Its style is imbued with delicate lyricism and fluid grace, as the movements are rounded, circular, and flowing. ROGER WOOD/CORIBIS.

high pitch in *nupi bashak*, competitions by two groups of women. Original compositions of the Vaishnavite poets of the medieval period like Chandidas, Vidyapati, and Jayadeva and their translations in the Meitei language are also used while performing expressive pieces.

Manipuri is essentially a group dance, but special solo numbers are also found in the Rasalilas. Natasankirtana is performed before the Rasalilas. Basantarasa, Kunjarasa, Maharasa, and Nityarasa are various Rasalilas performed on different and specific festive occasions. Attired in gossamer veils and mirrored skirts and decked with ornaments, the milkmaids (*gopis*) and Krishna create a great spectacle of beauty. Pung *choloms*, the playing on drums by male dancers while dancing with acrobatic feats, and Karatala *cholms*, playing with large cymbals by men, form a part of the repertoire. Women also dance, playing with small cymbals. The variety of Manipuri dances is manifold.

Manipuri continues to be performed in the temple courtyards and the *mandapas*, the special spaces for the Rasalilas and Natasankirtan. It is also being performed in the metropolitan centers, retaining its inherent religious, devotional character while meeting the demands of the theater. Many gurus continue to create new choreographic works, solo numbers within the traditional framework, whereas some have ventured into new works with a shift in

theme. Chaotombi Singh has choreographed Kaibul Lamjao about a vanishing species of deer in Manipur. Priti Patel uses Thang-ta, a martial art, along with traditional techniques of Manipuri dance to create a new kinetic language in her choreographic works. Disciples of Guru Amobi Singh, Mahabir, Jamuna Devi, Ojha Babu Singh, Rajkumar Singhjit Singh, his wife Charu Sija, Priya Gopal Sana, Guru Bipingsingh's wife Kalavati Devi, his daughter Bimbavati, his disciples the Jhaveri sisters, and Priti Patel are all well-known exponents of the art of Manipuri dance.

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MOHINI ATTAM

Mohini Attam, which literally means “dance of the enchantress,” is a solo dance form of Kerala, performed only by female dancers. In Tamil Nadu *dēvadāsīs* (servants of the gods) performed in the temples, but in Kerala women dancers were attached only to Suchindram and Tripunithura temples. References are found in a Nedumpara Tali inscription, dated A.D. 934, to Tali Nangyars performing solo dances. Literary references are found in Manipravala *kavyas* (poems) about dancers. Kunjan Nambiar mentions Mohini Attam in his *Ghoshyatra*. Mattancheri palace and Padmanabhapuram murals suggest the popularity of the Mohini myth, and manuals like *Balaramabharata* deal with the *bastas*, the hand gestures used in Mohini Attam dance. The influence of Dasiattam, the precursor of contemporary Bharata Natyam, on the existing female dance forms in Kerala is clear. By the nineteenth century in the court of the poet-king Swati Tirunal, two dance gurus, brothers Sivanandam and Vadivelu, received royal patronage, and they contributed to the shaping of Mohini Attam on lines similar to solo Bharata Natyam.

Kerala's lovely landscape, lined with swaying coconut fronds, with boats bobbing on its rippling lagoon waters, is reflected in the gentle movement patterns of Mohini Attam dance. The smooth circular movement of the torso forms the central motif. Movement starts at the center of the body and travels to the periphery. Along with the swaying torso, the waist, shoulders, elbows, and wrists move with flexibility and precision. *Nritta* (pure dance) and *nritya* (expressional dance) are both part of

Mohini Attam, and the *Nāṭya Shāstra* principles of *rasa* theory, or aesthetics, govern Mohini Attam.

Formerly, a Mohini Attam recital began with *cholketu*, a number of pure dances interspersed with expressional poems and the rendering of mnemonics. With the recent revival of Mohini Attam, native classical Sopana music of Kerala has been introduced, and Ganapati prayers are added, as well as the poems of Swati Tirunal and Iriyamana Tampi and songs from the Gita Govinda. Elegant white costumes with gold borders and ornaments enrich the dance.

When the poet Vallathol established Kerala's Kala Mandalam in 1936, primarily for training students in Kathakali, he also rescued Mohini Attam by institutionalizing its training. Exponents like Kalyani, Madhavi, and Krishna Panicker were asked to teach there. Devotional *bhakti* fervor permeates most of the songs used in modern performances of Mohini Attam by such popular artists as Shatna Rao, Satyabhama, Kshemavathy, and Sugandhi. Kanak Rele and Bharati Shivaji have reconstructed this dance form using a scientific approach, choreographing new numbers and enhancing its popularity.

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ODISSI

In the *Nāṭyashāstra* (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.), the early phase of development of Odissi dance is called *Odra-nritya*. Sculptural evidence dating to the first century B.C. from the Ranigumpha cave of Orissa's Udaygiri hills shows a dancer performing with musicians before a royal couple. Odissi dance was nurtured both in Hindu temples and at the royal court. Innumerable Orissa temples, built over several centuries and adorned with prolific dance sculptures, serve as a veritable lexicon of dance, culminating in the thirteenth-century Konarak temple with its *natamandapa*, or dance hall—which suggests that a vital tradition of Odissi dance was then flourishing. Inscriptional evidence from the eleventh-century Brahmeswra temple in Orissa mentions the dedication of dancing maidens, *dēvadāsīs* (slaves of God), called *maharis* in Orissa at that time. The Anantavasudev temple of the thirteenth century also points to the practice of dedicating *maharis* to Hindu temples.



Odissi, a Classical South Indian Dance. Odissi has a striking sculptural quality. Its precise dance positions may be observed in the carvings of ancient temples in southern India. LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS.

Odissi dance was performed only for the gods in the inner sanctum sanctorum at the Jagannath temple in Puri. Outside the temple, *gotipua* dancers, boys dressed as girls, later danced on festive occasions like Chandan Jatra and Jhulan Jatra. Thus Odissi has evolved as a dance form nurtured in Hindu temples by the *maharis*, in royal courts by the court dancers, and outside the temples for public enjoyment as well.

The fifteenth-century text *Abhinaya Chandrika* by Maheswar Mahapatra set forth the characteristics of Odissi dance, following the tenets of the *Nāṭya Shāstra* governing dance: *nritya* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressive dance), and *natya* (drama). Odissi dance has a striking sculptural quality. It appears much like mobile sculpture. Its basic stance is called *chauka* (the square position); other positions are the *abbanga* (two body twists), the *tribhanga* (three body twists), and the *atibhanga* (many body twists). These positions impart a sculptural quality.

beauty to Odissi dance. *Gotipua* dancers also performed *bandha nritya* (acrobatic feats).

Odissi had declined under British rule, and because of its disreputable social status, girls from good families were not allowed to study the dance. After Indian independence, however, Odissi was revived by its gurus, the most prominent of whom were Pankaj Charan Das, Kelucharan Mahapatra, and Deba Prasad Das. They worked out a repertoire of *bhumi pranam*, *batu*, *pallavi*, *abhinaya*, and *moksba*, incorporating pure dance in the first three numbers, expressive dance in *abhinaya* numbers, and using Oriya songs by modern poets and poems from the Gita Govinda. *Moksba* (release) is the finale, with pure dance movements and a Sanskrit poetic prayer.

Sanjukta Panigrahi, Priyambada Mohanty, Kumkum Mohanty, Minati Mishra, and Sonal Mansingh are well-known exponents of Odissi dance.

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DAS, CHITTA RANJAN (1870–1925), Indian nationalist leader. Popularly known as Deshabandhu (Friend of the Land), Chitta Ranjan (C. R.) Das emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century as a prominent moderate nationalist leader. One of the high-profile barristers at the Calcutta High Court, C. R. Das achieved instant fame and name recognition throughout Bengal for successfully defending Aurobindo Ghose (Sri Aurobindo), who was charged with sedition. The Ghose case not only greatly boosted Das's reputation as a trial lawyer, it also inducted him into the public arena and nationalist politics. By the time he passed away in 1925, Das and Motilal Nehru were the two leading "moderates" among the increasingly extreme and cacophonous voices of the Indian nationalist movement.

Das was born in Kolkata in 1870 to an upper middle class Brahmo (reformed Hindu) family. Originally from Bikrampur in the Munshiganj district of Bangladesh, Bhuban Mohan Das, C. R. Das's father, was a solicitor at the Calcutta High Court. Educated at the London Missionary Society School in South Calcutta, C. R. Das passed the entrance examinations in 1885, and graduated from Presidency College in 1890. Thereafter, he went to England to join the Inner Temple and was called to the



C. R. Das. A lawyer catapulted into the struggle for Indian independence, Das became a leading figure in Bengal and initiated the nationalists' ban on European-style clothing. He set an example by burning his own British-made suits and donning traditional "desi" or Khadi clothes. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Bar in 1894. He returned to Kolkata and started practicing law as a barrister at the Calcutta High Court. His reputation soared as a professional and as a nationalist politician in the aftermath of the *swadeshi* movement in Bengal (the first major phase of a militant nationalist movement protesting against the British authorities' decision in 1905 to divide the province of Bengal in two parts—one with a Muslim majority, the other Hindu); he proved a staunch and successful defender of *swadeshi* activists imprisoned by the British.

Das joined forces with Surendranath Banerjea and Bipin Chandra Pal in opposing the partition of Bengal. After the partition plan was abandoned in 1911, Das appeared not to be politically active, except for presiding over the Bengal Provincial Conference in 1917, until 1921. In that year, he promptly responded to Mahatma Gandhi's call for noncooperation with the government. He took an active part in the boycott of the visit of the prince of Wales to Kolkata in 1921. However, he opposed, even condemned, Gandhi's move to withdraw the noncooperation movement following the outbreak of violence in the country. He called it a "serious mistake."

He opposed the Congress Party's policy decision to boycott the legislative councils. Instead, he proposed in his Council Entry Program to seek noncooperation from within the councils. He resigned from his position as president of the Congress Party in 1922 as his voice and vote did not appear to count. He joined Motilal Nehru, Hakim Azmal, and the Ali brothers (Muhammad and Shaukat) to form the Swarajya Party. As a leader of the new party, he devoted his energies to bringing about Hindu-Muslim amity and unity. He and the Swarajya Party offered to give Hindu-Muslim collaboration a concrete shape with an agreement, signed by leaders of the two communities in Bengal, which became known as the Bengal Pact. However, the Congress Party rejected it, as did some of the senior Hindu Bengali leaders, including Surendranath Banerjea and Bipin Chandra Pal.

During his last years, Das served as the mayor of Kolkata. His death at age fifty-five was mourned by crowds of Hindus and Muslims. It was indeed a blow to the potential of Hindu-Muslim unity in Bengal. He is fondly remembered to this day in Bangladesh and India's West Bengal for his anticolonial and nonsectarian beliefs and policies, and for the personal sacrifice he made for the great cause in which he fervently believed. Known for his lavish sartorial style (he had the reputation of getting his suits tailored and laundered in Paris) and high living, he renounced that lifestyle in 1921 in favor of simple *swadeshi* comportment and living.

Dilip K. Basu

See also **Aurobindo, Sri; Banerjea, Surendranath N.; Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Motilal**

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DEBT MARKETS Roughly 90 percent of the Indian fixed income market is made up of bonds issued by the government of India (GOI). The GOI bond market capitalization grew sharply from 1 trillion rupees in 1995 to 11 trillion rupees in 2004. In part, this reflects India's fiscal problem, in which the fiscal deficit grew from 0.48 trillion rupees in 1995 to 1.30 trillion rupees in 2004. Both government and corporate bonds are held and traded locally. There are no GOI bonds that trade in international markets. Indian firms do raise money in international markets, but these are typically held to maturity or are traded in very illiquid markets.

The maturity of GOI bonds ranges from three months to fifteen years. Bonds with maturity greater than a year are issued with a fixed coupon, which is set to roughly obtain a par bond (a price of Rs. 100) at the date of issuance. There are practically no zero-coupon, indexed, or floating rate bonds. While the short-maturity bonds are more or less issued on a calendar fixed at the start of the year, longer-term bonds have no such schedule. New issues tend to create new kinds of bonds: there is little effort to consolidate the liquidity into a smaller set of bonds. On average, there tend to be between 140 and 170 bonds that are available in the GOI bond market. The market is concentrated among five kinds of finance companies: banks, insurance companies, pension and mutual funds, and (as an intermediary) primary dealers. Strong entry barriers exist, which have prevented wider market access.

Bond trading takes place through the telephone. It is an over the counter market with trades negotiated directly between two finance companies or intermediated by a broker. There is no pretrade transparency. Reliable information about the day's trades becomes available only by the end of the day. Roughly half of the trades, particularly those that involve brokers, are reported on the NSE WDM (the Wholesale Debt Market of the National Stock Exchange). Irrespective of whether a trade is reported on WDM, it is transmitted into the systems for clearing and settlement through the Negotiated Dealing System (NDS), which is a computer front-end screen linked to a computer network, run by the Reserve Bank of India.

Most (though not all) trades flow through NDS to the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL), which was established in 1999 to remove counterparty default risks for GOI trades. CCIL becomes the legal counterparty to both legs of all trades, removing risk and externalities associated with default by one counterparty. This is unusual by world standards, since netting by novation is typically a feature of exchanges and is not found in an over-the-counter market. CCIL has enabled multilateral netting in the settlement of trades, meaning that the multiple fund or securities obligations of a single entity (to pay or receive) are aggregated into a single net obligation. Prior to the creation of CCIL, the bond settlement process was much less reliable.

One significant development has been the emergence of exchange-traded collateralized borrowing and lending obligation (CBLO) contracts at CCIL, similar to funds borrowing backed by securities, or a repurchase agreement (repo), with maturities from a day to a year. However, unlike the repo, which is traded on an over-the-counter market, the CBLO is traded on a limit order book exchange and has had a volume of 25 billion rupees in a very short period. This is India's first accomplishment in

terms of opening up market access, and having a more transparent trading framework.

The turnover ratio, defined as trading volume over a year divided by market capitalization, went up sharply from 8 percent in March 1995 to 192 percent in 2002. Bond market liquidity lacks resilience; when bond prices decrease, liquidity tends to evaporate. The turnover ratio dropped to 152 percent in March 2004, and dropped further in the first half of 2004–2005. Trading was fragmented due to the large number of bonds with heterogeneous maturity and coupons. As a consequence, liquidity tends to be concentrated in a certain maturity of bonds at a given time.

A major driver of the liquidity in the corporate bond market—as well as the GOI bond market—has been the emergence of fixed income mutual funds in the late 1990s. Mutual funds are much more accountable, thanks to daily computation and disclosure of the value of the bond portfolio. In addition, the mutual fund industry has become largely private since the 1990s.

The Indian fixed income markets urgently need instruments to hedge against interest rate volatility. In a market economy, fluctuations of interest rates are innate. At present, there is little flexibility for firms and households to manage this risk. There has been significant growth in the over-the-counter market for interest rate swaps as well as forward rate agreements. Open positions rose from 2.4 trillion rupees in 2003 to 5.2 trillion rupees in 2004. However, this market lacks a modern legal and regulatory framework. There are continued concerns that the contracts on this market are not enforceable under Indian law. There have been attempts to start exchange-traded interest rate futures, but these have been unsuccessful.

The central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has a dominant role in defining India's bond market. There is no explicit mandate for this role in the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934. However, the RBI is the issuer of bonds and debt manager for the government of India. It runs the depository (Securities General Ledger) where GOI bonds are dematerialized and held. Since the RBI is also the regulator of banks, it has an overriding influence on policy questions about the bond market through the use of regulations that prevent banks from moving toward a market design considered unsuitable to the RBI. Therefore, the RBI has become the regulator by default because of all its other roles. Insights into many problems on the bond market can be traced to this institutional framework. The corporate bond market is regulated by the Securities Exchange Board of India, which is the securities market regulator.

Susan Thomas

See also **Capital Market; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets; Mutual Funds, Role of; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI); Stock Exchange Markets**

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DECCAN. *See* **Maharashtra.**

DECCANI PAINTING Over the centuries, immigrants and traders from East African, Arab, Turkic, Central Asian, and Iranian lands settled on the Deccan plateau along with the indigeneous population. An examination of the relatively small corpus of extant paintings produced in the Muslim courts of the Deccan sultans between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries reveals distinctive styles that often reflected a synthesis of indigenous and foreign artistic influences.

In 1292 'Ala' al-Din Firuz Shah and his forces began the process of wresting control of the region away from the Yadava, Kakatiya, and Hoysala Hindu kings in the name of the Khalji Sultan of Delhi. The first capital of the Deccan sultans was established in 1327 at Daulatabad (in modern Maharashtra) by the Tughluqs (r. 1321–1351), successors to the Khalji Sultans (r. 1290–1321). Only twenty years later, a group of Daulatabad nobles rebelled against Tughluq rule and enthroned 'Ala' al-Din Hasan Bahman Shah (r. 1347–1355), thereby establishing the Bahmanid dynasty (r. 1347–1538), a new line of rulers independent from Delhi. Although the remains of the great fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Bahmanid forts and palaces, such as those at Daulatabad, Gulbarga, and Bidar, display a beautifully designed interplay of stone, wood, and tile mosaic decoration evidencing the creativity of court artisans, there are no extant paintings or manuscripts that can be attributed to the patronage of these Deccan sultans.

During the reign of Sultan Mahmud (r. 1482–1518), the Bahmanid kingdom, weakened by internal and external pressures, split into smaller, independently ruled sultanates. The three most powerful and most significant to the history of Deccan court painting were the Nizām Shahis (r. 1496–1636), who made their capital in the northern Deccan at Ahmadnagar (in modern Maharashtra); the ‘Adil Shahis (r. 1489–1686), ruling from Bijapur (in modern Karnataka); and the Qutb Shahis (r. 1512–1687) at Golconda. Many of the Deccan sultans were great patrons of the arts and maintained artistic workshops and libraries that drew painters, calligraphers, poets, musicians, and scholars from all over the Muslim world. As Shi‘a Muslims, the three sultanates shared a religious affiliation, but their origins differed. The first Nizām Shah had indigenous affiliations, as he was descended from a Hindu slave that had converted to Islam; the founder of the ‘Adil Shahi dynasty was an immigrant who, according to Ottoman sources, was of Turkman origin; and the Qutb Shahis’ founding sultan was a Turkman prince who was forced to flee Iran for political reasons.

Ahmednagar

It was at the Nizām Shahi capital at Ahmednagar that the earliest and perhaps most innovative paintings of the Deccan sultanates were created. These rare works, of which only about twenty survive, indicate that royal portraits predominated as a favorite subject. Perhaps the earliest example of painting at Ahmednagar are twelve illustrations that accompany a manuscript from about 1565, the *Tarīf-i Husayn Shāhi* (History of Husayn Shah; Puna, Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala), a posthumous history of the reign of Sultan Husayn Nizām Shah I (r. 1554–1556) written by Aftabi. In these early Deccan paintings, the figures, foliage, and architectural features are rendered with a simple but exuberant line that may be related to works produced at Mandu, capital of the Sultans of Malwa (r. 1401–1531, 1534–1561). However, the inclusion of vibrant colors to indicate a profusion of decorative patterning anticipates a later Deccani preference for highly ornamented works. Ghostly silhouettes of a female figure sharing Nizām Shah’s throne included in five of the manuscript illustrations may be abraded images of the sultan’s beloved wife, Queen Khanzada Humayun, who lost favor after her husband’s death, and perhaps represents a rare example within Islamic court art of royal female portraiture.

In the decade following the production of this manuscript, great advances in technical refinement had occurred at the Ahmednagar atelier, as evidenced in three royal portraits from around 1575, possibly painted by the same artist, that exhibit a new interest in naturalistic portraiture. These magnificent works indicate an awareness of artistic developments in the Mughal, Safavid, and perhaps even



Adil Shah Playing Tambour. Deccani painting of the Tree of Life, a popular motif in Indian culture. With its branches reaching into the sky, and roots deep in the earth, the tree dwells in three worlds—serving as a link between heaven, earth, and the underworld. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT’S POTPOURRI.

European courts. A fine example of painting from this period includes the *Sultan Murtaza Nizām Shāh Enthroned* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale), a portrait of Nizām Shah’s son and heir Murtaza I (r. 1565–1588), rendered in minute parallel strokes upon a luminous golden ground. The painting depicts the youthful sultan seated on an elaborately inlaid throne, presenting gold to a courtier. To the sultan’s left is a weapon-bearing attendant fanning him, and a young page who hurries to offer the courtier betel nut, an indication that the audience has concluded.

A small group of exquisite line drawings, rendered with the grace of a Persian master calligrapher’s line, herald the last stage of imperial patronage at Ahmednagar, as in the elegantly rendered *Young Prince Embraced by a Small Girl* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from about 1580–1595. Mughal stylistic elements evident in these works may be due to a taste acquired by Murtaza’s brother, Burhan II (r. 1591–1595), who as a prince was in exile at the court of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) for attempting to usurp the throne.

Bijapur

The ‘Adil Shahi sultans were great patrons of the arts, and their capital at Bijapur was second only to the Mughal capital at Delhi as a center for artistic creativity.

Among the earliest known Bijapur paintings are those contained in a copy of a Persian manuscript on astronomy titled *Nujum al-‘Ulum* (Stars of science; Dublin, Chester Beatty Library), dated 1570–1571/A.H. 978. Probably created for Sultan ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I (r. 1557–1579), the subjects are illustrated in an unrefined but highly animated style.

It was under the patronage of Sultan Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II (r. 1579–1627)—poet, musician, and mystic—that Bijapuri painting came into full flower. During Ibrahim’s rule, elegantly conceived and painted works were created, featuring nobles depicted in languid ease within palatial surroundings, hawking on horseback, or in other princely pursuits set against a foliate dream-landscape. One of four anonymous artists identified as contributing to the small corpus of Bijapur painting was particularly adept at capturing the introspective nature of his patron, as depicted in *Sultan Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II* (London, British Museum).

A number of illustrations depicting mystics and ascetics were produced for the sultan, including a beautifully conceived portrait titled *Yogini* (Dublin, Chester Beatty Library) painted in the early seventeenth century. Exemplifying the jewel-like works produced during this period, this richly adorned and mysterious *yogini* (female ascetic) stands within a fantastic landscape of deep earth tones juxtaposed with gold-embellished pastel pink, purple, and green. Bijapuri paintings of this period exhibit elements of both indigenous South Asian and contemporary Safavid Persian court painting traditions, evidencing the cosmopolitan nature of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah’s court, which drew ambassadors, scholars, artists, and musicians from many regions.

By 1600 the Mughals had captured Ahmednagar fort and were preparing to challenge Bijapur and Golconda. Included among the Mughal entourage were Rajput (“sons of kings”) nobles and military commanders from the Hindu princely kingdoms of the western and northern regions of the subcontinent. The Rajputs were also patrons of the arts, and often their artists accompanied them on military campaigns. The influence of Mughal and Rajput artists is apparent in works produced during the reign of Sultan Muhammad ‘Adil Shah (r. 1627–1656), in which the ethereal otherworldliness of earlier paintings has been replaced by a more realistic representation of figures, a placement within naturalistic settings, and the use of a subtle, subdued palette.



Bijapuri Portrait of Yogini (Female Ascetic), c. 1600. Exemplifying the jewel-like paintings created by this school of artists, the richly adorned and mysterious *yogini* stands within a fantastic landscape. Bijapuri works exhibit the traditions of both indigenous South Asian and contemporary Safavid Persian paintings, evidencing the cosmopolitan nature of Ibrahim Adil Shah’s court. THE TRUSTEES OF THE CHESTER BEATTY LIBRARY, DUBLIN.

Although portraiture continued to be a popular subject, rulers and nobles were now depicted in profile within Mughalized compositions such as formal court ceremonies and parades. In more intimate compositions, they were shown seated or standing, equipped with shield, sword, and dagger—the accoutrements of power—or displaying the sensibilities of a connoisseur by holding a delicate flower. During this time, works often included notations identifying both subject and artist (or artists), influenced no doubt by Mughal artistic tradition, as the portrait *The African Prime Minister Ikblās Khan and a Page* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from the mid-seventeenth century, which contains the inscription “work of Muhammad Khan, son of Miyan Chand.”

Just before Bijapur fell to the Mughals in 1686, under the patronage of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II (r. 1656–1672) and Sikandar ‘Adil Shah (r. 1672–1686), there was a revival of

brilliant, fantastically colored paintings. The last extant painting attributable to Bijapur imperial commission is a genealogical painting *Sultans of the 'Adil Shahi Dynasty* (New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art), from about 1680, by the artists Kamal Muhammad and Chand Muhammad. Sultan Yusuf 'Adil Shahi, the dynasty's founder, is shown enthroned between his seven descendants, including Sikandar 'Adil Shah (r. 1672–1686), the last sultan of Bijapur, depicted here as a dark-skinned youth.

Golconda

The Qutb Shahis apparently had a great appreciation for Central Asian and Iranian artistic modes, perhaps influenced by their descent from the Qara Qoyunulu (Black Sheep) Turkman sultans of Anatolia and western Iran. Some of the earliest paintings in Golconda under Qutb Shahi patronage are attributable to the reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah (r. 1550–1580). Illustrations to a 1569 copy of Hatifi's *Khusrau and Shirin* (Bankipur, Patna, Khuda Bakhsh Library) are of varied quality but betray links to works produced in the late-fifteenth-century Turkman and Timurid artistic centers at Bukhara, Shiraz, and Herat, and to sixteenth-century illustrations produced in the Tabriz and Qazvin ateliers of the Safavids.

The *Kulliyat* (Collected works) of Sultan Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah (r. 1580–1612), from about 1590 (Hyderabad, Salar Jung Museum), is one of the first illustrated manuscripts under imperial patronage at Golconda to combine successfully Indo-Persianate artistic modes. Cluttered compositional schemes, a preference for surface patterning, and the use of thickly applied rich, vivid colors indicate a prototype for future developments in Golconda painting. Sultan Muhammad was an important patron of the arts, and this lavishly painted manuscript of his own Urdu verses may have been commissioned as a personal copy.

Works attributed to the reign of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah (r. 1626–1672) exhibit the lively interplay between contemporary Safavid and Mughal artistic influences implemented in the Golconda atelier, where indigenous and foreign artists may have worked side by side. One of the most beautifully rendered paintings from this period is the *Darbar of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah as a Youth* (London, British Museum), dated about 1630. The representation of *darbars*, or formal court gatherings, became an important subject for depiction by Mughal artists under Emperor Jahangir (r. 1605–1627). Here, however, their Golconda counterpart has interpreted the theme to suit local tastes. Eschewing the Mughal penchant for realism and psychological insight into subjects, Sultan Abdullah,

his courtiers, and attendants are rendered with idealized features and stare vacantly at the viewer. Although the composition is restrained, the artist has successfully presented the opulence and power of the Qutb Shahi court through the use of bold coloration and the lavish application of gold throughout.

An expanding Mughal military presence in the Deccan led to an increased exposure to Mughal iconographic traditions. Golconda's court painters, however, continued to interpret their works through the lens of Deccani aesthetic preferences. This tendency is evident in a handful of portraits attributed to the reign of Sultan Abdullah, such as the compositionally animated and realistically rendered *Procession of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah Riding an Elephant* (St. Petersburg, Saltykov-Shtshedrine State Public Library), dated about 1650.

In a rare portrait of the last Golconda ruler, Abu'l Hasan Qutb Shah (r. 1672–1687), *Sultan Abu'l Hasan Walking in a Garden* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from about 1672–1680, the robust sultan is dressed in multiple layers of exquisite garments, enjoying the scent of a flower just plucked from his garden. Although Abu'l Hasan is depicted in profile and is centrally positioned within the composition, conforming to Mughal painterly ideals, he is not a static figure. Indeed, the Golconda artist has conveyed the relaxed and almost sensual demeanor of the sultan with fluid line, embellished by rich coloration and opulent patterning.

In 1687, after an eight-month siege, Abu'l Hasan ceded the Golconda fort to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1657–1707). Mughal control of the region was thereafter centered at Hyderabad (in modern Andhra Pradesh), where Mughal nobles ruled as governors of the Deccan from 1685 to 1724. During this period, it is thought that Deccan artists and works of art made their way to northern courts in the company of Mughal and Rajput nobles returning from the Deccan campaigns. Evidence of Deccan artistic influence can be seen particularly in works of art produced at the Rajasthani ateliers in Bikaner and Kishangarh.

Hyderabad and the Provinces

In 1724 Nizām al-Mulk, the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan at Hyderabad, declared independence from the Mughal emperor at Delhi and took the title of Nizām Asaf Jah I, establishing the Asafiya dynasty (1724–1950). Portraiture continued to be popular at Hyderabad and provincial Deccan centers such as Kurnool, but increasingly courtly themes, featuring idealized ladies of the court, were included in the Deccan artistic repertoires. A

complete set of thirty-six *ragamala* (garland of musical modes) paintings called the “Johnson Ragamala” (London, India Office Library, Johnson Album 36) is considered by some to be the finest and most sophisticated example of Hyderabad painting. Painted sometime in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the acquisition of this *ragamala* set by Richard Johnson, the British Resident at Hyderabad in 1784 and 1785, heralds a new clientele for artists in the Deccan and other parts of the subcontinent: English, Dutch, and French traders and adventurers.

Rochelle Kessler

See also Rajput (Rajastani and Hill) Painting; Sultanate Painting

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DELHI SULTANATE. *See Islam’s Impact on India.*

DEMOCRACY. *See Political System.*

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS SINCE 1757 The Indian subcontinent is the seat of one of the world’s oldest agrarian civilizations, and has long sustained a sizable population. Before the explosive growth of the European population in the 1800s, only China exceeded India in

size and density of population. The period of almost continuous warfare that accompanied the establishment of the British Empire in India between 1756 and 1818 seriously affected the population in almost every major region of India. Thus the baseline population in 1757 was probably about 180 million for the subcontinent as a whole.

On the basis of scattered observations and anecdotal records, it seems that this population—like most pre-modern ones—was characterized by early marriage, relatively high fertility, and (by today’s standards) high mortality, quite like what was found in the subcontinent the mid-nineteenth century. Some mortality was intentional, especially through the neglect or outright infanticide of female babies in North India. Nonetheless, sources suggest that the population generally maintained an overall excess of births over deaths. There is evidence of a steady trickle of immigration over both land and sea frontiers. Emigration was limited, though all the European powers exported slaves (it is likely, however, that larger numbers were imported from Africa by both European and other merchants). Overall, migration was not of great significance for the large Indian population. Internal migration however, was important since labor was still scarce relative to land. Rulers and landlords sought tenants and taxpayers, and emigration was the major strategy by which merchants, artisans and peasants could resist political and economic oppression. It was also a way to reduce, if not eliminate, the consequences of crop failures. (Climatologists observe that the monsoon is much more uncertain in the arid zones of the subcontinent.) In addition, extensive transregional networks of trade and credit also mitigated the effect of regional crop failures. Still these would certainly cause terrible hardship for many, and significantly increase mortality, especially among the young and the old.

Heavy mortality occurred when political conflict prevented these mitigating mechanisms from operating. So the western peninsula saw a devastating famine in 1702–1703 because the monsoon failed in the twentieth year of a protracted war between the Marathas and the Mughal empire. Manucci, an eyewitness, thought that 2 million people perished. In 1769–1770, the predatory maladministration of the English East India Company in eastern India helped convert a regional crop failure into a serious famine in which 8 million to 10 million people, or over a quarter of the population of Bengal, died. Between 1780 and 1783, British wars with the Marathas in northern and central India, and with Mysore in the south, contributed to catastrophic famines that left hundreds of ruined and deserted villages in the affected regions. Internecine warfare among the Marathas culminating into war with



An Indian official described the aftermath of the 1783 famine in North India:

wilderness covered with grass. . . . Such is the state of the territory! The local administration was already oppressive—on top of that came the failure of the rains and the peasants died en masse, so that entire villages were left uninhabited. Entire households of ten to twenty persons all died! No one remained to dispose of the corpses! Heaps of bones lay in the houses! This is the condition of the country from the Chambal river to the borders of Kashmir and Lahore in the west; in the east up to Lucknow or perhaps even beyond. Many people have perished. The survivors are those who abandoned their homes early and emigrated to other provinces. Many went to the east; lakhs moved south. They came past the encampment at Gwalior—bands of thousands came, one after the other. But Marwar was in the same state; so the bands of refugees travelled on through Malwa, Nemar, Burhanpur.

(cited in Guha, p. 36)

the British led to widespread depopulation in southwestern India from 1801 to 1803.

Establishment of the Colonial Demographic Regime

The gradual establishment of British rule led to a significant improvement in population statistics. The statecraft of the era was anxious to promote population growth: Sir James Mackintosh, a leading scholar-official, proposed in 1804 that the comparative success or failure of governments worldwide might be measured by the reproductive success of the populations they ruled. The British colonial government moved beyond the established Indian practice of enumerating only households, rather than individuals, and for the first time began population counts ordered by approximate age and sex—basic inputs for demographic analysis. These sources allow us to estimate a population of 161 million in 1800, down from a probable 180 million in 1757. Recovery from this nadir was generally swift, and by 1860 the aggregate population of India had reached 250 million, despite the occurrence of at least one serious crop failure in every region, except the humid central and eastern Gangetic Plain. From 1868 to 1872 the British government coordinated population counts on a relatively uniform standard throughout British-administered India, and in 1881 a simultaneous enumeration covered the subordinate (princely) states as well. Thus began the series of decennial censuses that have been conducted in India to the present. Statistically speaking, we now enter the modern era, but the populations counted would not

derive the benefits associated with modernity for decades to come.

The Demography of the Colonial Era, 1860–1947

The impressive administrative achievement of enumerating hundreds of millions of highly diverse people, spread over thousands of miles, was but one aspect of an energetic drive to remake colonial India. It was also exemplified by the construction of a network of railroads and the revival and development of irrigation works on many major rivers. Yet, paradoxically, this period saw severe demographic catastrophes, and life expectancy at birth hovered around twenty-four years until 1901 and then fell in the next two decades, reaching the lowest ever recorded in 1911–1921, when crop failures, inflation, and the worldwide influenza pandemic struck in the same decade (see Table 1). The population increased by only 20 percent in fifty years, or about 0.35 percent a year. Only after 1921 did growth speed up to approximately 1.0 percent and then 1.4 percent per annum. As far as we can tell, growth was determined by variations in the death rate, since there is no evidence that marriage or birth rates changed significantly. Thus the decades of colonial modernization up to 1921 were marked by increases in death rates. This paradox may be understood in terms of three effects:

Global transport networks now ensured the rapid spread of epidemics, like the bubonic plague and influenza, that would earlier have burned themselves out in isolated locales;



COLONIAL FAMINE: A VICTIM'S ACCOUNT

(Ramabai was raised in a formerly affluent Brahman family. In the famine of 1874 she was forced to beg food for her mother after her father had died of starvation.)

The lady spoke kindly to me but I could on no account open my mouth to open my mouth to beg for that piece of *bajree* (millet) bread. . . . With superhuman effort I kept the tears back, but the expression on my face told its own story. The kind Brahman lady, guessing what was on my mind, asked me if I would like to have some food, so I said "Yes, I want only a little piece of *bajree* bread." She gave me what I wanted, and I felt very grateful, but could not say a word to express my gratitude. I ran to my mother in great haste and gave it to her. But she could not eat, she was too weak.

(Kosambi, p. 252)

In 1896, Ramabai was herself attempting to relieve famine victims in Central India:

The first [British Government] Poor House we saw was no house at all. It was a grove in the outskirts of the town. Groups of famished people were seen sitting or lying in ashes on dirty ground. Some had rags to cover their bodies, and some had none. There were old and young men, and women and children, most of them ill, too weak to move about, and many suffering from leprosy and other horrible diseases. . . . They slept in the open air or under the trees at night, and ate the scanty and coarse food provided by the Government. The food was nothing but dry flour and some salt. There were several starving orphan children who could not cook for themselves, and had no one to work for them. So they had either to eat the dry flour or depend upon the tender mercies of their fellow sufferers, the older persons, who took as much of their food as they could. . . . Parents can be seen taking their girl children around the country and selling them for a rupee or a few annas, or even for a few seers of grain.

(Kosambi, p. 254)

The same transport networks efficiently distributed food in response to prices, but the famine-affected poor lacked the purchasing power to buy it (resulting from what Amartya Sen has termed "entitlement failure");

The new irrigation works often resulted in waterlogging, which increased the incidence of malaria, a major killer of infants and children.

These impacts were mitigated, but not nullified, by a colonial government that ultimately considered balancing its budget more important than preventing famine. If so, why did the population increase through the interwar decades? First, these two decades escaped widespread crop failures. Furthermore, elected politicians and the press had more authority as power gradually "devolved" into Indian hands, which may have led to the more liberal disbursement of relief in areas where the scarcities

occurred; and finally, India benefited from the global recession of bubonic plague and lethal influenza. Thus the death rate fell significantly below the birthrate for the first time since the 1880s, and the population grew by 27 percent in twenty years. But the country was not secure against famine: renewed warfare and a downturn in the weather cycle again brought famine to Bengal, which had escaped it since 1770. Amartya Sen (1981) has emphasized the importance of political processes in preventing famine, and these now conspired to intensify it. The Indian National Congress had opposed the war, and its leaders were out of office and in jail. The leaders of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha alternately allied and feuded over office, while a succession of colonial governors were more concerned with repressing the nationalists and supplying Allied forces reeling from the Japanese onslaught than with feeding the rural poor. So food scarcities and associated epidemics resulted in at

TABLE 1

| Period | Life expectancy | | Annual rates per thousand | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|------|------|
| | Male | Female | Deaths | Births | GRR | NR |
| 1881–1890 | 24.6 | 25.5 | 41.3 | 48.9 | — | — |
| 1891–1900 | 23.6 | 24.0 | 44.4 | 45.8 | 2.99 | 1.09 |
| 1901–1910 | 22.6 | 23.3 | 42.6 | 49.2 | 3.14 | 1.06 |
| 1911–1920 | 19.4 | 20.9 | 48.6 | 48.1 | 2.83 | 1.03 |
| 1921–1930 | 26.9 | 26.6 | 36.3 | 46.4 | 2.99 | 1.25 |
| 1931–1940 | 32.1 | 31.4 | 31.2 | 45.2 | 2.76 | 1.30 |
| 1941–1950 | 32.5 | 31.7 | 27.4 | 39.9 | — | — |

Notes: Births and deaths per thousand of the mid-year population are referred to as the crude birth and death rates, respectively, because they are heavily influenced by the age-structure of the population—an older population will have more deaths and less births than a younger one with identical conditions and behavior. The gross and net reproduction rates (GRR and NR) measure the likelihood that, under the prevalent conditions, a woman of childbearing age will bear girls to replace herself and continue the population. The gross rate ignores the likelihood of interruption by premature death; the net rate takes that into account and is a better measure of trend population increase.

SOURCE: Adapted from Davis, Kingsley, *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951, Tables 36 and 87; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), *Population of India*. New York: United Nations, 1982, Tables 49 and 89.

least 2 million deaths in the Bengal famine that rang out the colonial era.

Population Policies and Impacts

While there is little doubt that the establishment of colonial rule brought enormous socioeconomic changes, few colonial policies directly targeted major demographic variables. In the nineteenth century, population growth was often viewed benignly and was cited as evidence of British beneficence. So, for example, Walter Hamilton, publicist for the East India Company, could write of Bengal: “It is pleasing to view the cheerful bustle and crowded population by land and water . . . evincing a sense of security, and appearance of happiness, seen in no part of India beyond the Company’s territories” (*Report on the Population Estimates of India (1820–1830)*, 1965, p. xii).

On the other hand, the enormous population could always be invoked to unburden the government of responsibility for anything negative, from famine to soil erosion. Perhaps the only demographic initiative taken in the nineteenth century was the effort to suppress female infanticide. This practice was widespread among some communities of northern and western India; it is probable that state penal measures led to the substitution of neglect for outright infanticide. Northwestern India and Pakistan are still characterized by heavily skewed sex ratios. Other than that, the 1892 law that raised the age

of consent to twelve years could hardly have had measurable demographic impact; the 1929 legislation that raised the marriage age to sixteen for women went unenforced.

Most medical interventions before the 1920s were focused on the health of colonial personnel and the new urban environment; interventions for the benefit of rural Indians began only between the two world wars. The joint impact of ignorance and parsimony limited their effects. At best, in the absence of state intervention, the unplanned growth of the early colonial cities would probably have led to large increases in urban mortality. As late as 1941, however, only 4.2 percent of the population lived in cities with over 100,000 people. Perhaps the most important development was the creation of a basic structure for medical education, the beginnings of a hospital network in the cities and of health centers in rural India. World War II also saw the beginnings of a food rationing system in the cities. These were the early measures that a more activist and less parsimonious Indian government would later build on.

India, 1947–2002

The successor states created by withdrawal of the British in 1947 had to mobilize swiftly to cope with the catastrophic population displacement that accompanied the partition of British India. A recent study calculates that between 1947 and 1950, 6 million to 7 million Muslims left India, and 4.7 million non-Muslims entered from West Pakistan and 2.5 million from East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands perished in the violence that generated this flight and from their sufferings on the way. The flow from East Pakistan continued for several decades.

Demographically, the new Indian republic was more urban and industrial than undivided India had been, but it had lost its only reliable food surplus region (West Punjab). For the next two decades, India was to live precariously “from ship to mouth.” The leaders of the new republic had long been critical of the stock British explanation of Indian problems as resulting from its population. Jawaharlal Nehru commented caustically in 1940: “And what they propose to do about this population I do not know, for in spite of a great deal of help received from famines, epidemics and a high death rate generally the population is still overwhelming.” He did not oppose the spread of voluntary contraception, but added that “[e]ven in India, the food supply has increased and can increase more than proportionately to the population.” (*Toward Freedom*, p. 283) Mahatma Gandhi was firmly opposed to contraception; confronted by Margaret Sanger in 1935, he would go no further than the “safe period” method. He said, “Why should people not be taught that it is immoral to have more than three or four children and that after they have had that number they

should sleep separately?" (Green, ed., *Gandhi in His Own Words*, pp. 233–235).

The directive principles of the new Constitution enjoined the state to improve the health and nutrition of its people. This injunction came at a time when cheap and effective public health technologies were becoming available; in the Indian context, the most dramatic was the insecticide DDT, which in its early years left surfaces lethal for mosquitoes for several weeks after spraying, and which had the collateral benefit of destroying plague fleas, flies, and other insects. A dramatic drop in malarial infections occurred during the 1950s. There were also great strides in the production and availability of the newly developed synthetic antimalarials and antibiotics. Access to older techniques such as vaccination jumped dramatically. (Smallpox was eradicated in 1975.) The health system grew considerably with over 3 percent of the outlay under the First and Second Five-Year Plans being allocated to it. Finally, the "ship-to-mouth" process was managed competently enough to avert famines, though chronic malnutrition remained common. In conformity with Nehru's prewar outlook, some government clinics began offering family planning services, and contraceptives were distributed free or were subsidized for low-income groups.

Life expectancy increased sharply from age thirty-two in the years 1931 to 1951 to age forty-four in 1960. The Planning Commission underestimated its own success in this sector, complacently assuming that the population would grow at 1.2 percent annually, even slower than in the 1930s. The 1961 census, however, found an increase of 78 million, a growth rate of 2 percent, with only 0.1 percent (the excess enumeration over natural increase) being net immigration, such as refugees from East Pakistan and "repatriated" Tamils from Sri Lanka. Not surprisingly, the Third Plan perspective declared that the "objective of stabilising the growth of population over a reasonable period must therefore be at the very centre of planned development." The planners now realized that mortality would continue to decrease and so policy had to be directed to reducing fertility. The 1960s saw further efforts in this direction, with wider outreach for family planning. The emphasis was on intrauterine devices and sterilization as contraceptive methods; the commercial distribution of condoms was introduced in 1968. The population grew even faster than in the 1950s: a birthrate of 41.1 and death rate of 18.9, yielding an annual natural increase of 22.2 per thousand. Legislation passed in 1972 lowered the legal obstacles to abortion. The Fifth Plan (1969–1974) aimed to reduce the birthrate to 30 by 1979 and 25 by 1984 by propagating a range of barrier and terminal methods of contraception. In 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,

beset by legal, economic, and political problems, established a semidictatorial regime ("the National Emergency"). In an interesting revival of colonial rhetoric, most problems were now attributed to the undisciplined nature and feckless reproduction of the Indian people. Coercion was liberally deployed to correct both, and—especially in North India—to achieve arbitrary sterilization targets. The targets were inaccurately reported as achieved and overachieved (by 8.3 million). But Gandhi's regime dramatically lost the national election of 1977, and its successor immediately declared that "family planning" was to be entirely voluntary. Presciently, the new government also introduced a new emphasis on maternal health, immunization, and the improvement of women's education. But the 1981 census enumerated 684 million people, an increase of 24.8 percent since 1971; in 1991 the total was 846 million (+23%); and in 2001, 1,027 million (+21.9%). Life expectancy at birth mirrored these improvements, reaching sixty-three years for men and sixty-four for women in 2002, twice the 1931–1951 level but still a decade below China and Sri Lanka.

In the gloomy stock-taking that followed the 1981 census, a few bright spots emerged: certain parts of the country had achieved dramatic reductions in fertility and mortality, and were within striking distance of zero growth. The most famous (and now, much-cited example) was the southern state of Kerala. Gandhi had been fond of saying that development was the best contraceptive; yet this state had gained little from the large industrial projects of the Nehru-Gandhi era, and its income was below the national average. Kerala's high level of literacy and quality of general public services were soon invoked as the explanation. Even though the Constitution of 1950 had directed the state to provide free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen, only 55 percent of men and 26 percent of women over that age were literate nationwide in 1981. In Kerala, however, the percentages were 86 and 71. Even as demographers were studying fertility trends, advocates for women's rights pointed out that:

[t]he right of women to decide freely on the number and spacing of her [sic] children and to have access to the information and means to enable them to exercise that right has a decisive impact on their ability to take advantage of educational and employment opportunities and to participate fully in community life as responsible citizens. (*Objectives of International Women's Year*, cited in ESCAP, p. 359)

A major national survey in 1992–1993 found that total fertility rates varied inversely with educational attainment,

ranging from a fertility rate of 4.03 for women who were illiterate to 2.15 for women who had completed high school.

More sophisticated analyses by Jean Drèze and Sen have confirmed this effect at both the state and district level across the entire country. Declines in fertility continued as the national female literacy rate inched up. Thus, in the 2001 census, 76 percent of men and 54 percent of women were returned as literate, and the overall population increase had slowed to well below the 1961–1991 rate. The 2001 census found that the target of bringing the crude birthrate to 25, set for 1984, was almost achieved (25.4). Of course, the enormous cohorts born between 1961 and 1981 were still in their childbearing years, and this masked the true extent of the decline in fertility. Encouragingly, the Kerala pattern seemed to be spreading, and in 2001 no less than 11 out of 20 major states had annual rates of natural increase (CBR-CDR) below 15, with Kerala and Tamil Nadu close to each other at 10.6 and 11.4.

On the other hand, the four northern states with the worst social and educational indicators (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) had rates of increase exceeding 20. These kept the national rate from falling below 17, a rate at which the population would still double in forty-one years. The only hopeful sign is that the rate of natural increase in 2001 was significantly lower than the average increase through the previous decade in these states; since out-migration predominates in them, immigration cannot explain the difference. This signals that fertility is beginning to fall even in these regions. There is evidence that given even minimal support, women would seek to limit their fertility. In 1992–1993 no less than 30.1 percent of women not using contraception in Uttar Pradesh desired to either postpone or prevent pregnancy, but only 17.7 percent planned to use contraceptives. Presumably the remainder were too powerless to make that decision. But by 1998–1999, 53.8 percent of those unprotected in Uttar Pradesh intended to resort to contraception in the future; 22.9 percent planned to do so within the next year. In the country as a whole, 58.8 percent of women planned to use contraception in the short or longer term. Obviously the fulfillment of such intentions depends on the ability of the administration—and the nongovernmental organizations active in the field—to deliver access to usable methods to millions of rural women who cannot travel far from their homes. In addition, it is likely in many cases to depend on protecting women from violence within the household. Both aspects are illustrated in the following anecdote from a woman journalist.

When a team of researchers visited a village in Uttar Pradesh to ascertain its health needs, several women walked up to inquire shyly whether contraceptive pills were being distributed. For many of these women, asking their husbands to get contraceptive pills meant inviting violence. (Jain)

Thus, successful trials of weekly- and daily-dosage oral contraceptives open the door to the adoption of contraception by women too powerless to use other methods. Overall, therefore, the long-awaited demographic transition in India seems finally to be setting in, but it is likely that the population will stabilize only after outstripping that of China in the middle of the twenty-first century. Still, as the experience of several countries has shown, effective improvements in governance and infrastructure can immensely accelerate such transitions to a low-fertility, low-mortality pattern. As of 2002, the total fertility rate had dropped to 3.1, down from 3.7 in 1992.

A disquieting feature of the Indian transition has been the markedly unequal distribution of its gains between the sexes. The sex ratio (women/men x 1,000) declined steadily from the 1901 census (when it was 972) to the 1971 census (925). In 1981 it showed a small increase (930), but dropped to 927 a decade later, and was at 933 in 2001. Analysis has established that the deficiency of women is concentrated in, but not confined to, the northwestern states of India. In most populations, women—biologically more resilient—outnumber men in the older age groups. Therefore, unbiased increases in longevity should raise, not lower, the proportion of women. But in fact, women lost ground exactly when longevity began to increase. The explanation lies in the systematic neglect of female children, and in the heavy toll of childbearing in adult life. It is only after 2000 that female life expectancy again exceeded male (64 and 63 years in 2002). But this is calculated from live births. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the growing availability of in utero sex determination tests allowed parents to selectively abort female fetuses, and the 2001 census found an adverse sex ratio below age six.

Looking at the situation as a whole, the picture is more hopeful than it has been for many decades. The population of India is well into the demographic transition to a modern regime, but only sustained efforts to maintain and develop the institutions of governance—especially those concerned with health and education—can ensure that it completes that transition.

Sumit Guba

See also Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Food Security; Population, Gender Ratio of

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DEMOGRAPHY AND CENSUS-TAKING India, the second most populous country in the world, had a population of over 1 billion (1,102,900), according to its 2001 census. The publication of India’s census results attracts worldwide attention due to its population’s sheer size. The population growth rate in the country has hovered at around 2 percent per annum since 1961. The estimated growth rate between the 1991 and the 2001 census was almost 2 percent (1.93%), but there is a strong indication that the rate of population growth in the country is now falling compared to that of earlier decades (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

| Total population and growth rate in India, 1901–2001 | | |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Census year | Population (thousands) | Average annual growth rate (percent) |
| 1901 | 238,396 | — |
| 1911 | 252,093 | 0.56 |
| 1921 | 251,321 | –0.03 |
| 1931 | 278,977 | 1.05 |
| 1941 | 318,661 | 1.33 |
| 1951 | 361,088 | 1.25 |
| 1961 | 439,235 | 1.96 |
| 1971 | 548,160 | 2.2 |
| 1981 | 683,329 | 2.22 |
| 1991 | 846,388 | 2.14 |
| 2001 | 1,028,610 | 1.93 |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

India had a very low increase in population until 1921, as a result of famines, epidemics of plague and cholera, and the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919. The influenza epidemic is estimated to have killed almost 5 percent of the Indian population. The control of many communicable diseases since 1921 has significantly reduced mortality in India, resulting in a slow but steady increase in population. The pace of population growth accelerated after 1961, with mortality rates declining substantially without any commensurate decline in fertility. The rapid increase in its population was one of the most serious challenges India faced after independence.

The last quarter of the twentieth century also recorded a significant fall in fertility throughout India. The trend in fertility and mortality rates reveals that the pace of decline in fertility was slower than the decline in mortality from 1921 to 1971. The trend reversed thereafter, and fertility is now also on a course of rapid decline. The 2001 census results presented a downward trend in population growth rate. India is also a vast and diverse country with significant variation in demographic indicators across regions. While the south and to some extent the west of the country experienced rapid declines in fertility and resultant declines in population growth, the highly populous states in the northern part of the country recorded relatively high fertility levels and lack of significant declines in the population growth rate.

India has a population of multilingual and multiethnic communities. Caste and religion play important roles in Indian social life. There is a very clear demographic difference between upper and lower castes in India. The upper castes have very low mortality and fertility rates, while the lower castes have adverse demographic

outcomes, an indirect indication of the socioeconomic vulnerability of India's lower castes.

Women occupy considerably lower positions throughout the country. As an exception to the international pattern, different decadal censuses taken throughout the last century present deficits of females in India. This is a reflection of discrimination against females in Indian society. India has about 6 to 8 percent more men than women. The sex ratio (m/f) showed a consistent upward movement until 1971 (except in 1951) and has fluctuated thereafter. The sex ratio recorded even in the 2001 census (1.07) was highly unfavorable to females.

Population Census

The population census is the basic national population data available in India. It is important for administrative purposes and for many aspects of economic and social research and planning. Indian census taking is a massive operation, which takes a number of years to organize, though the actual enumeration takes place within a month. Hundreds of reports are brought out in each census, and massive statistical materials have been published.

The Indian census operation is one of the largest in the world. Prior to independence, in 1931 the undivided British Indian empire had the world's largest population. Attempts were made to collect population data in India from the beginning of the Mauryan empire in the third century B.C. for the purpose of taxation. Similarly extensive records were maintained on land, production, population, and famine during the Mughal period. There were several assessments of India's population by the British East India Company, aimed at assessing its manpower for purposes of defense, taxation, and employment.

With the introduction of the first census in 1801 in Great Britain, it was expected that a census would be taken in India as well. It took, however, another eighty years to plan and execute a synchronous census in India. The first census along modern lines was taken in the North-West provinces in 1853. Although not systematic, population counts were taken since 1820 in several regions of India.

The year 1872 marked the beginning of modern census taking in undivided India. However, a synchronous census began only from 1881 and continued at ten-year intervals. The 1872 census was not synchronous or systematic. It was held at different dates in different parts of the country. It also did not cover all the provinces of India. The original idea was to count the population throughout the country on a particular day, but the census operation went on for several months. The reference date of the census was finally recorded as 21 February

1872. The problems of coverage and cartography that the 1872 group of censuses had presented were ably followed up by W. W. Hunter's Statistical Survey and the Survey of India, which helped plan for the 1881 census.

The Indian census was undertaken on the same day on a de facto basis until 1931. Each person was counted at the place where the person was actually found on the reference date of the census. However, it became increasingly difficult to conduct the entire enumeration on a single day. Hence, census taking moved from de facto to de jure, that is, counting a person according to his or her usual residence. Of these two types of enumeration, the de jure method is more difficult to accomplish without the risk of omission or double counting.

Census taking had been a strenuous effort in India. Certain areas had to be excluded from census taking, and special efforts had to be made in remote or mountainous regions. The 1881 census, for instance, was not taken in Kashmir. Further, in the princely states, except Hyderabad, Baroda, and Mysore, full information was not obtained. The censuses prior to independence thus missed some regions due to specific problems encountered in those areas.

The census of British India provided valuable insights into various aspects of Indian life. The results of each census have been published in detail, except in 1941, when detailed census reports could not be published due to constraints imposed by World War II. Hundreds of volumes have been written on various aspects of the census.

The British census commissioner of 1941, W. W. M. Yeatts, remained in India after independence in 1947, and he was appointed the first census commissioner of independent India. After his death in 1948, R. A. Gopalaswami was appointed to take his place.

When the preparation for the 1951 census was underway, it was clear that a complete count was impossible with the conditions prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir. The government therefore decided not to attempt a census in that state. However, using available past census figures, estimates were arrived at for Jammu and Kashmir for the 1951 census. Similarly, census taking could not be conducted in Assam in the 1981 census, nor in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.

In 1951, when the first census of independent India was taken, the census commissioner created a compromise between an omnibus type of report and the almost bare presentation of tables made in 1941. His general report was fairly lengthy, but it concentrated on one central theme: the food problem in the context of rapid population growth. The 1961 census commissioner also

followed this practice and chose levels of regional development as the main theme of his report.

The 1971 census used electronic computer facilities for the first time. This use of technology raised the hope that the publication of census results would become much faster. But modern computer technology without a matching printing technology created substantial delays in the publication of census tables. Census reports or tables printed five years after the census enumeration are usually shelved by readers in anticipation of the next census.

Soon after independence, India's census organization became permanent under the Ministry of Home Affairs. From 1961, the census of India began to publish a monograph series on various aspects of the field. The Census of India Act was passed in 1948, providing adequate support to the census organization, making it obligatory for every person occupying a house or enclosure to allow access to census officers and to allow them to paint on or to affix such letters, marks, or numbers as may be necessary for census purposes. The law further makes it mandatory for citizens to answer census questions truthfully. The law also ensures the privacy of the information collected during the census operation.

The aim of the census is to count each individual, although operationally the entity of enumeration is the household. In the 1951 census, a uniform definition was adopted for households throughout India. A "household" was defined as a "group of people who lived together and took their food from a common kitchen" (Census of India, 1951).

The village and town are considered the smallest territorial units in rural and urban areas, respectively. Maps of these areas would be useful, but have been rare in the history of the Indian census. Only in the North-West Frontier provinces were maps used to help in the enumeration. Since 1961, however, the use of maps has become more common.

Once the territorial location is demarcated clearly, the next important task in the preparatory stage is to locate every household within the smallest administrative units. Since 1941, during the house-listing operation, information was also gathered concerning the head of the family, type of house, and, recently, details of amenities. Such data provide valuable insights into many aspects of Indian domestic life, and increase knowledge of living standards throughout the country. Trained enumerators visit every household in every corner of the country to gather information. The enumeration now takes about twenty days to complete.

The census organization carries out data processing, tabulation, and analyses of their data; this data processing

has been computerized since 1971. Provisional census figures are published within months of the enumeration. However, there is an enormous delay in releasing other detailed tables, which may take six to seven years.

Problems of the Census Count


The aim of the census organization is to gather accurate information from every individual in the country. However, in India, social and cultural traditions often prevent people from revealing accurate information. Nearly 72 percent of the population in India live in rural areas, according to the 2001 census. Many villages, especially tribal villages, have very limited accessibility. It is widely accepted that most censuses in the world undercount people to a certain extent, particularly young children. In India, sociocultural habits are said to result in a significantly higher undercount of females.

In the past, the primary motive for census taking was for assessing taxes. This general perception has remained a serious barrier to the gathering of accurate information from most rural homes. It is, however, expected that the data collected over a number of censuses are likely to become more accurate and dependable. Even after several years of census taking in India, however, it is the experience of field workers in villages that the most common misgiving about any census or sample survey is fear of the imposition of taxes. As early as in the 1872, the census reports observed that many misapprehensions prevailed on the subject of an approaching census. A number of wild rumors were usually spread about the objectives of census taking, with the levy of taxes being the major concern. In Madras it was feared that houses were numbered to levy a house tax.

In many parts of India, land is largely held by dominant castes, who have economically exploited low-ranking landless laborers and poor artisans. Early censuses did not provide an accurate count of people of the lower castes. The censuses taken after independence removed questions on caste and limited them only to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as a constitutional requirement. The major contribution of the census of independent India was in the field of internal migration and urbanization. For the first time in the history of the census, the 1951 census gave the rural-urban makeup for all tables.

The poor status of women in India gives them a higher likelihood of being uncounted in censuses. In some parts of the British India, people thought that the British government conducted censuses to find wives for British soldiers. Women were often concealed from census takers to avoid the possibility of exploitation.

FIGURE 1



Indian censuses since the beginning of the twentieth century reveal a continuous increase in the masculinity of the population, at least until 1971 (see Figure 1). After a detailed examination of the various factors accounting for the falling sex ratio in the country, Pravin Visaria (1961) concluded that it was the result of higher mortality among females than males.

The sex ratio (m/f) of the population has been fluctuating since the 1971 census. An assessment of the underenumeration in the census by Mari P. N. Bhat in 1998 observed that there has been an excessive undercount of females, approximately 1.8 percent in the 1991 census as compared to the 1981 census, leading to an increase in the sex ratio. According to Tim Dyson (2001), the brief reversals of the trend toward increasing masculinity in the censuses of 1951, 1981, and 2001 happened mainly because females in particular were better counted in these censuses than in the immediately preceding enumerations. This gives credence to the notion that, even after independence, a fairly large proportion of females in the country remain unreported.

Given the sociocultural conditions prevailing in India, and the vastness of its census operation, conducted under extremely difficult conditions, census underestimates are not surprising. Skepticism still persists regarding the purpose of census taking, and widespread illiteracy, particularly among the lower classes, especially women, contributes to the possibility of underenumeration. Post-enumeration surveys, however, indicate levels of underenumeration varying between 1.5 and 2.0 percent. It is

possible that even postenumeration surveys underestimate the magnitude of the census undercount. Hence the true population of India may be larger than the census data indicate.

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See also **Demographic Trends since 1757; Population, Gender Ratio of**

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DESAI, MORARJI (1896–1995), prime minister of India (1977–1979). Born in 1896, Morarji Ranchodji Desai began his political career by taking part in the Indian Nationalist Congress's freedom struggle against British rule. Like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, Desai spent many years in British jails for his part in the civil disobedience movement. He was a Gujarati Hindu from the Bombay presidency province of British India, which included the present-day states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. A strict vegetarian expounding high moral values, Desai was a staunch Gandhian in his philosophy and practice. Desai had his early education in Gujarat and then at Bombay University.

Desai rose to prominence when he became the Congress Party chief minister of the state of Bombay (formerly the Bombay presidency) from 1952 to 1956, before the province was divided into Gujarat and Maharashtra. He later held ministerial positions in Jawaharlal Nehru's

Congress government and assumed that he was the rightful heir-apparent for the position of prime minister after Nehru's death in 1964. However, the Congress Party chose Lal Bahadur Shastri to become prime minister. When Shastri died in January 1966, Desai again sought to become prime minister, but was again bypassed, this time in favor of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. Desai became finance minister and deputy prime minister in Indira Gandhi's Congress government. He defected in 1969 to start a rival Congress Party, known as Congress (O), signifying that this new party represented the "old" Congress Party, which had brought freedom to India. The ruling Congress Party of Indira Gandhi then became identified as Congress (I), with the "I" standing for Indira. The public recognized the party of the daughter of Nehru as the continuation of the Congress Party of Nehru and Gandhi, and Indira Gandhi's Congress (I) was swept back to power in the elections of 1971, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

When Prime Minister Gandhi declared the "National Emergency," suspending the democratic Constitution and imposed authoritarian rule, Desai was imprisoned under the drastic provisions of the emergency. His Congress (O) Party then joined the alliance of opposition parties to form the Janata Party to challenge the Congress (I) Party in the national elections of March 1977. The Janata Party won, and Morarji Desai finally achieved his ambition, becoming prime minister of India. He was the first non-Congress Party prime minister of India, heading the Janata Party government from 1977 to 1979. Critics, however, claimed that having reached the pinnacle, he was content merely to sit on top of it. High inflation and intense rivalry among members of the Janata Party led to its defeat in the 1979 elections.

Often perceived as an eccentric, Desai gained notoriety when he claimed that he drank his own urine as a form of health therapy. He even wrote a book, titled *Nature's Cure*, about this odd belief. His bizarre practice was jokingly referred to by the public as "Morarji Cola." In 1974, before he became prime minister, he also published an autobiography, *The Story of My Life*. Morarji Desai died in 1995 at the age of ninety-nine.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

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DEVADASIS. See **Dance Forms; Devī.**

DEVANAGARI. See **Languages and Scripts.**

DEVA(S). See **Vedic Aryan India.**

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

1950–1990 When India attained independence in 1947, it inherited a weak and unwieldy banking structure. The rudimentary nature of the legal framework had allowed the haphazard growth of indigenous banking institutions, with the number of banks mushrooming in some periods, followed by sizable numbers of bank failures, especially during World War II. The structure of banking underwent a significant change during the war, with the semiofficial Imperial Bank of India and the foreign-controlled exchange banks yielding ground to the new Indian joint stock banks. With the preponderance of banks with miniscule capital and rampant unhealthy business practices, banking development during this period was considered uncontrolled and indiscriminate.

The stresses and strains faced by the Indian banking system during the immediate postwar years were compounded by the postpartition travails, particularly in West Bengal and Punjab, the provinces that suffered the worst impact. Two hundred and five banks went out of business from 1947 to 1951; of them, 83 were in West Bengal, with outside liabilities of 260 million rupees, and 24 were in Punjab, with much larger outside liabilities of 620 million rupees. Of 194 nonscheduled banks listed with the Reserve Bank of India at the end of March 1953, 146 were defunct or untraceable.

The subject of the inadequacy of banking laws had received probing attention in the report of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931), which recommended a full-fledged bank act, but this could be implemented only with the passage of a regular Banking Companies Act (1949). After these early steps, the Indian banking system experienced far-reaching changes in the post-1950 period. These changes have been primarily



State Bank of India. The Ballygunge branch of the State Bank of India, Kolkata. Known as the Imperial Bank of India until 1955, it is the largest state-controlled bank in India. INDIA TODAY.

influenced by public policies that evolved over different phases, which may be broadly described as: consolidation of banking and strengthening of banking regulations (1950–1967); credit initiatives and social control over banking (1955–1967); bank nationalization and significant structural and institutional changes (1969–1990); and the current period of banking reforms (1991 onward).

Banking Consolidation

The task of consolidation and strengthening of the banking system, which the Reserve Bank of India took up in earnest after 1950, required multilayered actions. Toward this end, even the new law was found to be insufficient; it was amended ten times between 1950 and 1967. The multilayered processes of consolidation and strengthening first required the execution of a wide set of measures of supervision and control over banking

TABLE 1

Growth and structure of commercial banks in India, 1951–1990

| | 1951 | 1969 | 1980 | 1990 | 2002 |
|------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Number of all commercial banks | 566 | 85 | 276 | 290 | 298 |
| Scheduled banks including regional rural banks | 92 | 71 | 273 | 287 | 294 |
| Regional rural banks | — | — | 194 | 196 | 196 |
| Nonscheduled commercial banks | 474 | 14 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Share in bank deposits (in percentages) | | | | | |
| Publics sector banks | — | 84.5 | 91.9 | 90.8 | 79.0 |
| Foreign banks | — | 9.2 | 2.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Private banks | — | 6.3 | 5.2 | 4.1 | 16.0 |

SOURCE: Reserve Bank of India.

companies, including control over management, board membership, and voting rights; there followed varied attempts at amalgamations, mergers, transfers, reconstructions, and even liquidations of fragile banks. The process of consolidation through amalgamation—voluntary until 1960—was slow. The failure of two major banks in 1960 brought home the inherent risks involved in allowing substandard banks to continue to function. An amendment to the banking law enacted that year facilitated the compulsory reconstruction and amalgamation of banks considered to be unviable and reluctant to enter into voluntary merger arrangements. During this phase, efforts were made to reorganize fifty-four state-associated banks in the erstwhile princely states.

As a result, between 1960 and the end of 1969, there were 48 compulsory mergers, in addition to 20 voluntary amalgamations, 17 mergers with the State Bank of India, and 125 transfers of assets and liabilities. These various measures of consolidation drastically reduced the number of banks from 566 in 1951 to 295 in 1961 and finally to 85 in 1969 (see Table 1). The process brought an end to the institutions that had been called nonscheduled banks, with limited capital size and unsustainable banking practices.

Social Orientation

To encourage the growth of regional and functional banking, the social orientation of commercial banking was conceived in the founding law of the Reserve Bank of India itself, which was entrusted with the responsibility of enlarging the supply of agricultural finance through scheduled commercial banks or cooperative institutions. Until the early 1950s, the cooperative movement was considered appropriate for this purpose. But, on the basis of the recommendations of the Rural Banking Enquiry

Committee (1950) for involving commercial banks in rural credit, the former Imperial Bank of India agreed to open 114 offices in rural and semiurban areas (against 274 branches recommended); it opened only 63 branches in the five years following July 1951. It was concluded, therefore, that without government intervention, banking facilities would not be extended to such areas. Hence, the Imperial Bank of India was brought under public ownership as the State Bank of India from July 1955, with the central bank of the country holding 92 percent of its shares and with a statutory responsibility to establish at least 400 additional branches within a five-year period; it fulfilled these and other branch expansion targets it set for itself. In September 1959 major state-associated banks of the former princely states were taken over and vested with the State Bank of India as subsidiaries.

Even so, many perceived weaknesses of the commercial banking system, such as poor population coverage of bank branches, vast sectoral credit gaps, excess control over banks by industrial and commercial interests, and a poor capital base, came to be aired in political circles, suggesting reorientation of the banking system. This led to the adoption of several measures, during the period from 1965 to 1969, that have been described as establishing “social control” over commercial banks. They included introduction of the credit authorization plan (1965) requiring scheduled banks to obtain prior authorization for granting new credit limits of 10 million rupees or over to any single party; initiation of a social control plan in 1968, with the objectives of achieving a wider spread of bank credit, preventing its misuse, and directing a larger volume of credit to priority sectors; and the statutory reconstitution of commercial bank boards with a majority representation to informal sectors.

Bank Nationalization

The sociopolitical undercurrent of the second half of the 1960s was one of disenchantment with the functioning of the commercial banking system, even after the initiation of social control over banks. Two major institutional developments took place during the period that followed. First, effective 19 July 1969, fourteen major Indian scheduled banks having public deposits of 500 million rupees or over were nationalized. On 15 April 1980 six more Indian banks of the same size were nationalized. In 1975 a new type of commercial bank, the regional rural bank, was established in underbanked districts of the country as an institution that could combine local familiarity with modern banking methods. By the end of December 1983, 150 regional rural banks had come into existence, covering 265 districts out of the country's then 400-odd districts. These were set up with central government, state government, and commercial bank partnership.

TABLE 2

Number of offices of scheduled commercial banks according to population group

| | 1969 | 1990 | 2002 |
|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Rural | 1,833 | 34,791 | 32,481 |
| (percent of total) | (22.2) | (58.2) | (49.1) |
| Semiurban | 3,342 | 11,324 | 14,723 |
| (percent of total) | (40.5) | (19.0) | (22.2) |
| All-India | 8,262 | 59,752 | 66,208 |
| (percent of total) | (100.0) | (100.0) | (100.0) |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

By the middle of the 1980s, public policies began to focus on facilitating banks to undertake diversification into “para-banking” and other financial service activities. Many banks had set up specialized subsidiary companies and asset-liability management companies, and either through these entities or on their own, they entered into new activities, such as merchant banking, mutual funds, hire-purchase, housing finance, venture capital, equipment leasing, factoring, securities broking and trading, and other financial services.

These institutional developments have brought, along with the State Bank of India and its subsidiaries, commercial banks with over 90 percent of deposits into public ownership (see Table 1). At the same time, a series of policy initiatives brought about many other structural changes, such as the fast growth of bank branches, the spread of branches to rural, semiurban, and underdeveloped regions, and a higher proportion of bank credit extended to agriculture, small-scale industries, and other defined priority sectors. By the end of March 1990, over 46,000 bank branches (or 77 percent) were located in rural and semi-urban areas (see Table 2). A large number of these branches were opened in underbanked and underdeveloped eastern, northeastern, and central regions of the country. Over 93 percent of bank branches represented public sector banks, including regional rural banks; the balance belonged to Indian private banks (6.5 percent) and foreign banks (0.2 percent). An equally sharp change occurred in the sectoral distribution of bank credit, with the share of agriculture, small-scale industries, and other informal sectors rising significantly, from less than 10 percent in March 1968 to about 40 percent in March 1990 (see Table 3); the share of medium and large-scale industry declined from about 60 percent to 37 percent during the same period.

Growing ailments. Even as the postnationalization policies for commercial banks were underway, many efforts were made to examine their functioning (James Raj Committee, 1978); to undertake their restructuring (Banking Commission, 1972, and James Raj Committee,

TABLE 3

| Distribution of advances of scheduled commercial banks by sector | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| (Percentages to total advances) | | | | | |
| Sector | March 1951 | March 1968 | March 1980 | March 1990 | March 2002 |
| Agriculture | 2.1 | 2.2 | 14.5 | 15.9 | 9.8 |
| Industry | 34.0 | 67.5 | 47.9 | 48.7 | 41.4 |
| Small-scale industries | — | 7.9 | 12.2 | 11.5 | 4.9 |
| Commerce | 36.0 | 19.2 | 28.5 | 22.2 | 26.7 |
| Personal | 6.8 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 6.4 | 12.6 |
| Other | 21.1 | 7.4 | 4.3 | 6.8 | 9.5 |

SOURCE: Reserve Bank of India.

1978); to enhance productivity, efficiency, and profitability (PEP Committee, 1997); and to improve customer service in banks (Varadachary Working Group, 1977). In retrospect, many of their substantive recommendations remained unimplemented or were implemented half-heartedly. As a result, the deterioration in the working of commercial banks persisted.

As various studies and committee reports have demonstrated, the vast quantitative progress of commercial banking with a directed and forced pace was accompanied by growing problems of deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios, resulting in sizable nonperforming assets, declines in productivity and profitability, serious management weaknesses, and trade union pressures, giving rise to overstaffing, weaknesses in organizational structures, inadequate internal controls, deterioration in “housekeeping,” and poor customer service. These issues of deterioration in financial health called for urgent remedial measures, which the two versions of the Narasimham Committee (1991 and 1998) subsequently proposed. Almost all of the committee’s recommendations, except that to reduce the 40 percent target for directed credit to 10 percent, have been under implementation since the beginning of the 1990s; these, along with other reform measures, have served as a check on the postnationalization structural changes and have overall contributed to an improvement in the working of the commercial banking system.

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See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of**

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DEVELOPMENT POLITICS The politics of development, or development politics, has always been at the core of modern economic activity, despite claims to the contrary. In India, a developing and democratic country, one can never fully understand the process of economic development, or of liberalization, without deciphering the politics and power that envelop it, even if market-oriented reforms pretend to rid economic activity of “political interference.”

Traditionally, development was understood as outcomes: economic wealth or economic progress measured in terms of gross national or domestic product. By this criteria, India performed badly despite its early potential; its per capita income in 2002 was \$470, while its per capita gross domestic product grew at 3 percent in 2001–2002 and its rank for purchasing power parity gross national product was quite low, around 146th. Indian leaders wanted significantly more. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had declared that independence in 1947 “is but a step, an opening of opportunity, toward the great triumphs and achievements that await us.” He noted that the tasks of development included “the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.” Important philosophical debates in the 1970s and 1980s expanded the notion of development to incorporate equality of opportunity as well as the expansion of human freedoms. The main idea was that one must see what “goods and services do to the actual opportunities and freedoms of people, categorized according to class, gender, location, and social status” (Drèze and Sen). Thus, development must be viewed in the broader sense as encompassing both economic and social opportunities and affecting different social groups—women and lower castes and minorities—differently. Unfortunately, India’s performance by these more expansive criteria also remained quite limited. About 363.8 million people (out of 1.2 billion) earned

less than \$1 a day in 2003–2004. Its infant mortality rate was one of the lowest, around 90 per thousand live births, while life expectancy at birth was sixty-three years. Illiteracy remained endemic: around 38 percent of India's population cannot read or write, while the figures for women were much higher, around sixty-four percent. Malnourishment inflicted around 53 percent of children. Gender-related indicators were among the worst in the world: in 2004 there were only 933 women to 1,000 men in the population, an exceptionally low sex ratio; life expectancy of women was sixty-four years, and female mortality rates during pregnancy remained high. Eighty-six million members of scheduled castes and tribes, Dalits and indigenous communities, forming 25.6 percent of the population, continued to suffer from caste (status) inequality in addition to many other forms of inequality, despite constitutional protections. According to the United Nations Development Program, India's human development index's rank was 134th, below almost all the countries of the Middle East and behind many African countries with lower per capita incomes. Social and economic deprivation has found a home in India, despite Nehru's wishes and a surplus of state capacity. Thus, India is a bundle of contradictions: its government is all-pervasive and strong; yet, its capacity to affect the long-term developmental prospects of its citizens or to increase growth remains limited.

Development Theory and India

India's developmental experiment is unique for a number of reasons: for its grand ambitions, in aiming to achieve simultaneous economic progress with social and distributional equity, but also for its attempt to achieve these goals through democratic means. Thus, India's developmental trajectory figures prominently in larger comparative debates about the role of the state in economic development, the contests between states and markets as prime movers of growth, the complementarity or lack thereof between democracy and development, as well as the impact of overt centralization in subverting local and market potentials.

India has been compared unfavorably with East Asia and Southeast Asia, although its protection from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, as well as its rapid growth in the late 1990s, has given pause to such negative assessments. The consensus of the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be that India's developmental failure is attributed to its governmental failures, which overwhelmed its intrinsic potential. Rapid growth in the 1990s seemed to confirm this picture, since it coincided with liberalization policies that sought to reduce the power of the state and replace them with market forces and international competition. Yet, India's state institutions and its administrative structure remain the

envy of many developing countries: its meritocratic selection system, the quality and reach of its civil servants, and its revenue capacity led the Indian state to create a public sector and a self-reliant economic policy in the 1960s that became a model for many other countries.

This puzzle led scholars such as Alva Myrdal to characterize the Indian state as "soft" and as "weak-strong." Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph noted that the Indian state defies easy generalization in that it has "alternated between autonomous and reflexive relations with the society in which it is embedded" (p. 1). Baldev Raj Nayar, in a pithy description noted the "paradox of state strength and policy weakness" in India (p. 145). In the words of Pranab Bardhan: "It is, by now, obvious to most people that in spite of some measure of political autonomy and its direct command over vast economic resources, the Indian state is rather weak in shaping the economy" (p. 323). Others have argued that the Indian state is a rent-seeking state that uses its regulatory power to extract rents from the private sector. In this view, the strength of the Indian state was exploited by its occupants to augment illegitimate power and hurt its developmental prospects.

Despite this apparent consensus, recent interpretations note certain anomalies. Ronald Herring notes that unlike the Latin American states, India was prudent in its international debt management before the 1980s, and the cycle of high inflation and high growth rates escaped its citizens (1999). Vibha Pingle (1999) and Eswaran Sridharan (1996) outline the specificity of different sectors; state intervention in some sectors was more enhancing than others; dimensionality of state intervention needs to be incorporated rather than a blunt analysis of the Indian state. Aseema Sinha (2005) and Patrick Heller (1999) focus their attention on another kind of variation: regional variation in developmental prospects. Sinha argues that subnational developmental states lead us to rethink the national frameworks of most assessments. In India the failure of the national state and pervasive market failures were complemented or mitigated by some subnational developmental states. Heller's study of Kerala state highlights the fusion of labor-oriented class mobilization and development. He argues that class mobilization is not antithetical to the wholesome developmental prospects of a subnational state. Correspondingly, the well-being of people in Kerala is among the highest in the world. Thus, recent reevaluations urge a more nuanced and careful analysis of India's developmental failures.

A Historical Perspective

India's developmental experience took birth in a moment of nationalist hope and global postcolonial enthusiasm. At that time, it was believed that states can

make a difference to long-term economic performance as well as address social and equity needs of a poor and underdeveloped population. India embarked on a path of planned industrialization, relying on the public sector to steer ahead, while a strong private sector was expected to aid the state's efforts toward larger developmental goals.

India's developmental trajectory has evolved simultaneously with the state and the Congress Party. India, after gaining independence in 1947, launched an ambitious developmental strategy that sought to achieve rapid economic growth and industrialization while improving the economic and social well-being of its citizens. The role of the central government was seen to be preeminent and strong. This strategy faced its first serious challenge in the 1960s with a persistent food crisis, combined with political instability and eventual recourse to a currency devaluation in 1966. Soon after, in 1969, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi moved the country's economic strategy toward stronger state intervention, nationalization, and self-reliance. A populist emphasis on poverty and welfare programs allowed the regime to acquire political and electoral legitimacy. Foreign economic policy turned inward, and trade with the external world was limited to the Communist bloc. India's share of world trade started to decline in this period. In 1977 a new Janata Party government took power and moved the economic trajectory more toward agriculture and small business. Yet, the overall orientation stayed state-led and centralized. Indira Gandhi, on returning to power in 1980, loosened some economic controls on the private sector and technology imports; her son, Rajiv Gandhi, who took power after her assassination, strengthened these hesitant steps.

Rajiv Gandhi's economic vision was different in two crucial respects: it was technocratic, and outward looking. Although he could not carry forward many of his reforms in his brief tenure (1984–1989), he can be credited with introducing many significant ideational shifts in India's economic policy, thus setting the background for far-reaching reforms that were to come in 1991. In 1991 the minority government of P. V. Narsimha Rao, faced with a balance of payments crisis, was forced to seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. The finance minister at the time, Dr. Manmohan Singh, took this window of opportunity to initiate systemic economic reforms that went far beyond reforms required by the IMF structural adjustment package. Regulatory controls over the private sector were dismantled and India's relations with the external world opened up. Since the 1990s, reforms have proceeded in fits and starts; yet by 2004 most observers agreed that the reforms had been consolidated.

Before India's independence, developmental choices were crucially shaped by Mahatma Gandhi, who put his

stamp of village democracy on India's developmental thinking so indelibly that, even after the ascendance of Nehruvian thinking, Indian politicians still evoke some of those ideas in their defense of local governance institutions such as *panchayat raj*. Critics of India's development experience, such as the recent anti-Narmada Dam movement, also evoke Gandhian ideas. Powerful regional voices gave different interpretations that shaped regional traditions of development in the colonial era: M. Vishveshvarayya, the *diwan* of Karnataka, and Sardar Patel, a leader in Gujarat, represented diverse views on development.

Yet, it was Jawaharlal Nehru's vision that proved most deeply consequential in the new nation's developmental thinking. He combined the goals of democracy, industrial development, and social and economic equity in a distinctive way. His stamp lies over the institutions of the Planning Commission, the Congress Party, and the national state as they grappled with these tripartite tasks. During the Nehruvian period, key regional leaders articulated their own visions, including Dr. B. C. Roy, the chief minister in West Bengal, Pratap Singh Kairon in Punjab, K. Kamaraj in Tamil Nadu, and Jivraj Patel in Gujarat. Intellectuals—largely economists and technocrats—also played key roles in the formative years of India's development, as policy makers consulted and involved “experts” in its policy process. P. C. Mahalanobis, the chief adviser to the Planning Commission from 1955, was the chief architect of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's role in India's developmental evolution is usually seen to be negative, but it is important to remember that she implemented an unparalleled populist reform program embodied in ameliorative antipoverty programs, as well as a move toward state capitalism of a distinct kind. Rajiv Gandhi, together with his group of technocrats such as Sam Pitroda, played a crucial role in laying the conditions for India's engagement with more current technologies and more generally with globalization. His technocratic vision, even if shorn of political realism, was an important turning point in India's developmental trajectory. Since then, the role played by Prime Minister V. P. Singh (1989–1991) and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in initiating liberalization, facilitated quietly by the subsequent prime minister, Narsimha Rao, is crucial in understanding the peculiar, internally driven trajectory of economic reform in India.

To this list of national leaders one must add the newly important role played by regional leaders who, in the 1990s, not only shaped national policies but also engaged the global political economy in new and different ways. Chadrababu Naidu, the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh,

along with Jyoti Basu, chief minister of West Bengal from 1977 to 2000, and S. M. Krishna, chief minister of Karnataka, as well as Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh, evolved distinctive regional responses to the ongoing process of liberalization in India. Naidu became famous for his ease with technology as much as for his ability to bargain effectively with the World Bank for loans for his state. Basu oversaw one of the most successful transitions in a subnational state as his party and state government, in 1994, embraced the central policy of liberalization while welcoming it for ensuring more “regional autonomy.” Digvijay Singh was temporarily successful in making “human development”—literacy, infrastructural development, and health—the goal of his state.

Institutional Framework of India’s Development

From rural development to agricultural development. “India lives in its villages” had long been the constant refrain of the country’s politicians. In 2003, 60 percent of the country’s population was still rural. Yet, India’s leaders never linked agrarian reform to broader development goals or adequately addressed the linkages between distributive aims, rural well-being, and agrarian productivity. Mostly, each of these elements—redistribution, agrarian well-being, technical improvements in the service of agrarian growth—were treated separately at different moments, a product of the crisis of the day rather than of long-term strategic thinking about how they fit together into a coherent developmental strategy.

India’s initial years of independence (1947–1955) saw the implementation of land reform legislation and the creation of community development institutions with the goal of achieving broader well-being for India’s citizens. It was not clear, however, how that strategy would fit with the emphasis on large-scale industrialization that was so prominent at the time. Moreover, land reform was left to the states, given the pressures by landlords and powerful notables in India’s ruling Congress Party. Its uneven and indifferent implementation robbed land reform of its radicalizing promise to change agrarian relations or to improve agrarian income and well-being.

The failure to address the core of India’s agrarian problem created a food crisis in the early 1960s that led India’s policy makers to move toward a limited technocratic and intensive solution aimed at agrarian productivity and self-reliance in food grain production. The New Agricultural Policy concentrated resources (credit and the Intensive Agricultural District Programme) and technology (high-yielding varieties of seeds, irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) in the already advanced areas of the country and

among progressive farmers. It also sought to involve foreign—largely U.S.—aid with research institutions set up for this purpose. The strategy paid off in increasing agrarian productivity, and India’s dependence on imports of food grain became a thing of the past. By 1988–1989, India was producing 170 million tons of food grain. Regionally, the greatest improvements occurred in the wheat-growing regions of Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh. Yet, this newfound self-reliance could not address the problems of the rice-growing regions of the country, thus creating new regional disparities in agrarian patterns. Even more tragically, large sections of India’s populace have continued to suffer from chronic malnutrition and hunger despite the self-sufficiency in food grain production, highlighting the role of institutions that mediate the production process to the consumption of food; distribution of food continues to be a persistent failure of India’s “Green Revolution.”

Industrial development as the lynchpin of the modern developing state. Industrial development was the centerpiece of India’s developmental strategy; its instrument was a strong public sector and regulation of the private sector for public purposes. Thus, India adopted an import-substitution industrial strategy (ISI), rather than developing its comparative advantage in agricultural and textile goods. Exports were neglected. This strategy was to be implemented by the central government, the licensing system, the constitutionally mandated Finance Commission, and the Planning Commission, which acquired disproportionate power in the early years.

The centerpiece of the regulatory state came to be identified with the licensing system—the so called “license-quota-permit raj”—that set up licensing regulations to direct the flow of industrial investments to desired locations and sectors and with the desired mix of product and technology. The purpose of the act was to regulate the entry of firms, to keep industrial capacities in line with plan targets, to achieve regional balance in the creation of industrial capacities, and to diversify the industrial base. Such applications were also reviewed for suitability of the proposed enterprise or expansion plans from the point of “national” and economically rational objectives.

Despite such rationality and preeminent power, the regulatory system became a combination of policy and patronage, wherein different groups established privileged channels of access to state policy. These distributive coalitions received subsidies, concessions, and benefits in return for their political support. As a consequence, the developmental health of the nation suffered.

Class, Capitalism, and Development

In its early years of India’s development, private business, it was believed, would serve a subordinate, although

important role. Colonialism had stunted the growth of capitalist enterprise in particular ways: it had ensured that Indian capitalists were reliant on state finances, in sectors like consumer goods and textiles rather than capital good industries, and were located in few coastal centers like Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai. Thus, the preeminent role of the state was seen to be natural, given the insufficient development of capitalist enterprise in colonial India and its dependent and uneven character. Largely foreign companies or the already strong business groups exploited the new opportunities for investment opened up by the newly independent Indian state: the Marwari, Gujarati, and Parsi business communities. Moreover, these business groups came to rely on state initiatives for finances, markets, and international connections. As state regulation proceeded, business learned to cope with a highly regulated system in subtle yet powerful ways, so that informal connections were established between the national bureaucracy and the large and powerful business houses. The influence of business on state policy took many informal forms wherein personal connections, party finance, and “briefcase politics” infiltrated the state-led system from within.

Democracy and Development

In comparative terms, India poses a puzzle to most accounts that link development with democracy. Most stable democracies are industrialized and wealthy; India is a large poor democracy, but one which has persisted and has been consolidated over time. Most of the world’s stable democracies arose together with capitalism, as middle classes and the bourgeoisie challenged aristocratic privilege in favor of commoners and masses. Indian democracy arose in an agrarian colonial country, where poverty was endemic and capitalist development was nascent. India’s failure to fit into this neat generalization has given pause to many an analyst.

In one view, democracy serves as an obstacle to growth. Democratic politics reduces developmental politics into populist and symbolic channels as office seekers subordinate the long-term collective ends to popular pressures and short-term electoral goals. Most observers believe that India’s chaotic democracy, with multiple social groups, prevents the movement toward developmental politics. In 1997 Prime Minister Inder Gujral said: “India had to pay the economic price of political democracy.” Yet, Adam Przeworski’s research on the political foundations of economic growth finds no strong correlation between regime type and positive economic growth. Development is hurt by entrenched political-economic interests that acquired vested linkages with the license-quota-permit raj. Democracy may be an innocent bystander to this corruption of the development process.

Federalism and Development

The Indian strategy of development was not only led by the central government but gave enormous formal power to central institutions. Nehru saw planning in terms of its national scope, where central institutions of power would rationally direct development in the right way. Nehru, in contrast to Indira Gandhi, saw the power of regional chief ministers as embodying these goals in the most effective manner. Yet, over time, regional leaders gained prominence, and claims of regional redistribution came to animate public discussions and the work of the Planning Commission, which was responsible for allocating public expenditure to states in the most rational and equitable manner. This led to the formation of the National Development Commission, with chief ministers as members, and the modification of national plans to accommodate regional claims. Thus, the Third Plan incorporated regional development and regional equity as important goals, and many commissions were set up in the mid- to late 1960s to deal with the issue of backward states and backward districts.

The role of regional states in shaping and modifying central policy was not insignificant, since they were the actual implementers of most economic policy. This meant that regional politicians sought to maximize their influence within the central developmental process in widely differing ways, mitigating central constraints, where needed, but enhancing central policy where beneficial for regional agendas. Thus, regional states evolved complex and multi-layered economic policies—incentives, tax breaks, and developmental goals—while creating new institutions to manage economic development in their regions. Also, numerous policy domains—most notably, industrial estates, small-scale sector, infrastructural development, agricultural development, and labor policy—were under the direct control of regional states. Thus, the role of regional states in India’s development process was pervasive and consequential. Local politics and regional political economy variables thus shaped the nature of regional responses to central policies and regional developmental strategies. Kerala relied on public action-led social development, while West Bengal relied on a public sector-led industrial strategy combined with sustained reform of rural institutions. Other states, most notably, Gujarat and Maharashtra, followed hybrid strategies that emphasized rapid growth and capital accumulation. Thus, centralization in economic policy engendered divergent regional responses; this served to enhance the role of regional actors and accelerate the process of regionalization of national developmental institutions.

Conclusion

India’s developmental experiment has been a unique one: the attempt to achieve broader developmental goals within a democratic framework. While its achievements

in improving the well-being of the large majority of its people leave much to be desired, its developmental achievements in ensuring a self-sufficient economy that has a self-generating industrial and global agenda are notable. An assessment of India's developmental trajectory yields some interesting and counterintuitive conclusions about the role of the state in economic life, the relationship between democracy and development, and the federalization of India's developmental vision.

While the central state has not created facilitative conditions for the development of private enterprise, one cannot rule out the role played by regional states and local governments in creating positive conditions for industry to flourish. Thus, an assessment of India's government-led path must pay attention to the federal nature of its polity and the autonomy often displayed by subnational units. A negative correlation between democracy and growth, while at first glance plausible, also must be avoided; there is no necessary link between some of India's developmental problems and its democratic institutions, but the nature of its governmental institutions, including federalism, shaped the nature of India's development.

Aseema Sinha

See also **Kerala, Model of Development**

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DEVĪ Special women and men who serve as possession ritualists in India today often insist there are 101 goddesses. For clients seeking answers to their personal problems, these ritualists may assume the facial, bodily, and vocal guises of one or more than a dozen goddesses who briefly descend on and enter them. It would not be difficult to solicit from their oral narratives the names of far more than 101 goddesses, and some Sanskrit texts declare 1,008 is the right number. Possession ritualists often mention one particular goddess who is Ādishakti—primal "energy" (*shakti*), the original, a goddess who is Parashakti, the transcendent source of all others and the ground of being itself. Sometimes this Ur-goddess is given a name, Devī, a great Goddess behind all manifestations, as Vishnu is the transcendent god behind all *avatāras*. Devī, the feminine form of *deva*, or "god," occurs in the Rig Veda and subsequent Brahmanical texts. Devī continues to hold two meanings, one an alternate name for a particular known goddess, another as generic term for "the goddess," sometimes augmented as Mahādevī, or "great goddess." Goddesses in general are called "mother" (*mātā* or *amma*), and it is significant that with respect to *shakti* as her nature, every female, regardless



Men Carrying the Hindu Goddess Durgā. During the Hindu festival of Durgā pūjā, devotees carry the image of the goddess Durgā. Her name, which means “invincible” in Sanskrit, is invoked when evil forces loom large. REUTERS/CORBIS.

of age and experience, is also “mother” and therefore a goddess representation. This overview identifies major goddesses of the Hindu textual and ritual tradition but keeps in view the yellow circle on a wall in millions of kitchens, a patch of turmeric paste known simply as Devī.

Goddesses in Prehistory and the Vedas

Recent archaeology has interpreted upright triangular stones in a nine-thousand-year-old hunter-gatherer site as evidence of a goddess cult, an altar not unlike those still in use today. Substantial excavations in urban levels of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro revealed multitudes of terra-cotta female figurines, indicating widespread popularity of goddess cults in the Indus Valley in the third and second millennia B.C. One of many remarkable Indus seals (DK 6847) seems to depict a goddess in a fig tree about to receive the sacrifice of a *markhor* goat, a kneeling male worshiper with hands raised in reverence, and a line of seven female figures beneath. Another seal has a female giving birth to a tree, and many show a powerful buffalo-headed god. Until the Vedas, however, there are no texts to provide names, myths, or rituals.

Although gods such as Indra, Varuṇa, Agni, and Soma take the lion’s share of Rig Vedic hymns, some of the most beautiful poems are addressed to goddesses, many of them in contexts of creation, primal energy, elemental powers, and motherhood. An archaic primal pair invoked in the dual is Dyāvapṛithivī (Dyaus-Prithivī), literally sky and earth, but also bull and cow, father and mother, immortal parents of the gods. The earth, Prithivī, is also known as Bhūmi, as in 10.18.11, a funeral hymn beseeching her to cover the deceased as gently as a mother covers her child. Invoked in the Rig Veda, although rarely mentioned in Vedic literature as a whole, is Sītā, the plowed “furrow.” Ushas, or “dawn,” is addressed in twenty hymns celebrating her as lovely daughter of heaven and sister of the starlit night, Rātrī, another goddess. Aditi, the “boundless,” free of all restraints, is mother of eight Ādityas, including Mītra, Varuṇa, and Aryaman, gods of sovereignty, order, and principle. As personifications of speech, Vāc and Sarasvatī are both key figures whose roles remain prominent through Hindu tradition. On the cosmic plane, it is Vāc who forthrightly declares supremacy as the first being worthy of worship, a queen with multiple forms and locales (Rig Veda 10.125), and at the personal level, according to the later Grihya Sūtras, her name should be heard three times at birth in an infant’s first appropriation of sacred wisdom. Like Puruṣa, three-quarters of Vāc remains unmanifest. Vāc has recently been interpreted not merely as goddess of ritual speech but as goddess of victory in war. In addition to her link to speech, Sarasvatī is associated with sacred rivers, both celestial and terrestrial. An entire assembly of the wives of the gods, *devānāṃ patnībḥ*, is addressed in early Saṃhitās and receives special offerings in twice-monthly sacrifices according to Brāhmaṇa texts.

In the early Saṃhitās, *shrī* is a term denoting royal power, prosperity, good fortune, radiance, and beauty. Personified as a goddess in Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.4.3.1-18, born of Prajāpati’s creative heat, she astonishes an assembly of nine gods and the goddess Savitrī, each of them lacking, then appropriating, one of her ten potent qualities. This myth is a prefiguration of later accounts of the collective powers of Devī, unique among deities. The Shrī Sūkta (hymn) praises the goddess along with elephants and lotuses, symbols of abundant rain and fertility. As Shrī is Lakshmī, or good fortune, her sister Alakshmī is a negative power, misfortune. In post-Vedic texts, Shrī-Lakshmī, alongside Pārvatī and Durgā, becomes one of the three most popular goddesses of classical Hinduism and is most frequently paired with her husband Vishnu.

In addition to explicit goddesses, the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda mention more than fifty names of those who might be described as feminine powers. A markedly

contradictory pair is Nirriti and Anumati, the former concerned with denial, destruction, and death, the latter with assent, prosperity, and life. The two are ritually balanced in a manner found later in a single goddess. The Gnaḥ is an archaic group connected with speech and poetic meters. Rākā, Sinīvālī, and Kuhū (e.g., Atharva Veda 7.46–48) are shadowy females who may carry an Indo-European heritage as midwives of destiny, a trio similar to the Moira, Parcae, Norns, and Dieves Valditoyes of ancient Greece, Rome, Scandinavia, and Lithuania, respectively. As guardians of the embryo and shapers of human fate, their concerns are sacred space, time, and life substance. Already in the early Saṃhitās there appears a tension between the sacrificial cult with supervisory masculine deities and cosmic concerns and the folk religion of the Atharva Veda, which permits glimpses of unchecked feminine powers, particularly concerning life-cycle mysteries and certain other domestic rituals, charms, and spells.

The Saṃhitās do not name Durgā. However, myths and cults of Sumerian Inanna (the later Akkadian Ishtar), the powerful goddess of sexuality, fertility, and war, may have influenced the growth of similar goddess traditions from the Mediterranean and Anatolia eastward through Iran to the Indus and adjacent regions. Inanna's ally as mount or companion was a lion, and her central narrative included the death and resurrection of her lover/husband Dumuzi (Akkadian Tammuz). Myths and cults of a goddess similar to Durgā of the later Purāṇas may have been fundamental to some regions of northwest India and Afghanistan prior to, and then contemporary with, the Rig Vedic Aryans.

Epics and Purāṇas

Although composition of the two great Sanskrit epics occurred in the broad period between about 500 B.C. and A.D. 400, certain archaic features suggest an older legacy for some myths. Several Vedic goddesses and feminine powers endure in the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, numerous others appear for the first time, and heroines such as Savitrī, Draupadī, and Sītā live on to become favored goddesses many centuries after their initial epic roles.

A goddess not in the Vedas who becomes as popular as Lakshmī is Pārvatī, daughter of the mountain Himālaya. As Lakshmī is wedded to Vishnu, Pārvatī is best known as the consort of Shiva. She goes by many names, including Gaurī, Umā, and Kālī. Frequently she is said to be a reappearance of Satī, the wife of Shiva who immolated herself in a sacrificial fire when Shiva was insulted by her own father, Daksha. Shiva went berserk at this cruel loss and bore her body into the skies until Vishnu, tasked with returning Shiva to order, sliced Satī into pieces, which fell

to earth and became her *pīthas*, or centers of worship. This myth, taken up in several of the Purāṇas, explained the origin of more than fifty sites of Devī scattered throughout India, and reinforced in Satī-Pārvatī the connections with earth that had begun with Rig Vedic Prithivī, Bhū, and no doubt hundreds of nameless regional goddesses.

Despite the ascetic-minded Shiva's opposition to fathering a child, and without a normal birth, Pārvatī's maternal cravings were satisfied by the creation of two sons in separate myths. Kārttikeya (or Skanda) was born of Shiva's fiery semen spilled in the Ganges. Like a doll, Gaṇeśha was made by Shiva from cloth for Pārvatī to nurse as son. Shiva and Pārvatī reveal the same tension between creative asceticism, fueled by the performance of austerities (*tapas*) for extensive periods, and thunderous lovemaking, also for vast ages until all the gods are alarmed by earthquakes. According to the Purāṇas, the sometimes fractious pair engage in endless games of dice, with throws corresponding to the cycle of *yugas*. Pārvatī always wins. She is credited with the emergence of Shiva's third eye when she playfully covered his eyes during his meditation.

For the most part, the benign aspects of Pārvatī are sufficient to stabilize and domesticate the wild side of Shiva, the outsider god. When seated in her *yoni*, his permanently erect *linga* represents totality, an order canceling chaos. In the language of philosophy, she is *prakṛiti*, primal matter that complements his transcendent spirit, *puruṣha*. As the left side of Shiva when he becomes Ardhanārīshvara, the god who is half female, Pārvatī provides the same completeness as when her *yoni* encircles his member in myth and in the temple and shrine altars that later became standard for Shaiva worship.

Like Durgā, Sāvitrī is a goddess who may have had pre-Vedic Indus Valley Civilization roots before surfacing in the Mahābhārata. She is the indomitable heroine who outwits Death himself to resurrect her young husband, Satyavān, in a myth that was expanded in many Purāṇas and served as the source for a woman's *vrata* (vow), widely practiced today. Sāvitrī is associated with another archaic female, Rohiṇī, both the "red girl" or bride at menarche and the "red star" Aldebaran in solar-stellar time reckoning.

The two principal figures in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, perhaps the earlier of the two epics, are Rāma, heroic warrior prince of Ayodhyā, and his wife Sītā, who was said to have appeared as a "furrow" in a crop field. To the central narrative belong the abduction of Sītā by the demon Rāvaṇa, king of Laṅkā, the subsequent battle for her rescue, Rāma's doubts about her chastity during captivity, her exile to the forest, and two conflicting endings to the narrative. In one she voluntarily steps into a funeral fire and is consumed, then is restored to a royal

life by Brahmā, who declares her to be the virtuous goddess Lakshmī, even as Rāma is Vishnu. In the other version, a late addition, the earth, her mother, opens to accept her back, and the epic continues without her. Later regional versions of the Sanskrit Rāmāyaṇa followed in Tāmil, Hindi, Bengali, and other languages from the twelfth century on, and Sītā became not only a permanent member of the pantheon but also a role model of loyalty and suffering for all women.

The Mahābhārata perpetuated particular groups known as *mātāras* or *mātrikās* (Mothers), variously seven, eight, nine, ten, or sixteen in number, usually considered to be on the dark side of feminine power. One prominent list of seven is the *saptamātrikās*, often identified as wives of the seven Rishis, as well as the constellation Pleiades. Along with Skanda-Kārttikeya, *mātrikās* can be demonesses afflicting a fetus or child with disease or death up to the age of sixteen. They are *grahas* (seizers), often confused in popular etymology with the nine celestial *grahas* of astrological reckoning.

It is the Purāṇas that elevated to greater prominence the goddesses Lakshmī and Pārvatī, wives of the two greatest gods, Vishnu and Shiva, along with Sarasvatī, now the wife of Brahmā, and a number of other goddesses, including great rivers such as Gaṅgā (the Ganges) and Yamunā. Lakshmī was featured in both epics as a treasured product of the churning of the ocean by warring gods and demons and this myth became a stock reference in the Purāṇas. But one Purāṇa, the Mārkaṇḍeya, emerged with a definitive set of myths of Mahādevī, the great goddess. Chapters 81–93 are an oft-recited sixth-century text known as the Devī Māhātmya. In the ongoing wars between gods and demons, the latter, the Asuras, are victorious and the world imperiled. No god, not even Vishnu or Shiva, can stand against Mahisha, the buffalo-headed Asura champion. The salvation of the world occurs only when the combined *tejas*, fiery splendor, of all the gods merges into a woman who becomes the invincible Devī. In detailed descriptions of horrific combat, Devī, aided by her ferocious lion, is called Caṇḍikā, Ambikā, Shrī, Durgā, and some thirty other names as she easily dispatches demon hordes and generals with trident, spear, arrows, sword, noose, thunderbolt, discus, and other weapons provided by the powerless gods. First, Mahisha is beheaded by her sword, then as Devī turns into the dreaded Kālī, with black face and lolling tongue, the demon pair Caṇḍa and Muṇḍa meet the same fate. Next, Raktabīja, whose every drop of spilled blood becomes yet another demon, falls lifeless as the insatiable goddess with cruel laughter drinks his blood. Finally, in ultimate victory, she spears to death the last demon pair, Shumba and Nishumba, kings who had foolishly attempted to woo this beautiful, deadly goddess.

While the majority of goddesses are married and more or less subordinate to their divine husbands, it is the independence of ferocious and warlike Durgā and Kālī that sets them apart and suggests an indigenous, non-Aryan heritage. Durgā became known as Mahishamardinī, slayer of the buffalo-headed Mahisha, and her autumn festival, Durgā-pūjā, celebrated her victory, complete with the beheading of a buffalo. Some versions of her career have Mahisha as her lover or husband, slain and resurrected as her devotee, and still today Pōtu Rāju takes that role in Andhra Pradesh. Tales of impassioned warriors who decapitate or disembowel themselves in self-sacrifice before the goddess are extensions of this motif, literal variants of the symbolic themes of *ātmayajña* in epic as well as later *bhakti* traditions.

In classical Hinduism, neither Durgā nor Kālī is a mother, the two sons of Pārvatī are born without her assistance, and Shrī-Lakshmī, while closely associated with agricultural fertility and the ideal wife to Vishnu, is not celebrated as a mother. And yet first the epics and then the Purāṇas featured groups of *mātrikās* (mothers), many of them destroyers of children. A late assembly, documented from the tenth century, is said to haunt every cremation-burial ground. Popularly known in North India as Mahāvidyās, they are another illustration of a great goddess with multiple forms, in this case ten. They include Kālī as leader, Tārā, Tripura-sundarī, Bhuvaneshvarī, the self-decapitating Chinnamastā, Bhairavī, Dhūmāvātī, Bagalāmukhī, Mātāṅgī—all fierce—and one benign cohort, Kamalā, a variant of Srī-Lakshmī. Tantric worship centers upon them, particularly the *vāmācāra*, or left-hand path, whereas the comparatively benign Durgā may be favored by the moderate right-hand path of *yoga*. The seven mothers lived on, often as neighborhood goddesses of epidemic disease. One of the most deadly on the subcontinent until the mid-1970s was smallpox, Mother Pox: Shītalā Mātā in the North, Māriyamman in the South, and Manasā the serpent goddess in Bengal.

The tenth-century Bhāgavata Purāṇa contains popular myths of Krishna and the *gopīs*, the souls of humans who adore him and, although married women, long to unite with him, deplore his absence, and go as a lamenting group to find him. Until Krishna eventually multiplies himself to dance with all the *gopīs*, one among them seems to be successful in love-play with the god. It remains for the *Gītā govinda*, a twelfth-century Sanskrit devotional poem by Jayadeva, to provide her name, Rādhā. Like Sāvitrī, Draupadī, and Sītā, this singular heroine is elevated to goddess status in the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa and the Devī-bhāgavata Purāṇa. A portion of the latter work, known as the Devī Gītā, became popular as an independent text at some point

between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The emphasis in the Devī-Bhāgavata and its Gītā encapsulation is on Devī as cosmic Mother, sovereign of all, nurturer, and provider of saving wisdom.

Major Purāṇas were adapted into Tāmil, and numerous *sthalapurāṇas* focusing on regional temple and pilgrimage traditions of South India were produced in Sanskrit, Tāmil, or both languages. Several great temples became known for annual festivals celebrating the sacred marriage of goddesses and gods. Best known is the Madurai temple tradition, observing the wedding of Mīnākshī and Sundareshvara and following a Tāmil text titled *Shiva's Sacred Games*. Mīnākshī, the “fish-eyed goddess” and queen, is a form of Pārvatī, as Sundareshvara is a manifestation of Shiva; their marriage lasts for ten or more days in the month of Citrā (April–May). The heroine-goddess of the Tāmil epic Shilappatikāram is Kannaki, punisher of an unjust kingdom, who destroys Madurai in her all-consuming wrath by tearing off her left breast and hurling it at the city.

Goddesses in Action

Only a fraction of existing goddesses have been mentioned at this point. And new goddesses do emerge. In the 1950s the goddess of contentment Santoshī Mā was worshiped by a small following. In 1975, however, a film-musical, *Jay Santoshī Mā*, expanded her circle of devotees nationwide, and vows, fasts, tracts, shrines, temples, and pilgrimages quickly followed. And living goddesses also appear. Ammachi, born in Kerala in 1953, has traveled with devotional musicians throughout the United States to give *darshan* (sight) to her devotees. The ecstatic career of Anandamāyī Mā (1896–1982) spread her following from East Bengal in the 1920s to more than a score of ashrams and gained the attention of India's ruling elite.

One feature of goddesses in India is their high visibility in daily life. They do not remain passive images waiting for worship. Knowing that goddesses specialize in *māyā* (illusion), people may glimpse them in the night, or hear ankle bells when they pass by. Every village, town, or great metropolis has multiple neighborhood goddesses, each belonging to a specific zone—literally, her turf—connecting crop fields, the food given by her soil, and her devotees who reside and work upon her. Her borders are well defined, even in a crowded city, and her festivals—for example, the nine nights of Durgā-pūjā—are ritual occasions to reinforce her lines of control vis-à-vis other goddesses, gods, and demonic powers. In South India, those who are possessed by a fierce neighborhood goddess may rage from border to border demanding blood; the culminating rituals before her image are the beheadings of goats, surrogates in modern times for the

buffalo (Mahisha) of a few decades ago. All goddesses, gentle vegetarians as well as the passionately horrific, may be carried in processions to circumambulate the neighborhood or entire village. The most violent may be extremely reluctant to leave their temples, particularly ancient ones, and must be coaxed, coerced, then forced out to maintain the borders. The goddess Gaṅgamma, a heap of coiled and knotted jute ropes in a grain basket, will be lowered once a year from her guardian post high in the rafters. Goddesses of epidemic diseases such as poxes, cholera, and plague may live right on the neighborhood border. Once a year, in the hot season when diseases strike, they will be invited into the neighborhood, where each becomes “sister” to all residents. In some regions, the goddess sleeps on every hearth, and no cooking can be done. The expectation is that each honored guest (and her dread disease) will depart with as little damage as possible.

Neighborhood possession ritualists capable of harboring goddesses and spirits of the dead will be routinely consulted by people who desire to know the well-being of their deceased loved ones, particularly children, or who crave answers to everyday problems such as oppressive dreams, a lost watch, “body weakness,” and the like. Those possessed will exhibit in speech and movement all the mood swings of the goddess between states of rage and repose. Devotees expect consistent ambiguity, the very nature of *shakti* in a world that betrays malevolence and benevolence in unforeseen measure.

Suffixed with the honorific “Mother” (*mātā* in the North, *amma* in the South), neighborhood goddesses may have personal names known only to a limited region. A farmer, fisher, or washer-caste person may, for example, find in a plowed field or the river an old goddess image or a curiously shaped stone, set it up for the community, and someone will provide the name by which it will be worshiped. Traits in her local lore or iconography may link her to a classical, textual goddess, but in some cases she appears to stand alone in a private oral tradition.

Today innumerable goddesses receive worship in home shrines, usually located close to cooking and dining areas. They are represented by small framed lithographs or images of brass, wood, terra-cotta, or a patch of turmeric paste on the wall with saffron lines and dots. Most goddesses receive special *pūjā* (worship) during the bright half of a lunar month, sometimes as many as half a dozen different goddesses in fourteen days. But even the inauspicious dark half will contain days, such as every eighth for Kālī, or the seventh of Shrāvaṇa (July–August) or eighth of Phālguna (February–March) for the pox goddess. In many regions, Thursdays or Fridays of certain

months are days to leave the house and worship in a temple or roadside shrine of Lakshmī, while certain Tuesdays are reserved for Gaurī, who also has multiday festivals, depending on regional customs, in Vaishākha (April–May) and Bhādrapada (August–September). The Sāvitrī *vrata* (vow) is fulfilled in Jyeshṭha (May–June) when women water, then wrap thread around a banyan tree as many as 108 times while hearing again of the cleverness and persistence of Sāvitrī in resurrecting her husband Satyavān from the grasp of Yama. This vow shelters her own husband from death and therefore herself from painful widowhood. Sītā's birthday is in Vaishākha, and in Shrāvaṇa (July–August) the swinging festival for Rādhā and Krishna is a joyous five-day celebration. The busiest festival of the year is Navarātra, the “nine nights” of Durgā-pūjā at autumn harvest time in Āshvina (September–October), when neighborhoods create on bamboo frames paper and clay images of Durgā that are worshiped, paraded, then abandoned in a river. As goddess of learning, Sarasvatī is worshiped earlier in the same month, particularly by teachers, students, and musicians. Kārttika (October–November) is exceptional for Lakshmī and the festival of lamps, but there is also a special Kālī *pūjā*. Caitra (March–April) begins the new year and the hot season with another Navarātra featuring goddesses on the move every night, and the bountiful harvest-mother Annapūrṇā is honored in the home or a local shrine.

David M. Knipe

See also **Goddess Images; Shiva and Shaivism; Vishnu and Avatāras**

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DEVI, SIDDHESHVARI (1908–1977), Indian vocalist. Siddheshvari Devi was one of the greatest exponents of semiclassical forms of Hindustani music.

She received unqualified acclaim from maestro Faiyaz Khan. “Next to Gauhar and Malka, you are the brightest jewel in the diadem of *thumri* music,” he told her (Devi and Chauhan, p. 75). She was conversant with the idiom of the *Khayal* form, but *thumri* (a semiclassical form of Hindustani music closely associated with dance, dramatic gestures, mild eroticism, evocative love-poetry and folk songs of Uttar Pradesh) was her forte, and her renditions of that music overflowed with emotion and vitality.

Siddheshvari Devi was born into a family of professional musicians from Benares (Varanasi). Her mother died when Siddheshvari was an infant. She was brought up by her grandmother, Maina Devi. Other singers in the family included Vidyadhari Devi, Rajeshwari Devi, and Kamleshwari Devi. Siyaji Maharaj, a singer and teacher who had been employed to train her cousins, discovered Siddheshvari’s talent when he heard her singing at her daily chores. After twelve years of study with Siyaji Maharaj, she trained under Rajab Ali Khan of Dewas, Inayat Ali Khan of Lahore, and Bade Ramdasji of Benares.

Siddheshvari Devi’s voice was famed for its pathos. She effortlessly blended the musical notes with a lyrical and poetic mood of love and loss, transforming the gestures of Kathak dance into their corresponding musical language. She was famous for the impassioned “voice throw” (*pukar*), which sounded like a cry from an anguished heart. The style of *thumri* singing that she popularized is known as the *purab*. Although the *thumri* emanated from the Lucknow court of Wajid Ali Shah as a song accompanying dance, it later attained autonomous status as a musical form. The *purab* (east) style derived its name from its geographical location, since Benares is east of Lucknow. The main feature of the Benares *thumri* in which Siddheshvari Devi specialized is *bol-banav*, which means evoking subtle shades of mood through a combination of words and phrases. It also extensively exploited the musical potential of the dialects of eastern Uttar Pradesh, which gave it a unique appeal. Siddheshvari Devi also sang *chaiti*, *kajari*, and *tappa* forms as well, which are a cross between the semiclassical and folk music. A recipient of many honors and awards, she left a few commercial recordings for posterity. The hypnotic quality of her voice and its eloquent expressiveness continue to enchant music lovers.

Amarendra Dhaneshwar

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DHARMA. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

DHARMA SHĀSTRA *Dharma Shāstra* (Texts of righteous legal conduct) in the wider sense is an important element of Indian tradition, and its literature is a genre of more than two thousand titles. Hinduism is less an orthodoxy than an “orthopraxy”: Hindu society is less concerned with what a person thinks than with his or her adherence to traditional social norms. In the narrower sense, *Dharma Shāstra* is the name of several ancient texts, composed about two millennia ago, in several Vedic schools that sought to establish social norms. They grew out of school traditions that preserved and cultivated the sacred Vedic texts: some devoted to the Rig Veda, the oldest sacrificial hymns; others to the Yajur Veda, the collection of formulae used during rituals; others to the Sāma Veda, a collection of melodies, with their attendant dogmatic and ritualistic works. Technical works that dealt with the proper execution of official rituals (*Shrauta Sūtra*), the domestic rites and life cycle obligations (*Grihya Sūtra*), and the rules of righteous conduct (*Dharma Sūtra* or *Dharma Shāstra*) together were called *Kalpa Sūtra* “ceremonial manuals” and formed one of the later layers of Vedic works. Among them, the texts dealing with *dharma* are generally the youngest, dating perhaps from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D. All dates assigned to these texts are tentative; though attributed to fictitious authors, the texts actually grew within their school traditions, often quoting one another. Texts whose core may be very old also contain some rather recent statements, make any exact dating impossible.

The fact that these works originated in a religious and ritualistic tradition explains their emphasis on ritual purity, virtue, and avoidance of acts considered sinful. The aim was the attainment of heaven, spiritual betterment, or bliss, which could be defined in different ways. The authors and compilers of these works were Brahmans, members of the priestly class that was generally entrusted with the preservation of tradition and the education of the young. Though many of their rules were clearly aimed primarily at their fellow Brahmans, they took note also of prevailing customs and attitudes concerning societal problems. There were three major topics: proper conduct, legal procedure, and atonement. Legal problems concerning inheritance, marriage, and adoption gained more prominence in time, and criminal

acts, which were first considered sins requiring expiation, were gradually regarded as antisocial acts that required punishment by the king or his judges. Yet, in spite of their growing legal sophistication, the authors of *Dharma Shāstra* never lost sight of the spiritual roots of their tradition: medieval authors based their rules on the priority among heirs on the question of which of them would confer greater spiritual benefit on the deceased. Texts that could be called legal texts emerged around the middle of the first millennium A.D., and the second millennium saw the creation of several large compendia by courtiers, who under royal orders tried to summarize and harmonize the traditional rules as they applied in their time and to their regions.

The *Dharma Shāstras* in a narrower sense were the basis of all later Hindu legal developments, and their authority was never challenged directly. The principles of righteousness (*dharmā*) are unchanging—though a good number of rules no longer apply in our decadent age (*kali yuga*). The ritual killing of cows that was enjoined in Vedic ritual is no longer practiced, and other practices are nowadays “decried by the world” (Manu, *Mānava Dharma Shāstra*). Over the centuries, many commentaries were written on the authoritative texts, often clarifying difficult or ambiguous passages, at times giving a new interpretation more in tune with contemporary customs. While commentators would not challenge the authority of the basic text, their interpretation could become authoritative, even if later judged erroneous. In British India, the courts employed Indian pandits to advise judges on traditional law as embodied in *Dharma Shāstra*. Gradually the growing body of case law and, after India gained independence, the passing of new laws limited the role of *Dharma Shāstra* in the Indian courts, though it still plays a role in cases involving religious groups.

Conflicts and Interpretation

Some of the old *Dharma Shāstras* (e.g., those ascribed to Gautama, Āpastamba) were composed in a terse form of prose, the so-called sūtras (threads), others (e.g., that ascribed to Manu, *Mānava Dharma Shāstra*) in verse; both forms were chosen with a view to aid memorization. Contradictions caused by gradual growth sometimes remain: Manu gives rules regulating the levirate (when a man begets a son with the widow of a close relative), then condemns the practice; the killing of animals is alternately allowed and condemned. In cases of conflict, a rule for which a reason is clearly visible is not as potent as one for which it is not; the author might have possessed insight into a higher metaphysical truth that we have no right to challenge. Interpretative skills were honed in the exegesis of Vedic rules, and ambiguous passages were discussed with great sophistication. Current customs that

could not be traced to any of the *Dharma Shāstras* could, it is argued, be based on lost Vedic texts, since it was known that not all Vedic texts survived into later times.

Many *Dharma Shāstras* explicitly refer to some divine authority who revealed the rules to a holy man in the distant past. There is no reasoning or reference to historical cases. The reasoning was presumably worked out long ago; the existing custom was idealized and systematized and handed down in this state to all future generations. The same attitude is evident in the Indian science of grammar: the wonderful descriptions of the Sanskrit language presuppose a penetrating analysis that is never revealed—we see only the application in the production of correct form. There is a characteristic difference in Buddhist canonical law, which based itself on alleged instances and reasoned rulings by the Buddha himself, fictitious though they might be.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Judicial System, Modern**

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DHRUPAD *Dhrupad* (Sanskrit, *dhruva pada*, “fixed words,” i.e., “refrain”) is a North Indian vocal and instrumental musical genre and one of the oldest documented South Asian mediums of performance. The modern *dhrupad* probably descends from a form (*dhurva*) mentioned in the *Nāṭyashāstra* that developed in the Gwalior region (central Indo-Gangetic Plain) and probably reached a peak of popularity in the sixteenth century. Most *dhrupads* are religious in nature, praising Hindu gods (particularly Krishna) although some texts praise kings.

The *dhrupad* tradition is arguably a consequence of both secular and sacred contexts, playing an important role in the multitude of royal courts in pre-independence India and in sacred traditions such as *havelī sangīt*, the devotional music of the Vallabhacarya Vaisnavas of north-central and northwestern India. In *havelī sangīt*, *dhrupad* still serves as liturgical praise, with its text drawn primarily from the *Gītā Govinda*. The musicians (often hereditary), who lead the worship, sing each line of the devotional *dhrupad*

(accompanying themselves on the *pakhāwaj*), and then repeat the line with the congregation. The twentieth century saw a resurgence of interest in *dhrupad* as a concert feature through performances by members of the Dagar family and artists such as Ustad Asad Ali Khan.

Musical Structure

The performance of *dhrupad* almost always begins with an introductory, free-time *ālāp*, which can range from a brief affirmation of the melodic underpinnings of the performance (in religious contexts) to elaborate note-by-note explorations of the possibilities inherent in the underlying pitch resources of *rāga* (melody). The concert *dhrupad ālāp* generally has two sections: the first (the *ālāp* of the *ālāp*) has the usual pattern of a growing pitch ambitus in free tempo, and the second (the *nomtom* or *jor*), an unmeasured, but pulsed, presentation of the *rāga*.

The metered portion (i.e., involving *tāla*, cyclical musical time) of the *dhrupad* begins with the *bandish* (“contrivance,” or “plot”), a fixed musical statement generally composed of four sections, although some *dhrupads* have only the first two parts. The first and most important section is the *sthā’ī* (stable), the phrase to which the composition repeatedly returns and that usually occupies the *purvang* (lower tetrachord) of the *rāga*. As with many Indian musical terms, *sthā’ī* has more than one meaning. *Sthā’ī* is similar to the Karnatak term *pallavi*.

The second part of the *bandish*, the *antarā* (Sanskrit, “intermediate,” or “contrast”), complements the *sthā’ī* and often occupies the *uttarāṅg* (upper tetrachord) of the *rāga*, ideally stabilizing the upper tonic. In instances where the *sthā’ī* occupies the *uttarāṅg*, the *antarā* may reside in the *purvang* or subtonic range (*mandra*).

In a full *bandish*, the two additional sections parallel and imitate the *sthā’ī* and *antarā* in form and function. The first, the *sañcārī* (Sanskrit, “wandering”), occupies the *mandra* and is often parallel to or nearly identical with the *sthā’ī*. The second, the *ābhog* (Sanskrit, “fullness”), often contains material from the *antarā* and returns the composition to the *sthā’ī*.

At the completion of the *bandish*, *dhrupadiyas* (performers of *dhrupad*) in a concert setting generally launch into a series of improvisations based on material that they juxtapose with the *sthā’ī*. Many describe this section of improvisation as the *bolbanao* (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *banna* “composed”), mentioning three kinds of improvisation: *laykārī*, *bol-bānt*, and *bol-tān*.

Laykārī (Hindustani, *laya* “tempo” or “rhythm” + *kārṇā* “to do”) is an improvisational style in which the performer concentrates on the *tāl* and on rhythmic

figures that complement the listener’s rhythmic and metric expectations.

Bol-bānt (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *bāntnā*, “to distribute” or “to apportion”) or *bol-banāo* (word making) are variations on the composition involving the partition or distribution of words. Commonly, a performer will present an entire section of the composition as a unit in its given tune (or in other configurations suitable to the *rāga*) and then systematically reduce the time values by a half, a third, and a quarter of their original length (*dugun lay*, *tigun lay*, and *caugun lay*).

Bol tān (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *tān* “exercise”) is a melodic embellishment with words from the composition. In this type of variation, the original words of the composition are vehicles for the presentation of phrases showing the *rāga* (usually in *laykārī* style).

Performance Practice

The accompaniment for *dhrupad* has some interesting and unique features. In addition to the ubiquitous drone of the *tamburā* common to almost all classical music, the most characteristic accompaniment for *dhrupad* is the double-ended, hand-beaten drum, the *pakhāwaj*. Unlike other performance idioms within the *Hindustāmi sangīt paddhati*, the drummer often plays elaborate passages (usually extended cadences) for much of the metered performance (depending on the repertoire and the tastes of the soloists).

When *dhrupad* singers look for melodic instrumental accompaniment, they often chose the *sārangī* (a bowed, short-necked lute with three gut melody strings and a host of sympathetic strings), although in some cases the *bansri* (flute) or harmonium appears in the ensemble. The principal method of melodic accompanying is to heterophonically trail the singer in improvisations, to play in unison during the *bandish*, and to fill in during those times when the singer(s) are silent.

Solo instrumental performances of *dhrupad* commonly feature the *bin* (Sanskrit, *vinā*, “lute”), a practice that attests to the historic ties of this genre with India’s musical heritage. These performances, commonly with *pakhāwaj* accompaniment, parallel vocal performances, substituting a *jor* section (melodic notes and phrases alternating with strokes on an instrument’s drone strings) in place of the *nomtom* (composed of rhythmic nonlexical syllables) for the pulsed but unmeasured exploration of the *rāga*.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Ālāp; Music; Rāga; Vina**

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DIASPORA

This entry consists of the following articles:

ECONOMIC IMPACT

HISTORY OF AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Although Indians have been migrating to other lands for thousands of years, large-scale migration only began following the end of slavery in the 1830s. Most migrants went to South or Southeast Asia; about 42 percent settled in Burma, another 25 percent in Ceylon, 19 percent in British Malaya, and the rest in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

The vast majority of Indian emigrants went as indentured labor. Contract length varied with distance with short-term arrangements more common within South and Southeast Asia. The *kangani* system (the *kangani*, or “head man,” was a professional recruiter, who often recruited whole gangs from a village) characterized migration to British Malaya and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which constituted two-thirds of early Indian emigration. A variant of this practice, known as the *maistry* system, played a similar role in migration to Burma (Myanmar). British colonies (Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya nearby, as well as distant Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Fiji) were the primary destinations for overseas migration. Dutch and French colonies in Reunion Island, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mauritius, and Suriname also became home to considerable numbers of Indian migrants.

The migrants were mostly unskilled, from the lower castes, and hailed primarily from the United Provinces (present-day Bihar and east Uttar Pradesh), Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. As with the great trans-Atlantic flows of the nineteenth century, substantial wage difference (from five to eight times what they would earn in India) was the key driver. The risks were large, however. Mortality rates during passage were high. Contracts were routinely abused, and suicide rates were also high, which might partly explain the high return rates. Of the 30.2 million who left India between 1834 and 1937, 23.9 million returned, resulting in a net migration of 6.3 million. As with contemporary migration, migrants sent remittances home (using postal savings) and usually returned with considerable savings. The average cash

savings brought back by indentured Indian migrants returning from Mauritius in late 1870s was equivalent to about four years of income at home.

The second wave of migration was the “free” or “passage” migration of traders, clerks, bureaucrats, and professionals, mostly to East and South Africa, and, in smaller numbers, to other British colonies where indentured laborers had settled earlier. This migration continued in small numbers into the first half of the twentieth century. Following the end of World War II, postwar reconstruction and an acute labor shortage created a large demand for unskilled and semiskilled workers in the United Kingdom. These labor shortages drew large numbers of Indians, mainly from Punjab and Gujarat. A modest number of professionals and traders also migrated during this period. These numbers were considerably supplemented by “twice migrant” East African Asians (especially of Gujarati origin) into the United Kingdom in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Two unrelated events sparked the next major flow of emigration from the late 1960s onward. First, the sharp increase in global oil prices and the resulting economic boom created a large demand for overseas labor in the Middle East. The majority of Indian emigrants were unskilled or semiskilled, although in comparison to earlier migration waves there were considerable numbers of skilled migrants as well. Since the policies of the Middle East countries made permanent settlement extremely difficult, Indian migration to this region has been inherently temporary. Migrants to these countries, especially women, have also been vulnerable, with limited civil rights and protections. While most eventually returned home, some skilled migrants often moved on to countries like Australia and Canada.

Second, the liberalization of U.S. immigration law in 1965 led to a large emigration of highly skilled Indian professionals and students seeking to study in and eventually immigrate to the United States. The large demand for information technology workers in the United States in the late 1990s led to another wave of young professional immigrants. However, since most came with temporary work visas, a relatively larger, though still modest, fraction returned home. The Indian-origin population in the United States grew from around 10,000 in 1960 to nearly 1.7 million by 2000. This migrant stream has been the most highly educated, compared both to other immigrants to the United States, as well as to any other Indian migrant streams.

By the beginning of the new millennium, it was estimated that the Indian diaspora consisted of about 20 million people and spanned over 110 countries. There were 10,000 or more overseas Indians in 48 countries, and



Kerala Airport. Referred to as the “gateway to paradise” in its advertising, modern-day Kerala Airport. Although migration has not abated, return home is on the upswing, drawn by (and fueling) India’s improving economy. AMIT PASRICHA.

11 countries had more than half a million persons of Indian origin. More than fourth-fifths of the diaspora lived in middle- and high-income countries, and more than 90 percent of those who lived in low-income countries were concentrated in just one (Myanmar). The diaspora from the first two waves of migration (in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries) has enjoyed mixed fortunes. On the one hand, this immigrant group on average is better off in terms of per capita income, when compared to both the society from which it emigrated, as well as in many cases that into which it settled. The latter holds true for many countries where there is a significant Indian-origin population (Malaysia and Trinidad are notable exceptions). On the other hand, the diaspora suffers from ethnic tensions in many countries and, periodically, has been politically disenfranchised in the Caribbean, East Africa, Fiji, Myanmar, and in South Africa under the apartheid regime. The large “generational distance” of this diaspora means that its economic and family ties to India are quite weak, but it continues to draw religio-cultural sustenance from its Indian roots.

In recent years, international migration and the establishment of a significant diaspora have had considerable political, economic, and cultural effects on India. This is particularly true of the migrant streams of the post-independence period. During this time, international migration and the diaspora’s engagement with India have progressed through three distinct phases. Initially, optimism in independent India’s future led many of those who went to study abroad to return and help build domestic institutions, especially public institutions in higher education and research and the public sector. By the mid-1960s, the optimism had begun to fade and, as opportunities opened up first in the United States and later in the Gulf countries, as well as in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, one-way high-skilled migration, or the so-called brain drain, increased significantly. This pattern continued into the early 1990s. Although migration has not abated during the most recent phase, circulatory and return migration has increased, drawn by (and fueling) India’s improving economic prospects. Unlike the generation immediately following independence, however, the

principal institutional mechanism of return has been the private, rather than public, sector.

Financial remittances, which emerged as an important part of India's balance of payments since the mid-1970s, constitute the diaspora's most visible economic contribution to India. By the late 1990s, remittances were about six times net capital transfers from international capital markets and official sources such as the World Bank. Before this time, India's policy makers operated under conditions of foreign exchange scarcity. Attracting inflows from nonresident Indians (NRIs) has been a part of official policy since 1970, when the first plan to attract NRI flows was devised. Inflows from NRIs have come through both the current account (remittances) and the capital account (NRI deposits), in contrast to the Chinese diaspora, which invests directly in the country of origin. The rate of foreign direct investment (FDI) by the Chinese diaspora is nearly twenty times that of the Indian diaspora, while remittances by the Indian diaspora have been about seven times those from the Chinese diaspora. Until the early 1990s, most NRI remittances came from the Middle East. Since then, North America has also become a prominent source. Both remittances and NRI deposits surged in this period and, by the end of 2003, NRI deposits were one-third of India's foreign exchange reserves, or about one-sixth of the total deposits by resident Indians in commercial banks. For the most part, NRI capital flows have been relatively stable.

Financial remittances have had multiple effects, ranging from increased consumption levels to providing social insurance, both for households and at the national level, by mitigating the effects of external shocks. They have also had considerable distributional consequences, affecting income inequalities across states, social groups, and households. In Kerala, the largest recipient state, remittances account for nearly a quarter of state net domestic product and appear to have had considerable policy incentive effects as well, by reducing pressures for policy change. The use of remittances to build places of worship appears to have contributed to both an increasingly competitive dynamic of religious consumption and support for more extreme groups.

By the 1990s, India's human capital-rich diaspora, especially in the United States, emerged to become an international business asset for the country. Indians' success in the Silicon Valley provided broader and improved global perceptions of Indian technology and talent. These global "reputation" effects also translated into political leverage in both source and destination countries, with positive spillovers for Indo-U.S. relations. In addition to information technology, diasporic networks (mostly Gujarati Palanpuri Jains) have also played an

important role in India's rising status as a world leader in the diamond industry.

The Indian diaspora and migration have also had considerable political and social consequences. Negative political effects have manifested themselves through financial contributions and moral support for extremist political parties, reactionary social and religious groups, and separatist movements. Whether financially backing hard-line Hindutva organizations, insurgencies in North-East India, Sikh separatism in the 1980s, or militant Kashmiri groups, the diaspora has periodically fished in troubled Indian waters. Conversely, support for the diaspora led India to covertly back the separatist Sri Lankan Tamils in the 1980s.

Perhaps the most important effects of migration have been the subtle and dynamic effects of "social remittances" on reshaping individual preferences and social norms at both local and national levels. There is anecdotal, though little hard evidence, that Indian political leaders, both local and national, are paying more attention to the policy preferences of the Indian diaspora. So many Indian elites now have global family portfolios that their preferences are changing as well, affected by their overseas family networks.

In the cultural sphere, the diaspora has had influence ranging from music (such as *bhangra-rap*) to literature (especially in English). But its effects are most evident in India's most potent contemporary cultural force, namely Bollywood films, which have consciously sought to cater to the tastes of the diaspora.

Official government policy has taken note of such changes. Until the 1980s, government policies and the diaspora's attitudes reflected mutual apathy and disdain. The Indian government did little to press for better treatment of the diaspora when it faced discrimination or expulsion (as in Uganda). India's fears of the outside world were reflected in not only its policies toward international trade and FDI, but also in an apathy, bordering on resentment, toward its more successful diaspora. In the 1990s the transformation of the ideological climate in India and the success of the diaspora, especially in the United States, instilled much greater self-confidence in both. The diminished defensiveness that resulted has been an important reason for the growing links and stronger bonds that have transformed relations between the two. In 2003 the government of India organized the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, officially sealing India's recognition of its diaspora. Members of the diaspora were granted dual citizenship, although this privilege was confined to those living in a select group of rich countries, excluding virtually all of the diaspora that had migrated prior to independence. Whether and in what ways this changes the diaspora's self-identity and its relationship

with India remains to be seen. However, given India's demographics and those of industrialized countries, international migration from India will continue to grow—and with it the diaspora's effects in reshaping both India and the countries of its destination.

Devesh Kapur

See also **Demographic Trends since 1757; Kerala, Model of Development**

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HISTORY OF AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION

The Indian diaspora, with an estimated strength of 20 million in 2005, spans the globe. Overseas Indians live in different countries, speak different languages, and are engaged in different vocations; despite their differences, they share a common bond: a pride in their cultural heritage and a deep attachment to India.

Undoubtedly, the Indian diaspora is a microcosm of India. Barring a few exceptions, Indian émigrés zealously maintain their regional, ethnic, linguistic, and caste identities. They are known for their resilience, hard work, thrift, and family values. Placing an emphasis on education has enabled them to excel in academic fields and professions like medicine and engineering. Even the descendants of indentured laborers and unskilled workers have relied on education for upward social mobility. Indian communities, particularly Gujaratis and Sindis, have also shown business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit. These qualities, combined with proficiency in English, distinguish the Indian diaspora as an influential group worldwide.

Evolution of the Indian Diaspora

Indians have migrated since the dawn of history. There is evidence of Indian migration to Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Migrants included traders, Brahman priests, Buddhist monks, and adventurers. Early Indian migration was entirely peaceful and not a product of military conquest. As a result, Indian culture and civilization deeply influenced these regions.

People of Indian origin began to migrate overseas in significant numbers only in the nineteenth century, driven by economic compulsions. In a uniquely diverse pattern, Indians spread initially to Africa, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Fiji. They migrated in small numbers to the West Coast of Canada and the United States, succeeded in the second half of the twentieth century by a steady outflow of some of India's best professionals to the developed countries of the West. In the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s, India's skilled and semiskilled labor moved to West Asia and the Gulf. Because of their open borders and geographical proximity, Nepal and Sri Lanka have millions of persons of Indian origin; this group is not included within the scope of this article.

Colonial period. The abolition of slavery in the British, French, and Dutch colonies in 1834, 1846, and 1873, respectively, created extreme shortages of labor in these plantation economies. A large number of Indians were recruited as indentured labor and were transported to various parts of the empire. The majority of indentured migrants were induced by unethical, illegal contracts. Most Indians were unaware of the provisions of the contracts, and in many cases were not even correctly informed of the location to which they were being transported. A number of workers did not survive the arduous voyage. Mortality rates were high because of the inhuman conditions of the camps and the cruelty of their employers. Indentured labor was, therefore, nothing but a euphemism for slavery. The extraordinary achievements of Indian workers in the face of these heavy odds were described by Vishwamitra Ganga Aashutosh, a Mauritian poet:

No gold did they find
Underneath any stone they
Touched and turned,
Yet
Every stone they touched
Into solid gold they turned.

In the first phase, beginning in 1834, the majority of emigrants were recruited in the "hill coolie" district of Chota Nagpur division and the Bankura, Birbhum, and Burdwan districts of the Bengal presidency. Soon the recruiting areas were pushed westward into the Hindi-speaking zones, which remained the leading recruiting area, with most of the indentured labor hired from eastern and central Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar, and later from the Madras presidency. They left India by ships from Calcutta and Madras. Subsequently, Indian labor was taken to Sri Lanka and Malaysia under the *kangani* system (in which a foreman acted as a recruiter) and to Burma (Myanmar) under the *maistry* system (in which a labor supervisor was responsible for recruitment) system. France sent labor

from its colonies in Pondicherry and neighboring areas to Reunion, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. Holland recruited indentured Indians for its colony in Suriname. Portugal also recruited Indians from its possessions in Goa, Daman, and Diu for its colonies in Africa and Macao. In the early phase of this migration, the overwhelming majority of migrants were males. It was only in the later period that special efforts were made to recruit females. The indenture system came to an end in 1917. Traders and other enterprising people who voluntarily followed these migrants at their own expense in search of greener pastures came under the “free passage system.”

Indian emigration to what was once the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), as well as to the former Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe), was necessitated in the nineteenth century by the extension of the British colonial empire to Africa. Eastern African Railways was constructed through the sweat and blood of Indians. Four workers died for each mile of the railway line laid. Indians introduced organized commerce in East Africa, replacing the barter system and establishing regular shops; they were known as *Dukawala* (shopkeepers).

The migration of Indians to North America began in 1903, when Sikh male immigrants from Punjab settled in Vancouver, British Columbia, to work in lumbering, agriculture, and the railroads. Most of these migrants had served in the British army or in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy. As there was a steady increase in the number of Indian workers, the Canadian government passed several laws to limit their entry into Canada. The *Komagata Maru* (a Japanese ship) tragedy of 1914 brought into sharp focus the fortitude of Indian immigrants and the blatantly discriminatory and racist attitude of the Canadian authorities.

Some of these workers radiated southward to California and neighboring areas, as the United States had not yet passed discriminatory legislation. A small number of students who had come to pursue higher education chose to stay in the United States. As a result of lobbying by Indians, the U.S. Congress in 1946 passed an act that gave Indians the right to naturalization and allowed a token quota of one hundred immigrants. This act enabled Dalip Singh Saund, who had come as a student, to become the first Asian member of the U.S. Congress in 1956.

The rule of the British Raj led to the emergence of an Indian community in Great Britain. Some Parsis and Bengalis settled there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as professionals. The number further increased, as many soldiers of the British Indian army emigrated to Britain. Dadabhai Naoroji was elected as a liberal member to the House of Commons in 1892.

Post-independence period. A steady flow of migration took place after independence that included skilled and unskilled laborers and highly qualified professionals who went to the United Kingdom and other countries of the West to meet the shortages of labor in the wake of World War II. Indian health-care professionals became the backbone of Britain’s national health-care service. Post-independence migration to the United States and Canada was primarily education driven. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1965 and the regulations introduced in Canada in 1967 paved the way for the settlement of a large number of professionals in both countries. The term “brain drain” was coined, primarily in reference to the migration of highly qualified professionals from India to the United States.

Skyrocketing oil prices in 1973 opened new opportunities for India in the Gulf states. The massive requirement of both professionals as well as skilled labor resulted in the emergence of large Indian communities in the oil-producing Arab countries. Indian migrants to the Gulf, however, are unique in that they remain citizens of India, with no prospect of acquiring local citizenship. The presence of Indians in the Gulf countries was an important factor in India’s economic development, particularly with regard to foreign exchange reserves.

Regional Profiles of the Indian Diaspora

Africa: Mauritius and Reunion. The French administration brought about three hundred artisans for the development of their newly acquired colony from 1729 to 1731. Later, from 1816 to 1820, the British government of India dumped some prisoners there to serve out their terms of rigorous imprisonment. With more than 700,000 persons of Indian origin, Mauritius is the only country of the diaspora where Indians constitute 70 percent of the total population. This, coupled with their stewardship of the independence movement, has enabled them to achieve political preeminence since the country’s independence. Beginning with Sir Shivesagar Ramgulam, all the prime ministers of Mauritius until October 2003 were of Indian origin. Indian migrants maintain a commitment to their linguistic and cultural heritage, even creating a lake called Ganga Talaab, into which water from the Ganges and the other sacred rivers of India was poured.

The Indian community in Reunion was estimated to be over 220,000 by 2005, constituting around 30 percent of its population. After 1920, Indians were granted French citizenship and full civic and political rights, giving them a prominent position in civic and political life. The Indian community there is trying to recapture its cultural heritage, which had become somewhat diluted

because of the policies of the colonial rulers and religious conversions in the earlier stages of migration.

South Africa. Indians started arriving in South Africa in 1653, when Dutch merchants sold them as slaves in the Dutch Cape Colony. The pattern of immigration in the nineteenth century was similar to that in other parts of Africa and indeed the world. The indentured labor on plantations was mainly from Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra. They were followed by Gujarati traders, who went as “free passengers.” The colonial administration enacted discriminatory laws and inflicted petty humiliations to curtail the progress of Indians, who were emerging as competitors to whites in trade and commerce. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s arrival in 1893 heralded the beginning of a long struggle for equality and dignity by the Indian community and led to the establishment of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in 1894, the forerunner of the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC). Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of struggle against injustice and racial discrimination inspired the next generation of leaders, including Y. M. Dadoo of the TIC and G. M. (Monty) Naicker of the NIC, to launch a prolonged joint struggle, in cooperation with the African National Congress.

Both President Nelson Mandela and President Mbeki appointed a number of Indians to important offices. Despite the fact that about 60 to 70 percent of South Africa’s Indian diaspora community live below the poverty line, misperception of the affluence of the Indian community among black South Africans has given rise to some resentment. This resentment, coupled with affirmative action policies, has created a sense of vulnerability among Indians, leading many to support the Democratic Alliance Party.

The Indian community of South Africa is proud of its cultural heritage. There are large numbers of places of worship, and all Indian festivals are celebrated with great enthusiasm. Caste divisions have been substantially diluted, and affluent Indians have maintained a strong tradition of philanthropy that has benefited both blacks and Indians. As South Africa is in a state of transition, the future of the Indian community there will depend on its ability to play a positive role in South African reconstruction.

East Africa. The prosperous Indian community of East Africa plays a dominant role in the economy as well as in the professions, and made a significant contribution to the independence movement. The prosperous lifestyle of affluent Indians generated some resentment among Africans. Idi Amin’s brutal treatment and expulsion of Asians deepened the sense of insecurity that had been growing among Indians since the independence of the

former colonies, and many migrated to the developed world. Because of their resilience, professional skills, and dominant role in the economy, the community has managed to overcome this crisis, retaining considerable influence in Kenya and Tanzania. The community maintains close interaction with India and is committed to preserving its cultural heritage. Indians in East Africa have undertaken several philanthropic projects benefiting both Africans and Indians.

Israel. The Indian community in Israel, numbering about 45,000 in 2005, is in a unique position in that country, as its members have not migrated because of any persecution or discrimination. Even though they are losing their distinct identity, the Indian community has considerable interest in maintaining its cultural links with India.

The United Kingdom. Indians constitute the single largest ethnic minority in the United Kingdom. In addition to about 1 million migrants from India, there are about half a million migrants of Indian origin from Africa and the Caribbean. The Asians and Afro-Caribbean communities in the 1950s and 1960s experienced difficulties in assimilation in the United Kingdom owing to their distinct lifestyles and cultures, thereby introducing a new concept of multiculturalism to the U.K. public agenda. From humble origins in the industrial and retail sectors, Indians have risen to become one of the highest-earning and best-educated groups. They have excelled in all spheres of life. Indians are the backbone of the national health service. In the political arena, five Indians have been elected members of Parliament and eleven have been members of the House of Lords, including two baronesses. There are a large number of Indian entrepreneurs and business people in Britain, including steel magnate Lakshmi N. Mittal, Lord Swaraj Paul, and Lord R. K. Bagri.

In addition to the celebrated Indo-Caribbean Sir V. S. Naipaul, the community has produced a number of well-known authors, including Salman Rushdie, Vikram Seth, Amitava Ghosh, and many more. The community takes great pride in its religious and cultural heritage. The United Kingdom is dotted with temples, *gurudwaras* (Sikh temples), and mosques. The Swami Narayan temple, on the outskirts of London, is among the finest examples of Indian architecture. The all-pervasive influence of the Indian community is perhaps best illustrated by its cuisine; chicken *tikka* is one of the most popular dishes in Britain.

The Indian community has formed a number of social, cultural, and political organizations. Almost all wealthy Indians in the United Kingdom have individual trusts or charities for projects pertaining to health, education, or infrastructure in their home states and villages in India. In times of national crisis or natural calamities

in India, these associations and charities raise generous contributions for relief.

Continental Europe. The presence of approximately 200,000 Indians in the Netherlands, 70,000 in Portugal, and 50,000 in France is primarily a product of secondary migration from their former colonies. Small Indian communities in Germany, Italy, and Greece are mostly semi-skilled and unskilled workers, small traders, and restaurant owners. Spain and the Canary Islands have prosperous Sindi communities. The Gujarati community in Antwerp plays a major role in the diamond trade.

The United States. The Indian community in the United States has emerged as the largest and fastest-growing constituent of the diaspora. In addition to 1.7 million people of Indian origin, a large number of secondary and tertiary migrations have taken place from countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji, and other parts of the world. Their achievements and status have earned them the respect of other communities in North America. Nobel Prizes winners Hargovind Khorana (1968, for medicine) and Subramaniam Chandrashekar (1983, for physics) are outstanding examples of the noteworthy first generation of the Asian diaspora.

Thanks to the knowledge-driven migration from the 1950s, Indians have a significant presence of 37,000 doctors of Indian origin in the United States. Indian academics have done particularly well in science, engineering, and management faculties. Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) graduates are highly respected for their extraordinary achievements. The technology-driven growth of the U.S. economy in the 1990s facilitated the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of Indians in knowledge-based industries, and the synergy between them and their Indian counterparts facilitated the impressive growth of the information technology sector in India. Today India is known as a quality source of technology and service sector workers.

A large number of migrants from East Africa belonged to the Gujarati community, which is known for its business acumen and entrepreneurship. The Patels, a sub-community of Gujaratis, occupy such a dominant position in the hotel industry that sometimes motels are jokingly called “potels.”

Indo-Americans have become more active in the U.S. political arena. Bobby Jindal, a thirty-two-year-old politician, narrowly lost the race for governor of Louisiana. He was subsequently elected to the U.S. Congress. The community has effectively mobilized on issues ranging from the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 to Kargil in 1999 (the conflict with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir).

They have played a major role in the creation of an India caucus in the U.S. Congress.

Indians in the United States have demonstrated a strong desire to give something back to India. They have contributed generously in times of natural calamities. Influenced by the American tradition of alumni contributions to their alma mater, many Indians, particularly IIT graduates, have established chairs and schools in institutions in India. Some Indo-Americans have also helped establish chairs in Indian studies in universities in the United States. The community has founded a number of nongovernmental organizations engaged in projects in the fields of education, health care, and rural development.

The Indo-American community reflects the diversity of India. Remarkably, their first generation has been able to transmit some of their attachment to culture and traditions to their second generation. Religion plays an important role in the affairs of the Indian community, and they have given priority to the construction of *gurudwaras*, temples, mosques, and a few churches. More than 87 percent of Indo-Americans have completed high school, while 62 percent have some college education. The rate of divorce in the community is also lower than the national average. The per capita income of the Indo-American community is estimated at U.S.\$60,093, compared to the average per capita income of U.S.\$38,885. It is hardly surprising that the Indian community is often referred to as the “model minority.”

Canada. The Indian community in 2005 constituted approximately 3 percent of Canada’s total population of 30 million. In addition, there are 200,000 people of Indian origin who have migrated from Africa, the Caribbean, and Fiji. Indo-Canadians are highly regarded in the fields of medicine, academia, management, and engineering. A large number of migrants from the rural areas of Punjab are employed in sawmills and farms and as taxi drivers. Many migrants from Africa are engaged in small and medium businesses. The community is urbanized, and the majority live in metropolitan areas, especially Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. The average annual income of the community is nearly 20 percent higher than the national average.

Indo-Canadians have made their presence felt in mainstream Canadian politics in a relatively short time. Herb Dhaliwal’s appointment as federal cabinet minister and Ujjal Dosanjh’s election as the first nonwhite premier of British Columbia are important landmarks in Canadian politics. There are six Indo-Canadians among the 301 members of Canada’s Parliament. Because of close interaction among first-generation migrants and their families in India, reverberations of developments in Punjab are felt in Canada. Misperception about India’s policies led to

sections of the Sikh community extending substantial support to the separatist movement in the 1980s.

Indo-Canadians adhere to their religions, maintain their cultural identity, and celebrate their festivals with great enthusiasm. More than a hundred *gurdwaras* and temples throughout Canada provide a haven to migrants who face problems of adjustment. A number of Indo-Canadians have been awarded the Order of Canada. They have also contributed generously to various causes in both India and Canada.

The Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, Central and South America. As of 2005, an Indian diaspora community of 1 million in the Caribbean had settled in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname, constituting over 51 percent, 40 percent, and 35 percent of their total populations, respectively. Indentured laborers attained both economic status and some share of political power after a difficult struggle both during and after colonial rule. Most of the migrants in the Caribbean have zealously retained significant elements of their cultural heritage, having resisted attempts at conversion to Christianity at considerable economic and social cost. They have an emotional bonding with India and regard it as their cultural and spiritual home. However, their social exclusivity and the nature of politics in these countries has set them apart, except in Jamaica, where interracial marriages have taken place. The Indo-Caribbeans do, however, participate in the region's three "Cs": cricket, calypso, and carnival.

At the time of independence, a large number of Surinamese Indians migrated to Holland. Many educated Indians from the Caribbean have also migrated to the United States and Canada in search of better opportunities. The Indo-Caribbean community has produced outstanding leaders in the political arena, including Cheddi Jagan, Bharrat Jagdeo, Basdeo Panday, and Jaggernath Lachmon. The French Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique also have around 45,000 and 5,000 Indian migrants, respectively.

Southeast Asia. Indians have migrated to Southeast Asia since the beginning of the common era. The Indian imprint is visible even today in the region's language and literature, religion and philosophy, and art and architecture. The major portion of the migration, however, took place during the British Raj. The British relied heavily on Indians for the workforce in plantations as well as for various services such as clerks, teachers, craftsman, and health care workers. Indian moneylenders and the trading community played a significant role in the economy of the colonies.

The Indian community in Burma suffered heavily as a result of the policy of "Burmanization" (replacing English

with Burmese in all teaching establishments and in government administration). This policy led to a large-scale exodus of the professional and educated segments of the Indian community between 1962 and 1964. The present-day community is not prosperous and lags behind in education and the professions, areas they had dominated until independence. A number of Indians in Burma are stateless and have no identity or travel documents. Muslims constitute a large segment of the Indian community.

The Indian community in Malaysia, numbering around 1.6 million, is primarily from South India; approximately 80 percent are Tamils. A large portion of the community are engaged in plantations. However, a small number are involved in services like the police, railways, and education, as well as the legal and medical professions. They have particularly excelled in the fields of medicine and law. A number of these professionals have pursued higher studies in India. Malaysia is, however, one of the few countries where the per capita income of the Indian community is lower than the national average. The Indian community constitutes approximately 9.7 percent of Singapore's population. The current president, S. R. Nathan, is of Indian origin.

In 2005 the Indian community numbered around 85,000 in Thailand, 55,000 in Indonesia, 38,000 in the Philippines, and 7,600 in Brunei. Geographical proximity has facilitated regular interaction with India and has enabled the community to maintain its cultural heritage. Indians throughout Southeast Asia have maintained their religious, cultural, and ethnic identity.

The Asia-Pacific region. The history of migration from India to the Asia Pacific regions dates back to the nineteenth century. A common feature is that the Indian community has mostly adapted itself well to local conditions and is generally regarded as law-abiding, educated, and responsible. Indians are present in significant numbers, with 190,000 in Australia, 55,000 in New Zealand, and 50,000 in Hong Kong by 2005. There has been a shift in the nature of the migrants, from camel handlers and agricultural workers to professionals.

The Fiji archipelago. The history of the Indian community in Fiji (numbering about 340,000 in 2005) has been quite tragic, from the days of indentured labor to the post-independence period, which saw anti-Indian coups. The two coups in Fiji, by Sitiveni Rambuka and George Speight, brought into sharp focus the vulnerability of Indians and the reluctance of the natives to share power.

About 75 percent of the indentured Indians were recruited from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and 25 percent from Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. They were compelled to work under deplorable conditions on the sugar

plantations that had begun to dominate the local economy after the demise of cotton as the preferred cash crop. Gradually, “free immigrants,” mainly farmers from Punjab, craftsmen and traders from Gujarat, and some professionals began to arrive. There was also an awakening of political awareness and a desire to remedy their skewed position in the country’s social and political life. The British tried to keep the native Fijians and Indo-Fijians apart as far as possible, not even permitting the establishment of racially mixed schools. Race was the prevailing factor of colonialism in Fiji. At the top of the pyramid were the whites; the natives occupied the intermediate position; and the Indians constituted the lowest rung.

The constitution that was created after independence perpetuated the special status of the indigenous Fijians. Indians overcame these hurdles and acquired a share of power during the government of Prime Minister Timochi Bavadra, but this shift in status led to coups in May and November 1987. The cycle was repeated when Mahendra Chaudhry became prime minister with the support of small Fijian parties. These coups led to the emigration of many educated Indians to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

The Indians in Fiji have an uncertain future, which can change only with the intervention of Fijian leadership. Like other indentured laborers in Mauritius and the Caribbean, Indians in Fiji have also zealously preserved their religious traditions and cultural and linguistic heritage. Discriminatory treatment by the whites and subsequently by native Fijians has accentuated this phenomenon.

India and Its Diaspora

India’s policy toward its diaspora communities has been governed by the prevailing circumstances. In pre-independence years the Indian National Congress took an avid interest in the welfare of overseas Indians, particularly indentured laborers. Congress sent delegations to meet overseas Indians and actively lobbied with the colonial administration for improvement in their conditions. Mahatma Gandhi led agitation for the abolition of indentured labor. India broke diplomatic relations with South Africa in protest of the policy of apartheid.

As a champion of the struggle against colonialism, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accorded high priority to relations with the oppressed nations. He exhorted Indian migrants to completely identify with the country of their adoption, and the Indian diaspora actively participated in freedom struggles in Commonwealth countries. Many were therefore disappointed by India’s lack of support when Indian diaspora communities received patently discriminatory treatment in Burma (Myanmar), Sri Lanka, East Africa, and the Caribbean.

The destinies of India and its diaspora are intertwined, and this fact is perhaps best illustrated by the achievements of both since the 1990s. It was during this period that India registered its most impressive economic performance and became a nuclear power. Collaborations between India and Indo-Americans in the information technology sector provided impetus to the development of a mutually beneficial relationship. These developments enhanced the prestige of both India and the diaspora. During the 1990s, Indians became presidents, prime minister, and ministers in a number of countries and attained positions of leadership in academia and the corporate world. Indian writers of English won many laurels; Amartya Sen and V. S. Naipaul became Nobel laureates in 1998 and 2001, respectively. The Ispat Group of Lakshmi Mittal became the second-largest producer of steel in the world.

India’s government recently opened a new chapter in its relationship with the diaspora. A plan that included identification cards was created for all segments of the diaspora in 1999. The government also created a Non-Resident Indian/Person of Indian Origin division in the ministry of external affairs. In a major initiative, the government appointed a high-level committee on the Indian diaspora in September 2000. The committee’s six-hundred-page report is the most exhaustive study thus far conducted on the Indian diaspora and its relationship with India. The ninth of January was declared the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Indian Diaspora Day) in recognition of the achievements of the diaspora (Mahatma Gandhi had returned to India on 9 January 1915 after his twenty-one years in South Africa). New Delhi also considered the demand for dual citizenship by Indian migrants in a number of countries, and a bill was introduced in the Parliament in March 2003.

Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee inaugurated the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas on 9 January 2003. Approximately two thousand diaspora Indians from sixty-two countries attended the event, witnessing unprecedented enthusiasm in India for fostering a relationship with its diaspora communities. The event increased the perception of a global Indian family and was a major step in the development of India’s relationship with all the constituents of its diaspora.

After the elections of 2004, the new coalition government, led by the Congress Party, created a ministry for Overseas Indians Affairs. The third Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was celebrated in Mumbai, and the policy for dual citizenship was further liberalized. The diaspora is poised to play an important role in the realization of India’s aspirations worldwide.

Jagdish Sharma

See also **Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions; United States, Relations with**

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DĪKSHITAR, MUTTUSVĀMI (1775–1835), South Indian poet and composer.

Muttusvāmi Dīkshitar was the youngest of three nineteenth-century poet-composers (*vāggēyakāra*) hailing from Tiruvārūr, reverentially called the “Trinity” of South Indian music. He used the *mudrā* (signature) “Guruguha” in his lyrics, and he contributed more than four hundred songs to the concert repertoire of Karnātak music. Compared with the lively and emotional style of Tyāgarāja, many of Dīkshitar’s songs are more tranquil, though they conclude with a distinct feature called *madhyama kāla sanchāra* (phrases in a faster tempo). His songs are based on the *kṛiti* format (the principal compositional form of Karnātak art music) and have Sanskrit lyrics, except for some in Telugu.

In his *kṛiti* “Bālagōpāla” (*rāga* Bhairavi), Dīkshitar refers to himself as *vainika gāyaka*, a “singer and player of the long-necked lute” (*vīnā*, the principal instrument of Karnātak art music). Interestingly, several embellishments (*gamaka*) of Karnātak music are reminiscent of the playing of a vina, and through Dīkshitar’s songs both vocalists and instrumentalists stay sensitized to the aesthetic value of intricate *gamakas*.

Dīkshitar was initiated into *Srī vidyā upāsana*, the Tāntric Dēvī cult, followed by five years of studies in North India (Varanasi). To modern listeners, his Sanskrit lyrics may be reminiscent of a remote past, as they describe specific images and stories of deities associated with the temples he visited. Yet he also subscribed to Vedānta philosophy, which postulates an impersonal Absolute (*parabrahma*) behind all phenomena, including the various deities he praised in his lyrics. It is evident that frequent pilgrimages and exposure to diverse cultural traditions left their mark on his personality and

music. Several of his famous songs are based on Hindustani *rāgas*. His progressive outlook is corroborated by the rapid integration of the violin in South Indian music: his brother Bālusvāmi Dīkshitar and Vādivēlu, one of his famous disciples, became the first South Indian violin exponents to become known by their names. At the request of the Collector (the British chief administrator of district), he even wrote Sanskrit lyrics for about fifty English tunes (*nōttusvara sābhitya*, or note-lyrics).

Through his compositions he defined the melodic “shapes” (*rāga rūpa*) of several rare *rāgas* for the first time, particularly those derived from the *mēlakarta rāga paddhati* (scheme of 72 scale types). In contrast to Tyāgarāja, he did not embrace a later version of the *mēlakarta rāga* scheme, one that is entirely based on heptatonic scale types (*sampūrna paddhati*). Dīkshitar adhered to the earlier scheme known as *asampūrna paddhati* (nonheptatonic arrangement), and the *rāga* nomenclature is therefore peculiar to his compositions. This difference is ascribed to the fact that through his father, the composer Rāmasvāmi Dīkshitar, he belongs to the *parampara* (musical lineage) of Venkatamakhī. This influential theorist had outlined his innovative *mēlakarta* scheme in a treatise titled *Chaturdandī Prakāshikā* (Four-fold explanation) as early as 1660.

Through his disciples, notably the four brothers known as the Tanjore Quartet, Dīkshitar also contributed to the field of dance music. Being leading figures in the fields of dance and music, the Tanjore Quartet succeeded in redefining and enriching the repertoire of temple and court dance. As demonstrated by T. Bālasarasvati, the legendary dancer, this program format continues to inspire *Bharata Natya* dancers and their accompanists.

Ludwig Pesch

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DISEASE. See *Health Care*.

DĪVĀLĪ Dīvālī (the modern contraction for Sanskrit *dīpāvālī*, “garland of lamps”) is a very popular festival, celebrated annually in most parts of India. It takes place at the end of the “dark” half of the month of Kārttika (October–November), thus beginning just before the new moon and lasting from three to five days, when the sky is the darkest. Rows of bright candles and lamps in the temples, halls, on roofs and in windows of houses, hanging in small baskets from poles, and lined up along roads and in parks, contrast with the dark sky, and fire-crackers are set off. Tiny rafts carrying earthen lamps are sent sailing down the rivers. People celebrate mythological victories of the gods over evil, as well as the reunion of brothers and sisters who had been separated when the girls left their parental homes after marriage.

Dīvālī is actually a cluster of several events, some of which have been attested for nearly two millennia. Among these is the propitiation of Yama, the god of death, so as to ensure a long life, and the lighting of a lamp for *naraka* (hell), that is, for the avoidance of hell.

The propitiation of Yama is now generally omitted, though a lamp is still lit for *naraka*. There is also the celebration of the slaying of the demon Naraka by Krishna, and an oil bath is taken to ward off hell. Noise making at midnight is thought to drive out bad luck, and the worship of the goddess Lakshmī ensures good fortune; a small clay lamp, filled with clarified butter (ghee), is lit in her honor. In some regions the worship of the good demon Bali, who has been banished to the netherworld, is included in the festivities; since Shiva is believed to have been defeated in gambling on that day by his wife Pārvatī, men (and even women) are encouraged to gamble that morning.

In some provinces, houses are cleaned and painted and metal vessels are polished during Dīvālī. Shops are decorated and illuminated, and merchants worship their books of accounts and host friends, customers, and other traders. Indeed it was sometimes alleged that divine Brahmā granted Dīvālī especially to the traders as their festival; but it is enjoyed by all with new clothes, sweets, socializing, and a sumptuous feast.

Hartmut E. Scharfe



Festival of Lights. Boy illuminating candles on the eve of Dīvālī, the “festival of lights,” in the northern city of Chandigarh. During Dīvālī, Hindus and Sikhs in India, and worldwide, perform the same ritual in their homes to mark the victory of good over evil. AJAY VERMA/REUTERS/CORBIS.

See also **Hinduism (Dharma)**

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DMK AND AIDMK. See **Dravidian Parties; Political System.**

DRAVIDIAN. See **Languages and Scripts.**

DRAVIDIAN PARTIES The Dravidian movement and the parties that emerged from it played important roles in the state of Tamil Nadu in southeast India since World War I, and these parties ruled the state from 1967 onward. Aside from their major roles in this state, which is currently inhabited by over 60 million people, these organizations were exceptions to some trends in Indian politics, and forerunners in other respects. Caste and language were central to their political vision, and some of the Dravidianist organizations criticized religion, or at least some religious practices and beliefs. The Dravidian movement of the late colonial period aimed to mobilize South Indians (especially speakers of the Tamil language), other than those of the upper Brahman caste, against the alleged dominance of Brahmans and North Indians. Its support was initially restricted to small pockets of society. However, the Dravidian parties grew after Indian independence, effectively mobilizing the less-privileged groups and changing social policies in ways that gave middle and lower social groups greater representation and power. Dravidianism came to express ethnicity in ways that strengthened democracy and enriched civic life.

The Dravidian movement mobilized South India's middle castes (often called the "other backward castes") and, to a lesser extent, the lower castes (called the "scheduled castes," Dalits, or Harijans) before political movements and parties did so outside South India. The Dravidian parties introduced the most extensive preferential policies for these castes in Tamil Nadu, setting aside 69 percent of college admission and government employment for these groups after 1980. Preferential quotas were instituted in other parts of South India as well, but were introduced later and were not as extensive in other parts of India.

The Dravidianist organizations linked caste appeals to language appeals in the late colonial period by claiming that South Indians (especially Tamil speakers), other than Brahmans, belonged to the "Dravidian race," distinct from the Aryan race, to which they claimed both North

Indians and South Indian Brahmans belonged. They were among the first to demand secession from India, doing so as early as 1938, even before decolonization. While the major Dravidian parties demanded secession until 1963, they did not engage in armed insurgency or much violent protest to press this demand, unlike many of the secessionist organizations that emerged (most of them some decades later) in northern and northeastern India. The Dravidianists later abandoned secession, though the national and state governments neither subjected them to much repression nor granted some of their major demands, such as greater autonomy for the states and the acceptance of Tamil as one of India's official languages.

The Dravidian parties contributed to some changes in language policy and language use. The national government continued to use English and Hindi, as languages of administration, contrary to the Indian Constitution's commitment to replace English with Hindi for this purpose by 1965 because the Dravidianists led popular protests in Tamil Nadu against a complete shift to Hindi from the 1930s to the 1960s. The government of Tamil Nadu did not promote the instruction of Hindi in the state after the Dravidian parties came to power, while continuing to accept instruction in English. The Tamil used in Tamil Nadu's media changed, drawing more extensively from the dialects of the middle castes, from which the Dravidian parties drew much of their support.

Party competition was regionalized much earlier in Tamil Nadu than elsewhere in India because the Dravidian parties became dominant in this state early on. Pan-Indian parties ceased to be major contenders in the state as early as the 1970s, when the Congress Party still dominated much of India. Besides, Tamil Nadu was Hindu nationalism's weakest spot because of the influence of Dravidianist mobilization. This limited violent conflict further in Tamil Nadu, as Hindu nationalist organizations resorted periodically to violence against non-Hindus and other opponents in their regions of strength elsewhere. As the Dravidian parties built close political and social links between different religious groups and castes, they helped restrict mass violence along religious lines, and to a lesser extent along caste lines.

The ideology and some of the activities of the early Dravidianist organizations had considerable potential to promote intolerance, while also having the potential to promote social equality. The most popular Dravidianist organization of the late colonial period (the Self Respect Association, later renamed the Dravidar Kazhagam, or DK, the Party of the Dravidians) opposed religion, especially Brahmanical Hinduism, as the foundation of caste-based social oppression. It highlighted its atheism through heretical gestures such as breaking Hindu idols



Muthuvel Karunanidhi, President of the DMK. Now in his eighties, the still charismatic and popular leader has been accused of running the party like an extension of his family. INDIA TODAY.

and depicting Hindu deities in demeaning ways. The DK opposed Indian nationalism even when it was the most popular political force in much of India. After decolonization, it criticized the Indian Constitution's provisions for religious freedom, meant to ensure tolerance in a multireligious society, on the grounds that allowing free exercise of the Hindu faith would inevitably involve the official acceptance of caste discrimination. While such gestures were meant to shock society into insight about caste-based dominance, they evoked widespread outrage, even among some from the middle and the lower castes. While critical of Hinduism, the DK mainly mobilized some Hindus of the middle castes.

The strategies of the DK might have evoked considerable intolerance and violent conflict along the lines of religion, caste, and language. Brahmans and non-Tamil speakers could have faced violence and intolerance, as could the lower castes and non-Hindus. However, the later Dravidianist organizations altered their social vision and approaches to mobilization to give greater value to various aspects of popular culture without promoting

much animosity along ethnic and religious lines. Indeed, the Dravidian party formed in the 1970s, which ruled Tamil Nadu for five terms over the next three decades, was initially led by one of non-Tamil ancestry and later by a Brahman, though earlier Dravidianists had upheld the Tamil language and had opposed Brahman dominance.

The two most popular Dravidianist organizations of the post-colonial period were the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. These parties promoted civic associations, such as literary and debating societies, reading rooms and film fan clubs, and engaged with other organizations that were independent of political parties or affiliated with other parties, such as caste associations, farmers' associations, and unions of white collar workers. Such engagement with civic life linked the Dravidian parties closely to society and promoted their growth. However, civic associations remained somewhat independent of the Dravidian parties.

The Dravidian parties addressed the demands of various groups through policies such as caste-based preferences, agrarian subsidies, subsidized housing, and a free lunch program, which has fed over a fifth of the state's population (especially schoolchildren) since 1983. Such forms of patronage and political empowerment of some lower- and middle-status Tamils increased their upward social mobility.

Aspects of the Movement's History

Certain intellectual and cultural currents of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced early Dravidianist ideology. Some European Orientalist intellectuals, who were colonial bureaucrats or missionaries, grouped South Indian languages in a Dravidian family, and claimed that South Indians, other than Brahmans, were descended from a distinct Dravidian race. Tamil revivalists recovered the two-thousand-year-old history of the Tamil language and its literature made available to the public old Tamil literary works, and attempted to develop a Tamil that was purged of words originating in Sanskrit. Dravidianist ideologues of the early twentieth century drew from Orientalist linguistics and Tamil revivalism the ideas that a Dravidian community, composed of South Indians, spoke a non-Sanskritic Tamil and had no caste distinctions prior to the arrival of Brahmans from the North and the growth of Hinduism in southern India toward the end of the first millennium A.D. They called for the revival of such a community in opposition to Brahmans, North Indians, and Indian nationalism.

The first Dravidianist political organizations—the Dravidian Association and the South Indian Liberal Federation (popularly called the Justice Party)—emerged in

the 1910s to increase the presence of “non-Brahmans” in Western education and the professions, and to compete in provincial elections, based on a very limited franchise. Much of their leadership and support came from affluent princes, landlords, and merchants of the upper non-Brahman castes. The Justice Party ruled the provincial legislature through parts of the 1920s, when it increased caste-based preferential policies. It became ineffective once the franchise was increased and the Congress Party contested provincial elections in 1936.

The Self Respect Association, which emerged from the Congress Party in 1925, became the first mass-based Dravidianist organization, under the leadership of E. V. Ramaswami Naicker (1880–1974; popularly called Periar, or “Respected Leader”). Periar’s sharply worded opposition to Brahman and North Indian dominance struck a chord among many of the middle castes and some of the lower castes. However, his heretical gestures against Hindu orthodoxy, his opposition to all religious beliefs and practices, and the popularity of Indian nationalism restricted the Self Respect Association’s support. While Periar pointed to the goals of a society without caste distinction, and less consistently to reducing class and gender inequalities, the organizations he led consisted mainly of middle caste men. Nevertheless, many later lower caste organizations claimed Periar as their inspiration.

Many younger activists of the Self Respect Association developed an outlook somewhat different from Periar’s through the 1930s and the 1940s. They gave the Tamil language greater importance, accepted popular culture (including popular religion), and used the cultural media effectively for political communication, opposing social elites more consistently and valuing more democratic practices. Their attachment to the Tamil language came to the fore when the Self Respect Association successfully agitated in 1938 against the efforts of the provincial government, led by the Congress Party, to introduce compulsory Hindi instruction in schools. During this agitation, the demand emerged for the first time for the secession of a “Dravida Nadu,” a Dravidian state. Led by C. N. Annadurai, this faction initiated a change in the party’s name to the Dravidar Kazhagam in 1944, and welcomed India’s independence in 1947, in opposition to Periar. Inclined to use the political opportunities presented by India’s postcolonial federal democracy, this faction formed a separate party in 1949, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Party for the Progress of Dravidam, or DMK).

The DMK grew rapidly through the 1950s and 1960s and was elected to control the state government in 1967. It drew support particularly among the intermediate and lower Tamil castes and classes. As it grew, the DMK

opposed social elites linked to the state and the ruling Congress Party more than it opposed Brahmans or non-Tamil speakers. It built close social and political bonds between many Hindus and Muslims, and so inhibited the growth of religious nationalism. The party’s leaders abandoned their demand for secession in 1959, viewing it as a hindrance to building popular support, and made the decision public in 1963. The DMK’s association with major language agitations in the 1960s and its celebration of Tamil and middle caste cultural pride aided its rapid growth. The growing popularity of a film star who promoted the party, M. G. Ramachandran (known as MGR), was crucial in attracting groups that had not previously supported the Dravidian parties.

Ramachandran maintained some distance from the DMK’s caste and language appeals, but in his film career systematically chose to play roles of champions of the underprivileged, protectors of women, and idealized lovers. This especially attracted the poor, the lower castes, and women, groups that could readily watch films but had limited access to the printed word. Ramachandran’s admirers associated him closely with the roles he played in his films, and were attracted to visions of him as a leader of his party and state, benefactor of the poor and the powerless.

The DMK distributed patronage among its middle-caste and middle-class supporters, and to a lesser extent among the lower castes and the poor. It increased the state’s preferential quotas from 41 percent to 49 percent, especially benefiting upwardly mobile groups, with which the DMK became more associated. In the early 1970s, the DMK government abandoned or reduced the scope of policies attractive to the poor, such as food subsidies and temperance laws, and the corruption of many DMK leaders became widely known. This created an opening for Ramachandran, who did not enjoy a stature in the DMK commensurate with his mass popularity, to criticize DMK leadership for failing to provide welfare and clean governance. In 1972 he founded a new party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK, or Anna’s Party for the Progress of Dravidam, named after the DMK’s founding leader, Annadurai, who had since died).

Starting from the base of Ramachandran’s fan clubs, the ADMK became Tamil Nadu’s most popular party in its very first year of existence. The DMK retained the support of many of its early followers, but the Congress Party became marginal to Tamil politics thereafter. The ADMK drew its greatest support from the poor, from women, and from non-Tamil speakers until the 1990s. To highlight its acceptance of Indian nationalism, the party changed its name to the AIADMK (the All-India ADMK) in 1976. The AIADMK assumed power after the next state assembly

election of 1977, and retained power for three terms until Ramachandran's death in 1987. It expanded caste preferences from 49 percent to 69 percent, and introduced welfare policies that benefited the poor most, notably a free lunch program in all public schools. Such policies reinforced Ramachandran's preexisting image as a patron of the poor and helped the AIADMK retain its early support, even while building its following among the propertied.

The association of the two major Dravidian parties with particular social visions and social groups weakened from the late 1980s, reducing the strength of these parties. Some lower and middle caste Tamils felt the DMK did not effectively represent them, and they formed distinct caste parties. This was particularly true of the Vanniar, the majority of whom supported a caste party formed in 1989. Other DMK activists were critical of the inconsistency of the party's support of the secessionist insurgency that emerged among the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka, and of the gulf between party leaders and modest social groups, forming a separate party in 1994, the Marumalarchchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK, the Revitalized DMK). This highlighted the DMK's departure from its origins, although the MDMK drew only limited support. Cohesion declined among the DMK's supporters across caste and religious boundaries, leading to increased caste violence from the 1980s and greater violence between religious groups from the 1990s. It also created space for a minor growth of Hindu nationalism from the 1990s, leading the DMK and the AIADMK to tactical electoral alliances with the Bharatiya Janata Party from the late 1990s.

The leadership of the AIADMK passed after Ramachandran's death to his former lover, who had acted with him in many films, J. Jayalalitha. During her first term in office in the early 1990s, Jayalalitha did not retain Ramachandran's image as a champion of the underprivileged, and the AIADMK lost support among all groups because of its repression of dissent and the open corruption of its leaders. This especially reduced support among the lower castes, and two minor lower caste parties emerged in the 1990s. The recently formed caste parties claim inspiration from the early Dravidian movement, although each of them directs its appeals to particular castes, accounting for 10 percent of the state's population or less. As the newer parties are restricted to particular social niches, the DMK and the AIADMK remained Tamil Nadu's two strongest parties, alternating in power from 1989 (the DMK from 1989 to 1991 and from 1996 to 2001, and the AIADMK from 1991 to 1996 and since 2001). However, their support is less extensive, less consistent, and more vulnerable to erosion than was the case before the 1990s.

Narendra Subramanian

See also **Caste System**

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DUBOIS, JEAN-ANTOINE (1765–1848), *French Catholic missionary*. Jean-Antoine Dubois, known as Abbé Dubois, was ordained in the diocese of Viviers in 1792, joined the Missions Etrangères, and then fled the French Revolution to Pondicherry. In contrast to the Madura Jesuits, Dubois dressed like an Indian peasant to identify with local custom, became an accomplished Tamil scholar, and was well acquainted with Sanskrit.

Upon the fall of the Muslim ruler, Tipu Sultan, in 1799, Dubois was asked by Colonel Richard Colley Wellesley to go to Srirangapatana to reorganize the Christian community in Mysore. This was more of a challenge than might be expected, as many Christians had abandoned their faith because of Tipu's brutality in forcibly converting them to Islam. For Dubois this was a scandal. "Not a single individual among so many thousands," he writes, "had courage enough to confess his faith under this trying circumstance" (Dubois, 1982, p. 40). In fact Dubois was so depressed with the state of affairs that he reckoned that the greater number of Christians with whom he had come in contact presented "nothing but . . . a hollow

mockery of Christianity” (Richter, p. 94). Nonetheless, Dubois did all he could to communicate the compassion of his faith to the local population. He was the first to introduce smallpox vaccination in the state. His own records indicate that 25,432 people were vaccinated in eighteen months, including the members of the raja of Mysore’s household. Moreover, he tried to address rural agricultural problems by organizing farming communities. As a result, he was greatly respected by the local population.

Abbé Dubois’s most memorable contribution was the publication of his *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. The original manuscript in French was purchased by the East India Company and is now held in the India House Library in London. In 1823 Dubois returned to France totally shattered. He published *The State of Christianity in India; During the Early Nineteenth Century*, a series of letters in which he related his devastating experiences; the work was severely criticized, especially by Protestant missionaries.

Dubois believed that Hindus were resistant to Christianity in part because the biblical accounts and sacrificial ceremonies deeply offended their sensibilities and prejudices. He was convinced that Hindus were so “peculiarly circumstanced” that it was “next to impossible to make them real and sincere Christians” (Dubois, 1982, p. 36). In spite of this, Dubois never allowed himself to be drawn into personal confrontation or recriminations against Hinduism. Dubois spent the last years of his life as director of foreign missions. He died in 1848 at the age of eighty-three.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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DUFFERIN, LORD (1826–1902), first marquis of Dufferin and Ava, viceroy of India (1884–1888). A descendant of the acerbic playwright R. B. Sheridan, Frederick Templeton Blackwood, or Lord Dufferin, possessed enough of his ancestor’s literary gifts and political bile to gain a reputation for having “an iron hand inside the velvet glove.” Urbane and erudite, if somewhat indolent,

Dufferin triumphed in roles where the velvet glove sufficed. He excelled as a diplomat, particularly as British ambassador in St. Petersburg and as governor-general of Canada, leading to his appointment as India’s viceroy. The home government expected Dufferin to smooth over the ruffled feathers of the British Indian Civil Service which had revolted against the efforts of his predecessor (Lord Ripon, viceroy 1880–1884) to give Indians an opportunity to gain experience in modern government. Dufferin proved equal to that task. Rudyard Kipling later extolled Dufferin’s respect for the men who ruled India, especially Sir Frederick Roberts, British India’s commander-in-chief. Roberts, however, exploited Dufferin’s favor by pushing the administration into a more active policy along the northwest frontier of India, leading to the deterioration of relations with the amir of Afghanistan and countless “little wars” among the people of that borderland. Dufferin the diplomat anticipated these results, but lacked the ability to impose his will as an administrator, failing to write the comprehensive dispatch on frontier policy sought by his superiors. When the short-lived jingoistic Conservative ministry of Lord Randolph Churchill came to power in 1885, Dufferin obediently fulfilled the prime minister’s desire to annex Upper Burma, though the high cost of that venture forced Dufferin to drain India’s famine fund and to impose an income tax. These steps alienated Western-educated Indians—whose continued loyalty Ripon had wisely identified as the key to the continuance of the Raj—and led directly to the formation of the Indian National Congress.

The emergence of the Congress alarmed the home government, which urged Dufferin to find some harmless means of answering its critiques of British Indian administration, such as through the appointment of token Indians to the Council of India. He responded by holding a brief dialogue with Congress cofounder Allan Octavian Hume, but Dufferin’s own hatred of nationalism among subject-peoples—borne perhaps of his experiences as a harsh northern Irish landlord—resulted in a deeply racist antipathy for its Indian counterpart. He refused to believe that there was “one Indian fit” for any high public office. At the urging of his likeminded subordinates, Dufferin approved of their two-stage plan, which would reform the Provincial Councils of India, but on such harsh terms that India’s nationalists would oppose it, thus justifying new draconian antinationalist legislation accompanying the council’s reform measure. This scheme was sent to London in draft form; even here, Dufferin was avoiding the role of policy maker. However, to clear the way for his successor and leave “New India” in no doubt as to the government’s future political policy, Dufferin closed his term of office with a reactionary speech on St. Andrew’s Day to a British audience in Calcutta (Kolkata) that became the standard against

which future British antinationalist remarks would be measured.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British Crown Raj**

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DUNDAS, HENRY (1742–1811), the first viscount Melville, Baron Dunira, president of the Board of Control for Indian Affairs (1793–1801). Henry Dundas earned his place in British politics by being able to deliver the Scottish vote to the Tory Party, whose leader, William Pitt, was also a close personal friend. His connection with India began in 1781 with his chairmanship of a secret Parliamentary committee investigating wars in the Carnatic and Rohilkhand and continued during his service as home secretary (1791–1795), as secretary at war (1794–1801) and as first a member and then president of the Board of Control (1784–1801).

Dundas's preeminent concern was to curb the British East India Company's tendency to wage costly wars of expansion and consolidation. He was not opposed to such measures where they served Britain's imperial interests, but he believed that these and the company's dominant shipping interests were best served by increasing the company's revenues by trade. Wars for dominion could be profitable, but in Dundas's opinion, they had in the past filled the pockets of the company's agents, not the company's coffers. Accordingly, Dundas praised Warren Hastings as the savior of India when that governor-general's military operations appeared to him to be in the defense of empire, but he opposed Hastings whenever other motives could be attributed to his diplomacy or war-making. This ambivalence was exploited by one of Hastings's successors, Richard Colley, the marquis of Wellesley (governor-general, 1798–1805). Wellesley regarded the company's revenues as best secured by actively reducing its many rivals, foreign and indigenous, thus consolidating its political influence. As a former member of the Dundas-led Board of Control, Wellesley well knew of Dundas's prejudice against such a policy, but events

played into Wellesley's hands. Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1801, the presence of French officers advising Tipu Sultan in Mysore, and the threat of an Afghan invasion from the north left Dundas with little choice but to support intervention in Mysore and other Indian states.

Wellesley promptly translated Dundas's security concerns into a mandate for a series of campaigns, including the Fourth Mysore War and a Second Maratha War, which he supplemented with annexations and subsidiary alliances that collectively secured for the Company either the possession of, or control over, virtually the entire subcontinent, except Sind and Punjab. These steps won Wellesley his marquisate. However, they had proven very costly, and Wellesley had pressed them to their conclusion long after the French and Afghan threats had evaporated. These were sufficient reasons for Dundas to withdraw his support and for the company's directors to recall Wellesley in 1805.

Dundas was by then himself in some difficulty. In 1802 he had been elevated to the English peerage as Viscount Melville and Baron Dunira, but that same year his political enemies accused him of misappropriating funds during his long tenure as treasurer of the navy (1782–1800). In 1805 a report of a Parliamentary committee of inquiry led to his impeachment and trial. He was acquitted of all charges in 1806 but did not again hold public office.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Hastings, Warren; Wellesley, Richard Colley**

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DUPLEIX, JOSEPH FRANÇOIS (1697–1763), influential governor-general (1742–1754) of the French East India Company. During his three decades in India, the Marquis Joseph François Dupleix expanded the commercial, political, and military operations of the French East India Company (La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes), and his administration marked the apex of French colonial ambitions in India. His accumulation of an enormous personal fortune led to suspicions about his integrity and, eventually, his recall to France. Nonetheless, Dupleix



Joseph François Duplex. Engraving of the Marquis Duplex, based on drawing by Antoine-François Sergent-Marceau, 1789. A decade after his lucrative dealings in India came to an end, Duplex died a broken man, his wealth spent and honor impugned. STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS.

successfully protected French interests from threats from local authorities such as the Marathas, the *nawābs* of Arcot, and nizams of Hyderabad. His lifestyle and methods defined the paradigm of the “Nabob Game.” He also led the French in a war with the British East India Company and prevailed on the ground at first. The high point occurred in 1746, when French forces captured nearby Madras (Chennai) and held it until the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle restored it in 1748. Many of Duplex’s practices were imitated by the British East India Company, most notably by Robert Clive.

As did many of those who went to India, Duplex came from the merchant class; he was the second son of an ambitious tax farmer and capitalist who aspired to the minor nobility. His father, a director of the French East India Company in 1721, arranged an appointment for Duplex to the Superior Council of Pondicherry, the governing council of the nexus of the company’s Asian

trade. Duplex soon caught his stride as a merchant, rapidly proving his worth to the company while simultaneously engaging in the lucrative “private” or “country trade,” that is, trading between ports east of the coast of Africa.

In 1730 Duplex became the company’s governor of Chandernagar, a remote and rough trading post near Calcutta. Its trade was small, competition stiff, disease rampant, and security tenuous: a perfect opportunity for energy and ambition if tempered with good judgment. Over the next dozen years, Duplex turned Chandernagar into a profitable and habitable trading colony by linking the Ganges country trade with the rest of Asia and Europe. He made a considerable fortune participating in country trade. He found new goods and markets and increased the volume of established items such as cottage-industry silks and cottons from Bengal and saltpeter from Patna. Because of his improvements to the trading and living facilities, he was able to attract and retain good agents.

To improve security, he developed diplomatic relations with Mughal authorities. Contact with the Mughal seat of power in Delhi allowed Duplex to play an instrumental role in obtaining the Mughal rank of *mānsabdār* for Governor-General Pierre-Benoist Dumas. The title bestowed upon the company official stature, land revenues, and the legal right to maintain armed forces, greatly increasing the impact of the French in India and greatly changing the rules of the Nabob Game.

In 1739, already in his early forties, Duplex married Jeanne Vincens, a Creole of Tamil and Portuguese extraction and the widow of his best friend. For the rest of his life, Jeanne provided invaluable insight and advice and reputedly drafted much of his most sensitive correspondence in Persian and Tamil. Duplex was also enormously aided in Pondicherry by his *dubash* (interpreter and agent), Ananda Ranga Pillai, whose diaries provide invaluable insights into Duplex’s commercial and political affairs.

The following year, the directors in Paris appointed Duplex governor-general in Pondicherry. When he finally arrived in 1742, he was faced immediately with several perils that characterize his tenure. Duplex was facing potential threats from Indian forces, especially the Marathas, and was soon presented with a potential threat from the English. Unfortunately, the company was passing through one of its periodic crises in cash flow, and both the directors and the king opposed spending on Pondicherry’s defenses. Duplex therefore drew funds from his own considerable fortune to strengthen the bulwarks. This act was praised at the time but later became the basis for his lawsuit against the company.

Threatened depredations from Indian armies were only part of his security concerns, however. More dangerous perhaps was news of the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). When the news of war between France and England arrived in 1744, Dupleix proposed that the French and British East India Companies remain neutral, but he was rebuffed. When the news arrived that the British Royal Navy had taken French East India men as prizes, war with the English was inevitable. In league with a French fleet commanded by Mahé de la Bourdonnais, Dupleix's forces and captured Fort St. George (Chennai) in 1746.

The fighting provoked the *nawāb* of Arcot, Anwār-ud-din, who had forbidden both sides to fight, to issue an ultimatum demanding the French withdraw. When Dupleix refused, Anwār-ud-din dispatched an army to take it. A thousand soldiers under French command dispersed the enemy host, and the already intimidating reputation of European military might was reinforced; henceforth European armies were rarely challenged.

Dupleix then engineered the overthrow of Anwār-ud-din by backing a rival for the throne of Arcot, Chanda Sahib. Two years later, Nizām al-Mulk, the nizam of Hyderabad, died, and Dupleix cultivated the successors on the throne, propping them up with French soldiers and installing French political agents in the court. With French puppets now on the thrones of two of the most powerful states in South India, Dupleix was at the top of the Nabob Game.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) returned India to the status quo ante. The English quickly emerged as implacable competitors for power and trade. They challenged the installation of Chanda Sahib as *nawāb* of Arcot by backing Muhammad Ali, Anwār-ud-din's son. When Chanda Sahib laid siege to Muhammad Ali in Trichinopoly (Tiruchchirappalli), English forces under Robert Clive boldly counterattacked Arcot. Eventually, Marāthas decided the succession by killing Chanda Sahib, but the struggle between the French and the English in India was now for complete control.

Meanwhile, the directors in Paris had become deeply concerned with the mounting expenses of war even while trying to recover from trading losses suffered during the

War of the Austrian Succession. Dupleix was dramatically recalled to Paris in 1754, his successor handing him the letter as he stepped off the ship. Thenceforth, French influence in India vis à vis the English declined ceaselessly throughout the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Pondicherry was captured in 1761 and although returned with the peace never again posed a threat to British interests.

Dupleix had returned amid hints that his wealth had been obtained by abusing his position and privileges. A scandal erupted when Dupleix submitted a demand to be repaid for the vast out-of-pocket expenditures he had incurred building defenses for Pondicherry and purchasing cargoes during the years of conflict with the English. His lawsuit alienated many friends and allies and dragged on until his death in 1763. He died a broken man, his wealth spent and his honor impugned.

Dupleix's role in the colonization of French India is cloudy even today. Clearly, as the governor-general in dynamic times, he rose heroically to the challenges posed to him. It is not as clear, however, whether Dupleix was a grand visionary of empire, designer of the Nabob Game, brilliant military commander, and shrewd businessman, who redesigned the paradigm between European and Indian powers, or merely an opportunist reacting to events. Dupleix's legacy is an ironic one: to be the intellectual founder of Britain's Indian empire.

J. Andrew Greig

See also French East India Company; French Impact; Nabob Game

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
Serene Maitreya ("Future Buddha"), a contemporary idol once consecrated by the Dalai Lama. In the fifteenth-century Thikse Monastery near Leh, the capital of Ladakh. IPSHITA BARUA/FOTOMEDIA



TOP: Illuminated manuscript, c. eighteenth century, of the *Gita Govinda*, India's last great devotional text. Written in Sanskrit as an allegorical lyric poem six centuries earlier, it describes through the recounting of Krishna and Radha's love the union of a human soul with God. In the Maharaja Sawai Man Singh II Museum, also known as the City Palace Museum, in Jaipur, Rajasthan. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA

MIDDLE: The majestic white marble carvings of Dilwara, a Jain temple built on the order of Vimala Shah, trusted adviser to Gujarat's kings, in 1031. AMIT PASRICHA/ FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: With the Himalaya Mountains beckoning in the distance, tourists file to and from the Bhimkali palace and temple, in Sarahan, Himachal Pradesh. A monument to India's Rampur Bushahr rulers, the stone and timber complex's exact date of construction is unknown, but its age has been estimated at eight hundred years. AMAR TALWAR/ FOTOMEDIA





TOP: In Rajasthan, vibrant colors and patterns come together seamlessly, as the façade of this home in Jaipur attests. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: In Jaipur, Rajasthan, site of the Jantar Mantar, one of five monolithic observatories constructed at the behest of Sawai Jai Singh between 1728 and 1734. Within this sculptural setting, some of the observatory's original weather-forecasting instruments remain in use. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Constructed in 1784 as part of a famine relief project, in an effort to foster employment, the perfectly symmetrical exterior of the Bara Imambara ceremonial hall. Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Close up view of a stucco figure in the Meenakshi Temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. The figures represent deities from Hindu mythology and are sculpted onto the towering gateways (called *gopura*) of the temple. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Site of the Meenakshi Temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. Built by the Pandyas between the seventh and tenth centuries, the temple complex is enclosed within high walls beyond four gateways (like the one shown here) with distinctly ornate stucco detailing. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: With twin minarets framing its central arch, the Jamid Masjid in Delhi welcomes Muslims for Friday prayers. India's largest mosque (the legacy of Emperor Shah Jahan from 1656) features a courtyard that can accommodate up to twenty thousand worshippers. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Beyond these calm waters sits the Golden Temple, spiritual home of the Sikh religion in Amritsar, Punjab. Punctuated by a lotus-shaped dome, it is a unique blend of Islamic and Hindu architectural styles, erected between 1589 and 1601. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: Dating to 1799, the red façade of the Hawa Mahal (“Palace of the Winds”) in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Behind the screens of its balconies, a veiled harem would have observed the activities on the street below. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

MIDDLE: Transformed into a major trading center and gateway in the nineteenth century, Bombay, now known as Mumbai. With a skyline merged of stately Victorian architecture and sleek skyscrapers—symbols of India’s colonial past and present-day burgeoning economy—it remains the nation’s most dynamic city. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA


BOTTOM: Close-up of the Kadal Alagar, temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu, to which followers of Vishnu continue to flock. Madurai is one of the oldest cities in South India (about 2,000 to 2,500 years old), and although no historical evidence yet exists to support the claim, it is believed that this temple dates to the same period. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: Recently constructed home of Ericsson in Gurgaon, Haryana. With its sleek surfaces, a symbol of India's bright economic future. AKHIL BAKSHI/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: The fifteenth-century Adinath Temple, part of the Ranakpur complex and one of the five most important holy places of the Jain faith. Located in the Aravali Hills in the Rajasamand district of Rajasthan, the temple is constructed of white marble, boasting some 1,444 pillars, each carved with a different floral motif. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: Mud homes in Jodhpur, Rajasthan, their resonating blue walls the result of a traditional paint mixture of lime and indigo. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: The imposing Gwalior Fort, Madhya Pradesh. Built in the eighth century and stretching for almost 2 miles, the fort encloses within its high walls a series of palaces and temples with stone carving and lattice screens in the Rajput style. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Situated on the south bank of the Tungabhadra River in Karnataka—Hampi, the capital of the Vijayanagar Empire that reached its zenith in the sixteenth century. The core of the city was fortified and separated from its sacred center by an irrigated valley through which ancient canals and waterways still run. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





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EARLY MARITIME CONTACTS Conventional studies have tended to categorize maritime trade in the Indian Ocean in the pre-colonial period into ethnic networks, such as Roman trade, Arab trade, and European trade in the western Indian Ocean, as well as Indian trade across the Bay of Bengal. The basis for these identities was inevitably the nature of sources available. For example, the first century A.D. text, the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* (Periplus of the Erythraean Sea) provides the most comprehensive account of trade and trading commodities between the Red Sea and the west coast of India. The text itself nowhere refers to “Roman trade,” though it does mention a diverse range of communities involved, including the Ichthyophagoi, or coastal fishing communities, the Nabateans, Sabaeans, Homerites, Arabs, and Indians. Nevertheless, in historical writing, references to Roman trade supplying the markets of the Empire with luxury items such as Indian muslin continue.

Contrary to such assumptions, the archaeological data indicate that the initial stages of the maritime system in South Asia may be traced to around 10,000 B.C., when fishing and sailing communities settled in coastal areas and exploited a diverse range of marine resources. These communities formed the bedrock of maritime travel and often combined fishing with trading ventures, especially in regions such as Gujarat, where fishing grounds are located at some distance from the coast.

By the third millennium B.C., these local and regional fishing and sailing circuits had evolved into trade networks between the Harappan settlements on the Makran and Gujarat coasts of the subcontinent and the Persian Gulf, as evident from finds of Harappan ceramics and seals at sites in the Gulf. A triad of names that figures consistently in Mesopotamian texts of the third to

second millennium B.C. includes those of Dilmun (the Bahrain archipelago), Magan (the Oman peninsula) and Melukkha (identified with the Harappan settlements). Around the beginning of the common era, this network had expanded to include large parts of the western Indian Ocean extending from the Red Sea to the east coast of India, as described in the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*.

A corresponding network extended across the Bay of Bengal to incorporate large parts of island and mainland Southeast Asia. However, the distribution of a range of ceramics such as the rouletted ware, a fine textured pottery with rouletted decoration, at archaeological sites from lower Bengal to Sri Lanka, the north coasts of Java and Bali, and as far as Vietnam indicates several regional and transoceanic circuits.

The Sassanians ruled Iran and adjacent countries from A.D. 226 to 651 and were active participants in the trade of the Indian Ocean, with Siraf, located in the Persian Gulf, an important center of trade. After a break in settlement, Siraf reemerged as a major center around A.D. 700 and, together with Sohar, its location close to the mouth of the Gulf on the coast of Oman enabled it to participate in a regional trade network in the ninth to eleventh centuries A.D. that extended to settlements in the Indus delta, such as Banbhore, several centers along the west coast of India, and Mantai on the north coast of Sri Lanka. One of the characteristic features of maritime trade from the ninth and tenth centuries onward was the location of markets in fortified settlements along the Indian Ocean littoral, as in the interior. Rules governing the payment of taxes and regulating the functioning of the markets were often inscribed on copper plates and provide useful insights into the organization of the trade network.

Trade and Exchange

The commodities involved in maritime trade in the Indian Ocean may be divided into various broad categories, such as aromatics, medicines, dyes and spices; foodstuffs, wood, and textiles; gems and ornaments; metals; and plant and animal products. These categories find mention in a range of textual sources from the first-century *Periplus Maris Erythraei* to the Geniza documents of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, Chinese accounts, and medieval Arab writings.

Textiles were a major commodity involved in the Indian Ocean trade and included a wide range, from coarse cottons to fine silks and from dyed cloth to embroidered material. Furniture in Asia consisted mostly of various types of carpets, cushions, canopies and draperies—all produced by the textile industry. The value attributed to these varied not only temporally but also spatially in the different regions of the Indian Ocean littoral. It is suggested that textiles in Southeast Asia were recognized as a means of storing wealth, whereas in India domestic surplus income was traditionally stored in the form of gold and silver jewelry.

Gold, silver, and copper were the main traded metals, exchanged both as currency and bullion. Though sources of copper and lead are available in the subcontinent, the *Periplus* refers to the import of copper, tin, and lead to Kane, Barygaza, and Muziris on the west coast. This is repeated in the Geniza documents, which refer to trade in metals from south India and the regular export of iron and steel, brass, and bronze vessels. In return, copper, tin, and bronze vessels were imported into the south, where new ones were created and old ones repaired.

These commodities were exchanged through a complex diversity of transactions including gifts, barter, and trade. There are several references in the *Periplus* to presents given to the elite—for example, wine and grain in considerable quantity imported into the region of the Barbaroi in east Africa was “not for trade but as an expenditure for the good will of the Barbaroi.” Similarly, in the region of Barygaza, or Bharuch, on the west coast of India, the king imported slave musicians, beautiful girls as concubines, fine wine, expensive clothing with no adornment, and choice unguent.

In addition to these gifts, the elite constantly tried to control trade. The *Periplus* refers to a customs officer and a centurion being dispatched to the harbor of Leuke Kome on the east coast of the Red Sea. The island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea was under the control of the king of the frankincense-bearing land, who had leased it out; the island was hence under guard. Somewhat later in the text, there is reference to the harbor of Moscha Limen in the region of Omana,

where frankincense was guarded by some power of the gods.

Organization of Trade

In the early centuries of the common era, Buddhist texts and inscriptions recording donations at early Buddhist monastic sites provide data on the organization of trading activity into guilds, in addition to the presence of individual merchants. The state no doubt derived revenue from taxing trade transactions at entry points to cities and towns. From the middle of the first millennium A.D. there are several instances of these taxes being transferred to religious establishments. The charter of Visnusena, dated to A.D. 592 from Lohata in the Gujarat-Kathiawar region, provides a detailed list of seventy-two trade regulations or customary laws to be followed by the “community of merchants” (*vaniggrama*) established in the region. For example, it is specified that merchants staying away for a year were not required to pay an entrance fee on their return. Other clauses specify duties that were to be paid. A boat full of vessels had to pay twelve silver coins, but if the vessels were for a religious purpose, then it was only one and a quarter silver coins. In the case of a boat carrying paddy, it was half this amount. Other commodities mentioned as being carried on boats included dried ginger sticks and bamboo.

From the ninth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, two of the merchant guilds that dominated economic transactions in south India were the Manigramam and the Ayyavole. Associated with these two merchant guilds were associations of craftsmen such as weavers, basket makers, potters, and leather workers. Though these two guilds originated independently, from the mid-thirteenth century onward, the Ayyavole association became so powerful that the Manigramam functioned in a subordinate capacity. Not only did these merchant associations develop powerful economic networks, they also employed private armies.

The range of their operations extended well beyond the boundaries of the Indian subcontinent into Southeast Asia. Several clusters of Tamil inscriptions have been found on the eastern fringes of the Indian Ocean from Burma to Sumatra. In contrast, the major states of Java and Bali reacted somewhat differently to the advent of Indian merchant groups. In the tenth century, local versions of these merchant guilds termed the *banigramama* appeared in the north coast ports of both the islands. While some foreign merchants may have been included in these groups, these appear largely as indigenous organizations associated with the local economic networks as tax-farmers.

Around the turn of the second millennium, there was increasing evidence of fortified settlements in coastal

areas and of attempts by the state and religious institutions to localize the sale and exchange of goods, either within the fortified precincts or in the vicinity of a Hindu temple. The tenth-century Siyadoni inscription from Gujarat records donations made to a temple of the god Vishnu between 903 and 968 by merchants and artisans and the endowment of shops in the textile market, main market, and so on.

Along the Konkan coast, there are references to the fortified market center of Balipattana. The Kharepatan plates of Rattaraja, dated to A.D. 1008, lists gifts to the temple of Avvesvara built by Rattaraja's father and situated inside the fortifications. Also located within the fortifications were settlements of female attendants, oilmen, gardeners, potters and washermen, and also some land.

Farther south is the Piranmalai inscription of the thirteenth century from the Sokkanatha temple, built like a fortress. The importance of the temple lay in its strategic location astride routes crossing the southern part of the peninsula from the Malabar coast to the east. The record lists a range of commodities on which a tax was levied for the benefit of the temple. These included cotton, yarn, thick cloth, thin cloth, and thread.

Aggression and Sea Battles versus Ritual and Ceremony

The establishment of fortified coastal settlements is matched by references to settlements across the Bay of Bengal. In one of his inscriptions dated A.D. 1025, Rajendra Chola enumerates thirteen port cities of island Southeast Asia and the Nicobar islands, which were raided by the South Indian maritime force. Sastri used this reference to conclude that the Chola navy had conquered parts of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, and this is a trend found in subsequent writings.

These references should, however, be reexamined within the overall developments in peninsular India and the increasing emphasis on the cult of the hero. Elaborately carved memorial stones have been found extensively in peninsular India, dating from the first to the twelfth centuries. These provide abundant information on the cult of the hero and are also significant indicators of sea battles, especially those from the region of Goa dating to the period of the Kadambas (950–1270). From the eleventh century onward, representations on memorial stones depict planked vessels, sharp-ended with a long projecting bow strongly raked, in addition to canoe-shaped craft.

In contrast to this emphasis on sea battles and aggression along the west coast are the iconographic illustrations from Orissa and Bengal. A ceremonial barge is prominently depicted on the eleventh-century Jagannatha temple at Puri on the Orissa coast, stressing the ritual and ceremonial aspects of the boat. It is evident that several

networks overlapped in the Indian Ocean in the ancient period and brought together interest groups ranging from boat-building communities to religious functionaries, traders as well as armed groups. As the focus shifts from national histories to maritime history, researchers are only now unraveling the intertwined history of these communities.

Himanshu Prabha Ray

See also **Chola Dynasty**

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EAST INDIA COMPANY. *See* **British East India Company Raj.**

EAST PAKISTAN. *See* **Bangladesh; Pakistan and India.**

ECONOMIC BURDEN OF DEFENSE The question of "how much is enough" when addressed to estimating the optimal defense expenditure of nations



Border Security Force Patrolling the Indo-Pakistan Border in Punjab. A large part of the defense budget is spent on maintaining the Indo-Pakistan Border Fencing. INDIA TODAY.

yields no easy answers. Peace and disarmament lobbies argue that outlays on defense and social welfare by the state embody zero sum games; increases therefore in defense expenditure must inevitably lead to reductions in social welfare, and vice versa. This is a maximalist position, since the maintenance of armed forces and paramilitary units is essentially intended to ensure national security. Modern defense forces should be able to deter inimical nations from eroding a state's territorial integrity or abridging its national sovereignty. A new dimension to the need for greater defense expenditure to protect India from disruption is added by the increasing dangers arising from the menace of international terrorism.

India's Defense Budget in Context

Allocations for the defense budget in India are made in terms of "current rupees," which is the usual practice followed across the world. For comparative purposes and for long-term planning, defense expenditure can be designated in terms of "constant rupees," which has the advantage of discounting the inflationary factor. Assessing defense expenditure in "real terms" allows other

deflators to be applied, like currency fluctuations that would allow the actual value of the defense rupee to be informed. For making comparisons between the economic burdens on defense accepted by different nations, some generally accepted means of comparison are possible, notably by denoting defense expenditure as a percentage of either the gross domestic product (GDP) or the central government expenditure (CGE). The Indian Constitution envisages the legislative, administrative, and financial control over the armed forces in India vesting in the central government; thus, including therein expenditures by the state governments for comparison purposes is inappropriate, although some analysts in India have found this useful. There are other parameters that can be used to express the defense burden, like its per capita amount or the size of the armed forces in relation to the population of the country, but they are not helpful for making comparative studies.

Characteristics of the Indian defense budget. The Indian government deprecates its need to incur expenditure on defense by rather self-consciously suggesting that it is only providing the minimum irreducible outlays

required. The official explanations are: “The endeavour of defence planners is to balance the minimum maintenance requirements of defence forces and the need to modernize them, without unduly straining the economy” (Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1997–1998, p. 12); and “Given India’s size and security concerns, the outlay on Defence, assessed either as a percentage of the total Central Government expenditure or of the Gross Domestic Product, continues to be one of the lowest among neighbouring countries” (Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1999, p. 16).

India’s defense expenditure since the 1960s does not reveal any pattern of incremental growth, but rather suggests that periodic increases have been reactive to external conflicts and internal dynamics. The most important external factors were the wars that India fought with China and Pakistan: the Sino-Indian border conflict (October 1962); the Second Indo-Pak War (September 1965, preceded by the Kutch operations in April 1965), the Third Indo-Pak War (December 1971), leading to the creation of Bangladesh; and the Kargil conflict (May–July 1999). The yearlong Kashmir Line of Control buildup and border confrontation between India and Pakistan (December 2001–October 2002) also led to dramatic accretions in the defense budget. These periodic additions to India’s defense budget occurred in the years following these conflicts, and relected high costs to replace lost equipment, make up for perceived deficiencies in weapon systems, and heighten defense preparedness. The major internal factors bringing dramatic increases in defense allocations were required to implement the awards of the Pay Commissions of 1974, 1986, and 1996.

Personnel and personnel-related military costs have radically increased over the years due to the generosity of successive Indian Pay Commissions. Recruiting suitable young persons for the armed forces in India has become progressively more difficult for various reasons, primarily the availability of attractive job opportunities in civil avocations and the disincentives of hard living conditions and inherent risks in the military profession. At the same time, the high value and complexity of modern weapon systems makes it imperative for the armed forces to recruit a fair share of the available talent by offering larger compensations and more attractive perquisites; these have added to manpower costs that approximated over 40 percent of the defense budget in India. Military pensions have also increased exponentially over the years due to the cumulative effects of the Pay Commission awards and the rapidly growing longevity of pensioners due to improved health conditions in India. Since 1984–1985, military pensions have been debited to civil estimates, but they now amount to around 20 percent of defense expenditure.

India’s major weapon systems were long of Soviet origin, available at “political prices,” and still comprise some 70 percent of the weapons in the armed forces. Over the years, the spares and ancillaries needed to keep these systems operational have progressively become more difficult to procure, and also much more expensive, as they are now only available at market prices. India is now diversifying its sources for procuring military supplies by turning to Western countries, and increasingly to Israel. These procurements, available only at commercial and market prices, add considerably to defense costs and spending.

Factors Influencing Defense Allocations

Defense expenditure in India is predicated on the threat perceptions of its strategic elite, who influence the decision-making process. These special interest groups include the three Services Headquarters (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division of the Ministry of Defence), the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Defence, and the political parties. Other, but less significant, groups are the voters, foreign arms suppliers, and domestic contractors supplying defense requirements. There are, moreover, a steadily growing number of retired civil and military officials, media personalities, and academics who are active in the seminar circuit, and in print or electronic media. The official articulation of India’s national security threats emphasizes its external dimensions and the dangers emanating from its strategic location in the northern Indian Ocean littoral, as well as its proximity to the volatile Gulf, Central Asian, and Southeast Asian regions. But the primary military threat is seen to arise from Pakistan, with its support of Islamic militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, and from China.

A cross-border security threat is increasingly perceived, especially by the nongovernmental components of India’s strategic elite, as emanating from nonmilitary sources of insecurity, including international terrorism, arms and drug smuggling, organized crime, and money laundering, apart from forced migration and environmental decay. These threats require regional and global solutions. Furthermore, major threats to Indian security arise from internal factors, including ethno-nationalist upsurges, communal and caste conflicts, and the growing menace of indigenous extremist movements that have spread across several parts of the country.

Cumulatively, these threat perceptions guide the defense planning process. Its basic determinants have been identified to be the need for a two-front defense to secure the borders with Pakistan and China; the need to acquire an independent deterrent capability, since it runs counter to India’s foreign policy to join any military alliance or strategic grouping; the inevitability of large-scale involvement by the armed forces in internal security

functions; and India's strategic interests in the northern Indian Ocean, its Exclusive Economic Zone, and defending its island territories, highlighting its need for a blue-water navy.

Categorization of Indian defense budget.

Expenditure estimates in the defense budget are classified under five major demands; four are on the revenue account (for the army, navy, air force, and ordnance factories), and the fifth on capital account. Military expenditures can be divided into six broad categories: pay and allowances of the personnel of the armed forces; payments to industrial establishments employed by stores, depots, and factories; transportation and miscellaneous expenditure; stores purchases; works expenditure; and capital outlays such as capital works, purchase of vessels, plants, and machinery.

The distinction made between revenue and capital expenditure in the Indian defense budget is an inherited British practice, which is not very satisfactory. In theory, revenue expenditure must not result in creating any permanent assets. Capital outlays are expended on acquiring lands, buildings, and machinery. This distinction is artificial, as expenditures on small and temporary buildings were classified under the revenue head. But it also included outlays on aircraft, aero-engines, and the naval fleet, which were anomalous. After 1987–1988, these latter outlays were classified under the capital head, which also includes expenditure on heavy and medium vehicles, equipment, and buildings that have a value of more than 200,000 rupees and a life of more than seven years.

Yet another manner of classifying the defense budget is to differentiate between outlays on personnel and personnel-related costs, maintenance costs, and modernization costs. This classification disaggregates the defense expenditure in terms of its major functions, allowing its utilization for comparative purposes and more purposeful orientation. The empirical experience regarding the utilization of the Indian budget reveals that any reduction therein or any unforeseen expenditure requiring accommodation in the defense budget results in a negative effect on the modernization effort. (Personnel costs are sacrosanct and remain unaffected.) This leads to a diminution in the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces, due to weapons systems becoming obsolete, the unavailability of essential equipment due to the shortages of spares and ancillaries, and inadequate training of the forces.

Can economy and efficiency be achieved in the defense budget? The answer to the above question must be unequivocally affirmative. The major reasons given for increasing India's defense budget include such arguments as: no real increase in defense outlays has

occurred if inflationary factors over the years are discounted; allocations made to the army might have increased, but those for the navy and air force have remained almost static; capital outlays of around 30 percent of the budget are inadequate to cater to even high-priority modernization programs; and the financial implications of the Pay Commission reports are not being configured into the defense budgets. Moreover, a recurring complaint is that the defense plan is never finalized in time because of interminable bureaucratic delays, which disrupt the reequipment plans of the three services, adding to the cost of these acquisitions and ultimately to the defense burden.

There are large areas, however, where economies can easily be effected in defense expenditure that could, paradoxically, also improve efficiency in the armed forces. These include: the scaling down of authorized unit holdings of tanks, heavy vehicles, and other equipment; reducing the consumption of fuel, oil, and lubricants by imposing quantitative restrictions on their issue; renovating the ordnance depots and achieving better inventory management in stores holdings; and effecting greater capacity utilization in the ordnance factories and defense public sector undertakings. More radical steps could also be taken to reduce defense expenditure, such as reviewing the manpower holdings of the armed forces and locating areas of wasteful use. This could also be achieved by integrating similar administrative functions that are being separately performed by the three services headquarters, such as the procurement of stores. The possibility of using civilians in place of uniformed personnel could also be accelerated for tasks like the manning of general and logistics establishments. Civilian personnel may be employed at less than half the cost of uniformed personnel in terms of compensation and perquisites. A more professional system for the procurement of indigenous stores or acquiring weapon systems from abroad could also ensure economies. Large economies can thus be effected in defense expenditure without jeopardizing the operational efficiency of the armed forces.

Effect of nuclearization. The nuclearization of India has not led to any reduction in defense expenditure, though India's bomb protagonists had earlier argued that this would lead to a reduction in outlays on conventional weaponry. This reduction has not happened; instead, India's defense expenditure has almost doubled since the nuclear tests in May 1998. India's commitment in its Nuclear Doctrine to deploying the strategic triad of land-based missiles, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched missiles, apart from establishing the requisite command and control arrangements, and early warning systems to achieve assured second-strike capability, will add considerably to the defense budget. The prevailing

thesis is that outlays on conventional forces will simultaneously have to be increased to “raise the nuclear threshold,” so that conditions are not created that predicate the early use of nuclear weapons in any conflict.

Interservice rivalries also increase expenditures, since each service chief would like to be remembered for the perquisites he wrested for his own service and the weapon systems acquired during his tenure. Establishing the strategic triad has much to do, therefore, with satisfying the aspirations of the army, air force, and navy to acquire their individual nuclear forces. For this reason it seems inevitable that expenditure on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems will grow over time, as will the outlays on conventional forces. Therefore, no economies will be possible in the allocations made for defense.

Does defense expenditure strain the Indian economy? As a percentage of the GDP, the defense budget hovers between 2 and 3 percent, and between 13 and 16 percent of the CGE. This is by no means an insupportable economic burden for India. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that between a third and a fourth of India's population (approximately 300 million) live below the poverty line and are deprived of the most basic needs for food, housing, education, and public health. Viewed from this perspective, defense expenditure, which has been steadily rising, preempts funds required for meeting the basic needs of India's poor, representing significant lost opportunity costs.

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See also **Armed Forces; Wars, Modern**

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS IN AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF

A recent major advance in the analysis of economic development is the recognition of the importance of institutions. This has moved us beyond sterile debates such as whether the economy should be left to the market or should be thought of as the responsibility of government. It is now recognized that government and markets are not alternatives between which we choose, but that government—in particular, good governance—is a prerequisite for the market to function effectively; and that, for an economy to progress, it may not be enough to raise savings and investment rates, improve trade policy, and control fiscal deficits if we do not have good institutions.

One has to be careful about this kind of analysis because “institution” is not a well-defined term. In this article, “institutions” will refer to the social and political settings within which the economy is embedded. Thus the word will encompass not only the structure of government and its legal institutions but also the cultural and social norms within which the human beings of a nation function, and which can be even more important than the formally enacted laws of a nation.

The significance of institutions thus defined is easy to see. Trade, exchange, investment, and business almost always involve transactions performed over time. You supply a commodity today, and your trading partner will pay for it tomorrow or may have paid for it yesterday. You, as the owner of an enterprise, send a salesperson to market your good in distant lands, and the salesperson is expected to pay you back on his or her return. Even when you take a taxi, you usually pay after you have taken the ride. If traders and ordinary citizens did not feel confident that, after they had done their share, their trading partners or business associates would fulfill their obligations, they would refuse to do business or make investments. In such a nation, the market would be stunted and development would remain a distant dream.

If, on the other hand, a society's laws are effective, and contracts are enforced by the state without individuals having to incur too large a cost, then trade, business, and investment will grow, leading to greater economic prosperity. Even in the absence of law enforcement, if a nation's citizens are naturally trusting of one another, or its social norms are such that individuals keep their promises, then this society could also progress. Indeed, a disposition toward keeping one's promise could be even



Mother and Children in Front of Public Health Poster. Mother and her children front of sign proclaiming, “you can save your beloved child’s life by timely inoculation against fatal diseases.” The consistent underfunding of public health services by both central and state governments, which share responsibility for the provision and financing of health care, remains a major problem in India—with its infant and child mortality rates among the highest in the world. POPULATION COUNCIL.

better than the case in which contracts are enforced by formal legal machinery, which requires costly courts and enforcement bureaucracies.

One of the basic premises on which a market economy is founded is the principle of free contract. The principle asserts that adults who voluntarily agree to a contract, which has no negative impact on others, should not have the contract nullified by the government and, in an ideal situation, should be able to seek governmental or societal help to prevent anyone from reneging on the contract. A major role of institutions is to provide a setting in which the principle of free contract is upheld.

For India, it can be argued that the roots of its prolonged economic stagnation (and the optimism observed in recent years) cannot be fully understood if one ignores such variables as the social norms, collective beliefs, and the structure of polity and law—basically, the range of

institutions. An understanding of the role of culture and institutions in the life of a nation can help in the design of better and more appropriate economic policy. In the case of Russia, for example, it is now recognized that standard economic policies designed to speed transition did poorly because they amounted to changes that Russian society was not prepared to accept; the requisite culture and institutions for the market economy were not in place. The failure to adopt recommended economic policies (as in Tanzania or Venezuela), or the abortion of economic policies due to social instability (as in Indonesia or Yugoslavia), is often caused by a lack of understanding of the social and political context in which the policies were implemented.

It is also arguable that a nation’s collective beliefs shape what is politically and economically feasible. In the case of independent India, the early economic policies



Prem Chand Gupta, Minister for Company Affairs. Gupta at opening session of the First National Conference on Corporate Governance Trends, 18 October 2004. Corporate governance is increasingly recognized as an important aspect of sustainable economic growth, and the government in New Delhi, in partnership with several Indian institutions, has established the National Foundation for Corporate Governance (NFCG) to lead the way. INDIA TODAY.

were marked by deep mistrust of the market and big business. In a democracy, one cannot simply overrule such popularly held views, and it is not surprising that until quite recently, India remained burdened by a gargantuan bureaucracy appointed to plan and control the economy but which in reality had become the cause of India's stagnation.

Centuries earlier, the British had come to India not to rule but to trade. The initial contact that India had with Britain was not with the Crown but with one of the earliest multinational corporations of the world, the British East India Company. Later, British commercial interests merged with imperial conquests that proved more lucrative, and gradually, without much serious resistance, a huge subcontinent passed into the control of the British Empire, the center of which was thousands of miles removed from South Asia. Thenceforth, the Indians would be relieved of their resources not only through asymmetric trade and currency exchange, but also by

taxation and state-sponsored extortion. Fears of multinationals and a general mistrust of business and trade were soon deeply etched into India's collective memory. Independent India would design its economic policy in the shadow of this memory. And it is not surprising that it took decades of debate and ultimately the shock of recession in the early 1990s to shake the country out of its policy stupor.

India's policy was born out of two conflicting systems of beliefs and ideas—those of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—held together precariously, their differences often denied. The differences had roots that go back to well before 1947. Nehru's education at Harrow and Cambridge helped forge his commitment to Fabian socialism; Gandhi's ideas emerged from his grassroots struggles and his experiments in alternative communal village (ashram) lifestyles. The economic policies they envisaged for India were very different. In the 1930s and even the early 1940s, Nehru was enamored of Karl Marx and

V. I. Lenin (though not of Russian Communism), referring to their works repeatedly in his diary and in letters to friends. He had shed his Marxism-Leninism, and even socialism, by the time India attained independence, but his faith in planning, heavy industry, modern science and technology would persist. Along with Prasanta Mahalanobis, he would try to give shape to those ideas in the form of what came to be called the Mahalanobis-Nehru strategy of development. Gandhi's vision, on the other hand, was deeply rooted in rural hand labor, primarily cotton spinning and weaving, and the revitalization of India's village handicrafts.

The actual policy regime that India followed in its early days of independence was a mixture of these two competing institutional visions. A Soviet-style planning system was developed, but without the state having a monopoly of control over resources. Capitalism was allowed to flourish, but a large bureaucracy was nurtured. Huge investments were made in basic industries, but at the same time, several sectors were protected as belonging to the small-scale "Gandhian" sector. Capitalism was criticized, but it was at the same time relied upon. Socialism was never practiced, but the rhetoric of socialism was constantly reiterated. A burgeoning bureaucracy became the surrogate for socialism.

Advisers from Washington and many economists recommend that Third World nations must have democracy and that they must open up their economy and privatize, oblivious of the fact that to ask for a democracy and then to insist what the democracy should choose could amount to a contradiction. Since most developing countries are not democracies they did not face the problem, but India did. Once people's opinion had been shaped (and Nehru was instrumental in this), there was no way that policies could be easily dictated to them. Opinion would have to be molded before major policy shifts were possible.

Institutional changes are probably the hardest policies to effect. When India's reforms started in 1991, they began with standard economic policies. Thus ceilings on import tariffs were first brought down to 150 percent, and thereafter reduced steadily, virtually every year. The industrial licensing system was dismantled, fiscal deficits were curtailed, and controls on foreign exchange transactions were eased. Economic reforms, however, have not been able to alter India's legal system and other institutions.

Consider India's labor laws, especially those enshrined in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. This law was a direct outcome of India's mistrust of the market and a result of its own historical experience. When can a worker be fired, under what conditions can workers be retrenched, when can a firm be closed down? These were all matters that were written down as law, leaving very little room for the

principle of free contract by which workers and employers could use their own judgment, bargaining power, and information about their specific industries to reach independent agreements. This has now become a handicap. A fashion industry with variable demands may want to pay its workers more than the "market" but retain the freedom to close down its operations at short notice. The workers themselves may agree to such terms, but Indian law makes such a contract difficult to uphold, thereby having a dampening affect on the demand for labor, and thereby holding wages down. Clearly, in the next generations of reforms, India will need to take on these institutional matters, amending many of its labor laws, rent control laws, and contract legislation, and reducing delays in its courts and the bureaucracy. Such reforms could bolster economic growth, even without raising investment and savings or reducing the fiscal deficit.

There is another class of policies, which only partly entail institutional change, but which should not be omitted from a discussion of development policy. This is what Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen broadly define as "social opportunity." In order to be able to partake in market activities, individuals need a minimal amount of education (and what constitutes "minimal" is steadily increasing in today's world of advanced technology) and to be in reasonably good health. Government has a major responsibility in ensuring that people are able to have access to basic health care and education. These are domains in which markets function poorly. In some sense, these are the prerequisites for the market to function well, rather than being what the market can deliver on its own. Hence, along with the role of providing good governance and better laws, a government has the responsibility to provide certain basic needs of its population, especially its poor, who are unable to marshal these for themselves.

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ECONOMIC POLICY AND CHANGE, 1800–

1947 India, by the end of the eighteenth century, had attained a high degree of development not only in agriculture but also in a wide variety of industries. Spinning and weaving remained the major industries, but iron manufacture, shipbuilding, and several other industries were also flourishing by 1800. India produced manufactured goods not only for home consumption but also for export.

However, by about 1858, there was a marked decline in the output of the manufactures. In 1880 the Famine Commission noted that agriculture formed almost the sole occupation of the mass of the population, and that any remedy for India's predicament must include the introduction of diversity of occupations. The agricultural sector by 1881 employed more than 70 percent of the male working force; this proportion did not change until 1931. Employment in manufacturing declined from about 25 to 30 percent of the workforce in 1800 to 18 percent in 1881, and further to 15 percent in 1931. Varying estimates of per capita income from 1850 to 1900 show that the average annual per capita income did not change much during 1867 to 1882, then declined somewhat by 1900. On the basis of the most reliable estimate for the years 1900 to 1947, there was an increase of about 12 percent in per capita income during this period.

According to Simon Kuznets, et al. (1955), international differences in per capita income were not significant by about 1800. Colin Clark's estimate (1957) of the per capita income of the United Kingdom, in international units, was 378 in 1688. India's per capita income for that year was probably not different from that of the United Kingdom. Even assuming that India's per capita income was 25 percent lower than that of the United Kingdom, it could not have been less than 284 in international units. India's per capita income was about 200 in international units in 1925–1929, according to Clark. By these estimates, India's per capita income declined by about 30 percent between 1688 and 1925–1929. The decline probably was much greater. All the available data suggest that India passed through a phase of economic stagnation, or even decline, for the 150 years before independence.

Aspects of Economic Policies

Alexander Gerschenkron's research suggests that, during the period from 1800 to 1914, the role of the state in economic development was an increasing function of the

relative backwardness of a country, on the basis of the experience of France, Germany, and Tsarist Russia. In India, the state was not only passive but even inimical to development. However, it did create important prerequisites for development. It brought about political and administrative unity and established an administrative, legal, and judicial system. It developed the railways and communications and introduced modern education. In spite of these real achievements, its policies not only lacked an orientation toward development but were such as to retard economic progress. The capacity of Indian farmers to improve the productivity of land was hampered by excessive and uncertain land taxes. These excessive land taxes would not have brought about the deterioration of agriculture if a part of them had been spent in improving agricultural techniques, as in Japan. Nor were these tax receipts used for starting an iron and steel industry to provide inputs for railways, which would have reduced the need for imports. The development linkages of iron and steel would have stimulated industrial developments in general; the building of railways produced a great momentum to industrialization in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Far from fostering an iron and steel industry, the state prevented Indians from starting one; Indian entrepreneur J. N. Tata was denied permission to manufacture iron in the central provinces in the 1880s.

Land revenue financed the export of capital to the United Kingdom for the payment of home charges (which included the expenses of the India office in London, and other commitments of the British government of India to England), interest on and repayment of avoidable and unproductive foreign debt, and some private remittances. The average annual level of this economic drain, on a conservative estimate, was about 2 to 3 percent of national income from 1800 to 1947. So India had to generate an export surplus of this magnitude. Thus, if the economic drain were excluded, India had a surplus on government as well as on external trade account. These surpluses could have been used for capital formation in India; they were actually used for the economic development of the United Kingdom.

British commercial policies were such as to adversely affect Indian exports, particularly textiles. From 1800 to 1850, there was in force an elaborate network of mercantilist provisions designed to aid British textiles, which penalized Indian textiles and industrial products in British markets, in foreign markets, and even in Indian markets. Further, Indian shipping was hampered by the policy of not permitting Indian ships to participate in the trade between the United Kingdom and India. Even the government stores' purchase policy discriminated against Indian industries, to the advantage of manufacturers in the United Kingdom. British industries, particularly the

textiles industry, developed as a result of this protectionist policy, particularly against Indian imports, until 1858. Though all contemporary advanced countries protected their industries during the nineteenth century, India was unable to follow suit. Consequently, India's manufacturing sector experienced a significant decline.

The British government's policy did change after World War I, with the adoption of discriminating protection to Indian industries; government purchasing procedures too were reorganized to allow potential Indian suppliers to bid on equal terms with British suppliers. However, the shift in policy was piecemeal. Tariff protection was granted only to existing industries; there was no provision for new industries such as chemicals and machine tools. Furthermore, the shift came when the major railway construction was already completed. Despite such halting tariff protection, India was able to develop industries that included steel, cement, sugar, matches, and textiles.

Urgency of Planned Process of Development

Because of what has been described as a period of arrested economic development from 1800 to 1947, India faced tremendous problems of dire poverty, unemployment, and acute economic backwardness at the time of independence. Among the fifty-five countries for which the United Nations published per capita income data for 1952–1954, India's per capita income was one of the lowest. All these problems were aggravated by its large population, increasing at the rate of 2 percent per annum.

If a social catastrophe were to be avoided, India had to accomplish in a few decades the degree of economic development that had taken other countries more than a century. Under the circumstances, it was clear to the Indian leadership, even before independence, that there was an urgent need for initiating a planned process of development. In fact, the president of the Congress Party appointed a National Planning Committee in 1938 to create a program for planned development. The interrupted work of the committee was taken up by the Planning Commission of the Government of India in 1950. The era of planning thus began with the first Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) and still continues.

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See also **British Crown Raj; Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947; Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947; Trade Policy, 1800–1947**

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ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER PLANNING, ASPECTS OF

Economic development in India was initiated in 1952 through the formulation of Five-Year Plans, which set the direction of growth for the Indian economy. The government's economic policy under planning was predicated on four basic premises. First, the economy would not achieve rapid growth and egalitarian income distribution under free markets; therefore, the state must intervene in multiple ways. As a consequence, a comprehensive regulatory apparatus whose wings spread to all sectors of the economy emerged. Second, the economy should pull itself up by its own bootstraps, which meant in practice that it should operate almost as a closed economy, producing as many products as possible domestically and assigning a marginal role to foreign trade. Third, the public sector should occupy a commanding height in the economy, producing basic goods like steel and machinery, with consumer goods playing a complementary role. Fourth, the growth should benefit the most disadvantaged classes of society, affording them more employment opportunities and more equal income distribution.

Instruments of Economic Policy

The instruments devised to ensure the outcome of the economic policy according to the plan priorities were—apart from the fiscal, foreign exchange, trade and monetary policies (which are discussed separately in related entries): domestic industrial licensing, foreign investment licensing, price controls, and regulation of monopolies. All these instruments except the last one originated with the Industrial Development and Regulation Act of 1951, although their nature and coverage changed over time.

Industrial licensing. Industrial licensing was directed toward creating capacity in existing lines of manufacturing and in intended new areas. As a priority, small-scale industries with fixed capital below 50 million rupees were exempted from licensing and labor legislation in order to increase employment through less capital-intensive methods of production. In addition, production of certain goods was reserved for this sector, which was also given a credit subsidy. The issue of a letter of intent, which was only the first step in a series under the licensing procedure,

often went through a bureaucratic tangle involving various ministries of the government of India and other concerned agencies. By the time a license was translated into concrete action, a considerable amount of time was spent, and in many cases, the investor either lost interest and withdrew or held the license without actually using it to start production. This dilatory procedure often ended in the hoarding of licenses for approved projects by influential producers, solely with a view to preventing their competitors from entering the field. Since 1985 there has been considerable relaxation of the regulations. Some categories of manufactures were completely delicensed, and industrial licensing was made more flexible by allowing additional capacity under different provisions of the act, like “automatic growth,” “unlimited growth,” and so on. However, the liberalization of industrial licensing remained half-hearted, with uncertainty hanging over its possible future reversal.

Foreign investment control and licensing of foreign technology. Being concerned about the free entry of foreign capital into the country, many restrictions were imposed on foreign investment on the grounds of foreign exchange scarcity and the need to promote domestic enterprise and indigenous technology suited to India’s resource endowment. India opted for the purchase of foreign technology and minority foreign participation in equity during the 1960s. Royalty rates and fees were prescribed, and the conditions for Indianization of management and proportion of equity participation were set forth. The most restrictive policy was introduced through enactment of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1973, under which maximum equity participation by foreign investors was limited to 40 percent, except in export-oriented and high-technology industries, and the royalty rates were lowered. In terms of the impact on industrial growth, however, these restrictions were less onerous because foreign investment, both in stock and flow terms, had been modest and the domestic industrial policy’s bias against competition and high profits hardly excited foreign firms.

Price controls. The government maintained comprehensive price controls on commodities, varying from essential consumption goods like sugar and gram to intermediate goods and even capital goods, accounting for about sixty-five individual goods or groups of commodities. Prices were usually set on a cost-plus basis, derived from technical relationship and the norms for reasonable rate of return on capital employed. The coverage of commodities was altered from time to time, depending on which prices needed to be raised or lowered. This mode of determining prices was not uniform and varied from industry to industry. As a result, there were anomalous situations, such as uniform pricing for all plants for a given product like steel, regardless of the

cost conditions in each, or different prices for different plants for the same product, depending on the obsolescence of the plant, or different prices for the same product from a given plant. On many occasions, the prices of products manufactured by public enterprises were raised only to wipe out their losses or to increase their profits. It was overlooked that the policy of jacking up prices of intermediate goods helped raise resources for financing public sector investment only in the short term, while creating a resource crunch in the medium and long run with higher intermediate goods prices. The chaotic and counterproductive price control regime was continued, despite a severe indictment of this regime by various official committees. The government did, however, eventually recognize the complexity and irrationality of price controls, though it persisted with the core of the administered price control system to accommodate populist opinion and the vested interests.

Regulation of monopolies. Whenever the industrial licensing mechanism failed to accomplish what it was designed to do, other regulatory measures, often draconian, emerged from its womb. One such was the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practice Act (MRTP) to control the size of firms. One of the committees of the government of India, set up in 1969 to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensing policy, concluded that the prevailing licensing framework did not succeed in regulating the growth of industrial output in the right direction and in fact facilitated concentration of economic power and monopolistic practices. The MRTP Act was passed to prevent this outcome by restricting the expansion of large industrial firms with gross assets exceeding 200 million rupees in interlinked undertakings, or of “dominant” undertakings with assets over 10 million rupees. Since 1985, however, the asset limit to be exempt from the application of MRTP was raised to 1 billion rupees. As a result, the large firms had to overcome more obstacles than other industrial firms to raise the production capacities or to introduce new products. Paradoxically enough, the MRTP-induced restrictions on large firm entry or expansion accentuated the prevailing market concentration and led to excessive profits, as the threat to the existing dominant firms from new competitors was substantially reduced.

Implications of Economic Policy

The implications of economic policy, vaguely perceived initially by the government and the intelligentsia, became clear with the passage of time. If the public sector was to be the promoter of heavy industry, the private sector must be denied entry into that field. If employment-generating and quick-yielding small-scale industries were to be encouraged, large industries in the private sector

must be prevented from encroaching on the areas reserved for small industries. If egalitarian goals were to be attained, luxury goods must not be allowed to be produced domestically or imported from abroad. These “don’ts” rather than “dos” received prominence in fashioning industrial policy as well as trade policy design. Initially, the government’s objectives were confined to steering investment allocation where it would yield maximum benefits, but once the regulatory machinery was set in motion, it developed a life of its own, with constricting impact on growth in industrial production, efficiency, and trade promotion, thereby creating opportunities for corruption.

Indian economic policy under planning, often buffeted over the years for ideological reasons, can best be characterized as “unlearning by learning.” Right from the beginning, the basis of economic policy and the instruments of its implementation were influenced by a strong perception that there was a pervasive market failure and that salvation lay in frequent and decisive government intervention. The effectiveness of this interventionist approach was judged in terms of its “first impact effects.” If industrial licensing was used to determine the output pattern, import quantity, and composition of imports, it was believed that the final outcome would conform to the original intention. If foreign exchange was allocated according to a scale of priorities, it was assumed that it would go to the sectors that were designated as high priority. If bank credit was selectively channeled to what were designated as essential sectors, like agriculture, small-scale industries, and so on, it was concluded that the earmarked sectors would be the real beneficiaries.

As it turned out, the actual effects of the remedies directed toward eliminating market failure were vastly different from the intended ones. Although impressive progress was achieved by the late 1960s in diversification of output and development of infrastructure, and in industrial and agricultural technology, there was widespread inefficiency in the use of labor and capital. Industrial production was of low quality and high cost; small-scale industry used more capital than labor; and the public enterprises, which were heralded as the instruments of resource mobilization and income distribution, drained away, instead, the resources mobilized by the government through massive tax efforts. The only beneficial consequences were discerned in several infrastructure activities and public distribution of essential supplies to the low-income population—the areas that were well suited to government intervention. However, such was the mesmerizing appeal of state intervention that it took several decades before the targeted groups could realize its pernicious effects and utter futility. In the meantime,

parasitic middlemen mushroomed to appropriate the gains flowing from the interventionist policies.

The importance of competition and efficiency was recognized at times, as reflected in marginal changes in the economic policy frame in 1964 and 1965, 1981 to 1985, and 1989, but there were quick retreats from action to promote them at the slightest sign of protest from not only the left but the center and the right political parties as well. Despite the superficial diversity in political ideology, India’s political parties were usually in agreement with regard to the core of economic policy. Both those who advocated liberalization and those who urged interventionist policies held that the state should not abdicate its responsibility in economic management. If there was any difference among the various ideological camps, it was only about the degree of intervention. Though the parties rationalized their advocacy of state intervention by invoking the poor and downtrodden, the real reason lay in the enormous power that they wielded and the patronage they dispensed when the state remained strong and centralized.

Political Economy Perspective of Economic Policy

The inability of a democratic polity and its highly modernized political leadership to pursue a growth-promoting and welfare-enhancing policy has to be seen from a political economy perspective. Policy instruments under planning, though designed as promotional measures, bred proliferating rent-seeking activities. The initial controls were the product of ideas and ideology, but they later created the interests that stalled a shift in strategy, even when ideas and ideology changed. As Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) argued, the regime of controls yielded a society with entrepreneurs enjoying squatters’ rights, “which created a business class that wanted liberalization in the sense of less hassle, not genuine competition. The bureaucrats, however idealistic at the outset, could not have noticed that this regime gave them the enormous power that the ability to confer rents generate. The politics of corruption also followed as politicians became addicted to the use of licensing to generate illegal funds for election. The iron triangle of businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians was born around the regime that economists and like-minded ideologues had unwittingly espoused.”

The condition for such an “iron triangle” was made possible by the existence of a proprietary coalition of the industrial-capitalist class, white-collar bureaucrats, and rich farmers, all of whom belonged to the top percentile of the population, as propounded by Pranab Bardhan (1984). There have been continuing conflicts among these proprietary classes—conflict between urban industrial and professional classes and rural classes of rich farmers, between the professional class in the public sector and

the other proprietary classes in industry and trade, and so on. The consequences of these conflicts were seen in the deceleration of public investment and the decline in the productivity of capital, which largely accounted for the slowdown of economic growth. The resources raised were frittered away through the competing demands of these various classes, entailing uncontrollable expansion of the government's nonproductive current expenditure.

In the name of social welfare, the proprietary groups created a regime that protected the administrative power of a literati bureaucratic power group, the business class, which easily manipulated its way through the maze of regulatory controls, being insulated from foreign and domestic competition, and the rich farmers who benefited from massive subsidies. This configuration of power derived legitimacy from the populist rhetoric of national self-reliance, the role of the benign state in providing distributive justice, and the need for protection from the greed of the unbridled private sector. In such a conjuncture, the economy that evolved only culminated in waste of resources, not to speak of lack of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The answer to the intriguing question of why the proprietary classes could exploit the state machinery with impunity for their parochial interests could be sought in the role of the prevailing political system in economic decision making. The weaknesses of the ineffective economic policy had its genesis in the inner workings of the political system, which operated in such a manner that, at one extreme, economic policy had punishment as its basis, but without any sanctions for enforcing it, and at the other, incentive as its basis but without any built-in mechanism to reward success. The omnipresent physical and price controls and licensing procedures, though motivated by the desire to punish the defaulters, left enough loopholes to render them ineffective. The announcement of penalties was more often than not in a nature of a quietus to hold in check the restiveness of the electorate. The reason for this opportunistic nature of economic policy lay in the concentration of political power at the center and the dominant role of the state in decision making.

The economic reforms unleashed in 1991 transformed the Indian political landscape and consequently the framework of economic policy making. Through liberalization, the iron grip of the state on the economy was loosened, and this process was strengthened by changes in center-state relations induced partly by the economic reforms but more importantly by the eclipse of the dominant one-party rule at the center and its substitution by a coalition of different political parties. The economic policy making therefore tended to become less dependant on the arbitrary decisions of the bureaucracy and vested

interests of all hues and was governed more by the impersonal judgments of the market.

Deena Khatkhate

See also Fiscal System and Policy since 1952; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991; Private Industrial Sector, Role of

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ECONOMIC REFORMS AND CENTER-STATES RELATIONS The founders of modern India set themselves the task of devising a Constitution that would suit India's "unity in diversity," adopting a federal Constitution with some unitary features. The states of the Indian Union have been vested with jurisdiction over important areas and assigned independent sources of tax and other revenues and are fairly autonomous within their spheres. However, the states' powers are circumscribed by: a list of concurrent powers; powers given to Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the state list under certain conditions (Article 250); a requirement to obtain the president's approval of proposals for state legislation in areas of concurrency before they can be enacted; and the placing in Entry 52 of the Union list "Industries, the control of which by the Union, is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest." With respect to a subject in the concurrent list, supremacy is given to the

law passed by Parliament. Furthermore, the president can supersede a state government if he or she determines that there is a breakdown of the Constitution or a financial emergency subject to the approval of Parliament.

These provisions make the Indian Constitution a quasi-federal one. To be sure, these Constitutional powers given to the Union (central) government in this regard are in the nature of enabling provisions, to be used when necessary in the national interest. So in practice, states could have had autonomy over broad areas of policy. Even powers in the concurrent list were, for the most part, introduced only to enable the central government to lay down the broad framework of policy, with the states formulating and implementing programs within that framework. Had the central government followed this policy in general, the states would have been autonomous with respect to the major part of governmental activities.

Economic Planning and Centralization

However, the adoption of centralized economic planning with a large role assigned to central public enterprises led to considerable augmentation of the powers and responsibilities of the central government. For purposes of planning, the central government extended its activities and control to most of the important sectors of the economy. Using powers given under Entry 52 in the Union List, the Industrial Development and Regulation Act was passed which conferred on the central government the power to control all important industries. Establishing the Planning Commission within the central government gave it considerable power over the entire planning process, including the allocation of plan expenditures. The introduction of physical controls such as licensing of industries, import control, and control over foreign investment, intended to regulate the market, simultaneously diminished the area of autonomy of the states. The nationalization of large private banks by the central government added considerably to the process of centralization. Overwhelming economic power thus came to be wielded by the central government.

Such centralization of economic decision making had led to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, since market forces were suppressed. Also, the subnational governments found their freedom of action greatly diminished, and felt that the Indian Constitution had lost much of its federal character.

Liberalization and the Enlargement of States' Area of Activities

Economic reforms launched in 1991 were mainly designed to convert India's economy into a market-oriented, open economy. This transition involved the gradual removal

of most of the physical controls such as industrial licensing, exchange control and import controls over a wide area, and the phased abolition of price controls. Another important aspect of liberalization has been a steep reduction of investment in public enterprises, public sector disinvestment, and the opening of most industries to the private sector.

As a result of these policy changes, state governments, no less than private enterprises, have had their spheres and freedom of action enhanced. Each state now is free to develop its economic, social, and intellectual infrastructure in such a way as to attract and develop industries best suited to its natural and human endowments and geographic location. With the abolition of industrial licensing by the central government, states now have the power to approve of the establishment of large industries. States are also in a position to compete for foreign direct investment, with automatic approval of such investment assured in most areas. All these developments represent considerable decentralization of economic decision making.

Since a major part of current investment in the economy is by the private sector, the Central Planning Commission's control over investment has been drastically reduced. State government investments in sectors such as education, health, power, roads, and irrigation are (in most cases) only nominally under the scrutiny of the Central Planning Commission. These are areas in which a major part of public sector investment will take place in the future, all mainly in the sphere of the states.

One can conclude that liberalization in India has not only led to a much more efficient economic system but has strengthened federalism. The state governments now enjoy powers that, in the spirit of the Constitution, they were meant to enjoy, but which the central government, in order to implement centralized planning, had previously prevented them from using.

Toward a Common Market

In the field of taxation, the states had used the powers given to them by the Constitution, unhindered by central government intervention, except for prohibition of levying sales tax on sales at two stages, prior to export, and limitation of the rate of sales tax on "goods declared to be of special importance in inter-state trade." Tax provisions of the Constitution were not really designed to create and sustain an efficient productive system within a common market. To cite an example, the cascading type of sales tax that was levied in European countries in the inter-world war years and old taxes surviving from the Mughal era like Octroi (tax on the entry of goods into a local area) were assigned to the states that used them. The founders had clearly stipulated that states could not tax interstate sales; however, the central government


endowed itself with that power through a Constitutional amendment and levied a central sales tax on interstate sales, whose rate was raised from time to time to raise additional resources. These cost-increasing and distortionary taxes could be levied because the resulting inefficiencies were protected by import controls and high taxation of imports. To counteract the higher costs resulting from inefficient taxes, exports were subsidized in several ways that led to further distortions. Liberalization and globalization have meant that, in order to maintain competitiveness, the states have had to be persuaded to switch to economically efficient taxes, such as state value-added tax. Thus, liberalization, which made possible the enhancement of the area of powers that could be wielded by the states, has at the same time led to pressure for restraining them from actions that would adversely affect growth and national welfare. But the restraints that are being imposed would also mean that each state would be protected from the adverse effects of “wrong” tax policies of other states.

Raja J. Chelliah

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ECONOMIC REFORMS OF 1991 The immediate factor that triggered India’s economic reforms of 1991 was a severe balance of payments crisis that occurred in the same year. The first signs of India’s balance of payments crisis became evident in late 1990, when foreign exchange reserves began to fall. With the onset of the Gulf War, world oil prices starting increasing, and remittances from Indian workers in the Gulf region fell sharply as many of these workers left the region. From a level of U.S.\$3.11 billion at the end of August 1990, foreign exchange reserves dwindled to \$896 million in January 1991. The rapid loss of reserves prompted the Indian government to initially tighten restrictions on the importation of goods. However, it was increasingly clear by the beginning of 1991 that the import compression, by limiting the imports of capital and intermediate goods, was restricting the rate of economic growth and of




Mobile Phone Use in Agra, near the Taj Mahal. The 1991 reforms have freed Indian entrepreneurs from the shackles of bureaucratic controls, and the business class has responded to the new opportunities by significantly increasing its investments in productive capital. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

exports. Furthermore, it was evident that the payments crisis was no longer primarily due to the trade deficit, but was driven by adverse movements in the capital account, in particular the drying up of commercial loans and a net outflow of deposits held in Indian banks by nonresident Indians, reflecting a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to manage the balance of payments situation. The new government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, who assumed office in June 1991, moved swiftly to deal with the situation. It implemented a macroeconomic stabilization program on an urgent basis, along with a comprehensive and far-reaching overhaul of the policies governing India’s and industrial sectors.

Rationale

The decision to embark on the reforms following the crisis of 1991 was primarily motivated by the beliefs of former finance minister Manmohan Singh (prime minister

FIGURE 1



since 2005) that the roots of the financial crisis were structural in nature and lay in the import-substituting industrialization strategy followed by India's governments since 1947. The main elements of this strategy were inward-looking trade and foreign investment policies, along with extensive bureaucratic controls over production, investment, and trade, and a substantial public sector presence in the economy, going beyond the conventional confines of public utilities and infrastructure.


The trade regime was highly restrictive, as nearly all imports were subject to discretionary import licensing or were channeled by government monopoly trading organizations. The only exceptions were commodities listed in the open general license (OGL) category. Capital goods were divided into a restricted category and the OGL category. While import licenses were required for restricted capital goods, those in the OGL could be imported without a license, subject to several conditions. The most important of these were that the importing firm had to be the "actual user" of the equipment and could not sell the latter for five years without the permission of the licensing authorities.

Regarding industrial policy, the two key components of the regulatory framework were the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. The first piece of legislation

introduced the system of licensing for private industry. The licensing system governed almost all aspects of firm behavior in the industrial sector, controlling not only entry into an industry and expansion of capacity, but also technology, output mix, capacity location, and import content. The principal aim of this act was to channel investments in the industrial sector in "socially desirable directions."

The system of controls was reinforced in the 1970s with the introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act in 1970 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973. The MRTP Act stipulated that all large firms (those with a capital base of over 20 million rupees) were permitted to enter only selected industries, and that too on a case-by-case basis. In addition to industrial licensing, all investment proposals by these firms required separate approvals from the government. The FERA provided the regulatory framework for commercial and manufacturing activities of branches of foreign companies in India and Indian joint-stock companies with a foreign equity holding of over 40 percent.

The industrial licensing system, in conjunction with the import licensing regime, led to the elimination of the possibility of competition, both foreign and domestic, in any meaningful sense of the term. As it became

FIGURE 2

increasingly complex over time, it led to a wasteful misallocation of investible resources among alternative industries and also accentuated the underutilization of resources within these industries, thus contributing to high levels of inefficiency in the industrial sector. As J. Bhagwati (1993) noted, “the industrial-cum-licensing system . . . had degenerated into a series of arbitrary, indeed inherently arbitrary, decisions where, for instance, one activity would be chosen over another simply because the administering bureaucrats were so empowered, and indeed obligated, to choose.”

The 1991 Reforms

The economic reform program specifically targeted the highly restrictive trade and industrial policies. Quotas on the imports of most machinery and equipment and manufactured intermediate goods were removed. A large part of the import licensing system was replaced by tradable import entitlements linked to export earnings. Furthermore, the “actual user” criterion for the imports of capital and intermediate goods was removed. There was also a significant cut in tariff rates, with the peak tariff

rate reduced from 300 percent to 150 percent and the peak duty on capital goods cut to 80 percent. The industrial licensing system was abolished altogether, except for a select list of environmentally sensitive industries. Sections of the MRTP Act that restricted growth or merger of large business houses were eliminated. The list of industries reserved for the public sector was reduced from seventeen to six, and private investment was actively solicited in the infrastructural sector. Foreign ownership restrictions were liberalized, and foreign direct investment was actively encouraged, particularly in the infrastructural sector.

The Indian Economy in the Post-Reform Period

Since the 1990s, the Indian economy has grown at a rate of 5–6 percent per annum, far exceeding the “Hindu rate of economic growth” observed for much of the previous decades since independence. Much of the increase in economic growth can be attributed to the strong performance of the manufacturing sector, in contrast to the 1970s, when the manufacturing sector’s performance was dismal (see Figure 1). A significant positive feature of

economic performance in the 1990s has been control of the inflation rate, which has fallen to less than 3 percent, significantly below the historical average of around 5 percent. The performance regarding inflation is particularly noteworthy given that, in the context of the Indian economy, the control of inflation is considered to be among the most effective antipoverty measures.

Another positive development in the 1990s was the large increase in foreign exchange reserves over the decade (see Figure 2). In 2001 foreign exchange reserves stood at U.S.\$54,106,000,000, a fiftyfold increase to its level at the height of the 1991 economic crisis. The buildup of foreign exchange reserves reflects the sharp decline in the current account deficit as well as the large net capital inflows during the 1990s. The improvement in the balance of payments can be mainly attributed to the large inward remittances through legal channels, as nonresident Indians took advantage of a market-determined exchange rate that was steadily depreciating.

The wide-ranging trade and industrial policy reforms have clearly had a positive effect on India's engagement with the world economy. The openness of the economy—defined as exports plus imports as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP)—had nearly doubled in less than a decade, and the openness ratio stood at 23 percent in 2000, a significant achievement for an economy that had remained closed to international trade for much of its post-independence period.

The 1991 reforms freed Indian entrepreneurs from the shackles of bureaucratic controls and from a policy regime that encouraged unproductive rent-seeking activities at the cost of activities aimed at increasing productivity and output. The Indian business class responded to the new opportunities provided by the reforms by significantly increasing their investments in productive capital. The surge in private investment observed in the aftermath of the reforms, if continued, promises sustained economic prosperity for India and for its many citizens.

Kunal Sen

See also **Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Liberalization, Political Economy of; Saving and Investment Trends since 1950**

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ECONOMY SINCE THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS

The 1990s saw far-reaching changes in India's economic policy. A severe balance of payments crisis at the beginning of the decade triggered wide-ranging reforms in economic policy during the early 1990s. These reforms brought about a swift turnaround in India's external sector and catalyzed an unprecedented spurt in economic growth during the five years from 1992–1993 to 1996–1997, coincident with the “Eighth Plan” period. Unfortunately, the program of policy reforms lost momentum after 1995, and the early partial success with fiscal consolidation was reversed after 1996. Coupled with some deterioration in the international economic environment in the final years of the decade, these factors contributed to a clear deterioration in growth for the ensuing six years.

Crisis and Reforms (1991–1992)

The deep-seated roots of the 1991 crisis in fiscal laxity, growing reliance on external borrowing, a weakening financial sector and heavy-handed regulation of trade and industry are well known. The proximate trigger of the 1991 crisis was the Gulf War in the second half of 1990–1991, which jacked up international oil prices (and India's oil import bill) and reduced remittance inflows from the Gulf. Unstable coalition politics of 1990–1991 compounded the economic problems and hastened a full-fledged balance of payment crisis. Foreign exchange reserves fell below U.S.\$1 billion in early 1991, short-term external debt rose steeply, and exports declined. Despite imposition of severe restrictions on imports, a default on payments seemed imminent by mid-1991, when the new Congress Party government took office. This government, with Manmohan Singh as finance minister, acted quickly to stabilize the macroeconomic situation and initiate long overdue structural reforms.

The systemic nature of the 1991 reforms may be gauged from the fact that within a few months, the following steps had been taken: virtual abolition of industrial licensing; rupee devaluation by 20 percent; the complex import licensing replaced by a system of tradable import entitlements earned through exports (later replaced by a dual, and then market-determined exchange rate); phased reduction of customs duties; fiscal deficit cut by 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); foreign investment opened up; banking reforms launched; capital market reforms initiated; initial disinvestment of public enterprises announced; and major tax reforms outlined.

The Economy Rebounds (1992–1997)

The reforms led to a swift restoration of health in India's external sector. Export growth soared to 20 percent in 1993–1994 and the two years thereafter. Inward remittances by nonresident Indians quadrupled from U.S.\$2 billion in 1990–1991 to \$8 billion in 1994–1995, and rose further to exceed \$12 billion in 1996–1997. The current account deficit in the balance of payments never again exceeded 2 percent of GDP and averaged only about 1 percent for ten years after 1990–1991. Foreign investment soared from a negligible \$100 million in 1990–1991 to over \$6 billion in 1996–1997. Foreign exchange reserves climbed steeply from the precarious levels of 1991 to over \$25 billion by the end of 1994–1995. The debt service ratio was halved over the decade. The critical ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves (proven critical again in the Asian crisis of 1997–1998) plummeted down from the stratospheric heights (380 percent) of 1991 to a very safe 20 percent by March 1995.

The reforms of the early 1990s (with emphasis on deregulation and market orientation) and partial success with fiscal consolidation also ushered in a strong revival of investment and growth. Aggregate investment rose from 22.6 percent of GDP in 1991–1992 to nearly 27 percent in 1995–1996. GDP growth, which had dropped to hardly 1 percent in the crisis year of 1991–1992, recovered swiftly and averaged an unprecedented 6.7 percent in the five years from 1992 to 1997. Per capita GDP grew by almost 5 percent a year, compared to just over 1 percent in the three decades from 1951 to 1980. Growth was broad based, with all major sectors recording better performance than in the 1980s and far better than the outcomes in the thirty years from 1951 to 1980 (see Table 1). Among the factors propelling this growth acceleration were: the productivity gains from deregulation of trade, industry, and finance; the reform-assisted surge in exports; the investment boom of 1993–1996; the partial success with fiscal consolidation; the improvement in terms of trade for agriculture; and the buoyant world economy.

Growth Slows (1997–2002)

The year 1997 was a watershed, which signaled the end of the economic party. In particular, three events occurred within a six-month period to disrupt the momentum of growth. In March, the instability inherent in coalition governments became manifest in the political crisis that ended the Deve Gowda United Front government and ushered in the Inder Gujral United Front government. In July, the Thai financial crisis raised the curtain on the Asian crisis saga, which dominated the international economic arena for the next eighteen

months. Finally, in September, the Gujral government announced its decisions on the Fifth Pay Commission report (regarding government pay scales), decisions that were to prove costly for both the fiscal and economic health of the country.

As the table shows, the rate of average GDP growth dropped to 5.5 percent in the “Ninth Plan” period, 1997–2002. Particularly disquieting were the sharp declines in growth of agriculture and industry. Indeed, the drop in GDP growth would have been much steeper but for the extraordinary buoyancy of the services sector, which averaged growth of 8 percent during these five years. This rapid growth in services was much faster than in industry, a pattern that is quite different from India's past experience and that raises issues of future sustainability. Only a very small part of this services growth can be attributed to the remarkable dynamism in the relatively new sectors of information technology and business process outsourcing. Growth was rapid but from a very small base. By 2002 these new subsectors accounted for perhaps 2 percent of GDP, as compared to over 50 percent of GDP contributed by services as a whole.

Both macroeconomic and structural factors contributed to the growth slowdown. On the fiscal front, there was a significant deterioration in the consolidated deficit of central and state governments, about half of which was directly due to government pay increases following the Fifth Pay Commission. This deficit, which had declined from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1990–1991 to 6.4 percent in 1996–1997, rose steadily in subsequent years to around 10 percent by the end of the decade. Revenue deficits (government dissaving) also worsened by over 3 percent of GDP and fully explained the sharp decline in public saving and aggregate saving. The fall in savings was reflected in similar declines in aggregate investment.

From India's perspective, the international economic environment also weakened after 1997. The Asian crisis of 1997–1998 hurt exports and private capital inflows. The problems were compounded by the economic sanctions, which followed the nuclear tests in May 1998. In the next two years, the surge in international oil prices (much of it eventually passed on to Indian energy users) exerted negative effects. Finally, from the last quarter of 2000, the global economic slowdown took its toll of India's economic performance. The growth of exports slowed to below 10 percent per year in the period from 1996 to 2000.

Other, more structural factors also influenced the deceleration in economic growth. They included the petering out of productivity gains from economic

TABLE 1

| Percentage growth of GDP and major sectors | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| | 1951/1952– 1980/1981 | 1981/1982– 1990/1991 | 1992/1993– 1996/1997 | 1997/1998– 2001/2002 | 2002/2003 | 2003/2004⁽¹⁾ |
| GDP | 3.6 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 5.5 | 4.0 | 8.5 |
| Agriculture | 2.5 | 3.6 | 4.7 | 1.9 | –7.0 | 9.6 |
| Industry | 5.3 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 4.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 |
| Services | 4.5 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 9.1 |

(1) Provisional estimate.

SOURCE: Central Statistical Organization, Government of India.

reforms, which clearly slowed after 1995. Although reforms continued throughout the decade, they never regained the breadth and depth of those of the early 1990s. Key reforms in the financial sector, infrastructure, labor laws, trade and industrial policy, and privatization remained unfinished or undone. Despite good intentions, the bottlenecks in infrastructure became worse over time, especially in power, railways, and water supply, reflecting slow progress in reforms of pricing, ownership, and the regulatory framework. The low quality and quantity of investment in rural infrastructure, moreover, combined with distorted pricing of some key agricultural inputs and outputs to dampen the growth of agriculture. The continuing decline in governance and financial discipline in (especially, but by no means exclusively) the populous states of the Gangetic Plain constrained growth prospects for over 30 percent of India's population.

The postreforms period saw a significant decline in poverty headcount ratios. The percentage of people below a minimally defined poverty line fell from 36 percent in 1993–1994 to 26 percent in 1999–2000. However, over the same period, total employment growth was sluggish, just over 1 percent a year. This is partly attributable to a decline in the labor force participation rate and partly to various policy distortions (including rigid labor laws), which discourage a more labor-intensive pattern of development. Regarding the spatial distribution of income expansion, the continued slow growth of the populous states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa in the 1990s has contributed to increasing regional inequalities and raised serious concerns.

Recent Trends and Outlook

Since 2003 there has been renewed optimism about the growth prospects of the Indian economy. The “Tenth Plan,” published in early 2003, projected an overall growth of 8 percent for the period from 2002 to 2007. A

boom in software exports and remittances (together with reduced import needs of a somewhat sluggish industrial sector) has swelled the country's foreign exchange reserves to unexpectedly high levels (exceeding U.S.\$100 billion), dispelling the old fears of a “foreign exchange constraint.” The demographic outlook of a rapidly growing labor force and falling dependency ratios hold promise of rapid economic growth. GDP growth in 2003–2004 actually exceeded 8 percent, lending credence to the Tenth Plan projections.

In actual fact, the medium-term growth outlook for India is less bullish. The 8.5 percent growth in 2003–2004 followed slow economic expansion of 4 percent in the preceding year. Much of the economic dynamism of 2003–2004 reflected an exceptional rebound in agriculture from a drought-affected decline of 7 percent in 2002–2003 to a strong 9.6 percent recovery, thanks to the best monsoon in over twenty years. Growth requires investment. India's investment-GDP ratio in recent years remained stuck in the 23 to 24 percent range, not enough to generate sustained growth at 7 to 8 percent. East Asian experience suggests the need for investment levels of 30 percent or higher. A major constraint on India's investment performance has been the high levels of negative saving (revenue deficits) of government budgets, which have offset a strong private savings record. Although the reforms of the 1990s achieved a significant opening up of the Indian economy to external trade and investment, the country's integration with the world economy remains limited, with merchandise exports accounting for only 0.8 percent of the world exports and foreign direct investment inflows for hardly 0.5 percent of the global total. Despite recent initiatives, infrastructure constraints remain severe, especially with respect to electric power, roads, ports, airports, and urban services. The low (2 percent) growth of agriculture reflects serious problems with the organization of support services, low investments, and inappropriate pricing policies. As for the “demographic dividend,” the constraints lie on the side of labor



Upscale Shopping Mall in Gurgaon, Delhi's Modern Township. After the economic rebounds of the first half of the 1990s and the ensuing slowdown, a new optimism has returned to India, with a rapidly growing labor force and falling dependency ratios holding the promise of economic growth. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

demand, which remains seriously inhibited by policy impediments such as labor laws.

Sustained economic growth at 7 to 8 percent is possible, but only if serious policy reforms are undertaken to reduce government deficits, improve infrastructure, revamp agriculture, enhance labor market flexibility, and accelerate integration with the international economy. Until then, India's economy is more likely to average growth in the range of 6 percent, which is good but not commensurate with the country's compelling needs for job creation and poverty alleviation.

Shankar Acharya

See also Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Economic Reforms of 1991; Trade Liberalization since 1991

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EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES, TRADITIONAL AND MODERN

"Education" comes from the Latin *ex* (out of) and *ducere* (to lead, to guide); hence, to lead out of ignorance into knowledge, out of inability into competence. The desired knowledge and competence, however, will be shaped by historical circumstance and by cultural and social conditions. Education reflects the cultural self-understanding of a society and in turn helps both to determine it and to transmit it across countless generations. In India, with its long history and cultural diversity spanning many languages and religions, a comprehensive account of its educational character would require several volumes. The emphasis here, in this brief discussion, will be philosophical, highlighting the cultural and conceptual contexts of India's various educational systems and the values and ideals they attempt to embody. It is obvious that such rigorous selectivity results in some lacunae, for example, the long period of Muslim rule stretching from around the tenth to the eighteenth century. Muslim influence on Hindu culture has undoubtedly been considerable, but its impact on general, as opposed to sectarian educational patterns and policies, is less salient.

The Traditional Period

This period, for the purposes of this entry, extends from the early Vedic period to the coming of the British in the eighteenth century. It is dominated in the early period by the influence of classical Hinduism and Buddhism. The roots of the ancient Indian pattern of education may be traced to the earliest Vedic works, the four Vedas collectively known as Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upanishads. The purport of the hymns and chants that comprise the Vedas was largely to achieve cosmic harmony (*ṛta*) and the human prosperity it was believed to bring. This cosmic order was sought initially through sacrifices offered to the gods. Increasingly, the sacrifice itself came to carry the powers that had formerly been attributed to the gods, and much effort was expended on coming up with the most

efficacious sacrificial rituals. Concurrently with this emphasis on the sacrifice, there was a contemplative turn away from ritualism to philosophical reflections about the nature of reality and the place of humans within it. Now it is knowledge itself that is seen as salvific, and it sets up a pattern of education in which sages reveal the nature of ultimate reality to select students in search of sacred knowledge. That is the etymological connotation of the term “*upanishads*,” signifying a secret or esoteric knowledge that was largely confined to Brahmins. The rest of society, stratified along class lines, was provided the education appropriate to a particular class—the art of warfare in the case of Kshatriyas and agriculture, commerce, arts, and crafts in the case of Vaishyas. The Shudras who performed menial work were, however, deprived of education. The most detailed account of codes and laws, according to the *caturvarnāśrama* (four varnas) scheme, is provided in the *Manusmṛiti* written by Manu, the lawmaker whose classification of social strata is said to have mirrored the makings of the world.

Buddhist influence was responsible for expanding the Vedic scheme of education beyond the caste restrictions imposed by the latter. Part of the appeal of Buddhist institutions of learning, both in India and abroad, was their ecumenical, inclusive character. The Buddhist approach includes both monasteries concerned with the training of monks and “universities,” like Nalanda, involved in more secular education and systematic instruction in grammar, medicine, philosophy, and arts and crafts.

Outside the religious framework, kings and princes were educated in the arts and sciences related to government: politics (*daṇḍa-nīti*), economics (*vārttā*), philosophy (*ānvīkṣiki*), and historical traditions (*itihā*). Here the authoritative source was Kautilya’s *Artha Shāstra*, often compared to Niccolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince* for its worldly outlook and political scheming.

Principles, values, and goals. Those types of education, though involving different groups, shared at least two characteristics. Religion broadly conceived provided a frame of reference, though to different degrees. Even the Kshatriya prince featured in the *Artha Shāstra* was made to study *trayī* (the Vedas and their commentaries), while for Vedic students education was predominantly religious. Secondly, all ancient Indian education emphasized the role of the teacher, who in the Vedic scheme assumed the mantle of the guru (spiritual preceptor), or the *ācārya* (authoritative teacher), revered and served by his student (*śishya*).

The goal for the Vedic student might be termed “transcendent,” that is, transcending the mundane interests and attractions of life to attain direct experience of Brahman and in the ideal case to reestablish union with

it. The institution of *brahmacharya* (chastity) enjoined on the student served many purposes; on the one hand, it pulled him away from the lures of the world, and on the other, conserved and sublimated the vital force (*prāna*) for union with the divine. The spiritual character of his education was also marked by the *upanayana*, or initiatory rite, which he had to undergo before being formally accepted by his teacher and beginning his instruction. This solemn ceremony typically took three days, when as expounded in the Atharva Veda, the teacher held the student within him and gave birth to a *dvija*, or twice-born student. The first birth from his parents was physical, but the second birth was spiritual. The close bond with the guru was cemented by the student living with the teacher so as to imbibe his inner spirit and in that way facilitate the attainment of *vidyā* or the highest knowledge leading to *mukti* (liberation).

The goal of Buddhist education, by contrast, was less transcendent and “vertical” and more immanent and “horizontal,” in accord with the humanistic character of Buddhism. Within the Buddhist scheme, there were two types of institutions, the monasteries concerned with the training of monks and general universities imparting a more secular education. The goals of the two institutions varied accordingly. The monks were required to follow Buddhist teachings in a strict manner, begging for their food and keeping to the monastic disciplines, so as to bring about an inner renunciation or emptiness (*sunyatā*) and to awaken universal compassion. The students at the universities, on the other hand, while being instructed in the Buddhist teachings were trained to apply them in the world, as, for example, in the field of medicine, as mentioned in a canonical Pali work, *Mahāvagga*.

The goals of princely education were more secular. Mention was made earlier of the *Artha Shāstra*, a work concerned with the imperatives of royal or imperial power. Even though Kautilya describes the work as a species of *rāja-nīti*, the ethics of government, there was far more Machiavellianism in it, designed to make the king an absolute monarch and the state he ruled absolutely dominant.

Agencies and institutions. Ancient Indian educational institutions tended to be located in forests rather than in towns or cities, in an atmosphere of quiet and of natural beauty conducive to mental and spiritual concentration. The *Aranyakas*, or forest books, constitute a significant category of Sanskrit sacred literature. Radha Kumud Mookerji, the eminent Indian historian, says “India’s civilization through the ages has been very largely the product of her woods and forests. It started as a rural and not as an urban civilization,” and he goes on to cite Rabindranath Tagore: “a most wonderful thing we

notice in India is that here the forest, not the town, is the fountain-head of all its civilization” (Mookerji, pp. 640–641).

The home of the teacher served often as the school in the *guru-shisya* relationship that constituted the most important educational pattern of the Vedic system. The intimate bond that thus tied a student to his teacher was familial and sacred. After the *upanayana* ceremony that marked the formal acceptance of student by teacher, a student was expected to live in his master’s house and serve his needs, while the teacher was expected to be of high moral character and to teach as much by his life as by his explicit instruction. The Upanishads make frequent reference to pupils bringing firewood to their guru’s house, signaling their readiness to serve their teacher and also their desire to keep alive the flame of their own devotion and concentration (*tapas*). These homes of learning, known as *āshramas*, served as places of rest and spiritual focus, removed as they were from the din and bustle of the city.

However, as population and human needs increased and as the division of labor to meet those needs grew more complex, education moved from these sylvan settings into the cities. The period from around 200 B.C. to the rise of the Guptas in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. saw the emergence of many great urban centers of learning. The Jatakas (folk tales from the lives of the Buddha) provide us with detailed accounts of Takṣashila, capital of the Gandhara kingdom in West Punjab, one of the first such centers where students flocked from all parts of the country, as they did also later to Benares (Varanasi). But without question the most famous such center was the Buddhist monastery Nalanda in Magadha (present-day Bihar). We owe the most meticulous accounts of the eminence of Nalanda, which drew students from all over India and beyond, to two seventh-century Chinese Buddhists pilgrims, Hsieun Tsang and I-Tsing. According to their reports, the curriculum included not only the works of all the eighteen Buddhist schools but also the Vedas, logic, grammar, medicine, metaphysics, arts and crafts, and a great deal more. Knowledge was thus systematized, and methods for imparting it were devised in ancient India long before universities were established in Europe.

The Modern Period

This period spans the interval between Lord Macaulay’s Minute on Education of February 1835 to modern India, reflecting the tensions between traditions and modernity. Macaulay’s Minute was introduced to the British company’s education committee planning the course and general direction of education in British India. On one side were ranged the “Orientalists,” who

avored the support of Arabic and Sanskrit and the knowledge opened up through these languages. On the other side were the “Anglicists,” who championed the cause of learning English and western textbooks. This debate was much more than a quarrel about the desired medium of instruction. Macaulay with his statement that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia,” came down firmly on the Anglicist side. His intention was to produce a cadre of Indians who could help the British run the empire by mastering modern Western knowledge. He considered India’s education archaic and moribund. Macaulay’s ideas carried the company and Parliament, and with the introduction of modern English instruction, Indian education was brought into the Western world.

Traditional Hindu culture, largely hierarchical, was averse to change, caste-based, status-oriented, religious in character, and generally accepted authority in the form of scriptures, teachers, or family or community elders. Modern Western culture, by contrast, was on the whole egalitarian, meritocratic, cosmopolitan in outlook, democratic in spirit, secular, reason-based, and oriented toward change and material advancement. It would be no exaggeration to say that the tensions between tradition and modernity brought into prominence by Macaulay are still unresolved today, with significant repercussions for the course of Indian education.

An example from the field of philosophy might illustrate the point. While there was a vibrant philosophical climate until around the time of the Mughals in the sixteenth century, Indian philosophy in the modern period has by and large languished. This is not at all to say that there have not been outstanding thinkers in this time frame because there certainly have been a few. It is rather to claim that these few have been somewhat isolated figures whose work has not on the whole generated the schools of thought or the vigorous debate between them that characterized earlier periods. Contemporary Indian philosophers trained largely in a Western idiom are not able to draw creatively on ancient traditions. Part of the problem is linguistic: the ability to plumb the depths of the tradition requires a deep and sophisticated knowledge of Sanskrit and Pali in order to appreciate the subtleties of traditional philosophical argument, and not many contemporary Indian philosophers possess the requisite linguistic and philological skills. In the limited time at their disposal, young scholars prefer to focus on Western philosophy where the academic prestige lies. On the other hand, there are still great Sanskrit scholars whose mode of expression and style of argument is not the modern one, and so one finds two groups of scholars, the traditional *pandits* and the modern Western-trained

philosophers, who ideally should communicate with each other but who unfortunately do not. As a result, a subject that was once the wellspring and foundation of the culture has today fallen on hard times.

This tension between tradition and modernity has generated two responses. On the one side are revivalists, who want to return to a supposedly pure Hinduism and a purportedly golden age of the past. In a globalized and modern world such a simple return to the past is unviable. On the other side are those who tend to equate modernization with Westernization and turn their backs on tradition. This inevitably results in rootlessness and alienation. By far the most creative Indian educational thinkers have been those who have attempted both in their thought in general and in their educational philosophy in particular to effect a creative dialogue between past and present. It is instructive to consider two of them, Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, before examining the actual situation prevailing in Indian education by way of considering the values and goals at play in education today.

Principles, values, and goals. Both Gandhi and Tagore were sympathetic to and deeply appreciative of India's philosophical and spiritual traditions, though they drew on different parts of them in crafting their views on education. Gandhi was attracted to the moral and didactic parts of the tradition and to the Bhagavad Gītā in particular. Tagore by contrast was drawn more to the speculative and metaphysical richness of the Vedas and the Upanishads and developed an aesthetic philosophy of *ānandā* (joy). These temperamental and philosophical differences were reflected in their respective philosophies of education. While they agreed that education should have a social orientation and be situated in close proximity to nature, and while they also agreed that education should be holistic and integrative, encompassing the head, the heart, and the hands, they disagreed about the main goal of education. For Gandhi the chief purpose of education was moral and social; the focus should be on the building of character within a framework of service to the community. To that end he insisted that intellectual instruction be imparted through a craft and that manual labor be coordinated with academic pursuits. For Tagore, this was too restrictive a goal: for him the main purpose of education was to develop the creative potential of a student and through that creativity to achieve a unity with nature and with his fellow humans. "Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I feel the embrace of freedom in a thousand bonds of delight" (*Collected Poems*, p. 34).

Whatever their differences, Tagore and Gandhi were idealistic thinkers seeing the purpose of education as disciplining and elevating the spirit and as the balanced

development of intellect, imagination, and will. Of the two, it was Mahatma Gandhi who had greater influence on actual educational policies. After many years of preparation, he came up with a plan that became known as the Wardha Scheme of Basic National Education, whose salient features were free compulsory education, instruction in one's mother tongue, handicrafts as an essential instrument of learning, self-supporting education, and training in nonviolence. The plan was tried for a few years but met with fundamental criticism, namely that it concentrated on primary education to the detriment of secondary and higher education and that it was largely village-based and too decentralized to allow for much operational coherence or development in towns and cities where employment opportunities attracted a swelling population.

After independence and Gandhi's death, the direction of India's educational planning was much more pragmatic. The Constitution of India declared India a secular, socialist, and democratic republic, and much of the educational thinking swayed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of India as a modern developing industrial nation moved in directions quite different from those of Gandhi's plan. Five national goals were highlighted to guide the course of education: the promotion of democracy; secularism, given the multireligious character of the country; the elimination of poverty through economic and technological development; the creation of a socialistic pattern of society; and national integration. To that end some of the prominent features of the educational planning of the 1950s and 1960s were universal, compulsory, and free education for children up to the age of fourteen, a stress on the education of illiterate adults, an emphasis on science and technology, enlarged and equalized opportunities for Dalits and other "backward" sections of the population, and finally an emphasis on vocational training in technical skills. In general, education was linked closely and directly to the economic growth of the country. As J. P. Naik, member-secretary of India's Education Commission, in the mid-1960s put it: "The main justification for the larger outlay on educational reconstruction . . . is the hypothesis that education is the most important single factor that leads to economic growth . . . [based on] the development of science and technology" (p. 35).

Modern Indian education is thus seen in terms of economic growth and material advancement rather than the acquisition of timeless spiritual knowledge. In its reliance on science and experimental reason, it calls into question traditional emphasis on authority. In its stress on equality of opportunity, it negates the old caste-based system of privilege. In its valorizing of productivity, it moves firmly in the direction of a meritocratic and egalitarian rather than a hierarchical order.



Twentieth-Century Primary School for Children in Rural Haryana. In spite of the egalitarian goals that the Indian educational system set for itself soon after independence, the gap between the urban middle class and the rural poor has increased precipitously, with the imbalance only furthering endemic poverty and illiteracy in some regions of the nation. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

It is thus no exaggeration to say that India suffers from what the English scientist C. P. Snow once called the problem of two cultures. Snow was referring to the opposition between scientific and humanistic cultures, which to some extent troubles modern India as well. But there is a deeper gulf that is yet to be satisfactorily bridged: the gulf between two different mind-sets and outlooks, the traditional and the modern.

Agencies and institutions. Emphasis on technological development and economic growth in post-independence India has almost reversed the traditional and Gandhian emphasis on rural education. India's major cities have all embraced universities, institutes of science and technology, and centers for advanced studies, many of them highly regarded. These institutions, especially the technical ones, have produced a cadre of engineers and

computer scientists who both in terms of quality and quantity are world-renowned. The success of the Silicon Valley in California, of German software production, and of firms like Infosys and Wipro in India is based to a large extent on the excellence and technical skill of a pool of computer personnel produced by Indian technical institutes. At the other end of the scale, however, basic education for the poor has been largely stagnant, so that problems of illiteracy and endemic poverty still remain for the most part unsolved. This imbalance has created what India's preeminent sociologist, the late M. N. Srinivas, called the dual cultures of independent India, the urban middle class and the rural poor. The country's professional classes are drawn largely from the former, which comprises chiefly the high and middle castes and the top strata of minority groups. Those living in villages, except for the middle and large landowners and a few successful traders and artisans, constitute the rural poor. In spite of the egalitarian goals that national education set itself soon after independence, the gap between these two groups has increased precipitously.

India's urban middle class and its intellectuals have thus for the most part adopted a modern Western mind-set. This creates a reaction on the part of chauvinist and revivalist groups rendered queasy by what they view as deracination, and consequently raises shrill invocations of a "pristine," mythic Hindu past. This is at times a political ploy to win mass allegiance or votes. The deeper Hindu values and ideals championed by Gandhi and Tagore, among others, are largely unheeded. At the other end of the scale, the rural poor, illiterate and uneducated, remain at the mercy of large- and middle-scale landowners in whose economic interests they work.

These dualities highlight at least four problems that Indian education continues to face: the increasing politicization of Indian schools and universities which compromises freedom of thought and inquiry; the lack of creative integration of tradition and modernity; an increasing religious polarization, especially in the form of Hindu-Muslim tensions, which calls into question the goals of national integration and a secular society invoked by the Constitution; and finally, the daunting inequalities between rich and poor and between higher and lower castes. Indian education still faces a formidable set of challenges as it attempts to meet the demands of a steadily growing population in a globalized world.

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
See also Artha Shāstra; Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs); Information and Other Technology Development

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ELEPHANTA The island of Elephanta, located 6.8 miles (11 kilometers) off the coast of Mumbai, is well known for a large cave temple dedicated to Shiva. Six minor excavations are also located on the slopes of this island, which owes its name to the Portuguese who, in the sixteenth century, found a large sculpted elephant near the southern harbor. The caves were carved in the sixth century A.D., and it is disputed whether they were sponsored by Kalachuri rulers or by members of a late Maurya dynasty controlling the Konkan at the time. However, as suggested by Walter Spink, significant coin finds at Elephanta seem to link closely the Kalachuri king Krisnaraja, who was a supporter of the Pashupata sect, to the patronage of the main Shaiva cave on the western hillside.

The main cave has a rectangular ground plan with openings on the north, west, and east sides. The north entrance has a two-pillared portico, while the eastern access opens to a court and the western one onto an unfinished space. The interior hall, carved 139 feet (42.5 meters) deep into the basaltic rock, is filled with four rows of pillars with fluted cushion capitals (16.4 feet, or 5 meters high) and displays an unusual layout with two main foci of worship: a square lingam sanctum placed next to the western opening, aligned with the eastern entrance; and a colossal relief depicting three faces of Shiva, carved at the center of the south wall and lined up with the northern entrance. This atypical plan has long puzzled scholars, who have tried to interpret the cave's function and iconographical program, which consists of a number of large sculpted narrative panels placed next to the accesses and on the south wall. On either sides of the north entrance portico appear two slightly damaged reliefs depicting Shiva as Nataraja (Dance King) and as Lord of the Yogis. These two well-known guises nicely counterbalance each other, as they emphasize the static and dynamic powers of Shiva, the god's inner energy and



Large Carving of Elephanta Caves. Tourist contemplating the imposing figure of Shiva inside the Elephanta caves. CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS.

its outer manifestation. Inside the main hall, on the north wall bracketing the entrance, there are two reliefs, one representing Shiva impaling the demon Andhaka, and the other showing Rāvaṇa lifting Mount Kailas. These two scenes both focus on Shiva's role as conqueror of demons and perhaps, much like the two panels in the north portico, seem to function as a pair. Across the pillared hall on the south wall, facing these reliefs, are representations of the god Shiva with his consort Pārvatī: next to the west entrance is the marriage of Shiva and Pārvatī (Kalyanasundara); and next to the east entrance, Shiva and Pārvatī are gambling at dice (Umamahesvara). In these two family depictions, filled with heavenly figures, Shiva continues to be the absolute focus of the scene, as he is much larger in scale.

Across the north entrance, in a recess of the south wall, is the central relief depicting three colossal heads of Shiva (18 feet, or 5.5 meters tall) guarded by two attendants. The iconography of this high relief, generally identified

as representing Sadashiva, or “eternal” Shiva, has been object of great discussion. The frontal face depicts a serene aspect of the god, the left profile portrays the angry form of Shiva, and the right one focuses on his feminine appearance. The setting and design of the image implies the existence of a fourth, nonvisible face in the back, and some scholars have proposed that a fifth face, looking upward, should be imagined as completing the icon. The size, position, and quality of the image, as well as its alignment on the north-south axis of the cave, suggest that the patrons placed enormous relevance on this relief, which emphasizes the essence of the god Shiva rather than his actions. Two large-scale panels flank the central Sadashiva: Shiva bearing Gaṅgā (Gangadhara) appears on its right, and the androgynous form of Shiva (Ardhanarishvara) on its left. It is worth noting that these two images, which underline the all-encompassing nature of the god Shiva, beyond duality and distinctions, work as perfect complements to the central icon of Sadashiva. All the reliefs in this cave seem to be the product of a single vision and are related in style and composition. They display great affinity with late Gupta regional idioms from areas adjacent to the Konkan, in particular with the sculpture from Ajanta in inner Maharashtra, and Shamalaji in Gujarat.

The other focus of the great cave at Elephanta is the perfectly square sanctum placed at the western end of the east-west axis. The shrine contains a lingam on a high square base (*yonī*), and has four entrances aligned with the cardinal directions, protected by imposing *dvarapalas*, or door guardians. A similar organization of space and placement of sanctum can be found at Ellora in the Dumar Lena cave (cave 29). At Elephanta, the relationships between the sanctum and the colossal image of Sadashiva on the south wall remain unclear—it is almost as if two different, independent layouts overlap in the same space. The presence of multiple entrances to the pillared hall confirms that the cave at some point in its history had two foci of worship, but it is uncertain whether this was part of the original plan. Recent interpretations maintain that some idiosyncratic features of this cave might be explained with its possible affiliation with the esoteric Shaiva sect of the Pashupatas.

Two subsidiary caves are part of the main cave complex: the larger is next to the east entrance overlooking the east court, and has a small porch leading into a square chamber, with a central lingam shrine that can be circumambulated. The porch is decorated on the left by a large-scale relief of Kārttikeya that appears visually linked to the Shaiva panels inside the main cave hall, and by a poorly preserved depiction of the seven mother goddesses (Saptamatrikas). In the unfinished west court, a small *linga* shrine faces the entrance to the cave and is

bracketed by damaged reliefs of Shiva Nataraja and Shiva as Lord of the Yogis, the latter very different in style from the other carvings at the site.

Pia Brancaccio

See also **Shiva and Shaivism**

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ELLENBOROUGH, EARL OF (1790–1871), governor-general of India (1842–1844).

Edward Law, the earl of Ellenborough, served on the Board of Control of Indian Affairs (1828–1830, 1834–1835, 1841) where he advocated the transfer of the government of India to the Crown and took an interest in Central Asian affairs. He advocated a cautious Indian policy except where Britain’s long-term imperial interests were directly threatened. His term as governor-general would, however, be no more quiescent than that of his predecessor, Lord Auckland.

Ellenborough hoped to repair some of the damage done by the loss of the “Army of Indus” in the First Afghan War. At his direction, British Indian forces returned to Kabul, sacked the city, then departed, allowing the return to power of Dost Mohammad, the Afghan amir that the war had been ostensibly fought to unseat. Ellenborough greeted the returning “victorious” troops with sumptuous celebrations and parades designed to revive flagging British prestige.

Ellenborough then completed the other major order of business left unfinished by Auckland: the seizure of Sind. Ellenborough dismissed local warnings that the amirs’ sovereignty was protected by iron-clad treaties and that they were amendable to British interests. Unfortunately for the amirs, their domains stood between British territory and the southern strategic gateway to India, the Bolan Pass. They also straddled the River Indus. British leaders had long sought to control the northwestern approaches to India and, declaring that the rivalry “of European manufacturers is fast excluding our productions from the markets of Europe,” had identified the

Indus one of the most likely “new vents for the produce of our industry” (prime minister Lord Palmerston, quoted in Webster, pp. 750–751). Ellenborough shared these strategic and commercial views. He also knew that the seizure of Sind would secure British control over the Parsi-dominated Malwa opium trade, thus stabilizing the price of Bengal opium and adding to India’s revenues. Accordingly, Ellenborough gave Sir Charles Napier, an able and ambitious general, leeway to provoke the amirs into rebellion, thereby justifying the annexation of the region, which was brutally accomplished in 1843.

Ellenborough then aggressively dealt with a crisis in the domains of the late Maratha leader Daulat Rao Scindhia of Gwalior, which were then roiled by an internal succession dispute that held the potential of creating a linkage between Scindhia’s disaffected forty-thousand-man army and the Sikhs, who could together threaten nearby Agra and key lines of British communications in the north. Having already ignored and violated a series of treaties with the amirs of Sind, Ellenborough now punctiliously evoked long-dead provisions of an 1804 treaty with Scindhia to justify intervening in the succession dispute. Scindhia’s forces were crushed, and a young Maratha puppet was placed on the state’s throne under a council of regency supervised by a British Resident.

Ellenborough then contemplated moving against the Sikhs, but the Court of Directors, alarmed by the cost of Ellenborough’s militarism, exercised their constitutional right of recall, summoning him home in 1844. The British government was more generous, granting him an earldom for his work in ending the Afghan conflict. He was later reappointed as president of the Board of Control. He continued to take an active interest in Indian affairs until he was forced to resign from that post in 1858 for impulsively allowing the publication of a private letter critical of Lord Charles Canning’s settlement of the War of 1857.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842); Auckland, Lord; British East India Company Raj**

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ELLORA (ELURA) The Ellora caves are located in the heart of Maharashtra, near the town of Aurangabad, about 62 miles (100 kilometers) from the site of Ajanta. A modern Hindu shrine in the vicinity of the rock-hewn site is also renowned for being one of the twelve sacred *tirthas*, or pilgrimage centers associated with the Shiva *linga*. The thirty-four caves, carved onto the steep face of a hill, can be divided into three main groups: Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain. The earliest caves at Ellora, mostly unfinished, appear to be the Hindu ones, clustered around and upstream of a waterfall at the center of the rock-hewn site. Caves 27 and 28, according to Walter Spink, were the first to be excavated, as they make reference to architectural features occurring at Ajanta. Caves 20, 21, 26, and 29, also known as Dhumar Lena, are grandiose in conception and appear to be architecturally and stylistically related to Elephanta and other sixth-century excavations in the Konkan. Caves 17 and 19 follow, showing a complete local assimilation of features common at other rock-hewn sites in the Konkan and inner Maharashtra. The last of the early excavations linked to the sphere of Kalachuri influence in the region is cave 14, also known as *Ravana ka khai* (Demon Ravana’s cave), judging from its location and innovative iconography. All of these early Hindu units are dedicated to Shiva, as the presence of reliefs depicting the god and his associates, as well as *linga* shrines, seem to indicate.

The most grandiose Hindu rock-cut temple of the subcontinent was completed at Ellora during the eighth century A.D. Cave 16, better known as Kailash, consists of a temple structure excavated in the round out of the Deccan trap, emerging like a freestanding structure from the hill out of which it was dug. This 197 foot long (60-meter) and 98 foot (30-meter) deep temple was carved mostly during the time of the Rashtrakuta king Krishna I (r. 757–783). Dedicated to Shiva, this monolithic structure evoking the god’s Himalayan dwelling materializes almost like a self-generated (*svayambhu*) structure within the domain of the Rashtrakutas to serve their political ambitions and help legitimize their power in the Deccan. The body of the Kailash temple consists of three independent parts, linked together by small bridges: an entrance pavilion, followed by a shrine hosting an image of Nandi (the “bull vehicle” of Shiva), and finally the actual temple. The southern style, or Dravida temple, cruciform in plan, consists of a pillared hall decorated with wall paintings (now mostly lost), and a sanctum enclosing a Shiva *linga* surmounted by a *shikhara* (tower) on the outside. The outer walls of the Kailash, once also painted, are embellished with images portraying Hindu mythological scenes and deities carved deep into niches framed by pillars. Worth noting is the Ravana scene, rendered with great intensity; the three-dimensional figure of the demon powerfully emerges from the living rock.



Rock Panel at Ellora Complex. Portion of sculpted back wall, cave 15 (also called Dashavatara) at the Ellora complex. Depicts the Gangadhara Shiva in the act of releasing Ganga (the river of heaven) from a lock of his hair. Dates to period of Rashtrakuta rule, c. eighth century A.D. ADITYA ARYA.

All around the base of the temple are sculptures of elephants, almost as if supporting the weight of the entire structure. The Kailash is placed at the center of a rectangular court with multistoried porticoes that house subsidiary shrines and large images of deities. While no inscriptions are immediately associated with this cave, a copper plate inscription from the region mentions this amazing structure as rivaling heavenly abodes. To the same phase of Rashtrakuta patronage can be ascribed the neighboring cave 15, carved high on the cliff, also known as Dashavatara, as well as caves 25 and 22, nestled among the earliest Hindu caves at the site.

The Buddhist caves (2 to 12), located toward the southern end of the cliff, can be roughly dated to the seventh century A.D., an intermediate phase between Kalachuri and Rashtrakuta Hindu patronage at the site. Images of buddhas, *bodhisattvas*, female and other esoteric deities are

arranged in each cave, following precise iconographical schemes that suggest the diffusion of early tantric beliefs at Ellora. Geri Malandra has argued that each cave should be understood as a *mandala* (cosmic diagram), thus implying the existence of a programmatic vision for the structures that merges imagery and design. However, most of the Buddhist caves appear to be unfinished.

The most imposing Buddhist excavations at Ellora are caves 10, 11, and 12. Cave 10, or Vishvakarma cave, consists of an apsidal hall (*caitya* hall) containing a rock-cut stupa (dome-shaped monument) measuring over 16 feet (5 meters) in diameter. On the stupa, facing the entrance to the hall, is carved an image of a seated Buddha, flanked by attendants, in a guise reminiscent of Ajanta caves 19 and 26. The elaborate ornamentation of the rock-hewn facade of this cave appears to be a development of earlier *caitya* hall types, with a central horseshoe-shaped window. The cave opens onto a large court with a pillared corridor along the sides. Caves 11 and 12 are unfinished multistoried excavations, apparently conceived to be pillared halls with central chambers hosting a seated Buddha image. Noteworthy is the third floor of cave 12, a grandiose pillared hall with cells opening on either side in which are carved different types of seated buddhas. A row of seated female deities is sculpted on the back wall of this cave, flanking the entrance to the main Buddha sanctum. It is worth remarking that none of the Buddhist caves was intended to be a monastic residence.

The five Jain caves (30–34), all unfinished, sit isolated on the northern spur of Ellora hill and represent the last phase of patronage at the site. Some excavations appear very complex and elaborate. Cave 30 (also known as Chota [Little] Kailash) imitates on a smaller scale the monolithic structure of the Hindu Kailash cave. The two-storied Indra Sabha cave (32) and the Jagannatha Sabha cave (33) appear rather irregular in plan and are filled with images of Tirthankaras (Ford-crossers) and other Jain subsidiary gods and goddesses.

Pia Brancaccio

See also Ajanta; Buddhism in Ancient India; Elephanta; Maharashtra

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ELPHINSTONE, MOUNTSTUART (1779–1859), governor of Bombay (1819–1827). One of the shrewdest administrators of the British East India Company, Mountstuart Elphinstone “settled” the vast region of Maharashtra after defeating the Brahman *peshwa* of Pune in 1818. His father, Baron Elphinstone, was governor of Edinburgh Castle, where Mountstuart attended school. Appointed to the East India Company’s Bengal Service, he landed in Calcutta at the age of seventeen, and six years later was made assistant to the company’s Resident in Pune.

Fascinated by classical Greek and Roman history, Elphinstone proved himself singularly adept at governance, using both sticks and carrots in his daily dealings with the last *peshwa* of Pune, Baji Rao II, whom he viewed as “intriguing, lying, and corrupt,” but believed could be “restrained by fear” from becoming “treacherous.” Baji, however, tragically underestimated his young British master, mistaking Resident (Mountstuart was promoted in 1810) Elphinstone’s soft-spoken advice on how best to govern his “Land of Marathas” for weakness. One fateful day in June 1818, Baji watched his “mighty” Maratha force outside Pune, at Kirkee, crushed by the much smaller, yet better-armed company of British Sepoys under Elphinstone’s command, marking the dawn of British paramountcy over western India. Baji was pensioned off and shipped north with his courtiers to Bithur castle. Elphinstone remained in charge of settling Pune, before moving on to govern Bombay, ruling a region larger than all of England, Scotland, and Wales before he turned forty.

Wisely using non-Brahman Maharashtrian Indians to govern the territory he settled, Elphinstone was careful to do nothing to rouse the fury of the Brahmans who continued to live in the region, preserving the sanctity of their Hindu temples, allowing them to remain tax-free, continuing to subsidize religious schools as well as other charitable societies. The company confiscated lands of the largest “nobles” (sirdars), who had supported the *peshwas*, but most other landowners were granted amnesty as long as they vowed loyalty to the “Great” (*Bahadur*) Company’s Raj. Peasants soon learned that, though British collectors of their land revenues demanded no less than the *peshwa*’s servants had, once taxes were paid they would be left in peace, no repeated demands made by princely robbers or petty pilferers, who had in the past returned to demand more grain or gold. Before Elphinstone left Pune, it was said that even an old woman could walk across that city at night with gold on her cane, without fear of robbers or molesters.

The same was true of the work Elphinstone did as governor of Bombay, drafting a new Code of Laws, laying the foundation of an excellent educational system, one so widely appreciated by its populace that when he

retired from that job the city’s foremost institution of higher learning was renamed Elphinstone College. After leaving India, Elphinstone was repeatedly invited to return as governor-general by the company’s Board of Control, but he declined that honor, preferring to travel through Italy, writing his useful papers and later his *History of India* (1841) at his home in Surrey.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British Crown Raj; Maharashtra**

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EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE Given the paucity of dependable statistical evidence, the employment structure in India can be described only for a period beginning in 1881 to the present, from data based on the decennial population census until 1960, and the National Sample Survey (NSS) thereafter. Though the methodology used in these sources is different, the trends in employment and its pattern are broadly comparable.

The Nineteenth Century

For India, most of the nineteenth century, at least up to the 1870s, was a period of economic decline. Exploitative features of British colonial rule, including the introduction of burdensome land revenues and tariffs, first by the British East India Company Raj, then directly by the Crown, were primarily to blame. More positive features appeared in the first quarter of the century as law and order improved, and economic infrastructure and modern communications were developed. Between 1860 and 1900, land revenue collection rose by just 25 percent, while the value of agricultural output (largely due to a rise in prices) increased by about 116 percent. National income estimates for the period after 1870 suggest that output kept pace with population, which grew by about 1 percent per annum. On the basis of the population census, the share of India’s primary sector (agricultural) workforce rose from

approximately 60–65 percent to 70 percent in 1881; that of the secondary sector (industrial) declined from about 15–20 percent to 11 percent, and that in the services sector remained virtually unchanged. The increased relative and absolute size of the primary sector reflected not only a movement away from declining handicrafts within the manufacturing sector, but also increased acreage brought under cultivation, which may have increased agricultural output, though not necessarily output per acre. The industrial output was estimated to have declined.

The Period from 1881 to 1950

Between 1881 and 1911, the share of labor force in agriculture, including allied activities such as forestry, rose slightly, from 72.4 to 74.5 percent, and that of the labor force in manufacturing declined from 10.6 to 9.1 percent. The employment picture did not perceptibly change in the next forty years. The share of employment in the agricultural sector remained almost constant at 75 percent, rising from 74.8 percent in 1911 to 75.7 percent in 1951. On the other hand, the share of employment in the manufacturing sector and the services sector during the same period declined slightly. In the former case, the fall was from 12.2 percent to 11.9 percent, while in the latter case it was from 13 percent to 12.4 percent. Stagnation in employment in the manufacturing sector and the decline in employment in the other two sectors took place despite the rise in net domestic product. It should be noted that the data in 1951 pertain to undivided India (which included Pakistan and Bangladesh). However, the comparison is appropriate, as the figures for 1911 are also for undivided British India.

The statistics relating to employment for the country as a whole fail to reflect the regional picture of employment. While a large part of central India had the same pattern of employment as India as a whole, two groups of states showed different patterns. In the first group, consisting of Kerala, Maharashtra, Madras, and West Bengal, there was a marked shift in the workforce away from agriculture and toward manufacturing. In the second group, consisting of Rajasthan, Orissa, and Punjab, while there was a notable rise in the share of agriculture in the workforce, the share of manufacturing fell sharply. The difference in the employment pattern in these two groups of states was attributable to the varying access of these states to transportation facilities such as internal waterways (as in the case of Kerala), seaports (as in the case of Maharashtra, Madras, and West Bengal), and the railway network.

The Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Trends in employment for the latter half of the twentieth century may be more accurately described for the

period from 1961 to 1999–2000, as the 1961 census adopted the concept of participation in productive work more inclusively than did the 1951 census, using income rather than work as the criterion for being in the labor force. The share of agricultural employment during the period from 1961 to 1999–2000 declined from 75.9 percent to 60.4 percent, while the corresponding shares in industrial and service employment sectors increased from 11.6 to 17.3 percent and 12.4 to 22.3 percent, respectively. In sharp contrast to the period from 1881 to 1950, there was a more decisive structural shift in the workforce away from agricultural employment to the fast growing industrial and service employment. The growth in total employment and a major change in its structure were induced by the acceleration in the aggregate and per capita national product. Thus, the gross domestic product at factor cost grew by about 3.4 percent between 1951 and 1980–1981, by 5.75 percent in the 1980s, and then by 6 percent in the 1990s.

J. Krishnamurty

See also Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950; Demographic Trends since 1757

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ENERGY POLITICS AND POLICY India is the world's sixth-largest energy consumer and the world's third-largest producer of coal. China is the second-largest energy consumer, after the United States. China's production and consumption of coal, its dominant fuel, is the highest in the world. Oil demand and imports have been rising rapidly, making China the world's second-largest petroleum consumer in 2003, surpassing Japan. The average projected economic growth rates of 7–8 percent in India and 9–10 percent in China will increase the demand for world energy enormously in the decades to come.

Two major events of 1974—oil pricing shocks and India's atomic test—highlighted some of the linkages of energy, security, and development policies in India. Heavy dependence on oil imports at the time from the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and the Soviet Union had implications for Indian diplomatic, economic, and military policies. Apart from the obvious need to maintain cordial relations with these states to keep oil flowing on affordable commercial terms, India had to step up exports to the oil-supplying



Nehru with Homi Bhabha. Nehru (left) conferring with Homi Bhabha, the principal architect of atomic energy in India. Although the pursuit of a nuclear program initially subjected India to international sanctions that adversely affected its general economy, today's scientists and economic planners contend that expanded nuclear power is the only viable long-term solution to the nation's massive energy needs. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

countries to prevent a foreign exchange crisis that would have crippled the Indian development program. There was also a military dimension to the international oil crisis. The oil-exporting states of the Middle East were some of the largest buyers of technologically advanced weapons systems from the industrialized countries of the West, which were able to reverse the cost of their oil imports through arms sales. The proximity of these Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) arms importers to the subcontinent, and the overt or latent military links of states such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the shah's Iran with Pakistan carried strategic implications for India. Special purchases of oil and military equipment from the Soviet Union at the time also accentuated India's economic and military dependence on Moscow.

The passing of the international energy crisis by the mid-1980s brought greater economic prosperity to India, both because of successful efforts to tap domestic oil resources, especially in the offshore Bombay High oil fields on the western coast, and because of the decline

and stabilization of international oil prices. Since socialism ended and marketization began in 1991, the Indian economy has grown at a healthy average rate of almost 7 percent per annum. There was a short phase when Indian oil imports from commercial goods exports to Iraq were dislocated following the 1992 Gulf War and the imposition of economic sanctions on Baghdad. But even this problem was overcome through higher oil imports from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms to offset Iraqi oil imports. Memories of the energy crisis faded at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

India has three conventional sources of commercial and industrial energy: oil, coal, and hydroelectric power. Oil of various kinds and oil products are used primarily in the transportation, petrochemical, and household sectors of the economy. The other two energy sources—coal-fired thermal and hydroelectric power—provide some 70 and 25 percent, respectively, of electricity generation in India. India holds some 7 percent of the total estimated world coal reserves, and domestic coal production meets more than half of its total energy needs. Coal is still used marginally in locomotives in some sectors of the Indian railway network. In the rural economy, where about 70 percent of the Indian population lives, there is still considerable use of firewood and agricultural and animal waste. The extensive use of dried cow dung as fuel in the rural areas has led to the establishment of several biogas plants there. The government of India has also been exploring the potential use of geothermal, tidal, and solar power.

India has relatively low oil and gas resources, with oil reserves estimated at 5.9 billion barrels (0.5 percent of global reserves), with total proven, probable, and possible reserves of close to 11 billion barrels. The majority of India's oil reserves are located in Mumbai's offshore fields and onshore at Assam. Due to stagnating domestic crude production, India imported approximately 70 percent of its oil in 2001, much of it from the Middle East (65 percent). This dependence is growing rapidly. The *World Energy Outlook*, published by the International Energy Agency, projects that India's dependence on oil imports will grow to 90 percent by the year 2020.

India is seeking oil import diversification from outside the Gulf. India's investment in overseas oilfields is projected to reach \$3 billion in a few years. Of particular interest is Africa, especially Sudan, where India has invested \$750 million in oil, and Nigeria, with which India reached a deal in November 2004 enabling it to purchase about 44 million barrels of crude oil per year on a long-term basis. Russia, Vietnam, and Myanmar are also potential suppliers to the Indian oil market. India has entered the international competition in the Caspian Basin, seeking special rights and privileges with Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran.

In 2002 India's electric generation capacity was a total of 120 gigawatts (GW), which included 90 GW thermal, 26 GW hydro, and 3 GW nuclear. In the same year its power plants generated 547 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, of which 84 percent was conventional thermal, 12 percent hydro, and 3 percent nuclear.

Coal reserves in India are substantial, projected to last another eighty to one hundred years at compound rates of consumption. Despite such large proven reserves, the productivity of operations under the government-owned corporation Coal India Limited and its subdivisions is low when compared with Western standards. The average output per man-shift (each day or night shift that miners work) for Coal India is 0.8 metric ton in underground mines, considerably lower than the range of about 2.5 to 4 metric tons in western Europe, and 8 to 12 in the United States, Australia, and South Africa. Indian productivity, however, compares favorably with China, where it is 0.5 metric ton.

The problem with coal utilization is the location of coal reserves: West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh. Political conditions in the first two states have been particularly volatile over the decades, and labor strikes and general political unrest have been extensive. The location of coal resources in the northeastern sector of India requires that it be transported and distributed throughout the country by railway. This makes it vulnerable to disruption or interruption if the powerful labor union, the All-India Railwaymen's Federation, with a membership of between 2 million and 3 million employees, were to go on a nationwide strike. This would not only bring all railway passenger and goods traffic to a halt, it would also paralyze coal-fired thermal plants and thereby industrial activity throughout India. The seriousness of this internal security threat was probably best exemplified by the crisis of 1974, when the All-India Railwaymen's Federation successfully launched a nationwide strike of its over 2 million members. With most power plants carrying less than two weeks of coal supplies, power had to be severely rationed in major industrial cities that were dependent on electricity from coal-fired thermal plants. Apart from this potential problem, there is the additional criticism that coal mining is hazardous to the health of the miners, and that its utilization causes considerable pollution of the atmosphere.

Assessing the total potential of hydroelectric power resources in India is difficult because the flows of Indian rivers vary widely, ranging from thousands of cusecs (cubic feet per second) in the monsoon season to a few cusecs in the dry season. Consequently, estimates of hydroelectric potential in India usually amount to identifying specific targets in each river basin where the potential for hydroelectric power generation is both technically

feasible and economically viable. In 1978 the Indian government estimated the potential annual energy generation from hydroelectric plants to be about 400 terawatt-hours (tWh). However, the installed hydroelectric generating capacity at that time was only 40 tWh, or just 10 percent of estimated potential, a share that changed little during the next two decades. This meant that a 90 percent potential for clean and renewable hydroelectric power was being wasted annually because of the failure to harness India's rivers. Part of the problem has been the social opposition to large dam building for irrigation and hydroelectric power, as the construction of large dams is perceived to cause environmental damage and would also uproot several hundred thousand villagers from their traditional homes. This opposition eventually killed the huge Narmada Dam project in the mid-1990s, despite World Bank approval and offer of a loan. The Narmada project involved the building of thirty major dams and several hundred smaller dams. On the other hand, China has decided to go through with its highly controversial massive Three Gorges Dam project on the Chang (Yangtze) River. Critics have alleged that the Three Gorges Dam project could lead to another major Chinese disaster like the "Great Leap Forward" of the 1950s, but on a much larger scale.

Although there are limitations and liabilities in developing coal-fired thermal and hydroelectric power and oil as sources of energy in India, these will continue to generate the bulk of electricity in India for several decades to come. But the growth in thermal and hydroelectric generating capacity is not expected to keep pace with industrial and urban demand. Projected energy needs beyond the year 2000 suggest serious shortfalls of up to 20 percent. The crucial gap cannot be filled by increasing oil production, since domestic oil reserves are too limited to meet industrial demand and, in any case, are being depleted rapidly. Almost all of the future oil imports are expected to be absorbed by the petrochemical, household, and transportation sectors of the economy. The concentrated geographic location of coal in the northeastern India and the vulnerability of transporting coal throughout India suggest that coal cannot be guaranteed for the generation of electricity in the major industrial cities. Indian planners and politicians perceive nuclear power as crucial to India's energy needs.

Nuclear energy constitutes less than 3 percent of its total electricity generation. However, the dual-use nature of the peaceful technology also provides India with nuclear weapons capabilities. Unlike Israel and Pakistan, and earlier South Africa under its apartheid regime—all three of which sought a dedicated path toward a nuclear weapons capability—India's nuclear weapons program is mainly an offshoot of its nuclear energy program and

TABLE 1**1995 comparative per capita consumption of electricity
(in kilowatt-hours, kWh)**

| | | | |
|-------------------|-------|-----------------------|--------|
| Bangladesh | 84 | United Kingdom | 5,843 |
| Kenya | 139 | Germany | 6,513 |
| India | 314 | France | 7,126 |
| Pakistan | 416 | Japan | 7,281 |
| China | 719 | United States | 12,308 |
| Mexico | 1,486 | Sweden | 16,534 |
| Brazil | 1,783 | Canada | 17,347 |
| Italy | 4,588 | | |

SOURCE: Compiled from *India Means Business: Investment Opportunities in Infrastructure*, Ministry of External Affairs, Investment Promotion and Publicity Division, Government of India, 1997.

uses the plutonium extracted from the waste fuel. From an economic development standpoint, India has rationalized the necessity of a nuclear energy program to fill shortfalls in its overall electricity needs. Especially given the costs of mining and transporting coal throughout India from its location in the northeast-central regions, and considering that the great rivers of India cannot all be harnessed appropriately for hydroelectric power to service the major cities of India, a case is made for nuclear energy. Elsewhere in the world, especially in France, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and many of the European Union countries, nuclear energy is viewed as essential for meeting increasing energy demands and for reducing reliance on the oil of the Middle East. Oil supply and prices are subject to manipulation by OPEC, and coal mining and coal-fired power plants are considered health hazards. However, the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program subjected India to international economic sanctions that not only affected the general economy, but also hindered technological advances in its nuclear energy program. Many of the sanctions have now been lifted, but technical sanctions remain for India's nuclear energy and space programs. Both India's energy potential and its economy have been affected.

Indian nuclear scientists and economic planners are convinced that nuclear power is the only long-term solution to India's energy needs. The following statement in 1980 by Raja Ramana, director of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, is reflective of the views of many members of the nuclear scientific community in India: "Looking at it [the future of nuclear energy] with the experience of the past and the terrifying energy problems of the future, I can think of no other source of energy that has been discovered to date except nuclear energy, which can solve the energy problems of this country during the

next twenty-five years and beyond. If I do not make the case now and point out . . . the urgency of accepting its inevitability, I will have done a great disservice" (Pachauri).

There remains the question, however, whether nuclear-generated electricity is commercially viable and affordable compared to the conventional sources of energy. The pro-nuclear power lobby in India suggests that this source of energy may have a cost advantage over coal-fired thermal plants. This has been disputed in Germany and Britain, countries that are now cutting back on their nuclear power programs. However, France, Japan, and South Korea are convinced that nuclear power is a critical source of electricity. As noted earlier, France obtains 78 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Japan has embarked on a major program of establishing nuclear power plants.

Power remains in the public sector and was not privatized following the marketization and privatization measures of the 1991 economic reforms. Government-run energy corporations include: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Oil India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation in the petroleum sector; Gas Authority of India Limited in the natural gas sector; and Coal India Limited in the coal sector. Government electric power corporations include National Thermal Power Corporation, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation, and various state electricity boards. Major oil terminals are located at the ports of Mumbai, Cochin, Haldia, Kandla, Chennai, and Vizagapatnam.

In 2004 the capacity of the major oil refineries in India were as follows: Reliance-Jamnagar, 540,000 bbl/d (barrels per day); Koyali-Gujarat, 185,100 bbl/d; Mangalore, 180,000 bbl/d; Mathura-Uttar Pradesh, 156,000 bbl/d; Mahul-Bombay (Bharat Petroleum), 120,000 bbl/d; Madras, 130,660 bbl/d; and Mahul-Bombay (Hindustan Petroleum), 111,700 bbl/d.

Since independence in 1947, India's electricity generation capacity has grown by more than sixty times. In 1947 India generated 1,362 milliwatts (mW) of electricity. In 1997 this capacity reached 83,288 mW. Energy projections in India beyond the year 2000 suggest serious shortfalls of about 11 percent, rising to a high of 19 percent during peak periods. Demand for electricity is expected to rise at a rate of 8 percent per annum over the next decade, this despite the fact that overall generating capacity increased from 287 billion units (BU) in 1991–1992 to 420 BU in 1997–1998, and to 502 BU in 1999–2000. With the economic reforms since 1991 generating a growth rate of about 7 percent, the main obstacle to more rapid growth in India is its poor

infrastructure of roads, water supply, telecommunications, and especially power.

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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950; Nuclear Programs and Policies**

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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS SINCE

1800 Reports in the early 2000's that the Sariska wildlife reserve in northern India had lost all its remaining tigers is indicative of the deepening crisis into which India's wildlife and its environment have fallen. Vanishing wildlife, depleted forests, and polluted air and water are grave ecological concerns in India. The survival of the majestic tiger—king of the jungle and the top of its food chain—is not just a battle to save an individual species but rather an entire ecosystem and a web of life that sustains human life and livelihoods as well.

Concern for humankind and its environment in India dates back several centuries, when such coexistence was widely practiced among India's tribes and indigenous communities. Tribal peoples, or *adivasis*, inhabiting the vast forests of the Chhotanagpur and Danakaranya regions in central and peninsular India and Garhwal and other parts of the Himalayas carefully nurtured their forests, as their existence depended on these resources. They usually faced little interference from local chiefs and landlords, who little valued forests, other than to practice *shikars*, or trophy hunts. British rule, however, dramatically altered these relationships and greatly increased forest exploitation.

India's Forests

The British at first showed total indifference to forests. The only threat to forests came from agricultural expansion, which was actively sought to generate revenue

for the government. However, the growing timber needs of the colonial rulers for shipbuilding and other purposes soon hastened forest exploitation. The first reservation of teak was established by the British along the western Indian Malabar coast in 1806 to conveniently supply teak for ships built in dockyards in Goa and other coastal locations. Pressure on forests greatly increased with the arrival of the railways in India in the latter part of the century. Forests were recklessly cut to provide for railway sleepers and, before coal mines became operational, as fuel for locomotives.

Such was the demand for timber that the governor-general in 1862 called for the establishment of a department that could ensure a sustained availability of the enormous timber requirements for railway sleepers. As a result, the first imperial forest department was set up in 1864. The Indian Forest Act of 1865 was the first official attempt at asserting state monopoly rights over forest resources and at curtailing the traditional rights of local communities. The 1865 act, to a large extent, dictated all successive forest legislation in British and post-independence India. The provisions of the 1878 Forest Act, for instance, empowered the state to usurp all "valuable" tracts of forest, needed especially for railway purposes, and to retain enough flexibility over the utilization of the remaining forests. The customary use of forest timber by villagers was henceforth considered not a "right" but a "privilege" exercised solely at the discretion of local rulers.

The next assault on India's forests came during the two world wars, when the British found it expedient to plunder the country's forests to service the huge war demand. Approximately 1.7 million cubic feet of timber (mostly teak) were exported annually from 1914 through 1919 to meet the demands of the British military in Egypt and the Middle East. The impact of World War II was even more severe, when a special Timber Directorate was set up in Delhi to channel supplies of forest produce from India's provinces. As a result of the growing military and mercantile demands of the colonialists, social and ecological needs were increasingly overlooked.

Forest management in the post-independence era has not been much different. India's 1952 Forest Policy is striking in its assertion of the state's monopoly right over forests in order to safeguard the "national interest." The policy states that "the country as a whole is not to be deprived of a national asset by the mere accident of a village being situated close to a forest." While on one hand the rights of local communities to forest resources were severely curtailed, overexploitation of forests to supply the high demands of forest industries, especially pulp and paper, grew even further. The forest department argued that the low productivity of Indian forests was due to the

government's "uneconomic" and "conservation oriented" approach and called for replacing the existing natural forests with high-yielding industrially useful trees. The National Commission on Agriculture went even further, outlining a strategy for industrial forestry in 1961. A new program of social forestry was also launched to encourage local communities to raise their own forests, usually on degraded wastelands, to satisfy subsistence needs for fuel and fodder, but the program failed.

Emphasis on industrial forestry extended beyond timber when several commercially attractive minor forest products such as *tendu* leaf (used in making local cigarettes), *sal* seed, and *mabua* flower were nationalized. Sale and marketing of these products was handed over to private contractors, not only depriving tribals of their livelihoods but encouraging corruption and misuse of the resource at the hands of middlemen. The resulting alienation of tribals, particularly in central India, has given rise to local protests, sometimes turning to violent conflicts. The recently established states of Jharkhand (meaning "forest land") and Uttaranchal have their roots in secessionist struggles over natural resource rights.

The rapid decimation of the country's wildlife and forests has led the Indian government to enact new legislation: the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972 aimed at protecting wildlife in strictly controlled national parks and sanctuaries, and the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 contained strict provisions for preventing the diversion of forest land. However, it is the National Forest Policy of 1988 that is credited with being the watershed in forest governance. The new forest policy aims to achieve ecological balance through conservation of biological diversity, soil and water management, and reforestation, while at the same time meeting the subsistence needs of rural and tribal populations. Reversing the earlier stance, the demands of forest industries are now secondary to these social objectives.

Encouraged by the new policy, a new program of joint forest management has been initiated in various parts of the country. The program aims at involving local communities in the management of state forest lands in return for regulated use of forest resources. Villagers are grouped in forest protection committees (named differently in different states) and work with local forest guards to protect specific forest areas. Community management, based on self-agreed rules and responsibilities, has helped curb misuse and corruption and has ensured a steady flow of forest benefits for participating communities. Although the program is viewed as a growing success, it operates on the basis of individual state resolutions (and often the goodwill of local forest officials), and local communities do not enjoy secure access to state forest resources.

Environmental Problems in the Modern Indian State

While deforestation has been a growing concern, India's environmental problems today span a much wider spectrum and are closely tied to its rapid pace of industrialization and urbanization in recent years. Problems of water and air pollution were first recognized when the government enacted the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1981. The 1984 Bhopal gas disaster—in which a toxic leak from the city's Union Carbide chemical plant resulted in the deaths of more than three thousand people—significantly raised environmental awareness and activism in India. It also caused the formulation of the Environment (Protection) Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) as an independent federal department in 1985. The MoEF is tasked with the overall responsibility of administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies.

Despite a greater commitment by the Indian government to protect public health and the environment, policies geared to develop the country's economy have taken precedence in recent years. Market reforms launched in the early 1990s have significantly raised economic growth but have also resulted in a huge cost to the environment. According to the World Bank, environmental damage from unclean air and water and natural resource depletion was valued at U.S.\$9.5 billion, or 4.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product in 1992. A high proportion of these costs are attributed to premature mortality from exposure to indoor air pollution (from burning firewood in poorly ventilated kitchens) and the consumption of unclean water.

Growth in energy consumption in the power, industrial, and transportation sectors has resulted in rising emissions of greenhouse gases—the main contributor to climate change—and other pollutants harmful for human health. While per capita emissions are still small, these are growing rapidly, and India already ranks fifth in the world in aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. Given the country's reliance on low-quality coal—77 percent of electricity in India is produced from coal—and its soaring demand for electricity, carbon emissions are likely to grow exponentially. A stumbling block is artificially low electricity prices that have favored a few interest groups at the expense of those who really deserve its benefits. A commercially viable electricity sector could improve the quality of the electricity supply, improving access especially for rural households who otherwise would have to depend on dirty biomass fuels.

Vehicular air pollution in India's large metropolitan cities is already a serious human health hazard. Airborne particulate matter in New Delhi, the nation's capital, has

been recorded at five times the World Health Organization limit. The problem is not due to the absence of sound environmental legislation, but rather a lack of proper enforcement at the local level. Lack of official response led the Supreme Court of India to take matters into its own hands by ruling in 1998 that all buses in Delhi must be run on compressed natural gas, a cleaner fuel. But this has not solved problems for other parts of the country, where buses still use diesel, a far dirtier fuel, although its quality has improved due to government action in recent years. A particular problem, however, concerns the price advantage that diesel enjoys over gasoline, which encourages its rampant use.

Availability of adequate freshwater is important for human consumption, growing crops, industrial use, and for sustaining all other life. But freshwater availability has been declining, both in terms of its quantity and quality in India. Water availability per capita reduced from 5,400 cubic meters in 1950 to 2,400 cubic meters in 1991, and several regions in the country are today water stressed. Following the "Green Revolution" of the 1970s, water demand for modern irrigation greatly increased. Overexploitation of groundwater for irrigation has depleted groundwater aquifers and has resulted in land salinization, particularly in intensively cultivated northern parts of India. In other regions, where agriculture is rain-fed, people traditionally took to harvesting scarce rainwater by building ponds and other water retention structures. Several such structures are in use even today in Rajasthan and several parts of southern India, testimony to indigenous knowledge, though concerns have been voiced about their maintenance in recent years.

An equally serious issue concerns water pollution, both inland and along the vast Indian coastline. The most shocking instance is the pollution of the Ganges, the ancient holy river that flows through thickly populated plains of northern India. Municipal and industrial wastes have been allowed to be freely dumped in the river, rendering it unfit for safe human use. The government responded by launching the Ganga Action Plan in 1987, a multipronged project involving wastewater treatment, urban renewal, riverfront development, and public education to make the river pollution-free. Since then, three other rivers have been covered under similar projects. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has also undertaken the preservation of the country's coastline by regulating urban development and controlling pollution along the coast.

While India's environment faces several challenges, there are also reasons for hope. The significance of the environment is recognized in the country's Constitution. The various environmental laws and regulations have not been sufficiently implemented in the past, but the government is now taking its mandate for the environment

more seriously. India is also an active participant in international environmental discussions, having ratified almost all United Nations conventions and treaties on the environment. With a vibrant civil society and a centuries-old tradition of coexistence with the environment, India has a good opportunity to tackle its environmental problems. How well it can balance its environment with the imperative for economic growth and development remains to be seen.

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See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Ethnic Conflict

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EPIC ERA. *See Mahābhārata; Rāmāyaṇa.*

ETHNIC CONFLICT A defining force in India's modern history and politics, ethnic conflict was the principal cause behind the creation of India and Pakistan as independent nation-states. It has made and unmade governments, led to wars, and precipitated domestic strife in many parts of India. Ethnicity has also been an incubator of Indian democracy. Without ethnic mobilization—made possible because of segmented social diversity—democracy would not have expanded as rapidly as it did in India. The stability of post-independence India has depended largely on the balance between the demands of ethnic communities and the need to build a unified nation-state. While India is recognized as an independent nation-state, its borders remain in dispute, and its ethnic communities spill across into neighboring states. Even when boundaries are well defined, as between India and Sri Lanka, ethnic overlap tends to blur international boundaries, causing conflict.

Indian ethnic communities live on a scale of graded linguistic and cultural differences. Rajasthani, an Indo-Aryan language spoken mainly in the North Indian state



Police in Action after Assam Killings in Nellie. Police take a Tiwa tribe member into custody after the Assam massacre. In February 1983, in one of several “sons of the soil” uprisings, the Tiwa massacred hundreds of migrant Bangladeshis in the border state of Assam. Tensions continue to run deep in the area, with the native Assamese accusing India’s central government, particularly the Congress Party, of ignoring its plight—the loss of jobs and land to the newcomers. INDIA TODAY.

of Rajasthan, changes every hundred miles whether one travels north or south, east or west. It absorbs local culture, words, and phrases as it gains distance from the original point and moves toward an area of the next proximate language. The Indian state of Bengal, parts of Assam, and Bihar, as well as what is today the nation of Bangladesh, share scores of dialects derived from Bengali. India’s ethno-linguistic communities are for the most part concentrated in compact areas or regions. Thus Bengali is the dominant language in Bengal state, as is Marathi in Maharashtra and Gujarati in Gujarat, although many other linguistic communities reside in those states. This concentration, however, enables an aspiring ethnic community to demand political recognition in forms that range from provincial autonomy to national separation, although demands for separation have mostly been made by ethnic communities living on the borders of India. Officially, India’s government recognizes fifteen regional state languages within its twenty-eight federal states and seven union territories.

There is no agreement among scholars about the distinctions between the languages and dialects of India. Linguistic scholars have suggested that there are 325 distinctive languages in India and thousands of dialects. To this linguistic diversity, we have to add several separate religions, as well as divisions of caste and locality. Each criterion divides Indian society differently. Together, all form the complex and layered identity of a modern Indian. The idea of ethnic identity then amalgamates linguistic, religious, and cultural attributes. Each ethnic composite possesses a geographic space, a distinctive history, and a singular perspective on its place within modern India. Some ethnic groups see themselves as targets of discrimination, while others are content with the autonomy and power they have managed to gain for themselves. Since religious and tribal manifestations of ethnic identities are discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia, this article will focus on the broad cultural constructs that define ethnic identities. The objective here is to provide an overarching frame for understanding the causes of ethnic conflicts. It should be stressed that the

story of India's ethnic politics is one of success as well as large failures; some ethnic communities have therefore chosen to integrate, while others have sought separation.

Historical Background

Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism disagree about how to define ethnic identity. Some view ethnic identities as primordial, given and immutable; others believe they are instrumental and are evoked in the service of other social and political objectives. To understand ethnic identity in the Indian context, however, one must view them as constructed identities, buffeted and shaped by historic and sociopolitical events.

Several historical events have shaped ethnic evolution. The rise and fall of empires, the Mughal and then the British, led to the crystallization of ethnic consciousness in several regions of the Indian subcontinent. Before the British arrived on the scene, India was ruled by several large and small kingdoms, each multiethnic and multi-religious but with one or two linguistic groups that had gained dominance because of size and royal patronage. The British absorbed these kingdoms into their empire by 1857, but for the most part ignored the ways in which local communities defined themselves. British policies nevertheless had a profound impact on ethnic self-definition. The British believed that India had not existed as a historical country, and that the British themselves had fashioned it out of a welter of regions and kingdoms. The British would build an overarching state while tolerating social and cultural diversity within their empire. But the British disregarded ethnic overlap when drawing of the borders of their Indian empire. The partition of ethnically united Bengal in 1905 was clearly a British administrative and political convenience. British policies—like the introduction of a census and the recruitment into their colonial army along ethnic (“martial race”) and religious lines—reinforced ethnic consciousness. The British colonialists based army recruitment on their belief that certain ethnic groups made better soldiers than others. The Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and the Marathas who spoke Marathi were viewed as hardy and soldierly; the Bengalis were regarded as soft and artistic, better suited to British civil service. These perceptions became part of ethnic folklore and endured beyond the British period into the political life of independent India.

The rise of India's nationalist movement and the way in which it came to be organized was another determining factor in the shaping of ethnic identity. It was, however, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party that systematically wedded ethnicity to Indian nationalism. Congress delineated its provincial organization not along the imperial map of the Raj, but along the lines of ethnic and

linguistic distinctions. The nationalist era taught ethnic communities the value of mass mobilization against a central government. It is then not surprising that for independent India, management of “ethnic nationalism” and its incorporation into pan-Indian nationalism has been the single most important problem since 1947.

The Nature of Ethnic Conflict

Why have some ethnic groups in India long sought integration, while others have demanded separation? Several characteristics of ethnic demography and political economy can be offered as explanations. First, there is a correlation, though not a perfect fit, between ethnic “homeland” and ethnic identity. Possessing many of the features of a “nation,” ethnic communities seek cultural and political autonomy. This characteristic compelled Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to agree in 1955 to a linguistic reorganization of the Indian federation, creating linguistically discrete provinces. Ethnicity thus became the principle on which India would henceforth create new or merge existing state-provinces. Since then, India has added many new states to its union through internal reorganization. The creation of three new states in 2000, carved out of Uttar Pradesh (Uttaranchal), Bihar (Jharkhand), and Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh), are instances of the most recent efforts at appeasing ethnic demands. The extent of autonomy granted to state-provinces—on which the Constitution is ambivalent at best—has been a persistent source of domestic tension. Frequently, the success of one ethnic group has triggered demands for parallel recognition by other ethnic groups within the same state-province. The Sikh demand for a separate state triggered counterdemands by Punjabi Hindus and resulted in the creation of the state of Haryana, carved out of Punjab in 1966. The creation of Nagaland in 1963 triggered demands for separate provincial states all over the Northeast region, and led to the division of Assam into seven new states in 1972. Ethnic tensions are aggravated by the perception that the central leaders favor one ethnic group over another.

Ethnic groups can be divided into those forming the core and those residing on the geographical periphery of India. The former are part of the Indian heartland, the latter frequently share kinship and identity with fellow ethnics across the borders. Overlapping ethnic nationalities include the Indian Kashmiris and the Kashmiris across the Line of Control in Pakistan; the Tamils in India's state of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils in the north and east of Sri Lanka; the Bengalis in west Bengal and those in what is now Bangladesh; the Nagas on both sides of the India-Myanmar border; and the Nepalis on both sides of Indo-Nepal border. Frequently, ethnic communities on the border are poorly integrated into the Indian

union. Pakistan would not have been able to foment insurgency in Kashmir had the Kashmiris been fully content to remain within the Indian Union. As most popular movements are prone to do, ethnic conflicts have a rhythm; they rise and fall. Ethnic communities are known to move from autonomy to separatist militancy, and then back to autonomy. The separatist movement in Punjab followed this rhythm between the 1970s and the 1990s.

Democratic expansion and economic growth have also contributed to ethnic tensions. Relatively better economic opportunities have led to mass migration from Bangladesh into India, particularly into the bordering state of Assam. The native Assamese have mobilized in protest against the new migrants and have accused the central government of deliberately ignoring their loss of jobs, overcrowding, and political shifts unfavorable to the native Assamese. Assamese leaders charge that India's central government, largely dominated by the Congress Party, sought the migrant vote and therefore ignored the Assamese demands. These suspicions led to several "sons of the soil" movements in Assam since the 1970s.

Economic growth since 1947 has affected different ethnic groups differently. Some have gained while others have been slower to benefit. The sense of relative deprivation among rival ethnic groups has frequently led to violence. The separatist movement among the Sikhs in Punjab was nurtured by the perception that the government in New Delhi did not give Sikhs all that they deserved, and that their state of Punjab had been cheated out of its fair share of industrial investment for development. Economic nationalism constitutes an important element in the Naga and Assamese separatist movements. The Nagas claim they do not belong in India, while the Assamese charge that India's central government has exploited Assam of its oil and other rich resources without making corresponding investments. Economic grievances are often combined with charges of mistreatment. Sikh anger flared up when Sikhs were searched and mistreated by the Harayana police during the Asiad games in 1983. By 1984 Punjab was in the grip of a violent insurgency. The Jharkhand Tribal movement and violence in Manipur and Assam also underline the importance of these grievances in the rise of ethnic protests.

Ethnic conflicts also arise because they are grist to the political mill of electoral campaigns. Political leaders appeal to pride, historic achievements, and current injustices—real and imagined—to win elections, to deny the same to opponents, and to gain office, position, and power. Indian politicians have become extremely adept at mobilizing ethnic mass support for all manner of political and personal objectives. The threat of mass disaffection, whipped up by ethnic leaders, works effectively against a central

government unwilling to accede to ethnic demands. Ethnic leaders who command a large following in a particular province are not unlike feudal lords commanding loyalty from their "captive" fiefdoms based on myths of common origin, language, and religion. This is evidenced by the existence of a large number of regional and provincial political parties, which regularly win elections and form governments in India. A few examples are: the Akali Dal in Punjab, Telugu Desam in Andhra, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) and All-Indian Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) in Tamil Nadu, and the Assam Gano Parishad in Assam. Similarly, ethnic leaders such as Lalo Prasad Yadav in Bihar, Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra, Jayalalita in Tamil Nadu, and Prafulla Mohanta in Assam have prevailed because of their appeals to fellow ethnics. Mindful of the political advantage of ethnicity, political parties nominate individuals who enjoy high standing in their ethnic constituencies.

Excessive centralization and heavy-handed rule by central governments are usually behind the powerful surges of ethnic protests. A closer examination, however, suggests that centralization alone is rarely the sole reason for ethnic disaffection. More often than not, demographic pressures, as in Assam, a change in the distribution of power within an ethnic community, as in Punjab, or political competition among leaders and parties, witnessed almost everywhere else in India, can change the position of an ethnic group within India's polity, leading to conflict.

While fears of fragmentation propelled India's National Congress leaders to adopt a largely unitary Constitution in 1950, the pulls of electorates mobilized along ethnic lines have since forced India to cede greater autonomy to linguistic regions and ethnic communities. Ethnic communities have in turn regularly organized under the banners of ethnic parties. From 1950 to the mid-1970s, India enjoyed a period marked mostly by ethnic cooperation, but from about 1975 that spirit of compromise had all but vanished. From 1980 to 1990, India was jolted by violent ethnic conflicts, several serious enough to revive fears of disintegration. Since 1990, however, with economic reforms and the growth of prosperity, the balance has again tilted in favor of unity and accommodation.

The Management of Ethnic Conflict

During the last years of the British Raj and in the tragic year after partition in 1947, Hindu-Muslim-Sikh violence claimed the lives of more than a million people, and Indian leaders became extremely wary of separatist demands. The Constitution was therefore designed to balance the overriding need for unification against demands for autonomy. India was to be a secular federal

democracy with a strong central government that had vast powers over its federal units, especially in the event of local or national emergency. India's Constitution did not define the criteria by which India's federal units were to be created. Originally, however, the federation was to be divided on the basis of administrative efficiency.

The first reaction to the administrative federation began in South India's Telugu-speaking Andhra with the demand for a linguistically defined Andhra province in 1952. Other large and numerically dominant ethno-linguistic groups soon followed, and by 1954, ethnic agitation had spread far and wide. In 1956 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's government finally agreed to reorganize the Indian federation along ethno-linguistic lines. Problems remained, however, in areas that could not be neatly divided into separable ethnic spaces, such as the provinces of Bombay and Punjab. Northern Bombay, with its Gujarati majority, emerged as Gujarat in 1958; the rest of that province, with Bombay as its capital, became Maharashtra state, with a Maratha-speaking majority. The stories of ethnic conflict in Kashmir, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Darjeeling (Nepalis demanding Gorkhaland), Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur are too long and complex to be told here. We may, however, examine a couple to understand how various conditions combined together to create ethnic conflict. The province of Punjab consisted of Sikhs and Hindus, who both spoke Punjabi but worshiped at separate temples. This religious distinctiveness was exploited by ethnic leaders in each community. The Nehru government refused the demand for a separate Sikh Punjabi Suba (province) on the grounds that in secular India, religion could not be the basis for federal division. The Shiromani Akali Dal Party, which represented Sikhs demanding autonomy, subsequently abandoned the religious argument and claimed an autonomous Punjab state on the basis of language alone. In 1965 Indira Gandhi, the third prime minister of India, proposed the creation of three new states out of India's existing Punjab: Harayana, Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh. The national Parliament, in which the Congress Party commanded a majority, promptly obliged. In the new Punjab, the Sikhs were a majority, but that numerical advantage did not translate into political dominance, which the Akali Dal leaders most coveted, since a substantial segment of the Sikh community continued to vote for the Congress Party. The Congress Party's dominance in Punjab was based on putting together a winning alliance between Punjab's Hindus and Sikhs, including the poor, lower caste farmers, and urban Sikhs. However, by the late 1970s, the political economy of Punjab had changed dramatically. A whole new class of peasant proprietors had emerged to take power in the Akali Dal. Economic changes brought Congress's dominance to an end in Punjab, but Congress was unwilling to surrender Punjab to its rival, the Akali Dal.

The tensions between the two parties mounted to dangerous levels of violence. The Akalis led demonstrations and strikes, and passed their famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, which demanded that Punjab be given autonomous jurisdiction over all subjects except foreign policy, defense, and currency. Changes in government at the center in 1977 temporarily defused the tensions, but they resurfaced in 1979, when the Congress Party and Indira Gandhi were reelected. The forces that had paralyzed Punjab previously—intensifying party competition, religious extremism, and tensions between the central government and the province—soon plunged the province into violence. This time the struggle revolved around Jarnal Singh Bhindranwale, an obscure Sikh preacher pushed into the limelight by Delhi's Congress leaders with the purpose of splitting the Akali Dal. Bhindranwale soon gained enough Sikh support to abandon his erstwhile Congress sponsors, demanding the creation of Khalistan (Land of the Pure), a separate Sikh state where Sikhs could live without fear of Hindu dominance. The armed confrontation between Delhi's government and Amritsar's Sikh insurgents led to several tragic events: the assault on the Golden Temple, the holiest of all Sikh shrines, in June 1984; the death of Bhindranwale and his followers as well as many troops; and the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her own Sikh bodyguards on 31 October 1984. Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's older son, succeeded his mother as prime minister, then signed an agreement with Sikh Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali leader who had been marginalized by the militants. But Longowal was assassinated within months of the agreement, and Punjab was again plunged into prolonged militancy. It was not until 1992 that elections could be held in Punjab, and gradually normal political activity returned peace to Punjab. The erosion of the Congress Party's dominance in Delhi, however, accounted for that turn of events, as the new ruling coalition, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), incorporated Punjab's Akali Dal into its fold.

Ethnic conflicts in Kashmir and the Northeast region can be traced to many of the same factors: arbitrary centralization of power in Congress's quest for dominance; denial of political autonomy; and the rise of nativist, ethnic, and religious tensions in response to intensifying competition for economic and political opportunities. All were a result of modernization, uneven economic growth, and party competition. There are nevertheless important differences among them. Assam and the Northeast were poorly integrated, first into the British Raj, and later into independent India, and were populated by many hill tribes that had a distinctive culture from that of the plains of Assam. The first tribes to break with Assam and to demand autonomy were the Nagas.

Once the Nagas were given a state, others with equally distinctive cultures and languages could no longer be denied. Between 1972 and 1987, the original province of Assam was divided into seven separate federal states. These measures brought temporary respite from ethnic violence in the Northeast region.

In the Northeast, as well as in Kashmir, there is an added element that has aggravated tensions and increased conflict: interference by neighboring states into what India regarded as its domestic affairs. Pakistan had tried repeatedly in the first four decades to infiltrate and rouse Kashmiri masses against India, but such efforts were not well received on the Indian side of the cease-fire line (now called the Line of Control). This situation changed after 1989, when the National Conference government of Farooq Abdullah collapsed and Kashmir was plunged deeper into turmoil and violence. Militant Kashmiris found ready help in terms of arms and money, training, and safe sanctuaries across the line in Pakistan and returned to attack Indian army troops in Kashmir. The nature of the struggle in Kashmir in the 1990s has, however, changed with the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conflict in Kashmir is no longer just about Kashmiri independence or autonomy; it is caught up in the wider struggle between Islamic fundamentalists and the governments of Pakistan and India.

Naga separatism was similarly supported first by China. But such support is not in every instance provided by hostile governments. There are regional bazaars in arms where aspiring groups can purchase lethal weapons. Smuggling in drug, gold, arms, and contraband goods is yet another source of money to finance violent activities. In some instances it is difficult to draw the line between crime and an ethnic "cause." This is evident in the evolution of the United Front for Liberation of Assam (ULFA). By 1986 ULFA had established contacts with agents of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as with militants from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). With roughly only an estimated 3,000 armed militants, ULFA created terror in the state, disrupting communications, hitting various economic targets, kidnapping prominent businessmen, and killing government officials. Its activities escalated, reaching unprecedented heights in 1990. As the former government of Assam lost control, the state was brought under President's rule from Delhi in November 1990, and ULFA was banned. Ethnic violence, from Kashmir and Punjab in the north and west, to Darjeeling in the east and Tamil Nadu in the south, has made it difficult to distinguish between political motivations and criminal purpose in any corner of troubled India.

The emergence of coalition governments and the demise of Congress Party dominance, and the relationship between ethnic nationalism and pan-Indian nationalism, have undergone a sea change. Coalition governments at the center brought direct and immediate access to national power and patronage for ethnic leaders and their cohorts. In fact, there are growing concerns in India's media and press over the perceived weakness of the central government and its inability to withstand local pressures and policy compromises that benefit only politically stronger regional leadership. Ethnic leaders have used newly found powers to make and break governments at the center. In 1999 the BJP government collapsed when Tamil Nadu's leader, Jayalalita, pulled her AIDMK Party from the ruling coalition. There are new tensions in Nagaland and Manipur as well as Assam. Violence has claimed thousands of lives in Kashmir, while Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat and Mumbai have become fairly routine. This suggests that, while power sharing between India's various nationalities is critical for internal peace, that alone will not eliminate ethnic conflict. An increasingly important condition for social harmony is justice and governance. In India today, poor governance and the maldistribution of resources and employment opportunities have become potent causes of ethnic disaffection.

Maya Chadda

See also Amritsar; Assam; Bengal; Bihar; Congress Party; Ethnic Peace Accords; Gujarat; Insurgency and Terrorism; Kashmir; Manipur; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Northeast States, The; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Sikh Institutions and Parties

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ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS In the post-independence period, resolution of ethnic conflicts, as a part of a nation-building strategy, has been a daunting task of Indian leadership. Out of nine major ethnic conflicts faced by the country over a period of five decades, six were secessionist and three pertained to autonomy. The secessionist movements occurred in the states of Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur; the autonomy demand was made by the Bodos (Assam), Gorkhas (West Bengal), and Tripuris (Tripura). The underlying causes of these conflicts were rooted in the manifold grievances of the ethnic groups. For some, forcible territorial integration in the wake of decolonization has been the main issue. Some others have feared cultural assimilation engineered by the dominant groups in their region. The denial of equal socioeconomic and political rights has remained another reason, and some groups have felt powerless in the face of the hegemonic tendency of the central government. In all conflicts, either the perceived or real grievances of the ethnic groups and the nature of the state's response determined the conflict goals. Every conflict turned violent, though the intensity varied. While the Punjab conflict witnessed collective violence against the Sikhs in 1984, as many as five conflicts in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, and Punjab attained the dimension of an internal war—a situation marked by continuous and prolonged military engagement between the insurgents and government security forces.

Yet violence has been an important factor in peace processes, and India has used coercion in pursuit of peacemaking, with mixed results. All the nine major peace accords were reached in six conflicts; in three other conflicts—in Tamil Nadu, Assam, and Manipur—there have been no political negotiations. Three conflicts involving the Tripuris, Bodos, and Mizos have thus had two peace accords each. The government has always preferred to negotiate first with the moderate leaders; only after the failure of those talks would the government negotiate with the militant leadership. Two conflicts (involving the Mizos and Gorkhas) have so far ended in political settlement; it is likely that the Bodo conflict will be added to this list if the violent opposition to the 2003 peace accord is neutralized. Conflicts in Punjab and Tamil Nadu have ended in military suppression or coercion by the government, although, in the case of Punjab, it signed a peace accord with the moderate Sikh

leadership. The remaining four ethnic movements (in Tripura, Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland) are continuing. Concerning the Tripura conflict, the Delhi central government signed two failed peace accords; both the Assamese and Manipuri conflicts have not thus far seen a peace process; and protracted negotiations are underway to end the conflict in Nagaland.

Failed Accords

Six out of nine ethnic peace accords have failed. The first such accord was signed on 11 November 1975 between five representatives of a breakaway Naga group (the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland) and Nagaland governor L. P. Singh. Constant military pressure by the Indian forces and growing dissidence facilitated this accord. Popularly known as the Shillong Accord, it did not intend to redress the Nagas' grievances but to end the conflict by seeking the rebels' surrender, the precondition for reaching a final negotiated political settlement. The operative clauses of the accord stated that the representatives of the underground organizations accepted the Indian Constitution and agreed to surrender their arms—details of which were worked out under a supplementary agreement on 5 January 1976. It set a twenty-day deadline for the arms surrender and created peace camps for housing the surrendered militants. Subsequently, a large number of detainees were released. The accord did not restore peace, because only a small section of the Naga leadership participated in the talks. Most Nagas considered the agreement an unequal deal, which the government had negotiated from a position of military strength. The antiaccord forces consolidated themselves under two new militant factions of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland. Thus, since the 1970s, India's government has faced formidable opposition forces while trying to negotiate peace.

The Mizo Accord came second in the series of failed peace accords. Signed on 18 February 1976, between India's government and Mizo National Front (MNF) chief Laldenga, it was similar to the Shillong Accord. It secured the MNF leadership's acknowledgment of Mizoram as an integral part of India as well as their desire to find a political solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution. However, there was no mention of the specific solution the government was willing to offer. The MNF agreed to ensure an end to the violence by its military wing—the Mizo National Army (MNA)—and to collect the underground cadres with their arms, placing them in camps run with government help. On its part, the government was to declare a suspension of military operations, but only after the rebels stopped their activities. As expected, the accord stimulated internal bickering in the MNF, whose members refused to surrender



Naga Leaders. Thingaleng Muivah (left) with Isaac Chisi Swu prepare to meet then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on Indian soil after three decades in exile. Officials hope the talks will pave the way for a peaceful settlement of an insurgency that has haunted northeast India since independence in 1947. INDIA TODAY.

any arms. Laldenga was isolated in the organization and found his support failing in the Mizo Hills. At the same time, he was under pressure from the government to implement the accord. In 1978 violence erupted, and the government responded with full military operations.

The Punjab Accord, signed on 24 July 1985, was different in two ways. First, it was entered into with the moderate Sikh leadership while the militants were actively involved in armed campaigns. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself was a signatory. The Akali Dal leader, H. S. Longowal, represented the Sikhs. Second, it tried to address some of the political grievances of the Sikhs. Its main thrust was to satisfy their territorial aspirations, as well as their desire for autonomy. It was agreed that Chandigarh, the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana, would be given to Punjab. In return, Punjab would transfer some of its Hindi-speaking areas to Haryana. Regarding the autonomy demand, the government was to refer

that issue to the Sarkaria Commission, set up to make recommendations on center-state relations. The accord also stipulated that the river water dispute between Punjab and Haryana would be referred to a tribunal headed by a Supreme Court judge. While the government considered the accord a sincere attempt at reconciliation with the Sikh community, the agreement evoked protests from many militant Sikh leaders, who bitterly opposed the Akali Dal's cooperation with the Indian government. Intense violence ensued, including the assassination of Longowal by Khalistani Sikhs on 20 August 1985, during his election campaign. Soon after, the accord itself expired, as the government embarked on a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to crush the Khalistani militants.

Two accords (in 1988 and 1993) to end the conflict in Tripura met similar fates. The trilateral accord of August 1988 involving the central and state governments and Tripura's Tribal National Volunteers. The militant

organization agreed to end all underground activities; the Indian government promised to extend resettlement facilities, increase tribal representation in the legislature through reservations, to protect tribal interests in land alienation, and to develop agricultural and irrigation facilities in tribal areas. The failure of the accord may be attributed not only to opposition within the militant movement, leading to the rise of splinter groups to carry on the fight, but also to political differences between the central and state governments over its implementation. It took about five more years for the government to coerce, through sustained military operations, another group—the Tripura Tribal Force—to negotiate an accord. Interestingly, the 1993 accord incorporated most of the provisions of the earlier accord. Additionally, it provided some safeguards to protect Tripura tribal culture. As soon as that accord was signed, however, another group of disgruntled leaders began a new armed movement, which continues to shatter Tripura’s “peace” as a low-intensity conflict.

The movement for Bodoland presented a similar picture until 2003. The first accord signed between the Assam government and moderate Bodo leadership in February 1993 did not work. Though the accord provided limited autonomy to the Bodos under an autonomous council covering some two thousand villages and twenty-five tea gardens, a section of them remained dissatisfied because of the exclusion of areas lying on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra River, as well as rejection of their demand for a full-fledged state within the Indian union. Dissident militant groups—the Bodo Security Force (BSF) and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)—took advantage of the general discontent to continue their armed struggle amid heavy military pressure from Indian security forces.

Successful Accords

Two accords have been successful; a third is likely to be the 2003 Bodo Accord. The Mizo, Bodo, and Gorkha leaders have accepted negotiated peace settlements only after they found military engagements futile. The strategy in the Mizoram conflict was to use military pressure to bring the MNF to the negotiating table, so the central government held peace parleys even after the breakdown of the 1976 accord. The talks became protracted due to the intransigence of the MNF, but the government capitalized on the military weakness of the MNA to reach a deal. Once the local population and religious leaders threw their weight behind the peace process, the MNF chief was forced to sign the Mizo Accord in 1986. A step forward from the 1976 accord, it separated the political solution from the immediate surrender of arms. However, the MNF

agreed to bring out, within the agreed time limit, all underground personnel, along with their arms and ammunition. The government offered political concessions, such as conferment of statehood on Mizoram and constitutional guarantees for the religious and social practices of the Mizos. An enhanced allocation of central resources was assured as a special case. The accord generated positive responses from Mizo tribal society. The MNF joined the political mainstream; enduring peace returned to Mizoram—now the most peaceful state in northeast India.

The same can be said about the Gorkhaland Accord of August 1988. The central government, which had been a signatory in the Mizo Accord, in this case merely mediated the accord between the state of West Bengal and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF). What made the accord possible was the compromise the GNLF made, under military pressure, regarding its original goal: it was prepared to give up its demand for a separate Gorkha state (within the Indian Union) and instead accepted the formation of a Hill Council in the Darjeeling district. Though peace returned to the district, the accord did not fully satisfy all leaders of the GNLF, whose desire for statehood is still articulated, though nonviolently.

The latest peace accord pertains to the Bodo conflict. This is the second accord to be reached on the same conflict within a ten-year period. While the 1993 accord was signed between the state government of Assam and the moderate Bodo leaders in the presence of a representative of the central government, the February 2003 accord was a trilateral one, directly involving as signatories the central and state governments and the BLT, which had been formed in opposition to the 1993 accord. The 2003 accord has created an autonomous self-governing body, the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), within the state of Assam. The council’s jurisdiction is spread over 3,082 villages; additional villages can also be included if all three signatories agree. The BTC enjoys protection under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. In addition, there are guarantees of accelerated infrastructure development in Bodoland; the fulfillment of the economic, educational, and linguistic aspirations of the Bodos; and the preservation of their land rights and ethnic identity. The BSF, which reemerged as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), has opposed the accord, whose success in restoring peace depends upon either defeating the NDFB or coercing it to join the political mainstream.

As in many other countries, secessionist conflicts in India are more intractable than lesser conflicts. The only secessionist conflict to end in negotiated settlement has been the Mizo conflict, because in that case the MNF

leadership has compromised, under heavy military pressure, on its original separatist goal.

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See also **Ethnic Conflict; Insurgency and Terrorism; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Tribal Politics**

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EUROPEAN UNION, RELATIONS WITH

India and the European Union (EU) have shared historical links, political institutions, and a liberal ethos. India's independence and the initiation of the efforts to achieve regional cooperation in Europe both began shortly after World War II. India was among the first countries to recognize the then six-member European Economic Community (EEC), a precursor of the EU. Since then, India has enjoyed many areas of convergence with the EU, ranging from social and cultural relations to economic and political matters. Still, there are many problematic areas of divergence on which both parties will have to work diligently to ensure future cooperation.

Overview of Relations

The table below reflects the slow progression in EU-India relations. After an initial period of stabilization and cautious foreign relations, India established formal diplomatic relations with the EEC in 1963. Besides historical ties, the values of democracy and pluralism were significant promoters of this relationship. With India's policy of nonalignment, this relationship was peripheral during the cold war. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi fully realized the potential significance of economic, cultural, and political cooperation with Western Europe. She was successful in evolving bilateral relations with France and former West Germany, but these agreements were country specific and could not reach the wider European community.

The first major economic assistance came in 1970 when the EU contributed 147 million euros to the Operation

Flood Programme for dairy development in India. In 1973, India and the EEC signed their first Agreement on Commercial Cooperation. In 1971, India was included in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program of the EEC. Another Agreement for Five-Year Economic and Commercial Cooperation was signed in 1981. The evolution of the European Community as a political organization thus led to the establishment of closer political and trade relations with India. It was agreed formally to institute an India-EEC Political Dialogue with the establishment of the EEC delegation in New Delhi in 1983. Despite of all these developments, the bilateral relationship remained limited to certain economic areas.

The end of the cold war era placed both India and the EEC in a new environment without ideological barriers. The EEC was formally transformed into the European Community (EC) under the Treaty of European Union (EU), which took effect on 1 November 1993, leading to deeper political and economic integration of the European nations. The EU also moved toward the adoption of a common currency and common foreign and security policies. In 1991 India also started implementing its economic deregulation and liberalization program, emerging as a major economic player in the global market, with a huge potential for investment. As a giant in information technology (IT), India provided additional impetus for the improvement of bilateral relations based on complementary interests.

India's first comprehensive agreement with the EU came into force in August 1994, with the signing of their Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development. That agreement covered issues that included respect for human rights and democratic principles; development and diversification of trade and investment; cooperation on technical, economic, and cultural matters; sustainable social progress and poverty alleviation; and support for environmental protection and sustainable development. Concrete steps toward these objectives were clearly stated in a communication approved by the council of the commission on EU-India Enhanced Partnership in 1996. The same year, India's Trade and Investment Forum was held in Brussels, jointly chaired by EC vice president Manuel Marin and Indian minister of commerce B. B. Ramaiah. Indian minister for external affairs Jaswant Singh's visit to Brussels in 1999 was another landmark in strengthening relations. Meanwhile, India-EU political dialogue was elevated to the Foreign Ministerial level and institutionalized through the Troika mechanism, comprising of the current EU presidency, the succeeding president and the previous president. The EU-Troika started holding annual talks with India on major bilateral and



LANDMARKS IN INDIA-EU RELATIONS

| Year | Event |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1963 | India establishes diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). |
| 1971 | EEC includes India in the countries of general tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. |
| 1981 | India and the EEC sign a five-year Commercial and Economic Cooperation agreement (16 November). |
| 1983 | EEC delegation in India established in New Delhi. |
| 1988 | EC-India Joint Commission Meeting held (March). |
| 1992 | Indian and European businesspeople launch a joint initiative, Joint Business Forum (October). |
| 1993 | EC and India sign Joint Political Statement, simultaneously, with the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (20 December), effective from 1 August 1994. |
| 1994 | Setting up of Technology Information Center (TIC) in New Delhi. |
| 1996 | Commission adopts the communication on EU-India Enhanced Partnership (26 June), approved by the council on 6 December. EU-India Economic Cross-Cultural program is launched (26 November). |
| 1999 | European Parliament endorses the commission's Communication on "EU-India Enhanced Partnership" (12 March). |
| 2000 | The first EU-India summit is held in Lisbon (28 June); the joint declaration emphasizes a strategic partnership to cover economy, trade, security, and democracy. |
| 2001 | The second EU-India summit is held in New Delhi (23 November). A joint communiqué issued after the summit focuses on an Agenda for Action for developing the full potential for bilateral partnership and addresses issues pertaining to global challenges. A Declaration against Terrorism, the EU-India Vision Statement on Information Technology, and the EU-India Agreement on Science and Technology are the highlights. |
| 2002 | The European Commission presents Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 for India, which aims to chart out the course for development and economic cooperation between India and the EU. The third EU-India summit is held in Copenhagen to review the progress in bilateral relations (10 October). |
| 2003 | EU Troika meets Indian foreign ministers in Athens (11 January). EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy visits India on 13-14 March to discuss bilateral trade issues as well as the World Trade Organization's negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda with the Indian leaders. EU Cultural Weeks 2003 organized in New Delhi, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chandigarh (22 November-4 December). The fourth EU-India Summit was held in New Delhi, India, on 29 November. Pluralism, democracy, the multipolar world and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq also became the important points of discussion in the summit. |
| 2004 | EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy visits India on 19 January to enhance trade ties with the EU and to boost the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten visits India on 16 February for a series of EU Ministerial Troika(1) meetings. The troika is led by the Irish minister of foreign affairs, Brian Cowen, accompanied by the Dutch minister for foreign affairs, Dr. Bernard R. Bot. Commission communication on "EU-India Strategic Partnership" of June 2004. The fifth summit between the EU and India was held in the Hague, the Netherlands, on 8 November. The focus of this summit was rich and diversified cultural traditions and the Action Plan for Strategic Partnership. |

The list was compiled with the help of *Milestones in EU-India Relations*, available at http://www/delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/milestones.htm and bilateral documents available at the site of Ministry of External Affairs, India, <http://meaindia.nic.in>

international issues. European commissioner for trade Pascal Lamy visited Mumbai and New Delhi in 2000, which led to the first EU-India summit that year.

That summit was held in Lisbon on 28 June 2000, and wide-ranging issues of political, economic, developmental, and environmental significance were discussed. The Joint Summit Declaration further ensured such summit meetings of foreign ministers every year to examine all impediments to trade and investment in India, with a view to removing them. The second summit convened in New Delhi on 23 November 2001, focusing on strategic and international issues. Its Agenda for Action was a joint statement on international terrorism, with both sides agreeing to help one another in facing the current international situation, with specific reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initiatives on the economic front were striking. Some of the economic landmarks included a joint statement regarding trade and investment, the signing of an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation, and the adoption of a statement on information technology. The third EU-India summit met in Copenhagen on 10 October 2002, reviewing the challenges and possible responses in areas of regional and global peace, the integration of developing countries into the global economy, and issues related to civil society, including poverty alleviation, health care, and education.

EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy played a very significant role in normalizing the bilateral trade issues when he visited India on 13–14 March 2003. The fourth EU-India summit was held in New Delhi, India, on 29 November 2003. Besides pluralism, democracy, and the multipolar world, both sides have reiterated their commitments toward strengthening the role of the United Nations (UN) in the maintenance of international peace and security, the common fight against terrorism and transborder crimes, and the UN Convention on Climate Change. In the changed global context, intense cooperation to promote peace, stability, and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq also became the important points of discussion in the summit.

The fifth summit between the EU and India was held in the Hague, the Netherlands, on 8 November 2004. The focus of this summit was rich and diversified cultural traditions enjoyed by both sides. There was an agreement to work toward the elaboration of a specific chapter on cultural cooperation within the EU-India Action Plan for Strategic Partnership. Successful conclusion of the Customs Co-operation, progress in the negotiations on Maritime Agreement and strategic dialogue on the Information Society was reviewed. The EU-India Action Plan for Strategic Partnership was also drawn in this summit, focusing on the regional and international dimensions of fight against terrorism.

Areas of Convergence

Sociocultural cooperation. The vast English-speaking and technologically skilled population of India, along with the interest of European scholars in studies pertaining to Indian society and culture, forms the basis of sociocultural ties between India and the EU. After their first summit at Lisbon, a think-tank network and an India-EU Round Table were established to discuss social and civil issues. The first EU-India think-tank seminar declared that the EU and India share common goals in the battle against poverty and the welfare of marginalized sections of society. An EU-India Economic Cross Cultural Programme (ECCP) was initiated, with the overall objective of strengthening and enhancing civil society links and cross-cultural cooperation through dialogue between European and Indian media and cultural organizations and by supporting educational and cultural activities. The European Union Film Festival held in New Delhi (6–13 October) and Kolkata (19–25 October) 2000, on the theme of “The City,” and the parallel conference on “Cities of Tomorrow” demonstrated mutual concerns over urban planning and sustainable development. Jawaharlal Nehru University’s European Studies Programme, with an EC support of 590,000 euros (approximately 30 million rupees), an EC contribution of 200 million euros to the Indian universal elementary education program, and attempts by scholars and the media to change stereotypical depictions of an underdeveloped India in the European media all pointed to the emergence of closer social and cultural ties.

Political and strategic concerns. At the political and strategic level, India and the EU have shared values of democracy, pluralism, commitment to multilateralism, the reformation of international organizations, and a common concern over terrorism and the protection of human rights. According to the EU-India Joint Statement on Political Dialogue adopted in 1994, both sides are committed to defending democracy, human rights, and a peaceful, stable, and just international order in accordance with the UN Charter. In the Declaration against International Terrorism made on 23 November 2001, India and the EU reiterated their commitment to cooperation against international terrorism.

Science and technology. India’s inability to realize its goal of complete self-reliance, and the failure of the EU to match the United States and Japan in science and technology during the last half century, provided a foundation for bilateral cooperation in that field. The Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation adopted by the EU council on 25 June 2002 was based on the principle of mutual benefit and reciprocal opportunities. This agreement will enable both India and the EU to share experience and utilize each other’s technology for

poverty eradication, food security, and environmental sustainability. The conferment of observer status to India at the Council of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) was a sign of cordial and confident bilateral relations. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been another mutually beneficial area of cooperation between the EU and India, both jointly agreeing to establish the Software Service Support and Education Center at Bangalore to promote India-EU joint ventures in information technology. The Joint EU-India Vision Statement on Development of the Information Society adopted on 23 November 2001 led to the establishment of the EU-India Working Group on the Information Society, which will work toward enhancing human capacity development, knowledge creation and sharing, and training in related fields.

Trade and economy. At the first bilateral summit, low levels of trade and the need for joint efforts to increase its potential were stressed. A joint initiative was adopted, in which four sectors were specified for potential investment: food processing, engineering, telecommunications, and IT. India exports textiles, jewelry, leather goods, chemicals, and agricultural products to the EU, while India imports chemicals, engineering goods, metal products, and transportation equipment from the EU. After the process of liberalization, and thanks to multilateral trading under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), EU-India trade increased from 9,975 million euros in 1991 to 25,032 million euros in 2001, a phenomenal growth of 150 percent. By 2003 the EU accounted for a quarter of India's imports and exports and was the largest source of foreign direct investment.

Areas of Divergence

WTO. Though the WTO has brought about greater trade at the multilateral level, the historical legacy of development process has made the WTO negotiations as a point of confrontation for both the sides. As a developed market the EU is seeking greater tariff reduction and more trade facilitation while representing the interests of developing countries. India always supported tariff reduction and inclusion of larger issues within the WTO ambit only after the phased elimination of support subsidies to the farmers of the developed countries. These differences were evident in the Fifth Ministerial Conferences of the WTO at Cancun and later negotiations.

Nuclear nonproliferation. After India's nuclear tests in 1998, nuclear nonproliferation has been an issue of contention between India and the EU. The joint communiqué of the second EU-India summit reiterated "unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons." However, India has a

principled stand against any discriminatory approach to nuclear nonproliferation. The EU as a whole had reacted sharply and bitterly against India's nuclear tests and expects unconditional acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which India has refused to accept. After five years of tests, it is still not clear whether India and the EU will be able to accommodate and adjust to each other's positions on this issue.

International power relations. India and the EU have their own realistic interests and perceptions of international power relations, and their consequent behavioral differences have affected their relations. Principally, India has always perceived the EU as the shadow of the United States, while India is perceived by the EU as a strategic ally of Russia. India has, moreover, consistently opposed undemocratic practices in governing international institutions, primarily the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. The EU is not ready to forgo the superiority built up by its members in creating these institutions. On the question of its own bilateral relations with Pakistan, India has consistently opposed the EU's policy of collaborating with military rulers in the international war against terrorism.

India has genuine concerns over the violence abetted by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, the reformation of the UN and the WTO, and the regional protectionist policies of the EU in agriculture and textile sectors. At the same time, the perception of India as a strategic and business partner is still largely negative within the EU. India is considered a country with administrative impediments and unethical, nontransparent practices in trade-related matters. At the political level, India is known as a country with uncertain and inconsistent policies due to enormous domestic pressures and constraints. India will have to speed up its internal reforms in social and economic matters, while building a positive image as democratic and commercially vibrant country. It will have to review its policy of focusing only on the EU's larger countries, like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, while ignoring smaller countries of enormous trade potential, like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. More importantly, both sides will have to transcend the historical legacy of colonialism and the inherent conflicts between developed and developing countries, and they will have to strengthen communications and institutional mechanisms to address their mutual disagreements and concerns.

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EXTERNAL DEBT POLICY, 1952–1990 India chronically suffered from a shortage of resources necessary to finance a rising rate of investment required to yield a growing rate of income growth. India’s planned program of economic development began in 1952, with its First Five-Year Plan. Being a low-income country, its savings were inadequate to finance investment. Its difficulties were compounded because India needed foreign exchange to supplement its domestic savings to pay for the import of goods, essential for sustaining the rising investment rate. The growth of the domestic savings rate since the 1950s was impressive, but it was not sufficient to fully support the investment required to sustain rapid growth. Foreign resources were not easily forthcoming, as India’s exports were far below its import requirements, thereby impelling it to seek foreign assistance. The balance of payments difficulties and the resultant increase in foreign indebtedness that India faced were, therefore, not a temporary phenomenon but inevitable throughout the process of development, with its calculated strategy to keep the rate of investment consistently above the rate of saving.

During the First Plan, 1951–1956, external assistance served two functions: it would make available adequate supplies of foreign exchange to finance imports; and it would supplement the investment resources the country could raise on its own. The balance of payments did not present problems during the First Plan period. Foreign saving as a proportion of total investment turned out to be 4.6 percent, while the external debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio averaged 2.05 percent during the period.

The Second Plan, 1956–1961, which put greater emphasis on industrialization, entailed a larger amount of foreign exchange. Of the estimated current account deficit of 11 billion rupees during 1956–1961, 8 billion rupees was assumed to be met by external assistance. The plan, however, ran into unexpected balance of payments difficulties from the very start, and had to be reappraised in 1958, signaling a turning point in India’s external position. Stringent restrictions were imposed on less essential imports, and its own foreign exchange reserves were drawn down to the largest extent of 6 billion rupees during the Second Plan period. In addition, external assistance of the order of 8.72 billion rupees was provided in the public as well as private sectors, besides commodity imports of 5.34 billion rupees under the commodity assistance program and borrowings from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 55 billion rupees. The external debt/GDP ratio increased to 8.06 percent during the Second Plan period.

The Third Plan, 1961–1966, reflected some rethinking in India’s external financing strategy, highlighting self-sustaining growth as a major goal. While it envisaged that normal capital flows would continue, it set out the contours of the concept of self-reliance. The main elements of this concept were import substitution, with the expansion of capital goods and infrastructure industries on a scale that would enable the country to produce domestically the bulk of capital goods and machinery as well as consumer goods, and a well-defined export strategy. It therefore called for the maximum rate of investment and a change in its structure so as to secure an increase in national income of over 5 percent per annum. Accordingly, gross external assistance of 32 billion rupees was allowed for the Third Plan period, with the assistance net of repayments and liabilities arising from Public Law 480 (PL 480) imports and loans to the private sector being around 22 billion rupees. The Third Plan projection, however, went awry, partly because of its unrealistic nature and misconceived domestic and macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies, and partly because of the Indo-Pakistani hostilities that broke out in 1965.

The same policy was continued during the Fourth Plan (1969–1974), more or less, with additional emphasis

on doing away with concessional imports of food grains under the commodity assistance program by 1971. The goal was to reduce net foreign aid to one-half the Third Plan level. External debt to GDP ratio was 13.6 percent during the Fourth Plan.

The Fifth Plan (1974–1979) strategy was based on massive exports growth and on containing imports. By the time the plan was adopted, however, the scenario had changed. Owing to a hike in oil prices and a sharp increase in the import prices of certain other important commodities, like fertilizers and food grains, the size of external assistance was pushed up to over 58 billion rupees from the original estimate of about 24 billion rupees. External debt to GDP ratio averaged 13.4 percent during this plan period.

The Sixth Plan (1980–1985) also saw a major change in the pattern of foreign borrowings, which until the end of the 1970s had contained a bulk of concessional foreign assistance. First, nonconcessional flows accounted for a growing proportion of official borrowings. Second, direct borrowings by financial institutions and the private sector grew substantially, unlike in the previous period of planned development. These factors, combined with outstanding borrowings from the IMF and nonresident Indian (NRI) deposits (transfer of funds by Indians living outside India) raised substantially the average cost of foreign debt, and consequently the external debt to GDP ratio spurted up to 15.5 percent. The situation did not improve during the Seventh Plan period (1985–1990). An increase in imports from hard currency areas; diversion of a substantial part of India's exports to Eastern European, Soviet-dominated countries with nonconvertible currencies; and a shift to high cost commercial debt sharply increased India's hard currency external debt.

The current account deficit of 29 percent during this period, which was widening rapidly, was financed by way of external assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors, 24 percent by commercial borrowings, 23 percent through nonresident deposits under the Foreign Currency Non Resident Account plan and Non Resident External Rupee Account, about 13 percent from other capital transactions, and the remaining by a draw-down of foreign currency reserves. External debt to GDP ratio as a result doubled to 30 percent, with foreign savings as a proportion of investment reaching 11.2 percent.

India was the fourth-largest debtor (after Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia) among developing countries at the end of March 1991. India's total outstanding external debt, including the use of IMF credit and short-term credit, stood at U.S.\$71.6 billion at the end of March 1991, steadily increasing from about \$8.9 billion in 1971. In terms of the share of total outstanding debt in GNP at

29.2 percent, it was lower than that of Mexico (36.9 percent) and Indonesia (66.4 percent) but higher than Brazil's 28.8 percent. The vulnerability of the Indian economy by the end of 1990 was reflected in large debt service payments on its huge stock of external debt. India's debt service ratio in 1991, at 30.6 percent, was nearly equal to Brazil's 30.8 percent and Mexico's 30.9 percent and was higher than the average of 27.6 percent for the moderately indebted low income countries group.

India's Approach to External Debt Policy

Until the beginning of the Fifth Plan, there was almost total reliance on official, especially multilateral flows, mainly on concessional terms and recourse to IMF facilities to meet extraordinary situations such as the drought of the 1960s and the oil shocks of the early and late 1970s. Thus, until the 1980s, external financing was confined to external assistance, mostly on concessional terms. The plan strategy was interventionist and biased against exports. This was an era of perpetual foreign exchange shortage, and foreign resources to a developing country like India, where reliance continued to be on external borrowings, was not easily forthcoming. The policy was to approach the developed countries and the World Bank group with an accent on soft terms of interest and other conditions governing loan repayment. In terms of multilateral financing, the relationship with the World Bank and its soft loan window, the International Development Association (IDA), evolved since the beginning of planning. Until 1979 IDA loans formed between 70 to 80 percent of loans from the World Bank group. These loans were at highly concessional rates and for very long maturities. Between 1980 and 1990, the World Bank loan component increased to about 50 percent of the total loans from the World Bank group, of which India was the largest debtor. Since 1958 the World Bank organized the Aid-to-India consortium, consisting of the World Bank group and thirteen other countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The consortium was formed to coordinate aid and establish priorities among the major sources of foreign assistance. Consortium aid was bilateral government-to-government, and the loans from the World Bank group were loans given for specific projects.

The trends in external debt reflected the evolution of external debt policy during the plan periods. Until the end of the 1960s, the composition of India's external debt was characterized by the predominance of long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt. Bilateral debt comprised about 75 percent of the total debt, while multilateral debt accounted for about 20 percent. The 1970s

saw a shift in the composition of the official debt with the share of bilateral debt progressively reduced to about 50 percent. There was a shift from the official debt toward borrowings from private sources during the 1980s. The composition of official debt itself changed, with the share of bilateral debt decreasing sharply. As a consequence of the above two developments, the terms of borrowing, including maturity, interest rate, and the grace period, turned harder. Short-term debt increased during the latter half of the 1980s. Commercial borrowings accelerated, particularly during the latter half of the 1980s. This increased the cost of debt and reduced the average maturities of the debt portfolio. “Scarce” foreign exchange was also sought through a number of nonresident deposit plans, which offered higher rates of interest relative to prevailing international rates and, in addition, exchange guarantees. This change in strategy proved to be unsustainable toward the end of the 1980s, and in 1990, when the Gulf oil crisis erupted, the government was unable to roll over the short-term debt and commercial borrowings, which coincided with withdrawal of “hot” NRI deposits, which had initially flown in to take advantage of arbitrage in interest rates. India went into a crisis in August 1991 and resorted to use of IMF resources. Since 1991, its debt policy also changed, with de-emphasis on debt-creating flows and greater focus on

nondebt creating investment flows, that is, equity. Even among debt flows, limits were imposed on commercial borrowings and within more stringent limits on short-term debt. The high interest and exchange-guaranteed nonresident deposits were dismantled. The current NRI deposits offer interest rates around prevailing international rates, and the exchange rate risk is being borne by the depositor.

Since the mid-1990s, India has surpassed the era of chronic foreign exchange shortages. India now has a strong economy, which attracts foreign capital—short- and long-term, equity and debt funds—under market determined conditions.

A. Prasad

See also **Capital Market; Economic Reforms of 1991; Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991**

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FAMILY LAW AND CULTURAL PLURALISM

India's family laws, also called personal or customary laws, govern features of family life such as marriage, separation, divorce and its consequences, maintenance for children and other dependents, inheritance, adoption, and guardianship. Independent India retained many aspects of the plural family law system of the British colonial period as a means of cultural accommodation within its multicultural society, especially concerning the accommodation of Muslims. Different family laws govern India's major religious groups—Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, and Jews—as well as many tribal peoples. Hindu family law also governs those who follow religions of South Asian origin, such as Sikhism and Jainism.

Indian legal pluralism is in tension with the secular commitments of the Indian state, and with the constitutional aim to promote gender equality as the various family law systems uphold unequal gender relations. India's political elite attempted to resolve these tensions in the first decade after independence, through the partial homogenization and reform of Hindu law, the introduction of optional marriage laws in a Special Marriage Act and a constitutional commitment to introduce a uniform civil code to govern all Indians. These policy choices restricted the state's social engineering, however, to Hindu law. They appeared likely to limit efforts to promote gender equality through legal change, particularly through changes in the laws governing the religious minorities as such changes were supposedly left to the initiative of unspecified representatives of these groups, who in practice were often conservative religious and political elites. The price of Indian legal pluralism reflects the problems seen in most multicultural arrangements, in which laws justified in terms of enabling cultural pluralism do not necessarily reflect group norms or

practices. The scope for legal change is limited even if citizens demand changes in gender-biased group laws.

Complete legal pluralism involves the application of distinct laws to different cultural groups in all areas of social life, adjudication by distinctive community courts, and a lack of reference to common principles (such as those recognized by international human rights law or national constitutions) in making and implementing law. Where religious groups are the social units to which distinctive laws apply, religious leaders, religious scholars, and priests are the main or sole agents of lawmaking and adjudication. Legal pluralism is only partial in India in many respects. The laws governing Indians are uniform, other than those concerning family life. Indian judiciaries, largely trained in Western legal traditions, are the main agents of adjudication in all disputes brought to state courts. Aside from the state's judiciary, different religious and cultural groups have their own community leaders who act as adjudicative agents, the community institutions involved in adjudication include Hindu caste associations, Muslim prayer groups (*jamaats*), and local Christian churches and Parsi temples. Individual religious figures, caste leaders, and popularly recognized informal judges also adjudicate family disputes.

The complex nature of Indian legal pluralism provides some room for changes in family law, even while impeding rapid transformation. Over the last generation, Parliament changed the provisions governing all Indians for the prohibition of dowry, and for maintenance payments to indigent women upon separation or divorce. It made divorce easier for Hindus and Christians, including on grounds of mutual consent. Some state legislatures gave daughters the right to demand the partition of ancestral property so that they could access their shares, equal to those of sons, that the law assures them.

Prompted by the growth of public interest litigation, especially since the “National Emergency” of the mid-1970s, the judiciary initiated more changes in family law by interpreting some statutes and features of nonstatutory law in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution. The judiciary changed family law more often than legislatures did, and sometimes prompted subsequent legislative change. This was true, for instance, of the changes introduced in the grounds on which Hindus and Christians could seek divorce, and in the alimony rights of Muslim women.

A Comparison of Hindu and Muslim Law

Many aspects of Indian family law are misunderstood. It is widely believed that the legislative reform of Hindu law in the 1950s made it secular and more conducive to gender equality, more so than the family laws of other groups, particularly Muslims. Many claim that the secularization and homogenization of family law is the only route to greater gender equality.

After the Hindu law reforms of the 1950s, statutes governed more areas of Hindu law than Muslim law. But, religious texts and beliefs influenced these reforms, for instance, the introduction of divorce rights. In addition, these reforms weakened the rights of some women, for instance, the rights of widows to shares in their former husbands’ property if they chose to remarry. They further weakened the divorce rights of some Hindu women, who previously could get divorces more easily based on the recognized customs of their castes, and the property rights of others that were governed by matrilineal inheritance laws earlier.

While legislation of the 1950s partly homogenized the major features of Hindu law, the Shariat Act of 1937 had the same effect earlier on Muslim law. It made “Muslim law” applicable to most areas of family life among Indian Muslims (while leaving the content of Muslim law unspecified), and in the process overrode the customs of some Muslim subgroups that had enjoyed legal recognition until then. Partial homogenization was effected in ways that increased the rights of Muslim women more often than it did the rights of Hindu women. This was true, for instance, of the inheritance rights of Muslim women. Daughters gained rights to half the shares that sons enjoyed in their parents’ property, in contrast with previously having no rights to inherit parental property. Although no statutes specified these rights, they were recognized in Islam’s founding texts as well as in later Islamic jurisprudence, and the Indian judiciary followed these prescriptions in adjudication.

Muslim law is far less codified than Hindu law. Only three short statutes pertain to Muslim law in India: two

that outline the divorce and alimony rights of women, and the Shariat Act, which in effect leaves the content of Indian Muslim law to the judiciary’s discretion. In contrast, four elaborate acts define the major features of Hindu law. Judges refer far more often to religious sources in adjudicating cases involving Muslims than those involving Hindus.

While Muslim law is less codified and more closely linked to religious sources than Hindu law, the rights of Muslim women are superior to those of Hindu women in some respects. This is true of a daughter’s inheritance rights. Hindu daughters have rights to share equally with sons in intestate succession to their parents’ self-earned property, in contrast with Muslim daughters, who have rights to only half the shares that Muslim sons enjoy. However, the succession rights of Hindu daughters are restricted to intestate cases, that is, cases in which the parent did not leave a will. Hindu parents are free to will self-earned property as they wish, typically leaving all or most of such property to their sons, or perhaps other male kin. Male coparcenaries, moreover, control ancestral Hindu property in much of India, and daughters do not have any right to demand the partition of such property so that they may control their shares. (They gained this right since the mid-1980s only in five states.) This gives Hindu women little effective access to most forms of family property.

Muslim daughters have the right to half the shares left to sons in all forms of parental property. Muslim parents cannot deny their daughters rights to inherit shares in their property by willing self-earned property to male kin alone, or by effectively presenting more of the property they own as being of ancestral origin. While many do so, their daughters can effectively challenge such disinheritance in the courts. Hindu daughters have no legal recourse under such circumstances in much of India.

Muslim women had fewer rights in other respects than did Hindu women at different points. For instance, until recently, most Indian courts recognized the unconditional right of Muslim men to unilaterally divorce their wives, without giving Muslim women similar rights. In contrast, statutory Hindu law allows divorce based only on mutual consent, or if a spouse is found guilty of a “fault” such as cruelty, desertion, or adultery. From 1973 onward, indigent Hindu women had the right to alimony until their remarriage or death. Many courts did not recognize the right of divorced Muslim women to maintenance from their ex-husbands beyond a three-month period after divorce. The courts allow Muslim men to marry up to four wives (while not permitting polyandry), while Hindu law bans bigamy. The ban on Hindu bigamy is, however, not very effective, as the courts set high standards to recognize

the validity of bigamous Hindu marriages. Public debate has highlighted the ways in which Muslim women have fewer rights than Hindu women, though not vice versa, reflecting the recent growth of Hindu nationalism, the widespread vision of Muslims as marginal to Indian citizenry, and the limited understanding of Muslim law.

The limited codification of Muslim law gave judges greater autonomy to initiate legal change, and the judiciary used this autonomy to address some of the gender inequalities in Muslim law over the last generation. The Supreme Court (India's apex court) recognized the alimony rights of Muslim women and placed conditions for the validity of unilateral Muslim male divorce in two landmark judgments in 2001 and 2002. It decreed earlier that bigamy was a ground on which Muslim women could claim divorce, without criminalizing Muslim bigamy. As the apex court defines the law for the lower courts, these judgments made the alimony rights of Muslim women the same as those of non-Muslim women. They also meant that there was similar room for unilateral male divorce among Hindus and Muslims. While Hindu law does not explicitly recognize unilateral divorce, it permits divorce if a couple did not live together for a year after a decree of judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, a provision used by many Hindu men but very few Hindu women.

Feasible Routes to Change

Recent judicial reforms in Muslim law indicate some routes available for changes in Indian family law that would give women greater rights. Judges introduced these reforms with reference to early and more recent Islamic religious and jurisprudential traditions, statutory Muslim law, and features of the Indian constitution (the fundamental rights to life, equality, and dignity). Their reference to constitutional principles did not lead them toward the secularization or homogenization of family law, yet enabled greater gender equality. Other judicial and legislative changes in Hindu and Christian law followed this pattern. For instance, divorce was made possible for Christian women on grounds other than adultery, because Protestants had long accepted divorce on such grounds, and even Catholic Church leaders came to support the right of Christian women to seek divorce under conditions of spousal cruelty or desertion. The recent legal changes effected convergence in some features of the different Indian family laws, and were restricted to some of the gender inequalities in family law.

While more Hindus (especially Hindu nationalists) demand a uniform civil code (UCC), consensus has not yet emerged about the content of a UCC. Many Hindus are likely to resist a UCC that favors much greater gender

equality, and others to resist a UCC that draws from the different existing family laws and associated cultural traditions. If change in family law occurs within a framework of legal pluralism, this is partly because of the changing patterns of mobilization regarding family law policy. The introduction of a UCC was a major demand of women's organizations and other civic associations aiming to promote gender justice until the 1980s. This goal seemed increasingly unrealistic, however, with the passage of time. Hindu nationalists particularly embraced the demand for a UCC after the Congress Party government, under Rajiv Gandhi, appeared to give in to conservative Muslim pressure to overturn in 1986 earlier judicial reforms that gave Muslim women permanent alimony rights (the Shah Bano case). Many women's organizations shifted their focus, from demanding a UCC to promoting gender-equalizing reform within the context of legal pluralism, because of their desire to avoid an association with the Hindu nationalists.

While some key legislators engaged in making family law have belonged to parties that demand a UCC, their legislative initiatives have been for piecemeal changes that do not clearly move family law toward homogenization. Along with resistance from the religious minorities and the tribal peoples to a UCC, and resistance among many individuals in all religious and ethnic groups to the promotion of gender equality, the recent orientations of the major policy-making agents suggest the likelihood of gradual, halting gender-equalizing change, within the context of legal pluralism, in the foreseeable future.

Narendra Subramanian

See also Development Politics; Gender and Human Rights

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FAMINES Famines, defined as large-scale episodes of acute starvation, were a frequent occurrence in South Asia until the mid-twentieth century. In 1770 nearly a third of the population of Bengal died due to a famine. Around 1877 about 4 million lives were lost, mainly in Bombay and Madras presidencies. In 1896–1897, more than 5 million perished, and in 1943, more than a million died in Bengal's famine. The incidence of mass starvation leading to death diminished substantially in the post–World War II period. Devastations of such magnitude had long-term demographic, economic, social, and political consequences, raising two questions: Were famines in this region a product of natural disasters or the result of human agency? Why did famines disappear after 1943?

Although famines have a long history in the region, some of the best-documented episodes of famine in India occurred after British rule began. The 1769–1770 famine in Bengal occurred five years after British takeover of taxation rights in the province. That famine reportedly followed two years of erratic rainfall, but was clearly worsened by the ruthless efficiency of the new regime in collecting land taxes, and by a smallpox epidemic. The 1812–1813 famine in western India, which particularly affected the Kathiawar region, came in the wake of several years of crop losses attributed to attacks by locusts and rats. The legendary Guntur famine of 1832–1833 followed crop failure as well as excessive and uncertain levels of taxation on peasants. In at least three episodes in nineteenth-century western India—in 1819–1820 in Broach, 1820–1822 in Sind, and 1853 in Thana and Colaba—famines were caused by monsoon flooding and resultant crop loss. The 1865–1867 famine in coastal Orissa followed several seasons of erratic rainfall, but was worsened by the persistent refusal of the local administration to import food. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, major famines causing in excess of a million deaths occurred three times: 1876–1878, 1896–1897, and 1899–1900. In each case, there was a crop failure of unusual intensity in the Deccan plateau, possibly the most famine-prone region in India.

In the twentieth century, major famines were fewer. In 1907–1908, an extensive crop failure and epidemic threat was effectively tackled by state relief machinery. Food procurement for World War II, combined with a crop failure, caused perhaps the harshest famine of the twentieth century, the 1943 Bengal famine.

Causes: Food Availability and Entitlement

A section of the colonial bureaucracy believed that famines were expressions of a Malthusian imbalance between resources and population in the region, the impact of which colonial relief efforts helped mitigate. Whatever the merits of that view, an element of high risk was indeed intrinsic to the resource endowment of the region. The greater part of the Indian subcontinent combines three months of monsoon rains with extreme aridity the rest of the year, which dries up much of the surface water. The rains make growing one crop relatively easy, but growing another crop is dependent upon irrigation systems that need to harvest groundwater or to transport water from long distances and are, therefore, relatively expensive. The dependence on a natural supply of water increased the risk of crop failure, and single-cropping reduced security against the failure of the monsoon crop. El Niño-type disturbances of the tropical oceanic atmospheric systems could make rainfall more unpredictable. Sudden and large-scale scarcities of food, therefore, were potentially part of the cycle of India's agricultural production.

Nationalist critics of British colonialism in India believed the scale of mortality during the nineteenth-century famines resulted from imperial economic policies. The argument consisted of two parts, an assertion that the intensity of famines increased in the nineteenth century, and a belief that British trade and taxation policies were primarily responsible. Land taxes were believed to be too high. Food exports were believed to increase food shortages for the local population, while nonfood crop exports encouraged farmers to give up food production. Both factors raised food prices. The colonial administration answered these charges by arguing that in fact foreign trade stabilized prices, since exports increased in times of low prices, and fell in times of high prices. Recent research on this question has found support for the thesis that foreign trade did stabilize food availability and prices.

While both these perspectives identified mass starvation with absolute scarcity of food, more recently the relationship between food availability and starvation has been recast in the more general “entitlement” approach advanced by Amartya Sen. In this view, access to food depends on an individual's entitlement to food by means of direct production, market purchase, or gifts and transfers. It is possible to consider scenarios in which food supplies are adequate, but certain groups face large declines in market-based or transfer-based entitlements to food. Famines can be caused by the inability to buy food or a collapse of transfers, even as food availability does not fall. The Bengal famine of 1943, and perhaps several other “war famines” in India, seem to illustrate this view.



Food for Work Program, Rajasthan. Since the 1960s, India has developed a number of comprehensive programs to address the poverty and famine resulting from severe drought. In this 1986 photo, women in hard-hit Rajasthan queue up for supplies as part of a rural Food for Work program. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Consequences

Consistent with the predictions of the entitlement approach, the effect of famines varied according to livelihood, gender, and social status. Further, famines affected both livelihood and demographic patterns, and through these effects could delay a return to normal conditions even as the proximate cause of the famine disappeared.

Crop failures affected artisans and wage workers in the rural areas much harder than the peasants. The latter usually had some stocks of food. But laborers were unable to obtain food as soon as food prices increased, because money wages were poorly indexed. The association between food prices and famine mortality, therefore, was a strong one. The effect of food prices on the incidence of rural poverty persisted in the late twentieth century, even as famines or starvation deaths became less frequent. Artisan incomes too declined during famines, for households stopped buying anything other than food with the onset of a famine. The 1876 famine drove large numbers of rural laborers and hand-loom weavers of

South India to enlist for emigration to British tropical colonies abroad. The 1896 and 1899 famines again encouraged permanent migration. Famines also affected land transfers between the poor and the richer peasants, but these effects are not well researched.

The two late nineteenth-century famines (1876–1878 and 1896–1898) had severe impacts on population growth rates. For example, almost the entire expected natural increment in population in Madras and Bombay presidencies between 1871 and 1881 was carried off by the excess mortality from 1876 to 1878. In both these episodes, the first few months after a harvest failure saw a rise in food prices, followed by a decrease in conceptions due to famine amenorrhea, and a rise in deaths. Deaths were more common among men, who left home in search of work, among children and the elderly, and among the lower castes. Short-distance migration increased during a famine, and caused severe health crises. Almost always, crop failure drove people to change diets and forage for food in the forests and commons. In

the first few months of starvation, more fodders and seeds were consumed, and livestock mortality therefore increased. Toward the end of a famine, epidemic diseases claimed lives. Sustained malnutrition reduced biological resistance to smallpox, plague, cholera, pneumonia, and diarrhea, and left the population susceptible to malarial death. Ironically, the spread of malaria was sometimes attributed to waterlogging due to the construction of irrigation canals as part of famine relief measures. These demographic conditions, together with the shortage of livestock and seeds, made any return to normal cultivation difficult even as the rains came back. After a famine ended, the mean age at marriage for women declined somewhat, marital fertility and birth rates tended to rise above average, and death rates fell below average.

Famines also created social stresses. Food riots, burglaries and raids, mob violence, and the sale of children increased, causing a rush of convicts into the prisons. Ironically, prisons were the only places where food was easily available.

Famine Policy

In the early nineteenth century, the British East India Company left famine relief largely to the native princes. The very real prospect of famines had encouraged the construction of state granaries in pre-colonial India, which were used for relief purposes. Common measures to prevent the occurrence of famines included the building of irrigation tanks and canals. On a more limited scale, private and temple charity were also at work. However, both the granaries and the private systems were localized, whereas the incidence of starvation was widely dispersed.

In the second and the third quarters of the nineteenth century, a discourse emerged in administrative circles on the need for building irrigation works and for the restoration of disused tanks as insurance against future famines. However, a clear policy in this regard did not take shape until 1880–1881. There was resistance within the administration to expenditure on irrigation, which, it was felt, brought uncertain returns. State agency in relief, it was sometimes argued, interfered with the agency of the market in bringing food to the needy. The ferocity of the 1876 famine, brought home by a series of influential books and articles in English, reduced such resistance.

Between 1876 and 1896, a state relief infrastructure was put in place in British India. The main elements of the policy were relief camps, where starving persons could receive food in exchange for labor at public works projects, such as the construction of railways or irrigation canals. A Famine Insurance Fund was started in 1881, out of which relief-related expenditures were to be funded. The relief camp was not unknown in 1876, but its effectiveness during

that episode was in serious dispute. Its scale was limited, the labor requirement was rarely enforced due to a shortage of supervisors, and entry was based on the degree of distress, which was hard to define and subject to abuse. By the end of the century, however, the relief camp was a well-established institution in Madras and Bombay presidencies, and could mobilize thousands of laborers for construction works. The Famine Commission of 1881 outlined the relief policy, and the provincial Famine Codes wrote detailed instructions for local administrations to follow. If the relief camps were efficient in mobilizing labor, they were not very effective in averting large-scale mortality. Many seekers of relief, such as the artisans, could not offer the kind of labor the camps wanted and paid for. Some did not want to eat the same food as others due to caste prejudices. Women often avoided the camps. The Famine Codes became progressively lengthier to accommodate this heterogeneity.

With the exception of the 1943 “war famine” in Bengal, famines causing large mortality more or less disappeared in twentieth-century India. The state relief system functioned much better. The spread of irrigation and multiple cropping stabilized food availability. In the interwar period, internal markets were efficient in carrying food from excess supply to shortage regions. Easier migration contributed to this process. The railway network, in facilitating these movements of goods and labor, had a mitigating impact. Along with market efficiency, there was a change in political attitudes. Free markets in food came to an end at about the time of World War II. The government during the war and subsequent governments in independent India controlled food trade. Exercise of state power in the former case led to a famine. Exercise of state power in the latter period prevented any recurrence.

Serious and large-scale erosion of access to food did recur in India briefly in 1966–1967, but had no significant impact on mortality. Starvation deaths, though rarer, continue to occur in parts of the arid zones poorly served by irrigation and transportation. While large-scale starvation deaths became less frequent in post-independence India, malnutrition has persisted.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Poverty and Inequality**

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FEDERALISM AND CENTER-STATE RELATIONS

The achievements of Indian federalism are quite astounding and counterintuitive. Despite the multiplicity of social and ethnic divisions, federal institutions have survived. In the 1940s and 1950s, language was a divisive issue, but since the implementation of linguistic states, language movements have been domesticated and multilingualism and bilingualism can be found in most regions of the country. Secessionist movements in Punjab and in the Northeast region have evolved into movements of regional autonomy, seeking recompense from the central government rather than independence. Despite fiscal stresses and strains, central revenue capacity continues to hold in India; tax revolts of the kind witnessed in Russia or Brazil are unheard of. A majority of India's regional units have well-developed democratic systems with regular elections, party competition, and regional parties. Regionalization of the polity has proceeded in tandem with democratization, so that new regional forces representing hitherto unprivileged sections of society—for example, the Bahujan Samaj Party—have acquired strong roots in some states such as Uttar Pradesh, and new parties—Lok Shakti in Karnataka, for example—have arisen to challenge the monopoly of political power enjoyed by existing political formations. Most citizens' strong regional identities coexist with their pan-Indian identities; in India there is no zero-sum relation between national and regional identities. Did federalism play a major role in these transformations? Federalism is ultimately a formal institution insofar as it refers to a set of constitutional provisions, but in the Indian case, its ethnic and socioeconomic roots give it a substantive and societal basis not necessarily found in other federations. Also, in the 1990s, federalism has become livelier and more dynamic, embedded within larger political and economic changes currently underway in India.

Ideas about Regional Autonomy, Central Power, and Federalism

Federalism in India is not merely a set of institutions, but a set of evolving ideas and practices about how the balance of central and local power should be organized, and subnational movements perceived. At the center of

the discourse around regional autonomy and central authority are the notions of state stability, the political unity of India's boundaries, and the concept of the Indian nation.

During the formation of India's Constitution, debates concerning relations between the central government and the provinces were contentious and extensive. India's Constituent Assembly debated whether to institutionalize a strong center or strong states, and what procedures were to govern the relations among them. The nature of pre-independence religious conflicts organized across territory (Punjab, Kashmir, and Bengal) and partition played major roles in generating and shaping ideas about the federal Constitution in India.

One dominant theme of India's Constituent Assembly was whether giving power to regional units would threaten the unity of India, and whether the principle of cultural autonomy and self-determination was contradictory to "national unity." Some argued that India needed to embody "one corporate nation, a homogenous nation," while others suggested that cultural autonomy and national unity could be made consistent with each other. B. R. Ambedkar, the leader of the Dalit community and the chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, argued that while he was an advocate of a "strong united Centre," in the present circumstances, "it would not be prudent, it would not be wise," since the problem was "how to make the heterogeneous mass we have today" make a decision "in common."

In December 1946 the Objectives Resolution moved by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru affirmed that the Constitution of an "undivided country" would allow the regional units to "retain the status of autonomous units" in a substantial manner. Immediately after Viceroy Lord Mountbatten announced his partition plan on 3 June 1947, the Constituent Assembly decided in favor of writing a Constitution with provisions for a strong center. Earlier, the term "Federation of India" had been used, but it was replaced by the term "the Union of India." This terminology was meant to clarify that the federation was not the result of an agreement by the states to join the Union; therefore, no states had the right to secede from the Union.

After independence, concepts of national integration and "unity in diversity" continued to animate discussions of federalism. Unfortunately, the issue of regional demands was understood as one that challenged the government and national unity. Thus, the central government sought to discipline such demands as well as make them discursively unacceptable. So, regional autonomy movements—in Kashmir, Assam, or Punjab—were framed by the government as challenges to the integrity

of the state, and the enhancement of central government authority was seen in a zero-sum relationship to regional autonomy. In the 1980s, this created enormous strains in managing center-state relations. Since then, the language of terrorism has been inserted into the discourse, and India has instituted many terrorism-related laws, such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Thus, the discursive economy of state power was and continues to be negative toward regional movements, although the state has negotiated much more effectively with intransigents and “terrorists” in recent times.

Formal Institutions of Indian Federalism

India’s federalism, similar to that of Canada and Germany, and in contrast to that of the United States, is framed within a parliamentary system. The Constitution of India is the foundational text that lays out the structure of center-state relations. In addition, certain juridical and legislative initiatives have created institutions that mediate center-state relations.

India’s Constitution has been described as “quasi-federal,” in that it frames many centralist features within a federal framework. The primary articles (Seventh Schedule of the Constitution) demarcate authority between the states and the center: a Union List, a State List, and a Concurrent List. While most key subjects such as defense and national infrastructure are controlled by the Union government, many important subjects are controlled by the states: law and order, agriculture, and health. Residual powers remain with the central government.

This center-state allocation of powers was dominated by a highly centralist provision—Article 356, referred to as President’s Rule—that allows the national cabinet to disband a state legislature under certain conditions. A related constitutional provision that seeks to ensure central control is the role played by the governor, the appointed head of each regional government. In the 1970s and 1980s, the role of the governors became controversial as central rulers used their services to discipline states ruled by the political opponents of the Congress Party.

It is notable that in the 1990s, the provision of President’s Rule has been challenged, and after a crucial judicial ruling, its institutional force to meddle in the democratic rights of states has declined substantially. In the *S. R. Bommai* judgment in 1994, the Supreme Court ruled against the misuse of Article 356. The unanimous judgment by the nine-judge constitutional bench, delivered on 11 March 1994, further held that any proclamation under Article 356 would be subject to judicial review,

thereby giving the federal compact a new institutional force. This, combined with the changes in India’s party system, has given some leeway to the president to refuse to impose President’s Rule. President K. R. Narayanan in October 1997 returned the Union cabinet’s recommendation to impose President’s Rule in Uttar Pradesh. Again, in 1998, Narayanan refused to support such a recommendation for Bihar. Thus, with changes in India’s party system and the political context of federalism, the power of the provision of President’s Rule to constrain the autonomy of states has been significantly attenuated.

One interesting centralist feature of the Indian Constitution that has nevertheless operated to accommodate regional demands and substate movements can be found in Articles 2, 3, and 4, according to which the national Parliament has extensive powers to reorganize the boundaries of states. These provisions “enable Parliament by law to admit a new state, increase, diminish the area of any state or alter the boundaries or name of any state.” Seemingly a centralist provision, this has allowed a rare flexibility at the heart of Indian federalism so that central institutions can respond to pressure to create new states. In 1955, after the Linguistic Commission gave its recommendation, the provision was used for the first time to create language-based states. Since then, this provision has been used many times, most recently in 2000 to create three new states of Chhatisgarh, Uttaranchal, and Jharkhand, reconstituting Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, respectively. The formation of the new states did arouse some concern that there would be an intensification of demands for the creation of additional states in other parts of the country: Telengana in Andhra Pradesh and Vidarbha in Maharashtra have already staked their claims. Yet, these assessments have lost the power to challenge the basis of central power in India. This means that movements are able to address their demands of regional expression without challenging the integrity of the nation-state; thus, a centralist feature has acquired important decentralizing consequences, making Indian federalism stable. Another distinctive set of institutional features of Indian federalism is a set of asymmetric rules regarding some states, called “Special Category” states. Article 370 gave provincial autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, and other provisions regulated the affairs of the Northeast states. Each of these provisions has given stability to India’s federal institutions.

In addition to such constitutionally mandated rules, some institutions were created in response to demands and pressures from regional elements. In 1983, for example, the Sarkaria Commission was set up to study federal relations in India. The Sarkaria Commission invited responses by all regional governments and opposition

parties. It concluded that India's center-state relations suffered from "administrative over-centralization" and offered moderate changes in India's institutional design. This commission became both a signpost of troubled center-state relations as well as the central government's desire to address some of those problems by a comprehensive assessment. Yet, most of its recommendations (except two) were not implemented.

Cyclical Movements from Centralization to Decentralization

Despite these centralist features, the Indian experience of federalism has moved from strong centralization imperatives to decentralizing ones, and the balance between national and local power has shifted over time. From 1947 to 1964 the central and national institutions held sway, although regional actors and subnational institutions were not trampled over, but rather aggregated in a different combination with central institutions. The dominance of the inheritor of the national movement—the Congress Party—and its ability to integrate and represent provincial interests was crucial to this integration. The relationship between national and local leadership was a mutually dependent one. In developmental terms, the state with its national plans and "rational" allocation across different regional units created a national market and a national development agenda, howsoever imperfect. From 1964 to 1969 the regional impulses held sway, as transitional instability after the death of Nehru and an economic crisis at the state level (food crisis) allowed regional elites—largely strong Congress state leaders—to lay claims on shaping the policies of the national government and the national Congress Party. Thus, tendencies toward localization, factionalization, and ruralization dominated the period between 1964 and 1971.

Yet, Indira Gandhi reasserted executive and personal authority, reorganized the Congress Party, and rearticulated the developmental vision of the central government toward populist policies. She was able to craft a new national majority coalition that, at face value, undermined the power of regional powerbrokers. Thus, from 1971 to 1977, centralization tendencies again seemed dominant in India's polity. After a brief decentralizing interlude, when the Janata government was in power (1977–1980), with Indira Gandhi's return to power, the power of the central government and the Congress Party again seemed dominant. The prime minister intervened violently to control the resurgent Khalistan movement in Punjab and tried to undermine the regional party—the National Conference—in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet many of these centralist attempts backfired and made reconciling regional autonomy with expanding central power imperative. In the 1980s her centralization attempts were

of a different quality, linked with regional concerns and interests more systematically than before; trampling over regional interests was proving more difficult than before in the face of regional resurgence. Thus, the pendulum swings between centralization and decentralization in India's polity were not equally balanced; the center of gravity had begun to shift to localization and decentralization. In a similar vein, the process of consolidating central power always remains tenuous and begins to disintegrate soon after such attempts. In the 1990s, the trend certainly shifted much more toward decentralization or "decentering" (Echeverri-Gent). Changes in India's party system contributed to this shift; it clearly seems that the regionalization imperative in India's policy and political economy has become a stable feature.

The Changing Party System and Federalization

The 1990s witnessed unprecedented changes in the party system: the era of one-party dominance (1947–1989) seems to be over; instead a competitive multiparty system seems here to stay. What is interesting is that the dominance of the Congress Party has not been replaced by another national party (the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, for example) or multiple national parties, but rather by the rise of coalitional politics and the national importance of regional or single-state parties. In 2004, even when the Congress Party returned to power, it did so in a coalitional arrangement. India is undergoing a process of federalization or regionalization of its party system. This process of federalization encompasses multiple dimensions. First, as is apparent from the Table 1, the simple physical presence of regional parties has increased in the national Parliament.

Regional parties have become important in national government formation. Both national parties—BJP and the Congress Party—need the support of regional parties and alliances with regional parties to form a government (this is also apparent after the 2004 elections). Third, national parties have themselves acquired regional personas. This is true of the BJP and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as well as most other national parties. The Congress Party, a national party par excellence, too has had to accommodate to regional pressures in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, where regional formations such as Nationalist Congress Party, Tamil Manila Congress, and Trinamool Congress have weakened its base and national scope.

This emergent reality must be understood as mutually self-enforcing: party system change at the national level (the displacement of Congress party dominance) has evolved in a dialectical relationship with the regionalization of India's polity. While both have independent sources

TABLE 1

| Percentage share of regional parties' seats and votes in the Parliament in the 1990s | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Parties | Lower house election year | | | | | | | |
| | 1991 | | 1996 | | 1998 | | 1999 | |
| | Seats | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | Votes |
| Congress | 42.7 | 36.5 | 25.8 | 28.8 | 26.0 | 25.8 | 21.0 | 28.3 |
| BJP | 22.0 | 20.1 | 29.6 | 20.3 | 33.4 | 25.6 | 33.5 | 23.8 |
| Other national (multi-state) parties | 20.9 | 24.7 | 18.8 | 20.0 | 11.8 | 6.6 | 13.3 | 14.1 |
| Subtotal of national parties | 85.6 | 81.3 | 74.2 | 69.1 | 71.2 | 58.0 | 67 | 66.2 |
| Regional (single state) parties | 6.9 | 9.3 | 20.4 | 17.7 | 26.3 | 26.4 | 26.8 | 23.5 |

Notes: These figures do not total 100 percent, as many small parties and independents are not included.
 Regional and single state parties: Telugu Desam, Samajwadi Party, Shiv Sena, DMK, AIADMK, Biju Janata Dal, National Congress Party, Trinamool Congress, Rashtriya Janata Dal, PMK, Indian National Lok Dal, J& K National Conference, MDMK, and RSP.
 Other national (multistate) parties:
 1991: JD (Janata Dal), JP (Janata Party), LKDB (Lok Dal-Bahugana), CPM, CPI, and ICSS (Indian Congress Socialists)
 1996: CPM, CPI, Samata, Janata Dal, AICC (Tiwari), and Janata Party
 1998: CPM, CPI, Samata, Janata Dal, and BSP
 1999: CPM, CPI, Janata Dal (U), and BSP

SOURCE: Author's calculations from Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952–1995*, New Delhi: Books and Things, 1995; election commission web site available at <<http://eci.gov.in>>; and Rao, G. V. L. Narasimha, and K. Balakrishnan, *Indian Elections: The Nineties*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999.

and origins, they have begun to acquire a mutually reinforcing effect in the late 1990s. Regionalization has speeded up the process of party system change, while the opening up of the national governmental system in the form of coalition governments has allowed important spaces to regional parties, who deploy their national roles and participation to regional ends; this accelerates the process of regionalization even more.

Identity Politics in India's Regions

Indian federal relations have seen an abundance of ethnic and secessionist movements at the subnational level. In the 1940s, the Dravidian movement arose in South India seeking a separate Dravidian state; since then, Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast states (Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland) all have witnessed strong quasi-separatist movements organized around territory, identity, and ethnicity. Many have transformed into regional parties that seek to govern their states (Tamil Nadu, Ghorkaland in West Bengal, and Jharkhand, among many others) by articulating a regional cultural identity; others have continued to be violent and confrontational (Manipur, Kashmir). Most analysts have explained these movements separately.

Economic explanations fail to explain the persistence of regional movements in states such as Punjab and

Assam: while one state has the highest per capita income in India, the other has been one of the most backward states in the country. The level of development (in Punjab) did not prevent confrontational and mobilization movements against the central government; the economic deprivation of Assam and its exploitation by the central government and by economic elites within the state did play a role in enhancing the sense of relative frustration that sparked the rise of an anti-Bengali subnationalist movement. In the late 1980s the United Liberation Front of Assam described India's relationship with Assam as "colonial" and demanded that multinational companies and Indian-owned companies do more for the development of the state. Yet, the Khalistan movement in Punjab arose soon after the "Green Revolution" in a prosperous state. Thus, the rise and persistence of subnationalist movements across different regions needs better explanations and answers.

First, while cultural roots must be incorporated in any analysis, identities in India are not given or ascriptive, but rather can be created and mobilized by political entrepreneurs. Thus, the role of parties and politicians in shaping and activating identities can be important. These instrumental political actors, consciously or unwittingly, not only articulate regional aspirations, but also create or

make available new social spaces for “the reproduction of subnational meanings and political projects” (Baruah 1997, p. 511). Second, understanding the role of society or what is fashionably called “civil society” may be necessary. Yet, analysis of civil society must not be seen as opposed to the role of party and ethnic entrepreneurs. The relationship between party (political organizations) and society may be the key to understanding the nature of and the changing prospects of ethnic regionalist movements. In Tamil Nadu, DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and its various inheritor parties played a major role in shaping Tamil identity over time. Similarly, in Assam, two organizations, the Asom Sahitya Sabha (the Assam Literary Society) and the All Assam Students Union, proved to be crucial. Moreover, the rise of subnationalism is not unrelated to economic processes: urbanization, expansion of communications, literacy, educational institutions, and industrialization. This has been true in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. It is the process of modernization that activated feelings of relative deprivation and frustration among the mobile population of these regions. It is not a coincidence that students played a major role in both Assam’s and Kashmir’s movements. Despite the interactive effects of economic change on cultural identities, economic change has had an independent logic in shaping center-state relations.

Economic Change and Federalism in India

The fiscal structure of the Indian Constitution is quite centralized, as the central government collects most of the taxes and then distributes them to the regional states through the finance commissions that are constituted once every five years for that purpose. The revenue sources of the provinces are limited and inelastic, although the states have been politically constrained not to tap agricultural taxes, further limiting their revenue base. Despite a fiscally centralist Constitution, rapid changes in federal economic relations urge attention to ways in which the economic liberalization process has affected federalism and vice versa.

Federalism and subnational governments have played a major role in shaping the nature of economic liberalization underway in India. First, federalism made economic reform politically sustainable by displacing opposition to reform at the state level. The “energies of economic interests” were dispersed in twenty-six states, leading to fragmentation of opposition along regional lines. This is true for both business interests and labor unions, whose actions, opposition, or protests tend to get “quarantined” within states. Second, federalism encouraged new supporters of reform to emerge from India’s

regions. As subnational governments renewed their efforts to reregulate the central policy of liberalization, they created new coalitions, new interests, and new incentives in favor of reform. Many chief ministers themselves became aggressive supporters of economic reform (for example, Andhra Pradesh’s Chandrababu Naidu, Tamil Nadu’s J. Jayalalitha, and Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh). Regional capitalists or capitalists concentrated in one region of the country began to support liberalization more forcefully than national-level capitalists. This is true of the software capitalists (Infosys, Wipro, and others) based in Karnataka. Interestingly, reform of subnational governance mechanisms was stimulated by these processes.

Simultaneously, economic liberalization further accelerated the process of federalization, prompting “a change in federal relations from intergovernmental cooperation towards interjurisdictional competition among the states” (Saez, p. 135). Basically, competition unleashed by economic liberalization took an interstate form insofar as states began to compete with each other to offer concessions to global and national business actors. While this dynamic had some negative consequences in undermining regional states’ revenue capacities, it ensured some scope for market competition and the disruption of monopoly power of national business classes as well as the national bureaucracy. Both regional business classes and the regional bureaucrats were more supportive of reform than the national civil servants and national business interests.

Thus, economic liberalization has begun to affect the nature of center-state relations quite substantially. New supporters of reform—regional elites—seek participation in the national government and national politics as a means of getting crucial benefits from the liberalization process. The national arena continues to be an important site for their interaction with national resource-rich institutions, as well as access to global actors, such as the World Bank, and global capital. Second, economic reform has unleashed a fiscal crisis that has crucial center-state components. The central government has withdrawn from some of its functions by displacing its public goods responsibilities to the regional states; this creates strong hunger for resources and revenues at the regional level. At the same time, federal transfers to the regions are declining; this implies that the asymmetry between revenues and expenditures at the regional level continues to grow. Fiscal deficits of states in India grew quite substantially in the 1990s, constituting almost 40 percent of the total fiscal deficit. This phenomenon has been stimulated by the ongoing economic reform in India. Further, a “race to the bottom” effect is evident after the onset of economic liberalization, as regional elites shed their

public expenditure responsibilities. Thus, the provision of health, education, and irrigation infrastructure, the responsibility of states in a federal system, suffers much more in federal India than it would in a unitary system undergoing liberalization.

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See also **Political System: Constitution; State Formation**

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FEMALE INFANTICIDE. See **Gender and Human Rights**.

FEMALE SEXUAL POWER. See **Devī**.

FEMINISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISTS

The platform of women's rights was central to the nineteenth-century social reform movement, which crystallized both nationalist aspirations and feminist responses to patriarchy. In the twentieth-century nationalist upsurge, Indian women mobilized against colonial rule. When independence was granted in 1947, they achieved important rights.

Colonial Constructions of Gender

Women's rights were first advocated in India by men of the elite, whose missionary teachers compared the modern post-Enlightenment developments of the West with India's apparently moribund society burdened by archaic caste and gender hierarchies. Filtering their understanding of these new Western ideologies through the humanistic lens of ancient Hindu scriptures like the Upanishads, men of the literate castes concluded that India had declined from a "golden age" free of caste and misogyny, which were medieval accretions. Like their British colonial rulers, the reformers denounced female illiteracy and high caste customs like prepuberty marriages, *sati* (widows' immolation on their husbands' funeral pyres), polygamy, widow abuse, and enforced widow celibacy. They also cast a critical eye on female domestic seclusion in the *zenānā* (women's quarters) and the *pardah* (veil), a custom prevalent among Muslims and Hindus.

Elite class men reinforced the rhetoric of Britain's civilizing mission by accepting the colonial critique of Indian society. Early official surveys on the absence of high caste women in schools appeared to prove that Indian women were completely subjugated and submerged in ignorance. Feminist scholars argue that customs like *sati* became more common during the wars for colonial hegemony over India. Women of the literate classes, however, were often taught informally at home, and village women often chose religious mendicant vagrancy over a brutal domestic life. Influenced by Victorian views, literate Indian men undertook to improve the condition of elite caste women, while underestimating the potential of working-class women.

Male Reformers' and Women's Rights

The earliest Bengali reformer was Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), who denounced polygamy and *sati* through his Amitya Sabha (Friendship Association) in 1815, and the Brahma Samaj (Society of Brahma) in 1828. A similar *bhadralok* (elite class) humanist was Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, who petitioned to legalize widow remarriage in Bengal in the 1850s; Vishnusastry Pandit, D. K. Karve, and Viresalingam Pantulu started widows' remarriage associations in Bombay and Madras in the 1870s and 1880s. The Prārthana Samaj (Prayer Society) in 1867 and

the Vedic Hindu revivalist Ārya Samāj (1875) also promoted women's education and criticized misogynistic marriage customs as detrimental to female health. In 1896, Justice M. G. Ranade and his wife Ramabai started the Ladies Social Conference, a secular forum within the Indian National Congress. In 1884 B. M. Malabari's tract on child brides and abused widows horrified Victorian England. In 1891 colonial legislators enacted the Scoble Bill, raising the age (of married girls) for consensual sex from ten to twelve in India. Liberal Hindus like Raghunatha Rao, M. G. Ranade, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale supported such legal reforms, unlike Bal Gangadhar Tilak who opposed colonial intervention in Hindu customs.

Feminist Writers and Activists

Several nineteenth-century women writers refuted the charge of female intellectual inferiority and denounced child marriage, widow abuse, dowry, and *purdah* in vernacular and English literature, while founding schools. The pioneer was Pandita Ramabai Saraswati (1858–1922), a Sanskrit scholar who married out of her caste and who became a vociferous feminist after her husband and family died in a famine. She began the first Indian feminist organization, Ārya Mahilā Sabhā (Association of Aryan Women) in 1881. Male reformers appreciated her call to the colonial government to create schools for women doctors and teachers. To pay for her studies in England, she wrote *Stree Dharma Niti* (Women's religious ethics) in Marathi in 1881. After much soul-searching, she converted to Christianity in 1884, and she wrote *The High Caste Hindu Women* (1888) in English to finance her non-sectarian widows' home, Sharada Sadan. Conservative Hindus like Bal Gangadhar Tilak accused her of proselytizing their daughters, whom they withdrew from the school. Clearly, feminists had to toe the line or be punished by male nationalists.

In 1882 Tarabai Shinde wrote *Stri Purush Tulana* (A comparison of men and women) in Marathi, accusing men of lust and duplicity and of falsely portraying women as seductresses. In 1891 Sarat Kumari Chaudhuri exposed the neglect of girls in her Bengali work, *Adorer na Anadorer?* (Loved or unloved?). The Muslim Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain advocated gender equality in Bengali, while her English novel, *Sultana's Dream* (1905), describes a topsy-turvy world of male seclusion in *mardanas* resembling women's *zenānās*. Savitribai Phule (1831–1897), a dutiful Hindu wife, described her radical work of educating the lowest castes. Some others were loyal Indian wives but ardent Christians, like Kripabai Sattianadhan (1862–1894), who laid the blame for women's plight squarely on Hinduism in her English novel, *Kamala: The Story of a Hindu Life* (1894). Less

famous women criticized patriarchy in journals like *Matbar Manoranjani* in Tamil in the 1890s, *Sadhana* in Bengali in the 1890, *Stree Darpan* in Hindi in 1909, *Khat-oon* in Urdu, and *Stree Bodh* in Gujarati.

Motherland and Mothers of the Nation

Nationalism intensified after Bankim Chatterji's 1883 poem "Bande Mataram" (Hail to the motherland) was set to music by Rabindranath Tagore (Thakur) and became the anthem of Indian nationalism. The paradigm of divine motherhood for the nation helped raise the status of its domestic mothers. After the 1905 Partition of Bengal, women joined men in boycotting and burning English goods. Young men in Maharashtra and Punjab, as well as Bengal, appeared ready to become martyrs for the motherland; "New Party" Congress activists, led by Bipin Chandra Pal and Tilak, advocated radical revolution. While some men felt threatened by women emancipated from domestic servitude, humanist authors Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), C. Subramania Bharati (1882–1924), and A. Madhaviah (1872–1925) praised women's education in their prose and poetry.

Women awakened to their dual identities as feminists and nationalists in this era. Sarladevi Ghoshal Chaudharani (1872–1946), a feminist Hindu revivalist, started her journal *Bharati* in 1895 and the Bharat Stree Mahamandal (Great Society of Indian Women) in 1910 at Allahabad. At an international women's suffrage meeting in 1910 in Budapest, Kumudini Mitra advocated violent revolution to win gender rights. Women like Bina Das (b. 1911) and Santi Ghose (b. 1916) attempted to kill British officials. Communist women often subordinated feminism to the class struggle, while nationalists argued that freedom would guarantee women's rights.

Elite women believed that women's rights were central to national revival through legal means, and they began feminist associations across India to improve their conditions. Mahatma Gandhi's exhortations to men to emulate female moral superiority helped to empower women. Perceiving themselves as selfless mothers of the nation, they heeded his call to aid its poor women. When he launched his *satyagraha* ("hold fast to the truth") campaigns of nonviolent resistance in India after 1917, many women joined, energized by his fervor.

Feminist Associations

The primary goals of most women's associations were to improve women's literacy and health by abolishing child marriage, enforced widowhood, and *purdah*. Imitating Ramabai's Ārya Mahila Samāj, elite women formed similar sectarian and local organizations. In 1886,

Swarnakumari Debi (1856–1932), Rabindranath Tagore's sister, started Sakhi Samiti (Women's Friendship League) to spread knowledge among women and widows. In 1900 in Bombay, Parsi women founded the Stri Zarothoshi Mandal (Parsi Women's Organization). Other welfare groups included the Young Women's Christian Association and, in 1915, the Anjuman-e-Khawatin-e-Islam (Association for Muslim Women). Viresalingam Pantulu and his wife Rajya Lakshmi founded the Andhra Mahila Sabha (Andhra Women's Club) in 1910 for girls' education and widow remarriage.

Between 1902 and 1912, Indians established many girls' schools based on the Indo-centric curriculum advocated by Annie Besant in 1904, and girls' school enrollment rose substantially. In Madras in 1906, elite Indian and European women started the nonsectarian Tamil Māthar Sangam (Tamil Women's Organization), which met in Kanchipuram in 1907 and 1914. In 1908 its women activists delivered papers at an all-India Ladies' Congress (*parishad*), from which the secular Women's Indian Association (WIA) drew its initial members, on 8 May 1917 in Adyār, Madras. Impressed by the Tamil Māthar Sangam, the Irish suffragist Margaret Cousins proposed an all-Indian organization in 1915. The WIA was India's first major multiethnic feminist organization. Its initial success was partly due to its effective use of the framework of the Theosophical Society whose head, Annie Besant, was chosen as the first WIA President. Cousins became the WIA's first honorary secretary, a role shared with Dorothy Jinarajadasa, the Irish wife of a Sri Lankan Theosophist. As the "daughters of India," they pledged to guide the nation, serve the poor, promote women's education, abolish child marriage, raise the age of sexual consent to sixteen for women, and win female suffrage and the right to elected office. The WIA was the first organization to connect women's social and sexual subjugation with patriarchy, poverty, and political disenfranchisement.

On 18 December 1917, Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) headed a WIA delegation to Secretary of State Edwin Montagu. They requested female suffrage on a par with men in expanded provincial legislatures after the 1919 Government of India Act. Although the franchise commission in London did not immediately sanction their request, WIA feminists won an appeal supported by C. Sankaran Nair, the Indian member of the commission, and Indians in the legislative councils. Provincial legislatures were instructed individually to decide upon female suffrage, so that a few women voted in Madras in 1921, in Bombay in 1922, and in other provinces after 1930. In 1927 Muthulakshmi Reddi was elected to the Madras Legislative Assembly as India's first woman legislator.



Portrait of Sarojini Naidu Pioneer suffragette Sarojini Naidu. She was among fourteen women included in the Constituent Assembly, the body charged with drafting an independent India's constitution in December 1946. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

Two other important organizations were the National Council of Women in India (NCWI), founded in 1925, and the All India Women's Conference for Educational Reform (AIWC), founded in 1927. The NCWI was headed by Mehribai Tata, the wife of a prominent Parsi industrialist. Despite its commitment to women's issues, the NCWI's dependence on the British colonial government, patronization of the poor, and conservative attitudes precluded its popularity. The AIWC began with a secular agenda on women's education and marriage reform in Poona in 1927, led by the Rani of Sangli, the Begam of Bhopal, and the Maharani Chinmabai Saheb of Baroda. However, there were ideological and class differences over how to effect social changes amongst women in *purdah*. The AIWC has become less elitist and still functions.

After 1920 the WIA and AIWC published their own journals, providing information on legislative bills, such as the one to abolish the dedication of *dēvadāsi* dancers to temples, where they were reduced to prostitution. The system was legally abolished in 1928 due to the eloquence

of Muthulakshmi Reddi. The WIA also campaigned against *pardab* and for the 1930 Sarda Act, raising the minimum age of marriage for girls to fourteen. The AIWC campaigned to raise school enrollment of girls, and literacy rates rose over the next decades; it was also instrumental in revamping family laws on divorce and property rights.

Women and Independence

If early reformers had argued that women were the weaker sex, Mahatma Gandhi emphasized their nobility and self-sacrifice, and his cotton-spinning program was influenced by women. His appeal to elite class women to purify the nation and to aid their disadvantaged sisters was answered by donations of jewelry, the wearing of homespun cloth (*khadi*), and the picketing of shops that sold foreign goods and liquor. However, he initially resisted allowing women to join his 1930 Salt March to Dandi, but Sarojini Naidu, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya (1903–1990), and Khurshed Naoroji (1894–1966) persuaded him to change his mind. Thousands of women from across India were jailed for “stealing” salt from India’s beaches. Aruna Asaf Ali (1906–1996), Durgabai Deshmukh (1909–1981), and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (1889–1964) were in the front ranks of “salt thieves.” The formation of the women’s wing of the Indian National Congress in 1942, led by Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya, facilitated women’s mobilization in the Quit India movement.

Jawaharlal Nehru staunchly supported universal suffrage and women’s rights. In recognition of their contributions, fourteen women were included in the Constituent Assembly to draft independent India’s constitution in December 1946. These pioneers were Ammu Swaminathan, Kamala Chowdhuri, Begam Aizaz Rasul, Sarojini Naidu, Hansa Mehta, Sucheta Kripalani, Dakhsayani Velayudhan, Durgabai Deshmukh, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Begam Jahanara Shah Nawaz, Begam Ikramullah, and Lila Roy. Besides the 1940 Hindu Marriage Validating Act, which removed the caste bar in marriage, post-independence acts favorable to women include the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act, which allowed divorce, and the 1956 Hindu Succession Act, which removed gender disparities in inheritance.

Progressive and conservative grassroots women’s organizations have consolidated in postmodern India. Women now organize strikes and *morchas* (protests) against inflation, discriminatory labor practices, and economic marginalization. They have denounced ministerial interference over female inheritance, as in the Shah Bano case; the resurgence of *sati* in Rajasthan, in the Roop Kanwar case; dowry deaths related to consumerism; and

commercial destruction of trees and the environment, as in the Chipko movement. Others strive to improve women’s literacy and health; yet these rights must be carefully and consistently guarded against resurgent erosion.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also *Devī; Women and Political Power; Women’s Education*

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FEUDALISM The word “feudalism” inevitably brings to mind a number of images: an aristocratic class of landed warrior-nobles constantly at war among themselves, a preponderantly agrarian economy serviced by an impoverished peasantry, and a religious establishment emphasizing values of hierarchy and submission to authority. While the images may have a pronounced European connotation, they may not be entirely out of place in India, and historians, both European and Indian, have for some time debated whether there could be an “Indian feudalism.” The problem, however, is first and foremost one of definitions, for it would seem that there can be as many conceptions of feudalism as there are historians working on the subject. Indeed, in European writing alone, the term has had an exceedingly complex history over the last three hundred years. Two general features, however, seem to unite most concepts of feudalism. First, feudalism is deemed the great political or social order that preceded the rise of the absolutist or colonial state, which, arguably, in turn gave birth to key features of recognizably modern societies and economies. Second, representations of feudalism have rarely been simply neutral descriptions. Many early writings on feudalism were written with a strong reformist agenda, and were part of the liberal project of defeating the political order of the *ancien régime*. Later, concepts of feudalism or semifeudalism have been regularly invoked in Marxist political thought as part of their own accounts of the rise of bourgeois society.

The first systematic argument for the existence of feudalism in India was forwarded by Lieutenant Colonel James Tod, who served the British East India Company at the turn of the nineteenth century and first published what would become a famous work on western India, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* in 1829–1832. Inspired by Henry Hallam’s recently published *History of the Middle Ages*, Tod argued that the Rajputs of India had a system of “pure feuds” analogous to those of medieval Europe. For Tod, this was the case because the Rajputs, being of “Scythian” racial stock, were descended from the same Central Asian peoples who formed the forebears of the tribes in early Europe. The feudal compact that emerged in both places was based on obligations between vassal and sovereign secured through bonds of kinship or personal loyalty. The claims by Rajput kings to have descended from either the sun or the moon created a factional political system, in which disputes were

resolved through feuds. Though a strong king might reduce such internecine warfare, it remained a systemic feature of Rajput society. Tod admitted that the Rajputs, as he encountered them, had been subjected to an exterior despotic force from North India, and he counterposed Rajput feudalism to the centralized rule of powers like the Marathas and the Mughals. Tod believed that if the Rajputs could be restored to their original prosperity, they would not only pose no threat to British interests (with their own divisive tendencies keeping them in check), but that they would also prove potential allies against any Russian encroachment on Britain’s valuable possessions in India.

Tod’s idea of Rajput feudalism was largely overtaken and displaced by other theories among British historians in colonial India, but some of its features tended to become absorbed into a more generalized notion of ancient and medieval Hindu polities as atomistic, divisive, and entropic, which often mixed uneasily with notions of Oriental despotism. Soon, this image itself became associated with a putative “medieval” period emerging among historians in both imperialist and nationalist circles. According to Vincent Smith’s famous history of early India, the great ancient imperial experiments of the Mauryans and the Guptas collapsed by the seventh century, giving way to a medley of petty states engaged in unceasing internecine warfare. Smith’s stance was that this was the natural state of affairs among Indian princes unless they were checked by some superior authority like the British. Nationalist historians mapped representations of feudalized political chaos onto the idea of the fall of the golden age and medieval decline, often using political chaos as an explanation for “national weakness” before invading Islamic armies.

Though such notions of a vague political feudalism have persisted in some historical circles, they have been largely overtaken by a more systematic treatment of feudalism from an entirely different angle since the 1950s, when scholars of Marxist persuasion sought to come to terms with pre-colonial Indian society. The classification of societies through the “mode of production” concept had been an integral feature of Marxist historical thought from its inception. Its impetus came from Marx himself, who in order to develop a better understanding of the rise of capitalism, proposed a sequence of modes of production in Europe, beginning with primitive communism, which evolved sequentially into the “slave” and “feudal” modes of production and finally into a capitalist mode of production. What made each mode of production unique was its peculiar combination of forces of production (tools, materials, and labor processes) and relations of production (the ownership of productive forces), and following from this, the particular means by which a ruling

class extracted surplus from the laboring class. Feudalism, from this point of view, could be characterized on the one hand as an agrarian society composed of small-scale peasant producers who met their own subsistence needs with a labor force based on the family, and on the other as a society in which a class of landed lords extracted surplus from these peasants through rent. Feudal rent was deemed “noneconomic” because it was not settled through the dynamics of the market forces, but instead on the superior force possessed by the land-owning class with its coercive, lordly prerogatives. This class was a military aristocracy whose ranks were divided into great lords and free vassals who entered into feudal “compacts,” whereby a piece of landed property (fief) was held by the vassal from the lord in return for military service or counsel. In contrast to the life of the aristocracy was the unfree condition of peasants or “serfs,” who had no property rights (save that of use), were restricted in movement, and were obliged to surrender the product of their labor over and above what was needed for the reproduction of the peasant household.

Marxist Interpretations

How India measured up to this portrayal is a vexed and complex topic. Marxist thinking on India’s pre-colonial society may be traced to Karl Marx himself, who wrote several pieces on British imperialism in India from the 1850s. Drawing on diverse sources, Marx argued that Indian society, as elsewhere in Asia, differed substantially from that of Europe. Here Marx drew on thinking from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that, written against the backdrop of European absolutist states, saw Asiatic governments as despotic in nature. Other sources included Henry Maine’s theory of the self-sufficient, isolated village community in India and the general notion, championed by G. W. F. Hegel and others, that Asian societies were static and unchanging. On these bases, Marx concluded that India and other Asiatic societies could not be placed in the developmental continuum of European society (slave or feudal) and instead developed the controversial concept of the “Asiatic mode of production.” The key features of the Asiatic mode of production included the absence of private property resulting from the king’s absolute ownership of all land, state control of irrigation and public works, and the decentralized and communal nature of production at the village level. The absence of private property, combined with despotic (as opposed to feudal) rule, prevented India from developing the dynamic forces that led to social development, a process which was only brought about through the external force of colonialism. Despite its obvious moorings in the Orientalist perception of the East, the Asiatic mode of production suggested by Marx and Friedrich Engels represented an

important and often neglected contribution to further social analysis—the attempt to account for the specificity of societies outside Europe. The concept, however, was largely abandoned during the period of the Third International (1919–1943), the congress of different communist parties across the globe, and during the anti-imperialist movements of the 1930s by communist intellectuals, who instead sought to understand Asiatic societies in terms of the unilinear development from primitive communism to capitalism.

It is against this background, and the additional context of a robust nationalist historiography, that a number of Indian Marxist historians in the 1950s and 1960s reassessed early Indian society in terms of Marxist categories. A vast amount of new information on precolonial Indian society had come to light in the hundred years since Marx’s first articles on the subject, and much of this evidence contradicted the premises of the Asiatic mode of production. It suggested in the first instance that while the village remained to some extent an independent economic unit, it possessed a far greater degree of economic differentiation than Marx had assumed. Also, Marx’s idea that all of the surplus product of the village went entirely into the hands of the state was incorrect. There was, in fact, a whole class of hereditary claimants to shares in rent: courtiers, military retainers, provincial lords, and religious institutions in earlier times, and in later times Mughal *zamindars* (landowners). Such claims further indicate the presence of what Marx had thought was absent in India, the private ownership of land-shares. The situation of the classes that held these shares, placed between the king and the peasants, suggests an arrangement generally akin to feudal land ownership. Most importantly, it is clear that political and economic structures, land ownership, and trade and commodity production underwent change over time in pre-colonial India, contradicting the presumed stasis of Asiatic society before the coming of European imperialism.

Indian Feudalism

Marxist historians subsequently developed the theory of “Indian feudalism” to explain the social formation emerging with the Guptas in the fourth century and extending down to the establishment of the Turkish power in Delhi during the thirteenth century. Marxist historians of later medieval India have been more reticent in applying the category of feudalism to the great Muslim empires of northern India. For the earlier period, the pioneering study of D. D. Kosambi suggested two phases of development: an initial phase of “feudalism from above,” in which kings alienated land rights to subordinates, functionaries, and religious institutions; and a later phase of “feudalism from below,” in which a class of

landed intermediaries emerged at the village level. Kosambi's observations were supplemented by the more detailed and comprehensive works of R. S. Sharma and others in the 1960s. Sharma began with the point that the alienation of tax revenues in the land grants from the Gupta period was accompanied by the surrender of administrative and judicial powers, resulting in the parcelization of sovereignty and the decentralization of state power. While most of the extant land grants preserved on permanent materials (copper plate or stone) were made to religious institutions, evidence suggests that royal functionaries and servants were also remunerated in land revenues. Numerous officials and military retainers from the sixth century appear to take titles that imply land ownership (*bhogika*, *bhogapati*). Part of the argument here has also rested on wider economic factors. There is a well-documented contraction of the larger urban centers, a decline in trade networks and petty commodity production, and an apparent paucity of coinage in North India during post-Gupta times. In such an increasingly ruralized economy, payment for services, whether religious or secular, was necessarily in land revenue rather than cash.

The royal charters and records, which by the sixth century begin to include genealogical introductions in high poetic style, do seem to suggest considerable evidence for the growth of "lord-vassal" relationships among ruling elites, though no single feudal compact can be attested in the legal literature of the period. The famous Allahabad pillar inscription of the Gupta king Samudragupta (ruled c. 330–380) mentions that subordinate kings were expected not only to pay tribute and offer themselves for military assistance, but were to provide daughters (in marriage), and attend court to pay physical obeisance to the Gupta monarch. The emphasis on personal submission and courtly hierarchy was highly pronounced in political life, from the proliferation of increasingly calibrated titles (*sāmanta*, *mahāsāmanta*, *mandalesvara*, *mahāmandalesvara*) for ranks of subordinates, to elaborate gestural, verbal, and sumptuary protocols (like the bearing of insignia and possession of five musical instruments in public procession), which were enacted between men of different rank at court. Literary and genealogical records also suggest the existence of a loose code of warrior ethics that emphasized a fierce but honorable heroism as well as a compassionate irenism. The latter tendency may have been the influence of religious elites (Brahmans and monks) who regularly attended or served at the more important aristocratic households. Religious institutions, however, tended to reinforce rather than undermine feudal social relations, and the symmetry between religious and political ideologies in this period is notable. Hindu temples, for example, were much like palaces in their spatial arrangement—the

central god of the temple was surrounded by subordinate forms and divinities in a carefully calibrated fashion to reflect perceived rank and hierarchy. The major religious ideology of the period, *bbakti*, or devoted participation in the majesty of god, conceived of lordship as an encompassing yet hierarchical mastery that mirrored the nested rights which obtained between lords and their inferiors in the secular realm. Religious and courtly texts in fact present a single dispositional and affective vocabulary to encode relations between lords and subordinates across both religious and political realms: the subordinate honored his lord with loyalty (*bbakti*) and service (*pūjā*, *sevā*), and the lord in turn exhibited his grace (*anugraha*) through the bestowal of favor (*prasāda*). In fact, religious and political realms were largely continuous, leading some scholars to argue for a great "chain of being" in medieval India.

How the political order was constituted is somewhat uncertain, as some vassals seem to have originally been independent lords of minor royal status who entered service through conquest and subordination, while others seem to have been courtiers or functionaries who were granted lands by the king as favors. These two categories often merged over time. Because of the difficulty in interpreting the meaning of many terms for hereditary administrators and vassals left in the inscriptional record, and because of their regional variation, it is difficult to indicate the precise stages and structures of feudal organization. Yet by the sixth century it is clear that there were a large number of hereditary intermediaries between the royal authority and the producing classes. This situation was compounded by a tendency of subinfeudation, as the alienation of revenues in land grants often (and sometimes necessarily) conferred upon donees the right to have the land cultivated by other groups, leading to a hierarchy of shares and rights on the land. The consequences of this "feudalization" for peasants were serious. First, the system of land grants tended to transfer the communal rights of village cultivators to donees, who in turn often conferred shares to tenants, petty officials, and other "great men of the village" who enriched themselves from the threshing floor at the expense of the direct producer. The proliferation of intermediaries thus placed a continual burden on the actual cultivator, as the increase in rents and imposts drained all but the bare minimum of produce necessary for the reproduction of the peasant household. Sharma and others have additionally pointed out the existence of corvée or forced labor-rent (*vishti*) as well as legal restrictions on the movement of the peasantry (villages were granted with their inhabitants, and donees could restrain them) as indications of their serflike status.

Historians of Indian feudalism recognized deficiencies in the evidence, differences on a number of points with

the European model, and significant variations in regional development within the subcontinent itself. While the system of land grants was well-established in central India and Maharashtra, for example, it seems to have been significantly weaker in the Punjab, where very few land records have survived from medieval times. The explanation (not altogether satisfactory) for this state of affairs has been the existence of a more robust money economy in the region under the Hindu Shahi dynasty. It was generally held that the feudal system that evolved from Gupta times was effectively disrupted in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, which saw the centralization of political power, the relegation of the feudal class to petty landlords, and a new invigoration of trade and commodity circulation.

Challenges and Debate

By the late 1970s a number of dissenters to the theory of Indian feudalism had emerged from within the ranks of Marxist historians in India, and they were joined by scholars of various disciplines from outside the Marxist tradition working on such topics as monetary history, urbanization, and “state formation” in early India. The challenges to the feudalist thesis were twofold. The first was evidentiary. There were long-standing critiques by epigraphists that the evidence of the land charters could not support the existence of vassalage, but only of religious “landlordism” at best. The theory of a demonetized economy was challenged as resting on weak methodology, and it was suggested that North India, during the period between A.D. 600 and 1000, had just as many coins in circulation as in earlier times. Similarly, the thesis of widespread urban decay had to be counterbalanced by the fact that while archaeology seemed to demonstrate that the great cities of early historic India did witness a marked contraction in size, the period also saw considerable urban growth, as new regional capitals and smaller urban settlements emerged throughout many regions in the subcontinent. The other challenges to the feudalist position were theoretical. It was pointed out that the evolution of feudal structures was attributed entirely to state action instead of class relations, as in Europe. The notion of a subject peasantry was also challenged. These arguments combined with a number of other critiques, which suggested that the entire theory of Indian feudalism had borrowed too heavily from European precedents, and had a tendency to force the Indian evidence into ready-made European historical case studies rather than using Marxist theoretical tools to deal with the Indian evidence. Such criticisms for the most part were not intended to dismiss entirely the relevance of the feudalism concept or Marxist approaches as such, but to underscore the inability of such

model-based methods to account for the specificity of the Indian situation. Needless to say, these critiques and alternatives elicited a vigorous debate, which featured in the pages of history journals sporadically for nearly two decades. The discussions have led to the question of whether there can be variants of feudalism, and if so, what degree of variation in any particular instantiation might risk rendering the concept so inclusive as to lose any discriminatory meaning.

The debates took place in the context of new, often non-Marxist, theories of state formation and long *durée* development in early India. An important contribution of one of these latter approaches, which has been called “integrative” or “processual,” has been the emphasis on reading the evidence of the period as “productive”—mostly in criticizing the thesis of political fragmentation and urban decay—that is, inquiring into what grew up in medieval India rather than what fell apart. Such an approach, perhaps ironically, has considerable potential for re-orienting and invigorating any theory of Indian feudalism that has yet to be realized. As it stands, it is perhaps an open question as to whether the theory of Indian feudalism is in disrepute. But any trip to parts of the Indian countryside even today, where the rural poor endure conditions of abject poverty and staggering inhumanity at the hands of landed interests, in part as the result of age-old social relationships at the village level, surely vindicates the fundamental concerns of Marxist scholarship in India, whatever the fate of “Indian feudalism.”

Daud Ali

See also **Guptan Empire**

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FILMĠĠT *Filmġġt* (English “film” + Hindi *ġġt*, “song”) refers to the music (particularly the songs) of popular South Asian movies. Many films have five or six major musical items; each song and its elaborate choreography acts as commentary on the drama. The songs are often as important as the story and the actors, and producers sometimes prerelease selected items in order to determine whether or not to release a film. A song’s success ensures a film’s release. Although each linguistic region has a film industry, the most important center is Bombay (Mumbai), which carries the moniker “Bollywood.”

The diverse audience within India, as well as other parts of the world, and the increasingly cosmopolitan attitudes of India’s middle class demand an exceptionally eclectic musical approach. The composers and music producers for popular film incorporate a variety of different regional genres, idioms, and instruments, as well as Western ideas. A film might incorporate a small orchestra, sitars, temple bells, electric guitars, synthesizers, and folk drums (such as the *dholak*); it may borrow from classical Indian and European compositions or imitate Latin American and East Asian musical styles. One result is a kind of pan-Indian musical style that has had a normalizing effect on South Asian communities around the world.

Many songs follow the verse-chorus format of popular religious and folk songs, usually with an instrumental introduction and an interlude. One regional style of folk song and dance genre that composers have used extensively in Indian film is that of Panjabi *bbāngrā*. Whether the film is set in northwest or south India, Bollywood music producers often insert *bbāngrā* rhythms and dance movements. Indeed, *filmī bbāngrā*, with the addition of Western bass and drums and an electronic mixing, has gained an appreciative young audience in Britain.

Vocal melody dominates *filmġġt*, and a select group of playback singers (most notably Lata Mangeshkar) are in demand to perform these songs. In a fiction well known to film fans, screen actors mouth the words of recordings made by the playback singers. The separation of roles has allowed some singers to be active for decades as new sets of fresh young actors add their dramatic gestures as part of their interpretation.

Filmġġt melodies have characteristic Indian vocal ornamentation and Indian and Western scale patterns

often accompanied by chords that, while resembling Western harmonic practice, are distinctly South Asian.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Film Industry; Music**

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FILM INDUSTRY In the years leading up to the 1990s, Bollywood was a glamorous cottage industry, churning out hundreds of films annually for a domestic market whose population was poised to edge over the one billion mark by the end of the millennium. Because the films were in Hindustani, a variant of the Hindi language, approximately 40 percent of the population, especially in the northern regions, became cinema fans. Whether they crowded the new multiplex theaters in the cities or huddled in the rural villages in front of makeshift screens fashioned from little more than a sheet stretched between two trees, they alone determined which film became a hit, not through a single viewing but by revisiting the same film dozens of times. The industry knew how to play to its audience and rarely strayed from convention. The films were structurally the same, the formula aptly described, somewhat tongue in cheek, by novelist Ashok Banker: “What else can you expect from a genre that requires every film to have a young good-looking romantic lead couple, half a dozen or more lengthy songs lip-synced by actors to playback singers, costume changes every five minutes and an utter disregard for most film narrative conventions?”

Nevertheless, in terms of production, the industry thrived. In 1991 Bollywood released a record 215 films. The market, however, remained relatively insular, with exports shipped mainly to the Gulf states. That changed in 1995 with *Dikwale Dulhania Le Jayenge*, a huge hit in the United Kingdom and the United States that launched a trend. Producers suddenly realized that scattered around the world was a vast nonresident Indian audience, estimated at 20 million in more than a dozen countries, all hungry to see the latest Bollywood films. To satisfy demand, and to attract an even wider audience, producers began releasing both contemporary and classic Hindi, and a few Tamil, films on DVD, with subtitles in English and wide-screen presentation. As a result, in 1995 the steadily increasing popularity of Bollywood films in emerging markets sparked an annual growth rate of 15 percent, three times that of India’s 5 percent gross



Bollywood Movie Poster. Advertisement for the 2000 film *Kabho Naa . . . Pyaar Hai* (Say this is love) that captured the imagination of the Bollywood-watching world. A huge hit on the subcontinent and blockbuster phenomenon with the Indian diaspora, it also made its lead, Hrithik Roshan (shown here), an international celebrity. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

domestic product growth. In a good year, a Bollywood hit could earn revenues of 25 percent or more, and by 2000 Bollywood's global annual revenues were estimated at \$1.3 billion.

Overall, film revenues increased sixfold between 1991 and 1999. Whereas *Saudagar*, released in 1991, generated total revenues of a reported 43.6 million rupees, Subhash Ghai's *Taal*, released nine years later, raked in 266.9 million rupees. As revenues rose substantially during that period, so did the cost of filmmaking. By the end of the decade, the cost of a major Bollywood production featuring the top stars was budgeted at between 150 and 200 million rupees. The leading actors commanded a lion's share of the film's budget, their fees ranging between 15 million and 30 million rupees, depending on their star status. In 1993, for example, Sanjay Dutt demanded and

got 4 million rupees for a film, when only two years earlier he had signed up to make an R. K. Nayyar film for a mere 50,000 rupees. Similarly, a screen heroine like Madhuri Dixit in 1993 was getting 2 million rupees a film. By 2000 a superstar like Shah Rukh Khan was charging up to 30 million rupees per film, while a costar of Dixit's stature could expect between 10 million and 12.5 million rupees.

The top Bollywood stars signed contracts to act in three to four films simultaneously, which considerably slowed production on individual films, sometimes by up to six months. Once the films were released, the producers of course expected a payday. Domestic rights sold to the various distributors made up the bulk of a film's revenue, which hovered around 80 percent, while overseas rights drew close to 12 percent. Music rights, which brought in between 4 to 5 percent of a film's earnings, were also a major revenue generator. Music companies like Saregama, TIPS, Sony Music, and Venus competed fiercely to acquire the music rights of the latest films, since film music accounted for 70 percent and new film music for 48 percent of India's total music sales. Yet, even with a stellar cast, only 20 percent of the 160-odd Hindi films released in a year were commercially successful, and approximately eight of them were viable hits.

With the steady rise of revenues, the film industry attracted parallel criminal enterprises. As early as 1991, the same year the industry released its record number of films, Bollywood estimated it was losing as much as 10 million rupees a day to video piracy. By 2001 India estimated its trade losses due to piracy at \$70 million. Throughout that ten-year span, pirated films were available in India's major cities well before the film's local theatrical release. Although India had its own copyright laws, enforcement was lax and haphazard. Raiding small-scale pirates was commonplace, but the larger pirates remained elusive, either because of official protection, or because they set up smaller "fall guy" operations to avoid capture. If arrested, their prosecutions were hampered. Such was the case of two factories in the state of Haryana and the state of Rajasthan known to be manufacturing a significant number of the pirated VCDs. The facilities were raided, but because of slow, cumbersome, and costly criminal procedures weighted against the legitimate copyright owners at every step, they soon reopened and were back in operation.

By the end of 2001, the Bollywood film industry had 608 criminal cases pending in the courts, only four of which resulted in conviction. The first conviction was in January 1997, when a Bangalore court sentenced a video pirate to three years hard labor in a case that dated from 1993. The second conviction came in May 1997, when a New Delhi magistrate sentenced a cable operator (the

first to be convicted for cable piracy) to six months hard labor and ordered him to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees, which at the time amounted to approximately \$103. In early 1999, the third conviction, following a raid conducted in 1986, resulted in a sentence of one year in prison and a fine of approximately \$118. The fourth case, the first of its kind brought against a video pirate under the new 1995 Indian Copyright Act, was decided in December 1998. Some of these cases, however, were reversed on appeal.

If piracy had been financially damaging to the film industry, the infiltration of the Indian mafia was insidious. Yet the symbiosis between Bollywood and the Indian criminal underworld was nothing new. More than thirty years ago, crime boss Haji Mastan was so enraptured with an aspiring Bollywood actress that he began producing films with her in the starring roles. Decades later, Abu Salem, one of the more prominent gangland figures, even named his sons after his favorite on-screen heroes. Suketu Mehta, who wrote the critically acclaimed *Mission Kashmir*, explained the connection for this romance between film and crime: “The Hindi filmmakers are fascinated by the lives of the gangsters, and draw upon them for material. The gangsters, from the shooter on the ground to the don-in-exile at the top, watch Hindi movies keenly, and model themselves—their dialogue, the way they carry themselves—on their screen equivalents.”

The romance ended there. Evading the jurisdiction of the Indian police by operating from Karachi in neighboring Pakistan, as well as from Nairobi, Dubai, and even New Jersey, and conducting their criminal activities by cell phone, the crime bosses lured financially strapped filmmakers into loan-sharking schemes, where the pay-offs were exorbitant regardless of the film’s box-office performance. They also used overseas concerts as money-laundering fronts, with the stars agreeing to appear as headliners in order to avoid starring in mafia-funded films.

An insight into just how deeply the crime bosses had insinuated themselves into the Bollywood film industry came to light when Sanjay Dutt was arrested on charges of dealing with the mafia following the Mumbai communal riots of 1993. During his trial, a taped phone conversation surfaced that allegedly featured Dutt ingratiating himself with mafia crime boss Chhota Shakeel. The tape was later introduced as evidence in a separate trial when film producer Bharat Shah was facing charges of conspiring with underworld figures to murder Bollywood superstars Hrithik Roshan, Aamir Khan, and Shah Rukh Khan.

Stars were not the only ones targeted. Producer Mukesh Duggal was shot and killed in Mumbai in June

1997. Two months later, allegedly on orders from Abu Salem, producer Gulsham Kumar was shot dead outside a Mumbai temple. In December of that year, producer Manmohan Shetty survived an attempt on his life. In 2000 director Rajiv Rai also escaped a kidnapping/murder attempt and moved to London. A year later, director Rakesh Roshan survived an assassination attempt outside his Mumbai office because he reportedly refused to sell the overseas rights of his *Kaho Na... Pyaar Hai* to gangsters. And in late 2001 the Indian police revealed a mafia plot to kill actor Aamir Khan and director Ashutosh Gowariker after they had spurned extortion attempts following the success of *Lagaan*.

Toward the close of the decade, an estimated 40 percent of the film industry’s finances came from organized crime. To loosen the underworld’s grip on the film community and to stem the wave of attacks on its celebrities, the Indian government in 1998 granted Bollywood industry status. Two years later the official mechanisms were in place, which allowed filmmakers to obtain loans and other forms of aid from financial institutions as well as to secure insurance for delays and losses. Still, some remained skeptical. “The industry is often guilty of tax evasion, and big people in it lead a lifestyle far beyond their declared incomes,” the *Hindu* newspaper declared in its editorial pages. “Unless these cobwebs are cleared, the cinema here will continue to be plagued by failure and unsurmountable hardship.”

But Bollywood made efforts to clean up its act. By 2002 there were at least half a dozen public offerings for film-related companies, although they all traded at less than half their opening price. Meanwhile, such Indian corporate titans as the \$8 billion Tata Group and the \$13 billion Reliance Industries were seriously considering venturing into film production. Bankers, too, saw Bollywood in a different light. In 2001 the Industrial Development Bank of India became the first to lend \$13.5 million to fourteen Bollywood productions. Similarly, Insight Productions and iDream Productions, each an offshoot of local investment banks, were confident they could turn a profit by imposing hard-nosed business methods on what had long been a chaotic industry. Consequently, police authorities estimated that by 2002 only 10 percent of Bollywood’s films were backed by mob financing.

Official governmental recognition also conferred cultural legitimacy. Ever since the premiere screening of the first Hindi, albeit silent, full-length feature film *Raja Harishchandra* in 1913 at Mumbai Coronation Cinematograph theater, Bollywood had been India’s orphan industry. According to writer Vijay Mishra, “The Cinematograph Acts of 1918 and 1919 and the establishment of the

Indian Cinematograph Committee of Inquiry in 1927 were informed by an emphatic definition of cinema as pure entertainment without any social (and even artistic) significance. These assumptions about cinema made their way into postcolonial India's Cinematograph (Amendment) Act of 1973, too." Only recently has Mumbai cinema begun to receive attention as an object of serious critical scholarship from Mishra and others.

Meanwhile, the debate over how Bollywood acquired its name raged on. Theories abounded, but Madhava Prasad believed she may have settled the issue. In a 1932 issue of *American Cinematographer*, she found an article by Wilford E. Deming, an American engineer who claims that "under my supervision was produced India's first sound and talking picture." In the article, he mentions a telegram he received as he was leaving India following his assignment: "Tollywood sends best wishes happy new year to Lubill film doing wonderfully records broken." He went on to explain that "our Calcutta studio was located in the suburb of Tollygunge . . . Tolly being a proper name and Gunge meaning locality. After studying the advantages of Hollygunge we decided on Tollywood. There being two studios at present in that locality, and several more projected, the name seems appropriate." Thus, Prasad concluded, "it was Hollywood itself, in a manner of speaking, that, with the confidence that comes from global supremacy, renamed a concentration of production facilities to make it look like its own baby."

Nowadays, Americans are familiar with Bollywood, more by its influence than by its product. Director Baz Luhrmann candidly admitted his *Moulin Rouge!* was inspired by Bollywood's cinematic extravaganzas. Andrew Lloyd Webber's musical *Bombay Dreams*, replete with Bollywood overtones, headed for Broadway following a successful run in London's West End. In 2002 Hyperion Pictures announced it was going into production on the musical comedy *Marigold*, which represented the first full-fledged joint venture between Hollywood and Bollywood. That Western artists were borrowing from Bollywood remains significant. The last decade of the twentieth century marked the milestone when Bollywood came into its own as a vibrant industry, accorded respect and globally appreciated as a cultural phenomenon in its own right.

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FINANCE COMMISSION One of the distinguishing institutions of India's federal polity, the Finance Commission provides a constitutional mechanism for the transfer of resources from the national to subnational governments in a fair and judicious manner. India's Constitution vests powers to levy most of the major revenue-yielding taxes, including income tax and general excise duties, with the central government. The only mass-based tax assigned to the states is the sales tax. On the other hand, many functions that require large expenditures, including police, public health, and sanitation, are assigned to the states, creating a serious gap in the fiscal system, with roughly 55 percent of aggregate expenditures undertaken at the state level, while only about 35 percent of aggregate revenues are raised by the states. All of India's states need transfers, but the most backward states need the greatest assistance from the central government to enable them to provide even minimal public services.

Article 280 of India's Constitution mandates the president to appoint an independent Finance Commission at least once every five years to recommend to the president: the proper distribution of taxes collected by the central government, that are to be shared between the central government and the states and their allocation among the states; and the principles that should govern "grants-in-aid" to states in need of assistance, which the Parliament is authorized to make under Article 275. Since 2000, revenues from all central taxes constitute a divisible pool. The president may also refer "any other matter" to the commission for its recommendations "in the interests of sound finance." Since 1993, following constitutional recognition of a "third tier" of government in the country, namely village and district *panchayats* and urban municipalities, the Finance Commission has been required to recommend measures to help state governments supplement the resources of the local bodies. The commission is also advised to keep in mind the revenue needs of both the central government and the states in meeting their essential expenditures. In recent years the commission has also been asked to review "the state of finances of the Union and the states" and suggest ways "to restore budgetary balance and maintain macro-economic stability." Every commission is normally required to make recommendations to cover a five-year period.

Since independence there have been twelve Finance Commissions. Recommendations of the commission are accepted by Parliament without modification, with rare

TABLE 1

| Criteria and relative weights for determining <i>inter se</i> shares of states in union taxes: Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commissions | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Criterion | Tenth Finance Commission | Eleventh Finance Commission |
| 1. Population | 20.0 | 10.0 |
| 2. Income–distance(1) | 60.0 | 62.5 |
| 3. Area | 5.0 | 7.5 |
| 4. Index of infrastructure | 5.0 | 7.5 |
| 5. Tax effort(2) | 10.0 | 5.0 |
| 6. Fiscal discipline(2) | — | 7.5 |

(1) This reflects the difference in the per capita income of a given state from that of the highest income state or that of a group of states with the highest per capita income.

(2) As measured by formulas spelled out in the respective commission's reports.

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

exceptions, regarded almost as an impartial “award.” Apart from taking note of the legitimate revenue needs of both levels of government, two cardinal commission principles have been to treat all states on a uniform basis, and to use the transfer mechanism to reduce interstate inequalities. “Upgradation grants” have been a regular feature of the transfers. Grants are also recommended for relief in the event of natural calamities. Commission transfers, comprising tax share and grants-in-aid, have generally been unconditional, the former being regarded almost as an “entitlement” of the states.

The states have persistently complained that transfers have not been adequate, though transfers to states as a proportion of central government revenues have risen from less than 25 percent in the 1950s to around 35 percent by 2002. Nevertheless, the states find it increasingly difficult to meet their expenditure out of the revenues made available to them.

Transfers have played a significant role in reducing revenue disparities among the states, per capita revenue of low-income states from their own sources usually being less than one-third that of the higher-income states. Per capita current expenditure of poorer states is nearly two-thirds that of the richer states. Even so, interstate disparities in revenue capacity have increased over the years, and federal transfers have not fully offset the fiscal disabilities of the poorer states.

A factor undermining fiscal discipline among the states has been the manner in which commission grants are determined. After laying down the formula for tax devolution, the commission assesses the budgetary position of each state by projecting its revenue and expenditure. Although the projections are made on reasonable

assumptions regarding the likely growth of the states’ revenue and expenditure, in reality “history” dominates the estimates, tending to breed fiscal laxity among the states. The Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commissions have tried to rectify this deficiency by introducing weights for “tax effort” and “fiscal discipline” in their tax devolution formula as shown in Table 1.

Debt relief measures recommended by the recent commissions are also linked to criteria designed to induce better fiscal management. How far such devices help inculcate fiscal discipline remains to be seen. Attaching strings to statutory transfers also raises questions about the central government’s infringement of the states’ fiscal autonomy.

Not all the blame for the ills of the transfer system can be attributed to the commission, however. Contrary to the constitutional scheme, a substantial portion of transfers has been routed through other channels. About one-third of the revenue transfers to the states has been dispensed by the Planning Commission, a body created to draw up and implement the five-year plan. Some funds are transferred by central ministries at their own discretion. Such multiplicity of channels with overlapping jurisdictions has blurred the overall efficiency the transfers.

Despite its perverse effects, the gap filling approach continues to cast its shadow over the commission’s transfer scheme. The Ninth Commission attempted to introduce normative principles in deciding the transfers. The Eleventh also tried to anchor the transfers to objective norms. But their attempts did not go very far.

Even a fully normative transfer scheme may not succeed in inculcating fiscal discipline among the states without a credible commitment to a “no-bail-out policy” on the part of the central government. Debt relief granted by the commission periodically has not much helped to improve matters.

There is thus urgent need for reforms of the transfer system if the Finance Commission is to play the constitutional role more effectively.

Amaresh Bagchi

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FISCAL SYSTEM AND POLICY FROM 1858 TO 1947 The fiscal system of British India has figured prominently in debates on the political origins of underdevelopment. The question often asked is: Did India's political status compromise the government's capacity to make investments?

Federal Structure

Two features persistently influenced the fiscal system of British India: the federal structure, and susceptibility to external shocks. Before British Crown rule began in 1858, the finances of the three major presidencies—Bombay, Bengal, and Madras—were nearly autonomous. The basic structure of federal finance was established in the first twenty years of British rule. Under the new arrangement, customs, salt tax, opium tax, and railway income were the main revenues raised and used exclusively by the central government. Receipts of provincial administrative departments, such as law and justice or education, went only to the provinces. Land revenue and excise taxes were shared. Only the central government could borrow. As for expenditure, the central government was responsible for defense, while the provinces were left in charge of local administration, education, and public health.

This structure caused persistent friction between the central government and the provinces. The provinces believed they had control over sources of income that were too few and too limited. The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 and the legislative assemblies that were created after 1920 restructured federal finance and exposed it to organized pressures from elected representatives. Major changes were introduced: the divided heads of revenue were abolished, land revenue was given over to the provinces, and the central government took the income tax. The central budget now had to be balanced by contributions for the provinces, which increased contention. These changes did not alleviate provincial grievances over their minimal sources of revenue, while they remained responsible for expanding expenditures for a growing population. The 1935 Act, however, went somewhat further in giving a larger share of revenue to the provinces.

One outcome of this system of divided sources of revenue was the growing inequality between the provinces in per capita tax burden and expenditure. Bengal, with its

“permanent settlement,” raised less revenue than its land was worth and thus spent less. Bombay and Madras raised more land revenue and spent more.

Instability

Under normal conditions, the government balanced its budget, that is, balanced current revenue and expenditure. In the pre-World War I period, government investment was financed out of public saving, but increasingly thereafter it had to be financed by borrowing. The equilibrium was often upset by famines, wars, and depressions. The wars fought by the British East India Company, the uprising of 1857, and the famines of 1876 and 1896 each imposed a burden of growing debt. Until the war, the main source of borrowing was London. Usually these debts were paid back from current revenues, but military expenditure during World War I created a crisis. It not only forced the government to borrow, but also forced it to turn to Indian sources of funding since London was no longer an easy money market. Another debt crisis appeared at the time of the Great Depression, when the creditworthiness of the Indian government came into question for the first time in history.

World War II again found India in serious deficit. The government spent larger sums and proportions of the budget than ever before on defense, for its own troops and also on behalf of Great Britain's war expenses. Taxes and borrowing proved insufficient to cover the deficit. But this time there was a central bank and substantial monetary autonomy. Consequently, the money supply increased to finance the deficit as never before. The supply of essential goods, including food grains, on the other hand, was being diverted to support the war effort. The net effect was massive inflation, with disastrous consequences for India's rural poor. The last days of the war saw government controls imposed on supplies of essential commodities. This was the precursor of the public distribution system, with which independent India has become familiar. The end of the war also saw the liquidation of India's accumulated foreign debt. Given Britain's sterling debt to India throughout the war, India began its independence with an ample credit balance in sterling.

Revenue and Expenditure

There were two major types of governmental expenditure in British India: expenditure in India and expenditure abroad. The two most important expenditures abroad were pensions paid in sterling to retired British employees and the interest on public debt raised in London. The government could finance its expenditure by three means. The first was current revenues, 70 to 80 percent of which were raised in taxes. The second was borrowings from abroad, and the third borrowings at home.

In the nineteenth century, the most important tax was the land tax. In 1858, it accounted for as much as 50 percent of total revenues. Next in importance were the opium and salt taxes. The government had a monopoly on the production of opium, and a near monopoly on the production of salt. Together, these two taxes accounted for 24 percent of all revenues in 1858. The income tax and customs and excise taxes together yielded no more than 12 percent of revenue. Clearly, the tax structure was both income-inelastic and regressive. Over the next sixty years, the pattern changed: the share of the land tax decreased to about 20 percent of all revenue in the 1920s, opium and salt taxes dwindled, and income tax, customs and excise expanded their combined share to over 50 percent.

The land tax as a proportion of the value of agricultural production declined from possibly 10 percent of net output in the mid-nineteenth century to less than 5 percent in the 1930s. At the same time, financial stringency forced the government to experiment with more elastic sources of revenue, such as customs and income tax. Until the interwar period, pressures from British exporters were too strong for comprehensive revenue tariffs to be introduced. The pressure eased, and counterpressures grew stronger. Income tax again became the scene of a battle, though a more subdued one. The government was unable to impose that tax on self-employed people. The groups that could be more easily targeted and assessed were those closest to the government, including prominent landlords, government employees, and owners of modern industry, many of whom were Europeans. Though some of these groups stoutly resisted being taxed, their resistance weakened over time.

For most of this period tax revenue as a proportion of the national income remained small and almost static at about 5 to 7 percent. Shifts in the composition of tax revenues made little difference to the government's spending power, even as the economy grew, leaving it ever more dependent on borrowing.

The main items on the expenditure side were defense, civil administration, and debt service. Each of these items was politically controversial. The Indian army was not only costly to maintain, it was repeatedly drawn into serving Britain's imperial interests outside India. The cost of imported administrative personnel was frequently excessive, and debt service was imposed by the poverty and dependence of the state itself.

Drain

The most controversial item of all was the "Home Charges," or the government's payments abroad for "services" received. These payments were called by Indian nationalists an imperial "drain" or "tribute," seen

as intolerably wasteful. The "drain theory" became an explanation for the political roots of India's poverty and underdevelopment. There was some truth, and some exaggeration, in the drain theory. The truth was that British government employees serving in India were indeed often overpaid. The exaggeration was that measures of drain tended to lump all factor payments together, whereas a lot of these payments were for technical services that had no substitutes in India. The broadest measure of drain (Home Charges or net factor payments abroad as a ratio of national income) was about 1.5 to 2 percent in 1901. The real drain was considerably smaller, and therefore quantitatively insignificant. Further, the drain theory assumed that the amount potentially saved on this account would have been available for investment, which was not necessarily the case.

Investment and Growth

Gross investment as a proportion of expenditure declined from 24 percent in the period from 1898 to 1913 (annual average) to 16 percent in the 1930s. Net investment was smaller still and falling faster. The three main areas of investment were railways, irrigation, and roads and buildings. The railways' share in gross investment fell from 51 percent in the period from 1898 to 1913 to 27 percent in the period from 1930 to 1938. Irrigation accounted for about 11 to 16 percent throughout. The share of roads and buildings increased from 31 to 46 percent. In the prewar period, public investment was mainly financed from public savings. But in the interwar period, the percentage dropped sharply.

Unquestionably, the primary objective of this fiscal system was governance and not development, on which it had a mixed effect. Did it actually contribute to underdevelopment? The question remains.

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See also **Balance of Payments; Money and Credit, 1858–1947; Trade Policy, 1800–1947**

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FISCAL SYSTEM AND POLICY SINCE 1952

India is a federal democratic republic with a multilevel parliamentary system of government. The Constitution

of India mandates, since 1993, three levels of government (central, state, and local) with specification of the powers and functions of each tier, through lists set out in schedules seven, eleven, and twelve. India's fiscal policy, emanating ultimately from the cabinet, must be approved by the Parliament and by the legislative assemblies of the states.

Article 112 of the Constitution requires the government to lay before both houses of Parliament—the Lok Sabha (the lower “house of the people”) and the Rajya Sabha (the upper “council of states”)—an annual financial statement every year. The statement sets out estimates of expenditures separately for sums required to meet expenditures charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, including: the emoluments and allowances of the president and other expenditures of his or her office; debt charges for which the government of India is liable; salaries, allowances, and pensions of the judges of the Supreme Court; and expenditures declared by the Constitution or the Parliament to be so charged. Estimates of such expenditures are not open to voting in Parliament and can only be discussed. Estimates of all other expenditures must be presented in the form of demands for grants to the Lok Sabha for approval. Once the demands are approved, a bill has to be introduced for appropriation of moneys required to meet the grants for expenditures.

India's fiscal year begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March. The proposals for expenditures, taxes, and borrowings set out in the budget for the year commencing in the following April are presented to Parliament on the last working day of February every year. Parliament can be approached with proposals for supplementary, additional, or excess grants when the sums already authorized prove insufficient or when need arises for supplementary or additional expenditures on some new service not previously contemplated. Along with detailed accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the government for the year to come, budget documents contain information on receipts and expenditures for the year about to end as well as the preceding year, constituting a rich source of data on India's public finances.

The budgets are accompanied by statements by the finance minister reviewing the performance of the economy and announcing the intent of the government on various matters affecting the economy and the life of the people. The budget session of Parliament constitutes an important public event in India and is preceded and followed by intense lobbying and by discussions in the press and among the public, testifying to the vibrancy of India's democracy. Similar procedures are followed in the states, with the difference being that the state budgets are usually

presented in their respective legislative assemblies after the Union budget has been unveiled.

The expenditures contained in the budget proposals for a given year on approval by the legislature are meant to be appropriated in the year in question; any excess requires *ex post* approval, while shortfalls are not allowed to be carried over to the subsequent year. In order to ensure that the expenditures incurred in a year are within the limits approved by Parliament (in the case of the Union), a detailed verification and scrutiny of the expenditures incurred is undertaken after the year's end by the comptroller and auditor general of India, an authority mandated in the Constitution with statutory protection. The audit reports of the comptroller are submitted to the president, who then causes them to be laid before each house of Parliament (Article 151). The comptroller is also required to audit the accounts of the states; the state audit reports are submitted to the governor of each state, who thereafter transmits them to the state assemblies. There are also parliamentary committees to undertake the verification and scrutiny of government expenditures and accounts, including the Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings, and there are standing committees for every ministry.

Taken together, the budget process thus provides a comprehensive fiscal system to ensure that the finances of government are run according to the wishes of the people, articulated in Parliament by their representatives. Public funds should be used efficiently, irregularities duly detected, accountability enforced, and corrective measures taken. Government budgets are debated openly before they are adopted by Parliament. Their implementation also comes under close scrutiny, and yet the actual operation of the system is marked by shortcomings that have tended to undermine fiscal discipline and efficiency.

The scrutiny of expenditures at the parliamentary stage is not as thorough or detailed as one might expect, partly because the accounts are not always transparent. Factors that make the budget nontransparent include: the multiplicity of budget heads for classification, such as “developmental” and “nondevelopmental” and “plan” and “nonplan.” Parliamentary scrutiny is also often perfunctory, inasmuch as large chunks of expenditure are “guillotined” in Parliament, without any discussion, for lack of time. Moreover, as the budgets are framed only for one year, supplementary budgets are routinely presented to Parliament and the state assemblies, as there is a tendency to underestimate expenditure in the original budget.

Until recently there was no legal constraint on the central government to borrow either from the Reserve

Bank of India (RBI) or from the market. As a result, deficits in government budgets that were not covered by borrowing from the market or from abroad were met ultimately by borrowing from the RBI through short-term borrowing instruments called “Treasury bills.” Since 1997, by virtue of an understanding entered into with the RBI, recourse to Treasury bills by the Union government has been discontinued. Cash flow problems are met through ways and means advances from the RBI. Similar provisions exist for the states. However, this budgetary constraint is often evaded through off-budget borrowing (e.g., borrowing through state-owned enterprises guaranteed by the government). Parliament has recently taken measures to restrain the tendency to finance deficits with improvident borrowing, passing in 2003 the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act to compel the Union government to reduce its deficits to stipulated levels. The law also requires the government to place before Parliament statements setting out its medium-term fiscal policy, fiscal policy strategy, and macroeconomic framework.

Fiscal Policy: The First Three Decades

When India attained independence in 1947, the role of government was minimal, rarely extending beyond the maintenance of law and order and the provision of relief after calamities like droughts, floods, and famines. Some public works were undertaken from time to time, but their scale was limited. The proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) going into public spending was barely 9 percent. Current revenues (tax and nontax) were more than adequate to meet current expenditures. The gap between revenue and expenditures—the fiscal deficit—was less than 1 percent.

After independence, government activity expanded rapidly, driven by initiatives taken by India’s leaders to promote economic development and the general welfare of the people. The aggregate expenditure of government (central and states combined) rose to over 15 percent of GDP in the first ten years and kept growing, reaching 22 percent in the 1970s. Capital expenditures increased from 1.7 percent to nearly 7 percent. Though the government resorted to borrowing for financing capital expenditures, the fiscal deficit remained moderate, no more than 4 or 5 percent of GDP. Current expenditures were financed entirely by current receipts; in fact the revenue budgets generated some surplus, which, though small, could be used for capital spending.

Given the objectives set for fiscal policy by India’s policy makers, such expansion of government was to be expected. The strategy of planning that the government of India adopted for development envisaged a leading

role for the public sector in lifting the country out of abject poverty and satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the people. At the same time, emphasis was on “democratic planning,” allowing a large role to the private sector as well. The primary responsibility for raising the level of saving and investment in the economy—which was crucial for initiating development—was, however, assigned to the public sector. Since this was to be achieved within the framework of a mixed economy, it was recognized that fiscal policy, along with monetary and credit policy, would play a critical role. The other major objectives of planning, for which fiscal policy instruments were to be relied upon, were: to bring about a progressive reduction in inequalities and regional disparities; and to influence the level and direction of economic activity. These objectives were reiterated in successive plans, with varying emphasis.

Additional instruments, “quasi-fiscal” in nature, were also employed to serve the objectives of the plans. To secure the flow of private investment into priority areas, a regime of licensing and control was imposed, empowering the central government to exercise control over all substantial investments in the private sector. Further, large segments of the economy were brought directly into the public sector through nationalization. Control was exercised over the flow of investment into the private sector with the creation of development finance institutions in the public sector and nationalization of major commercial banks in 1969. Control was then exercised over the production, distribution, and pricing of several commodities, like sugar and steel, and a fraction of their output was preempted through “levy” at below market prices, mainly by invoking the Essential Commodities Act of 1956. Even so, fiscal policy continued to play a vital role in running the economy and was used extensively to subserve the objectives of the plans. The results, however, did not always meet expectations.

On the positive side, in less than ten years, the level of capital formation in India’s economy rose from 10 percent of GDP to over 16 percent, and further to 23 percent at the end of the next two decades. Gross domestic saving increased from less than 10 percent of GDP to nearly 13 percent in the early 1960s and to over 20 percent during the 1970s. Even at fairly high levels of investment during the 1970s, the resource gap of the Indian economy (that is, current account deficit) remained mostly below 1 percent of GDP. Although the bulk of savings originated in the private sector, the public sector also made a significant contribution, forming in some years over 20 percent of the total. But that was far from adequate to meet the requirements of the public sector. Nearly 40 to 50 percent of investment in the economy took place in the public sector, and that required intersectoral resource transfers on a

large scale. Fiscal policy was used to play a supportive role in this endeavor.

The fiscal system also provided support for investment in physical capital (plant and machinery, in particular) through liberal capital allowances in income tax. Also, there was tax holidays for new industrial undertakings in the early years. In view of their employment potential, concessional treatment was accorded to small-scale industries in both direct and indirect taxes. Along with quantitative restrictions on imports, customs tariffs were used to protect domestic industries and to help implement the policy of import substitution. Other objectives pursued through the tax system included environmental protection and encouraging the use of certain inputs in specified lines of production.

Equity too figured prominently among the objectives of public policy pursued with the help of fiscal instruments. Personal income and wealth were taxed at steeply progressive rates. Then there were estate duties on wealth passing on death and gift taxes on gifts made *inter vivos*. Indirect taxes were used in a big way to favor the poor by distinguishing between essentials and luxuries. Several public services were provided free or at prices well below cost, particularly power and irrigation water. Exports were liberally subsidized.

Whether or to what extent progressive taxation helped the cause of redistribution or regional equity is not clear. There is some evidence that estate duty and gift taxes served to restrain the concentration in the distribution of wealth. However, confiscatory income and wealth taxes were believed to have spawned a huge “black economy.” A study carried out in the late 1980s revealed that around 40 to 50 percent of taxable incomes were probably concealed from tax authorities. Attempts to mitigate the ill effects of high rates of income and wealth taxes through exemptions and concessions weakened the potency of the taxes as instruments of redistribution, opening up loopholes and undermining the revenue potency of India’s tax system. In any case, agricultural incomes remained outside the purview of central income tax by virtue of the constitutional plan of tax assignment. The weight of direct taxes in the country’s tax structure declined from 37 percent at the time of independence to about 14 percent in the 1980s. Regional disparities too did not come down significantly, though they did not worsen.

The revenue productivity of indirect taxes suffered because of a plethora of exemptions and concessions. The revenue lost in this process was sought to be made up through high, multiple rates and by levying taxes on virtually all countries at all stages of production and sale, with excise levied by the central government and sales tax

by the states, rendering the tax system complex, non-transparent, and distortionary. By virtue of an amendment to the Constitution in 1956, interstate sales were brought under taxation through parliamentary legislation (the Central Sales Tax Act). The states of origin were entrusted to administer the tax and retain the revenue. The tax structure that emerged as a result, rather than fostering an efficient, self-reliant economy, constituted a major source of distortion and inefficiency. Neither equity nor resource allocation was well served.

Regarding stabilization, the main concern of fiscal policy in macromanagement was keeping inflationary pressures in check, rather than acting as a stabilizer or stimulator of the economy. Fiscal policy, working in tandem with monetary policy, was remarkably successful in maintaining macrostability and keeping inflationary pressures in check, barring a few episodes of double digit inflation in the 1970s. Unlike many developing countries, India did not experience hyperinflation. Nor did it suffer the convulsions that rocked many economies during the oil shocks of the 1970s. In fact, for nearly three decades after independence, government finances were in reasonable balance.

The 1980s and Beyond

Things took a turn for the worse in the 1980s. The deterioration began in 1979–1980, as the central government’s revenue budget for the first time went into the red and the consolidated fiscal deficit rose beyond 6 percent of GDP. Consolidated fiscal deficit crossed 10 percent in 1986–1987, and the average for 1985–1990 measured 9 percent. As a fallout of those deficits, the ratio of government debt to GDP went up to nearly 62 percent in 1990–1991, compared to 46 percent in 1980–1981.

The persistence of large fiscal deficits, together with a chronic imbalance in the external sector, led to a full-blown economic crisis in 1991. The crisis, triggered by the Gulf War, was marked by inflation of nearly 14 percent and a severe balance of payments problem. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled to a level sufficient for import cover of less than one month. The crisis compelled policy makers to undertake some radical reforms to stabilize the economy and launch a program of structural adjustment to correct the chronic imbalances and inefficiencies that had brought the economy to crisis. With liberalization as its keynote, India’s economy was opened up; quotas were removed, industrial licensing was all but eliminated, and the financial sector was unshackled. Fiscal consolidation figured prominently in the reform program.

While the immediate task of reform was to reduce the fiscal deficit to manageable levels by compressing

expenditure, the aim was to see that government finances were restored to health on a sustainable footing. Fiscal restructuring was undertaken with reforms on several fronts: reforms of the tax system to minimize inefficiencies while enhancing revenue productivity; reform of public expenditure management; and restructuring of the public sector. Institutional changes were also made to secure better coordination of monetary and fiscal policies.

Tax reform. Radical reforms were undertaken in both direct and indirect taxes to reduce heavy dependence on foreign trade taxes, turning more to taxes on income and domestic trade while minimizing their distortionary effects. The reforms that were initiated in 1991–1992 continued through the 1990s and are still in progress.

The strategy was to have a small number of broad-based taxes with moderate rates and few exemptions or concessions. The maximum marginal rates of personal income tax were brought down from 60 to 30 percent, and corporate income tax to around 35 to 40 percent, from 65 to 70 percent in 1980–1981. Presumptive taxation sought to widen the base, bringing selected services under taxation. Customs duties were reduced progressively from a peak of 150 percent to 25 percent. Rates of major ad valorem excise duties were compressed, and a three-rate structure of 8, 16, and 24 percent was introduced.

Expenditure management. Measures were taken to cut down and check the growth of government expenditure and to change its composition. These measures included: zero-based budgeting for ongoing programs, review of staff requirements of government departments and agencies, and the introduction of a voluntary retirement program. Subsidies were brought under scrutiny and reduced through cost recovery. An Expenditure Reforms Commission was appointed to identify specific areas for action. To contain the growth of pension payments, a partly funded contributory pension plan has been instituted for central government employees.

Public sector restructuring. A major thrust of the reforms was aimed at restructuring the public sector by reducing its size and budgetary support. The aim was to downsize government by withdrawing from activities where the private sector could do better or equally well. The reforms also sought to establish better coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. The government of India entered into an agreement with the RBI to discontinue the issue of Treasury bills, which meant automatic monetization of deficits, relying instead on ways and means advances to meet temporary cash requirements. Large-scale preemption of bank deposits for subscribing government bonds through requirements of statutory

liquidity ratio was reduced by cutting down the ratio to 25 percent from nearly 40 percent. Measures were taken by the RBI to widen and deepen the government security markets.

Reforms at state level. Initially, the reforms were primarily the concern of the central government. The second half of the 1990s witnessed moves toward reform at the state level as well, with greater efforts made for revenue mobilization, expenditure compression, and downsizing of government through restructuring of the public sector. Prodded by the central government and realizing the need to reform archaic and inefficient sales tax systems and avoid tax competition among themselves, the states joined together to move toward a harmonized system of value-added tax in place of sales taxes. The process is, however, still to be completed. On the nontax side, state governments moved to reduce subsidies by raising user charges for public services. In public sector restructuring, the focus has been on reforms of the power sector, as the losses of the state electricity boards have been a major drag on state budgets. The central government sought to induce the states with various incentives to undertake reforms essential to the success of the reforms as a whole.

Outcomes and Outlook

The measures initiated toward fiscal correction in the wake of the crisis of 1991 produced some tangible results. The consolidated fiscal deficit of the central government and the states came down from 9.3 percent of GDP in 1990–1991 to 6.9 percent in 1991–1992, then to 6.3 percent in 1996–1997. The ratio of government debt to GDP also registered a decline of 3.7 percent by 1995–1996. The improvement, however, proved short-lived. The fiscal deficit started moving up again in 1996–1997, crossing the 9 percent mark in 1999–2000, and was estimated to be over 10 percent in 2002–2003. Primary deficit, after coming down from 4.9 percent in 1990–1991 to 1.1 percent in 1996–1997, moved up again, measuring 3.8 percent in 2001–2002.

The debt-GDP ratio also moved up, standing in March 2003 at 75.5 percent. While this overstates the extent of the government's liabilities, in that a part of it (around 10 percent) is debt owed to the RBI, it does not provide a complete picture of the government's debt obligations, as it does not reflect the liabilities likely to arise from off-budget borrowings, such as guarantees extended by the government to borrowings of public sector undertakings and unfunded pension liabilities. As of March 2002, outstanding government guarantees measured 11.5 percent of GDP. A particularly worrying feature of the fiscal scene in the closing years of the 1990s was the growth of revenue deficits, that is, the deficits in the

revenue or current budget. In 2002–2003 revenue deficit accounted for over two-thirds of the consolidated fiscal deficit, compared to two-fifths before the reforms.

At current levels, India's fiscal deficits are among the highest in the world and are a cause for serious concern. Given the buildup of foreign exchange reserves, capital controls, flexible exchange rates, and widespread ownership of banks, the economy may not be vulnerable to the kind of crisis that overtook the country in 1991. There are no symptoms of crisis associated with fiscal imbalance of this magnitude. However, it is generally agreed that these deficits, particularly the revenue deficits arising from growth of the government's consumption expenditure, need to be brought down.

Even after a decade of reforms, though the economy is much stronger than before, India's fiscal situation has yet to stabilize. While there is no case for adhering to rigid budget-balancing rules all the time—budgets must adjust to the emerging situation in a constructive way—some basic rules of the game, like raising the revenue ratio in a nondistortionary fashion to meet current expenditures and a hard budget constraint, are yet to gain general adherence.

In a way, the inability of the Indian government to sustain the fiscal consolidation that began in the early 1990s is traceable to the weaknesses of a periodically elected federal democracy. Profligate promises made to the electorate by some of the leading political parties, like the promise of free power to farmers in the 2004 general elections, would seem to corroborate this prognosis. Reflecting a recognition of this reality, prescriptions for fiscal discipline now rely more on institutions such as “rules,” insulated from politics, which focus on the task of addressing structural imbalances, leaving the task of contracyclical action to automatic stabilizers. The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, passed by India's Parliament in 2003, set out a road map for eliminating revenue deficits in the central budget by 2008, and progressively reducing fiscal deficits with targets set annually. Several moves have been initiated to achieve greater transparency budget. Besides, the transfer mechanism, with built-in incentives for prudent fiscal behavior, is being used increasingly to inculcate fiscal discipline among the states. Whether all these remedies succeed in curing the malady of India's chronic fiscal deficits, however, only the future will reveal.

Amaresh Bagchi

See also Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Subsidies in the Federal Budget; Taxation Policy since 1991 Economic Reforms

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FITCH, RALPH (1550–1611), English merchant. Ralph Fitch, the first English merchant to reach India, wrote home to London from Portuguese Goa, where he had been taken prisoner by the Venetians from his captured ship *Tiger*. “Here be Moors and Gentiles,” Fitch reported. “They worship a cow and esteem much of the cow's dung to paint the walls of their houses. They will

kill nothing, not so much as a louse. . . . They eat no flesh, but live by roots and rice and milk. And when the husband dieth his wife is burned with him if she be alive” (letter of 1853, in Locke). Fitch thus reported such exotic Hindu customs as *sati* and cow worship, but he also wrote of how fabulously rich many Goan merchants were, and how palatial and sumptuously furnished were their homes.

Fitch escaped from captivity in 1584, venturing north to great Mughal emperor Akbar’s capital, Fatehpur Sikri, which at the time had twice the population of London, as did the other great Mughal capital, Agra. His letters home now praised the fabled jewels many Indians wore on their elegant silks and satins, and spoke of the rich profusion of spices, which England desperately needed to preserve its meats and mull its ale. Enterprising Fitch went on to Varanasi, where he observed Hindus bathing from its *ghats* and the cremation of bodies on the bank of the busy Ganges; he then sailed farther east to Bihar’s capital, Patna, where he met many wealthy merchants from Bengal and Burma. He left India in 1586 to sail off to Malaya, starting home from Southeast Asia in 1591.

Fitch’s firsthand accounts of fabled India and its amazingly rich variety of peoples and produce helped whet the appetites of London merchants, who eagerly sought to sail east in the next century, when England’s East India Company vessels first headed for the Indian Ocean, determined to break the Catholic Portuguese monopoly of the spice trade and run their blockade, as would the equally bold Protestant Dutch sea captains from Antwerp and Amsterdam. Haarlem-born Jan Huygen van Linschoten had arrived in Goa as secretary to its archbishop just two years before Ralph Fitch was brought there as a prisoner, and Linschoten returned home a year after Fitch did, carrying priceless secret Portuguese navigation maps in his baggage, allowing Dutch vessels to cross the Indian Ocean without being blown to its bottom by monsoon winds. The Dutch quickly established themselves in force on the Spice Islands they coveted, massacring English merchant “allies” there at Amboina in 1623. The English company then fell back to buy spices along India’s Malabar coast, and at the great Mughal port of Surat, seeking silks and saltpeter from the rich province of Bengal, all of which they first learned about in reports by Ralph Fitch.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Goa; Portuguese in India**

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FIVE-YEAR PLANS. See **Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of.**

FOLK ART In the vast panorama of India’s sociocultural diversity, creative expressions are closely linked to diurnal rhythms, fertility cults, and protective rituals. Traditional ways of life as well as professions shape the form of creative expression. Women as the nurturers of the household have played the dominant role in performing rituals; many folk expressions arose from these traditions, thus evolving a parallel creative expression to the classical arts. In addition, there are professional groups that cater to the ritual needs of different communities. These professionals intervene between the physical and mythical world, involved not only in rites of passage but also serving as healers and as propitiators of the gods and the spirits that populate the inner hidden world. Many folk expressions are multifaceted, combining the creation of objects for worship with ritual mudras, song, dance, and performance, and well-known schools of folk art have evolved from these traditions.

Folk art from the earliest times included works created by women for ritual purpose, such as wall and floor paintings, hand-molded gods and goddesses, and offerings to sacred shrines to propitiate their gods. Art objects created by women for the family and for exchange as gifts cementing social relationships, also serve as an expression of their dreams, their longings, and their anguish. Traditional craftspeople, of course, also produce art for ritual use by the people of a village community or by shamans, who are not only the priests and genealogists of different communities, but who visually create and narrate the tales of deified heroes, as well as those of the progenitors of craft guilds. Pilgrim centers also became important centers for folk art.

Different communities have distinctive styles of artistic expression. In Gujarat’s Kutch, a single village may contain several different groups, such as Ahirs, Rabaries, Lohanas, and Bhatias, each creating art objects in a distinctive style. The same is true of most rural communities, the unique ethos of each reflected in its artistic motifs, which are connected to ancient tribal or caste origins.

Painting on Floors, Walls, and Paper

In most Hindu households, a woman’s daily morning task is the creation of floor decorations, known as *alpona*,



Detail of Krishna from Wall inside One of Orchha's Palaces. Orchha is a medieval city in central India (now in Madhya Pradesh) founded in 1531. Its crumbling palaces, pavilions, and gates are testimony to a rich feudal lifestyle that encouraged the patronage of art and craft forms, including Lipai, the mud-based process used to create this mural. CHRISTINE PEMBERTON / FOTOMEDIA.

aripana, and *kolam*. These auspicious patterns are meant not only to welcome visitors and to propitiate the household gods, but also to provide food for unseen creatures, or spirits. In South India each dot of the *kolam*, created with dots of pure rice flour, is believed to feed three ants. Each design, every motif has a symbolic significance; some of the stylized patterns can be found as well in the tattoo designs created by wandering tattoo artists.

In different seasons, for festivals and rites of passage, each house is painted, and that too is traditionally women's art. Among the women in Saurashtra and Kutch, Gujarat, the Meos of Haryana, and the Jats and Harijans of Punjab, dung- or mud-work walls, encrusted with mirrors, decorate the interiors of the village huts, creating a shimmering inner landscape.

The ritual paintings of Mithila, North Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Warli have long been recognized and acknowledged as sensitive expressions of a folk art tradition. Mithila, a poverty-stricken area, had an extraordinary tradition of painting on mud walls. The most elaborate was the Kobar Ghar, paintings for the nuptial chamber, which were created to bless the inner room where the young couple would be together for the first time. The ritual focal point was a tree form of lotuses, often with a female head on the top, known as the *kamalban*, alongside of which was painted bamboo. These motifs were not only associated with fertility but were also subtle delineations of the sexual organs. Paintings of sacred Hindu couples—Rāma and Sītā, Shiva and Pārvatī—brought the blessings of the eternally united gods. The Brahman and Kayasta styles of painting were quite distinct. Older women painted from memory directly onto the mud walls, while others relied upon aide-mémoires kept on paper. Brahman women's work often exhibited a great spontaneity, while Kayasta women's paintings were usually linear and more controlled. Interesting ancient folk stylizations of a veiled woman with one eye and of floating animals and birds are sometimes mistakenly interpreted by Western viewers as the influence of the European modernists Paul Klee and Joan Miró.

Painting moved from village walls to paper, thanks to the encouragement of government departments, to add income to impoverished village families. Many women artists, including Jagdama Devi, Sita Devi, Mahasundari Devi, and later, Ganga Devi, emerged as highly creative and successful popular artists.

Another art form, the paintings of the Warli, a tribal group of Maharashtra in western India, also emerged from the walls of village huts. Originally, men were prohibited from painting, but the emergence of a lucrative art market broke this prohibition. One of the finest Warli painters, Jivya Soma Mashe, is a male folk artist who has won many awards.

The Navarātras, the nine nights devoted to the worship of the mother goddess, which require strict fasting, were also the occasion for creating images of the goddess, painting or preparing mud figures in relief on the walls. These were then immersed in a local pond or river with great ceremony. From this ancient ritual evolved a popular modern tradition, the elaborate creation of Goddess Durga images, in Bengal.

These traditions are also associated with the seventy-two *vratas*, rituals of fasting and praying performed by women, which are the early beginnings of narrative folk painting. The paintings continue to be used to tell the stories associated with each *vrata*. *Hoi*, for example, is created

for the protection of children and *karvachaut* for the protection of a husband. The women recite the stories painted on the walls, a tradition that is still practiced. In urban areas, however, lithographic prints have taken the place of the wall paintings, curtailing women's creativity.

The women of Kumaon, in the mountainous areas of Uttar Pradesh, create images of Lord Shiva and his family, which are worshiped by the household during Mahashivaratri, and then left outside on the ledge of the house. The collection of these images placed on the house ledges evokes an art gallery.

Other Art Forms

Indian women create a vast range of artistic products, using recycled or common materials that often hold no intrinsic value; yet their labor and artistic expression transform these materials into works of great value. The finest pieces may be the sculptural forms created from golden grass in North Bihar, made by the women of the household for a young bride as gifts to be taken to her new home. Grass elephants, peacocks, statuesque men, and boxes are made to simulate the dowry gifts of the wealthy landlords of the area. Wastepaper and rags are pulverized to create papier-mâché figures of men, women, animals, and large grain containers, further enlivened by painting, as gifts and for decorating the home. Elaborate palm leaf, bamboo, and straw baskets are created as gifts. The women of Chettinad in Tamil Nadu make exquisite baskets from dyed palm leaf that are as fine as any embroidered cloth and that also serve as wedding gifts.

Textiles. Throughout India, new clothes are never made for a newborn child; instead, a patched wrapper is created from rags, often collected from different individuals who have led long and happy lives. These patches are stitched together with great care for the newborn baby. The rag wrappers, known as *kantha*, *sujani*, *gudree*, and *dharkhee*, are representative of the spirit of Chind-deo, the "Lord of Tatters," and Chindevi, the "Goddess of Tatters"; not only are they protective clothes, they also symbolize a child's purity, connecting him with the final stage of life, *sanyas*, when a person gives up all attachments to family and hearth.

Woven *durries* of Punjab and Haryana, created by the Jat community, are made only for the household, and as gifts for their children or relatives, as an act of bonding. Pictorial scenes from folk epics such as Heer Ranja or from local ballads are created, often interspersed with lines from folk songs or a form of poetry, for example, *Bagha wich aiye bahar koil kuk utbi* (The spring flowered and the nightingale began to sing).

Scrolls. A number of folk artists created painted ritual cloths, which were used by the shamans of different communities for celebrating deified heroes. These scroll

paintings are of ancient origin and are mentioned in ancient texts. The Pabuji ka Phadh, Ramdeoji-ka Phardh are painted by Brahmans of Shapura, Rajasthan, and are used by the Bhopas, the priests of the local communities, to celebrate the lives of the heroes, thus earning merit for the community. The creation of wall paintings, known as Pithoda, by the shamans of the Rathwa tribe is an important household ritual through which the legend of Pithoda is related.

The painters, or *patuas*, of the painted scrolls (*pata*) of Bengal are often those who relate the stories as they move from village to village. The Ghazi Pat, which is now found only in Bangladesh, was painted by a Brahman but used by Muslim performers, who sang, danced, and told the story, which is an interesting syncretism of Muslim and Hindu beliefs. The Hindu *patuas* of West Bengal were painters and wandering minstrels who unrolled their long scrolls scene by scene as they sang the story. *Jadu pats*, magical scrolls, were created by the *Jadu patuas* for the tribal Santhals, of the Santhal and Pargana districts of Bihar, as well as among the Santhals of Bengal. They claimed that creating the image of the ancestor would help them find their way to the other world. The Chitrakuthis of Paithan in the Deccan were famous for their extraordinary paintings, which they used to relate religious legends.

Scrolls painted in Andhra of the Markandaya Purāna were created specially for the Padmasalis, a weavers' community. The painters also created clay figures of the main characters, which were used along with the scrolls to tell the story of Bhavana Rishi, their progenitor.

Centers of the folk art tradition. Places of pilgrimage became important centers for the creation of ritual objects as well as mementos for pilgrims to carry back to their homes. Important schools of art emerged from this tradition. Kalighat paintings achieved fame because of the large number of pilgrims who visited the temple. Local *patuas*, as well as painters who had lost their courtly patrons, thus found other outlets for their talent. They began to paint pictures of gods and goddesses, as well as local scenes and narratives. European influence was seen in the use of watercolor in place of gouache, and in the use of bold lines for creating figures. These paintings were not only bought by Europeans, but were also appreciated by the Bengali elite, who had been exposed to contemporary art in Europe. Jamini Roy, a contemporary painter inspired by Kalighat painting, became world renowned. Kalighat painters continued their tradition by painting on clay plaques, which were used to decorate family shrines as well as the home.

The *pata-chitra* painting of Orissa was practiced by local painters, whose primary duty had been and continues

to be the painting of the deities Lord Jagannath, Balram, and Subhadra of the Jagannath Temple of Puri. They created replicas of the images for the pilgrims, both in wood and on a canvas created from cloth and a paste made of vegetal materials. They painted Subhadra, scenes from the *Gītā Govinda*, and depictions of a number of deities for sale to pilgrims. They also painted the *ganjifa*, local playing cards, a tradition maintained in many parts of India. Raghurajpur village on the outskirts of Puri has a number of such well-known painters.

Tanjore, an important pilgrimage center in Tamil Nadu, developed a range of paintings depicting Lord Krishna as a child and as a lover surrounded by the *gopis*, lovelorn women devotees of Vrindavan, as well as paintings of other gods. The paintings were painted on treated wood, using gold and silver, and were even encrusted with stones and jewels. Tanjore also became known for its glass paintings.

The Bhats, a priestly caste of the lower castes of Rajasthan, were string puppeteers who carved and dressed their puppets, performing throughout North India. According to their oral tradition, they played in the Mughal court and evolved their art at the court under a Persian master puppeteer, though there is also a reference to the string and shadow puppetry of Central Asia. Rajasthani puppeteers may have been responsible for the spread of string puppets throughout India. Orissa had a tradition of string puppets, painted in the *pata-chitra* style, while Bengal had a tradition of rod puppets as well as string puppets. Leather shadow puppets were found in South India in Karnataka, Andhra, and Kerala. Kerala shadow puppets, made of buffalo hide, were distinctive and echoed the classical style as represented in the bronze and wooden sculptures. Beautifully carved wooden dancing puppets with articulated body movements and eye movements are used in temple processions in Tamil Nadu.

The *dbokra*, or *cire-perdue* (lost wax) technique of metal casting of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa was created by itinerant metalsmiths known as Kasars, Malhars, and Mals. Originally they moved from place to place, living on the fringe of the village, and were often treated as vagrants. They would buy broken brass pots and melt them to create their pieces. The base was made out of clay, and the figure was shaped from strings of wax. Thus spiral patterns appeared on the finished pieces. They created images worshiped by the tribal people, as well as ritual objects and jewelry worn by the men, women, and shamans. Each of the center's had a distinctive style of work. Over the years, Bastar and West Bengal further developed the art as a form of creative expression. Jaidev Baghel of Bastar has emerged as an artist whose work is exhibited in galleries in India and abroad.

Karnataka also has centers where the *cire-perdue* method is used for casting anklets, belts worn by the traditional shamans, who perform the rituals of exorcism, by the worship of the Bhoota figures, as well as performance of ritual dance and plays in Kerala associated with the Theyyam and worship of Bhadrakali.

Some of the richest forms of creative expression are to be found in Kerala in the celebration of temple festivals and the enactment of rituals for ancestor worship and healing. One of the most powerful performances is the creation of large floor paintings of the powerful goddess, Bhadrakali, from which the goddess is believed to appear. Her painted face, headdress, and costume create a world of fantasy in which, accompanied by loud drumming, the battle between good and evil is enacted. The *theyyam*, or ritual performance, patronized by landed gentry, brings into play the creation of mythical characters with the use of palm leaves, straw, paint, and facial as well as body masks, enhancing the viewers' entry into a mythical world.

Recognition and acclaim. A new class of folk artists has emerged as a result of their recognition and promotion by well-known artists, art historians, and art institutes. A number of artists began the study and advocacy of the work of folk and tribal artists: Shankho Choudary, a sculptor, initiated his students at the Baroda Fine Arts Faculty in the 1950s into an appreciation of folk arts; and J. Swaminathan, the well-known painter, promoted the cause of folk and tribal artists, presenting a policy paper to the Governing Council of the Lalit Kala Akademi (the institution for contemporary art), stating that it should give equal status to folk and tribal artists. As director of the Kala Bhawan in Bhopal, Swaminathan ran workshops jointly for contemporary and folk artists. He also held exhibitions at which the work of folk and tribal artists was hung alongside the work of contemporary artists. Haku Shah, a sensitive contemporary artist, was responsible for encouraging the talent of many folk artists, such as Saroja Bai and Ganesh, whose works were featured in international exhibitions and now are preserved in a number of museums. Balan Nambiar, a sculptor and enamel artist from Kerala, made a detailed study of folk expression in Kerala State. The photographs taken by the well-known artist Jyoti Bhat were responsible for the discovery of Sona Bai, whose work in clay created a unique environment.

An exhibition organized by Dr. Jyotindra Jain, called "Other Masters: Five Contemporary Folk and Tribal Artists of India," at the National Crafts Museum in New Delhi brought the works of Sona Bai, Jivya Soma Mashe, Ganga Devi, Jangardh Sing Shyam, and of the great Manipuri potter Nilomani Devi into the public eye. Though Jain's catalog of the exhibition, as well as his book on Ganga Devi, focused public attention on the

enduring creative work of Indian folk artists, great numbers of them will no doubt continue to work in anonymity.

Jasleen Dhamija

See also **Bandhani; Paithani; Papermaking; Patola; Textiles**

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FOLK DANCE Dance plays an important role in celebrating South Asian life-cycle events and calendrical rituals, as well as religious beliefs, and appears to have done so for millennia. Every Indian language and social group has its own words for dance, emphasizing the local and unique over the national and common. Indeed, no single word can commonly translate the idea of dance, and no single encyclopedia entry could hope to discuss every dance form, classical or folk. Moreover, dance provides numerous examples of the codification of "folk" tradition into classical praxis. When aristocrats brought regional dances into their courts (as with *kathak*) and when temples standardized village dance dramas (as with *kathakali*), they helped link cosmopolitan and rural India. Thus, dance illustrates a continuum between the folk and the classical in South Asian performance traditions. Dancers in "folk" traditions may spend many hours perfecting their choreography with the assistance of teachers, learning patterns and techniques passed down from previous generations. However, these dance contexts can also spawn improvised and spontaneous gestures that can take on choreographic lives of their own.

In many cases, folk dance seems to begin as stylized gestures illustrating either daily routine or episodes of religious stories. If, for example, during devotional singing an individual stands up and demonstrates how a character in the song walked or behaved, then the careful execution of those movements becomes dance. When, in the context of music, individuals reenact daily chores such as carrying a water pot on the head, or illustrate their ability to handle weapons such as swords, the careful execution of those movements becomes dance. And, when these actions are isolated, abstracted, and socialized, dance is a consequence. Sometimes, children's games are the source of dances. For example, in the *bikat* of Jammu and Kashmir (and found widely in similar forms throughout South Asia), pairs of dancers cross and extend their arms, clasping their partner's wrists, leaning backward and spinning in time with the music. The dance ends when one of the dancers becomes too dizzy or the rate becomes too fast. Notably, the dance teaches a participant to rely on a partner—whose counterbalance keeps you from falling during the dance and who will hold you if you fall. In an agrarian society where success and survival are linked with mutual dependence, the lesson is not frivolous.

Regional genres, such as Gujarati *garbā*, can function both in the contexts of life-cycle events (such as



Gujarati Folk Dancer. On 21 September 2003, in Ahmedabad, a Gujarati folk dancer, in swirling traditional attire, rehearsing for the upcoming Hindu festival of Navarātri. Navarātri is the longest Hindu festival, lasting for nine consecutive nights. AMIT DAVE/REUTERS/CORBIS.

weddings) and calendrical rituals associated with religious festivals (such as Navarātri, in which it is the preferred form of worship for mother goddesses). However, at the core of this musico-choreographic form is a celebration of fertility, both etymologically (*garbā* derives from *garbhā*, “womb”) and symbolically. For example, one of the most common central points of this circular and repetitive dance is a perforated earthen pot (*garbhā dīpā*), which represents life within the womb. Other representations in this tradition can be a pot of water with a coconut stopper or a basket of seedlings. Women gather in the evening during Navarātri (nine nights of autumnal celebration) wearing long embroidered skirts with inset mirrors, short blouses similarly decorated, and long scarves. As they dance in a circle, they bend, clap, and repeat the pattern, while singing songs praising the mother goddesses and asking for their blessings. The twirling dancers, with the light of the *garbhā dīpā* reflecting

off their skirts, illustrate the reality of dance, not as entertainment, but as a cathartic experience that, combined with fasting, brings the goddess into their midst as a fellow dancer. The genre also has gendered versions: *garbo* (masculine) for women and *garbī* (feminine) for men. (*Garbā* is the plural form.) Regional variants include Punjabi *giddhā*, performed at festivals or in connection with wheat, both during sowing and harvesting. This dance can also mark the arrival of rain or of a new baby and has a rich musical tradition.

A variation of this dance style is *kummi* of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala, the songs of which sometimes describe everyday tasks such as chores, while others are dedicated to specific gods. Women perform *kummi* as a counterpart to men’s dances, and it can take multiple forms, even within the same region. In Tamil Nadu, for example, the *kummi* is both a “flower dance,” extolling the beauty of flowers, and a “housewife’s dance,” to name just two of many. The dance is also performed during Dīvālī, when cattle (the animals considered sacred to Shiva and Krishna) are decorated and led in a procession accompanied by music and dance. New rice is cooked and girls dance—stepping, jumping, pirouetting, and clapping to form circles.

In northwestern India, a *rāsa* or *rāso* can be a legend set in verse and sung about kings or warriors (such as the *Prithvirāj Rāso*), suggesting that perhaps the widespread dance of the similar name might have begun as an enactment of scenes in these stories. These dances share movements and perhaps origins with dances that have distinctly military associations, such as the *kattbak* of the Pathans. In this case, male dancers perform a series of stylized military motions with swords and shields, complete with feints, turns, and pivots. Similarly, in eastern India, men perform versions of the *chau* dance-drama, particularly the *puruliā chau* of West Bengal and Bihar, in the spring. This last version includes mock reenactments of fights between the principal characters, in which dancers strike their “weapons” against each other in a stylized battle. *Serūikela chau* in Bihar also uses stylized martial movement, but today prominently includes rural and rustic themes. *Chau* dancers also wear masks in most (but not all) traditions and depict episodes from the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, as well as other religious stories. Another martial and religious themed dance is the *parāsa* (after *parāsu*, “battle ax”) dance of Sirmur in Himachal Pradesh, where male dancers wield clubs and reenact the story of Parashu-Rāma (an incarnation of Vishnu) defeating Renuka.

Stick dances occur in various forms throughout India and celebrate deities, agriculture, marriage, and life-cycle events and, while they may vary in specific features and

functions, the fundamental elements remain the same. The defining characteristics are the use of two sticks and, like *garbā*, choreographic patterns of one or more counter-revolving concentric circles (or sometimes, two parallel lines). *Rāsa* stick dances share the characteristic of dancer pairings; dancers beat their own sticks together and with those of other dancers in time with the music. Stories of Krishna are often themes in stick dances, though some regions, such as Travancore and Cape Comorin, pay homage to other deities, such as Shiva and St. Francis Xavier. Stick dances can be found throughout India and commonly have connections with agriculture, the dance movements often reflecting this association as dancers pat the earth, imitating the sowing of seeds. Some social groups use stick dances to celebrate life-cycle events. For example, Rajasthani Bhils perform a version of *rāsa* called *jhorīā* (referring to the pair of wooden sticks) at weddings. Performances of *rāsa* in northern India typically occur on festivals such as Vasant Pancamī, Navarātra, and Sharada Purnima, which celebrate harvests. But while *rāsa* commonly has links with agricultural cycles, individual societies ultimately dictate the content of the dance. The *rāsas* of some communities, such as those found in Manipur, are less related to agriculture, while in many of Saurashtra's villages, *dandīā rāsa* ("stick" *rāsa*) dances are nearly synonymous with harvests. Communities throughout Gujarat, Saurashtra, and Maharashtra perform dances of this type, maintaining the fundamental traits of *rāsa*, while imprinting the movements with regional stylistic features.

Variations of the *rāsa* exist even within regions. Some dances replace sticks with stylized swords, others remove vocals and dance only to the accompaniment of drums, and the sticks vary in size and style. *Rās līlā* in Manipur is generally elaborate and thematic, with different varieties such as *basant rāsa* ("spring" *rāsa*, depicting the amorous quarrels of Rādhā and Krishna), *kunj rāsa* (the love of Rādhā and Krishna), *mahā rāsa* (the separation of Krishna and Rādhā), *divā rāsa* ("daytime" *rāsa*), *nitya rāsa* ("everyday" *rāsa*), *nātnā rāsa* (Krishna playing with the milkmaids), and others. Some of these are in the form of a circle (such as the *mahā rāsa* and the *nātnā rāsa*), while others are more dramatic representations. In Sirmur of the Himalayan region, *rāsa* performances occur during the Maghi or Bisu festivals and, unlike the dance in Graj and Manipur, use many instruments and focus less on deities and more on stories of mortal love. One variation, the *rās līlā*, found particularly in Uttar Pradesh, reenacts Krishna legends in various celebrations, and some local variants have sophisticated patterns of foot stamping and flowing arm movements. In the Punjab, *jhummar* seems to be a variation on *bhangrā* (see below), but is performed by women with sticks during festivals like Navarātra.

Again, women move in circles, often pirouetting (as in other Indian circle dances) and striking pairs of sticks together and against those of other dancers.

In Kerala and Karnataka, another variation on *rāsa* is the *kōlāttam*, a ribbon and braid dance that originally was a fertility dance, but which has also come to symbolize the triumph of the goddess Mohini over the demon Basmāsura. Although the dance has developed agricultural associations throughout the decades, the *kōlāttam*'s popularity has spread to homes, schools, and cities, making the dance primarily social today. Some communities, however, still maintain the earlier principles of the *kōlāttam*. In Tamil Nadu, for example, girls perform the *kōlāttam* by moving around the circle or square and hitting sticks high and low as they bend from side to side. Opposing dancers hit sticks as they dance around the circle, moving forward and backward, leaping onto and away from their toes. *Kōlāttam* can also focus on religious, philosophical, or musical ideas through song, and may celebrate deities such as Rāma.

Dances celebrate many occasions in the Punjab, but by far the best-known Punjabi dance is *bhangrā*, originally performed by farmers after a harvest but now widely performed by men in public contexts. Again, this dance is gendered. Women sometimes perform *bhangrā*, but only in private contexts, such as in the home or with family. However, when men perform *bhangrā*, they commonly engage in intensely kinesthetic movement meant to illustrate the physical prowess of the dancers. They may even engage in gymnastics and activities such as human pyramids. The jumps, spins, bends, and other exaggerated movements in time with the drumming are usually accompanied by the dancers holding their arms above their heads, often snapping their fingers, with the head either slightly downturned or bent back, suggesting a kind of self-absorption. *Bhangrā* became one of the most popular dance forms in twentieth-century popular Indian films and, because of this identity, *bhangrā* and its variations have spread internationally, especially in British club settings. Today, *bhangrā*-like dances can be seen in wedding processions in Bengal, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Kerala.

Some folk dances have become the subject of elaborate urban and suburban competitions that attract thousands of people. *Bhangrā*, *garbā*, and *dandīā rāsa* are the choreographic fields upon which dance clubs and teams compete; they are judged not only on the intricacy and execution of the dances, but also for their costumes and stage props. One part of the strategy for a successful performance in these competitions is to evoke historical or regional variations. *Bhangrā* dancers might swing a farmer's stave (*lāthī*) as part of their choreography, attempting to evoke an authenticity to their dance (the

presumption being that a rural performance would be more “authentic” than an urban or suburban performance), but also demonstrating the virility of the men dancing (the *lathi* being a formidable weapon in the right hands). In *garbā* competitions, women and girls will often dance with pots on their heads, sometimes with lamps burning inside, and, in the most elaborate situations, some performers may dance with a *mandapikā* (lamp tree). *Dandīā rāsa* competitions may have the most elaborate choreographies. The essential dance pattern itself is already complex: an inner circle moves counterclockwise, an outer circle moves clockwise, and dancers are paired with a different partner after each set of gestures and one partial rotation of each of the circles. The gestures can be simple (the commonest consisting of about eight strikes against your partner’s sticks and your own) or much more elaborate (e.g., dancers twirl before, during, and after the strikes, perhaps also kneeling and striking the floor). Dance teams can come from such diverse sources as neighborhood associations and police academies. Universities in Gujarati-speaking western India commonly have *dandīā rāsa* clubs. All will purchase or create elaborate costumes that attempt to be both colorful and authentic, sometimes to the point of being too flamboyant and only romantically authentic.

A contributing factor to the codification of folk dance in India has been the central government, whose annual Independence Day celebrations in Delhi have regularly featured troupes of dancers from the different states. Performed in a large stadium, only those dances that involve the most people in the brightest costumes, making the grandest gestures, have an impact. The intimacy and contextual importance of the local art form is lost.

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See also **Dance Forms**

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FOOD SECURITY Defined as a condition in which all people have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and preferences, food security is considered by the United Nations a basic human right. The current world

food system normally functions efficiently, at least in an economic sense, though not a moral one. It provides at reasonable prices adequate food of their choice to those who can afford to pay for it.

Thus food security is a problem of the poor, in poor countries. The hungry of the world are hungry because they are poor. They are poor because they own too few resources of land, capital, or skills. Poverty can also be a most vicious circle, since from lack of food the poor may not be physically or mentally productive enough to earn adequate income, thus perpetuating their poverty. Hunger is primarily a problem of poverty, not of food production. If all the world’s poor were given sufficient income, more food would be demanded and produced. But if more food were produced because farmers were given higher prices, the poor, whose incomes would not have changed, would remain hungry.

Food security for a country is also a matter of underdevelopment. A poor country deficient in food production is vulnerable to transient influences that reduce domestic production or increase world market prices, as it cannot import the food it needs. While it is conceivable—for example, in some nuclear winter scenarios—that global food production could fall so much below the demand that even rich nations would not find enough food, such supply shortages are very unlikely. The technological food production potential of the world, even without exotic technologies, is so great that the inability to produce food at any cost is not likely to threaten the food security of wealthy nations.

What constitutes “adequate” food intake is still a matter of contention among nutritionists. The general approach is to consider the basal metabolic rate, the number of calories that a person needs while lying down but wide awake, and take some multiple of that as the norm for adequate caloric intake. Metabolic rates vary, of course, across similar individuals (in height, weight, gender) and also across time for a given individual. Individuals learn to live with fewer (or more) calories over time. Yet, no matter how one measures hunger and poverty, one finds that hundreds of millions of persons suffer from hunger and poverty in the world and in India.

In addition to the millions who suffer from persistent hunger, many others who normally get enough to eat live precariously on the margin of subsistence. They are vulnerable to all manner of external influences, which can easily reduce their food consumption and bring them into the ranks of the hungry. A major threat to the already inadequate food consumption of the poor is from any temporary drop in real income. The real income of the poor can also fall because food prices rise.

When India's monsoon rains fail, the poor not only lose employment but food prices rise as well. Even when the rains fail in a remote, prosperous country, the price of food for the poor may increase. The rich country would then either export less food grains or import more grains, and the world market prices of food grains would go up. A country's booming domestic economy could aggravate the hunger of the poor if their incomes do not rise as rapidly as do increases in food prices. Apart from such sudden drops in real income, a creeping loss may occur if employment opportunities do not keep pace with the growth in the labor force.

Both persistent hunger and transient hunger, the extreme form of which is famine, have underlined the fact that to deal with chronic hunger is to deal with poverty and underdevelopment. Amartya Sen (1981) and Jean Drèze and Sen (1989) have extensively examined how to deal with the extreme case of transient hunger, namely, famine. Famines have led to large-scale deaths since World War II in some countries but not in India. The question is why some governments fail to take effective action in time to prevent mass deaths due to famine. Drèze and Sen stress the role that freedom of the press and media plays in mobilizing timely and effective action against famine.

The State of Food Security in India

India's national level of food security is reflected in the availability of food, whose net availability at the aggregate level in per capita terms has been maintained at reasonable levels and has been increasing over the years, though since 1997 it has been coming down a bit for two reasons. Diversification due to better quality food (milk, edible oils, etc.) has reduced demand for grains; and high levels of minimum support prices for wheat and rice set by the government reduced the demand and increased output and led to net accretion of nearly 40 million tons of buffer stocks from 1997 to 2001.

Domestic production of food grains, dependent to a large extent on India's rains, fluctuates from year to year. The government thus holds buffer stocks of food grains to ensure that availability does not suffer. The size of the buffer stock should be adequate to fill the gap of any fall in production caused by a sequence of poor monsoons, keeping prices at reasonable levels.

The state of food insecurity at the individual level is reflected in the number of persons who do not get adequate food to eat and who show signs of malnutrition. The poverty line in India is defined as the level of consumer expenditure at which people in rural areas will consume 2,400 calories per person per day and those in urban areas 2,100 calories per person per day. Based on

household consumption surveys carried out by the National Sample Survey Organization the estimated number of persons below the poverty line has been coming down. Transient hunger, however, can throw almost 10 percent of India's rural population into poverty from one year to the next.

Government programs, such as buffer stock policy, to provide food security have not been very effective. Another indicator of food insecurity is the level of malnutrition in India. In 1997–1998 the percentage of stunted children (height-for-age) was 57.1 percent among the rural poor and 49.6 percent in urban areas, very high proportions indeed.

Policies for Food Security

Once adequate food is available at the national level, providing food security to all is to provide adequate real income to all. The government has followed a variety of policies to do so. Poverty removal has been the main objective of all of India's five-year plans and all political parties. The policies have included transfers of food, such as public distribution of food at subsidized prices through ration shops, Midday Meal programs, Mother and Child Nutrition programs, and income-enhancing programs, such as employment guarantee plans, Food for Work, and other employment programs, and many other antipoverty programs, described briefly below.

Public distribution. Under the public distribution system, selected items of mass consumption, such as wheat, rice, other cereals, sugar, oil, and kerosene, are provided at subsidized prices to ration card holders in limited quantities. People are free to buy additional quantities in the open market. Ration cards are now issued to everyone. This program is now considered one of the government's most significant antipoverty initiatives. In 2004, under the Targeted Public Distribution System, each family below the poverty line is entitled to a quota of 22 pounds (10 kg) of food grains at subsidized prices (about 50% of cost). Families above the poverty line received a lower subsidy (90% of cost). However, the large difference between the issue price to the poor and the open market price provided incentives for diversion of considerable amounts of grain into the open market, and such leakage, coupled with exclusion errors in targeting, implied that very little subsidy reached the poor. The objective of providing adequate food to all has not as yet been realized.

Antyodaya Anna Yojana. This program was introduced in early 2001 for the poorest of the poor, as identified by *gram panchayats* (village leaders) and *gram sabhas* (village

councils). Antyodaya households are entitled to 77 pounds (35 kg) of grain a month at highly subsidized prices (Rs. 2 per kg for wheat, and Rs. 3 per kg for rice). A survey of destitution in five states indicates that the program is doing well. The selection of Antyodaya households appears to be quite fair. In some areas, however, the survey found that many households had been deprived of their entitlements by ration shop dealers. The program covers only about 5 percent of the rural population. If these limitations are overcome, the Antodaya program holds much promise.

Food security through ICDS. Malnutrition among children and women is severe in India. Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), perhaps the largest of all food supplementation programs in the world, was initiated in 1975 to: improve the health and nutrition of children in the 0–6 year age group by providing supplementary food; to provide early stimulation and education to preschool children; to provide pregnant and lactating women with food supplements; and to enhance mothers' abilities to provide proper child care through health and nutrition education.

A World Bank and Government of India review in 1997 found that ICDS services were much in demand, but there are problems in delivery, quality, and coordination. The program might perhaps be improving food security at the household level, but has failed to effectively address the issues of prevention, undernourished child/mother detection, and management.

Food security through midday meals to schoolchildren. The provision of free midday meals to schoolchildren encourages enrollment and retention, in addition to providing food security to children. School feeding programs often double enrollment within a year and can produce a 40 percent improvement in academic performance in just two years, the World Food Program has found in its study of a number of states in India.

The program, first introduced in the southern state of Tamil Nadu in 1956, has proved remarkably successful in improving school enrollment in that state. With modest cost, the benefit has been dramatic, increasing school enrollment in the state: in primary schools, up 31 percent, from 5.04 million in 1985–1986 to 6.59 million in 2002–2003; in middle schools, dropouts decreased from 24 to 13.85 percent during the same period. Apart from boosting school attendance and child nutrition, midday meals have an important social value. As children learn to sit together and share meals, there may be an erosion of caste prejudices; the gender gap may also be reduced as female school attendance increases.

The Supreme Court of India in November 2001 directed all of India's "State Governments/Union Territories to implement the Mid-Day Meal Scheme" in every government and government-assisted primary school, offering every child a midday meal of no fewer than 300 calories and 8–12 grams of protein each day of school, for at least 200 days.

Food security through employment programs. The best-known employment program is Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), started on 26 January 1979, guaranteeing employment to all adults eighteen years and above who are willing to do unskilled manual work. The act bestows a right to work on every adult person residing in rural areas of Maharashtra. Only the needy offer themselves for work, and the supply of employment has to adjust to demand, so that fluctuations over seasons and over years are automatically taken into consideration. It is also self liquidating. When economic growth provides opportunities for better paying jobs, people would automatically stop coming for work in EGS programs. Though EGS has not eliminated rural poverty in Maharashtra, there is some evidence of decline in the depth of poverty there. Another important benefit of EGS is that by providing an alternative opportunity for employment to rural workers, it increases their bargaining power and increases rural wages.

The many programs to provide food security have surely made some impact and have been extremely important as short-term measures. However, perhaps the best long-term measure for food security is economic development that provides enough income for all Indians to buy as much food as they need.

Kirit Parikh

See also Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Famines; Poverty and Inequality; Subsidies in the Federal Budget

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FOREIGN RESOURCES INFLOW SINCE 1991

The period from 1990 to 1992 can be regarded as a watershed in the historical profile of external capital

flows to India. Prior to that period, external assistance constituted up to 80 percent of net capital flows. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was repressed by an inward-looking regime guided by a socialistic view of India's economic development. Portfolio investment was virtually nonexistent. In the 1980s, shortfalls began to be experienced, as external financing needs expanded in response to an increase in growth. A modest recourse to international financial markets by Indian corporates—mainly public sector enterprises—in the second half of the 1980s was accompanied by a reliance on high-cost deposits by nonresident Indians. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 would alter this canvas dramatically.

The war in the Persian Gulf precipitated a combination of shocks into an unprecedented balance of payments crisis. Crude oil import costs surged threefold, even as evacuation of expatriates from the war zone and the loss of key export markets in the Gulf region dealt crippling blows. The almost coincident disintegration of the Soviet Union disrupted a fifth of India's exports and a steady source of strategic imports. To add to the acute situation, the application of prudential norms under the Basel Capital Accord of 1987 led to the restriction of lending by international banks to developing countries, including India. Suddenly there was a collapse of capital flows. Credit ratings were downgraded, and this triggered a flight of nonresident deposits and even a moderation in bilateral and multilateral aid. By July 1991 the foreign exchange reserves had run down to a level of less than a week's imports and, for the first time in its history, India approached the brink of default on external obligations.

Stabilization

The response to the crisis was equally spectacular. An orthodox International Monetary Fund (IMF)–style stabilization program was put in place, supported by IMF funding and exceptional finance from donors. Unconventional measures included the sale/pledge of monetary gold, a two-stage devaluation of 18–19 percent, immunity from taxes for inward remittances from nonresident Indians and their investments in India Development Bonds, issued to beat the subinvestment grade credit ratings. By November 1991 came the turnaround. The crisis passed, and with it went the paradigm that had driven India's previous economic development. As stability returned, structural reforms were put in place, including a measured liberalization of the capital account.

Two compulsions weighed upon policy authorities in the choice of a gradualist approach over a "big bang." First was the sheer magnitude of the reform effort—an economy of continental dimensions, housing 15 percent of

the world's population. Second, there was the unenviable task of implementing stabilization and structural reforms simultaneously on a crisis-ravaged economy. In addition, the reforms were an article of faith with the international community, and time was running out.

Considerable time was spent in setting up the preconditions for the liberalization of the capital account. Over the years 1991, 1992 and 1993, fiscal compression and tight monetary policy were put in place. Industry and foreign trade were virtually deregulated from licensing, tariffs were lowered sharply, and a dual exchange rate regime was instituted to prepare the evolutionary foreign exchange market for a greater role in determining exchange rates (earlier the exchange rate was administered by the Reserve Bank of India [RBI] under a trade-weighted peg). FDI, highly restricted hitherto on account of ownership considerations, was allowed into all key areas of Indian industry at international rates of taxation and with free repatriability. Portfolio investment by foreign institutional investors was allowed into Indian stock exchanges under similar considerations. Indian companies were permitted to make both debt (convertible bonds) and equity (global depository receipts) issuances in international stock exchanges. The process of liberalizing exchange control was set in motion, leading up to current account convertibility and India's acceptance of the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement from 1994. At the same time, the brief but traumatic brush with debt default during the crisis laid the foundations of a strategy for external debt management. External commercial borrowings were routed through an approval procedure emphasizing maturity, cost, and end-use, within an overall exposure ceiling. Short-term debt was monitored under a subceiling.

The operating framework of monetary policy was undergoing a silent transformation, as if in anticipation of the deluge of capital flows to follow. Nonresident deposit accounts carrying exchange guarantees from the RBI and instruments of automatic monetization of the fiscal deficit were phased out in a planned manner. There was a progressive shift to indirect instruments of monetary control, and statutory preemptions were lowered to minimum levels prescribed in relevant legislation.

Surges in Capital Flows

Shortly after the progression from dual exchange rates to a unified, market-determined exchange rate system in March 1993, India faced its first encounter with surges in capital flows. Beginning in August 1993 and extending well into 1995, waves of foreign investment inflows dominated the balance of payments, accounting for almost half of net capital flows in 1993–1995. FDI rose from

near-negligible levels in 1990–1991 to exceed U.S.\$1.3 billion in 1994–1995 (fiscal year). Leading the flood, however, were portfolio investment flows: foreign institutional investors in Indian stock markets, offerings of global depository receipts (GDRs) paper in overseas equity markets, convertible bonds raised abroad by Indian companies, and Indian offshore funds. In each of these years, portfolio investment flows averaged U.S.\$3.5 billion. After a hiatus of almost four years, India renewed access to short-term trade credits toward the close of 1994–1995.

The visitations of private capital flows were clearly a response to the strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals. The economy grew by over 7 percent from 1993 to 1996, well above trend. A robust expansion of both merchandise and invisible exports easily accommodated the surge in import demand in response to the liberalization in trade and industrial policies. Despite sizable repayments of bilateral and multilateral aid, repurchases from the IMF, and net outflows under the discontinued nonresident deposit accounts with exchange guarantees, there occurred a hitherto unprecedented buildup of the foreign exchange reserves to a level of over U.S.\$25 billion in March 1995, equal to about ten months of imports. In turn, this posed challenges to the conduct of monetary policy. A combination of policy responses—sterilization, external liberalization, retention of funds abroad—could not head off upward pressures on inflation, which rose above 10 percent in 1993–1995. A social resistance to inflation in double digits, entrenched in the Indian polity, manifested itself tellingly in a withdrawal of confidence in the government of the day. A fractured political mandate decisively ended the office of the “original reformers” in 1996 for a period that would last until 2004.

By early 1995, the capital flows ebbed and the downside of the roller-coaster experience with mobile capital flows was about to begin. Persistent surplus conditions in the foreign exchange market throughout 1993–1995 had been assuaged through passive interventions (purchases) by the RBI. Consequently, the nominal exchange rate of the rupee remained fixed over a period when the U.S. dollar was going through a pronounced appreciation against major currencies. Inflation differentials between India and the rest of the world were widening sharply, and the policy authorities themselves indicated discomfort with the building appreciation in the real exchange rate. Burgeoning imports had been comfortably financed all along, but when the capital flows ebbed, signs of incipient pressure became evident by August 1995. A spurt in the demand for domestic bank credit pushed up domestic interest rates, feeding an upward drift in the forward premium. Downward pressures on the exchange rate intensified in October, and India had its first taste of

a currency attack. Expectations of a free fall of the rupee ran rife, disrupting the tranquil market conditions. The RBI engaged in exchange market interventions (sales), but this had the effect of withdrawing domestic liquidity and causing short-term interest rates to soar. Accordingly, interventions were soon backed up with money market support and an easing of reserve requirement stipulations on deposits with banks.

Capital flows remained, by and large, impervious to the currency turmoil. Net inflows under nonresident deposits actually increased in 1995–1996 over the preceding year. There was a welcome spurt in inflows of foreign direct investment, which exceeded U.S.\$2 billion for the first time. The United States emerged as the largest investor. Engineering and electrical equipment were the preferred industries. Portfolio investment flows, on the other hand, were adversely affected by the disorderly conditions in the domestic financial markets and the restrictions imposed by the authorities on the introduction of funds from GDRs, which remained in force until November 1995. There was a slump in issuances of GDRs in overseas stock exchanges. Low equity prices in domestic stock exchanges combined with the unsettled market conditions to dampen investment by foreign institutional investors. In the first quarter of 1996, however, sentiment improved as the currency attack dissipated and the authorities undertook a series of confidence-building measures, including a rollback of the interest rate increases and a tightening of exchange control undertaken to deal with the “bandwagon” effects that had driven financial markets. Indian companies launched about U.S.\$0.5 billion of GDRs in the quarter and foreign institutional investment surged, with perceptions of overcorrection in the equity and foreign exchange markets. The medium- and long-term debt flows—bilateral and multilateral aid and external commercial borrowings—continued to be dominated by large repayments. Access to short-term trade credit was extremely modest. For the first time since 1993, net capital flows fell short of the external financing requirement set by a higher current account deficit. This necessitated a draw down of the foreign exchange reserves on the order of U.S.\$1.2 billion.

The currency attack in the second half of 1995–1996 (fiscal year) turned out to be only a temporary disruption in India’s tryst with private capital flows. The inflows resumed strongly in the following year. Net inflows under nonresident deposits recorded a threefold increase, marking the return of confidence. The largest inflows were into rupee deposits under the nonrepatriable scheme. FDI maintained its uptrend, benefiting from enhancement in equity holding limits and an expansion of the industries for which approval was automatic. The sluggish

domestic capital markets and policy relaxations prompted a large number of GDR issuances. Portfolio investment by foreign institutional investors was maintained, as overheated international capital markets propelled a diversification of portfolio flows in favor of emerging markets. Debt consolidation was pursued apace with substantial amortization of external aid and commercial borrowings, including the “bullet” redemption of the India Development Bonds issued at the height of the crisis of 1990–1992. Expanding energy requirements resulted in higher short-term trade credits in order to finance imports of petroleum products.

Asian Crisis

The fiscal year 1996–1997 was a turning point of sorts, presaging the cataclysmic Asian crisis that would reverberate across the world. International trade slowed down, and shifts in consumption patterns in mature economies provided early indications of the synchronized global slowdown that would dominate the second half of the 1990s. India’s merchandise exports and industrial production were adversely affected. The demand for bank credit remained damped by the tightening of monetary policy during the currency turbulence of the preceding year. As the growth of the economy moderated from the scorching pace set in the period 1993–1995, non-Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants imports slowed down sharply. Indian industry entered a period of painful restructuring and organizational change, as corrections to the massive capacity expansion in the first flush of liberalization had to be made in a more realistic assessment of demand.

Buoyant capital flows were interrupted in the first half of the fiscal year 1997–1998 by exchange market turbulence generated by the floating of the Thai baht. Sporadic speculative attacks led to a slackening of investment by foreign institutional investors in Indian stocks and even outflows in the period from November 1997 to February 1998. GDRs dropped sharply and were mainly in the form of disinvestment by public sector entities. The rekindled appetite for external commercial borrowings in the first half of the year was choked off in the second half by a sharp rise in the forward premium as monetary policy braced itself to defend against the crisis spreading across Asia. Corporate entities that had raised funds preferred to hold them abroad. Net inflows into nonresident deposits halved over the year, reflecting the generalized sense of uncertainty as well as the imposition of incremental reserve requirements; in fact, net outflows occurred in the period of exchange market volatility. FDI flows were untroubled by the surrounding chaos and exceeded U.S.\$3 billion. FDI was allowed into financial services. Mauritius emerged as the most important source

of FDI inflows into India as transnational corporations sought exemptions from Indian taxes by exploiting treaties for avoidance of double taxation.

India emerged relatively unscathed from the Asian crisis. Foreign exchange reserves were built up by U.S.\$3 billion, and the nominal exchange rate held its own in an environment of domino effects among Asian currencies. In the following year, however, Asian financial markets experienced heightened turbulence and contagion spread to Russia and Brazil amidst fears of the competitive devaluation of currencies. A global slowdown, which began in mid-1997, deepened in 1998, and world trade underwent a substantial contraction. The spectacular increase in private capital flows to developing countries, including India, in the first half of the 1990s collapsed. The domestic financial markets were buffeted by bouts of instability during May–September 1998. The stormy international environment was worsened by sanctions on India imposed by industrial countries in response to nuclear testing. Monetary policy measures were deployed in conjunction with the issue of Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs) of U.S.\$4.2 billion for nonresident Indians. Other types of external commercial borrowings and issuances of GDRs registered a sharp decline. Net outflows were recorded by foreign institutional investors, and even FDI was distinctly lower than in the fiscal year 1997–1998. By contrast, net inflows into nonresident deposits rose significantly, impervious to the generalized global uncertainty, and revealed a definite home bias. Net capital inflows taken together were lower by more than U.S.\$1 billion. Ultimately, it was the RIBs that shored up the balance of payments in an extremely testing year, enabling a buildup of reserves to a level of U.S.\$31.4 billion by March 1999.

Stability returned to international financial markets in early 1999 to mark the close of an eventful decade. The global economy staged a V-shaped recovery. The resumption of growth was particularly strong in the crisis-hit economies of Asia, shaped by successful macroeconomic adjustment and strict financial policies. Net private capital flows to developing countries resumed modestly but were dominated by substantial repayments of bank lending. Hardening crude oil prices emerged as the major risk to an improved global outlook. In India, a broad-based firming of industrial activity ensured that trend growth of over 6 percent was maintained, despite the shadow cast by border tensions in May 1999. The RBI resumed a graduated liberalization of capital flows. Foreign corporate entities and high net worth individuals were allowed to invest in Indian stock markets through foreign institutional investors. All sectors of the economy, except for a short negative list, were opened to

FDI on an automatic basis. The policy regime for external commercial borrowings was substantially liberalized with the approval procedures largely moved out of the Ministry of Finance to the RBI. End-use stipulations were relaxed, except for real estate and equity investments in light of the experience gained in the Asian crisis. Outward FDI was encouraged, and Indian companies engaged in knowledge-based activities (information technology [IT], biotech, and entertainment) were allowed enhanced capabilities for the acquisition of companies abroad. Policies for the import of bullion were also liberalized, with banks and financial institutions allowed to freely import gold and silver.

Net capital flows returned to pre-1998 levels on the back of a renewal of portfolio investment by foreign institutional investors, resilient flows to nonresident deposits, and a larger recourse of Indian entities to international equity markets. For the first time, American depository receipts (ADRs) entered the portfolio of capital flows to India. FDI continued to be sluggish, despite a greater focus domestically on the speedy implementation of FDI proposals and the opening up of the insurance sector. The debt flows in the form of external aid and commercial borrowings continued to remain muted, reflecting lackluster domestic investment demand. For the fourth year in a row, there was an accretion to the reserves of over U.S.\$ 6 billion in 1999–2000. By June 2000, all liabilities to the IMF incurred in the crisis of 1990–1991 were repaid.

Global Slowdown

The advent of the new millennium began another phase in India's experience with capital flows. A deepening of the global slowdown from mid-2000 to late 2003 was accompanied by large sell-offs in international equity markets, the bursting of the IT bubble, and a receding of private capital flows to emerging markets as risk aversion increased in the aftermath of the currency crises in Turkey and Argentina. Repayments of bank loans continued to be sizable. Beginning with a significant reduction in fiscal year 2000–2001, India's current account deficit turned into a surplus in 2001–2002 after two decades. Surpluses persisted in the ensuing years, powered essentially by the strength of remittances from Indians residing abroad. By 2003 India became the highest recipient of such inward remittances, accounting for 14 percent of global flows. Merchandise exports regained lost momentum, particularly since 2002–2003. The generalized aversion to emerging markets was reflected in a sharp decline in trade credits, syndicated loans, and other types of commercial borrowings in 2000–2001, as well as a fall in investment by foreign institutional investors and FDI over the previous year. Net inflows into nonresident deposits, however,

continued their uptrend, reflecting the confidence of non-resident Indians in the Indian economy. Indeed, the invulnerability of nonresident deposits to the vicissitudes of the international financial environment turned out to be a source of strength to India through an extremely difficult decade. The shortfall in various types of external financing in 2000–2001 was bridged by the launching of the India Millennium Deposits of U.S.\$5.5 billion, again targeting nonresident Indians.

Fortuitously, this shortfall would prove to be a transient experience, as capital flows became stronger in 2001–2002 and 2002–2003, led initially by FDI and nonresident deposits but dominated in 2002–2003 by large inflows in the form of banking capital as exchange rate movements and interest rate differentials made rupee assets highly attractive. In 2003 and 2004, a massive surge in investments by foreign institutional investors was the most striking feature of capital flows to India, supported by the buoyancy of nonresident deposit inflows and continuing inflows of banking capital. By May 2004, India held the sixth-largest stock of foreign exchange reserves in the world, a far cry from the low point of July 1991. Beginning in 2002, India became a lender to the IMF. The level of the reserves currently exceeds the stock of India's gross external debt.

Capital flows weathered subinvestment grade credit ratings, the general aversion to emerging markets, adversities peculiar to India such as sanctions, terrorist attacks, a terrible drought, and soaring crude oil prices to endorse the underlying strength and resilience of the Indian economy in the decade of the 1990s. In fact, throughout 2004, even after undertaking large prepayments of external debt and bullet repayment of RIBs, policy authorities were actively engaged in strategies to temper the massive influx of capital. Efforts to counter the expansionary impact of the inflows on monetary conditions threatened to deplete the stock of monetary instruments and innovative strategies have had to be combined with orthodox measures of monetary policy to deal with the inflows.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a perceptible acceleration in the speed of capital account liberalization. New economy industries—IT, e-commerce, telecommunication, financial services, mass rapid transport, airports, urban infrastructure, even defense—have been opened to foreign direct investment, along with a removal of quantitative restrictions such as dividend balancing through exports imposed on FDI in consumer goods industries. Overseas business acquisitions through ADRs/GDRs have been significantly enhanced, up to several times the size of export earnings, and outward FDI is now allowed up to 200 percent of the

net worth of the domestic investor. All approval procedures relating to external commercial borrowings have been delegated to the RBI for proposals beyond U.S.\$500 million. Below that amount, approvals are not required.

Since the opening up in 1991, India's experience with capital flows has been marked by episodes of surges and short-lived reversals. The policy regime has emphasized stability and gradualism and a shying away from the more dramatic attempts at liberalization in neighboring Asia. A hierarchy of capital flows has emerged but not entirely in consonance with policy preferences. Inflows into nonresident deposits have turned out to be the most durable flows, in spite of measures to slow them down as part of the overall approach to contending with capital flows. Special bond issues for nonresident Indians have filled in exceptional financing gaps in periods of stress. FDI has, in general, not lived up to policy expectations, held down primarily by implementation gaps in the process of turning proposals into actual inflows. Investment by foreign institutional investors and raising of ADRs/GDRs/FCCBs (foreign currency convertible bonds) have exhibited volatility and sensitivity to shifts in market conditions. Foreign investment, both direct and portfolio, is now entrenched in India's capital account, with a share of more than 50 percent of net capital flows. The reliance on debt flows has declined substantially. While the policy for external commercial borrowings has been modulated in tune with the needs of the economy and the compulsions of prudent external debt management, the appetite of Indian corporate entities has been muted by the slowing down of investment demand since the second half of the 1990s. The reliance on external aid that characterized the period up to the 1980s has dissipated completely. Active efforts are underway to prepay bilateral and multilateral donors and seek, in a redefinition of self-reliance, freedom from aid.

Michael Debabrata Patra

See also **Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Information and Other Technology Development; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets**

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FORSTER, E. M. (1879–1970), author of *A Passage to India*. Edward Morgan (E. M.) Forster was a Cambridge don, and author of the renowned Anglo-Indian novel, *A Passage to India*, published in 1924. Forster's passionate affair with India started in 1906, when he tutored Syed Ross Masood at Oxford. He fell in love with the handsome aristocratic Indian Muslim, and at his invitation left England on his first sea voyage to India in 1912. Forster briefly stayed with Masood and his family in Bankipore, a town he found "horrible beyond words." He also spent time on that first passage with his British Civil Service friend, Rupert Smith, in Allahabad. Smith took Forster to Buddhist Bodh Gayā and the Barabar ("marabar") Caves, which they visited by elephant, as would his fictional protagonist, Dr. Aziz. On his way out of India, Forster stopped in the central Indian state of Chhatarpur, where he met the maharaja of Dewas, who invited him to serve as his private secretary. After World War I, Forster returned to Dewas for six months in 1921, his diary account of which was later published, in 1953, as Forster's only other book about India, *The Hill of Devi*. Forster began writing his *Passage to India* in 1913, after returning home from his first trip. He borrowed the title from Walt Whitman's poem of the same name:

Not you alone proud truths of the world,
Nor you alone ye facts of modern science,
But myths and fables of old, Asia's, Africa's . . .
Passage to India!
The races, neighbors, to marry . . .
The oceans to be cross'd, the distant brought near.

"When I began the book," Forster wrote his friend Masood, "I thought of it as a little bridge of sympathy between East and West." By the time he finished, however, he realized how "unexplainable" a "muddle" British India was, how impossible it seemed for even the most passionately empathetic men of England and India to live in harmony as loving friends. In the novel, British magistrate Ronny Heaslop's mother, Mrs. Moore, is probably the character whose liberal, loving philosophy of life most closely reflected that of Forster, though Schoolmaster Fielding also reflected at least part of the author's brilliant mind. Fielding's unorthodox ecumenical preference for the friendship of "natives" like Dr. Aziz to the company of stuffy and pompous British officers like Ronny or Collector Turton at the British Club branded him an "outcaste" if not a "traitor" to his "own" race. Yet even

Fielding fails at the end of this remarkable book to convince Aziz that they at least can truly be friends, though "It's what I want. It's what you want."

But in 1924, India was still locked under the steel-frame imperial grip of the British Raj, so their "horses didn't want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn't want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view . . . didn't want it, they said in their hundred voices, 'No, not yet,' and the sky said, 'No, not there.'" Twenty-three years later, when India emerged independent of British rule, men like Forster and Masood, or Fielding and Aziz, were free to pursue their relationships as equals, no longer fearing or resenting each other as masters and servants.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British Crown Raj; British Impact**

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FRENCH EAST INDIA COMPANY The French East India Company (La Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales), was founded as a monopoly by royal edict of Louis XIV in 1664 at the strong urging of his finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert. The king was its largest investor, and the crown effectively controlled the company. After an inauspiciously disastrous beginning, it eventually became moderately successful and profitable but was always undercapitalized and dependent on loans, often from the treasury.

The establishment of the French East India Company was part of Colbert's ambitious mission to revamp France's economy. Its founding implied the removal of the monopoly from the Compagnie de l'Orient started by Cardinal Richelieu in 1642. Richelieu's company had become entangled in the colonization of Madagascar, which it saw as a necessary way station on the sea-lanes to India. As a consequence, it was unable to meet the demand for fine Indian silks and cotton goods, and a substantial market share had been taken by "foreign businesses." Colbert, a mercantilist, wished to slow, if not



Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Efforts (1664–1683). Colbert's efforts to regulate and expand France's economy in the seventeenth century, the formation of the French East India Company having been his brainchild, were soon threatened by the extravagances of the monarchy. ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS.

prevent, the steady export of wealth required to pay for the trade balance. At the time, it is estimated that the French market was purchasing 30 percent of the textiles and spices imported by other joint stock companies, chiefly the English and Dutch East India Companies.

Colbert's company was granted a fifty-year monopoly of trade east of the Cape of Good Hope, given charge of the colonization of Madagascar, two adjacent isles (Réunion and Mauritius), and trading centers in India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Unfortunately, the initial reaction of French merchants was tepid; of the 15 million livres envisaged, just over eight million livres (three million from the king) were raised. Colbert's company was nearly always undercapitalized and often had to borrow money to operate from season to season.

Personnel were a second problem, solved by recruiting among the Dutch. The Dutch were hardy mariners and skilled shipwrights. Dutchmen had been crews on Portuguese vessels when that country had a monopoly on

the spice trade. Once Dutch crews learned how to navigate to the Moluccas, they went into business for themselves. By 1664 there were experienced Dutch captains and sailors to be had. A third obstacle was the lack of adequate vessels, so Colbert established a port and shipyard named, appropriately enough, Lorient, on the Atlantic coast.

The first decades of the *Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales* were checkered. The company faced stiff competition from the Dutch East India Company, which harassed the French merchant marine and occasionally confiscated cargoes. Support from French merchants was never enthusiastic for they were subject to strict royal control. Furthermore, the company's administration deteriorated after the deaths of Colbert in 1683 and his son, the marquis de Seignelay, in 1690. The initial voyages were so commercially disastrous that Colbert had to resort to lies to hide the magnitude of the losses in order to raise more capital.

Affairs in India were better, however. François Martin, left behind after a French defeat by the Dutch and the *qutbshab* (king) of Golconda in San Thomé, founded Pondicherry in 1674. Pondicherry became the center of French India, lying about 85 miles (137 km) south on the Coromandal coast from the English East India Company's trading center at Fort St. George (Madras, now Chennai). Even though port facilities were inconvenient, the commercial viability of Pondicherry was based on the availability of silk and cotton textiles, calicoes and muslins, produced by nearby village cottage industries. The profitable commercial activity caught the jealous attention of the Dutch East India Company, which drove out the French in 1693. The *Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales*, facing deficits due to failed adventures in Madagascar and Thailand, was helpless. After a sojourn in France, where he was received cordially by king and company, Martin was named governor of Pondicherry for the third time and as director of all French factories in Surat, Chandarnagar, Calicut, Dhaka, Patna, Qasimbazar, Balasore, and Jogdia. He remained in Pondicherry, the Indian capital of the French East India Company, until his death in 1706.

With the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Dutch East India Company withdrew to Indonesia, leaving England and France the only rivals in India, much as their rivalry was to dominate European affairs for the next hundred years.

When the fifty-year monopoly of the *Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales* expired the next year, a ten-year extension was granted to the by-then moribund company. Shortly afterward, Louis XIV died, and the duke of Orleans succeeded as regent. In 1717 the regent

granted monopoly trade rights in the Caribbean, Canada, and Louisiana to a publicly traded French West India Company, La Compagnie Française des Indes Occidentales, founded by John Law, a Scottish financier. Two years later, Law persuaded the regent to meld the dormant East India and the nascent West India companies, and the conglomerate was titled simply the Company of the Indies (La Compagnie des Indes).

The new company's public stock offering was a brilliant success, briefly doubling and redoubling in value. It immediately purchased the tobacco monopoly, which was a steady source of revenue, allowing it to pay its promised dividends even as the stock was becoming grossly overinflated. The bubble burst, and by the summer of 1720, panic set in. There was a run on the Royal Bank, and the company's shares plunged. The company offered to accept all its shares at face value in return for a perpetual monopoly (its ten-year extension was due to expire in 1725), and it was restyled the Perpetual Company of the Indies (La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes).

The crash tarnished the reputation of the Perpetual Company, however, which had to be restructured in 1723 into a private regulated monopoly, but one in which the king and regent still had substantial investments. However, the Perpetual Company was successful for several decades, becoming a serious rival to the English East India Company, and was responsible for the major French impact on India. After the Seven Years' War, the Perpetual Company declined steadily, and was completely moribund by the French Revolution.

J. Andrew Greig

See also **French Impact**

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FRENCH IMPACT France's most influential and successful period in India coincided almost completely with the reign of Louis XV (1723–1774). After the death of Louis XIV in 1715, the French East India Company

created by Jean-Baptiste Colbert was replaced by a reconstructed French company of the Indies (Compagnie Française des Indes). The reason had to do with the moribund state of the company of Colbert, and the agents of this change were the regent, the duke of Orléans, and his financial adviser and controller general, John Law. This new company was far more profitable than its predecessor, and it reached its apex of power and influence in India during the governor-generalship of Joseph François Dupleix. At one point, it was a major threat to the British East India Company's commercial empire and seemed to be in position to drive its rival from the subcontinent. At its height, the French were perhaps the wealthiest and most powerful Europeans in India. However, largely due to repeated wars for supremacy fought between France and England in Europe, North America, and India, the French Company of the Indies lost its primacy and then its vigor during the Seven Years' War. It lasted until the French Revolution, but as a shell of the company that Dupleix had left behind at the time of his recall in 1754. The tactics and strategy adopted by Dupleix to accomplish this primacy formed the paradigm for what came to be called the "Nabob Game" when adopted by his rival and imitator, Robert Clive. French control and influence continued in Pondicherry, even now a French-speaking enclave on the Coromandal coast.

In 1714 the monopoly of the French East India Company (La Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales) founded by Jean-Baptiste Colbert expired. At the time of Louis XIV's death the next year, the company too seemed to be terminally ill. Its prospects were dim; the War of the Spanish Succession had cut profits, it was heavily in debt, its capital was undersubscribed, and disputes among the directors had sapped their energy and made it harder to obtain credit. In the previous three years the company had been leasing its trading privileges to merchants from St. Malo, the main competitor to the company's own port facilities in Lorient, its only revenues. Before dying, Louis XIV had granted the moribund company a ten-year extension with the expectation that the additional time would allow it to turn around or at least provide for its orderly liquidation.

Louis XIV also left behind an empty Royal Treasury. In this difficult environment, the duke of Orleans, regent (1717–1723), turned to a package of financial initiatives to stimulate the French economy. They were proposed by a Scotsman, John Law, who had seen the success of the Bank of England (flourished 1694) in increasing the money supply through the issuance of bank notes and the subsequent creation of financial enterprises that increased the value of those bank notes through guaranteed bonds and transferable stocks.



Street Sign in Pondicherry. Surviving French and Tamil street sign in Pondicherry, seat of the eighteenth-century La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes (Perpetual Company of the Indies). In their astute analysis of Indian politics and exploitation of divided factions, the French set the course of subsequent British expansion on the Indian subcontinent. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

John Law's major proposals led to the creation of a Bank of France (La Banque Générale) empowered to issue paper bank notes and to the merger of trade monopolies in both the West Indies and East India into one French company chartered by the regent. In 1717 the regent had granted Law monopoly trade rights in the Caribbean, Canada, and Louisiana to a publicly traded French West India Company, La Compagnie Française des Indes Occidentales. Its merger in 1719 with La Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales resulted in an entity named, simply, Company of the Indies (La Compagnie des Indes). It was formed over the objections of both the French company's directors and the merchants of St. Malo, and litigation continued until 1751.

The sale of stock in the conglomerate precipitated an inrush of capital and unprecedented speculative fever. Prices doubled and redoubled, but within months, the market crashed in a scenario reminiscent of the "South Seas Bubble" in contemporaneous England. A rush on the Bank of France soon exposed the fact that there was not enough specie on hand to cover all the paper bank

notes. To salvage the situation, Law, on behalf of the Company of the Indies, offered to accept all shares at face value in return for a perpetual monopoly (its ten-year extension was due to expire in 1724). It was consequently renamed the Perpetual Company of the Indies (La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes), the name it retained until its demise.

Its credit seriously tarnished, the Perpetual Company of the Indies cut all ties with Law and was exhaustively reorganized into a private monopoly in which the king and regent kept substantial investments, but with a board of directors appointed by the king and closer royal oversight by the controller-general. The initial influx of capital had enabled Law's company to begin to put essential infrastructure into place, commissioning ships, buying cargoes, engaging crews, and otherwise preparing for voyages to India. Law had wisely purchased the tobacco monopoly, which assured a steady income, in return for an extension in perpetuity of the monopoly then slated to expire in 1724, and that provided for a steady and reliable annual income.

In addition to the tobacco monopoly, the major assets of the Perpetual Company were its trade monopolies with Asia and the West Indies. Commerce from the West Indies was generally disappointing, with only the slave trade showing profits. In India the major assets were trading colonies. French establishments, some no more than a warehouse, were located in Surat, Chandarnagar, Calicut, Dhaka, Patna, Qasimbazar, Balasore, and Jogdia, but Pondicherry on the Coromandal coast in India was the most vital of them all. Even though its port facilities were insufficient, its commercial viability was based on the ready availability of the silk and cotton textiles, for example, calico and muslin, produced by nearby cottage industries.

In order to grow its assets, the Perpetual Company expanded and improved its trading colonies. A settlement in Mahé was established, as was a secure and reliable way station on the Île de France (present-day Mauritius), replacing the never-successful stopover in Madagascar. During the 1730s under the leadership of Dupleix, Chandarnagar, close to Calcutta, was turned into a viable and habitable center of trade. East Indiamen of the Perpetual Company had, therefore, a choice of ports with which to engage in country trade. Country trade referred to a trading voyage between ports east of Africa to anywhere in Asia, but most often within India.

Agents for all East India companies engaged in country trade to supplement their meager salaries. Fortunes could be made in this private commerce, but by engaging in it, they played a dual role, purchasing goods as agents for their companies as well as on their own behalf. Due to a lack of effective controls, agents could make enormous fortunes at the expense of their company's profits. The hint that these fortunes were obtained by defrauding their employers underlay the pejorative use of the term "nabob" to refer to such agents.

The Perpetual Company of the Indies was also profiting from a decrease in competition. The Dutch East India Company, the chief bane of Colbert's company, withdrew to Indonesia after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. So the Perpetual Company of the Indies was in competition only with the British East India Company. By around 1740, French trade equaled half that of the English and might well have surpassed it, except that the British Company was heavily invested in tea, a commodity popular in England.

A third reason the restructured company's trade grew so dramatically was that it had three activist and extraordinarily capable governors-general in India: Pierre Christophe Lenoir, Pierre Benoist Dumas, and Joseph François Dupleix. They were ably supported by directors

in Paris who valued Indian experience; both Lenoir and Dumas became directors upon their return. De Godeheu de Zaimont, the director who replaced Dupleix in 1754, had worked in India years before. Dupleix was a supernumerary director, whose proxy attended regular meetings in Paris.

As already mentioned, Dupleix was the governor of Chandarnagar responsible for developing that trading colony's value to the company. The administration of Dupleix as governor-general in Pondicherry (1742–1754) coincided with the height of French influence, wealth, and power, and so he is rightfully regarded as the greatest of France's governors-general and is often considered the inventor of the Nabob Game. Dupleix's version of the Nabob Game is perhaps the greatest contribution of the French in India.

Dumas and Dupleix, perhaps more than any other Europeans, analyzed the political situation in India and saw how to use it to French advantage. With the death of the last of the Great Mughals, Aurangzeb, in 1707, the vast territories he had spent his life conquering began to break up, leaving the potential for chaos. By the 1720s, any potentate with a title and armed forces, such as a *mānsabdār*, could gain control of a region and claim to rule. All that was required was taking control of its resources, assuming its governance, albeit without openly rebelling against the center, and actively using for their own ends whatever share of imperial authority they could grab. The Mughal successors to Aurangzeb were weak and offered little or no resistance to these secessions. Some of the first to go, and certainly the most notable, were the *nawāb* of Oudh (present-day Ayodhya) and the nizam of Hyderabad. Although their revenues and titles had been granted them by the Mughal emperor, once they removed themselves to their territories they began increasingly to rule as if sovereigns. They assumed the right to appoint revenue officials and collect land taxes, to select their successors, pursue independent diplomatic and military activity, and mint coins locally. For Muslim rulers, the final break was marked when their name was recited during Friday prayers.

By the 1730s, the Perpetual Company of the Indies was also pursuing the benefits of having titles and land revenues granted by Mughal authority, but with autonomy at least equal to the local governors, or *nawābs*. For instance, in 1736, during the administration of Dumas, the Perpetual Company of the Indies was given the title of *nawāb* and the rank of *mānsabdār* over five thousand cavalry by the Mughal emperor. Dupleix, stationed at the time in Bengal, closer to the Mughal court, was instrumental in this initiative. He was also in regular correspondence with the *nawāb* of Oudh. Dumas in

Pondicherry would have been in diplomatic contact with the nizam of Hyderabad. Clearly, the Perpetual Company had established independent diplomacy with important elements of the Mughal administration of the country. Because Dumas insisted that the title of *nawāb* and rank of *mānsabdār* belong to the company, a corporate entity, and not to him, he anticipated the question of succession. Additionally, the company obtained the right to mint silver rupees in Pondicherry, saving several percent in minting costs. When combined with the grants given of the right to collect revenues in villages in the vicinity of Pondicherry, the Perpetual Company had become, for many intents and purposes, a sovereign entity in India, although it remained a commercial concern in France.

From both political and commercial points of view, assuming Mughal titles and ranks were brilliant moves that became central to the Nabob Game. Not only were demands on the company coffers reduced, a new revenue stream in local currency was introduced to the books. Company control of villages could also be used for encouraging the production of piece goods in cottage industries. A further benefit was the legitimization of armed force—an attractive prospect to a wealthy trade center in times plagued by plundering warlords.

Upon Dumas's retirement to France, where he took a seat on the board of directors, his successor, Dupleix, was faced with a new challenge: armed rivalry with the English in South India. During the private war between the English and French companies (1744–1748) that echoed the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), Dupleix captured Madras (Chennai) with the help of a fleet under the command of Mahé de la Bourdonnais. It was restored to English control under the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, but by then, both companies had become ever more deeply involved in India's local power struggles, allying with or battling, at different times, the Marathas, the nizam of Hyderabad, and the *nawāb* of Arcot.

Unfortunately, time was not on the side of the French East India Company. It had lost a significant part of its merchant marine to the British navy during the war. English forces under the command of an energetic Englishman, Robert Clive, reversed Dupleix's initial victories on the ground in India. It is said that Clive had studied Dupleix well and used his methods boldly. As French losses mounted, Dupleix's policies were perceived back in Paris to be too expensive, and so the directors of the company recalled him in 1754. He died there in 1763, disgraced, disappointed, in debt, and embroiled in lawsuits.

During the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) between France and England, the French were repeatedly defeated in India. Pondicherry was captured in 1761 (and returned

to the French). British ascendancy could no longer be challenged after British East India Company victories against the Mughals in Bengal, again with Clive in command, and the decline of the Perpetual Company of the Indies as an economic and political force in the wake of the Seven Years' War. In 1769 the Perpetual Company of the Indies lost its monopoly and thenceforth merely languished until the French Revolution, when it was finally overthrown along with the rest of the old regime.

The impact of the French in India was primarily as European trading pioneers. The Perpetual Company of the Indies formed by John Law during the Regency recovered from early disaster and collapse, only to prosper for three decades because of the energy of its governors-general, notably Pierre Benoist Dumas and most especially Joseph François Dupleix. Their contribution to the history of India, if it can be termed as such, was to correctly analyze and exploit the internal political situation on the subcontinent for the commercial interests of the Perpetual Company. In doing so, they, and particularly Dupleix, set the course of European expansion on the subcontinent that was followed by the British East India Company.

J. Andrew Greig

See also British East India Company Raj; Clive, Robert; Dupleix, Joseph François; Nabob Game

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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS India's constitutional framework, developed between 1947 and 1950, adapted the British Government of India Act of 1935 to the needs of the new Indian state. India's Constitution is essentially a Western constitution. The parliamentary system was a legacy of Britain; the federal system was adapted from the Canadian Constitution; the financial relationship between the central and state governments came from Australia; the concept of social policy objectives and directives embodied in the preamble came from Ireland; and the chapter on Fundamental Rights was drawn from the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights. Yet despite its Western structure, the style and process were essentially Indian, and the interpre-

tation of fundamental rights in India has been different from that of the Western democracies. In the West, these rights are considered the inherent rights of the individual. In India, they tend to be perceived as derived from the state. The state grants them, and the state can take them away through constitutional procedures.

India's democratic Constitution places the well-being of society and the security of the state above the fundamental rights of the individual. Thus, in India, fundamental rights are not always guaranteed when they conflict with the interests of society and the preservation of the state. Democracy and fundamental rights may be suspended if warranted by external wars and internal conflicts, although the Constitution requires that such actions must be endorsed by Parliament every six months, up to a maximum of eighteen months. The determination of whether the suspension of democracy is warranted or not is to be made by Parliament. This essentially means that if the party holding the reins of government carries a two-thirds majority in Parliament, it may assume authoritarian powers through constitutional means.

The "Emergency" Articles

India's Constitution identifies three types of emergencies that may justify the suspension of fundamental rights. The first is a "National Security Emergency" (Article 352), under which the president, acting on the advice of the prime minister, may proclaim a state of emergency if the "security of India, or any part of its territory is threatened by war, external aggression or armed rebellion." When Article 352 is invoked, Articles 353 and 354 then go into operation. They allow the central government to suspend the federal provisions of the Constitution, thereby giving it direct control over the states and over all revenue. In effect, the central government may impose a unitary system of government. The second is a "Constitutional Emergency in the States" (Article 356) under which the president, acting on the advice of the governor of a state and the prime minister, may proclaim a state of emergency in that state if he is satisfied that the normal process of government cannot be carried out in accordance with the Constitution. The third type of emergency identified by the constitution is a "Financial Emergency" (Article 360), which may be declared by the president, acting on the the advice of the prime minister, if the financial or monetary stability or the credit of the country is threatened.

All of the above proclamations must be approved by Parliament. Article 352, on external threats to national security, was invoked by the Congress Party government of Indira Gandhi during the yearlong Bangladesh sepa-

ratist movement in 1971, which culminated in the war with Pakistan in December of that year. The same article was invoked, in the name of threats to internal security, by the Indira Gandhi government when it declared a state of "National Emergency" throughout the country between June 1975 and March 1977. Article 356, "Emergency in the States," has been invoked on different occasions in various Indian states, including Kerala, Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir. Article 360, "Financial Emergency," has never been used, although drastic economic measures, such as the banning of all industrial strikes, were adopted during the National Emergency between 1975 and 1977.

The government of India under various prime ministers, from Jawaharlal Nehru to P. V. Narasimha Rao, have resorted to Article 356, "Emergency in the States." This article has frequently been invoked when the ruling government of a state was no longer able to muster the required parliamentary majority in the state legislature. This has led to "President's Rule," in which the state government is taken over directly by the central government until new elections can be held and a new state government put in place. More controversial, however, has been the resort to Article 356 in some Indian states where the state government is unable to cope with the crisis, irrespective of whether a parliamentary majority is retained by the state-based political party. This has been problematic in states such as Nagaland, Punjab, and Kashmir, where separatist movements, which have included armed insurgencies and acts of terrorism, have occurred. Similarly, widespread religious, linguistic, or ethnic rioting in a state has also led to the suspension of the state government, as has occurred in Assam. However, the suspension of the democratic process under conditions of internal security and instability has been ad hoc, regional, and temporary. After the crisis is over, the democratic process is restored.

The provisions of the Emergency Articles 352 and 356 are supplemented by the provisions of two other articles—Articles 358 and 359—which enable the president, acting on the advice of the prime minister, to suspend fundamental rights and protection clauses as guaranteed under Articles 13 to 32 of India's Constitution. Such suspensions must also be approved by Parliament within six months. The suspension of the rights and protection clauses, especially Article 19, which embodies the "Seven Freedoms," is accompanied by the right of the central government to resort to preventive detention, that is, to arrest and detain persons to prevent them from indulging in acts, as yet uncommitted, that may be detrimental to national security and to the maintenance of law and order. Under the subtitle "Right to Freedom," Article 19 of India's Constitution states: "Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. (1) All citizens

shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations of unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of territory; and (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.” However, once the emergency is declared and approved by Parliament, the Constitution empowers the government to prevent citizens from appealing to the courts for the protection of their fundamental rights. Not even Article 32, which incorporates the “right to constitutional remedies” and the “writ of habeas corpus,” can overcome central government powers, made possible under Articles 352 to 360, that relate to national emergency.

The imperial-type powers lodged in India’s Constitution are a legacy of British rule, which, ironically, also provided India with the basic structure of a democratic system. The Indian president’s ability to proclaim a state of emergency when the country’s security is threatened was a power held by the British viceroy under the Government of India Act of 1935. The British had exercised these emergency powers between 1940 and 1945, when they were at war with Germany and Japan and simultaneously had to deal with the Indian struggle for independence and with Hindu-Muslim violence. Such viceregal powers were reinforced by the British through the Defence of India Act of 1939; under its terms the British Indian government could resort to “preventive” detention of those who were deemed threats to internal law and order for political reasons, even though they were not charged with committing illegal acts. The nature of these problems has not changed fundamentally since India obtained independence in 1947, nor have the far-reaching powers that were assumed by the newly independent Indian government.

Legislative Measures

During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Defence of India Rules (DIR) were introduced, which included the practice of “preventive detention.” Communists in India who were felt to be a threat to the nation were detained without showing cause. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, many Muslims were detained on the suspicion that they might resort to sabotage. All were immediately released on the cessation of hostilities. The DIR remained in force until 1968, six years after the 1962 Sino-Indian War and three years after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War had ended. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act was introduced, which provided far-reaching powers to detain citizens who might be a threat to the state. The provisions of this act were used to justify the detention of several opposition

leaders in attempts to curb the violence in areas of ethnic strife, especially in the border regions.

Following the declaration of the “National Emergency” in June 1975 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the passage of the 42nd Amendment in 1976, the fundamental rights embodied in the constitution were suspended, and the practice of preventive detention was expanded. This was the infamous legislation that introduced the mechanics of an authoritarian state in India. When the actions were challenged, the Supreme Court of India reversed its earlier judgments that fundamental rights were inherent and inviolable by the state, and favored the legislative powers of the state (provided proper procedures were followed) over the rights of the individual. It argued that fundamental rights were rights granted by the state to its citizens and could be suspended if national security and the survival of the state so warranted.

After Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party lost to the Janata Party in 1977, the 42nd Amendment was abrogated by the 44th Amendment in 1978. The conditions for declaring an emergency were made much more stringent, and limitations were placed on the suspension of democratic rights. However, during the violent Sikh separatist movement in the 1980s, new legislation was introduced, including the 1980 National Security Act under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the 1987 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Preventive Act (TADA) under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Legislation that eroded the democratic process continued under the Congress government of Rajiv Gandhi. Under TADA, suspected terrorists could be detained for up to one year without trial, and court hearings and the testimony of witnesses could be conducted in secret.

The continuing deterioration of law and order in the 1980s led to the passage of the 59th Amendment in March 1988. The amendment nullified parts of the 44th Amendment by permitting the suspension of Article 21 in Punjab during an “Emergency,” and sought to further amend Article 352—the National Emergency Article—of the Indian Constitution. The 42nd Amendment had substituted the words “internal disturbance” (a vague and loose show of cause) for the words “armed rebellion” (a more stringent show of cause). The 44th Amendment restored the original words, so that the justification for an internal emergency would only take place in the case of an “armed rebellion.” However, the more restrictive term “armed rebellion” did not seem to apply to the intensifying Sikh terrorist campaign in Punjab. Although it did not call for the return of the milder term “internal disturbance” in order to invoke the far-reaching Article 352, the Rajiv Gandhi government felt that something

less than the term “armed rebellion” had to be adopted in order to invoke the National Emergency clause of the Constitution. The 59th Amendment sought to apply the National Emergency provisions only to Punjab, but fears of misuse was expressed by several opposition members of both the Lok Sabha (the “House of the People,” Parliament’s lower house) and the Rajya Sabha (the “Council of States,” Parliament’s upper house).

Subsequently, the power to detain suspected terrorists without trial was further strengthened for the two regions where separatist violence was strongest, Punjab and Kashmir. This legislation was provided through the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act in the 1980s, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act in the 1990s, and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act in the 1990s. The Muslim revolt in Kashmir was accompanied by an increase in the frequency and magnitude of Hindu-Muslim violence in northern India, especially in the states of Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Maharashtra.

Allegations have been perennial in India that TADA has been widely misused throughout the country to address basic criminal and law and order cases that had little to do with terrorism. The act was considered to be a violation of the rule of law in a democracy. Periodic efforts have been made by members of the ruling and opposition parties to revoke TADA since its passage in 1987. But the Congress Party government’s Home Minister, S. B. Chavan, declared in 1994 that TADA would not be repealed. He acknowledged that there had been widespread misuse of an act that had been intended to deal with terrorists, but stated that the chief ministers of the states had been warned not to misuse TADA. The government was endorsed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in September 1994 in the Sanjay Dutt case when it declared that “there is no reason, in law, to doubt its constitutionality or alter its proper construction” (*Pioneer*, New Delhi, 6 and 9 September 1994). In a fifty-eight-page judgment, the five members of the Constitution Bench, headed by Justice A. M. Ahmedi, affirmed the state’s right to make special provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist activities.

These powers continued to be used to deal with secessionist-related insurgencies and terrorism in Kashmir, Assam, and the tribal Northeast region. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, and the terrorist attack on India’s Parliament on 13 December 2001, a long-debated legislative proposal labeled the Prevention of Terrorist Ordinance was passed, which abridged the rights of the individual, legalizing detention on suspicion alone. The legislation

resembles the Patriot Act in the United States passed later that year.

In sum, when the security and stability of the country are threatened, one set of articles permits the central government of India to qualify and suspend the democratic freedoms provided under another set of articles that supposedly guarantees those freedoms. India’s democratic constitution in effect provides easy recourse for its own overthrow through constitutional means on the grounds of national security. No doubt, the suspension of the democratic constitution is intended to be temporary. But there is no guarantee that a prime minister who resorts to drastic constitutional methods will restore democracy. The liberal constitutional provisions in India are a would-be tyrant’s dream. So far no prime minister has grossly misused the privilege, although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came close to doing so between 1975 and 1977. In the end, even she restored democracy after twenty-two months of “Emergency” rule that had been declared in the interests of national security. After the passage of the 59th Amendment in March 1988—which sought to apply the national emergency provisions only to insurgency and terrorism in Punjab—several opposition members argued that the bill would be utilized eventually in other parts of India and thus would amount to a “declaration of war on the people” (*Times of India*, 24 March 1988).

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also Assam; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Government of India Act of 1935; Jammu and Kashmir; Punjab

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GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH (1908–), *economist, ambassador to India (1961–1963).* John Kenneth Galbraith served as a highly effective ambassador of the United States to India from 1961 to 1963. One of President John F. Kennedy's closest friends and advisers, Galbraith quickly became Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's good friend as well, expediting India's economic and educational development by serving as a personal link between India's first prime minister and America's young president. Forty years after his invaluable ambassadorial tour ended, India awarded ninety-year-old Galbraith its highest foreign official honor, Bharat Vibhushan.

Born in Ontario, Canada, on 15 October 1908, Galbraith received his doctoral degree in economics at the age of twenty-six from the University of California at Berkeley. For the next eight years he taught at Harvard and Princeton, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1937. From 1941 to 1943 Galbraith worked as assistant and deputy administrator in Washington's Office of Price Administration, while also serving on the editorial board of *Fortune*. He was appointed director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in 1945, carefully assessing the overall impact of heavy "saturation" bombing on German cities, finding it far less effective than had been commonly believed in Washington. After World War II, Galbraith was appointed director of the Office of Economic Security, charged with the important job of developing sound economic policies for occupied Germany and Japan. Thanks to his humanitarian planning, both defeated nations were soon back on their feet, avoiding any tragic repetition of the harsh post-World War I economic depression, wrought by vengeance, which paved the way for Adolf Hitler's rapid rise out of the ashes of a bankrupt Weimar Republic.

Professor Galbraith returned to teaching at Harvard in 1949, the year he published his *Beyond the Marshall Plan*. *The Great Crash* was published six years later, and only three years after that his most famous work, *The Affluent Society*, which so wisely called for less wasteful emphasis on the production of luxury goods and far greater expenditure on public services to help America's impoverished unemployed and homeless claim their fair



John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith as photographed with Jackie Kennedy (whose late husband he had served) at an exhibition of Northern Indian painting, Asia House, NYC, 22 September 1965. Almost forty years after his ambassadorial tour had ended, India awarded Galbraith its highest diplomatic honor, Bharat Vibhushan. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

share of America's dream. Professor Galbraith's stunningly prolific pen turned out more than twenty-five books, including his splendid diary of the years of his diplomatic work in India, *Ambassador's Journal*, published in 1969. As renowned for his wit as his singular wisdom, Galbraith concisely called India's polity "a functioning anarchy," perhaps the most famous succinct summary of any global government.

Distinguished Professor Galbraith held the Paul M. Warburg Chair in Economics at Harvard until his retirement at age seventy-five in 1983. He served as national chairman of Americans for Democratic Action from 1967 to 1969, and in 1972 he was president of the American Economic Association. He has received no fewer than forty-five honorary degrees from universities the world over, including Harvard, Oxford, Moscow State University, the University of Paris, and the University of Toronto.

At the age of ninety-five, Galbraith published *The Economics of Innocent Fraud*. He has never stopped writing, advising Democratic presidents of the United States for more than six decades, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton. Galbraith was twice honored with America's highest civilian award for public service, the Medal of Freedom, first by President Harry S. Truman in 1946, next by President Clinton in 2000. Few economists and even fewer diplomats and public servants have had as pervasively salubrious an impact on the lives of countless millions of people as has John Kenneth Galbraith.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Nehru, Jawaharlal; United States, Relations with**

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GAMA, VASCO DA (c. 1460–1524), Portuguese explorer. Portuguese sea captain Vasco da Gama discovered the Cape of Good Hope route to India in May 1498, relying on the expertise of local seamen, both Indian and Arab, to sail across the ocean they knew so well. Crucial to da Gama's crossing of the Indian Ocean to Calicut was the assistance given by Arab navigator Ahmad ibn-Madjid, who knew the secrets of the treacherous monsoon. Ibn-Madjid's help allowed Vasco da Gama to become the first European to reach India by sea.

Vasco had left Lisbon on 8 July 1497 with four ships, reaching Mozambique on 2 March, Malindi on 14 April, anchoring 12 miles (19 km) off Calicut on 18 May 1498. The first encounter of Europeans with India was fraught with misunderstandings on both sides. Vasco da Gama and his men, mistaken for Muslims, were at first warmly received by the Hindu ruler, the *samuri* (*zamorin* in Portuguese records) of Calicut. Vasco and his crew, on the other hand, thought that the Malabar ruler and his subjects were Christians. The Portuguese worshiped in a Hindu temple, which they assumed was a chapel dedicated to the Virgin Mary. At the instigation of the powerful local Muslim merchants, the *samuri's* attitude toward Vasco da Gama and his men quickly changed. The *samuri* found Vasco's goods to be of "inferior quality" and the Portuguese sailors' refusal to pay the traditional customs duties on their purchases only intensified local dislike of the arrogant visitors.

Da Gama left on 5 October 1498 without the trade treaty he sought, but with precious cargo, which brought Portugal a hefty profit of sixty times its investment after meeting the expenses of the entire voyage. The human costs of the first voyage, however, were very high. Of the 170 Portuguese sailors, only 55 survived, most dying of scurvy. In Lisbon, Vasco da Gama received a tumultuous public welcome, rewarded by King Manuel I with presents, cash, an annual pension, and the exalted rank of "admiral of the Indian Ocean."

On his second voyage to India, in 1502, Vasco da Gama was brutal beyond belief. He seized a ship headed for Mecca, and after confiscating the goods, burned it with hundreds of Muslim pilgrims—men, women and children—on board. He extracted treaties of "friendship and trade" from the rulers of Cannanore and Cochin by

terrorizing the rulers and their subjects, bombarding the coast, killing scores of innocent, unarmed fishermen, and selling many others into slavery.

Vasco da Gama was sent for the third time to India in 1524, with the title of viceroy, to cleanse the Portuguese administration there. Within two months of his arrival, however, he died. Fourteen years later, in keeping with his will, his body was taken to Portugal and interred on his estate at Vidigueira. For Portugal, he remains its greatest hero.

D. R. SarDesai

See also Portuguese in India

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GANDHARAN ART AND ARCHITECTURE

Gandhara is the ancient name given to the region that today surrounds the city of Peshawar in northern Pakistan. Between the early second century B.C. and the eighth century A.D., active trade with the Mediterranean, South Asia, and China made this a multiethnic, wealthy area, and provided an economic foundation for the creation of many Buddhist centers. The word “Gandharan” is also used to describe sculptural finds from a series of culturally related areas beyond the Peshawar plains, such as the Swat valley, the Buner and Taxila regions, eastern Afghanistan, and even parts of Kashmir. This larger area has come to be described as Greater Gandhara.


Alexander the Great conquered Gandhara in the mid-fourth century B.C. Following his death, his generals divided the empire, initiating a period of Indo-Greek kingdoms known primarily through scattered numismatic evidence. The archaeological remains of the city of Ai Khanoum indicate that for a time a Hellenistic colony existed in Afghanistan. In the third century B.C., the North Indian Mauryan king Ashoka issued several edicts stressing nonviolence (*ahimsa*) and duty (*dharmā*); these were carved on boulders in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is generally understood as the beginning

of Buddhism in the region, even though the inscriptions do not explicitly refer to this religion. During the following two hundred years, different Central Asian groups, including the Parthians and Scythians, repeatedly invaded Greater Gandhara before the Kushans (initially known as the Yüeh-chih) began to move toward Afghanistan from the western Chinese borderlands. Kushan rule culminated under the kings Kanishka I and Huvishka in the second century A.D., by which time this dynasty had established a united and stable kingdom extending beyond the Hindu Kush and across northern India.

Gandharan architecture and its associated figurative sculpture offer a glimpse of the religious life of this region and a paradigmatic model for the study of the larger South Asian Buddhist tradition. The first Greater Gandharan Buddhist sites were probably established early in the second century B.C., Butkara I in the Swat valley and the Dharmarajika complex in Taxila. These early centers share many characteristics with contemporary Buddhist sites in India, including large hemispherical stupas (solid mounds housing relics of the Buddha). The dating of these first sites is debated; some scholars believe they were founded in the third century B.C. during the Mauryan dynasty, but enough numismatic evidence survives to place them with confidence in the second century B.C. Archaeological excavations of the city of Sirkap in Taxila provide valuable information for this poorly understood period, as this center was already established prior to Alexander’s invasion and was occupied by various groups in succession until the time of the great Kushans. John Marshall’s excavation of this city and the surrounding Buddhist sites of Taxila provided masonry evidence for determining a sequence for the architecture. Finds from Sirkap show that a broad range of Near Eastern and Mediterranean gods were popular, and they attest to the sophisticated and eclectic tastes of the multicultural elite. Of particular interest are the many classical foreign luxury objects that came from the West along a complex system of trade routes. Our understanding of this trade system is also based on an excavated hoard of trade goods, found at the site of Begram in Afghanistan, which includes Mediterranean objects as well as those from China and South Asia.

Early Gandharan Tradition

Although the origins of the Gandharan Buddhist tradition are obscure, it is clear that this new religion became popular in the late first and early second centuries A.D. Under the Kushans, many Buddhist sites were founded, notably Takht-i-bahi, Jamal Garhi, and Thareli in the Peshawar basin; Mohra Moradu, Jaulian, and Kalawan in Taxila; and the Swat sites of Saidu, Panr,




Rendering of the Floorplan for the Jaulian Complex at Taxila. Like other Gandharan sacred areas from the first and second centuries A.D., it included a main stupa (or shrine) and a quadrangular monastery. Over time, subsidiary stupas were added, another widespread architectural practice. Such shrines possibly displayed relics of the Buddha. PUBLIC DOMAIN.

and Butkara III. By this time both the layout of the sites and the embellishing sculpture were quite different from their North Indian counterparts, and a true Gandharan idiom can be recognized. A typical Gandharan sacred area of this period was founded with the fabrication of a main stupa and a quadrangular monastery, as can be seen at the Taxila site of Jaulian. A sacred area could not exist by itself; it relied on the care provided by a resident monastic community, and all the religious complexes in Gandhara invariably included one or more monasteries. Commonly, these took the form of multistoried structures, like the one at Jaulian, where monastic cells were organized around an open courtyard, with attached rooms for cooking, storage, and other such uses. When steep, mountainous terrain precluded the construction of quadrangular monasteries, the monks lived in groups of smaller multistoried structures (3–4 rooms per story). The main stupa was believed to contain powerful relics of the Buddha and was the primary devotional focus for both lay and monastic devotees. Surrounding the main stupa at the Jaulian site are heterogeneous subsidiary stupas that were added over time; Gregory Schopen has suggested that these small stupas contained the cremated remains of the monastic dead. The practice of erecting shrines that housed small stupas within the sacred area was widespread; in some instances, such shrines probably also were used to display relics of the Buddha.

Significant numbers of schist narrative sculptures that recount the Buddha's life were found in conjunction with an apparent surge in building activity in the second century A.D. Typically, these panels ringed small stupas and were read in conjunction with the ritual act of circumambulation (*pradaksina*). These reliefs placed great emphasis on the historic personage of the Buddha (Shakyamuni); sequential reliefs depict his miraculous birth, childhood, great departure, role as teacher of the Buddhist *dharmā*, and performer of miracles, as well as his death and cremation and the ultimate distribution of his relics. The narrative illustrated in these sculptures appears to relate closely to early texts such as the *Lalitavistara* and the *Abhiniskramana Sūtra*. In some instances, the early narrative sculpture shows remarkable stylistic affinities to northern Indian sites such as Bharhut, especially those produced at early Swat sites like Butkara I, Saidu, or Marjanai. It is clear that in the earliest periods of Gandharan activity, the Buddhist traditions of northern India were vitally important to this provincial Buddhist community; this probably also explains the emphasis given to the above-mentioned texts.

The vast majority of narrative imagery produced in Greater Gandhara (c. 2nd century A.D.), however, shows clear affinities to Western Classical styles. It is important to remember that in the Greater Gandharan region by



Relief Found in the Village of Mohammed Nari (in the Peshawar Basin). Here, the Buddha preaches from his lotus throne, flanked by standing *bodhisattvas*. Historic Buddhas line the base, and the top portion depicts the Great One about to depart on his wordly travels. The relief (yet to be definitively identified by art historians) marks a moment of transition in Gandharan art, with its mix of early narrative and later iconic elements. PUBLIC DOMAIN.

this time, Mediterranean Classical architectural features, such as Corinthian pillars, had been popular for nearly four hundred years. Early scholars attributed to the Hellenistic Greek contact the emergence in Gandhara of anthropomorphic images of the Buddha in the narrative and iconic images. This assumption led these scholars to date much of Gandhara's sculptural production to the first centuries B.C., and they suggested that this contact with the Greeks was the source for the anthropomorphic Buddha found throughout South Asia. Today it is clear that the exchange of styles occurred later, with the Roman Empire, leaving the origin of the Buddha image an open question. Gandharan sculptors appear to have selectively appropriated and recontextualized classical forms. For example, the Bodhisattva from Mekhasanda wears northern Indian garments and jewelry suited to a prince, but the drapery follows classical conventions and the body is quite naturalistic in style. The face, however,

is more in line with the North Indian tradition of representing the Bodhisattva as an idealized being.

The emergence of iconic images marked a transition in Buddhist practice; they replaced the narrative panels that had been so popular in Gandhara during the second century (narrative imagery was also common in other parts of South Asia in this early period). Some scholars have seen this as an indication of the doctrinal shift from Nikāya (early) Buddhism to Mahayana (later, “Great Vehicle”) Buddhism, but this has recently been called into question. In Gandhara the main stupa remained the central object of veneration, even as monumental imagery and depictions with complex iconography became popular. The identification of some of these complex panels has been much debated, as the Nikāya-Mahayana affiliation of the Gandharan Buddhist tradition rests in part on this interpretation. Alfred Foucher saw them as related to the early narrative and interpreted them as components of the life of the Buddha, specifically when he performed miracles at the city of Saravasti. More recently, other scholars have suggested that the panels represent Buddhist “pure lands” (heavens with living Buddhas) and thus are clearly Mahayana scenes. In a relief found in the village of Mohammed Nari, the Buddha sits on a lotus throne and preaches; he is flanked by standing *bodhisattvas* (pure land characteristics). The historic Buddhas, however, adorned the base, and at the top the Buddha is shown, prior to his enlightenment, in the palace and embarking on his great departure. The identification of the relief remains open, but it is clear that this representation marks a moment of transition, because a mix of early narrative and later iconic elements are present.

Later Gandharan Sites

Between the third and fifth centuries A.D., the patronage of Buddhist sites dramatically increased; old sites were expanded and many new centers were founded. This increase in patronage must have been economic, not dynastic; the Kushan empire was fading at this time, and only a vague idea of the political landscape can be formed on the basis of coin finds of the late Kushans, Kushano-Sassanians, Sassanians, and Kidarites. Relic monuments such as stupas and stupa shrines were augmented with free-standing Buddha and *bodhisattva* images placed in chapels that enclosed the sacred area. It was at this time that Jaulian’s main stupa court was encircled by image shrines that would have housed life-sized Buddha and *bodhisattva* images. Schist remained an important sculptural medium between the third and fifth centuries A.D., but during this time sculptors began to produce images in stucco, probably because it was faster and cheaper. The tremendous wealth of patronage during this period

is attested by the number of images found in the sacred areas, as can be seen in an 1890s photo of sculpture recovered from the site of Loriyan Tangai. By the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., iconic images became monumental in size, a trend that apparently culminated at the late sixth-century site of Bamiyan, in Afghanistan, where a Buddha image more than 174 feet (53 m) meters tall was cut into a rock face. At this time, small image shrines with complex iconography began to appear in the monasteries, apparently for the private devotional needs of the monks. At many sites, pious donations of small stupas and image shrines filled the public sacred area around the main stupa. This proliferation necessitated the expansion or creation of additional sacred areas to accommodate donations; at Jaulian this was the lower sacred area, where three monumental image shrines were fabricated.

Between the fifth and seventh centuries A.D., Chinese Buddhist pilgrims began to visit Greater Gandhara to see famous relics, like the alms bowl or skull bone of the Buddha. These visitors included Fahsien (A.D. 401) and Xuanzang (A.D. 630), who both documented their trips. Their accounts reveal much about the late Gandharan Buddhist tradition and suggest a dramatic fifth-century decline in Buddhist patronage in the Peshawar basin (ancient Gandhara). The archaeological evidence supports these written records, for very few coins datable after the fifth century have been found in Gandharan sacred areas, and new construction seems to have stopped abruptly at most sites. The main stupas found at Bhamala and Shah-ji-ki-dheri are notable exceptions. Sparse numismatic evidence indicates that only a few isolated Buddhist centers, especially those in the Swat valley, remained active until the eighth century. In Afghanistan, it appears, Buddhism continued to flourish during this late period at sites like Hadda and Bamiyan.

Kurt Behrendt

See also **Alexander the Great; Buddhism in Ancient India**

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GANDHI, INDIRA (1917–1984), prime minister of India (1966–1977 and 1980–1984). Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's only child, Indira Gandhi was elected to succeed him as prime minister, just two years after his death. Born in Allahabad in the palatial mansion of her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, Indira was reared in lonely luxury. Her mother, Kamala, soon after Indu's birth, was incurably afflicted with tuberculosis. Indira seemed so frail a child that her "Auntie Nan," Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the first woman to preside over the United Nations General Assembly, feared that "Indu-Boy" (as Nehru fondly called his daughter) might somehow have caught her mother's illness. Indira would emerge more powerful, however, than any man in Nehru's Cabinet.

Education and Marriage

Indira learned her best lessons in history and politics from her brilliant father. During several of the long years Nehru spent behind British bars, he wrote weekly letters to his daughter, offering her "glimpses of world history." She had another remarkable teacher as well, Bengal's *Guru-Dev* (Divine Teacher) Rabindranath Tagore, to whose private college *Shanti-niketan* (campus of peace) she went for little more than one year, obliged then to accompany her mother to the Swiss sanatorium in which she died. Nehru was released from prison to visit his wife and daughter in Europe and went to Moscow for the tenth anniversary of the birth of the Soviet Union. Both Nehru and Indira were to remain ardent Socialists for the rest of their lives. Indo-Soviet friendship became a powerful pillar of Prime Minister Gandhi's foreign policy. V. K. Krishna Menon, Nehru's alter ego in London, became Indira's close friend and adviser. Her future

husband, Parsi Feroze Gandhi, long devoted to her sick mother, accompanied Indira in her travels around Europe just prior to and during the first few years of World War II. Nehru strongly opposed the marriage, but Indira prevailed, marrying the husband she chose in March 1942.

Political Power

Indira's son Rajiv, heir to her premier power, was born on 20 August 1944. Her second son, Sanjay, born three years later, died in a stunt plane crash in Delhi three years before his mother. Indira's own passion for power was long hidden behind her seeming disinterest in office, but as Nehru's official "hostess" and constant traveling companion during his decade and a half as prime minister, she learned all that was required to be chosen by her Congress Party colleagues as India's first female prime minister in 1966. Her first half decade at the top proved so successful that Indira Gandhi was virtually worshiped by millions of Indians and Bangladeshis as an incarnation of the "Mother Goddess" Durgā. She led India to victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh War, when Dhaka surrendered in mid-December 1971. "Madam" Gandhi had signed a twenty-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship that June, which provided India with heavy Russian tanks and artillery for its campaign across Bangladesh, as well as potential "nuclear support" if India were ever threatened with a U.S. attack. The independence of Bangladesh, after a quarter century as East Pakistan, diminished what remained of Pakistan by more than half its population, also stripping Islamabad of most of the hard currency earned from the export of Bengali jute. Indira Gandhi thus towered over South Asia as its most powerful premier, hailed by her own people as "Mother India," admired by Bangladeshis as their nation's "Liberator," feared by Pakistan's fallen General Yahya Khan and by his humiliated successor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Decline and Fall

Though Indira reigned supreme in foreign affairs, domestically she faced increasingly difficult problems and mounting political opposition. Global inflation of crude oil prices hit India's economy harder than it would have in times of peace. Unemployment rose sharply and strikes wracked Bihar and Bombay soon after the war had ended in so stunning a victory. Railroad workers and miners joined in slowing down, if not closing, crucial sectors of India's urban economy. Former Congress colleagues of Nehru called upon his daughter to either take appropriate action in helping heal open wounds or "step down." Bombay's Congress leader, Morarji Desai—who had run unsuccessfully against Indira for Nehru's mantle,



Indira Gandhi with Her Two Sons. Photographed in 1967 in the garden of their home, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with her two sons, Sanjay (left) and Rajiv (right). It was commonly assumed that Sanjay would enter politics, but he perished in an airplane crash in 1981. Rajiv became prime minister after his mother's assassination in 1984, but he too died the victim of an assassin's bullet—in 1991 while mounting a campaign to once again hold India's highest office. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION.

later joining her as finance minister in her Cabinet—resigned after she ignored his advice. Now he led a popular Janata (People's) Party opposition movement, together with Bihar's Jaya Prakash (J. P.) Narayan, Nehru's oldest Socialist comrade-in-arms, aimed at forcing Indira to resign or suffer ignominious national electoral defeat.

In May 1974, faced with mounting internal opposition, Indira Gandhi triggered India's first underground nuclear explosions—warnings both to Pakistan's bellicose new premier Bhutto, as well as to Morarji and J. P., of just how powerful "Mother India" was. But Janata Party opposition only grew louder, and in June 1975, Allahabad's High Court Justice Jag Mohan Lal Sinha found Prime Minister Gandhi guilty of two counts of electoral malpractice, each carrying mandatory penalties of resignation and abstention from elective office for six years. Rather than step down, however, Gandhi had her president declare a "National Emergency," giving her dictatorial

powers, imprisoning her opposition, including Morarji and J. P., banning every opposition party, shutting off power to Delhi's news presses, and canceling elections. India remained under her autocratic power in darkness and fear for a year and a half, from 26 June 1975 until 18 January 1977. Indira Gandhi's "Emergency Raj" was the most shameful and tragic period in more than half a century of India's independent rule.

The Janata Party's victory in national elections of April 1977 appeared to end Gandhi's political career. Yet constant squabbling among the aged leaders of that coalition only proved them impotent to solve any of India's most pressing problems, reopening doors of power to "Madam Gandhi," who returned in January 1980, on a popular wave of electoral support. Gandhi was faced in her last four years with growing opposition from Punjab's Sikh community. Militant Sikhs demanded an independent nation-state of Khalistan (Land of the Pure). Gandhi tried to counter Punjab's most popular Sikh leaders with younger candidates of San-

jay's choice, whom she thought they could "control." By early summer of 1984, however, it seemed clear to her that "Sant" Bhindranwale, who seized control of Amritsar's Golden Temple, was no "Saint" at all, but a fanatical extremist determined to lead a Sikh revolt against India. In June she unleashed the army, whose Operation Blue Star left Bhindranwale and all his followers inside the temple compound dead, claiming the lives of one hundred Indian troops and later of Indira Gandhi herself, who was gunned down in her Delhi garden by two of her own trusted Sikh guards on 31 October 1984.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Bangladesh; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Gandhi, Rajiv; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nehru, Motilal**

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GANDHI, MAHATMA M. K. (1869–1948), political and spiritual leader; father of nonviolent resistance in India to British rule Mahatma (Great Soul) Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was India's greatest political leader and social reformer. His global legacy has touched the hearts of more people than any Indian since the Buddha. Born in what is now India's Gujarat State on 2 October 1869, Mohandas was the youngest child of Karamchand and Putlibai Gandhi. His father, Karamchand, chief minister of the princely state of Porbandar, was wealthy and influential. Gandhi's devout mother was a Vaishnava Hindu and also a devotee of Jainism and fasting, the practice of

which her brilliant son was to convert into a political weapon. Young Mohan's marriage was arranged by his parents when he was only eleven or twelve to his Hindu Modh Vania child bride, Kasturba ("Ba") Makanji, who remained his wife for life, mothering their four sons, Harilal (b. 1888), Manilal (b. 1892), Ramdas (b. 1896), and Devdas (b. 1900).

Early Years in London

Mohan was restless and eager to travel beyond the provincial borders of his father's state, which he did soon after his father died. Nursing and Āyurvedic medicine fascinated Gandhi all his life. He nursed and massaged his dying father during his last illness, delivered his son Devdas, and prescribed remedies for all his followers and disciples, ministering warm enemas and hot bath holistic cures for everything from head to stomach- and back-aches. The remedy he trusted most of all was prayer, daily calling out Rāma's name, which was the last word he uttered at the moment of his assassination. The Sanskrit inscription of Mahatma Gandhi's dying cry, "He Ram!" is carved on the onyx stone memorializing the "Step of Peace"—Shanti Ghat—at which his remains were cremated on the bank of the River Yamuna in Delhi.

Despite the strict Hindu prohibition of Gandhi's caste (*jati*) elders against his venturing out upon the ocean's "dark waters," and his devout mother's pleas, eighteen-year-old Mohan steamed from Bombay to Southampton in the fall of 1888, eager to "see and know" London, the world's greatest city, teeming capital of Empress Victoria's Crown Raj. He ventured there to study law, however, not medicine, for his elder brother, who supported him, felt certain that as a British barrister, Mohan would much better serve the Gandhi family's needs and ambitions.

Soon after landing in London, Gandhi's mind focused more on questions of religious philosophy than either law or politics. His mother had exacted three vows from her beloved son. He solemnly promised her to abstain from meat, wine, and women while abroad. Much of Gandhi's first cold and lonely month in London, therefore, was spent in long walks, searching for a vegetarian restaurant. After finding one, he befriended British Quakers and some English clergy there, who, much the same as Hindus and Jains, believed it sinful to eat any part of soul-endowed animals. He soon joined London's Vegetarian Society, and there he met members of London's Theosophical Society, two of whom invited him to join them in studying the Bhagavad Gītā, one of Hinduism's most important ancient works of religious philosophy. Gandhi later reinterpreted the fierce battle that followed the Gītā as an allegory of humankind's struggle on the field of "soul" (*atman*), rather than as the Epic Mahābhārata's blood-drenched Aryan conflict for control



Mahatma M. K. Gandhi. April 5, 1930: The indomitable Gandhi on his famous Salt March. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

of India on the “field of Kuru” (Kuru-kshetra), north of Delhi.

Gandhi met Theosophy’s Russian founder, Madame Blavatsky, in London, as well as her charismatic disciple, Annie Besant, who later moved to Madras (Chennai) as president of the Theosophical Society there, becoming the only English woman ever elected to preside over the Indian National Congress. Besant tried very hard to convert Gandhi to Theosophy, but he remained as impervious to her pleas as he would to those of many Christian ministers. Throughout his life, Gandhi remained true to the Hindu faith of his birth, though he studied every religion and read aloud from many scriptures other than the Gītā at his evening prayer meetings. All “true” religions, Gandhi insisted, adhered to the same universal moral principles, “truth” (*sat* or *satya*) and “nonviolence” (*ahimsa*). He equated those two ancient Hindu ideals to “God.”

For his first years in London, Gandhi was too busy mastering culinary “Experiments with Truth” (as he would title his autobiography) and English common law

to focus his Yogic meditation on transforming those twin moral aspects of God into a force powerful enough to shake the world’s mightiest empire. Inner Temple barrister Gandhi left London and sailed home to Bombay (Mumbai) on 12 June 1891. His mother died while he was abroad, but he had remained faithful to her vows. His elder brother now expected his barrister sibling to be of great value in all his business dealings with British officials and in British courts of law. Scrupulously sensitive and truthful, Gandhi could neither plead falsely in any court nor speak less than the truth to anyone. He could find no acceptable work in India, so he took on a case in South Africa, though it paid little and obliged him to leave his young family again, sailing from Bombay this time for what he believed would be just one year.

The Impact of South Africa

Gandhi’s two decades in South Africa transformed him from an ineffectual British barrister into a uniquely brilliant and powerful Mahatma. He went to South

Africa to represent a wealthy Gujarati Muslim merchant in a family dispute, but experienced such humiliating racial prejudice there as to make him resolve to lead a mass struggle against it for almost twenty years. In South Africa, Gandhi endured harsh months behind bars, emerging as the Indian community's foremost defender of human rights in Natal and the Transvaal as well as in the Union of South Africa. Gandhi's expulsion from a first-class railway coach, despite his elegant barrister's dress and the expensive ticket he purchased, and his exclusion from many clean hotel rooms—merely because of the shade of his skin and Indian birth—made him resolve soon after his first year in South Africa to abandon his barrister's top hat and tails in favor of the peasant garb worn by indentured Tamil laborers.

In South Africa, Gandhi found his political voice. As spokesman for the Indian community against Britain's Colonial Office autocrats and Boer bullies, Gandhi fought to remove the invidious poll tax charged to every Indian. On the eve of his final departure from South Africa in 1914, Gandhi reached what he had believed to be a firm agreement with General Jan Smuts to remove that tax, but soon after he left it was reintroduced. Political activism, however, was only one of many changes South Africa wrought in Gandhi's life. He established a highly successful legal practice in Johannesburg, keeping no fewer than four Indian clerks busy from dawn to dusk, attracting brilliant full-time British idealists to his side, including several talented young women as well as men. Gandhi's fearless honesty and passionate criticism of every injustice and all human prejudice proved so charismatic that wherever he went to speak or lingered to live, men and women of every faith, color, and class rallied to his side and supported his principled causes.

Gandhian Socialism

Young Gandhi experimented in communal as well as familial and personal reforms. He established his first ashram (rural community) in Durban, inspired by John Ruskin's and Robert Owen's handicrafts and Utopian ideals. Gandhi was also influenced by his careful reading of the Bible at this time, as of the *Gītā*, and of John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Leo Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God Is within You*. His ashram was named Tolstoy Farm.

"The Uplift of All"—Sarvodaya—was the ultimate goal of Gandhi's rural community movement, which brought together individuals from many lands, all devoted to rural communal living, sharing in every fruit of the soil they tilled as well as in every hardship they jointly endured. Gandhian "socialism" resembled that of early Christian orders and later Utopian socialist communities. He insisted that every member of his ashram

take solemn vows of truth and nonviolence and abstain entirely from sex as well as from alcohol, meat eating, and luxuries of any kind. He taught each of his disciples the divinity of truth and nonviolence, which he also called "love," and the virtues of daily prayer, hand labor, and rural self-sufficiency.

In 1906 Gandhi launched his first nonviolent noncooperation movement in Johannesburg, against the British colonial government's Asiatic Ordinance Bill, which would have required every Indian to register and to be fingerprinted. He called that "Black Act" criminal, and vowed "cheerfully" to welcome imprisonment rather than comply. Gandhi's passionate yogic embrace of suffering had now begun, vowing from this time to abstain from sexual relations with his wife, eliminating "passion-inducing" foods from his diet, cutting back on sleep as well as curtailing his daily nourishment before sunset to goat's curd, fruits, and nuts. He hardened himself, toughening his body to prepare for police brutality or isolation in prison cells. He named his new method of revolutionary noncooperation *satyagraha*—a Sanskrit compound meaning "hold fast to the truth." Mahatma Gandhi spoke now of an "inner voice" directing him, which he called the voice of "God that was Truth." He warned his followers of dark dangers confronting them, flogging, long prison terms, even death. He urged them to pray and be fearless. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, later defined Gandhi's greatest message to his nation as "Forget fear!"

Gandhi's Nonviolence

Nonviolence (*ahimsa*), one of India's most ancient religious beliefs, emerged long before the dawn of the Christian era, an ethical ideal of early Buddhism and Jainism. Gandhi insisted that *ahimsa* was Hinduism's "highest religious law" (*paramo Dharma*). He equated it to "God" and "truth," also redefining it in positive terms as "love." The powers of truth and love were so great, Gandhi argued, that united they could "move the world." Such was the force he focused against British imperialism in its final four decades of the first half of the twentieth century. Gandhi purified himself by praying to Rāma, and he armed himself with India's most ancient yogic weapons: suffering (*tapas*), fasting, and breath (*atman*) control before launching any revolutionary movement. He never defended himself with physical weapons of any kind, nor did he hate his opponents, teaching his followers to love those who sought to harm or arrest them.

Home to India

Soon after the start of World War I, Gandhi returned to India, joining Gopal Krishna Gokhale at his Servants of India Society in Pune. Moderate Anglophile Gokhale

had presided over India's National Congress in 1905, inspiring Gandhi to join the Congress. He was hailed by Gandhi as "my political guru" (divine teacher). Gandhi also admired Pune's revolutionary Hindu nationalist leader, Lokamanya (Beloved of the People) Bal Gangadhar Tilak, launching his first nationwide *satyagraha* the day Tilak died, 1 August 1920. By then, Gandhi had established his first Indian ashram at Sabarmati, on the outskirts of Gujarat's capital, Ahmedabad. Gandhi was most ably assisted in several provincial *satyagraha* movements by a fellow Gujarati, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who remained his political lieutenant. Patel appealed to Gandhi to join his struggle on behalf of Gujarat's famine-racked peasants in the spring of 1918, after which the Sardar became a devout disciple of the Mahatma. The failure of India's annual monsoon rains conspired with British wartime shipping of India's meager grain reserves to troops on the Western Front to bring famine to Gujarat's Kheda district.

At the start of his Kheda *satyagraha*, Gandhi inspired thousands of his peasant followers with his stories of the noble virtues of ancient India's great civilization, contrasting it to the "Satanic civilization" of the West, whose worst recent crime was World War I. Still he felt ambivalent about war, attempting to help the British Raj recruit Gujarati peasants for its army a month after his Kheda *satyagraha* ended in only partial victory. Peasants were shocked that he, "a votary of *ahimsa*," would urge them to join the British army! His failure as a "recruiting sergeant" led to Gandhi's worst breakdown, which "nearly ruined my constitution," as he confessed on the eve of the Allied victory that relieved him, "at death's door." The aftermath of armistice proved even more disillusioning to India and to Gandhi than had the long years of war.

Post-World War I Politics

British fears of "sedition" and "terrorist" violence brought the immediate extension of harsh martial defense of India "Black Acts" in the wake of the War. "I can no longer render peaceful obedience to . . . such devilish legislation," Gandhi responded. Like most Indian nationalists, Gandhi had expected freedom (*swaraj*) as India's reward for its loyal wartime support of the Raj, providing almost a million troops to the West and millions more in sterling, as well as countless tons of wheat, steel, and shipping. The Punjab had recruited most of India's valiant troops, Sikhs and Muslims, who fought bravely in France and Mesopotamia, only to return home to brutal British repression and racial discrimination rather than the freedom they had anticipated. On 30 March 1919, police opened fire on a crowd in Delhi, killing several protesters, which led Gandhi to proclaim 6 April 1919 a day of protest and national prayer.

Massacre in Jallianwala Bagh

One week later, on 13 April 1919, in Punjab's Amritsar, whose Golden Temple is the most sacred center of the Sikh faith, British Gurkha and Baluchi troops were ordered by the British brigadier to open fire, without warning, at point-blank range on thousands of unarmed peasants gathered inside an almost totally enclosed nearby garden, Jallianwala Bagh. Four hundred innocents were shot dead, another 1,200 left wounded inside that garden, now India's premier shrine to the nationalist struggle's martyrs to freedom. Mahatma Gandhi was arrested and sent back to Bombay when he tried to enter Punjab, that entire province being locked under the most brutal martial repression. Crawling orders were posted over several of Amritsar's narrow lanes for all Indians residing there, whippings lashed onto the naked backs of those daring to disobey.

Jallianwala Bagh alienated millions of previously loyal supporters and admirers of the British Raj. Wealthy Anglophile lawyers like Motilal Nehru, father of India's first prime minister, became converts to Mahatma Gandhi's revolutionary leadership and methods. Gandhi called upon all Indians to boycott British titles and law courts, as well as imported British manufactured cloth, consigning the latter to "freedom pyres." He urged Indians to spin their own cotton and weave their own cloth, assuring his followers that the "music" of millions of spinning wheels would be the anthem of India's freedom, destined to liberate Mother India's children from thrall-dom to imperial oppressors. He made a monthly minimal amount of hand-spun cotton (*khadi*) the dues of membership in India's National Congress. "There is no deliverance without sacrifice and self-control," Mahatma Gandhi instructed his followers. "Is the country ready?" he asked. Were the Hindu majority in Congress ready to embrace their Muslim neighbors as "brothers"?

"Hindu-Muslim Unity," Gandhi taught, was a primary pillar of Indian independence. Without unity, multicultural India would fall apart. His vision and warnings proved prophetic. His appeal reached the Muslim masses, whose hatred of British rule was intensified by Britain's postwar annexation of the Turkish caliph's (*khilafat's*) North African domain, after having so often denied any territorial ambitions during the war. The Khilafat Movement, led by Shaukat and Mohammed Ali, was hailed by Gandhi as his own "cause," embracing the Ali brothers as his "brothers," leading many Hindus to question the wisdom of their Mahatma's political strategy in embracing that pan-Islamic movement. Tens of thousands of Indian Muslims abandoned homes in India to march north to Afghanistan in support of a caliph ("deputy" of God), whose soldiers erected barbed wire at his borders to stop them. Moderate Muslim leaders of

India's National Congress, like Barrister Mohammad Ali Jinnah, also disapproved of Gandhi's revolutionary appeals to India's Muslim masses, as well as to illiterate Hindu peasants to "boycott" all British goods and institutions, fearing he would only provoke violence. Mahatma Gandhi listened to his "inner voice," however, as he launched nationwide *satyagraha*.

Leader and Guru of the Indian National Congress

From 1920 until 1945, whether in prison or on silent retreat in his last Central Indian ashram, Seva-Gram (village of service), or on one of his many "walking pilgrimages" (*pada yatras*), "Great Soul" Gandhi was hailed by his Congress Working Committee followers as virtually divine, even after he resigned from the Congress, whose Constitution he had rewritten and democratized. For Mahatma Gandhi was never primarily a political leader, sickened by the corruption, falsehood, and jealous in-fighting of politics, turning away from it to his cotton spinning, rural uplift work, and the struggle against "untouchability," which he viewed as the darkest sin of Hinduism, and to his holistic health cures, including Brahmacharya.

After the Nagpur Congress in December 1920, when Gandhi won the clear support of an overwhelming majority of new delegates to launch his multiple-boycott noncooperation movement nationwide, he lost the backing of many influential moderate leaders, most important of whom was Jinnah, who later led his Muslim League in demanding a separate Muslim nation-state of Pakistan.

Chauri Chaura Tragedy

When Gandhi launched nationwide *satyagraha*, he optimistically promised his Congress followers freedom (*swaraj*) from the British Raj in one year. Long before that, however, he learned of the murders by immolation of twenty-one Indian police, forced to burn inside their wooden station house by a mob of *satyagrahis* in Chauri Chaura. "I have committed a Himalayan blunder!" Mahatma Gandhi cried, calling a halt to *satyagraha*. For the first requirement and virtue of any *satyagrahi* was *ahimsa*. The remorseful Mahatma abandoned all political action and retired to the peaceful calm of his rural ashram, spinning cotton on his hand loom, weaving it into cloth "of our own country" (*sva-deshi*), remaining silent one day every week, periodically fasting. "All of us should be in mourning" for Chauri Chaura, Gandhi said. Jawaharlal Nehru, when he learned in his prison cell of Gandhi's decision to call off India's revolution, wrote "We were angry." Just when national resistance had started to build and to gain momentum, Nehru felt that,

thanks to Gandhi's scruples, it "wilted away." But Gandhi believed that means and ends were inextricably related, and that only nonviolent means could result in good ends. Soon after the British realized how unpopular Gandhi had become, they arrested him. When he almost died of appendicitis in 1924, however, he was released for surgery, after which he returned to rural and religious reform work

Struggles against Untouchability

"Untouchability is a blot upon humanity and therefore upon Hinduism," Gandhi argued, leading several important struggles against that Hindu "caste" crime, which treated some 10 percent of India's Hindu population as "polluted outcastes," denying them admission to temples or the use of village wells, treating them as creatures lower than animals. Gandhi risked his own life fighting this "age-long prejudice," arousing the ire of many orthodox Brahmans, who viewed him as a "traitor" to his faith. In 1932, when British prime minister J. Ramsay MacDonald classified "untouchables" as "separate" from "upper caste Hindus," awarding them a separate bloc of electoral seats on enlarged councils, as the British had earlier done with India's Muslims, Gandhi launched a fast-unto-death, determined to sacrifice his life rather than allow "perfidious Albion" further to divide and thus longer to rule over India's "enslaved" population. He thus brilliantly united his religious and political powers, magnifying the force of each, forcing the Raj withdraw its "Communal Award," rather than to risk allowing a Mahatma to die protesting it. Untouchable leaders, like Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, however, who had lobbied at London's Round Table Conferences for those separate electorate seats, angrily resented Gandhi's intervention, considering him no better than the most reactionary of Brahmans. But Gandhi continued his long struggle to abolish untouchability, renaming Hindu "outcastes" *Harijans* (children of God), insisting that at least one of them should always live in his ashram, treating them as his own "children."

Breaking the Salt Tax Monopoly

Gandhi's most famous *satyagraha* began on 12 March 1930, when he led a band of faithful disciples on his 240-mile antisalt tax march south from Sabarmati ashram to Dandi beach. The British Raj long enforced its monopoly on the sale of salt throughout India, annual tax revenue from which was second only to that collected from land. "Next to air and water," Gandhi told his long-suffering nation, salt was the "greatest necessity of life . . . the only condiment of the poor . . . by taxing which the State can reach even the starving millions." That invidious salt tax was 2,400 percent of its sale price, yet salt

could be picked up free on every beach along India's some 2,000-mile (3,400 km) littoral. That was exactly what Gandhi did on 6 April, when he reached Dandi beach, cheered by Sarojini Naidu as India's "Deliverer!" Millions of Indians rushed down to the sea to break the British monopoly, "stealing" lumps of sea salt and using them instead of buying tax-stamped inflated packages. Before year's end, every jail cell in India was filled with more than 60,000 salt *satyagrahis*. Gandhi never contested any jail sentence, welcoming each return to his prison "temple" (*mandir*) cell. During most of his years behind bars, he prayed while spinning cotton.

Quit India Movement

Gandhi never lost faith in *ahimsa*, rejecting every British demand that he should support Britain and its Allies in World War II. In the final decades of his life, he rejected the concept of "just war," insisting that all mass violence was evil. Some of his closest British Christian friends abandoned him when, shortly after the beginning of World War II, Gandhi launched his individual *satyagraha*, sending his most devout disciple, Vinoba Bhave, out publicly to break British martial law. The British Raj waited, however, before arresting Gandhi himself, reluctant to rouse mass Indian opposition while Japan was fast approaching India's eastern border. Early in August 1942, the Congress Working Committee appealed to Gandhi to come to Bombay to lead them again in one final mass *satyagraha* to end the Raj. Gandhi agreed, resolved to demand that every British soldier and civilian immediately "Quit India." "Do or die!" was the mantra he coined for this *satyagraha*, but the night before he was ready to launch it, he was driven away in the dark, incarcerated behind British bars until the war's end.

Last Years and Assassination

Mahatma Gandhi was deeply depressed by postwar conflicts in India, primarily between Hindus and Muslims, who fought over the imminent division of British India's loaves and fishes, as the few remaining days of the Raj dwindled. Britain's newly elected Labour Government, led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, found its Indian "jewel" more a liability than an asset. Of all the leaders of India's National Congress and the Muslim League, Gandhi alone refused to accept young Viceroy Lord Mountbatten's hasty plan to partition South Asia into a "moth-eaten" Pakistan and a much diminished India. Partition would be the "vivisection of Mother India," Gandhi cried. But when Mountbatten announced his partition plan early in June 1947, he set the date for all British troops to be withdrawn from South Asia at the midnight birth of independent India on 15 August 1947. That was also when multicultural

Bengal and the Punjab were slashed in half—the latter "Land of Five Rivers" through its Sikh population's heart—triggering the most tragic flight of over 10 million terrified Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs who awoke to find themselves on the wrong side of unguarded, ineptly drawn borders, leaving a million innocents to die in the following months.

At his evening prayer meetings in New Delhi, Mahatma Gandhi cried out against the tragic plight of old Delhi's Muslims, violently driven from their ancestral homes, robbed, beaten, or murdered by Sikh and Hindu mobs maddened by reports of Muslim rapes and murders of Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan's Punjab and North-West Frontier province. "What brutalities are going on!" Gandhi cried. "People are trying to see that there is no Hindu left in Pakistan and no Muslim in Hindustan."

He decried as well the Indo-Pak War in Kashmir, which started in October 1947 and was destined to continue, with interludes of seeming calm, for more than half a century. "Today my wings are clipped," Gandhi groaned as he watched fighting escalate in Kashmir's Vale. "If I could grow my wings again, I would fly to Pakistan." When asked by his disciples why he did not urge his political heirs (Nehru and Patel) to Congress power in New Delhi to end the war, Gandhi replied. "No one listens to me . . . if I could have my way of nonviolence . . . we would not send our army." But "I have no say with my people today." A month before his assassination, Gandhi offered himself as "arbitrator" of the conflict that still plagues India's relations with Pakistan and has cost over 50,000 lives, as well as billions of dollars. "I shall advise Pakistan and India to sit together and decide the matter," the wise Mahatma suggested, but he was never called upon by Nehru to assist India in resolving the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir state. "Today mine is a cry in the wilderness," Gandhi said.

On Friday, 30 January 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was shot dead by a hate-crazed Hindu Brahman, Nauram Godse, who called India's saintly father a "traitor," and a "lackey" of Pakistan. "The light has gone out of our lives," Nehru mourned after Gandhi died. "Conflicts must be ended in the face of this great disaster." Neither the conflict between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor lesser conflicts among Hindus and Muslims, whether in Gujarat or Ayodhya, have been resolved as yet. "In our age of moral decay," Albert Einstein wrote, memorializing Mahatma Gandhi, "he was the only statesman who represented that higher conception of human relations in the political sphere to which we must aspire with all our power."

Stanley Wolpert

See also Gokhale, Gopal Krishna; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Pakistan and India; Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai; Satyagraha; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

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GANDHI, RAJIV (1944–1991), prime minister of India (1984–1989). Born in 1944, Rajiv Gandhi was the eldest son of Indira Gandhi, daughter of the first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Rajiv's father, Feroze Gandhi, was a Parsi, a Gujarati-speaking Zoroastrian, who was briefly elected to India's Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament).

Like his grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv studied at Cambridge University, but he failed to complete his engineering degree there. While at Cambridge, he met Sonia Maino, the daughter of an Italian industrialist, who was studying English at a local college. They married, and Rajiv Gandhi became a pilot for Air India, resisting a political career until he was finally persuaded to run for office by his mother, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, after the accidental death in 1980 of Rajiv's younger brother, Sanjay. Until then, Sanjay Gandhi was being groomed to succeed her as prime minister. Rajiv was elected to Parliament in 1981 from the rural constituency of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, the Congress Party persuaded Rajiv Gandhi to succeed his mother as head of the Congress Party and as prime minister of India.

Forty years old at the time, Rajiv Gandhi led his Congress Party to victory and was welcomed as prime minister on a wave of sympathy for his assassinated mother and widespread admiration for his youthful dynamism and modern outlook. His politics as prime minister was not divisive or controversial, nor very striking or groundbreaking, compared to that of his mother and his grandfather.

His tenure was notable for promoting high technology in India, though without much impact on reducing poverty.

In the foreign arena, he continued his mother's close ties with the United States, and in particular, promoted the close personal ties that she had established with President Ronald Reagan. Closer to home, his fateful foreign policy mistake was India's intervention in Sri Lanka, which was locked in a devastating civil war between the Sinhalese government and the rebellious Tamil areas of the north seeking an independent Tamil Ealam (nation). In an agreement with President Julius Jayawardene, the Sri Lankan president, Rajiv committed several divisions of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the Colombo government to help it disarm and pacify the Tamil militants. Having gone to "disarm" the rebellious Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) and bring about peace, the IPKF ended up fighting the LTTE, and was withdrawn ten years later with no peace in sight.

Scandals and allegations of corruption during his tenure plagued Rajiv Gandhi, especially one that revolved around claims that he had received "kickbacks" from Bofors, a Swedish company that made the long-range guns purchased by India's defense ministry. The Congress Party suffered electoral defeat in 1989 and was succeeded by a coalition led by the Janata Dal party under Vishwanath Pratap Singh as prime minister. This coalition government proved shaky, however, and Rajiv started campaigning again in 1991, when new elections were called. While campaigning outside Madras (now Chennai) in South India, a female LTTE suicide bomber detonated a bomb, killing Rajiv Gandhi and eighteen others.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Sonia; Nehru, Jawaharlal

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GANDHI, SONIA (1946–), Congress Party leader, widow of Rajiv Gandhi. Sonia Gandhi, the widow of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated

in 1991, entered politics in 1998 after being persuaded by the Congress Party to lead the organization during that year's general elections. She was elected to Parliament in 1999 from Jawaharlal Nehru's Rai Bareilly constituency, adjacent to Rajiv Gandhi's rural constituency in Amethi, Uttar Pradesh. Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi's son, Harvard-educated Rahul Gandhi, now holds this Parliamentary seat. The Congress Party lost to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition in the 1998 elections, and then again in 1999, following the collapse of the BJP coalition in a successful vote of no-confidence. In the April 2004 general elections, riding on the Gandhi name and visibility, she led the Congress Party and its allies back into office. Her victory generated strong passions among extreme Hindu nationalists because of her foreign origins and Christian faith. Concerns about causing deep political divisions in India, and fears of assassination, as in the cases of her husband and her mother-in-law, Indira Gandhi, prompted her not to assume the office of prime minister.

Sonia Maino Gandhi was born in 1946 in the small Italian town of Orbassano, near Turin. Her father was a building contractor, and she was raised as a traditional Roman Catholic. She met Rajiv Gandhi in England, where she had gone to study English at a school in Cambridgeshire, while he was studying engineering at Cambridge University. Sonia and Rajiv were married in 1968. They returned to New Delhi and moved into the residence of Rajiv's mother, Indira Gandhi, who was then prime minister of India. Thereafter, she adapted to the Indian way of life to become part of the Nehru-Gandhi political family, learning Hindi, wearing saris, and adjusting to Indian culture and cuisine. Their daughter, Priyanka, was born in 1970, and their son, Rahul, in 1972.

Sonia Gandhi refused to accept the office of prime minister following her successful 2004 election campaign, wisely remaining president of the Congress Party. She chose the former finance minister under the earlier Congress government, Dr. Manmohan Singh, an Oxford-educated economist, to assume the position of prime minister. He became India's first Sikh prime minister. Sonia Gandhi remained the political power behind the prime minister shaping key Congress government policies.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Singh, Manmohan**

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GANDHINAGAR The capital of Gujarat, Gandhinagar ("city of Gandhi") is named after Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the native son of Gujarat revered worldwide as the Mahatma, the "Great Soul." Gujarat, called the melting pot of India and treasure trove of architectural styles, derives its name from *Gujjara-ratta*, the form it takes in Prakrit, the ancient Indic dialect. Its Sanskrit name, Gurjjara-rastra, literally means the "country of the Gurjjaras." The Gurjjaras were a Central Asian tribe, believed to have entered India along with the Huns in the mid-fifth century, when the imperial control of the Guptas was in decline. The region the Gurjjaras settled was called Gujarat by the tenth century, when Mulraj Solanki, the founder of the Hindu Chalukyan dynasty, established his capital at Anhilwara Patan. Anhilwara in time came to be replaced by Ahmedabad, which was selected by Muzaffar Khan as his sultanate's capital in 1412. In time, the city came to rival Manchester, U.K., in textiles. Bombay (present-day Mumbai) became the capital of the region when the British placed Gujarat under their Bombay presidency, and it was not until 1960, after the unilingual (Gujarati) state of Gujarat had been created from bilingual Bombay, that Gandhinagar, about 15 miles (24 km) north of Ahmedabad on the right bank of the Sabarmati River, was selected as the site of the capital city for the new state.

The selection of the site for the new capital was not without controversy. Princely Baroda (present-day Vadodara) and industrial Ahmedabad both wanted the honor of being named the capital city. But Baroda was ruled out because of its princely status, which was deemed incongruent with the democratic properties of independent India. Moreover, Fatesinghrao Gaekwad, the ruler of Baroda, was of Maharashtrian origins, which was not viewed favorably in Gandhi's Gujarat. Ahmedabad was ruled out because of its overcrowded character, even though the mill owners, led by Ambalal Sarabhai and Kasturbhai Lalbhai, lobbied very hard to shift the capital to Ahmedabad.

Gandhinagar became a battleground for the competing ideals that had surfaced during the building of Chandigarh and Bhubaneswar. The mill owners of neighboring Ahmedabad, backed by Indian architect and planner Balakrishna Doshi, wanted the American architect Louis Kahn to build Gandhinagar as a worthy rival to Le Corbusier's Chandigarh. There was, however, tremendous political pressure to make Gandhinagar a



Policeman Stands Guard at Swaminarayan Hindu Temple in Gandhinagar. On 24 September 2002, several gunmen entered the imposing Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar and indiscriminately opened fire on Hindu worshipers, killing 32 people (including 11 children) and wounding another 100. Four days later, a policeman stands guard at the site, where thousands have gathered to pray for the victims. The captured gunmen were later identified as Muslim extremists with links to Pakistan. REUTERS/CORBIS.

purely Indian enterprise, partly because the state of Gujarat was the birthplace of Mahatma Gandhi. Even though, in the end, negotiations with Kahn broke down over payment in U.S. dollars, he exercised some influence in the construction of Gandhinagar from Ahmedabad, where he was building the Indian Institute of Management campus. The Gujarat government also considered the option of creating a consortium of private Indian architects, including Doshi, Charles Correa, Achyut Kanvinde, Hasmukh Patel, and others; but in the end the government recruited American-trained Hargobind K. Mewada, who had apprenticed with Le Corbusier in Chandigarh, to complete the project. The development of Gandhinagar, like its older cousins Chandigarh and Bhubaneswar, was in part an educational experiment and social welfare project, as well as a venture in professional city planning and architecture.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gujarat; Urbanism**

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GAÑESHA In Hinduism, no other god is as often invoked as Gañesha, or Gaṇapati, “lord of the *gaṇas*,” or Shiva’s dwarf attendants, Gajānana, “he with the elephant’s head.” Predominantly the god of good luck, Gañesha is worshiped at the start of any important enterprise. Son of Shiva and Pārvatī, he is, however, not their natural offspring. His real origin lies in India’s far distant past; even the compilers of the Purāṇas and other ancient writers have lost all track of it.

There are many different accounts of Gañesha’s birth. According to the Shiva Purāṇa, Pārvatī fashioned a handsome boy out of the unguents and other applications she had used in her bath, and asked him to guard the entrance to her apartment against strangers. When



Painting of Gaṇeśha. In the desert city of Jaisalmer, in the region of Rajasthan, painting of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśha, the Hindu god of good fortune. His image often adorns doorways or building walls, as here. ROMAN SOUMAR/CORBIS.

Shiva, her husband, arrived, the boy barred him, not knowing Shiva to be his father. Shiva, not knowing the boy's identity, decapitated him in anger. To placate the disconsolate Pārvatī, Shiva quickly brought the child back to life by placing the head of the first living thing he could find on the boy's body.

As the god's birth is narrated in the Skanda Purāṇa Pārvatī was amusing herself by forming a figure out of the remains of her bath; she could make only the torso with the remains. Later, her elder son Skanda finished the task by adding the head of an elephant to the incomplete body.

In the Varāha Purāṇa, it is Shiva himself who gave his handsome young son an elephant's head, a portly form, and serpents for the sacred thread. The story in the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa is that the malevolent planet Shani (Saturn) bore a curse: the head of anyone at whom he looked would fall off. Not knowing this, Pārvatī made him gaze at her newborn son, whose head fell off at once; it was later replaced by that of the king of the elephants.

References and Iconography

References to Gaṇeśha, Gajānana, Vināyaka, and Gaṇapati can be traced back to the Vedic period. The name Vināyaka occurs already in the Gṛhasūtras, books of rules for worship by householders. As many as six Vināyakas are named, who are malevolent—or at least mischievous—beings. Under their influence, men and women are afflicted by many misfortunes. In slightly later texts, the six Vināyakas coalesce into one, but by then he has come to be associated with Ambika, or “Mother,” that is, Pārvatī. He is her son, and he can be pacified when offerings are made to him.

Vināyaka, Gaṇeśha, and Gajānana all fit into the type of *yakshas*, the fickle-minded, temperamental beings of early mythology. Indeed, what may be perhaps a prototype of Gaṇeśha comes from Amaravati in South India. There, on a fragmentary beam of a stupa railing, a corpulent *gana* with an elephant's head is pulling a thick cord.

A portly form and an elephant's head are of course the god's most distinctive characteristics. Among the

attributes of Gañesha images are a bowl of *modaka* sweets, his own broken tusk, an ax, and a radish in his hands; his mouse mount; and his sacred thread of a cobra. He has many colors—red, white, turmeric-yellow, and even black—but the predominant colors are various hues at the red end of the spectrum, which are described imaginatively as molten gold, rising sun, and vermilion.

Not only does Gañesha have the head of an elephant, he may have two of them, or three, four, five, or even six. These forms, however, are extremely rare, with the exception of the five-headed form. Sometimes, instead of five heads, there are five images of Gañesha, or *pañcagañesha*.

It is obvious that a god with such universal appeal would be represented in many ways. Images of the god for worship in the household and in his temples portray him as having two, four, or more arms, occasionally numbering up to as many as twenty. He may be seated, standing, or dancing; alone, with his consorts, or in the company of his parents and his brother Skanda-Kartikeya. As a god presiding over good luck, Gañesha may be represented together with his other “partner gods,” Kubera and Lakshmi.

One of the earliest images of Gañesha is in a cave at Udayagiri in central India, of the early fifth century. He has only two arms; the right hand is broken, but the left hand holds a bowl of his favorite sweets, with the trunk curving to partake of the contents. Gañesha’s penis is erect. This is a trait of some Shaiva images, suggesting the retention of the semen, and continence—paradoxical though it may seem. And though Gañesha indeed was influenced by the Tantric cult, in an image of so early a date, not too much should be inferred; perhaps it is only evidence of the god’s impish nature and origin.

The posture of sitting at ease seems to come naturally to this portly deity, with one thick leg folded on the seat and the other folded at the knee and resting also on the seat. It is as such that Gañesha has come down to us from the fifth-century Pārvatī temple at Nachna in central India. One hand of this two-armed god holds the sweet bowl, while the other holds a large radish, another of his favored foods. A string of pearls with many loops serves as his coronet, and a cobra playfully forms the sacred thread.

In the Deccan, in the sixth century, representations of Gañesha were created at Elephanta, Aiholi, and Badami. In the great cave at Elephanta near Mumbai (Bombay), for example, a two-armed Gañesha is participating in his own way in his father’s dance, his trunk curving in delight. In the Ravalphadi cave at Aiholi and in cave 1 at Badami in Karnataka as well, the sparsely and simply clad

adolescent god witnesses the cosmic dance of Shiva, the bowl of sweets in one hand, as ever. In North India, a charming panel from the brick temple at Bhitargaon shows a spirited tussle between Gañesha and Skanda over a bowl of *modaka* sweets.

When Gañesha is endowed with more than two arms, they are most often four, but there are sometimes six or eight, and occasionally even up to twenty. When he has four hands, among the most frequent attributes are the elephant goad, the battle-ax, the noose, the single tusk, and the bowl of sweets. There is also a very beautiful six-armed Gañesha, dancing and listening to the sound of his own bell-ornaments, from Kannauj in North India.

Gañesha also figures in panels of the Saptamatrkas, or the Seven Divine Mothers, where he guards one flank of the row of the Mothers, with Shiva or Virabhadra guarding the other. There are also more esoteric forms of Gañesha, his many forms and uses described in the Tantras.

Gañesha’s wives are Siddhi (“Success”) and Buddhi (“Wisdom”), who are the god Brahmā’s daughters. For while Gañesha is on the one hand the facilitator of all enterprises, he at the same time also presides over the higher functions of the mind. Gañesha has profound wisdom and a prodigious memory—it was he who undertook the task of writing down the epic Mahābhārata, verse by verse, as soon as the sage Vyasa composed it. In all cases, the notions of wisdom, knowledge, success, accomplishment, and well-being are present.

Worship of Gañesha

There are a number of days that are sacred to Gañesha but the most important is the Gañesha Caturthi, the fourth day in the bright fortnight in the Hindu month of Bhādrapada (August–September). In Maharashtra in particular, nine places came to be known as being sacred to the elephant-faced god. They are Morgaon, Theurgaon, Sidhtek, Varad, Murud, Ganagapur, Lenyadri, Ranjan-gaon, and Ojhar.

The worship of Gañesha spread beyond the present boundaries of India. His sculptures have been found in Afghanistan. Gañesha also entered the Buddhist Mahayana pantheon of Tibet, Japan, and countries of Southeast Asia.

As discussed above, the authors of the Purāṇas asked how Gañesha came to have an elephant’s head on a human body, and came up with many mythical explanations. But perhaps the correct question to pose is: how did an elephant come to have a man’s body?

All these mythological stories have the distinctive appearance of being retrospective; they attempt to explain the god's unusual form by invoking some other previous mythological happenings. Is it possible that they are approaching the question of the human body and elephant head from the wrong end, trying to explain the origin of the elephant's head on the human body? In other words, is it possible that it is the elephant—such as the Amaravati *yaksha*—that is the original god, so to speak, and that therefore we are to explain rather how a human body came to be associated with it, and not the other way around.

Kirit Mankodi

See also **Elephanta; Shiva and Shaivism**

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GANGES. See **Geography**.

GAT-TORĀ Gat-Torā (*gat*, Hindustani, “form” or “movement of the body in dance” + *torā*, Hindustani, “an ornament for the wrists”) is instrumental music in North Indian classical music, particularly for the sitar and sarod, in which a composition alternates with improvisations. Masit Khan, who lived in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, popularized this form of performance, and one of the most important of these composition patterns bears his name. *Gat*, as a reference to a way of walking, also refers to a kind of drum composition for tabla and a category of dance movements.

In sitar and sarod performance traditions, *gat* refers specifically to a kind of precomposed melody and to the entire measured section of the performance (as contrasted with the unmeasured *ālāp* section) that such precomposed melodies commence. A *gat* presents the *rāga* (underlying melody) in a composed melodic form and often illustrates the qualities of the *tāla* (underlying time cycle).

Gats are commonly composed of one or more sections, each of which will be in its own specific register.



GAT-TORĀ (MELODIC SOLOIST WITH TABLA)

| | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>vilambit lay</i> | appearance of <i>gat</i> often begins with a drum solo (<i>peshkāra</i>) features long solos, often with elaborate <i>tihā'īs</i> |
| <i>madhya lay</i> | increasingly virtuosic solos |
| <i>drut lay</i> | short fast <i>tāns</i> fewer tabla solos |
| <i>atidrut lay</i> | metered <i>jhāla</i> dramatic devices such as <i>sawāl-jawāb</i> , <i>tār paran/sāth sangat</i> may conclude with an elaborate <i>cakradār paran</i> played in unison |

The most important of these sections is the *sthā'ī* (Sanskrit, “steady”) and is usually limited to the lower and middle registers (*purvāṅg*). Complementing the *sthā'ī* is the *antarā* (Sanskrit, “contrast”) which serves as a counter theme and usually explores the middle and upper registers (*uttarāṅg*).

Most commonly, the beginning of the *sthā'ī* (the *mukhrā* [Hindustani, “face”]) emphasizes beat one (*sam*) of the *tala* in such a distinctive way that musicians often repeat only this part of the *gat*, especially when they get to the final and fastest portions of the performance.

Two standardized rhythmic patterns for *gat* are common. In *Masitkhānī gat* (*gat* in the style of Masit Khan) the *mukhrā* begins on beat 12 in slow or medium-tempo *Tīntāl* and cadences on the *sam* in a tripartite rhythm. *Rāzākhnī gat* (*gat* in the style of the Raza Khan family, notably of Ali Raza) and other fast-tempo *gats* tend to be less regular than *Masitkhānī*. This more specific use of the word *gat* as a composition refers to a rhythmic pattern of plectrum strokes (usually mnemonically represented by the syllables *dā* and *rā*). These *gats* also imply melodic shape so that, over all, the term has a matrixlike quality encompassing metric, rhythmic, pitch, and kinesthetic organization.

The notion of *torā* encompasses the elaborations that contrast with the recurring *gat*. Explorations of the *rāga*, *tāla*, and the limits of the performer's technique occur in the *torā*'s that come between statements of *gat*. These improvisations (sometimes known as *tān* [extension]) usually exhibit the virtuosity of the performer. In the broader structural context of performance, the *gat* marks

the point at which the drummer enters and, in alternation with the improvisatory *torās* (especially in some performance traditions), where the drummer solos. Vice versa, when the melodic soloist is improvising or playing precomposed elaborations, the drummer maintains the time with a *thekā* representing the *tāla*.

After the melodic soloist has finished with his or her solo variations and improvisations, performances sometimes feature various kinds of interaction between performers, commonly the soloist and the drummer. Perhaps the most notable of these is the *sawāl-jawāb* (Hindustani, “question-answer”), a telescoping responsorial format. Sometimes this occurs between two instrumental soloists, one of whom states a musical line in one musical medium while the other repeats it, translating the musical line into the characteristic shape of his or her medium. The most common version of *sawāl-jawāb* is between a melodic instrumental soloist and a drummer.

Gordon Thompson

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GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS The rights of women are an inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of universal human rights. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, women perform an estimated 60 percent of the world’s total work but receive only 10 percent of the world’s income and own a mere 1 percent of the world’s land. They constitute nearly 60 percent of world’s poor. Recent attempts at structural adjustments and economic liberalization have led to further marginalization of women and an increasing feminization of poverty, particularly in the developing countries. India is no exception to these trends.

The traditional Indian social structure is heavily tilted in favor of men, giving them authority and prestige while confining women primarily to domestic roles. Even if women work outside the home, most of them have no control over their own earnings. Even in the case of highly educated and professionally qualified women, a dowry is still provided at the time of marriage. That is why in many communities, the birth of a female child is still treated as a curse and a financial liability. In some regions sex detection tests and female infanticide are widely practiced, disturbing India’s male-female ratio adversely over the last few decades.

India still does not have a uniform civil code. Personal and family laws discriminate not only between men and women but also between one woman and another. A Hindu woman is not entitled to a share in joint family property. Under Muslim law, a male child is entitled to double the share of a female child. A Parsi girl is discriminated against in matters of inheritance in case she decides to marry out of the community. Most Indian girls are treated as *paraya dhana* (somebody else’s property) in their parental homes and as outsiders by their new families after marriage. Very few women have the courage to raise their voice against such discrimination, and most women remain unequal, dispossessed, and disadvantaged throughout their lives.

Under ancient Indian concepts, culture, and ethos, women were honored with the status of *devīs* or goddesses, yet in practice were denied human rights and basic freedoms. After independence in 1947 some steps were taken to bridge gender-based disparity legally. For instance, the Constitution of India gave Indian women civic and political freedoms equal to those of men. Whereas Article 14 guarantees “equality before law” and “equal protection before law,” Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, or gender.

The Indian government has also passed various legislation—including the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, Indecent Representation of Women Prevention Act, and the *Sati* Prevention Act—to safeguard the dignity, control of sexuality, and reproductive rights of women. Many judicial verdicts have also favored the rights of women in order to raise their status. However, the constitutional and legal provisions appear to be too radical in view of prevailing sociocultural realities, which frequently create a resistance to the special protection and acceleratory measures that were designed to enable women in India to achieve their just and equal position in society. The majority of women in India act as custodians of family well-being and in general are neither aware of their legal rights nor anxious to assert themselves against established norms and practices. Traditional values and behavioral norms, which have evolved over thousands of years, inhibit women from asserting themselves as individuals, except in a very limited context.

The success of several thousand Indian women who, after independence, used courage, financial means, and family support to break sociocultural barriers does not imply the emancipation of Indian women or the enjoyment of human rights by Indian women in general. Most Indian women are still waiting for equality, and many are



Women on a Pilgrimage to Obtain Water for Their Households in Kutch, Gujarat. Although India's Constitution guarantees women civil and political rights equal to those of men, traditional values and behavioral norms, evolving over thousands of years, have coalesced with lack of education and poverty to prevent many women from succeeding as individuals. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

forced to live what may be considered subhuman lives. Working women have to face additional problems, owing to conflicts in their educational values and age-old socialization practice. Inequality affects not only the mental health and physical well-being of India's women, but also the well-being of their families and society at large.

As such, it is in the interest of humankind to protect women's rights as human rights. Addressing the World Congress of Women at Moscow in June 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev observed "The status of women is a barometer of the democratism of any state and an indicator of how human rights are respected in it." Fortunately, India has a rich tradition of vociferous women's movements and nongovernmental organizations sensitive to women's issues. The National Human Rights Commission and the National Commission for Women have been striving to promote and preserve women's rights as human rights in India. Both are statutory bodies. The National Human Rights Commission was established in 1993, with the

power to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment, and compensation in cases of human rights abuse (though it is prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of human rights abuses by the army and paramilitary forces). The National Commission for Women was constituted in 1992 to facilitate the redress of grievances and accelerate the socioeconomic development of women.

Both the government and nongovernmental organizations rely on active and positive support from the media to portray images consistent with the acknowledgment of girls and women as individuals capable of relating to other persons on the basis of mutual respect. Education is also playing an increasingly vital role in the mainstreaming and sensitization of a gender perspective of human rights in India, transforming notions of "men" and "women" into a broader view of humankind.

Asha Gupta

See also **Family Law and Cultural Pluralism; Human Rights; Women and Political Power; Women's Education**

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GENERAL (NATIONAL) ELECTIONS India's first "general election," as national elections are called in India, was held in 1952, following the adoption of India's independent democratic Constitution in 1950. The first election was a monumental event. A nationwide election based on adult franchise on such a scale had never been undertaken before. It required the recruitment of armies of election officers, thousands of ballot boxes, and hundreds of polling stations. Given the fact that some 80 percent of the adult voting population was illiterate at that time, parties and candidates were identified by pictures and symbols. There were some unusual and unexpected problems, such as a marauding tiger preventing some voters from getting to their poll booth, and paper rupees being stuffed in some ballot boxes by people who thought they were donation boxes. Overall, the first election ran smoothly. Since then, elections in India have been held regularly in accordance with constitutional requirements. By the end of 2004, fourteen general elections had been held: in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2004.

Elections to the lower house of Parliament, known as the Lok Sabha (House of the People), are based on adult franchise and a direct vote. There are 545 seats in the Lok Sabha, of which all but two are subject to direct election. Those two seats are nominated by the president of India, on the advice of the prime minister, to include special minorities who may not otherwise be represented. National electoral constituencies are formed in accordance with population, giving more populous states more seats. Members of Parliament's upper house, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) are elected indirectly by elected members of the Vidhan Sabhas (state legislatures), and through nominations by the president of India on the advice of the prime minister.

India's ruling government may call for the dissolution of Parliament and for new general elections to the Lok Sabha at any time after it takes office. However, the government cannot remain in power for more than five years



Congress Party Supporters. Their banner asserts, "Only the Congress Party can offer us a stable government," giving voice to the popular concern over the instability of various coalition or minority governments in India after 1989. INDIA TODAY.

and must call for new elections by the end of its fifth year in office. The Lok Sabha is then dissolved, and new national elections must take place. The ruling government may also fall if a majority of the members of Parliament pass a vote of "no confidence." This happened at the national level only once, in 1998, although state governments have frequently been dissolved by such votes, with members of the ruling state governments defecting to the opposition by walking across to the opposition benches. An antidefection law was adopted in 1985 as the 52nd Amendment to India's Constitution.

General Elections during the Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty, 1952–1977, 1979–1989

Between 1952 and 1989, the Congress Party under the "Nehru Dynasty" (prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi) dominated Indian elections, winning clear majorities in all national elections.

After Nehru's death in May 1964, the Congress Party government was briefly headed by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, until his own sudden death in January 1966, the only time before the death of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 that a non-Nehru family member formally led a Congress government.

Following India's defeat of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan in December 1971 in the war for an independent Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi led her party to an overwhelming victory against the divided opposition parties, gaining more than a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. Her declaration of the "National Emergency" in June 1975 generated a strong reaction against her. In the March 1977 elections, Gandhi's Congress Party was defeated by a quickly forged coalition of parties called the Janata Party (People's Party), led by former Congress Party leader and finance minister Morarji Desai. Indira Gandhi's Congress won only 153 seats, 34.5 percent of the votes. The Janata Party was composed mainly of breakaway Congress Party groups, socialists, and members of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh. In-fighting and factionalism among that motley group brought down the Janata government in 1980.

In the 1980 elections, the Congress Party, led by Gandhi, won 351 of the 539 seats contested in the 545-seat Lok Sabha. Following Gandhi's assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi led the Congress Party to an overwhelming victory, securing 396 Lok Sabha seats, an unprecedented 49 percent of the votes. In the 1989 elections, the Congress Party won only 193 of the 525 seats contested.

The main opposition parties to the Congress Party were the earlier reincarnations of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), namely, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (until 1971) and the Bharatiya Lok Dal (until 1977); the Communist Party of India; the breakaway Communist Party of India Marxist; the Swatantra Party; the Praja Socialist Party; and the Samyukta Socialist Party.

The Post-1989 Era of Coalition Politics and Governments

The defeat of Rajiv Gandhi's Congress Party in 1989 ushered in a decade of coalition and minority governments. The first of these, a coalition government called the National Front under Prime Minister V. P. Singh of the Janata Party (1989–1991), was followed by a minority Congress Party government under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao (1991–1996), and then by two short-lived minority United Front coalition governments under prime ministers H. K. Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral (1996–January 1998). With no party obtaining a simple majority in the March 1998 elections, a coalition

government led by the BJP, under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, took office. A year later, in April 1999, the Vajpayee government fell, losing a vote of no confidence in Parliament by a single vote. The loss was caused when the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) party of Tamil Nadu, led by Jayalalitha Jayaraman, defected from the coalition. These weak and unstable governments contrasted sharply to the period from 1947 to 1989, when the Congress Party ruled with a clear majority of seats, except for a brief interval between 1977 and 1979. However, even during Congress Party majority rule, the party received less than 50 percent of the total votes, varying between 34.5 and 48.1 percent.

In the March 1998 elections, the Hindu nationalist BJP and its allies secured 252 seats in the 545-seat Lok Sabha, of which 179 were secured by the BJP. The Congress Party and its allies received 167 seats, including 141 by the Congress Party itself. The United Front secured 97 seats. Minor parties and nominations filled the remaining seats. Since 1998, the ability of BJP- or Congress Party-led coalitions to remain in power for the full five-year term has appeared tenuous. For example, after the BJP-led coalition took office in 1998, Tamil Nadu's AIADMK, led by Jayalalitha Jayaraman, continued to escalate its demands for cabinet posts and other privileges. The AIADMK won only 18 seats in parliament in 1998, compared to the BJP's 178, but its membership in the coalition was crucial for the BJP, giving Jayalalitha's AIADMK a disproportionate number of political offices and power.

Regional parties have assumed important roles in making or breaking the BJP- and Congress Party-led coalitions during this period. These include the Akali Dal, the Sikh party of Punjab; the Telugu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh; the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and AIADMK of Tamil Nadu; the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir; the Asom Gana Parishad of Assam; and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) of North India, a party of the Dalits (former "untouchable" castes).

Reversal of Fortunes: 1999 and 2004 General Elections

National elections were called by the ruling BJP coalition government in the spring of 2004, India's fourteenth general election since 1952. As in the previous elections in 1989, 1991, 1995, 1998, and 1999, no single party was able to claim a majority in the 2004 elections. This time, however, the coalition of parties led by the Congress Party and its leader, Sonia Gandhi, defeated the ruling coalition led by the BJP under Prime Minister Vajpayee.

The main allies of the Congress in the 2004 elections were the breakaway nationalist Congress Party, the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Republican Party of India (primarily a Dalit party), the Kerala Congress, and the Muslim League of Kerala. Elected members from the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India Marxist, classified under other parties, supported the Congress coalition in Parliament to keep it in power without being a formal part of the coalition. The main allies of the BJP were the Shiv Sena, the DMK, the Telugu Desam of Andhra Pradesh, the Akali Dal of Punjab, the Indian National Lok Dal, the Biju Lok Dal, the Samata Party, and the Lok Shakti.

The Congress Party, identified with Sonia Gandhi, is the political heir of the original Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1888, which led India to independence. After the death of Nehru in 1964, and especially after his daughter Indira Gandhi took over as prime minister in 1966, factions within the Congress Party broke away to form separate parties. The split began with a rift between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the finance minister Morarji Desai, leading to two Congress parties, Congress (I) and Congress (O). Breakaway new Congress parties were, however, unable to claim the legacy of the original INC, which continued to be held by the Nehru-Gandhi family and its loyal supporters.

In 2004, Sonia Gandhi's INC contested 417 seats in the 545-seat Lok Sabha, winning 145 seats. The Congress coalition as a whole won 220 of the 428 seats that were subject to elections. The BJP, led by former prime minister A. B. Vajpayee, contested 334 seats and won 138. The BJP coalition as a whole won 185 seats. Independents and smaller parties won 137 seats.

In comparison, in the previous 1999 general elections, the BJP and its allies had won a majority of 298 seats, compared to 135 seats won by Congress and its allies. Independents and smaller parties won 137 seats in 1999. The 2004 general election was thus a surprising turnaround from the 1999 general election.

Reasons for the success of Congress and its left-wing supporting parties in 2004 have been attributed to the greater attention it paid to the rural poor compared to the BJP, which trumpeted the success of its high tech revolution that largely benefited a rising Indian middle class, variously estimated at between 15 and 30 percent of the population. The Nehru-Gandhi mystique and the popular image of Sonia Gandhi among the masses, a white woman in a white sari and a red *tilak* on her forehead, along with the campaign conducted by her children, Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, played an

important role in the success of the Congress coalition. The defeat of the BJP has also been attributed to its promotion of a hardline Hindu nationalist ideology, which alienated the religious minorities of India (20 percent of the population), especially Muslims and Christians. The Akali Dal, the minority Sikh party of Punjab, was allied with the BJP. Additionally, the BJP's high caste Hindu image and its alliance with the more extreme Shiv Sena and its nonparty affiliates, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), alienated much of the Dalit populace. The Dalits, the former "untouchable castes" also known as the Scheduled Castes, may constitute as much as 25 percent of the population, and have remained outside the caste-based Hindu fold, from which they have been excluded for two millennia.

Until the electoral campaign of early 1998, the BJP and other more radical Hindu parties, especially the Shiv Sena, argued for the rejection of the secular ideals of Nehru's Congress Party, which are also espoused by most other Indian parties, including the Janata Dal, the Samajwadi Party, the two main factions of the Communist Party, and the regional parties in the south (the Tamil Maanila Congress and the two factions of the DMK of Tamil Nadu, and the Telugu Desam of Andhra Pradesh). The secularism of all of these parties have now come to represent the equality of all religions in practice, rather than the Western concept of the separation of church and state. On the other hand, the Hindu nationalists represented in the BJP—the Shiv Sena, the RSS (an unarmed paramilitary Hindu nationalist affiliate of the BJP), the Bajrang Dal, and another nonparty organization called the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)—wish to establish India as a Hindu state under the political banner of "Hindutva." The more benign version of the relatively more moderate BJP's Hindutva would be a broad Hindu Weltanschauung, of which other religious groups would also be a part. The VHP and RSS, and the more extreme elements of the BJP and the Shiv Sena, however, have talked of marginalizing or even Hinduizing all of India's minorities.

In early 1998, with the BJP on the threshold of gaining even more seats in the Lok Sabha and possibly forming the next government itself, the party moved even more toward the secular ideology of the other parties. Indeed, the BJP's main leader and designated shadow prime minister, Vajpayee, publicly declared in January 1998 that a BJP government would retain India's secular Constitution and would continue to implement the secular policies of previous governments. Such reassurances were further reinforced by statements from L. K. Advani, who subsequently became the home minister and deputy prime minister in the BJP government.

Even the more radical Hindu party, the Shiv Sena, called for reconciliation between Hindus and Muslims. As a symbol of this new move, the ultranationalist Hindu leader of the Shiv Sena, Bal Thackeray, went further by calling for the erection of a Hindu-Muslim monument at Ayodhya, where the fifteenth-century mosque of the Mughal emperor Babur had been demolished by Hindu mobs in December 1992, triggering widespread Hindu-Muslim rioting and killing. In making this ideological shift, the BJP and its main ally, the Shiv Sena, were able to draw some Congress Party members to their fold, as well as members from other secular regional parties. There are at least two reasons for this ideological shift on the part of the BJP and the Shiv Sena. Unlike the earlier Hindu Mahasabha (banned after one of its members assassinated Mahatma Gandhi), and its successor, the Jana Sangha, from which the BJP originated, the BJP has learned that an avowedly Hindu nationalist platform causes fear and adverse reactions among India's Muslim minority of 120 million, as well as among the other 50 million Christian and Sikh minorities. Secessionist violence in Kashmir, Punjab, and the Christian tribal states of the northeastern region could also be aggravated.

Additionally, the emphasis on Hindu nationalism in Hindi-speaking North India has not generated support from the Dravidian states in the South—Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala—which constitute about 20 percent of India's population. More importantly, the image of Hindu nationalism represented by upper caste Hindus has alienated the Dalits and the other "backward castes" (the lower caste Shudras), who constitute together about 70 percent of the Hindu population (about 55 percent of the Indian population). Without support from these groups, the BJP would have difficulty obtaining an electoral majority in the Lok Sabha—the main reason they were a marginal party for decades until the 1990s. Democracy in India has, in fact, reversed the power of the Hindu caste hierarchy, with Brahmans carrying the least number of electoral votes, less than 5 percent.

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See also Advani, Lal Krishna; Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Congress Party; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Gandhi, Sonia; Hindu Nationalist Parties; Hindutva and Politics; Shiv Sena; Vajpayee, Atal Bihari; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

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GEOGRAPHY Although the spatial connotations of the name "India" have varied substantially over time, this article will consider the components of the region included within the British Indian empire just prior to its partition in 1947, that is, the present republics of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, plus the small neighboring states of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), the republic of the Maldives, and the former British protectorates of Nepal and Bhutan. Excluded from this purview will be Burma (now Myanmar), all or parts of which were included within the Indian empire between 1824 and 1937, and Afghanistan, a British quasi-protectorate from 1880 to 1919. The total area being considered comes to just over 2 million square miles (5.12 million sq. km). In latitude, the region extends from roughly 37° 5' north, near the meeting point of the borders of Afghanistan, China, and the disputed state of Kashmir, south to 8° 3' north, at Kanyakumari (Cape Comorin), the southern extremity of the Indian mainland, or 0° 40' south at the southernmost Maldivian atoll. The region's longitudinal extent is from 60° 24' east, at the westernmost point of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, to 91° 27' east near the point of convergence of the borders of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, China, and Myanmar.

In respect to both physical and human geography, the area we shall be considering is exceedingly varied, more so than the whole of Europe. In this essay we shall limit our discussion to a consideration of its landforms and their associated land uses, other aspects of physical geography, economic geography, and settlement patterns. For discussions of historical, political and social geography, including such important topics as administrative structure,

religion, language and caste, readers should refer to appropriate articles elsewhere in this work.

Terrain Regions and Associated Land Use

The region is conventionally divided into three main physical divisions: the northern mountain wall, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, and the so-called peninsular massif, including Sri Lanka and several island groups in the Indian Ocean. The northern mountain wall extends from the shores of the Arabian Sea northeastward through much of Pakistan to that country's northern border with Afghanistan; then in a southeasterly and easterly direction through northern India, Nepal, and Bhutan, along or in close proximity to the border of China; and finally, roughly southwestward along the border between India and Bangladesh on the west and Myanmar on the east, to the Bay of Bengal. Thus, it forms a barrier that largely isolates the region from the rest of Eurasia, giving rise to the concept of a distinct Indian subcontinent. This isolation gives the region a distinct climatic regime, as well as distinctive fauna and flora, and has served throughout history to limit interaction between its inhabitants and those of neighboring lands.

The northern mountain wall. The northern mountain wall consists of numerous mountain ranges of relatively recent geological origin and also includes several distinctive intermontane vales. The principal mountain range, the greater Himalayas, forms a great arc, roughly 1,500 miles (2,400 km) long, occupying the central portion of the border region. A number of its peaks exceed 25,000 feet (7,750 m). Among these, on Nepal's border with the Xizang (Tibetan) Autonomous Region of China, is Mount Everest, the world's highest summit, at 29,028 feet (8,848 m). Several ranges run parallel to and south of the greater Himalayas. These include the lesser Himalayas and the much lower Siwaliks, fronting on the Indo-Gangetic Plain. Toward their western limit in Kashmir, the Himalayas are roughly paralleled also by several ranges to their north. The most prominent of these, running along the border with the Xinjiang Uygur (Sinkiang) Autonomous Region of China, is the Karakoram Range, whose tallest peak, K2 (Mt. Godwin Austin) is among a cluster of closely grouped summits rivaling those of the Himalayas in elevation. In both the Karakorams and the Himalayas, glaciers are prominent. Those of the former range are the largest in the world outside the polar regions. The principal vales within the Himalayan system are those of Kashmir and Nepal, each exceedingly fertile and constituting the hearth of a distinctive and enduring culture. Natural vegetation and land use within the Himalayan region varies greatly. Deforestation is a major ecological problem. The density of the forest cover tends to decrease from east to west;

windward slopes are much more heavily wooded than leeward slopes; and altitude exercises a major climatic control analogous to the influence of latitude at lower elevations. Terraced agriculture is common at elevations up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m), and pastoral activity occurs at many levels.

The mountains extending along Pakistan's boundary with Afghanistan and covering much the greater part of the province of Baluchistan are arrayed in numerous discontinuous chains. Wildly jagged and mainly barren in aspect, they include relatively few peaks in excess of 10,000 feet (3,000 m). Among the more prominent ranges (proceeding from north to south) are the Safed-i-Koh, the Sulaimans, the Kirthar Range, and, along the Arabian Sea coast, the Makran Range. Between the ranges, especially in the southwest, are numerous arid depressions, while cutting through the mountains farther north are several fabled passes, most notably the Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan, through which streams of invaders from Central Asia intermittently made their way into the subcontinent. Agriculture in this region is scant and dependent on several forms of irrigation, including *karez*, ingenious gravity-controlled tunnel systems. Pastoral activities also engage much of the largely tribal and nomadic population, many of whom—when political conditions permit—travel hundreds of miles between summer and winter pasturelands in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The ranges forming the eastern segment of the northern mountain wall also consist of numerous discontinuous chains, few of which are much more than a hundred miles in length. Summits range from more than 15,000 feet (4,500 m) in the north to less than 5,000 feet in the south. While less jagged than the mountains of the west, their dense vegetative cover, torrential streams, endemic diseases, and, in former times, head-hunting inhabitants severely inhibited passage through the frontier region. The area forms the home of a host of tribal groups, who still mainly practice shifting slash-and-burn agriculture, supplemented by hunting, fishing, and gathering. Increasingly, however, these groups are turning toward more sedentary forms of cultivation.

The Indo-Gangetic Plain. Immediately south of the northern mountain wall lies the Indo-Gangetic Plain, the world's largest continuous expanse of alluvial (river-deposited) soil. This plain extends with no perceptible break from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. In the west it is watered by the Indus and its five main tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej (from west to east). These rivers all drain into Pakistan from areas held by India (largely from the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir). When the 1947 partition interposed an

international boundary within the Indus drainage basin, a major problem arose over water allocation. This issue was largely resolved, however, by the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, whereby all the water of the three western rivers was allocated to Pakistan, while that of the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas went to India. To make this division work, it was necessary to build new canals within Pakistan to link the western to the eastern rivers, thereby establishing the world's greatest integrated irrigation system.

Most of the Indian portion of the plain is watered by the Ganges (Ganga) and its tributaries, chief among which are the Yamuna, a right-bank tributary, and (from west to east) the Ghaghara, Gandak, and Kosi, all left-bank tributaries. These all emanate from the Himalayas and have relatively even year-round flows, whereas the Chambal, Ken, and Son rivers, flowing out of the peninsular massif, have very uneven regimes with maximum flows during the summer (wet monsoon) season. In the far east, the plain extends along the course of the mighty Brahmaputra, the flow of which far exceeds that of the Ganges. The Ganges and Brahmaputra systems converge in what is now Bangladesh to form an enormous delta, which is exceedingly prone to devastating floods from high river levels and surges of ocean water from tropical cyclones in the Bay of Bengal.

With maximum elevations lower than a thousand feet (300 m) above sea level, the average slope of the plain is less than one foot per mile. The inhabitants of the plain, especially in its upper reaches, distinguish between terraces of old alluvium (*bhangar*) and riverine tracts of new alluvium (*khadar*), often several tens of feet lower. The *khadar* tracts are more prone to flooding in the summer high-water season and tend to be more fertile than the *bhangar*; but, as modern canal irrigation is located mainly on the latter, the initial advantage enjoyed by the *khadar* has largely been reversed. Additionally, much irrigation comes from deep, mechanized tube wells tapping the vast reserves of groundwater found throughout the plain.

Virtually all of the Indo-Gangetic Plain is intensively cultivated. Over much of Bangladesh, rural population densities exceed 2,000 per square mile (roughly 800 per sq. km), higher than in any other predominantly rural region of the world, while densities of more than a thousand per square mile are found in many other plains localities. The plain thus supports nearly two-fifths the total population of India, more than four-fifths that of Pakistan, almost all that of Bangladesh, and roughly half that of the subcontinent as a whole. Two, or even three, crops per year are possible in well-watered regions. Little remains of the original vegetative cover, but villagers maintain groves of trees for fruit, shade, and firewood.

Straddling the Indo-Pakistani border is the Thar Desert, most of which, from a topographic perspective,

may be considered an extension of the Indo-Gangetic Plain, despite the protrusion through the largely wind-deposited soils of numerous starkly dramatic hilly outliers of the peninsular massif. The area supports a mixed agricultural and pastoral economy and somehow sustains population densities that would be unimaginable in comparable environments in other parts of the world.

The peninsular massif. The peninsular massif, an area of great geological antiquity, is a remnant of the vast former southern continent of Gondwanaland. It comprises a portion of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate, the northern flank of which (now covered by the alluvium of the Indo-Gangetic Plain) collided with and subsided below the northern Eurasian plate to force the rising of the Himalayas and adjoining mountain ranges. The massif includes a highly variegated assemblage of plateaus, worn-down mountain ranges, escarpments, interior basins, and riverine plains, as well as a relatively narrow west coastal plain and a somewhat wider coastal plain to the east.

In its northern reaches, between the east-west trending Vindhya Range (actually a south-facing escarpment), the drainage of the massif is mainly to the northeast. Just south of the Vindhyas lie the west flowing Narmada and Tapi Rivers. Further south, virtually all rivers of any consequence—including (from north to south) the Godavari, Krishna, Tungbhadra, Penner, and Kaveri—flow eastward from crests close to the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. Prominent among the highlands of the massif are the Western Ghats, a long, imposing, west-facing, fault-line escarpment terminating southward in the Nilgiri Hills. Just south of the Nilgiris lies the Palghat, the principal pass between the east and west coastal plains and, in the far south, the Palni and Cardamom Hills. These southern hill ranges contain summits surpassing 8,000 feet (2,400 m), the highest in peninsular India. Elsewhere, few elevations reach even half that altitude. The so-called Eastern Ghats (a toponymic invention of British geographers) are actually a discontinuous series of highlands more or less parallel to the coast of the Bay of Bengal. The northeastern portion of the massif, an area known as the Chhota Nagpur, is a complex hill and plateau region that is still largely forested and the home of numerous tribal peoples. As it happens also to be a highly mineralized region, containing the best and most abundant coal and iron ore resources in India, it is now undergoing rapid industrialization and has become an area of substantial immigration. Forming the northwest edge of the massif, bordering the Thar Desert, are the Aravalli Mountains, on whose craggy summits are situated many of India's most striking hill forts. Though now militarily useless, they provide a source of substantial tourist revenue.

Vegetative cover, soils, and agricultural land use in the peninsular massif are no less varied than the terrain. Forested tracts are, for the most part, small and largely degraded as a result of repeated clearing, often by fire, for agriculture and other purposes. Although soils are generally poor in interior locations, those derived from the basaltic rocks underlying a large western tract known as the Deccan Lava Plateau are relatively rich. So, too, are the alluvial soils along the courses of the major rivers and the largely deltaic soils of the two coastal plains. The intensity of agriculture and the resultant rural population densities depend mainly on soil fertility and rainfall, though irrigation by canals, tube wells, and tanks also plays a major role in determining agricultural productivity. The southern highlands are major areas of plantation agriculture.

The physical geography and land use of Sri Lanka largely mimic the patterns found in the southern peninsular portion of India. To the west of Sri Lanka lie the Maldives, a group of tropical atolls now comprising an independent republic. The Laccadive Islands, a union territory of India, form a similar island group to their north. Finally, in the Bay of Bengal, closer to Myanmar than to the Indian mainland, are the little developed, largely tribal Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which also comprise an Indian union territory.

Climate

No less than terrain, climate profoundly impacts the livelihood and lifestyles of the peoples of the region. Its dominant aspect, the monsoon regime, is more pronounced here than in any other part of the world. The temperature, wind, moisture, and rainfall patterns associated with this regime combine to produce three seasons: a hot, dry season from about March to mid-June; a hot, wet season from about mid-June to the end of September; and a relatively cool, dry season from early October to February. These are modal conditions; the actual duration of the three periods will vary not only from one part of the region to another, but also from year to year.

From March to mid-June, the temperature difference between the Indian Ocean and the more rapidly heating subcontinent becomes increasingly great, and a system of low atmospheric pressure becomes well established over the latter region. Increasingly steady landward winds bring considerable humidity, but little rain, to most of the region, creating a dusty period of steadily increasing discomfort and physiological stress.

Around late June the jet stream, a fast-moving current of air flowing eastward at altitudes of 25,000 to 35,000 feet (7,625 m–10,675 m), typically shifts from a position just south of the Himalayas to a path several hundred

miles farther north, beyond the Tibetan Plateau. This shift usually occurs within a short time span and generates a rapid inflow of moisture-laden air, usually accompanied by torrential downpours. This phenomenon, known as the “burst of the monsoon,” marks the onset of the so-called wet or southwest monsoon season. Despite its simplified directional name, the general flow of monsoon air is actually in two branches, one blowing eastward from the Arabian Sea across the west coast of India, and another northward from the Bay of Bengal. Monsoon rains are then produced in several ways, all involving the rising of air and its resultant cooling below the dew point, the temperature at which atmospheric saturation occurs: (a) when air streams are forced upward by intervening highlands such as the Western Ghats or the Himalayas, (b) when fronts form due to the confluence of the two main air streams, and (c) when the diurnal heating of the atmosphere causes sufficient upward convective flow. Conversely, where monsoon winds cross highland barriers and descend their leeward slopes, the air masses heat up and increase their moisture-bearing capacity. This results in relatively dry “rain-shadow” conditions. The dry belt just east of the Western Ghats is the most prominent area exemplifying this phenomenon.

In the cool, dry season, that of the so-called northeast monsoon, the prevailing wind pattern is essentially reversed. As the Eurasian land mass cools, atmospheric pressures over the much warmer Indian Ocean become lower than those on the continent, and the flow of dry air is mainly from the northeast and from land to sea. Additionally, the desiccating effect is enhanced because of the descending flow of air from the Tibetan Plateau and the subcontinent’s northern mountain rim onto the relatively low-lying terrain to the south.

Over most of the subcontinent, some two-thirds to four-fifths of the total rainfall is registered in the wet season. Total annual precipitation varies from around 450 inches (over 11 m) at Cherrapunji in the Khasi Hills (Shillong Plateau), lying directly in the path of the eastern branch of the monsoon in northeast India, to as little as 5 inches in the heart of the Thar Desert. But on the plains of India and Bangladesh, rainfall exceeds 100 inches (roughly 2.5 m) in only a few small areas.

Coastal areas experience monsoon rains as much as two months earlier than do deep interior locations and the length and intensity of their monsoon season is commensurately greater. Apart from this broad generalization, details of the pattern of rainfall vary greatly in relation to local topography, in respect to both elevation and the orientation of highlands and coasts relative to the paths of prevailing winds. Southeastern India and eastern Sri Lanka, for example, are exceptional in experiencing

maximum rainfall during the period from October to December, because the initially dry winds of the north-east monsoon pick up moisture as they cross the Bay of Bengal and then lose it as they blow across these areas. Another area departing from the general seasonal regime is a belt along the southern flank of the northern mountain wall, which experiences the tail-end effects of winter storm systems moving eastward from the Mediterranean Basin.

The monsoons play a pivotal role in agriculture. Their substantial year-to-year variability in terms of timing and total precipitation makes for considerable uncertainty in crop yield. As a rule, the greater the average precipitation, the more dependable the rainfall, but few areas are totally free from the prospect of drought. Devastating tropical cyclones, which are most common along the northern shores of the Bay of Bengal, constitute yet another major climatic hazard.

Temperatures over most of the region generally peak in late May or early June, just prior to the cooling downpours of the southwest monsoon. A secondary maximum is often experienced in September or October, when precipitation wanes. In the northwest, where total annual rainfall is low, July is usually the warmest month. Temperature ranges tend to increase with distance from the coast and also with latitude. The difference between the mean temperature of the coolest and warmest months in Sri Lanka or near the southern tip of India, for example, fluctuates by no more than a few degrees around the annual mean of 80°F (27°C). In marked contrast to these marine conditions is the continental regime of Punjab. In Lahore, for example, the mean daily high temperature in late June is 104°F (40°C), while the mean daily low in January is only 39°F (4°C). Freezing temperatures, however, are rare on the northern plains and are virtually unknown on the peninsular massif. Temperatures are moderated substantially in highland locations, with many mountain towns, especially in the Himalayas, serving as “hill stations,” where those who can afford to do so may escape the scorching heat of the plains.

Natural Vegetation and Fauna

Over the ages, some four-fifths of the forests that once blanketed the greater part of the region have been removed to make way for agriculture and for other uses. As in the past, however, the remaining natural vegetation reflects the distribution of rainfall. Areas of high precipitation (over 80 or so inches, or roughly 2 m) are marked by tropical, broad-leaved evergreen forests, a larger proportion of which survive than in forests in drier areas that are easier to clear. With increasingly dry conditions, one encounters scattered stands of mixed forests, partially

evergreen and partially deciduous. Forests in nonmountainous areas with less than 40 inches (101 cm) of rainfall are entirely deciduous. Still drier climates are characterized successively by open scrub, or *jungle*, then grassland, and ultimately scrubby desert vegetation. Coniferous forests are confined to the northern mountain rim. Many of the region's 17,000 or so flowering species are found only in the subcontinent.

The subcontinent, along with most of Southeast Asia, forms a major part of the highly diverse Oriental or Indian zoogeographic province. Among its characteristic primates are the rhesus monkey and Hanuman langur. Its carnivores include tigers, leopards, and lions (confined to the Gir Forest in the Kathiawar Peninsula), mongooses, jackals, and foxes. Wild herds of elephants survive in several protected areas, as does the Indian rhinoceros. Other mega-fauna include several species of deer and wild bison. Among the more than 1,200 species of birds are herons, storks, ibis, flamingos, and cranes. Reptiles include crocodiles, gavials and cobras, pythons, and nearly 400 other species of snakes, many of which are poisonous. The variety of fish, insects, and other forms of animal life is exceedingly great.

Economic Geography and Settlement Pattern

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Despite sweeping economic changes since independence, agriculture, including animal husbandry, remains the predominant occupation in almost all parts of South Asia, accounting for about three-fourths of the labor force in Nepal, two-thirds in Bangladesh, three-fifths in India, half in Pakistan, and one-third in Sri Lanka. In all those countries its impress on the landscape is pervasive and profound. The scale of most operations, however, is quite small (except in parts of Pakistan and several plantation areas). Moreover, as per capita returns from agriculture are much less than in other sectors of the economy, the proportions of the gross national product derived from that sector are less than one-fourth the total in all of the countries named, except Nepal. The forms of agriculture and the combinations of crops and livestock vary enormously throughout the region, depending on climate, irrigation, soil type, proximity to urban markets and ports, culture and other factors. Staple crops, especially grains, account for a substantial majority of the total area sown. Other staples include a wide variety of pulses, such as gram (chickpeas), lentils, and peanuts. Potatoes are a major crop in the Himalayan region and, because of improved storage facilities, have become increasingly important on the Gangetic Plain as well.

Over most of the subcontinent, farmers recognize two growing seasons: the *kharif* season, in which crops

mature over the wet monsoon months, and the *rabi* season, in which crops mature more slowly during the cool season and are harvested after the initial summer rains, or earlier if irrigation permits. In very wet areas, including parts of Bangladesh and Assam, three crops per year may be possible. Rice is almost always the principal staple crop where there is sufficient rainfall, in that it yields more calories per unit area than any other grain. Annual rainfall of 80 or more inches of rain will permit the cultivation of two crops of rice. With 40 to 80 inches (101–202 cm), farmers will typically seek to produce a summer crop of rice and a winter crop of wheat, pulses, or vegetables. Somewhat drier areas will grow mainly wheat, almost always as a *rabi* crop, with gram or vegetables in the *kharif* season. Generally, 15 to 20 inches (38–50 cm) of rain will suffice for a single crop of wheat. Where soils are poor, however, sorghum (*jawar*) and various millets (*bajra*, *ragi*, etc.) are likely to take the place of wheat. Maize is grown mainly in hilly and mountainous areas, especially in the northern mountain regions. Intertillage of grains, other than rice, with pulses is common.

Livestock occupy a very important place in the region's agriculture. Cattle (largely of the distinctive zebu breed) and buffalo are numerous and are utilized as draft animals, for milking, as providers of leather, and as sources of fertilizer. Goats and sheep are also multipurpose animals. Camels, horses, and donkeys serve mainly as beasts of burden, as do yaks and *dzo* (yak-cattle hybrids) at high elevations in the Himalayas. Per capita consumption of meat, however, is quite low. Other sources of animal protein include milk (production of which has increased enormously in recent decades), eggs, and fish. Fish are derived from both marine and freshwater sources and, increasingly, from aquaculture in flooded rice paddies.

Many areas of the subcontinent specialize in the cultivation of nonstaple crops. The foremost of these is cotton, the chief cash crop in much of both Indian and Pakistani Punjab, much of the interior of Maharashtra, and parts of Gujarat. Jute is a major fiber crop in much of Bangladesh and parts of West Bengal, Bihar, and Assam. Sugar is very widely cultivated in small quantities, and forms a major specialty crop over much of western Uttar Pradesh, Indian and Pakistani Punjab, and the leeward slopes of the Western Ghats. Tobacco is especially important in the delta regions of Andhra Pradesh.

Tree crops, which vary greatly throughout the region, include mangoes, oranges, and other citrus species. Coconuts, which provide food, vegetable oil, fiber, fuel, and building material, are of particular importance in the Indian state of Kerala and in Sri Lanka. Other useful palm species include the palmyra (sugar

palm), areca (betel palm), and dates. Kashmir and other mountain regions are sources of apples and other temperate fruits.

Plantation cultivation is restricted to only a few relatively small areas. Unlike most agriculture in South Asia, it involves large-scale, highly capitalized corporate enterprises and employs large gangs of mainly immigrant labor. The chief plantation crop, by far, is tea. Neatly manicured tea plantations cover much of the highlands of Sri Lanka, which has surpassed India as the world's leading tea exporter. They also occupy similar terrain in the Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu and are important along the lower flanks of mountains in West Bengal and Assam, as well as in northern Bangladesh. Coffee is grown in Sri Lanka, Kerala, and Karnataka, at elevations lower than those favored for tea, and rubber plantations are found at still lower elevations in Sri Lanka and Kerala.

Commercial and subsistence forestry are practiced in many scattered localities, mainly where rugged terrain makes cultivation impracticable. Among the many timber species, teak (sometimes grown on plantations) and sal are most prominent, while highly priced sandalwood and rosewood are also important. Pines and other conifers are extensively cut for timber in the western Himalayan region. Bamboo and a great variety of wild species are gathered as building materials and for fuel and other purposes.

Nonagricultural rural activities. Throughout recorded history, agriculture has been supplemented by a wide range of ancillary activities that, in the context of regional socioeconomic systems, have been carried out largely by members of occupationally specialized castes, such as weavers, potters, carpenters, well diggers, leather workers, traders, and so on. Muslims and followers of other faiths in rural India were also integrated within this hereditary system, in which services rendered were compensated by payments in grain or other goods, rather than by cash. Over the past century or more, with the increasing commercialization of agriculture and the supplanting of craft-made goods by the products of modern factories, this system has been greatly eroded and in some areas has virtually ceased to exist. Nevertheless, many traditional occupations continue to be pursued, often precariously, by particular castes, though increasingly within a market-based nexus.

A characteristic feature of rural India is the periodic market (*bat*) to which households resort to obtain goods that are typically not available in most villages: spices, cooking oils, brassware, bangles, saris, textiles, tools, and so forth. Most such markets occur on a particular day of the week and are served largely by itinerant merchants, craft specialists, and local hawkers of agricultural produce.

There are also larger, more widely scattered seasonal markets, often associated with the observance of religious festivals (*melas*), at which a broader range of goods and services may be procured. Entertainers, astrologers, medical practitioners and, nowadays, government-sponsored purveyors of useful information (e.g., on family planning) are prominent actors at such venues. Apart from the periodic markets, there are thousands of small market towns (*mandis*), combining both wholesale and retail functions for the surrounding countryside. Their importance has grown greatly with the commercialization of agriculture in recent decades; and many such towns are also centers for the provision an expanding array of administrative, educational and medical services.

Rural settlement pattern. In contrast to the United States, almost all cultivators in the region reside in agglomerated settlements that vary in size from hamlets of only a dozen or so households to large villages with 5,000 or more inhabitants. A substantial majority, however, live in villages ranging in population from 500 to 2,500. Most villages are of an irregular shape, growing outward, with no predetermined plan, from an initial nuclear locality. Within almost all villages there is a high degree of residential segregation by both religion and caste. In general, households of the higher castes and those of the caste that initially settled the village will occupy the central portion of the village, while lower castes and (in India) Muslim groups will occupy peripheral locations. The degree of segregation of the low-ranking castes, especially those formerly held to be untouchable, may be such as to consign them to separate tributary hamlets, which may be as much as a half-mile distant from the main village settlement.

Within the village, lanes and alleys between houses are typically narrow and winding, often terminating in dead ends. Most houses are built mainly of dried mud mixed with straw and smoothed on the exterior with a cow dung and mud paste; but those of more affluent households are typically made of brick or, in some regions, even of stone. In northeastern India and Bangladesh, bamboo and various types of reeds may replace mud as a construction material. Wood is sparingly used, largely for roofing beams and doorframes. Roofs are generally flat in relatively dry areas and peaked in wetter areas, with increasingly steep slopes in areas of greater precipitation. Houses of poor families typically have roofs of mud or straw (made from the stalks of rice and other grains, or from reeds), whereas those of wealthier households will most likely be of sun-baked tile. Detailed study will reveal great regional differences in vernacular forms of domestic architecture. Also varying greatly is the exterior décor of housing and the designs made on the floors of courtyards, the production of which is largely in the hands of women.

Houses typically accommodate both humans and livestock and include spaces for storing provisions for both. Granaries, however, are frequently built as separate, adjacent structures. Living space is generally scanty and furniture and other household furnishings are sparse. Many houses have a small area set aside for family worship.

While some settlements are wholly residential, most contain a variety of structures given over in whole or part to specialized functions: temples, mosques, schools, the offices of the *panchayat* (village council) and/or cooperative, shops, and small handicraft enterprises. Open spaces, facilitating social intercourse, are found mainly at or in close proximity to public buildings, the homes of major land owners, threshing floors, and large, widely shared wells. Village groves are also commonly situated near such wells.

In general, villages tend to be more compact in the north and west of the subcontinent than in the east and south, as well as more inward-oriented. That is, individual houses form parts of high-walled compounds, the inhabitants of which all belong to the same caste or other ethnic group and are likely to be related to one another by birth or marriage. Windows to the street are either altogether lacking or tend to be small and barred, while within the compound houses open onto interior courtyards. This arrangement facilitates the exclusion of women from public view. Toward the south and east, rural settlements tend to be more open. Spaces between houses are greater and the proportion of the population living in exterior hamlets increases.

Some regions display marked variations from the foregoing generalizations. In Tamil Nadu, some adjacent areas, and the Kathiawar Peninsula of Gujarat, for example, villages tend to be laid out on a grid pattern, which is thought by some scholars to provide a link to the supposed Dravidian founders of the ancient Indus civilization. Over most of Bangladesh and coastal Kerala rural dwellers live mainly in isolated households, rather than in village agglomerations; but, given the dense populations of those areas, few households there would be out of shouting distance from their nearest neighbors. In many tribal regions, especially in northeastern India, small hamlets, rather than proper villages, are the norm and houses are laid out on either side of a single village lane. Hamlets are also common in mountainous regions in which it is difficult to find large areas of terrain flat enough for the building of larger settlements.

Mineral resources, mining, hydroelectric power, and industry. India is well endowed with a wide range of mineral resources, whereas the other countries of South Asia are relatively mineral poor. Among India's resources are abundant and widespread reserves of coal,

mostly bituminous; widespread, and largely high-grade, iron ore deposits; a wealth of minerals used as ferroalloys, especially manganese; substantial quantities of bauxite, used in the manufacture of aluminum; modest supplies of copper, lead, zinc, antimony, silver, and gold; a variety of precious and semiprecious gemstones; and an abundance of such ordinary, low-value (per unit of weight) minerals as ceramic clays, refractories (for use in smelting furnaces), limestone, rock phosphate, and building stone. The chief area of concentration of mineral products is the Chhota Nagpur, but many other portions of the peninsular massif contain locales of significant mineral production.

India's coal reserves are among the greatest in the world, though the amount of coking coal, suitable for use in metallurgical industries, is limited. Thermal energy from coal-fired plants is the principal means of meeting the country's energy needs. The most important mines, those of the Jharia-Raniganj Field, near the northeastern edge of the Chhota Nagpur, provide coal of good coking quality. Their location, near major sources of iron ore, has led to a concentration of the iron and steel industry in this region. Uranium is also produced in the Chhota Nagpur and helps sustain the country's five nuclear reactors. Nuclear power, however, accounts for only a small fraction of India's total energy output.

India's most serious energy deficiency is that of petroleum and natural gas. Although production from fields in eastern Assam (the first to be developed), Gujarat, and the "Bombay High" (off the coast of Maharashtra) has grown rapidly, growth in demand has also been rapid. Hence, Indian petroleum production seldom exceeds 30 to 40 percent of its needs. Natural gas supplements petroleum as an energy source to only a modest degree.

Hydroelectric installations are very widespread in India and are largely associated with multipurpose river basin development plans that include irrigation, navigation, and recreation. In all, they provide approximately a sixth of all the electric power consumed in India.

Mineral resources in South Asian countries other than India include modest supplies of petroleum, natural gas, and coal, as well as a variety of minerals needed for chemical industries and construction in Pakistan; some natural gas and a little coal in Bangladesh; and various gemstones in Sri Lanka. Hydroelectricity is well developed in both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to meet domestic needs, and in Nepal, mainly for export to India, the source of the engineering expertise for their construction. Modern developments notwithstanding, throughout South Asia firewood, cow dung, and other traditional organic sources continue to be major providers of energy in the rural economy.

Beginning with cotton milling in the mid-nineteenth century, the industrial revolution has largely transformed the traditional way of life for a substantial fraction of the population of South Asia and has significantly impacted all but the most remote of areas. Among modern manufacturing enterprises, the most ubiquitous are those related to the processing of agricultural goods and the weaving and processing of textiles. Given the differential availability and costs of the factors of production, other industries are prominent in only one or a few specialized production centers.

Industries that typically locate close to the source of raw materials are those that involve refining and loss of weight in the manufacturing process, for example, rice milling, sugar refining, cotton ginning and spinning, the processing of coir (coconut fiber), cigarette manufacture, the tanning of leather, the preparation and packaging of tea, and the smelting of minerals. Most such simple activities take place in relatively small urban centers or near plantations and mines. More sophisticated manufacturing, such as the weaving of cloth, the manufacture of shoes and wearing apparel, cement and chemical industries, light engineering industries, and so forth gravitate to larger cities. Few among the hundreds of cities in South Asia (i.e., places with populations of 100,000 or more) are without establishments devoted to several of these forms of manufacturing production.

Of particular importance in recent years has been the growth of foreign investment—mainly from the United States, but also from Japan and other developed countries—taking advantage of the abundance of cheap labor in assembling wearing apparel, footwear, small appliances, and so forth, much of which is produced for distribution through mass retail marketing corporations. Special industrial zones, with privileged production conditions and tax benefits for foreign investors, have been created in a number of ports and other cities to stimulate such development. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have been important beneficiaries; in both countries clothing and accessories now account for more than half the total value of exports.

At a more technologically advanced level, metallurgical, heavy engineering, industrial chemical, pharmaceutical, and electronics industries are concentrated either in ports or locations in which bulky resources, such as iron ore and coal, can be combined with minimum transportation costs; or in other large cities (those with a million or more people), where capital and ancillary services (banking, insurance, advertising, etc.) are relatively abundant and where purchasing power is highest. Thus, one finds the manufacture of steel and steel products in Jamshedpur and other cities of the Chhota Nagpur, as

well as in several port cities (including Karachi in Pakistan and Chittagong in Bangladesh, which utilize imported scrap metal and/or iron ore); automobile assembly plants in Chennai, Delhi, Pune, and Kolkata; high-tech electronics and aviation industries in Bangalore; pharmaceutical producers and petroleum refineries in Mumbai; ship building in Vishakhapatnam; and so forth. There are very few manufactured goods that India cannot produce. But, because it is not yet fully competitive with more advanced countries, some industries survive only because of high protective tariffs. As India moves increasingly toward a free trade regime and away from government-owned industries, the future of inefficient producers is likely to be bleak.

The global revolution in electronic communication has ushered in two major developments of which India has become a major beneficiary: first, the spectacular growth in the production and exporting of computer software; and subsequently, the outsourcing, mainly by American firms, of consumer services in such fields as banking, insurance, health maintenance industries, and the like. This has resulted in an enormous boom in the training and utilization of relatively cheap, but highly skilled, labor in such cities as Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai. This has had a major favorable impact on India's balance of payment.

The globalization of labor markets has also led to significant flows of South Asian labor, both skilled and unskilled, to developed countries in North America and Europe as well as to the Middle East. Particularly important source areas in respect to the Middle East are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kerala. Remittances from overseas have been an important source of capital for both investment and consumption in many parts of South Asia.

A final aspect of globalization that has significantly impacted South Asia and that holds tremendous promise of future change is tourism. The number and variety of sites worthy of a visit defies the imagination: Mughal architectural masterpieces, such as the Taj Mahal, the nearby ruins of Fatehpur Sikri, or the Red Fort of Delhi; the great Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain temples (including cave temple complexes such as those at Ajanta and Ellora) found throughout India; the dramatic fortress cities of Rajasthan; the ruins of such ancient cities as Mohenjo Daro, Harappa, and Taxila in Pakistan; distinct cultural niches such as the Vale of Nepal or Manipur; areas of scenic splendor, such as Kashmir; national parks and other pristine areas reserved for nature study, trekking or serious mountaineering; and tropical beaches such as those of Kovalam, Goa, and the Maldives. Some of these have long been favorites of privileged elite classes, while others became meccas for more penurious globetrotters in

and since the 1960s. Most sites await the development of modern hotels and improved travel facilities to reach their full potential. In relation to their populations, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have reaped the greatest gains from tourism.

Infrastructure. The fact that most of the countries of South Asia could develop to the extent that they have over the past century is attributable to no small degree to changes in their economic infrastructure, begun during the colonial period and, in many respects, accelerated in the period since independence. In the case of Nepal and Bhutan, however, the physical isolation resulting from their mountainous terrain creates a serious and persistent obstacle to development.

The building of railroads was of particular importance. Even before independence, India had the world's third-largest rail system, a major catalyst for subsequent development. While railroad mileage has not been greatly extended in South Asia since independence, the quality and volume of service has continued to expand. Today, Indian railroads log more passenger miles per year than in any other country in the world. Relatively speaking, however, more effort went into the building of roads. Although per capita ownership of automobiles remains very low by world standards, few areas are now out of reach of bus service, and the transportation of goods by truck has greatly multiplied. Few villages cannot be reached by road, at least during the dry season. While the rail system remains a government monopoly throughout South Asia, bus systems have become increasingly privatized. In the deltaic terrain of Bangladesh, the complex network of broad rivers greatly hampers overland transport, especially in the rainy season; hence, river traffic, largely in simple "country boats," carries a greater volume of goods than either road or rail. Finally, air services, both nationally and privately owned, are also expanding rapidly throughout South Asia.

Among the colonized areas of the world, India stood out for the quality of its institutions of higher learning. In addition to its indigenous traditions of learning, universities, along Western lines, were established in its major cities as early as 1857 and have proliferated in subsequent generations, especially so in the period since independence. In contrast to this emphasis on higher education, the reduction of illiteracy in South Asia, especially in the countryside and among females, has proceeded slowly. The most notable exceptions are in Sri Lanka and the Indian state of Kerala. Both attach great importance to education at all levels and have achieved virtually universal literacy. In general, Pakistan and Bangladesh lag behind India in their educational attainments, and the reliance of ordinary Pakistanis on education in traditional

religious education in *madrassah*, given the paucity of government-sponsored alternatives, presents a significant potential obstacle in the way of economic development and the integration of Pakistan into the modern world.

Finally, one must note the remarkable extension, throughout South Asia, of government services in the form of community development schemes, public health clinics, government-aided cooperatives, and so forth. Nongovernmental organizations, including indigenous self-help programs such as those of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and SEWA (Self-Employed Women's Association) in India have also made enormous strides. All of these are engaged in one way or another in improving human capital. Therein may lie the best hope for the future of South Asia.

Urbanization and urban morphology. Despite the fact that South Asia is still among the least urbanized regions of the world, its total number of urban dwellers at the beginning of the twenty-first century was already in excess of 400 million. Of these, roughly 135 million lived in cities of a million or more inhabitants. The proportion of urban dwellers to the total population in 2003 was about 36 percent in Pakistan, 28 percent in India, 25 percent in Sri Lanka, 24 percent in Bangladesh, and only 13 percent in Nepal. Among the region's cities are some of the world's largest and most rapidly growing. The 2001 populations, to the nearest million, of India's largest metropolitan areas (suburbs included) were: Mumbai (Bombay), 16 million; Delhi, 13 million; Kolkata (Calcutta), 13 million; Chennai (Madras), 6 million; Bangalore, 6 million; Hyderabad, 6 million; Ahmedabad, 5 million; and Pune, 4 million. Another twenty-four cities had populations of from 1 million to 3 million each. The leading cities in the remainder of South Asia were: Dhaka, in Bangladesh, 12 million; Karachi and Lahore, in Pakistan, 9 million and 5 million; and seven others, with populations from 1 million to 2 million each.

As with villages, though to not quite the same degree, cities tend to be residentially segregated. Thus, many neighborhoods will be identifiable by their dominant religion, caste, language group (in that many cities have substantial populations of interstate or interprovincial migrants), and/or economic class. Within such neighborhoods, social clubs, places of worship and the purveyors of foods, other goods and services cater largely to the needs and preferences of the socially dominant group.

The spatial arrangement and architecture of cities also reflects the time of construction of particular areas and the functions they are intended to serve. There is, for example, usually a densely crowded old city core, dating from the pre-colonial period. Often walled (though many

city walls have now been dismantled in whole or part), the old city is typically marked by a confusing maze of narrow streets and alleys and is likely to include the mansions of the original urban gentry, the principal places of worship, and traditional markets, often containing streets given over wholly to the vending of particular goods such as grains, sweets, saris, jewelry, and hardware. The burgeoning of urban population has, almost invariably, caused an overflow from the original core area to neighborhoods that are somewhat less crowded and slightly more regular in their layout. To one side of many an old city one often finds an adjacent area or areas known as "civil lines" or the "cantonment." As their designations imply, these were originally built mainly to accommodate the British civilian and military personnel and their families and household servants. Such areas are spaciouly and regularly laid out and are marked by colonial-style bungalows, with broad verandas and adjacent gardens. Since the departure of the British, the civil lines and cantonments have been occupied mainly by Indians performing the same functions as those of the former colonial overloads.

In some industrial cities one finds squalid "coolie lines," built by factory owners to accommodate the mill hands, a large proportion of whom are likely to be immigrants from surrounding rural areas. Similar "lines" are found adjacent to many mines, plantations, and railway workshops. Since independence, there has been a proliferation of various types of housing "colonies," located mainly along and beyond the urban periphery. For relatively affluent families, these consist mainly of single-family dwellings, with small surrounding gardens; but more commonly they are comprised of drab multifamily apartment houses, many of which reflect the housing styles of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Stalinist period.

At an economic level below that of ordinary, regularly employed salaried laborers are masses of slum dwellers who, for the most part, survive from irregular and low-paid work, or who live from begging and other socially undesirable activities. This segment of the population occupies dilapidated tenements or inhabits flimsy, makeshift huts. One must also note that South Asian cities have more than their share of roofless pavement dwellers.

Finally, as in all major cities in an age of economic globalization, the megacities of South Asia are also witnessing the growth of central business districts, with skyscraper office buildings, major banking establishments, a wide range of other commercial services, shopping malls, luxury hotels, restaurants, and so forth. One may safely assume an acceleration of urbanization in the decades

ahead and increasing concentration of economic activity and wealth-generation in South Asia's cities, widening income gaps between the economic elite and the masses, greater urban congestion and pollution, increased crime, and mounting challenges to urban governance.

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GLOBALIZATION India embraced economic globalization in the wake of its severe balance of payments crisis in 1991. Today, India's economy is largely integrated into the global economy. Overall, the achievements have been positive. The country has been able to move beyond the specter haunting it since independence: the stagnant 3 percent per annum growth, known pejoratively as the "Hindu growth rate." India's economic growth in the ten-year period from 1992–1993 to 2001–2002 averaged slightly over 6 percent a year,

making India one of the fastest-growing developing economies in the world.

Over four decades of statism and "export pessimism"—characterized by pervasive government planning and regulation, earning India its once dubious distinction as the most controlled economy in the non-communist world—have given way to significant industrial and trade liberalization, financial deregulation, improvements to supervisory and regulatory systems, cuts in tariffs, the removal of quantitative restrictions, and policies more conducive to privatization and foreign direct investment. India's traditionally high custom duties were systematically lowered in its budgets from 1991. Maximum tariff rates, which exceeded 300 percent, and the average (import-weighted) tariff rate, which stood at 87 percent in 1990–1991 (the highest in the world), have been lowered.

During the prereform period, with import-substituting industrialization the cornerstone of economic development, the principal instrument of industrial policy was an elaborate industrial licensing framework under the Industries Development and Regulations Act of 1951. The act required a government license for either establishing a new production unit (above a certain defined size), or making substantial expansion to an existing unit. A long (and growing) list of industries, including iron and steel, heavy machinery, oil and petroleum, air transport, mining, and telecommunications, were reserved solely for the public sector, under the intrusive eye of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1970. This heavily protected industrial sector has witnessed the virtual abolition of the industrial licensing system as well as other regulatory impediments. Industrial licensing has been abolished for all but fifteen industries. Similarly, in an attempt to encourage greater private sector participation in the economy, many sectors that had previously been reserved for the public sector have been opened for private investment, including power, telecommunications, mining, ports, transportation, and banking.

Prior to 1991, restrictions on foreign direct investment were so strict that it was reduced to a trickle. After 1991, Indian companies with sound financial positions were permitted to raise capital from abroad by issuing equity in the form of global depository receipts, foreign currency convertible bonds, and other debt instruments. The government also created the Foreign Investment Promotion Board to facilitate one-stop, "fast-track" shopping for foreign investors. Automatic approval has been granted for joint ventures with up to 74 percent foreign equity participation, and 100 percent foreign equity and ownership are permitted in export processing zones and units that are export oriented. These reforms



Corporate Headquarters of Nestlé in New Delhi. The Swiss food giant has been in India for ninety years: With six manufacturing plants, thousands of employees, leading domestic market shares in semiprocessed foods, and double-digit sales growth driven by export revival, it remains a broad-based economic presence in India. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

have not only forced Indian companies to improve the quality of their products, but have also enabled many to restructure their activities through mergers and acquisitions.

Similarly, in the financial sector (especially banking), the Reserve Bank of India has strengthened prudential requirements and introduced a capital risk-asset ratio system as a measure of capital adequacy, thereby raising minimum capital and capital adequacy ratios to conform to international standards. By 1995 the government set the minimum capital adequacy requirements at 8 percent of risk-weighted assets for Indian banks with foreign branches. In 1998 the standard was raised to 9 percent (effective March 2000), with government securities given a 2.5 percent risk weight, to begin reflecting interest-rate risk. By the end of 2000, only about two dozen public sector banks fell short of this standard. Greater competition in the banking sector and improvements in the capital and debt markets have reduced reliance on central bank financing. Banks and financial institutions are now permitted access to capital markets to expand their equity

base, and the passage of the Foreign Exchange and Management Act in 1999 has greatly streamlined foreign exchange regulations.

Cumulatively, these reforms reawakened what John Maynard Keynes called the “latent animal spirits” of India’s entrepreneurs, thereby giving a sharp boost to growth. Nowhere has this dynamism been more evident than in the information technology (IT) industry and the service sector. Ten years ago, India’s computer industry had sales of U.S.\$150 million. In 2001 its exports were over \$9.6 billion, 2 percent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP). Similarly, the share of IT (mainly software) in total exports increased from 1 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2001. IT-enabled services such as back-office operations, remote maintenance, accounting, public call centers, medical transcription, insurance claims, and other bulk processing are rapidly expanding. The city of Hyderabad is now known as Cyberabad, and Indian companies such as Infosys, Wipro, and Satyam may yet become household names around the world. Robust exports of food and capital goods, garments,

engineering tools, and refined petroleum products have also contributed much to India's growth in recent years. However, it is India's rapidly expanding services sector (which currently accounts for about 40 percent of India's GDP, 25 percent of employment, and 30 percent of export earnings) that has provided recent growth and stability.

India's foreign exchange reserves have risen steadily, from U.S.\$42.3 billion in March 2001, to \$54.1 billion at the end of March 2002, to a record level of nearly \$72.4 billion in January 2003. In the foreign exchange market, dealers are now allowed to buy and sell foreign exchange for current as well as capital account transactions, and firms earning foreign exchange through exports are allowed to retain a certain proportion of the proceeds to avoid costs of conversion and reconversion. Since the rupee was floated in March 1992, its significant nominal and real devaluation relative to its value prior to 1991 provided a much-needed impetus to trade. The exchange rate of the rupee in terms of the major currencies of the world has remained reasonably stable, notwithstanding occasional fluctuations caused by normal market forces of supply and demand. It is particularly noteworthy that, for the first time, the World Bank has classified India as a "less-indebted country."

Like the proverbial rising tide that eventually lifts all boats, the fruits of economic liberalization have benefited (albeit unevenly) most sectors of society, making a significant dent in the country's stubborn poverty problem. The latest official surveys indicate that poverty levels fell from about 40 percent of the population to roughly 28 percent during the second half of the 1990s. This translates into a net reduction in rural poverty of some 60 million people between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. In rural India, poverty was down to 27 percent, while urban poverty fell by around 8 percent, from 32 to 24 percent.

The accomplishments of the 1990s are dwarfed only by what remains to be done. One urgent task is to correct the growing regional and state-level economic imbalances, as growth continues to vary sharply among the twenty-eight states and seven union territories that make up the Indian union. Second, constraints associated with infrastructure and regulatory bottlenecks have become increasingly evident. Reforms are badly needed in the area of infrastructure: roads, railways, telecommunications, electric power, air transport, and ports all need radical expansion as well as improvement in the quality of services. Third, economic reforms have generally bypassed the agricultural sector, which accounts for about one-quarter of GDP and provides the livelihood of roughly 70 percent of the population. Initially, agricultural growth

resulted from the expansion of cropped areas; then, since the 1970s, the "Green Revolution," which increased the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, commercial fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation, spurred further growth. However, even as the Green Revolution contributed to sharp increases in agricultural production and productivity, its strategy also led to increasing reliance on explicit subsidization of inputs such as nonorganic fertilizer, and implicit subsidization of inputs such as irrigation and power through deliberate underpricing. The central government's fertilizer subsidies amounted to 110 billion rupees (U.S.\$2.3 billion), or 0.4 percent of GDP in 2002–2003. The major beneficiaries of this subsidy were the inefficient domestic fertilizer industry and high-income farmers. Fertilizer use, moreover, must be complemented with a regular supply of water. The heavily subsidized electric power enables farmers to draw water from irrigation canals or to pump it from deep wells at relatively little cost. The overuse of urea (nitrogenous fertilizers) and water has greatly aggravated the problem of waterlogging, topsoil depletion, pollution of ground water, and a host of related environmental problems. While it is generally agreed that a phased increase in fertilizer prices and the imposition of user charges for irrigation and electricity would prevent abuse and raise resources to finance investment in rural infrastructure, the powerful rural interests, given their influence and control over large electoral constituencies, have made this task politically difficult. In fact, successive governments have generally skirted the issue, threatening to raise prices and cut subsidies in their budget speeches, only to back down later under political pressure.

Further exacerbating agricultural diversification and productivity are outdated laws and regulations. For example, the government's guaranteed price supports for food grains—crucial in the 1960s and 1970s to give farmers the incentives to produce more food grains—have long outlived their usefulness. Today, price controls are maintained for staples to ensure remunerative prices for farmers. In fact, support prices have long been fixed higher than market prices, encouraging overproduction. The result has been a substantial increase in stocks to unsustainable levels—over 60 million tons in mid-2002, against a norm of around 17 million tons—considered necessary to avert famine and ensure food security. In recent years, the costs of maintaining these stocks have been so prohibitive that it is not uncommon to allow food grains and other commodities to rot in poorly maintained, rat-infested storage facilities. While short-term measures, such as selling excess grain below cost, are usually undertaken, this is not a viable long-term solution. Both the central and state governments have tried to justify the maintenance of high support prices on the

grounds that it allows them to subsidize the sale of certain commodities to low-income families through the public distribution system, but it is well known that such distributed grain rarely reaches the needy. The agricultural sector is also shielded through import and export controls, including tariffs and export restrictions. Perhaps the most pernicious are the interstate sales tax, and restrictions on interstate and even interdistrict movement of agricultural commodities. The price support system clearly needs to be better aligned to market demand if farmers are to be encouraged to shift from food grains like wheat and rice to other staples.

Though the financial sector reforms have liberalized Indian firms' ability to raise and hold money offshore as well as foreign investors' ability to invest in India and to repatriate their investments, the government still maintains controls on international capital movements. The 1997 Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (the Tarapore Committee) recognized the gains to capital account convertibility in terms of increased funding for investment and risk diversification, and recommended that India move toward capital convertibility over a three-year period. However, the committee's report, issued just three weeks before the floating of the Thai baht in July 1997 and the onset of the Asian financial crisis, halted the move toward capital account liberalization. India's cautious approach to capital account liberalization helped limit contagion during the Asian crisis by containing short-term debt. The authorities must nevertheless ease capital account liberalization as India's financial system and fiscal policy are strengthened. Compared to China, India's ability to attract foreign investment remains disappointing. During the 1990s, foreign direct investment in India averaged 0.5 percent of GDP, while in China it was 5 percent of GDP.

Although the number of activities reserved for the public sector has been reduced from six to three and the number of sectors reserved for small-scale industry (units whose investment in plant and machinery cannot exceed \$250,000) has been reduced from 821 to 799, those numbers are still too high. This "reservation" policy has created protective enclaves within the industrial sector, with an adverse effect on industrial competitiveness and job creation. Accelerating the pace of divestment and privatization of public sector enterprises will help reduce the public sector deficit by raising revenues, increasing the efficiency of resource use, and helping to realign government policy in a way that contributes to faster economic growth.

As the Asian financial crisis clearly demonstrated, a strong and well-regulated financial sector can serve as a critical bulwark against global market turmoil. This not

only means having in place prudential and supervisory systems to ensure financial stability; authorities must also take swift corrective actions to deal with weak or insolvent institutions. Despite India's achievements in strengthening prudential and supervisory systems, considerable weaknesses remain. At the core of the problem is the fact that a few government-owned banks (particularly the State Bank of India, the country's largest commercial bank) still account for roughly 80 percent of the banking sector. The vast majority of these banks are chronically undercapitalized and burdened with huge nonperforming loans. Weak banks can put the entire economy under risk during a crisis. While public ownership of banks has created an aura of invulnerability to shocks, it is urgent that the authorities move expeditiously to reduce the high level of nonperforming loans, restructure weak banks, and close insolvent public-sector banks.

Economic globalization demands constant innovation. While India's software industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in the economy, it is important to note that India may not realize its vast potential unless some important policy changes are made. The software industry's focus is currently on mostly proprietary work for foreign multinationals, which is only a small part of the world's software market. India's cost advantage, because its software professionals are inexpensive, will be eroded as other players (such as China) with similar or lower costs enter the market. Finally, although India has been able to exploit the opportunities economic globalization has provided, the process continues to draw fierce domestic opposition. Thus, making the benefits of economic globalization meaningful to all of its more than 1 billion citizens remains India's major challenge.

Shalendra D. Sharma

See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Information and Other Technology Development; Trade Liberalization since 1991

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GOA Located on the South Konkan coast of western India, approximately 250 miles (402 km) south of Mumbai, Goa is bounded by Maharashtra in the north, Karnataka in the east and south, and the Arabian Sea on the west. Before it attained statehood on 30 May 1987, Goa was a union territory. Its area of 1,429 square miles (population 1,343,998; 2001 census) makes it the smallest of the twenty-eight states of the Indian union. In 2003 it was judged the richest state in India by the magazine *India Today*, and had the highest rate of literacy at 82.3 percent. It is one of the most popular tourist destinations for domestic as well as international tourists. Despite intensive exploitation of iron and manganese ore as well as general industrialization since 1961, the state has retained its famed natural beauty, thanks to successive environmentally conscious governments.

A former Portuguese colony for 450 years, acquired by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1510, Goa was made the capital of the Estado da India periodically under a viceroy or a governor-general with authority over all Portuguese possessions from Sofala in East Africa to Macao off China. Goa was also dubbed “Rome of the Orient” because it was the headquarters of the papal ecclesiastical enterprise in the East, where the “incorrupt body” of St. Francis Xavier has been kept since 1553. Goa saw new peaks of prosperity under the Portuguese, at least until 1580, as a substantial slice of the profits from their extensive spice trade poured into the city of Old Goa, enabling the government to build impressive office buildings and churches, mostly following Iberian architectural style. In 1759, compelled by persistent outbreak of plague in Old Goa, the administration was moved to Nova Goa (New Goa), also called Panaji. Before Portuguese rule, Goa formed part of the adjoining kingdoms in Maharashtra and Karnataka. It had earlier formed the southern part of the Mauryan province of Aparanta, later coming under its feudatory chief, the Bhoja family, and still later under the Silaharas, Kadambas, and Chalukyans of Badami. From 1312 to 1370 it came under Delhi’s Muslim sultanate. Later, Vijayanagar acquired it and developed it as its principal port of entry for Arabian horses. In 1489 Goa came under the Bahamani kingdom, and after the latter split into five separate entities, under the Adil Shahi rulers of Bijapur.

The Portuguese acquired Goa in two stages: Velhas Conquistas (Old Conquests) consisting of Tiswadi (thirty villages), Bardez, Mormugao, and Salsete, all acquired in the sixteenth century; and the Novas Conquistas (New Conquests), made in the eighteenth century, comprising Pernem, Sanguem, Quepem, Ponda, Sattari, Bicholim, and Canacona. The rigors of the Inquisition in the Old Conquests account for the overwhelming majority there of Catholic converts, while later tolerance is reflected in the overwhelming majority of Hindus and their temples in the New Conquests. By the end of Portuguese rule in 1961, Goa’s population was 60.8 percent Hindu and 36.1 percent Catholic; the rest were Muslims, Luso-Indians, and others, with no Portuguese settlers despite their 450 year rule.

Goa’s prosperity declined along with the erosion of Portuguese power from the late sixteenth century. Beginning in the nineteenth century, large numbers of Goans, particularly Catholics from poor families, sought employment as butlers in affluent British households, as waiters and cooks in expensive urban restaurants and hill stations, and in diverse jobs on oceangoing vessels. Both Hindus and Catholics migrated for educational and employment opportunities—about 150,000, or over one-fourth of the entire Goan population, to British India, over 100,000 to Mumbai, and several thousand more to Portuguese and British East Africa.

In 1946, on the eve of India’s independence, with the discovery of iron and manganese ore, Goa became both fiscally solvent and a source of valuable foreign exchange to Portugal. Even the small portion of foreign exchange made available in Goa was enough to import many luxury items. Goans “could wear a hundred watches on each arm,” and smuggling increased across the porous border to the rest of India. With no income tax or sales tax to pay, business in Goa boomed. Despite such sudden economic betterment, the colonial government faced growing opposition, supported by the large numbers of émigrés. The National Congress of Goa, established by Tristao Braganza da Cunha, a Goan Catholic, in 1930, spearheaded the movement for independence. Expecting the Portuguese to leave the moment the British would quit the subcontinent, leaders of the Indian independence movement had paid no attention to Goa, whose population was, according to official Portuguese statistics, 98.7 percent Indian, the rest being transitory Portuguese officials and army personnel. In 1951 Portugal decreed that Goa and all other Portuguese colonies were “overseas provinces” entitled to North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s protection. The Indian government’s pleas for negotiations with Portugal on the same lines as France with regard to its Indian colonies fell on deaf ears. Instead, further curbs on freedoms were instituted,



Facade of Sé Cathedral. Also known as St. Catherine's Cathedral, witness to the intensely religious history of Goa. Its construction commenced under the Portuguese viceroy Redondo in 1562, but was not finished for another ninety years. With an elaborate Corinthian-style interior, the church is dedicated to the saint on whose feast day the city was recaptured by the Portuguese in 1510. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

including the strictest censorship. Evading such tight controls instituted by a dictatorial regime, Goans offered *satyagraha*, or nonviolent resistance, courting arrest. Such prominent professionals as Dr. T. B. Cunha, Telo Mascarenhas, Dr. Pundalik Gaitonde, Dr. Rama Hegde, Advocate Gopal Mayekar, and others were sentenced to ten- to fifteen-year prison terms and were deported to Portugal and Angola. Hundreds were detained for indefinite period in Goan jails. Unarmed Indians, including Goans who attempted to cross into Goa as nonviolent Gandhian *satyagrahis* in 1954 and 1955, were shot down in cold blood. The irresistible force of the spirit of free India was met by the obstinacy of Portuguese premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who refused to acknowledge the “winds of change” sweeping the European empires from Africa and Asia. Failing moral and diplomatic approaches, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru finally turned to a military solution. “Operation Goa,” lasting thirty-six hours, began with the bombing and disabling of the only Portuguese frigate, SS *Afonso de Albuquerque*. Indian troops marched in from three directions, taking

Goa with hardly any resistance from Portuguese forces, welcomed warmly by the overwhelming majority of Goans on 19 December 1961.

D. R. SarDesai

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de; Gama, Vasco da; Portuguese in India

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GODDESS IMAGES India is unique in its multifaceted goddess worship. Unlike the goddess worship of the ancient Western world—which has largely vanished, except in the veneration of the Virgin Mary as a semi-divine figure, or in modern attempts to revive ancient pagan goddess cults—Indian goddess devotion is a vibrant living tradition. For her worshipers the Goddess sums up all the powers of this life and the hope of salvation in the next. Worshipers of Mahadevi (the Great Goddess) seek *bhukti*, meaning the enjoyment of the things of this life, as well as *mukti*, the quest for spiritual liberation in the hereafter. There are many different paths to these two goals, and the complexity of goddess imagery reflects this. Buddhists, Jains, and Hindus honor the Goddess in a variety of roles. She is the source and support of life and the architect of death and destruction. She brings forth life, nurtures creativity, embodies wisdom, destroys the wicked, and takes the dead. Her many images reflect this array of meanings.

Forms of Goddess Images

There are hundreds of forms of the Goddess in India; sometimes she is recognized as immanent in natural phenomena such as Prithvi, or Mother Earth, or the holy river Ganga, or the sacred mountain Nanda Devi, but more often artists create her imagery to fulfill a multitude of social roles and designations. Traditionally, artists followed prescriptive religious and sculptural texts in portraying the image of the Goddess in her various forms. However, this does not mean that subject matter, styles, or media remained static over time, or over the vast geography of the Indian subcontinent. Regional schools, individual artists, patrons, developments in ritual, and diversity of materials all contributed to the rich variety of goddess imagery.

As the origin of life, the Goddess is represented as Lajja Gauri, whose neck sprouts a lotus blossom rather than an identifying head. She is shown with her legs splayed in a birth-giving posture, her two hands holding lotus buds, symbolic of regeneration. As Lajja Gauri, she is beyond the specifics of particular identity and is the nondifferentiated conduit of all life and creativity.

Sri Lakshmī, goddess of wealth and fertility, is worshiped by both Hindus and Jains. Lakshmī is said to have emerged from the churning of the primordial milky



Early Indian Sculpture of Mother Goddess. In India, a rich variety of goddess imagery abounds. Here, third-century B.C. sculpture of Mother Earth, Lajja Gauri. With a barely identifiable head, she is beyond the specifics of a particular identity and is the conduit of all life and creativity. Collection of the National Museum, New Delhi. ANGELO HORNAK/CORBIS.

ocean. She is often depicted emerging from a lotus and lustrated by elephants, representing the wealth of the monsoon rains. These are reminders that the Goddess is intimately connected to the primordial waters, the fertilizing rains, and the nourishing sap of creation. This iconography can be traced throughout the centuries and became the modern ideal in the nineteenth-century Raja Ravi Varma oleolithographs. Ravi Varma's articulation remains the most common representation of Lakshmī in contemporary commercial calendar prints.

As Pārvatī, or Uma, the Goddess is the ideal consort. Her iconography reflects the Indian notions of idyllic beauty, with long limbs, graceful hands, narrow waist, wide hips, and full breasts. During the South Indian Chola period (c. A.D. 850–1279), bronze artists delighted in the loving depiction of these attributes. In these images the Goddess is never cloaked in drapes or veils; her beauties and perfections of fluid form are sensuously revealed as if she were almost nude. However, we must remember that when in worship, the Goddess would have been clothed in silks, jewels, and flower garlands.

The Goddess may also represent the tragic aspects of existence: she sums up decay, destruction, disease, and death. As Kālī or Chamunda, she is the embodiment of all these dark powers of unmaking. As Kālī (the Dark One), she is shown in seventeenth- through nineteenth-century paintings with black skin, disheveled hair, and angular jutting arms and legs. She is often shown dancing in ecstatic violence amid the carnage of battle. As Chamunda, she is represented as a withered hag, with desiccated breasts, protruding ribs, and crazed eyes, maw agape, ready to consume her victims. She frequently wears a garland of severed heads and is ornamented with snakes and scorpions.

The Goddess is sometimes depicted in groups such as the Sapta Matrkas, a collection of seven angry (*ugra*) deities. Their images were usually installed in ancillary shrines located next to Shiva temples. *Yoginis* were groups of goddesses who ruled the occult and violent forces of tantric Hinduism. *Yogini* worship arose in the seventh century; followers were attracted by the promise of magical powers. *Yoginis* were worshiped in groups of 64, or sometimes 42 or 81 images. *Yogini* rites took place in unusual hypaethral temples (open to the sky) situated in remote rural areas. *Yogini* imagery reflects the complexity of identity and ritual; there are bear-, goat-, rabbit-, cow-, elephant-, and snake-headed *yoginis*, as well as more easily identified goddesses such as the Sapta Matrkas, Chamunda, and Kālī, who are also incorporated into the *yogini* groups.

The Power of the Goddess

The Hindu goddess represents *shakti*, the catalyzing energy of the divine. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century paintings, Kālī is frequently revealed with hair disheveled, tongue lolling, standing astride the corpse of her consort Shiva. Shiva is inert, except for his erect phallus. This is a reminder that without the sexualizing and energizing presence of *shakti*, the divine feminine power, the male gods could not perform their necessary roles for the harmonious balance of the cosmos. Hindus thus say: “*Shakti ke bina, Shiva shava hai*,” which means, “Without Shakti, Shiva is a corpse.”

Unlike the Hindu Goddess, the Buddhist Goddess is, in theory, a more passive presence representing salvific wisdom rather than active good works. As Prajnaparamita (Perfected Wisdom), the personification of the Prajnaparamita Sūtra, she is spiritual insight par excellence. She is portrayed as a beautiful young woman, often holding a copy of the Prajnaparamita text as her defining attribute. As Tara, she is the savior of Buddhism, and the divine consort of the *bodhisattva* Avalokiteshvara. Tara represents spiritual knowledge, the passive balance

to the male Avalokiteshvara's active compassion. Within Tantrayana Buddhism it is essential that wisdom and compassion unite to form enlightenment. This union is graphically represented in the images of the male and female divinities in sexual embrace.

Why are there so many forms of the divine feminine? The Hindu Goddess embodies all aspects of the psyche, but especially the threshold regions of birth, death, and intuition. She is often the birthing, witnessing, and destroying aspects of religious consciousness. It is the Goddess who usually brings forth new life, nurtures it, and brings about its death and reabsorption into the divine matrix. In Buddhism these aspects of the divine feminine represent a less physical role and instead represent the growth and maturation of gnosis.

Historical Development of Goddess Images

If we look at goddess images strictly from the standpoint of historical development, we can see an almost continuous divine female presence throughout Indian history. Megalithic constructions from Kerala indicate that it is most likely that goddess worship was in force in the Indian subcontinent from prehistory. The numerous terra-cotta figurines from the Indus Valley Civilization (c. 2300–1750 B.C.) are evidence for the ubiquity of the female image in historical antiquity. Because the Indus script has not been adequately deciphered, we cannot know if or how these figures were in worship, but we can surmise from their numbers that they were of significance to the Indus Civilization, and that they probably represent a cult of the Goddess.

Again, with the evidence of numerous terra-cotta figurines, as well as stone rings decorated with nude female forms and vegetative motifs, we can surmise that the Goddess was of continuing religious importance during the Maurya period (323–185 B.C.). Despite the intervening rise of male-dominated Vedic religion, the Maurya period figurines are strikingly similar in style and iconography to the earlier Indus Valley images.

By the first century B.C. we begin to find stone sculptures of *yakshis*. *Yakshis* are female nature spirits, goddesses of the earth and vegetation, and particularly trees, whose origins can probably be found in the ancient pre-Vedic goddesses. The *yakshis* were conduits of fertility, pulling up the invigorating sap of creation from the bowels of the earth. The *yakshi* cult must have been a powerful focus for devotion, for we find *yakshi* imagery at many early Buddhist sites. This indicates that early Buddhism, while focused on a primarily atheistic philosophy, was also sufficiently pragmatic to accommodate itself to the needs of the laity. At Buddhist sites such as Bharhut (c. 100 B.C.) and Sanchi (25–50 B.C.), we find many sculptures of these

auspicious divinities closely associated with specifically identifiable trees, such as the mango or the *ashoka*. The *yakshi's* direct, wide-eyed gaze is touched with a sweet smile; her figure is broad-hipped, full-breasted, with a narrow waist. She is lavishly ornamented with jewels, and her hair is arranged in elaborate braids. She raises an arm above her head to grasp a branch, and a leg is poised to kick the trunk, indicating that it is she who pulls up the sap of creation and brings the trees into flower and fruition.

Some of the earliest Buddhist female images represent Hariti, the goddess of children and smallpox. Hariti represents the ambivalence associated with the divine female: she is the guardian of children, but also ravages children with her fevers. Hariti images from the Kushana period (c. late 1st–3rd centuries A.D.) reflect the syncretic religious atmosphere of the period. In an image from Sahri Bahlol the goddess is portrayed as queenly, with high pearl encrusted diadem; she wears a Greek *chiton*, but has tusklike fangs. In one of her two right hands she holds a wine cup, perhaps an allusion to Dionysian cults present at this time, and in the other she supports one of her five hundred children; in one of her two left hands she holds a trident to ward off evil (an emblem associated with the Hindu god Shiva), and in the other a vase of *purnagbata* shape, indicating the vase of endless prosperity associated with the pregnant belly of Mother Earth.

As Indian religions developed, the identities of goddesses become expanded in texts such as the *Devi Mahatmya* of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* (5th–6th centuries A.D.). The story of Durgā slaying Mahiṣa, the ever transformative buffalo demon, is a favorite theme, appearing in stylized form as early as the second century. In the more elaborate narrative sculptures of the struggle, such as the great seventh-century Pallava period relief at Mamallapuram, the Goddess is shown as the epitome of the continuous fight between good and evil, knowledge and delusion. The artist has depicted her as ever vigilant; her face and posture are graceful, but uncompromising. The battle portrayed is furious, but the Goddess's eventual victory is indicated by her assured pose and the recoiling posture of the demon. The Goddess offers *mokṣa* (liberation) to her devotees, the narrative battle image promising that just as she will quell the demons representing ego and self-delusion, she can surely guide her worshippers to salvation from their own egotistical desires and self-deceptions.

Identities and images of the Goddess continue to evolve. In 1996 activists of the Hindu right wing condemned the contemporary Muslim Indian painter M. F. Husain for his nude portrayal of Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning. Despite the ubiquity of nude or almost nude goddesses in antiquity, the celebrated artist was assailed

for his supposed insult to the dignity of the Goddess. The politico-religious clash brought about a national debate on the meaning and the suitable representation of the Goddess in art, as well as the ownership of image and meaning. This debate, as farcical as some aspects of it were, reiterated to many that images of the Goddess, aesthetically pleasing as many are, were not intended solely as works of art, but as docetic tools to provide the worshiper with the physical means to take *darshan* (the viewing) of the divinity. The constructed image provides a physical nexus for the devotee and the Goddess to see and be seen by each other, and to provide the visual interaction necessary for the incorporation of the divine reality into the mind of the worshiper.

Mary Storm

See also **Indus Valley Civilization; Jain Sculpture; Monuments; Sculpture: Buddhist**

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GOKHALE, GOPAL KRISHNA (1866–1915), Indian educator and politician, president of the Indian National Congress (1905). Gopal Krishna Gokhale was one of the wisest moderate leaders of India's National Congress, revered by Mahatma Gandhi as "my political guru." Born in Maharashtra's village of Kotaluk, the younger son of a Chitpavan brahman clerk in Kolhapur State's administration, Gopal inherited little money but was brilliant and diligent enough to master English literature and write Victorian-style poetry, as well as poetry in his own language, Marathi. At Pune's Deccan College, Gokhale committed many passages from the works of Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and John Morley to his prodigious memory. He later was to become one of Morley's most highly respected advisers, during Liberal Morley's half decade as secretary of state for India, from 1906 to 1910. He also mastered mathematics, a subject he taught for several years at Pune's New English School, after living for a year in Bombay at Elphinstone College.

One of young India's most enlightened social reformers as well as liberal nationalists, Gokhale supported the first municipal high school for girls, started in Pune, bringing him into sharp conflict with religiously conservative popular Hindu leaders, like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who argued that a "woman's place was in the house," not in school. Gokhale and Tilak remained poles apart on every issue of social reform and political action. In the "age of consent" controversy, Sir Andrew Scoble's 1891 bill to raise the minimal age of "rape" in India's Penal Code despite a child wife's "consent" from ten to twelve years, won Gokhale's strong support. Tilak led outraged Hindu Brahman opposition to that timid legislative attempt to save the lives of young girls from often lethal attacks on their wedding nights by husbands three or four times their age. Similarly, Tilak and Gokhale stood at opposite sides of barricades raised over Hindu widow remarriage. Since 1829 the burning of Hindu widows as *satis* (true ones) had been abolished by British Indian Law, and since 1854, Hindu widow remarriage received legislative legitimacy; yet Hindu widows were still expected to reside, unadorned, in rear quarters of Hindu Brahman households. Gokhale, and his sage role model, Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade, led an enlightened vanguard of Hindu reformers who knew that female education and reforms in all spheres were prerequisites to national freedom.

Political Role

Gokhale took an active role in India's National Congress and became the youngest leader ever elected to preside over that premier political body, at its Benares Congress in 1905. Gokhale's eloquence and brilliance in denouncing the "cruel wrong" of Britain's first partition of Bengal did not, unfortunately, suffice to reverse that



Portrait of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. With his message of conciliation and negotiation, rather than violence, Gokhale played a pivotal role in early nationalist actions. He proved to be one of India's most enlightened social reformers as well, boldly supporting, for instance, the first municipal high school for girls in Pune. This stand brought him into sharp conflict with conservative Hindu leaders. K.L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

act of imperial arrogance when Liberal Morley took charge of Whitehall's India Office a year later. But Morley sought and followed Gokhale's advice in many matters relating to his Indian Council Reforms Act of 1909, and before the end of his tenure helped to draft the reunification of Bengal announced by King George on his visit to Delhi in 1911.

Impact on Mahatma Gandhi

Gokhale also supported Gandhi's South African struggle at every meeting of India's Congress. He visited his political heir in South Africa to bolster Gandhi's courageous *satyagraha* there against the discriminatory poll tax levied on all Indians, bringing hope to Gandhi and his followers at crucial times in their fight for equality. When Mahatma Gandhi left South Africa at the start of World War I, it was to return to India to join Gokhale's Servants of India Society in Pune, so eager was he to work for India's rebirth as an independent nation under "Mahatma" Gokhale's tutelage. But just a few weeks later,

Gokhale's heart, long weakened by diabetes, gave out. "He is dead, but his work is not dead," Mahatma Gandhi eulogized his guru, India's greatest moderate nationalist.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

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GOLDEN TEMPLE. See *Sikhism*.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1919

World War I had an all-pervasive impact on India—socially, economically, and politically. A wide range of problems emerged after the war, collectively labeled "dilemmas of dominion" by historian Judith Brown, which irrevocably altered relations between Britain and India. Among India-related issues highlighted by the war were the increasingly contentious internecine struggles among British interest groups regarding the administration of the subcontinent and its long-term future. This pressure was exacerbated by the increasingly urgent and divergent demands on British authorities by articulate and well-organized Indian groups. The exigencies of war and the demands by different Indian groups magnified the need for reform on the constitutional front.

Great Britain had moved circumspectly concerning Indian participation in government, both in India and in London. Statements on Britain's willingness to include Indians in administrative positions in India and to selectively expand Indian participation in government were on record from Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 and various India-related acts in 1858, 1861, and 1892. With the Indian Councils Act of 1909, however, the British believed that they had taken major steps forward in Indian constitutional development by introducing even more elements of representative government in India. The number of nonofficial Indian members elected to the central and provincial legislatures in India was increased. For the first time, legislatures could discuss

the government of India's budget. Indians were admitted to the inner sancta of Indian governance—the viceroy's executive council in Calcutta, and the secretary of state's Council of India, in London. Significantly, while the British did not introduce truly responsible government to India (many constraints on legislative power remained in British hands), it did interject into the Indian political scene the "communal" or "separate" electorate for Muslims, which remained an element of all subsequent constitutional legislation in India until its eventual culmination in the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

The 1909 act did not stem the call for expanded Indian participation in India's governance. The frustration and discontent with the political situation grew unabated into the first years of World War I, and the imperatives for retaining Indian support in a time of crisis—conceding some element of expanded Indian participation in government—led to Secretary of State Edwin S. Montagu's public proclamation of Britain's new goals for India. On 20 August 1917, Montagu announced that the goal of British policy was to establish responsible government in India. He then traveled to India and with the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, issued a report in 1918 that was essentially given life as the Government of India Act of 1919. Indian response to the proposals was at first guarded, the expectation being that the British would reward India for its enormous human and material contributions to the war efforts. That expectation was short-lived.

While the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was being formulated, Indians received perhaps a more accurate barometer of Britain's intentions through other events: the swift enactment of the Rowlatt Acts in 1919 (to sustain martial law and restrict public activities), shock at Britain's ineffective response to a major influenza outbreak, and the Amritsar Massacre in the spring of 1919. Thus, when the act of 1919 was finally issued, harkening a "new era" in British-Indian relations, its constitutional advances were, from the Indian perspective, limited and cosmetic, and actually widened the fractures in Indian polity.

The act of 1919 did not make any substantive change in the legal relationship between the governments at Whitehall and Delhi, and only moderately reshaped the executive council of the central government in India, expanding it to include three Indian representatives. The most radical change introduced by Great Britain was the introduction of "dyarchy" into provincial administration in India. Under this plan, responsibility for some key areas devolved to the provincial level. Some domains were actually transferred to Indian ministers who were responsible to provincial legislatures through the electorate. Transferred areas included agriculture, public works, education, and local self-government. However, several key

elements remained in British hands—irrigation, land revenues, military matters, currency, police, justice, and press controls. Although Indian franchise was expanded by almost 10 percent and the official majority ended in both the provincial and central legislatures, British officials could retain the power to “certify” legislation and retained a de facto veto over Indian legislation.

Indians, already anxious about the sincerity of British reforms in the act of 1919, were disheartened by the retention and expansion of the principle of separate electorates in the act. Not only were separate electorates set aside for Muslims, but other minorities received special consideration, and certain privileged groups had reserved seats in Indian government. The act of 1919 was set in motion against the backdrop of increasing Indian anxiety and disappointment at British behavior, and against the backdrop of Mahatma Gandhi’s assumption of leadership in the Indian National Congress and the departure of Mohammad Ali Jinnah on a separate search for Muslim identity in India. Yet, in spite of its limitations, the act of 1919 did introduce direct elections based on a wider franchise than ever before. Additionally, it provided expanded opportunities for Indians in both administratively responsible positions and in the consultative process, however circumscribed. One further, albeit important change was built into the act of 1919. For the first time since its creation in 1858, the salaries of the secretary of state, his staff, and operational expenditures of the India Office were placed on the British estimates rather than funded through Indian revenues. This had a progressive effect of allowing the Treasury and Cabinet increased influence in India Office affairs until its end in 1947.

Arnold P. Kaminsky

See also **British Crown Raj; British India Office, The; Chelmsford, Lord; Montagu, Edwin S.**

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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935 This legislative act by the British government of India initiated significant changes in the colonial administration of India and formed the future substructure of the constitutions of

the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan in 1947. The Government of India Act of 1935 must be contextualized by pointing out that the ebb and flow of Indian nationalist politics had during the interwar years become a raging torrent. Against the backdrop of sustained tension, disillusionment, and economic dislocations of the so-called twenty-year truce, the Government of India Act of 1919 and piecemeal British legislation in the 1920s failed to assuage Indian political demands. Indeed, the extension of the communal electorate in 1919, and its further expansion in J. Ramsay MacDonald’s Communal Award in 1932, created seemingly unmanageable fissures in the India body politic. As early as 1927, the British government attempted to address growing contentiousness and disorder (from their viewpoint, of course) by sending the Simon Commission (1927) to India to assess the next step in constitutional development for the colony. There were no Indian members of the commission, and it was met everywhere by cries of “Simon, go back.” In the wake of this debacle, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League proposed their own plans for constitutional movement, which simply highlighted the growing divergence of the parties. In rapid succession, the (Motilal) Nehru Report (1928) proposed essentially dominion status for India within the British Empire, followed by a Congress resolution calling for *purna swaraj* (complete independence) in 1929. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League responded immediately with their Fourteen Points, rejecting the logic of Congress representation for all Indians, and the following year, as Congress declared Independence Day (26 January 1930), Muhammad Iqbal, poet laureate of the future Pakistan, raised the call for an independent Muslim state in northwestern India. (In 1933 the name *Pakistan* was coined.)

The tension increased considerably with Mahatma Gandhi’s march to the sea in March 1930 and the British government of India’s arrest of the entire Congress Working Committee following the ensuing upsurge in civil disobedience. The British government then tried another approach: a Round Table Conference was convened in London. Everyone was there—except Congress, which, as historian Stanley Wolpert notes, “was like trying to stage *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark.” Little came of the first Round Table Conference, and before a second conference might convene, some resolution of the impasse had to be effected. Viceroy Lord Irwin concluded the Gandhi-Irwin Pact with Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi in March 1931. Gandhi agreed to attend the Second Round Table Conference as the sole representative of the Indian National Congress. Further, he agreed to moderate the *swadeshi* movement by excluding the burning of British goods, and he agreed to withdraw

Congress's demands for a public inquiry into police behavior during the civil disobedience movement.

While Muslims, Sikhs, and Dalits ("untouchables") argued for separate representation, Gandhi repeated his position that Congress represented all Indians, and he was especially adamant that untouchables were, in any case, Hindus. Despite his success in broadcasting to America for the first time, and even after achieving some success in the depressed British midlands that had been deeply affected by his boycott efforts at home, the Second Round Table Conference ended unsuccessfully, and Gandhi returned home. Ostensibly because civil disobedience had erupted during his absence, a new governor-general, Lord Willingdon, jailed Gandhi. When J. Ramsay MacDonald's Communal Award was made public in 1932, Gandhi began a fast unto death, which ended only when the leader of the Dalits, B. R. Ambedkar, concluded an agreement with Gandhi to stand select Dalit candidates within the Congress allocation, but not in any separate electorate. Britain moved ahead with a Third Round Table Conference at the end of 1932 and produced an almost universally disdained White Paper in 1933, outlining the gist of what would become the Government of India Act of 1935.

British administrators believed that any forward step in Indian constitutional development had, logically, to include not just the key players in British India, but also representatives of the over five hundred Indian princes whose territory comprised roughly one-third of the subcontinent outside direct British rule. The cycle of non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements, the persistence of communal tensions, and British equivocation between repression and reform as the solution to the "Indian problem" had to end. After three conferences and three years of white papers, drafts, and parliamentary maneuvering, the India Act of 1935 was passed.

The act marked a major step toward conferring "dominion status" on India, but it fell short on several counts. Its key provisions extended fiscal autonomy to the provinces, abolished dyarchy at the provincial level, and enabled Indian ministers to hold key portfolios that had hitherto been reserved for the British. However, Indian politicians were quick to note that provincial authorities retained the technical ability to act independently of their largely Indian legislatures in certain cases. The India Act of 1935 also extended dyarchy to the central government of India. Thus, the act allowed increased participation by Indians at the highest levels of government, but it left certain official members "irremovable" by the people of India and responsible only to the British Parliament. Finally, all acts of the central legislature were still subject to the approval or reservation by the governor-general, or

in extreme cases, disallowance by the Crown. This last caveat was somewhat anomalous. The provision approximated the conditions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 applied by Britain to its dominions. Oddly, that restriction, which had been repealed in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, was here being reasserted in the Indian case.

Another significant feature of the 1935 act was the proposal for a federation of British and princely India. Framers of the act envisioned an elected council of state and a federal assembly. But this part of the act was never effected. It had too many "democratic" features for most princes, and it remained a paper plan. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament that drafted the act was headed by Lord Linlithgow, who was then posted to India as viceroy to oversee its implementation.

Overall, the India Act of 1935 shifted the locus of Indian governance to the subcontinent. More Indians than ever participated in local, regional, and national levels of government. Yet, the act retained key provisions for a British veto of important legislation, and more repulsive, from the standpoint of Congress, was its retention of the Communal Award and separate electorate system. Jawaharlal Nehru, in his condemnation of the India Act of 1935, called it a "new charter of slavery." The Muslim League also opposed the act. Nevertheless, all Indian political parties contested elections when the act (without its federal plan) went into operation in 1937. Those elections initiated the penultimate phase of the Raj, but any chance that the act might evolve into a working plan for a united India was interrupted by the advent of World War II. Nonetheless, in 1947 the Government of India Act of 1935 was accepted by both India and Pakistan, with few amendments, as their provisional constitutions.

Arnold P. Kaminsky

See also **Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; British Crown Raj; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Government of India Act of 1919; Iqbal, Muhammad; Linlithgow, Lord; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Princely States**

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GRAMDAN. See *Bhave, Vinoba.*

GUJARAT A state in western India, Gujarat in 2001 had a population of 50.6 million and an area of 75,700 square miles (196,000 sq. km). Gujarat is shaped like an amphitheater, encircled by rugged hills, with its plains opening to the sea and the Kathiawar peninsula at its center. The semicircle has a radius of about 186 miles (300 km). This setting provided in some periods of history a base for regional powers. Mighty Indian emperors tried to control this rich region and its maritime trade throughout Indian history. Nevertheless, Gujarat has acquired an impressive historical personality of its own.

Ancient History: From the Indus Civilization to the Gupta Empire

Gujarat was an important outpost of the ancient Indus Valley (Harappa) Civilization. Two ports of this civilization are located at the eastern and western side of the Kathiawar peninsula: Lothal, which has been excavated long ago, and the much larger Dholavira, where excavations are still in progress. Harappan sites like Oriyo Timbo and Rojdi in the interior of Kathiawar have shed light on the material culture of this time. The grazing of cattle and the growing of millets seem to have been the most important agricultural activities in this area. There is a theory that some of the millets came from Africa and helped to sustain people in the arid parts of Gujarat, where wheat and barley did not grow.

Gujarat participated in the maritime trade of the Indus Civilization. It also attracted European seafarers at the time of the greatest expansion of the Roman empire. *The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, written by an anonymous author around A.D. 50, testifies to the importance of Bharuch (Barygaza) as a leading emporium of his time. He mentions that goods from Ujjain were available at Barygaza. He also reports that the Saka rulers of the time insisted that maritime traders would visit Barygaza and not other ports farther down the coast. Cotton textiles were among the major items of trade, and they were taken by Indian traders as far as the ports in the Red Sea. The Gujaratis must have been prominent among those maritime traders, and they must have continued in this trade throughout many centuries. Tome Pires, the Portuguese traveler who met Gujaratis in the ports of Southeast Asia around 1515 was deeply impressed with their business acumen. He even recommended that his countrymen should learn from them. Khambat (Cambay), which he visited, was in his time the most important emporium of Gujarat; it reached out to Aden in the west and to Malacca in the east and depended on these farflung connections.



Kutch Woman in Colorful Attire. Located in northwestern Gujarat, Kutch is a microcosm of India's vibrant cultural diversity, honoring the rich traditions of some eighteen different tribes, cultures, and languages. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

While Gujarat, with its long coastline and its many ports, was deeply attached to the Indian Ocean, it was also connected to North India by caravan routes to Agra and Delhi, one passing through Palanpur via Mount Abu to the north, the other following the Narmada valley and turning north at Burhanpur. But from the north came invaders as well. The legendary Krishna who came down from Mathura to settle at Dwarka is worshiped in Gujarat to this day. Ashoka had his famous edicts inscribed on the Girnar rock near Junagadh, and in A.D. 150 the Saka ruler Rudradaman I adorned the same rock with a Sanskrit inscription. Skandagupta of the great Gupta dynasty added another Girnar inscription in 456. When the Huns invaded India around 500, they wiped out the last empire of ancient India, but there is no evidence of their rule in Gujarat. However, the Rajputs and Gurjars, who are supposed to have come with the Huns from Central Asia, then imposed their rule on Gujarat, which became known as Gurjaradesha. The rule of these people was at first rather decentralized. Many little kings

established local strongholds. But in due course some larger political units emerged.

Medieval History: Rajputs, Gurjars, and the Sultanate of Gujarat

The local dynasties that ruled medieval Gujarat were the Valabhis (c. 490–770), with their capital near the present city of Bhavnagar, and the Chalukyas or Solankis (c. 942–1242). The Chalukyas established their capital at Patan Anhilvada in the plains at the foot of the hills about 62 miles (100 km) northeast of Ahmedabad. Their king Bhim Dev I (r. 1022–1054) was a powerful ruler, but even he could not prevent the destruction of the great Shiva temple at Somnath by the Afghan invader Mahmud of Ghazni in 1026. This attack remained an episode, and the reign of the greatest king of the Solankis, Siddhraj (1094–1143), was a period of glory for medieval Gujarat.

Gujarat also provided a safe haven for the Parsis who fled their Iranian home about 716 to protect their religious identity from the Muslims. But in due course, Muslim conquerors also reached Gujarat. Under Ala'ud-Din Muhammad Khalji, the Delhi Sultanate extended its sway to Gujarat, and a Muslim governor was installed at Patan in 1298. But the control of Delhi over Gujarat was always tenuous, and in 1407 the last governor of the Delhi Sultanate, which had fallen prey to the invader Timur, turned into a sultan of Gujarat. His grandson Ahmad I (r. 1411–1442) then founded Ahmedabad in 1411 near the old town of Asawal. The famous architecture of the new capital reflected a beautiful synthesis of Hindu and Muslim art. The greatest sultan of Gujarat was Mahmud I Begada (r. 1458–1511). He consolidated his realm and extended its sway from Jungadh in the west to Champaner in the east. He subdued the Rajput rulers of these two fortified strongholds and made Champaner, approximately 75 miles (120 km) southeast of Ahmedabad, his new capital, from where he could launch further expeditions toward Malwa. The sultans of Gujarat derived most of their wealth from the taxing of maritime trade and were envied by the rulers of North India for that. But until the Mughals established their empire, Gujarat could very well defend itself against covetous invaders.

Gujarat under the Mughals and under the British

Humayun attacked Gujrat and sacked Champaner in 1535. But he soon had to leave Gujarat as his power was threatened in the north. Gujarat was then ruled by a series of weak sultans and ambitious courtiers. It was also threatened from the sea by the rising power of the Portuguese, who managed to entrench themselves at Div. When Akbar turned his attention to Gujarat, his conquest of this rich region was nearly effortless. The nobles

of Gujarat surrendered to him. He did not even have to defeat them in a major battle. The only dangerous enemies he had to confront in Gujarat were his own rebellious cousins, the Mirzas, who had established a stronghold in South Gujarat. After he had vanquished them, Gujarat became one of his most precious possessions. Contemporary Europeans actually called Akbar the King of Cambay, because Cambay (Khambhat) was the greatest port of his empire before it silted up and was then replaced by Surat.

When the Mughal empire declined, the Marathas established strongholds in Gujarat. Their great king Shivaji sacked Surat in 1664, but he did not establish any permanent territorial rule over Gujarat. This was left to a Maratha general of the eighteenth century who became the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda (Vadodara). When the British established their colonial rule in India, they entered into an alliance with the maharaja of Baroda, and his heirs continued to rule a large part of Gujarat until 1947. Under British rule, Gujarat consisted of a patchwork of princely states interspersed with districts under direct British control. In one of these princely states, Porbandar on the coast of Kathiawar, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born in 1869, later emerging as the Mahatma, the greatest son of Gujarat, to lead the Indian freedom movement.

Gujarat in Independent India

After 1947 Gujarat remained part of the giant Bombay presidency, which had been composed by the British out of various incompatible elements. The Maharashtrians were most vocal in claiming their own linguistic state within India, but this also included Bombay (Mumbai), in which Gujarati businessmen controlled almost all economic activities. The government of India was reluctant to permit a reorganization of the Bombay presidency, as they felt that this would endanger national unity. But due to persistent agitation, Gujarat and Maharashtra were finally separated in 1960, and Mumbai and Ahmedabad became the capitals of Maharashtra and Gujarat, respectively. Later, Gujarat established a new capital, Gandhinagar, about 19 miles (30 km) north of Ahmedabad. Initially, the Congress Party, which had been in power in the Bombay presidency, also remained in control of the two new states. But in recent years the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has emerged as a new force, particularly in Gujarat. The new state is in the forefront of Indian economic development, but this has also increased social tensions. Gujarat has a very assertive new middle class, which tends to support the BJP.

The Muslim Massacre of 2002

The most striking event of Gujarat's recent history was the massacre that cost the lives of thousands of

Muslims in the city of Ahmedabad. The Muslim minority amounts to only about 9 percent of the population. However, while in most parts of India the Muslims are poor artisans, workers, and peasants, there have been many rich traders among the Muslims of Gujarat. They participated in maritime trade, and many of them settled overseas. In general, they got along well with the Hindu middle class, but obviously some competition and rivalry have developed in recent times. The event that triggered the massacre in Gujarat was an attack of a Muslim mob on a train carrying Hindu activists who had visited Ayodhya, the site of the mosque destroyed in 1992. The train was stopped at a Muslim settlement near Godhra and several of its cars were burned, causing the death of several dozen women and children.

The revenge that was inflicted on the Muslims of distant Ahmedabad, who had not been involved in this crime, was terrible. There is evidence that it was not spontaneous but was pursued in a systematic manner. The police did not interfere, and the state government remained suspiciously inactive. Even middle-class Hindus participated in the looting of Muslim property. Voices were raised demanding the resignation of Chief Minister Narendra Modi, but he defied all criticism. In the subsequent elections he projected the pride (*gaurav*) of Gujarat and won with a large margin. The national leadership of his party, the BJP, did not censure him. Only after the loss of the national elections in 2004 did the former prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, admit that the massacre in Gujarat may have contributed to a setback of his party at the national level. It was an irony of fate that this extraordinary outbreak of communal violence happened in Gujarat, whose most famous son, Mahatma Gandhi, had advocated nonviolent conflict resolution. Gandhi also had very good relations with Muslims. He had been sent to South Africa by a Muslim businessman from Gujarat, and he had involved the Muslim traders from Gujarat in his campaign against racial discrimination in South Africa. He had quelled Hindu-Muslim riots in Kolkata (Calcutta) and in Delhi in 1947, and he would have been shocked by the terrible massacre of Muslims in his home state.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Guptan Empire; Humayun; Indus Valley Civilization; Muslims

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GUJRAL, INDER KUMAR (1919–), prime minister of India (1997–1998). Inder Kumar Gujral, political leader and global diplomat, was born in Punjab's Jhelum on 4 December 1919. Young Inder attended Hailley College in Lahore, was elected president of its Student Union, and served as general secretary of the Punjab Student Federation. Inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's *satyagraha* campaigns, he soon joined India's freedom struggle and was jailed by British police, together with his mother, Pushpa, during Gandhi's "Quit India" movement in August 1942. The tragic partition of India in mid-1947 forced the Gujrals to flee their home in what overnight had become Pakistan, settling down in Delhi. Inder volunteered to help care for many desperately impoverished Hindu and Sikh refugees, forced by fear to flee their homes in the aftermath of Punjab's hastily inept partition.

Modeling himself on India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gujral joined the Indian National Congress Party, devoting himself to vigorous political action and social reform. His refugee camp work in Delhi won him the admiration of those he had helped to find jobs as well as homes, and they elected him to serve as vice-president of New Delhi's municipality, over which he later presided for many years. Nehru remained Inder Gujral's role model both in politics and social activism. Like Nehru, he was inspired by Western humanism and socialist ideals, never losing his passionate faith in democratic India's capacity to create a better future for all its people, regardless of their caste or creed, their ethnicity, or their income. He also has remained a lifelong student of India's history, and, like his poet-wife Shiela, a devotee of poetry, memorizing many of the best works of Persian and Urdu poetry, as well as epic Sanskrit *shlokas*, and poems written in Punjabi, Bengali, and English. "India is a country of vast diversities," Inder Gujral reminded his troubled nation at one of its darkest hours in the summer of 2002—as both India and Pakistan remained at high alert due to threat of nuclear war—"of language, religion, ethnicity and historic experiences, but we have chosen to stay together as one Nation. Gandhi and our freedom struggle gave us our logo . . . 'Unity in Diversity'—not uniformity." He refused to abandon his faith in Indian secularism to any reactionary "Hindu-first" prejudice or battle cry preached by political opponents.

Inder Gujral was first elected to the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament) in 1964, retaining his seat until 1976, when he resigned from Indira Gandhi's Cabinet, where he had served as minister of information



Inder Kumar Gujral. Gujral the day he became India's prime minister, 21 April 1997. Though his tenure was brief (not quite a year) and he was unable to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict in Kashmir, he did launch a number of diplomatic initiatives with India's other South Asian neighbors. BALDEV/CORBIS SYGMA.

and broadcasting and planning. Minister Gujral refused to take orders from Prime Minister Gandhi's younger son, Sanjay, who once tried to dictate which news stories he should approve or reject for publication during the "National Emergency" of 1975–1976. Gujral was again elected to Parliament from 1989 to 1991, and from 1992 to 1998. He then served as minister of external affairs in 1989 and 1990 and in 1996 and 1997, after which he also became India's prime minister, from 21 April 1997 until 19 March 1998, leading a multiparty Janata coalition government in New Delhi. Nehru and Gujral were India's only two prime ministers who served as their own foreign ministers.

Prime Minister Gujral presided over India's festive fiftieth anniversary National Day celebrations in New Delhi's Parliament at midnight on 15 August 1997. Speaking the next morning from the ramparts of Delhi's Red Fort, he reaffirmed India's faith in Gandhian nonviolence and Nehruvian secularism, promising to root out corruption at every level of government, and to resolve "peacefully through bilateral negotiations" differences with India's neighbors, including India's half century of

conflict with Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Though his tenure as prime minister proved all too brief to permit Inder Gujral to negotiate a peaceful end to Kashmir's tragic conflict, he unilaterally launched a number of confidence-building measures with India's other South Asian neighbors, including Nepal and Bangladesh, and his creative policy of "preemptive peace and friendship," known as the Gujral Doctrine, remains his most enduring diplomatic legacy to India's polity and history.

Stanley Wolpert

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
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GUPTAN EMPIRE A powerful imperial polity based in northern and central India between the fourth and sixth centuries A.D., the Guptan empire was often regarded as embodying a classical age of Indian art and literature. The Guptan period witnessed the crystallization of a cultural and political order that would set a pattern for centuries to come. In the third century A.D., the Sassanian empire in west Asia effectively curtailed Kushana power, and in India a number of principalities that formerly owed allegiance to them became independent. The Gupta family seems to have been among these groups, though its origins are obscure. The Guptas may have ruled in the region of Magadha or, more likely, in the western Gangetic Plain. The first important king of the family was Chandragupta I (reigned A.D. 320–335), who married into the well-established and prestigious Licchavi dynasty of northern India. Chandragupta I ruled along the Ganges (Ganga) River from Magadha in the east to Saketa and Prayāga in the west. The famous “Guptan era” used to date inscriptions between the fourth and sixth centuries begins with his accession to throne. His son Samudragupta (reigned A.D. 350–375) seems to have inherited the crown amid controversy. He may not have been the eldest son, and his Allahabad pillar inscription makes much of him being “selected” by his father over others of “equal birth.” Contemporary coins mention another Guptan prince named Kacha who was probably a rival. Samudragupta’s political capabilities, however, are hardly in doubt. According to the long eulogistic introduction composed by his courtier Harisena on the Allahabad pillar, Samudragupta conquered numerous kings through a performance of a *digvijaya*, or “conquest of the directions.” These included: rulers of the northern Gangetic region, who were “violently uprooted”; forest or tribal chiefs in central India, who “were made into servants”; and kings of southern and eastern India, who were “captured and released,” that is, defeated but allowed to retain their kingdoms, and who, like other kings of eastern and western India (notably the Shakas and Kushanas), paid homage to Samudragupta. Perhaps more important than the extent of Samudragupta’s conquests is the political structure it implied, since in all but the most proximate regions of his empire, he allowed defeated or submissive kings to retain their kingdoms in return for some form of service. These services, which are formally mentioned for the first time in the Allahabad inscription, included, variously, the paying of tribute,



court attendance, the gift of maidens, and the offering of military assistance. While the Guptan monarch took imperial titles like “Great King over Kings” (*mahārājādhirāja*) and “Supreme Lord” (*paramabhātāraka*), subordinate rulers were permitted only more modest titles like “Great King” (*mahārāja*).

Samudragupta was succeeded by his son Chandragupta II (reigned A.D. 375–415) who also seems to have risen to the throne through the elimination of a rival, one Rāmagupta, whose existence is attested by coins and literary sources. A marriage between Chandragupta II’s daughter Prabhāvatīguptā and the Vākātaka king Rudrasena II secured the southern borders of the newly founded Guptan settlements in middle India at Udayagiri and Arikana. Chandragupta II’s major military campaign was fought against the Shakas in western India, and he took the title Vikramāditya (Sun of Prowess), perhaps to commemorate his success against them.

A notable feature of early Guptan political culture is its attempt to invoke the bygone imperium of the Mauryas. This is suggested not only by the use of the name “Chandragupta,” the founder of the Mauryan empire, but also by supplementing Mauryan rock faces and pillars with Guptan royal inscriptions, as well as imitating Mauryan lion capitals. The famous text on statecraft, the *Artha Shāstra*, which was attributed to the minister of the Mauryan king Chandragupta, also seems to have been reworked during the Guptan period by one Visnugupta. The reasons for such an evocation are unclear, for in many ways Guptan imperial culture was also innovative and formative. Imperial terminology and protocols of service, deference, alliance, and war were standardized by the end of the Guptan period and remained largely stable (with some modification) for nearly a millennium. Religiously, the period saw a great consolidation and bid for court patronage of the theistic cults, Shaivism and Vaishnavism. The transition to Sanskrit as a courtly language, which had begun during Kushana and Shaka times, was completed by the fourth century, and from Guptan times, both the practice and patronage of the arts (literature, music, and drama) became the sine qua non of aristocratic and urban existence. Samudragupta, for example, is praised in his inscriptions as proficient at both prose and poetry and is depicted on his coins seated, playing a lyre. The famous Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa, author of a number of poems and dramas, also lived at the court of Samudragupta’s son Chandragupta II. Vātsyāyana, author of the treatise on romantic love called the *Kāma Sūtra*, also probably lived in the Guptan period.

The structure of the Guptan empire was less “centralized” than the Mauryan, and although some officials remained the same, there was an expansion in both palace personnel and lesser, semiautonomous officials. Two characteristics of Guptan polity may be noted. First, landed lords became the essential building blocks of polity, either as subordinate kings who retained patrimonial lands or palace servants who were deeded property and over generations came to wield effective lordship. Second, the importance of such landed lords as political subordinates and royal servants meant that kings employed men who had significant local power bases, and who were often more than ready to assert autonomy in moments of imperial weakness. These processes taken together are thought to herald an epoch of “Indian feudalism.”

The latter half of the fifth century saw a slow decline of Guptan fortunes. Chandragupta II was succeeded by Kumāragupta (reigned A.D. 415–454), who fought off a branch of the White Huns, or Hephthalites (known as the Hūnas in Indian sources), from the northwest. Kumāragupta’s successors were less fortunate, and due in

part to internal problems, Guptan power slowly shrank in the next fifty years, until at the end of the fifth century the Hūnas were able to enter northern India. We find Hūna inscriptions in Arikana, the erstwhile city of the Guptas in central India, dated at the beginning of the sixth century. As Guptan power contracted and finally disappeared entirely in the first half of the next (sixth) century, a number of smaller kingdoms, formerly subordinate to the Guptas, asserted independence. These families most typically adopted Guptan political vocabulary and thus ensured a lasting legacy for the dynasty down to the thirteenth century.

Daud Ali

See also **Artha Shāstra; Kālidāsa**

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GUPTAN PERIOD ART The Gupta dynasty governed much of northern India for about two hundred years after its founding by Chandragupta I in A.D. 320. During this period, sculpture in stone and terra-cotta rose to high aesthetic levels, and the earliest Hindu stone temples were created. It was a period of not only outstanding artistic accomplishments but also the creation of some of India’s most honored poetic compositions, including the plays and poetry of the famed Kālidāsa. We have the testimony of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited India during this time, describing the social, cultural, and political customs and institutions, which were, by our contemporary standards, unusually enlightened. Modern historians have used such exemplary characteristics to propose the Guptan period as a “Golden Age,” a time when Indian art and culture reached its apogee, creating a classical standard against which all Indian traditions can be compared. While these claims are not unfounded, it is important to remember that knowledge of the Guptan dynasty and the

art of the period was lost early in ancient India, and was only rediscovered by nineteenth-century scholars and antiquarians, who used the Guptan period for various nationalist and political purposes.

The Guptan kings themselves, although they ultimately controlled much of northern India, were not major patrons of sculpture and architecture. There is only one temple site known today that was actually patronized by the Guptas: Bhitari, in modern Uttar Pradesh, which has an inscription by Skandagupta (reigned c. 455–467), the last of the major Guptan kings. The temple remains at Bhitari are brick. Terra-cotta and stone were used to decorate the temples, and small pieces found at the site of what was once a large stone Vishnu image are probably part of the Vishnu sculpture that Skandagupta's inscription mentions he had made.

While the Guptan kings cannot be connected to any temple or sculptural patronage other than Bhitari, they were producers of lavish gold coins whose tiny images, including portraits of the kings, rank among the most accomplished artistic creations of the period. The portraits of the kings show them performing a variety of tasks that are part of the vocabulary of kingship, including sacrificing by placing incense into a censer and playing the lyre to indicate the king's musical and intellectual accomplishments. A coin type of Samudragupta (reigned A.D. 350–375) shows a horse standing before a sacrificial post (*yūpa*) with the Sanskrit inscription reading: "The king of kings who performed the horse sacrifice wins heaven, having protected the earth." The coin commemorates Samudragupta's performance of the vedic horse sacrifice (*ashvamedha*) that would make him a universal king (*cakravartin*), while on the reverse is an image of the queen holding a flywhisk.

Scholars assume that during the Guptan period many Hindu temples in brick, like the remains of those at Bhitari, were built throughout northern India, particularly in the Gangetic Plain. Only one fairly complete example remains today, however, that at Bhitargaon. The assumption is that the other temples have been over time dismantled and their bricks reused. The only secure evidence for their existence, however, are the various finds of loose terra-cotta reliefs that turn up and must once have decorated brick structures. Many of these terra-cotta reliefs are of the highest quality and are a major artistic accomplishment. The plastic quality of terra-cotta worked well for Guptan artists, who favored a fluid and unencumbered sculptural modeling.

It was also during the Guptan period that Hindu temples began to be made of stone, both temples that were rock-cut caves as well as temples built from stone blocks. Again, these temples are found mostly in relatively



Fifth-Century Stone Sculpture. During the Guptan period, northern India, now returned to native rule, experienced a degree of artistic achievement by which later civilizations continue to be judged. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

peripheral geographical areas, in an arc of what must have been forested land around the edge of the Gangetic Plain and outside the Guptan heartland, mostly in what is today Madhya Pradesh. These temples and caves are all small and structurally diverse, indicating their early date and novelty. The absence of early stone temples elsewhere in northern India remains unexplained.

The earliest Hindu cave temples are located at Udayagiri near Vidisha in Madhya Pradesh. There are twenty rock-cut caves, all very simple, with a single cell and one doorway with a porch. There are indications that some of the caves had structures built in front as well, probably of

wood. Two inscriptions at the site name Chandragupta II who, while not the patron, came to the site to celebrate a battle victory around A.D. 401. Because of the inscription, we can date caves 5 and 6 to around A.D. 400. The facade of cave 6 has a series of images carved in relief. The importance of these dated images cannot be overstated, as it is the first time we have Hindu images set into a context. While Hindu icons date from around the first century B.C., almost all are from Mathura and are loose finds, so that we have little idea how they were originally intended to be organized.

The image series at cave 6, starting from the far left side, begins with the elephant-headed Gaṇeśha. Across the front (from the left) is Vishnu, then two door guardians on each side of the door to the cell, then a second Vishnu, and two images of the goddess Durgā as killer of the Buffalo Demon. On the right side are two shallow niches that once housed now very ruined sets of the Seven Mothers (*sapta mātṛkās*). Finally, flanking the top of the door to the cell are two females, personifications of the sacred rivers, Gaṅgā and Yamunā. The cell itself is today empty, but it would have held a Shiva *liṅga*. Thus, the little cave has an elaborated and surprisingly complicated iconography that involves Shaivite, Vaishnavite, and Shakta deities, and such imagery as paired door guardians and river goddesses that have remained standard at Hindu temples even today.

One of the most famous and frequently illustrated sculptures from ancient India is that of the Boar *avatār* of Vishnu (Varāha) carved in high relief in the niche next to cave 6. The figure has a boar head and human body, and is shown in triumph having rescued the earth, here personified as a woman holding onto the Boar's tusk, from the watery flood of the ocean. While the story of the rescue comes from a number of texts, the enormous tableau (the Boar is 12 feet [3.6 m] tall), with detailed and numerous figures carved across the back and sides of the niche, has been interpreted by scholars as having an allegorical meaning related to Chandragupta II's victory in conquering most of northern India for the Guptas. It was under Chandragupta II's reign (c. 375–415) that the Guptas reached the height of their political power, with Chandragupta removing the last of the resisting political powers and consolidating the geography of his kingdom. This included the area around modern Allahabad, where the two rivers, the Ganges and the Yamuna, join together. This is one of the most sacred areas to the Hindus, and these two rivers are depicted on both sides of the Boar niche, coming together to form one river and flowing into the ocean, represented by the wavy lines at the bottom of the relief. This is the ocean from which the earth has been rescued, but it is also a pun on the name of Chandragupta's father, Samudragupta, as Samudra means

“ocean”; the imagery implies that now the Guptas control India from ocean to ocean across northern India.

The earliest Hindu temples built in stone date to slightly later than the Udayagiri cave 6, that is, the first quarter of the fifth century, and like the cave temple consist of a simple cell with a porch. Some of these fifth- and sixth-century temples retain part of what were towered roofs, but none is complete. Scholars are divided on whether some of the earliest temples, such as Sanchi Temple 17, were actually flat-roofed, without a tower, but the tower very quickly became standard on all Hindu temples, as seen on temples today as well.

The Vishnu Temple at Deogarh, of the early sixth century, is one of the best preserved of the Guptan Hindu temples. While the single-cell shrine is small (inside about 9 feet square), it has an exquisitely carved doorway and three large relief panels on each of the other three sides. There are still sections of the tower remaining as well. The shrine is set on a square, raised plinth of earth, enclosed with low stone walls with directional stairs and small, now ruined, shrines at each of the four corners. The three relief panels are each masterpieces of Guptan period relief sculpture. Each panel depicts a form of Vishnu—as the savior of the entrapped elephant, as an ascetic, and as preserver of the universe while lying on the cosmic snake. The concept of the Hindu deity in the temple shrine manifesting himself on the walls of the temple in the four directions and in multiple forms for the worshiper, who circumambulates the outside of the temple in worship, is seen in its nascent form at Deogarh.

Jain and Buddhist Art of the Guptan Period

The Guptan kings were Hindus, but both Jainism and Buddhism were also important religions during the Guptan period, for which art and architecture were produced in great numbers. At many sites, for example at Mathura, all three religions existed together, with art being created in a shared style but depicting different gods and their stories. The focus of Buddhist worship was on the stupa, a relic mound that by the Guptan period was highly elaborated in hundreds of forms, materials, and sizes, and on the Buddha in human or anthropomorphic form. One of the most amazing sites in India is Ajanta, a rock-cut monastic site of some thirty caves that stands as one of the world's inspired artistic accomplishments and dates primarily from the second half of the fifth century.

The histories of Buddhist rock-cut architecture and that of the Hindu caves stand in stark contrast. We have seen the beginning of Hindu rock-cut architecture at Udayagiri with the simple cave 6 of about A.D. 400. By that date, the Buddhists had been making rock-cut caves for over five centuries, and were producing structures of elaborate

complexity. The late appearance of Hindu architecture in stone versus that of the Buddhists is due in part to the Hindus' lack of the highly organized monastic structure of the Buddhists, which could plan, finance, and create enormous monastic complexes of stone with involved and extensive narrative reliefs. Hindus at that time worshiped their deities in local shrines, under trees, and in their homes, all of which did not call for temples and large icons.

When and where the anthropomorphic Buddha image was first created continues to be the focus of considerable research and debate. By the first century B.C., small images were being made, but it was the monumental images created at Mathura around A.D. 125 that were to be decisive for the form of the Buddha image in India. By the Guptan period, the Buddha image had a fairly consistent iconography: the robe of a monk, a cranial bump, and certain standard hand gestures. At Mathura, the Guptan-period Buddha retained much of the earlier monumental Buddha style, including the broad shoulders, large arms, and swelling chest. A new type of Buddha image appeared, however, at another site, that of Sarnath, the place near Varanasi on the Ganges River where the Buddha gave his First Sermon. The Sarnath Buddha image appeared in the second half of the fifth century, and was a radical departure from the Mathura type of Buddha image from which it was ultimately derived. Rather than the powerful and masculine Mathura Buddha, the Sarnath images were much slighter in build, with delicate facial features and narrow shoulders, their robes clinging tightly to their bodies without any indication of fabric folds. It is this new style of Buddha image that became popular, influencing images across India and ultimately in China and Southeast Asia as well.

The Vakataka Dynasty

The rock-cut monastery of Ajanta mentioned above, while created during the Guptan period, was not under the control of the Guptan dynasty. Ajanta was in an area controlled by the Vakataka dynasty. Scholars have long categorized the art of Ajanta, and indeed all art in northern India during the fourth to sixth centuries, as "Guptan art." It has only been since the mid-1990s that the full importance of the art done under the Vakatakas, who ruled more or less simultaneously with the Guptas and were at times related to them through marriage, has become clear, due to recent finds and excavations.

The Vakatakas were split into two branches. The eastern branch ruled the territory where Ajanta was built. A western branch, which ruled near modern Nagpur, patronized Hindu temples and art. Excavations and field research at sites such as Mandhal, Ramtek Hill, and Purnar have revealed archaeological and artistic material that is only just now being evaluated, but it is clear that our

placement of this material within a Guptan stylistic tradition is not correct. The Hindu sculpture from Mandhal, for example, in its squat heavy forms and unusual iconography, has yet to be integrated into the art historical traditions of India as we know them today. Whether or not the Guptan period can be considered an artistic Golden Age, there remains plentiful material and scholarly rethinking for future art historians.

Robert Brown

See also Ajanta; Ashvamedha; Guptan Empire; Kālidāsa; Sculpture: Buddhist; Shiva and Shaivism; Vishnu and Avatāras


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GURKHAS. *See Nepal.*

GURMUKHI. *See Languages and Scripts.*

GURU NANAK (1469–1539), first of the ten Sikh gurus. Nanak was the first of the ten Sikh gurus (saintly teachers), a line that ended with the death of Guru Gobind Singh in 1708. Nanak belonged to the saintly tradition of folk poets of northern India, like Kabir, who died about twenty years before Nanak was born. The verses of both Nanak and Kabir were included in the *Adi Granth*, the sacred book of the Sikhs. Nanak believed in the Akal Purakh (Supreme Being) and rejected all outward forms of worship.



Guru Nanak. In November 2003, members of the Sikh community presented a portrait of Guru Nanak to former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (right). Approximately 35 million Sikhs live in India, most in Punjab, their ancestral home. AFP/GETTY IMAGES.

He was born to a Hindu family at Talwandi, a village in the Punjab. In addition to Hindi, he learned Persian and Arabic at school, then worked as an accountant. He married and had two sons, but then he embarked on a long walking trip, attracting followers everywhere. Hindus and Muslims were equally touched by his teachings. He became a legendary figure, and there are many stories about his life, some of which reflect the radicalism of his belief. Once he saw pilgrims bathing in the Ganga (Ganges) throwing water toward the rising sun, believing that it would reach their ancestors. Nanak turned around on hearing this and threw water toward the west. When asked why he did this, he replied that he was watering his fields in the Punjab. The pilgrims made fun of him, but he replied that if the water they were throwing reached their ancestors, his water would surely reach his fields. It is also reported that he visited Mecca, where he fell asleep with his feet pointing toward the Kaaba. A guard woke him, scolding him for pointing his feet toward God. He then requested that the guard move his tired body in any direction where he thought his feet would not point at God.

In his old age, Nanak returned to the Punjab and lived with his family. There he was joined by a very ardent follower named Lehna. Nanak anointed him, renaming him Angad. Guru Angad then became his successor as the second guru of the Sikhs. It was this act of installing a successor that helped to make Nanak the revered founder of the Sikh faith; otherwise, he might have been remembered simply as one of India's saintly poets and religious reformers.

Dietmar Rothermund

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GURUS. See **Sikhism**.



HAQ, A. K. FAZLUL (1873–1962), *Muslim political leader.* Abul Kasim Fazlul Haq (also spelled “Huq”) emerged in the first part of the twentieth century as a charismatic Bengali Muslim leader with mass appeal. He was the first important leader who did not come from a landholding family and was not a member of the aristocratic Muslim families who dominated Bengal politics until the partition of India in 1947. He rose on his own merits. He was in favor of intercommunal harmony, and at heart believed in a united Bengal comprising both Hindus and Muslims.

Haq was born to a well-to-do Muslim family in a village in the Barisal district (now in Bangladesh) in 1873. Both his grandfather and father were district-town lawyers—a *muktear* (with knowledge of Persian) and a pleader (with knowledge of English), respectively. Education and a professional career were an integral part of Haq’s family heritage.

Haq had a traditional Arabic and Persian education at home. He graduated from the Barisal District School in 1890, and was admitted to Kolkata’s prestigious Presidency College. He graduated from the College with triple honors in chemistry, mathematics, and physics in 1894. He was the first Muslim student to earn a master’s degree in mathematics and, the following year, a law degree from Calcutta University.

Haq began his career as a teacher and a journalist. He taught for two years at Rajchandra College in Barisal in 1903 and 1904, then became an editor of two Bengali-language journals and a newspaper daily, *Navayuz* (New Age). He joined the government service in 1906 and served in several important mid-level posts in Bengal and Assam until 1912. He decided to move to Kolkata and join the Bar. He served as a junior to the famed judicial

luminary Sir Ashutosh Mookherjee, later vice chancellor of Calcutta University. He came in close contact with the prominent nationalist leaders of the time, mostly moderates such as W. C. Bonnerji, Surendranath Banerjea, Ashwini Kumar Dutt, Shamsul Huda, and Abdul Rasul.

Like a few other Muslim leaders in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Haq saw no contradiction between being a member of both the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, of which he was a founder in Dhaka in 1906. From 1916 to 1921, he was president of the All-India Muslim League. All through his political life, from 1913 until the partition, he was a member of the Bengal legislature. He was instrumental in drafting the Lucknow Pact of 1916, bringing the League and the Congress together on a common platform. He served as the Congress’s general secretary in 1918 and 1919. He did not, however, favor Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement. From 1930 to 1933, he represented Indian Muslims at the Round Table Conference in London.

He broke away from the Muslim League in 1936, as major policy differences between him and Mohammad Ali Jinnah surfaced, proving insurmountable. He formed a new political party, the Krishak Praja Party, in 1937. During the elections of that year, he won handily against the Muslim League leader Nazimuddin in the Bengal legislature. He offered to form a coalition government with the Congress in Bengal. The Congress leadership refused to accept his offer. The League seized the opportunity and agreed to join Haq’s coalition. As a partner of the League, Haq was briefly persuaded by its growing separatist strategy. He moved the Pakistan resolution in 1940 in Lahore. A year later, discouraged by the League’s extremist rhetoric and action, he resigned from the League, which led to the ministry’s fall. In 1946 Haq

rejoined the League, only to leave it again after the partition to form the Krishak Shramik Party in 1954. After winning the election in East Pakistan that year with an overwhelming majority, he formed and led the United Front Ministry. With the Muslim League reduced to a shambles in East Pakistan, Haq was named the chief minister. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman joined Haq as an ardent follower. Haq made a nostalgic journey back to Kolkata after forming his cabinet. At a highly charged emotional moment during a public meeting in Kolkata, he spoke about the commonality and unity of the two Bengals. His ministry was dismissed and replaced by Governor's Rule. Tired of politics and disillusioned, A. K. Fazlul Haq died in 1962.

Throughout his personal and political life, Haq negotiated between his rural roots in Bengal among Muslims and Hindus, and the challenges of provincial and national politics. As a result, there were several overlapping layers to his personality that also shaped his politics. He was a Bangla-speaking, hearty and robust, rustic Muslim who loved his land and people; he was also a highly educated, urbane Bhadrak (intelligentsia) who endeared himself to Kolkata's Hindu elites. He was a contrast to the traditional landholding Muslim aristocrats, yet his prominence in his profession and in politics enabled him to marry, not once but three times, into aristocratic North Indian Muslim families. In sum, Haq remained a quintessential Bengali: he is loved and revered in both West Bengal and Bangladesh today as Sher-i-Bangal (The Tiger of Bengal).

Dilip K. Basu

See also **All-India Muslim League; Congress Party; Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur**

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HARA. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma); Shiva and Shaivism.**

HARAPPA The Indus Civilization was first discovered in the course of exploratory excavations at Harappa by Alexander Cunningham in 1856 and 1872. Major excavations between 1920 and 1934, directed by Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni and Madho Sarup Vats, found that the site had been badly looted of bricks, but important inscribed seals, architecture, figurines, and sculptures were discovered that have contributed greatly to our

understanding of Indus culture. Subsequently, numerous excavations were conducted by different officers of the Archaeological Survey of India and, after 1947, by the Pakistan Department of Archaeology and Museums.

Harappa is situated on a low Pleistocene terrace between two major tributaries of the Indus River, the Ravi and the ancient Beas (now the Sutlej). One-third of the ancient site is occupied by the modern city of Harappa, which is still an important regional center for agriculture and craft production. Harappa was connected by trade to Mohenjo-Daro in the south, as well as to distant regions such as Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Mesopotamia.

Although this is the type-site for the Harappa culture, most of the popular focus shifted to Mohenjo-Daro, where spectacular architectural remains were well preserved. Nevertheless, Harappa's most important contribution is that it is the only major city that has revealed the full sequence of occupation, beginning from the earliest farming village to the rise and eventual decline of the city. The mounded ruins of ancient Harappa consist of three large walled sectors and several smaller suburbs that cover approximately .6 square miles (150 hectares). The original settlement was probably a single village during the earliest part of the Ravi Phase, around 3500 B.C. As it grew in size, it split into two sections, and by the Kot Diji Phase (2800–2600 B.C.) there is evidence for two distinct mounds that appear to have been surrounded by separate mud-brick perimeter walls. During the Harappa Phase (2600–1900 B.C.), these walled areas were enlarged, and new perimeter walls were built to enclose each sector of the urban center. Gateways at strategic locations in the walls allowed the dominant elites in each sector to control access into and out of their neighborhoods. Economic as well as political competition probably stimulated the continuing expansion of the site during the 700 years of the Harappa Phase. Three periods of settlement growth and expansion can be defined, and these are associated with the construction of new suburbs, changes in seals and writing, new pottery forms, specialized crafts, and changing trade networks.

Excavations in the walled suburb of Mound F have revealed some of the most famous structures at the site, dating from the middle and latter part of the Harappa Phase. Discoveries of a large furnace for firing pottery, a hoard of copper tools, and a hoard of jewelry suggest that prosperous merchants and craftsmen inhabited this part of the site. The so-called granary was built around 2450 to 2200 B.C. on a massive mud-brick foundation over 164 feet (50 m) north-south and 131 feet (40 m) east-west. There is no evidence that this structure was used for storing grain or other commodities. Almost two hundred



Remains of the Granaries of Harappa, Pakistan. The so-called granaries of Harappa, built between 2450 and 2200 B.C. The circular brick platforms were originally thought to have been utilized for husking grain, but recent archaeological reexamination has not uncovered any evidence of this or the use of the entire structure for storing grain. ROGER WOOD / CORBIS.

years later, we see the construction of circular brick platforms that were thought to have been used for husking grain, but re-examination of these circular platforms has not uncovered any evidence of grain or chaff. Another important set of buildings, constructed around the same time as the circular platforms, appear to have been constructed with identical floor plans and orientation as part of a housing project. Although originally referred to as workmen's quarters, these houses are substantial brick structures that could have housed merchants and traders.

During the Late Harappa Phase (1900–1300 B.C.), some areas of the city were overcrowded, possibly as a result of refugees from regions to the east, where the Sarasvati-Ghaggar-Hakra River was beginning to dry up. Harappa is the only excavated Indus site where there is strong evidence demonstrating the gradual transition from the Harappa to the Late Harappa Phase. Continuities in some technologies and art styles and changes in other aspects of technology indicate that the transition was neither abrupt nor the result of replacement by new people. However, in the end there was a major change in religion, and the Harappan extended burials were replaced by pot burials that contained the secondary burial of long bones and skulls. We know from later Vedic texts that the people who came after the Harappans spoke an Indo-Aryan language and practiced a very

different religion. After the Late Harappan period, the region was not abandoned, but the upper levels of the site were destroyed, and fragments of Gupta brick architecture and sculpture dating to around A.D. 320 to 454 are all that remains of what must have been a very large Early Historic city.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also **Indus Valley Civilization; Mohenjo-Daro**

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HARDINGE, LORD (1858–1944), viceroy of India (1911–1916). Liberal Lord Charles Hardinge of Penshurst served as viceroy of India from 1911 to 1916. His first major act was to recommend the reunification of Bengal, announced by King George V on 12 December 1911 at his grand Delhi durbar coronation. Not only was provincial Bengal's heartland reunited, but the capital of British India would be removed from Bengal's Calcutta (Kolkata), to be resurrected in New Delhi, on the historic ruin-strewn plains around Old Delhi, where no fewer than nine previous capitals of North India, including that of the Great Mughals, had flourished and fallen. When Viceroy Hardinge entered Old Delhi atop his royal elephant in 1912, he was wounded by a terrorist's bomb, thrown from a high window into his howdah. His wife never fully recovered from the shock, dying soon afterward. One other viceroy, Lord Mayo, had been assassinated by a Pathan prisoner in 1872. Lord Hardinge stoically carried on, however, until the Mesopotamian disaster in World War I prompted his departure from India.

In early August 1914, when Lord Hardinge declared India at war with Germany, he hardly anticipated the all but universal support in response, declarations of loyalty to the British Raj loudly proclaimed by all of India's some six hundred princes, as well as most of its people, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh alike. Within the first month of war, two British Indian divisions and a cavalry brigade

embarked from Karachi's port to Marseille, bolstering the Western Front on the very eve of the fiercest German assault against Ypres; thousands of Indian troops were killed, several heroes among them posthumously honored with Victorian Crosses. Soon after Turkey joined the Central Powers before the end of 1914, Indian troops were shipped to the Persian Gulf, easily capturing Basra as they started up the road toward Baghdad, which they never reached. The "Mespot" (Mesopotamian) disaster that all but destroyed India's army at Kut before they surrendered in April 1916 would soon force Britain's secretary of state for India, Austen Chamberlain, to resign, leading to Viceroy Hardinge's replacement by Horse Guard double Captain Viscount Chelmsford.

Hardinge returned home to rejoin Whitehall's Foreign Office, where his public career had begun in 1906, serving for the remaining years of World War I as permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. He was one of Britain's most brilliant and accomplished diplomats, and one of India's most sympathetic viceroys.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Bengal; Chelmsford, Lord**

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HARI. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma); Vishnu and Avatāras.**

HARSHA (c. 590–647), *ruler of North India* (r. 606–647). King Harsha ruled over much of North India during the first half of the seventh century. The sources for reconstructing Harsha's life include a biography written by the court poet Bāna, a handful of inscriptions issued by Harsha and contemporary rulers, and the travel account of the Chinese monk Hsieu Tsang, who visited Harsha's court toward the end of his reign. Harsha (also known as Shīlāditya) belonged to the Vardhana or Pushyabhūti family of Sthānviśhvara in eastern Punjab. Though their origins are obscure, the Vardhanas seem to have taken royal titles not long after the fall of the Gupta empire at the beginning of the sixth century, when they were subordinate to more powerful houses like the Maukharis of Kanauj. The family's fortunes began to change in the

reign of Prabhākara Vardhana (c. 580–606), Harsha's father. This king's military conquests and alliances made him a formidable enough ruler to attract a marriage proposal for his daughter Rājyashrī (Harsha's sister) from the prince Grahavarman, of the powerful Maukhari house. Soon after, Prabhākara Vardhana was taken ill and died suddenly. Though his court biographer, Bāna, portrays Harsha as his father's choice in succession, other sources indicate that his elder brother, Rājya Vardhana, actually inherited the throne. But other events soon changed the course of dynastic politics.

A rival alliance between kings from Malwa and Gauda attacked Kanauj. When news arrived that Grahavarman had been killed and his queen Rājyashrī imprisoned, the young Rājya Vardhana set off to avenge his brother-in-law and release his sister. Though successful in battle, he was treacherously murdered while negotiating with the king of Gauda. According to Bāna, the ministers of the ruined Maukhari court then invited young Harsha to ascend the throne. As inheritor of both his patrimonial lands as well as the more powerful Maukhari kingdom, Harsha was now the most powerful king in North India. He immediately embarked on a conquest of eastern India to avenge the death of his brother and to subdue the Gauda sphere of influence; he then turned his attention to the kingdoms to the west and eventually southward to Mālwa. Harsha's victories did not lead to the accession of lands directly to his empire, but rather to the establishment of a hierarchy of vassals and subordinate kings called *sāmantas*.

Harsha's empire was among the most famed in Asia, receiving emissaries from the Tang emperor and drawing a number of prominent poets and scholars to his court. He himself was a skilled poet and wrote two palace dramas, *Ratnavali* and *Priyadarshikā*). The culture of Harsha's age, though still very much like that of the Guptas, reveals a discernible predilection for luxury and the trappings of a "feudal" mannerism. Politically, his long-term goal was the defeat of the powerful Chalukya dynasty in the Deccan, who regarded Harsha as the mere lord of "northern" India. Harsha and the Chalukyan king Pulakeshin II (r. 610–643), accompanied by their *sāmantas*, met in battle near the Narmada River between 630 and 634, where Pulakeshin seems to have been victorious, dashing Harsha's ambitions of an India-wide empire. Harsha had no successor, and his death is usually seen as the beginning of a period of full-blown feudalism in North India.

Daud Ali

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HARSHA VARDHANA. See **History and Historiography**.

HASTINGS, WARREN (1732–1818), British East India Company's governor of Bengal (1772–1773), first governor-general of India (1774–1785). Warren Hastings was born into a noted English family then in reduced circumstances. An uncle paid for his private education, which revealed his brilliance as a scholar. However, his financial situation was such that in 1750 he had no choice but to accept a clerkship in the East India Company's service in Bengal. Over the next fourteen years, the company overthrew the Indian rulers of Bengal and introduced a corrupt "dual government." During this turbulent era, Hastings served as a councilor in Kassimbazar, as Resident at Murshidabad, and ultimately as a member of the Governor's Council in Calcutta. Hastings denounced the rapacity of his fellow agents and the mistreatment of Bengal's indigenous leaders. Disgusted with his compatriots, he went on leave to Britain in 1764, having established a reputation for courage and resourcefulness, as well as for an unrivaled capacity to place duty over personal interest; he had so little enriched himself at the company's and India's expense that he had to borrow the money to pay for his return voyage to India in 1769, when his prior service earned him appointment as second in charge of the company's Council in Madras.

In 1772 Hastings was appointed governor of Bengal, a title expanded to that of governor-general of India by the Regulating Act of 1773. Of the thirty-two British officers to hold that rank, Hastings is one of the very few whose name still inspires admiration among Indians. This recognition is derived from the efforts Hastings made to bridge the cultures of Britain and India; he had quickly mastered Persian, the language of the Indian courts, spoke both Bengali and Urdu, and had some knowledge of Arabic. He used his period of leave in Britain to press for the establishment of a school for the education of the company's servants in Indian languages and culture and sought the creation of a scholarship in Persian at Oxford. He subsequently encouraged research into Arabic studies as well as Sanskrit and Hindu law, and he founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He also supported the translation of the Bhagavad Gītā into English (writing a learned

introduction to the text) and lent support to a fellow Persian and Arabic scholar, Sir William Jones, who identified the historic linguistic link between Sanskrit and Latin.

Hastings's affinity for India influenced his administrative policy. Not long after assuming office as governor of Bengal, the company determined that his government should "stand forth as *dirwan*," ending whatever remained of the *nawāb* of Bengal's authority; the company itself began collecting the revenues of the province, rather than doing so through Indian officials. Hastings complied, but attempted to retain Indian revenue agents, whose work would be supervised by company managers. This arrangement ultimately pleased neither the company's servants nor Indians, but Hastings strove to blend Indian traditions with Western practices when he later reconstituted Bengal's judicial system. Hastings's revenue reforms and his establishment of a cadre of Collectors and Magistrates, backed by courts of civil and criminal appeal, laid the foundation of modern Indian public administration.

Hastings was also instrumental in the preservation of the company's dominions. In the decade spanning 1774 and 1785, the company faced a series of severe challenges at once imperial and regional. Under the provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773, his authority over the company's other provinces was unclear. A simple majority of Hastings own four-man council could, moreover, vote to overrule his actions, an issue so critical that Hastings was forced to resolve it, in part, by fighting a duel with his most bitter council opponent, Philip Francis.

When conflicting financial as well as political relations between the company, the Mughal emperor Shuja-ud-Dawla, the Marathas, and Afghan freebooters (known as Rohillas) threatened the frontiers of Oudh (Awadh), Hastings did not hesitate to intervene, though the territory in question lay beyond the company's domains. The resulting Rohilla War eliminated the Rohillas, strengthened Oudh, and added a crore (ten million) rupees (over £1,000,000) in tribute to the company's coffers. Though a subsequent Parliamentary Committee investigating the war urged Hastings's recall, the company's directors refused to do so.

Ruthless may be the only word to describe the pressure Hastings brought to bear on the Chait Singh, the raja of Benares, to contribute to the company's coffers in order to help defray the costs of conflicts with the Marathas and Mysore, as well as with the French. Chait Singh, however, had also intrigued with Hastings's enemies on his council. Hastings showed no mercy: Chait Singh was ultimately deposed, a nephew installed in his place, and the raja's annual tribute to the company was

raised from 22.5 lakhs, or 2,500,000 rupees (£225,000) to an exorbitant 40 lakhs, or 4 million rupees (£400,000). Hastings employed an equally self-serving interpretation of a previous treaty with the *nawāb* of Oudh to successfully extort funds from the *nawāb*'s mother, the begum of Oudh, which enabled the *nawāb* to pay off his enormous debts to the company.

The First Maratha War from 1775 to 1782 was not of Hastings's making, but he defended the Bombay Council's ill-advised decision to back the young *peshwa* Raghunath Rao, who had turned to them for support against his Maratha rivals. Bombay's early military losses in this cause were later overcome as a result of Hastings's decision to risk sending a brigade of enforcements on a heroic march from Allahabad to Surat in 1779. The performance of these troops and Hastings's skillful diplomacy eventually brought a satisfactory end to the otherwise ill-starred conflict by the Treaty of Salbai in 1782.

Hastings employed the same martial daring and diplomatic skills in dealing with a dangerous alliance of Indian and French forces in the south. The ill-considered policies of the company's servants in Madras had provoked a war with a dangerous coalition of forces led by Hyder Ali Khan of Mysore and the nizam of Hyderabad in 1779. The timing of this conflict was unfortunate, for it coincided with a revolt in Britain's North American colonies, which had evolved into a global war with France and its allies in Europe. France was thus eager to exploit the turbulence in South India. It offered the support of its naval forces in the Bay of Bengal to Haidar Ali and the nizam's forces when they defeated a company army in the Carnatic and occupied its capital, Arcot.

Though then fully occupied by the struggle against the Marathas, Hastings effectively dealt with the deteriorating situation in the south. After suspending the company's governor in Madras and persuading the raja of Berar and Mahadaji Scindhia to break with the enemy alliance, Hastings launched fresh offensive operations in the Carnatic, supported by reinforcements that successfully marched from Bengal to Madras. Hastings's diplomacy and bold military strokes led to the Peace of Mangalore in 1784. This treaty stipulated little more than a mutual cession of conquests, but by the time of its signing, France's chief potential ally and the linchpin of any southern alliance, the nizam of Hyderabad, was firmly in the company's camp.

With the company's territory and revenues secure and with the British government committed to fresh Indian legislation (the Regulating Act of 1784), which he did not support, Hastings resigned his office in 1785. On his return to Britain, he sought only to cultivate his garden in Windsor, but his old enemy Philip Francis joined a host of British

politicians to secure Hastings's impeachment by Parliament in 1787. His trial commenced the following year. Among his accusers were Edmund Burke, Richard B. Sheridan, and Charles James Fox, whose principal charge was Hastings's extortion of funds from the begums of Oudh.

The length of the trial (145 days over seven years—the longest in British history) worked in Hastings favor, as did the dignity with which Hastings managed his defense and the common knowledge that Hastings had derived only a modest fortune from his long service to the company. He was acquitted of all charges in April 1795. The company soon restored his finances, which were decimated by the cost of the trial. The prince regent offered him a peerage in 1806, but the government withheld its assent when Hastings made the revocation of his bill of impeachment a condition of his acceptance. He was, however, greeted with a standing ovation when he attended Parliament to offer testimony during the debate over the renewal of the company's charter in 1813, and he was made a privy counselor the following year.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj**

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HEALTH CARE At least seven different systems of medicine function in India. Professional skills in some traditional systems are acquired through apprenticeship, and the right to practice is formalized by becoming a registered medical practitioner (RMP) with the relevant board, council, or association. Hence, most Indians move freely from one type of medical science to another. Nevertheless, allopathic (Western) medicine is predominant in the country. It is financed and managed by both public and private sectors. The former is free of charge to the poor, and of nominal cost to all others. It accounts for approximately 18 percent of the overall health spending and 0.9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Responsibilities are shared by local, central (federal), and state governments. The latter provides the services. The central government sustains about 25 percent of public expenses. It focuses on developing and monitoring national standards and regulations, linking states with funding agencies, and sponsoring schemes for implementation by state governments.



High-Tech Cardiac Assessment at the Fortis Hospital, Chandigarh, Punjab. Though this institute provides world-class care, in partnership with several renowned Western hospitals, such medicine is largely unavailable to most Indians, who remain reliant on India's public health infrastructure—a system plagued by obsolete equipment, overcrowded and run-down facilities, lacking services and health-care professionals. DINESH KHANNA.

Remarkable achievements have been made since independence in 1947. Life expectancy rose from 36.7 to 64.6 years. Eradication of smallpox (1981) and Guinea worm (2000) accompanied steep declines in *kala azar* (black fever), leprosy, malaria, and polio. The number of doctors increased from 61,800 to 503,900, and nurses from 18,054 to 737,000. By 1991 the country had 22,400 primary health centers, 11,200 hospitals, and 27,400 dispensaries. These facilities form a tiered system that funnels complicated cases into urban hospitals while providing routine treatment in the countryside. By the 1990s the country had approximately 10 hospital beds per 10,000 individuals, a threefold growth in ten years, and 128 medical colleges, a 300 percent increase since 1950.

However, the per capita expenditure on public health in India is half that of other comparable countries. Only 23 percent of Indians have safe drinking water because of inadequate spending on related subjects like hygiene and sanitation. Similarly, little is invested in preventing the

adulteration of foodstuffs or controlling pollution. Furthermore, the poorest 20 percent of the population have more than double the rates of mortality, malnutrition, and fertility in comparison with the richest quintile. A 1995–1996 national survey also revealed that tobacco intake and alcohol abuse were highest in the lowest quintile. The plight of the estimated 90 million disabled has, likewise, received little attention.

Health-Care Sectors

The government sector. The cornerstone of the government's health-care system, especially in the countryside, where 72 percent of Indians live, is the primary health center (PHC), as based on the recommendations of the Bhore Committee (1946). The following guiding principles of the committee remain the basis of the government's medical organization for the country:

- No individual should lack access to medical care because of inability to pay for it.

- Special emphasis on preventive methods, and on communicable diseases.
- The establishment of a primary health unit (center) per 10,000–20,000 population with 75 beds, 6 doctors, and an equal number of public health nurses.
- Provide one bed per 175 people, one doctor per 1,600, and one nurse per 600 citizens.
- Build 650 bed hospitals at *taluka* (300,000 people) level and a 2,500 bed hospital in each district (3 million population).
- No patent protection for pharmaceutical products.
- Fifteen percent of government expenditure on health care.

Slow economic growth, rapid rise in population, and shifts in government priorities were acknowledged fifteen years later by the Mudaliar Committee. Accordingly, the goals of the Bhore Committee were essentially halved: the ratio of PHCs was decreased to one per 40,000 people; the bed strength reduced to one bed per 1,000; and the ratio of doctors was one per 3,000. The committee also recommended that the central government build one medical college per 5 million people. Bowing to international pressure, process patent protection for up to ten years for pharmaceuticals was instituted. The committee was the first to examine the other systems of medicine in the country, and concluded that it was too early to integrate them. The Jain Committee (1966) concentrated on enhancing maternity facilities, enlarging health insurance coverage, and augmenting resources by increasing fees for services. Social activism was an important feature of the Srivastava Committee (1975). It recommended compulsory service for two years at a PHC for every doctor between the fifth and fifteenth year of a physician's career. It also proposed the creation of a Medical and Health Education Commission. Fifteen years after the Mudaliar Committee, Srivastava suggested selective integration of different health systems.

Decline in public expenditure on health was a major concern for the Indian Council of Medical Research-Indian Council of Social Science Research Joint Panel (1980). Consequently, it advocated that 6 percent of the gross national product be spent on medical services. The National Health Policy (1983) aimed for universal primary health coverage by encouraging greater participation of private practitioners and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with the public sector and the utilization of village-based workers to treat simple ailments. Similarly, the National Population Policy (2000) sought comprehensive reproductive and child health care through the collaboration of the government with NGOs and the private sector. Further decentralization of planning and program implementation was intended by involving community groups and *panchayati raj* institutions. (*Panchayats* are

autonomous village councils with administrative, civic, judicial, and social responsibilities. Over 270,000 elected *panchayats* are currently operational.)

An important feature of rural health care is the specific “camps” organized by medical colleges, NGOs, and charitable hospitals. Fully self-contained camps are set up for three to five days. Doctors operate on cataracts, fix bones, provide plastic surgery for cleft lip, and so forth. Usually held in winter, when days are short and crisp and working hours long and exhilarating, camps have a festive air about them. In some parts of the country they are a regular feature, and villagers eagerly await their return.

Despite years of planning, the public health infrastructure is modest because of insufficient funding. Hence, hospital equipment is often obsolescent or unusable, buildings dilapidated and overcrowded, and the availability of essential medications, capricious. Furthermore, chronic scarcity in specialties like anesthesiology and radiology results in critical deficiencies in public health services. Nursing care is inadequate, for there is a very low ratio of nursing personnel to doctors and beds. Low staff morale is reflected in poor quality of service and absenteeism. These problems are compounded by inadequate mobilization of private practitioners and NGOs and an excessive focus on sterilization to meet family planning targets.

The private sector. India's reliance on private spending on health is among the highest in the world. Accordingly, primary, secondary, and tertiary care is offered principally through independent practitioners. This sector is largely unregulated and little constrained by medico-legal considerations. For instance, Indians receive three times as many injections (3.4 per year) as Western patients because it is more lucrative for the physician to administer injections than to prescribe oral medicines. About 40 percent of Indians borrow money or sell assets to pay for hospitalization. The private sector accounts for 78 percent of overall expenditure on health and 4.5 percent of GDP.

Civil society. Since the 1980s, increased participation by NGOs and other civil institutions has considerably improved the implementation of national disease control programs. In addition, civil activists and voluntary organizations stimulate awareness and debate on various health issues and take major initiatives in preventive medicine and disaster relief. NGOs are prominent in funding rural camps.

Health insurance. About 15 percent of Indians enjoy some form of health insurance, whether social or private. The latter is small. The largest such insurer, Mediciam, has a mere 2.5 million subscribers. Social plans such as

Employee State Insurance Scheme and Central Government Health Scheme cover another 30 million. Comprehensive health care is also provided to government employees, active or retired, and their dependents. Large companies do the same.

A remarkable success is the ESI Act (Employees' State Insurance) of 1948. ESI is an integrated need-based insurance that provides maternity leave, financial assistance for both temporary and permanent physical disability, vocational rehabilitation, and wages for survivors of workers killed due to employment injury. Factories with at least ten workers and companies with twenty or more employees are covered by the act. By March 2001, there were 238,486 companies in the program. Its hospitals, dispensaries, and other services are efficient and well run. Its beneficiaries are almost 33 million workers and their families. However, the urban and rural poor rely largely on the public health system outlined earlier.

External assistance. South Asia receives the lowest official development assistance per capita in the world, and less than 7 percent of it goes to the health sector. Assistance was largely in family planning, maternity care, and child health. Except for the eradication of malaria and leprosy, other disease control programs received scant consideration. Since 1995, external assistance increased partly in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the rise of other communicable diseases. Another factor was the decision of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to participate in programs with "a human face." The latter sought collaboration with the International Development Association (IDA) to establish nationwide surveillance of quality controls for foods and drugs.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the only agency whose funding is outside normal budgetary mechanisms. This flexibility allows WHO to focus on disaster relief, tobacco control, and identification of parameters that increase the responsiveness of health systems to the needs of the poor.

The United Nations (UN) advocates the privilege of good health as one of the fundamental rights of every human being. In India, the UN has largely limited itself to a global fund for the control of communicable diseases.

The G-8 governments (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States) are assisting with clean water and sanitation projects. The governments also work on mutually satisfactory arrangements for the pharmaceutical industries in India and in the G-8 countries to promote the availability and affordability of lifesaving medicines.

Indian communities abroad are active in donating medicines and equipment, and setting up hospitals and clinics in India. In addition, doctors return to the country to teach, train, and provide specialized services.

India has bilateral health arrangements with a number of countries. USAID supports three major bilateral projects: HIV/AIDS in Tamil Nadu, population control in Uttar Pradesh, and the establishment of the National Institute of Biologicals for the quality assurance of vaccines. Similarly, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency is setting up a children's hospital in Delhi and collaborating on basic research on cholera. Various European and Canadian agencies are active as well.

Key Health Issues in India

Communicable diseases. The resurgence of communicable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis and the emergence of new infections like HIV/AIDS, new strains of cholera, and different forms of viral hepatitis pose serious challenges to India. The following infections greatly impact the country's ecology and economy:

Malaria. Increased insecticide resistance has developed in malarial vectors. The long-term impact of chemical insecticides on the food chain and ecology is a matter of great concern. Meanwhile, the incidence of the more deadly P-Falciparum malaria has risen by about 50 percent.

Tuberculosis. South Asia is home to about 38 percent of tuberculosis patients worldwide. There are 2.5 million new cases and 600,000 deaths annually. There is also a growing threat of coinfection with HIV/AIDS. The financial and human cost is obvious.

HIV/AIDS. Eight million Indians may be infected, but estimates vary widely.

Waterborne diseases. The common waterborne infections—gastroenteritis, cholera, and some forms of hepatitis—contribute to high levels of morbidity in the population. Recent reports of chemical contamination of underground water, especially in West Bengal, may cause significant medical problems in the future.

Disaster relief. Fifty million Indians suffer drought each year. Half as many are flooded annually. In addition, cyclones, earthquakes, and natural and manmade disasters strike millions. In 1980 a Health Sector Emergency Preparedness and Response Program was finally established. Clearly more work remains to be done.

Generic drugs and vaccines. Low-priced indigenously manufactured generic drugs and vaccines are widely available. Both globalization and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights System are likely to result in an increased cost of drugs. India's leading role in software

development and computer sciences may keep the costs low by triggering innovations in the development, testing, and marketing of new medications. Costs may fall by 50 to 70 percent from the current average of U.S.\$250–500 million per development of a new drug, and the lead time from the discovery of a drug to its introduction in the marketplace may decline from twelve years to five. Development of vaccines may be even cheaper, with a shortened lead time. The ongoing Indo–U.S. collaboration in the development of an AIDS vaccine may be the first of many such undertakings.

Geriatric care. Geriatric care is expected to rise substantially as a result of increased life expectancy, breakdown of the extended family, pressures on the nuclear family, and increased urbanization.

Health research. The Indian Council of Medical Research was established in 1911. For more than ninety years, health research in India faced the same two major problems: low spending on research (\$300 million in both public and private sectors in 2001); and neglect by international pharmaceutical companies of medical research on therapeutic drugs and vaccines for tropical diseases because of their limited profitability.

Information, education, and communications. Initiatives are needed for the dissemination of the evolving curative guidelines for diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, leprosy, cataract blindness, as well as for bringing about behavioral changes to prevent HIV/AIDS and other lifestyle diseases.

Lifestyle diseases. Since the 1980s, there is a noticeable increase in mortality through lifestyle diseases such as diabetes, obesity, infirmities associated with cigarette smoking, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases.

Macro- and micro-nutrient deficiencies. The persistence of macro- and micro-nutrient deficiencies, especially among women and children, leads to chronic morbidity. Deficiencies have a multiplier effect, as they result in a higher incidence of low birth weight babies, which in turn causes both mental and physical retardation.

Mental health. Patients are usually confined to mental hospitals, and drug therapy is the rule. Psychotherapy and rehabilitation still have a limited role in the management of these patients. On the other hand, Indian society is generally tolerant of its “eccentrics and lunatics.”

Noncommunicable diseases. Over 10 percent of urban Indians have coronary artery disease. Since the 1970s, the average age of the first heart attack in India has decreased by ten years, and about 50 percent of all heart attacks in Indian males occur under the age of 55, with 25 percent under the age of 40. These striking

statistics are unheard of in any other population. Similarly, the incidence of strokes and hypertension has increased dramatically during the past thirty years.

Population control. During the twentieth century, India's population increased from 238 million to more than 1 billion despite almost fifty years of attempts at population control; it was the first country in the world (1952) to launch a national program for family planning. However, following excesses committed during the 1975 emergency, the program was not vigorously pursued. Nevertheless, the total fertility rate fell from 6.0 in 1951 to 3.3 in 1997. Consequently, the National Population Policy (2000) reaffirmed the government's commitment to voluntary and informed population control, and set the ambitious target of achieving net replacement levels of population by 2010.

Preventive medicine. In the late 1990s the central government adopted an integrated Non-Communicable Diseases program. It consisted mainly of health education for citizens and the development of protocols for training physicians in preventive medicine.

Trauma. Increase in trauma caused by violence (political, domestic or otherwise), traffic crashes, industrial accidents, or natural calamities is a significant burden on the health-care systems. As elsewhere, women and children bear the brunt of it.

Vaccine-preventable diseases. Infections such as measles, diphtheria, and whooping cough still pose significant risks to children. While efforts to eradicate polio have made tremendous progress in India, there were still 268 cases in 2001.

Traditional Systems of Medicine

In March 1995 the Department of Indian System of Medicine and Homeopathy was established in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. It gave belated recognition to traditional systems of Indian medicine that provide at least 40 percent of health care in the country, especially among the poor and in rural areas. By setting up a separate department, the government sought to improve cooperation among the various systems of medicine, and to better regulate the traditional ones.

These systems are generally geared toward the treatment of simple or chronic ailments. The scientific basis of therapy lies in restoration of the balance between the patient, biofactors (nature, ecology), and body humors (secretions). Hence, the systems are holistic and oriented toward lifestyle instead of focusing on specific organs or diseases. Surgical intervention and diagnostic tests are few. Medicines are invariably cheap, derived from natural sources, and have few side effects.

Āyurveda is the largest of the traditional Indian systems of medicine. Its origins lie in two of the four Vedas: the Rig Veda and the Atharva Veda (c. 1400–600 B.C.). About sixty ancient treatises form the corpus of Āyurvedic knowledge. The two most prominent texts are the Caraka Samhita and the Susruta Samhita, ascribed respectively to the eponymous Caraka, a physician, and Susruta, a plastic surgeon. Susruta reputedly trained under the legendary Dhanvantari at Kashi (Varanasi), the traditional center for surgical expertise in India. Dhanvantari is acknowledged as the “father of Indian medicine.” Related to Āyurveda are Siddha (a Tamil version) and naturopathy (which relies on diets prescribed in Āyurveda). The practitioner is called *vaidya*, and the profession was formerly hereditary. Modern Āyurveda still emphasizes its eight traditional disciplines of *kayachikitsa* (internal medicine), *salya tantra* (surgery), *salakya* (ear, nose, and throat), *kaumarabhrtya* (pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynecology), *bhutvidya* (psychiatry), *agada tantra* (toxicology), *rasayana tantra* (nutrition, rejuvenation, geriatrics) and *vajikarana* (sexology). The universal and timeless applicability of these subjects is a tribute to the ongoing relevance of this ancient system of medicine. By the twenty-first century there were 98 colleges of Āyurvedic medicine in India.

Three other systems—Unani, homeopathy, and Tibetan medicine—are from non-Indian sources. Unani is Greek in origin, founded on Galenic concepts of good health being dependent on the balance of four humors (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile). Seventeen colleges operate in India. Its practitioners are known as *bakims*. Homeopathy originated in Germany. Treatment is based on empiric observations that highly diluted matter often relieves symptoms caused by that very substance in its concentrated form. For instance, repeated small bites by poisonous snakes protect snake charmers from death following a severe bite. Education is imparted by 132 colleges. With more than 182,000 practitioners, homeopathy is the second-largest system in India. Tibetan medicine resembles Āyurveda. It was established in India in 1961 after the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to India.

Medical Services as an International Industry

India reportedly attracts approximately 100,000 patients from abroad every year, as certain hospitals provide international standards of care at affordable prices. The Apollo group, India's largest chain (38 hospitals) pioneered the concept by establishing state-of-the-art medical facilities in India's metropolitan centers and other large towns like Pune, Kochi, and Ahmedabad. Most hospitals are also linked to good hotels and shopping centers, which cater to the families of patients. By

2003 the Confederation of Indian Industry, sensing commercial opportunities, became actively involved, offering Indian facilities to Britain's beleaguered National Health Service as a low cost, expeditious alternative for British patients.

The prices of Indian health care are quite low. For instance, heart surgery costs U.S.\$8,000 in India, compared to \$30,000 in the United States; liver transplantation, which is \$300,000 in the United States, is \$45,000 in India; similarly, orthopedic surgery is generally available for a tenth to a third of its price in the West.

Both the Indian government and the private sector are active in the growing global telemedical services. Telemedicine was initially available in radiology, cardiology, and pathology. Advances in technology have added electronic stethoscopy, ophthalmoscopy, and spirometry.

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See also **Āyurveda; Health Care for Tourists**

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HEALTH CARE FOR TOURISTS By the new millennium, there was a substantial increase in travel to India. Further growth is anticipated as the country opens up its economy and develops more tourist facilities. In addition, trips to South Asia by the Indian diaspora are expected to rise. For travel to India, all foreigners, including those from Commonwealth countries, are required to have a valid passport and an appropriate (entry, transit, or tourist) visa obtained abroad from an Indian mission. Tourist visas are generally valid for 120 days from the date of issue. Though directed toward U.S. citizens, a useful precaution prior to departure is to check the travel warnings posted on the U.S. State Department's web site,

<www.travel.state.gov/travel_warnings.html>. The International Society of Travel Medicine's web site, <www.istm.org>, is also useful.

Precautions before Travel

Medical insurance. Most medical insurances do not cover health-related expenses incurred abroad or the cost of medical evacuation from overseas, unless such specific coverage is purchased before travel. This is particularly true of U.S. Medicare and Medicaid. However, most travel agencies and health insurance companies offer plans for medical coverage during foreign trips.

Vaccinations. Four to six weeks should be allowed for certain vaccinations to take full effect. The following vaccinations should be obtained before leaving for India:

1. Hepatitis A, or immune globulin (IG).
2. Hepatitis B, if exposure to blood (for example, health-care workers), sexual contact with the local population, or a stay longer than six months is anticipated. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children who did not receive it as infants.
3. Japanese encephalitis, only if visits to certain rural areas for four weeks or more are planned.
4. Rabies, if exposure to wild or domestic animals through work or recreation is anticipated.
5. Typhoid vaccination is important because *S. typhi* strains in the region are resistant to multiple antibiotics.
6. As needed, booster doses for tetanus, diphtheria, and measles, and a one-time dose of polio for adults. In 1998, 75 percent of all polio cases in the world occurred in India. The incidence has dropped dramatically following the massive vaccination programs carried out in the country since then.

There is no risk for yellow fever in the Indian subcontinent. A certificate of yellow fever vaccination is required for entry into India if the visitor is coming from certain countries in South America or sub-Saharan Africa, where yellow fever is endemic.

Dental care. Dental appointments should be scheduled early enough to allow time for the completion of necessary or outstanding dental work before departure. Decayed teeth and broken fillings should be tended to and teeth cleaned. Consideration should be given to the removal of partially exposed lower wisdom teeth, especially if a long trip is envisaged. The fleshy covering over such teeth creates a food cap that can cause pericoronitis, a potentially serious infection. Similarly, all root canal

treatment should be completed before travel. On the other hand, most Indian cities have well-trained, well-equipped dentists in private practice. The fees are much smaller than in the West.

Medications. All medications should be properly labeled. Copies of prescriptions, especially narcotics, with a letter from the prescribing doctor identifying such medications, could prove helpful should security or customs officials raise questions about them.

First-aid kits. First-aid kits for travelers are commercially available in most developed countries. The cost varies from U.S.\$10.00 to ten times as much, as does weight and size. The kit should contain antacids, analgesics, antibacterial ointments, antidiarrheals (as tablets), antihistamines, antiseptics (including towelettes), calamine lotion, bandages (adhesive, butterfly, and elastic), corticosteroid creams (low-dose emollients are most cost effective), cotton-tipped applicators, hypodermic needles (nonluer lock are more versatile), insect repellants, moleskin (for blisters), waterproof adhesive tapes, oral rehydration salts, single-edged razor blades, sharp scissors, sterile small syringes (nonluer lock, 1 and 3 ml), thermometer (digitals are less fragile, but have limitations), tick-remover forceps, and tweezers. Kits should be packed in the checked-in baggage as most contain sharp metallic objects like razor blades and will not be cleared by airport security. An emergency smoke hood can be carried into the cabin.

Air travel and its medical effects. Air travel is the most common means of transportation to India. Deep vein thrombosis (DVT), jet lag, and motion sickness are the most common medical conditions resulting from long-distance jet travel. DVT, "coach class syndrome," is increasingly common and affects all ages. Most airlines therefore provide instructions on in-seat ankle exercises to minimize the risk. Immobility, cramped seating and dehydration further contribute to DVT. Hence, compression stockings, avoidance of alcohol, consumption of plenty of fluids, and regular walks around the cabin are useful in preventing DVT. An alternative to water is a fluid expander like CeraLyte, which prevents jet lag as well.

Jet lag is caused by the alteration in the endogenous rhythms of the body vis-à-vis environmental changes, especially time. Hence a six-hour journey in the same meridian—for instance, travel from North to South America—is much less likely to cause jet lag than the six-hour trip across five time zones. Travel from west to east appears to worsen jet lag more than a trip in the opposite direction. Reduced output of the regulatory hormone, melatonin, is considered an important underlying factor.

Other factors, like the dehydrated cabin air, older age, night flights, and consumption of alcoholic and caffeinated beverages, also contribute to jet lag. The most common symptoms are increased fatigue and irritability, disturbed sleep patterns, and loss of concentration. The incidence and severity of jet lag is reduced by taking melatonin (3–5 mg), a high-fiber diet, and liberal intake of fruit juices and drinks that contain electrolytes, like Gatorade and CeraLyte. Melatonin is available without prescription at pharmacies and health-food stores.

Pacemaker malfunction does not occur in modern pressurized and insulated airplanes. Most long-range aircraft carry defibrillators for resuscitating the stopped heart resulting from acute myocardial infarction (heart attack). Motion sickness is caused by irritation of the middle or inner ear, and/or the brain stem. It is treated by prescription medicines and may be alleviated by getting a seat in the center of the cabin. Avoiding unnecessary head and eye movements (as when watching television or reading) and abstinence from alcohol and caffeinated drinks further reduces its severity and incidence.

The International Commission on Radiation Protection calculated that air crews, after twenty-five years of regular flying, have a risk of radiation-related malignancies of 25.5–26 percent, as compared with a 25 percent risk in the rest of the population. Hence, radiation is a very small hazard. There is also the unlikely possibility of picking up infections, ranging from the common cold to tuberculosis.

At landing, aircraft are usually disinfected using 2.9 percent d-phenothrin spray. Passengers wearing contact lens should keep their eyes closed during disinfection.

Common illnesses. The most common concern is travelers' diarrhea ("Delhi belly"). About 50 percent of travelers are stricken with this illness. It is caused by a variety of different viruses, bacteria, toxins, and parasites. The most frequent etiology is certain strains of the bacteria *E. coli*. The onset is usually within the first week of arrival in India. The diarrhea is often associated with nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, bloating, low-grade fever, urgency, and malaise. Most cases resolve in a few days without treatment. The most commonly prescribed antibiotics are Quinolones, Trimethoprim-Sulfamethoxazole (Bactrim), and Azithromycin (Zithromax). Antidiarrheals, such as Diphenoxylate (Lomotil) and Loperamide (Imodium), may be judiciously used to reduce the frequency of stools and to prevent dehydration. The safe and simple compound Pepto Bismol, a binding agent that neutralizes toxins and solidifies stools, is recommended for both prevention and cure of symptoms. If the diarrhea is bloody,

severe, or accompanied by chills and high fever, medical attention should be immediately sought.

To prevent travelers' diarrhea, it is advisable to avoid consuming foods or beverages from street vendors and other places where unhygienic conditions may be present. In addition, raw or undercooked meat, seafood, and raw fruits and vegetables, unless they can be peeled or thoroughly washed, should be avoided. Furthermore, tap water, ice, unpasteurized milk and dairy products increase the risk of travelers' diarrhea. Safe liquids include bottled beverages, hot tea and coffee, beer, wine, and sealed bottled water.

Other common illnesses are respiratory tract infection or inflammation, and dengue, a flulike illness occasionally complicated by bleeding. Much rarer are exotic infections like filariasis, Japanese encephalitis, leishmaniasis, leptospirosis, and the plague. All these diseases are transmitted by insects. Accordingly, protection against the relevant insect bites is an important precaution while traveling in India.

If visits to the Himalayas are planned, then gradual ascent above 10,000 feet is desirable to allow the body to adjust to high altitudes. At higher elevations the early symptoms of illness are insomnia, headaches, and nausea. Later, high-altitude sickness characterized by shortness of breath and accumulation of fluid in the lungs can develop. In addition, it is prudent to use sunblock rated at least 15 SPF, because the risk of sunburn is greater at high altitudes.

Health maintenance. In addition to washing hands with soap and running water after meals and morning ablutions, the visitor should take the following precautions:

1. Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, the water can be purified by filtering it through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter and adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. Both filters and iodine tablets are available from camping supply stores.
2. Consume thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables that can be thoroughly washed or peeled. A useful axiom: boil it, cook it, peel it, wash it thoroughly, or forget it. An exception: sealed "comfort foods" brought into the country by the visitor.
3. Malaria prophylaxis should be undertaken throughout the year, regardless of official guidelines and recommendations. Medications should be taken before, during, and after travel. The commonly

prescribed medicine, Chloroquine, is not effective in the Indian subcontinent. Instead, mefloquine (Lariam), atovaquone/proguanil (Malarone), or doxycycline is recommended. Malarone is used most often as a once daily dose, starting two days before arrival, and continuing through the trip and for seven days after departure from India.

4. Take protection from mosquito and insect bites by:
 - Paying special attention to mosquito protection between dusk and dawn, the period when the type of mosquito-bearing malaria is most active.
 - Wearing long-sleeved shirts, long pants, and hats.
 - Using insect repellents that contain DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide). For adults, a 25 to 35 percent preparation is available. For children, a 10 percent compound is adequate. DEET should not be used for children under two years of age because of the risk of neurological toxicity.
 - Applying insect repellent to exposed skin but not putting it on wounds or broken skin.
 - Not breathing, swallowing, or getting repellents into the eyes (DEET is toxic if swallowed). If using a spray, apply DEET to the face by spraying it on hands and rubbing the product over the face, avoiding eyes and mouth.
 - Unless housing is air-conditioned or well-screened, using a bed net with a mesh size of less than 1.5 millimeters. The net should be impregnated with the insecticide permethrin or deltamethrin. Spray the bed net with one of these insecticides if pre-treated nets are not obtainable.
 - Protecting infants by using a carrier draped with mosquito netting with an elastic edge for a tight fit.
 - Children under ten years old should not apply insect repellent themselves.
 - Using tweezers or forceps for grasping and removing the head of ticks from humans. Most tick-borne illnesses can be prevented by prompt removal of the head of the insect.
5. To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.
6. Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other sexually transmitted diseases.
7. Avoid swimming in freshwater lakes and rivers. Salt-water is usually safer.

Medical facilities. Adequate to excellent medical care is available in major population centers, but services are usually limited in rural areas. Pharmacies are present even in small towns and most larger villages. The Indian pharmaceutical industry is the fourth largest in the world, and most of the latest medications are easily obtainable. The cost of a visiting doctor is low (about \$2.00) in the countryside. On the other hand, traffic

safety and road conditions, especially in the countryside, are a major health hazard as regulations regarding safety of public transportation are lax; maintenance of roads is poor, and availability of roadside assistance, negligible. Consequently, the capital, New Delhi, despite its slow-moving traffic, experiences more than two thousand road deaths annually.

Terrorism and crime. Petty crime, especially theft of personal property, is not uncommon. But violent crime, including rape, is rare. Areas of instability and terrorism, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeast of the country, may expose the visitor to unexpected and sporadic violence, civil disturbances, and kidnapping. In any case, most of these regions are restricted for foreign travelers.

Medical tourism. India reportedly attracts approximately 100,000 patients from abroad every year, as certain hospitals provide international standards of care at affordable prices. The Apollo group pioneered the establishment of state-of-the-art medical facilities in India's four largest metropolitan cities and other big towns like Pune, Kochi, and Ahmedabad. The group, India's largest, operates 38 hospitals and has opened information centers in key foreign countries to attract medical tourists. Other well-known hospitals that attract medical tourists include the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in Delhi; Escorts Heart Institute, also in Delhi; the Madras Institute of Orthopedics and Traumatology in Chennai; the Rabindranath Tagore International Institute of Cardiac Sciences in Kolkata; and the Hinduja Hospital, Mumbai. In general, these hospitals have created connections with good hotels and shopping centers to cater to the needs and comforts of the families of patients. In 2003 the Confederation of Indian Industry, sensing commercial opportunities offered by medical tourism, sent a delegation, led by a prominent heart surgeon, to negotiate with Britain's National Health Service to provide low cost and expeditious health care to British patients. The figures for using India as a destination for health care are compelling. For instance, heart surgery costs U.S.\$8,000 in India as compared to \$30,000 in the United States; liver transplantation is \$45,000 in India, in contrast to \$300,000 in the United States; similarly, orthopedic surgery is generally available for a tenth to a third of the price. The expense of certain operations is remarkably cheaper; for instance, cataract surgery, at \$1,500 in the United States, is performed for \$12 in India. The growth of similar facilities in smaller cities is likely, if small hospitals (100 beds and under) are given the same tax exemptions enjoyed by the larger ones. Traditional Indian strengths in Ayurveda, yoga, naturopathy, and other alternative medicines continue to attract an increasing following as well.

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 <<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/indianrg.htm>>
 <<http://www.mdtravelhealth.com/destinations/asia/india.html>>
 <<http://www.passporthealthusa.com>>
 <<http://www.traveldoctoronline.net/regions/india.htm>>

HIMALAYAS. *See* **Geography.**

HINDI. *See* **Languages and Scripts.**

HINDU ANCESTOR RITUALS Among contemporary world religions, Hinduism has the oldest and most elaborate complex of ancestor rituals. The Rig Veda and Atharva Veda (c. 1200–1000 B.C.) include hymns for both inhumation burial and cremation, with verses indicating construction of a mound or marker of earth or stone, and rituals performed by mourners on behalf of both the living and the deceased. Two or three centuries later, Brāhmaṇa texts describe a *citi* (mound) to be erected on the *śbmashāna* (burning and burial ground) as replica of the *agnicayana* Shrauta sacrifice, a cosmic soma ritual that the deceased had performed with a thousand bricks to create an altar of fire and regenerate the world. Such commemoration entitled this elite householder, who had maintained the requisite three ritual fires in his home until he was cremated by them, to enter *svarga* (heaven) with a new *tanu* (body), hopefully to remain immortal. In the course of time, during the first millennium B.C., the Shrauta, Grihya, and Pitrimedha Sūtras detailed a full-fledged cult of ancestors known as *śbrāddha* (from *śraddhā* “faith”), a ritual system still in place today, reinforced by post-Vedic texts such as Dharma Shāstras, Purāṇas, and manuals compiled by ritual authorities over many centuries of changing doctrines.

These manuals on death and the nurture of ancestors are concerned first with the disposition of the body in *antyeshti*, the “final sacrifice.” Second, because the belief that a new body awaited the deceased in heaven no longer prevailed, there had to be ritual construction of a temporary body for the disembodied “spirit” (*preta*) in its brief passage into the status of “ancestor” (*pitri*, literally, “father,” whether male or female). Third, after the deceased had become a *pitri*, located in an otherworldly realm of ancestors, a systematic program of rituals was necessary to nurture that ancestor during all stages of advancement toward another rebirth. All of this proceeds from the doctrines of karma and *samsāra* that emerged with a new worldview in the early Upanishads. These late Vedic texts distinguish between the *pitriyāna* (path of

ancestors), which leads to the moon, an abode from which the departed return to earth and a new existence, and the *devayāna* (path of gods), which goes to the sun without return or rebirth. The moon retains an important cosmic role in ancestor rites today, as do the moral implications regarding the effect of action (karma) upon the fate of the deceased in rebirth (*samsāra*).

The first feature of these manuals regarding death and ancestors is disposal of the now useless old body, ordinarily by cremation on the day of death or the following one. Some communities always bury their dead, however, and suicides, victims of accidents, snakebites, or epidemic disease, as well as small children—all the untimely dead—may either be buried or given to a river, the same disposal being true also for certain ascetics and saints.

The second concern of ritual handbooks turns to *śbrāddha* and the assembly of an invisible body by means of *piṇḍas*, balls of cooked rice or barley, offered along with water and sesame for ten successive days (often abbreviated today). Parallel to ten lunar months of human gestation and ten days of a special fire in the birth room after delivery of a child, these rituals create a transitional body, beginning with the head and ending with digestive powers. On the eleventh day a set of sixteen *śbrāddhas* may be done to satisfy the deceased for one year. *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa*, the moment of blending a *piṇḍa* of the deceased with those representing ancestors, is a dramatic twelfth-day event. Presentations of cooking utensils, clothing, a bed, personal items, money, and enough raw food for a year to a priestly surrogate, a Brahman of degraded status due to the pollution of death, is all for the satisfaction of the still-watchful deceased. It is essential that the surrogate and his relatives are seen to eat cooked food meant for the deceased. The same Brahmans will prepare and eat the supply of raw food during the presumed year-long journey of the deceased to the other world. Several Purāṇas describe this emigration to the kingdom of Yama, lord of the dead, as arduous. To cross the dread river Vaitarani the deceased must hold onto the tail of a gracious cow, formerly sacrificed, but in modern times simply rented for a ritual moment.

The third feature of *śbrāddha* takes over following the twelfth day (a symbolic year), with the vulnerable *preta* safely transformed by rituals into a secure *pitri*. The danger of a troublesome, dissatisfied ghost has been overcome. Although not all will be so dutiful, kinfolk may now perform offerings (*tarpaṇa*) as one of five daily sacrifices (*mahāyajñas*) and special monthly rites (*māsika*) on new-moon day (*amāvāsyā*). Certainly all will observe the death anniversary (*pratyaḍdika*). The recently deceased has joined a company of three generations of ancestors, often understood as dwelling in three hierarchical companies of deities, Vasus, Rudras, and Ādityas, located respectively on earth, in midspace, and in heaven. Men are assumed

into the lineage of a deceased father, father's father, and father's paternal grandfather. Ritual authorities vary regarding a married woman, with advocates for the maternal lineage of her father or her husband being two alternatives. In any case, three generations of ancestors require gratification in the form of rice, sesame, water, and mantras or *shlokas* in return for favors in health, prosperity, and longevity of descendants. Beyond the three nearest generations are remote ancestors, dwelling with the Vishvedevas (All-gods). They require little in the way of food, only rice that sticks to the fingers after *piṇḍas* are offered to the closer kin. It could be said that ancestors of the fourth generation and beyond need only minimal sustenance as they dissolve toward rebirth.

Once a year, in a dark lunar fortnight, *pitris* are invited collectively for Mahālayā in Bhādrapada (August–September) and Pitripaksha in Āshvina (September–October), festivals not unlike All Hallow's Eve (Halloween), the night before All Saints' Day (November 1 in the Christian calendar). The mid-January solstice festival of Saṅkrānti is another time to honor ancestors. A personal or family choice may be to travel to a pilgrimage center on a sacred river—Varanasi on the Ganges, for example, or Nasik on the Godavari, Shrirangam or Thanjavur on the Kaveri—to immerse bone and tooth fragments preserved from ashes of the cremation pyre, if not already dispersed in a local river. Deposition in a sacred river is meritorious to the deceased and may determine a more positive status in the next life.

As with other long-standing religions with multiple choices for religious expression, Hinduism displays considerable variation regarding the actual location of a person after death. Doctrines and practices shift, particularly with regard to sectarian, regional and textual differences, and modern life has diluted attention to rituals. Yet there is astonishing consistency in rituals of death and veneration of ancestors over the past twenty-five or more centuries, and Hindus—not only the most ritually dedicated families—are remarkably devoted to and dependent upon the generations who have gone before.

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See also **Agni; Bhūta; Hinduism (Dharma); Saṃskāra**

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HINDU AND BUDDHIST THOUGHT IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Europe's encounter with the Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions of philosophy in India has been imbued at once by two simultaneous, and contradictory, tendencies. The first has been a fascination with the unique sophistication and profundity of the classical Indian *darshanas* (visions), and the other a relentless search for self-understanding through comparisons and contrasts with South Asian thought. Each tendency has exhibited both awed appreciation of the insights and trajectories of Brahmanical and Buddhist systems as well as self-absorbed reactions and even contemptuous denigration and dismissal under the banner of European philosophical exceptionalism.

For two and a half centuries, these tendencies of the European reception of classical Indian philosophical thought have followed several distinct phases, which are for the most part chronological but which sometimes overlap. The first phase, that of Orientalism and Romanticism, corresponding with the end of the eighteenth and the greater part of the nineteenth centuries, witnesses an ongoing attempt by European thinkers to familiarize themselves with Indian systems and to assess their meaning and significance for European self-understanding. The second phase, which roughly extends from the end of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth centuries, displays a growing ambivalence with and widening rejection of Indian thought from "proper" philosophical contemplation and history. The third phase, running from the middle of the twentieth century to the present, has seen a much more hermeneutically sensitive and professional treatment of classical Indian thought and a concerted attempt, significantly on the part of both Indians trained in European thought and Western

philosophers, to incorporate Vedic and Buddhist traditions into analytic and continental paradigms.

Orientalism and Romanticism: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Alexander the Great's brief conquest of the Punjab brought early contact between Greco-Roman philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism, and Indian *darśhanas*, such as yoga and Theravada Buddhism, as early as the fourth century B.C. However, no positive evidence of extensive contact and interchange between the South Asian and Western intellectual worlds can be traced back farther than the aggressive Jesuit missionary ventures into India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. An increasing number of missionary reports, however, sparked enough interest to prompt Voltaire (1694–1778) to unabashedly proclaim that India, and not Mesopotamia, was the birthplace of both the world's civilizations and its core— and more or less universal—religious doctrines. It was at this moment in the eighteenth century that the new European “science” of Indology was inaugurated, taking root in the direct and indirect translation of Sanskrit literary, religious, and philosophical classics, such as Khalidasa's *Shakuntala*, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, and the Upanishads, by such figures as William Jones (1746–1794), Charles Wilkins (1749–1836), H. Thomas Colebrooke (1765–1837) and A. H. Anquetil Duperron (1731–1805). Common to these pioneers of Indian studies in Great Britain and on the Continent were the convictions that the Sanskrit language was the earliest manifestation of a “common source” of all European languages and an insistence that the study of classical Indian philosophy could enhance and renew the European philosophical tradition.

These convictions were embraced by early nineteenth-century Romantic philosophers, specifically J. G. Herder (1744–1803) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829). While each of their cumulative views on early Hinduism were revised over their decades of study, both enthusiastically proclaimed immersion into ancient India's civilization to their philosophical contemporaries. Though both were committed Christians, they warned against the biased penchant of Europeans to see themselves as the standard of all culture, citing the antiquity and “pure theism” of the Vedic worldview. Their excitement was, however, tempered by skepticism over the removal of theistic associations from idea of *brahman*, which in their views led to a nihilistic mysticism and dangerous moral indifference. This latter was for Herder and Schlegel exemplified by India's caste hierarchy, which, along with pantheism, represented the tragically “degenerate” state into which India's religions had fallen from their “pristine” early truth. Despite these reservations,

both philosophers thought that the oldest forms of Vedic religious symbols and ethical “compassion” could serve as a remedy for what they perceived as the artificial and arid technicalism of Enlightenment post-Kantian Idealism and the mechanization of European society at large, set in motion by the industrial revolution.

Without question the most fascinating contrast of receptions of Indian thought in nineteenth-century European philosophy can be found in G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Hegel, whose philosophical progressivism depicted Europe, with its new democratic monarchies and “social” consciousness or spirit, as the culmination of both philosophy and civilization, rejected the common Romantic notion of India as some ideal “birthplace” of humanity from whose perfection society had long since strayed. Taking up Schlegel's critique of the “empty substantialism” of the Upanishadic concept of *brahman*, Hegel could discern no possibility for either dialectical development or socioethical advancement on the basis of such an abstract universal notion. While readings late in his life of Colebrooke's essays on the classical schools such as Nyāya, Vaisheshika, Sāṃkhya, and Buddhism convinced him that “genuine philosophical systems” did indeed exist in India, Hegel retained his adherence to the commitment that India's place at the “beginning of history” relegated whatever philosophical truth could be found there to the “poorest” kind, and while, even if philosophy had been born in the East, it reached its maturity and fruition in Europe. India was a place where “substance” never became “subject,” where *brahman* never became individuated, and consequently spirit never became social in Indian civilization.

Schopenhauer was openly contemptuous of this philosophical Eurocentrism. Deeply moved early in his career by Duperron's 1801–1802 secondhand translations of the Upanishads and an ever-widening expertise in secondary literature on Buddhism, Schopenhauer framed parts of his own philosophical system around core concepts of Advaita Vedānta and Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism. He posited that human consciousness was deluded by its inbuilt Kantian schematization of experience (what he labeled “the veil of *maya*”) into the false metaphysical presumption of seeing the world as a collection of heterogeneous individualities rather than the unitary ground of being (what he styled “Will”). Concomitantly, rather than castigating yogic *samyasins* and Buddhist ascetics as nihilists, as earlier Romantics had, Schopenhauer hailed the “renunciation of Will” and “perspective of *nirvana*” that they attained as making possible true ethical selflessness and compassion. With this stance, Schopenhauer fully embraced the Romantic view of India so sharply challenged by Hegel, celebrating it as the birthplace of

“perennial philosophy.” Schopenhauer expected the study of India and Asian thought generally to be the greatest boon imaginable to nineteenth-century Europe, promising it an intellectual “Renaissance” comparable to the one prompted by the fifteenth-century rediscovery of classical Greco-Roman thought.

Perhaps predictably, it was Schopenhauer’s enthusiasm that immediately spilled over into the field of Indological studies. The late-nineteenth-century Schopenhauerian enthusiast and Indologist Paul Deussen (1845–1919), a former classmate of Friedrich Nietzsche’s, became at once the translator of sixty Upanishads, the editor of the first critical edition of Schopenhauer’s works, and president of the German Schopenhauer Society. Wholeheartedly dedicated to Sanskrit studies, he was confident that Advaita Vedānta (and particularly Schopenhauer’s spin on it) represented the culmination of philosophical truth, far surpassing all systems from “a-psyche and atheistic” Buddhism to modern Enlightenment thought. This confidence led him to write Indian thought into the larger history of world philosophy; half of the six volumes of his *General History of Philosophy* (1894–1917) were devoted to the schools of the Indian tradition as these were categorized through the fifteenth-century Advaita doxography, the *Sarvadarśhanasamgraha*.

In the Romantic period then, we find a remarkable fascination with the histories and core concepts of Brahmanical and Buddhist thought. Nonetheless, this fascination seems firmly located within a larger self-reflection that, rather than investigating the treasures of classical Indian philosophical thought for their own sake, always took stock of the latter in view of a self-preoccupied assessment of the current state of philosophical affairs in Europe. Through studying Indian thought, Europe could learn more about its own origins, identity, and destiny.

Rejection and Dismissal: The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the first major Western philosopher since Hegel to cast serious aspersions and skeptical doubt at the value of Indian philosophy for European thought, although for markedly different reasons than Hegel’s. Nietzsche learned and accepted most of what he knew of Indian culture and thought from Schopenhauer and his personal friend Deussen, but suspended his early approbation for Schopenhauerian “pessimism” in search of a philosophical formula for the “affirmation” of both individual life and the rational and spiritually independent *Übermensch* of high culture. Ironically, while Nietzsche found one prototype for the *Übermensch* in the Brahmans of Manu’s social order, who legitimated their cultural authority through the establishment of caste hierarchy, he found

one of the most formidable threats to the coming *Übermensch* in the onset of a “European Buddhism,” which he equated with nihilism. While admiring Gautama Buddha for his unrelenting “honesty” in denying God’s existence in the determination to accept life for its inevitable suffering, Nietzsche saw the Buddha’s *nirvāna* and the practices that led to its attainment as the ultimate manifestation of “the denial and hatred of life,” the “decadence” of fleeing the world in the face of its meaninglessness and terror. Buddhist nihilism was for Nietzsche too “passive,” and it represented a spiritual tendency that might appear to a European to be opposed to Christianity, but at its heart is at one with it. Only the “Dionysian spirit” of the *Übermensch*, which embraced life in *amor fati* and dedicated itself to the “Will to Power,” could ward off that attitude toward the body and life as valueless, an attitude of which Buddhism was in his eyes the most perfected manifestation.

Despite the enthusiasm of the Romantic sensibility and Deussen’s later efforts, several fateful turns led to the relative eclipse of Indian thought in the reflection of Western philosophers for approximately half a century. One factor was the influence of Hegel on late-nineteenth-century historians of philosophy. While the most popular textbooks of the history of philosophy from mid-century all had chapters on Indian thought, the textbooks from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries omit it. The Hegelian contention that the dialectic of Being had its origins in Greek thought began to find its way into more and more late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century histories of philosophy, which led their authors to foregone conclusions that Asian and pre-Thalic Greek thought should be excluded from a historic appreciation of their topic. On the other hand, those historians who did not ascribe to Hegel’s vision of a universal history of philosophy were driven by a professionalization, or specialization in historical research, which left the field of Indian studies to the professional Indologist and thus outside the scope of Western intellectual historiography.

These presumptions can be found in the passing mention made of Asian and Indian thought in some of the twentieth century’s most prominent European philosophers. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the renowned founder of phenomenology, identified the single most characteristic mark of philosophy as its purely theoretical orientation; philosophy arose out of Aristotelian wonder, not from practical concerns, and its possibilities as a pure eidetic “science” were the legacies of Greek thought. For him, no traditions, such as the Indian or Chinese, where intellectual speculation was so closely tied to soteriological dogmas and concerns, could possibly give rise to genuinely philosophical reflection. While Husserl’s early student and

“path-clearer” for “hermeneutic ontology,” Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), drew much inspiration for his later thought from Chinese Daoist and Japanese Buddhist traditions, he was always careful to qualify this fascination with the recognition that Asian thought had its abode in another “house of Being.” It was Greek philosophy that “uniquely and univocally” made the fundamental concern of Western thought a search for the Being of things, and as such “Being” could not be imagined to be the “basic concept” of any other tradition, philosophy is for him “Western philosophy—there is no other kind, neither a Chinese nor an Indian philosophy” (1968, 224). Thinking could certainly take “other paths” in other traditions, but not the distinctly European philosophical path. In the end, Western philosophy proper is actually a tradition of which the cultures of the world should, in his eyes, beware in the face of the progressive intellectual colonization by the West, “the Europeanization of the Earth.”

The second phase of European philosophical reflection on the Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions then mixes ambivalent rejection with dismissal. Reasons for such dismissal were both historiographic and ideological. Ironically, however, the neglect to regard Indian thought as a genuine philosophical tradition was sparked in this phase by a motivation strangely similar to that which attracted Romantic Europeans of the first phase to either appropriate or take special note of it. This motivation was a preoccupation with the necessity of Europe to isolate the essence and fulfill the mission of its own philosophical tradition, or at least a particular and historically conditioned self-understanding of that tradition.

Reincorporation through the Analytic and Continental Divide

Against this onslaught of skepticism about the worth of Indian thought for Western philosophical reflection, translations and commentaries on the Brahmanical Buddhist traditions, openly advocating a rekindling of cross-cultural philosophical engagement, began to renew interest. Foremost among the early translators were Theodore Stcherbatsky (1886–1942), who interpreted the Buddhist epistemologies of Dignaga and Dharmakirti through Kantian categories, and Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974), whose treatments of scholastic Buddhism and even Vaisheshika insisted that both could, for at least certain periods in their histories, be considered purely theoretical and nonsoteriological systems. Running alongside these more Continental appropriations were receptions of Brahmanical Nyāya logic as fully compatible with the contemporary formalism of symbolic logic, so much so that the former can be paraphrased into the latter, which we find in Stanislaw Schayer (1899–1941), Daniel Ingalls (1916–1999) and Frits Staal (b. 1930).

Perhaps the most exemplary contrast between the analytic and phenomenological appropriations of Indian thought can be found in two contemporary Indian philosophers trained by both native pandits and European professors, Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935–1991) and Jitendranath Mohanty (b. 1924). Former colleagues at the Sanskrit College in Kolkata, both set themselves the task of ensuring that the classical *darshanas* of India receive proper acknowledgment among modern thinkers, though their approaches varied. Matilal began his career as a Sankritist in Kolkata but then studied under Ingalls and W. V. Quine at Harvard. He vigorously defended Hindu Nyāya realism against Vedantic and Buddhist “idealist” objections, giving the ancient debates lucid expositions to English audiences, notably against the backdrop of more contemporary debates in logic and theory of knowledge. More importantly, he demonstrated how, whether in the guise of the worldly Lokayatikas and Vaisheshikas or under the rubric of “mystical” strands of Mahayana Buddhism or Vedānta, philosophy in India was always undertaken with serious examinations of *pramaashastra* (epistemology), logic comparable in its analytical insight to contemporary symbolic logic and considerations of the philosophy of language. Mohanty for his part became an avid student of Immanuel Kant in Göttingen and later of Husserl in Kolkata before turning his attention to the study of Nyāya and Vedānta. His representations of the classical scholastic debates in India schematized them according to more phenomenological themes. Nyāya, Vedānta and Yogacara-Sautrantika Buddhism were played off against one another based on their differing theories of consciousness, truth, and language. Mohanty came to the conclusion that the presence of the Husserlian concept of the “intentionality” of consciousness could be found to enhance the positions of Nyāya and Buddhism in various contexts, while its lack in some Advaita teachings could be taken to compromise the integrity of the latter. Striking in the cases of both Matilal and Mohanty is the extent to which the analytic and phenomenological debates are replayed in their respective presentations of classical Indian thought, but in addition how each of their presentations suggested native Indian rapprochements in this debate. Each brought vastly improved methodological and hermeneutic tools to bear on the explication of Indian philosophers. Neither saw hermeneutic implications to these presentations that should cause overmuch concern, for while it is true, Mohanty concedes, that the Indian and Western philosophical traditions exhibit important differences, their many historical inquiries and debates “overlap” in profoundly significant ways.

The most recent reincorporations of Brahmanical and Buddhist thought into Western philosophy can be found in the works of scholars such as Harold Coward (b. 1936) and David Loy (b. 1947). Reviewing the skeptical traditions of Bhatrhari’s Grammar and Mādhyamika Buddhism, these

scholars have found parallels between modern Derridian “deconstruction” and antiessentialist tendencies within the Indian tradition. Just as twentieth-century Anglo-European thought seeks to shed the heritage of “Being”-centered metaphysics and the hierarchical, exclusivist, and imperialistic society it has fostered, so too, they suggest, did exemplary figures such as Bhartrhari, Nagarjuna, and Shankara challenge dualistic and socially corrupting ontologies, along with artificial intellectual boundaries, within their own heritage. Indian thought once again offers a corrective alternative, in a fashion reminiscent, though in a much modified tone, of the Romantics, to the wayward trajectories of Europe’s intellectual legacy.

Thus in the contemporary period of reincorporation, we see the many strands of thought in the West converging around the twin themes of deep appreciation for India’s philosophical contributions and an abiding desire to make those contributions speak to their own philosophical problematics. Despite all the interpretive and cultural pitfalls against which such “comparative” or “cross-cultural” philosophy is constantly warned by its critics, however, it was under the circumstances perhaps inevitable that over the past two and a half centuries India has been gradually accepted as a major “conversation partner” for European thought.

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See also **Buddhism in Ancient India; Hinduism (Dharma)**

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HINDUISM (DHARMA) The term “Hinduism” is derived from *Hindu*, the Old Persian form of the name of the River Indus (Sanskrit *Sindhu*, hence also *India*). This Iranian, and then Arab, term for all Indians was only slowly accepted as the self-designation of non-Muslim Indians, such as by the Kashmiri Jonarāja (early 15th century). It commonly signifies the indigenous religion(s) of South Asia, now increasingly called by the Epic term Sanātana Dharma (eternal religion). “Hinduism” is a loose agglomerate of many of the interlinking religions and worldviews of South Asia (and Bali); though overlapping with some other religions, it basically includes those that are neither Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, Sikh, or “tribal” (i.e., *ādivāsī*, “aboriginal”; *vanavāsī*, “forest dwellers”).

As this negative description indicates, an effectual definition of Hinduism (used here for brevity’s sake) is virtually impossible: it is the sum of the traditional beliefs, rituals, customs, and pertinent social structures of South Asia, including the philosophical and theological representation of these beliefs in some two dozen of schools of thought. Less encompassing definitions (especially those deriving Hinduism simply from Vedic origins, do not sufficiently cover the realities on the ground or in the available texts. The Veda is expressively rejected by many Tantric sects, Vīrashaivism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Nor does the fashionable description of Hinduism as a colonial creation apply: Greek and Chinese visitors (c. 450 B.C.–A.D. 600) saw it as different (as “*deva* worship”) from Buddhism and other ascetic religions (gymnosophists); indigenously, Hinduism was often referred to simply as *dharma*.

However, the religions that emerged from early Hinduism, such as Jainism and Buddhism, and later on, Sikh religion, have had shifting boundaries with Hinduism; they were both included as well as excluded. The authoritative fourteenth-century Sarvadarshanasamgraha (or the 11th-century Shivaite Somashambhupaddhati) do include them. All these “views” (*darshana*) and religions were influenced by developments that spread from one religion to the other. Nevertheless, some religions, such as Buddhism, are excluded by their own self-understanding and definition. Interestingly, even in recent times, politically active Hinduism (*Hindūtvā*) cannot yet give a good definition of itself: “reciting prayers, reading the Gītā, worshipping the image (*mūrti*) of a deity, reciting *om*, planting the *tulsi* plant” should make one a Hindu. Many South Asians would disagree.



Devotee Offering Worldly Gift to the Shivling. *Shivling* (also spelled *shivalinga*) is the state of eternity, the symbolic idol of Lord Shiva usually represented in phallic form. AMIT PASRICHA.

Frequently, Hinduism is indeed more of a *weltanschauung* and a way of life than a “religion” in the traditional Western sense. There is no common “creed” or “statement of faith” or “catechism.” Instead, people can choose which god(dess) they want to worship (*iṣṭadevatā*), even the impersonal “deity” Brahma or none at all. A common aspect, however, is the (almost) universal acceptance of the idea of rebirth combined with the effects on a next life of actions in this world (*karma*). Most Hindus also follow a series of rituals from birth to death and beyond (ancestor rituals, *sbrāddha*). Another early, still strongly held belief is that of three “obligations” (*ṛṇa*) incurred by birth: those owed to the deities (*deva*), ancestors (*pitṛ*), and the ancient seers (*ṛṣi*). All must be worshiped and fed in various rituals carried out by the family’s priests (Brahman *purobitas*). All these customs, rites, and beliefs bind a Hindu individual into the Hindu community, but they also separate Hindus from non-Hindus, with whom there cannot be, for reasons of purity, any interdining and intermarriage.

Nevertheless, Hinduism has not been static at all but has clearly evolved over time. Some aspects of later Hindu folk religion seem to emerge already in the Indus

Valley Civilization (2600–1900 B.C.), though in the absence of script, we cannot be sure. The famous Shiva Pashupati probably is nothing but a neolithic hunting god, and bull-killing scenes may not represent Mahiṣāsūramardīnī but rather Mediterranean or South Asian bull fights, while the worship of certain trees (pipal/Ashvattha) and snakes seems reasonably certain.

Roots of Hinduism in the Veda

However, the major roots of Hinduism are found in the Veda (roughly, 1500–500 B.C.), composed by newly arrived Indo-Aryan-speaking people in the northwestern subcontinent and later concentrated in the Kuru realm, which saw many foundational changes in religion, texts, social structure, and politics. Vedic religion has mostly male deities of nature (personifications of the sun, fire, wind, heaven; or the feminine Aditi, dawn, and earth), of social organization (Āditya such as the gods “agreement, share, lot,” including the demiurge and warrior god Indra), and many vaguely personalized “powers” (*brahman*, fever, revenge, heat, etc.). These, and even more so the rituals (*yajña*) performed in public (soma, etc.) and domestic situations (birth, marriage, death, ancestor

worship), along with the recitation of sacred verses and formulas (mantras of the four Vedas), have in part survived to this day. The large literature of the period, orally composed in archaic Sanskrit and perfectly transmitted, is collected in the Vedic Saṃhitās, their Brāhmaṇa/Āraṇyaka commentaries (the fountainhead of much of Hindu thought and sciences), the late Vedic Upanishads, and the Sūtras.

In the Upanishads, the traditional belief in an automatic reincarnation as human beings was joined with the new theory of karma, which had gradually developed in the newly acculturated eastern region of North India. This foundational combination has influenced virtually all later religions and sects of South Asia. Such new developments were discussed at length in the Socratic-style dialogues of the early Upanishads, which advanced a monism identifying the personal soul (*ātman*) with the universal spirit (*brahman*). In the ascetic mood of the period (note the gymnosophists of Herodotus [c. 485–425 B.C.], the birth of Jainism and Buddhism), a shift occurred away from ritualism to a symbolic interpretation and internalization, much of which is based on the correlating and identificatory procedures of the Brāhmaṇa texts. All of this was foundational for later Hinduism: it abounds in the identification of deities with each other (including even that of Vishnu = Buddha, or now of the Devī = Mary of Lourdes), of the deity with the universe (such as Krishna in the Gītā), of the worshiper with the deity or the universal Brahman, and of various concepts, ideas, and practices as being of equal value in attaining the spiritual goal.

Such new ideas were constantly added to existing older forms of Hinduism, often in framelike fashion, surrounding the Vedic core. However, many of the older forms have also continued independently and still coexist today, so that a solemn Vedic ritual can be performed today by a Brahman who may be a worshiper of Vishnu in his public and family religion, and a Tantric in his private rituals. These developments accrued in several stages. The Vedic period was followed, at least in our texts, by that of the Epics, caused by the ever-changing societal and religious conditions. The ever popular and often re-adapted, fairy tale-based Rāmāyaṇa has recently shown its resilience in a year-long television series; the more complex, giant Mahābhārata (collected c. 100 B.C.), too, has local adaptations (Pāṇḍava in the Himalayas; Draupadī in South India; the Newar god Bhīmsen in Nepal; the five Pāṇḍavas in Indonesia, etc.). In the Epics (including the Harivamsha) some Vedic gods survive, but several new ones were added, such as Krishna and Rāma (both were later incorporated into Vishnu), or Shiva, who developed out of Rudra, and the Devī (Lakshmī, Shrī, Kālī, Pārvatī, etc.). Vedic ritual was superseded by *pūjā*

and *stotra* (“praise” of the gods), or even by the recitation of their names or their texts, which was declared worth many Vedic *yajñas*. The famous Bhagavad Gītā, the “song of the Lord (Krishṇa),” is a late (first century A.D.?) insertion into the Mahābhārata. Krishna’s teachings initially stress, in rather sophistic manner, the moral and societal duties (*dharmā*) of a Kshatriya to fight (even his relatives), but with “detachment” as to avoid karmic outcomes; the later sections of the text focus on *karmayoga* and *bhakti*, and finally, on some additional topics such as Sāṃkhya philosophy. The lasting impact of this supposedly unitary, but clearly stratified text is due to the fact that it provides several views to choose from individually; people of all stripes quote from this (frequently translated) text, find solace in it, or bolster their views, from moral action and pacifistic *bhakti* to violent chauvinism.

Guptan Hinduism

The post-Vedic epoch overlapped with the period “between the empires” (c. 230 B.C.–A.D. 320) that saw continuous cultural influence by peoples invading from the northwest (Alexandrian and Bactrian Greeks, Hellenistic Parthians, north Iranian Saka, Central Asian Yue-ji/Kushana). In reaction to this and to the challenge of the prominent contemporary Buddhism and Jainism, new forms of Hindu religion developed, syncretistically incorporating both local trends and foreign influences. In classical Hinduism, under the Guptas (from A.D. 320), a conservative synthesis emerged, after five hundred years of ferment, which set the stage for medieval Hinduism. The hallmark of Guptan Hinduism is its stress on old (often Vedic) features, which hides substantial new developments; it is retrospective and “progressive” at the same time.

The most important innovations include: creation and destruction of the world (viewed as illusion) in cyclical time; *pūjā* and temple worship with figures of deities, pilgrimages, planets (based on the still all-important post-Vedic astrology); yoga; deliverance from *samsāra* during one’s lifetime; vegetarianism; a strict social system (see below); and the deification of kings (as a walking Vishnu), just as the gods are treated like kings. Further, the codification of the standard Hindu gods (Brahmā as creator, Vishnu as preserver, Shiva as destroyer, the Devī, Gaṇesha, etc.), with their various forms (*avatāras*), and their beneficial as well as destructive aspects, always simultaneously with the identification of many local deities (a process still visible with Jagannātha in Orissa, Pattinī in Sri Lanka, or Mastā in the Himalayas). All of this was collected in the eighteen great Purāṇas that, like the Epics, have been eternally popular. They project divine and human history against the framework of cyclical time, with the present, evil Kālī age starting on 18 February 3102 B.C., but they also include, as virtual

encyclopedias, subjects from art to medicine. Stories from these genres were retold in local languages and by wandering bards, with the help of paintings. This practice has now been supplemented by adaptations in films and on television.

In the late Guptan period, a new element emerged, again directed against formal “Brahmanical” Hinduism, in the form of Tantra and Bhakti. The latter is the fervent worship of a single, selected deity. It emerged from South India (Alvār poetry, 8th century), which had just been Hinduized, largely replacing the older Dravidian religion. The new religious outlook gradually traveled northward and is encountered in Sanskrit texts such as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, or in eastern India, in Jayadeva’s Gītā Govinda (12th century) where it was strongly propagated by Caitanya (1486–1533). The various well-known sects of Vishnuism and Shaivism (Bhāgavata, Pāñcarātrin, Kashmiri Shaiva, Shāivasiddhāntin, etc.), of Devī or Gaṇeśha worship, and many other, sometimes rather transitory, sects have produced a large amount of narrative, poetical, and devotional texts in Sanskrit and later, especially since about A.D. 1000, also in local languages.

Tantric Movement

From the mid-first millennium A.D. onward, the pan-Indian and pan-religious Tantric movement made its appearance as well. It is based on the dichotomy between the male Puruṣha and female Prakṛti, the origin of all creation. Identification with them (or other deities) can be reached through a combination of meditation and yoga, with inner and outer rituals. In the left-handed (*vāmā*) Tantra, they also are of a sexual nature; this was at first rejected but still persists, especially in Nepal, Bengal, Assam. There is great and still continuing importance of various goddesses (whether of beneficial or destructive forms, such as the nine Durgās or eight Mātṛkās). Tantra forms yet another frame around Vedic, Epic, and classical Hinduism, and it permeates, whether acknowledged or not (and in spite of still prevailing Victorian prudery in sexual matters), much of modern Hinduism, as seen in the reinterpretation of the Mahābhārata by Nīlakaṇṭha (17th century) and in current ideas about the secret spiritual and mundane power of the recitation of (Vedic) mantras (e.g., in transcendental meditation).

Such new religious developments and the representations of local forms of deities and their myths were collected in local Sthala Purāṇas and Māhātmyas, which often show little similarity with the “official” pan-Indian versions of the deities and their mythologies. Many of such data are available only in local brochures sold at temples, important though largely neglected sources. However, folk religion can be Pan-Indian, too; for example, the minor deity Maṇināga is found in Nepal, Orissa,

and Maharashtra (and probably elsewhere). Such data usually slip under the radar of textual scholars or village-based anthropologists. Folk religion can be astonishingly archaic, for example, with still common animal sacrifice and non-vegetarianism. In addition, the study of local art, inscriptions, and manuscript colophons is important. For example, manuscript colophons indicate the spread of Krishna worship in Nepal and Gujarat around 1550 or 1600. Such historical and geographical data of the spread of certain cults have largely been neglected thus far.

Influence of Islam and Christianity

Medieval Hinduism also saw considerable influence of Islam (especially since the 13th century), which resulted, due to long persisting, soft religious boundaries, in the improbable religious overlap of Muslim Sufi saints and their Bhakti-following Hindu compatriots (e.g., Lallā, the Islamic *ṛṣi* sect in Kashmir, Tulsīdās, Eknāth, Sūrdās), also Kabīr (1440–1518, who equated Allah with Rāma) and the founder of the Sikh religion, Nānak, as well as many leaders of new theistic sects (including Rāmānuja, Madhva, Basava, Nāmdev, Jñāneshvara), some of a militant and chauvinistic nature.

Due to the influence of British colonialism and Christian missionaries (at first only grudgingly admitted by the British), still another form developed, Neo-Hinduism. Reformers such as Dayanand (1827–1883) or Vivekananda (1863–1902) insisted on eliminating certain traditional aspects and adding other features, often inspired by Christian or Western sources. The movement began with social reforms (Brahmo Samaj, 1828) but soon included tendencies of abolishing “idol” worship, access of worship and “priestly” duties by all, and a perceived return to Vedic times and values (Ārya Samāj, 1875). This was followed by important social and nationalistic trends, such as the uplift of the low caste population, propagated by Mahatma Gandhi.

The Hindutva (Hinduness) movement, active since the 1920s and especially since the 1980s, surprisingly adds a large amount of “Abrahamization,” such as the reliance on a narrow band of indigenous, foundational texts (Veda, Gītā, Rāmāyaṇa, etc.), general public access to them, sometimes even a catechism. The texts are reinterpreted as containing the seeds of all human culture. This still ongoing rewriting of history underlines the uniqueness and superiority of “Hinduness” and glorifies a golden age, before the “damage done by the Muslims and the British,” in short: god Rāma’s realm. The aim to regain this Hindu India was propagated by M. S. Golwalkar (1939) and V. N. Savarkar (1923, repr. 1989) with the slogan: “one country, one culture, one religion,” which excludes non-Hindus. However, given the derivation of Hindu-tva from a Perso-Arabic term, joined with

the Sanskrit suffix *-tva* (-ness), the word is as composite as modern India itself. The movement has resulted in the emergence of right-wing Hindu political parties since the 1980s. All of this is reminiscent of the great restoration and glorification project of the Guptas.

Still another frame surrounding medieval Hinduism is that of modern science and technology. Many Indian scientists merely add selected scientific data to their traditional beliefs, and do not perceive any clash; rather, they use the amalgam to defend the ancient glory and superiority of Hindu India. Subhash Kak (1994), for example, “discovers” items such as planetary distances or the speed of light in the Vedas; others, from Dayanand onward, have found steam locomotives, airplanes, rockets, atomic bombs, and laser beams, always *post factum*.

Hinduism thus has always been a living, constantly changing religion, in which new trends developed, in the absence of any central authority or dogma, in reaction to social and political developments, such as Kuru Sanskritization, the reactions against Buddhist and foreign influences (c. 150 B.C.–A.D. 320), or Tantra and Bhakti against the Brahmanical Hinduism of the Gupta/Harṣa period. Recently, new popular deities such as Santoṣi Mā and even an AIDS Ammā have emerged.

At the local, still predominantly village level, many of the formal divisions and characteristics collapse: local folk religion is intermingled with archaic local traditions, previous forms of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and even Islam. Hindus visit an Islamic Pīr’s grave and Muslims go to Hindu festivals, or the Buddhist goddess Harītī is still in *pūjā* in the guise of a Muslim Pīr, protecting against smallpox. Many basic South Asian concepts (such as the power of sight, heat) are found both in Hinduism and local Islam, though under different names. Conversely, constant Sanskritization, ever since the Kuru realm, can be witnessed in the increasing Hinduization of “tribal” religions in the mountains of Nepal or the more secluded areas of central India, and among the lower caste Hindu communities that imitate higher caste, preferably Brahmanical, lifestyle; for example, the low caste goldsmiths of Karnataka have even claimed Brahman status.

Concepts of Life and Class

In light of the many concurrent forms of Hinduism, even in the daily life of one person, what then are its overarching characteristics? The societal aspects cannot be overestimated; indeed, some want to see Hinduism as a social system rather than a religion. In endocentric classifications, three sets of concepts have been claimed to be encompassing: the four aims of life (*puruṣārtha*), the four stages in life (*āśrama*), and the four “classes” (*varṇa*) of Hindu society, which are subdivided into several thousands of castes (*jāti*).

Purusartha. The “aims in life” that can be achieved *seriatim* include *artha* (material success), *kāma* (sexual desire), and *mokṣa* (“release” from the cycle of recurrent rebirth, *saṃsāra*), to which *dharmā* is sometimes added. *Dharma* covers everything from customs, incidental and general beliefs, rituals, *ṛṇa* (duty), organization of society, and procedure in law courts, to the laws that govern nature, the gods, and the universe. It relates to the whole of Hindu culture, not just its religious or societal aspects. This Epic (and medieval) construct offers “feeling at home” in a fixed, ordered universe and society, the rules of which are spelled out at great length in the respective texts (*Dharma Sūtra*, *Manusmṛti*, etc.). Many of its societal aspects are summarized by the three Vedic *ṛṇas* (obligations): one is born with the primordial obligations (not guilt) toward the gods, ancestors, and primordial poets (*ṛṇi*); they are sometimes extended to include one’s teachers. A first summary is found in the *Taittirīya* and *Kaṭha Shikṣā Upanishads*: “Speak the truth, behave according to custom (*dharmā*), carry out the (ritual) actions, do not neglect your recitations, . . . do not cut off your family line . . . treat your mother, father, teacher, guests like a god.”

Asrama and Varna. Much of this obligation involves rituals, which leads to, as Indians complain, a “ritual-ridden” society, governed by the *varṇāśrama* system. The term refers to the four classes (*varṇa*) of society and the four stages (*āśrama*) in life, from childhood to old age, concepts that are socially imprinted early on. After early childhood, the four stages are: *brahmacārya*, “living as a (celibate Veda) student” in the home of a teacher; *gṛhastha*, married life as a “householder”; *vānaprastha*, living as a married “retiree in a (nearby) forest”; *saṃnyāsa*, living as a (celibate) ascetic who has “completely thrown away” all strictures of society and strives, alone, for his personal emancipation from the cycle of rebirth. None of these stages, which must be attained by appropriate rituals, are prescriptive, though the *gṛhastha* stage is considered normal, since it ensures the required birth of a son who must carry out the ancestor rituals. The system is an early medieval Brahmanical construct; the Veda had only two stages, the *brahmacārin* and the *gṛhastha*; the *saṃnyāsin* was added during the Maurya period, while the separate *vānaprastha* stage is still more recent.

Similarly, the division of society (Vedic: *śūdrārya*) into *varṇas* (“colors,” the four classes), is already attested in the famous *Puruṣa* hymn (*Rig Veda* 10.90, c. 1000 B.C.). The Vedas enumerate the classes as the three *ārya varṇas*: the *Brāhmaṇa* (poets/priests); *Kshatriya* (or *rājanya*, nobility); *Vaiśya* (belonging to the people), who alone are entitled to perform the solemn (*śrauta*) rituals; the fourth, the non-*ārya* *Shūdra varṇa*, originally was one of artisans—who are thus excluded and included at the same time.

Another large group (*pañcama*) outside and below this system has developed, the Dalit (*barijan, pariah, pore*, formerly called the “untouchables”), who can perform only the most menial and degrading work. These five levels represent a corresponding decline in purity.

The *varṇa* system has been overlaid by several thousands of occupational castes (*jāti*), as exemplified in Manu’s law book (c. 100 B.C.), representing a conservative Brahmanical reaction to Buddhist/Jain and foreign challenges. One is born both into a *varṇa* and into a caste and can practically change this status—if ever—only with great effort over several generations, by social upward movement, now called Sanskritization. Occupational castes are perhaps first visible in certain Vedic designations, such as the (always impure) *caṇḍāla, vṛṣala*, washermen, most artisans, fishermen, and so on, and appear, around the beginning of the common era, in normative *dharma* texts or early inscriptions (at Mathura). Caste certainly is not just a colonial invention, as some now want to have it. In the never-colonized Nepal, where good historical records exist (unutilized in fashionable “colonial” investigations), there is not just talk of restoring the *varṇas*—as is always done by new dynasties—but also, around A.D. 1390, of restoring the thirty-six castes by the Malla kings. In 1851 the Rāṇās went even further in their *Mulukī Ain*, and compiled the strictest caste regulations anywhere, which lasted until 1960. The current caste altercations and “voter bank” politics show the persistence of caste, in spite of its abolishment after Indian independence (and in Nepal, after 1960). It remains endemic in South Asian society, including Muslims, Jews, and Christians.

As the caste of caste indicates, such modern representations, or the anthropological study of contemporaneous village communities, cannot, however, reliably inform about the situation in the past, for which the (roughly datable) texts and the evidence of archaeology and art must be included. Texts are studied by philologists and historians of religion. They cover the past three thousand years, from the Veda to modern temple booklets; however, they do not always indicate the contemporary social importance of certain forms of Hinduism and related religions. Many forms did not make it into the texts (e.g., village religion), or did so only belatedly (Tantra), once the local form was adapted to “standard” (often Brahmanic) Hinduism and represented by Sanskrit texts. All local forms must therefore be studied, not just “privileged” Brahman rituals and texts: folk tales and songs, accounts and observations of traditional festivals and rites, religious dance, theater, processions, pilgrimages, local and folk art, and so on.

Finally, it must be emphasized again that Hinduism has been an ever-changing entity, with many local variations within South Asia, and now also in its diaspora areas, where acculturation is steadily proceeding: new holy places,

such as American rivers, are created, but *pūjā* and many life-cycle rituals remain, as does part of the mythology—if often only in Bollywood fashion and as ahistorical comics. Conversely, traditional dance is elevated from a low caste performing art to one aspired to by immigrants’ daughters. What, then, will be the future of Hinduism, now followed by some 800 million of the more than 1 billion people of the subcontinent? Will it develop like the indigenous, not centralized religion of another modern Asian country, the Shinto of Japan—with foundational though little known myths, *pūjā*-like rituals performed out of habit (“one never knows what it may be good for”), and with specialized temples (such as for electronics, success in school, etc.)—while religion plays a relatively small role in daily life. Or, will it develop rather like an “Abrahamic” religion, with an increasing focus on selected normative texts and rituals, bolstered by a newfound self-consciousness and pride in an emerging India, and accompanied by increasing interaction with the distant diaspora, who see all things Indian in sharper focus, though in nostalgic and idealistic ways. We can be certain about one thing: “Hinduism” will remain dynamic.

Michael Witzel

See also **Astronomy; Brāhmaṇas; Buddhism in Ancient India; Devī; Jainism; Rāmāyaṇa; Sikhism; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedic Aryan India**

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HINDU MAHASABHA PARTY. See **Hindu Nationalism; Hindutva and Politics.**

HINDU NATIONALISM Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, is centrally concerned with notions of social solidarity. Hindu nationalism has thus focused on questions of identity, and symbols and practices that link people and groups to the larger community. It is also concerned with notions of prestige and India's place in the global order. It is therefore not surprising that India conducted weapons-related nuclear tests during the tenure of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's first Hindu nationalist prime minister.

Hindu nationalism was a force throughout most of the twentieth century, embodied especially in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a group that historically has viewed its mission as the training of a cadre of nationalist activists. Most Hindu nationalists interested in the political process operated under the broad umbrella of the Congress Party until the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 by a former member of the RSS. In the wake of Gandhi's assassination, several Hindu nationalist groups were banned and their members prohibited from participating in the Congress Party and its affiliated organizations. The RSS responded by establishing counterpart groups, using full-time workers (*pracharakas*) to organize new affiliates to work with labor, students, teachers, and journalists. Organizations affiliated to the RSS, popularly referred to collectively as the Sangh Parivar, or "family," took some three decades to recover from their public condemnation in the aftermath of Gandhi's assassination. Only since about 1980 have the RSS and its affiliates managed to recover their earlier self-confidence and substantial popular support.



Hindu Nationalists Converge in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. After the BJP's call for the construction of a temple at a site in Ayodhya that was home to a sixteenth-century mosque, that mosque—the Babri Masjid—was destroyed by an irate mob in 1992. Ownership of the religious site has yet to be determined in the Indian courts. INDIA TODAY.

The most dramatic example of the new prominence of Hindu nationalism is the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in many ways its political face. The predecessor party of the BJP, the Jana Sangh, was formed in 1951 when many Hindu nationalists were excluded from the Congress. As late as the 1984 elections to the Lok Sabha, Parliament's lower, popularly elected house, the BJP remained a party on the margins. In the 1984 elections, it won only 2 of 543 seats, with less than 8 percent of the popular vote. It has steadily increased its share of seats in almost every subsequent election, expanding to 85 in 1989, 120 in 1991, 161 in 1996, and plateauing at 182 in both 1998 and 1999. The BJP's gains came largely at the expense of the long dominant Congress Party, which dropped from more than 400 seats in 1984 to just 114 in the parliamentary polls in 1999, even while the BJP won a somewhat smaller share of the popular vote—24 percent to its rival's 28 percent. The BJP, recognizing

that it needed a coalition to win power at the federal level, built an alliance known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that assumed power after the 1998 national elections. The coalition has proved stable; it remained intact during the 1999 national elections and the usually contentious cabinet selection process, and internally divisive issues have not resulted in any significant defections. During the coalition government (1999–2004), Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani, and a majority of the federal cabinet were members of the BJP; many of them were members of the RSS. The BJP-led NDA lost to the Congress Party-led United Progress Alliance in the mid-2004 parliamentary elections, 187 to 215 seats (of 543), though there was very little difference between the popular vote of the two alliances. The NDA alliance has largely remained together, though there are signs that the BJP in opposition may adopt elements of its earlier strident Hindu nationalist agenda.

The BJP is just one of several dozen Hindu nationalist organizations that are loosely linked to the “family” of organizations associated with the RSS. The RSS thinks of itself as a school that trains men to be the cutting edge of social change that will revitalize Hindu society. Since the 1980s, dozens of new affiliated organizations have been added, specifically to work among a broad array of social groups, like tribal communities, the urban poor, and the Hindu ecclesiastical establishment. Perhaps the most well known—and controversial—of these is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Organization; VHP) because of its aggressive pursuit of the Hindu nationalist cultural agenda. This organization has had a tenuous relationship with Prime Minister Vajpayee.

Tension in the “Family”

The victory of the BJP in taking power as head of the national governing coalition in 1998 deepened strains within the RSS family of organizations. These other organizations insist on maintaining a commitment to principles no longer entirely possible for the BJP, which must make compromises to mobilize popular support and attract coalition allies. The VHP has harshly criticized the BJP for its agreement to remove the most controversial parts of the Hindu nationalist cultural agenda from the Common Agenda of the ruling NDA, several of whose constituents depend on Muslim support. The BJP's Hindu nationalist critics argue that the party will never emerge with a majority on its own unless it reverts to its unalloyed Hindu nationalist roots. They point out that the fastest growth of the BJP occurred in the 1991 elections, in the wake of strong party support for the traditional Hindu nationalist cultural agenda, especially a national campaign on behalf of the construction of a

temple dedicated to the god Rāma in Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh. The issue became heated and controversial because the construction was proposed on a site that was occupied at the time by a sixteenth-century Mughal mosque known as the Babri Masjid. The Babri Masjid was torn down by a Hindu mob in 1992, and the question of ownership of the site and some surrounding land has been under judicial review. Other controversial issues within the RSS family are the opening of the economy to foreign investment, cooperation with the United States in the global war on terrorism, and the BJP's relatively conciliatory view, within the Sangh Parivar, on the issue of Kashmir.

The BJP faced a dilemma as it prepared for the national elections in 2004; it needed to activate its Hindu nationalist workers while simultaneously trying to expand its vote base and maintain a diverse coalition. The debate focused around a choice of campaign models: the successful Hindutva theme of the Gujarat state elections in December 2002, or issues of good governance, which the party used in subsequent state elections in Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. The BJP lost the latter set of elections, giving voice to criticism from its Hindu nationalist right that the party needed to reassert its traditional vision, in part to activate the RSS cadre, many of whom declined to campaign for the BJP. The party faced a similar apathetic response from many of the RSS cadre in the mid-2004 elections when it also emphasized the issue of governance.

Stability

The RSS has traditionally emphasized internal consensus, and tries to maintain a culture of judiciousness, discretion, and prudence within the Sangh Parivar. Traditionally, the RSS achieved this by placing its most talented full-time workers (*pracharaks*) in key positions in the affiliated organizations. These full-time workers created an informal collaborative network that kept differences within manageable limits. Still another tactic was to emphasize issues with broad cultural and symbolic resonance, and to use these issues to paper over differences. Kashmir has long been an issue with resonance beyond the Hindu nationalist community, and is seen more broadly as an Indian national concern. The planned temple at Ayodhya is also an issue with broad Hindu backing and was employed by the BJP in the early 1990s to counter the efforts of the Janata government to mobilize support for job reservations applicable to historically disadvantaged castes. Increasingly, terrorism has also been used to mobilize activists and appeal to a broader audience, and has risen to the level of a major theme in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. With the attack in December 2001 on the Lok

Sabha Parliament building in New Delhi, the RSS and some of its affiliates have begun to express their suspicion of Muslims in terms of the war on terrorism.

Yet, new developments have undermined the efficacy of the RSS's traditional management strategies. Success has bred its own problems. Full-time workers from the RSS no longer control the levers of power in the BJP below the very top; the party has grown in size and complexity and is thus more difficult to discipline, even if the leadership wanted to do so. The party is now too large to permit the revival of the office of organizing secretary, a position that had existed at each level of the party and was staffed by full-time RSS workers who constituted a parallel structure that enforced discipline. The question of reviving this parallel structure has been debated, but has been rejected as impractical. Other groups within the RSS family have also expanded rapidly over the past two decades. They too rely less on full-time RSS workers. In addition, the consensus on key cultural issues has also broken down. All this has undermined the ability of the RSS to maintain its conventional role of mediator.

RSS as Mediator

The RSS has perhaps recognized that conditions call for a new management style. The present head of the RSS, K. S. Sudarshan, who took control in 2000, has a very different style from his predecessors. He lacks their charisma, and is more the chairman of the board of the RSS executive than supreme moral figure of the whole organization and its affiliates. He must spend more time negotiating differences because pronouncements from the leadership no longer carry the same weight. Not only are RSS full-time workers less influential in many of the affiliates, but several of these organizations, including the BJP, now have senior leaders that outrank the RSS top leadership. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his deputy L. K. Advani are senior in age and experience to Sudarshan, who took on his first leadership role in the RSS (as *pracharak*) only in the 1950s, a decade after Vajpayee and Advani. The breakdown in consensus-building shows itself in the deep internal differences over several significant issues, especially the Hindu nationalist drive to construct a temple dedicated to Rāma at Ayodhya, an effort that combines nationalist fervor, religious conviction, and identity politics. Many religious Hindus believe the site is the precise place where Rāma took human form; many Hindu nationalists consider a temple at the site as a symbol of revived national pride.

Ayodhya. The VHP has been the most vocal and uncompromising on the Ayodhya temple issue. In many ways the explicit religious face of the RSS family, the VHP takes a proprietary view of the issue. The violence connected with the campaign to build a temple, however, has aroused

debate on the issue within the BJP and has made their coalition partners unwilling to compromise. The VHP nonetheless has continued openly to confront the government, calling for legislation to allow the construction of a Rama temple. The VHP viewed Prime Minister Vajpayee's caution as a betrayal of a key element of the Hindutva agenda, and regularly called for his resignation.

In an attempt to resolve the issue before the 2004 elections, Vajpayee encouraged the Shankaracharya of Kanchi, a senior Hindu ecclesiastical figure, to negotiate a compromise with the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board. The effort resulted in a proposal calling for the construction of a Ram Hindu temple on an undisputed plot adjacent to the site of the destroyed mosque, and the construction of a wall separating the temple from the original mosque property. The VHP, which was excluded from those talks, rejected any effort at compromise. Caught in the middle, the RSS initially opposed the Shankaracharya's proposal, but then decided to support the proposal while still protesting the VHP's exclusion from the negotiating process. The situation then got very complicated, reflecting intense infighting within the Sangh Parivar that ultimately resulted in a revision of the original proposal. The Muslim leadership rejected the revised proposal. The VHP blamed Vajpayee for his involvement in the failed effort, and, supported by the RSS, immediately resumed calls for legislative action to permit the construction of a Ram temple, prompting the prime minister to threaten to resign.

The issue flared again in the wake of a September 2003 government-commissioned archaeological investigation reporting evidence of a Hindu temple beneath and predating the Babri Masjid on the Ayodhya site. The report inspired the VHP to mobilize hundreds of thousands of supporters for a march in the city in mid-October. Vajpayee called on the organizers to keep the rally peaceful. The government of Uttar Pradesh, controlled by an opposition party, arrested the organizers of the march in an attempt to prevent violence. The VHP leadership charged that the Vajpayee was assisting the state government to quash the protest march. The proposed march did not take place, but the VHP promised to take whatever steps are necessary to build the temple.

Swadeshi. The Hindutva critics have adopted a program of economic populism, once largely associated with the Indian left, opposing privatization and foreign investment on the one hand and arguing for economic self-sufficiency on the other. The labor affiliate of the Sangh Parivar, the Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, has strongly opposed globalization, and has received support for its stand from the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, whose leaders are close to the RSS, and which has support from a broad array of student, farmer, and workers' groups. The Mazdoor Sangh organized rallies, some with unions and political

groups opposed to the former BJP-dominated coalition government, to protest initiatives permitting the involvement of foreign companies in the life insurance sector and the sale of public enterprises to private interests. This criticism of globalization has a resonance among small-scale business, the traditional core support group of the RSS, which fears being overwhelmed by large modern enterprises, both Indian and foreign. This criticism also finds substantial support among workers in the organized sector of Indian industry; they fear that the rationalization of industry under private management would result in significant unemployment. The Mazdoor Sangh and other groups also argue that foreign investment is a threat to the nation's sovereignty. Prime Minister Vajpayee resisted this guerrilla activity against his government by appealing to still another traditional ingredient in the Hindu nationalist agenda, the building of a "great India." He argued that globalization is necessary for the 8 to 10 percent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate that would make India an international power.

Kashmir. A dramatic example of the breakdown in consensus-building occurred during Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections in October 2002, when the RSS supported non-BJP candidates running on a platform of a "trifurcation" of the state. That plan, which has been on the agenda of the RSS family for decades, would divide Jammu and Kashmir into three separate states along communal/ethnic lines, thus constitutionally separating the Hindu-majority Jammu area from the largely Muslim Kashmir Valley and the largely Buddhist Ladakh. The BJP had not given the proposal serious consideration for two decades, and when the RSS brought forward the idea of splitting Kashmir along communal lines, the Vajpayee government rejected it as a violation of India's traditional commitment to the "one nation" principle. The only other instance in which RSS activists withdrew support from the BJP on a large scale was in the 1984 parliamentary elections, when the Congress Party made blatant appeals to Hindu nationalism. Despite the growing criticism of the BJP within the Sangh Parivar, the Kashmir rebellion is an exception because the RSS leadership continues to try to dampen criticism of what it still considers a friendly government. The rebellion against the BJP in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, however, reveals the deep opposition to the Vajpayee government's conciliatory efforts and also a weakening of the RSS's mediatory role.

Trends

The RSS and the Sangh Parivar spent most of the last half century in political opposition. The role of opponent fit an ideology that has been deeply suspicious of the government since the founding of the RSS in 1925, a suspicion exacerbated after independence by the periodic

efforts of Congress Party governments to ban it. When elements of the RSS family were in power, that political power had a destabilizing impact. Never in the history of the RSS has there been such public bickering. Nonetheless, no senior figures have yet defected from the BJP; there has been no serious challenge to Vajpayee's political leadership, and no Hindus have set up a countering political organization. The only political figure in the BJP, other than Vajpayee, who has charismatic appeal is Narendra Modi, the BJP chief minister of Gujarat, who so successfully ran a tough Hindutva campaign in the 2002 state elections in the wake of communal violence there. Modi scored an overwhelming personal victory in the state, and is seen as the champion of the Hindutva agenda by many Hindu nationalists. Unlike Vajpayee, however, he has virtually no appeal outside the party. He is viewed by some BJP allies as a disruptive figure. Modi for his part is probably too much of a disciplined RSS member to rebel. He may also be conscious of the dismal fate of past party rebels. The most likely successor to Vajpayee is his deputy, L. K. Advani. The two have jointly run the party since the 1970s. They may have policy differences, but they are also close allies and Advani assumed control of the party organization after the 2004 loss of power. It is questionable if the RSS can ever again assert the influence it once had. The consequence is likely to be increasingly acrimonious relations between the BJP and other elements of the RSS family. The likely outcome of this is a greater distance between the BJP and them. Another likely consequence is a growing independence among some of the other larger constituents of the Sangh Parivar.

*Walter Andersen
Daniel Consolatore*

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindu Nationalist Parties; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)**

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HINDU NATIONALIST PARTIES Hindu social and political consciousness in India, articulated by revivalist movements and charismatic reformers, predates the

twentieth century. The Hindu Mahasabha (HM), founded in 1915, was an expression of this consciousness. It was also a reaction to the political activism of the Muslim clergy and sought to represent Hindu interests, though within the established Indian National Congress fold, espousing a pan-Indian nationalism, derived from Hindu cultural roots. The indifference of the HM to land reforms allowed it to cooperate with British India's landed Muslim elite, whose principal concern was any threat to their own position as landlords.

In 1925 Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a member of the HM, and a group of his associates established the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS was a militant grassroots organization established to defend Hindus in the aftermath of the Khilafat movement to restore the Caliphate and the subsequent communal riots, which had resulted in many deaths and forced conversions to Islam. The RSS began functioning in an atmosphere of growing religious division in the 1920s, as Hindus and Muslims jockeyed to position themselves to succeed the British in India. Significantly, the RSS proudly recorded its intervention in the religious riots that overtook the central Indian city of Nagpur in 1927 as one of its first successful acts on behalf of Hindus.

The RSS disagreed with the political strategy of the Indian National Congress, which remained secular in its political support of Muslims as well as other minorities of India. The RSS gained support from the Hindu Mahasabha's ties with wealthy Hindu elites, but distanced itself from the HM once it was well established. The latter declined in influence, especially after its expulsion from the Congress in the late 1930s, despite being led by Veer Savarkar, a major architect of Hindu-first nationalist politics. It succumbed to greater conservatism after Indian independence, leading to the departure of its leader, Shyama Prasad Mookherji, founder of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The RSS wanted to actively address what they perceived as the religious, political, socioeconomic, and cultural challenges facing Hinduism, combating a general lack of Hindu awareness by teaching Indians about their ancient Vedic traditions and historic achievements. The RSS claimed to be the inheritors of the hallowed traditions of an earlier generation of religious and social reformers such as Dayananda Saraswati and Swami Vivekananda. Such a narrow conception of multicultural India inevitably meant a rejection of India's Islamic past. The British conquest of Bengal had also been welcomed as liberation from the Mughal imperial yoke.

The subsequent evolution and perceptions of the RSS were colored by the experience of partition, for which

they blamed Muslims. RSS loyalists harbored even greater suspicion of Muslims, based on the creation of Pakistan and India's wars with that nation. Ultimately, the RSS appeared motivated by patriotism, inspired by Italian nationalists Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi. Critics, however, have compared the RSS to the nationalist perversion in Nazi Germany.

The RSS asserts that Hindutva (Hindu-first extremist values) is merely the ancient and eternal culture of India, which Muslims must accept if they remain in India. Their insistence that most Indian Muslims had Hindu ancestors fails to resolve the dilemma posed for Muslims by the glorification of Hindu rulers like Maharashtra's hero, Shivaji, who successfully assailed the Mughal rulers. The RSS expresses fervent admiration, however, for Muslim nationalist leaders of India, admiring men like the current Muslim president of India, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, the father of India's ballistic missile defense program.

The RSS was banned for a year in 1948, after a former RSS Hindu extremist, Nathuram Godse, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi. For several decades following, the RSS remained outside the mainstream of Indian public life, which was dominated by the secular ideals of India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The RSS was viewed with undisguised dismay and hostility by an influential section of India's English-speaking elite. Many among India's Westernized leaders believed that the RSS and its affiliates represented a pernicious variant of fascism, though millions of Hindus in small towns and villages continue to have faith in it.

The RSS demands the imposition of a uniform civil code throughout India to end Muslim personal law. It also demands a national ban on cow slaughter and the termination of the autonomous constitutional status accorded to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. Critics argue that the implacable hostility of the RSS and its affiliates to religious conversion, especially as a result of the missionary activities of the newer Christian churches, has become a recipe for intimidation and violence.

The RSS is organized as an organic unit of power, the Shakhā, which meets daily. By 2004 there were more than 2.5 million members, in over 25,000 Shakhās, throughout India and abroad. The Shakhā is responsible for ideological indoctrination ("man-making") and provides the organizational basis for its various activities, running numerous schools and engaging in voluntary social service.

In 1951 the supreme leader of the RSS, Guru Golwalkar, reluctantly agreed to allow members to enter the electoral fray. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was then

formed, succeeded in 1980 by the BJP. The RSS is the parent organization to members of the Sangh Parivar (family of Hindu-first organizations), including the Bharatiya Janata Party (one of the largest parties in Parliament) the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (its trade union affiliate), and the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (student union). It remains the largest organization of its type in the world, with the exception of the Communist Party of China. The RSS itself was led by upper caste Hindu Brahmans through much of its history, like virtually all of India's political parties (until the recent rise of political parties composed of and led by Dalits, former "untouchables").

The RSS uncritically imbibed many of the commonplace collectivist economic certitudes of Indian political life until 1991, when economic liberalization and globalization were ushered in by the Congress and were later accepted by the BJP. The intensification of the campaign to build a Ram temple over the destroyed Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Pakistan's struggles against India, with its violent spillovers for Hindu-Muslim relations, and the dramatic mobilization of India's deprived communities all test the sagacity of the RSS. The question posed by evolving circumstances is whether the RSS is capable of sustaining the wider interests of the Indian society and polity, instead of giving priority to its narrow Hindu-first imperatives.

Gautam Sen

See also Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindu Nationalism; Hindutva and Politics; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

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
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HINDU TANTRIC DEITIES Although the origins of Tantrism are lost in remote antiquity, it is certain that Tantrism was a pan-Indian movement by the fifth to sixth centuries A.D. It arose in response and in contradistinction to the orthodox Vedic religion of the Brahmins. Heterodox in nature, Tantrism tends toward obscure secret beliefs and rituals. Although it is difficult to date any of the surviving Tantric texts with accuracy, the earliest Hindu text with specific Tantric content is the *Devī Māhātmya* (A.D. 400–600). Various Tantric sects continued to produce texts throughout the medieval period and beyond.

Tantric rites were designed to avoid the endless cycles of rebirth and to enable practitioners to reach enlightenment (*moksha* or *mukti*) in one lifetime. In addition, Tantric rituals promise earthly enjoyment and domination (*bhukti*). Accomplishing the two goals is an arduous and lengthy process that can only take place under the direction of a guru. Tantrism emphasizes, in varying degrees, key practices involving intricate and complex rituals, mantras (chanting incantations), spells and magic, secret sounds and syllables and hand gestures, magical diagrams called *yantras* and *mandalas*, deliberately coded language, and restricted practices and initiations in which secret lore is passed to the student. Yogic exercises and meditation are essential components in Tantric rituals, particularly *kundalīnī* yoga, in which creative energy is directed upward in the body along the nerve centers (*chakras*). From earliest times, Tantric mystics and seers refined the “supramental” process of meditation that allowed them to scrutinize, dissect, and classify the macrocosmic and subatomic universes. Their knowledge came not through the senses but through minute observations of patterns and sequences perceived through intuitive awareness. Cultic rituals include the formation of an elaborate macrocosmic/microcosmic cosmology located within the human body in which the deity is invoked in the heart. Tantra’s psycho-experimental techniques led to highly elaborate systems that were given visual expression in abstract symbolic and diagrammatic images (*yantras* and *mandalas*) that represented the deity and facilitated merging with the deity in order to bring about the shattering of the individual ego and the ultimate experience in which the seeker and deity became one.

The Tantric Goddess

Hindu Tantrism centers on the Great Goddess (*Devī*, the Shining One) as the supreme deity and Divine Mother. Tantric texts assert that only the Goddess is



Nineteenth-Century Drawing of the Goddess Kamala. The *Dasa Mahavidyas* (Ten Great Wisdoms) often threaten the accepted social order and challenge their worshipers to reject convention. This nineteenth-century drawing illustrates the tenth such goddess, Kamala (or Kama), who grants power, peace, and prosperity to the material world. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

capable of granting the dual aims of *mukti* and *bhukti*. The *Devī Māhātmya* explains that she is eternal, supreme knowledge and the one who grants the boon of final liberation. As the sole and absolute creative force of the universe, she also sometimes is identified as *shakti* (power). Sometimes used as a name for the Goddess herself, *shakti* is the ultimate principle, the source of all; it is the dynamic, manifesting energy of creation, while the male god is the static, unmanifested aspect of reality. Yogis regard *shakti* as the dormant power (*kundalīnī*) in the body that must be awakened in order to rise to the final *chakra* at the top of the head to achieve liberation.


There are countless forms of the Goddess in Hinduism; one text, the *Lalitāsahasranāma*, provides a list of 1,008 names, but there are, in fact, far too many to obtain

an accurate count. They all, however, are emanations or manifestations of Devī. The innumerable manifestations can be grouped into two general categories, the invincible aspect and the benevolent aspect, both of which nurture the practitioner in the quest for spiritual release.

Her invincible forms. Of the invincible manifestations, Durgā, Ambikā, the Saptamātrikās and later Ashtamātrikās, and Kālī are among the most prominent. The beautiful Durgā was born to slaughter the powerful demon Mahishāsura, the symbolic personification of evil and ignorance. So potent was he that the gods were unable to overcome him, thus each was compelled to surrender his individual energy (*śakti*) and contribute it to the collective force that was the Goddess Durgā. She disposed of the demon with ease; decimating the beast symbolizes obliteration of the tenacious human ego, the element that binds the individual to the cycle of reincarnation.

Called on to obliterate the demons, Shumba and Nishumba, the goddess appeared in the world again as Ambikā in order to wage war on the mighty pair and their demonic forces. The battle was so unrelenting and dangerous that the gods, unable to fight themselves, sent aid in the form of the Saptamātrikās, or the Seven Mothers. They are Brahmānī, Māheshvarī, Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Vārāhī, Indrānī, the relinquished *śaktis* of six major Hindu gods, and Chāmundā, the most virulent energy of the Goddess that issued from Ambikā's forehead. Her best-known name in her dark, violent, and formidable form is Kālī; by virtue of her unparalleled valor in defeating the demon generals, Chanda and Munda, however, she was given the name Chāmundā. The Saptamātrikās always appear in a group and are placed strategically in Shiva temples to indicate a point in the circumambulation of the temple when the seeker and deity may merge. Specifically, the Saptamātrikās embody the seven *chakras* through which the *kundalīnī* progresses until it is released from the body, at which point the worshiper attains enlightenment. The Saptamātrikās are iconic symbols representing in linear fashion the process of transcendence as it unfolds in the body. Some versions of the myth add an eighth goddess to the group (Astamātrikās). In Nepal, the Astamātrikās became the standard. The Devī Māhātmya identified the eighth as Nārasimhī; various texts give other names.

The invincible Kālī is the manifestation of the goddess often worshiped by Tantric seekers in east India and Nepal. Kālī, the same potent form of the goddess as Chāmundā from the Saptamātrikā group, has been extricated for separate worship. As the final member of the group of seven, she is the deity who presides at the instant of enlightenment. She has a savage power, accompanied by a horrifying howl. She was so intoxicated by her bloody rampage on the battlefield that she could not stop, even when the victory



Illustration, c. 1800, Depicting the Spinal Nerve Channels and Centers of the Human Body. In yoga, the *chakras* (centers) denote a point of intersection where the psychic self and the physical self connect; the *nadis* (spinal nerve channels) is the network by which *prana* (the “life force”) travels through the *chakras*. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

was secure. Wildly, she continued killing through a dance that threatened to topple the universe. Finally, her husband Shiva (in this story he represents the passive potential of creation) lay prone in her path. Inadvertently, she stepped on him, realizing at last that she had been out of control. Thus, her appearance is frightening and portrays her dangerous character; she is extremely scrawny, dark skinned, and wears ornaments of severed heads and snakes and an apron of severed hands. She drinks blood, as witnessed by her lolling red tongue and the blood-filled skull cup that she holds. She is the supreme symbol of death and simultaneously new life, that is, a blissfully enlightened life that relinquishes the ego and overcomes all fear of death. While she is celebrated in iconic form for temple worship and festivals, she is represented by her distinctive *yantra* for the initiate engaged in ritual.

The Dasa Mahāvīdyās (Ten Great Wisdoms) form a group of ten goddesses whose aim is to stretch one's awareness beyond comfortable standards. Several of them threaten the accepted social order and challenge the worshiper to reject the conventional. Their origin derives from a quarrel between Shiva and Pārvatī. The angry Shiva attempted to leave his wife, who then multiplied herself ten times in order to block all the directions and prevent his escape. Each of the ten Mahāvīdyās revealed a new truth to Shiva. Not only was Shiva forced to acknowledge the superiority of the goddess, but he became enlightened as well.

The first Mahāvīdyā is Kālī, who represents ultimate destruction. She removes attachments and fears. Tārā, the second, is compassionate. She carries scissors for severing attachments and stands, like Kālī, on the prone body of Shiva. The third, Sodashī, is a beautiful sixteen-year-old girl. She provides inspiration and awareness in the three worlds. Bhuvaneshvarī, the fourth, is the mistress of the phenomenal world. She too is beautiful, unlike the fifth of the group, Bhairavī, who is the Goddess of Decay. Symbolically, she destroys all impediments to clearing the mind and sustaining the yogic state. The sixth is a shocking goddess known as Chinnamastā. She chops off her own head to feed her two daughters. From her neck issue three streams of blood: two pour into the mouths of her offspring and the third flows into the mouth of her own severed head. Her role is to halt the activity of the mind and to remove ignorance. The ugly Dhūmāvātī, as the dark widow, brings destruction, hunger, and thirst. To worship her is to induce a nondual state of consciousness. Bagalāmukhī is a dynamic deity who is invoked to obtain *siddhis* (supernormal powers). She holds the tongue of a demon to still his evil speech. She paralyzes the tongue so that no evil words are emitted and thus thwarts the accumulation of negative karma. The ninth goddess, Mātangī, symbolizes death and

impurity through her association with the untouchable class. Finally, Kamalā is beautiful, with a golden complexion; she grants gifts of power, peace, and prosperity in the material world.

While the goddesses mentioned here are still actively venerated in Hinduism, worship of the sixty-four *yoginīs* has been abandoned. The *yoginīs* were obscure and esoteric deities that had a following by the ninth century A.D.; they maintained their status in Tantric circles until the fourteenth century. Little can be affirmed, however, about the specifics of their worship because the few texts that survive cloak the esoteric knowledge in coded language. The central figure was Bhairavī, a ferocious form of the Goddess. *Yoginīs* were both benevolent and malevolent and engaged in a dance of destruction. The goal for their devotees was acquisition of *siddhis*, or supernatural powers, and the acquisition of all sixty-four *siddhis* led to perfection. There is an obvious but still rather poorly understood relationship of the sixty-four *yoginīs* to the Astamātrikās. Some scholars regard the *yoginīs* as attendants of the goddesses of the eight *chakras*; thus eight goddesses times eight attendants resulted in a total of sixty-four forms. Others view the *yoginīs* as manifestations of the eight Mātrikās.

Her benevolent forms. The Tantric pantheon of goddesses includes some benevolent aspects. Today in India and Nepal there survives the active worship of the Shaktipīthas, places where pieces of the body of the goddess Satī fell to Earth. An ancient myth records that the insults leveled by the goddess's father Daksha at her husband Shiva caused the goddess to kill herself in protest. In a great state of grief, Shiva picked up her body and raged across the world. Fearing cataclysmic destruction of the universe, the god Vishnu hurled his discus at her corpse, severing it bit by bit. As the body diminished, Shiva came to his senses and mourned quietly. Each place where a portion of the body fell has become a sacred spot. Shrines at the various locations protect odd stones or icons in remembrance of Satī. Within the sacred precinct, a stone representing Shiva as Bhairava attests to the eternal relationship between the goddess and the god. Tantric yogis attracted to the sacred sites had their graves located in close proximity. The Kalighat Temple in Kolkata is a Shaktipītha. The Kamakhya Temple in Gauhati houses the vagina (*yoni*) of Satī.

Another of the benign forms of the Tantric goddess is Lalitā Tripurasundarī of the Shrī Vidyā cult. Shrī Vidyā evolved in South India by the seventh century A.D. and later influenced Kashmir Tantrism. Obscure Tantric practices were refined in Shrī Vidyā to a point at which orthodox Brahmanism and Tantrism merged. Lalitā Tripurasundarī is the supreme deity who embodies all aspects of Devī simultaneously. She is represented in ritual by the Shrī *yantra*, where she resides at the center.

The Tantric God

Shiva is always linked to the Great Goddess, although in Tantrism, he often appears as the fearsome Bhairava. He is worshiped independently in Tantric rites, but more often is paired with the Goddess. The relationship of the Goddess and Bhairava is an extremely complicated one. In Tantrism, he in effect symbolizes the consecrated sacrificer; therefore, the devotee, by ritually identifying with the Godhead, achieves blissful union with the Goddess.

While Tantric rituals must conform to complex criteria, they are in and of themselves valueless unless their inner significance is understood by the practitioner; they are external rites that mirror internal conscious activity. Ultimately, the goal of the ritual is to dissolve vain distinctions between subject and object, internal and external, and to realize undivided oneness. Deities are worshiped to rid the individual of weaknesses and all fetters that prevent liberation. Once the bonds are severed, oneness is then realized through the process called “cosmicization.” The process entails a fusion of the collective (the divine) with the individual seeker’s consciousness. “Cosmicization” is undertaken through the use of the *yantra* or *mandala*, a diagrammed energy grid that, when combined with proper training and meditation, is the means through which union is achieved. As part of the ritual, the practitioner studies the *yantra* until it is committed to memory (called the absorption concentration). Once the image is perfectly constructed as a mental image, it is regarded as being one thousand times more purified than the original. The potent mind image reenacts the movements of the cosmos and embodies the divine union of opposites. Within the *yantra* are the *trikona*, consisting of upward pointing triangles, representing the God Shiva, and inverted triangles representing the Goddess. The idea is symbolized by the interaction of male and female triangles that eventually become united in the *bindu*, or the nucleus, symbolizing the union of all opposites, zero, infinity, creation and destruction, subject and object. The *yantra* is a dynamic symbol of the cosmos; hence it is represented as an expanding form emanating from the central dimensionless *bindu*, the sacred dwelling place of the deity. Such symbols are not static, but dynamic graphs of the creative process of cosmic evolution and involution.

Katherine Anne Harper

See also **Devī; Goddess Images; Shiva and Shaivism**


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HINDUTVA AND POLITICS In 1999 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the central government at the head of a coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), consisting of twenty-four primarily regional parties. For the BJP, this was the fruition of years of careful groundwork, carried out in conjunction with organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). The BJP had been making advances in the Indian electoral process, but this was the first time it was in a position to form a stable coalition government. While the BJP did not win an outright majority, enabling it to form the government alone, nor beat the Congress Party in the total number of votes garnered, it reaped the benefits of long-term planning and skillful coalition building, as well as the structural and institutional weaknesses that were plaguing the Congress Party. The BJP called for early Lok Sabha (parliamentary) polls in 2004, riding high after successful elections in a number of states. However, in a result that took most observers by surprise, the Congress Party returned to power at the head of a coalition government. The BJP won only nine seats less than the Congress, but the electoral losses of some of its key allies in the polls, coupled with the Congress’ ability to form a successful alliance, put the BJP in the opposition.

The BJP represents the political face of India’s Hindutva ideology, defined amorphously as Hindu cultural nationalism, or “the essence of being Hindu.” Hindutva ideology demands the assertion of India’s national identity as a Hindu state, but it defines Hinduism as a cultural construct rather than a religious one. As such, it demands that India’s minorities—numbering about 150 million Muslims and several million Christians, among others—reconfigure their beliefs, espousing Hindu values and considering themselves part of an overarching Hindu culture. Such an ideology poses a profound threat to minorities, and to the social cohesion of the nation. The belief that India’s authentic culture lies in Hinduism has bred an “antiforeign” outlook, a definition that encompasses both the Muslims and Christians of India. Since the 1980s, the BJP has gone from being a marginal political player, catering to the aspirations of a small upper caste Hindu elite, to a party that enjoys widespread popular recognition and the support of a growing segment of Indians, both at home and among India’s wealthy and influential diaspora population.



Bharatiya Janata Party President L. K. Advani. Advani was a forceful proponent of Hindu cultural nationalism, whose first religious caravan (*rath yatra*) sparked widespread controversy, leaving a trail of anti-Muslim violence in its wake. INDIA TODAY.

The Growth of Hindutva Politics

The politics of Hindutva, as represented by India's ruling party, the BJP, cannot be separated from the larger grassroots social movement from which they stem, though the two aspects of the movement clash periodically. The BJP belongs to a family of organizations, known as the Sangh Parivar (or "Sangh Family"), which collectively represent the ideology of Hindutva in its many social and institutional forms. The primary ideological organization within the Parivar is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), or World Hindu Council, supported by its youth wing, the Bajrang Dal. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National Volunteers Society) provides the organizational backbone of the movement, and is paramilitary in nature.

The organizational roots of Hindutva go back to 1914, to the creation of the Hindu Mahasabha, an organization founded to unite the nation against British imperial rule under the banner of Hindu culture. The

Mahasabha's work was bolstered in 1925 by the creation of the RSS by Keshav Hedgewar. Hinduism is a religion that is amorphous in its teachings, open to diverse interpretations and modes of practice, and polytheistic. The Mahasabha saw these values as a weakness, since they provided few means for united mobilization, and therefore were perceived historically as offering little resistance to conquest, either by Muslim conquerors, or by European imperialist powers. The hierarchical social character of Hinduism that privileges its upper castes, coupled with India's complex regional and linguistic diversity, were further barriers to cohesion. The Hindutva movement sought to "re-create" a golden age of Hinduism—a vision best epitomized by the rule of Rāma, a human incarnation of the god Vishnu. The political goal of the Hindutva movement was the creation of a Hindu Rashtra, or nation, modeled on the golden age of Rāma. The ingredients of this golden age, and of a unified Hinduism, however, had to be created, and this has been an ongoing process for the Sangh Parivar.

The antecedents of Hindutva, or the politics of "Hinduness," as both a political and social ideology, date back to the last decades of the nineteenth century and were formulated in reaction to colonial administrative policies. Debates, focused around Hindu revivalism and reformation, dealt with the desire of upper caste Hindus to protect their traditions and values, and to renegotiate their identity in a modern and colonized context. Hindu nationalism reflects the view of high caste reformers and retains strong Brahmanical tendencies.

During the movement for independence, the Hindutva movement mobilized against the Congress Party's secular and pluralist platform. The uniting and mobilization of Muslims against the British government, through the Khilafat movement of 1919, launched with the help of Mahatma Gandhi, fed the insecurities of the Hindutva leaders. Later, the Muslim League's negotiations with the Congress to ensure rights for Muslims further strengthened those insecurities within the Hindutva fold, which from the beginning conceptualized Hinduness in very territorial terms. The Congress decision to accede to the Muslim League's demand for a separate nation of Pakistan and the subsequent creation of Pakistan were seen as betrayals of the principle of a single "united Hindu nation" (Akhand Bharat). The Congress and Mahatma Gandhi were portrayed as pseudo-secularists who were eager to pander to the Muslim minority at the cost of Hindu pride and the Hindu nation. The themes of injured Hindu pride and of victimization, at the hands of Muslims in particular, bred a "majority's minority complex" that has remained powerful within the movement. Mahatma Gandhi was also resented because of his mobilization of the lower castes in Indian society, the empowering of



V. D. Savarkar is one of the principal ideologues of the Hindutva movement. This was his message on the eve of his fifty-ninth birthday, on 25 May 1941. The Hindus should henceforth test all national and international politics and policies through the Hindu point of view alone. . . . Let every Hindu youth who is capable to stand the test, try his best to enter the army, navy and air force or get the training and secure employment in the ammunition factories and in all other branches connected with war crafts. Unforeseen facilities are being thrown open to you. You help no one else more than you help yourselves if you utilize these facilities and opportunities to militarize Hindudom! This done everything else shall follow: if you miss this, nothing else shall avail! This sums up the whole program and the supreme duty of the hour. Hinduize all politics and Militarize Hinduism—and the resurrection of our Hindu nation is bound to follow it as certainly as the Dawn follows the darkest hour of night!

whom was seen as a threat to the upper caste ideological core that was defining the Hindu nation.

While the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS enjoyed a modicum of popularity in the 1930s and 1940s, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi at the hands of a Hindu fundamentalist in January 1948, soon after independence, was a turning point for the movement. Gandhi's assassin, Nathuram Godse, was a former Swayamsevak (as members of the RSS are called) and a member of the Hindu Mahasabha. The immediate reason for Gandhi's assassination was his pressure on the Indian government to pay reparations to Pakistan for certain losses during partition, but this was only the last in what Godse saw as a series of betrayals. Gandhi's assassination horrified the public and created a popular uproar against the RSS and the Mahasabha. Nehru and the government clamped down on Hindutva organizations, and while the organizations continued to operate, they fell out of the larger public perception for almost four decades. The VHP was founded in 1964 to further Hindutva's ideological program. The political arm of the Sangh Parivar and the precursor to the BJP, then called the Jana Sangh, was generally a marginal presence in Parliament.

The Devolution of Politics and the Rise of Hindu Majoritarianism

Two related fractures helped to change the political arena from the 1980s onward. The first was the unraveling of the Congress Party's nationwide political hegemony, and the resulting fragmentation of Indian politics. Since the Lok Sabha elections of 1989, no party has won an outright majority in the polls, and a succession of volatile coalition governments has ruled the nation. Regionally based parties have grown in power and prominence, and in the last two national elections, the majority of votes cast were in favor of regional parties.

The end of the Congress monopoly also heralded the end of Nehru's cohesive vision of India as a state united in its diversity, run in a highly centralized manner, and based on a Fabian socialist economic model. Although this opened the political field for regional parties—including the BJP, which remains more regional than national in scope, with most of its support concentrated in North India's "cow belt"—it also left an ideological vacuum, and it was this vacuum that Hindu majoritarian sentiment quickly helped to fill. In order to compete with increasingly vibrant regional parties at the state level, the Congress Party played religious politics and relied on an obliquely defined "populist Hinduism," a strategy that the Parivar emulated with far greater ideological zeal in the northern heartland of India.

The second "fracture" came in 1990, with the central government's decision to implement the Mandal Commission Reforms, an affirmative action program that created reserved seats at universities and in government jobs for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) of India. This was the first step toward empowering lower caste politics in India, traditionally seen as a Congress "vote bank."

The BJP traditionally received the bulk of its political support from upper caste urban voters. The empowerment of the lower castes created a rift in the Hindu community; with the OBCs constituting over 50 percent of India's Hindus, this was a vote bank the BJP could not afford to lose. Nor could it afford to publicly disagree with the Mandal Commission reforms without further alienating this key demographic. The issue that the Parivar chose to unite Hindu sentiment and buttress its support was that of building a temple to Rāma on the site of a sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya, the Babri Masjid, named after India's first Mughal emperor, Babur. The BJP claimed that the mosque stood on the site of Rāma's birth (*Ram janmabhoomi*), and had been built after

the destruction of a much older Hindu temple at the site. The goal of building a temple to Rāma at this site has been an integral part of the Sangh Parivar's program of re-creating the history of Ayodhya to substantiate the myths of Rāma, but now an opportunity had presented itself to use the issue in a highly dramatic, politicized way. L. K. Advani embarked on a Rath Yatra (sacred pilgrimage) through North India in a "golden" chariot, much like one in which Rama might have ridden, on an ethno-religious campaign. The Sangh Parivar turned all government efforts to restrain them in their march into a highly effective cult of martyrdom, and gained a wider range of Hindu supporters in the process among the urban and rural lower middle classes, as well as among the unemployed and upper caste students whom the Mandal Commission had disadvantaged. Sangh Parivar workers eventually tore down the mosque in December 1992, unleashing a wave of Hindu-Muslim riots across the nation. The Parivar and the Supreme Court of India have been deadlocked over the fate of the land on which the Babri Masjid stood. The issue, however, has deep emotional resonance for Hindutva to this day.

Balancing Ideology and Politics

Although Hindutva gained ground as an ideology from the 1980s onward, the BJP was unable to form a lasting government at the center until 1999. More importantly, the primary factor enabling the BJP to form the central government after the 1999 elections was structural, not ideological. The regionally based appeal of politics in India today leaves the Congress Party, the BJP's main competitor, at a distinct disadvantage. The Congress Party remains national in scope, and competes directly with regional and caste-based parties in state elections. This makes it difficult for Congress to build coalitions with these parties at the center. The BJP, on the other hand, has an established electoral presence in only a handful of states, and is able to build coalitions with regional parties, who do not feel threatened by it. After the 1999 elections, the BJP was willing to make significant concessions on its ideological platform to build bridges with secular allies, and was able to form a government with twenty-three primarily regional parties, under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee's image as a moderate BJP leader, and the emphasis he placed on social and economic issues, helped to keep this coalition together.

While this has been a successful political strategy, it has caused tensions within the Parivar, most notably with the RSS and the VHP. The BJP has had to toe a fine line between alienating its governing coalition and alienating the Parivar by not following its lead on all ideological issues. It depends on both for political power and

legitimacy. This tug of war between two competing needs has led to contradictory statements and policies by the BJP on a range of issues, including the dispute over Kashmir, the Babri Masjid issue, and, most recently, over the Gujarat riots. By following largely centrist policies, the BJP has been able to demonstrate that while the era of coalition politics is there to stay in India, coalitions can be relatively stable.

The increasing participation of regional and caste-based parties has added a new level of vibrancy and enfranchisement to India's democratic fabric, but the new political system also brings with it a host of new problems. Party platforms appeal to narrower needs and concerns, and there is a new degree of political opportunism. This comes at the expense of broader, more long-term national goals, most importantly the need to ensure that India's complex fabric of communities does not lose the ability to live together and share in their common burdens and opportunities. The value of secularism, which is integral to the stability of India, is in danger of being undervalued and ignored under the constraints of making a coalition government function. While the BJP put aside its ideological agenda in the interests of building its broad coalition after the 1999 elections, it remained disturbingly passive on certain key issues, such as the VHP's virulent stance against conversions of Hindus by Christian missionaries. The most serious omission of the government's constitutional duties occurred during the communal violence that broke out in Gujarat in February 2002. Anti-Muslim riots in the state, in retaliation for an attack on Hindu pilgrims returning by train from Ayodhya, remains one of the darkest moments in modern India's history. What sparked the initial attack remains controversial, but what is clear is that the BJP-run state government did little to stop the violence, leading some analysts to conclude that what occurred was a politically supported pogrom against Muslims in the state. Under pressure from the Sangh Parivar, the BJP allowed Narendra Modi to remain chief minister of Gujarat, despite the law and order breakdown in the state. While the BJP's secular allies at the center protested, they remained passive and unwilling to risk their own positions to confront the BJP. In the state elections that followed later that year, the BJP, led once again by Narendra Modi, won with a thumping majority.

The Significance of the Gujarat Elections

The BJP has consistently fared well in Gujarat polls in the early years of the 2000s. Its success was not a major upset, but its landslide proportions in the wake of the riots were a surprise. The impact of the riots was expected to make the Congress Party a stronger contender in the polls. In the months that followed the riots,

however, Chief Minister Narendra Modi waged a virulently communal campaign designed to inflame Hindu sentiments and, by association, patriotic zeal. This connection between being a Hindu and being a nationalist is a central tenet of Hindutva ideology, but was used in a uniquely successful way in the Gujarat election. Pulling foreign policy and domestic politics together, Modi was also able to effectively utilize anti-Pakistan and anti-Musharraf rhetoric to garner support in the wake of a terrorist attack that had left people in Gujarat feeling particularly vulnerable. While Hindutva was not the sole or even the determining factor contributing to the BJP's success in Gujarat, it is significant and will continue to play a role at the state and national level, in conjunction with and in reaction to a range of other political drivers.

The passivity of the moderate middle, which does not espouse the Hindu fundamentalism of Hindutva ideology, and the political exigencies of secular parties have created an atmosphere conducive to the growth of extremism. The BJP has been successful in keeping its allies in the NDA just weak enough to remain useful in the coalition but unable to challenge key BJP policies. The fear following the Gujarat elections was that the BJP might be tempted to move from its largely centrist policies to fully embrace in practice the ideological positions of the VHP and a new political strategy that political wags are calling "Moditva" or "Modi-ism." There is also the real fear that the increasing acceptability of religious rhetoric in the political arena is moving the terms of political debate to the right.

Indian politics remain far too complex, however, to respond to so narrow an ideological agenda. Elections in India reflect regional and community-based issues, and this was true of the Gujarat elections, as well as the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. Several factors set the Gujarat elections apart. Gujarat's urban density, degree of industrialization, economic priorities, and the absence of caste politics all played in favor of the BJP. The riots played a key role, and it is noteworthy that they did not spread to any of India's other states. Gujarat's urban centers, particularly Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Godhra, have an unusually bad history of communal violence, and Modi was able to successfully capitalize on anti-Muslim sentiment unleashed by the attack in Godhra that led to the communal riots, as well as on a subsequent terrorist attack by suspected Pakistani militants on the Akshardham temple in Gujarat. Moreover, the BJP landslide was not uniform. In sixty-four constituencies in Gujarat, the BJP and the Congress were neck and neck, and the BJP won by less than 3 percent; in some areas where the margin between the two parties was larger, third parties held the balance of the votes, and strategic alliance building could have delivered a different result.

This is a lesson the Congress Party took to heart in the 2004 general elections, redoubling its efforts to build genuine partnerships with regional parties and successfully sorting out internal dissent and issues of leadership within the party.

But the Gujarat "test case" also highlighted a critical aspect of the Sangh Parivar's work as an effective grassroots social movement. The RSS and the VHP have spent years cultivating a base in Gujarat, through labor unions, social work, building schools, and focusing on backward communities, particularly tribal communities, to draw them away from their traditional Congress support. The different Sangh Parivar organizations have also reached out to the lower castes with reasonable success. If there is a message to be drawn from Gujarat, it is that the full impact of the Hindutva movement will bear fruit through its social organizing, not in the short-term political future of the BJP. Its social organizations occupy a space in civil society that cannot easily be regulated by the state, and these organizations will continue to work for their social revolution with profound consequences for the country.

The victory of the BJP in the Gujarat state elections of 2002 was bolstered by unexpected wins in the Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, and Rajasthan state elections in 2003. The BJP called for early Lok Sabha polls in 2004, expecting to ride this winning streak to another term in office. The BJP's loss in the elections was a result of several factors. Anti-incumbency is strong in Indian politics and certainly played against the BJP. The BJP's "Shining India" campaign, focused on middle class consumerist ideals, had a negative reaction amongst India's millions of rural and urban poor. The election results were also seen as a "Gujarat verdict"—a reaction by the national electorate against overt ideological politics. The BJP also suffered because many of its regional allies suffered losses at the polls, while the Congress' allies fared well.

The larger question underlying the analysis of electoral politics is the future of Hindutva and its implications for India's multireligious population. While in power, the BJP followed a policy of de-linking governance and development from its core ideological issues, and following largely centrist policies. There is a real fear that the BJP will revert to relying on its ideological rhetoric in opposition, where it will not need to balance the needs of political allies or have the responsibilities of governance. Following the elections, there has been a move in the Sangh Parivar to sideline its moderate elements, including Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in favor of more hard line elements who are eager to return to the BJP's "core agenda," which includes a uniform civil code for the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent, and the *ramjanmabhoomi* issue.

Looking Ahead

There has been a shift toward, and cohesion of, the religious right in Indian politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but that does not trump the dynamics of regionalism and coalition building. The outcome of the national elections still depends on regional factors and the ability of parties to build alliances at the state level.

Regional and caste-based parties thus seem destined to remain the mainstays of Indian politics in the future, and much will depend on the dynamics of particular coalitions, how stable they are, the terms of the debate with the political opposition, and the quality of leaders that political parties produce.

Mandavi Mehta

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Congress Party; Gujarat; Hindu Nationalism; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)**

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
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY For over four thousand years, the Indian subcontinent has sustained a brilliant civilization, rivaled in its longevity only by that of China, attracting “conquerors” from every part of the world to its fertile plains and singular riches. From the earliest invading Aryans to its most recent Western colonialists, India has absorbed the elements of other cultures but retained its distinctive identity. India’s history is the record of that process of assimilation and transformation over time.

Indus Valley Culture

The roots of India’s history lie buried more than four thousand years deep under the fecund soil of the valley of the River Indus, for which India and its great civilization were named by ancient Persian invaders. Over a thousand villages and five major urban sites have been excavated around the Valley of the Indus and its tributary “Five Rivers” (Punjab) that flow into it from the perennially snow-covered Himalayas. Remains of those Indus Valley cities date back to at least 2300 B.C. That technologically sophisticated and artistic Bronze Age of Indian history lasted until about 1700 B.C. Artifacts of Hindu Shiva and Mother-Goddess worship, as well as of ancient yogic practice, have been unearthed in Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, the two richest Indus sites, and fragments of woven cotton, India’s most important handicraft, and of dice and chess, its most ancient popular games, have all been found there, as have the bones of domesticated chickens, India’s culinary gift to global appetites.

Aryan Invasions

From about 1500 B.C. seminomadic Indo-European Aryan tribes—the most powerful of which was called Bharata, modern India’s Sanskrit name and root of the epic poem Mahābhārata (Great Bharata)—invaded and conquered the Indus Valley. They came over the high Khyber and Bolan passes in the Hindu Kush from the Afghan plateau, galloping down on their horses and in royal chariots, driving herds of cows, which would later be worshiped by Hindus, long after functioning as Aryan currency. Hearty Aryan warriors also brought deadly arrows and hafted axes, but those would not have sufficed to conquer the more advanced cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro had their walls not earlier been breached and their citadels shattered by severe earthquakes, leaving them vulnerable to Aryan cavalry assaults and conquests. Pre-Aryan peoples of the Indus, called Dasas (dark-skinned), were mentioned by Aryan Brahman bards, in their most sacred Rig Veda, as living in “walled cities.” *Dasas* later came to mean “slaves,” reflecting their fate after they were conquered prior to 1000 B.C., by



which time tribal Aryans had crossed the Punjab and reached the plateau around Delhi, settling in cities and kingdoms.

The longer epic, Mahābhārata, tells the tale of Aryan tribal cousins in deadly conflict over land near urban Delhi's earliest capital incarnation, Indra-Prastha. The shorter epic, Rāmāyaṇa, tells the story of divine King (Raja) Rāma, reflecting Aryan advances eastward into the forests of the Gangetic Plain around Rama's Kosala capital of Ayodhya, the center of so much Hindu-Muslim tension and conflict over his presumed "birth temple." By 1000 B.C. iron had been discovered in such profusion that it could be peeled off the Barabar Hills of Magadha. The Gangetic thick forests were either burned or cut down, the sedimentary soil turned up for planting by iron plows, and wealthy rajas were arming their soldiers with cheap swords and spears, and erecting capitals of wood with high timber walls and towers over newly planted fields in that richly watered region of North India's powerful, populous plain, modern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

Between 800 and 500 B.C. a number of radical new ideas came to light in that Eastern Gangetic heartland of North India, reflecting both orthodox and heterodox rejections of the Vedic Brahmanism taught by Brahman priests, who claimed the privileges of "gods on earth." Princely authors of the orthodox Upanishads (To Sit Down in Front of), also called Vedānta (End of Vedas), philosophic dialogues on the nature of "reality" and ways of controlling it, speculated on how best to understand and escape from the "torture" of rebirth, and attain "release" (*moksha*) from this world's pain and violence. Optimistic early Aryans had poured libations of clarified butter (*ghee*) and gold onto ritual fires, carrying the bright sparks of their gifts to Vedic Gods-on-high like Indra and Varuna, believing they would answer all prayers for long life, strong sons, and rich harvests. But skeptical Upanishadic princes asked "Who has ever seen Indra?" losing faith in Brahmanic rituals that cost them herds of fine cattle, bringing scant rewards, daily faced as they were with tigers, snakes, mosquitoes, and savage enemies. They

turned inward, swayed perhaps by wise pre-Aryan “yogis” or *munis* (silent ones), who sat cross-legged and naked in forest clearings, seeking through meditation to control their inner “breath,” their “souls” (*ātman*), equating those with a mighty transcendental principle called *Brahman*, originally meaning “sacred utterance.”

By the fifth century B.C. heterodox princes, like Siddhartha Gautama (563–483 B.C.) and Mahavira (540–468 B.C.), rejected the authority of the Vedas and their Brahman priests entirely. Gautama, who left his royal palace at the age of thirty, sought wisdom wandering in the forests of Kosala and Magadha for six years, attaining enlightenment in a deer park in Sarnath, near modern Varanasi (Benares). As the Buddha (Enlightened One), he set in motion his Wheel of the Law, preaching the four noble truths of this earliest type of Theravada (Teachings of the Elders) Buddhism. The ultimate Buddhist goal is *nirvāna* (blowing out), much the same “liberation” from life’s misery and sorrow as the Hindu goal of *moksha*. Both Buddhism and sage Mahavira’s Jainism stressed another important new idea, *ahimsa* (nonviolence), which was later also adopted by Hinduism and, together with cow worship, led to almost universal vegetarianism throughout pre-Muslim India.

Mauryan Imperial Unification

India’s first imperial unification came in the wake of Alexander the Great’s invasion of Punjab in 326 B.C. Alexander’s dream of universal conquest ignited a similarly glorious ambition of North Indian unification in the mind of a “young stripling” who met him on the banks of the River Beas. Chandragupta Maurya was thus inspired to found his Mauryan dynasty in 324 B.C. That first mighty Indian Empire flourished for 140 years. Chandragupta ruled from Pataliputra (modern Patna), his capital on the south bank of Mother Gaṅgā, aided in his empire building by a wise old Brahman minister, Kautilya, author of India’s realpolitik “Text on the Science of Material Gain,” the *Artha Shāstra*, which may well have inspired Niccolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince*. A powerful prince, Kautilya advised, must be “ever wakeful,” carefully controlling all of his subjects, including his beautiful “queens” and his mighty “ministers,” trusting no one, keeping an army of “spies” as well as soldiers and civil bureaucrats. The “Circle” (*mandala*) system of foreign policy was also first articulated in this text, warning every Indian prince from this time on that his neighboring monarch was always his “enemy,” while his neighbor’s neighbor was his “friend,” and so forth, until in the final circle a “neutral mediator” might at last be found, too remote to have to worry about fighting.

Chandragupta’s grandson Ashoka, who reigned from 269 to 232 B.C., was the greatest Mauryan emperor. The

first eight years of his reign were no different from his father Bindusara’s three violent decades of martial expansion, but after Ashoka’s most bloody conquest of tribal Kalinga (modern Orissa), “He of Gentle Visage,” as he was called, had a remarkable change of heart, converting to nonviolent Buddhism. Instead of annual imperial hunts, Ashoka undertook “pilgrimages of Religious Law” (*dharmā*), planting shade trees along new highways he had constructed, erecting tall sandstone pillars all over India, inscribing them with wise edicts, commending Laws of Nonviolence and Love to his people, rather than hatred and war. Ashoka was hailed as *Chakravartin* (He by Whom the Wheel of the Law is set in Motion), the first universal monarch in history to advocate peace as his primary platform. Between 250 and 240 B.C. Ashoka hosted the Third Great Council of Buddhism, soon after which he withdrew from public life and appears to have died as a Buddhist monk, in 232 B.C. Many claimants followed him, but none proved as wise. The last of the Mauryan monarchs, Brihadratha, was murdered by his Brahman general Pushyamitra Shunga, who founded the Shunga dynasty in 184 B.C. It lasted in much diminished form only until 72 B.C., ruling little more than the old kingdom of Magadha.

Mauryan imperial collapse left the North-West frontier, the classic highroad for India’s invaders, unguarded. From 180 B.C. Greco-Bactrians were the first to gallop over those passes, capturing Punjab. King Menander, a Greek converted to Buddhism by a monk named Nagasena, ruled the Indus Valley’s “Land of Five Rivers.” Another Greek, Heliodorus, erected a stone pillar proclaiming himself a “worshiper” of “Vasudeva,” a Hindu god identified with Krishna (Black), one of Vishnu’s ten “earthly emanations” (*avatāras*). From earliest historic times, India has always thus in some measure conquered its “conquerors,” luring them with its rich crops, fabled jewels, and artistic beauty, converting them by the warmth, charm, and wisdom of its glorious civilization. The Bactrian bridge erected before the dawn of Christianity between India and the West served as a vital passageway for merchants as well as Buddhist monks, who brought not only their monastic beads and yogic practices to the West, but also the Buddha’s wisdom of nonviolence.

Persian Pahlavas and Central Asian Scythian Shakas followed the Bactrians over the same North-West passes, displacing them. They too converted to Buddhism and Hinduism after having settled down in Punjab. The fiercest Central Asian invaders to gallop down from their frozen plateaus to India’s fecund plains were Kushans, whose greatest *maharaja* (Great-King) Kanishka ruled over Punjab almost two decades around A.D. 100. Thanks to their metal stirrups, Kushana archers could brace

themselves on their saddles, arms and hands free as they galloped to fire their deadly crossbows. They, too, ultimately were converted to nonviolent Buddhism.

While northern invaders thus followed one another for centuries over the Hindu Kush, South India broke free of Pataliputra's hegemony, with competing provincial dynasties carving out independent kingdoms. The great Andhras ruled most of central India from the second century B.C. for nearly four hundred years. Their modern reincarnation is the Telugu Dravidian state of Andhra on the east coast of India's peninsula. Just south of Andhra is India's largest Dravidian-language state, Tamil Nadu, "Land of Tamils." South India's four Dravidian-linguistic states (the other two being Kerala and Karnataka) were probably where the ancient pre-Aryan Indus Valley people originally fled, settling south of central India's Vindhya mountain range, to escape being enslaved by Aryan invaders. Three Tamil kingdoms are mentioned in ancient texts: the Cheras (or Keralas) on the west (Malabar) coast; the Cholas, who became South India's greatest sea power and bronze artists on the east (Coromandal) coast; and the southernmost Pandyas, whose famed "pearls" were coveted by the West when King Solomon was still building his temple. Madurai, the Pandyan capital as early as the second century B.C., remains one of South India's greatest Hindu temple cities, its Meenakshi Temple containing icons of the three most powerful Hindu divinities: Shiva, Vishnu, and Mother Goddess Meenakshi (Devī). The Chola capital, Kanchipuram, home to a much larger walled temple "city," whose giant *gopuram* (towers) are visible for miles in every direction, was captured in the fourth century by a new "robber" dynasty, the Pallavas. These may have originally been Persian Pahlavas, driven south by the Kushanas.

Guptan Reunification

India's second era of imperial unification under the Guptan dynasty was a golden age of classical Hindu glory and power. Chandragupta I was crowned in A.D. 320 at Pataliputra, and assumed the exalted title "Great King of Kings." He doubled his domain by marrying his powerful Lichavi neighbor's daughter, controlling the rich lands to the north and south of North India's Ganges commercial artery. His son Samudra ("Ocean") Gupta reigned from A.D. 335 to 375, conquering Kashmir to his north, and Maharashtra's Deccan to the south, and exacting tribute from the last of the Kushana and Shaka monarchs of Punjab. To celebrate his Napoleonic conquests, Samudra ordered performance of the year-long royal "horse sacrifice" (*ashva-medha*). The pinnacle of Guptan glory, however, was attained in its third reign under Chandragupta II (r. 375–415). Hailed as Vikramaditya

(He Whose Splendor Equals That of the Sun), his court patronized India's greatest authors and artists, including the Shakespeare of Sanskrit drama, Kalidasa, whose beautiful *Shakuntala* is still staged to world acclaim. Hindu temples were erected in growing numbers from this time. Buddhist and Jain caves continued to accommodate many thousands of monks, who adorned their ceilings and walls with stunning frescoes, whose portraits still dazzle visitors with their vivid vitality. Countless Roman coins were shipped East to pay for tons of precious Indian silks and cottons, jewels and spices, ivory and perfumes. Alaric's ransom for Rome in 410 included three thousand pounds of Indian pepper.

Half a century after Chandragupta II died in 415, fierce Central Asian Hsiung-nu "Hunas" (Huns) reached India's Khyber Pass. Toramana first conquered Persia in 484, then took Punjab; his son, Mihirakula, captured Kashmir after 515. North Indian reunification was then briefly achieved under Harsha Vardhana (r. 606–647), who seems to have been a wise and tolerant king, as supportive of Buddhism as Ashoka, yet equally generous to Hindu Brahmans. He ruled his mighty empire from Kanauj, which after his death remained the capital of several later North Indian dynasties.

Most of India reverted, however, to its most common historic pattern of feudal fragmentation, many competing monarchs fighting one another. Political unity has proved the exception rather than the rule of Indian history. Vakatakas of Bundelkhand established their martial grip over the Nagpur-Vidarbha region of Maha-Rashtra, the "Great Country," where Hindu Maratha power would later attain primacy. Hindu Marathas challenged both Mughal Muslim warriors and British East Company Christian merchants alike for hegemony over South Asia. Shivaji Maharaj, father of sixteenth-century Maratha national resurgence, would be crowned at the top of his Deccan "Fortress of the Tiger" as ten thousand Brahmans chanted their Vedic Sanskrit mantras. The Chalukyas of Badami had earlier claimed the Deccan themselves, as did their feudal "Country-Lord" Rashtrakutas in 752. Powerful Rashtrakuta monarchs continued to rule the Deccan until the early tenth century, when another Chalukya dynasty emerged to defeat its old rivals.

The Impact of Islam

After 711 a totally new foreign force, called Islam ("submission" to the will of Allah), born in the desert sands of Saudi Arabia in 622, entered India from the Arabian Sea to conquer the province of Sind, in what is now Pakistan. That wave of Muslim invaders was but the first of a series of Islamic conquests to spread the faith of their Prophet to India, but many more Islamic invasions

followed later, most of them over the North-West passes—Turko-Afghans, Persians, and Central Asian Mughals, the last of whom finally conquered virtually all of South Asia by the end of the seventeenth century. Throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries it was Afghan Ghaznavids and Ghors, who plundered the Hindu temple cities of Punjab and Sind on their annual raids against “infidel” Hindus and the naked statues they worshiped, “abominations” to Allah. The great temple city of Somnath, “protected,” its people thought, by a jewel-filled magnetized Shiva-lingam, was reduced to rubble, thousands of its inhabitants slaughtered or taken prisoner by Mahmud of Ghazni, who slashed the lingam with his sword, on his last raid in 1025. A legacy of Muslim hatred, never fully erased from the memory of Kathi-awar’s Hindus, was thereafter inscribed.

Until the thirteenth century Muslims continued to treat India as a land fit only for periodic plunder, a domain at “war,” rather than in “submission.” However, after 1206—the dawn of the Delhi sultanate, when the first of five Muslim dynasties established dominance over North India—Muslim rule remained an integral part at least of some portion of South Asia, if not its entire length and breadth. The Afghan “Slave” (Mamluk) dynasty lasted less than a century, followed by tougher Turkish Khaljis, who brought the faith of Islam to the Deccan, looting and plundering Devagiri, capital of pastoral Yadavas, worshippers of Krishna. Under Ala’-ud-din Muhammad Khalji (r. 1296–1316), the sultanate reached its peak of power, but his sons were unable to consolidate their father’s phenomenal conquests. Turkish Tughluqs ruled for most of the fourteenth century, during which India suffered one of its worst prolonged periods of drought, bringing deadly famine to much of the Deccan, as the sultans in Delhi ignored the plight of dying peasants, impervious to pleas for aid. Farther south, Hindu warriors joined forces to start a “City of Victory” (Vijayanagar), ruled in 1336 by Harihara I (r. 1336–1357), who defeated his neighbors, the Hoysalas, and seven years after taking his throne, controlled most of South India’s peninsula. In 1345 rebellion against the Tughluqs spread from Daulatabad, led by Hasan Gangu, who adopted as his reign name Bahman Shah, founding the Deccan’s first Muslim kingdom, the Bahmani dynasty.

In 1398 a Central Asian army led by Timur the Lame (Tamerlane) poured over the Khyber, galloping across Punjab to Delhi, which was put to the torch, dragging tens of thousands of Indian slaves back to Samarkand. That dreadful sack of Delhi presaged the demise of the sultanate, though two more dynasties laid claim to its tattered mantle. Turkish Sayyids ruled from 1414 to 1450, displaced by Afghan Lodis, who reigned over North India until 1526. The Lodis were replaced by the mightiest and

longest of all South Asia’s Muslim dynasties, founded by Central Asia’s Mughal (Mongol) Padishah (Emperor) Babur, who skillfully defeated the massive Afghan army that faced him on the field of Panipat on 21 April 1526.

Great Mughals dominated most of India for some two centuries. The dynasty’s wisest monarch, Akbar (r. 1556–1605), conquered not only by the power of his Central Asian artillery and crushing elephant corps, but also by the enlightened tolerance with which he won the support of India’s Hindu majority by removing the most offensive Islamic taxes demanded by previous Muslim monarchs. Akbar won over several powerful Hindu Rajput monarchs by marrying their daughters, and brought a number of clever Hindu Brahman “land-tax collectors” as well as mighty Rajput princes into his multicultural Mansabdari (administrative “office”) system of imperial rule. His heirs were less tolerant, however, than their “Great” (Akbar) progenitor. The mightiest and most bigoted, Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), expanded Mughal dominance to its greatest limits over South India, but lost the support of most of his subjects. Hindu Marathas and Rajputs rallied and rose in revolt against Aurangzeb’s narrow Muslim intolerance, and a new powerful religious force, Sikhism, earlier founded by Guru Nanak in Punjab, turned from a passive faith of disciples into an “Army” (Khalsa) of “Lions” (Singhs) led by Guru Govind Singh.

Impact of the West

Portuguese Western European sea captains were first lured to India by the rich scent of spices and the prospect of vast profits to be made by venturing around the Cape of Africa in their cannon-bearing caravels, clearing the Indian Ocean of all competing Arab and Venetian merchant vessels. Lisbon grew wealthy from the peppers and cloves of India and the Banda and Molucca Islands of Indonesia, and for most of the sixteenth century, tiny Portugal held a virtual monopoly over the lucrative Indian Ocean trade with its powerful fleet. By the dawn of the seventeenth century, however, Protestant Dutch and English sea captains and merchants pooled their wealth, forming their own East India Companies, arming fleets to challenge and defeat the Catholic Portuguese monopoly. The Dutch were initially stronger than the English, driving them away from the richest Spice Island plantations of Southeast Asia, obliging English merchant ships to fall back on India’s Malabar Coast as their second best choice. At Surat they also built their own factory, and ventured to appeal to the “Great Mogor” in Agra for permission to enjoy “quiet trade” with his empire. Other than gold, horses, and watches, however, the West really possessed nothing that Mughal India wanted or needed. India, of course, had so many things the West desired that before very long the bitter complaint of

London's merchants and monarchs was that "India doth drain us of our wealth." The Indian nationalists would later reverse that cry, lamenting the "drain" of "India's wealth by the rapacious West."

French and English merchants, who had established colonial fortress toeholds at neighboring ports along India's eastern Coromandal Coast in the early eighteenth century, battled one another at sea as well as on Indian soil in the wake of Europe's war over Charles's Austrian succession and the subsequent Seven Years' War (1756–1763). The historic revelation of that brief but sharp colonial conflict, between small forces trained by France's brilliant Joseph François Dupleix and British bully Robert Clive on the fragmenting fringe of Mughal power, was that modern European cannon and musket fire sufficed to defeat huge undisciplined armies of South India's nizams and *nawābs*. As Mughal hegemony fragmented into provincial principalities, British company merchant-plunderers like Clive moved into those vacuums of power in Bengal as well as Madras, playing the "Nabob Game" devised by Dupleix, who could have won India for France had he not lost the support of his own company's directors in Versailles. Clever Warren Hastings soon placed his British company's Raj onto a sounder financial base, little more than a decade after Clive's looting of its treasury, and then vigorously integrated the company's remote presidency ports of Bombay and Madras under his own martial and administrative control from Fort William, his Bengal headquarters in Calcutta, capital of the British company's Raj. Britain's Parliament, however, impeached Hastings instead of thanking him, and sent out Lord Cornwallis to restore British confidence in the sound security of their new Indian empire. Landlord Whig that he was, Cornwallis hammered a British "steel-frame" Regulation System down onto the naked body politic of Bengal, knowing nothing of India before he sailed east to secure a new empire for his king and country, to replace the one just lost in North America.

The British Raj

The East India Company and Britain's Parliament jointly ruled distant India from 1773 until 1858. British trained Indian Sepoy armies fought under British officers against Marathas as well as the remnants of Mughal provincial power and periodically invading Afghans from the northwest. In 1761, at Panipat, the mightiest Hindu Maratha army of Pune's Peshwa confronted a flood tide of invading Muslim Afghan cavalry. Both armies so brutally destroyed one another's finest fighters that the much smaller British force, hitherto no match for either contesting indigenous army, was left to claim the remnant of Great Mughal hegemony over South Asia. In 1818 the last of the Peshwa's Maratha force was finally defeated by

the company's Sepoy army. The British Raj thereafter emerged as India's "New Mughal" paramount power, virtually unchallenged by any indigenous competitors until the "Mutiny" of 1857. By the time India's once powerful monarchs, its *padishabs*, maharajas, rajas, nizams, and *nawābs*, awoke to realize what had become of their vast continental domain—"stolen" from them by a Christian band of British merchants, reducing the greatest of them to suppliants and beggars in their own capitals—it was too late to recapture the powers they had lost. In desperation, an uneasy triple alliance of the last Mughal emperor's Delhi courtiers and garrison, the "mutinied" Sepoy Bengal Muslim troops loyal to their ousted Muslim *nawāb* of Oudh, and Hindu dependents of the pensioner Peshwa of Pune living in a castle outside Cawnpore, sought with insufficient coordination to drive the foreign "usurpers" out of India. But by that time Britain was fully aware of India's unique value to its global prestige and power. The War of 1858 was won by British Crown troops, with the aid of sturdy Sikh soldiers of the Punjab, and Nepalese Gurkhas, who thereafter remained the most trusted "native" recruits to the army of Britain's Crown Raj, which replaced the discredited old company Raj on 2 August 1858.

India's Nationalist Movement

Though British company merchants were initially lured to India for profit or plunder, English missionaries later ventured to the East to "save" souls, remaining to translate their Bibles into Indian languages, opening schools and hospitals, preaching social reform as well as scripture. Still other secular missionaries of Western civilization, Utilitarians and liberal social reformers, swiftly followed as the company secured more territories, drafting civil laws for those "protected" under its Regulation Raj, planning new cities, laying down railroads, putting up telegraph wires, bringing all the blessings, virtue, and barbarism of Great Britain's "civilization" to ancient India's conquered subcontinent. The English language itself proved a potent national unifier of India's new elite who learned it, taking advantage of Britain's "penny-post" that helped to convert India from a divided continent of remote strangers into an inchoate nation-state, unleashing winds of rapid radical change, much too strong for the company's rickety Raj, and ultimately even too powerful for Britain's stronger Crown Raj to withstand.

After 1885, when the Indian National Congress was born in Bombay, brilliant leaders of a "New India" emerged, eager to play some role in administering their own nation, willing at first to work under and in cooperation with British Indian civil servants to rectify all the ills of ailing India's society, to raise their Motherland from depths of poverty to sunny plains of health and

happiness. Some Englishmen were wise enough to welcome those overtures, but most of the others were either too fearful or narrow-minded to view Congress's leaders as anything but "terrorists," "anarchists," or "trouble-makers," seeking only to take their jobs away, "useless natives" hoping to run their country without the help of over-burdened white men! Nonetheless, the first two decades of India's Nationalist Movement proved remarkably moderate and cooperative, but after the partition of Bengal in 1905 a new revolutionary wing of the Congress emerged, and cries of "boycott" of British goods and "freedom" (*swaraj*) were raised by leaders of a "New Party," eager to send the British home and to claim all the keys to their "own country" (*swadeshi*).

After World War I, India's Congress was transformed into a mass revolutionary movement under the charismatic leadership of Mahatma (Great-Soul) Mohandas K. Gandhi, who returned home after two decades in South Africa, introducing his *satyagraha* ("Hold Fast to the Truth") movement of nonviolent noncooperation to India. Gandhi's impact was unique, at once mobilizing India's peasant power by the potency of his Hindu religiously based appeal, but alienating many moderate Anglophile Indians, including Muslim-minority leaders like M. A. Jinnah. The Muslim League, which Quaid-i-Azam ("Great Leader") Jinnah transformed into his vehicle leading to the birth of Pakistan, evolved in the last decade of Britain's Crown Raj as a constant counter to Gandhi's and Congress's claim to represent the "Indian nation." South Asia's Muslims, Jinnah insisted, were no mere minority but a "nation" worthy of their own state.

On the eve of their departure from India, after World War II, exhausted Britain agreed, for by that time India's restless Raj had become more of a liability than an asset. British fears of facing a possible civil war in South Asia made them opt for the most hasty, ill-conceived partition of the subcontinent it had taken them more than a century to unify. In mid-August 1947 that "shameful flight" of British troops and withdrawal of any protective cover for unarmed Indians, ordered by vainly impatient Lord Mountbatten, the Raj's last viceroy, triggered a mass migration of over 10 million terrified Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs of Punjab and Bengal, which left at least a million innocents dead.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, welcomed the midnight birth of his nation as "in some measure" the historic fulfillment of Congress's long-deferred "tryst with destiny." Mahatma Gandhi left Delhi on the eve of Nehru's most famous speech, traveling to Calcutta, where he sought valiantly to calm rising tides of communal hatred and violence that threatened to drown all of Bengal and Bihar in a sea of Hindu-Muslim blood. A few months later, rivers of blood did flow through the

Punjab, which was divided through the heartland of its Sikh population. Freedom brought with it the first of three wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir state, draining both newborn nations of so much precious wealth each of them needed for their impoverished peoples. Gandhi returned to Delhi, trying again to heal wounds of ancient hatred that refused to respond even to that wise old Mahatma's messages of "Love" (*ahimsa*) as God. Angry young Hindus shouted at Gandhi whenever he tried to read prayers from the Qur'an at his nightly meetings, or called for an end to the murder of Muslims in Delhi and the stealing of their property. Then he, too, was murdered, early in 1948. "The light has gone out of our lives," Nehru cried that night, but India carried on, and under his dynamic leadership soon emerged as a secular democratic republic.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; British Crown Raj; British East India Company Raj; British Impact; Buddhism in Ancient India; Clive, Robert; Congress Party; Cornwallis, Lord; Dupleix, Joseph François; French Impact; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Guptan Empire; Harappa; Hastings, Warren; Indus Valley Civilization; Jainism; Jammu and Kashmir; Jinnah, Mohammed Ali; Mohenjo-Daro; Mountbatten, Lord; Muslims; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Portuguese in India; Satyagraha; Sculpture: Mauryan and Shunga

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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS In a broad sense, human development is about freedom. In Amartya Sen's influential work, *Development as Freedom* (1999), five instrumental freedoms are mentioned: economic facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. In the subsequent and related rights-based literature, the point is made that development is not only about improvements in outcomes, it is also about processes. However, most standard measures of human development concern economic indicators, sometimes spilling over into socio cum political ones.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted as targets to be attained by developing countries by 2015, are an example. There are eight such goals:

1. eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
2. achieve universal primary education;
3. promote gender equality and empower women;
4. reduce child mortality;
5. improve maternal health;
6. combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
7. ensure environmental sustainability;
8. develop a global partnership for development.

Stated thus, these goals are vague; however, targets under these goals make them operationally meaningful and enable one to quantify and measure progress toward the MDGs. There are 18 such targets; this analysis will ignore the 7 targets under Goal 8 (developing a global partnership for development). The targets for the other

TABLE 1

| Millennium development goals and targets | |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Goal 1 | Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger |
| Goal 2 | Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling |
| Goal 3 | Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 |
| Goal 4 | Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate |
| Goal 5 | Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio |
| Goal 6 | Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases |
| Goal 7 | Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

goals are shown in Table 1. One does notice that targets are a bit more precise up to Goal 5.

UNDP and Human Development Reports (HDRs)

The standard source for making cross-country comparisons about human development is the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) *Human Development Report (HDR)*, which has been used since 1990. These reports predate the acceptance of MDGs as goals or targets in 2000, although subsequent HDRs always have a discussion of MDGs. Each HDR has a theme, and data on human development and deprivation are provided. For example, the theme of *HDR 2003* was MDGs, and that of *HDR 2004* was cultural liberty. The argument for publishing the HDR is obvious. Conventionally, economists have measured development through indicators like per capita income or the percentage of the population below a designated poverty line. But the percentage of the population below a poverty line, known as the poverty ratio or head count ratio, is also based on income or expenditure; and income ought to be an input into the human development process. Instead, development can be more reliably measured by tangible improvements in indicators like health or education attainments.

Having accepted that argument, problems arise. Data must be available, and if cross-country comparisons are to be made, the cross-country data collection must be comparable. That is difficult, even for something as simple as income. Every country has reasonably satisfactory collection systems for aggregate national income, through national income statistics. That can be converted into per capita income by dividing by population. However, that figure will be in national currencies. To use it for cross-country comparisons, there must be conversion into a common currency, such as the U.S. dollar. Should one use official exchange rates for this conversion? That will be misleading, because goods, and certainly services, are often cheaper in developing countries. Therefore, one uses PPP (purchasing power parity) exchange rates. However, to obtain figures on poverty ratios, one needs data on personal income or expenditure distributions, which are not available through national account statistics, but only through surveys. To complicate matters further, some countries have surveys of income, others of expenditure. Nor are surveys held every year. For example, India has reliable large-sample surveys on consumption expenditure, conducted through the National Sample Survey (NSS), once every five years. The last such surveys were held in 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. What does one do for data in the intervening periods? Also, income data through surveys and income data through national accounts never match, and this problem exists for all countries. Such survey-related data problems also crop up for health and education indicators.

Once one has decided on variables and obtained data on the variables, there is the question of constructing an index. This process involves weighting the variables before aggregating them, and subjectivity is involved in almost any selection of weights. It would have been better to leave data on the variables as they are, but the use of indexes is widespread. The *HDR* has five such indexes: HDI (human development index), HPI-1 (human poverty index for developing countries), HPI-2 (human poverty index for selected Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries), GDI (gender-related development index), and GEM (gender empowerment measure). Of these, HPI-2 is not relevant for India.

HDI is the most commonly cited index. It is based on three variables: a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth); knowledge (measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrollment ratio); and a decent standard of living (measured by per capita gross domestic product in PPP U.S. dollars). The aggregation process is such that the maximum value of HDI is 1 and the minimum value is 0. The higher the HDI value, the better. Depending on the HDI value, countries are divided into three categories: high human development for countries that have an HDI

more than 0.800; medium human development for countries that have an HDI between 0.500 and 0.800; and low human development for countries that have an HDI less than 0.500. With an HDI value of 0.595 (in 2002), India now belongs to the medium human development category, wedged between Namibia and Botswana. In 1975 India's HDI value was 0.411, and it inched up gradually, with India moving to the medium human development category in the 1990s.

Although the latest *HDR* is for 2004, there is a time lag in obtaining data; the data are mostly for 2002. In the three components of HDI, India's life expectancy at birth in 2002 was 63.7 years. The adult literacy rate was 61.3 percent. Censuses are held at ten-year intervals, and the last census was in 2001. The Indian census-based literacy rate is 65.38 percent. The difference between the two figures requires explanation: the 65.38 percent figure is for populations aged seven and above, while the 61.3 percent is for populations aged fifteen and above. India's track record on literacy improved sharply in the 1990s, but there is a serious adult illiteracy problem, which largely explains the difference. India's gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary, and tertiary schools in 2002 was 55 percent. Finally, India's per capita PPP gross domestic product (GDP) was U.S.\$2,670, compared to the official exchange rate per capita income figure of around \$500. The improvement in the 1990s occurred largely because of growth and increases in per capita income. The gross enrollment ratio in primary and secondary schools has also improved. For classes (standards) I through VIII (ages 6–14), the gross enrollment ratio is 82.35 percent. What pulls the Indian HDI down is enrollment in tertiary schools (colleges and universities).

Countries are ranked worldwide based on HDI values; as of 2004, India had a rank of 127 out of 177 countries. Attention invariably focuses on ranks, but one must be careful, because the number of countries included in rankings varies from year to year. It is far better to focus on HDI values. There is a correlation between per capita income and HDI values. Given India's per capita income, India's HDI rank should have been ten places higher. Notwithstanding the improvement in the 1990s, India should have done better on human development.

The next index in the *HDR* is HPI-1, based on a long and healthy life (measured by probability at birth of not surviving to age 40), knowledge (measured by the adult illiteracy rate), and a decent standard of living (measured by percentage of population without sustainable access to an improved water source and percentage of children underweight for age). India was ranked 48th out of 94 developing countries in 2004. Of India's children, 15.3 percent will not survive to the age of forty. The adult illiteracy rate (61.3%) has already been mentioned. Sixteen

percent of the population does not have sustainable access to an improved water source, and 47 percent of children (under 5) are underweight for their age. The percentage of the population below the poverty line is not used in estimating HPI-1. Internationally, a poverty line of one U.S. dollar per day (sometimes U.S. \$2 per day) is used, at PPP and at 1985 prices. At current prices, this is equivalent to around \$1.70 a day. The *HDR* tells us that 34.7 percent of India's population is below this poverty line. However, India also has its own national poverty line, corresponding roughly to one U.S. dollar per day. In 1999–2000, 26.1 percent of India's population was below the national poverty line. There is thus some discrepancy between national data and *HDR* data.

The GDI attempts to capture gender disparities. It follows the same methodology as HDI, but factors in male-female differences. India's GDI value in 2004 was 0.572, wedged between Namibia and Botswana and ranked 127th out of 144 countries. There are fewer countries, because gender-disaggregated data are sometimes not available. The GDI rank is more or less the same as the HDI rank (among 144 countries), suggesting that gender discrimination in India is not overwhelmingly more than what the level of human development would suggest. Looking at the individual components of GDI, there are gender-based deprivations in education (literacy and enrollment). And in PPP U.S. dollars, the average male income is \$3,820, while the average female income is \$1,442. GEM is an indicator of female empowerment, with variables that capture political participation and decision making, economic participation and decision making, and power over economic resources. Requisite data are not available for an Indian GEM or GEM rank to be constructed; 9.3 percent of seats in Parliament are held by women.

National Human Development Report (NHDR)

There is a *Human Development in South Asia* document, published annually by the Islamabad-based Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre. It will not be discussed in detail here, because its human development indicators are primarily drawn from *HDR*.

To state the obvious, India is a large and heterogeneous country, and there are significant regional variations. A *National Human Development Report (NHDR)* was published in 2002, providing a wealth of data on human development and deprivation across states and union territories (UTs). Some of this data is reproduced in Table 2. There is more data, especially in terms of rural-urban differences, that is unavailable. The *NHDR* was published when most of the results of the 2001 census were not yet available. Hence, some data are dated, and the developments of the 1990s will not be fully incorporated

until the next *NHDR* is published. That also explains why the HDI figure is available only for larger states. In addition, three states—Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh—have been bifurcated, leading to the creation of Jharkhand, Uttaranchal, and Chhattisgarh, respectively. Data are not always available for these three new states separately. Data for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are thus for the states before their division. Neither can the HDI and GDI reported in this table be directly compared with the HDI or GDI reported in *HDR*. Although the objective is similar, the methodology is different, so no direct comparisons are possible.

What does this table tell us about human development across India's states and territories? Conventionally, India's "backward" states have been referred to as BIMARU states (BIMARU is an acronym for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, and there is a pun on the word *bimar*, which means "ill" or "sick" in most Indian languages). Indeed, if we look at the HDI values for 1991 and have a cutoff of 0.350, we find that the states that are below this threshold are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. With the exception of Arunachal Pradesh, the GDI values do not dispute this trend. There is significant deprivation in Assam and Arunachal. However, figures for Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan are no longer as low as those for Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. Having said that, in addition to the North-East region, the most deprived states clearly are Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa. Such identification is also mirrored in the poverty ratio, literacy, and infant mortality figures. A recent report by the World Bank on India's progress regarding the MDGs also focuses on these differences between the states. In general, India seems to be on track for the income poverty and hunger goals, at least on a nationwide basis. India also seems to be on track for the educational goals, except for the elimination of gender disparity. However, India is falling behind on the goals for health.

The "Backward" Districts

Variations exist not only between states, but also within them. State boundaries are administrative ones, and development and deprivation do not necessarily follow such administrative criteria. There has therefore been an attempt to also focus on backward districts, as opposed to backward states alone. In collaboration with UNDP, several states have begun to publish *State Human Development Reports (SHDRs)*. These are "official" *SHDRs*, as opposed to "unofficial" ones published for some states like Rajasthan and West Bengal. There is also another "unofficial" HDR, published regionally (North, South, West, and East) by the National Council of Applied Eco-

TABLE 2

| Human development in India | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| State/Union Territories | HDI (1991) | HDI (2001) | GDI (1991) | Percent below poverty line (1999-2000) | Literacy (in percent) 2001 | Infant mortality rate (per thousand) 1991 |
| Andhra Pradesh | 0.377 | 0.416 | 0.801 | 15.77 | 61.11 | 55 |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 0.328 | — | 0.776 | 33.47 | 54.74 | 91 |
| Assam | 0.348 | 0.386 | 0.575 | 36.09 | 64.28 | 92 |
| Bihar | 0.308 | 0.367 | 0.469 | 42.60 | 47.53 | 75 |
| Goa | 0.575 | — | 0.775 | 4.40 | 82.32 | 51 |
| Gujarat | 0.431 | 0.479 | 0.714 | 14.07 | 66.43 | 78 |
| Haryana | 0.443 | 0.509 | 0.714 | 8.74 | 68.59 | 52 |
| Himachal Pradesh | 0.469 | — | 0.858 | 7.63 | 75.91 | 82 |
| Jammu and Kashmir | 0.402 | — | 0.740 | 3.48 | 54.46 | — |
| Karnataka | 0.412 | 0.478 | 0.753 | 20.04 | 67.04 | 74 |
| Kerala | 0.591 | 0.638 | 0.825 | 12.72 | 90.92 | 42 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 0.328 | 0.394 | 0.662 | 37.43 | 64.08 | 133 |
| Maharashtra | 0.452 | 0.523 | 0.793 | 25.02 | 77.27 | 74 |
| Manipur | 0.536 | — | 0.815 | 28.54 | 68.87 | 28 |
| Meghalaya | 0.365 | — | 0.807 | 33.87 | 63.31 | 80 |
| Mizoram | 0.548 | — | 0.770 | 19.47 | 88.49 | 53 |
| Nagaland | 0.486 | — | 0.729 | 32.67 | 67.11 | 51 |
| Orissa | 0.345 | 0.404 | 0.639 | 47.15 | 63.61 | 125 |
| Punjab | 0.475 | 0.537 | 0.710 | 6.16 | 69.95 | 74 |
| Rajasthan | 0.347 | 0.424 | 0.692 | 15.28 | 61.03 | 87 |
| Sikkim | 0.425 | — | 0.647 | 36.55 | 69.68 | 60 |
| Tamil Nadu | 0.466 | 0.531 | 0.813 | 21.12 | 73.47 | 54 |
| Tripura | 0.389 | — | 0.531 | 34.44 | 73.66 | 82 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 0.314 | 0.388 | 0.520 | 31.15 | 57.36 | 99 |
| West Bengal | 0.404 | 0.472 | 0.631 | 27.02 | 69.22 | 62 |
| Andaman and Nicobar Islands | 0.574 | — | 0.857 | 20.99 | 81.18 | 69 |
| Chandigarh | 0.674 | — | 0.764 | 5.75 | 81.76 | 48 |
| Dadra and Nagar Haveli | 0.361 | — | 0.832 | 17.14 | 60.03 | 81 |
| Daman and Diu | 0.544 | — | 0.714 | 4.44 | 81.09 | 56 |
| Delhi | 0.624 | — | 0.690 | 8.23 | 81.82 | 54 |
| Lakshadweep | 0.532 | — | 0.680 | 15.60 | 87.52 | 91 |
| Pondicherry | 0.571 | — | 0.783 | 21.67 | 81.59 | 34 |
| Uttaranchal | — | — | — | — | 72.28 | — |
| Jharkhand | — | — | — | — | 54.13 | — |
| Chhattisgarh | — | — | — | — | 65.12 | — |

Notes: HDI=Human Development Index; GDI=Gender-related Development Index.

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

conomic Research. Of the “official” reports, ten states have so far published *SHDRs*: Madhya Pradesh (1995, 1998, and 2002); Karnataka (1999, second *HDR* under preparation); Sikkim (2001); Rajasthan (2002); Maharashtra (2002); Himachal Pradesh (2002); Tamil Nadu (2003); Assam (2003); West Bengal (2004); and Nagaland (2004). Eight *SHDRs* are being finalized: Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh. Nine additional *SHDRs* are under preparation: Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka (second *HDR*), Kerala, Mizoram, Tripura, and Uttaranchal. Once all these *SHDRs* are available, one will have a better sense of variations within states.

For instance, the World Bank report identifies eighteen regions, corresponding to the regions used by the NSS, where human development is low: Central Bihar,

Vindhya in Madhya Pradesh, Malwa in Madhya Pradesh, southern Madhya Pradesh, northern Madhya Pradesh, southeastern Rajasthan, Tripura, western Uttar Pradesh, eastern Uttar Pradesh, southern Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, northern Bihar, central Madhya Pradesh, southern Orissa, central Uttar Pradesh, southern Uttar Pradesh, southwestern Madhya Pradesh, and southern Rajasthan. District-level data are more difficult to acquire than state-level data. Using district-level data linked to the MDGs, a study by Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari (2003) identified 69 districts (out of a total of 593 districts) that are the most deprived: 26 in Bihar, 13 in Uttar Pradesh, 10 in Jharkhand, 10 in Orissa, 6 in Madhya Pradesh, 3 in Arunachal, and 1 in Karnataka. Geographically, these are contiguous to another 70-odd districts that are also fairly backward. This list is more or less identical to a list of 170

districts that the government has identified as backward and on which it wishes to focus. There is a listing (schedule) of backward tribes, known as scheduled tribes, and another such schedule of backward castes, known as scheduled castes. “Backwardness” is identified on the basis of agricultural wage rates, agricultural productivity, and share of scheduled tribe and scheduled caste populations. Together, scheduled tribes and scheduled castes account for around 25 percent of the population. Scheduled tribes tend to be concentrated in select geographical areas, while scheduled castes are more evenly spread out.

Government focus means increasing the share of educational expenditure to 6 percent of GDP and that on health to 2 or 3 percent of GDP. The present figures are 3.74 percent for education and 1 percent for health. Simultaneously, through decentralization, accountability, transparency, public/private partnerships, and Right to Information Acts, the efficiency of public expenditure will be improved.

Bibek Debroy

See also **Development Politics; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Gender and Human Rights; Scheduled Tribes**

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HUMAN RIGHTS The term “human rights,” denoting universally applicable moral principles as the rights of all people, was until recently not in common usage in India, either as a language of resistance or as a normative principle in matters of governance. Rights were articulated in the course of the anticolonial struggles as civil liberties and democratic rights. These rights were incorporated in the 1950 Constitution of India as Fundamental Rights which were justiciable in the courts of law, and as the

Directive Principles of State Policy. The latter are seen as indicating the general direction in which the expansion of fundamental rights ought to take place in such areas as socioeconomic equality and justice. In the years after independence, numerous movements emerged against caste and class oppression, and in support of development, civil liberties, and democratic rights for all Indians.

The Legal Framework of People's Rights in India

The Constitution of India and specific laws, along with representative and statutory institutions, provide the framework within which the rights of the Indian people become effective. These rights have helped to engender a process of equality in a society long segmented and stratified by caste, feudal, and class hierarchies. Alongside uniform rights the Constitution also recognizes group-differentiated rights. Religious minorities and weaker sectors of society are guaranteed some special safeguards (e.g., the right to freedom of religion). Similarly, the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV of the Constitution) direct India's central and state governments to promote socioeconomic conditions in which legal, political, and cultural rights will become substantial. Article 38, for example, directs the state to commit itself to “the welfare of the people” by promoting a “social order” in which “justice—social, economic and political—shall inform all institutions of national life.” To achieve this, the state is urged to “strive to minimise inequalities of income” and to “eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities.” Article 46 likewise instructs the state to “promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes” and “protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.” The Directive Principles thus envisage an active role for the state in providing a range of socially ameliorative rights, including access to adequate means of livelihood, equal pay for equal work, living wages for workers, provision of just and humane conditions of work, and the right to education, public assistance, equal justice, free legal aid, and adequate nutrition and health.

There are specific provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act that protect people against arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and use of force by the police. Specific Acts of Parliament have also sought to give protection to disadvantaged social groups. The Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1955 “penalises the preaching and practice of untouchability in any form and prescribes punishment for enforcing any disability arising from untouchability.” Similarly, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 provides for special courts for the trial of offenses against



The Disabled Demonstrate for Their Civil Rights. Though it was believed that certain legal protections would unfold after independence and the formulation of a fully democratic constitution, Indian society continues to be deeply fragmented around issues of caste. INDIA TODAY.

members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of such offenses. Moreover, special institutions have been created by specific acts of Parliament to protect the needs of disadvantaged groups. These include the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (The Constitution [65th Amendment] Act, 1990); the National Commission for Women (the National Commission for Women Act, 1990); the National Commission for Minorities (the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992); and the National Commission for Backward Classes (the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993). The Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 set up a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), state human rights commissions in states, and human rights courts for improved protection of human rights. Under this act, “human rights” are defined as rights relating to life, liberty, and equality, and to the dignity of the individual, as guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international covenants and enforceable by courts in India.

The Practice of Human Rights: Ambivalences and Divergences

The practice of human rights in India has demonstrated both ambivalences and divergences. The institutional structures of the post-colonial Indian state are embedded in liberal Western principles of freedom and equality of individuals, as well as socialist principles of socioeconomic equality. At the same time, however, the social fabric of India continues to be deeply fragmented and segmented by caste, religion, language, class, and gender. Indian democracy, unfolding within the framework of the Constitution, evinced strong strands of egalitarianism and individual and group freedom. Ironically, however, it also incorporated measures that focused on “securing the state” in ways that eroded personal liberties and freedoms. In a manifestation of this “duality of state structures” in India, its democratic strands thus coexist with authoritarianism. Paradoxically, the Fundamental Rights to Freedom (Articles 19–22) in the Constitution contain provisions for “preventive detention,” noting

conditions under which these rights can be rendered virtually inoperative. Successive governments made extensive use of these constitutional provisions to enact preventive detention and other extraordinary laws to curb political dissent. Moreover, emergency provisions in the Constitution (Articles 352–360) specify certain conditions of “national emergency,” during which parts of the Constitution, in particular those relating to the fundamental rights of citizens, may be suspended.

The Preventive Detention Act of 1950, used against the communists in Telengana, was the first such detention law enacted after the adoption of the Constitution. The Indo-China War of 1962 provided another occasion for the vigorous use of preventive detention. The declaration of emergency due to the war enabled the government to promulgate its Defence of India Ordinance of 1962 and to frame rules under it. The official state of emergency persisted until subsequent wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and the government continued to detain people under the 1962 act. In 1968 the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was passed, turning many emergency powers under the Defence of India Act into statutory law. Under this act, any organization could be declared illegal, and any individual imprisoned for questioning India’s sovereignty over any part of its territory. The Preventive Detention Act, renewed seven times, lapsed in 1969. The states, however, continued to enforce their own preventive detention laws. In 1971 Parliament passed the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). The Defence of India Act of 1971 introduced some changes in MISA, particularly regarding the period of detention, making it more stringent. Indira Gandhi’s “National Emergency” of 1975 suspended the right of access to the courts for the restoration of fundamental freedoms. Under such conditions, MISA assumed formidable powers. Certain amendments were subsequently made by the government, which virtually rewrote the act. The Constitution (39th Amendment) Act placed MISA in the ninth schedule of the Constitution, placing it beyond judicial review. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act of 1976 further strengthened the powers of the central government by providing that no law for the prevention of antinational activities could be declared invalid on grounds that it violated the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. In 1977 the Janata Party government repealed MISA. It did not, however, repeal the other extraordinary laws that had been enacted by earlier governments, including the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Preventive detention laws continued to be enacted by different political parties in power in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar, and Orissa. When the Congress Party returned to power, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 was enacted, followed in

1985 by the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1985 and 1987. TADA lapsed in 1995, but in 2002 the coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party pushed through the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in an extraordinary joint session of Parliament. In December 2004 the new coalition government of the United Progressive Alliance led by the Congress Party of India fulfilled its election promise and repealed POTA. Several provisions of POTA were, however, retained through amendment in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 2004.

Successive Indian governments have deployed extra-constitutional measures, euphemized as “encounters” and “disappearances” to counter insurgencies or class conflicts—for example, against the Naxalites, as the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organizations are called, against the Khalistan secessionists in Punjab in the 1980s, and against Muslim secessionists in Kashmir since the 1990s. Moreover, the Northeast states of India, in a continuation of British colonial policy, have been viewed as a frontier region, a land to be buttressed and militarily secured. In this view, the specificity of the region as well as differences among the people of the area were overlooked, and the Northeast was construed as a homogeneous territorial unit, disturbed and dangerous, control of which was imperative for strategic reasons. Thus movements for self-determination and autonomy in various parts of the region, and struggles grounded in issues of underdevelopment, illegal migrations, questions of identity, and political rights were addressed by the central government with its coercive might in the form of counterinsurgency measures, backed by laws like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958.

Custodial violence is yet another violation of the right to life and liberty of citizens at the hands of the state. Torture, rape, and deaths in custody have been reported in large numbers. While campaigns by civil rights groups and dissemination by newspapers have brought these violations to public notice, the procedure of redemption in these cases, including prosecution and compensation to families of victims, most of whom are poor, remains painfully slow. The NHRC’s annual report for the year 2001–2002 cites 165 deaths in police custody and 1,140 deaths in judicial custody.

Another area of human rights violations are crimes perpetrated by dominant sections of the population against marginalized groups. Recent cases of upper caste violence in Haryana, Punjab, and Bihar demonstrate how the fundamental rights of the Constitution are regularly thwarted by the complex hierarchical structures of Indian society. The lynching of Dalits (formerly called “untouchables”) by upper caste villagers and members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in the Dulina district of

Haryana in October 2002, for example, reveals that the vulnerability of Dalits involved in the leather trade was increased by police threats to implicate them under the Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act. The shocking pattern of communal violence and murder of Muslims in Gujarat in February 2002 shows a collusion of the state government in acts of brutal violence and its justification by the political leaders of the state.

In all cases of mass violence, as in Gujarat, women suffer directly as victims of rape; they also suffer indirectly when rendered destitute or homeless by displacement, loss of livelihood or the death of wage-earning family members. Another constant problem is sexual harassment at the workplace. Despite guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in 1997 in the Vishakha case, in most places of work there is no attempt to prohibit or punish harassment.

Movements for the Expansion of Rights in India

The concept of rights has progressively widened as a result of popular struggles to include rights not mentioned in India's existing legal-constitutional framework. The right of access to the means of subsistence and control over resources for peasants, the right of indigenous people to their cultural resources, environment, and livelihood, the right to a humane environment and humane development are some of the rights that have emerged as a result of people's movements. The Narmada Bachao Andolan, for example, has sustained a prolonged struggle against the building of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the River Narmada. The large number of people displaced by its construction has not only raised significant issues pertaining to people's rights, but has also subjected state development projects to greater scrutiny. Similar movements against large dams are seen in other places, including the Tehri region of Uttaranchal. Experiences with development projects and popular struggles have also shown that while these movements have succeeded in raising consciousness about human rights, they have also borne the brunt of state repression. Similar issues of access to resources and claims to a traditional environment and livelihood have been raised in the context of attempts by the state to appropriate forests, which would prevent local people from exercising their claims to the forest and its resources, as in the Chipko movement in what is now the state of Uttaranchal.

It is important to note that a vibrant civil rights movement has developed in India. In a 1982 judgment (*People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India*, AIR 1982 SC 1473), the Supreme Court held that nonpayment of minimum wages to workers amounted to denial of their right to live with basic human dignity, violating Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees to every Indian

citizen the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. It is also important to note that the origins of the civil rights movement in India is often traced to the formation of the Indian Civil Liberties Union (ICLU) in Bombay on 24 August 1936 under the initiative of Jawaharlal Nehru, with Rabindranath Tagore as its president, Sarojini Naidu its working president, and other prominent nationalist leaders as members. "The idea of civil liberties," said Nehru in his address to the founding conference of the ICLU, "is to have the right to oppose the government." The ICLU investigated cases of political imprisonment and harassment, police brutalities, bans and restrictions on citizens' and subjects' rights by the British colonial government and by the rulers of the princely states, publishing reports and lodging protests on the basis of its investigations.

After independence in 1947, and with the adoption of a republican constitution, many nationalists' concerns for civil liberties diminished or disappeared. Nationalists who had once vehemently espoused the right to oppose the government now evinced an overriding anxiety over protecting the infant state. Communists involved in peasant movements in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh and Tebhaga in West Bengal took the initiative to reorganize the civil rights movement. The Civil Liberties Committee (CLC) was formed in West Bengal in 1948 with the support of renowned intellectuals. It was in this phase that the movement had to face a conceptual dilemma that lingers to this day—the question of political violence. Working on the assumption that state violence was more harmful to civil society than that practiced by revolutionaries, the CLC took the stand that the primary task of the movement was to oppose the authoritarian tendencies of the state and to see that the state did not assume arbitrary powers or move beyond the boundaries set by law.

In 1971 elections the Congress government of Indira Gandhi was reelected, riding high on her populist slogan of "eliminate poverty." The next few years, however, saw the promise of radical change based on economic growth and equitable redistribution slip away. The Congress government faced massive opposition in Bihar, which threatened to assume nationwide proportions, while a similar movement against the imposition of central rule loomed large in Gujarat. Under the Emergency Provisions of the Constitution, Prime Minister Gandhi armed the government with extraordinary powers, proclaiming a "National Emergency," which lasted from June 1975 to 1977. In the pre-Emergency period, the civil rights movement had remained an appendage to one or another regional struggle. While concerns for civil rights were generated in the course of these struggles, these concerns remained at the periphery of those political struggles.

The National Emergency, unlike state repression of struggles in earlier years, caught in its web large numbers of those functioning within the parameters of parliamentary politics, irrespective of their ideological leanings. The Emergency thus shook the urban middle class intelligentsia out of its complacency regarding the durability of the democratic processes. The shared experience of repression generated a sympathetic perception by liberal groups of the more radical groups, while alerting sections of the latter to the importance of constitutional values. This experience shaped the intellectual and political context that led to the emergence of an autonomous civil rights movement. Regional organizations, notably the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, the Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights, the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, the Organisation for the Protection of Democratic Rights, and, at the national level, the People's Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights, all of which were formed either before or during the Emergency, acquired national attention and support.

In addition to civil liberties and democratic rights groups, people's tribunals, human rights commissions, and citizen's initiatives have also investigated specific events. For instance, the Indian People's Human Rights Tribunal, under Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, was set up by the People's Human Rights Commission on 10 January 1987 in the aftermath of the 1984 massacre of Sikhs in Delhi and in other parts of the country, following the inaction of the government to bring the guilty to justice. The Human Rights Commission consisted of a number of prominent persons, including V. M. Tarkunde, Mrinal Sen, Rajni Kothari, and Romila Thapar. The main objective of the commission was to establish and maintain the Human Rights Tribunal comprising ex-judges of the Supreme Court and the high courts.

In 1993, amid growing domestic concerns over human rights abuses in different parts of the country—particularly the Northeast, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir—and international pressures for greater governmental accountability, the Protection of Human Rights Act was finally passed. The act provided for “the constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commissions in States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The seminars held at Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad, and Kolkata to elicit public opinion on the National Human Rights Commission Bill were, however, strictly official affairs, and very few individuals apart from officials and ministers were invited, giving rise to apprehensions that the NHRC might be yet another attempt to dampen opposition to civil rights violations in India. While

various other national commissions, including those on women, minorities, and scheduled castes and tribes, have been made ex-officio members of the commission, the NHRC has been explicitly precluded from taking up cases pending before other commissions, which effectively removes many matters from its purview and limits the scope of its investigations. In its actual working, however, the NHRC has made several significant interventions. It filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court, seeking to enforce the rights of the 65,000 Chakma tribals who were being persecuted in Arunachal Pradesh (*National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh* Writ Petition [Civil] No. 720 of 1995, SC 295, 1996, 49435.). The NHRC also opposed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance and Bill for its ramifications for the promotion and protection of human rights, but with little success. Most recently, it intervened in the Gujarat cases stemming out of the many murders of Muslims in that state in February 2002.

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See also **Ethnic Conflict; Gandhi, Indira; Gender and Human Rights**

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HUMAYUN (1508–1556), Mughal emperor (1530–1540, 1555–1556). Born Nasin-ud-din Muhammad in Kabul, Afghanistan, Humayun was the second Mughal emperor of India. In his youth he participated in the Battle of Panipat in 1526 with which his father, Babur, began his conquest of India. Humayun served as governor of Kabul for his father, returning to India shortly before Babur's death. He inherited an empire in name only, appointing his four brothers governors of its provinces,

though two of them, Kamran and Askari, combined to deprive him of the Punjab. A Sur Afghan, Sher Shah, leader of the Afghan resistance to the Mughals, controlled Bihar. In 1532 Humayun besieged him at Chunar but did not capture him. Humayun's predicament was worsened by his bouts of lethargy, caused by his increasing addiction to opium, and the threat to his position from his brothers. He invaded Gujarat in 1535, but it was brought under Mughal control only after the death of Bahadur Shah in 1537 at the hands of the Portuguese. That same year, Sher Khan invaded and captured Bengal. Humayun marched east to confront him, but Sher Khan defeated Humayun in battle at Chausa on the Ganges in 1539, assuming the title of Sher Shah, and at Kannauj in 1540, after which Humayun fled for his life, becoming a homeless wanderer in Sind and Rajasthan.

While in Sind in 1542, Humayun's wife gave birth to his son Akbar, the true founder of the Mughal empire. Humayun arrived in Persia in 1544 with a few hundred followers and came under the protection of the Safavid ruler, Shah Tamasp, who gave him support when he converted Shi'ism. With this Persian military assistance Humayun captured Kandahar in 1545, which he had promised to return to Persia, and Kabul in 1553, after three campaigns over an eight-year period against his brother Kamran.

After the death of Sher Shah in May 1545, his son Islam Shah Sur ruled until 1553. After his death, the empire was split into four parts ruled by different relatives, and his young son Firuz was murdered by his maternal uncle. Humayun took advantage of this war and of the growing popular dissatisfaction with Sur rule due to famine, invading India. He captured Lahore in February 1555 and then defeated Sikander Sur, the Afghan ruler of the Punjab, at Sirhind, after which he recovered Delhi and Agra. Once again he was emperor of India. The following year, however, he died after accidentally falling down the stone stairs of his observatory at Purana Qila, which led to the quip, "He stumbled out of life as he had stumbled through it."

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Babur**

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HUME, A. O. See **History and Historiography**.

HUNAS. See **History and Historiography**.

HYDERABAD Hyderabad State, named for the city long the cosmopolitan capital of kingdoms in India's Deccan plateau, developed autonomy from the Mughal empire in the second half of the eighteenth century and ended only in 1948. India became independent in 1947, and in 1948 Hyderabad State was incorporated into it, acquiring a new national language, Hindi (Hindustani written in Sanskrit script). In 1956 the federal reorganization of Indian states along linguistic lines made Hyderabad city the capital of the Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh. (The former state's Kannada-speaking districts went to Karnataka and the Marathi-speaking districts, in 1960, to Maharashtra.) The official state language is Telugu, although English continues to be used for many administrative and educational purposes.

Deccani and Mughal Origins

The state changed orientation over time, pulled by political engagements with powerful neighbors. Nizām al-Mulk, the Mughal nizam, or governor, of the Deccan province in the early eighteenth century, ruled by military force from his capital city of Aurangabad in the western Marathi-speaking region of the Deccan. But the expanding Maratha power in the western Deccan—under Shivaji's successors, the Peshwas—was not the nizam's only regional competitor. The rise of new powers in Mysore and Madras and the increasing activities of the French and English trading companies heightened diplomatic and military competition in southern India. Nizām al-Mulk Asaf Jah I maintained nominal allegiance to the Mughals in Delhi, but he and his successors had established a separate dynasty by the end of the eighteenth century.

Nizām Ali Khan Asaf Jah II, who reigned from 1762 to 1803, stabilized the state. Under him, the capital moved from Aurangabad to Hyderabad, reflecting pressures from the Marathas in the west and from Tipu Sultan in Mysore. Aurangabad and Hyderabad remained, however, almost equally important until the end of the century. Then Hyderabad, an attractive, well-planned administrative city for the Qutb Shahi dynasty in the late sixteenth century, was rebuilt, resettled, and became truly hegemonic.

Hyderabad city began when the Kakatiya Hindu rajahs of Warangal established Golconda fort just north of the Musi river by the thirteenth century. In 1364 Golconda passed to the control of the Bahmanis (Shi'a Muslim kings of Iranian ancestry). By 1530 the Bahmani kingdom had split into five Deccani sultanates, with the Qutb Shahi dynasty ruling from Golconda fort. Hyderabad city developed south of the river across from the fort. A bridge was built across the Musi in 1578, but the city's traditional founding date is 1591, when the landmark Char Minar was constructed during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah. Popular belief credits Quli Qutb Shah's



Street Vendors in Hyderabad. Hyderabad's urban services were good in the mid-twentieth century, but the rising population since then has severely taxed the city's resources. In this 2003 photo, street vendors sell their wares in front of a crumbling colonial edifice. CHRIS LISLE / CORBIS.

founding of the new city to his love for a Hindu dancing girl, Bhagmati, who lived south of the river, and the city was first known as Bhagnagar (after her, or, in other versions, "city of gardens"). After Quli Qutb Shah married her, Bhagmati was renamed Hyder Mahal and the city was renamed Hyderabad. In this first phase, Hyderabad city was closely tied to Golconda fort and its surrounding area, particularly Karwan, where the leading bankers lived.

In 1687 the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb conquered Golconda fort and incorporated the Deccan into his empire. From the 1760s, as the first nizam's successors shifted the capital back to Hyderabad, the great palaces of the nizam and his nobles revitalized the city. Major gates in its walls led to Machilipatnam, the seaport on the eastern coast, and Delhi, the Mughal capital. To the city's south, the establishments of the nizam's military officers formed rural outposts, with weapons stored in their extensive gardens. Other gardens at the city's boundaries housed Hindu temples or Muslim graveyards.

The Hyderabad nobility in the eighteenth century was a military one, based on the collection and deployment of resources for warfare. Leading nobles dispensed highly personal patronage. *Vakils*, or diplomatic agents, were crucial to the patron-client system of the time. Mughal *vakils* were more prominent in the eighteenth century, followed by those of the Maratha Peshwa, the Peshwa's nominal subordinates, chiefs Scindia and Holkar, and the *nawāb* of Arcot in the late eighteenth century. Securing land revenue and loans from bankers then became important to the state, and the Mughal bureaucracy grew, supporting Hindus and Muslims alike as part of the growing state establishment centered in Hyderabad city. The nizam's household establishment, the Sarf-i-Khas, eventually grew as well, employing many in the city of Hyderabad. Hindus were high-ranking members of the military, revenue, and household administrations, although Muslims were the majority among the nobles of the state.

The culture of both city and state expanded as the Deccani urban culture of the Shi'a Muslim Qutb Shahis—modeled on that of Persia, but with many Telugu-speakers in the ruling class—incorporated the Mughal or Indo-Persian northern court culture and those who brought it. Muharram, the Shi'a commemoration of the martyrdom of Hasan and Husain in 680, continued to be a major public observance. Under the Sunni Muslim nizams, many new men, speakers of Marathi, Kannada, Telugu, and Urdu, entered the ruling class. Other new participants in Deccani politics were the French and British East India companies, contending with each other on Indian soil and giving European military training and arms to Indian soldiers. The nizam eventually lost Machilipatnam, Hyderabad's seaport, to the British East India Company, and the latter, victorious over the French, forced the nizams to sign successive treaties of "subsidiary alliance" in the later eighteenth century. The second largest "native state" in India, Hyderabad remained independent of direct British control, but a British cantonment settled in the hamlet of Secunderabad and a British resident (political representative of the British East India Company and later of the British government) settled in Hyderabad north of the river.

The Influence of British India

With expansion to the north, a second phase of urban development began, the twin cities now being Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The British Residency secured economic concessions for the adjacent Residency Bazaar, attracting many merchants and bankers. A powerful *darwan*, or prime minister, Sir Salar Jung (1853–1883), recruited modern administrators from British India and initiated modernizing projects, such as, in 1874, a railroad linking Hyderabad to Bombay and the British Indian economy.

The nizams built a palace near the Residency, and movement from the old walled city to the new Hyderabad accelerated. At the same time, Salar Jung protected the old Mughal administration and its employees in the old city from the new British-patterned administration and its high-ranking employees based in the new city.

As the city sprawled over the boulder-strewn fields and hills along both banks of the Musi River, three historically distinct zones developed in the metropolitan area: old Hyderabad (the walled city dating from the sixteenth century, south of the river); new Hyderabad (north of the river); and Secunderabad (developed from a British cantonment in the early nineteenth century, north of Hussain Sagar Tank or lake). In the nineteenth century, the old walled city fell behind the modernizing new Hyderabad, yet even in the newer city the pace of change was slow. Hyderabad was under a *kotwal* (the Mughal equivalent of a police commissioner, city magistrate, and municipal commissioner) appointed by the nizam until 1869, when a department of municipal and road maintenance was created, which included a municipal commissioner. Hyderabad under the nizams did feature much lower taxes than British India, but this advantage was offset by the delayed development and low level of municipal politics. The 1934 introduction of limited municipal elections, modeled on the 1884 Bombay municipal reforms, came too late to produce experienced local politicians by 1948. Hyderabad city's urban services and general condition in the 1940s were relatively quite good, but the rising population since then has severely taxed the city's resources and services.

Hyderabad State introduced reforms in its judicial and educational systems in the late nineteenth century. In the 1870s, a modern Anglo-Indian legal system replaced the Mughal judicial system, and, in the 1890s, a High Court on the British Indian model was established. The modern educational system began in 1883 and 1884 with vernacular primary and secondary schools in the state's four major languages. These fed into the small and elite English-language Nizam College, affiliated to Madras University in British India in 1886 and 1887. The innovative founding of the Urdu-language Osmania University in 1918 sought to educate more of Hyderabad's youth and equip them for administrative service, using the state's official language and emphasizing its independence from British India. *Purdab*, or the seclusion of women, marked most higher educational institutions until 1948, when it was abolished in Osmania University and elsewhere. The new federal University of Hyderabad was established in the 1980s just outside the city, placing the city firmly on the all-India educational map.

While Hyderabad State fell into the colonial "indirect rule" category during the British period, historians of the princely or native states have found that Hyderabad, the

second largest and most populous such state, resisted conforming to patterns typical of other such states. The East India Company had a resident in Hyderabad, but the governor-general and the Madras Council contended over issues within the state, and often the resident and the company were also at odds. For various reasons, Hyderabad had more consistent internal policies and more independence from the resident in the nineteenth century, and Hyderabad's nobility remained dependent upon royal, not British, favor. Difficulties specific to Hyderabad continued in the twentieth century. The seventh and last nizam, Osman Ali Khan, often did not fulfill British wishes or did so for what can easily be seen as his own reasons. Most notably perhaps, in 1917 and 1918, the nizam refused to be associated with those other rulers working toward constitutional arrangements and a Chamber of Princes. Also, again and again the nizam raised the question of "the return of the Berars," referring to the mid-nineteenth century subsidiary alliance treaty ceding that rich province to the British East India Company to support a company-led military force; this issue clearly deflected the nizam's attention from what was going on in the rest of India and led to the state's isolation from the nationalist movement, though it was eventually incorporated into modern India.

Politics in Hyderabad really moved beyond court circles only in the 1930s, when the Indian nationalist movement against British rule finally brought political turmoil into the city. Even in 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent, the nizam thought he could retain his autonomy. He failed to negotiate seriously with India, precipitating the Indian army "Police Action" of 1948, which brought Hyderabad State into the Indian Union. Another rupture came in 1956, when India's reorganization of states along linguistic lines dismembered the old trilinguistic state. Hyderabad city and the Telingana districts were united with the Telugu-speaking districts formerly under British rule and oriented toward Madras city, and Hyderabad became the capital of Andhra Pradesh.

Hyderabad State's history is reflected in its architecture, cuisine, and linguistic and religious diversity. From the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries in this part of India, successive Muslim-ruled dynasties had promoted Persian as the state language, while the peasants in Hyderabad city's hinterland came from three linguistic backgrounds, Marathi, Telugu, and Kannada (the first an Indo-Aryan language, the latter two Dravidian or South Indian languages). In the city itself, the lingua franca was Urdu or Hindustani, a language developed first in the Deccan under Shi'a Muslim rulers and then in North India under the Mughals. Its structure is derived from the Indo-Aryan or Sanskritic languages of North India; Urdu has many Persian words, and it is written in Perso-Arabic



Chowmohalla Palace, Hyderabad. The palace before its 2002 (recently completed) facelift. Built in 1750 by Nizam Salabat Jung and designed along the lines of the shah's palace in Teheran. INDIA TODAY.

script. Urdu replaced Persian as the official language of Hyderabad State in 1884, and English became important then, too, because of the hegemonic influence of British India and the British-trained Indians recruited to the Hyderabad administration.

Present-Day Hyderabad

Hyderabad State boundaries were dismembered in 1956, but the city continued to have a cosmopolitan population, although the ruling class has shifted its composition over time. It has shifted from mostly Muslim to mostly Hindu, and its languages have changed from Persian and Urdu to Telugu and English. While Hindus are scattered throughout the city, Muslims and Christians are clustered: almost two-thirds of the old city is Muslim; one-fifth of Secunderabad is Christian. Speakers of Telugu are the majority, but sizable numbers of people speak Tamil, Sindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Malayalam, and Kannada, as well as Urdu. The city population has grown steadily since 1881, when it had 367,417 people, to some 5 million at the start of the twenty-first century (save for a 19 percent decline from 1911 to 1921 due to the 1918 plague epidemic). After the formation of Andhra

Pradesh, rural to urban migration increased greatly, and extensive industrialization began in the late 1950s. There was some Muslim out-migration, but most immigrants were Hindu Telugu-speakers, some of them replacing departing Muslims in the old city and increasing tensions there. Average population density has been highest in the oldest parts of the walled city, in Secunderabad, and in Hyderabad's economic center just north of the river.

Hyderabad city, arguably more than any city in India, combines features from India's north and south, its Muslim and Hindu peoples, in an urban culture that has always been strikingly cosmopolitan. Hyderabad cuisine featured Mughal dishes with a Deccani flavor, a touch of tamarind in the lentils, a special rich *biryani*, slow-roasted kebabs, delicious thick-sauced eggplant and green chili dishes (*begara began* and *mirch ka salan*). As in Central Asia and Mughal India, people used to sit on the floor around a *dasturkhana*, or tablecloth, eating with their hands, or, if South Indian, eating from banana leaves spread on the ground or table. South Indian Brahman vegetarian restaurants and Persian tea houses were always there, and spicy coastal Andhra food has come to Hyderabad since 1956.

The defining features of the present city evoke competing versions of the past. Major buildings from the nizam's period, especially those so proudly constructed in the early twentieth century (the High Court, Osmania Hospital, Osmania University, the State Legislature) are still much in evidence. However, the harmonious Mughal design they imposed on the city has been broken by new buildings and monuments as the government of Andhra Pradesh tries to re-create a past reaching back to Buddhism and Hinduism. Andhra's chief minister in the early 1990s, the film star N. T. Rama Rao, installed a huge statue of the Buddha in Hussain Sagar Tank (lake). The new Telugu University has changed the look of the public gardens, its bold, powerful lines suggesting South Indian Hindu temples and contrasting with the earlier, lighter Indo-Saracenic buildings. Along the Tank Bund road from Hyderabad to Secunderabad stand many statues erected by the state government. Almost all are of cultural heroes from coastal Andhra; the last nizam, Osman Ali Khan, and Hyderabad's great nineteenth-century *diwan* (prime minister), Sir Salar Jung, are not included.

The assumption of political power by Andhra's peasant castes has reoriented the city to the eastern coastal districts and to Delhi, India's capital, and the wider world. However, internal differences still reflect the region's history. Development policies favoring the newer urban areas and the coastal regions of the state reflect the still-unsuccessful integration of the former Hyderabadis and the Andhras, and resentment is particularly acute among long-standing residents of the capital

city. Hyderabad State ended in 1956, but Hyderabad city still features a Deccani or regional dialect of Urdu, a distinctive cuisine and style of dress, and a leisurely sense of time. The popular culture of earlier days combined Shi'a Muslim commemorations with Mughal or Indo-Persian court and literary traditions, and this has been overlaid with British Indian culture and Telugu South Indian culture. Hyderabad State's legacy to modern India might be its cosmopolitanism, best exemplified in Hyderabad city, and its political culture that linked people across caste and community lines.

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ILBERT, SIR COURTNEY. *See* **British Crown Raj; Ripon, Lord.**

INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE (IAS). *See* **Political System.**

INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE (ICS), BRITISH. *See* **British Crown Raj.**

INDIAN INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY (IITs) In 1945 the government of India, on the initiative of Sir Ardeshir Dalal, appointed a twenty-two-member committee of industrialists, scientists, and educators, under the chairmanship of N. R. Sarkar, to consider the development of higher technical institutions in India, with the goal of ensuring an adequate supply of technical personnel for India's industrial development. The committee recommended the establishment of at least four "higher technical institutions"—one each in the north, south, east, and west—with the first to be located near Calcutta (Kolkata) and another near Bombay (Mumbai). These institutions were possibly to be modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

In May 1950, Sir J. C. Ghosh, who succeeded Sir C. V. Raman as director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, was appointed founding director for the first such institute. Named the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kharagpur, it was inaugurated at Kharagpur in West Bengal on 18 August 1951 by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, minister of education. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru laid the cornerstone on 3 March 1952, and formally opened the institute on 21

April 1956. On the occasion of the convocation of the first graduates of IIT Kharagpur on 15 September 1956, the Indian Parliament passed the Indian Institute of Technology (Kharagpur) Act, declaring it an "Institute of National Importance."

IIT Kharagpur remains the largest of the seven IITs in India. With 19 academic departments, 8 academic centers and schools, and 9 research centers, it offers 22 undergraduate and 63 postgraduate and doctoral programs in almost all branches of engineering and technology. It has the largest technical library in Asia and one of the largest computing facilities in the country.

In 1958 the second Indian Institute of Technology was founded in Bombay, in collaboration with the former Soviet Union. IIT Madras (Chennai) was established in 1959, in collaboration with West Germany, and in 1960, IIT Kanpur was set up in collaboration with a few top American universities, led by MIT. In 1963, IIT Delhi was established by upgrading the College of Engineering and Technology, which had been created in 1961 at Hauz Khas, New Delhi, with British collaboration. The Indian Parliament passed an act in 1961 (which has been amended a few times, most recently in March 2002), known as the Institutes of Technology Act, which declared each IIT an "Institution of National Importance."

In 1995 the sixth IIT was established at Guwahati in Assam, located in a picturesque campus near the Brahmaputra River. Unlike the earlier institutes, IIT Guwahati had no formal collaboration with any other country, since by that time the IIT system was strong enough to assist in its own growth. IIT Guwahati was created as a part of the Assam Accord reached by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with local leaders for the development of the Northeast region of India.

On 21 September 2001, through an ordinance by the president of India, the oldest technical institute of India, the University of Roorkee, was upgraded to an IIT and was renamed the Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee, in the newly created state of Uttaranchal. The newest IIT of India is therefore also the oldest technical institution, with more than 156 years of service.

The Admission Process

The IITs are known for their rigorous admission process, which attracts high-achieving Indian students. The academic and research programs of these institutes are comparable to those of leading institutions worldwide. Undergraduate admissions are conducted through a joint entrance examination, and postgraduate admissions mainly through the Graduate Aptitude Test in Engineering (GATE). Only about 2 percent of those students who take the screening tests are admitted to the seven IITs. Recently a joint admission test has been initiated for admission to the master of science programs in various sciences and mathematics, and another for admission to the master of business administration programs in the IITs.

At the undergraduate level, a four-year degree program leading to a bachelor of technology (B.Tech.) degree in various branches of engineering at the seven IITs requires that candidates pass a qualifying examination in science and mathematics. IIT Kharagpur and IIT Roorkee also offer a five-year bachelor of architecture (B.Arch.) program. At the graduate level, the admission requirements are a bachelor's degree in engineering (and in some programs a master's degree in science) in addition to passing the GATE, which is a prerequisite for receiving financial assistance from the government. Admission to doctoral (Ph.D.) programs in all IITs are handled at the institute level.

Vision and Development

Each IIT may have its own statement of its vision, mission, and core values, but all share a common theme. These statements are essentially excellence driven, holistic in scope, covering education, research, and outreach, emphasizing national relevance yet global understanding, nurturing academic freedom, creativity, innovation, integrity, and the overall development of their students. Quality in all its endeavors is the hallmark of the IIT system.

IIT Delhi has created a Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer, which has established Technology and Business Incubation units to facilitate research ideas and their development into products. IIT Kharagpur and Roorkee have Science and Technology

Entrepreneurship Parks. All other IITs also have institutional mechanisms to promote entrepreneurship and technology transfer. IIT Madras has made notable contributions to technology transfer in the area of communications systems.

The governance of each IIT is essentially comparable. The president of India is the ex-officio visitor of each. The minister of human resource development of the government of India is the ex-officio chairman of the Council of IITs, which deliberates on policy issues common to all IITs. Each IIT has a board of governors, with a part-time honorary chairman and a full-time director appointed by the IIT Council with approval of the visitor. The director is the chairman of the Senate, which is the apex body for all academic policy matters, with each professor of the institute serving as an ex-officio member. There are deans for various academic and administrative functions, as well as faculty boards and research committees. At the lower level, the governance structure may vary at each IIT, as determined by their respective board of governors and Senate. The director of the institute is the principal academic and executive officer, similar to the vice-chancellor or president of a university. The registrar is secretary of the Senate and the Board of Governors.

Engineering Education and the Growth of Technology

Engineering education in India has seen exponential growth since the 1990s, after the All-India Council for Technical Education became a statutory body, empowered by an act of Parliament in 1987 to control the quality of technical education. Over 1,200 degree-awarding engineering colleges exist in various parts of India, admitting some 380,000 students every year. There are, however, regional and discipline imbalances, with an overconcentration of these colleges in certain states and in certain branches of engineering, mostly electronics, computer science, and information technology. There is also an acute shortage of qualified faculty in many engineering colleges.

However, the seven IITs have a capacity of about four thousand students admitted annually, and the quality of their graduates is comparable to the best in the world. There are also eighteen National Institutes of Technology (NITs) in modern India, and several other very good technical universities and institutes. The number of graduate programs in IITs varies from 25 to 55, with over five hundred research students enrolled for doctoral studies.

During more than fifty years of existence, IITs have played a very important role in India's technological development. Their graduates have contributed to government

departments, including public works, irrigation, power, railways, highways, and space research, as well as in the private sector for manufacturing and service. Current trends indicate that IIT graduates prefer to join private sector or multinational corporations, with relatively fewer opting for the public sector. About 10 percent of these graduates become entrepreneurs, and 20 percent go abroad for higher studies and research, mostly to the United States. IITs's contributions to research and development laboratories and educational institutions in India is enormous, as nearly 60 percent of those holding doctoral degrees in engineering and technology come from the IIT system, as do nearly 45 percent of those holding master of technology degrees in engineering and technology. In the corporate sector, both nationally and internationally, IIT alumni have made enormous contributions, and have risen to leadership positions at corporations, laboratories, and university departments. Many have reached senior positions in government, technical institutions, and universities as secretaries, directors, and vice-chancellors.

IIT graduates have also contributed to entrepreneurship and technology development in the United States, particularly in the Silicon Valley, working for organizations such as IBM, Microsoft, Intel, Texas Instruments, General Electric, Motorola, Boeing, Ford, General Motors, Bell Labs, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Many of them are senior professors in American universities and technical institutes, or hold top management positions in U.S. corporations. There are an estimated 30,000 IIT graduates contributing to economic development in the United States.

A study of IIT Kharagpur alumni who graduated between 1982 and 1991 found that of 28 percent who went abroad, about 24 percent were in the United States and Canada. About 50 percent of the alumni had taken higher degrees after graduation, half of them in management. About 8 percent of these alumni had reached top positions by 1994, when the survey was conducted.

Prem Vrat

See also Information and Other Technology Development; Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions

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INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA). *See Armed Forces; Bose, Netaji Subhash Chandra*.

INDIA OFFICE AND INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY

The India Office functioned as the home government of Britain's Crown colony in India from 1858 to 1947. It was the natural successor most immediately to the Board of Control (1784–1858) and, in the broadest sense, to the East India Company (1600–1858). Viewed from the outside, the office was often criticized by its own officials as “intolerably cumbrous and dilatory” (Sir Malcolm Seton) and a “marvel of circumlocution” (Lord Kimberley). Indian nationalists since the late nineteenth century considered the office a repository of conservatism and hostility. These images stem partly from a general lack of appreciation of the formal responsibilities of the India Office in the governance of the subcontinent as articulated in the Government of India Act of 1858, and partly from a calculated determination by successive permanent officials in the India Office to cloak the home government in secrecy vis-à-vis both other U.K. institutions of state and the Government of India.

In the early days of the India Office, the India Office staff was a somewhat carefree bunch that attended correspondence business casually and used their mantelpieces for pistol practice. In its first two decades, clerks were castigated as loafers and shirkers who played all day like the fountains in Trafalgar Square—from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. From the 1880s, the clerks were a much more sober lot, who efficiently processed, evaluated, and cataloged well over a hundred thousand documents a year. The movement of such vast quantities of material necessary for the formulation of policy for India was influenced by several factors, including the physical setup of the India Office (3.5 million cubic feet), logistical procedures, and the performance of subordinate personnel. The flow of paper and the processing of paperwork was the primary responsibility of the permanent undersecretary of state for India, the most formidable of whom was Sir Arthur Godley (later Lord Kilbracken), who managed the position ably for twenty-five years (1883–1909) for ten secretaries of state for India.

Arthur Godley was educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford. He was trained by Benjamin Jowett, who shaped Godley's lifelong high standard of duty, and he spent his political apprenticeship as private secretary to both Lord Granville and William Gladstone. Godley later reminisced that he was “saturated with the Gladstonian tradition of the earnestness of work” (Bassett, p. 225). This passion for administrative efficiency was matched by a carefully cultivated commitment by Godley to not play an active role in politics, and eventually he

saw himself more of a “ministerialist,” who advised and guided both Liberal and Conservative secretaries of state with whom he worked.

In practice, Godley considered the India Office “very leaky” when he joined it in 1883, and over the next two and a half decades refined the rules and regulations for processing paperwork with precision—from designing cabinet map drawers, to positioning hall porters to move paper along, to negotiating the charwoman’s salary, to codifying the division of responsibilities among the permanent staff and committee of the Council of India. Still, he complained of odd, irascible resident clerks such as William Robinson, who, in 1894, “used to roller skate through the corridor of the India Office until prohibited.” Godley eventually oversaw the integration of new technology into the office at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly the use of typewriters (“manned,” as they were, by “female manipulators”) and the telephone.

The essential components of the India Office were the secretary of state, his council (after 1937, advisers), and the permanent correspondence departments. Indian policy was legally conducted by a corporate entity, the Secretary of State in Council, and often required very delicate management by the permanent staff. The Council of India, which was staffed by men who had prior Indian expertise and, after 1909, included several Indian members, had a series of committees that mirrored the permanent departments. Strict rules guided the flow of paperwork from the council and its committees to the correspondence departments to the permanent undersecretary and secretary of state. Balancing this unique projection of Indian ethos into the policy-making arena with the bureaucratic imperatives of the increasingly professional India Office staff was a delicate endeavor and occasionally led to potential legal complications. Godley minimized this internal tension by aligning the correspondence departments and council committees more closely, and by encouraging successive Indian secretaries to use their powers of “persuasion and prestige” to reduce tensions. Godley, and his successors, always reminded India Office personnel that the real source of interference, as he saw it, was, oddly enough, Parliament. Because the India Office establishment was not on the British estimates, deflecting Parliamentary inquiries into India policy seemed an unstated but real priority. The India Office sanitized reports to Parliament in the nineteenth century, maintained its own private printers, and right up through World War II conducted almost daily meetings to vet information to be shared with other ministries and departments of state.

There were modifications to the internal processing of paperwork in the India Office in 1919 and 1923 that corresponded to a great influx of Indian matters referred

back to London. The most significant adjustments related to devolving responsibility for some policy matters to departmental secretaries, leaving only serious matters to be sent up to the undersecretaries. Departmental heads could, in fact, now correspond directly with their counterparts in India on many routine matters. Between 1937 and 1940, as a result of the Government of India Act of 1935, a new relationship emerged between the secretary of state for India and his advisers. The Indian secretary now had broader legal powers to deal with secret matters and a less formal imperative to act always as a corporate entity, the Secretary of State in Council. Burmese affairs were slivered off the India Office responsibilities in 1937, although de facto, Burma Office officials worked out of the India Office and overlapped personnel considerably.

On the dissolution of the India Office in August 1947, the official archives of the India Office, Burma Office, East India Company, and the Board of Control, along with smaller groups of records from Haileybury College, the Royal Engineering College at Cooper’s Hill, and various overseas agencies administratively linked to India (e.g., Aden, the Gulf, Afghanistan), were transferred to the Commonwealth Relations Office (1947–1966). Thereafter, the India Office Library and Records went to the Commonwealth Office (1966–1968), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1968–1982), and finally to the British Library in 1982.

Arnold P. Kaminsky

See also **British Crown Raj**

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INDIA'S IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION India’s impact on Western civilization has been sporadic and not always easily defined, in contrast to the great influence of Indian religious ideas on Central Asia, Southeast Asia, China, and through China to Japan and Korea, especially in the form of Buddhism. Indian influence in the West can be traced with reasonable certainty from the ancient Mediterranean world of Greece and Rome, through the European Middle Ages, the



Drawing of Englishman Smoking Hookah. Not all representations of Indian culture have been positive, as this drawing possibly created during the era of British colonial rule attests. A humorous image perhaps, but one that reinforces a negative stereotype—bringing to mind the common stereotypes that Indians at home and in the West continue to struggle against. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

Renaissance, the age of European imperial expansion and decline, to the post-colonial world of the Indian diaspora of modern times.

Greece and Rome (600 B.C.–A.D. 650)

For the ancient Greeks and Romans, India had no definite boundaries, but it was thought of as all the territory beyond Arabia and Persia, the end of the habitable world. The first detailed accounts of what the Greeks knew about India appear in the great history of Herodotus (c. 480–425 B.C.), and these became part of the Western imagination for two thousand years. Some of it was factual, some of it was fantasy. India was thought of as a land of fabulous creatures as well as great wealth, an idea that was to lead Europeans through the centuries to seek to trade with India. Other Greek writers found a striking contrast between the Greek love of freedom and the servility of Indians and Persians, who they lumped together as “Asians.”

Fascinating questions about Indian influence on the origins of Greek religion and philosophy arise in relation to the prominence of the idea of reincarnation, so central to

Indian religion, in early thinkers including Plato. This connection, the subject of speculation in recent years, was also mentioned by early writers like Eusebius (c. A.D. 300–359), who relates a story of an Indian visiting Socrates. New information and new influences from India came to the Mediterranean world after Alexander the Great crossed the River Indus in 326 B.C.; his troops returned home from India with tales that were part myth, part fact. Indian religion probably influenced Manichaeism, one of the great heresies of the early Christian church, for Mani, its founder, traveled to India and included the Buddha alongside Jesus among his divine beings. Trade in material goods between India and the Roman world is less speculative than that in ideas, for it finds frequent mention in contemporary Roman writing. Rome imported exotica from India: spices, jewels, fine textiles, ivory, peacocks, elephants, and lions. In return, India wanted only gold from Rome, and the trade balance was very unfavorable to Rome.

The Middle Ages and the Renaissance (500–1500)

India was never unknown to the Western world, but direct communication was rare in the European Middle Ages, with the fantasies and facts of the Greeks and Romans remaining the principal base of knowledge about India. That a few scholars in the Christian West remained aware of the high civilization of India is attested by a seventh-century monk, writing in 662 of the Indians’ “subtle discoveries in the science of astronomy . . . of their rational system of mathematics and their method of calculation” (Basham, p. vi). There were persistent stories of a great Christian king somewhere in India, perhaps based on rumors of the ancient Christian church in Kerala. A curious development took place in the late Middle Ages, when the devil, demons, and monsters of the Christian tradition began to be identified with stories of the Indian gods, in all their multitude of forms, animal and human, many-headed and many-limbed. As “much-maligned monsters,” Indian deities became a staple of the Western imagination right up to the present time (Mitter, p. 10).

Imperialism and Indian Influence on the West (1500–1947)

When Vasco da Gama reached Calicut on the southwest coast of India in 1498, he was able to report that India lived up to the expectations that Europeans had long held. They “found large cities, large edifices and rivers, and great populations, among whom is carried on all the trade in spices and precious stones” (Lach, p. 96). This was the beginning of European imperialism in India, and the Portuguese established themselves at coastal ports, notably Goa, which became the center of their great Asian sea-based empire. Attempts to evaluate the influence of its Indian possessions on Portugal itself are confused by the



Yoga Instructor Works with a Pupil. To cope with the increasingly stressful demands of their cultures, many Westerners have turned to the centuries-old spiritual teachings and practices of India. IPSHITA BARUA.

motivations for imperial activities, which were different at different times. In the case of Portugal, the motivations seem to have been a seamless mixture of politics, religion, and economics, that is, to strengthen its position in Europe; to win converts to Christianity; and to control as much of the Asian trade as possible.

The dominating motivation of British imperialism in India was economic, and the success of the British in controlling both external trade and land revenue made it possible for Britain to build one of the largest standing armies in the world. British possession of India prevented Russia, or so at least the British believed, from moving southward through Afghan territory into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Indian soldiers were used to maintain British power in China and East Africa as well as in Europe and the Middle East in both world wars, and India was the key to the British navy's control of the sea passages to Southeast Asia and China. The Indian taxpayer, not the British, paid for this use of the Indian

army. An argument is sometimes made that the wealth of India helped to fuel Britain's industrial revolution, but while this is dubious, exports of British goods to India certainly helped British trade balances. In the final years of British rule, however, India was of less economic importance, making it easier for the British to leave.

Other areas of Indian influence on both Britain and the West are more intangible but in the long run perhaps more enduring. One of these emerged as Europeans in the nineteenth century discovered the immense wealth of Indian learning in Sanskrit and the other Indian languages. German intellectuals were particularly open to the study of Indian thought and culture. G.W.F. Hegel, while celebrating the antiquity of Indian thought, believed its otherworldliness prevented change and progress, an idea that was taken up by both Karl Marx and Max Weber. The philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, on the other hand, exalted Indian religions, arguing that intolerance and fanaticism were known only in "the

monotheistic religions,” Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In the United States, Indian religious thought found enthusiastic support from Ralph Waldo Emerson and the other Transcendentalists.

It was the character and ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, the most famous of modern Indians, however, more than the great systems of Indian religion and thought, that became for many people in the West the great symbol for the meaning of India. His message of nonviolence had a profound influence on the way that Westerners thought about India's struggle for freedom and independence, and this reaction, particularly in the United States and India, made it more difficult for the British rulers to oppose his demands for Indian freedom. This message was used with telling effect in the 1960s by Martin Luther King Jr., in the struggle by black Americans for equal civil rights in the United States.

Independence and the Indian Diaspora (1947–2017)

The reason for choosing the beginning date—the year when India gained political independence—is obvious enough; the ending date, seventy years later, is often suggested by observers as the time when India will not only be the world's most populous country and its largest democracy, but a political, economic, and military world power. Some of the factors that have contributed to making such influence possible—although all are problematic—can be noted as follows: internal political and economic strategies; shifting international situations; academic studies of Indian history and culture; and the remarkable influence of its migrant people, its “elite diaspora,” especially throughout the English-speaking world.

Although Indian culture had influenced Western civilization in a variety of ways since ancient times, remarkable changes that took place after India became independent in 1947 and assumed its place in the comity of sovereign nations; the new Indian nation was widely respected for having achieved not just independence but a mature and stable civil society. Unlike many other newly decolonized nations, India had the seasoned leadership of a political party, the Indian National Congress, which enjoyed widespread support from all levels of society for moderate political and economic strategies for change. There was a general consensus that the future of the nation depended upon commitment to a number of goals, one of which was a commitment to national unity against the tensions of regional, linguistic, and religious differences that had been exacerbated by the partition of the subcontinent into two nations, India and Pakistan. Such tensions continued, but foreign observers were impressed by the success of the authorities in moderating them. Observers were also impressed with the success, against great odds, of the

commitment to a democratic polity that permitted free elections, free speech, and the unfettered operation of rival political parties. The government also impressed foreign observers by its decision to industrialize in order to raise the low standard of living of vast numbers of its people. There was less widespread approval, however, for its decision that this could only be done through a socialist pattern of society, which entailed limitation on foreign investment and governmental control of many aspects of economic life. Many critics, especially in the United States, associated this with India's foreign policy, which was one of attempted neutrality between the two great hostile blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no question that this policy led to a loss of Indian influence in the West, as dominated by the United States. At the same time, many friendly foreign observers believed that India was following a course that was good for the Indian people. Shifting political international relations, signified by the political disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, made it possible for India and the United States to move toward more fruitful relations built on the influence India had gained through the years.

Some credit for this influence must go to an important aspect of American academic life: beginning in the 1950s, as part of a movement to broaden the curriculum, universities and colleges began to include the study of Indian cultures and languages. Not only did this increase an appreciation of the richness of Indian culture, it also provided government officials with a new understanding of Indian political life. It was largely among the college-educated that Indian religions found a surprisingly enthusiastic response, not only in converts to such neo-Hindu groups as Hare Krishna but also in a more dispersed receptivity to Hindu spirituality in general, with many Indian gurus finding large followings. Indian classical music became popular for the first time in the West. So did Indian food, with Indian restaurants becoming commonplace.

One of the most striking causes of increased influence of India on the West after 1947 was the migration of large numbers of Indians to the English-speaking world. There had been large-scale migrations of Indians in the nineteenth century, but these were poor laborers, who often went as indentured labor. This new migration came from the educated elites, comprising an “influential diaspora.” Many came as graduate students and stayed to occupy prominent places in the professions and business, most famously in information technology. The high point of this particular area of influence came with the sudden growth of “outsourcing,” when many U.S. businesses found it more economical to transfer much of their information processing to India. This practice became so extensive that it led to demands, from both British and U.S. governments and workers, for legislative

steps to halt the loss of jobs to highly qualified but far less expensive Indian workers, an ironic comment on the growth of Indian influence, precisely in the area of technology long dominated by the West.

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INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. *See* **United States, Relations with.**

INDO-ARYAN. *See* **Languages and Scripts; Vedic Aryan India.**

INDO-PAK WARS: 1948, 1965, AND 1971. *See* **Pakistan and India.**

INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY. *See* **Russia, Relations with.**

INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS. *See* **Sri Lanka, Relations with.**

INDO-U.S. RELATIONS, CULTURAL CHANGES IN In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, India and the United States found themselves

bound together by an expanding web of cultural ties. This development seemed all the more astounding given the history of Indo-U.S. relations, marked more by wary estrangement than warm embrace. Indeed, despite a post-cold war rapprochement, the governments of the two countries continued to find that their interests often diverged. Yet, their peoples have embarked upon a relationship of transcreative synergy across every cultural medium that is profoundly transforming both countries, and that may have significant implications in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

The twentieth century has often been called the “American century.” The United States grew to global economic and political dominance, ultimately outspending the Soviet Union into oblivion, and thus ending the cold war. The engine of the United States’ extraordinary growth during these decades was unmatched technological innovation. The United States’ technological lead was driven in no small part by the brain power of brilliant immigrants, many of whom came from India. The inestimable contributions of thousands of highly trained Indian migrants in every area of American scientific and technological achievement culminated with the information technology revolution most associated with California’s Silicon Valley in the 1980s and 1990s.

Yet throughout this period of rapid change, American images of India remained virtually unchanged. The average American thought of India rarely, if at all. Indian high culture barely made a small entry into the rarified world of the urban elite. For the vast majority of Americans, a few forgettable Indian moments consisted of shocking pictures of the desperately poor on the television news, or the orientalized images of maharajahs, palaces, elephants, and tigers from the nostalgic era of the British Raj. Aside from a fleeting moment during the 1960s when the Beatles returned from their pilgrimage to Rishikesh, Indian culture did not penetrate the psyche of the average American. India remained for most Americans a distant, timeless place whose culture’s only possible contemporary contribution might be transcendental meditation, useful primarily as a therapeutic escape from the stresses of modern life.

The opening years of the twenty-first century, however, saw a revolutionary transformation of these stereotypical images in the United States. Today, the average American is far more likely to associate India with technological innovation rather than grinding poverty, with hip fashion rather than tigers and elephants, or with the latest movies rather than sitar concerts. India thus has emerged as one of the primary engines of global cultural innovation in the twenty-first century. Its relationship with the United States is no small reason for this incredible metamorphosis. In fact, India’s cultural relationship

with the United States is changing the very definition of what it means to be American, even as the absorption and reinterpretation of American consumer culture is changing what it means to be Indian.

The biggest factor in the emergence of this new transcreative synergy between India and the United States was undoubtedly the explosive growth of the Indian-American community at the historical moment of the information and communication technologies boom. Cold war imperatives moved the United States to liberalize immigration laws during the 1960s in order to allow a limited number of highly educated and technically skilled immigrants from non-European countries, including India, into the United States. A first wave of Indian physicians, engineers, and scientists came to America during the late 1960s and early 1970s, lured by a standard of living far above anything to which they could aspire at home. Subsequent immigration reforms led to more immigrants; the 2000 census counted more than 1 million persons of Indian descent living in the United States. By 2004, that number had increased to 1.7 million, and was expected to reach over 2 million by 2010 and to double again by 2020, making Indians the fastest-growing immigrant group in the United States.

Indian Americans also became the most prosperous and one of the most highly educated immigrant groups in the country, with a per capita income of \$60,093, versus \$38,885 for the general population, and with 58 percent holding a bachelor's degree or higher, versus 20 percent for the general population. By 2004, one out of every ten Indian Americans was reported to be a millionaire. Nowhere was the extraordinary success of the Indian American immigrant community more dramatic and more visible than in California's Silicon Valley, where high-tech entrepreneurs from India founded some of the most successful start-up companies of the late twentieth century and created some of the most widely used American products, from Hotmail.com to Corel's WordPerfect.

Meanwhile, two additional phenomena were occurring that would profoundly transform the cultural dynamic between India and the United States. First, the children of the first post-1960s wave of Indian immigrants were entering colleges across the country. In contrast to their technically skilled parents, the second generation, having grown up with a dual cultural heritage, began in increasing numbers to explore careers in the arts, journalism, and the humanities, endeavors that allowed them to express their identity as Indian Americans. The community itself was also changing. As immigration laws expanded to include family members and other categories, the Indian American community became more educationally and economically diverse, with many families living below the poverty line. As the

population grew, "Little India" communities sprang up in every major American urban area, from Devon Street in Chicago, to Jackson Heights, Queens, in New York, to Fremont, California. These enclaves offered all the comforts of "home," from food and clothing to Bollywood movies and Indian film soundtracks. The offspring of Indian and other South Asian immigrant taxi drivers, semiconductor fabricators, and newspaper vendors often "Black-identified," adopting the dress, idioms, and music of African American youth culture. Second-generation Indian Americans began to conjugate the Hindi film songs and Punjabi *bhangra* beats of their parents with the sounds of rap and hip-hop. The 1990s saw an explosion of Indian American DJs, who spliced Hindi film tracks over the pulsing rhythms of both hip-hop and *bhangra*. By the time African American hip-hop star Jay-Z recorded an album with *bhangra*-rap star Punjabi MC, Indo-American fusion pop culture was well on its way into the mainstream.

At the same time, cutting-edge information and communication technologies—often the brain-children of Indian immigrants—were compressing the time it took to bridge what used to be the almost unfathomable distance between North America and India. Along the way, an equally dynamic Indian fusion culture emerging in London was swept into what quickly became a pan-global Indian cultural phenomenon, relayed around the world by an Indian diaspora population of over 20 million. Riding this wave, India burst into the American imagination in the early 2000s as never before. For the first time in its history, the United States, the country that had defined "newness" since its revolutionary beginnings in the eighteenth century, was displaced as the land of the "new" by one of the world's most ancient civilizations, India.

This was due in no small part to the transformation of the "brain drain" model, which had brought the first wave of highly technically skilled Indian workers to the United States, into a "brain circulation" or even a "brain gain" model. Successful Indian immigrant entrepreneurs, physicians, scientists, and engineers began to understand that the very technologies they had helped to invent could provide a ticket home—not to the India they left behind in the 1960s but to an India that their skills could transform into a global center for technological innovation. A steady stream of "America-returned" Indians joined a significant number of highly talented individuals who had never left India, creating high-tech companies such as Asim Premji's Infosys in Bangalore, in Hyderabad, Chennai, and Mumbai. American high-tech companies soon joined the caravan of technology leaders and entrepreneurs on the India trail, with Hewlett-Packard, Intel, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft, and others

opening offices in India. Many U.S. companies began to “outsource” highly skilled work, formerly performed at much greater cost in the United States, to India. The NRI, or “non-resident Indian,” who had made it in California became a “newly returned Indian” living in a California-style gated community in Bangalore that boasted every amenity one could expect at a posh U.S. address, but at a fraction of the American cost.

Hooked into an American-inspired global consumer culture, with the privatization of Indian television and the advent of satellite broadcast technology and cable, the lifestyle expectations of young urban Indians was irreversibly transformed. The Internet completed the connection, in real time, of young Indians in India with young Indians in the Indian diaspora, adding another dimension to “Cyber-India.” The fascination of Indians with the diaspora and the nostalgia of diaspora Indians for an increasingly imaginary Indian homeland spawned a spate of blockbuster movies such as *Kul Ho Na Ho*, starring Bollywood hero and heartthrob Shah Rukh Khan as a newly arrived Indian migrant in New York who falls for one less “fresh off the boat.” Young people in Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, and Chennai became indistinguishable from their diaspora counterparts. Their tastes had become profoundly internationalized. Thanks to India’s liberalized economy and new urban prosperity, international brands of clothing were available in major Indian cities, along with the latest hair styles, makeup trends, club music, and the ubiquitous “mobiles” glued to every ear.

Young Indians went well beyond the passive consumption of global popular culture and international brands. They became active producers of new, hybridized cultural content that landed in the capitals of North America and Europe as the latest craze among non-Indian and Indian diaspora populations alike. Fashion moguls Anand Jon and Sandy Dalal, both based in New York, created their own successful lines of Indian-inspired clothing, while European couture superstars such as Giorgio Armani and Jean-Paul Gauthier began to “cite” Indian colors, textiles, prints, and images in their own work. Composer A. R. Rehman, based in India, became an international sensation, while Bally Sagoo created London-inspired fusion sounds; Norah Jones, the Grammy Award-winning daughter of sitar star Ravi Shankar, created soft jazz croonings that bore no trace of her Indian paternity. English-language Indian literary colossus Salman Rushdie moved to New York, while novelist Chitra Bannerjee Divakaruni and travel writer Pico Iyer remained on the West Coast. Jhumpa Lahiri’s debut collection of short stories, *The Interpreter of Maladies*, depicting Indian immigrants caught between India and America, won a Pulitzer Prize for “distinguished fiction by an American author, preferably dealing with American

life.” Diaspora Indians became not just Indian stars but, simply, stars.

The Indian American cultural revolution continued at the box office with an explosion of “search for identity” films, from Krutin Patel’s *ABCD* to Anurag Mehta’s *American Chai* to Nikhil Kamkolkar’s *Indian Cowboy*. Ismail Merchant, of the Merchant-Ivory Productions team that produced *A Room with a View* and *Howards End*, continued to turn out films with Indian diaspora themes, such as *The Mystic Masseur*, based on the novel by V. S. Naipaul. New York-based Indian film director Mira Nair achieved the ultimate “crossover” success with her *Monsoon Wedding*, a movie that portrayed the contradictions of contemporary Indians fully engaged in the contradictions of twenty-first-century life, featuring an arranged marriage between a diaspora Indian and an Indian Indian. She went on to produce a sumptuous version of William Thackeray’s *Vanity Fair* that featured an Indian musical dance extravaganza right out of the purest Bollywood tradition.

In New York, there was an explosion of Indian American theater, ranging from Aasif Mandvi’s side-splitting comedy *Sakina’s Restaurant* to the Broadway hit *Bombay Dreams* by musical producer Andrew Lloyd Webber. Contemporary visual artists from India, as well as those working in the United States, including the Gujarati but New York-based painter Natvar Bhavsar and Washington, D.C.-based Anil Revri, sell out shows in trendy galleries such as Sundaram Tagore’s gallery in Soho. Their work has a markedly Indian sensibility in terms of color and geometry, yet it is as attractive to deep-pocketed Indian Americans as to other American and international collectors.

On a more mundane level, it is easy to find Indian entrées such as *palak paneer* and *chicken tikka* in the frozen food section of any supermarket in most major or even mid-sized American cities. Indian *chai* has become as much a fixture of the ubiquitous American coffeehouse scene as have lattes and cappuccinos. The American “*dosa wrap*” has expanded the South Indian traditional repertory to include such nontraditional fillings as roast chicken and goat cheese. The *masala bhangra* workout has become the latest fitness craze in California. These transformations and others led *Newsweek* magazine in 2004 to proclaim under the rubric “American Masala” that South Asians in the United States “have changed the way we eat, dress, work and play.”

Meanwhile, in India, American culture was transforming the lives of the urban and the affluent and challenging the Indian government to meet the aspirations of the millions of Indians who still live below the poverty level yet can see all around them, and on television, the new

affluence of their fellow citizens. Starbucks attempted a foray into the land of Darjeeling and other teas. Pizza Hut, McDonalds, and other fast-food restaurants have set up shop in India, while new shopping malls complete with underground parking, escalators, and multiplex movie theaters feature international brands. Many young urban Indian girls have become Westernized to such a degree that they not only no longer wear traditional Indian dress but need help from mothers or aunts to put on a sari when a social occasion requires one. Indian television, once the lone territory of state-run Doordarshan television, began to broadcast Western popular culture with MTV. MTV simply rebroadcast in India shows designed for American and other Western audiences. Local networks leapt into a deregulated Indian television market with old reruns of *Bewitched* and *Baywatch*, dubbed in Hindi. Today, no television network can survive in India unless it broadcasts locally produced content featuring local talent. An explosion of Indian-produced talk shows, sitcoms, soap operas, and game shows now dominate the television screens of India.

The visibility of India, Indians, and Indian Americans has reached new levels in American media. Major American magazines, such as *Business Week* and *Wired*, now run cover stories on the Indian technology revolution and outsourcing. Indian actress Aishwarya Rai is featured in photo spreads in the *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, proclaimed to be one of the most beautiful women in the world, a rising “international superstar.” British Indian actress Parminder Nagra has a role on the television series *ER*, while Indian actors regularly have cameo or even episode-starring roles on major American television network and cable shows. NBC is working on a comedy, *Nevermind Nirvana*, based on the lives of a family of Indian immigrant doctors, the Mehtas, modeled on the British hit series *The Kumars*. Meanwhile, real-life television doctor Sanjay Gupta dispatches medical advice daily to millions of Americans who watch CNN. The increasing visibility of Indian Americans in everyday American life has everyone in the media business talking “crossover.” With India predicted by some leading economists to overtake the U.S. economy within the next fifty years, it is looking more and more as if the next American century may be Indian.

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See also **Diaspora; Film Industry**

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INDRA The leading deity in Vedic Hinduism, Indra is evidently a pre-Vedic god, invoked by Mitanni Aryans of northern Syria in their famous treaty with the Hittites about 1380 B.C. Almost one-fourth of the 1,028 hymns of the Rig Veda, composed in verse by 1000 B.C. at the latest, are addressed to Indra as the conqueror of enemies of Indo-Aryans, the Dāsas or Dasyus in particular, at times conflated with *asuras*, mythic enemies of the gods. When destroying demons or human foe, Indra wields his *vajra*, a thunderbolt-mace forged by Tvastā, and becomes a shape-changer by means of his powers of *māyā*. Above all, he is Vritrahan (slayer of Vritra) an epithet cognate to ancient Iranian Verethraghna. This conquest of the serpent demon named “Resistance” is recounted in Rig Veda 1.32 and 1.51. Indra emerges here as a cosmogonic figure, since Vritra held in bondage all the fertilizing waters necessary for life. Not only does the warrior of the gods release those streams, often homologized to captive cows, he also wins the light or the sun, and retrieves the primary sacrificial substance soma from the cloud-mountains. In another cosmogonic feat, he is credited with propping apart heaven and earth. As invincible leader, Indra thus becomes patron deity of Kshatriyas, the warrior *varṇa* (class) that is the source of kingship in ancient and classical India. In sum, he is the heroic

champion who in battles of cosmic scale wins the day and the territory—perhaps in the vicinity of the Sarasvati River in southern Afghanistan—for Indo-Aryan nomadic pastoralists.

Of all the deities in Rig Vedic poetry, Indra is described most colorfully. Whereas Varuṇa is *samrāj*, or universal king, simply by his nature, the younger, impetuous Indra is *svarāj*, one who seizes kingship by his prevailing self-rule. Chariot-driving Indra, said to have a hundred powers, is bearded and gigantic in size. Having a thousand testicles, he is a universal fertilizer of females, including the earth; though boastful and intoxicated by soma, he is also generous, designated by poets as *maghavan* (bounteous).

In some fifty hymns, Indra is associated with other gods and goddesses, chiefly Agni, Brihaspati, Varuṇa, Ushas, Vāyu, the Ashvin twins, martial storm-gods known collectively as the Maruts, and Soma, the last as both god and the pressed juice that he voraciously consumes in soma sacrifices. In the extended mythology, more than one perspective unfolds to engage Indra in controversy. He is charged with crimes against the three classes—Brahmans, Kshatriyas (his own *varṇa*), and Vaishyas—and in consequence suffers diminution of his seemingly invincible power. The terrible dragon Vritra is identified as a Brahman, and therefore Indra is guilty of Brahmanicide, a dreadful sin. In violation of the code of courageous warriors, he is accused of cowardly flight from combat, including his initial confrontation with Vritra. And in a sexual crime against the Vaishya class, society's producers, he assumes the guise of Gautama to trick and violate his wife, Ahalyā, while sage Gautama performs his morning prayers.

In the later era of the Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas, Indra's worship and centrality as divine sovereign dwindle in favor of Shiva and Vishnu. Preserved, however, are countless aspects of his warrior career. Tamil epics, for example, situate the self-offerings of martial heroes, and victory for their king, in the festival of Indra. Also perpetuated are Vedic myths that ridicule his sexual prowess in accounts of castration and substitution of his genitals with those of a ram or goat. In one variant, the body of Indra sprouts a thousand vaginas. Shiva in particular sustains many of Indra's famous roles. Shiva, Vishnu, and emerging cults of major goddesses gradually take center stage, just as Indra himself in an earlier era had replaced Varuṇa as king of the gods.

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See also **Agni; Hinduism (Dharma); Soma; Varuṇa; Vedic Aryan India**

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INDUSTRIAL CHANGE SINCE 1956 When India achieved independence in 1947, the national consensus was in favor of rapid industrialization, which was seen not only as the key to economic development but also to economic sovereignty. In the subsequent years, India's industrial policy evolved through successive industrial policy resolutions and industrial policy statements. Specific priorities for industrial development were also set forth in the successive Five-Year Plans.

Early Industrial Development

Building on the so-called Bombay Plan prepared by leading Indian industrialists in 1944–1945, the first Industrial Policy Resolution in 1948 laid down the broad contours of the strategy of industrial development. At that time the Constitution of India had not taken final shape, nor had the Planning Commission been constituted. Moreover, the necessary legal framework had not yet been put in place. Not surprisingly, therefore, the resolution was somewhat broad in its scope and direction. Yet, an important distinction was made between industries to be kept under the exclusive ownership of government (public sector) and those reserved for the private sector. Subsequently, the Constitution of India was adopted in January 1950, the Planning Commission was constituted in March 1950, and the Industrial (Department and Regulation) Act (IDR Act) was enacted in 1951, with the objective of empowering the government to take the necessary steps to regulate the pattern of industrial development through licensing. This paved the way for the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which was the first comprehensive statement on the strategy for industrial development in India.

Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 was shaped by the Mahalanobis model of growth, which suggested that an emphasis on heavy industries would create long-term higher growth. The resolution widened the scope of the public sector. Its objective, following socialist theory, was to accelerate economic growth and boost the process of industrialization to achieve social benefits. Given the scarce capital and inadequate entrepreneurial base, the resolution accorded the state a predominant role in industrial development. All industries of basic and strategic

importance and those in public utility services, as well as those requiring large-scale investment, were reserved for the public sector.

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 classified industries into three categories. The first category comprised seventeen industries (included in Schedule A of the resolution) exclusively under the domain of the government, including, among others, railways, air transportation, arms and ammunition, iron and steel, and atomic energy. The second category comprised twelve industries (included in Schedule B of the resolution), which were envisaged to be progressively state owned, with the private sector supplementing the efforts of the state. The third category contained all the remaining industries, and it was expected that the private sector would initiate development of these industries, though they would remain open to the state as well. The government was to facilitate and encourage development of these industries in the private sector, in accordance with the programs formulated under the Five-Year Plans, by appropriate fiscal measures and by ensuring adequate infrastructure. Despite the demarcation of industries into separate categories, the resolution was flexible enough to allow adjustments and modifications in the national interest.

Another objective specified in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 was the removal of regional disparities through the development of regions with a low industrial base. Accordingly, adequate infrastructure for industrial development of such regions was duly emphasized. Given the potential to provide large-scale employment, the resolution reiterated the government's determination to provide various forms of assistance to small and cottage industries for a wider dispersal of the industrial base and a more equitable distribution of income. The resolution, in fact, reflected the prevalent value system of India in the early 1950s, which was centered around self-sufficiency in industrial production. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 was a landmark policy statement, and it formed the basis of subsequent policy announcements.

Industrial Policy Measures, 1964–1980

The Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) was set up in 1964 to review various aspects pertaining to the concentration of economic power and the operation of industrial licensing under the IDR Act of 1951. While emphasizing that the planned economy contributed to the growth of industry, the report by the MIC concluded that the industrial licensing system enabled large business firms to obtain a disproportionately large share of licenses, which had led to preemption and foreclosure of capacity. Subsequently, the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (Dutt Committee), constituted in

1967, recommended that larger industrial firms be given licenses only for setting up industry in core and heavy investment sectors, thereby necessitating the reorientation of industrial licensing policy.

In 1969 the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act was introduced to enable the government to effectively control the concentration of economic power. The Dutt Committee had defined large business firms as those with assets of more than 350 million rupees. The MRTP Act of 1969 defined large business firms as those with assets of 200 million rupees or more. Large industries were designated as MRTP companies and were eligible to participate in industries that were not reserved for the government or the small-scale sector.

The new Industrial Licensing Policy of 1970 classified industries into four categories. The first category, termed "Core Sector," consisted of basic, critical, and strategic industries. The second category, termed "Heavy Investment Sector," comprised projects involving an investment of more than 50 million rupees. The third category, the "Middle Sector," consisted of projects with investment in the range of 10 million to 50 million rupees. The fourth category, the "De-licensed Sector," in which investment was less than 10 million rupees, was exempted from licensing requirements. The Industrial Licensing Policy of 1970 confined the role of large business firms and foreign companies to the core, heavy, and export-oriented sectors.

The Industrial Policy Statement of 1973. With a view to prevent the excessive concentration of industrial activity in the large industrial firms, this statement gave preference to small and medium entrepreneurs over the large firms and foreign companies in the setting up of new industrial enterprises, particularly for the production of mass-consumption goods. New undertakings of up to 10 million rupees in terms of fixed assets were exempted from licensing requirements for the substantial expansion of assets. This exemption was not allowed to MRTP companies, foreign companies, and existing licensed or registered undertakings having fixed assets of 50 million rupees or more.

The Industrial Policy Statement of 1977. This statement emphasized the decentralization of the industrial sector, with an increased role for small-scale, "tiny," and cottage industries. It also provided for close interaction between industrial and agricultural sectors. The highest priority was accorded to power generation and transmission. It expanded the list of items reserved for exclusive production in the small-scale sector from 180 to more than 500. For the first time, within the small-scale sector, a "tiny" unit was defined as a unit with investment

in machinery and equipment up to 0.1 million rupees and situated in towns or villages with a population of less than 50,000 (as per 1971 census). Basic goods, capital goods, and high technology industries important for the development of small-scale and agriculture sectors were clearly delineated for the large-scale sector. It was also stated that foreign companies that diluted their foreign equity up to 40 percent under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 were to be treated on par with Indian companies. The Policy Statement of 1977 also issued a list of industries in which no foreign collaboration of a financial or technical nature was allowed, as indigenous technology was already available. Fully owned foreign companies were allowed only in highly export-oriented sectors or sophisticated technology areas. For all approved foreign investments, companies were completely free to repatriate capital and remit profits, dividends, and royalties. Further, in order to ensure balanced regional development, it was decided not to issue new licenses for setting up new industrial units within certain limits of large metropolitan cities (population of more than 1 million) and urban areas (population of more than 0.5 million).

The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980. The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 placed emphasis on the promotion of competition in the domestic market, technological upgrade, and the modernization of industries. Some of the socioeconomic objectives defined in the statement were: optimum utilization of installed capacity, higher productivity, higher employment levels, removal of regional disparities, strengthening of the agricultural base, promotion of export oriented industries, and consumer protection against high prices and poor quality.

Policy measures were announced to revive the efficiency of public sector units by developing the management cadres in functional fields such as operations, finance, marketing, and information systems. An automatic expansion of capacity up to 5 percent per annum was allowed, particularly in the core sector and in industries with long-term export potential. Special incentives were granted to industrial units that were engaged in industrial processes and technologies aiming at optimum utilization of energy and the exploitation of alternative sources of energy. In order to boost the development of small-scale industries, the investment limit was raised to 2 million rupees in small-scale units and 2.5 million rupees in ancillary units. In the case of “tiny” units, the investment limit was raised to 0.2 million rupees.

Industrial Policy Measures, 1985–1991

Policy measures initiated in the first three decades following independence facilitated the establishment of basic

industries and the growth of a broad-based infrastructure in the country. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985–1990) recognized the need for consolidation of these strengths and the initiation of policy measures to prepare Indian industry to respond effectively to emerging challenges. A number of measures were initiated toward technological and managerial modernization to improve productivity and quality, and to reduce costs of production. The public sector was freed from a number of constraints and was provided with greater autonomy. There was some progress in the process of deregulation during the 1980s. In 1988 all industries, except twenty-six industries specified in the negative list, were exempted from licensing. The exemption was, however, subject to investment and locational limitations. The automotive industry, cement, cotton spinning, food processing, and polyester filament yarn industries witnessed modernization and expanded scales of production during the 1980s.

With a view to promote industrialization of the underdeveloped areas of the country, the government of India announced in June 1988 the Growth Centre Scheme, under which seventy-one growth centers were proposed to be created throughout the country. Growth centers were to be endowed with basic infrastructure facilities such as power, water, telecommunications, and banking to enable them to attract industries.

The Industrial Policy Statement of 1991. The Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 stated that “the Government will continue to pursue a sound policy framework encompassing encouragement of entrepreneurship, development of indigenous technology through investment in research and development, bringing in new technology, dismantling of the regulatory system, development of the capital markets and increased competitiveness for the benefit of common man.” It further added that “the spread of industrialization to backward areas of the country will be actively promoted through appropriate incentives, institutions and infrastructure investments.”

The objectives of the Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 were to maintain sustained growth in productivity, to enhance gainful employment and achieve optimal utilization of human resources, to attain international competitiveness, and to transform India into a major player in the global economy. Quite clearly, the focus of the policy was to unshackle the Indian industry from bureaucratic controls. This called for a number of far-reaching reforms.

A substantial modification of industrial licensing policy was deemed necessary, with a view to ease restraints on capacity creation and to respond to emerging domestic and global opportunities by improving productivity. Accordingly, the policy statement included the abolition

of industrial licensing for most industries, barring a handful of industries for reasons of security and strategic concerns, or social and environmental issues. Compulsory licensing was required in only eighteen industries. These included coal and lignite, distillation and brewing of alcoholic drinks, cigars and cigarettes, drugs and pharmaceuticals, household appliances, and hazardous chemicals. The small-scale sector continued to be reserved. Norms for setting up industries (except for industries subject to compulsory licensing) in cities with a population of more than 1 million were further liberalized.

Recognizing the complementarity of domestic and foreign investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) was accorded a significant role in policy announcements of 1991. FDI up to 51 percent foreign equity in high priority industries that required large investments and advanced technology was permitted. Foreign equity up to 51 percent was also allowed in trading companies primarily engaged in export activities. These important initiatives were expected to provide a boost to investment as well as enabling access to the high technology and marketing expertise of foreign companies. To spur the growth of technology in Indian industry, the government provided automatic approval for technological agreements related to high-priority industries and eased procedures for the hiring of foreign technical expertise.

Major initiatives toward the restructuring of public sector units (PSUs) were initiated, to remedy their low productivity, overstaffing, lack of advanced technology, and low rate of return. In order to raise resources and ensure wider public participation in PSUs, it was decided to offer its shareholding stake to mutual funds, financial institutions, the general public, and employees. Similarly, in order to revive and rehabilitate chronically "sick" PSUs, it was decided to refer them to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The policy also called for greater managerial autonomy for the boards of PSUs.

The Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 recognized that the government's intervention in investment decisions of large companies through the MRTP Act had proved deleterious for industrial growth. Accordingly, preentry scrutiny of investment decisions of MRTP companies was abolished. The thrust of policy was more on controlling unfair and restrictive trade practices. The provisions restricting mergers, amalgamations, and takeovers were also repealed.

Industrial Policy Measures since 1991

Since 1991, industrial policy measures and procedural simplifications have been reviewed on an ongoing basis. Currently, there are only six industries that require

compulsory licensing. Similarly, there are only three industries reserved for the public sector.

The promotion of FDI has been an integral part of India's economic policy since 1991. The government has ensured a liberal and transparent foreign investment regime in which most activities are opened to foreign investment, without any limit on the extent of foreign ownership. FDI up to 100 percent has also been allowed for most manufacturing activities in special economic zones. More recently, in 2004, the FDI limits were raised in the private banking sector (up to 74 percent), oil exploration (up to 100 percent), petroleum product marketing (up to 100 percent), petroleum product pipelines (up to 100 percent), natural gas and liquefied natural gas pipelines (up to 100 percent) and the printing of scientific and technical magazines, periodicals, and journals (up to 100 percent). In February 2005 the FDI ceiling in the telecommunications sector in certain services was increased from 49 percent to 74 percent.

The reservation of items of manufacture exclusively in the small-scale sector has been an important tenet of industrial policy. Realizing the increased import competition with the removal of quantitative restrictions since April 2001, the government has adopted a policy of de-reservation and has gradually pruned the list of items reserved for the small-scale industry sector from 821 items as in March 1999 to 506 items in April 2005. Further, the national budget of 2005–2006 has proposed to de-reserve 108 additional items that were identified by Ministry of Small Scale Industries. The investment limit in plant and machinery of small-scale units has been raised by the government from time to time. To enable some of the small-scale units to achieve required economies of scale, a differential investment limit has been adopted for them since October 2001. As of early 2005, there were 41 reserved items that were allowed an investment limit up to 50 million rupees instead of the limit of 10 million rupees applicable to other small-scale units.

Equity participation up to 24 percent of the total shareholding in small scale units by other industrial undertakings has been allowed. The objective here has been to enable the small sector to access the capital market and to encourage modernization, technological advance, ancillarization, and subcontracting.

In an effort to mitigate regional imbalances, the government announced a new North-East Industrial Policy in December 1997 for promoting industrialization in the Northeastern region. This policy, applicable to the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura, has provided various concessions to industrial units in the region, including

the development of industrial infrastructure, subsidies under various schemes, and excise and income-tax exemption for a period of ten years. The North Eastern Development Finance Corporation has been designated as the primary disbursing agency under the program.

The focus of the disinvestment process of public sector units has shifted from the sale of minority stakes to strategic sales. Up to December 2004, PSUs had been divested to an extent of 478 billion rupees. Apart from general policy measures, some industry-specific measures have also been initiated. For instance, the Electricity Act of 2003 was designed to de-license power generation and to permit captive power plants. It was also intended to facilitate private-sector participation in the transmission sector and to provide open access to the grid sector. Various policy measures have facilitated an increase in private-sector participation in key infrastructure sectors such as telecommunication, roads, and ports. Foreign equity participation up to 100 percent has been allowed in the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. MRTP provisions have been relaxed to encourage private-sector financing by large firms in the highway sector.

Evolution and Change

In the evolution of India's industrial policy, governmental intervention has been extensive. Unlike many East Asian countries, which used state intervention to build strong private sector industries, India opted for state control over key industries in its initial phase of development. In order to promote these industries, the government not only levied high tariffs and imposed import restrictions, but also subsidized the nationalized firms, directed investment funds to them, and controlled land use and many prices.

There has long been a consensus in India on the role of the government in providing infrastructure and maintaining stable macroeconomic policies. However, the path to be pursued toward industrial development has evolved over time. The form of government intervention in development strategy must be chosen from two alternatives: "outward-looking development policies" encourage not only free trade but also the free movement of capital, workers, and enterprises; "inward-looking development policies" stress the need for internal development. India initially adopted the latter strategy.

The advocates of import substitution in India believed that imports should be replaced with domestic production of both consumer goods and sophisticated manufactured items, while ensuring the imposition of high tariffs and quotas on imports. These advocates cited the benefits, in the long run, of greater domestic industrial

diversification and the ultimate ability to export previously protected manufactured goods, as economies of scale, low labor costs, and the positive externalities of learning by doing would cause domestic prices to become more competitive than world prices. However, the pursuit of such a policy forced Indian industry to have low and inferior technology. It did not expose the industry to the rigors of competition and therefore resulted in low efficiency. Inferior technology and inefficient production practices, coupled with a focus on traditional sectors, choked further expansion of Indian industry and thereby limited its ability to improve employment opportunities. Considering these inadequacies, the reforms since 1991 have aimed at infusing state-of-the-art technology, increasing domestic and external competition, and diversifying the industrial base so that it can expand and create additional employment opportunities.

In retrospect, the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 reflected the desire of the Indian state to achieve self sufficiency in industrial production. Huge investments by the state in heavy industries were designed to put Indian industry on a higher long-term growth trajectory. With the limited availability of foreign exchange, the effort of the government was to encourage domestic production. This basic strategy guided industrialization until the mid-1980s. Until the onset of the reform process in 1991, industrial licensing played a crucial role in channeling investments and controlling entry and expansion of capacity in the Indian industrial sector. Industrialization thus occurred in a protected environment, which led to various distortions. Tariffs and quantitative controls largely kept foreign competition out of the domestic market, and most Indian manufacturers looked on exports only as a residual possibility. Little attention was paid to ensuring product quality, undertaking research and development for technological advancement, or achieving economies of scale. The industrial policy announced in 1991, however, substantially dispensed with industrial licensing and facilitated foreign investment and technology transfers, opening areas hitherto reserved for the public sector. The policy focus in recent years has been on the deregulation of Indian industry, enabling industrial restructuring, and allowing industry the freedom and flexibility to respond to market forces and provide a business environment that facilitates and fosters overall industrial growth. The future growth of Indian industry, as widely believed, is crucially dependent upon improving the overall productivity of the manufacturing sector, rationalization of the duty structure, technological advancement, the search for export markets through promotional efforts and trade agreements, and the creation of an enabling legal environment.

Narendra Jadhav

See also **Capital Market; Economic Reforms of 1991; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Industrial Policy since 1956; Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950; Small-Scale Industry, since 1947**


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INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION

In 1951, when India embarked on its first five-year plan, the country's industrial base was small, dominated by cotton and jute textiles. Registered manufacturing units, employing ten or more workers, contributed about 4.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) at 1993–1994 prices; the contribution of unregistered units was 4.6 percent. Barely more than fifty years later, India has a highly diversified industrial structure, producing a wide range of goods. Indian industry is now capable of designing and implementing industrial projects using sophisticated technology. In 2000–2001, the GDP share of registered manufacturing was 10.5 percent, and that of total manufacturing 17.2 percent. In terms of manufacturing value added, in 1998 India ranked fifteenth among 87 countries (UNIDO, *Industrial Development Report, 2002/03*, p. 162). Among developing countries, India ranked sixth, behind China, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan.

The industrialization strategy implemented in the second (1956–1957 to 1960–1961) and third (1961–1962 to 1965–1966) plans emphasized rapid growth and diversification through industrialization, considered essential for achieving and maintaining full employment at a rising level of productivity. India's planners believed that in order to industrialize, it was necessary to develop an indigenous heavy industry base, for which the public sector would take prime responsibility. Such thinking shaped the policy environment for Indian industry, and the government invested in heavy industries, primarily iron and steel. During this period and in the next twenty-five years, India pursued an inward-oriented industrialization strategy. There were high import restrictions, combined with strong regulation of domestic industry. Domestic manufacturing enterprises were highly protected against foreign competition. Most production- and investment-related decisions of industrial firms were subject to extensive government controls.



Portrait of Jamnalal Bajaj. Bajaj, an Indian industrialist, was drawn to the teachings of Gandhi. The two men developed a close friendship (Gandhi often publicly referred to Bajaj as “his fifth son”), and the Bajaj family came to play a pivotal, pioneering role in the economic development of India following its independence in 1947. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

In the 1970s, those “protective” industrial and trade policies were clearly having detrimental effects on India's economy, which led to the initiation of a slow process of liberalization of industrial and trade policies that gained momentum in the 1980s. It was the economic crisis of 1991, however, that led to major and far-reaching economic policy reforms in India. The economic reforms undertaken in India since 1991 have unleashed the forces of competition and globalization, providing opportunities for Indian industry to raise its standards of technology, product quality, and efficiency, allowing it to become competitive at home and abroad.

Industrial Growth

Reforms of the 1990s were expected to lead to an accelerated industrial growth, but the growth rate in the first ten years of the postreform period was inferior to that of the 1980s. During 1990–1991 to 2000–2001, the annual growth rates in real value added in registered and total manufacturing were 6.3 and 6.1 percent respectively, both lower than the 7.9 and 7.0 rates achieved in

the 1980s. Industrial growth performance was quite poor in the second half of the 1990s; between 1996–1997 and 2000–2001, real value added in total manufacturing grew only at the rate of 3.8 percent.

In the mid-1960s, there had been a sharp fall in the growth rates of basic metals, metal products, nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and transport equipment. During the 1980s, however, the growth rates of these industries recovered, accompanied by accelerated growth in food products, beverages and tobacco products, wood and wood products, paper and printing, textiles, and leather and fur products. Indeed, the 1980s proved to be a period of broad-based industrial growth for India. In the 1990s, there was a fall in the growth rate of real value added in food products, paper and printing, rubber, plastic and petroleum products, and in electrical and nonelectrical machinery. On the other hand, there was an increase in growth rate of real value added in basic metals and metal products.

Factors determining industrial growth. Several econometric studies have been carried out to explain variations in industrial growth, concluding that India's industrial deceleration of the mid-1960s was largely due to the following factors: unsatisfactory agricultural performance affecting agricultural incomes, slowdown in public investment, infrastructure constraints, reduced scope of import substitution, deterioration of intersectoral terms of trade unfavorably affecting industry, and the adverse effects of restrictive industrial and trade policies on industrial costs and efficiency.

The resurgence in industrial growth in the 1980s may be traced more or less to the same set of factors. Growth of per capita agricultural incomes, improvement in the rate and pattern of gross domestic capital formation, particularly in public investment, step-up in investment in infrastructure and better management, less adverse trends in intersectoral terms of trade, and reforms of industrial and trade policies all contributed to the revival of industrial growth.

The deceleration in industrial growth in the postreform period seems to have been caused by stalled reforms. The initial 1991 reforms should have been followed up quickly by sharp reductions in tariffs on imports, while pulling down the remaining restrictions on foreign direct investment and removing all policy-induced rigidities in industrial labor markets. This was not done, however, hence the adverse effect on growth.

One important difference between the industrial growth in the 1990s and that prior to the mid-1980s relates to exports. From 1973–1974 to 1984–1985, the contribution of export expansion to output growth in manufacturing was merely 5 percent, while that in the

period 1989–1990 to 1997–1998 was 24 percent. The ratio of India's manufactured exports to the value of production of the registered manufacturing sector was 6.7 percent in 1980–1981 and 8.4 percent in 1990–1991, and increased to 15.4 percent in 2000–2001. Exports have now become an important source of industrial growth in India, and for this reason international market conditions exert an important influence on industrial growth performance. During 1990–1995, the global exports of manufactures grew at the rate of 8.6 percent; during 1995–2000, that growth rate was only 4.5 percent. With a quarter of India's industrial growth now dependent on export, world markets in the latter half of the 1990s clearly have had a significant adverse effect on India's domestic industrial output.

Diversification

Since self-reliance through the building of heavy industries was the key element of India's industrialization strategy, a major drive for diversification was launched in the mid-1950s, establishing machine tool industries, heavy electricals, machine building, and other branches of heavy industry. The value of production of machine tools increased from Rs. (rupees) 3 million in 1950–1951 to Rs. 8 million in 1960–1961 and Rs. 430 million in 1970–1971. Production of power transformers increased from 0.2 million kilovolt amps (KVA) in 1950–1951 to 8.1 million KVA in 1970–1971. Production of crude steel increased from 1.5 million tons in 1950–1951 to 6.1 million tons in 1970–1971. Production of caustic soda increased from 12 thousand tons in 1950–1951 to 371 thousand tons in 1970–1971, while the production of soda ash increased from 46 to 449 thousand tons in that period. Between 1956–1957 and 1970–1971, the value of chemical industrial production increased at the rate of 12.6 percent per annum.

In spite of the setback to industrial growth after the mid-1960s, the progress in diversification of the industrial structure was maintained. The weight of capital goods in the Index of Industrial Production increased from 4.7 percent in 1956 to 11.8 percent in 1960 and further to 15.2 percent in 1970. The weight of "basic goods" (heavy chemicals, fertilizers, basic metals, and cement) increased from 22.3 percent in 1956 to 32.3 percent in 1970 and further to 39.4 percent in 1980. The weight of consumer goods, on the other hand, declined from 48.4 percent in 1956 to 31.5 percent in 1970 and further to 23.7 percent in 1980.

The diversification achieved by India in its industrial structure is reflected in a relatively high share of high and medium tech industries in manufacturing value added. In 1985 this ratio was 56 percent for India, the foremost position among all the major industrializing countries

(UNIDO, *Industrial Development Report, 2002/03*, p. 164). This ratio was 54 percent for Brazil, 49 percent for China, 47 percent for Korea and Malaysia, 43 percent for Taiwan, 37 percent for Mexico, 25 percent for Indonesia, and 18 percent for Thailand. But, in terms of the share of high and medium tech products in manufactured exports, most of these countries were ahead of India, with the exception of China and Indonesia. By 1998 China had surpassed India, and Indonesia had caught up with India in terms of the level of technological sophistication of manufactured exports.

The fact that the share of medium and high tech industries is relatively high in India's industrial production while the products of such industries constitute only a small part of India's manufactured exports shows that in most cases these industries are not internationally competitive. Since India's initial drive for diversification was directed at attaining self-reliance in a wide range of industrial products, that process neglected cost considerations, which did not receive sufficient attention. Its new industries therefore were not under any strong pressure to improve efficiency and reduce costs until 1991. In such an environment, the global competitiveness of new industries was obviously low.

Technical Change

In the last five decades, the main source of technical change in Indian industry was the purchase of technology from foreign firms against royalty, technical fees and lump-sum payments, and the efforts made by Indian firms to adapt technologies to local conditions. Another important source was the import of capital goods embodying advanced technology. Heavy machinery imports declined as domestic machinery replaced them. While foreign direct investment can potentially be an important source of technical advance, the level of foreign direct investment in India remained very low until the end of the 1980s. In the postreform period, there has been a spurt in foreign direct investment in Indian industries. However, as a ratio to the annual rate of capital formation in manufacturing, foreign investment inflows have remained low (about 5 percent from 1992–1993 to 1998–1999).

A large amount of technology has entered Indian industry through the route of technology imports, that is, the purchase of foreign technology. Three phases can be distinguished in the government policy on foreign collaboration: 1948 to 1968, 1969 to 1979, and 1980 onward. In the first phase, the foreign collaboration policies were liberal, and the annual average number of foreign collaborations increased from a mere 35 during 1948–1955 to 210 during 1964–1970. Technology payments increased from Rs. 12 million in 1956–1957 to Rs. 190 million in

1967–1968. However, in the absence of competitive pressure, there was little incentive to learn, absorb, assimilate, and upgrade the foreign technologies. In the second phase, 1969 to 1979, Indian policies regarding foreign collaboration were highly restrictive. The focus was on technological self-reliance, making use of the infrastructure built in the previous phase. To generate demand for indigenous technologies, the government reversed its policies on foreign technology acquisition. Numerous restrictions were imposed on foreign collaborations. There were lists specifying industries in which foreign investment would be permitted with or without technical collaboration, industries in which only technical collaboration would be permitted, and industries in which no foreign collaboration, financial or technical, would be permitted. There were also elaborate regulations relating to the duration of technology agreements, payment of royalties, and lump-sum transfers for imported technology. Technology sellers had to abide by conditions connected to export restrictions, the use of trademarks, and the importer's rights to sell or sub-license the imported technology. Because of such policies, the growth rate of technology payments fell, as did the level of foreign direct investment. The overall effect of the restrictive technology policies from 1969 to 1979 was that Indian industry could not bring into use internationally competitive technology, with adverse consequences on its export performance.

Since 1980 the policies on foreign collaboration have been progressively liberalized, especially since 1991. For instance, the procedure for approval has been made easier and the ceiling on royalty and lump-sum payments has been raised. This liberalization has led to a dramatic increase in the number of foreign collaborations, from an annual average of 230 in the 1970s to about 550 in the 1980s. The average number of collaborations (technical and financial combined) was about 730 in the 1980s, increasing to about 1,600 in the 1990s.

Royalty and license payments made by India for imported technology were \$25.1 million in 1985, increasing to \$200.8 million in 1998. As a share of gross national product, this increased from 0.012 percent in 1985 to 0.047 percent in 1998. However, this achievement is still small in comparison with other industrializing countries. In 1998 royalty and license payments for technology was \$2,392 million in Malaysia, \$2,369 million in Korea, \$1,149 million in Taiwan, and \$420 million in China.

Productivity Change

Labor and capital productivity. From 1951 to 1970, the average growth rate of labor productivity in Indian

industry was about 5 percent per annum. In the 1970s the growth rate was much lower (about 1% per annum, according to some estimates). In the 1980s and 1990s, the growth rate of labor productivity picked up again to a little over 6 percent per annum. Increases in capital intensity (ratio of fixed capital stock at constant price to employment) made a major contribution to increases in labor productivity. Capital intensity grew at the rate of about 5 percent per annum during the 1950s and 1960s, about 3 percent per annum during the 1970s, and about 7 percent per annum during the 1980s and 1990s.

During the 1950s and 1960s, capital productivity (measured by the ratio of real value added to the value of fixed capital stock at constant prices) in Indian industry declined by about 1.5 percent per annum. During this period, there were major changes in the structure of the industrial sector in favor of metals, machinery, and chemical industries. These industries are relatively more capital intensive and have relatively low capital productivity as compared to traditional industries such as textiles. Therefore, the changes in industrial structure had an adverse effect on capital productivity during the 1950s and 1960s. The downward trend in capital productivity continued in the 1970s, but reversed later.

Total factor productivity. To assess overall production efficiency, the concept of total factor productivity (TFP) is commonly used in productivity studies. TFP may be defined as the ratio of output to total input, a composite measure of the technical change and changes in the efficiency with which technology is applied to production.

During the decades of 1950s and 1960s, the average growth rate of TFP in Indian manufacturing was very low, about 1 percent or a little less than 1 percent per annum. Trade and industrial policies of India's government, especially import control and domestic industrial licensing, curbed competition; the lack of competition protected inefficiency and blunted incentive for cost reduction. Control of foreign exchange and raw materials, policies aimed at control of monopoly, led to industrial fragmentation, which adversely affected efficiency since scale economies could not be exploited. Moreover, India's general economic condition, characterized by shortages of materials and power, as well as transport bottlenecks, was not conducive to productivity growth.

The increased industrial growth rate in the period from 1980–1981 to 1985–1986, as compared to the period from 1965–1966 to 1979–1980, may be attributed to improvement in productivity growth in the first half of the 1980s, thanks to the liberalization of economic policies.

Estimates reported in some recent studies on productivity in Indian industry indicate that the average growth rate during the 1980s was 3 to 4 percent per annum. By comparison, the growth rate in the 1990s was only about 1.5 to 2 percent per annum. The explanation for that deceleration seems to lie mostly in capacity underutilization during the 1990s. As a result of the reforms, India's manufacturing sector had an investment boom in the first half of the 1990s, raising capacity output sharply, though demand did not expand as rapidly, leading to underutilization of capacity, which had an adverse effect on productivity.

B. N. Goldar

See also **Industrial Policy since 1956; Private Industrial Sector, Role of**

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INDUSTRIAL LABOR AND WAGES, 1800–1947

Throughout the British colonial period, workers in "unorganized," small-scale units outnumbered those in modern factories, mines, and railroad construction. As late as 1911, 95 percent of industrial workers were employed in units other than registered factories. The level of employment in important industries such as hand-loom manufacture and spinning no doubt declined due to the competition of European imports and to the disappearance of demand from pre-colonial states. But weaving, rice processing, *bidi* (cigarette) rolling, leather work, carpet making, and gold thread manufacture gave work to substantial numbers of people.

Changes in the modes of work and in production relations could be as significant in smaller industries as in large factories. Merchants frequently tightened their control over artisan producers, small workshops using wage labor sometimes replaced family-based units, and workers often had to adjust to new forms of technology.

In the hand-loom industry, there was extensive mobility of labor, as thousands of weavers moved from depressed areas of northern and southeastern India to more dynamic centers of the Bombay presidency. There was also considerable conflict between workers and employers, though often it was expressed in the form of

individual, "everyday" acts of resistance, such as slowing the pace of work, embezzling yarn, or absconding with cash advances. There was little collective action by workers against employers in small-scale production until the 1930s and 1940s, when several unions were established and strikes were organized in the hand-loom, *bidi*, and gold thread industries, at least in western India.

Labor in Large-Scale Industry

What most distinguished the "organized" sector was in fact not its degree of organization or, in all cases, its technology, but the size of the pools of labor it required. At the peak of their activity, railway building, cotton textile production in Mumbai (Bombay), jute manufacture in Kolkata (Calcutta), and coal mining in eastern India each gave employment to hundreds of thousands of workers, while industries such as the cotton mills of Ahmedabad and Kanpur, the steel mills of Jamshedpur, and the gold mines of Mysore used tens of thousands. Because of the small number of such industrial enclaves, employment in registered factories was never more than 1 percent of the Indian population. Nonetheless, each industry needed to attract sizable numbers of workers to a concentrated locale, with the largest industries recruiting labor from great distances. Because of constantly fluctuating economic circumstances, many industrialists were unwilling to offer significant prospects for long-term employment to a large portion of their workers, often hiring them instead on a casual daily basis, then discarding them when the workers were no longer needed.

In most cases, migrants to industrial workplaces came from "labor catchment areas," rural regions where marginal farmers often struggled for subsistence on small plots of land. Bihar, Orissa, and parts of the United Provinces in eastern India, Telugu- and Tamil-speaking districts in the Madras presidency, and the Konkan and Deccan regions in the Bombay presidency were all areas marked by significant outflows of labor. In the textile industries of Bombay and Calcutta, ex-artisans provided an important part of the skilled workforce. Workers were often recruited by intermediary contractors and jobbers either in the villages or, more commonly, among people who had already moved to cities. These intermediaries frequently took small payments from the workers in return for the jobs they provided. Migrants looking for employment also relied on relatives and fellow villagers whom they had followed to industrial centers. Workers often retained rural connections to their home regions, in part due to cultural attachments and kin ties, in part because maintaining landholdings provided some insurance against the uncertainties of industrial employment.

Conditions of work in large-scale industry were generally quite difficult. Workers labored as long as fifteen



Indian Girl at Loom, 1944. While historians tend to disagree on the veracity of available statistics for laborers' wages in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the consensus is that compensation was rarely adequate. This frequently necessitated the employment of all family members, including children. BRADLEY SMITH / CORBIS.

hours daily, for instance, in the Bombay mills, after electricity was introduced in the 1880s and before legislation established a maximum workday of twelve hours in 1911. Jobbers often tyrannized workers, and the sexual harassment of women appears to have been widespread. Health and safety standards remained low. Work rules frequently gave to employers' arbitrary and unlimited authority to punish workers by dismissal or the docking of pay. At the same time, the ability of employers to impose tight discipline in practice was limited by their own internal divisions, their dependence on intermediaries, and their reluctance to develop a permanent workforce. Workers' resistances, whether in the form of collective action or of individual methods of everyday struggle, could affect employers' ability to introduce new technology, to

standardize wages, or to speed up production. In railroad construction managers learned that they needed to offer significant cash advances before they could hire workers. In short, employers often had to make accommodations to workers' social structures and expectations.

Women in Industry

Women's role in modern industry was increasingly marginalized over time. Women constituted 37 percent of mine workers in eastern India in 1920 but only 11 percent in 1938; they composed 25 percent of the workforce in Bombay mills in 1896 but only 12 percent in 1944; their proportions in the jute industry fell from 21 percent in 1901 to little more than 12 percent by 1950. This trend

seems to have been caused by a convergence of several factors: the strengthening of norms of social respectability discouraging women's work outside the household (especially in rural north India); British colonial legislation that restricted working hours for women; and the role of jobbers and other middlemen in hiring. There is some evidence of decline in women's industrial role even in informal industry. Spinning of cotton yarn dwindled into virtual economic insignificance, and the use of machinery displaced women in professions such as rice husking and warping of yarn. A few occupations involving women, such as rolling *bidis*, did expand, but the overall trend toward "de-industrialization" for women seems clear.

Wages and Earnings

Compensation for industrial work was uneven and generally poor. When male workers could find jobs, these positions usually paid better than unskilled agricultural work or employment as hand-loom weavers. There was no single trend for wages in India as a whole. Available statistics seem to suggest that while real wages in the cotton textile industry of Bombay and Ahmedabad rose after World War I, wages in the jute industry were stagnant until the late 1930s, and then increased only to a minor extent. But these general trends mask considerable internal variations and instability.

Most workers received less compensation than they needed to support their families. This sometimes necessitated labor by all family members, including children. Women were paid less for the same work as men when they could get it, but more commonly they were confined to less prestigious forms of employment deemed "supplementary," where payments were particularly poor.

Evidence on wages for workers in small-scale industry is especially scanty, but unpublished research suggests that real earnings of hand-loom weavers in some cases fell over the course of the nineteenth century to levels little higher than those received by unskilled agricultural laborers. Other forms of artisan wage employment, such as carpentry and brick masonry, may have kept better pace with rising prices.

Strikes, Trade Unions, and Workers' Consciousness

Workers in large-scale production took part in collective resistance almost from the inception of the factory system, but sustained participation in trade unions was limited. Nearly every major industry had an extensive history of strikes, and dramatic episodes of confrontation with factory management were not uncommon. There were also several major waves of strikes for India as a whole: in 1919–1920, 1928–1929, 1937–1939, and

1945–1947. Some strikes proved successful in winning higher wages or in defending against wage cuts planned by employers. Strikes sometimes brought into being the organizations necessary to sustain workers' solidarity and to bargain collectively, but such unions often died out after the strikes were broken or workers lost interest. A number of significant trade unions with substantial membership did develop, for instance, the Gandhian Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association after World War I; the Bombay Textile Labour Union in the mid-1920s and the communist Girni Kamgar Union after the later 1920s (both among mill workers of Bombay); and the Jamshedpur Labour Association and the Jamshedpur Labour Federation in the Tata steel mills of Bihar. There were also national organizations of workers, most notably, the All-India Trade Union Congress, founded in 1920. But few of these organizations commanded the support of a majority of workers over long stretches of time. Labor organizations often became torn by internal conflict. The hostility of employers and occasional repression by the colonial government were major causes of the ephemeral character of union organization.

Discussions about workers' consciousness are among the most contentious issues in the labor history of India. Certainly contemporary scholars no longer accept the notion that work experiences in factories and mines led automatically to the formation of broad solidarities among workers. Divisions among the working class were widespread. Often these resulted from ethnic identities that were developing in Indian cities, differential skills and earnings in workplaces, and competing social networks in working class residential areas. Indian workers could be drawn to nationalist, caste-based, and communalist activity as strongly as action on the basis of class. Workers' solidarities often shifted over time as the larger political environment changed. Consciousness of exploitation in the workplace could just as easily give expression to caste- as to class-based assertions of equality. Even nationalist and communalist politics among the urban poor, however, were often colored by uniquely working class perspectives grounded in the experience of deprivation and subordination. As discussion of these issues continues, labor history, once thought to be virtually moribund, now appears to be undergoing a significant revival.

Douglas E. Haynes

See also **Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947**

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INDUSTRIAL LABOR MARKET, WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT, SINCE 1950 India is a large agrarian economy; as of 1999–2000, 60 percent of its workforce was employed in agriculture, living in rural

areas and producing about 25 percent of gross domestic product. In terms of institutional structure, the organized (formal) sector employed slightly less than 10 percent of the total workforce to produce 40 percent of net domestic output, mostly originating in the industrial and services sectors; the rest were in the unorganized (informal) sector. The organized sector consists of public sector, private corporate enterprises and cooperatives, manufacturing firms registered under the Factories Act of 1948, or the Bidi Cigar Workers' Act of 1966, and recognized educational institutions. The public sector constitutes about 66 percent of organized employment.

Worker-population ratio in the economy has remained roughly stable, at around 40 percent; it is about 28 percent for women (with sizable underestimation). The participation of children in the workforce has steadily declined, though in absolute numbers it remains substantial, concentrated in selected labor-intensive industries, often producing goods for export.

About 30 percent of India's population is urban, residing mainly in the metropolitan cities. Rural-urban migration to the cities moderates urban wage growth, and also causes considerable open (as well as disguised) unemployment in the informal sector. The industrial sector's share in the workforce (mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities) is around 18 percent, producing 27 percent of domestic output. Only about 20 percent of industrial employment is in the organized sector, much of it is in urban areas and is predominantly male.

Changes in Workforce Composition

After remaining roughly constant, at little over 70 percent, from 1950 to 1980, the share of India's workforce in agriculture declined to about 60 percent by 2000. In 1980 both China and India had roughly about the same proportion of workforce engaged in agriculture. Two decades later, while the agricultural share in China declined by 20 percentage points (the majority of whom found employment in manufacturing), the decline in India was only half as great, and the majority of that percentage went into services. In fact, there has been only a marginal rise in the share of manufacturing, while the construction sector has doubled its share, from around 2 percent to 4 percent of the total workforce, between 1983 and 2000.

In 1950 manufacturing employment was concentrated in four states: West Bengal, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Kerala. Half a century later, Kerala's share has declined, while those of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and West Bengal have increased. Other states that have improved their share in the industrial sector are Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Haryana.

Household manufacturing has declined in absolute as well as in relative terms, a trend consistent with modern economic growth. However, in contrast, employment has shifted away from the organized (registered or formal) into the unorganized (unregistered) sector. Within the organized sector, employment has shifted to smaller sized factories, as the average factory size has declined from over 140 workers per factory in 1950 to less than 60 in 1976. The trend has persisted in more recent years as well. Proportion of workers employed in factories with 500 or more workers has declined from 55 percent in 1980–1981 to 38 percent in 1997–1998.

Trends in Wages

From 1960 to 1980, real earnings per worker in registered manufacturing grew at about 1.5 percent per year, marginally higher than the growth rate of per capita income during this period. However, in the subsequent two decades (1981–2001) per capita income grew twice as fast as real earnings per worker at 3.6 percent per year. But product wage—nominal earnings deflated by producer prices—grew at a faster rate than real earnings, as a result of the effects of domestic terms of trade. All along, there has been a steady growth of casual and contract labor, and a decline in the share of “permanent” jobs, thus affecting the quality of employment. Despite the wage growth, unit labor cost declined from 1974 to 1998, as labor productivity grew much faster. Moreover, the wage-rental ratio—the ratio of wages to deflator for machinery—also declined during this period. Wage growth in India’s public sector, a sizable part of which is industrial, has been consistently faster than that in organized manufacturing. This growth is in part explained by the compensation for higher education and skills required in heavy industry, and in part by the superior bargaining power of public sector employees.

As no official statistics on wages in the urban informal sector exist, wage trends in this sector cannot be directly assessed. It is reasonable to expect, however, that unorganized sector wages lie between those in the organized sector and those in agriculture, subject to education, skill, and experience. Agricultural wages have shown a steady rise since the 1980s; but wages in agriculture as in unorganized urban sector, tend to be too low to overcome poverty.

Labor Market Institutions

State intervention in industrial labor markets began during the colonial period with the introduction of several measures including the restriction of the length of the working day to eight hours, the establishment of a minimum wage, and the right to form trade unions apparently under pressure from British textile interests, who were

losing markets to Indian firms. After independence, these efforts were strengthened and their scope widened. However, the scope and effectiveness of labor legislations vary across the states.

The Factories Act of 1948 is the cornerstone of labor regulation in manufacturing, and electricity and gas; the Shops and Establishments Act exists for the tertiary sector. Registration under the Factories Act is mandated for all factories employing ten or more workers using power, and twenty or more workers without using power on a regular basis. As the factory size increases in terms of employment, the act becomes more stringent with respect to benefits for workers.

Minimum wage legislation. India does not have a national minimum wage, or publicly funded universal unemployment insurance. As per the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, the state governments mostly set minimum wages. In some states, like Maharashtra, minimum wages are indexed to the cost of living. Many traditional industries have “Wage Boards,” with members drawn from management, unions, and government that periodically determine wages for the industry or region as a whole.

Trade unions and collective bargaining. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is the principal legislation intended to resolve workplace conflicts. The state can intervene in any dispute between employers and employees in the organized sector. Employers or employees are expected to inform the labor commissioner before declaring a lockout or going on strike. In all such disputes, the labor commissioner is, in principle, a party to the decisions. On the face of it, the mechanism is stringent; for instance, to retrench even a single worker, an employer must seek the permission of the state labor commissioner if the factory employs one hundred or more workers.

As in most developed economies in recent decades, union density in India has declined sharply, to about 25 percent among workers in organized manufacturing by 2000. Labor militancy, as measured by workdays lost due to strikes and lockouts, decreased dramatically during this period. Centralized industry- or region-wide collective bargaining mechanisms have given way to decentralized, company based, collective bargaining arrangements.

Public sector. Employment generation in the public sector was accepted as one of implicit objectives. Every ten years, the central government appoints a “pay commission” to determine wages for its employees, arriving at wages (and benefits), based not on the government’s ability to pay, or on worker productivity, but on notions of “fair” wages. The pay commission awards tend to become benchmarks for wages in the rest of the public sector. Thus public sector employment generation and

wage settlement have become significant determinants of the organized labor market.

Social security. This benefit is largely restricted to the organized sector. Public sector employees have either (indexed) defined benefit pensions or contributory provident fund programs with publicly set interest rates. Central government employees are entitled to health insurance for life, and organized workers have the Employees State Insurance Scheme (a social security plan) that provides health care financed by workers and employers while employed. Some state governments have social security and pension plans for workers belonging to specific industries in the unorganized sector.

Evidence on enforcement of labor laws. As in many developing economies, India's labor legislation tends to be aspirational, with limited effectiveness. Ambiguity in the legal system leaves considerable discretion to the administration and the courts that seem detrimental to the smooth functioning of the labor market. The Factories Act, for instance, is widely violated. In 1990, 58 percent of all manufacturing enterprises employing ten or more workers did not register under the act. The magnitude of underregistration is likely to have gone up further in the 1990s, when the enforcement of many legal provisions was relaxed.

As productive activities are decentralized and geographically dispersed in the unorganized sector, government has little ability to administer minimum wage laws effectively. Even where it is possible, enforcement is problematic, as most of the employment contracts are informal, and unverifiable in courts. Moreover, illiterate workers have little knowledge of their rights; even if they do, they are often too poor to seek redress from administration or courts. Not surprisingly, in factories employing up to one hundred workers, effective trade unions are uncommon, with some states and location excepted.

Development Strategy

Why has industry's share in the workforce remained modest in India compared to fast-growing Asian economies? India's development strategy is believed to have caused the dominance of large, capital-intensive factories that are inconsistent with the economy's resource endowments, compared to East Asia, where small factories dominate. India inherited a skewed distribution of factories for many historical and institutional reasons, including the British managing agency system, a lack of capital market institutions, and the absence of market-based interfirm relationships. Moreover, Indian data overstate large-sized factories in manufacturing, as the data on the size-distribution of factories include generation and distribution of electricity, which tends to be large sized.

Industrial labor in India forms a relatively small proportion of the total workforce; its share has witnessed a modest increase since the 1950s, compared to many rapidly industrializing Asian economies. Household manufacturing's share has declined, both in relative and absolute terms. However, contrary to much of the development experience, Indian industrial employment over the last few decades has diffused into small-sized factory and into nonfactory enterprises. Thus, it is the urban informal (unregistered) manufacturing sector's employment that has been growing.

Regionally, the industrial sector's employment percentage has declined in Kerala, while that in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Haryana have increased. Similarly, the shares of urban and male employment probably have declined somewhat in favor of rural and female labor.

Real wages have risen half as fast as the growth in per capita income since the 1980s; the wage share, and wage-rental ratios have declined. Whether the rise in real wages represents compensation for education, skills, and experience or the growing power of organized labor is unclear.

Many believe that India's organized industrial labor market has grown very rigid, as employers must seek the state's permission to retrench even a single worker. Such rigidity is believed to be responsible for rapid wage growth and poor employment growth and increasing substitution of capital for labor. Evidence on the declining strength of unions, the informalization and casualization of the workforce, and the declining unit labor cost are, however, widely adduced to question the rigidity hypothesis.

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See also **Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950;**
Industrial Policy since 1956

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INDUSTRIAL POLICY SINCE 1956 Prior to the economic reforms of the 1990s, industrial policy in India was characterized by an extensive regime of domestic regulation, a strong bias in favor of the public sector (with several industries reserved for the public sector), a restrictive approach to foreign investment, and very heavy protection of domestic industry from foreign competition. Industrial licensing was a major instrument of control of the private sector; under this system, central government permission was needed for both investment in new units (beyond a relatively low threshold) and for substantial expansion of capacity in existing units. Licensing also controlled technology, output mix, capacity location, and import content. Apart from industrial licensing, large industrial firms needed separate permission for investment or expansion under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, which aimed to prevent the concentration of economic power. There were price and distribution controls in industries such as fertilizers, cement, aluminum, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals. Almost eight hundred items were reserved for production by small-scale units as a way of protecting the small-scale sector from competition from large companies; investment in plant and machinery in any individual unit producing these reserved items could not exceed \$250,000.

There were also barriers to industrial restructuring and exit of firms. The Bureau of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) was set up in 1987 and was assigned the task of separating the nonviable "sick" enterprises from the revivable ones and providing rehabilitation packages for the latter and effective solutions for exit to the former. Because the BIFR came into the picture at a fairly advanced stage of "sickness" and because its powers are not mandatory this has meant that it has not been effective in facilitating this exit of the

nonviable sick units within the existing institutional constraints. Labor laws have been relatively inflexible, making it difficult for nonviable firms to exit or for firms to reduce labor if needed. As of May 2005, any firm wishing either to close down a plant or to retrench labor in any unit employing more than one hundred workers can do so only with the permission of the state government, and this permission is rarely granted. These provisions discourage employment and are especially onerous for labor-intensive sectors.

The inefficiencies promoted by the regime of industrial controls were supported by India's trade policy regime, which provided very heavy protection to domestic industry from foreign competition. It was characterized by very high and dispersed tariff rates and pervasive import restrictions. Before 1991 India's import tariffs were among the highest in the world, with duty rates above 200 percent being fairly common. Imports of manufactured consumer goods were completely banned. For capital goods, raw materials, and intermediates, some goods were freely importable, but for most items for which domestic substitutes were being produced, imports were only possible with import licenses. The criteria for issuing these licenses was nontransparent, delays were endemic, and corruption unavoidable. Policies toward foreign investment were quite restrictive, reflecting the general protectionist thrust of India's industrial policy.

Domestic Deregulation and Trade Policy Simplification: 1980–1990

Some steps toward reforming the policy regime were taken during the 1980s. Some of the important initiatives in domestic deregulation included the de-licensing of a number of industries, providing flexibility to manufacturing units to produce a range of products rather than a specified product under a given license, encouraging modernization and innovation by exempting such investments from licensing requirements and making it easier to import foreign technology, providing a broader scope for large industrial firms, and encouraging existing industrial undertakings in certain industries to achieve minimum economic levels of operations. These initiatives had the common theme of reducing reliance on physical controls and experimenting with market orientation in domestic regulation. Reforms of the public sector enterprises were limited to providing somewhat greater autonomy to these enterprises from their administrative ministries through signing a series of MoUs (Memoranda of Understanding).

The trade policy changes during the 1980s focused on the simplification of the existing complex procedures; the protectionist thrust nevertheless remained intact. This process was driven by pressures from domestic industry

to allow easier access to imported intermediate inputs for capacity utilization and modernization of capital goods. Export subsidies were given to domestic industries in order to offset the anti-export bias of the import substitution regime.

Although the industrial and trade policy reforms of the 1980s were limited, they did lead to significant improvement in productivity in the manufacturing sector; total factor productivity grew at a rate of 2.7 percent per annum in the 1980s, compared with a growth rate of -0.5 percent per annum in the preceding two decades. This experience was to form the basis for much bolder reforms in the industrial and trade policy regime in the 1990s.

Economic Reforms since 1991

Domestic deregulation. Industrial policy was radically overhauled during the reforms of the 1990s, with most central government industrial controls being dismantled. Industrial licensing by the central government has been almost done away with, except for a few hazardous and environmentally sensitive industries. The MRTP Act was abolished so that large industrial houses no longer require a separate additional clearance. Instead, the Competition Act of 2002 was put in place on 14 January 2003. It regulates anticompetitive behavior in other ways. The list of industries reserved solely for the public sector has been drastically reduced to three: defense aircraft and warships, atomic energy generation, and railway transportation.

Removal of the reservation in production of items for the small-scale sector started late but gathered momentum after 2000. Even earlier, since some of the reserved items, such as garments, had high export potential, and small-scale limit was a serious constraint to producing in a cost-effective manner for export, exemptions were granted to units if they were substantially engaged in export activity. Beginning with 2001, when fourteen items were removed from the reserved list, a number of such steps were taken, so that by March 2005, 550 items remained on the list. The unreserved items include some important sectors, such as garments, shoes, toys, and auto components, all of which have strong export potential.

Opening up to imports. A process of radical change in trade policy was set in motion in 1991, although progress here was slower than in industrial liberalization. Import licensing was abolished relatively early for capital goods and intermediates, which became freely importable in 1993, coinciding with the switch to a flexible exchange rate regime. For consumer goods, a process of dismantling the quantitative restrictions on imports was started through the introduction of the Special Import License

Scheme, whereby export earnings could be used by exporters to import certain consumer goods. Quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactured consumer goods and agricultural products were finally removed on 1 April 2001, almost exactly ten years after the reforms began.

Progress in reducing tariff protection has been slower and not always steady. The weighted average import duty rate declined from the very high level of 72.5 percent in 1991–1992 to 24.6 percent in 1996–1997. This was followed by a process of slow reversal up to 1999–2000 and a sharp increase in 2000–2001, the latter reflecting the imposition of tariffs on many agricultural commodities in preparation for the removal of quantitative restrictions as part of an obligation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization. In the subsequent years, with the resumption of the reduction in import tariffs, the import-weighted tariff rate was brought down to 18 percent in 2004–2005—still the highest among the developing countries.

A new approach to foreign direct investment. A more liberal approach to foreign direct investment was an important plank of India's reforms during the 1990s. From a policy that was restrictive and selective and that supported mainly technology transfers, foreign investment policy in the 1990s moved toward becoming much more open and proactive. The policy now allows 100 percent foreign ownership in a large number of industries and majority ownership in all except banks, insurance companies, telecommunications, and airlines. A bill to allow up to 74 percent foreign ownership of banks was introduced in Parliament in March 2004. Procedures for obtaining permission have been greatly simplified by listing industries that are eligible for automatic approval up to specified levels of foreign equity (100 percent, 74 percent, and 51 percent). Potential foreign investors investing within these limits need only register with the Reserve Bank of India. For investments in other industries, or for a higher share of equity than is automatically permitted in listed industries, applications are considered by a Foreign Investment Promotion Board that has established a good record of speedy decisions. Beginning in 1993, foreign institutional investors have been allowed to purchase shares of listed Indian companies in the stock market, opening a window for portfolio investment in existing companies.

Public sector reform. Reform of the public sector has been talked about since the 1980s. During the 1990s the government began to undertake sales of minority shares in the better-performing public enterprises, and the enterprises were also given the freedom to access capital markets on the strength of their own performance. They

were given more management autonomy in shaping their future. The loss-making enterprises, however, languished for want of budgetary support and political will to close them down.

A Disinvestment Commission was set up in 1997, but privatization was not seriously put on the policy agenda until 2001. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government did undertake a few privatizations involving the sale of public sector enterprises with the transfer of management control during the period 2001–2003, the most important being the privatization of Bharat Aluminum Company to a “strategic” private investor. But resistance to privatization was building from within the NDA government when an attempt was made to privatize two oil companies. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which came to power in 2004, changed the policy to one that is more restrictive. The current policy is that profit-making public sector enterprises will not be privatized, although sale of government equity can continue as long as the government retains 51 percent.

Policies toward infrastructure. Poor infrastructure has been a major constraint on India’s industrial performance and competitiveness, especially as the country opens up to foreign competition and seeks to attract investment from abroad. Industrial policy has therefore focused on the need to build better infrastructure, especially electric power generation and distribution, telecommunications, roads, railways, ports, and airports. Prior to 1991, all these infrastructure services were organized as public sector monopolies, and a major challenge of the reforms was how to attract private investment into these sectors in order to meet the enormous investment requirements of upgrading infrastructure. Following the reforms of 1991, these sectors were opened up to private investment at different times with varying degrees of success. Telecommunications is the area in which the effort was most successful. The process was not smooth, and there were many regulatory hiccups on the way. But policy was helped by the fact that the pricing of telecom services (unlike that of power) was not uneconomic; by 2005 there were a handful of strong private sector telecom service suppliers competing effectively with the public sector companies. Access to telecom services has expanded greatly, costs have come down, and quality has improved. Private investment has also been attracted in ports and more recently in airports. In roads, new investment has been dominantly in the public sector, as is the case in most countries, but there has been some limited private sector involvement.

The biggest disappointment has been in the power sector, mainly because both the reform of the incumbent public sector and the setting up of an effective regulatory

framework were slow to develop. This was the earliest sector to be opened up, and at one stage there were expectations of being able to attract large investments in generation capacity. These expectations were belied by the continuing financial problems of the distribution segment, which remains unviable because of a combination of unrealistically low tariffs for some sections of consumers (households and farmers) and also very large inefficiencies in collection. Faced with financially bankrupt distribution systems, private investors have been understandably reluctant to invest in generation capacity to supply electricity for which they may not be paid.

In recent years, attempts have been made to depoliticize the process of fixing power tariffs. Following the lead of the central government, a number of state governments have set up independent regulatory commissions for this purpose. Policies are also being directed at improving the efficiency of distribution, both through reforming the existing utilities and by selective privatization. The Electricity Act of 2003 lays out a broad legal framework of regulation for the sector. The act effectively empowers state governments to accelerate power sector reforms by fostering greater competition, increased involvement of the private sector, and better governance. But many details remain to be put in place. The Common Minimum Program of the UPA government has expressed a commitment to review the Electricity Act.

Special economic zones. A May 2005 initiative announced by the government of India is the enactment of a law to establish special economic zones, which would enable industrial units located in the zones to benefit from duty-free entry of imported inputs for production meant for exports, while paying duty on production diverted to the domestic market. The zones will have superior infrastructure and some special facilities, including the possibility of a more liberal labor law regime if the states in which the zones are located request it. Unlike the special regions of China, these zones will be much more compact, but their improved infrastructure should increase their attractiveness to investors.

Role of state governments. Industrial policy reforms by the central government have not always been associated with comparable policy reforms by state governments. Private investors require multiple permissions from state governments to start operations, for example, connections for electricity and water supply, environmental clearances, and other municipal clearances. They also need to interact with the state government administration for their day-to-day operations because of laws governing pollution, sanitation, and workers’ welfare and safety. Some states have taken the initiative to ease these interactions and have put in place a process of supportive

deregulation to attract private investment. States that have moved faster in this regard have created a better investment climate for private investors and have succeeded in attracting investment. Similarly, states differ in the extent to which they have implemented reform in the power sector, which is a crucial dimension of state policy toward infrastructure. Because liberalization has created a more competitive environment, the payoff from pursuing good policies has increased, thereby increasing the importance of state-level action. It is noteworthy that in one major respect, that is, with regard to modernizing the labor laws to provide the flexibility in shedding labor when necessary, only a few state governments have taken initiatives, while most have resisted reform.

Assessment. The industrial and trade policy regime has come a long way on the road to reform since 1991. However, the gradual pace of reform has meant that important gaps remain. India's tariff levels are still much higher than those in most developing countries. Infrastructure reforms thus far have been far too slow and inadequate. Important areas remain closed to foreign investment or with equity ceilings that are too low. Approach to privatization has been hesitant. Labor laws continue to be rigid.

Notwithstanding these gaps, there is evidence that in recent years Indian industry has been responding to policy reforms by working toward restructuring and reducing costs in a slow but steady manner. Some star performers have emerged on a global scale, particularly the new knowledge-based industries. In addition to information technology, pharmaceuticals and automotive components are two conspicuous examples of manufacturing industries that have successfully developed a global vision and have subsequently penetrated world markets. Biotechnology and animation industries have also been growing very rapidly. However, Indian industry still falls short of the targets set for its growth, presenting a continuing challenge to India's planners and policy makers.

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See also Economic Reforms of 1991; Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950

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INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION Also referred to as the Harappa culture, the Indus Valley civilization was the earliest urban, state-level society in South Asia (2600–1900 B.C.) and was contemporaneous with state-level societies in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The core area for settlements of the Indus Civilization has been found in the alluvial plains of the Indus River and its tributaries, as well as along the now dry bed of the Sarasvati-Ghaggar-Hakra-Nara river system that flowed east of the Indus. This eastern river has many modern names but is thought to be associated with the ancient Sarasvati River mentioned in the Rig Veda. Settlements of the Indus Civilization were also established in the rich agricultural regions between the Ganga and the Yamuna rivers and throughout modern Gujarat. Because of its vast extent, the term "Greater Indus Valley" has come to be accepted by most scholars as representing the territories surrounding the Indus River that include sites of this civilization.

In some circles, a new name, the Indus-Sarasvati or Sarasvati civilization, has begun to appear, based on the unsubstantiated argument that a larger proportion of the ancient sites were situated along the bed of the now dry Sarasvati-Ghaggar-Hakra-Nara River. Although the Sarasvati mentioned in the Rig Veda and later Mahābhārata texts is said to be a major river flowing to the sea, with many large and populous cities along its banks, most sites along the dry river channel are relatively small, and even the few large ones are not as large as the major cities on the Indus or its tributaries. Furthermore, the only reason so many small sites have been discovered along the dry river channels is because the region was abandoned and there was very little sedimentation and site disturbance in later times. Most of the smaller settlements along the Indus were covered by flood sediments or buried by later historical villages and cities.

The total geographic area encompassed by sites associated with the Indus Valley civilization is over 262,500 square miles (680,000 sq. km) and includes most of



Brick Wall and Drain Excavated at Mohenjo-Daro. Due to the nature of the topography and the intensity of floods along the Indus and its tributaries, ancient settlements were not able to maintain major canals for irrigation, although they frequently constructed drains for redirecting floodwaters. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.


modern Pakistan and parts of western India and northern Afghanistan. Indus artifacts have been found at sites in Oman and the Persian Gulf region, as well as in Iran, Iraq, and various Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan.

Origins and Chronology

The origins of the Indus civilization can be traced to the early Neolithic settlements such as Mehrgarh, located along the borders of the major alluvial plain of the Indus River, and subsequent Chalcolithic cultures that emerged at sites like Harappa, along the Indus and Ghaggar-Hakra river systems. All of these communities appear to be descended from even earlier Paleolithic peoples living in the subcontinent and are not the result of migration from outside regions.

The chronology of the Indus civilization is now based primarily on radiocarbon dates, using charcoal or burned bone from hearths, and undisturbed stratigraphic levels. While the origin and decline of specific Indus sites varies

slightly from one region to the next, excavations at the site of Harappa between 1986 and 2001 have provided more than 120 radiocarbon dates that can be used to define the chronology of this major urban center and surrounding regions of the northern Indus Valley. The early Ravi Phase (3500–2800 B.C.) corresponds to the Chalcolithic period, when agricultural settlements were established in the alluvial plains and regional cultures were emerging in different regions of the northern and western subcontinent. The subsequent Kot Diji Phase (2800–2600 B.C.) represents the culmination of regional cultures and the establishment of the first small urban centers. The Harappa Phase (2600–1900 B.C.) is the major period of urban expansion and corresponds to the Bronze Age in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Some scholars refer to the Harappa Phase, which lasts for over seven hundred years, as the Mature Harappan or Mature Indus period. This long time period can now be divided into three subphases on the basis of major rebuilding episodes and site expansion, as well as changes in artifact and writing styles. The Late Harappa Phase represents the final Indus



occupation of the city. From 1900 to 1800 B.C. a transitional phase can be identified, during which pottery traditions, burial practices, and other cultural patterns began to change. What followed was a longer period of transformation and eventual decline that continued until around 1300 B.C. in the region around Harappa, but may have lasted as late as 1000 B.C. in other regions to the east.

Geography and Climate

The geographical setting of the Indus civilization includes the western plateau of Baluchistan and the piedmont zone along the western edge of the Indus. Resources of wood and minerals were obtained from the northern mountains of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Two major river systems, the Indus on the west and the Ghaggar-Hakra on the east, combined to create a vast area for grazing and a fertile alluvial plain for agriculture. This plain can be divided into two regions: the Punjab in

the north has higher rainfall from both the summer monsoon and the winter rains; the region of Sind in the south is flatter and semiarid, with unpredictable rainfall. The eastern border of the civilization extended from the Yamuna and Ganga rivers in the north, to the Aravalli ranges and the Thar Desert of Rajasthan, eventually ending at the mouth of the Narmada River in south Gujarat. The coastal zone bordering the Arabian Sea extended from the rugged Makran hills in the west, through the Indus delta and the Greater and Lesser Rann of Kutch, to the Gulf of Khambhat in the southeast. The large island of Kutch, the peninsula of Saurashtra, and the coastal plains of north and south Gujarat represent several distinct geographical regions, but are generally included as part of the Greater Indus Valley region.

Two major climate systems dominate the greater Indus Valley. The southwest summer monsoon brings rain and floods from June to August, and the winter cyclonic

TABLE 1

| General Indus chronology based on radiocarbon dates from Harappa | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Period 1 | Ravi aspect of the Hakra Phase | 3500 B.C.–c. 2800 B.C. |
| Period 2 | Kot Dijji (Early Harappa) Phase | c. 2800 B.C.–c. 2600 B.C. |
| Period 3A | Harappa Phase A | c. 2600 B.C.–c. 2450 B.C. |
| Period 3B | Harappa Phase B | c. 2450 B.C.–c. 2200 B.C. |
| Period 3C | Harappa Phase C | c. 2200 B.C.–c. 1900 B.C. |
| Period 4 | Harappa/Late Harappa Transitional | c. 1900 B.C.–c. 1800 B.C. |
| Period 5 | Late Harappa Phase | c. 1800 B.C.–<1300 B.C. |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

system contributes snow in the higher elevations and light rains throughout the Punjab and sometimes into Sind. Snow melt in the spring results in major flooding, followed by the summer monsoon and more flooding.

Settlements

Over 2,600 sites have been discovered, and they include major cities (250 to 500 acres, or 100–200 hectares) such as Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, Dholavira, and Rakhigarhi, as well as smaller urban centers (125 to 250 acres, or 50–100 hectares) like Ganweriwala that are located along the major river systems. Regional towns (25 to 125 acres, or 10–50 hectares) such as Kalibangan and small towns (2 to 25 acres, or 5–10 hectares) like Lothal, Chanhudaro, and Banawali were situated along important tributaries or along major trade routes between the major cities. The hinterland was dotted with villages (2.5 to 12 acres, or 1–5 hectares) such as Kot Dijji, Nausharo, Balakot, and Nageshwar, as well as small hamlets (2.5 acres, or 1 hectare) that may have been country estates like Allahdino or coastal outposts such as Surkotada.

Major features of Indus sites. Perimeter walls are found around most settlements, with gateways that allowed for the control of access into and out of the settlement. These walls were probably built for defensive purposes, as well as for control of trade and protection from floods. Standardized bricks with a thickness to width to length ratio of 1:2:4 are a diagnostic feature of the Indus civilization. All domestic and public architecture throughout the Indus Valley and adjacent regions used bricks with this same strict proportion. The standardization of brick size is probably the result of craft specialization, combined with the migration of kin-related masons and brick makers to sites throughout the region, rather than highly centralized state control as proposed by early scholars.

Main streets were not paved and generally range in width from 13 or 16 feet (4–5 m), which would allow

two-way cart traffic. Large sewers, sometimes covered with limestone slabs, were placed along the side of major streets and eventually emptied through the main gateways or walls out onto the plain. Many of the large drains were covered with a corbelled arch to allow the drain to pass under streets, walls, or other buildings. Narrow side streets, 6 to 10 feet (2–3 m) wide for one-way cart traffic, led into the major neighborhoods, and smaller lanes for pedestrian traffic created an irregular network linking one house to another. Small drains leading from bathing areas and latrines fed into sump pits and larger drains on the main streets. Rectangular trash bins for dumping solid waste were often located along major streets and would have been cleaned out regularly by city maintenance workers.

Baked brick architecture using standardized bricks is seen at major cities and towns, while smaller settlements used baked brick only for drains, wells, and bathing platforms. Mud brick was used for platforms and smaller dividing walls. Stone architecture is seen in regional sites with locally available stone, and there is evidence for wood and reed architecture at all sites. Gateways and important administrative or ritual structures had columned entryways with large wooden columns set on stone ring bases.

House plans were quite varied with many different styles, but most had a central courtyard and surrounding rooms with a private entrance off the main street. Some houses did open out directly onto the street, and these may have been shops with domestic quarters in the back or on the second story. Most houses had separate bathing and toilet rooms located adjacent to the street. Bathing platforms were made with closely fitted bricks and had drains leading to street drain. Latrines were located next to the bathing area and consisted of reused large storage vessels buried up to the rim, with a few bricks set along one edge of the rim to allow a person to squat more comfortably. A large water vessel with water and a small dipper were often placed next to the commode for washing up after using the latrine.

Wells for providing clean drinking water are common at most Indus sites. Some sites had only one well, but larger cities needed more water, and at Mohenjo-Daro archaeologists have estimated that as many as seven hundred wells would have been scattered throughout the city. Wells were almost always made using specially designed wedge-shaped bricks (or stone at Dholavira) to create a strong cylindrical structure. Some settlements like Harappa had only a few wells and appear to have obtained water from the nearby river or large reservoirs constructed at the edges of the city. Reservoirs found at Lothal and Dholavira were lined with brick or stone with gypsum plaster to make them waterproof. Catchment drains for

collecting water to fill reservoirs are found at the site of Dholavira and were separate from the sewerage drains. Drainage channels were constructed at sites like Dholavira and Lothal for directing river flow into the reservoirs.

Public areas for markets are found in front or inside the major gateways and in various neighborhoods at large sites. Large buildings were discovered at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa that may have been used for public rituals, or by centralized administrators, but there is still much controversy regarding their precise function due to the lack of proper excavation and precise recording during the early excavations. The so-called Great Bath at Mohenjo-Daro may have been used for ritual public bathing, and the large building next to it may have been the foundation of a large hall or possibly even a palace. This building has been commonly referred to as the “Granary,” but there is no evidence that it was used to store grain or any other produce.

Specialized architecture has been found at Mohenjo-Daro that may represent a meeting hall and a dyer’s shop or laundry; a large building complex with a double staircase entryway may be a palace or temple. At Harappa circular brick platforms were discovered that excavators thought were used for processing grain, but recent excavations do not support this interpretation.

Indus Writing

The Indus script appears to have been developed indigenously and was not borrowed from West Asia. It has its foundation in early written symbols dating to the Ravi Phase (3500–3300 B.C.) at the site of Harappa and at approximately the same time from other sites in the greater Indus Valley region. This script became more standardized during the Kot Diji Phase (c. 2800–2600 B.C.) into what can be called the Early Indus script. By 2600 B.C. a fully developed Indus script was being used throughout the Indus Valley in an area that was twice the size of ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt.

The Indus script was usually written from right to left. This is confirmed through an analysis of sign sequences carved on seals and on the basis of writing on pottery shards that shows the sequence of strokes. More than 4,200 objects containing Indus script have been discovered, and most of these come from the sites of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa (over 3,700). Scholars have defined between 400 and 450 distinct Indus script signs or graphemes. Most scholars agree that the writing is based on a logo-syllabic system in which each sign means a word, a syllable, or a sound. However, some signs appear to represent pictographs (of a man or a fish, and so on) and when used alone they might represent an idea or an entire story. The use of ideographs with a logo-syllabic

writing system suggests that there were many different ways of using the writing.

The Indus writing has not yet been deciphered, and there is no hope of a breakthrough until a bilingual text or longer inscriptions with Indus script have been discovered. Because the script was no longer used after 1900 B.C., it is not possible to connect it to later writing systems and known historical languages. Dravidian languages are now spoken primarily in South India, but some of the place names and river names, such as the Nara and Porali rivers in Sindh and Baluchistan, may represent Dravidian or Mundari (Austro-Asiatic) languages. Indo-Aryan languages may have been present in the northern Indus region and Baluchistan, while Sino-Tibetan languages may have been spoken in the far north at sites such as Shortughai. Remnants of earlier Neolithic languages that have no relation to any of the four major modern language families also may have been present in the region. Since urban centers are by their very nature places where people from different cultures come together, it would not be surprising to have many different language speakers present in the cities. As was common in Mesopotamia and Egypt, traders and elites from each group could have used the same writing system for inscribing their names or words for commodities. Words and names from any one of these four or five language families may have been written in the Indus script during the seven hundred years when the script was being used.

The production of seals and tablets was a highly specialized craft that was strictly controlled by the elite traders and rulers of the cities. New research at Harappa has been able to provide a new chronology for the writing and to better define the wide range of contexts in which the writing was used by literate elites. The script is found on square seals made of stone, engraved with symbols and animal motifs. The most common animal on the seals is a mythical unicorn, while other seals are carved with a bull, an elephant, or even a rhinoceros. Seals were used to stamp into clay sealings on goods to document and control trade, and also possibly for ritual purposes. Steatite and terra-cotta tokens include script and what appear to be numbers. Some of these tokens may have been used for accounting, and others appear to have been used for ritual purposes. Script is found inscribed on clay lumps that were used as sealings to lock storehouses. Merchants incised messages directly on large jars filled with trade goods to indicate the contents or the destination. Script was also painted or molded on pottery to define ownership or for ritual purposes. Examples of script have been found on tools and personal items that may indicate personal identification or ritual protection. Writing was also used in combination with narrative depictions of myths and religious ceremonies, possibly

identifying the main characters or deities, or the name of the ritual. At the two largest cities, Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, distinctive copper tablets with script and animal motifs may be the earliest evidence for city coinage in South Asia, a thousand years before the introduction of stamp-marked silver coins of the Achaemenid Empire.

Most inscriptions are only five to seven signs long and are very small, ranging in size from .4 to .8 inches (1 to 2 centimeters) in height. However, one example of what appears to be a public signboard has been discovered in a side room of the major northern gateway on the citadel mound at Dholavira. Made with white gypsum inlay, the signboard had ten script signs that are around 14 inches (37 centimeters) high and 10 inches (26 centimeters) wide. The board may have been mounted above the gateway for all to see, but this does not mean that everyone in the city was literate. The distribution of seals and writing in distinct areas of Harappa suggests that only certain segments of the population had seals and that, even though writing was found on artifacts throughout the city, the production of seals and the use of writing were restricted to the elites.

Sociopolitical Organization

Scholars are currently divided on how to best describe the political organization of the Indus cities. Although most agree on the presence of a highly stratified social organization and the presence of multiple urban centers, some feel that these cities were not organized as state-level societies but were basically large chiefdoms. The main argument for chiefdom society is that no large central buildings that could represent temples, palaces, or administrative structures have been identified. Another argument is that there are no royal burials, which are a common feature in the early states of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China. The opposite position, which is supported by most scholars, is that the Indus was organized as a state-level society, but that it had a decentralized political and ideological organization.

In this model, several competing classes of elites dominated the four or five major cities. In the course of seven hundred years, different individuals and communities would have been dominant, but no single community was able to rule long enough to establish a high degree of centralization. Merchants, ritual specialists, and individuals who owned resources such as land, livestock, and raw materials would have maintained different levels of control in different regions. These communities shared a common ideology and a standardized economic system and used a common script. In contrast to the large cities, the smaller settlements, which included more agriculturalists and herders, may have been less rigidly stratified and segregated than the larger cities. The largest cities,

such as Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro, Dholavira, and Rakhi-garhi, may have been relatively independent city-states with direct political control over their immediate hinterland. Trade and exchange of important socio-ritual status items demonstrate that the cities and villages were politically and economically integrated, and they therefore appear to be integrated on a general ideological level as well.

There is no evidence for the presence of a military or the use of warfare in the integration of the hinterland around the major cities. In contrast to the patterns seen in Mesopotamia and Egypt, there are no depictions of people being captured, attacked, or subjugated. Even though large city walls with impressive gateways surrounded all of the major settlements, there is no evidence that these walled cities were ever attacked or burned. The city walls and gateways were probably guarded by armed watchmen, and the discovery of bronze arrow heads, spears, and daggers indicate that they had the technological capability to protect themselves against bandits and raiders, as well as to wage warfare. The absence of conclusive data for warfare does not support a model for a peaceful civilization, and it is not unlikely that there were occasional battles and violent conflicts.

Indus Religion and Belief Systems

Without the aid of written texts it is difficult to reconstruct the Indus religion. They made clay figurines of animals, men, and women that probably were used in special rituals. Some of the female figurines are thought to represent Mother Goddess images, while others are possibly toys for children. Soft limestone was used to carve small sculptures of deities or important people such as the famous "Priest-King" found at Mohenjo-Daro. Harder stone was carved into nude male sculptures that have been found at the site of Harappa. These images were probably used in special domestic rituals to represent deities.

Many of the seals have narrative scenes that appear to represent ceremonies and mythological scenes. One famous seal from Mohenjo-Daro shows a deity with horned headdress and bangles on both arms, standing in a pipal (sacred fig) tree. Seven figures in procession and a kneeling worshiper sit before the deity, with a human head resting on a small stool. Since no temples have been identified, it is possible that worship took place under trees as depicted on this seal. Some terra-cotta tablets have narrative scenes stamped on both sides. At Harappa, one such tablet shows a figure, possibly a female deity, grasping two tigers by the throat and standing above an elephant. On the reverse is a narrative scene depicting the killing of a water buffalo in the presence of a priest or deity seated in yogic position. Such narrative scenes indicate the presence of a highly developed mythology and iconography, and



Woman Kneading Dough, Terra Cotta Sculpture Unearthed at Harappa. Images of this sort were often used in domestic rituals to represent deities. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

similar motifs are widespread at sites throughout the larger Indus region. Some of the iconography seen on Indus seals and the use of specific symbols, such as the swastika and *mandalas*, were incorporated into later Vedic, Brahmanical, Jain, and Buddhist religious traditions. Even though there is no direct historical connection, some Indus symbols and narratives do appear to have been incorporated into religious traditions that are today collectively referred to as Hinduism. For example, the famous seal from Mohenjodaro with a horned deity seated in yogic position surrounded by wild animals has often been compared to later Hindu representations of Siva as “Lord of the Beasts.”

The Indus people buried their dead in wooden coffins along with many pottery vessels that were probably filled with food for the afterlife. Most individuals, both male and female, were buried with some simple ornaments, such as shell bangles or copper rings and agate beads. Elaborate ornaments of gold, silver, and precious stones were never included in the burials and must have been inherited by the living relatives. No royal burials have been found.


Trade and Technology

The Indus cities were connected with rural agricultural communities and distant resource and mining areas through strong trade networks. They used pack animals, riverboats, and bullock carts for transport. This trade is reflected in the widespread distribution of exquisite beads and ornaments, metal tools, and pottery that were produced by specialized artisans in the major towns and cities. Cotton, lumber, grain, livestock, and other foodstuffs were probably the major commodities of this internal trade. There was also external trade with Central Asia and Iran by overland routes. Trade with the Arabian Gulf region and the distant Mesopotamian cities, such as Susa and Ur, was conducted by sea and may have been dominated by middlemen living along the Indus coast or Oman.

Indus artisans produced a wide range of utilitarian and decorative objects using specialized techniques of stone working, ceramics, and metallurgy. They did not erect stone sculptures to glorify the power of the elites, and most of the art and symbolic objects were relatively small and in many cases even made in miniature. Objects made with exotic materials and complex technologies were probably produced for the wealthy merchants and the ruling classes, while more simple objects made with local materials and simple technology were presumably for ordinary people. Ranking or stratification within the society as a whole appears to have been reinforced by the use of various raw materials and manufacturing processes that resulted in finished objects with different relative values.

Pottery with a red slip and black painted designs were made in all the major settlements for use in rituals and possibly in marriage ceremonies. Motifs on the pottery are usually arranged in panels and include the intersecting circle, fish-scale, and pipal leaf design, combined with floral and geometric patterns, as well as animals and birds. Plain pottery was produced for everyday use, including disposable goblets with pointed bases that were common in the major cities. Copper and bronze were used to make ornaments, tools, mirrors, pots, and pans. Bone, shell, and ivory were used to make tools, ornaments, gaming pieces, and especially inlay for furniture. Silver and gold utensils and ornaments and fine ceramic objects, such as stoneware bangles and glazed faience ornaments, also were produced. The glazed faience of the Indus is much stronger and more durable than terra-cotta and was used to make beads, bangles, buttons, inlay, and small vessels for holding pigments or perfume. Natural stones were prepared in specific ways to enhance their color and accentuate the natural patterns of the stone. Artificially colored stone, faience, and painted terra-cotta ornaments were created as imitations of the natural stones.

Evidence for wool and cotton textiles is found preserved on copper tools and reveals the presence of a



Mortar and Pestle from the Mohenjo-Daro Site. The strong network of trade among Indus peoples is reflected in the widespread distribution (among archaeological sites) of tools and pottery produced by specialized artisans in the civilization's major towns and cities. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

well-developed spinning and weaving tradition. Recent analysis of threads preserved inside copper beads suggests that wild tussar silk was also being used. The textile industry would have been an important source of wealth to large cities that could maintain extensive cotton fields and large numbers of craftsmen and -women.

Weights. The Indus rulers and merchants developed and maintained a highly standardized weight system for taxation and control of trade in specific commodities. Cubical stone weights were usually made from a special type of banded chert or agate and range in weight up to 24 pounds (10,865.0 grams). The smaller weights were probably used in the weighing of precious stones, metals, and perfumes or incense, while the larger weights may have been used for assessing the taxes for larger quantities of grain, foodstuffs, and other commodities. Each graduated weight is double the weight of the previous weight category. These distinctive weights have been found at all

settlements of the Indus region as well as in settlements on the periphery, where Indus merchants may have obtained raw materials or traded finished products.

Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

The Indus subsistence system was highly diverse due to the many different environments in which people lived. Wheat and barley cultivation, supplemented by animal husbandry, was the foundation of the urban centers in the core alluvial regions, but millets and possibly rice were cultivated in Gujarat. Animal husbandry was dominated by humped zebu (*Bos indicus*) cattle, but also included non-humped cattle (*Bos taurus*), water buffalo (*Bubalus bubalis*), sheep, and goats. Fishing, hunting of wild fauna, and the collection of wild fruits supplemented the major crops and animal foods. Wheat and barley agriculture was practiced primarily during the winter growing season, and crops such as cotton and millet were probably

cultivated after the summer monsoon. The presence of two growing seasons made it possible to create enough surpluses to support large cities and trade networks.

Due to the nature of the topography and the intensity of floods along the Indus and its tributaries, it was not possible to maintain major canals for irrigation. Most cultivation in the alluvium was based on adequate rainfall and opportunistic agriculture where crops could be planted along the banks of oxbow lakes and slower streams. Along the piedmont zone of Baluchistan, some Indus settlements constructed diversion canals for directing floodwaters to fields, and there is some evidence for the construction of small irrigation canals near the site of Shortughai in northern Afghanistan.

Decline and Legacy

Around 1900 B.C. there is evidence for a transitional phase during which many characteristic features of the Indus civilization begin to fall out of use. This transition represents a reorganization of power among the ruling elites of the Indus cities, but does not reflect the intrusion of new people or the invasions of Indo-Aryans, as has been proposed in the past. The Indus script and square seals with unicorn and other animal motifs gradually disappeared. Cubical weights for taxation and trade were no longer used, possibly because the major trade networks began to break down.

Different factors leading to the decline and reorganization of the Indus civilization have been identified. The overextension of political and trade networks led to eventual fragmentation. In addition, the lack of a military to reinforce integration would have had a direct impact on political and economic organization. The Sarasvati-Ghaggar-Hakra river system in the east began to dry up, and the changing river systems disrupted the agricultural and economic system. Eastern communities began to gradually migrate to the larger urban centers along the Indus or into new agricultural areas of the Gangetic Plain and Gujarat. The processes involved in this transformation were more rapid in some areas, but by around 1300 to 1000 B.C. a new social order emerged, dominated by Vedic communities who used horses for ritual sacrifice and warfare, spoke Indo-Aryan languages, and worshiped new deities.

Although certain distinguishing aspects of the Indus civilization disappeared, many other aspects of Indus craft technology, art, agriculture, and possibly social organization continued among the Late and post-Harappan cultures. These cultural traditions eventually became incorporated in the new urban civilization that arose during the Early Historical period, around 600 B.C.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also **Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age; Goddess Images; Harappa; Mohenjo-Daro**

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INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS India has a long history of traditional financiers, or "indigenous bankers" as they came to be called in British times, organized along ethnic community lines. Some of them, such as the networks of Gujarati *sbroffs*, accepted deposits, discounted commercial paper, and facilitated trade and remittances, especially to upcountry areas poorly served by the banks. With the spread of modern banking, these indigenous bankers lost much of their share of the market, but many of them evolved into thriving present-day "finance companies." These continue to be important in financing modern India's trade in cloth, grains, and other commodities, including used commercial vehicles, hand looms, and small industries. Rotating local savings and credit groups, called chit funds, also date back at least several centuries in South India.

References to village moneylenders date back to Vedic times. Their dominance began to be broken only near the end of the nineteenth century, when British officials started promoting cooperatives, introducing legislation to restrict the sale of agricultural land. Such restrictions in Punjab, especially, proved effective in ending the large-scale alienation of land that had been taking place for the previous thirty years. The new class of agricultural trader moneylenders started lending against the security of produce, replacing the earlier large farmer moneylenders. These are still widely used by farmers in the Punjab in preference, or in addition to, the banks.

Size and Types of Lenders

With the growth of cooperative credit after independence, and the massive expansion of rural bank branches since the 1970s, following the nationalization of banks, the share of informal credit in total rural credit has steadily declined from about 90 percent of all outstanding debt in 1951 to about 40 percent in 1991. In 1991 moneylenders still accounted for about 16 percent, and interest-free credit from friends and relatives for about 7 percent. Reflecting the declining share of cooperative credit during the 1980s, the share of "other sources" such as chit funds and finance companies almost doubled from 13 to 24 percent between the rural credit surveys of 1981 and 1991.

In contrast, in the urban areas, informal credit was almost as important as formal, even after excluding large flows of tax-evaded "black" money. More than half was used as trade credit, though there were also other important sectors like small-scale industry, road transport, construction (especially residential), and a large number of service sectors.

Informal credit is heterogenous, encompassing the wide range of activities of wholesale traders, commission agents, and chit fund operators, as well as those of local moneylenders, pawnbrokers, village shopkeepers, agricultural input suppliers, itinerant peddlers, and even friends and relatives. What all these lenders have in common is informality, adaptability, and flexibility of operations, a characteristic that reduces "transactions costs" (i.e., the cost of making, monitoring, and recovering loans) and confers on informal lenders their comparative advantage over formal banks and credit associations.

Areas of Comparative Advantage

Formal and informal finance each have their comparative advantages. Formal finance is more readily able to accommodate large and longer-term loans because of its greater reliance on the pooling of deposits and maturity transformation (being able to lend for longer terms than

the average tenure of deposits, because deposits are continually replaced). It is better suited to serving the needs of large- and medium-scale industry, organized trade and commerce, large- and medium-scale farmers who can offer the security of the land they own, and well-to-do urban households. It has been less successful in serving the needs of the large unorganized sector of small and micro-entrepreneurs, small traders, tenant farmers and sharecroppers who do not have title to their land, and small and poor borrowers in general.

The lower transactions costs of the informal sector make it particularly well suited to making transactions that are cost intensive, small, and of short duration. Its flexibility regarding collateral enables it to finance a large number of service activities, where fixed assets are not created as security for the loan. The tying of credit with marketing transactions gives informal lenders a comparative advantage in supplying working capital loans for agriculture, as crop production loans, as well as in small industries, such as those using hand looms or making footwear, where the lender is often also a supplier of raw material or a buyer of the final products.

The two sectors are therefore by and large complementary. Policy should proceed on a recognition of this complementarity and facilitate informal finance in its own area of comparative advantage. There are three major aspects to this broad policy orientation. One is to improve market structure, or the degree of competition between lenders in the informal sector by encouraging ease of entry. Licensing and registration should be restricted as far as possible to deposit taking and the main emphasis of regulation should be prudential. An example of inappropriate regulation is the central government's Chit Fund Act, which requires chit funds with as little as 100 rupees to register with the state registrar. However, the costs of registration would render hundreds of thousands of community chit funds unviable, and the limit should be raised. Usury laws are another example. Although interest rate ceilings have largely been removed in the formal sector, they are still being enforced by some state governments for moneylenders and pawnbrokers. Usury laws only drive informal credit transactions underground, and by making contracts legally unenforceable, increase the risk premium that borrowers have to pay through the interest rate.

The second approach, of promoting "linkages," or increasing lending from the banks to informal lenders, applies to parts of the informal sector that are reasonably competitive and in which lenders do not enjoy market power, but where the cost of funds of informal lenders are high. This approach seeks to take advantage of the lower transactions costs or better informational resources

of informal lenders by refinancing them, thereby reducing their cost of funds and enabling them to lower their lending rates. In this approach, the formal sector acts as a "wholesaler," while informal lenders "retail" credit to small and poor borrowers. It is suited, for example, to pawnbrokers and potentially to improving the terms and amount of credit available to farmers from agricultural marketing intermediaries such as commission agents, input suppliers, and agro-processors. Thus in Abohar in the Punjab, the largest cotton market in the country, banks refinance the book debts of commission agents, who lend huge amounts to farmers at the standard 2 percent a month against sales through them of cotton and grains. Farmers prefer the one-stop convenience of dealing with commission agents, who pay for purchases of fertilizer, diesel, and other inputs when they come into town, and who pay interest on balances left with them after the season.

A third approach, applicable to parts of the informal sector in which the problem of market power is not amenable to the previous two approaches (because in some markets informal lenders will always have better information ties to poor borrowers, and will earn "rents" or monopoly profits on such information, no matter what their cost of funds) is that of offering stronger competition to the informal sector, and thereby improving its terms. An example is the huge expansion currently taking place of micro-finance through women's self-help groups, bringing down village moneylender rates for small emergency and consumption loans. In the long run the two sectors are expected to become increasingly integrated but specializing in their own area of comparative advantage.

Chit funds (or *kuris* in Kerala, "committees" in the north, and *bishbis* in the west) is the Indian term for what are generically known worldwide as rotating savings and credit associations, small neighborhood- or workplace-based community organizations whose major attraction is that they are a convenient vehicle for savings. They entail contractual savings, each member committed to saving a particular amount on a particular date, usually once a month, being entitled to the pooled kitty in turn, the sequence of turns being decided by consensus, lottery, and in more evolved business people's chit funds, by a system of bidding for the kitty, the bid amount becoming in effect the interest earned by other members in that round.

Given the widespread ownership of gold and silver ornaments in India and the convenience of ornaments as collateral (being easy to store, value, and sell), borrowing against the security of ornaments is widespread. A large part of the lending by moneylenders is against the security

of pledged ornaments. As a shop-based activity, however, pawnbroking is carried out usually as an adjunct to the activities of goldsmiths and jewelry shops. Much of the lending by smaller unlicensed pawnbrokers is for relatively small amounts and for consumption purposes. In a poor tribal district of Rajasthan, thirteen retail shopkeepers lent an estimated 4,500 *bhils* in the surrounding hamlets, against the security of silver ornaments. Only about 30 percent of the value of the pledge was lent, difficulties were experienced in redeeming the pledges, and interest rates were high. However, an important part of lending by pawnbrokers in other areas is for crop production purposes. Thus in the agricultural district town of Raichur in Karnataka, farmers top up loan requirements after first exhausting limits available from banks and commission agents. The lending of about fifty active pawnbrokers peaks at the start of the *kharif* (autumn) crop and winds down from December, when the loans start to be repaid. Loans range from 500 to 15,000 rupees, at an interest rate of 3 percent a month. This appears to be the standard “institutional” rate in most parts of the country.

The banks also make (cheaper) gold loans, motivated primarily by the need to meet their agricultural lending targets. With the emphasis of modern banking on cash flow rather than security-based lending, the term “pawnshop banking” has come to acquire pejorative connotations. The ambivalence of the official stance may also have something to do with the country’s policy of discouraging the hoarding of gold as an unproductive asset. However, in providing essential liquidity against gold, banks enable the savings represented by gold to be invested productively. The major advantages pawnbrokers have over banks is the higher proportion of the value of pledged articles they advance, flexibility about exceeding this margin in appropriate cases, and lower borrower and lender transaction costs generally. The optimum division of responsibility between banks and pawnbrokers might be refinancing arrangements by the banks, based on the replugging of pawns to the banks.

Prabhu Ghate

See also Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952

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INFORMATION AND OTHER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

India’s information technology industry achieved exports of \$12.8 billion in the year ending March 2004, equal to 19.8 percent of India’s exports and 10.9 percent of current account receipts. Its total sales of \$21.5 billion amounted to 3.5 percent of India’s gross domestic product. India’s new stellar “industry,” information technology (IT) has given India an international reputation for high technology and has boosted Indian self-confidence.

The Early History of the Industry

A number system can be constructed out of three numbers: 0, 1, and any number greater than 1. The decimal system, which uses 10 to build the system, is a historical accident. The simplest number system is one based on powers of 2, the binary system; in this system, for instance, 2 would be represented by 10, 4 by 100, and 7 by 111. This system has been used in computers from the outset, as it is easy to give a physical form to a binary system: all it needs is a device that would give an interruptible power flow. A state in which power was interrupted would represent zero, and a state in which power flowed would represent one.

The first computers, constructed during World War II, employed radio valves, which were switched on and off to represent binary digits. But soon thereafter, the semiconductor was invented; it used much less electricity and thus did not overheat so easily, and it was sturdier. (V. Ramamurti, an Indian scientist, believed that the semiconductor was invented because the Allies feared the loss to Japan of India, the Allies’ prime source of mica, which was essential to the making of radio valves.) Technological development of computers and of their multifarious applications has since been driven by the progressive reduction in the size and cost of semiconductors. They have now been so reduced in size that millions of them can be etched onto a small chip; chips are



Infosys Headquarters in Bangalore. In response to the collapse of the Silicon Valley technology boom, India developed a vast IT marketplace catering to the needs of corporations in the West. Infosys is one of the biggest IT providers worldwide. INDIA TODAY.

designed for specialized uses, such as for a laptop or a washing machine.

The first computers in the 1940s were as big as a house; by the 1960s, however, miniaturization of semi-conductors had made it possible to create computers that were no bigger than a small room. At that point, IBM began to make a series of standardized computers; its 1620 and 360 series of mainframe computers found users all over the world, including India. The Indian government imported a few computers from the Soviet Union, especially EVS EM, its IBM 360 clone; but they were not popular, even in the government establishments where they were installed. IBM computers dominated the market. They were used for calculation, accounting and data storage in large companies, and in research laboratories. Tata Consultancy Services, India's largest software producer, was established in 1968 to run the computers acquired by the Tata group and to develop uses for them.

Tension has prevailed in relations between India and Pakistan since they were formed by the partition of British India in 1947. In the 1950s Pakistan joined two defense pacts under the aegis of the United States; in response, India moved closer to the Soviet Union. In 1971 a revolt erupted in East Pakistan. A war broke out, in the course of which India supported the separation of East Pakistan; it emerged as a new country, Bangladesh. During this war, the United States ordered its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, worsening relations between India and the United States.

In 1973 India passed an amendment to the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act that required foreign companies to reduce their equity holdings in Indian subsidiaries to a minority. The law was initially implemented haltingly. In the 1977 general election, the Indian National Congress was defeated, and the Janata Party formed a coalition government. Its socialist minister of industries,



Users at a Cyber Café. Software development continues to thrive in India's cities, many of which boast state-of-the-art facilities and the presence of a large number of overseas vendors. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

George Fernandes, vigorously began to implement the 1973 act. Most foreign companies fell in line, with the exception of Coca-Cola and IBM, which closed down their operations in India. However, IBM's computers in India needed continued servicing; to ensure this, the government established the Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC), which took over the erstwhile IBM subsidiary.

A major cost of using mainframe computers was the specialized manpower they required. It was the practice then to write programs for individual operations; when operations changed or expanded, the programs had to be modified. The data were stored in punched cards and tapes. Both were easily damaged, and data often needed to be reconstructed. Thus a mainframe computer had its complement of servicing staff; a small business could not afford such manpower.

By the 1980s, computer chips were becoming small enough to be embodied in almost portable mini-computers, and these were getting cheap enough to be used in small businesses. Manufacturers began to build into minicomputers a selection of programs that performed the

most common operations, such as word processing, calculation, and accounting. Over the 1980s, the mini-computers shrank in size and weight and were transformed into personal computers (PCs). Indian agents who sold imported minicomputers and PCs also employed software engineers for sales assistance and service. Thus, in the latter half of 1980s, Indian software engineers were scattered. Some worked in CMC; others serviced the surviving IBM machines in companies, government establishments, and research facilities; and still others serviced minicomputers and PCs.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the computer industry was manufacturing PCs, which embodied standardized software. A great deal of work went into perfecting PC software. Other software companies translated customers' requirements into software packages and sold them off the shelf to be copied into their PCs' hard disks. As PCs developed, so did mainframe computers. The old computers, known as legacy systems, were loaded with data; and a running business, like a bank or an insurance company, could not do without records. The old computer users wanted to keep their old systems while at the

same time acquiring new equipment; and they wanted the two to work together seamlessly. So programs had to be written to enable the new and old machines to talk to one another. That required knowledge of old and new languages; and it required patience and application. The work had to be done on systems that were in use; and often the programmer had to try out a number of approaches before achieving a workable solution. It was laborious, often frustrating work.

Growth of the Industry in India and the United States

By the late 1980s, there were many Indian engineers in the United States. The Indian government had expanded engineering education in the 1950s, but its engineering industry could not absorb the number of engineers that its institutes produced. The brightest engineering graduates began to go to the United States to pursue higher degrees and were soon absorbed into the U.S. industry. Graduates of India's five elite Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) found easy entry into the United States, and over two-thirds of them routinely emigrated. Thus by the 1980s there was a large diaspora of Indian engineers in the United States, and many of them entered the new computer hardware and software industry. When they encountered shortage of programmers, they turned to India for supplementing the supply. They tapped grapevines of their old friends and colleagues in India. Some just went to the Indian metropolitan areas, checked into a hotel, advertised for software engineers and recruited them on the spot. This "body-shopping" deprived Indian employers of their programmers. Indian sellers and manufacturers of PCs and private users of mainframes could not afford to lose their staff. They took a number of defensive steps. First, a number of them went into body-shopping themselves: they began to hire out entire teams of programmers. Today's foremost software exporters, Tata Infotech, Patni Computer Systems, and Wipro, began as computer manufacturers, all between 1977 and 1980. Second, they realigned wages so as to retain their more experienced staff. Third, they developed active and anticipatory recruiting techniques. The standard method was campus recruitment. In response to their demand, the intake into engineering and IT courses increased. Fourth, with the recruitment of fresh graduates, Indian software firms also developed short, focused training programs designed to bring them up to speed quickly. Finally, Indian software firms meticulously recorded the progress of work every day, so that if a worker left a job half done, someone else could immediately pick up the threads.

By 1985 satellite links made the export of software possible without having to send programmers abroad. At

that time, however, the Indian government did not allow private links, so Texas Instruments gave it the equipment, which it then proceeded to use from its Bangalore establishment. IBM, which wanted to set up a link in 1988, ran into the same problem: the government insisted on retaining its monopoly in telecommunications, the rates offered by its Department of Telecommunications were exorbitant, and it was inexperienced in running Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) links.

In 1991 the Department of Electronics broke this impasse, creating a corporation called Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) that, being owned by the government, could provide VSAT communications without breaching its monopoly. STPI set up software technology parks in different cities, each of which provided satellite links to be used by firms; the local link was a wireless radio link. In 1993 the government began to allow individual companies their own dedicated links, which allowed work done in India to be transmitted abroad directly. Indian firms soon convinced their American customers that a satellite link was as reliable as a team of programmers working in the clients' office.

Another important change was in the import regime. In the 1980s, an importer of hardware had to get an import license from the chief controller of imports and exports, who in turn required a no-objection certificate from the Department of Electronics. That meant going to Delhi, waiting for an appointment, and then trying to persuade an uncooperative bureaucrat. In 1992 computers were freed from import licensing, and import duties on them were reduced. As a result, it became possible for Indian software firms to work on the same computers as their clients.

Satellites and import liberalization thus made offshore development possible, with a number of implications: It enabled firms to take orders for complete programs, to work for final clients and to market their services directly. Work for final clients also led firms to specialize in work for particular industries or verticals: it led in particular to India's specialization in software for banking, insurance, and airlines. It gave India a brand value and a reputation.

The next big technological change was the World Wide Web. Even when satellite links became available, they could be used only by exporters who had their own satellite disks or shared the STPI ones. The Internet, which gathered pace after 1996, offered the same links on telephone lines, although they were slower; and as the number of firms using the Internet expanded, the potential market for software expanded accordingly. Since it was easier and cheaper to obtain telephone lines than satellite links, the Internet greatly increased the number of potential exporters, bringing many small, resource-poor Indian firms into the market.

The late 1990s saw a surge in the Indian IT industry. To assure potential clients of their permanency, Indian software companies built large, expensive campuses, where they made working conditions as attractive as possible, to help them retain workers. Trees grew and streams flowed inside buildings, and swimming pools, badminton courts, meditation rooms, auditoriums, and restaurants were provided.

The IT boom in the United States was the source of India's software exports. It ended in 2000; the downturn in India was delayed until early 2001. The low-cost Indian programmers' market in the United States expanded. More Indian programmers got an H-1B visa in 2001–2002 than in any previous year. Of the 331,000 H-1B visas issued in the United States that year, 191,000 were issued to software engineers, and 137,000 of those went to Indians. Although export growth slowed down, exports still continued to grow. From an average annual compound rate of 52 percent between 1993–1994 and 2000–2001, export growth fell to 22 percent in the next two years.

However, demand for Indian programmers also fell in 2002. For the first time since body-shopping began in the late 1980s, Indian companies did not face a labor shortage. Body-shopping virtually ceased; and firms that depended on it closed down. So did many small firms, which served local firms.

As realization of low wages in India spread, new services and new companies began to locate in India. Until 2000, most call centers serving the U.S. market were in the United States; the only countries that had offshore call centers were Britain and Ireland. After 2000, both U.S. and Indian firms began to set up call centers in India. Back-office functions, such as record transcription, accounting, and documentation, also began to be moved to India. In 2003–2004, exports of such IT-enabled services were estimated to be \$3.6 billion.

Major international IT firms have set up a presence in India, mostly doing work outsourced to them by their head offices. The software industry has grown to a size at which it affects the larger economy, particularly in its major centers in the south: Bangalore, Chennai, Poona, and Hyderabad. The industry's export revenues have added to India's bulging reserves of foreign exchange. As a result, the Indian economy has been flush with liquidity, and interest rates have been halved since the late 1990s.

India's IT development has created a model of placing high international value on India's educated manpower. Some 150 global companies, including General Electric, Oracle, DaimlerChrysler and Hyundai, have set up research and development centers in India. Indian pharmaceutical companies are turning research and development into internationally marketable products, doing research

on commission for companies abroad. Indian companies are venturing into bioinformatics. India's hospitals are attracting patients from neighboring countries. The Anglophonic educational system planted decades ago by the British has begun to bear global fruit.

Ashok V. Desai

See also Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs); Industrial Growth and Diversification; Intellectual Property Rights

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INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION, 1857–1947

At independence in 1947, the most tangible legacy of British rule in India was the modern infrastructure that the regime had left behind, built to a large extent with British expertise. This legacy included the railways, ports, major irrigation systems, telegraph, sanitation and medical care, universities, postal system, courts of law, information-gathering systems, and scientific research. The immediate motivation behind infrastructure development by the British was governance rather than development or welfare. And yet, once built, such assets did not necessarily serve only imperial

interests, but were available as public goods. That said, the absence of a strong welfare or developmental objective imposed unevenness in the way that these assets were created.

The Impetus

In the nineteenth century the main focus of productive investment by the state was irrigation, railways, roads, and the telegraph. Defense interests played a role in the creation of modern communication and transportation networks, but they were not the only factor. Business interests too urged that such systems be set up in India. The influence of Lancashire textile-mill owners behind the construction of a railway in India is an example. Because Britain was a pioneer in these new technologies, the knowledge and capital were more cheaply available to India than to many other developing countries of that time. Famines in the nineteenth century exposed the susceptibility of the economy to shocks, and underscored the importance of irrigation in preventing famines, railways in distributing food, and public works for providing wage work to affected people.

By the interwar period, the drive to create physical infrastructure had spent itself. On the other hand, the demand for welfare expenditure had been gaining ground. The demand for education was connected with movements for social reform. Mass education had thus far been neglected by both public and private institutions. Extreme illiteracy and mortality in India showed rather starkly that fifty years as a British colony had done little to enable India to approach British standards of social development. Yet, given the government's own poverty and political commitments, the change in mindset made rather little impact on the scale and composition of government investment.

Public investment in railways was regionally well balanced in the long run, but investment in irrigation, roads, and power was unevenly distributed. There was apparently a correlation between the initial inaccessibility of a region, its size, and the share of the region in public investment. Burma (present-day Myanmar), for example, was a major recipient of funds. Within British India, western and southern India received more investment than did eastern and northern India.

Irrigation

When the British East India Company took control of the upper Gangetic Plains, an extensive network of irrigation channels in a state of disrepair was found in the western part of the river Yamuna, attributed to Firoz Shah Tughluq. The “grand anicut” (dam) on the Cauvery, attributed to the Chola rulers, was another large

pre-British system. The company administration by and large appreciated the importance of these systems, and restored some of them. From the late nineteenth century, major new constructions consisted of canals taken out of perennial rivers (in Punjab, Sind, and United Provinces), and weirs constructed on major rivers (South India). The Punjab canals spread access to water over formerly water-scarce territories. In the South, canals mainly redistributed monsoon water. The most dramatic effect of the former type of canals was the “colonization” of vast areas of wastes and pastures by migrant cultivators. In Punjab these “canal colonies” arose between 1890 and 1930. The colonists did not come from peasant stock necessarily; many were soldiers of disbanded armies, and many others were former pastoralists. A network of canals thus restructured entirely the rural society and politics in some areas of Punjab.

Acreage irrigated as percentage of cropped area increased from possibly 5 or 6 percent in the early nineteenth century to 22 percent in 1938, about 60 percent of the addition to irrigated areas being served by government canals. Among the largest projects undertaken in British India were Upper and Lower Ganga canals (1854–1878; 3,212,000 acres, or 1.3 million hectares), Sirhind canal (1887; 2,471,000 acres, or 1 million hectares), Cauvery delta system (1889; 1,050,000 acres, or 425,000 hectares), the Western Yamuna canal system (1982; 1,236,000 acres, or 500,000 hectares), the Krishna and Godavari delta systems (1898–1890), together serving about 2,471,000 acres, or close to a million hectares, and Sarda canal (1926; 1,236,000 acres, or 500,000 hectares). Smaller works that had considerable impact in a relatively small area included the Sone canal (1879), the Nira valley system (1938), the Mettur project (1934), and the Upper Bari Doab canal (1879).

In the regime of the company, canal construction was left to the engineering department of the army. From 1854, the Public Works Department became responsible for canal construction. A broad distinction was made between those works that were built for administrative or famine relief purposes (“protective” works) and those built to increase agricultural production (“productive” works). The former class was not expected to yield an income, though they might save the government money that would have to be spent on famine relief if a famine occurred. The latter class could be commercially profitable for the government. The water that raised incomes was charged at a certain rate, paid out of that income. This tax accrued to the Public Works Department, and was calculated in the rate of return on capital invested in irrigation projects. Increased income from a plot of land also increased the rental value of that land. In areas outside the Permanent Settlement, the government could realize



Bhakra Dam. When Nehru dedicated the Bhakra Dam (shown here) in 1963, he referred to it as a “temple of modern India,” a symbol of the aspirations of developing countries worldwide. In the early twenty-first century, similar large-scale dam projects in India (at last count more than 23) are the focal point of several well-funded campaigns to protect the millions of ordinary citizens displaced by them. SUJATA KULSHRESHTHA / FOTOMEDIA.

this value. But these benefit-cost estimates were neither quite accurate nor persuasive to the critics, in London, of government investment in India.

In 1878 an influential committee of the India Office declared that irrigation projects were a failure, both commercially and in preventing famines. At the same time, the 1880s Famine Commission claimed that irrigation projects were on average profitable for the government. The difference partly reflected official mindsets in India and Britain. This question of what monetary return the irrigation programs generated for the government remained shrouded in speculation. Nevertheless, private enterprise was never seen as a viable alternative in canals. It was felt that allowing the private sector to construct canals would complicate the question of property rights in canal water.

The private gains from irrigation projects were mixed. Did irrigation projects reduce famines and increase peasant incomes? Canal-irrigated area as a percentage of cropped area was not very different between Madras and Punjab in 1900. Yet, Madras suffered far more from

famines. The reason was that canals as such could not prevent water scarcity in the dry months if the region suffered from a general shortage of rains. In other words, the natural supply of water and the capacity of canals to prevent famines were correlated. In several parts of the canal-served agrarian countryside, there were dramatic improvements in the wealth and income of the people. But the negative externalities of extensive canal projects were also large. These costs occurred due to a persistent engineering defect, the poor drainage of excess water, and the resulting malaria epidemics and saline deposits. The net effects of canal irrigation were seemingly larger in the initially more water-scarce Punjab and Sind than in a region like western United Provinces, where canals were an alternative to well irrigation. Uniformly, however, canals intensified rural inequality.

Railways

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the common systems of long-distance transportation of cargo were pack animals and small sailing vessels on navigable rivers. Large trains of pack animals were driven by the nomadic Banjaras on



Railway Train Car. With their construction initiated under British rule, India's railways—still one of the largest transportation networks in the world—provided much needed stimulus to the labor market. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

roads that connected western India with eastern and northern India. For short-distance trade and travel, the common means of transportation were palanquins, small river craft, and bullock carts. The older systems of long-distance trade used a lot of labor and time. The railways destroyed them without much resistance. Comparatively lesser attention was paid by the government to roads and short-distance travel, so in that sphere, traditional means of transportation survived until well after 1947.

In 1849 the Government of India entered an agreement with some British railway companies to construct railways in India on a guaranteed minimum return of 5 percent on paid-up capital. The guarantee was meant to attract investment in a venture that would normally be seen as risky because it consumed so much capital for an uncertain return. The guaranteed profit imposed a fiscal burden on the state. But since many crucial lines in India (nearly all those in South India, for example) ran at a loss for many decades after their construction, it is probable that without the guarantee these would not have been built at all.

Railway construction began on a large scale in the 1850s and continued, almost exclusively by the private

sector, until 1870. At 1870, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and Delhi had become interconnected by the “broad-gauge” system. Thereafter, the fiscal burden became too heavy to bear due to the depreciation of the rupee and the rise in interest rates on government borrowing abroad to pay for guarantees. Increasingly, therefore, the government itself entered railway construction. The first major “meter-gauge” lines were a product of direct investment. Later in the nineteenth century, the government started buying out some of the “guaranteed companies.” During the 1920s, all railways in India were brought under government management.

By then the Indian railway system was one of the largest networks in the world. Between 1860 and 1940, total route miles increased from 838 to 41,852. Route miles per 1,000 square miles increased from 0.5 to 26, and route miles per million persons increased from 3 to 107. Passengers carried by the railways increased from 48 million in 1880 to 604 million in 1940. Clearly, the railways had revolutionized the mobility of people and goods in South Asia.

The economic effects of the railways can be classified into two types. First, the railways had significant forward



Truck Owned by Tata Industries. Road construction was a low-priority area of government investment during the colonial period and beyond. In 2004, however, the National Highways Development Project devised an ambitious plan to repair and convert some 8,000 miles (13,000 km) of road in India to four- and six-lane superhighways. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

and backward linkages with other sectors of the economy. Second, there was great reduction in average transportation costs measured in money and time. Railway construction worldwide stimulated the engineering industry, financial markets, and labor markets. In India the first of these three effects was relatively weak until World War I. Until then, nearly all of the railway material was imported from Britain. The government had built railway workshops in India for repair and production of parts, but they were not intensively used. Coal mining was the only important example of backward linkage of the railways. After the war, a progressive “Indianization” began to occur. The role of the railways as a major source of demand for the basic metal industries in India became significant from that time forward. The financial development effect was weaker still, since the major part of the capital came from London. The effect on stimulating the labor market was of great importance. At 1947 the Indian railways were the single largest employer in the organized sector, a distinction maintained today. And railways facilitated the major channels of internal labor migration. A Chota Nagpur laborer, traveling to the Assam tea plantations for work in the mid-nineteenth century, was awestruck by the railway carriage and composed songs, at

least one of which compared the black locomotive to the image of Krishna, the dark-skinned god.

Import and export trades in real terms increased enormously as a result of reduction in transportation costs. Because these costs became a smaller part of the price, the supply of goods now responded to narrower differences between local and world price than before. Exports of raw cotton and hides and skins quickly expanded. Railways also facilitated the integration of markets. This is evident from declining regional variability in prices of food grains. Some Indian nationalists alleged that by thus increasing the supply response to the world market, the railways intensified local shortages of food during the late-nineteenth-century famines. More recent research, on the other hand, has attributed the remarkable reduction in the incidence of famine after 1900 to easier interregional crop movements that the railways had made possible.

Roads and Inland Waterways

A systematic history of roads and road transportation in India remains to be written. From the little research that is available on the nature of long-distance trade before the British came to India, it is fair to conclude that

good and safe roads were scarce in pre-colonial and early colonial India. The poor condition of the roads partly reflected limited engineering capability in bridging the numerous rivers. The East India Company restored and constructed some major roads for military purposes, but regular allocation of funds for roads did not begin until the 1830s.

Even thereafter, roads were a low priority area of government investment. Road length grew at a much slower pace than the railways. In 1931 the length of “metalled” roads per 1,000 persons was as low as 0.4. For a comparison, the ratio was above 1.5 in British Ceylon and Malaya. There were possibly three reasons behind this bias against roads. First, road construction was said to have been too costly in India given the terrain, the rivers, and the high repair costs due to the monsoons. Second, roads brought the government no monetary return, whereas the railways did. Third, the lobbies that pushed the government into investment in modern transportation clearly wanted railways, or cheaper modes of long-distance trade.

In northern and eastern India, and sporadically elsewhere, the major navigable rivers were an important means of transportation of cargo. River traffic was cheaper than roads, and carried larger volumes per head. But the role of rivers in long-distance trade was more or less confined to the Gangetic Plains. This traffic was of great antiquity. It declined in competition with the railways.

Ports

India had a long and rich tradition in mercantile marine and shipbuilding. The advent of the Europeans in the Indian Ocean created competition for the Indians in coastal shipping. However, it also stimulated the business of some of the ancient ports like Masulipatnam or Cambay. The final blow to Indian traditional enterprise in ocean shipping came with the displacement of sailing vessels by steamships in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The major ports that carried the bulk of foreign trade in the colonial period were new sites where railways and modern harbors converged, for example, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Karachi, and Rangoon. Each served as an export outlet for the products of a vast hinterland. The two western Indian ports enhanced their trade manifold with the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869). Thereafter, Calcutta and Bombay also grew to become industrial centers. World War I, while upsetting private business through these ports, emphasized their military importance. Bombay especially saw a modernization drive in the early interwar period.

Posts and Telegraph

The foundations for a government postal system were in place before 1858, but it became a widely used utility only in the late nineteenth century. This expansion was largely driven by the demand for the services of the post office. Migration and money orders had become synonymous. In safety, cost, and wide reach, the postal money order was unprecedented in the history of internal remittance in India. Already in 1849 the East India Company had decided to construct a telegraph system along the railway lines. The telegraph became an urgent necessity on account of the Afghan war and the impending war with Burma. The first line, between Calcutta and Diamond Harbour, opened in 1851 and was used to send shipping news from the coasts to Calcutta. The major lines were completed before 1855. This remarkable speed of construction resulted from both strategic needs and Lord Dalhousie’s personal interest in the plan. The telegraph was a private enterprise in England and the United States and a state enterprise in continental Europe. In India it turned out to be a state enterprise for military reasons, despite Dalhousie’s general aversion to state monopolies. By 1857 the telegraph had proved itself a critical military tool. Not surprisingly, it symbolized evil for the mutineers. With vengeance, they destroyed telegraph establishments wherever they could (and never used it to their advantage). With this lesson behind itself, the Crown rule saw massive expansion of the telegraph system within the country and between India and Europe. From then onward, the commercial uses of the telegraphs began to overwhelm strategic needs, leading to extremely rapid growth in the use of the system.

Power

Electricity generation in colonial India saw significant private-public coexistence and cooperation. By contrast, in the period after 1947, there was a decisive turn toward state monopoly. The first private firm to produce electricity for Calcutta city was proposed in 1891. In the next ten years, a series of legislation laid down the basic framework of regulation. Electricity was first introduced in 1897 by a small firm in the Darjeeling Municipality utilizing a mountain stream. Two years later, the Calcutta Electricity Supply Undertaking started producing electricity with steam power. Two other large hydroelectric projects came up before World War I: the Sivasamudram on the Cauvery, erected by the Mysore government, and the Khopoli plant of Tata Electric Power. The former supplied power to the Kolar gold mines, and the latter to Bombay city. The report of the Indian Industrial Commission (1918) laid great emphasis on the need for organized exploitation of natural resources, including hydroelectric power. However, efforts in this direction had to wait until the mid-1920s, when the provinces

recovered from the initial trauma of “dyarchy” and pursued some of their now exclusive duties, electricity generation for example. In the interwar period a large number of hydroelectric and thermal power units were started, many of these in the territories of the princely states. At 1947 the installed capacity stood at 1.7 million kilowatts.

The process of infrastructure development had inherent inequalities. Irrigation systems remained primitive and undeveloped in large parts, the railways de-prioritized roads, electricity generation was initially drawn toward centers of modern enterprise, and so on. Some of these inequalities were redressed in the post-colonial period, but others continued. Communication and local transportation remain even now of sharply variable quality. The regions poorly endowed have seen a long history of neglect and government failure.

Tirthankar Roy

See also Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947; Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947

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INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY SINCE 1950

India’s infrastructure services are slowly but steadily moving away from the realm of government control to that of the private sector. Across sectors ranging from telecommunications and roads to power and ports, state-owned agencies are giving way to private sector entities operating in a competitive environment and subjected to economic regulation where necessary. Governments at both central and state levels are actively engaged in managing this transition, devising appropriate policy frameworks and

establishing suitable institutions such as the central road fund and independent regulatory authorities in power and telecommunication sectors.

Telecommunications

Since India’s independence, its telecommunications sector has continued to be governed by the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which placed all telecommunications within the government domain. Telecommunications services were the exclusive monopoly of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, which had the mandate to regulate and provide these services. Public ownership over the next several decades hampered growth of the sector, leaving India’s teledensity (defined as main lines per 100 inhabitants) among the lowest in the world: 0.4 in 1980 and 0.7 in 1990. The extremely high level of unfulfilled demand was evident from the long waiting lists and the willingness of Indian subscribers to pay large up-front payments for telephone connections.

The government initiated partial reforms in 1985, when the Department of Posts and Telegraphs was divided into separate entities, the Department of Posts and the Department of Telecommunications. In 1986 the government spun off basic telephone services in the two metropolitan cities of Delhi and Mumbai into a new public sector entity, the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited. Overseas communication services were transferred to Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited. Subsequently, the government ushered in the National Telecom Policy of 1994, which allowed private participation in both basic and cellular services. In 1997 the government enacted legislation to establish the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India.

The process of liberalization received further fillip in 1999 with the adoption of the New Telecom Policy of 1999, which permitted the entry of multiple players into all segments, including fixed line, cellular, and long distance telecommunications. Furthermore, the policy-making and service-providing functions of the Department of Telecommunications were separated; the latter were transferred to a new company, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited. In addition, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act was amended in 2000, to bring clarity to the authority’s functions and powers, and a separate Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal was established to adjudicate disputes.

In November 2003 the government issued guidelines for converging the hitherto disparate basic and cellular licenses into Unified Access Services Licenses. This process of license unification is likely to be extended to other service segments. Today, most major telecommunications operators are aggressively seeking to expand their

operations. These expansion plans will, however, require substantial additional investment, and will prove to be a considerable challenge for private players due to the steep decline in tariffs.

The spectacular progress of India's telecommunications sector has been largely due to the entry of private players. Private participation has resulted in greater competition, better service, increased penetration, and lower prices. By 2002 the average cellular tariffs were reduced by 53 percent, and national long distance and international subscriber dialing tariffs declined, respectively, by 56 percent and 47 percent. Cellular tariffs in India are now among the lowest in the world, and tariffs for cellular-to-cellular calls fell by almost 70 percent. This steep decline, coupled with a significant growth in wireless telephony, resulted in an unprecedented increase in teledensity, from 1.9 in March 1998 to 7 in March 2004. The cellular subscriber base nearly doubled in 2002–2003 to reach 12.7 million, and again in 2003–2004, to 26 million.

Though teledensity has grown at so rapid a pace, much of this growth occurred in urban areas and telephone connectivity in rural areas still remains a cause of concern. In rural areas, where two-thirds of India's population live, about 14 percent of the villages are still without any telephone service. While the costs of rolling out village public telephones are undoubtedly high, it is also widely acknowledged that the absence of credible penalties for nonfulfillment of rural rollout obligations by the licensees has not helped in this regard. The government is, however, committed to expanding the rural telephone network through a universal service fund.

Power

Private sector participation in the power sector is not new to India. In fact, at the time of independence in 1947, private sector utilities and licenses accounted for over 80 percent of all electricity supplied in India. Immediately after independence, the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 vested responsibility for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to State Electricity Boards (SEBs), marking the first shift toward public ownership in the power sector. Within the next decade, the state electricity boards took over almost all private sector power licenses.

By the mid-1970s it had become apparent that SEBs alone would not be able to meet the rapidly increasing demand for power, and the central government established the National Thermal Power Corporation Limited and the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited to enhance generation capacity. To mitigate regional imbalances, the government established the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited to manage

the transmission of power between states and regions. By the mid-1980s it was clear that the power sector would not be able to meet India's growing demand without considerable restructuring. In 1991 the government amended the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 to encourage private investment by providing a legal basis for facilitating investment in generation and distribution. This policy was to provide additional generation capacity to complement the rapidly declining public sector resources.

The responsibility for the power sector is currently shared between the central government and the states. At the central level, policy and planning is under the purview of the Ministry of Power and its arm, the Central Electricity Authority. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission was established in 1998 and deals with inter alia regulation pertaining to the tariffs of generating companies owned or controlled by the central government and those who sell electricity in more than one state, interstate transmission of energy including tariff of transmission utilities, and oversight of the India's Electricity Grid Code. At the state level, there are State Electricity Regulatory Commissions, whose functions include determining the tariff for generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity within the state, issuing transmission, distribution and trading licenses, and facilitating intrastate transmission of electricity. The energy departments of each state address policy and planning issues.

Although the sector was liberalized in 1992, private participation has remained far below expectations. Out of nearly 120 expressions of interest registered to add 69,000 megawatts of capacity amounting to about U.S.\$55.5 billion of investment, only a handful of private projects have been implemented.

One of the main factors impeding private participation in generation is the precarious financial condition of the SEBs, which, in turn, is attributable to nonremunerative tariff structures, poor operational and collection practices (which facilitates theft), and dilapidated networks. Despite some improvement over the previous year, the operating losses of state power utilities in 2002–2003 continued to remain high, at an estimated U.S.\$4 billion. Aggregate technical and commercial losses are reported to be as high as 40 percent, and, of these, about two-thirds are said to be commercial losses, a euphemism for theft. As a result, private investors and lenders are wary of supporting power projects that have to sell exclusively to financially weak SEBs.

India's per capita electricity consumption is still among the lowest globally (for example, half that of China). It is estimated that over 100,000 megawatts of



Nagarjunasagar Dam. Named after Acharya Nagarjuna, a philosopher who spread Mahayana Buddhism, the Nagarjunasagar Dam was among the earliest hydroelectric projects in India. The largest masonry dam in the world, it straddles a massive manmade lake and has rendered Andhra Pradesh the “rice bowl” of India. JYOTI BANERJEE / FOTOMEDIA.

capacity need to be installed by 2012, which will require additional investments of U.S.\$178 billion in the next decade. To meet these requirements, the power sector will have to rely on sizable private sector participation and investment, which in turn is intrinsically linked to reform of the sector.

In order to spur reforms, the central government has undertaken a few key initiatives. Parliament passed the Electricity Act of 2003, which consolidates the existing electricity laws and attempts to usher in a market-based competitive regime and institutionalize appropriate regulatory safeguards. Following the recommendations of an Expert Committee, the Ministry of Power is now providing incentives to the states that manage to reduce the gap between the cost of supply and revenue realization, through the Accelerated Power Development and Reform Programme. The Expert Committee also delineated a reform framework and financial restructuring principles that could potentially form the basis for devising state-specific reform programs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has notified and implemented an

Availability Based Tariff regime, with a view to make the incentives of the utilities compatible with the merit order requirements of the entire network and thereby improve grid discipline.

At state level too, reforms are progressing, albeit at a varying pace. While Orissa and Delhi have moved furthest by privatizing power distribution in their respective states, quite a few other states have unbundled generation, transmission and distribution functions into separate entities. Twenty one states have constituted State Electricity Regulatory Commissions.

Ports

India has over 3,728 miles (6,000 km) of natural coastline and is strategically well-positioned on global trade routes. India has 13 major ports and over 181 minor ports (of which 139 are operational), which together handle the bulk of India’s foreign trade. Most of the major ports in India were established after independence, except for Kolkata (Calcutta) and Mumbai

(Bombay), which were built in the nineteenth century by the British. Responsibility for all major ports has mainly been, and still is, in the domain of the central government. The thirteen major ports handled over 280 million metric tons of cargo in 2001–2002, mostly petroleum, iron ore, and coal; they operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Shipping. The Tariff Authority for Major Ports regulates prices at the major ports, while the remaining ports fall under the jurisdiction of their respective state governments.

While overall cargo traffic grew at approximately 7 percent per annum during the 1990s, most Indian ports are already operating at full capacity and there is a critical need for augmentation of capacity. Globally, increased trade, coupled with enhanced efficiency levels and improved processes, have made it difficult for traditional ports with outdated facilities and systems to compete effectively. Indian ports are plagued by widespread inefficiencies in cargo handling, poor connectivity, a mismatch of facilities and type of cargo traffic, and outdated labor practices. In the last few years, although there has been some improvement in operational performance, with the average turnaround time falling from 8.1 days in 1990–1991 to 3.7 days in 2001–2002, there is still a long way to go to attain international efficiency levels. Indian ports also face growing competition from nearby transshipment ports, such as Colombo, Singapore, Dubai, and Salalah, which offer world-class facilities and quick turnaround times. The mismatch of cargo facilities is further likely to impede future viability of the sector, as global trade is moving increasingly toward containerized cargo, which has been growing at over 10 percent per annum; only 13 percent of India's port capacity is dedicated to container traffic.

In due recognition of the aforementioned deficiencies, the government has sought to usher in market oriented reforms in the sector. As part of this, port trusts have been given the authority to spend up to 1 billion rupees (U.S. \$22.2 million) without prior permission of the central government. Ports trusts are also now required to follow a new commercial "profit and loss" accounting system. More significantly, the central government as well as states have initiated measures to attract private participation in the sector. Major port trusts have awarded concessions for container terminals to global port majors such as P&O (Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust [JNPT] and Chennai) and PSA (Tuticorin) and new international players are entering, viz., Dubai Port Authority in Cochin and Maersk in JNPT and Pipavav. Amidst poor efficiency gains in the port sector as a whole, the performance of some private port terminals has been impressive. The Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal developed by P&O Australia at JNPT initially expected to handle 500,000

TEUs (twenty feet equivalent units) by 2005, had already exceeded 900,000 TEUs by 2002.

It is imperative that Indian ports improve efficiency levels to match international standards. This cannot be achieved in an environment in which state-owned monopoly operators provide port services, since there is little incentive for them to improve efficiency. The experience of the private container terminal at JNPT clearly indicates the benefits that can be achieved through private sector involvement and competition. Accordingly, the government should curtail its involvement in this sector and instead devolve more power to port authorities, and embrace privatisation of various port services. In addition, the government should ensure good connectivity to ports with the rest of India's transportation network, so as to facilitate and enhance interport competition. As intraport and interport competition increases, the government should phase out economic regulation.

Roads

India's total road network, stretching approximately about 2 million miles (3.3 million km), is the second-largest road system in the world, comprising national highways, state highways, major district roads, and rural roads. Since independence the road network has suffered from a lack of funds, poor monitoring, and inadequate supervision of road projects. Maintenance has been a low priority, which has led to appalling safety conditions, resulting in over 70,000 fatalities per year. Only 46 percent of India's roads are paved, and of those only 20 percent are in good condition. The last few years have seen a rapid increase in motor vehicles and a marked deceleration in the development of road capacity, as over 85 percent of passenger traffic and 70 percent of freight traffic is carried by the road network. As a result, roads have become congested, and the quality of road travel has deteriorated substantially.

This problem is especially acute in the case of national highways (36,000 mi., or 58,000 km), which form the backbone of India's transport network. Due to the poor physical condition of roads, traffic speeds are low, leading to increased freight costs. In 1995 the National Highways Authority of India was given a mandate to develop, maintain and manage national highways entrusted to it. The authority is currently implementing the National Highways Development Project (NHDP) comprising of over 8,700 miles (about 14,000 km) of the national highways network, including the 3,600 miles (5,800 km) of roads linking the four major metropolitan cities and 4,500 miles (7,300 km) of the North-South and East-West corridors. The total construction cost of the NHDP has been estimated at about U.S.\$13 billion. In addition

to NHDP, forty-eight new road projects at an estimated cost of about U.S.\$8.8 billion will be undertaken in the coming years.

According to a World Bank study, the completion of the new corridors will result in annual savings of approximately U.S.\$1.8 billion in fuel spending, reduced wear and tear of vehicles, and faster transportation. It is noteworthy that, compared to an annual addition of 6.8 miles (11 km) of national highways since independence, about 3,200 miles (5,100 km) of roads have already been four-laned as part of the NHDP.

The high traffic risk and the unwillingness of commuters to pay tolls often impede private investment in this sector. In this regard, the government's decisions to indirectly collect road-user payments through a tax on fuel and to constitute a nonlapsable central road fund appear to be steps in the right direction. However, there remains scope for further improving the existing institutional arrangements. For example, including road-user representatives in the management of the road fund would help impart greater transparency, establish accountability, and ensure that expenditure decisions are more responsive to the user needs. Yet another area of concern is that a substantial portion of the NHDP is being implemented through traditional civil works contracts, which leaves subsequent maintenance of the roads to the vagaries of funds availability and allocation. In order to overcome this limitation, the government could consider adopting approaches such as Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT), Annuity and Shadow Tolling, which seem to offer better incentives for the operators to adopt optimal life-cycle construction methods and to maintain the roads over the contract duration.

At the state level too, there has been some progress. Several states, including Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, are going ahead with their (state) highway development programs, funded by a variety of approaches including toll roads, annuity, and capital subsidies. The last few years have also seen a much-needed thrust by the government toward improving the rural road network in India. In 2000, with a view to enhancing rural connectivity, the government launched the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, a centrally sponsored program funded by a tax on diesel.

Airports

Airports play a critical role in promoting trade, tourism, and the economic development of a country. The Airports Authority of India was constituted in 1995 to bring about integrated development and the expansion and modernization of operational, terminal, and cargo facilities at India's airports. Out of a total of 400 airports/

airfields/airstrips in the country, the authority manages 94 civil airports (of which 11 are international airports) and 28 civil enclaves at defense airfields. These airports handled over 44 million passengers in 2002–2003 (15 million international and 29 million domestic). The authority is responsible for providing air traffic services over the Indian airspace and adjoining oceanic areas.

Although it may appear that India has considerable airport capacity, it has for the most part lost out in aviation; it missed the global travel boom of the 1990s, ceding its natural geographic and economic advantages as a cargo and courier hub to other countries. Air travel still remains confined to a tiny section of the domestic population. The share of India in total world aviation traffic remains minuscule. India accounted for a mere 2.4 million tourist arrivals in 2002, compared to 715 million worldwide and 130 million in the Asia Pacific region. Worldwide, tourism accounts for about 10 percent of gross domestic product; in India it is less than 5 percent.

There is considerable underutilization of existing capacity, as only 62 of India's airports are in use, with the rest remaining inactive. Moreover, there are a large number of airports where full infrastructure is available, but which operate only a few flights a day. Over 40 percent of the passenger traffic is concentrated in the two main international airports in Delhi and Mumbai, and the limited terminal capacity at these airports has led to increased congestion, bunching of flights, and delays in passenger clearance. This situation is exacerbated by outdated infrastructure, inadequate ground-handling systems and night-landing facilities, and poor passenger amenities. Grossly inadequate cargo-handling procedures at airports result in delays of days in transit from one terminal to another. Only ten airports in the country are profitable, despite airport charges in India being considerably higher than the international average.

India's airports urgently need to improve efficiency and undertake investments for capacity addition. There is an increasing recognition that private participation is the key for achieving both these two objectives. The government has recently taken a long-awaited decision on the privatization of the New Delhi and Mumbai airports, approving the proposal to set up joint ventures with 74 percent private ownership and a cap of 49 percent on foreign direct investment. The government has also approved plans for two new airports near Hyderabad and Bangalore, with majority private sector participation.

Railways

The Indian Railways (IR) is over 150 years old. Since independence, the IR has remained a government enterprise and it currently operates the world's second-largest



Indian Airlines Passenger Jet. State-owned Indian Airlines remains the top domestic carrier. In the face of intense competition from budget, no-frills airlines, and the growing number of air travelers (the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation estimated that the Indian market will add 5 million passengers every year for the next five years), can it continue to manage its high costs while maintaining service standards? AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

rail network under single management, with a route length of over 39,500 miles (63,000 km). The railways carry over one million metric tons of freight and transport over 10 million passengers a day (of which over 5 million are in Mumbai's suburban network). The annual revenue of the IR is approximately U.S.\$5.5 billion, of which freight transport accounts for 70 percent and the balance is passenger traffic.

IR is now facing strong competition from road transport, pipelines, and air transport. Arbitrary pricing policies by the government, especially after 1985, prevented IR from raising passenger fares in line with rising costs, and led to heavy cross-subsidization by overcharging freight customers. Greater customer orientation, more flexibility, and the lower costs of road transport, contrasted with the slow movement and poor service quality of the railways, induced many freight customers to move to relatively cheaper road transport. IR is also plagued by very high operational expenses. In 2000–2001, operating ratio—that is, ratio of total working expenses to gross

traffic receipts—reached 98.5 percent. Even as IR is unable to generate enough internal resources to contribute to investment plans, the government too reduced its level of financial support to the railways in the last decade.

A combination of the aforementioned factors has placed the IR on the verge of a financial crisis and led to substantial whittling down of fresh investments. The Railway Safety Committee's recommendation to invest U.S.\$2.2 billion over the next five years to improve the safety of the aging network through better track maintenance and general improvements has been inordinately delayed. The need to increase investment in rail infrastructure led to a policy decision in 2000 to allow private capital in the railways sector, covering rolling as well as fixed infrastructure. In December 2002, the government announced a scheme—the National Rail Vikas Yojana—aimed at increasing the capacity of the rail golden quadrilateral connecting the four largest cities, providing better connectivity to major ports and building

a few critically needed bridges over the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. Funds required for this scheme, estimated at U.S. \$3 billion, are planned to be raised through an innovative mix of budgetary and nonbudgetary resources, including market borrowings and multilateral funding agencies.

The early 2000s have seen some initiatives involving private sector participation in the railways, one in Gujarat, completed in May 2003, entailing an investment of U.S.\$119 million. The project, which aims at providing rail connectivity to Pipavav port, has been developed by Pipavav Rail Corporation, a joint venture between Gujarat Pipavav port and the IR. A similar structure is now planned to connect Krishnapatnam port in Andhra Pradesh. In the southern region, the IR is encouraging private entrepreneurs to set up private goods terminals, which will comprise multi-modal facilities for rail-cum-road links, warehousing facilities, storage facilities, and information technology backup for logistics services.

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See also Information and Other Technology Development

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INSURANCE INDUSTRY At the time of India's independence, the country had a competitive market both in life and nonlife insurance. After independence, Indian insurance companies started growing faster as competition intensified and as non-Indian insurers were

dislodged. In 1956 the government nationalized the life insurance industry, and in 1973 nationalized nonlife insurance businesses. Until 2000 India's government enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the country's insurance industry. Currently, however, competition from many private insurers has been introduced.

Nationalization and Change

When the government of India nationalized all life insurance companies in 1956, it brought together over two hundred private life insurers and provident societies under a single entity, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). However, the stated mission of the nationalization of life insurance was to mobilize savings for the development of the country and to conduct the business in the spirit of trusteeship, providing protection to the people in every part of the country. The LIC is a public company, owned entirely by the government. Since the LIC's charter specified that only 5 percent of its annual valuation surplus would go to the government (the owner), the remaining 95 percent was returned to policyholders in the form of bonuses and profits. The corporation was thus run almost like a mutual fund. After the nationalization, the life insurance business in the country has been synonymous with the LIC, which has developed a vast network of branches. The number of policyholders has increased from 5.6 million in 1956–1957 to 125.8 million in 2001–2002; the number of branches increased from 240 to over 2,000 during the same period.

The LIC has also been active in the field of group insurance plans for the more vulnerable sections of society since the 1980s. By offering subsidized plans for the unorganized and rural sectors, the LIC has played an important role in supplementing other, state-level efforts in providing social security. In the past, it covered around 5 million lives of people working in diverse occupations, including rickshaw pullers, construction workers, and self-employed women. A significant portion of LIC funds was invested in social projects; in March 1997, the LIC invested 610.74 billion rupees in central, state, and local government guaranteed marketable securities, and in loans to various socially oriented programs to provide for and improve basic amenities such as potable water, drainage, housing, electrification, and transportation.

The LIC's socioeconomic commitment defined its basic thrust. In its formative years, it was engaged in harnessing savings, providing security, and utilizing people's money for their welfare. However, in the 1970s, the LIC branched from its traditional life insurance operations into mass insurance through group insurance, later extended to social security. It further entered the pension field in mid-1980s. These achievements notwithstanding,

the LIC has been able to cover only a quarter of India's insurable population. Lack of competition engendered complacency in the insurance industry, and this was reflected in insufficient responsiveness to customer needs, high costs, overstaffing, and a relatively high rate of lapsing policies. The LIC was also slow to adopt new technology. By the 1990s the need for major reforms in the insurance sector seemed clear.

On the nonlife insurance (or "general" insurance) front, the situation was much the same, though the General Insurance Council did frame a code of conduct for fair and sound business practices in 1957. In 1968 the Insurance Act was amended to provide for greater social control over the general insurance business. In 1971 the management of nonlife insurers was taken over by the government, and general insurance was nationalized in 1973. As a result, 107 insurers were amalgamated and grouped into four companies with headquarters in Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi, and Chennai. The General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC), incorporated in November 1972, was their holding company, commencing business on 1 January 1973. The general insurance business also increased in volume after its nationalization. The net premium income increased from 2.2 billion rupees in 1973 to about 85 billion rupees in 2001–2002. The four public insurers were expected to compete among themselves. But, in reality, there was hardly any competition among them, partly because they all were owned by the government, and partly because the Indian general insurance market was substantially driven by a tariff regime, decided by the Tariff Advisory Committee.

General insurance business is broadly divided into three categories: fire, marine, and miscellaneous. Motor vehicle insurance is a part of miscellaneous, accounting for 35 to 40 percent of the total gross premium collected by the general insurance industry. The fire portfolio accounts for about 20 percent of the total business. Though the industry makes overall profits, the motor vehicle portfolio continues to lose money, mainly due to third-party legal liability claims.

Later Reforms

Reforming the insurance sector has been part of India's economic reforms initiated in the 1990s. The government constituted an insurance reform committee, headed by former finance secretary and central bank governor R. N. Malhotra, in April 1993. In its report submitted to the government in January 1994, the committee highlighted the major weaknesses and problems in the sector, and also recommended opening the sector to competition from private players. Other important recommendations were to restructure the public insurance companies so as to enable them to face competition, and

the setting up of an autonomous statutory regulatory body with independent financing. In response to the Malhotra Committee recommendations, the government in 1996 constituted an Interim Insurance Regulatory Authority to suggest legislative reforms in the insurance industry.

The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Bill of 1999 was passed by both houses of Parliament and was later ratified by the president on 29 December 1999. The act provides for the establishment of a statutory IRDA to protect the interests of insurance policy holders and to regulate, promote, and ensure orderly growth of the insurance industry, opening it up to the private sector. The act also stipulated that no insurer be allowed to conduct life insurance or general insurance business in India unless it has a paid-up equity capital of 1 billion rupees. A single company is not allowed to transact both life and nonlife insurance business; foreign equity at present is capped at 26 percent. For banks to enter into the insurance business, prior approval of the central bank is required.

Following the passage of the IRDA Act, private players were allowed into the insurance business in 2000. In the first year, six private insurers were registered: four in life insurance and two in nonlife insurance business. As of 31 March 2002, there were twelve life and ten nonlife insurers registered with IRDA. Most of the new companies in the industry have formed a joint venture with a foreign partner.

The Insurance Amendment Act of 2002 has paved the way for the entry of corporate agents and brokers, for accepting different modes of payment of premiums, and for changes in provisions relating to the distribution of surplus in the life insurance business. The introduction of licensed third-party administrators is expected to give a boost to the health insurance that has remained underdeveloped in the country. In 2001–2002—the first year of operation of four new life insurance companies—the life insurance industry witnessed a growth of 43.03 percent in gross premiums. LIC dominated the life insurance market. On the general insurance front, of the six new nonlife insurers, five have formed joint ventures with foreign equity participation. The general insurance business grew at 12.03 percent during 2001–2002. The share of private insurers was 3.74 percent of the total gross premiums underwritten in the country.

The benefits of a competitive market are becoming visible as the insurance companies are educating customers about the need for buying insurance, advertising their products, and trying to differentiate from those of others. The insurers are adopting creative ways of marketing products and developing unconventional distribution

channels, such as establishing links with banks to attract their clientele. The insurance regulator's approach so far is reassuring.

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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM Insurgency and terrorism are as old as war. These are tactics of the weak, a means by which people with a cause attempt to gain political objectives through violence. Since independence, India has extensively experienced both insurgency and terrorism, essentially of two types. One type is oriented to socioeconomic Marxist revolution, the first of which began at Telengana in present-day Andhra Pradesh, spreading over time to include Nepal. In the 1960s it engulfed parts of West Bengal in violent urban terrorism inspired by the politics of Mao Zedong. These movements were countered essentially by state police forces, subdued but never eliminated. There has been a resurgence in these movements; in 2002 they formed an umbrella organization called the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to facilitate cooperation and coordination among fourteen Marxist groups. The other form of violence was guerrilla war, or an insurgency, advocating separatism and affecting the peripheral regions of the country. It began at independence among the Naga people in Northeast India and spread elsewhere later. Terrorism evolved and spread in India in the 1990s as an even more intense form of violence.

Insurgency and terrorism have definite characteristics in India. Insurgency may be said to represent a people's movement with a political cause, usually aiming for independence and often settling at some stage for political autonomy. It uses violence as the principal though not the only means to achieve its ends. It targets mainly the

state apparatus and particularly the security forces. Legitimacy is sought through popular support; it therefore attempts to create an alternate state structure. Even though violence may be intense, it is neither random nor meant purely for effect. The battle is for the hearts and minds of the people, based on a perceived cause, with the insurgents likely to have an initial advantage. Terrorism, a comparatively recent phenomenon in India, is more likely to be inspired by religious causes. Particularly since 1999, it has also adopted the version of suicide or fedayeen attacks.

The Northeast Insurgencies

Insurgencies in independent India began in the Northeast region of the country, which today comprises seven provinces. The region was deprived of its links with the rest of the nation at partition, with East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) interposed between the two parts. Only a narrow 12 miles (20 km) wide corridor between Bangladesh and Nepal link the two parts. Deprived of an outlet to the sea and with limited access to the outside world, the region was condemned to underdevelopment. Ethnically, the people are immensely diverse, with distinct and separate identities, more akin to those in Southeast Asia, from where many of them originally came. Except for the Brahmaputra River valley and the adjacent low hills suitable for the highly lucrative tea cultivation, the British had left the tribes almost entirely to themselves. It is not surprising that they would ask for independence.

Nagaland. Insurgency in India began in Nagaland on 14 August 1947, when the Naga National Council (NNC) demanded independence from the Indian Union. The movement was initially limited to political action. First, the NNC conducted a "plebiscite" in 1951, which it claimed supported their cause. Next, it launched a boycott against the first general elections, held in 1952. Soon after, the movement turned violent. In September 1954, Naga leader Angami Zapu Phizo announced Nagaland independence and confronted the central government with an armed insurrection. Initially, the Indian government responded with escalating counterviolence, using local police and the Assam Rifles, and in 1956 sending in the regular army. By 1964 an Indian infantry division of some 20,000 soldiers was deployed against a few thousand armed rebel insurgents. Simultaneously, state administrative structures were strengthened, and political actions were initiated, granting statehood to Nagaland in January 1964. A peace initiative was then launched under Jaya Prakash Narayan, B. P. Chaliha, and Michael Scott, a Scottish missionary. This initiated a cease-fire, and after a decade of sporadic violence, peace terms were finally agreed upon. The Shillong Accord was

signed in 1975, under which most Nagas agreed to surrender their arms. Two armed Naga groups were, however, enroute to China for military training and arms procurement at the time the agreement was signed, and hence were left out of the peace process. The leaders of this group, S. S. Khaplang, Issak Swu, and T. Muivah, decided to continue the insurgency from adjacent Myanmar. After prolonged discussions they too finally abandoned the insurgency in 2002.

Mizoram. South of Nagaland lie the Mizo Hills, inhabited by a single tribe, the Mizos. Unlike their neighbors in the plains, however, they did not initially demand independence, merely greater autonomy from the state of Assam in order to maintain their identity and traditional culture. Crops failed repeatedly in the area in the early 1960s, leading to acute famine in the hills. The slow response of the Assam government led to deep discontent and finally to insurrection. The Mizo movement, led by Laldenga, commenced with armed attacks throughout the region at midnight on 28 February 1966. India responded in force, sending in an armed division to punish the Mizo tribals. Support was offered to the rebels by East Pakistan (Bangladesh after 1971) and sanctuary in Myanmar. Violence continued for two decades. After prolonged discussions, a peace settlement was finally reached in 1986, with Laldenga finally vowing to accept the Constitution of India. He was made the chief minister of the state of Mizoram the next year. All violence ended with the accord.

Manipur. The plains of Manipur, adjoining Nagaland, saw an outbreak of insurgency in the mid-1970s. Several factions had varied goals, centered around factional and tribal demands. At least one was pro-Communist, its leaders having come in contact with China. Sporadic violence continued during the initial years of independence, but was countered successfully by the army. The state remains prone to law and order problems, though virtually all insurgency ended by the early 1990s.

Assam. Economic stagnation, lack of employment, and a continuous flow of refugees from Bangladesh have posed major challenges to Assam's state government. Prolonged popular student agitation in the late 1970s led to the All Assam Students Union forming its own state government in 1983. Assam's problems did not go away, however, and the resultant instability bred greater discontent, leading to the outbreak of more insurgencies. The principal one, led by indigenous Assamese of the valley under the United Liberation Front for Asom (ULFA), brought out the army in support of the government in Operation Rhino before the end of 1989. The Indian army has remained engaged, though at much lower levels of intensity. The situation in Assam remains disturbed and is countered primarily by central police forces. A number of smaller insurgencies have emerged, opposing ULFA and challenging the

Assamese majority. Violence remains in the region and has spread to Bhutan, with armed groups seeking sanctuary there as well as in Bangladesh.

The Punjab

Insurgency came to the heartland of India's in the early 1980s. The Sikhs constitute a vibrant minority in India, with 2 percent of the nation's population. The linguistic reorganization of India's states after 1957 led to the formation of a much smaller state of Punjab, where the Sikhs had a bare majority. Autocratic and interfering policies of the central government led in turn to fundamentalist Sikh aspirations, which soon turned violent under a charismatic religious leader, "Sant" J. S. Bhindranwale. Sharing a border with Pakistan, dissident Sikh groups received arms and support from Islamabad. Armed groups soon established themselves in Sikh religious shrines (*gurdwaras*), with Bhindranwale moving into the holiest of them all, the Golden Temple at Amritsar. They openly challenged Delhi, promising a violent revolution. The Indian state responded with military force, launching Operation Blue Star on the night of 4 June 1984. After an intense overnight battle employing tanks, the army secured the Golden Temple, damaging it seriously in the process and suffering over three hundred casualties. Many Sikh insurgents and some pilgrims perished in the attack. The state was traumatized.

Barely five months later, on 31 October, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards. A riot broke out in Delhi, targeting Sikhs. It is claimed that some mobs were led by political leaders belonging to the ruling Congress Party. Over two thousand innocent Sikhs were murdered and torched in the nation's capital over the next few days. An armed insurgency soon broke out in the Punjab.

The insurgency was intense, violent, sectarian, and indiscriminate. The situation was countered primarily by the state police, with the army remaining always on call and in support. Even though an accord was signed with the moderate Sikh leader of the Akali Party, Sant Gurcharan Singh Longowal, in 1986 and a government installed in the state under him, insurgency continued. Finally, when in desperation the insurgents targeted the families of policemen, they countered with greater violence under the leadership of the director general of police, K. P. S. Gill, himself a Sikh. After prolonged attrition, the situation was controlled by 1992, returning to full normalcy soon afterward.

Jammu and Kashmir

The most complex and intense insurgency that India has faced is the ongoing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir.

Its origin can be traced to the state's accession to India at partition. The Indian Independence Act promulgated by the British Parliament allowed the rulers of the princely states to decide to which dominion (India or Pakistan) the state would accede. The maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, delayed his decision. Only when armed marauders from the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan, led by regular officers from its army, invaded the state did the maharaja seek help from Delhi, signing the Instrument of Accession to India on 25 October 1947. Indian forces flew in the next day and over time stabilized the situation. India referred the question of "Pakistani aggression" to the United Nations Security Council, and a cease-fire was agreed to from 1 January 1949, with Pakistan still in control of about one-third of the state.

Two more wars were fought between India and Pakistan by 1971. Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, both sides agreed to resolve the issue bilaterally. The earlier cease-fire line was replaced by a new "line of control" demarcated after prolonged meetings of senior military commanders of both sides and both countries agreed not to violate it. Peace prevailed in Jammu and Kashmir for the next sixteen years.

Discontent surfaced in the province over the central government's interference with the political process in the state in the 1980s. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), a wing of the Pakistan military, seized this opportunity, and with surplus weapons of the Afghan War (supplied to it by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) directly sponsored insurgencies in India. The turning point came in December 1989, following new elections to Parliament, when the new home (interior) minister's daughter, a medical doctor, was kidnapped in the state capital at Srinagar. The new government was unable to deal with the situation effectively and released the prisoners sought by the kidnapers unconditionally. Euphoric celebrations followed, expecting a collapse of the government in Jammu and Kashmir. The situation was restored, but only with much martial power, and the state settled in for a prolonged period of insurgency encompassing the entire province.

Two terrorist organizations took up arms. One, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), consisted of indigenous insurgents seeking independence. The other group, led by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), sought to merge Kashmir with Pakistan. All insurgent groups were supported and supplied by Pakistan and its ISI, with training, weapons, and money from across the border. By the end of 1990, additional formations of the regular Indian army reinforced the police and paramilitary organizations, and intense counterinsurgency repression was launched. Cordon and search, raids, patrols, and special operations formed the bulk of counterinsurgency

operations throughout the state. Borders had to be sealed and the deployment posture along the line of control was shifted from conventional defense to anti-infiltration. Force levels increased over the years, and a new paramilitary organization, the Rashtriya (National) Rifles was formed, consisting of regular soldiers on deputation in Kashmir. By the early 1990s, the JKLF was marginalized, and the HM was slowly replaced by extremist Islamic forces

Kashmiri insurgents continued their terrorist attacks against Indian security forces, which by then were more than half a million strong in Kashmir, as well as against minority Hindu families, forcing the latter to leave the valley. Indigenous militants were replaced by "guest" militants from Pakistan Occupied (Azad) Kashmir, Pakistan itself, and Afghanistan, and by Islamic terrorists from around the world. Advanced training was carried out under the Taliban, supported by Osama bin Laden, in Afghanistan. By the late 1990s, the situation had turned into "cross border terrorism."

Indian Counterinsurgency Strategy and Tactics

Indian counterinsurgency doctrine evolved from the British era "Aid to Civil Authority," the lessons of the Malayan campaign, and its own experiences of what it terms "low intensity conflicts." The premise has always been that operations were against misguided elements within one's own society and therefore justified use of only "minimum force." In very exceptional and rare circumstances, and as a last resort, the Indian army has used tanks or helicopters in such combat. The principal focus has been to win the "hearts and minds" campaign, with civic actions always following coercive tactics.

There has never been any dichotomy or questioning within the army of its use in internal security. A secondary role of the armed forces, enshrined in the Constitution, mandates aid to the government when required. Detailed modalities and procedures are laid down by the government for its implementation. Special legal authority is provided by the Parliament through the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, applicable in specific "Disturbed Areas" as notified and for a fixed duration, which allows the army to search and arrest without warrant.

When called upon for counterinsurgency operations in a rural area, the army would deploy in a grid pattern. A battalion of about 800 soldiers in five companies would operate over an area of about 4 sq. miles (10 square km). About one-third of the force would remain in reserve at all times. The rest would be engaged in patrolling, collecting information, and launching operations. Opening roads and protecting convoys were important

initial tasks. Specific search-and-destroy operations would be carried out on known hideouts and weapons caches. Grouping of villages, as in Malaya, was tried in both Nagaland and Mizoram with varying success. A grid system facilitated civic actions, which in turn produced intelligence and also ensured accountability.

Major fedayeen attacks have been frequently launched by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir since 1999. These terrorists seize hostages, murder innocents, and kidnap and rape at random. India has trained special forces and antiterrorist cells in military and police units to deal with these situations. An elite National Security Guard specializes in hostage rescue and antihijacking operations.

The security forces' record in counterinsurgency has not been without blemish. There have been many cases of human rights violations, deaths in custody, rape, and looting. Perhaps police forces with a less stringent regimental system of discipline are more vulnerable to such behavior. Cases brought to light have been dealt with severely, and exemplary punishments meted out. National and state human rights commissions are vigilant in trying to keep the security forces in check. A notable feature of the Indian counterinsurgency experience has been that, despite their extensive use in India's internal environment, the forces have never attempted to usurp political power. They have consistently maintained their accountability to Indian law and their adherence to the Constitution.

Dipankar Banerjee

See also Assam; Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Peace Accords; Jammu and Kashmir; Manipur; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Northeast States, The; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Punjab

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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Intellectual property (IP) awareness in India has recently experienced a sharp increase. From 1972 to the 1990s, research and development expenditure in the country grew more than fifty times, but patent filing remained static at 3,500–4,000 applications per year. Though new inventions were being made, they were not being protected, due to a general distrust of the system, coupled with a lack of awareness.

This situation has now changed. As of 2005, India's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research was the third-largest applicant from developing countries under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The number of patent applications being filed annually has more than doubled, to over 10,000, as people are recognizing the potential of their creative skills and channeling them into productive resources.


The Indian courts have also started granting substantial damages in IP cases. Initially, the courts were reluctant to grant damages, being more sympathetic to a defendant whose business was restrained through an injunction. There has, however, been a radical change in the approach of the courts.

Legislation

Since 1999 Indian law relating to IP rights has doubled in volume as a result of the requirements of the World Trade Organization agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). New IP laws have been enacted, including: the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999; the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers' Act, 2001; the Information Technology Act, 2000; the Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout Design Act, 2000; and the Bio Diversity Act, 2002.

The Patents (Amendments) Act of 2002 was enacted, taking effect on 20 May 2003, in line with India's phased compliance with its TRIPS obligations. The act established a patent term of twenty years; exclusive marketing rights; patentability of microorganisms; expansion of the list of nonpatentable inventions; and patentability of software-related inventions. The time period for the grant of most patents was reduced from over five years to about two years.

On 26 December 2004 the government of India also promulgated the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance of 2004 to make Indian patents law compliant with TRIPS, (January 2005). This ordinance ushers in a product patent regime for all fields of technology and is of particular relevance to drugs, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. The ordinance clarifies the Indian position on the patentability of software inventions by stating that



Investigators Visit a Video Store in Search of Pirated DVDs. There is a well-established statutory and judicial framework in India for safeguarding intellectual property rights, whether they relate to patents, trademarks, copyright, or industrial designs. Accordingly, tougher enforcement measures have been adopted in recent years. INDIA TODAY.

embedded software as well as software/hardware combinations would qualify for patents. However, the provisions relating to exclusive marketing rights have been deleted. The Indian Parliament on 23 March 2005 passed the Patents (Amendment) Bill of 2005, to replace the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance of 2004.

Intellectual Property Litigation

While the Indian courts continue to deal with traditional IP matters pertaining to “passing off” and counterfeiting, an attempt is being made by rightful owners as well as the courts to take IP litigation to the next level. The courts have adopted an innovative and experimental approach, rather than remaining rule-bound. This was achieved by expanding and developing well-established principles and by exploring new legal avenues.

In the first case of its kind, the Delhi High Court in *Emergent Genetics India Pvt. Ltd v. Shailendra Shivam* in 2004 applied principles of the law of confidentiality in giving protection to hybrid cotton seeds that are genotypically identical to those of the plaintiff, and principles of

copyright law, to protect unique sequencing information locked inside genes of hybrid varieties of the plaintiff.

The courts have started to grant compensatory damages in IP litigation and have also begun to grant punitive and exemplary damages. The case that set the benchmark was *Time Incorporated v. Lokesh Srivastava & Anr*, in which the High Court of Delhi granted 500,000 rupees as damages to the plaintiff on account of loss of reputation, and punitive and other damages of an additional amount, for a total of 1.6 million rupees. The court held that the defendant’s magazine, which used the Hindi transliteration of the word “time” with the word *sanskaran* and a distinctive red border, to be a slavish imitation of the plaintiff’s trademark and held the defendant liable for infringement.

This trend was followed in numerous cases, including:

In the case of *Amarnath Sehgal v. Union of India* (1992), the High Court of Delhi ordered the government of India to pay 500,000 rupees of damages to the plaintiff, a world-famous sculptor, for the violation of his moral rights by their act of distortion, damage, and

mutilation of his bronze mural, which had been sold to the government, and also directed a return of the mural itself to the sculptor.

In the case of *Buffalo Networks Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Manish Jain & Others* (2000), the Delhi High Court protected the domain name rights of the plaintiffs, a media and advertising company, by restraining the defendant from using the domain name “www.tehelka.com” or the word “tehelka” on the Internet or otherwise, awarding a sum of 100,000 rupees as damages against the past misuse of the same by the defendants.

In *Tata Sons Limited v. Fashion ID* (2005), the Delhi High Court directed the transfer of the domain name “www.tatainfotecheducation.com” to Tata Infotech Education from a Chinese registrant, and awarded an amount of 100,000 rupees as costs to Tata Infotech.

In *Microsoft Corporation v. Yogesh Popat* (2003), the Delhi High Court awarded a sum of 1.98 million rupees as damages to Microsoft Corporation, with 9 percent interest, for the infringement of its IP rights in its software programs.

Pharmaceutical Patents

The Patents (Amendments) Act of 2002 had had some far-reaching implications for the pharmaceutical sector with the introduction of requirements envisaged by the Doha Declaration of 2001 by the World Trade Organization in the form of a provision for the grant of a license to manufacture generic drugs on notification of the central government in a national health emergency, thus overriding international pharmaceutical patents. The emergency circumstances include “public health crisis relating to Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Tuberculosis (TB), malaria or other epidemics.”

On 26 December 2004 the government of India enacted the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance of 2004, introducing product patents for all fields of technology, including drugs and pharmaceuticals. That ordinance has now been replaced by the Patents (Amendment) Bill of 2005.

Amendments brought about by the new legislation have raised concerns in the pharmaceutical industry that the prices of drugs might increase tremendously. Given the advent of a faster and more effective patent protection regime, the vibrant Indian pharmaceutical industry is gearing up to face challenges. The highly fragmented Indian pharmaceutical sector, with approximately 22,000 registered units employing around 460,000 people, is led by about 250 companies that control 70 percent of the market share. Besides being one of the top five bulk drug

manufacturers in the world, India is also among the top twenty pharmaceutical exporters in the world.

India has also become an attractive destination for clinical trials. India anticipates the gain of a large share of the multi-billion-dollar global business of clinical trials in drugs. In India the clinical research industry is projected to bring in over U.S.\$100 million in 2005, and potentially over \$1 billion by 2010.

Protection of Small Farmers

Over 200 million Indian farmers and farm workers have been the backbone of India’s agriculture. Despite having achieved national food security, the well-being of the farming community continues to be a matter of grave concern for the country. The establishment of an agrarian economy, which ensures food and nutrition for India’s billion people, raw materials for its expanding industrial base and surpluses for exports, and an equitable reward system for the farming community for the services it provides to society, will be the mainstay of reforms in the agriculture sector. These concerns led to passage of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act in 2001. The act provides for the establishment of an effective system for the protection of plant varieties, the rights of farmers and plant breeders, and the development of new varieties of plants.

The government of India introduced the Seeds Bill in 2004, in place of the existing Seeds Act of 1966. Although the main purpose of the 2004 Seeds Bill was to address farmers’ concerns regarding sowing, use, exchange, and sale of seed, the bill has in turn made it more difficult and cumbersome for a farmer to sell seeds or exchange or reproduce seeds. The bill makes it compulsory for a seed of any kind or variety to be registered if it is sold for the purpose of sowing or planting. Even for bartering of seeds, the person doing so must obtain a registration certificate as a dealer in seeds from the state government.

The bill has obviously made the sale, import, export, and bartering of seeds more transparent by laying down various procedures. However, government intervention has increased. Compensation to farmers in cases where the seed fails to provide the expected performance has been provided for. However, the farmer can claim this from the producer, dealer, distributor, or vendor under the Consumer Protection Act of 1986. Therefore, although there are provisions providing benefits to the farmers, they are cumbersome.

India also has a unique position in the world insofar as it accounts for 7 to 8 percent of Earth’s total biodiversity. India is also one of eighteen “mega-diverse” countries, which together possess 60 to 70 percent of the world’s biodiversity. For the conservation of its biodiversity,

important steps taken by India include enactment of the Biological Diversity Act of 2002 to protect India's rich biodiversity and associated knowledge against their use by foreign individuals and organizations without sharing the benefits arising from such use.

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See also **Information and Other Technology Development; World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with**

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INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT, GROWTH AND COMPOSITION OF

The uninterrupted and rapid growth of India's public debt has been a matter of serious concern. An increasing debt servicing burden and its feedback into further deficits and debt have raised apprehensions about sustainability and solvency. Its adverse impact on economic growth by crowding out private investments has also been a matter for concern. Government finances deteriorated and deficits emerged in the revenue (current) account in 1982, and its rapid increase since has caused India's central government to employ public debt mainly as an instrument to transfer private savings into public consumption and public investment, a considerable proportion of the latter being unproductive. Increasing indebtedness has raised questions about sustainability, and has dampened the growth prospects of the economy by crowding out private investment.

The growth of government indebtedness can be viewed in relation to the development strategy and economic environment in the country, and four distinct phases in the trend can be discerned. Initially, government borrowing was meant to finance public sector investment in keeping with the development strategy of India's first few Five-Year Plans. Thus, public debt as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 30 percent in 1950–1951 to 36 percent in 1960–1961, remaining broadly at that level until 1964–1965. However, inability to generate public savings required financing

further public sector investments, initiating the economic recession of 1965, which forced a suspension of the plan from 1966 to 1968. Subsequently, in the second phase, government indebtedness declined sharply to 26.8 percent of GDP until 1975. The third phase saw the rapid increase in public debt, particularly after 1984–1985. The debt to GDP ratio increased from 37.6 percent in 1980–1981 to 45 percent in 1984–1985 and further to 56.7 percent in 1990–1991. The fiscal expansion in the latter half of the 1980s, and the consequent sharp increase in primary and revenue deficits at both central and state levels resulted in the rapid increase in the debt-GDP ratio. The buildup of fiscal expansion in the 1980s and the persistent fiscal imbalance caused macroeconomic imbalance, creating a crisis in 1991. Thus, the fourth phase in public debt began with fiscal containment, which was, however, short-lived. The inability to contain government expenditures on the one hand and a declining tax-GDP ratio at the central level on the other resulted in the sharp increase in government indebtedness, bringing to the fore serious questions of debt sustainability and solvency.

The increase in indebtedness over the years is due to both central and state governments. The total outstanding debt attributable to the states increased from about 10 percent in 1950–1951 to over 25 percent in 2001–2002. Thus over a quarter of the internal public debt incurred in India is for the state governments, and the remainder is for New Delhi's central government.

The internal debt of the government consists of outstanding loans from the market and other outstanding liabilities. Within the latter, deposits in provident funds, post office savings, and other small savings collections constitute the bulk. Analysis shows that the proportion of other outstanding liabilities has steadily increased over the years, from about 25 percent of total outstanding liabilities in 1950–1951 to over 40 percent in 2001–2002. Transferring private savings for public investment within the regime of financial repression was an inherent part of the planning strategy. Thus, during the first four decades, the interest rate on market borrowing by the government was fixed at substantially below the market rate, and commercial banks were required to invest a significant portion of their lendable resources in government securities as a statutory liquidity ratio.

Traditionally, part of the budget deficit was financed by loans from the Reserve Bank of India. The proportion of such deficit financing increased from 16 percent in the early 1970s to nearly one-third during the latter half of the 1980s. This resulted in unplanned growth in the public debt. The economic crisis of 1991 raised serious questions about the means of financing budget deficits, and in 1995 an agreement was reached between the Reserve

Bank's governor and the finance secretary of the government of India to completely dispense with the practice of monetizing the deficit.

The high and increasing volume of debt raised serious questions of stability and sustainability, and had a dampening effect on economic growth. As much of the borrowing is undertaken to finance current expenditures of the central and state governments, it does not generate direct or indirect returns to the government to meet debt-servicing obligations. Thus, additional borrowing has to be resorted to, and this vicious cycle creates imbalance between savings and investments and spills over into the balance of payments problem. The simple test of sustainability is given by the Domar rule, according to which debt is sustainable as long as the interest rate is lower than the growth rate of the economy. In India, the interest rates were deliberately kept low, and therefore there was no danger of their exceeding the growth rate until the interest rate regime itself was liberalized. Nevertheless, effective interest rates steadily increased from 2.3 percent in 1951–1952 to 5 percent in 1970–1971, to 7.6 percent in 1990–1991, and finally to over 10 percent in 2001–2002. Recent careful analysis of the central government debt shows that the interest rate has been higher than the growth rate of the economy both in 2000–2001 and 2001–2002.

Thus on the one hand, the volume of borrowing has increased at over 20 percent per year since 1991–1992, and on the other, the effective interest rate has shown a sharp increase following the financial liberalization. The effect is rapid increase in debt servicing costs, feeding back into further borrowing. Recent lowering of interest rates and acceleration in growth rate may hold back the growth of indebtedness, but the high volume of borrowing to finance large fiscal deficits continues to be a matter of serious concern. Fiscal consolidation is perhaps the key required to arrest further rapid growth of India's internal indebtedness.

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See also **Fiscal System and Policy since 1952; Public Debt of States since 1950**

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), RELATIONS WITH The Bretton Woods Conference was convened in 1944 for the purpose of formulating postwar currency plans, as a result of which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established. India, though not yet independent, was among the countries whose representatives attended the meeting, and it was therefore counted as one of the founding members of the IMF. India's special concern at the time was about the "embarrassing plentitude" of sterling balances and their multilateral settlement and the inclusion, among the purposes of the IMF, of a clause to assist in the fuller utilization of resources of underdeveloped countries. This concern was not appreciated by the Americans and the British on the ground that the problem of wartime balances was too large for the IMF to tackle, and the development of underdeveloped countries was the responsibility of the World Bank. However, as the deliberations of the conference proceeded, it was conceded that the sterling balances would be freely convertible after the transition period, and also that the Articles of Association governing the IMF would include the development of productive resources of all members as a primary objective of economic policy.

India, which became a formal member of the IMF in December 1945, played a significant role in its formation. Each member's contribution to IMF resources, called its "quota," was made partly in gold and U.S. dollars and partly in its own currency, determining its voting rights and the amount it could borrow in the event of need. The quotas are decided generally on the basis of a member's national income, foreign exchange reserves, and its importance in world trade, though political considerations also weigh heavily. In 1945 India's quota was fixed at U.S.\$400 million—sixth largest after those of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France, which entitled those countries to be five permanent members of the Executive Board of the IMF. As the Soviet Union declined to join the IMF, India moved up to the fifth permanent seat on the Executive Board. The board, the main decision-making body, consisted initially of twelve members. IMF membership expanded from thirty in 1947 to 194 by 2004. India's quota has grown from special drawing rights (SDR) of 400 million in 1947 to SDR4.158 billion in October

2004, though it declined relatively, thereby depriving it of a permanent seat on the board. India has, however, retained membership on the board through biannual elections.

Despite India's junior status as a member of the IMF, it exercised considerable influence in shaping IMF policies, being one of the largest developing countries. This was evident by the role it played in the emergence of the SDR, an artificial device for the creation of international liquidity, the shortage of which was felt since the first half of the 1960s. India also, as a prominent member of the Group of Twenty-Four (a subgroup of the leading developing country members of the IMF) worked assiduously for safeguarding the interests of developing countries in the management of the international monetary system.

India's Use of Fund Resources

The year 1947, when the IMF commenced its operations as a provider of resources to members in need of balance of payments support, coincided with the emergence of India as an independent nation. In March 1948, when India's requirements of foreign exchange exceeded its own receipts, India borrowed from the IMF for the first time, SDR28 million, and again SDR72 million toward the end of the year. The impact of the increasing development activity was felt on the balance of payments during 1956–1957, which sharply deteriorated, and India was required to negotiate borrowing of SDR200 million under the “stand-by” arrangement—one of several kinds of borrowing arrangements of the IMF. India returned to the IMF again in July 1961 for borrowing an additional SDR250 million. The relief afforded by the use of IMF resources, however, was short-lived, and despite the policy measures taken by the Indian government, the reserves continued their downward slide, forcing India to approach the IMF again for a loan of SDR100 million. After an interval of a couple of years of trouble-free times, India resumed further borrowing of SDR237.5 million between March 1964 and March 1966. The stresses and strains arising from the unsustainable size of the plans, the misconceived policies of the government, and the drought of 1965–1966 aggravated India's balance of payments problems. This compelled India to seek a loan of SDR90 million from the IMF under a compensatory financing facility (CFF). Thus, the IMF played an important role, through its lending to India, in stabilizing the Indian economy between 1952 and 1970.

During the early part of the 1970s, the Indian external position was comfortable as a result of a commodity boom facilitated by the international currency realignment. But

this respite lasted only for a year or two. With rising inflation, drought depleting food-grain stocks, and rising foreign debt servicing, India resorted to borrowing from the IMF. To begin with, it used the CFF because the conditionality associated with it was mild and less onerous. India was soon overwhelmed by the first oil price shock of 1974–1975, which led to a sharp worsening of its balance of payments. The foreign exchange outlay on oil imports rose to \$1.3 billion in 1974–1975, from \$625 million in 1973–1974. India had no other alternative than to resort to additional resources from the IMF. First, it used “gold tranche” (i.e., borrowing against its contribution in gold) for SDR76.2 million, and a first tranche of its quota of SDR235 million, called “credit tranche” for its less stringent conditions. But this was not enough to fill the gap in the balance of payments. India, therefore, borrowed \$400 million under two special oil facilities of the IMF, specially designed to meet the emergency faced by the developing countries in the wake of an upsurge in oil prices. This meant that India had to follow severely restrictive fiscal and monetary policies to contain both inflation and worsening of the balance of payments position.

India adjusted well to the first oil crisis, and there was a favorable turn in the India's external accounts, with invisible receipts rising sharply. History, however, repeated itself again. In 1979–1980, inflation soared to 20 percent, and the external trade deficit widened sharply. India responded to this by first using the CFF for SDR266 million and then approached the IMF for an additional borrowing of SDR5 billion under the extended financing facility (EFF) arrangement. Intense debate, both at home and abroad, marked the negotiations. Within India, controversy centered around conditionality versus economic sovereignty, whereas criticism abroad revolved around the size and the need for such a massive purchase. In particular, the industrialized members of the IMF were averse to the loan, on the grounds that the adjustment program lacked specificity, the balance of payments need was not established, and the investment plan was more suitable for commercial bank financing than that from the IMF. Despite vehement opposition by prominent members of the board, the SDR5 billion loan was approved, which at that time was the largest commitment for the use of IMF resources in history. However, there was heavy criticism from within India of the IMF conditionality associated with the loan. The Indian government tried to weather the storm, by pleading that it was a case of voluntary adjustment through appropriate stabilization and liberalization measures, though it carried little conviction. Eventually, however, India purchased only SDR3.9 billion until April 1984, and requested cancellation of the remaining part of the arrangement.

The next milestone in the IMF-India relationship was in 1991 following the Gulf War, with an increase in oil prices and a generally adverse turn in global developments. India's foreign reserves dwindled and credit ratings lowered, prompting India to seek again IMF financing. The resources borrowed from the IMF, under standby arrangement, amounted to a total of SDR2.2 billion. With the help of these borrowings, India could ride over the grim balance of payments crisis and move onto the path of structural adjustment in the crucial areas of finance, privatization, dismantling of controls, and liberalization of imports. Treading its way cautiously but firmly, India took several radical measures in the areas of trade, industry, and the public sector, which radically transformed the structure and nature of the Indian economy, thereby placing it firmly on a trajectory of steady and rapid growth. For the first time during the history of the IMF-India relationship, for more than a decade India did not approach the IMF for financing. Notwithstanding frequent differences regarding the conditions underlying loans from the IMF, India's association with the IMF has worked, on the whole, to its benefit; it has helped India to turn its chronically vulnerable economy with acute foreign exchange shortages into a self-sustaining one, globally competitive with high growth, relative price stability, and burgeoning foreign exchange reserves. As a result of this growth, India in 2004 has become a net creditor to the IMF—that is, it lends to the latter more than it borrows. As a consequence, India now has a greater voice in the formulation of IMF policies and in restructuring the international monetary system.

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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; World Bank (WB), Relations with**

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IQBAL, MUHAMMAD (1877–1938), Indian poet and philosopher. Muhammad Iqbal was born on 9 November 1877 at Sialkot, a border town of the Punjab. Iqbal's grandfather, Shaykh Muhammad Rafiq, had left Kashmir not long after 1857, as part of a mass migration of Kashmiri Muslims fleeing repression from the

British-backed Hindu Dogra rulers installed in Kashmir in 1846. Although the family never returned to Kashmir, the memory of the land and its people never left Iqbal, and he remained dedicated to the principle of self-determination for the people of Kashmir.

Life

Iqbal's parents raised him in a deeply Islamic environment. After Iqbal finished high school, he enrolled in the Scotch Mission College (later renamed Murray College). After two years he went on to the Government College in Lahore. By this time, Iqbal had mastered Urdu, Arabic, and Farsi under the guidance of Sayyid Mir Hasan (1844–1929), who had been markedly influenced by the Aligarh Movement of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898). Under Sayyid Mir Hasan, Iqbal studied classical Urdu and Persian poetry, and his own poetic genius blossomed early. Iqbal then found a master of Urdu poetry in Navab Mirza Khan Dagh (1831–1905). Iqbal was on the creative path that was to bring him success and international fame; however, his personal life was marred by unhappiness that was to follow him for much of his life. In 1892 his parents had arranged his marriage to Karim Bibi, the daughter of an affluent physician in the city of Gujarat. Two children were born to the couple, but soon differences developed, and they separated. Iqbal married again and also had two children with his second wife.

Iqbal graduated cum laude from the Government College at Lahore and was also awarded a scholarship for further study toward a master's degree in philosophy. During his studies at the Government College, Iqbal was strongly influenced by Sir Thomas Arnold, an accomplished scholar who combined a profound knowledge of Western philosophy with a deep understanding of Islamic culture and Arabic literature. Arnold helped to instill a blending of Eastern and Western sensibilities in Iqbal, and inspired him to pursue higher graduate studies in Europe. In May 1899, a few months after Iqbal received a master's degree in philosophy, he was appointed the Macleod-Punjab Reader of Arabic at the University Oriental College in Lahore. From January 1901 to March 1904, he taught English intermittently at Islamia College at the Government College of Lahore.

In 1905 Iqbal went to Europe, studying in both Britain and Germany. In London he studied law at Lincoln's Inn. There he received the Bar-at-Law degree on 1 July 1908. At Trinity College of Cambridge University, he enrolled as a student of philosophy while simultaneously preparing a doctoral dissertation in philosophy for Munich University. The German university exempted him from a mandatory stay of two terms on campus before submitting his dissertation, "The Development

of Metaphysics in Persia,” and he was awarded a doctorate in philosophy on 4 November 1907. Iqbal’s dissertation was published the following year in London. In Cambridge, Iqbal came under the influence of the neo-Hegelians John McTaggart and James Ward. Two outstanding Orientalists at Cambridge, E. G. Brown and Reynold A. Nicholson, also became his mentors; the latter translated Iqbal’s Persian masterpiece *Asrar-i Khudi* when it was first published in 1915.

Iqbal never felt at home in politics, but he was invariably drawn into it. In May 1908 he joined the British Committee of the All-India Muslim League, to which he belonged for most of this life. Iqbal was elected a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from 1926 to 1930. In 1930 the All-India Muslim League invited him to preside over its annual meeting, and his presidential address became a landmark in the Muslim national movement anticipating the creation of Pakistan. Iqbal called for “the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state” as “the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”

Iqbal returned to England to attend the second (1931) and third (1932) London Round Table Conferences, called by the British government to consult with Indian leaders on constitutional reforms for India. In February 1933 Iqbal was back in Lahore. Seven months later, Muhammad Nadir Shah, the king of Afghanistan, invited him to visit Kabul to advise the Afghani government concerning the establishment of a new university utilizing the best of modern Western and traditional Islamic values.

After his return from Afghanistan, Iqbal’s health steadily deteriorated. His intellect remained sharp, however, and during this time he conceived many new projects, including proposed studies on Islamic jurisprudence and the study of the Qur’an. During this period Iqbal also invited a younger Muslim scholar, Sayyid Abu al-‘ala Mawdudi, to the Punjab, where he began to publish his well known journal, *Tarjuman al-Qur’an*. Iqbal had hoped that Mawdudi would become a modernist scholar who would update Islamic ideas. Just before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Mawdudi established Jamat-i-Islami; after 1947, he moved to Lahore and involved himself in the struggle for power in Pakistan, presenting a very conservative paradigm of Islamic polity.

By 1938 Iqbal’s health had sharply declined, and he died on 20 April. He was buried to the left of the steps leading to the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore; construction of the mausoleum over his grave was started in 1946, its marble provided by the government of Afghanistan.

Religious and Political Thought

Iqbal lived exclusively under British colonial rule, a period during which Muslims in the Indian subcontinent

were profoundly influenced by the religious thought of Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762) and Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Shah Wali Allah was the first Muslim thinker to realize that Muslims were encountering a modern age in which old religious assumptions and beliefs would be challenged. His monumental study *Hujjat Allah al-balighah* provided the intellectual foundations for updating Islam. Sir Sayyid, who lived through the life of the last Mughal emperor, was profoundly influenced by British political culture. He engendered an intellectual movement that came to be known as the Aligarh movement; it attempted to update Islam, popularize Western education, modernize Muslim culture, and encourage Muslims to cooperate with the British government in order to gain a fair share in the administration and political framework of India. This was the intellectual legacy inherited by Iqbal.

Iqbal’s most notable philosophical and political prose works were: *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Cambridge, U.K., 1908); *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1930); and his *Presidential Address to the Annual Meeting of the All-India Muslim League, 1930*. Iqbal here expounded the concept of two nations in India. Subsequently, his address came to be known as the conceptual basis for the state of Pakistan, although he did not use the name “Pakistan.” The emphasis was on Muslim nationalism, giving shape and content to the national liberation movement of Muslims in India. Iqbal stressed the necessity of self-determination for the Muslims: “I’d like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British empire or without the British empire, and the formation of a consolidated North-West Muslim Indian State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”

Intellectually, however, Iqbal was not an enthusiastic supporter of nationalism, and especially nationalism among Muslims. He attempted to resolve this dilemma in a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, his younger contemporary, writing:

Nationalism in the sense of love of one’s country and even readiness to die for its honor is part of the Muslim faith; it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept and claims . . . that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life. Nationalism was an independent problem for Muslims only in those countries where they were in the minority. In countries with a Muslim majority, nationalism and Islam are practically identical, but in countries where Muslims are in the minority, their demands

for self-determination as cultural unification is completely justified. ("Reply to Questions Raised by Jawaharlal Nehru," in S. A. Vahid, ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964)

Iqbal composed his poetry in both Persian and Urdu. His six Persian works include: *Asrar-i khudi wa Rumuz-i Bikbudi* (Secrets of the self and mysteries of selflessness, 1915); *Payam-i Masbriq* (Message of the East, 1923); *Zabur-i 'Ajam* (Scripture of the East, 1927); *Javid-namab* (Book of eternity, 1932); *Pas chih bayad kard, ay aqdam-i sharq* (What should be done, oh nations of the East, 1926); and *Armaghan-i Hijaz* (A gift of the Hejaz, 1938). His Urdu works, which are primarily responsible for his popularity in Pakistan as well as in India, are: *Bang-i dara* (Voice of the caravan, 1924); *Bal-i Jibril* (Gabriel's wing, 1935); and *Zarb-i Kalim* (The rod of Moses, 1936). Poetry, like visual art, is susceptible to varied interpretations; consequently his admirers, relying primarily on his poetry, have variously attempted to prove him a Pakistani nationalist, a Muslim nationalist, a Muslim socialist, and even a secularist.

Relations with Jinnah and the Emergence of Pakistan

Iqbal remained a steady supporter of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. During 1936 and 1937, Iqbal wrote eight letters to Jinnah, emphasizing the partition of India into two states; earlier, during the 1920s, Jinnah was still groping for coexistence with the Indian National Congress, and Iqbal had opposed Jinnah's policies.

Reluctantly but steadily, Iqbal had supported the establishment of a separate Muslim identity in the Indian subcontinent, while to the British and the Congress he often extended tactical cooperation. In the 1920s, Jinnah was willing to compromise with the Congress by abolishing separate electorates for Muslims in the provincial legislatures. Jinnah had agreed with the president of the Congress on 20 March 1927 to accept the joint electorates under certain conditions. Muslim seats in the central legislature were to be no less than one-third of the total seats. This agreement came to be known as the Delhi Proposals. In May 1927 the Punjab Muslim League, under the leadership of Mian Muhammad Shafi, Mian Fazl-i-Husein, and Iqbal, denounced the Delhi Proposals. The Punjab's opposition seriously weakened Jinnah's bargaining position with the Congress, which nevertheless participated in the All Parties Conference from 12 February to 15 March 1928, which produced the revisions of the Nehru Report. This proposal granted Muslims only 25 percent of the legislative representation. The Congress adopted the Nehru Report and decided to initiate a policy of nonviolent noncooperation

against the British if they did not accept it by 31 December 1929.

This reflected the Congress's determination to defy the British government for not including an Indian in the Simon Commission, which was established to make recommendations for future constitutional reforms in India. The appointment of the Simon Commission split the All-India Muslim League into two factions, one led by Jinnah and Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew and the other by Mian Muhammad Shafi and Iqbal. The Shafi League met in 1928 in Lahore, rejected the Delhi Proposals, and offered cooperation to the Simon Commission.

At Calcutta in 1928, the Jinnah League disavowed the Punjab Muslim League, adopting the Delhi Proposals and accepting the Nehru Report, subject to four amendments; all four proposed amendments were rejected by the Congress. The Jinnah League was thus repudiated by the Congress and simultaneously alienated from significant Muslim opinion. The split in the ranks of the Muslim League did not end until 1934, when Jinnah was finally elected president of the united Muslim League.

In the interim period, 1930 to 1934, Iqbal provided ideological leadership, articulating the Muslims' demand for a separate Muslim state. It is in light of this political split within the ranks of the League that Iqbal's presidential address of 1930 should be examined. That Allahabad address formulated the two-nation theory, which Jinnah finally accepted when he presided over the Muslim League's annual meeting in Lahore in 1940. He then demanded that India should be partitioned. Even though Iqbal was by no means a skillful politician, he nevertheless may thus be seen as a political guide of Jinnah in regard to the creation of Pakistan.

Hafeez Malik

See also Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Pakistan; Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement

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IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY. See **Tata, Jamsetji N.**

IRWIN, LORD (1881–1959), *the first baron Irwin, first earl of Halifax, viceroy and governor-general of India (1926–1931).* Edward Frederick Lindley Wood was a respected Conservative member of Parliament (1910–1925) who served as president of the Board of Education (1922) and minister of Agriculture (1923) before being raised to the peerage as Lord Irwin and named to succeed Lord Reading as viceroy of India. From the outset of his viceroyalty, Irwin was not unsympathetic to Indian political aspirations, and he admired the religious spirit that animated Mahatma Gandhi's politics: that both men were devout helped smooth their subsequent face-to-face negotiations.

On 31 October 1929, with the tacit approval of the home government and over some resistance from of his own council, Irwin announced that “the natural issue of India's constitutional progress was the attainment of Dominion status,” and that a Round Table Conference in London would follow the Report of the Simon Commission to lay the groundwork for further political devolution of power to Indians. Without Indian representation, however, the Simon Commission was greeted with black flags and boycott wherever it went in India. India's National Congress responded by boycotting the first Round Table Conference, calling for *purna swaraj* (complete independence) on 30 January 1930. On 6 April at Dandi, Gandhi launched his famous march to the sea against the salt tax, which turned world opinion against the Raj. That action had been preceded on 2 March by Gandhi's direct appeal to Irwin, announcing his intention to resist the salt tax and urging the viceroy to act to remove the manifold inequities of British rule that left Indians no choice but civil disobedience. Irwin, however, would not countenance violations of the law, even in the furtherance of a cause he respected. His arrest of Gandhi, the Congress's entire Working Committee, and over ninety thousand Indians during the subsequent *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance campaign) led to widespread violence and brutal police atrocities.

British prime minister J. Ramsay MacDonald, recoiling from the damage the *satyagraha* and its subsequent repression had done to British prestige, expressed the hope that Congress would attend a second “all-party” conference in London, something Congress leaders could hardly do from prison. Accordingly, Irwin released Gandhi, and the two met eight times beginning on 17 February 1930. Winston Churchill decried the “nauseating and humiliating spectacle of this once inner-temple lawyer [Gandhi], now seditious fakir, striding half-naked up the steps of the viceroy's palace there to negotiate and parley on equal terms with the

representative of the King Emperor.” But the meeting of “the two Mahatmas,” as Sarojini Naidu, the Indian poet and nationalist, referred to these encounters, proved amicable. The resultant Gandhi-Irwin Pact, agreed to on 5 March 1931, was the subject of much debate. It ended the civil disobedience campaign in return for minor British political concessions, but it did allow Gandhi to attend the Second London Round Table Conference. His insistence on serving as the sole representative of India's National Congress, however, proved to be a serious strategic mistake.

Irwin left India in April 1931 and held increasingly responsible posts, culminating in 1938 with his appointment as foreign secretary. His association with Britain's failed policy of appeasement toward Hitler's Nazi regime, however, damaged his reputation. He ultimately accepted appointment as ambassador to the United States, and his wartime service there earned him an earldom in 1944.

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See also **British Crown Raj; Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Satyagraha**

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ISLAM Islam is a monotheistic religion that arose in Arabia in the early seventh century as a movement for social and spiritual reform. It began with Muhammad (571–632), regarded by Muslims as a prophet, who received revelations from God (*Allah* in Arabic) through Archangel Gabriel.

Islam means peaceful submission to God, and a Muslim is one who acknowledges the need of such a submission and commits to required practices identified as the Five Pillars or acts of faith. These include: the acknowledgment of the one God and of Muhammad as the Prophet of God; ritual prayer five times a day; fasting during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic calendar; almsgiving according to one's capabilities; and pilgrimage to Mecca, if means permit.

In Islam, God has no representation, although the practice of making calligraphic imagery of the many names of God is fairly common and can be seen in mosques and in the homes of many Muslims. The revelations God sent to Muhammad were collected and now form the sacred text of the Qur'an. Islam does not prescribe priesthood, and there is no clergy. Muslims rely on



Muslim Manuscript. Throughout the Middle Ages and into the modern period, Islam's presence in India has been so pervasive that it may be regarded as an intrinsic part of India's cultural heritage. Here, a rare illuminated Muslim manuscript dating to medieval times. From the collection of the Arabic and Persian Research Institute, Tonk, Rajasthan. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

the learning from ulama (religious scholars) who strive to understand and teach the Quran, the *hadith* (sayings of the prophet Muhammad), and Shari'a (Islamic law) to others. There are five major schools of law. Most Muslims in India follow the Hanafi school, prevalent in the north, and the Shafi'i school, which is more popular in the south.

The majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni, but a smaller percentage belong to the second major branch of Islam, Shi'ism. There is a significant population of Shi'a in India, which includes the Isma'ilis, concentrated in the western states and in Mumbai, and the Twelvers, who are more scattered. One of the major festivals in India in which both the Sunni and Shi'a Muslims come together is the celebration of Ashura, the day of remembrance of the martyrdom of Husain, the grandson of the

Prophet. This takes place each year on the tenth day of the first Islamic month, Muharram.

Sufism and the Growth of Islam in India

Islam spread rapidly throughout Arabia and its environs during the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad. Within a century of his death, Muslim armies were present in the farthest regions of North Africa in the west and among the Hindus and Buddhists of Sind in the east. It is through the conquest of Sind that Islam first came to North India. At the same time, Islam grew peacefully among the natives in the south through the Arab merchants who had been part of a thriving trade between Indian western coastal regions and the Muslim world since pre-Islamic times.

While Islam is not indigenous to India, Islam in India is as authentically Indian as are Indian Buddhism and Indian Christianity. A significant majority of Muslims in India descend from the native Indians who converted to Islam from the eighth century onward. They share ethnic and cultural as well as linguistic traits with Indians of other religious traditions. According to the 2001 census, there were approximately 138 million Muslims in India, 13.4 percent of the country's population. Unofficial estimates, however, range from 150 million to 180 million. Indian Muslims are culturally diverse, economically disparate, and geographically they are spread all across the country. The areas of concentration of Muslims can be found in the northern and eastern states of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal.

Since its arrival in the seventh and eighth centuries, Islam has continued to spread in India due to multiple factors. The most significant reason for this rise is the mediation of Sufis and scholars who are engaged in teaching, healing, and general spiritual guidance. The conversions themselves were a gradual process, spanned over centuries, thus indicating that they occurred partly through the assimilation of cultural and religious ideas. A major factor in the growth of Muslim communities in India was emigration from other Muslim lands.

The Sufis, or the mystics of Islam, were themselves of various origins. Many had emigrated from other Muslim lands; others simply emerged as Islam developed its roots in India. Many immigrants came because they were enchanted by the notion of "Hind" (Persian for India) as the land of ancient wisdom as well as of spices and silk. They intermarried and adopted those local customs that did not conflict with their faith obligations. There were also missionaries among them. Among the first Muslim missionaries to come to India were the Ismā'īlis. Arriving in the northwest, they tried to convert the natives to Islam through preaching. With the help of the Fatimids, the ruling dynasty in Egypt at the time, the Ismā'īlis exercised political control in the northwestern region for a brief period.

The second major thrust in conversions came from the Sufis, who were largely Sunnis. Sufism speaks of *tariqa* (mystical path), which has many varieties worldwide, and India certainly has its share of them. Authentic Sufism is based on the Qur'an and basic principles of Islam, but sometimes in actual practice these principles are interpreted in unorthodox ways. This becomes a cause for tension between what the textually explicit, orthodox tradition teaches and how a particular mystical seeker interprets those teachings and incorporates them into practice. Sufis often claim to have a direct experience of the oneness of God. From the eighth century, Sufis were organized in various orders, many of which were

brought to India by traveling scholars and saints with their disciples.

Among these was the Sufi Ali bin Uthman al-Hujviri, popularly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh (died c. 1073), revered to this day in parts of the northwest. He was the author of *Kashf al-Mahjub*, a major treatise on the lives of Sufi saints, which offered spiritual advice. Traveling throughout the Muslim world, he chose Lahore as his final destination, which is where his tomb lies today, visited by thousands of seekers each year.

Another major Sufi movement that established its foundations in India was the Chishti Order, introduced by Khwaja Muin al-Din Chishti (1142–1236) in the thirteenth century. Mu'in al-Din (or, as he is often called, Khwaja Gharib Nawaz) is associated with countless stories of spiritual miracles, which make him one of the most famous of all saints in India. His shrine in Ajmer is a major center of pilgrimage for Hindus and Muslims alike.

The memory and traditions of these and other Sufis are still kept alive through a chain of successors to the *shaykh* or *pir* (Sufi master), and their shrines have become sites of prayers and community gatherings for disciples and lay people alike. They believe that the *shaykh's* spiritual blessings are continuously available to all who come to seek it at their *dargah*. Such shrines exist throughout India. In the south, the shrine of Banda Nawaz (1321–1422) is known as the *dargah* of Gulbarga and is a place of pilgrimage for both Hindus and Muslims. The importance of shrines attached to the memory of Sufi saints is a significant aspect of Indian Islam because it is strong evidence against the cliché classification of fixed religious behavior belonging to either Hinduism or Islam.

The Sufis' main approach was devotionism, which included, among other things, the practical arts of healing the physical and the spiritual together. The devotional culture promoted by the Sufis and the Hindu *bhakti* movement gave rise to all forms of "religious" or spiritual trends, some syncretistic, others eclectic. Devotional music was introduced by the Chishti Sufis in the thirteenth century as a means of achieving the state of ecstasy. They believed that the harmony of sounds stirs the heart of the listener, arousing a deeper love for God. Sufis wrote in and used other major languages besides Persian and Arabic. Sufi devotional literature is found in Punjabi, Sindi, Bengali, and Urdu in particular, which became the language of the masses throughout North India.

Development of Urdu

Muslims over the centuries introduced several languages to India. Besides Arabic, the language of the Qur'an, Persian was the main medium of literary and political discourse. Many of the rulers during the Sultanate

period were of Turkish origins, hence elements of their language became part of the local dialects. It seems probable that the interaction of the local languages of North India with Persian, which was used by the ruling classes, gave rise to a “proto-language” during the period of the Delhi Sultanate. As the Sultanate became well established in the twelfth century, the emerging proto-language further coalesced with the Brij Bhasha spoken in Delhi and other local dialects of the surrounding regions, and gave rise to Urdu.

Spoken by the ruling classes, the language soon evolved as the forerunner of modern Urdu. In the fourteenth century Urdu was picked up and further developed in the south under Bahmani rulers, becoming known as Daccani. Like other languages, Urdu began its literature with poetry. In the south it flourished as the ruler of Golconda, Sultan Quli Qutb Shah (1565–1610), was himself a poet who wrote in Persian, Telgu, and Urdu.

While Urdu developed in the south, it was not so in Delhi, where Persian continued to dominate the literary scene. One major poet from the south, Wali Deccani (1644–1707), shook the city with his Urdu poetry while visiting Delhi. Wali thus became the reviver of Urdu in the north. This gave rise to a new and invigorating period in Urdu literature with the emergence of the so-called Delhi school, with Mir Taqi Mir (1723–1810) and Mir Dard (1720–1784), two of its pillars, developing different genres of poetry.

The towering figure of Asadullah Khan Ghalib (1789–1869) is another major poet who contributed to Urdu’s honored status. His also wrote letters, and his style was regarded by many as groundbreaking and innovative, liberating Urdu from the clutches of formalism and setting it apart from its “superior” rival, Persian. Ghalib wrote mostly in Persian, but his Urdu *divan* (collection of poems) is considered a classic.

In the twentieth century, Urdu poetry has served as a medium of expression for social critics, literary trendsetters, and even secularists and humorists, giving rise to figures such as Ali Sardar Jafri (1913–2000), Quratul Ain Haider (b. 1926), and Majrooh Sultanpuri (1919–2000). Urdu continues to be the language in which much of Islamic religious and secular literature is published, and it is also the national language of Pakistan.

Music, Architecture, and Art

For centuries, Islamic and Hindu cultures developed in relation to each other. There is a long history shared by the members of these two traditions with regard to Indian classical music, art, and architecture. India Muslim devotional music is a blend of *bhakti*-style poetry and music from Muslim regions brought to India by travelers and immigrants. The sharing of musical traditions

can be traced back as early as the eighth century. Musical traditions originating in Persia and Central Asia can still be found in the Kashmiri and Punjabi art forms. Many Indian musical instruments also developed as a result of Islamic influences. For example, the *santoor* as well as the *tabla* evolved during the Muslim period. Amir Khusrau (1253–1325) was a composer and a literary giant who wrote prolific poetry. He is credited with developing Hindustani classical music as well as Qawwali, a genre of Sufi devotional music that continues to be popular in South Asia today.

Islamic architecture in India is a reflection of the synthesis of Hindu and Muslim cultures. As these influenced one another, an unparalleled style developed out of the two seemingly contradictory cultural traditions. The Qutub Minar and the Jami Masjid in Delhi are classical masterpieces of Muslim architecture. The Mughals, connoisseurs as well as patrons of art and architectural masterpieces, built great monuments throughout India. One of the finest examples is the Taj Mahal at Agra, built during Shah Jahan’s reign (1628–1658) as a mausoleum for his wife Mumtaz Mahal.

The Mughals were also patrons of the literary arts, which thrived during this period. Historiography reached new heights with the writing of *Akbarnamah* by Abul Fazl (1551–1602). Persian and later Urdu were refined, spurring the production of numerous literary works. During the Mughal period, the art of miniature painting was also prevalent. These and other Mughal cultural traditions were replicated at various levels among the nobility and in the larger society in general, affecting Hindu and Muslim communities alike.

Islamic Modernism

Muslims are the largest minority in India, and Indian Muslims have influenced the world of Islam in several ways, most notably by creating a unique form of Islam that expanded the intellectual and spiritual horizons of Muslims everywhere. India was the land of enchantment for many in the Muslim world. Muslims learned from Indian wisdom and transferred it, as faithfully as they could, to other centers of learning around the world. It was Muslims who gave India its fundamental sense of self and defined it as a civilization, setting it apart conceptually as well as geographically. As André Wink notes in his magnificent study *Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, it was the Arabs and Muslims who first applied the word “Hind” to the entire subcontinent as well as the archipelago. In later writings India was referred to as “Hindustan,” the land of the Hindus.

Through the Middle Ages and into the modern period, Islam’s involvement in India has been so intricate

that it has become an inseparable part of the fabric of India's cultural heritage. The long presence of Muslims in India entitles them to be part of both Indian and Islamic civilizations, hence, Muslims are as much Indian as any other community in India. Muslims of India can be faithful to both their nationalistic aspirations as well as their religio-cultural traditions, without having to choose between the two. This is the message, echoed by many modern Muslim reformers, of Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898), founder of the Aligarh Muslim University.

Another early modernist Muslim thinker was Sayyid Ameer Ali (1849–1928), who appreciated the importance of scientific learning, earlier advanced by Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Ali studied abroad and practiced law upon his return to India. An orthodox Shi'a, he presented Islam in a nonsectarian framework. He produced a number of books, including a major influential work on Islam, *The Spirit of Islam* (1922).

Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) is perhaps the most revered modernist Muslim thinker of the twentieth century. He was a philosopher by training and studied in the West. He published a major philosophical work, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, in 1934. Iqbal believed that the decline of Muslims had been caused not by the failure of Islam but by a lack of adherence to the spirit of Islam. His poetry, written mostly in Farsi and Urdu, inspired not only religious but also sociopolitical activism among Muslims.

Another major thinker of the twentieth century was Abu'l 'Ala Maududi (1903–1979). He founded the Jama'at-i Islami in 1941, which has been proactively promoting Islam as a "way of life" and advocating the establishment of an overtly Islamic government through peaceful means by way of political processes.

During the same period, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) founded a humble organization, now known worldwide, called the Tablighi Jama'at, a society of missionaries. Ilyas and his followers became active in the 1940s as teachers of the basics of Islamic practice to rural illiterate Muslims, and they encouraged personal renewal of faith.

Challenges in the Twenty-first Century

Before the nineteenth century, Muslims and Hindus did not consider each other merely in religious terms. Religious differences were clearly present, but class differences, geography, and language were greater factors in determining identity than was religion. At the level of the common person, for most of their history in India, Muslims and Hindus have experienced a common culture, language, and even ethnic makeup. Religion as the determinant of identity is a very recent construct and one that

has been exploited by political leaders of both communities since the heightened awareness of their separateness was reflected in the policies of the British Raj.

Indeed, Hindus and Muslims are different and they have always seen each other as such. The Muslim religious elite, especially in the early twentieth century, highlighted these differences in clearly religious terms, some even attributing the term *kafir* (used as a derogatory term) to denote Hindus. Similarly, since the rise of Hindutva, the politics of the Sangh Parivar, Muslims and other minorities have been subjected to communal riots, frequently since 1947, in which their economic, social, and personal interests have suffered. The height of this religious tension was reached in the 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by members of right-wing Hindu groups, who continue to be vocal about their plans to build a Ram temple on the site. Many more Muslims and Hindus were affected throughout India by the violence that ensued. Then in 2002, a systematic persecution of Muslim communities was carried out in several towns and villages in Gujarat with the help of the state apparatus.

Islam in India is unique in many ways, and cultural traditions, both homegrown as well as those borrowed from Hinduism, are major factors in its uniqueness. Indian Muslims have "indianized" Islam in such a way that often many local customs (and they differ from community to community) have lost the puritanical Islamic status in their extended and parochial forms.

Indian Muslims also differ in cuisine and attire, as well as in their general attitude toward Pakistan and other Islamic countries. Furthermore, the process of Indian Islamization has allowed Muslim communities to legitimize social customs and practices on the basis of the Shari'a, hence remaining firmly rooted within both their cultural and religious traditions. Islam in India is hardly monolithic. It is as varied as Indians themselves.

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See also Ayodhya; Hindutva and Politics; Islam's Impact on India; Mughal Painting; Muslims; Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement

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ISLAM'S IMPACT ON INDIA Islam exploded from the Arabian Peninsula eastward and westward after the Prophet's death in A.D. 632. By the start of the next century, Islam would reach Spain in the West and India in the East. What did the early Muslims find in these societies?

In the West, Muslims came across Christian and Jewish communities with whom they were already familiar. These were faiths within the Abrahamic tradition. Muslims were aware that their God was the same, their prophets were shared and indeed many of their values and customs were familiar. In the East, however, Muslims were to encounter wholly different challenges in territory that had never been influenced by the Abrahamic tradition. In Persia, Muslims encountered a society in which people appeared to worship fire; further east, the Buddhists in Central Asia appeared to have no concept of a divine being; to the southeast, in what they would call Hindustan, or the land of the Hindus, societies appeared to worship numerous gods taking different forms. In Hindustan or India, a name derived from the river Indus, Islam came face to face with Hinduism—a polytheistic, ancient, and sophisticated religion.

In the encounters in the East, Islam's response tended to be one of two extremes: that of the military commanders, who believed that the Hindu and Buddhist idols were to be destroyed and the people who worshiped them to be converted; or that of the Sufi scholars, who preached the essential oneness of humanity on the basis of *sulh-i-kul* (peace with all). The former advocated a



Entrance to Ajmer Sharif, Tomb of Muin al-Din Chishti. Every year thousands make a pilgrimage here to honor the revered Sufi saint who came to Ajmer, in the heart of Hindu India, in the twelfth century. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

jihad, which ignored moral elevation and emphasized religious war against the *kafir*, or nonbelievers, and an imposition of the *jizya*, or head tax. The image of one of the earliest invaders, Mahmud of Ghazni (971–1030), “notorious” as an idol breaker, is therefore only one aspect of Islam in South Asia.

India presented what seemed to be intractable problems to the Muslims. The encounter changed the nature of Islam and was sometimes expressed in extravagant forms: Akbar, the great Mughal ruler, creating a new religion, the Din-i-Ilahi; Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet of Islam, almost worshiped as a Hindu avatar with four arms; Duldul, the Prophet's mule, equated to Hanuman, the monkey god. Islam in India was meeting its most interesting set of challenges.

For Hindus, the religion of Islam, too, was equally perplexing. In India people who were accustomed to looking for the divine in a stone or in a snake were now expected to believe in one God, who was also invisible. Individuals who were expected to be reborn in unending

cycles of life now faced the prospect of a judgment day at the end of their lives when they would be sent either to heaven or hell. Finally, societies that had been divided rigidly into a hierarchy of castes were expected to accept the notion that all human beings were essentially the same and that their deeds, not their birth, determined their merit.

In the stereotype created by the critics of Islam, the conversion of large parts of the population in India to Islam was effected by fanatical medieval warriors from Central Asia waving a sword in one hand and the holy Qur'an in the other. This is not entirely a correct picture. Conversions and their lasting impact on society came from Sufi scholars and saints. The first response rested in the strength of the sinew; the second in the enlightenment of the heart. It was the second Islamic response that in time would develop into a specific South Asian brand of Islamic mysticism. Nonetheless, Muslims are aware of the tensions that the stereotype implies. Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who best symbolizes the response of Islam to modernity, reflects the dilemmas in his popular poems *Shikwa* (Complaint) and *Jawab-i-Shikwa* (Response to complaint). He talks of *quwat-i-ishq*, or the power of love, while at the same time reminding God that it was the Muslims who—through the power of the sword—forced the infidel to acknowledge monotheism.

Sometimes alone and sometimes with a few disciples, these Sufis settled in and went about their business in small towns and villages. Universalist, gentle, and visibly rejecting the material world, these Sufis reached out to ordinary people with their message of *sulb-i-kul*. Sufism was the attractive face of Islam in India.

Perhaps the most famous Sufi saint of India is Muin al-Din Chishti (1142–1236). He came to Ajmer in the heart of Hindu India to preach *sulb-i-kul* and is buried in that town. His shrine attracts thousand of pilgrims annually. Many of these are Hindus who believe in the goodness of the saint. The annual anniversary of his death is the occasion for festivities and attracts hundreds of thousands of people.

Ali Hujwiri, popularly called Datta Sahib, is buried in Lahore and came to India even before Muin-al-Din Chisti. He is the most renowned Sufi saint of Pakistan. His shrine in Lahore is the center of social and religious activity. The tradition of devotional singing is maintained at both shrines.

From the time of Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century to that of the establishment of the Mughal dynasty in the early sixteenth century, Delhi was ruled by several Muslim dynasties of Afghan/Turkic background. Serious attempts were made at establishing a permanent administration and a permanent viable presence in India.

But it was with the arrival of Babur (Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad), originally from Farghana in Central Asia, that Muslims established what would be their most successful and famous dynasty, that of the Mughals.

The Mughals of India

Babur conquered Delhi and established the Mughal empire early in the sixteenth century. It became one of the largest and most successful centralized states in early modern world history—greater in extent than the other great Muslim empires, the Ottoman and the Safavid. At the height of their power, the Mughals ruled what in effect are the modern countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and parts of Myanmar.

Six remarkable emperors ruled the empire over the span of three centuries from the time of Babur to Aurangzeb, his direct descendant. The Mughal empire would last until the uprisings against the British in 1857, although by then it was a shadow of its former self and its rulers mere puppets. The British would then step in as direct rulers, and Queen Victoria would be declared the empress of India.

Akbar (1542–1605), the grandson of Babur, consolidated the empire during his fifty-year reign. Administrative, financial, and diplomatic structures were put in place that would convert the empire into one of the most powerful in the world. In particular, Akbar reached out to the majority population of the Hindus. Hindu warrior groups who had been excluded from power by the previous Muslim dynasty, the Lodhis, were favored by Akbar. Of these, the powerful Rajput chieftains now served the Mughal emperors, even giving wives to the emperors (as in the case of Akbar).

Indian, Iranian, and Central Asian influences combined to create eclecticism and synthesis in the arts, architecture, literature, and music. The creation in the next century of the Taj Mahal at Agra by Shah Jahan (1592–1666), Akbar's grandson, is to be understood in this context. One of the finest glories of Mughal architecture, it is also one of the most recognized buildings in the world. Indeed, the Taj Mahal, the tomb Shah Jahan built for his wife Mumtaz Mahal, has come to symbolize romantic love. Shah Jahan also built the Red Fort and the Jumma Masjid in Delhi. The latter was then the largest communal mosque in India. Alongside these buildings he built colleges and hospitals.

The mutual intellectual and artistic stimulation and synthesis between Hinduism and Islam reached a peak during the time of the great Mughal emperors. But from the late seventeenth century onward, Muslims became aware of their predicament as a minority, faced with two choices: they could either draw rigid boundaries around

Islam, or allow the boundaries to become porous to the point where Islam itself became compromised. The first strategy emphasized an orthodox, formal, and legal interpretation of Islam; the second advocated synthesis, eclecticism, and informality. It is no historical accident that the two opposed forms of Indian Islam were embodied in the sons of Shah Jahan, Dara Shikoh (1615–1659) and Aurangzeb (1618–1707).

The clash between Dara Shikoh and Aurangzeb was more than a clash for succession. The victory of one over the other would influence the course of history and cast shadows on events today in South Asia. Here are the differentiating characteristics of the two princes: Dara Shikoh believed in a universalist humanity, encouraged art, and was known to dislike religious clerics (as is clear from his quotation “Paradise is there, where there is no Mullah”). He kept the company of Sufis and Hindu yogis, and the ring he wore bore the legend *Prabhu*, Sanskrit for “god.” He helped translate the classic Hindu texts, the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gītā, into Persian. He argued that Hinduism and Islam were not theologically incompatible and, as an example, he equated Adam with Brahman.

Aurangzeb, in contrast, emphasized his commitment to the *ummah*, the Muslim community, discouraged art, and supported the clergy. He maintained the outward signs of orthodoxy, rejecting silk clothes and gold vessels. He patronized the *Fatwa-i-Alamgiri*, the most comprehensive digest of Muslim jurisprudence ever compiled. His favorite reading was the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, which he learned by heart. He abandoned many of Akbar’s liberal practices. The hated *jizya* tax was imposed on non-Muslims. Aurangzeb’s understanding of Islam did not prevent him from ruthlessly executing his brothers and cruelly imprisoning his father Shah Jahan until his death in 1666.

In the end, Aurangzeb would succeed to the throne of India, and Dara Shikoh would lose his life. Dara Shikoh was paraded in rags through the streets of Delhi and was executed in prison on the grounds that he was an apostate on 30 August 1659. The tension between the two brothers around the opposed forms and interpretations of Islam is reflected in modern South Asian society. It has been argued that the clash between General Zia ul-Haq and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leaders of modern Pakistan, reflected the earlier clash between the two opposed models of Islam. Zia was more like Aurangzeb and Bhutto like Dara Shikoh in their approaches to Islam. Bhutto’s death at the hands of Zia suggests that there is little compromise between the two positions. The death warrants signed by Aurangzeb and Zia, sealing the deaths of Dara Shikoh and Bhutto, reflect the unresolved dilemmas and tensions of South Asian Islam.

Muslim Crisis and Renaissance

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Muslim power in Delhi, however symbolic, was finally snuffed out after the uprisings against the British in 1857 and 1858. This was a major turning point in history for the Muslims of India. Delhi, their capital, was almost razed to the ground. The Red Fort and the Jumma Mosque, the two central symbols of Muslim rule, were almost blown up. To be Muslim was to be seen as an enemy of the British.

The savagery on both sides was startling. Here is Robert Montgomery, a well-known British official, writing to Hodson, a colleague, congratulating him on a deed that found few defenders, even among the British. Hodson had cold-bloodedly shot the male members of the family of the last king of Delhi, the frail and old poet Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last of the Mughals: “My dear Hodson, All honour to you (and to your ‘Horse’) for catching the king and slaying his sons. I hope you will bag many more.”

It appeared that Islam in India was the prime target of the new masters of the land. This was a depressing time for Muslims. A letter written shortly after 1857 by one of the greatest Urdu poets, Mirza Ghalib, in Delhi, once the mighty and flourishing capital of the Mughals, captures the mood.

At two separate points in your letter yesterday I see that you have written that Delhi is a big city and there must be plenty of people with all sorts of qualifications there. Alas, my dear boy, this is not the Delhi in which you were born, not the Delhi in which you got your schooling, not the Delhi in which you used to come to your lessons with me to Shaban Beg’s mansion, not the Delhi in which I have passed fifty-one years of my life. It is a camp. The only Muslims here are artisans or servants of the British authorities. All the rest are Hindus. The male descendants of the deposed King—such as survived the sword—draw allowances of five rupees a month. The female descendants, if old, are bawds, and if young, prostitutes. . . . Agha Sultan, son of Paymaster Muhammad Ali Khan, who has himself held the rank of Paymaster, fell ill; without medicine, without food, at last he died. Your uncle provided for his shroud and his burial. (Russell and Islam, *Ghalib: 1797–1869*, 1969, p. 269)

In not so subtle ways, the British now ridiculed the main figures of Islam, its kings and saints. Rulers such as Siraj-ud-Dawla (1733–1757) (notorious for the Black Hole of Calcutta in which many Britons were killed) and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk (1780–1842) became “Sir Roger Dowler” and “Cha, Sugar and Milk,” respectively. The saintly

leader, the Akhund of Swat (1794–1877), became part of a “nonsense rhyme” in Edward Lear’s poem, “Who or why, or which or what, is the Akond of Swat?” Religious leaders of revolts against the British were simply dismissed as the “Mad Mullah.” The British Empire’s most renowned writers reflected the prejudice: for Rudyard Kipling, South Asian “natives” were a “blackfaced crew” (“Gunga Din”), “half devil and half child” (“The White Man’s Burden”) and the women of the east, “funny an’ yellow” (“The Ladies”).

Muslim society itself was affected. Professor Imtiaz Ahmad, in Delhi, has documented the growth of caste-like structures. The *ashraf*—especially the Sayyids and Pukhtuns—considered themselves superior to the *ajlaf*, the recently converted Muslims. But these divisions are to be taken with a pinch of salt: a well-known proverb tells of the recently self-elevated sheikh who calculates that if crops are good again next year he will elevate himself to Sayyid category. In society it appears as if leadership after the collapse of the Mughal empire in India was provided by the *ashraf*, by men like Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan. But the most prominent leaders, including Muhammad Iqbal and M. A. Jinnah, were not from *ashraf* families.

Macaulay’s Minute and Muslim Society

Confronting the diverse mass of humanity in India that it was their destiny and intention to rule, the British outlined a strategy. British colonial philosophy would embrace the upper layers of society and encourage them to become as much as possible like their masters. T. B. Macaulay’s “Minute on Education” in 1835 established English as the medium of instruction in India. When English replaced Persian, the court language of the Mughals, ordinary Muslims found themselves at a crippling disadvantage. With this one crucial step, Macaulay aimed to create a social class “who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.”

The Indian generation after Macaulay, who would be “English in taste,” was mainly Hindu. Schools, colleges, and service in the army and civil administration encouraged this process. Among the Muslims, the man who came closest to representing Macaulay’s new ideal Indian was Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, “loyal servant of the Crown.”

Islam in India had constantly faced the challenges posed by the majority Hindu population and as a result developed inner tensions within society. Now it also faced a hostile British presence. The result was a constant renewal and continuous vitality, which produced remarkable leaders in thought and action. The decline of Muslim

power in the eighteenth century helped to sharpen sensibilities. This process began when the Mughal empire was still ruling from Delhi. It came with Shah Waliullah (1703–1762), who promoted the puritanical Muhammadia movement, which aimed to purge Islam of non-Islamic influences, in particular Hindu ones. Other reformers soon took to arms in different parts of the subcontinent: Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly (1781–1831) died waging jihad, or holy war, against the Sikhs in North India; and in Bengal, Haji Shariatullah (1781–1840) led the Faraizi movement to revive the teachings of Islam at the village level. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) fought the jihad, but in a different form: he opened a college at Aligarh.

The Aligarh Model

Sir Sayyid argued that if Muslims continued to shut out modern—by which he meant British—civilization they would be reduced to *khansamas* (cooks) and *khidmatgars* (attendants/servants). The Muslim tendency to ignore the present and wallow in past glory was, he argued, a dangerous opiate. His bluntly expressed views outraged religious circles.

In *The Loyal Muhammadans of India*, Sir Sayyid defended Muslim loyalty to the British. Muslims, he argued, were as loyal as the most faithful Hindus. The college that he founded at Aligarh in 1875 was called the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, its very name illustrating the synthesis he wished to effect. His models were the universities at Oxford and Cambridge. The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was later upgraded to a university. Its main buildings, the clock tower, and the cricket fields all reflected nineteenth-century ideas of British architecture in alliance with Islam. Resigning from government service in 1876, Sir Sayyid lived in Aligarh, promoting the college until his death in 1898. His success affected the future course of events in India.

The emblem of the college at Aligarh expressed its Islamic stance. In the center stood a date palm, a reminder of Arabia and the origins of Islam, on the right the book of learning—no doubt the Qur’an—and on the left a crescent, a widely recognized symbol of Islam. The emblem seems oddly out of tune with present-day India, which is undergoing Hindu cultural and religious revivalism.

The college at Aligarh was to be the Muslim answer to modernity, introducing the study of mathematics, science, and modern languages in a syllabus in which Islam was also prominent. It offered Muslims from all over India a sense of direction and revived confidence. It educated those Muslims who would eventually lead the community in the movement that would create Pakistan. Indeed, it produced several presidents and prime ministers.

Macaulay's vision and Sir Sayyid's ethos would bear triumphant fruit in one of the most influential and popular books written on Islam in the early part of the twentieth century, Justice Sayyid Amir Ali's *The Spirit of Islam*. Translated into numerous languages, including Arabic and Turkish, it was written in English. *The Spirit of Islam* reflects pride in Islam while placing it in a modern context, though Muslim critics cited it as too apologetic.

Amir Ali's book inspired men like Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) who represented the political response of Islam to modern times. Jinnah argued for rights and security for his community. Upon failing to achieve them, he demanded a separate homeland. What is important to point out is that Jinnah fought for the Pakistan movement through constitutional means, using his skills as a trained lawyer. It was this response that gave the Muslims their most notable triumph in the twentieth century: the creation of Pakistan, then the largest Muslim nation on Earth.

Aligarh was not the only Muslim model produced in India as a response to the modern era. Another educational center was opened in Deoband at around the same time as the college in Aligarh. However, in this case, lines would be rigidly drawn around Muslim identity and practice. Deoband has remained an important source of inspiration for many contemporary Islamic parties and movements, including the Taliban.

The Pakistan Movement

Although Jinnah skillfully and successfully led the Muslim League to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, he was representing an intellectual movement begun in the last century and one that was clear in the writings of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Sir Sayyid's discussion of two distinct communities in India, both needing to live in harmony but as separate entities, had already outlined the idea of a separate Muslim polity. This argument culminated in the poetic vision of Iqbal, which saw a distinct geographical area for the Muslims of North India. Chaudhri Rahmat Ali in Cambridge gave the name Pakistan to the area—letters of the alphabet representing a distinct Muslim area and together forming the word Pakistan—thus “P” for Punjab, “A” for Afghanistan, “K” for Kashmir, “S” for Sind and “tan” for Baluchistan. Pakistan also means the land of the “pure,” from *pak*. Jinnah, then, was expressing the sentiments of Muslims, not creating them.

Early in his career, Jinnah had advocated dialogue and understanding with the Hindus. Indeed, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a leading Hindu politician, called him “the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.” Later Jinnah began to believe that, once in power, the Hindus would not

honor their commitments to the Muslims. But Jinnah aimed high. In an inspiring speech that he made to the newly formed Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in August 1947, he underlined the tolerant and compassionate nature of the new Muslim state.

But even Iqbal the visionary poet, or Jinnah the humanist, could not have envisioned the extent of disruption at the creation of Pakistan. A communal madness gripped the land in 1947. Centuries of fear and hatred exploded into savagery. No one was spared—young or old, male or female, high or low. The massacre and migration were unprecedented. It has been estimated that possibly 2 million people were killed, and 10 to possibly 15 million migrated from their homes, Muslims fleeing to Pakistan, Hindus and Sikhs to India. Not all Muslims in India could or indeed wished to migrate to Pakistan.

Although the creation of Pakistan had solved one problem, that of establishing a separate homeland for Muslims, it did not solve the problem of identity. The debate about religious and political identity in Pakistan ensured stormy and unsettled politics; the periods of martial law were almost inevitable. Corruption and nepotism were also widespread. Bengalis in East Pakistan complained of being treated like colonial subjects by West Pakistanis and, in 1971, broke away to form Bangladesh—the “nation of Bengalis.” After 1971, what remained of Pakistan was plunged more directly than ever before into attempts to resolve the dilemma of identity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later his daughter Benazir wished for a “democratic” Pakistan, while generals like Zia ul-Haq wanted a fundamentalist Islamic Pakistan, ruled by the army.

There have been gains over the years. The number of universities and medical colleges has increased. Agriculture and the textile industry have shown development. Income per capita has risen to twice that of India. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the U.S. “war on terrorism” in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 have allowed Pakistan to play a major role in the region. Pakistan's self-conscious Islamic posture has assured it an important voice in the Muslim world.

But Pakistan faces the new century with uncertainty. Ethnic tensions, breakdown of law and order, and an unpredictable international climate have created problems. India and Pakistan have so far fought three wars. The rise of the communal party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in India and its campaigns against Muslims, including the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya and its support of riots (like the especially savage ones in Gujarat in 2002) confirm in Pakistani minds their worst fears of “Hindu domination”; for them, in retrospect, the orthodox Aurangzeb, not the tolerant Akbar nor Dara

Shikoh, seems vindicated. The BJP recognize this, almost as in a mirror, and have a contemptuous title for the Muslims of India: *Aurangzeb ki aulad*, “the children of Aurangzeb.” The failure of Pakistan to develop Jinnah’s vision and its subsequent spiral into violence has meant that the community is pushed further away from the tolerant and compassionate model of Islam.

The Creation of Bangladesh

While Bengali leadership enthusiastically embraced the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims in the first half of the twentieth century, once Pakistan was created, the Bengalis felt, rightly, that although they formed the majority of Pakistan’s population, the more powerful West Pakistanis had sidelined them. West Pakistanis controlled the two key instruments of government, the civil service and the army. Bengali political and cultural feelings of alienation developed into an irresistible ethnic movement for independence, which was given its final shape in 1971, when the mainly West Pakistani army posted in East Pakistan attempted to control that province by force. Atrocities were committed, as West Pakistani soldiers sought to suppress Bengali demands for “autonomy” and full democratic control of a new national assembly, reflecting the victory won in the 1970 elections by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League. Adverse international public opinion against Pakistan, despite support from U.S. president Richard M. Nixon, further isolated it. India, with strong Soviet military assistance, easily won the war it fought with Pakistan toward the end of the year, ensuring the birth of Bangladesh, quickly recognized as an independent nation.

Although Bengalis shared Islam with West Pakistan, they looked to Calcutta (Kolkata) for their poetry and literature. Their ideas were laced with the intellectual arguments emanating from the coffee shops and salons of Calcutta. They were also more politically sophisticated than the people of West Pakistan who, until then, were largely led by the feudal lords of Sind and Punjab and by tribal chiefs in the North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan. The breakup of Pakistan would act as a catalyst and help challenge this feudal and tribal way of thinking.

The creation of Bangladesh meant that the Muslims of South Asia were now divided into three bodies increasingly isolated from one another. Yet each remains aware of the mutual predicament of living in South Asia with and in the presence of a far larger majority, that of the Hindus concentrated in India.

The Muslims of India

Muslim leadership in India disintegrated in 1947 as millions fled to Pakistan. The next decades were traumatic.

Muslims appeared uncertain and unsure. It has been a slow struggle to reestablish an Indian Muslim identity. The events and dates are clearly etched in the Muslim mind: the uprisings of 1857 and 1858, the partition of 1947, and then, at the turn of the century, the dramatic rise of communal violence.

Muslims are aware of the cruel irony of history in the splendid monuments that lie scattered over India’s landscape: the Taj Mahal, the Red Fort, the Jumma Mosque, the Qutb Minar. It is precisely at this point where they are most threatened, for there is a growing movement among Hindus who claim that these monuments were built not by Muslims but by Hindus themselves, out of more ancient Hindu temples, that will be “restored” by force if necessary. Hindus argue that the now demolished Babri Masjid (Babur’s mosque) in Ayodhya was just the first of these conversions.

India’s Muslims desperately cling to some sort of identity in the face of massive cultural and media onslaught. It is this desperation that partly explains their rallying behind three major cases which they saw as Muslim causes from the 1980s onward, but which led to deaths and further alienated them from the majority: the Shah Bano case, in which Muslims succeeded in overturning a Supreme Court decision granting better financial rights to Shah Bano than provided by her husband who had divorced her under Muslim personal law; the banning of *The Satanic Verses* in India; and the Babri Mosque controversy in Ayodhya. India’s problems with Pakistan act as further pressure on the Muslims as communalist Hindu leaders accuse them of being secret supporters of Pakistan.

So as they cling to their identity they are castigated for being isolationist, backward, and marginal; accusations of a “ghetto mentality” create the ghetto and reinforce it. It is a cycle in which they appear to be trapped and from which, for the time being, there appears little escape. On the bright side, individual Muslims have done very well in India, several of them becoming heads of state.

The Muslims of South Asia

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India together have about one-third of the world’s Muslim population. About 95 percent of Pakistan’s population of 145 million, about 90 percent of Bangladesh’s population of 135 million, and about 13 percent of India’s 1 billion people are Muslim. It is estimated—and figures for population on the basis of religion are invariably “estimates”—that the total Muslim population in South Asia may well be over 400 million people.

Muslims in South Asia have produced a remarkable modern Muslim renaissance. Some of the most renowned and influential modern Muslim intellectuals—including

Iqbal, Maulana Azad, and Maulana Maududi—have lived there. The Muslims of South Asia have won international prizes, and they have produced world-class figures in sports, especially in cricket, hockey, and squash. South Asians have created a coherent and rich cultural legacy, starting from the time of Amir Khusrau (1253–1325), one of the earliest Sufi poets, who synthesized Hindu and Muslim cultures. They have created one of the most powerful and impressive empires of world history, the Mughals; achieved architectural excellence in the Taj Mahal; touched the highest peaks of literature in the verses of Mirza Ghalib, Iqbal, and Faiz Ahmed Faiz; and have led the most significant and successful Muslim political movement of the twentieth century, resulting in the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Women have always played an important role in South Asian Muslim society—from the time when Razia Sultana actually ruled over Delhi's sultanate in the thirteenth century, to the remarkable empress Nur Jehan, who ruled along with her husband, Mughal emperor Jahangir, in the seventeenth century, to modern times, when female prime ministers have been elected both in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The main communities, Hindus and Muslims, see history differently. If Muslims in Pakistan were asked to name their favorite historical figures, most would probably say: Mahmud of Ghazni (one of the earliest warriors to invade India from what is now modern Afghanistan); Aurangzeb, the last great Mughal emperor; and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Most Hindus would respond to the question “who are your least favorite historical figures?” by giving the same names. Mahmud is associated with brutal military raids into India, smashing Hindu temples and statues; Aurangzeb with a harshly violent, triumphant Islamic rule and a narrow interpretation of Islamic law; and Jinnah is blamed for splitting Mother India in two.

History is never far from the surface in contemporary India. Newspaper articles and letters constantly cite Mahmud, Aurangzeb, or Jinnah as a hero among some Muslims but a villain for most Hindus. Few mention that on the whole Muslims were sensitive to their Hindu compatriots. From the start, Babur abolished cow slaughter, and up to the last Mughal emperor it was banned in Delhi as a gesture toward the Hindus. Sir Sayyid did the same at Aligarh. The contribution to Hindu culture of rulers like Akbar and Dara Shikoh is forgotten.

Bazaar sociology does not stop with the past; it feeds into the writing and perception of modern history. In India, if Muslim rulers are depicted in the stereotype as alien invaders, mainly drunk and destroying temples, in

Pakistan the Hindu past simply does not exist. Hindus are dismissed as cowardly and mean. History in Pakistan begins in the seventh century, after the advent of Islam and the Muslim invasion of Sind; the great pre-Islamic civilizations of Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, and Taxila are more or less ignored.

Trends in the Future

The events of partition still haunt South Asia: for India the nightmare of disintegration; for Pakistan the terror of the violence. This mutual hatred still feeds into the complex political configuration of contemporary India and Pakistan. Three wars with India and now a nuclear confrontation further underscore the importance of reaching enduring agreements to ensure a peaceful future for South Asia. India and Pakistan's nuclear explosions, the struggle for independence among the Muslims of Kashmir, the exorbitant cost of keeping large armies and the geopolitics of the region all reflect the dreadful dangers and inordinate price of communal conflicts, rooted in history.

Nuclear weapons on the one hand and starving peasants on the other are the reality of South Asia today. As a result one-fifth of humanity is mired in poverty (incomes per capita range between \$200 and \$400 in these countries). South Asia has produced world scientists and writers—including Nobel Prize winners—and yet seems incapable of improving its poor record on poverty and peace. The true enemies of South Asia are poverty, illiteracy, and communal hatred. Until this dawns upon all communities, South Asia will not enjoy peace, nor will it benefit from the uniqueness of its cultural legacy of synthesis and harmony.

At the start of the twenty-first century, we could well ask which model of Muslim political action triumphed in South Asia for over a thousand years—the model called fanatical by its critics, or that of peace? The answer lies in the demographic figures of the subcontinent. The vast majority of the population is still Hindu. Had Muslim rulers been ruthless tyrants, they could have converted the people they ruled, virtually unchallenged, for the better part of a millennium.

Jinnah's Pakistan anticipated the global questions that would be asked about modern Muslim states and societies in the aftermath of 11 September 2001: Is Islam compatible with democracy? Does Islam always subordinate women? Does Islam preach violence?

Jinnah's vision of a tolerant and modern Muslim Pakistan had provided the answer to the first of those questions in the affirmative, while rejecting the second and third as totally biased and untrue. Current Indian and Pakistani “cease-fire” agreements in Jammu and Kashmir

and plans to meet to discuss ways of further opening closed borders to help achieve permanent South Asian peace and stimulate economic trade suggest the possibility of hope for the more than 1 billion people of this long-suffering region.

Akbar Ahmed

See also **Bangladesh; Iqbal, Muhammad; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali**

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ISRAEL, RELATIONS WITH The attitude of Indian nationalists toward their Israeli counterparts largely influenced India's policy toward Israel. Since the early 1920s, Indian nationalists strongly supported Arab rights in Palestine and were unwilling to endorse Zionist aspirations for a Jewish national home there. British India had the largest Muslim population in the world, and this, coupled with the ongoing rivalry with the Muslim League, forced the Indian National Congress to perceive the Arab-Jewish controversy through an Islamic prism. The tiny Jewish presence in India and the limited interests shown by the prestate Zionist leadership toward the subcontinent had also contributed to an unsympathetic Indian position. According to Mahatma Gandhi, "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French." Similarly, Jawaharlal Nehru, felt that Palestine "is essentially an Arab country and no decision can be made without the consent of the Arabs." Despite these positions, in March 1947, a ten-member Jewish delegation from Palestine was invited to the Asian Relations Conference hosted by Nehru. The political impact of the visit, however, was marginal.

In April 1947 the United Nations (UN) convened a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the

British request to determine the future of Mandate Palestine. After two weeks of deliberations, on 15 May 1947 an eleven-member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed, and India was elected to the committee as an Asian member. Nehru, who was then heading the interim government, nominated Sir Abdur Rahman, a judge at the Punjab High Court in Lahore, as the Indian representative.

On 1 September 1947 UNSCOP submitted its recommendations. A seven-member majority advocated partition as the solution for Palestine, while India (supported by Iran and erstwhile Yugoslavia) proposed a minority plan that called for a federal Palestine with adequate internal autonomy for the Jewish population. India perceived the partition of Palestine to be an unjust, unviable option. In an extension of the Congress Party's position vis-à-vis the Muslim League's two-nation theory, India refused to endorse any religious basis for modern statehood. It argued that since Palestine was a predominantly Arab country, any solution of the conflict should not be to the disadvantage of the Arabs.

Both Arabs and Jews found the Indian proposal inadequate and were unanimous in rejecting it, however; hence the UN never discussed that federal plan. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly approved to partition Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab states. Joining the Arab and Islamic countries, India voted against the partition plan.

Recognition without Relations

The establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948 created a new political reality in the Middle East. For a while, India continued to argue its former position, and in May 1949 voted against Israel's admission to the UN. After protracted deliberations, on 17 September 1950 India extended de jure recognition to the Jewish state. This decision was not accompanied by any formal announcement concerning diplomatic relations. For the next four decades, recognition without normalization characterized Indo-Israeli relations.

In May 1950 or nearly five months prior to Indian recognition, Israel appointed a Bombay (Mumbai)-based Indian national, F. W. Pollack, as its trade commissioner of Southeast Asia; in December 1950 he was redesignated as trade commissioner for India and South East Asia. In the same month, a temporary *aliya* (immigration) office was opened in Bombay to facilitate the immigration of Jewish refugees stranded in India during World War II. In June 1951 Pollack was concurrently appointed Israel's consular agent in India, and in October 1952 he was made honorary consul for India. In January 1953 this position was upgraded to a full-fledged Israeli consulate, and in



L. K. Advani and Shimon Peres. Indian Deputy Prime Minister Advani (left) and Israeli Prime Minister Peres during the former's official state visit, June 2000. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992, the two nations have regularly conferred on military matters, as they share similar concerns about terrorism and security. INDIA TODAY.

June 1953 career diplomat Gabriel Doron took over as the first Israeli consul in India. Between July 1953 and January 1992, fifteen officials headed the Israeli mission in Bombay. Despite their lower official status, Israeli consuls had direct access to the foreign minister and often met the prime minister. They also enjoyed unrestricted freedom of movement, except in sensitive border areas, but their consular jurisdiction was largely restricted to the state of Maharashtra.

Meanwhile, concerned over delays in the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Walter Eytan paid an official visit to India in early 1952, and Prime Minister Nehru informed the visitor that India was favorably disposed toward normalization. Following this visit, an Indian official was asked to prepare the budget and other financial details for a resident Indian mission in Tel Aviv.

At first, the absence of relations was attributed to financial constraints, scarcity of personnel, and India's desire not to overstretch its meager resources. India's

concerns over Pakistan, particularly its desire to neutralize Pakistani efforts and influence in the Middle East, resulted in a cautious approach toward Israel. India felt that an early "resolution" of the Kashmir dispute would enable it to modify its position toward Israel. There were apprehensions that diplomatic ties with Israel might displease Arab countries. Perceived opposition by India's Muslim population also played an important role in its reluctance to establish relations with Israel, and in private discussions with Israelis, Indian leaders candidly referred to their fears of inflaming Muslim sentiments. When Prime Minister Narasimha Rao decided to normalize relations with Israel in January 1992, his senior cabinet colleagues warned him of possible negative reactions from Muslims. Speaking in Jerusalem in June 2000, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh attributed prolonged nonrelations to the feelings of Indian Muslims.

The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955 marked an ominous trend for Israel-India relations. Bowing to Arab pressures, India went along with others and opted to exclude Israel from the conference, thereby

legitimizing the exclusion of Israel from subsequent Afro-Asian and third world meetings.

The Suez crisis of 1956, in which Israel joined hands with Britain and France and invaded the Sinai Peninsula, marked a shift in India's Israel policy. Afro-Asian solidarity, based on anticolonialism, as well as Israel's identification with imperial powers and the growing friendship between Nehru and Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, influenced Indian calculations. Strongly condemning the Israeli aggression against Egypt, on 20 November 1956 Nehru told the Indian Lok Sabha that "in view of the existing passion" diplomatic exchanges between India and Israel were not possible. Since then, "the time is not ripe" remained the standard Indian refrain to explain the absence of relations with Israel, up until January 1992.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, Indian and Israeli diplomats met regularly in a number of places, including Washington, New York, Ottawa, London, Ankara, and Rangoon. There were many regular visits between leaders of both countries, including former Israeli foreign ministers Moshe Sharett (1956) and Yigal Allon (1959 and 1964), who visited India and met with Nehru.

Since the mid-1960s, the general warmth of the earlier years began to wane, and Indo-Israeli relations deteriorated. The preemptive strike launched by Israel against its Arab neighbors on 5 June 1967 resulted in the deaths of a number of Indian soldiers serving in the Gaza Strip as part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Infuriated, India ruled out diplomatic relations, blaming Israel's "wrong" policies. The emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 further alienated India from Israel; in January 1975, India recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1969, India's growing dependence on the Middle East for energy resources, and the presence of substantial numbers of Indian laborers in the oil-rich Gulf states further entrenched India's pro-Arab policy.

When Morarji Desai's Janata government was in power, Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan paid an unsuccessful incognito visit to India in August 1977 to explore the possibilities of diplomatic relations. Continuing India's pro-Arab policy in March 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi granted full diplomatic status to the PLO mission in Delhi, while Israel's consulate languished in Maharashtra. In 1982 in a media interview, Yossef Hasseen, Israeli consul in Mumbai, accused India of trying to compete with Pakistan to curry favors with the Arabs. Coming as it did against the backdrop of

increasing international criticism of Israel, he was declared *persona non grata*. Moreover, since the late 1970s, a number of Israeli delegations were denied visas to attend various international conferences and sports events hosted by India.

Indo-Israeli relations began to improve after Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister in October 1984. The issue of normalization figured prominently in his discussions with U.S. officials. He also met with Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres during the fortieth annual session of the UN in 1985; facilitated the Indo-Israeli Davis Cup tennis match in New Delhi in July 1987; restored consul status to the Israeli mission in Mumbai in August 1988; hosted a pro-Israeli delegation from the Anti-Defamation League in January 1989; extended Israeli consular jurisdiction to the South Indian state of Kerala, which has a significant Jewish population; and relaxed visa procedures for holders of Israeli passports.

The outbreak of the Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) in December 1987 and subsequent Israeli isolation curtailed India's options. Israeli involvement in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, especially its military-intelligence cooperation, generated suspicion and anger in India. Rapid erosion of his own popularity and a string of electoral reverses suffered by his Congress Party limited Rajiv Gandhi's ability to complete the process he had initiated to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel. Nevertheless, these measures proved useful to Narasimha Rao, who became prime minister soon after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991.

Normalization

Within days after Rao assumed office, a group of Israeli tourists was kidnapped in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A senior Israeli diplomat came to India to "coordinate" their release, and during this brief visit, he met a number of senior Indian officials. In a well-publicized gesture on 16 December 1991, India voted with the majority in repealing the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism. As India had been one of the resolution's original sponsors, this move marked a significant departure from the past.

Shortly afterward, high-level Indo-Israeli diplomatic consultations were held in Washington. On 29 January 1992, Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit formally announced India's decision to establish full and complete diplomatic relations with Israel. India became the last major non-Arab or non-Islamic state to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Within weeks, the Israeli consul in Bombay, Giora Becher, moved to New Delhi and opened the Israeli embassy, and on 15 May, India opened its embassy in Tel Aviv.

A host of domestic and international developments enabled Rao to complete a process that began in September 1950. These developments included: the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union; the weakening of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which had consistently adopted an anti-Israeli posture; India's policy of economic liberation, which required strong American backing; the inauguration of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 1991, which signaled the willingness of the Arabs and Palestinians to seek a political settlement with Israel through direct negotiations; and the formal termination of Israel's prolonged political and diplomatic isolation.

Contrary to prolonged apprehensions, domestic or regional opposition to normalization of relations were marginal. Some Arab countries were displeased with India's development of security cooperation with Israel, but the overall response in the Middle East was subdued. Contrary to past apprehensions, the newly established relations did not inhibit India from pursuing productive relations with a number of countries in the region. The warming of Indo-Iranian relations and growing economic ties between India and the Gulf states underscore that normalization has not prevented India from improving its ties with countries pronouncedly hostile toward Israel.

Since the opening of the diplomatic missions, a host of official, semiofficial and nonofficial delegations have visited one another. A number of Israeli cabinet ministers, senior officials, and businesspersons visited India, including Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and President Ezer Weizmann (December 1996). Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani visited Israel in June 2000, with Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.

Diplomatic relations with Israel now have bipartisan support in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party has been enthusiastic in its support for the pro-Israeli policy initiated by Congress. Even parties such as Janata Dal, which opposed Rao's decision in 1992, have endorsed bilateral cooperation. The visit to Israel of veteran communist leader and West Bengal chief minister Jyoti Basu in the summer of 2000 signaled that even India's communists are no longer opposed to closer ties with Israel. India's position in the UN-sponsored World Conference against Racism in Durban in August–September 2001 underscored India's newly found self-assertion toward the Middle East. Despite pressures from the region, it refused to join Arab and Islamic countries in equating Zionism with racism.

Since normalization, both countries have established extensive relations and cooperation in the military-security arena. Because of increasing acts of terrorism and border

infiltrations, India has sought Israeli expertise in intelligence gathering, innovative and pro-active counterterrorism policies, and electronic surveillance along international borders, adapting some of the Israeli methods to combat threats emanating from India's borders with Pakistan. Moreover, in the political arena, India has gradually distanced itself from its past postures and has been less critical of Israel and its policies.

National security advisers of both countries meet periodically, holding high-level consultations, and both countries have set up a joint working group on counterterrorism. A number of senior officials belonging to intelligence and internal security officials accompanied Deputy Prime Minister Advani when he visited Israel. On 11 September 2001, the day terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States, Israeli national security adviser Major General Uzi Dayan was holding high-level counterterrorism discussions with top Indian officials in New Delhi. As part of a new approach toward Israel, India has contributed troops to the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon.

Conscious of the potentials, both sides have depoliticized defense-related cooperation. Less than a decade after normalization, Israel emerged as the second-largest military supplier (after Russia) to India, and the latter is now Israel's largest market for military exports. Israel is actively involved in upgrading India's aging Soviet-made MiG aircraft. Green Pine radars, remotely piloted vehicles, Barak ship-borne antimissile systems for the navy, and ammunition for Bofors guns, used during the Kargil operations, are some of the prominent defense deals. In August 2001, after months of negotiations, India signed a series of defense contracts with Israel, estimated at \$2 billion, for the supply of long-range surveillance equipment, night-vision hardware, and ammunition. An Israeli consortium has been awarded the contract to upgrade India's 130-mm artillery guns into 150-mm howitzers. In late 2003 Israel agreed to supply Phalcon airborne early warning systems to India, estimated to cost over \$1 billion. Growing Indo-Israeli military ties are developing against the background of increasing Indo-U.S. cooperation, leading to suggestions of a friendly triangle involving India, Israel, and the United States.

The pace of bilateral trade since the establishment of diplomatic relations gives the impression that India and Israel have determined to make up for lost decades. Bilateral trade stood at just \$200 million in 1992 and has crossed the billion-dollar mark in less than a decade. Diamonds and precious stones, which accounted for nearly 90 percent of the trade in 1992, now constitute just over 50 percent. Both countries have signed a number of agreements pertaining to agriculture, trade, investments, scientific cooperation, and double taxation.

Even though increasing Indo-Israeli security contacts are often presented as a strategic partnership, one cannot ignore that on such sensitive issues as Indo-Iranian relations or Pakistan's role in international terrorism, India and Israel have fundamental differences. Similarly, India has been less enthusiastic in endorsing Israeli positions concerning Islamic fundamentalism, especially since the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada* in September 2000. The Congress Party expressed its displeasure at what it perceived to be an abandonment of India's historic support for the Palestinian cause, and a section of the opposition called for a reassessment of India's growing ties with Israel.

Seen in this context, the high-profile state visit of Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was a watershed in Indo-Israeli relations. Despite controversies and protests in New Delhi, the visit marked a new high level of Indo-Israeli relations, underscoring the willingness and determination of both countries to give greater visibility to their diplomatic relations.

P. R. Kumaraswamy

See also **United States, Relations with**

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IVORY CARVING There is a long and rich history of ivory carving in India. Over the course of its millennia of artistic expression, several natural sources of ivory, antler, and bone were utilized interchangeably to fashion a wide variety of objects. Many of these works can easily be classified as decorative art, such as various containers, combs and other personal grooming items, ornaments, jewelry, writing implements and manuscript covers, hookah mouthpieces, dice and other nonfigural gaming pieces, nonfigural weapon hilts, and musical instruments. Many other extant examples are clearly sculpture, such as religious images of Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian subjects (but not Jain), and secular representations of royalty, the privileged class, and ethnographic or occupational types. Intriguingly, however, there are also several types of Indian carved ivory objects for which the traditional boundaries between figural sculpture and decorative art objects are blurred. For instance, numerous ivory plaques survive that were originally used in a decorative context by being affixed to various containers as ornamental facades. These plaques typically feature figures carved in intaglio, low relief, and in the round against a pierced background. Certainly the best-known South Asian ivory plaques are the hoard of about 600 extraordinary examples dating from the Kushana period (1st–3rd centuries A.D.) found at Begram in Afghanistan, the summer capital of the Kushana kings. These world heritage treasures now survive primarily in the Musée Guimet, Paris, as many of those in the collection of the Kabul Museum in Afghanistan have been looted and are in danger of perishing. The tradition of using ivory facade plaques for decorative purposes continued in India for centuries. Particularly accomplished examples were created in South India during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; one of the finest surviving such works is an exquisitely rendered tripartite panel, depicting amorous couples, now in the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts.

In addition to the ivory plaques, which were primarily carved in relief, there was also an extensive tradition of ivory carving in the round, featuring decorative throne legs, object handles, weaponry hilts, containers fashioned in figural forms, chessmen, and sundry representations of animals, humans, and conveyances that primarily served a decorative purpose. Ultimately, the classification of ivories depends upon the viewer's perspective—whether primacy is given to form or function. Given the extraordinarily high artistic level and extremely long history of Indian ivory carving, its classification should clearly not be determined on the basis of size or whether the medium of ivory is considered a "minor art" in comparison to works made of metal or stone.



Ivory Carving of Krishna and Rādhā. Dating to seventeenth-century Orissa, Krishna and Rādhā, his divine love. Though many ivory carvings were created in the image of religious deities, as here, many more proliferated in the decorative arts, with the distinction between the two often blurring. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Typology of Decorative Ivory Carvings

Myriad decorative ivory object types were carved in the Indian subcontinent, beginning at least as early as the Indus Valley Civilization (mature phase, dating from c. 2600 to 1900 B.C.), and continuing to the present day. Extensive evidence of the extent and socioeconomic importance of premodern ivory carving is provided by a plethora of extant ivory objects and numerous references to ivory carvers and their products contained within the vast corpus of Indian epigraphical records and literary works. In the earlier periods of Indian history, a wide range of domestic artifacts were made of ivory and bone, including pins, needles, hooks, awls, styli, pegs, rods, arrowheads, and gaming pieces. These everyday objects were generally unadorned or partially embellished with rudimentary cross-hatching and geometric designs sawed or drilled into the surface.

Personal grooming aids made of ivory, particularly combs and hairpins, were also common, and examples survive from many periods of Indian and greater South

Asian history. Early ivory combs, typified by the Kushana examples found near Taxila in modern Pakistan, have fine or occasionally coarse teeth on one side and rectangular or round-edged flat handles decorated with incised animal and human figures and auspicious symbols. Later ivory combs, especially those made during the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries in South India and Sri Lanka, typically have fine teeth on the top and bottom with a central grip area often decorated with painted female figures and animals carved in bas-relief. Early ivory hairpins usually have a single tapering shaft with an animal-shaped or animal-headed terminal. Later ivory hairpins can sometimes have as many as several thick tapering prongs, and a flat handle carved in the form of an animal such as a rearing lion.

Indian ceremonial throne legs carved of ivory are prime examples of utilitarian objects that can be classified as both decorative and sculptural. The earliest and best known such Indian ivory is a throne or perhaps stool leg (once thought to be a mirror handle) in the form of an elegantly coiffured and adorned female figure. This ivory, now in the Archaeological Museum of Naples, was unearthed from the ruins of Pompeii, where it was buried in A.D. 79 following the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. A similar ivory female figure was discovered at Ter in modern Maharashtra, which in ancient times was the important trade city of Tagara, mentioned in the first-century merchant account *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*. Thus, in addition to their artistic importance, these ivory female figures are significant for documenting the international trade in ancient Indian luxury items. The early use of female figures as subjects for furniture legs was generally supplanted in the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries by representations of lions, elephants, and mythical beasts (*vyāla* and *śārdūla*). With the introduction of British artistic influence, furniture legs often terminated in stylized lion paws. The tradition of making ivory ceremonial thrones continued in India at least until the mid-twentieth century. Many different types of ivory and ivory-veneered furniture and cabinets were created in India, each embellished with a different regional decorative style. The major centers of production were in Delhi, Orissa, Gujarat, Murshidabad in Bangla (West Bengal), Mysore in Karnataka, Vishakhapatnam (Vizagapatam) in Andhra Pradesh, and Travancore in Kerala. One of the finest and most famous examples of an Indian ivory-veneered throne, now in the Royal Collection, London, is the ornate one presented to Queen Victoria (r. 1837–1901) by Maharaja Martanda Varma (r. 1847–1860) of Travancore, which was displayed in the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London.

Only a few different types and sizes of Indian containers were made of ivory, presumably because of the

dimensional limitations inherent in the medium. Cups, bowls, decorative storage vessels, jewelry caskets, pen boxes, and rosewater sprinklers were among the most frequently fashioned objects. The most distinctive type of Indian ivory container was the powder primer flask, which was used to prime the flash pan and touchhole of early firearms. A number of these important weaponry accoutrements survive from the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most powder primer flasks are fashioned in the form of an antelope, its head at the mouth of the container, with a bird at the other end. They typically have a bipartite, gracefully curved body enlivened with hunt scenes, animals of prey, and fowl.

The largest Indian carved ivory objects—sometimes utilizing an entire tusk and more—are the ivory boats mounted on display stands that were made during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Murshidabad, the great Bengali center of ivory carving. These are ivory models of royal pleasure boats, called peacock barges (*mayūra-pankhī* or *morpankhī*) because their prow was shaped in the form of a peacock, which were enjoyed by Siraj-ud-Dawla, the governor (*nawāb*) of Bengal (r. 1756–1757), and his guests during festivals on the Ganges River. The ivory models, made in varying sizes, depict the elaborate peacock barges in detail. They typically feature one or two covered pavilions in the forward section that were used for entertaining the ruler and his guests with musicians, dancers, and a communal hookah. A number of servants are often in attendance, including one whose job was to pull the cord of the swinging ceiling fan (*pankhā*). The stern has several pairs of rowers and a helmsman. Intriguingly, these ivory boats could also be customized for a Hindu clientele by omitting the *pankhā*-servant and adding in its place a small shrine of the goddess Durgā Slaying the Buffalo Demon. Once graced with the divine image, the ivory boats may have been used for ritual immersion during the Durgā Pūjā festival.

The Murshidabad ivory carvers produced many other popular subjects, including bullock carts, elephants with canopied howdahs, and colonial personages such as Indian civil servants. Regrettably, the artistic glories of Murshidabad and other Indian centers of ivory production faded with the dawn of the modern age. The multi-purpose use of ivory was supplanted by the introduction of plastic, and despite the 1972 ban on the trade in ivory under the Indian Wild Life (Protection) Act, some

formulaic carvings of limited subjects are still being created for the indiscriminate tourist market.

Stephen Markel

See also **Metalware**

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JAHANGIR (1569–1627), *Mughal emperor (1605–1627)*. Jahangir (“World Grasper”) was born Muhammad Salim. Married at fifteen, ultimately over eight hundred women occupied his harem, and his strong constitution was ruined by alcohol and opium. In 1600 he revolted against his father, Akbar, declared himself emperor, and refused to march on Kandahar to stave off the Persians. In 1602 he had the last of his father’s great ministers, Abul Fazl, murdered. He was, nonetheless, forgiven by his father and was named as his successor.

As emperor, Jahangir promulgated twelve regulations that continued his father’s policies of conciliation, religious tolerance, and justice, although he was a more orthodox Muslim than his father. Under Jahangir, the bureaucracy expanded dramatically, but the empire did not. In 1606 his eldest son, the popular Khusrau, revolted, and in suppressing that Punjab-based rebellion, Jahangir initiated a brutal conflict with the Sikhs. Khusrau was partly blinded and imprisoned for life, and was murdered in 1622 by his younger brother, Prince Khurram, the future emperor Shah Jahan.

Jahangir’s reign changed dramatically with his marriage in 1611 to the Persian princess Nur Jahan (“Light of the World”), a beautiful, intelligent, and highly cultured and ambitious woman who set the fashions for the age and soon ruled the empire in all but name. Jahangir may have ordered the murder of her husband in 1607 in order to marry her. Nur Jahan, her father, and her brother, along with Prince Khurram, dominated the faction-ridden court until Prince Khurram rebelled in 1623, and the final years of Jahangir’s reign were riven with conflict. With Nur Jahan came a greater infusion of Persian culture to Jahangir’s court, especially miniature painting. Nur Jahan married her daughter by her first

husband to Jahangir’s youngest son, Shahryar. She and Jahangir had no children together.

Jahangir did not have his father’s energy or drive, and his long desultory war against Mewar was concluded unfavorably in 1615. His campaigns from 1610 against Ahmednagar were also conducted fitfully and unsuccessfully. His son Prince Khurram was more successful in 1616, and he obtained the surrender of Ahmednagar, though it remained independent until 1629. Prince Khurram also captured Kangra in 1620. In 1622, however, Kandahar was lost to the Persians.

During the day Jahangir carried out his imperial duties, met with people, and was capable of great energy; at night he loved pleasure, and was an alcoholic with a mercurial and violent temper. In 1623 Shah Jahan rebelled, and he and his father were not reconciled for two years.

Jahangir allowed the British East India Company to establish a trading post at Surat, where the representative, Captain William Hawkins, arrived in 1608 and spent three years at Jahangir’s court. The British ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, served at his court between 1615 and 1619. This was of historical importance because it allowed the Europeans to make inroads into India. Jahangir wrote his memoirs, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, but in his last year his health was broken. He tried to restore it by visiting his Shalimar Gardens in Kashmir. He died on his return and was buried in Lahore.

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See also **Akbar; Babur; Shah Jahan**

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JAIN AND BUDDHIST MANUSCRIPT PAINTING Buddhism and Jainism played an important role in generating written culture in a society where the oral transmission of knowledge has long been predominant. The production of Buddhist texts could have been inspired by the fear of forgetting the Buddha, who had already entered Nirvāna, and his teachings. Although much later in its date, Jain literature clearly records such fears as a reason for having written texts. When a terrible famine in the fifth century A.D. killed the majority of the Jain monks well versed in the sacred knowledge, the body of this knowledge was committed to writing for fear of losing the tradition forever. Books have been treasured in both Buddhism and Jainism not only as texts that record otherwise lost teachings of the venerable ones, but also as sacred objects that should be duly venerated. The books belonging to the latter category of sacred objects often contain paintings that contribute to their religious efficacy.

Buddhist Manuscript Painting

Historical background. The earliest illustrated Buddhist manuscript of the Indian subcontinent is the manuscript of the *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines) now in the Cambridge University Library. Its colophon tells us that the manuscript was made in the fourth regnal year of Mahīpāla I (c. 992–1042). The Pālas ruled in the ancient land of Magadha and adjacent regions (the present-day Indian state of Bihar and parts of Bengal) from the eighth to the early thirteenth centuries. The reign of Mahīpāla I marks a turning point in Pāla history because he is responsible for stabilizing and recovering the territory that was lost during the successions of weak kings before him. The heightened religious activities and the degree of royal patronage of the Buddhist institutions exemplified by the inscriptions bearing his regnal years suggest the perfect atmosphere for commissioning beautifully illustrated Buddhist manuscripts. A tradition of illustrating Buddhist books must have existed before Mahīpāla's reign, but the surviving body of manuscripts suggests a heyday of Buddhist book production, especially books with illustrations, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in eastern India. Illustrated Buddhist manuscripts were made in regions outside Pāla territory in eastern India, and we have manuscripts dated with the regnal years of the Candras and the Varmans, who ruled parts of eastern India during this period. The popularity of illustrated Buddhist manuscripts was also witnessed in Kathmandu

Valley, Nepal, a region that seems to have been culturally interconnected with eastern India during this time.

Manuscript production and the Buddhist monasteries in eastern India. The colophon of the Cambridge University Library manuscript mentioned above does not tell us where it was prepared, but the use of Mahīpāla's regnal year suggests that the site of its production must have been one of the famous Buddhist monasteries that prospered under the Pāla rule. Even though only a few of the Pāla kings were devout Buddhists, they continued to support the internationally well-known monastery of Nalanda and founded other grand monasteries, such as Vikramashīla, located in Antichak, near Bhagalpur in Bihar. We know from different colophons that manuscripts were actually made in these famous monasteries of eastern India. For example, a beautifully written manuscript of *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* that includes eighteen illustrations and painted wooden covers (now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford) was, the colophon tells us, prepared by a scribe Ahunakunda of Sri Nalanda in Magadha in the fifteenth year of the king Rāmapāla (c. 1087–1141). Another manuscript of *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* written in ornamental Kutila (hooked) scripts (now in the British Library) was made in Vikramashīla during the fifteenth year of King Gopāla III (c. 1143–1158).

Along with the accounts of later Tibetan monks visiting these sites, the ruins at the excavated sites of Nalanda and Vikramashīla suggest a blow of destruction by the Muslim army in the early thirteenth century, and such an attack must have destroyed thousands of manuscripts kept at the monasteries. This full-scale destruction of the Buddhist establishments in eastern India may have nevertheless contributed to the preservation of Buddhist manuscripts of the Pāla period: as the monks fled to Nepal and Tibet, these manuscripts were transported to a more hospitable climate for their fragile leaves, which otherwise may not have withstood almost a thousand years of harsh weather.

Material and production. Buddhist manuscripts of eastern India and Nepal were made with the leaves of the talipot (*Corypha umbraculifera*), a type of palm tree. The use of paper in Buddhist manuscript production was known in the Kathmandu Valley as early as the twelfth century, but palm leaf was the most commonly used material for writing. The palm-leaf manuscripts usually measure about 21–21.5 inches (53–55 cm) by 2–2.5 inches (5–6 cm) and come with a pair of wooden covers protecting the leaves. The pile of leaves and the wooden covers are strung together by a cord through prebored holes. A reed pen with black ink was used to write on the leaves, which had been rubbed to create smooth surfaces for writing. The colophons suggest that the scribe was



Illustrated Folio of Kalkacarya Katha. Illustration accompanying the Kālakāchāryakathā (Story of the teacher Kālaka), Jain manuscript from Western India, c. 1450–1500. By the time this watercolor was created, the introduction of paper had led to bolder stylization in Jain paintings. Note also the characteristic exaggerated linear depictions of figures. SURESH NEOTIA COLLECTION. JNANA PRAVAHA, VARANASI, INDIA.

usually a resident monk of the monastery where the project was commissioned.

When the donor's request included paintings in the manuscript, all the spaces for paintings were laid out at the commencement of the project. We do not know much about who undertook the paintings because the colophons are silent about the painters. It is most likely that there were specially trained painters at the monasteries, but there is also a possibility that a skillful scribe was the illustrator of the manuscript. Provided with a very small space of 2–2.5 inches (5–6 cm) square, the painters of the earliest illustrated manuscripts tended to abbreviate and simplify both lines and colors to create spontaneous and lively representations. By the late eleventh century, the manuscript painting style of eastern India and Nepal was as refined as that of Ajanta wall paintings, employing a fine yet sinuous line and color gradation to achieve a graceful and delicate modeling of each figure. Sometimes, if the donation fell short of the budget or the project was hurried to meet the deadline, these spaces for paintings were left empty. As long as the writing was finished, the manuscript was ready to be used and worshiped.

Book cult and paintings. Out of hundreds of Mahayana Buddhist texts, only a few enjoyed a great zeal of patronage during the Pāla period: the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā, the Pancarakshā Sūtra of five protection goddesses, and occasionally the Kārandavyūha Sūtra, in

eulogy of Avalokiteshvara. The most famous was the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā, a philosophical treatise that expounds the Mahayana doctrine of *shūnyatā* (emptiness) and a book of the Buddhist book cult in which the text promotes its own worship. As such, over two-thirds of the surviving illustrated manuscripts from this period are of the Asta.

The paintings in the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā manuscripts often depict the eight scenes of the Buddha's life, even though we find no reference to such scenes in its text. Scholars who acknowledged such disjuncture between the text and images have argued that the paintings in the manuscripts of the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā have no relation to the text, and that they serve as mere decorations that help the manuscript donor to accrue more religious merit. However, a careful look at the text-image relationship seems to prove otherwise. If the text of the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā tries to explain the nonexistence of existence or the existence of nonexistence, disjuncture between the text and images may be said to illustrate the text by being elusive. Moreover, a systematic placement of images suggests that the paintings serve a more important role than mere decorations and merit making.

In a typical manuscript of the Astasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā, we have either twelve or eighteen painted panels, sized about 2–2.5 inches (5–6 cm) square. Three panels that appear on one side of a folio usually face

another set on the next folio. Each set of two folios, with six paintings, marks the beginning and the end of the text. In the case of manuscripts with eighteen panels, paintings will also appear in the middle. Four of the eight panels depicting the Buddha's life scenes usually appear in the beginning, and the other four at the end. The rest are representations of different deities and *bodhisattvas*, such as Prajñāpāramitā, Avalokiteshvara, Manjushri, and Tārā. As a collective unit, these paintings become the icon of the book that can open and close the path to the core teaching of the Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. The paintings are the indexical signs of the contents of the book.

Jain Manuscript Painting

Historical background. Jain manuscripts were mainly produced and kept in the Jnāna Bhandārs, a comprehensive library usually found underground, attached to Jain temples. According to the Jain literature, the foundation of the Jain Jnāna Bhandārs began at the same time as the writing of the Jain texts in the fifth century A.D. From the tenth century these libraries began to enjoy prosperity, thanks to support from the Jain kings, who ruled Gujarat and parts of Rajasthan, their ministers, and the merchant-bankers of the Jain communities. Such support partly originated from the interest in religious merits one could attain with the donation of a book. The event of donating a carefully made book to a Jnāna Bhandār came with the opportunity for hearing the recitation of their sacred teachings. Such a book could be taken up for Jnanapuja, the worship of the book, as in Buddhist tradition. The survival of numerous palm-leaf and paper manuscripts made in western India is indebted to the Bhandārs of the Svetāmbara (clad in white) sect. The most famous Jain Jnāna Bhandārs are now found in Patan, Cambay, and Jaisalmer.

Scholars have suggested that the earliest illustrated Jain manuscript is the palm-leaf manuscript of the Nishīthachūrnī now in the collection of the Sanghavīnā Pādānā Bhandār, Patan, dated 1157 Vikramasamvat (A.D. 1100). This manuscript contains only floral and geometric patterned roundels and small figural drawings on the margins, whose purpose seems to be to decorate the manuscript. During the twelfth century we find Jain manuscripts of various canonical texts with illustrations of deities and other figures, as in the Buddhist examples. The illustrated manuscript on paper first emerged around the mid-fourteenth century, coinciding with the advent of the Sultanate rule in Gujarat, as exemplified by a paper manuscript of Kalpa Sūtra dated 1346, now in a private collection in Mumbai. Palm leaf continued to be used for manuscript production until about 1450.

The development of Jain manuscript painting. The Kalpa Sūtra (Book of the ritual), often paired with Kālakāchāryakathā (Story of the teacher Kālaka), seems to

have been the most favored Jain text for commissioning an illustrated manuscript. Apart from being recited once a year at the time of the Paryushana festival, both contain stories popular among Jains. The first two sections of the Kalpa Sūtra provide interesting narratives for illustrations, telling the life stories of the Tīrthānkaras and the genealogy of the elders, as does the Kālakāchāryakathā, a text about the adventure of a Jain monk, Kālaka, who saves his abducted sister with the help of the King Sāhi of the Saka tribes. Early makers of the Jain manuscripts paid little attention to the pictorial depiction of narratives. As in the illustrated manuscripts of other canonical texts of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the paintings in the Kalpa Sūtra portrayed the Tīrthānkaras, Jain monks, and lay devotees, probably the donors of the manuscripts.

The stories of the Kalpa Sūtra and the Kālakāchāryakathā began to be illustrated around the mid-fourteenth century, and once the iconography for each narrative scene was established, little deviation was made in their representations. It has been suggested that the introduction of paper during the fourteenth century led to stronger stylization and distortion of the figures. More exaggerated, linear, and flat depictions of figures with protruding eyes continued. During the fifteenth century, border decorations became more sumptuous and opulent, possibly influenced by contemporaneous Islamic manuscripts. The unusual manuscript of the Kalpa Sūtra of the Devasano Pādo Bhandār has very lavish illuminations on its borders. The application of new colors, such as ultramarine, lapis lazuli blue, and crimson red, with the occasional application of gold and silver, also contributed to the more elaborately decorated and illustrated Jain manuscripts of the fifteenth century. The unique figural style of the Jain manuscript paintings endured until the late sixteenth century, when the interest in Kalpa Sūtra suddenly dropped. In its place, other texts were commissioned for illustration in a completely different style, concurrent with that of Hindu manuscript paintings.

Jinab Kim

See also **Ajanta; Miniatures**

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JAINISM Jainism is one of the oldest living religions of India. Older than Buddhism, its origins date before 3000 B.C. Though Mahāvīra (599–527 B.C.) is popularly perceived as the founder of Jainism, he was actually the last of the spiritual lineage of twenty-four Tīrthānkars recognized under Jainism. Jainism had existed before Mahāvīra, who was more a reformer and propagator of Jainism, reviving the Jain philosophy preached by his predecessor, Parshva (c. 950–850 B.C.).

Jainism is a religion of purely human origin. The twenty-four Tīrthānkars recognized under Jainism are those who have attained perfect perception, perfect knowledge, and perfect conduct—the golden trinity. In ancient times, Jainism was also known as the religion of *jina*, which literally means “conqueror,” one who has conquered worldly passions such as, desire, hatred, anger, and greed. To Jains, all human beings have the potential to become *jinās*. The *jina* is not a supernatural entity, an incarnation, or almighty God, but a liberated soul, freed from the bonds of worldly existence and the cycle of rebirth.

Under Jainism, the concept of God as a creator, protector, and destroyer does not exist, nor does the idea of God’s reincarnation as a human being to destroy the forces of evil. Jainism does not believe in God as a creator, yet it is not immune to the idea of gods. Under Jainism, the *jinās* are viewed as gods. As such, there can be many gods in Jainism. Recent research claims that one of the twenty-four Tīrthānkars, Mallinath, could be female. Under Jainism, each soul can attain enlightenment and become a Paramatma, a divine soul. Jainism presents an enlightened perspective of the “equality of souls” irrespective of physical form, ranging from human beings to microscopic living organisms. Jainism thus remains an original system, quite distinct and independent from other systems of Indian philosophy.

Buddhism became much more popular outside India, but Jainism remained confined to India. The Jains were the first to withdraw from the mainstream of Hinduism by refusing to entertain all the deities of the Hindu pantheon, but today they are being reabsorbed into mainstream Hinduism. Most Jains have started worshiping the Hindu deities simultaneously. While some Jains call themselves Hindus, others are fighting for minority status in order to avail themselves of the special protections and benefits reserved exclusively for minorities under Indian law.

One of the answers to the question of why Buddhism became more popular than Jainism outside India may be that the former received royal patronage. Emperor (Samrat) Ashoka, the great Mauryan monarch, embraced Buddhism after he became disillusioned over massive violence and death during the Kalinga war. During his reign, the empire covered nearly all of India, and Ashoka, who is believed to have converted to Buddhism before he died, sent his disciples to promote Buddhism within India and beyond. Jainism did not benefit from such royal patronage. Moreover, Jains adhered to strict vegetarianism, whereas Buddhists could be nonvegetarians.

The Theory of Karma and Rebirth

The theory of karma and rebirth forms the foundation of Jainism. The ultimate goal of each soul is to seek emancipation, *nirvāna*, or *kaivalya*. But it is not possible to achieve this emancipation during the present lifetime. Hence, under Jainism, a number of births are required for its realization. This provides the metaphysics of rebirth, which is also inseparable from karma. If rebirth is accepted as a fact, the idea of prebirth cannot be rejected, as every event must have a cause, and every cause must have its effects. This is the law of karma, which governs the universe. Karma is rebirth latent, and rebirth is karma manifest, under the indivisible unity of cause and effect. The Jains despise all forms of karma, whether good or bad, since they cause bondage. In other Hindu doctrines, good karmas are encouraged, as they yield good results.

Under Jainism, it is assumed that every act must have its consequences, and if these are not worked out in one’s lifetime, another life is required for their fruition. The karma theory also seeks to provide an explanation for the widespread diversities and inequalities prevailing throughout the universe. To Jains, karma does not simply mean “work” or “deed” but signifies an aggregate of very tiny particulars attached to the soul, which are not even perceivable by the senses. The Jains believe in the material and formless nature of karma, crystallized as the effect of past deeds. They also believe in the doctrine of the soul as the possessor of material karma. To Jains, the karmas pervade all cosmic space in the form of a substantive force or matter in subtle form, mixing with the soul as milk mixes with water.

Jainism assumes that the universe is without a beginning or an end. It is everlasting and eternal. There are six *dravyaya* (fundamental entities): *jīva* (soul or consciousness), *puḍgal* (matter), *dharmā* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *aakash* (space), and *kaal* (time). These entities are eternal but undergo continuous and countless changes. During the changes, nothing is lost or destroyed; everything is recycled into another form.



Coconuts Being Prepared for Jain Ceremony. Most of the 8 million to 10 million followers of Jainism (traditionally known as Jain Dharma) worldwide live in India. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

The proper knowledge of the six *dravya* and nine *tattva* (fundamental truths) form the basis of right perception and right conduct. The nine *tattva* are: *jiva* (living beings), *ajiva* (non living substances), *aasrava* (causes of the influx of karma to the soul), *bandha* (bondage of karma to the soul), *samvara* (stoppage of the influx of the karma), *nirjbara* (exhaustion or falling of the accumulated karma due to self-purification, penance, and meditation), *moksba* (complete liberation from karma responsible for rebirth), *paap* (sin), and *punya* (virtue). The knowledge of these *dravya* and *tattva* paves the way for salvation.

Right conduct comprises the following five ideals: *ahimsa* (nonviolence), *satya* (truthfulness), *asteya* (not stealing), *brahmacharya* (chastity), and *aparigraha* (non-possessiveness). The main slogans under Jainism as a religion are *ahimsa paramdharma* (nonviolence is the supreme religion) and “live and let live.” Within Jainism, the concept of *ahimsa* is very profound. It does not refer merely to abstaining from physical acts of violence, but also to abstaining from violence in thought. According to ancient Jain texts, violence is not defined by actual harm but by the intention to harm. Without violent thought, violent action is not possible.

The Jain Symbol and Sects

The comprehensive Jain symbol consists of a digit of the moon, three dots, the swastika, the palm of the human hand with a wheel inset, and a figure outlining all. The moon symbolizes the region beyond the three worlds where the liberated souls reside. The three dots symbolize the path of liberation: right perception, right knowledge, and right conduct. The swastika symbolizes the cycle of birth and death, divided due to karma into four forms: heaven, human, *tiryanch* (animals, birds, and plants), and hell. The palm signifies that one need not be afraid of sufferings from karmic bondage. The wheel with twenty-four spokes represents the Jain religion, preached by the twenty-four Tīrthānkaras.

Mahāvīra, the last of the twenty-four Tīrthānkaras, organized his followers into four sects: *sadhu* (monks), *sadhvi* (nuns), *shravak* (male devotees), and *shravika* (female devotees). With the passage of time, Jainism as a religion grew more complex. Eventually, two major sects were established, the Digambaris and the Svetambaris. The Digambari (sky-clad) monks do not wear any clothes, and the Svetambari monks wear only unstitched white cloths. Both believe in basic values and principles

of Jainism. Both believe in *kshamavani* (forgiveness), a ritual that is performed annually in the month of August–September. On this day, Jains seek forgiveness from fellow Jains for any misdeed or bad thought during the past year, whether intentional or unintentional. It promotes universal friendliness, universal forgiveness, and universal fearlessness.

The Cardinal Principles of Jainism

Ahimsa (nonviolence), *anekantavada* (non-one-sidedness) and *aparigraha* (nonpossessiveness) form the distinguishing features of Jainism. It is not easy to explain the doctrine of *anekantavada* and *syadavada* (maybe). It is also known as the philosophy of nonabsolutism, the theory of manifoldness, and the theory of many-sided nature. It is nearer to the Western theory of relativism. To understand *anekantavada*, or “non-one-sidedness,” it is imperative to understand *ekantavada*, or “one-sidedness.” One-sidedness signifies only one point of view as absolute truth, often leading to dogmatism and intolerance. Jains view it as falsehood, false knowledge, and false perception. To Jains, the truth can be manifold. The doctrine of *anekantavada* and *syadavada* helps in understanding divergent viewpoints and in reconciling apparent contradictions.

Under Jainism, there can be many ways of looking at an object or an idea, all of which may be valid at the same time. This moral can be derived easily from the story of six blind men in the *Panchtantra*, who each tried to describe an elephant. Each of the six blind men caught hold of a different part of the elephant’s body and formed his own image of the huge animal. The man who caught the tail of the elephant thought it to be like a long rope. The one who held the leg thought it to be like a pillar. The one who touched the ear thought it to be like a huge fan. The one who held the trunk thought it to be like a python, and the one who held the stomach thought it to be like a drum. The one who touched the back thought it to be like a platform. Each of the six blind men considered his viewpoint to be absolutely true and the views held by others as absolutely false, resulting in a fight. At that critical juncture a wise man made them feel the other parts of the elephant. They then realized that although each one of them was partially correct in his imagination of the elephant, the others were equally correct. The *anekantavadi*, or multifaceted approach, helped them realize the truth.

The theory of *syadavada*, or the “maybe” approach, prepares one to accept other’s viewpoints as true by demonstrating that the human capability to learn and act accordingly is necessarily limited. Our perceptions can be partially true, and they can be true only conditionally. As such, it is always desirable under Jainism to add qualifying words, such as “perhaps” or “maybe.” This doctrine thus includes the respect of the viewpoints of others.

The theory of *anekant* and *syadavada* is also called a doctrine of reconciliation and assimilation, on the one hand, and tolerance and understanding, on the other. It holds the opening of one’s mind and one’s heart to the notion and complete picture of truth. It is the first condition of human well-being and happiness. It provides the binding force to other cardinal principles of Jainism: nonviolence and nonpossessiveness.

Jainism is an important ideological phenomenon in the religious history of humankind. The entire edifice of Jainism rests on one principle: live and let live. It is based on positive love, a principle that was propagated by Jesus and Mahatma Gandhi as well. The doctrine of *anekantavada*, or non-one-sidedness, can be seen as an extension of the doctrine of nonviolence. Jainism is adept at providing a theoretical basis for the practical beliefs of its followers. It emphasizes the dictum: “do not injure, abuse, oppress, enslave, insult, torment, torture or kill any living being.” Jainism does not advocate suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing, or the removal of life-supporting devices. However, Jainism allows *sallekhana*, a “holy suicide by starvation,” to spiritually very advanced persons. They can terminate their lives, as Mahāvīra did, under specified circumstances under the supervision of the Acharyas—the *sadhus*, teachers and role models.

According to Jainism, each soul is innately pure and inherently perfect, but the karmas attached to it, due to past thoughts and deeds, make it imperfect and obscure. When the soul is freed from karmic influences, it becomes liberated. The contribution of Jainism toward human omniscience is very significant. Equally significant is the Jain philosophy of *anekantavada* and *syadavada* which not only help in acquiring true knowledge from different perspectives but also help in reconciling different points of views amicably.

The cardinal principles of Jainism—nonviolence, nonpossessiveness, and non-one-sidedness—are important not only because they are ancient Indian in philosophy but because they are universal. They stress reconciliation rather than reputation, cooperation rather than confrontation, and coexistence rather than mutual annihilation. Jain philosophy, if understood, may help humankind to emerge from its modern moral crisis, emotional emptiness, and violence.

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See also Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting; Jain Sculpture

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JAIN SCULPTURE Jain sculpture is identifiable as Jain only by subject matter, iconography, or inscription. Otherwise, in terms of style, ornament, and in many cases, subsidiary figures, Jain sculpture is indistinguishable from sculpture made for other Indian religious groups, as they were all produced by artists from the same workshops. Nevertheless, as early as the second century B.C., the Jains continuously have been active patrons in many regions of the Indian subcontinent, and the sculpture they worship and use to adorn their sacred sites is of major importance in the history of Indian art. Movements and innovations within the Jain religious communities often found expression in sculpture, which in turn proved influential to members of the other religious traditions with which they regularly came in contact. Conversely, aspects of the literature, art, and practices of Buddhism, Hinduism, and popular local cults were absorbed and adapted by the Jains, since the Jain religion and its art existed not in isolation, but partook of a broad cultural and social network that was constantly interacting.

Some features of Jain sculpture are distinctively Jain, unmistakable from imagery associated with other sects, and they serve to identify the work as Jain in orientation. They include representations of the twenty-four Tīrthānkaras ("crossers of the ford," also called Jinas, or "conquerors"), who are the liberated beings of Jainism and the primary objects of veneration. Also distinctively Jain are the tonsured monks and nuns, usually shown carrying the accoutrements of their strict adherence to *ahimsa*, which refers to their practice of refraining from killing or harming any living being. Another means of distinguishing Jain sculpture is by identifying narrative sequences that are found only in Jain devotional texts. Most popular are scenes from the lives of the Tīrthānkaras, particularly

Mahāvīra, Pārshvanātha, or Rishavanātha. Finally, inscriptions, generally written in a vulgate (Prakrit) derived from Sanskrit, with distinctively Jain content or formulaic wording, can be used to identify a sculpture as Jain.

Icons for Veneration

A fundamental aspect of Jainism, regardless of sect, is that during the current epoch, twenty-four people have achieved supreme knowledge (*kevala jñāna*) through strict asceticism and meditation, which allows them upon death to be liberated from our world of endless cycling from one birth and death to another. These liberated beings are called Tīrthānkaras, and they dwell in an eternal state of meditative bliss in a realm above our universe, and hence they are depicted in sculpture in postures denoting meditation. Their presence is known in our world through the dissemination of their teachings and through the veneration of their images in temples. Most Jain iconic sculptures are images of a Tīrthānkara, which would be placed on an altar in a shrine or temple.

Other types of icons are also set up for veneration in a Jain context. Goddesses and other divinities play crucial roles in Jainism. The goddess of learning, Sarasvatī, is frequently found in association with Jain monuments, and the Jain mother goddess Ambikā becomes ubiquitous by the eighth century A.D. The goat-headed divinity Naigameshin, who transported the embryo of the twenty-fourth Tīrthānkara, Mahāvīra, to the womb of Queen Trishalā, remains an important figure in the Jain pantheon from the first century A.D. onward. Finally, saints and important teachers of Jainism can be venerated as objects of worship as well.

Iconography of Tīrthānkaras

The most recognizable type of Jain sculpture is that of the seated or standing Tīrthānkara icon. Rigidly axial and usually totally nude (until after the sixth century, when some sects provide them with a lower garment), sculptures of Tīrthānkaras embody the ideal of rigorous asceticism that is so central to the practice of Jainism. When standing, their arms are held stiffly by their sides, not touching the body, in a posture called *kāyotsarga*. Seated Tīrthānkara figures have crossed legs, and their hands are positioned one atop the other in the lap in the gesture of meditation (*dhyāna*). Often they will have the auspicious *shrīvatsa* symbol on the chest, denoting the beneficial results that can ensue from veneration of the image.

Most of the Tīrthānkaras are visually indistinguishable from one another, except for two of them that have distinctive characteristics. The first, Rishavanātha (also called Ādinātha), is the only Tīrthānkara depicted with long hair. Otherwise, all Tīrthānkaras are fully tonsured



DONORS AND THE PROCESS OF DONATION

Donors who give the images and the worshipers who venerate them earn valuable spiritual merit, which aids in a favorable rebirth and moves them closer to the liberated state. Many of the icons have valuable donative inscriptions that yield information regarding the structure of the Jain monastic and lay communities of the region. The thriving Jain monasteries had many monks and nuns, and they would serve as spiritual advisers to laypeople, who, acting under the instigation of the monastic adviser, would pay for the creation of an image and its installation within the sanctuary. This would be done for the sake of honoring the Tīrthānkaras, often called arhats (or “qualified ones”) in the inscriptions. During the pre-Kushana and Kushana periods (c. 150 B.C.–A.D. 250), many of the donors of Jain icons were laywomen, thus indicating that wealthy women were prominent supporters of the Jain establishments at Mathura.

with no cranial protuberance (*usbnisha*), until the fifth century A.D., after which Tīrthānkaras could be shown with the protrusion atop the head, like a Buddha. The twenty-third Tīrthānkara, Pārshvanātha (or simply Pārshva), is shown with a five-hooded serpent behind him, which makes reference to a specific event in his biography. By the mid-second century A.D., Neminātha (also Arishtanemi) can be identified by his being flanked by Krishna and Balarāma, the well-known Hindu gods whom the Jains consider to have been his cousins. Specific Tīrthānkaras were often provided with an animal or other cognizance that serves as a means of signifying which Tīrthānkara is being represented. Ajitanātha, for example, has an elephant for his cognizance, while Mahāvīra has the lion, and Rishavanātha the bull. As iconographies became more elaborate and codified, in keeping with pan-Indian trends of the medieval period, each Tīrthānkara was assigned further identifying attributes, such that by the eighth century they were provided with identifying colors, particular trees under which they achieved *kevala jñāna* (the highest knowledge leading to final liberation), and specifically named male and female attendants who serve as messengers (*sbāsanadevatā*) between them and their devotees.

Early History of the Tīrthānkara Icon

Some fragmentary examples of nude male figures resembling Tīrthānkaras standing frontally have been discovered that are attributed to the earliest phases of

stone sculptural production in India. However, there is no indication that Jainism as we know it existed before the time of Mahāvīra, who is credited with founding the Jain religion in the sixth century B.C. Moreover, other iconic images of unidentified nude male figures attributed on the basis of style to the next phase of stone carving (third century B.C.) possess no distinguishing inscription or iconographic mark to prove they are necessarily Jain.

The earliest known icon of an identifiable Tīrthānkara is a stone image of Pārshvanātha, made in the city of Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, in northern India, and datable on the basis of style to around 100–75 B.C. For the next three hundred years, Mathura figures as the most prominent center for the manufacture of Jain sculpture.

Most of the earliest Jain Tīrthānkaras, from the first century B.C. and first century A.D., are carved in low relief on stone plaques called *āyāgapata*, which functioned as objects of worship in Jain sanctuaries. The Tīrthānkara imagery on these plaques seems to have played an important role in the formulation of the anthropomorphic Buddha icon, which was initiated in Mathura in the first decades of the first century A.D. During this period, Jainism at Mathura flourished, and Jain foundations enjoyed much better financial support from the laity than did their non-Hindu monastic rivals, the Buddhists. The inhabitants of Mathura evidently favored the worship of anthropomorphic icons, and the particular heterodox sect of Jainism, called Ardphālaka, known primarily from sculptures and inscriptions and active only in Mathura, appear to have been eager to accommodate this regional predilection.

Hundreds of Tīrthānkara icons have been recovered from Mathura, dating predominantly to the Kushāna period of the second and third centuries A.D.; such mass production often led to repetitive and conventional modes of representation. Once the Ardphālakas were completely subsumed within the more mainstream Shvetāmbara branch of Jainism by the fourth century, the production of Jain sculptures at Mathura dropped off to be more in step with the number and type of images made for Jains in other regions.

Jain Icons of the Guptan and Medieval Periods

Some of the most sublime Jain Tīrthānkara icons were carved during the Guptan period of the fifth century A.D. Less mass-produced than during the preceding Kushāna period, the softly naturalistic Guptan Tīrthānkaras exude the peaceful idealization characteristic of all sculpture produced during this classical age. They still maintain the total nudity and stiff frontal postures, whether standing or seated in meditation.



RĀMAGUPTA TĪRTHĀNKARAS OF VIDISHA

At times Jain sculptures serve as important documents of Indian history and art history. Three stone images of Jain Tīrthānkaras were recovered near Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh. They are all inscribed with lengthy donative inscriptions stating that they were made during the time of King Rāmagupta, a monarch of the Guptan empire of northern India, who, until the discovery of these images, was thought to be apocryphal. He had a short and calumnious reign in the A.D. 370s, and hence these three images are rare examples of stone sculpture dated to the fourth century. They have thus become benchmarks for the understanding of sculptural styles of the fourth century, a time to which very little art from any region can be firmly attributed. The Rāmagupta Tīrthānkaras are key examples of the stylistic transition from the boldness and extroversion of Kushāna sculpture (second–third centuries) to the softer surfaces and gentle introspection of the Guptan period (fifth century).

After the Guptan period, a proliferation of Jain sculpture and icons can be found throughout the Indian subcontinent, as is the case with the arts of other religious traditions as well, since it is a time generally marked by multiplicity, elaboration, and more surviving examples. Some of the most important works of Jain sculpture from the sixth through the thirteenth centuries are cast in bronze, to be used as objects of worship in smaller shrines or for personal devotion. The tradition of casting Jina icons in bronze dates as early as the second century A.D., as known from a rare early hoard discovered at Chausa, Bihar, in eastern India, which includes images made during the Kushāna and Guptan periods. Dating from the sixth to tenth centuries are the extraordinary group of bronzes from Akota, Gujarat, in western India, including icons and shrines not only of Tīrthānkaras, but also of Jain goddesses, such as Ambikā.

From the eighth to thirteenth centuries, the most prominent center for the production of Jain sculpture, particularly in bronze, is in the south, both in Karnataka and in Tamil Nadu, where the Jain community flourished intermittently between major persecutions. The unusually magnificent tenth-century freestanding stone colossus of the Jain saint Bahubali (also known as Gomateshvara) in Shravana Belgola, Karnataka, in southwestern India, is to this day a major pilgrimage site for Jains. Bahubali, a son of the first Tīrthānkara, Rishavanātha, renounced his princely life after a duel with his brother. He stood for so

long in meditation that vines grew up around him, and depictions of Bahubali are readily recognizable by the distinctive feature of vines curling around his body. This sculpture measures about 60 feet (18 m) in height and is said to be the tallest freestanding monolithic sculpture in the world.

Jain Sculpture and Temple Architecture

Jain sculpture surviving on intact monuments are valuable documents for understanding how the imagery was used in its religious context. While the Tīrthānkara icon served as the focal object of worship, a profusion of other kinds of imagery adorn other areas of sacred structures.

Cave temples. On the hills known as Udayagiri and Khandagiri near Bhubanesvara, Orissa, in eastern India are the ruins of an apsidal temple and a number of rock-cut shelters in which Jain mendicants stay during the rainy season. In running friezes along the tops of the rear walls of the verandas, in tympana, on exterior walls of outdoor cells, and on pillar capitals are a great variety of relief sculptures. The first phase of carving dates to the second and first centuries B.C. Many of them are complex narratives that remain unidentified but testify to the rich literary tradition of the early Jains, which is now lost. Some reliefs depict intriguing scenes of worship, such as a royal couple venerating a nonanthropomorphic symbol on an altar. Other imagery includes pan-Indian motifs such as animals, nature divinities (*yaksha* and *yakshī*), Sūrya the sun god, and Lakshmī the goddess of good fortune. About a thousand years later, images of Tīrthānkaras and their messenger divinities were added to the walls of the caves, and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a Jain temple and Tīrthānkara sculptures further augmented the site.

It is remarkable that a number of major Hindu cave temple sites of the Guptan and post-Guptan periods (fifth and sixth centuries A.D.) include several Jain sanctuaries. Of note are the caves at Udayagiri, Madhya Pradesh (early fifth century) in central India; Badami, Karnataka (late sixth century) and Ellora, Maharashtra (eighth century), in the Deccan of western India. These Jain caves have received very little attention, overshadowed as they are by the Hindu caves at the same sites. The sculptural program primarily includes multiple Tīrthānkara icons and subsidiary divinities.

Structural temples. The inclusion of Jain temples at otherwise predominantly Hindu sites continues into the medieval period, even in structural temple complexes. At the famed temple site of Khajuraho, Madhya Pradesh, Jain temples are among the predominantly Hindu monuments. Visually, the Jain Pārshvanātha temple at Khajuraho is virtually indistinguishable from the other temples in the

area, and it is just as lavish, but with less emphasis on erotic imagery.

Some of the finest Jain temples are in Gujarat and Rajasthan in western India. The temple to the Jain mother goddess Ambikā at Jagat in Rajasthan is dated to A.D. 961, and it is an exemplar of the pure North Indian temple style at its height. The exterior is replete with figural and vegetal imagery. An explosion of sculptural imagery can be found on the interior of the Vimala temple at Mount Abu, a major pilgrimage Jain pilgrimage site atop a sacred mountain in Rajasthan. Carved completely of polished white marble in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the Tīrthānkara icons remain austere, but the dizzying array of figural and lacelike ornamental sculpture that adorns the ceilings, pillars, and archways testifies to the wealth of the Jain community in western India. Major donations from Vimala, the temple's patron and a minister to the Solanki king, supported the construction and embellishment of this stunning temple, including the famous spectacular ceilings made of concentric rings of intricately carved marble and images of female directional divinities, dancers, and celestial musicians. The voluptuous figures of the divinities and the exuberant ornamentation of Jain monuments such as the Vimala temple seem to be at odds with the doctrines propounding austerity and detachment for Jain practitioners. These temples, however, are reflections of the activities of the wealthy Jain laity, primarily of the mercantile class, and donations to Jain monuments in order to beautify them was one of the chief means of accruing spiritual merit without renouncing society.

Sonya Quintanilla

See also **Guptan Period Art; Jainism**

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JAMDANI *Jamdani*, a figured muslin, is a very fine, textured fabric. Considered the most sophisticated of the Indian hand-loomed textiles, it reveals the dexterity and genius of its makers. *Jamdani* is woven by varying the thickness of the yarn, in tones of white, bringing about a unique effect of light and shade, opaqueness and transparency. The resulting nuances of white in five different shades convey a highly developed aesthetic.

The origin of *jamdani* muslin is not clear. There is mention of this fabric as having been worn by Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth, in Bana Bhatta's treatise *Harsha Charita*, which is a rich source of knowledge of ancient Indian textiles. There is also a reference in the Sanskrit literature of the Gupta period (4th to 6th centuries A.D.). *Jamdani* appears to have been derived from the ancient Persian technique of twill weaving. The term, which applied both to the woolen weaves of Kashmir as well as to the cotton floral weaves of the Gangetic Plain, also seems to have been known as figured or loom-embroidered muslin. While the technique of weaving and the nature of the textile are considered ancient, it was not until very late that the term *jamdani* appeared, probably derived from *jama*, or "coat."

The Gangetic Plain was noted for its fine muslins since earliest times; the important centers were Banaras (Varanasi, in Uttar Pradesh), Tanda (in Faizabad district, Uttar Pradesh) and Dacca (Dhaka, the present-day capital of Bangladesh). In Banaras, gold thread was used along with bleached and unbleached white; in Tanda, only white yarn was used; and in Dacca, colored cotton thread was used in addition to white and gold. The finest and best *jamdani* textiles from Banaras are referred as *kasi vastra*. The development of these fine fabrics was attributed to the growing of high-grade cotton, the proficiency of the spinners and weavers, and the quality of water used for washing and bleaching, combined with the conditions of humidity in the atmosphere.

It was during the Great Mughal period (1556–1707) that royal patronage was extended and royal workshops were established for the manufacture of these fabrics for the court, giving further impetus to the production of the finest muslins. Tanda and Dacca became important centers of production. The spinners and weavers seemed to have migrated to Tanda from Banaras in the early sixteenth century. Under Mughal influence, there were two fundamental changes in the design of the textiles produced in the royal workshops. The existing figural designs of birds and animals were eliminated and were



A Weaver Designs a *Jamdani* Sari. *Jamdani* is considered the most sophisticated woven product among Indian hand looms. In this photo, a Bangladeshi works its delicate weave. AFP / GETTY IMAGES.

replaced by floral ornaments in the cloth. This practice, which originated in the Islamic prohibition of the use of imagery, existed in all textiles worn on the body. The color scheme also underwent a change, with no use of tones of white. The unbleached cloth, which had a ritual significance for Hindus, was replaced by the bleached *jamdani* worn in Mughal courts. In Banaras, there was no mention of royal workshops. The *jamdani* of Tanda, under the patronage of Oudh rulers, reached a level of excellence and became a monopoly of the government. The various techniques are said to have reached the weavers of the East Godavari and Nellore districts of Andhra Pradesh by way of West Bengal and Oudh.

The East India Company established a trading center in Dacca during the eighteenth century. Indian and European merchants had to purchase the muslins through brokers appointed by the British government. Under the British, many changes occurred in the production of muslin fabrics in Tanda. For the first time,

domestic products like tablecloths and towels were woven for the European market.

The feature of Tanda muslin that distinguishes it from other ornamental weaves is the use of the twill tapestry technique to weave without any additional devices or attachments. Historian John Irwin traces the origin of twill tapestry technique in India to the time of Zain-ul-Abidin (A.D. 420–470) and the weavers of Turkistan. The weavers were Muslims, and the spinners were Hindus; both had the capability and skill to produce and spin yarn in thread count ranging from 150 to over 200. Hand-spun cotton yarn was used to weave the *jamdani* cloth, containing threads of 90 to 120 ends in the warp and 80 to 110 in the weft. The weavers used the traditional type of pit loom. This technique of weaving is akin to embroidery, but in place of the needle, the weavers use a bamboo spindle directly on the loom, articulating the design from memory. Spindles made of small bamboo or maize stocks, about 2 inches (5 cm) long, were used for extra weft threads. The number of bamboo splits required

were as many as there were floral ornaments across the width of the cloth. To weave the ornamental figures, two threads of the same count as in the background were introduced, using extra spools where the threads were passed under and over the ornament as required to form the design. The threads were manually selected and lifted for this purpose. The weavers sat at the loom with one or two assistants, though there was no “draw boy” sitting near the loom to pull the cords to maintain the harness. In the *jamdani* of Dacca and Tanda, the weavers used only weft threads to make a pattern on the warp threads to create the ornamentation.

With the introduction of the new function of *naqsha-band* (making of jacquard) and the practice of tying the *naqsha* (pattern on the loom) by the Muslim conquerors of Persia and Central Asia to the *jamdani* weavers, both design and color underwent a change. More and more complicated designs and a large number of colored threads were included in the fabrics. The weavers adapted to the range of new techniques and continued to develop their fine product in the traditional *jamdani* centers, catering to the needs of different communities and different markets. Because of the great degree of skill required and time consumed, the number of *jamdani* weavers began to decline. Today *jamdani* fabrics are still being woven, though with a lesser degree of skill, in parts of Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Dhaka, mostly using mill-made yarn of a silk-cotton blend, for garments and other items on demand. Some of the weavers of Andhra Pradesh in the district of Srikakulam are still employing this ancient twill tapestry technique without any additional attachments, with hand-spun yarn, into the twenty-first century.

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JAMMU AND KASHMIR Jammu and Kashmir State consists of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Its three broad regions are: Jammu, which has a Hindu majority; Kashmir, with a Muslim majority; and Ladakh and Kargil, which is split between Buddhists and Muslims. A little over half of the population of the state is concentrated in the Valley of Kashmir, which accounts

for only 10 percent of the area. Ladakh, Gilgit, and Baltistan are very sparsely populated.

History

Kashmir is at the center of Purānic geography. In the Purānic conception, Earth’s continents are arranged in the form of a lotus flower. Mount Meru stands at the center of the world, the pericarp or seed vessel of the flower, as it were, surrounded by circular ranges of mountains. Around Mount Meru, like the petals of the lotus, are arranged four island-continent (*dvīpas*), aligned to the four points of the compass: Uttarakuru to the north, Ketumāla to the west, Bhadrāshva to the east, and Bharata or Jambudvīpa to the south. The meeting point of the continents is the Meru mountain, which is the high Himalayan region around Kashmir.

Kashmir’s proximity to rich trade routes brought it considerable wealth, and Kashmirs spread Sanskrit culture as missionaries. Kashmiris also became interpreters of the Indian civilization, and they authored many fundamental synthesizing and expository works.

Buddhism was introduced into the Vale by the missionaries of the emperor Ashoka (r. 268–231 B.C.). The Kushān emperor Kanishka (c. A.D. 100) convened a Buddhist council in Kashmir, which led to the foundation of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Kashmiri missionaries played a leading role in the spread of Buddhism into Central Asia and China.

The Kārkota dynasty of the seventh and eighth centuries provides the first authentic accounts of the government in the Valley. Lalitāditya (724–761), the outstanding king of this dynasty, built the famed Sun temple of Mārtand. In the ninth century Avantivarman built a grand capital south of Srinagar; the ruins can still be seen.

Muslim rule was first established in Kashmir in the fourteenth century. Kashmir became a part of the Mughal empire under Akbar in 1587. In 1752, with the collapse of Mughal power, Kashmir came under control of Afghans, who lost it to the Sikhs in 1819. In 1846, following the defeat of the Sikhs by the British—when Jammu’s Ghulab Singh turned against his Sikh allies—Singh reaped the Valley of Kashmir as a reward to add to his fiefdom of Jammu.

The movement for independence in British India spilled over to Kashmir as well. The maharaja tried to hold out for independence in August 1947 when India was partitioned. But in late October of that year Pathan tribesmen, led by military officers in civilian clothes, tried to take the valley by force. Maharaja Hari Singh, Ghulab’s grandson, hastily acceded to the Indian Union. Soldiers of the Indian army were immediately flown into



Supporters of the Ruling National Conference Party Campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. Supporters of the ruling National Conference Party hours before the September 2002 elections in the troubled states of Jammu and Kashmir. The long-entrenched party was ousted, but tensions between the Hindu majority in Jammu and the Muslim majority in Kashmir persist. AMIT BHARGAVA / CORBIS.

Srinagar, and they turned the tide of the tribal invasion. Pakistani regulars were sent in, and the Kashmir war raged throughout 1948. Finally, under the supervision of the United Nations Security Council, a cease-fire was declared on 1 January 1949. Pakistan still controls about one-third of the Jammu and Kashmir State, mostly the northwest parts of Jammu and Baltistan, and the Gilgit region. The Security Council called upon both India and Pakistan to allow the United Nations to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the will of its people; the two countries could never agree to do so in over half a century, fighting three wars instead.

The political boundaries of Kashmir have on occasion extended much beyond the valley and the adjoining regions. According to the seventh-century Chinese Buddhist monk Hsieun Tsang, the adjacent territories to the west and south down to the plains were also under the direct control of the king of Kashmir. With Durlabhavardhana of the Kārkota dynasty, the power of Kashmir extended to parts of Punjab and Afghanistan. It appears that during this period of Kashmiri expansion, the ruling

elite, if not the general population, of Gilgit, Baltistan, and West Tibet spoke Kashmiri-related languages. Later, as Kashmir's political power declined, these groups were displaced by Tibetan-speaking people.

In the eighth century, Lalitāditya conquered most of north India, Central Asia, and Tibet. His vision and exertions mark a new phase of Indian empire-building.

Religious and Cultural Influence

Kashmir had a very strong tradition of Sanskrit scholarship. Patanjali, the great author of the *Mahābhāshya*, the commentary on Pānini grammar, was a Kashmiri. He is said to have made contributions also to yoga and to *Āyurveda*. Some scholars believe that Bharata Muni of the *Nāṭya Shāstra* was a Kashmiri. Durgā, the commentator on the *Nirukta* of Yāska, was from the Jammu hills.

Tantra: Shaivism and Vaishnavism. The Kashmiri approach to the world is part of the tantric thought of both Shaivism and Vaishnavism. The Tantras stress the equivalence of the universe and the body and look for

divinity within the person. Although the Vaishnavite Pāncharātra now survives only in South India, the earliest teachers looked to Kashmir as the seat of learning and spiritual culture.

According to Kalhana, the twelfth-century Kashmiri historian, author of *Rajatarangini* (Chronicle of kings), one of India's oldest histories, the worship of Shiva in Kashmir dates prior to Mauryan King Ashoka. The Tantras were enshrined in texts known as the Āgamas, most of which are now lost.

Contributions to Buddhism. Kashmir became an early center of Buddhist scholarship. In the first century, the Kushān emperor Kanishka chose Kashmir as the venue of a major Buddhist Council comprising over five hundred monks and scholars. At this meeting, the previously uncodified portions of Buddha's discourses and the theoretical portions of the canon were codified. The entire canon (*Tripitaka*) was inscribed on copper plates and deposited in a stupa, the location of which is now unknown.

Kashmiris were tireless in the spread of Buddhist ideas to Central Asia. Attracted by Kashmir's reputation as a great center of scholarship, many Buddhist monks came from distant lands to learn Sanskrit and to train as translators and teachers. Among these was Kumarajiva (344–413), the son of the Kuchean princess who, when his mother became a nun, followed her into monastic life at the age of seven.

Buddhist Tantric teachers were associated with Kashmir. According to some Tibetan sources, Naropa and Padmasambhava (who introduced Tantric Buddhism to Tibet) were Kashmiris. The Tibetan script is derived from the Kashmiri Shāradā script. It was brought to Tibet by Thonmi-Sambhota, who was sent to Kashmir during the reign of Durlabhavardhana (seventh century) to study with Devatītasimha.

Architecture and the Arts

The ancient temple ruins in Kashmir are some of the oldest standing temples in India today. The sculptures found here are significant and exquisite. The Mārtanda temple, built by Lalitāditya, is one of the earliest and yet largest stone temples to have been built in Kashmir. Lalitāditya also built an enormous *chaitya* in the town of Parihāsapura which housed an enormous Buddha. Only the plinth of this huge monument survives, although one of the paintings at Alchi is believed to be its representation. There was also an enormous stupa in Parihāsapura built by Lalitāditya's minister Chankuna, which may have been even larger than the *chaitya*. The Parihāsapura monuments became models for Buddhist architecture from Afghanistan to Japan. The Pandrethan temple, as well as

the Avantipur complex, provide further examples of the excellence of Kashmiri architecture and art. Kashmiri ivories and metal images are outstanding and are generally considered to be among the best in the world.

Kashmir also had a flourishing tradition of painting, which was used to decorate the temples walls. The earliest surviving examples of these paintings come from Gilgit and date from about the eighth century. Kashmiri artisans were famed for their work, and their hand can be seen in many works of art in Central Asia and Tibet. Painted figures of Bodhisattva Padmapāni from Gilgit demonstrate the mingling of the Gāndhāran and the Gupta Indian conventions with local elements.

After Lalitāditya, Kashmiri style appears to have changed, and the new style endured until the tenth or eleventh century. This phase is the most developed stage of Kashmiri art, and its fame spread into the remote Himalayas. The ninth-century complex of Avantipura built by King Avantivarman (855–883) is an amalgam of various earlier forms from India and regions beyond. The best example of this style is found in the bronzes dated from the ninth to the eleventh century cast by Kashmiri craftsmen for Tibetan patrons. The style of such bronzes presents a remarkable affinity to the wall paintings dating to the tenth or eleventh century that decorate the Buddhist temples of Western Tibet. The wall paintings of Mangnang and the manuscript paintings of Tholing, discovered in Western Tibet, are generally acknowledged to have been created by Kashmiri painters.

One of the best sites to see the Kashmiri painting style is in the five temples comprising the *dbarma-mandala* at Alchi in Ladakh, which escaped the destruction that other temples suffered at the hands of a Ladakhi king who embraced Islam. The earliest of these buildings is the Du-khang, where one can see well-preserved *mandalas* that document not only the Kashmiri Buddhist pantheon but the Buddhist representation of the Hindu pantheon as well.

Pahārī painting. Outside Kashmir, there was a new flowering of painting in Basohli in the Jammu hills. By the closing decades of the seventeenth century, these paintings emerged in a steady stream, when a depiction of the Rasa-manjarī, a fifteenth-century poem, was painted during the rule of Kripāl Pāl.

Dance and music. The paintings in Kashmiri style depict the temple dances that prevailed in Kashmir at the time the paintings were made (tenth–eleventh centuries). The only extant complete commentary on the *Nāṭya Shāstra* is the one by Abhinavagupta. The massive thirteenth-century text *Saṅgīta-ratnākara* (Ocean of music and dance), composed by the Kashmiri theorist Shārngadeva, is one of the most important landmarks in Indian music history.

Literature. The ninth-century scholar Ānandavardhana, who was a member of the court of the king Avantivarman, wrote the *Dhvanyāloka*, (Light of suggestion), which is a masterpiece of aesthetic theory. Ānandavardhana was the first to note that *rasa*, identified by Bharata in his *Nāṭya Shāstra* as the “essence” of artistic expression, cannot be communicated directly. This can be done only by *dhvani*, or “suggestion.” Abhinavagupta, who lived about a hundred years after Ānandavardhana, wrote a famous commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* called the *Lochana*. His work on Tantra, the *Tantrāloka* (Light of the Tantras), is one of the most important on the subject. In all, he wrote more than sixty works.

Kshemendra was a philosopher, a poet, and a pupil of Abhinavagupta. Among his books is the *Bribat-kathāmanjavari*, which is a summary of Guṇādhyā's *Bribat-kathā* in 7,500 stanzas. Somadeva's *Kathā-sarīt-sāgara* is another version of Guṇādhyā's *Bribat-kathā*. Somadeva's collection of stories, in 22,000 stanzas with additional prose passages, were written for Queen Sūryamatī, the wife of King Ananta (1028–1063).

The classic arts and the sciences of Kashmir came to an abrupt end when Islam became the dominant force in Kashmir in the fourteenth century. Sculpture, painting, dance, and music could no longer be practiced. The next centuries saw preoccupation with devotion and its expression through the Kashmiri language, as in the poetry of Lalleshvarī.

Many Kashmiris emigrated, as in the case of the musicologist Shārngadeva and the poet Bilhana. Although Kashmir had sunk to a state of conflict and misery, outsiders continued to pay homage to the memory of Kashmir as the land of learning, and Shāradā, the presiding mother goddess of Kashmir, became synonymous with Sarasvatī.

The major poets who followed Lalleshvarī include Habbā Khātūn (c. sixteenth century) and, more recently, Mahjūr (1885–1952), Abdul Ahad Azād (1903–1948), and Zinda Kaul (1884–1965). Habbā Khātūn is credited with originating the *lol* style of poetry, in which the predominant mood is that of longing and romantic love. Mahjūr, Āzād, and Zinda Kaul and their successors have tried to forge a new sensibility in their poems, but the mystical and the *lol* continue to be the dominant ethos.

The theory and philosophy behind Kashmiri classical music, called Sūfiyānā, is described in two books from the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, written in Persian: the anonymous *Karāmat-e mujrā* (The flowering of munificence), and Dayā Rām Kāchroo Khushdil's *Tarānā-e-Sarūr* (The song of joy).

Subhash Kak

See also **Kashmir; Pakistan**

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JAMMU AND LADAKH The Valley of Kashmir frequently occupies a central place in discussions about the political status of Jammu and Kashmir, whether within or outside India. However, the valley is only one of three regions of the state—each defined by distinct geographical, historical, and cultural backgrounds. Since the partition of India and the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian state, the regions of Jammu and Ladakh have consistently pursued their own politics of identity in relation to the valley, yet they remain shadowed by the latter's demands for autonomy and freedom from the Indian state.

According to the Census of India of 2001, the total population of Jammu and Kashmir stood at 10.07 million. As no regular census was held in the state due to the secessionist movement, the population figures were “interpolated” by the Office of the Registrar General of India. According to these 2001 census estimates, 54 percent of the state's population resides in the valley, 43.7 percent in the Jammu region, and 2.3 percent in Ladakh. While the valley's population is 94 percent Muslim, the populations of the other two regions are less homogeneous. Jammu is 66 percent Hindu, 30 percent Muslim, and 4 percent Sikh. Dogri is its major language, although Gojari, Pahari, and Punjabi are also spoken. In Ladakh, Buddhists and Muslims are almost evenly divided. Buddhists, who constitute 52 percent of its population, are concentrated in the Leh district, while Muslims (48 percent; largely Shi'a), live in the district of Kargil. The major language of Ladakh is Ladakhi or Bodhi. Other languages spoken are Balti, Dardi, and Shina.

In 1947, after Indian independence and the partition of India, the Indian state faced the challenging task of nation building and integrating the princely states into the nation-state. In the process, the Indian political elite arrogated to itself the power to define Kashmiri identity and in so doing profoundly affected the process by which the collective identities of the Kashmir's Hindus and Muslims, Ladakh's Buddhists, and Jammu's Hindus were



Ladakh Landscape. With one of the lowest population densities in the world, Ladakh is a land of bewitching silence, its rocky desert framed by the imposing, seemingly inhospitable, Karakorams to the north and Himalayas to the south. IPSHITA BARUA.

constructed and maintained. The maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession in October 1947 when his troops were no longer able to defend the state from tribal aggression from the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan. The Indian state created two legal categories in its Constitution in Article 370, affirming a special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian federation and reaffirming the state-subject requirements whereby employment and ownership of property were to remain the exclusive prerogative of citizens of Jammu and Kashmir. The origin of these legal categories lay in the nationalist discourse developed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's 1939 mass-based, secular, and socialist nationalist movement against the Dogra ruler. Through the legal and constitutional categories underlined in the Delhi Agreement and finally in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the Indian state simultaneously embraced and denied its differences from Kashmiri society. While it recognized the cultural and political identity of the Kashmiri people and defined them as distinct, it also asserted that the similarities between Kashmir and the Indian state were based on their compatible secular, socialist, and democratic agendas.

Jammu

In the construction of the Kashmir nation, however, the Indian state privileged the collective memory and history of the Kashmiri Muslims at the cost of denying the history and stifling the politics of the Hindu and Buddhist populations of Jammu and Ladakh, respectively. India's political leadership completely ignored the latter regions' desire for full integration with India. As far as Jammu was concerned, there were two underlying reasons for that. First, the ruler against whom the Kashmiri nationalist movement was carried out was a (Hindu) Dogra, and guilt by association certainly played a part in the Indian state's indifferent attitude toward Jammu. Second, Jammu's loyalty to India was taken for granted. Given its large Hindu population and its awkward geographical location, Jammu had no choice but loyalty to the Indian state, since its future was secure only within Hindu-dominated India.

Jammu's response to the denial of political and legal space to its Hindu community within the articulated Kashmiri identity has been twofold. On the one hand, a minority has expressed itself through Hindu nationalist

symbols and has actively supported the Indian Hindu party (Bharatiya Jan Sangh, later the Bharatiya Janata Party) in the cause of fully integrating Kashmir within the Indian state by abolishing Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. According to these Hindu nationalists, Article 370 disallows Kashmiri citizens from being emotionally attached to the Indian nation. On the other hand, a much larger group also seeks emotional and political recognition and a space for itself within the formally articulated and constructed Kashmiri identity, but has supported the Kashmiri demand for the recognition and maintenance of its distinctness. However, it is not willing to sever Jammu and Kashmir state's links with India.

The Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, which had been formed in 1947 with the support of leading RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) workers, took up Jammu's cause for the state's complete accession to and total integration with India. By 1951 Praja Parishad had emerged as the principal opposition party, and the only party representing Jammu's Hindus as well as the refugees who had migrated from West Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The party drew support from the leading Hindu nationalist parties in India such as Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, and Bharatiya Jan Sangh. In 1952 it began its most vocal and aggressive agitation demanding the abrogation of Article 370, full integration of the state into the Indian union, full application of the Indian Constitution, complete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and removal of customs barriers between Kashmir and India. Over the next few months, Jammu's streets echoed with Praja Parishad's slogan of *Ek Vidhan, Ek Nishan, Aur Ek Pradhan* (One constitution, one flag and one head of the state). Jammu's Hindu population was effectively mobilized by Praja Parishad. Consequently, when the first assembly elections took place in 1957 (after the promulgation of the new constitution for the state), the Praja Parishad received 52 and 43 percent of the total votes polled in the urban constituencies of Jammu and Udhampur, respectively, the party's strongholds. The National Conference, Abdullah's ruling party, successfully competed for Jammu's votes, however, and was able to secure twenty-four out of its thirty seats.

Since then, Jammu's main grievance has been that the state government has consistently discriminated against Jammu in favor of Kashmir in terms of development, representation in the civil service and the Cabinet, and the provision of higher educational facilities. Since the mid-1960s, both the Kashmir and Indian governments have taken note of Jammu's grievances. The Gajendra-gadhar Commission was appointed in 1967 to inquire into complaints of regional imbalance in developmental programs and recruitment policies. The commission, in its 1968 report, recommended equal representation of

Jammu in the state cabinet, the establishment of a full-fledged university, medical college, and regional engineering college in Jammu, the establishment of a statutory State Development Board, and the creation of regional development boards for each of the three regions. Except for the establishment of Jammu University and a medical college, none of the commission's recommendations was implemented. In 1979 the state government appointed the Sikri Commission to review Jammu's consistent complaints of discrimination. In August 1980 the commission once again recognized regional imbalances and made specific recommendations in developmental policies and programs, recruitment policies, and admission to professional institutions. Since that time, several of Jammu's demands have been met, particularly in regard to development, political representation in the state government, and the establishment of professional institutions; a strong feeling still prevails among Jammu's population, however, that the central government in India has largely taken for granted their unflagging patriotism and Indian nationalism.

Ladakh

Despite knowledge of the cultural identity of the Buddhist population of Ladakh, India's leaders, in determining the Indian state's relations with Jammu and Kashmir, have consistently tended to ignore that region's aspirations. After the partition of India, the Buddhists in Ladakh perceived their historic association with the state of Jammu and Kashmir as having come to an end: they had been annexed by the Dogras in 1842, and now, with the maharaja's transfer of power to the National Conference, they felt they deserved to reacquire their full sovereignty. However, in their own larger interests and those of India, they agreed to continue to remain part of the state. The demands of Ladakh's Buddhist population have ranged from recognition of the community as scheduled tribes, to the granting of quasi-autonomous Frontier, Union Territory, or Autonomous Hill Region status.

During the very early days of the interim regime of Sheikh Abdullah, the relationship between the Buddhist population of Ladakh and the Kashmir government turned both acrimonious and fragile. The Buddhist Ladakhis have consistently complained about the Kashmir government's discriminatory attitude toward the region in terms of administrative and political representation in state institutions, a lack of economic development, and the denial of their cultural and linguistic identity. In addition, they have accused the state government of communalizing their politics by dividing the region into two districts, a Buddhist majority Leh and a Muslim majority Kargil. Fearing their assimilation into a

Muslim-dominated state and the conversion of their status into a minority, the Buddhists have consequently insisted upon the protection of their distinct religion and culture by seeking closer relations with India's central government.

On 4 May 1949, Chhewang Rgzin Kloan, president of the Buddhist Association, presented a memorandum to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, unequivocally declaring that Ladakh could not be bound by the decision of a plebiscite that might be held to decide Kashmir's accession to India. Kaushok Bakola, the head lama and the most vocal advocate of central administration for Ladakh, challenged the legality of the state government's jurisdiction over the region. In general, Ladakh complained of discrimination, police brutality (most of the police force was from the Kashmir region), conversion of the Buddhist population to Islam and Christianity, and finally, threats to the *gompas* (Buddhist monasteries) through the implementation of land reforms.

During the 1960s, the Kashmir government made some efforts to respond to some specific Ladakhi demands, but the communal divide between Buddhists and Muslims had begun to sharpen. In April 1969, when a Buddhist flag was desecrated by a Muslim, the Buddhist Action committee started an agitation for the central government to grant Union Territory status to Ladakh, a demand completely opposed by Kashmir's chief minister G. M. Sadiq. Continued communal problems between the two religious communities caused Bakola to reassert his demand that the region be centrally administered, while Chief Minister Sadiq, in turn, minimized the Ladakhi agitation as merely a "law and order" problem. The government and the Buddhist leaders attempted to negotiate Ladakh's demands for proper educational and health facilities and an increased share of the administrative and economic budget. The Jammu and Kashmir government acknowledged that there was a need to invest more resources in the region and, in 1973, Mir Kasim became the first chief minister of the state to visit Ladakh. The situation changed in 1977 with the reentry into Kashmir politics of Sheikh Abdullah. The Ladakhi Buddhists intensified their demands for the region to be centrally administered. The situation got much worse in 1979, when Ladakh was bifurcated into two districts, Leh and Kargil, for administrative purposes. The Buddhist leaders blamed Sheikh Abdullah for destroying the cohesiveness and the secular image of the region. The two districts began to select candidates from their respective majority religious faiths. The Buddhist-majority Leh chose the Congress candidate, supporting Ladakh's integration with India, and the Muslim-majority Kargil elected the National Conference candidate, supporting the cause of the valley's Muslims.

The All-Party Ladakh Action Committee launched an agitation in 1981 and 1982 for the declaration of the entire people of Ladakh as a "scheduled tribe." It was only in 1984 that G. M. Shah, in his brief stint as Kashmir's chief minister, recommended to the government of India to grant tribal status to eight selected Ladakhi ethnic groups, and it was not until 1991, in response to another serious agitation by the Buddhist community two years earlier, that the formal order to implement the decision was issued. Finally, after prolonged talks between the government of India, the state government, and the Ladakh Buddhist Association, an Autonomous Hill council was approved on 9 October 1993 for Leh, and a similar one for Kargil, which would be operational only when the population of the latter desired. On the whole, as the Indian state constructed the Kashmiri nation on the narrow premise of the Kashmiri Muslim identity, the economic and identity-related demands of the Ladakhi Buddhists and Jammu's Hindus remain less than fully satisfied.

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See also **Kashmir**

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JAMSHEDPUR A city in the state of Jharkhand, Jamshepur's population was 1 million in 2001. It is named after Jamsetji N. Tata, a Parsi industrialist. Tata had built several cotton textile mills before deciding to take the risk of establishing a steel mill in India. Since India is rich in coal and iron ore, it presented a natural advantage for the development of steel industry. Because British steel dominated the Indian market, Tata turned to U.S. engineers for advice on setting up his mill. Though he died before the mill was started, his sons Dorab and Ratan managed to raise the huge amount of capital required for the enterprise. Fifteen Indian maharajas were among the investors. Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) was founded in 1907; the village

Sakchi in Singbhum District, close to the iron ore deposits, was chosen as the site for the mill. In 1908 TISCO acquired 3,584 acres around Sakchi and thus became a large landowner. For the future development of the steel city, this was a great boon, as municipal government and city planning remained under control of the company.

TISCO started operating its first blast furnace in 1911. The venture could still have turned out to be a costly flop, but then World War I cut off trade links with Europe. TISCO now had to supply the entire Indian market; it also received British orders, for example for the Mesopotamian railway that was built for strategic reasons during the war. In 1919 Sakchi was given its new name, Jamshedpur, and became a veritable boom town. Wartime profits were invested in an expansion of the steel mill. But then a new challenge emerged, as cheap Belgian and German steel flooded the Indian market. In 1924 the British government of India imposed a protective tariff on steel with a preferential rate for British steel. TISCO survived and prospered once more during World War II. Since the supply of locomotives for Indian railways was cut off during the war, TELCO (Tata Engine and Locomotive Co.) was established at Jamshedpur in 1944. Later, TELCO became the major producer of trucks in India, initially in cooperation with Daimler-Benz (Mercedes), but then expanding rapidly on its own. In independent India, heavy industry was reserved for the public sector. TISCO was not nationalized, but it was not permitted to expand. This also constrained the growth of Jamshedpur, which could otherwise have emerged as an industrial metropolis even earlier than Bangalore.

Dietmar Rothermund

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JANATA DAL. See **Political System.**

JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH India and Japan had little mutual knowledge or appreciation of one another before the 1990s. India's policy of nonalignment—with a Moscow tilt—contrasted sharply with Japan's role as the bastion of U.S. forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese were irritated at what they perceived as airs of sanctimonious superiority among

Indians; the Indians were unimpressed by Japan's materialistic drive to economic growth. The persistence of poverty in India and the successful drive to prosperity in Japan changed the basis of their bilateral relationship. A more recent economic slump in Japan and the reemergence of India as a formidable power are once again redefining their relations.

The relative aloofness between the two countries is evident in the paucity of prime ministerial visits. Japanese prime ministers Nobusuke Kishi and Hayato Ikeda visited India in 1957 and 1961, respectively. The next such visit, by Yasuhiro Nakasone, did not take place until 1984, followed by Toshiki Kaifu in 1990, and Yoshiro Mori ten years later. In the other direction, Indian prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi visited Japan in 1957 and 1969, respectively, Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 and 1988, P. V. Narasimha Rao in 1992, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2002.

Political and Security Relations

Japan's presence in South Asia is not constrained by memories of wartime hostilities and atrocities. Since India has been relevant neither to Japan's security nor to its international economic strategy, New Delhi has figured little in Tokyo's foreign policy priorities. Yet some of India's diplomatic endeavors have ensured that it would not be totally ignored by Japan: its support for reintegrating Japan into the world community after World War II, its invitation to Japan to take part in the first Asian games in New Delhi in 1951, and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1952.

India interpreted Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific region from a macrostrategic perspective, as a regional balancer to China. Not having shared the rest of Asia-Pacific's experience of aggressive Japanese militarism, India was more welcoming of the prospect of a militarily resurgent Japan that would keep China's attention focused to its east. Even at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal after World War II, the Indian judge dissented from the verdict that Japanese leaders were guilty of having committed war crimes. But the Indian wish for a Japanese strategic counterweight to China remained unfulfilled because of the carefully nurtured relationship between Beijing and Tokyo, which is more important to both than either's relationship with India.

India's nuclear explosions in 1988 at Pokhran-II cast a long shadow on Delhi-Tokyo relations. While Japan has supported the antinuclear cause from within the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India has been the NPT's most prominent critic. Indians underestimate the depth and breadth of Japanese nuclear revulsion and the sense of sadness and betrayal that the land of the



Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee with Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori of Japan. Then Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee (left) welcomes Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori of Japan. Mori's five-day visit to India in August 2000 helped to soften the diplomatic impasse that had long existed between the two nations. INDIA TODAY.

Buddha, Mahatma Gandhi, and Nehru should have embraced nuclear weapons. India insists, however, that each country must make its own decision on reconciling tensions between its commitment to international idealism and the requirements of national security. Prime Minister Mori's five-day visit to India in August 2000 helped to soften the impasse. Opinion toward India became a bit more sympathetic in 2003, when reports of Pakistan's export of nuclear technology to North Korea (in return for long-range missile technology, whose object could only be India) were published.

The competition between New Delhi and Tokyo for permanent membership on the United Nations (UN) Security Council could be converted into cooperation, since their credentials and political constituencies are complementary. Japan is an industrialized nonnuclear country whose status as the world's largest aid donor is in contrast to constitutional restrictions on the use of military force abroad. India, a developing country with nuclear weapons, has contributed more personnel to UN peacekeeping than any other country. While Japan relies principally on economic instruments to pursue foreign policy, India has developed diplomatic tools to offset its

lack of economic muscle in world affairs. In the annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2004, India and Japan joined Brazil and Germany in pressing for permanent membership of the Security Council for all four countries.

Trade and Economic Relations

Historical and linguistic ties to the West, economic policies of import-substitution and protectionism, and a foreign policy of close relations with the Soviet Union kept India at a distance from Japan, whose importance increased with its enlarged role as an aid donor. Official aid to India has been part of a broader long-term government strategy of promoting Japanese business interests through a policy of maintaining low-cost official contacts in developing countries, until such time as they become more hospitable to foreign trade and investment.

While Japanese foreign aid to India increased, there was no commensurate increase in Japanese trade and investment, despite Japan's status as the world's largest capital exporter. By the 1990s, Japanese investment in China was about twenty times more than in India; only

0.3 percent of Japan's direct investment abroad in 1990 had gone to India. Ambassador Shunji Kobayashi delivered an unusually blunt address to an Indian audience in 1991. Noting that trade with India had fallen from 2.5 percent of total Japanese trade in 1960 to 0.7 percent in 1990, he urged India toward greater domestic and international competition. The Japanese were discouraged in part by the social and political instability of South Asia, but the main deterrents were India's restrictive foreign capital laws and the miles of "red tape" that confronted foreign investors.

The Indian economy has since then been progressively opened to international competition, of course, and has grown at a rate second only to China among the major countries. Complementary economic needs and strengths could provide a firm basis for substantial strengthening of bilateral relations. India's vast middle class offers a stable and expanding market, and its thriving information technology sector is of great interest to Japan. India also has a track record of adapting its management styles to match new technology. For India, Japan continues to be attractive as a major aid donor, a capital surplus economy, and a large trading nation with a huge export market.

On the security side, Tokyo's defense establishment awoke to the potential for military cooperation with India after a Japanese cargo ship, captured by pirates in the Indian Ocean, was rescued by Indian naval forces in 1999. India could thus prove helpful in safeguarding critical sea-lanes for Japan's oil imports across the Indian Ocean. In September 2003 the two countries held their fourth annual joint maritime search-and-rescue and anti-piracy exercises. The future of Indo-Japanese relations thus appears to be much more vital than in the past.

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JATI. See **Caste System.**

JESUITS. See **Christian Impact on India, History of.**

JEWELRY Several countries can boast of a period when their culture produced outstanding jewelry, but none can surpass the vitality of India's output, which has spanned over three thousand years. Physical evidence brought to light at Indian archaeological sites in the Indus Valley, such as Mohenjo-Daro (2500–1700 B.C.), support this claim. Necklaces, bracelets, bangles, rings, beads, and other forms of ornaments made in gold, silver, copper, stone, ceramic, proto-glass, and other materials were unearthed there, revealing that the material culture at that early period included an extensive use of personal ornaments. Other finds elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent support the premise that Indians adopted the concept of body ornamentation at an even earlier date. To these physical remains we must add the many later literary references to jewelry, highly sophisticated written treatises on gemstones, and the existence of epigraphic inscriptions concerning the donation of jewelry to a temple, such as those that occur in profusion on the eighth-century Rajaraja temple at Thanjavur in South India.

Ethnic Jewelry

The unique creative genius that constitutes Indian civilization permeates all aspects of its expressive arts, including jewelry. Following a recognized pattern of development, over time, the contributions of many individual artisans coalesce, and the results take on a unique character that becomes identifiable with the group or place where they were initiated. When, in the creation of artifacts, governing concepts of technology, form, and design are retained, repeated, and developed, the results become a physical aspect of the material culture in which they originated. When seen by others outside that culture, such concepts are perceived to possess original and unique qualities, and these become associated with the creators. Such a group is designated as a specific ethnic entity, which can consist of relatively few (a tribal group), many (a regional class), or an entire nation. The traditional jewelry of India is an outstanding example of ethnic jewelry characterized by unique, unmistakable regional styles.

Religion and Jewelry

Religion has always been a dominant factor in the use of Indian jewelry, and its attributed protective purpose was probably its original function. This is especially apparent in the widespread practice of wearing amulets



Gold Necklace. Nineteenth-century gold necklace (*kazhuththu uru*), from Pudukkottai, Tamil Nadu, South India. Worn by a Chettiar bride at her wedding and again on celebrating the 60th birthday of her husband. Unique in its traditional use by the mercantile Chettiar community. TOMMY CARAWAY, NEW YORK.

and using rosaries, both of which are normally carried visibly on the body. Their use is universal and stems from a common belief in the supernatural, whose dire effects the amulet is meant to repel or control. The most usual amuletic function is to counteract potentially disastrous encounters with the evil eye. Made in many materials, amulets must be consecrated and activated by a priest. They can then be worn on the body and put to use. Thereafter they are normally never removed.

Another example, the rosary, is a handheld prayer counting device in the form of strung beads. When not in use, it may be worn on the neck or coiled around the left wrist. Widely used by the followers of all religions in India, the rosary is a means of acquiring merit by the

recitation of prayers invoking a specific deity. Count of the recitations is noted by means of passing the beads through the fingers. Prayer recitation is a daily practice necessary to earn the ultimate reward of a future existence in the postmortal world (Nirvāna for Hindus, Paradise for Muslims, and the Western Paradise for Buddhists). Hindu rosaries have 100 beads; those of Muslims have 99, and Buddhists, 108. All these are made in a variety of materials that among Hindus and Buddhists is often one related by tradition to a particular deity and chosen for use for that or other reasons. Rosary materials include natural organic substances, such as sections of dried basilica stems (a plant sacred to Vishnu), various hard seeds, stones (including gemstones), glass, silver, and even gold.

Social Identity and Practices

Certain forms of jewelry are worn by particular groups to indicate to others their religion and caste, the latter concept still operative in India though legally banned. These forms become familiar to others, as is their significance. Aside from form, the particular material used for jewelry also becomes an important factor because ideas and specific symbolism are associated with them. Thus a wearer of gold jewelry automatically acquires a higher social status than one using silver, a less precious metal. This is most evident in making a distinction between the gold-wearing urban and silver-wearing rural people. Using a traditional jewelry form, normally made in silver, but ordered by the user to be made in gold, is another way of achieving and indicating high social status.

Until recent times, it was common to see rural women publicly wearing considerable amounts of jewelry. In effect, these possessions represented the surplus earnings of the family, transformed into ornaments acquired when economic circumstances permitted and, for reasons of safety, worn on the body. Rural economy, however, is subject to vicissitudes of reliability, often depending on natural causes such as monsoon success or failure. Investment in jewelry is a form of family security; when necessary, jewelry can be sold to assure survival from a natural or man-made disaster.

According to texts such as the *Kāma Sūtra*, which among other subjects discusses concepts of feminine beauty, the ideal woman must wear the types of ornament prescribed for her social condition. As a means of achieving this, the dowry system evolved and became a necessity at the time of marriage, an event considered to be the most important of one's lifetime. By universal practice, the two families must arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement, which in most Indian societies involves providing a bride with a specified weight of precious metal jewelry. The amount varies according to the economic condition of the families involved. This jewelry is generally termed the bride's *stridana* (*stri*, meaning "woman"; *dana*, meaning gifts). In theory it remains her sole property to dispose of as she wishes. In practice it may be used as a means of family survival when by necessity, the wife may allow it to be sold.

Indian jewelry can be classified into typological groups based upon broad geographic areas (Himalayan, North Indian, South Indian) and within these places classes that use it. These divisions simultaneously reveal the overall hieratic organization and complexity of Indian society. Each group has its own characteristic cultural concepts, resides in communally or geographically concentrated locations, and employs its own culturally evolved types of traditional ornaments. The most primitive groups,

whose culture until recently harkens back to Neolithic times, are tribal peoples, who generally live in relatively isolated locations. By far the largest group, comprising at least 70 percent of the over 1 billion total population of India, is the rural agriculturalist contingent. At the economic apex of Indian society are the growing middle and upper classes, the latter in former days the royal sector. In reality, a degree of interaction of jewelry design concepts occurs among these categories which at times results in the appearance of some hybrid artifacts.

Materials Used and Their Origins

In the history of the development of personal ornament by humankind, the earliest materials used are believed to have been substances available in the immediate environment. These include many types of fibers, grasses, wood, flowers, seeds, mica, shells, gourds, feathers, stones, and sometimes metals. In modern times in India, the use of such materials characterizes the ornaments of tribal groups such as the Nagas of northeastern India. Though tribal groups usually reside in remote areas, they were never totally isolated, and other non-indigenous materials, such as metals, came to them by trade. In some cases, unique metal tribal ornaments were made to their specifications by nontribal artisans who worked in or near tribal territory and catered to tribal demands. Glass beads of various types are also widely used; these also arrived through trade from their centers of manufacture, which were often great distances away from the place of their eventual use.

An example of the above is a special material and an important ornamental element used by most tribal people, but especially by Naga groups: hard-stone beads. For more than two thousand years, utilizing an unchanged manual technology, the manufacture of drilled hard-stone beads of a variety of stones and forms continues in many workshops of bead-making artisans at Khambat, Gujarat, in western India, and have since antiquity been widely distributed.

Metals. Metals of several kinds are a major element of jewelry in general. India is rich in iron (in very limited use, however, for ornaments in India), but the inadequate indigenous production of copper and its alloys, brass and bronze (widely used by tribal people for ornament), had to be supplemented by the import trade. The precious metals, silver and gold, whose local production was never sufficient to meet the enormous demand, since antiquity have constituted important foreign import products. As long ago as Roman times, and probably longer, the much sought after Indian spices and textiles were, by the demand of Indian merchants, paid for in foreign silver



Nineteenth-Century Gold Hand Ornament (*batpbul*) with Diamonds. The hand ornament's ring (*arsi*) is mounted with a small round mirror. Typically, such a piece is elaborately polychrome-enameled with an intricate floral and bird design on the reverse side (never seen), which is characteristic of work crafted in this North Indian Rajput-Mughal style. COURTESY AIR INDIA, MUMBAI.

and gold bullion or coinage, hidden hoards of which have been uncovered in archaeological excavations. Voluminous import of the precious metals continues even today, giving India the reputation of being the world's largest consumer of the precious metals, most of which are converted into jewelry.

Gemstones. Hard stones used in Indian jewelry are divided into two categories: the semiprecious variety, in Sanskrit termed *uparatnani* (minor gemstones); and the precious ones, termed *mabaratnani* (major gemstones). India is fortunate in its natural possession of many of both kinds. Deposits of semiprecious hard stones such as agates (which include carnelian, bloodstone, chalcedony, moss agate, and onyx), garnet (almandite and uvarovite), rose quartz, apatite, rhodonite, and tourmaline exist in quantity. Most of these are used for beads, and less frequently are set to ornament jewelry.

Beryl (emerald) and corundum (sapphire) also exist, but of the precious gemstones, the most important is diamond (which, followed by ruby, emerald, sapphire, and pearl, comprise the five classical gemstones used in upper-class Indian jewelry, especially since Mughal

times). Until 1726, when diamond deposits were discovered in Brazil, India was the world's principal producer of diamonds. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, a seventeenth-century French gemstone merchant who made six journeys to India mainly to purchase diamonds, recorded that enormous quantities came from several highly productive mines located in the Kingdom of Golconda in the Deccan. These mines were intensely worked until their exhaustion in the eighteenth century. Eventually South Africa and Russia emerged as the main diamond producers while Indian production today is negligible. The regular faceting of diamonds, on the other hand, has become an important industry centered in Mumbai and Surat. This technology now provides India with a means of earning foreign exchange. India today is a world leader in diamond faceting, exceeded only by the Netherlands and Israel.

Other gemstones that were not available domestically were regularly imported. Of primary importance among these is ruby, followed by emerald (found only recently in India) and the prolific pearl. In an annual monsoon-dependent trade, rubies came to India from the Mogok mines of Burma (Myanmar), which are still active. This trade originated in South India, from where wind-borne boats regularly seasonally crossed the Bay of Bengal. Mostly small rubies, rounded by attrition, became available in prodigious amounts, and as a result, with minimal polishing could be profusely used in a single ornament. This circumstance to a great extent determined the character of an extensively produced class of South Indian gold jewelry. Today, because of trade difficulties and high cost, synthetic ruby manufacture has been firmly established in India to supply the ongoing demand.

Emeralds have always been utilized in Indian ornament. Their original main source was Egypt, but in the sixteenth century, Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores in the New World discovered and exploited the highly productive Chivor and other emerald mines of Colombia, still the world's main source. Exported in extraordinary amounts to Europe, they were then brought to the colonial Portuguese-Indian enclave of Goa, which, with its existing Indian diamond trade, became a precious gemstone entrepôt. Indian Mughal dynasty rulers and their courtiers especially favored the intense green of emerald (a propitious color associated with Islam), endowed this gemstone with mystical, prophylactic powers, and utilized it widely in their highly idiomatic style of jewelry.

Pearls, a ready-made, popular natural mollusk product needing only to be drilled, have been extensively used in Indian jewelry from ancient times through the present. The proximity of their prolific sources in the Gulf of

Manar, between India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and Basra in the Persian Gulf facilitated their availability.

Semiprecious gemstones were also in wide use. Contributing to their employment is the concept of the nine planetary gemstones (*nava ratna*), in which the nine different stones were frequently used as a group, mounted in one object. References to this concept occur as early as the thirteenth century. In this belief system, each of the nine planetary or celestial entities in the then known universe is assigned a gemstone. According to the widespread belief in astrology, every planet is thought to exert a positive or negative influence on the life of every individual born at the time of its ascendancy, a fact calculated by an astrologer for every child at birth and carefully preserved on paper thereafter. This calculation of compatibility becomes a strong factor in choosing jewelry that contains a gemstone.

For those unable to afford ornaments set with gemstones, glass substitutes are treated in the same manner as precious stones, that is, cut into cabochon, rounded, or dome shapes, but not faceted forms. To heighten their brilliance, such transparent “stones” were backed by a polished, shining metal foil, sometimes colored to increase its resemblance to a genuine gemstone. Glass mirrors are also set as gemstones, an outstanding example being their use in a ring (*arsi*) generally worn on the left thumb.

Gemstone settings. India developed a unique system for the setting of gemstones, which when present can serve to identify the origin of some Indian jewelry. Known as the *kundan* style (meaning “pure gold”), the system is used to set gemstones in metal or stone substrates such as jade. In this technique, a depression or opening is made to conform to the shape of the gemstone (or glass “stone”) being set. This depression is filled with lac (the Indian term for a natural resin exuded by an insect—*tachardia lacca*—on the branches of its host tree during its life cycle). A backing sheet of polished metal foil is placed over the lac. While the stone is held in the depression, a strip of pure gold (*kundun*) is forced around its perimeter with a stylus. Because pure gold is soft enough to be manipulated simply by pressure, the result, a raised surrounding ridge of gold, firmly fixes the gemstone in place.

Jewelry Making

Jewelry making starts with the training of an apprentice. Until recent times, this was probably a boy belonging to a jeweler’s family, or a relative whose caste was that of the jeweler (*sonar*). Beginning at an early childhood age, the apprentice is trained by his family in the simpler tasks, which increase in complexity with his acquisition of

skills. Ultimately, after several years, the trainee becomes a full-fledged gold- or silversmith. Each workshop, whether a family unit or, as in recent times, a cooperative of many workers, is headed by a leader (*ustad*) or master craftsman, under whose direction work proceeds. Large workshops are often owned by an entrepreneur (Mahajan or Saraf) who decides what is to be made according to demand, provides his hired workers with materials, and either sells the results directly or wholesale to other jewelry dealers. There are believed to be over 2 million artisans currently making jewelry in India.

Fabrication techniques. The nature of metal jewelry fabrication is such that the basic techniques employed have not changed since the time when this technology began. Indian jewelers work with what their Western counterparts consider to be the most elemental tools. Yet, despite this seeming limitation, through the ages they have produced, and continue to make, masterpieces of the jeweler’s art.

Jewelry fabrication processes have developed from the necessity to employ the elemental forms of metal available to every jeweler: wire, sheet metal, and bulk metal, the latter used for the casting process. The dominating use of the first two forms, wire or sheet metal, at specific locations has resulted in jewelry designs that exploit the possibilities inherent in these forms of metal. Thus, for example, torques constructed totally of wrapped and coiled wire are made in Rajasthan and Gujarat; and low relief repoussage transforms flat sheet metal into decorated dimensional forms in Uttar Pradesh and places too numerous to mention here.

Some uniquely Indian specialized decorative metalwork processes have evolved, and their use in many cases has become associated with a particular place of manufacture. Among these are the granulation technique used in Gujarat; the *babul kam* (“acacia thorn work,” small projecting gold “thorns” that cover a surface) of the Punjab; *thewa* work (pierced gold foil units fused on glass) of Partabgarh, Rajasthan; the enamel work of Jaipur, Rajasthan; and the aforementioned, widely practiced *kundan* style of gemstone setting in universal use.

Mughal Style Jewelry

The styles of jewelry produced in India are extremely varied, and as mentioned, many can be associated with the geographic area of their origin. Thus the jewelry of the Himalayan area, North India, and South India are stylistically distinctive. Only recently have these general differences been recognized and given the attention they deserve. One North Indian style of design also practiced as far south as the Deccan is the so-called Mughal style. This today should rightfully be designated the



Silver Headband from South India. From South India, silver headband (*thalaikkachchu*) to adorn a sacred bull (Nandi). Madras (Chennai), Tamil Nadu, nineteenth century. Its sections are ornamented with repoussage and chasing, and set with glass “stones.” TIMO RIPATTI, HELSINKI.

Mughal-Rajput style since it originated during the Mughal period but is now practiced in places such as Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Bikaner (all in Rajasthan). This style has become so well known worldwide that for most Western people it represents Indian style in general to the exclusion of other, lesser known but equally interesting styles. Accounting for this popularity may be its prolific use of gemstones as well as the highly skillful application of polychrome enamel (usually on the reverse, unseen side of the ornament), resulting in objects of seductive opulence. Perhaps also operative in this world perception of what constitutes Indian design is the romanticized association of this style with the fabled wealth of the Mughal court, reflected in the rich appearance of new work in this design idiom. Its perpetuation in India and elsewhere attests to the endless design possibilities it allows.

Late Developments and Modern Trends

For millennia, Indian jewelers have cultivated their own systems of work production. With the invasion of

Europeans, bent on commercial and colonial exploitation, that started in the sixteenth century and ended with Indian independence in 1947 inevitably, new concepts exotic to indigenous practice were introduced. In the jewelry field, of significant importance was the Western use of regularly faceted, calibrated sized gemstones, and claw settings for them developed to increase gemstone brilliance. Previously, the time-honored Indian approach to the use of gemstones, especially diamonds, was to retain their initial weight as much as possible by limited polishing. As a result, gemstones of many dissimilar, irregular forms were used in the same object. Stone form irregularity is probably what motivated the invention of the *kundan* gemstone setting process, as it permitted and facilitated the setting of stones of any perimeter form, thus eliminating the painstaking work of producing many exactly measured collet-type bezels, which are required when calibrated gemstones are used.

The claw or open-backed setting was another innovation, though rare examples from the past do exist. Prior

to this, Indian gemstones were set into the *kundan* foil-backed, closed settings. In these settings, light was reflected through the stone from the backing foil to the visible front only. Open-backed settings, as in the case of claws that hold the stone in air, permit light penetration from all directions, which considerably increases gemstone brilliance. Both methods are in practice in India since the mid-nineteenth century. The Western use of regularly faceted gemstones and claw settings in an otherwise traditionally styled ornament probably are indications of a relatively recent manufacture.

The Influence of Indian Jewelry Design on the West

Conversely, the impact of Indian jewelry design on the jewelry of the Western world became strongly evident after the Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace in London in 1851, when traditional Indian jewelry was first presented in quantity to the general public. Its earliest subsequent influence is seen in the jewelry design of the so-called Arts and Crafts Movement in Great Britain in the late nineteenth century. Indian forms and motifs of ornament were widely adopted by Western craftsmen who, in sympathy with Indian handwork methods, admired the organic, handmade appearance characteristic of Indian jewelry, as contrasted with the more mechanical-looking perfection of most contemporary Western jewelry.

Especially dramatic was the adoption of Indian styles, especially inspired by that of the Mughal period, by the grand jewelers of France and Great Britain, such as Cartier, Van Cleef and Arpels, Chaumet, and others. This occurred coincidentally with the universal acceptance of platinum in jewelry at the turn of the nineteenth century into the early years of the twentieth. The reign of Queen Victoria and that of her son, King Edward VII, both of whom bore the additional title, respectively, of Empress and Emperor of India, brought about a surge of interest in Indian culture. This period also attracted to Great Britain and Europe many Indian maharajas and their retinues to participate in political events such as the celebration of Queen Victoria's Jubilee of 1877 (when she was designated empress of India) and the coronation of Edward VII in 1907 (when he became emperor of India). Their magnificent appearance, particularly the opulence of their elaborate jewelry display, was widely reported in the newspapers and magazines. Upon their exposure to high fashion Western jewelry and its refined technology, Indian royalty soon became important clients to the famous European jewelry houses. The result was an active intercultural jewelry design exchange.

Western jewelry that either exhibits an obvious stylistic similarity to Indian jewelry, or that uses typical

elements of traditional Indian design, is still produced by the workshops of the major jewelry fabrication houses of the world. This artistic homage, a form of flattery to Indian culture, is but one instance of evidence of the inexhaustible design inspiration that Indian jewelry has provided to the world.

Oppi Untracht

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JEWS OF INDIA The Jewish population of India is diverse—much like that of India itself—with histories extending over hundreds, if not thousands, of years. The Jews reached India by various routes and means, settling at different times, often in separate areas of the subcontinent, where they successfully adapted to the local environment. The Jews of India have lived peacefully with their neighbors in the subcontinent. Indian social paradigms allowed these groups to thrive unhindered and to survive into the twenty-first century, unlike the Jews of China, whose ancient communities had largely disappeared by the early twentieth century. Though small in size, the Jewish communities produced individuals and institutions that have enriched the substance of Indian society.

The Bene Israel, the largest group of Indian Jews, first settled on the Konkan Coast, on the shores of the Arabian Sea, south of the region that would eventually become Bombay (Mumbai). Arriving by sea from a place to the north, their traditional account mentions a shipwreck in which all their possessions were lost while several passengers survived. Eventually, as their numbers grew, their descendants spread to locations throughout the state of Maharashtra and beyond in the subcontinent. The other group claiming great longevity in India is based farther to the south, along the Malabar coast in the modern state of Kerala. They are known as the Cochin or Shingly Jews. The most recently arrived group of Indian Jews is that of the Iraqi or Baghdadi Jews, who can be found primarily in Mumbai, Pune, and Kolkata in ever dwindling numbers. This group includes Jews from other Arab lands, including Syria and Yemen. The most recently emerged group is that of the Jews of Assam. The latter, also known as the B'nei Menashe, from the northeast reaches of the subcontinent, have taken their place in Indian Jewish history only during the last several decades of the twentieth century. In addition, there are European Jews, primarily those who sought refuge in India before and during World War II.

The Bene Israel

The Bene Israel of Maharashtra state and the Jews of Kerala claim title to being among the first Jews on Indian soil. According to their folk tradition, the ancestors of the Bene Israel arrived at the village of Naveder Navgaon on the Konkan coast as the result of a storm at sea, which blew their ship far from their destination (perhaps Broach, a busy port to the north). As the story goes, the seven couples who miraculously survived the shipwreck



Man Holding Brass Insignia of the Pardesi Synagogue. As of 2004, fewer than twenty Jewish families remained in Cochin, Kerala. Still standing in the Mattancheri section of the town is the Pardesi Synagogue. At approximately 438 years, it is the oldest synagogue outside Israel. PALLAVA BAGLA / CORBIS.

made their way to shore and became the nucleus of the Bene Israel community. A memorial monument designed by a member of the community—Joshua Benjamin, (b. 1920) former chief architect to the government of India—stands on the shore near the village. The survivors took up the craft of oil pressing, which required little overhead and created a commodity much needed in that tropical region. In the villages, where they were known as *тели* (oil pressers), the Bene Israel came to be called the *shaniwar teli*, or those oil pressers who did not work on Saturday, in distinction from other *тели* of the area. As such, the Bene Israel can be traced in the local archives of the Hindu and Muslim rulers of the region. For example, two men named Aron and Sileman Israil are listed in the tax records for the coastal town of Revdanda in 1759. It is only in the British records that Bene Israel recruits are designated as being members of the “Jew Caste.” The community had remained largely in the villages and towns of the Konkan until the advent of the European powers in the 1700s, when they began migrating to British-controlled territories. It was also during the eighteenth century that a traveler named

David Rahabi is thought to have visited the Konkan, though this date is disputed by some historians as too recent. Rahabi (whose name might reveal Egyptian origin) was happy to have found an Indian community that observed the Sabbath by not working, recited the *Kriyat Shema* (the credo “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one”) on auspicious occasions, and followed the laws of *kashrut* (dietary purity). The impact of caste consciousness on the Bene Israel community is evident in its division into Gora (white) Israel and Kala (black) Israel. Individuals in each group maintain that the terms have nothing to do with color, but rather refer to children of “mixed marriages” with members of the surrounding population.

In the period during which Bombay was growing as a port for the goods of British traders, the Bene Israel began to move out of the Konkan. Since some of the men of the community had already served in the military forces of the local leaders, the Marathas, enlisting in the British East India Company’s forces was, perhaps, a natural choice. Others, who had served as contractors (suppliers) for the armed forces of the local rulers, moved to the city seeking business opportunities. Life in the expanding city of Bombay and in Pune (the traditional seat of Hindu power on the Deccan Plateau) brought about changes in social and economic patterns among the Bene Israel. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, military recruits fanned out over British India, settling in the regions of their posting from Karachi to Rangoon. When, in 1813, the British allowed Christian missionaries into India to preach and teach, the first group to arrive was the American Marathi Mission, which sent its members into the Konkan. Since they were well acquainted with the concept of monotheism, the Bene Israel were among the first to obtain positions as teachers in the American Marathi Mission schools. Hoping to convert the locals by means of Bible study, the impact of missionary education on the Bene Israel had precisely the opposite effect. By disseminating Hebrew bibles, along with those translated into Marathi, and in pioneering Hebrew language education among the Bene Israel, the missionaries provided the catalyst for a rejuvenated Jewish community in the Konkan and in Bombay.

Another catalyst came from Bene Israel contact with the Kerala Jews from the Malabar coast. In the second half of the eighteenth century, during the Mysore wars, a commander in the British East India Company Army was captured by the enemy, Tipu Sultan, the Muslim ruler of Mysore. According to the oral tradition of the Bene Israel, Commandant Samaji (Samuel) Hassaji (Ezekiel) Divekar, after having revealed his Bene Israel origins, was released as a result of the intervention on his behalf by the sultan’s mother. A very pious woman, she prevailed

upon her son to show mercy to Divekar, as he was of *Israil* stock—a people she knew of from the Qur’an, but whom she had never seen. Following what he considered a miraculous escape, Divekar returned to Bombay via Cochin, where he saw and admired several synagogues. As a gesture of thanks, Divekar constructed the first synagogue in Bombay in 1796; it is known as the Sha’ar Harachamim (Gate of Mercy) Synagogue. Throughout the course of the next century, synagogues were built in twelve towns and villages of the Konkan.

The contributions of the Bene Israel to India are found in politics, economics, the arts, and sciences. Beyond their original participation in military life—unique among Jewish diasporas—the Bene Israel continued to forge careers in the armed services. Several who actively engaged in politics during India’s freedom struggle include Abraham Erulkar (1887–1960), who was dean of Bombay University’s Faculty of Medicine as well as president of the Indian Medical Council; he tended Mahatma Gandhi during several of his fasts. His brother, David Erulkar (1891–1970), was part of the defense team (with Mohammad Ali Jinnah) during the trial of the radical Indian nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 1916. Elijah Moses served as mayor of Bombay in 1937. Jerusha Jhirad (1890–1984) was among Bombay’s most distinguished gynecologists, in addition to serving her community as a religious innovator by helping to bring liberal Judaism to India. Bene Israel original literary works in Marathi began with Samuel Shalom Kurulkar’s novel *Gooldbusta*, published in 1878. Meera Jacob Mahadevan (1930–1979) instituted the Mobile Creche network, which supplied child care for poor and migrant construction workers. She also authored a novel in Hindi (*Apna Ghar* [Our home], 1961) interpreting the impact on the Bene Israel community of the nearly simultaneous independence from British rule of both Israel and India. Perhaps the most prominent author in Jewish India is the poet Nissim Ezekiel (1924–2004). A professor of American and English literature at Bombay University, Ezekiel published *A Time to Change and Other Poems*, *The Unfinished Man*, and *Hymns in Darkness*, along with articles and literary criticism. His works, written in English, reflect the modern, post-colonial, urban Indian ethos. Another modern author is Esther David (b. 1945), whose novels include *The Walled City* and *Book of Esther*; along with the short stories in *By the Sabarmati*.

The Kerala Jews

The Kerala Jews in South India also claim ancient origins for their communities. Linguistic research has produced a connection between some Hebrew words and both Sanskrit and Tamil. As the southern portion of the Indian subcontinent has long been rich in spices—particularly

pepper—it is not surprising that sailors from southwest Asia might have risked the long voyage from southern Israel or Yemen to India. King Solomon is reported to have imported *tukki* (peacocks) to his palace court. *Tukki* is a Tamil word. The Hebrew word for ivory (*shenbav*), another luxury item, is related to its Sanskrit term (*ibba dana*). There are also literary concepts, such as courtly love poetry, that suggest a link between ancient Israel and India.

According to the traditions of the Kerala Jews, early settlers built a synagogue in the town of Cranganore (also known as Shingly). A tombstone in the region is dated to the thirteenth century. Another item attesting to the antiquity of the communities is a foundation stone inscribed in Hebrew, dated 1344, from Kochangadi. The local raja had given a grant of land and privileges to a man named Joseph Rabban, written on copper plates in archaic script; various scholars have dated the plates from the fourth to the eleventh century A.D.

During the fourteenth century, as a series of storms silted up the port of Cranganore, that community fled south. There they met other Jews who had migrated from Arab lands, as well as descendants of refugees from Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese nobleman Martim Pinheiro (perhaps a *converso*, a crypto-Jew) sold Hebrew books in Cochin in 1506. Another source reports Jewish traders in Cochin in 1518. Cochin Jews played important roles in the business enterprises of both the Portuguese and Dutch traders who brought their political and military might to bear on India. Ezekiel Rahabi (1694–1771), a wealthy trader, served simultaneously as leader of the Cochin community, advisor to the maharaja, and agent for the Dutch. Ultimately, when the British arrived to oust the latter, the Jews of Kerala found new benefactors. With ancestors reaching back to the Portuguese and Dutch periods in Cochin, the most prominent family of Jews in the late twentieth century was that of Koder. Wealthy and influential, the Koders, as leaders of the White Jewish community, had participated in Cochin's municipal government, directed the electricity board, and operated the ferry transport company. Changes in Kerala's political environment reduced the economic and political authority of the Koders, but in the Jewish life of Cochin and beyond, the Koder family name still reverberates.

The gem of Cochin Jewish life, known as the Pardesi (Foreigners') Synagogue, was built in Mattancheri (in an area now called Jew town) in 1568; those responsible for its construction included refugees from the Iberian Peninsula who had arrived in India by various routes. The site, a gift from the maharaja, is located adjacent to his palace. Inside the Pardesi Synagogue are the treasures of Cochin Jewish heritage: the delicately painted blue willow Chinese tiles (1762) that cover the floor of the sanctuary, and the copper grant given to Joseph Rabban

by the raja. The copper plates lie at the core of the continuing conflict among Kerala Jews, which is expressed in the community's division into three groups: White Jews, Black Jews, and the *meshuchrarim* (manumitted). Members of both the White and Black groups claim to be descendants of the first Jewish settlers in India, hence the dispute over the origins of Joseph Rabban. The *meshuchrarim* (also known as Brown Jews) are considered the descendants of local people who served the White Jews and, upon release, adopted Judaism. Well into the twentieth century, these groups were exogamous. However, since Indian independence and the creation of the state of Israel, the considerable number of people lost to all Cochin Jewish communities because of emigration has led to a softening of the lines, and—out of necessity—intermarriage among the groups. The White Jews make great efforts to bring Black Jews to their synagogues for holidays in order to ensure a *minyan* (quorum required for public prayer). The tiny communities remaining in Kerala see their days numbered; the Paradesi Synagogue has been designated a national treasure by the government of India. On the occasion of its quarter-century celebrations in 1968, a postage stamp featuring the interior of the building was issued and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi participated in the festivities.

The Iraqi Jews

The third major Jewish group, known as Baghdadi or Iraqi Jews, comprises the most recent arrivals to British India. Perhaps a more accurate name for this group would be “Jews of Arab lands” because the Arabic language and later English were the common links among the members of this community. The first Arabic-speaking Jew to settle in India was probably Joseph Semach from Syria, who arrived at Surat in 1730, later settling in Bombay. Shalom Cohen reached India and settled in Calcutta in 1798. The arrival of Baghdadi Jews infused new vigor into Jewish life in India, bringing a vibrant religious energy with which they constructed synagogues and community institutions wherever they settled.

David Sassoon (1792–1864) established a far-flung mercantile empire stretching from Bombay to Singapore, via Calcutta (Kolkata) and Rangoon. David Sassoon Enterprises consistently employed family and community members in its network of factories, warehouses, and shipyards. His great wealth enabled Sassoon to be a major philanthropist for both the larger Jewish community as well as the cities in which he lived and or had major establishments. After building the Magen David (Shield of David) Synagogue (1861) in Bombay, he went on to construct the Ohel David (Tent of David) synagogue in Pune in 1863, known locally as the “Red Temple” (Lal Deul). Throughout the nineteenth century it

was a city landmark, as it was the tallest building in Pune. He also funded the construction of the Sassoon Hospital there. The Sassoon family were great benefactors of the city of Bombay, where they constructed the Sassoon Docks (1870). They also established the David Sassoon Benevolent Institution near Bombay University, which now houses the Sassoon Library, where a life-size marble statue of David Sassoon stands near the entrance.

Calcutta's Iraqi community eventually supported three synagogues and two Jewish schools. The community's prosperity was so well known that an emissary was sent from Jerusalem (then part of the Ottoman Empire) to seek funds for the poor Jews of the Holy Land. Unlike the other Jewish communities of India, the Baghdadis, or Iraqis, never felt quite at home in India. They continued speaking Judeo-Arabic at home and even published a community newspaper in that language. From the second generation, they took to wearing Western dress and identified more with the British than with their Indian neighbors. For the most part, they were in India but not of it. This led the Baghdadi community to maintain a distinction, as far as possible, from the other communities of Indian Jews. Hence, there were separate sections for Bene Israel graves in the Baghdadi Jewish cemeteries. In Bombay, where the Iraqis had at first prayed together with the Bene Israel, synagogue separation was instituted as soon as the size of the Baghdadi population allowed for it. Following Indian independence and the creation of the state of Israel—with the consequent diminishment of both the Baghdadi and Bene Israel communities—members of the latter group were regularly, actively encouraged to join the Iraqis in their synagogues in order to form the *minyān*.

By the late twentieth century, the number of Baghdadi Jews in India was small, but a few individuals made vital contributions to Indian life. One of the most prominent is General J. F. R. Jacob (b. 1921), who played an important role as chief of staff in the 1971 conflict with Pakistan that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Subsequently, he served as the appointed governor of the Indian states of Goa, Haryana, and Punjab.

The Jews of Assam: B'nei Menasha (Children of Menasseh)

In the mid-twentieth century a group claiming to be descendants of the tribe of Menasseh (the son of the biblical Joseph) emerged in eastern India in the regions of Manipur and Mizoram, where prayer halls serving the communities dot the region. After several young members of the B'nei Menasha, also known as Shinlung, had reached the Jewish ORT Technical School in Bombay, and were accepted there, they forged a path to Israel, which many of their coreligionists have since followed.

European Jews in India

Although there have probably been Jews from the northern Mediterranean in India since Greek and Roman times, their numbers have been small and their names have been erased over the years. It is, therefore, interesting to note that two individuals in particular—both scientists—stand out: one in the sixteenth century, at the dawn of European exploration and involvement with the subcontinent, the other in the early twentieth century.

Garcia da Orta (1499/1500–1568) was born in Portugal, educated in Spain, and taught at Lisbon University before sailing for India in 1534. In Goa, he treated the viceroys, along with other Christian dignitaries, as well as the local Muslim ruler, Burhan al-Din Nizām al-Mulk. In acknowledgment of his services, da Orta was granted the island Mumbai, a small fishing village at that time (1554/1555). Da Orta's real interest lay in India's wealth of medicinal herbs, which he investigated for nearly thirty years, ultimately producing his vast work in Portuguese, *Colloquies on the Simples, Drugs and Medical Applications in India*, publishing it in Goa in 1563. After St. Francis Xavier in 1560 introduced the Inquisition in Goa, da Orta—a *converso*—moved his residence to Mumbai, where he died in 1568. However, after his sister had, under torture, admitted that the family were crypto-Jews, Garcia da Orta's remains were exhumed and burned at the stake alongside his sister and his treasured books.

Another European Jew came to India after having been denied a teaching position because of his religion. Waldemar Mordecai Haffkine (1860–1930), born in Odessa, developed the first effective cholera vaccine, which he introduced in India in 1893. Three years later, when plague broke out in Bombay, Haffkine worked there to develop a vaccine, which he produced within three months. After being honored by Queen Victoria and receiving British citizenship in 1899, Haffkine returned to India. He lived and worked in Calcutta for several years until ultimately settling in Paris. His contribution to India was recognized in 1925, when the Plague Research Laboratory he had established in Bombay was renamed the Haffkine Institute.

In the years surrounding World War II, Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust made their way to India, which provided them a haven from the horrors of Europe. Many of them were professionals or businessmen who, in the aftermath of the war and India's independence, left the subcontinent. Yet, as evidenced by Anita Desai's novel, *Baumgartner's Bombay* (2000), traces of this vanished group survive.

Brenda Ness

See also Bene Israel; Rabban, Joseph; Sassoon, David

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JINNAH, MOHAMMAD ALI (1876–1948), *first governor-general of Pakistan*. Quaid-i-Azam ("Great Leader") Mohammad Ali Jinnah, considered the father of Pakistan, was its first governor-general. Reared in Sind's port of Karachi, the eldest son of a wealthy Muslim merchant, Jinnah was shipped off to London at sixteen to study British management methods. His brilliantly vital young mind was magnetized more by bustling London's exciting politics, theaters, and Inns of Court, however, than the dull routine of business bookkeeping.

Impact of London

Soon after settling down in London, Jinnah met India's "grand old man" of Congress politics, Parsi Dadabhai Naoroji, one of the first Indians elected to Britain's Parliament. Dadabhai's maiden speech in the House of Commons, to which Jinnah listened from the balcony, inspired him to join India's National Congress as President Naoroji's secretary. But it was the Shakespearean performances at the Old Vic that youthful Jinnah found most fascinating, inspiring him to hone innate theatrical skills of rhetoric that would serve him so well for the rest of his life as one of British India's greatest barristers. Jinnah abandoned his business apprenticeship and completed legal studies at Lincoln's Inn in 1896, when he was admitted to London's Bar.

Bombay Barrister

After London, Jinnah found Karachi much too provincial a town in which to start his legal practice. He moved to British India's booming commercial capital, Bombay,



Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah with Jawaharlal Nehru (right), leader of the Congress Party, 1946. At this time Britain, as represented by Lord Mountbatten, still hoped for a diplomatic end to hostilities between warring Hindu and Muslim factions, but partition, not unity, was inevitable. A year later the separate nations of India and Pakistan were formed. BETTMANN / CORBIS.

where he felt more at home. Bombay's posh residential community atop Malabar Hill would soon become and, for most of the remaining years of Jinnah's life, remain his primary residence. Brilliant barrister that he was, Jinnah earned such high fees for his legal services that he could well afford the luxury of devoting much of his time to public political service. He joined India's National Congress in 1906 as President Dadabhai's secretary, and he worked closely with Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the previous year's Congress president, as well. Gokhale was so impressed with Jinnah's legal brilliance, eloquence, integrity, and singular command of English Common Law that he dubbed him India's "best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity," grooming him, as he also did Mahatma Gandhi, as one of his potential successors to Congress leadership. But moderate Gokhale died in 1915, too soon to permit him to see which of them would become his successor. World War I, and Mahatma Gandhi's return from South Africa soon after it started, radically changed the nature of India's

political aspirations and popular nationalist demands. Moderate “Mister” Jinnah was driven out of the Congress in the aftermath of that global conflagration, while Mahatma Gandhi captured the hopes and support of India’s Congress majority with his revolutionary *satyagraha* (“hold fast to the truth”) proposals.

Muslim League Leadership

In 1913 Jinnah joined India’s Muslim League, premier political organization of British India’s Muslims, founded in 1906. At Lucknow in 1916, Jinnah won both Congress and Muslim League support for the nationalist reform platform he drafted, calling upon Great Britain’s Cabinet to grant virtual Dominion status to British India after the war’s end. That “Lucknow Pact” marked the high point of Hindu-Muslim political agreement and seemed to augur well for the emergence of a united independent Dominion of British India, three decades before partition shattered South Asia’s unity with the birth of a bifurcated Pakistan and a diminished India in 1947.

Soon after leaving Congress in 1920, Jinnah had considered moving permanently to London. He bought a grand home on Hampstead Heath, rented chambers in the city, and pleaded princely probate appeals before the Privy Council. He even thought of running for Parliament, following Dadabhai’s lead, but he was unable to convince either of Britain’s major parties to nominate him as a candidate. So when several ardent young Muslim League leaders—among them Liaquat Ali Khan, who was to become Jinnah’s lieutenant and Pakistan’s first prime minister—passionately appealed to him to return “home” to revitalize their dispirited Muslim League, Jinnah agreed. Elected Muslim member from Bombay on the Viceroy’s Council, Jinnah’s eloquent brilliance won the admiration and friendship of British viceroys and secretaries of state for India, as well as of Prime Ministers J. Ramsay MacDonald and Winston Churchill.

The Muslim League was so inspired by Jinnah’s return that they elected him their permanent president, and by 1937 he was hailed as their “great leader,” Quaid-i-Azam, by thousands of Muslim followers. That was when Jinnah cast off his Saville Row suit, donning instead a black Punjabi *sberwani* and astrakhan cap (which came to be known as a “Jinnah cap”), symbolizing Jinnah’s Islamic faith and his unique powers as the leader of South Asia’s Muslim “nation” waiting to be born. Jinnah by now believed that Mahatma Gandhi had alienated not only himself but all Muslims from the Indian National Congress by transforming it from the moderate political movement it once was into a chauvinistic “Hindu” revolutionary organization. Congress leaders all disagreed, of course, but Jinnah claimed that Gandhi had “alienated eighty million Muslims . . . by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu.”

The Pakistan Idea

In 1930 Choudhry Rahmat Ali, a Muslim student in Cambridge, first called for the creation of a South Asian Muslim national “homeland” to be carved out of the Muslim-majority provinces of British India. He named it Pakistan (Land of the Pure), which could also be an acrostic of its major provinces: Punjab, Afghanistan (North-West Frontier), Kashmir, Sind, and the last few letters of Baluchistan. Bengal, the eastern half of which later became East Pakistan, was never even an initial in the new national name. In 1930 Punjab’s great Muslim poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, also called for a consolidated “North-West Indian Muslim state” at the League’s annual meeting, but Jinnah did not support either of those early Pakistan suggestions from London’s Round Table Conference, which he was attending at that time.

Not until after his Muslim League passed its own “Pakistan” Resolution in Lahore in March of 1940 would Jinnah be committed to Pakistan as his League’s primary demand. The year before, after Congress had won provincial elections in which the League did poorly, Jinnah lost all faith in Congress leadership, and any hope of Congress-League coalition-cooperation in jointly governing British India. At the historic Lahore League meeting in his presidential address, Jinnah thundered: “The Musalmans are not a minority. . . . The Musalmans are a nation.” After that he never changed his mind, nor would he ever abandon his ultimate goal—Pakistan—though at times he proved wise enough to be willing to work with all parties, Congress as well as the British Raj, seeking the most peaceful path to Muslim national independence from “Hindu dominance.”

Jinnah never lost faith in democratic governance based on Britain’s parliamentary constitutional model. He always admired and adhered to “justice and fair play” under the “rule of law,” as his personal ethical code. “The Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom and independence of the country than any other party,” Jinnah assured Stafford Cripps on his mission to India in 1942. “We have no designs upon our sister communities. We want to live in this land as a free and independent nation.”

Last Years and Legacy

Jinnah pressed his political suit for the creation of Pakistan with single-minded determination throughout the last decade of his life. He never wavered, nor did he reveal how pain-filled his life had become because of the fatal lung disease that half a century of heavy cigarette smoking had inflicted on him. Only his sister Fatima, who faithfully nursed him, his loyal Parsi physician in Bombay, who remained scrupulously silent about his greatest patient’s pneumonia and lung cancer, and his

leading lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, realized during the last years of the British Raj just how near death Jinnah was, for he remained stoical till his final hour. Little more than a year before Pakistan was born, Jinnah informed his Muslim League colleagues in Delhi that the Pakistan they were “fighting for” was “not a theocracy,” for he believed in equal rights and legal protection for people of every faith, which was why he so intensely opposed what he called “Hindu domination.”

In his first address to Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 in Karachi, Governor-General Jinnah told his new nation’s elected representatives that their “first duty” as Pakistan’s supreme governing body was to “maintain law and order, so that the life property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected.” Next, he warned them against twin “curses” of “bribery and corruption.” Jinnah himself was never tempted by either “poison,” those common temptations of power. “Unpurchasable,” Liaquat rightly called his great leader. “Black-marketing is another curse,” Jinnah warned his young nation, adding that they must also remain vigilant against “the evil of nepotism and jobbery.” Perhaps most important of all that Jinnah said in this wise speech to his newborn nation’s representatives was his reminder that “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed . . . there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another . . . we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”

Had he lived a decade longer, instead of merely fourteen more months—many so painful he was forced to spend them lying on a sick bed in Baluchistan’s hill station, Ziarat—Jinnah might well have led Pakistan to achieve those noble goals. “Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous,” Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah told his people, “we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the . . . masses and the poor . . . work together in a spirit that everyone of you is . . . first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights.” But just two months after Pakistan was born in August 1947, it was bogged down in a costly war with India over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. That was only the first round in more than half a century of conflict, costing South Asia some 50,000 lives and billions of dollars in scarce resources, keeping India and Pakistan constantly mistrustful of one another, if not locked in mortal combat. India’s first governor-general, Lord Mountbatten, came to dine with Governor-General Jinnah in Karachi in August 1947. Jinnah “assured” him then that “we shall not be wanting in friendly spirit with our neighbours and with all nations of the world.”

The last time Jinnah and Mountbatten met, however, was in early November in Lahore, after the first Indo-Pak War had started. Jinnah angrily accused India of grabbing Kashmir, which with its Muslim majority he believed “justly belonged” to Pakistan, by “fraud and violence.” Mountbatten replied that Maharaja Hari Singh’s “accession” to India was “perfectly legal and valid.” But Jinnah never forgave Mountbatten, and he felt “betrayed” by the British Commonwealth, which Pakistan had freely and hopefully joined.

“That freedom can never be attained by a nation without suffering and sacrifice, has been amply borne out by the recent tragic happenings in this subcontinent,” Jinnah told his compatriots. His coughing made it difficult for him to speak, and though doctors hoped that Ziarat’s hill-cooled air might ease his pain, nothing could stop the cancer that consumed his lungs. On 11 September 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, then weighing only 70 pounds, was flown home to Karachi, the teeming city of his birth, where his body now lies buried inside a marble-domed monument.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Gokhale, Gopak Krishna; Iqbal, Muhammad; Khan, Liaquat Ali; Naoroji, Dadabhai; Pakistan

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JIVA. *See Jainism.*

JODHPUR A city in Rajasthan, Jodhpur was earlier the capital of the princely state of Jodhpur. In 2001 its population was 860,400. Jodhpur is the center of a region called Marwar (Land of Death), which borders the Thar Desert. Since its barren soil does not offer much

scope for agriculture, many of its inhabitants have migrated to other parts of India, particularly the traders, who are mostly Jains by religious affiliation, and are known as Marwaris throughout India. Many of the Marwaris are financial wizards, including the famous Birla family. The Birlas have made a mark as industrialists and have built many large Hindu temples; they long sponsored and hosted Mahatma Gandhi, who lived in their Delhi mansion during his last months in 1947–1948. The fact that Marwar has produced such enterprising traders is probably due to its location at the center of an important trade route linking Delhi and Agra with the ports of Gujarat.

The princely state of Jodhpur was founded in 1212 and was locked in constant conflict with the sultans of Delhi at that time. The city of Jodhpur was founded by Rao Jodha of the Rathor clan of Rajputs in 1459. In 1561 Jodhpur was conquered by the Mughals, and later the Marathas captured this area. Under British colonial rule, the maharaja of Jodhpur survived, as had several other Rajput princes. Umaid Bhavan, the enormous city palace of Jodhpur, built with “golden” (yellowish) local sandstone in the twentieth century is a symbol of princely splendor in the twilight of the British Raj.

Jodhpur houses a university and the High Court of Rajasthan. In recent years it has also attracted some minor industries. As a railway station and a shopping center, it services a vast region, as it is located at a distance of about 185 miles (300 kilometers) from Jaipur to the northeast and 125 miles (200 kilometers) from Udaipur to the southeast.

Dietmar Rothermund

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JUDICIAL SYSTEM, MODERN The judicial system in India today has generally won laurels for safeguarding the basic spirit of the Constitution and protecting the fundamental rights of common citizens. But it has also come under severe criticism for exhibiting extra activism. The judiciary is an important organ of the Indian state, and it has a vital role in the proper functioning of the state as a democracy based on rule of law. Without courts, laws remain dead letters; it is the courts that expound and define the true meaning and operation of the laws. The framers of India’s Constitution had firm faith in the supremacy of law, and held that it was the only security for the disciplined and orderly growth of

Indian democracy. They further stated that the judiciary had to perform a crucial role in a federal polity like India, where power was divided between the central government and the governments of the constituent units, and disputes concerning the range of their power and authority were likely to arise. Disputes between citizens as well as those between citizens and the state had to be resolved by litigation. Only an independent and impartial judiciary could settle such disputes effectively and decisively. Initially, Indian judges were influenced by the British concept of justice. But as the socioeconomic and political climates of the country began to change, the judiciary had to refashion itself accordingly. It dispensed with many stereotypes and started entertaining public interest litigations, passing strictures against the malfunctioning of the executive. It issued cautions and held that the legislature had no right to destroy the basic spirit of the Constitution. Thus the judiciary emerged as the guardian of the Constitution and the protector of the rights of Indian citizens.

Pre-independence Judicial Systems

It is only partly true that the modern judicial system was British. It also had deep roots in India’s sociopolitical soil. India had various sets of laws, and its people were governed by different systems. Ancient scriptures, especially the Dharma Shāstra, took the dispensation of justice seriously. The king was entrusted with the supreme authority of the administration of justice. His palace court was the highest court of appeal, as well as an original court in cases of vital importance. He was assisted by a chief justice, and a host of other judges. The judges came from the upper castes, usually Brahmans. No Shūdra (a member of a lower caste) or woman could become a judge. Officers under the authority of the king presided over the town and district courts. Trade guilds (*srenis*) and corporations were authorized to exercise an effective jurisdiction over their members. *Pūgā* (commercial organization that was less powerful than *Sreni*, or guild) decided civil disputes among family members. Local village councils, or *kulani*, played an important role in solving simple civil and criminal cases. Decisions of each higher court superseded that of the court below. Each lower court respected the decision of each higher court.

Justice was not administered by a single individual. A bench of two or more judges was preferred. There were no lawyers, though persons well-versed in the laws of the *smritis* (law books) could represent a party in court. The rulings of the Dharma Shāstra were given precedence in criminal cases. In both civil and criminal cases, the social status of the accused, as well as that of the witness, was considered. The accused was allowed to provide witnesses in



High Court Building at Chennai (Madras), India. The High Court in Chennai. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with the socioeconomic conditions and political currents in India ever-evolving, the judiciary has had to continually redefine its role while interpreting and upholding a complex body of law. ABBEI ENOCK; TRAVEL INK / CORBIS.

his defense to prove his innocence. People of higher castes received lighter punishments than lower caste offenders.

During the time of Muslim rule, dispensation of justice continued to be a matter of utmost concern for the state. Islamic law, or Shari'a, was the basis of the administration of justice. It was considered the duty of rulers to punish criminals and to maintain law and order.

The British exploited India's traditional judicial systems to their own advantage for some time. In 1772 Warren Hastings took responsibility for dispensing both civil and criminal justice. He established a civil court (Diwani Adalat) and a criminal court (Faujdari Adalat) in every district. The civil court was presided over by a collector, who administered justice with the help of Indian subordinates. An Indian officer presided over the criminal court; *qazis* (judges) and *muftis* (theologians) assisted him. In the civil courts, Hindu law was applied in cases concerning Hindus, and Muslim law was applied in cases that involved Muslims. In the criminal courts, only Muslim law applied. For a while, the judges of the Supreme Court, established in 1774, tried to uniformly apply English law. However,

this move was opposed bitterly by Indians. Thus the Act of 1781 restricted the application of English law to Englishmen in India only. But soon conditions changed, and the need for definite codes, applicable to all Indian subjects, was urgent. Lord Cornwallis took the initiative in applying British laws in India, implying the spirit of equality for all before law. He is also credited with introducing a secular judicial system in India. The Cornwallis Code, or Bengal Regulations, bound the courts to make decisions on the rights of persons and the property of the Indians according to the provisions of the regulations. To a great extent the regulations accommodated the personal laws of Hindus and Muslims, stating them in clear terms. The regulations were published in English and in Indian languages. Thus the administration of justice based on written laws and regulations, rather than vague customs and the will of the ruler, was initiated. This was a landmark in the history of India's modern judicial system.

Cornwallis also separated the judiciary from the executive. One person could not control both wings honestly and efficiently. To make the judicial system more

effective, provincial circuit criminal courts were established. Provincial civil courts were initially established at Dhaka, Murshidabad, Kolkata, and Patna. Both district level courts were presided over by English judges. *Munsif* courts (local courts that dealt with civil matters) and registrar's courts (local courts that dealt with the purchase and sale of land) were introduced with Indians at their head. Sadr Diwani (an apex court that dealt with civil matters) and Sadr Nizamat courts (the highest criminal court) were the highest courts in Kolkata, and the governor-general was to preside over both. Capital punishment could be awarded only by the Sadr Nizamat court, just as the King's court, or Privy Council, in England was the highest court of appeal.

Governor-General William Bentinck abolished circuit courts. In 1833 an Indian Law Commission was appointed under T. B. Macaulay to codify the Indian system of law and court procedures. The Indian Penal Code was introduced in 1861. The Criminal Procedure Code was promulgated in 1872. The British Parliament passed the Indian High Courts Act in 1861, after which a number of High Courts were established in provinces. The Federal Court of India was established under the Government of India Act of 1935. This court was inaugurated in New Delhi on 1 October 1937. It was given all three kinds of jurisdiction: original, appellate, and advisory.

The British thus introduced a judicial system in India, which helped Indians in many ways. In theory, everyone was equal in the eye of law. In British India, however, this was never true in practice. The British living in India, suffering from their affliction of racial superiority, opposed any move by which they could be tried by Indian judges. The British bureaucracy and the police enjoyed arbitrary powers. In practice, therefore, the system failed to achieve its objectives of establishing a rule of law and equality before the law.

After Independence

India attained independence on 15 August 1947, and its Constitution was adopted on 26 January 1950. A single integrated system of courts for the union and the states, to administer both union and state laws, was accepted.

The Supreme Court. At the apex of the entire judicial system is the Supreme Court. This court is given independent status, and all laws declared by this court are binding on all courts in India. Initially, this court had a chief justice and seven other judges. The number of judges, however, has gone up to twenty-five. The chief justice is appointed by the president of India, as are the other judges, in consultation with the chief justice. Judges hold office only until they reach sixty-five years of

age. They can also be removed by the president, but only when impeached by both houses of Parliament.

The Supreme Court enjoys original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction. It is given exclusive jurisdiction in disputes between the central government and a state, or between one state and another. The Supreme Court also has exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising in the territories in India, and it is the custodian of fundamental rights, a power that is widely exercised. It has extended its powerful, long hands to protect any person whose fundamental rights have been violated. It has also started entertaining public interest litigation.

The primary task of the Supreme Court is appellate. It plays the role of final arbiter in constitutional questions. It can hear appeals against the judgments of the High Courts, tribunals, and special tribunals, and its judgment is final and can be reviewed only by itself.

The Supreme Court can render advice on any question of law or fact of public interest as might be referred to it for consideration by the president. The Supreme Court is a court of record, and its proceedings are recorded for perpetual verification and testimony. The Supreme Court enjoys the power of judicial review. It can pronounce upon the constitutional validity of laws passed by the legislature and actions taken by administrative authorities.

The High Court. At the state level, the Constitution provided a High Court, which is highest judicial administrative body in the state. The chief justice of the High Court is appointed by the president, and other judges with his consultation. A citizen of India who has held a judicial post for ten years or who has been a lawyer for two years can be appointed a judge of the High Court. Judges of the High Court hold office until age sixty-two. The mode of their removal is the same as that of a judge of the Supreme Court. They can be transferred from one High Court to another.

The High Court exercises supervision over all courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction. It can take steps to ensure that the lower courts discharge their function properly. It can transfer cases from one lower court to other lower courts. The High Court can issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights. It can issue writs even in cases where an ordinary legal right has been infringed. The High Court is a court of record and is the highest court of appeal in the state in both civil and criminal cases. The High Court has advisory power, and the governor seeks its advice on some important issues.

The lower courts. Barring some local variations, the subordinate courts throughout the country are structured uniformly. They function under the supervision of High

Courts. There are civil and criminal courts in each district. When the judge hears the civil suits, he is called district judge, and when he presides over the criminal court, he is called the session judge. Apart from these courts, Sub-judges Court (courts subordinate to the district judge), Munsif Court, and other courts also appear at the district level. At the subdivision level, similar courts function smoothly.

The *panchayats*, or village councils, also play a vital role at the local level. The Mukhiya (head of the village council) and the Sarpanch (figure who looks after judicial matters at the village level) are armed with some judicial powers. Inquiries are to be conducted, and punishments are imposed on the offenders.

The attorney-general is appointed by the president of India. It is his duty to give advice to the government of India on legal matters. He also gives advice to the president on legal matters. He can appear in any court in the territory of India. He has the right to speak in either house of Parliament, or in any committee. The solicitor-general and the additional solicitor-general are two other important legal authorities who advise the government of India on legal matters. They can appear in the Supreme Court or any High Court on behalf of the government of India.

Later Developments

India's courts of law, however, were unable to meet the challenges posed by modern socioeconomic developments. As a result, various tribunals have been established that are not strictly courts in the traditional sense. A member of a tribunal takes a functional rather than a theoretical and legalistic approach. Tribunals do their work more expeditiously, inexpensively, and effectively. The Central Administrative Tribunals were formed to deal with the service matters of the employees of the central government. The president of India appoints the chairman and vice-chairman of these tribunals, in consultation with the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Other important tribunals include: the Customs and Excise Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, States Cooperative Appellate Courts and Tribunals, Foreign Exchange Appellate, and Industrial Tribunals. The Election Commission has been constituted to hold free and fair elections in the country. Martial law courts at various levels have been constituted to handle cases related to military personnel.

Family courts have been established to dispose cases of divorce and promote conciliation in securing speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriages. Cases are also solved by the arbitration courts. Lok Adalats, initially started and encouraged by a few judges of the

Supreme Court, promote the voluntary settlement of disputes inexpensively and expeditiously.

To make justice more democratic, Legal Aid was created for citizens whose annual income does not exceed a certain sum. The Legal Aid and Advice Boards were also constituted. Another advance was the emergence of the public interest litigation movement in the 1970s, with its goal of making the judicial system accessible to the lower socioeconomic strata of the society. Socially conscious individuals and action groups helped bring justice to people whose rights had been violated and who on their own could not approach the court. Complaints filed against authorities were looked into by commissions appointed by the court. On the basis of their reports, cases were filed in the High Court as well as the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court shifted from a detached positivist institution to one that was an active player. Hence it was accused of activism. Judicial activism was an assertion of judicial power in cases where the judiciary came face to face with legislative arbitrations or executive abuses. The famous 1975 prime minister election judgment unseating Indira Gandhi and holding her election to parliament as null and void was one such case. The High Courts and Supreme Court on many occasions passed strictures on the functioning of the executive. It was argued that the judiciary was encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the executive, the legislature, and other institutions. However, an essential aspect of a constitutional judicial system is the duty of the courts to safeguard the interests of the common citizen.

As a result of public interest litigation, the weaker sections of the populace are now looking to the courts as their protectors. The courts, once inaccessible to them, are now seen as a source of justice. Still, despite these positive developments, litigation expenses and inordinate delays in deciding cases still plague modern judicial system.

The nature of the judicial process is very tiresome. Examination, cross-examination, and reexamination of witnesses in court takes too much time. Generally, the offenders and influential people manage lawyers and waste too much of the court's time. In this process, justice is delayed, and often, justice is denied. The high incidence of acquittals points to the failure of the judicial system. The judicial process has become technical and cumbersome; lawyers take full advantage of this complexity, and exploit the litigants financially as well.


*Pramoda Nand Das
Yuvaraj Deva Prasad*

See also **Bentinck, Lord William; Cornwallis, Lord; Dharma Shāstra; Hastings, Warren**

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CONTEMPORARY LIFE *India*



Modern-day *sadhu* (ascetic), wearing only beads with his face caked in ash, raises his hand in blessing to the unknown photographer. According to Hindu mythology, his beads, or *rudraksh*, have medicinal powers.
TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA



TOP: In Calcutta, now known as Kolkata, the Victoria Museum. Built at the behest of Lord George Curzon (one of the British Raj's most flamboyant and much derided viceroys) and of marble from the same quarry that had supplied the builders of the Taj Mahal in the seventeenth century. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: Throughout India's numerous and varied states, images of the old and the new constantly converge. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: On a crowded city street, the multitude of life that is India. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: At a roadside bazaar in Jaipur, framed images of popular Hindu gods. Thousands of such prints are sold throughout India each year for less than U.S. \$1 each. ADITYA PATANKAR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: The rickshaw remains the cheapest mode of transport in India and may be observed just about everywhere, from congested city streets as here to dusty country roads. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: In anticipation of Holi, a shop displays its colorful wares. On the eve of this Hindu festival, an effigy of the demon Holika is set afire to symbolize the triumph of good over evil. The next day, friends and relatives gather, sprinkling each other with colored powder to celebrate. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Aspiring models pose for the camera. Many urban teenagers in India get portfolio photos taken in hopes of a career in modeling, a very lucrative profession in India. AKHIL BAKSHI/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: In Uttar Pradesh, a roadside vendor displays a variety of salted savories. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Dotted across India's long coastline are many holiday resorts, including a host of posh destinations. In one such setting, these chefs proudly display their handiwork. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA


BOTTOM: In a small town of southern India, local men gather outside a wrestling club. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: There is no limit to the number of different-language dailies one may purchase in India, whose newspaper industry must cater to a literate population of some 600 million people. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: On the roads of Kerala, a not unusual sight: a commercial vehicle and an elephant riding side by side. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: A literacy class in Rajasthan. In recent decades, the Indian government, in tandem with non-profits, has sought to educate women in impoverished rural communities, where the rate of female illiteracy remains regrettably high. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: A mother and her daughter at an internet cafe in Kolkata. Cyber cafes are used by over half of India's internet users to access the web. JAYANTA SHAW/REUTERS/CORBIS





TOP: High in the Himalayas (below Dharamsala, home to the Dalai Lama in India), young monks ride with a Tibetan family. AMITA PATANKAR/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: In the city of Varanasi during the festival of Dala-Chatha, which is celebrated a week after Diwali in November, thousands gather on the banks of the Ganges, where all life is said to begin. Hindus believe that immersion in the river's waters, on designated holy days, will cleanse them of their sins. HENRY WILSON/FOTOMEDIA





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KABIR (1440–1518), mystic poet. Although tradition states that Kabir was born in 1398 and lived to be 120 years old, he was born in 1440 and lived only until 1518. He is the most quoted poet, apart from Tulsidas (1532–1623), in India. He was a disciple of Ramananda (c. 1400–c. 1470), the Hindu mystic poet. Kabir was an illiterate Muslim weaver of Varanasi (Benares), although some say he was the son of a Brahman widow who was adopted by the childless Muslim *julaha* (low caste weaver) Niru and his wife. Kabir married Loi, and they had two children. His devotional poems and his devotion led many to follow him (*Kabirpanthis*), irrespective of their sectarian faith, in his love of God. He contributed to the *bhakti* tradition, and his conception of devotion to God as suffering may come from the Sufis; his integration of these elements with the *nath sampradaya* “lord” or “master” tradition, whereby a devotee followed a teacher, produced his distinctive religion.

Kabir preached that a simple union (*sabaja-yoga*), an emotional integration of the soul with God through personal devotion, could be achieved by all people, whether they were Hindus or Muslims (“I am not a Hindu, nor a Muslim am I”), or whether they were of high or low caste (“Now I have no caste, no creed”). He denounced the mullahs and the Muslim practice of bowing toward Mecca, and he criticized Hindu practices as well, condemning ritualistic and ascetic practices of the Brahmans and yogis. Accordingly, he was condemned by both. He satirized hypocrisy, greed, and violence, especially of the overtly religious. He preached *ahimsa* (nonviolence), and he believed that women were a hindrance to spiritual progress.

Kabir’s simple songs of devotion to God, popularized through the song form, *sabda* or *pada*, were written in an

unsophisticated Hindi that could be understood by the uneducated and that continues to inspire the masses of Hindus and Muslims in North India and in Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is said to have written thousands of couplets (*doha* or *sakhi*), love songs, and mystic poems. He was claimed by both Hindus and Muslims, and legend states that when he died at Maghar near Gorakhpur, his body turned to flowers; his Muslim followers buried half of them, and his Hindu followers cremated the other half. The Sikhs also adopted Kabir’s works, and their holy book, the Granth Sahib, contains over five hundred of his verses. He is held by Sikhs in much the same kind of reverence as their ten Gurus. His work was collected in the Granth Sahib by Guru Arjan Dev in 1604, and in two other collections, the Kabir Granthavali and Bijak, the sacred book of the Kabir Panth, the Sikh sect devoted to Kabir’s teachings.

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See also **Bhakti; Sikhism**

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KALI. See *Devī*.

KĀLIDĀSA, fifth-century Indian dramatist and poet. Kālidāsa, considered to be the premier literary figure of the Sanskrit tradition, set the standard for classical Indian poetry and drama in his widely celebrated works. The

poet's vibrantly evocative landscapes (particularly around the North Indian region of Ujjayinī), detailed urban settings, and apparent knowledge of court life suggest an association with Chandragupta II, who ruled most of North India from 375 to 415. Inscriptions at Aihole, praising the poet's abilities, clearly date his works to before 634, but more specific historical information is lacking.

Kālidāsa's literary legacy is based on seven surviving works. The *Meghadūta* (Cloud messenger) is a spell-binding lyrical tour de force in which a cloud is asked to voyage through a myth-laden landscape of India and carry a message to the protagonist's beloved. Two longer poems (*mahākāvya*s), derived from earlier epic sources, combine heroic narratives with breathtaking natural descriptions. The *Raghubansha* (Lineage of Raghu) depicts the great solar race of warrior kings, into which Rāma, an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu, is born. The *Kumārasambhava* (Birth of the war god Kumāra) narrates the divine emergence of the son of Shiva for the restoration of cosmic order.

Kālidāsa's plays, employing both Sanskrit and Prakrit languages, affirm profound levels of cosmic unity, reconciling life's inevitable conflicts through a union of the hero and heroine, echoing the ritual sacrifice of Vedic literatures. *Mālavikāgnimitra* (*Mālavikā and Agnimitra*), generally classified as a secular romance in which the characters are "invented" as opposed to being taken from epic sources, depicts the love between King Agnimitra and an exiled servant Mālavikā, who turns out to be a princess. *Vikramorvasihya* (Urvashī won by valor) retells the Vedic and epic legend of love between the mortal king Purūras and the immortal nymph Urvashī and explores the sentiments of love in union and separation. The poet's best-known work, *Abhijñānashākuntala* (Shakuntalā and the ring of recollection), often referred to as *Shākuntala*, is also based on an epic narrative and is hence characterized as a heroic romance. It tells of King Dushyanta's fateful meeting with the daughter of a royal sage and a celestial nymph, Shakuntalā, in her adopted father's hermitage. Although the king marries her in secret, he is cursed to forget about the union until the ring he had given her is found in the belly of a fish. When the king's memory is restored, he reunites with Shakuntalā as the tension between desire (*kāma*) and duty (*dharmā*) is reconciled through a blending of erotic and heroic sentiments. This elevated aesthetic mood, or *rasa*, in which divisions between the audience, actors, and author were said to dissolve, was the expressed goal of the literary work of art, and Kālidāsa's ability to inculcate the distilled and universalized emotional essence of *rasa* is unparalleled in the Sanskrit literary tradition. His rapt imagery, aesthetic sensitivity, and dazzling landscapes,

infused with the presence of Shiva and the Goddess, reveal the divine presence in all things.

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KĀMA SŪTRA Composed by Vātsyāyana Mallanāga, the Kāma Sūtra is a treatise on erotic love, deemed one of the three spheres of worldly life in ancient India. The dates of the author are uncertain, but evidence suggests he lived sometime in the third or fourth century of the common era, just before the inception of the great Gupta empire. The Kāma Sūtra is the earliest surviving text of the quasi-scientific genre of writing on the subject of erotic love known as *kāma śāstra* (the science of erotics). Though earlier works on the subject are no longer available, this genre became abundant in later times. The Kāma Sūtra has a thirteenth-century commentary, called *Jayamangala*, written by one Yashodhara.

Long viewed as a sort of Hindu parallel to the *Joy of Sex*, recent research suggests that the Kāma Sūtra is actually better seen in the context of the courtly and urban culture that emerged during Gupta times. The Kāma Sūtra is divided into seven books, each comprising two or more chapters. The first book sets out the lifestyle of the "man about town," or *nāgaraka*, a figure to whom most of the text is seemingly addressed. Vātsyāyana gives details about his daily routine, social engagements, household, potential female partners, and a vast list of arts (*kalās*)

that he was to master as part of a courtly education. The second book, on sex itself, begins by dividing women and men up into a sexual typology (named famously after animals), based on size, endurance, and temperament. In subsequent chapters the author treats a variety of subjects, including embracing, kissing, nail scratching, biting, positions in intercourse, and oral sex, in a highly technical, often dry style. The third book advises a young man how to obtain a virgin for marriage, noting both more and less respectable methods, depending on his circumstances. It also discusses the manner in which a bride was to be sexually approached and “won over” on the days following the marriage. The fourth book discusses the conduct appropriate for married women, a profoundly complex subject given the fact that polygyny was widespread among the elite classes in early India. Vātsyāyana discusses the delicate protocol of the harem (Sanskrit, *antabpura*), where the master of the household met his wives and concubines on a daily basis, the dynamics of which were often complex, dangerous, and consequential for the maintenance of stability in the household. The fifth book discusses sex with other men’s wives, a practice Vātsyāyana warns against in all but the most desperate circumstances, when a man simply cannot control his desires. Here the use of intermediaries, as well as secret liaisons with women of the *antabpura*, are discussed. The sixth book is addressed to courtesans, instructing them on how to seduce, cajole, extract money from, and even dispose of, potential patrons. The last book sets out esoteric formulas (magical and medicinal) for those who, for various reasons, were unable to follow the policy laid out in previous chapters. These formulas are mostly aimed at controlling noncompliant lovers or enhancing one’s sexual prowess.

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See also **Devī; Hinduism (Dharma)**

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KANPUR An industrial city in Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur (population 2.5 million in 2001) is located on the banks of the Ganges about 250 miles (400 kilometers) to the

southeast of Delhi. Its old name, Kanhpur, is derived from one of the names of Krishna (Kanha). It was located in the heartland of the Mughal empire. In the eighteenth century, it was included in the territory under the control of the *nawābs* of Oudh. In 1803 the *nawāb* of Oudh had to cede the southern part of his realm to the British, and Kanpur was at the center of this ceded territory. Unlike in Bengal, where the British introduced a permanent settlement of the land revenue, they subjected this newly acquired area to a stiffer revenue settlement. Many peasants lost their land as the British collectors auctioned it off for the slightest default in revenue payments. The peasants were forced to turn to cash crops, and the soil of this formerly fertile area was degraded within a few decades. For these reasons, many of the peasants of this area joined the “Mutiny” of 1857. Kanpur became a major center of resistance against the British in 1857 and was the scene of a massacre of British men, women, and children. Nana Saheb, the last Maratha *pešwa* of Pune, was banished to the old Bitur palace outside Kanpur, and seemed to be as innocuous a pensioner as the powerless Great Mughal in Delhi, but he joined the mutinous soldiers and took over the city, directing the massacre.

In 1872 Kanpur had only 123,000 inhabitants, but in subsequent decades it emerged as a major center of India’s new cotton textile industry, started by British entrepreneurs, unlike the earlier mills in Bombay (Mumbai) and Ahmedabad, which were mostly owned by Indians. When the large Indian textile mills declined, the government of India tried to stimulate industrial growth in Kanpur by establishing one of the five great Indian Institutes of Technology (ITTs) in that city. The land was granted by the government of Uttar Pradesh, and the buildings were completed in 1963. An Indo-American program was launched in 1962, under which nine leading institutions in the United States helped provide equipment and training for ITT staff and students. At present, the Kanpur ITT has about 1,400 undergraduate and 850 postgraduate students and a faculty of 300, and Kanpur has become a center of India’s technological revolution.

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KANVAYANA DYNASTY. *See* **History and Historiography.**

KARACHI The capital of Sind province in southern Pakistan, Karachi is the country's largest city and principal seaport, and it serves as a major center for commerce and industry. The city occupies an area of 228 square miles (591 sq. km), with a metropolitan region that covers around 560 square miles (1,450 sq. km). The population, according to a 1998 census, is approximately 9.8 million.

Karachi's recorded history extends over a period of approximately three hundred years. The area that became Karachi was until 1725 a mostly barren piece of land surrounded on three sides by the Arabian Sea. The city takes its name from Kalachi-jo-Kun, referring to the area's deep saline creeks and the presence of a fishing hamlet.

The British East India Company occupied Karachi in 1839, conquering the larger region of Sind in 1843. The city was made an administrative center and thereafter expanded rapidly. When Sind was incorporated into the Bombay presidency, Karachi became its district headquarters. Economically, as a major port for the British Raj, Karachi was linked to the cotton- and wheat-producing areas elsewhere in the subcontinent. In 1935 Sind was made a separate province, with Karachi as its capital.

Between August 1947 and April 1951 the open borders between India and Pakistan saw 8 million Muslims move to the newly independent state and 6 million non-Muslims flee in the other direction. Karachi, at the time Pakistan's capital, received large numbers of Muslim refugees, including educated arrivals who hoped to find government employment. The 1951 census identified close to 55 percent of the city's population, then more than 1 million, as Muhajirs—Urdu-speaking immigrants from India.

Karachi experienced further rapid growth over the next two decades with the arrival of migrants from the rural Sind, and from Pakistan's North-West Frontier (NWFP) and Punjab provinces. Ethnic Pathans from NWFP, mostly a working-class community, expanded squatter settlements and shantytowns constructed earlier by Muhajirs. Competition for scarce available resources among antagonistic ethnic groups resulted over the following decades in near political and social breakdown, and contributed to an often corrupt and ineffective city administration. The Muhajirs' major political organization, the Muhajir (later Muttehid) Qaumi Mahaz (MQM, or People's Movement), emerged, seeking enhanced political recognition in Sindh for the Urdu-speaking community, and it has since called for Karachi to become a separate province. MQM has contested elections and sought national influence in alliance with other parties. It has also resorted to violence

and has been subjected to heavy-handed repression from federal authorities.

Ethnic troubles are not the only factor in Karachi's turbulent politics. Small arms were smuggled into the city during the anti-Communist jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s, making more lethal the urban culture of violence. Afghan refugees settling in the city have been linked to the city's flourishing drug trade. Millions of Pakistanis have become addicts due to easy access to heroin.

Karachi nevertheless retains a special character and importance for Pakistan. It serves as the country's center for transportation, finance, commerce, and manufacturing. Most international trade reaching Pakistan and Afghanistan passes through the city's modern port, and it boasts a major new airport. Karachi has a large automobile assembly plant, an oil refinery, a steel mill, shipbuilding, and textile factories, and it is the center of the country's media and entertainment industries. Although the seat of the national government shifted to Islamabad in 1960, Karachi remains the most vibrant city in Pakistan and the nucleus of the internationally oriented sector of Pakistan's economy.

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KARAIKKĀL AMMAIYĀR (c. A.D. 550), *mystic, early poet-saint of the bhakti movement*. Karaikkāl Ammaiyār, or the Lady of Karaikkāl, was a mystic devoted to Shiva, the dancing lord of Tiruvāṅkādu, Tamil Nadu. As one of the earliest of the sixty-three *nayanārs* (Shiva saints) and a contemporary of Pūdam, the first *ālvār* (Vishnu saint), Karaikkāl Ammaiyār helped to usher in the Tamil *bhakti* (devotional) movement, which spread from this region across India. *Bhakti* saints represented the folk voices of many castes, and their hymns in the local languages proclaimed the supremacy of a personal love for God above priestly ritual. Although *bhakti* mystics did not overturn caste hierarchies, their cultural imprint on India has been profound.

Karaikkāl Ammaiyār's songs are among the earliest *bhakti* compositions for Shiva in the *prabandha* mode, which became popular among the medieval saints. The

hymns and hagiographies of the *nayanārs* are recorded in the twelve Tirumurai, the scripture for the Tamil Shaiva Siddhanta school; Karaikkāl Ammaiyaṛ's three long hymns are recorded in the eleventh Tirumurai. Her work is inspired by the literary styles of the classical Tamil Sangam era (1st–5th centuries) and the evocative tone of fifth-century early *bhakti* texts like Tirumurukārupatai, a guide to god Murukan's sacred sites, and Paripātal, in praise of Murukan and Vishnu-Tirumāl. Karaikkāl Ammaiyaṛ's three hymns are *Mūtta-tirup-patikañkal*, twenty-two verses in classical melodies; *Tiru-irattai-manimālai*, twenty verses of two alternating styles; and *Arputat-tiru-vantāti*, one hundred one verses in the *antāti* genre, a sonorous web of praises in which the last word of each verse is echoed in the next.

Unlike the ninth-century *bhakti* saint Āndāl, who resisted marriage on Earth for love of Vishnu, Karaikkāl Ammaiyaṛ was married to a merchant when she was a young woman called Punitavati. The myth of her transformation from chaste wife to chaste yogi is recorded by the sage Sēkkilār in *Periya Purānam*, a thirteenth-century hagiography of the *nāyanārs*. One day, Punitavati's husband handed her two mangoes, which he had received as the gift from a sage. She fed a poor Shiva devotee with one fruit; and she magically produced more mangoes for her husband at mealtime by praying to Shiva. Frightened by this display of divine powers, her husband fled and remarried. On practicing severe yogic austerities, Punitavati came to be addressed as Karaikkāl Ammaiyaṛ. In a rare example of reversed spousal roles, her husband returned to prostrate humbly at her feet. The myth highlights the auspicious power of both the chaste, faithful wife (*pativrata*) and the chaste yogi who renounces sensuality. This follows the Tamil tradition of the *pativrata* Kannaki, who is transformed from a meek wife to a powerful, semi-divine heroine in the Sangam epic, Shilappatikāram.

Karaikkāl Ammaiyaṛ sang of her ironic, joyful bondage to Shiva, whose grace would free her from earthly bondage in the cycle of birth and death (*samsāra*). In another poem, she begs that Shiva at least grant her the boon of always remembering him. Sēkkilār states that Shiva respectfully addressed her as “Ammaiyaṛ,” or Mother, when she achieved enlightenment and *moksha*, or freedom from *samsāra*. A thirteenth-century Chola bronze provides a visual representation of the ghoulish yet gleeful yogi who described herself as a *pey* (ghost), “a female wraith of shriveled breasts, swollen veins, protruding eye-balls, white teeth, sunken stomach, fiery red hair, two protruding fangs,” according to Sēkkilār (Vanmikanathan, p. 537). Frescoes depict her life on the walls of her modern shrine at Karaikkāl; and young women today offer mangoes to the icon of this venerable woman saint.

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See also **Bhakti**

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KARGIL CONFLICT, THE In late April 1999, Indian soldiers patrolling along the Kashmir Line of Control (LOC) near the Indian town of Kargil were ambushed by unseen assailants who had occupied secret positions high atop frozen mountain peaks along the Great Himalayan Range. After several frantic weeks of confusion, Indian military and intelligence officers realized the intruders were not Kashmiri militants, as they initially had assumed, but in fact were well-trained troops from Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry (NLI), and that the infiltration was much larger and better organized than earlier believed. In response, the Indian government mounted a major military and diplomatic campaign to oust Pakistan's occupying forces. After two months of intense high-altitude fighting, during which each side suffered more than 1,000 casualties, Pakistan ordered its soldiers home, India regained its mountain posts along the LOC, and the conflict ended.

Although in the end no territory changed hands—as it had in the previous wars India and Pakistan fought in

1947–1948, 1965, and 1971—the Kargil conflict was a momentous event. Occurring just a year after India and Pakistan openly detonated nuclear explosives, this military engagement dispelled the conventional wisdom that nuclear-armed countries cannot fight one another. Like the only other direct military clash between nuclear weapons powers—the Sino-Soviet skirmishes over Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River in the spring of 1969—the Kargil conflict did not come close to causing a nuclear war. However, it is now known that Indian troops were within days of opening another front across the LOC, an act that might have triggered a large-scale conventional war, which in turn might have led to the employment of nuclear weapons.

Several analysts from India and the United States consider Kargil to be the fourth Indo-Pakistani war. It probably is more accurate to view Kargil as a “conflict,” or a “near war,” as one Indian general put it. The scale and intensity of the fighting well exceeded even the high levels of peacetime violence typically experienced along the Kashmir Line of Control, where fierce artillery duels and ten-person-a-day body counts have been far too common. However, the military engagement in the spring and summer of 1999 was confined to a small section of mountainous terrain in Indian-held Kashmir; only a fraction of each side’s soldiers and military arsenals were used; and both countries tried to reduce the risk of escalation by keeping their political and military objectives limited. Moreover, because about seven hundred Indian and Pakistani soldiers perished in the mountains near Kargil, this conflict did not meet the classical definition of war as an armed conflict with at least one thousand battlefield deaths.

Background

The Kargil intrusion is deeply rooted in India’s long-standing dispute with Pakistan over the political status of Jammu and Kashmir. In late 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of semiautonomous Kashmir, delayed acceding to either of South Asia’s newly independent countries, India or Pakistan, ignoring the rules of partition issued by the British viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Hari Singh’s dreams of an independent Jammu and Kashmir were interrupted by a tribal rebellion near Poonch. With the assistance of Pakistan army officers, tribal *lashkars* (forces) from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province raided Kashmir, as they had done many times in the past, seeking glory and loot. India’s new prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, sent in the Indian army to repulse these raiders, and India and Pakistan found themselves engaged in their first war within months of independence.

Kargil was a key battleground in the 1947–1948 war. In May 1948 a small force of Pakistan’s Gilgit Scouts

captured the high-altitude Zojila pass, the only strategic passage that links Srinagar with the Northern Areas and Leh on the Indian side of the LOC, and with it the surrounding towns of Kargil, Dras, and Skardu. Major General D. K. Palit, who was serving in a nearby Indian unit at Poonch, noted India’s apprehension over this development: “As a result of the fall of Skardu and Kargil, the Valley of Kashmir was threatened from the north as well as the east; what is more, the only line of communication between Srinagar and Leh, over the Zojila and through Kargil, was disrupted. Failing rapid reinforcements, it would be only a matter of months before the enemy could walk into Leh” (Palit, p. 241). Kargil’s strategic importance was as clear to the Indian government then as it is now.

India reacted immediately to this threat by sending a brigade-size force from Srinagar and Leh to retake Kargil and reopen the road. This episode is significant because the Gilgit Scouts eventually were incorporated into the NLI as part of Pakistan’s Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). These units remembered, through stories from previous generations and evidence retained in their archives, that they had captured the Kargil heights with a small, determined force. Second, it also is notable that India was unwilling to accept such an outcome and would retaliate forcefully to vacate any intrusion in this strategically important area—a crucial lesson. In the end, the fighting during what could be called the first Kargil conflict proved inconclusive. Pakistani and Indian forces reached a military stalemate, and a negotiated cease-fire line was codified in the Karachi Agreement of 1949.

Pakistanis generally believe that Hindu leaders have long oppressed the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir, and the questionable accession into the Indian union has denied the populace of their right to self-determination. They stress the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s demand for a “free and impartial plebiscite,” although other UN demands for “a cessation of the fighting” and the creation of “proper conditions” for such a vote to take place are generally overlooked. Pakistanis also consider the Indian government’s refusal to grant Kashmir independence as proof that Indians ultimately do not accept the “two-nation theory,” which is the *raison d’être* for Pakistan’s creation and its continued existence.

Pakistan always has faced a larger, more populous, wealthier, and militarily more powerful neighbor in India. Pakistani defense planners have had great difficulty finding ways to compensate for these profound structural asymmetries. The sense of political and strategic necessity, when combined with a strong belief of moral righteousness, has justified the use of almost any means for the sake of liberating Kashmir and resisting Indian primacy

on the subcontinent. As a result, the Pakistani army repeatedly has attempted daring and unconventional methods to wrest Kashmir from India by force and to liberate the Kashmiri Muslims from Indian rule—and it repeatedly has been stymied in these efforts. The 1999 Kargil operation was the latest failed attempt to seize the upper hand in South Asia's enduring rivalry.

Pakistan's Bold Plan

The Kargil operation was an audacious attempt to seize an opportunity of historic proportions. Pakistan's Kargil gambit can be seen as a logical—though perhaps extreme—continuation of its long-standing competitive policy with India. The Pakistani people view the Kashmiri cause as moral and just, and in 1999 Pakistani security planners continued a tradition of asymmetric strategies to circumvent India's conventional military advantages. A successful Kargil intrusion would have shown that Pakistani soldiers were willing to endure incredible hardships to support the Kashmiri struggle. It could have given a timely boost to a weakening insurgency inside Kashmir. And finally, if the plan succeeded, it could have forced India back to the negotiating table and given Islamabad greater leverage to resolve the Kashmir dispute on favorable terms once and for all.

In the winter of 1998–1999, Indian troops predictably vacated their high-altitude posts along the LOC as they retreated to winter positions—a normal measure taken by both Indian and Pakistani forces to reduce the strain on forces during the harsh winter months. Pakistani planners aimed to seize this unprotected territory to the maximum feasible limit, with an eye on interdicting National Highway 1A (NH-1A), the strategically important Indian road that runs between Srinagar and Leh. But the plan's boldness also made it dangerous and ultimately untenable. Its success would require hundreds of troops to infiltrate across the LOC without detection. After their inevitable discovery, these troops would have to fend off Indian counterattacks until the onset of snow the next winter, which would close the passes, halt military operations, and allow Pakistani infiltrators to harden their positions. This military feat accomplished would have enabled Pakistan to redraw the LOC.

At remote posts in the higher altitude terrain along the LOC separating the portions of Kashmir that India and Pakistan possess, each side's forces would retreat to lower heights during the winter owing to the intense logistical and weather hazards associated with deploying troops during such conditions. After the creation of the cease-fire line (and subsequently the LOC), India and Pakistan tacitly allowed such winter retreats to occur without taking advantage of them, a norm consistent with the letter and spirit of the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Following

India's military seizure of Siachen Glacier in northernmost Kashmir in 1984, however, both sides dramatically reduced the number of forward posts they would vacate during the harsh winter months. The loss of hundreds of square miles of territory around the Siachen Glacier was a deep scar for the Pakistan army, in particular the FCNA, which is tasked with its defense. So in the winter of 1998–1999, when Indian troops vacated their high-altitude posts in the area around Kargil, on the belief that invaders could not carry out any meaningful infiltration in such difficult terrain during inclement weather, Pakistan was quick to mount, and then expand, its secret Kargil campaign.

The Kargil operation's planners seemed convinced that India would not expand the conflict elsewhere along the LOC or the international border, and that the world community would view the Kargil operation as part of the normal pattern of violence along the LOC, similar to India's daring occupation of the Siachen Glacier fifteen years before. While some of the Pakistani army's calculations were borne out by events, the faulty assumptions they made, when combined with tactical missteps on the ground, doomed the Kargil operation to failure. Perhaps most crucially, Kargil's planners failed to recognize the significance of the nuclear revolution. The international community could not endorse any attempt to use force to redraw international boundaries, even if they were disputed, and in particular would not permit what looked like the manipulation of nuclear escalation, even if that was not what Kargil's planners had in mind.

India's Political-Military Strategy

By the end of April 1999, Pakistan's intruding force had occupied about 130 posts in the Dras, Mushkoh, Kaksar, Batalik, and Chorbit-la sectors of northern Kashmir, covering an approximate area of 62 miles (100 kilometers) across the LOC and running 4–6 miles (7 to 10 kilometers) deep into the territory previously held by India. This far exceeded what is believed to be the Pakistani army's original plan to seize two dozen or so posts in a much smaller swathe of territory across the LOC. Some of the captured positions directly overlooked NH-1A, and put Pakistani troops in a position to interdict the strategically important road with artillery and long-range small arms fire.

The Indian army first learned about the intrusions in late April 1999. Initial Indian attempts to retrieve the heights, which were then thought to be held by Kashmiri militants, were easily rebuffed by Pakistan's well-trained and well-armed NLI soldiers. In fact, Indian troops experienced weeks of enemy fire without even seeing who was shooting at them, for the infiltrators were well hidden high atop the 13,000–18,000 foot-high (4,000–5,500-meter)

mountain peaks. Indian officials gradually realized that circumstances were far more serious than they initially had assumed. Local commanders frantically began to maneuver their forces to contain the intruders and launched military patrols to determine the extent of the enemy intrusion. Because of poor intelligence, improper acclimatization of troops, a shortage of high-altitude equipment, and coordination difficulties, Indian troops suffered their heaviest casualties during this initial, frenetic phase of the military engagement.

The Indian armed forces launched a major counter-offensive, codenamed “Operation Vijay” (Victory), during the third week of May 1999. On 26 May, the Indian air force commenced air strikes in support of ground troops, vertically escalating the conflict. Indian troops simultaneously started mobilizing to war locations in other parts of the country, deploying forces along the India-Pakistan international border and elsewhere along the LOC. The Zojila pass opened in early May 1999, significantly earlier than normal. Pakistani defense planners had not counted on this development. The opening of Zojila facilitated India’s induction of troops, supporting units, and logistics necessary for an effective counteroffensive. The Indian army achieved its first success on 13 June in the Dras sub-sector when they captured point 4590 at the Tololing Ridge after nearly three weeks of heavy fighting. This tactical victory was a turning point for the Indian counter-offensive, which the Indian army progressively built upon until the first week of July, when it had managed to recapture a significant portion of previously occupied territory.

As the Indian military reclaimed more territory, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif found himself under mounting international pressure to pull back Pakistani regular and irregular forces from the Indian side of the LOC. After a hastily arranged visit to Washington, D.C., over the Fourth of July holiday weekend, Prime Minister Sharif signed the Washington Declaration with U.S. president Bill Clinton and agreed to instruct Pakistani troops to vacate the captured territory. On 11 July, the Directors General Military Operations (DGMOs) of the Indian and Pakistani armies met at the Wagha checkpost, where the Pakistani DGMO consented to commence withdrawal by 11 July and complete it by 16 July, a date that later was extended until 18 July. Pakistanis insist that this cease-fire was not implemented in good faith, as Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties throughout July. Indians counter that the use of force was authorized only to counter resistance or to attack positions that Pakistan still occupied after the cease-fire had expired. On 26 July 1999, the Indian DGMO declared at a press conference that all Pakistani intrusions had been vacated in and around the Kargil heights, thereby marking an official end to the conflict.

Was There a Risk of Nuclear War?

The Kargil conflict caused an especially high degree of alarm worldwide because it was the first major military engagement between two countries armed with nuclear weapons since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. Although no Indian or Pakistani nuclear weapons were actually deployed in 1999, and although previous Indo-Pakistani crises during the 1980s and early 1990s had occurred under the shadow of covert nuclear capabilities, the nuclear context of Kargil had three unprecedented effects on the strategic behavior of India, Pakistan, and outside parties, especially the United States. First, the achievement of mutual nuclear deterrence may have emboldened Pakistani military leaders to take assertive military action in Kashmir. Second, Indian officials believed that the nuclear revolution had fundamentally transformed the Indo-Pakistani competition, and thus reacted in a slow and confused manner to the infiltration. As Pakistan’s military role became apparent, India responded with unexpected vigor, both militarily and rhetorically. Third, India’s forceful response fed into the worst fears of the Clinton administration about nuclear escalation and spurred President Clinton to become personally involved in effecting Pakistan’s withdrawal and preventing escalation to full-scale war. Pakistan ultimately misread the impact of nuclear weapons on Indian and American behavior, mistakenly believing that India would not expend sizable resources to restore the *status quo ante* and that any international intervention would freeze the ground situation to Pakistan’s advantage.

These effects are striking because, prior to the Kargil infiltration, Indian and Pakistani elites viewed their nuclear capabilities as largely political, rather than military, tools, and assumed that they would stabilize their long-standing competition. Leaders of each country made assumptions about the impact that nuclear arsenals would have on the other side’s behavior, but these assumptions were mutually contradictory, and ultimately failed to account for the attitudes and responses of the other side. As a result, nuclear weapons did not deter war. They did not cause the conflict, but they may have emboldened Pakistan to launch the Kargil operation, and they significantly heightened the alarm with which India, the United States, and other countries viewed Pakistan’s intrusion.

The value of nuclear weapons as “cover” for the pursuit of Pakistani ambitions at lower levels of intensity was both recognized and publicly addressed prior to the conflict. Shortly before the intrusion was discovered, Pakistan chief of army staff general Pervez Musharraf announced that while nuclear weapons had dramatically changed the nature of war, “this, however, does not mean that conventional war has become obsolete. In fact

conventional war will still remain the mode of conflict in any future conflagration with our traditional enemy” (Kargil Review Committee, p. 242). India’s military leadership recognized this possibility, as did some intelligence analyses of Pakistani intentions. According to the Indian Kargil Review Committee report, as early as 1991 the Joint Intelligence Committee anticipated that Pakistan would use its nuclear capability to limit Indian conventional retaliation in the event of low-intensity conflict. On 10 February 1999, Indian chief of army staff general V. P. Malik declared, “Having crossed the nuclear threshold does not mean that a conventional war is out” (Cherian, “Political and Diplomatic Background”). While political elites were ruling out conventional war, within two months of each other, both army chiefs ruled conventional war back in.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Threats

Veiled and direct nuclear threats from a range of official and unofficial sources created a chilling backdrop to the fast-paced diplomatic interaction during the crisis, and not surprisingly added to the general confusion, raising the fears of military escalation. While leaders on both sides engaged in nuclear rhetoric, neither side directly threatened to use nuclear weapons and, judging by subsequent statements and actions, neither side feared the use of nuclear weapons by the other. However, observers in the United States and elsewhere were alarmed by the possibility that the limited conflict might escalate into a conventional war and then possibly to a nuclear exchange.

In late May, Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed made the most prominent nuclear statement of the conflict when he warned India that Pakistan could use “any weapon” to defend its territorial integrity (“Pakistan Warns It May Use Any Weapon”). This articulation is significant because Pakistani statements on nuclear doctrine usually focus on the use of nuclear weapons as a “last resort” when the survival of the state is at stake. It also took place quite early in the crisis—shortly after India had escalated the military situation by authorizing use of the Indian air force to conduct precision strikes against Pakistani positions on the Indian side of the LOC. This suggests that Pakistan was manipulating the nuclear threat, publicly setting a deliberately lowered nuclear threshold in an effort to spur international intervention and, as a consequence, to limit India’s conventional response. Pakistani planners probably assumed that foreign intervention would freeze hostilities at an early stage of the crisis, leaving Pakistan in possession of at least some of its captured territory across the LOC and thereby enabling it to bargain over Kashmir from an advantageous position.

The Indian government-appointed Kargil Review Committee writes that, unlike Pakistan, India issued no nuclear threats. This statement is not entirely correct. Indian officials made nuclear threats in response to Pakistani statements. Indian leaders also issued several statements in June apparently intended for domestic audiences. Indian naval chief admiral Sushil Kumar stated that the Indian navy could both survive a nuclear attack and launch one in retaliation. Since the Indian navy had not taken custody of any nuclear weapons, this statement probably was intended to draw attention to the movement of elements of India’s Eastern and Western fleets to strategic positions in the North Arabian Sea and also to position the Indian navy more favorably for future budget debates.

A 20 June 1999 editorial in the newspaper of the extremist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), affiliated with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which led the coalition that ruled India at the time, urged the government to launch a nuclear strike on Pakistan. Given the close ideological and political connections between the RSS and the more militant members of the governing BJP coalition, Pakistani leaders could have interpreted this as an official statement. While it certainly did not reflect Prime Minister Vajpayee’s views, these provocative statements by figures outside the actual decision-making loop complicated crisis management.

Pakistan also had its share of unsanctioned nuclear saber rattling, especially at the height of the crisis. As Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif prepared to travel to China and the United States to obtain support for Pakistan’s position, his religious affairs minister, Raja Zafarul Haq, publicly warned that Pakistan could resort to the nuclear option to preserve Pakistani territory, sovereignty, or security. Minister Haq was not involved in Pakistan’s nuclear command and control apparatus. This statement was uttered for domestic, or perhaps even personal, political reasons. Nonetheless, the international community viewed the remark with some alarm, and India responded emphatically to it. Prime Minister Vajpayee cautioned that India was prepared for all eventualities. According to the *Hindu*, “The Union Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, said here today that Pakistan’s threat of a full-fledged nuclear war should not be taken frivolously and that the country was prepared for any eventuality” (“India Ready for Any Eventuality”). National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra added that India would not use nuclear weapons first, but that India was prepared in case “some lunatic tries to do something against us.” (“India Prepared for Pakistan Nuclear Attack”). In this case, an apparently unofficial remark prompted a series of retaliatory statements by Indian officials at the highest level.

This rhetorical exchange during the Kargil crisis revealed a surprising lack of sophistication by India and Pakistan in nuclear diplomacy. Public statements in South Asia frequently are high on rhetoric and short on substance. In contrast to the U.S. and Soviet experiences, India and Pakistan had no history, organizational apparatus, or guidelines in sending nuclear signals. What occurred during the Kargil crisis was ad hoc, uncoordinated, and somewhat confused nuclear rhetoric. As a result, both sides took steps to tighten control over nuclear rhetoric in future crises.

Mysterious Nuclear Maneuvers

In addition to the ad hoc nuclear posturing, it has been reported that both sides increased nuclear readiness and may have made nuclear weapons available for actual employment. According to a report by a respected Indian journalist, nuclear warheads were readied, and delivery systems, including Mirage 2000 aircraft, short-range Prithvi missiles, and medium-ranged Agni missiles, were prepared for possible use. Nuclear weapons, according to this report, were placed at “Readiness State 3”—ready to be mated with delivery systems at short notice (Chengappa, 2000, p. 437). However, this claim has been discounted in Washington, Islamabad, and New Delhi. Moreover, no U.S. officials at the time mentioned it in any of their interviews or statements.

The most interesting postconflict testimony is that of Bruce Riedel, then-Special Assistant for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. According to a monograph he wrote in 2002, on 3 July 1999, U.S. intelligence detected “disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment” (p. 5). According to Riedel, in a personal meeting with Prime Minister Sharif, President Clinton asked, “Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear-tipped missiles?” Reportedly, Sharif responded only by saying “India was probably doing the same” (p. 7). While most observers discount this report, it apparently was confirmed by Indian chief of army staff general Sundarajan Padmanabhan, when he stated in early 2001 that Pakistan “activated one of its nuclear missile bases and had threatened India with a nuclear attack” (Chengappa, 2001). Pakistani authorities have been steadfast in their denials of moving missiles or preparing for a nuclear attack.

Although well-informed sources made the claims about Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployments, other evidence has not corroborated them. Moreover, they fly in the face of other, more official claims that no nuclear deployment took place. What some observers say could have occurred was that Pakistan dispersed its nuclear-

capable missiles out of storage sites for defensive purposes—a development that could have been misinterpreted by intelligence agencies as an operational deployment. Similarly, others have not verified accounts that India heightened the readiness of its nuclear forces.

Because official spokespeople in Washington, Islamabad, and New Delhi have refused to say more, these claims about nuclear maneuvers must remain a mysterious backdrop to the Kargil conflict. However, it follows that any serious military crisis occurring in the future between India and Pakistan (or, for that matter, any other pair of nuclear states) probably will be accompanied by a great deal of confusion, controversy, and alarm over possible operational deployments. And this certainly will be the context in which the United States and other concerned parties will regard future Indo-Pakistani military crises.

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See also **Jammu and Kashmir; Kashmir; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Pakistan and India; Strategic Thought**

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KARMA. See **Upanishadic Philosophy**.

KARMA YOGA. See **Bhagavad Gītā**.

KARNATAKA A state in South India, Karnataka has an area of 74,051 square miles (191,791 square kilometers). In 2001 its population was 52.7 million. Its capital is Bangalore, and the language is Kannada, which belongs to the Dravidian family of languages. The name of the state means "highland," which refers to its Deccan plateau, though Karnataka also has a coastline of about 185 miles (300 kilometers). The state in its present form was established in 1956, but its name was changed from Mysore to Karnataka only in 1973. It consists of two areas: the former princely state of Mysore and the Kannada-speaking districts of the erstwhile Bombay presidency, which were merged with Mysore to form a unified linguistic state. The maharaja of Mysore had signed the treaty of accession to India immediately after the attainment of independence. The legislature of the Bombay presidency had decided as early as 1938 that the Kannada-speaking districts should be merged with a future linguistic state. There was a dispute concerning the Belgaum and Karwar districts later on, since they had a sizable Marathi-speaking population, but they remained in Karnataka.

The state has many ancient monuments. The Mauryan emperor Ashoka had some of his famous inscriptions installed there in the second century B.C. Later, this area became a stronghold of Jainism. The huge statue of a Jain Tīrthānkara at Sravanbelgola is an impressive example of this tradition. In the northwestern part of the state, the Chalukya dynasty of Badami (Vatapi) created several beautiful temples in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D., which were influenced by the style of the Northern Gupta dynasty. Pattadakal, one of these temple towns, has been recognized by the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as a World Heritage site. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Hoysala dynasty established the beautiful temples of Belur and Halebid. From the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries, the Vijayanagar empire dominated the region. Its capital, Vijayanagar, (City of Victory) is located near Hampi, about 185 miles (300 kilometers) north of Bangalore. Bijapur, in the northwestern part of the state, houses one of the most impressive monuments of Muslim architecture, Gol Gumbaz, the seventeenth-century mausoleum of Sultan Muhammad Adil Shah of Bijapur, which has the widest cupola in the world.

Karnataka is a stronghold of the Congress Party. It does not have a state party like its neighbors Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, though the Janata Party had played this role and ruled the state for some time after it had lost its importance as a national party. In the assembly elections of 2004, the Congress Party lost many seats while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) captured 79 seats, an unprecedented party success in a southern state. Even though the BJP won the largest number of seats of any party in the assembly, the Congress Party (with only 64 seats) managed to form a new government with the help of other parties.

With the exception of Bangalore, Karnataka has no big industrial cities. There are only two other major urban centers in this state: Mysore and Hubli-Dharwar. The latter consists of two separate towns that have formed a joint municipal corporation. Dharwar is a university town, and Hubli is a major trading center. In addition, there are some important district towns, such as Belgaum, Bellary, and Mangalore. As far as per capita income is concerned, Karnataka is close to the national average.

Dietmar Rothermund

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KARTIKEYA. See **Shiva and Shaivism**.


KASHMIR Since the partition of India in 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir has remained a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, provoking three wars between the two countries. In 1989 a secessionist

movement, supported by Pakistan, arose in the Valley of Kashmir, demanding freedom from India. The two countries hold irreconcilable positions on Kashmir. For Pakistan, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory, and its future should be determined through a plebiscite in conformity with a United Nations Security Council resolution; India considers the state an integral part of its territory. India builds its case on the legal accession of Jammu and Kashmir and on subsequent elections through which the people of Kashmir created their own constitution and their own successive civil governments.

Historical Background

The state of Jammu and Kashmir, with its three distinct regions of the Valley of Kashmir (predominantly Muslim and Kashmiri-speaking), Jammu (majority Dogri-speaking Hindus) and Ladakh (majority Ladakhi-speaking Buddhists), is a relatively recent political and geographical entity. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, these three regions existed separately. In March 1846, under the terms of the Treaty of Amritsar, the British transferred the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh to Jammu's Raja Ghulab Singh. This transfer was in return for a payment by the raja to the British of 7.5 million rupees. Because of Britain's trade interests in Central Asia and its concerns over Russian expansion, the Jammu and Kashmir state was quickly integrated into princely British India. Until the partition of India in 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir remained under the rule of the Hindu Dogra rulers. After the death of Raja Ghulab Singh in 1856, the state was ruled by Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1856–1885), Maharaja Pratap Singh (1885–1925), and Maharaja Hari Singh (1925–1947).

As a result of British interventions in the Dogra rule, various administrative, constitutional, and educational reforms were introduced, the major beneficiaries of which were the Hindus, both from Jammu and the valley. They directly benefited from a new state-subject ordinance (1927) that restricted government employment exclusively to citizens of the state. Kashmiri Muslims, who constituted the vast masses of uneducated and exploited peasantry, remained largely untouched by these reforms. Muslim grievances first found a voice in 1931 when the Muslim Conference of Kashmir, under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, launched a protest. In 1939 Abdullah was to transform the Muslim Conference into a mass-based secular, socialist nationalist movement against Dogra rule, called the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah invoked the fourteenth-century Kashmiri historical and cultural concept of Kashmiriyat to unite both Hindus and Muslims in opposition



India's View of the Disputed Territory of Jammu and Kashmir

to Dogra rule. This indigenous concept of Kashmiriyat, while not excluding the presence and influence of religion, emphasizes syncretism and tolerance for all Kashmiri religions, differentiating both Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims from their counterparts elsewhere. The National Conference ushered in a new ideological agenda, underlined in the New Kashmir Manifesto, seeking constitutional reforms, a bill of rights, a national economic plan for eradicating poverty land reforms, and the right to self-determination. In 1946 the National Conference launched a "Quit Kashmir" movement against Dogra rule and received complete support from the Indian National Congress and its leadership.

After the British granted independence to India and Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir was one of only three Princely States not to accede either India or Pakistan. In October 1947 the Pathan tribesmen of the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan invaded Kashmir. Unable to defend the state, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the

Instrument of Accession dated 26 October 1947 and requested India's military assistance to free the state from that tribal invasion. In accepting the offer of accession under special circumstances, Governor-General Lord Mountbatten informed the maharaja that the question of accession should be settled by a referendum to the people, once law and order was restored in Kashmir and the invaders had been pushed out. India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confirmed the conditional acceptance of Kashmir's accession to India. The Indian army succeeded in driving the tribal invaders from some two-thirds of the state, which has remained under Indian jurisdiction, with the other third staying under Pakistan's control. Sheikh Abdullah headed the Emergency Administration in the state from its accession until March 1948.

India's Complaint to the United Nations

On 1 January 1948, under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, the government of India lodged a complaint to the Security Council against Pakistani "aggression" against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The complaint explained the circumstances leading to Hari Singh's accession of Kashmir to India and provided evidence of Pakistan's involvement in aiding the tribal invaders, who were still occupying a substantial portion of the state's territory. In April 1948, the Security Council set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). In the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, accepted by both India and Pakistan, both consented to a cease-fire, and to the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the state of Jammu and Kashmir, to be followed by the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces in stages to be determined by the Commission. Part 3 of the resolution laid out a framework for a plebiscite in the state. Even though India's initial complaint of Pakistani aggression had been earlier verified as legitimate when UNCIP delegates, who had arrived in India in early July, observed that Pakistan had sent troops to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the 13 August resolution put Pakistan on a par with India. Both were asked to withdraw their troops, which amounted to denying any legality to the accession treaty between the maharaja of Kashmir and India, making Kashmir a disputed territory until a plebiscite was conducted under peaceful and fair conditions. Initially, irresolvable difficulties over procedural matters led to the nonimplementation of both the original UNCIP resolution of August 1948, and the extended resolution of 5 January 1949, which sought demilitarization and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. In the early 1950s, the domestic situation in the valley, combined with Pakistan's military alliance with the United States, led India to abandon its prior agreement to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir.

In response to a Hindu nationalist movement in Jammu calling for full integration of the state into India, Sheikh Abdullah began to support the idea of an independent Kashmir. In the Jammu region—where a majority of the population were Dogra Hindus, emotionally attached to the Dogra Rajput dynasty—the Praja Parishad Party, strongly linked to the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), began agitating in 1952 for complete accession and full integration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The movement received vocal support from the militant Indian Hindu party, Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), and its leader Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. Though the movement lost momentum after Mookerjee's death in the Kashmir valley, its Hindu-chauvinistic demands made a powerful impact on Sheikh Abdullah's decision to call for a third option for the state: independence. In July 1953, the Working Committee of the National Conference, under the presidency of Abdullah, proposed four alternatives for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute: a plebiscite to choose among the three options of accession to India, accession to Pakistan, or independence; independence for the whole state; independence for the whole state with joint Indo-Pakistan control over foreign affairs; or the Dixon plan (partition of the state, with Jammu and Ladakh going to India, and independence for the Kashmir Valley). It is alleged that in a meeting with U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson, the latter had encouraged the Kashmiri leader to repudiate accession to India and declare Kashmir independent. Although this report was repeatedly denied, Nehru became increasingly suspicious of U.S. intentions. On 9 August 1953, India arrested Abdullah and replaced him with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.

During 1954 and 1955, the United States signed three different military assistance agreements with Pakistan. In the absence of any resolution of the Kashmir problem, India viewed the U.S.–Pakistan military pacts as enhancing the military power of Pakistan, which could then be used against India. Although in February 1954, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower tried to assure Prime Minister Nehru that the decision of the U.S. government to provide military assistance to Pakistan was not aimed against India, Nehru believed that U.S. support to Pakistan undermined the ability of the United Nations to realize a so-called impartial solution to the Kashmir problem.

Jammu and Kashmir's Constitutional Status within the Indian Federation

In January 1950 the Indian Constituent Assembly approved Article 370, outlining Jammu and Kashmir's political relationship with the Indian Union. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was applied to the state under the "Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir)

Order, 1950.” This article, while restricting the central government’s legislative power to the areas of foreign Affairs, defense, and communications, allowed the state government to legislate on all residuary issues. A sub-heading of this Article states that the constitutional provisions with respect to Jammu and Kashmir are temporary. At the time of the creation of the Indian Constitution, India remained firm on its offer of a plebiscite to the people of Kashmir. The Indian leadership, particularly Nehru, apparently had complete faith in the positive outcome of a plebiscite in Kashmir—an attitude that changed entirely in 1953. Article 370 also made provision for the revocation of the temporary constitutional arrangement.

In September 1951, elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly were held, and in November 1951, the assembly was convened. In July 1952 the leaders of Jammu and Kashmir and India entered into the “Delhi Agreement,” which laid out the basic principles and framework within which the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly would proceed with its work. The seven components of this agreement related to the application of the provisions of the Constitution of India to citizenship, fundamental rights, the emergency powers of the Indian president, the division of powers between the state and the central government, the abolition of Dogra rule, the retention of the state flag, and the acceptance of Urdu as the official language of the state. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was proclaimed on 26 January 1957. Its special features included: provisions with regard to the citizenship of the people of Kashmir and their classification into a special category of “Permanent Residents”; the Directive Principles of State Policy, outlining the socialist agenda of the New Kashmir Manifesto of the National Conference Party; internal autonomy to the state in all powers except foreign affairs, defense, and communication; and a parliamentary system of government, with its elected head, Sadar-Riyasat, a Permanent Resident of the state. The constitution determined that the legislative assembly be composed of 100 members chosen through direct election, based on universal adult franchise. Out of these 100 seats, 25 were reserved for the territories of the state under the “occupation” of Pakistan.

The citizenship provisions in the new state constitution were closely guarded by the Kashmiri leadership so that nonresidents were disallowed to seek employment, to buy property, and to participate in elections. In the constitution, citizens of the state are defined as “all those people who were born and residing in the territories of the state, when it was founded by the Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846, the people who settled in the state later but before 1885, the people who settled in the state under

special permission before 1911, and the people who took permanent residence in the state and acquired immovable property under the ‘Ijzat Nama Rules’ before May 14, 1944” (Teng, Bhat, and Kaul, p. 210). Although in 1959, with the extension of the powers of the Election Commission of India to conduct and control elections in the state, a slow and steady integration of the state into the Indian union began, the state has remained protective of its citizenship requirements—an essential ingredient in strengthening the Kashmiri identity and maintaining its distinct status within the Indian federation.

The State’s De Facto Integration within the Indian Union

The years 1957 to 1974 witnessed the extension of various entries in the Union and the Concurrent Lists of the Indian Constitution to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with the approval of the state legislature. As all three governments in the state, under the respective leaderships of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq, and Mir Kashmir, existed with the approval of the Indian central government, the local legislature’s approval was hardly problematic. The original Article 370, the first Presidential Order of 1950 and 1954, has been amended several times in order to make most of the provisions of the Indian Constitution applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. In 1956, Article 356, allowing the central government to impose President’s Rule, and Article 357, empowering Parliament to confer upon the president the power of the state legislature, were applied to Jammu and Kashmir. The same year saw the changes in the designations of the head of state and the head of the government, respectively, from Sadar-i-Riyasat to governor and from premier to chief minister—bringing the state in line with other federal units in India. In 1967 the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People’s Act was brought into conformity with the Central Law, enabling the Election Commission to appoint retired judges of the high courts of other states as members of the Election Tribunal. It also authorized the commission to interfere during the elections at the vote-counting stage in case of suspected irregularities. Articles 248, 249, and 250 of the Indian Constitution have been extended to the state so that the central government may legislate in matters of state jurisdiction. Under these constitutional provisions, the Indian Parliament would legislate on any matter not enumerated in the Union List. Article 248, in particular, gives extensive powers to the central government to interfere in state matters under the pretext of defending Indian sovereignty and preventing activities, including terrorist acts, directed against the territorial integrity of India, or causing insult to the Indian national flag, the Indian national anthem, and the Indian Constitution.

Patronage Politics and the Repression of Dissidence

During the period of Jammu and Kashmir's de facto integration into the Indian union, the state government employed the complementary strategies of patronage distribution and repression of democratic opposition. Through the use of large transfer payments from the central government (amounting to almost half of the state government revenues), the state expanded its governmental sector and became the largest employer. During the twenty-five years between 1964 and 1989, the public sector's share of economy more than doubled, from under 5 percent to 10 percent. This rapid expansion of the governmental sector becomes even more glaring when one realizes that the state paid negligible attention to the economic development of the region. The state leadership made only limited attempts to develop the region's manufacturing and industrial sectors. Consequently, rampant corruption prevailed within the state. Middle- and upper-middle-class Kashmiris took advantage of the expanded educational facilities, thus creating a massive burden on the state to accommodate the newly educated within governmental and state-supported institutions such as hospitals, schools, and social service institutions.

During the integration era, another significant characteristic of Kashmir politics was the leadership's determination to suppress political dissent. Whenever a dissident group tried to set up an opposition party, that group was either absorbed into the ruling party or simply outlawed. Until 1974 no effective opposition existed in the state. Any groups splintering from the dominant ruling party were quickly reabsorbed into it. The real opposition to Jammu and Kashmir's integrative politics was to come from two groups: the Plebiscite Front (formed by Sheikh Abdullah, and his close associate Mohammed Beg, after Abdullah's arrest in 1953) and the religious pro-Pakistan Jamait-i-Islami. Both groups served as significant avenues for those demanding self-determination for the people of Kashmir. The two groups were barred on and off by the ruling party from participating in the governing process. It is alleged that the Indian leadership viewed the emergence of an effective opposition as a threat to India's "national interests." As a result of limited public presence, the dissident groups remained ineffective in mobilizing the Muslim population of the valley toward their goal of holding a plebiscite. This was evident by their inability to take advantage of two significant political events in Kashmir, the "disappearance" of a holy relic in 1964 and the Pakistani armed infiltration into the valley in 1965. The Muslim population generally has a *dedar* (showing) of the holy relic (a hair from the prophet Muhammad's beard) after the Friday noon prayers at

Srinagar's Hazrat Bal Mosque. Its disappearance in the winter of 1964 brought the Kashmir capital to a standstill. Daily processions went through the streets, with anger expressed at the Jammu and Kashmir state government. Religious tension was so high that the Kashmiri Hindus soon joined the Muslims in their mass protest. The government of India quickly got involved and sent an emissary, Lal Bahadur Shastri, to the valley to coordinate the recovery and the authentication process with the Central Investigative Agency and local religious leaders. Once it was found, Kashmir's Mirwaiz Maluvi Farooq authenticated the relic. The Indian government's sensitive handling of the dispute averted further crisis, and denied the dissident groups an opportunity to convert the Kashmiri Muslim population's religious outrage into anti-Indian sentiment.

In 1983, although the electoral success of opposition groups was not significant, managing as they did to win only one seat in the legislature, it provided impetus to several dissident factions to fight a united battle in the next elections. For the 1987 assembly elections, an eleven-party oppositional alliance, the Muslim United Front, was created. Despite the overwhelming popularity of the Front, the group won only four seats. There were widespread accusations of rigging of the elections, thus setting the stage for the birth of a violent secessionist movement in the valley in 1989.

The Secessionist Movement

A mass-based secessionist movement, accompanied by political insurgency, began in the Kashmir Valley in 1989. Its immediate catalyst was the rigging of the 1987 elections and the unpopular alliance between Kashmir's ruling party, the National Conference, and the India's Congress Party. Overnight, dozens of secessionist groups emerged in the valley, demanding sovereignty and freedom (*azadi*) from the Indian state. The two most prominent among these groups were the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), demanding unification of the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir and seeking independence for all of Kashmir, and the Hizbul-Mujahideen, demanding an Islamic state and unification with Pakistan. Despite its killing of some Kashmiri Hindus in 1989 and 1990 (causing the departure of the small minority of Hindu Pandits from the valley), the JKLF claimed that its movement was essentially secular and that a unified Kashmir has room for both Hindus and Muslims. During the early stages of the movement, various Islamic fundamentalist groups failed to impose strict Islamic laws and customs, such as the compulsory veiling of Muslim women. This lack of adherence to the strict practices of Islam, as well as the popularity of the JKLF vision of freedom, led the Islamic secessionist groups to rethink

their strategy. To maintain the movement's momentum and to unify several secessionist groups, an apex organization of more than thirty militant-nationalist groups, the Kul-Jammat-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir (All Kashmir Freedom Front), was formed in 1993.

Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir's secessionist movement goes beyond its claims of moral, political, and diplomatic support. During 1988 several secessionist leaders crossed the border into Pakistan-controlled Azad ("Free") Kashmir, received military training and weapons, and returned to the valley prepared for insurgency. By the end of 1989, the secessionist groups were successful in bringing about the total breakdown of the civil and administrative structures of the government. In 1990 the state of Jammu and Kashmir was brought under India's President's Rule with a massive occupation by the Indian armed forces. For the first three years of the movement, militant violence was accompanied by harsh repression by Indian armed security forces, inflicting serious human rights violations. With increased international pressure from human rights agencies, as well as Pakistan's continued support for the Kashmiri cause in various global forums, the Indian government took steps to discipline its security forces, setting up its own human rights watch agencies. India also began to reactivate the electoral process within the state, setting the stage for a return to civil government. Since 1996 two legislative elections and three parliamentary elections have taken place. With each election, voter participation has risen consistently, with the exception of a few urban-based constituencies in the valley. The valley's response to India's efforts to reactivate civil society can be attributed to three factors: a general fatigue of the population with the movement, the inability of the secessionist groups to deliver *azadi*, and the continued violence by both the secessionist groups and India's security forces. Consequently, the secessionist groups have come to be divided into two camps: the moderates who seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue, and the extremists who continue to use violent means to promote their cause. The latter, which includes a small portion of the local Hizbul-Mujahideen cadres, is largely dominated by violent Pakistan-based and sponsored groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The Fida'iyyeen suicide attack is the newest and one of the more successful strategies adopted by these groups. The Kashmiri secessionist groups are now in the hands of the imported Islamic groups, sidelining the indigenous nationalist groups.

Since 1997 the Indian state has taken advantage of this situation and has adopted a dual strategy, on the one hand, to engage the moderate secessionist groups in dialogue, and on the other hand, to pursue the elimination

of the militant leadership. Until 11 September 2001, the engagement of the moderates brought about limited successes. However, the events of 11 September and the resulting war on terror have been responsible for isolating the extremists and giving the moderates an opportunity to seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue. The October 2002 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and the December 2002 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-based militant groups have strengthened India's hand vis-à-vis Pakistan in convincing international public opinion that the Kashmir issue cannot be resolved without Pakistan's commitment to prevent its territory from being used for political insurgency in Kashmir.

In April 2003, during his visit to Kashmir, India's prime minister A. B. Vajpayee made a promise to the Muslim population of the valley to seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem and to extend India's hand of friendship to Pakistan. In January 2004, following several confidence-building measures to reactivate relations between the two countries, which had become severely strained after the attack on India's Parliament, India and Pakistan set in motion a process of dialogue on several issues, including Kashmir. Meanwhile, the Indian central government and the Hurriyat leadership have begun a series of talks to seek a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir issue. While it appears that it might be difficult for India to convince Pakistan to abandon its claims to Kashmir and to accept India's solution of making the Line of Control the international border, from the Indian perspective there is greater hope of coming up with a reasonable solution, such as increased constitutional autonomy for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which might satisfy the moderate secessionist groups within the valley.

Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay

See also **Jammu and Ladakh; Pakistan and India**

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Krishna Serenading Radha, c. 1730–1750. Watercolor and ink on paper. The Kashmir artistic tradition faced extinction during the political and religious upheaval of the fourteenth century, but had revived significantly by the eighteenth century, finding expression in the illuminations of manuscripts, horoscopes, folk art, almanacs, and individual paintings, with religious themes dominating. BENOY K. BEHL.

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KASHMIR PAINTING Our understanding of the painting traditions of Kashmir is limited by a dearth of surviving evidence. Manuscript paintings dating prior to the seventeenth century are virtually unknown. In related media, the mural paintings at the sites of Alchi (Ladakh, western Tibet) are the only indicators of a previously existing Kashmiri style and its eastward dissemination. Moreover, the manuscript paintings from the eighteenth century onward are so varied in style—ranging from the heavily Persianized to the purely indigenous (often termed “folkish”)—that it is not possible to identify a single style among these as characteristic of the region. An inversion of the interpretative paradigm, then, is perhaps more beneficial. Rather than perceiving Kashmiri painting to be a directionless and mediocre imitation of styles

from the Islamic and Indic worlds, another perspective could be more productive: the wide and rich variety of painting styles evidenced in but two centuries of surviving examples demonstrates that Kashmiri painters were not only prolific, but that they also fruitfully incorporated the many stylistic strains reaching them through commercial and other conduits connecting the region with lower India, Central Asia, and the Near East.

The earlier Buddhist foundations at Alchi date to around the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. Like other such establishments, this complex also took advantage of its location on a hub of trade routes linking the region with Kashmir and Central Asia. Efforts to “purify” their Buddhist practices inspired Tibetan monks to visit learned counterparts in Kashmir, and to invite Kashmiri masters and artists eastward. Thus, the Sumtsek’s mural paintings at Alchi evince a relationship to the decoratively intricate, jewel-colored, compositionally balanced works likely admired at Kashmiri courts. Moreover, Kashmir’s—and western Tibet’s—linkages with larger Indic traditions are also discernible here: the series panels, separated by classicizing columns, are reminiscent of Gandharan stupa

drum plaques (2nd–4th centuries), while the repetitive patterning of some of the figures' textiles hearkens to the western Indian style of painting prevalent in North India between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Exceptions to the gap in small-scale painting before the seventeenth century are the rare manuscript covers. Manuscript covers provide evidence not only of the continuity of the hybrid Tibetan-Kashmiri style, but also of significant Buddhist patronage.

The 1719 *Shābnāma-ye Firdausi* provides a point of comparison for undated manuscripts, and its illustrations show local adaptation of a Persianate style that probably originated in Shiraz. There is a spontaneity and expressiveness in the figures that becomes rote in later works. Reminders of Shirazi and Timurid painting in general include the intricate arabesques of the textiles. In addition, the landscape lacks depth and, other than the detailed shrubbery, is schematic in its undulating lines. The figures' features, however, are rooted in local tastes as expressed in Hill painting, particularly the large, well-defined eyes and facial profiles.

Together with the strong presence of Persian-influenced painting styles in Kashmir, pre-Mughal idioms were still alive among the Kashmiri painters. Indeed, illustrations of Indic texts are convincing examples of the vast range of styles used freely by the painters, regardless of the illustrations' contents. An image from a Bhāgavata Purāṇa of about 1750 shows a subtle amalgamation. Basohli elements, particularly the rounded facial profiles with prominent noses and large eyes, are brought together with identifiably "Sultanate" characteristics. Compositionally, the whole image is strongly reminiscent of the late fifteenth-century *Candāyana's* depiction of Candā's flight with her lover Laur (Bharat Kala Bhavan, Banares [Varanasi]); meanwhile, the rendering of the striated domes and eaves, and the delicate color palate, are not unlike the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya's (formerly known as the Prince of Wales Museum) *Candāyana* (c. 1525–1570).

The image that captures and quite possibly personifies the trajectory of Kashmiri painting through the nineteenth century is one of the Goddess. She is shown in her apotropaic aspect, with many arms and weapons; her eyes look confidently ahead. Her aspect is somewhat softened by the mythical thousand-petaled lotus on which she sits, gently radiating and forming a transition to the muted colors and delicate arabesques of the *shamsa*. The image as a whole is the perfect balance of the stylistic poles discernible in Kashmiri painting. The traditions inherited from the Islamic world are abbreviated in the neatly executed *shamsa*, which makes reference to manuscript illustration, a practice associated with (though not exclusive to) Islamic culture. Simultaneously, the Goddess is

shown complete with all accoutrements, executed in a style representing the indigenous, "folkish" traditions abundantly evidenced in illustrations of Indic religious texts. The two styles represent the vast spectrum of creative resources available to Kashmiri painters throughout the common era.

Alka Patel

See also **Sculpture and Bronze Images from Kashmir**

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KASHMIR SHAWLS Of the myriad varieties of textiles for which India was famous over much of Europe and Asia from at least the time of the Roman Empire, the Kashmir shawl stands out as the only woollen one. Although its precise origin is lost in a haze of myth and legend, it is safe to say that it grew out of a unique combination: a superlatively fine fiber plus the highly developed set of skills necessary to work the fiber. Or, as a nineteenth-century government report put it, "It is impossible not to admire the felicitous conjunction, in the same region, of a natural product so valuable and of workmen so artistic."

The raw material of the Kashmir shawl, known in the West as "cashmere," is called pashm in India, and the fabric woven from it pashmina. It is the warm soft undercoat grown by goats herded on the high-altitude plateaus of Tibet and Ladakh as protection against the bitter winter cold. Combed out by their herders at the onset of summer, for centuries the entire clip was sent down in a series of complex trading operations to Kashmir, the only place whose craftspeople had developed the skills necessary to process it. In the 1820s it was estimated that between 121,000–242,000 pounds (55,000–110,000 kilograms) a year reached Srinagar, to be made up into some 80,000 to



Pashmina Shawl. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Kashmir or pashmina shawls were an essential element of the Indian royal and aristocratic lifestyle. In the late twentieth century they became a symbol of wealth in the West. JYOTI M. BANERJEE / FOTOMEDIA.

100,000 shawl pieces. The very finest shawls were woven from *toosh*, a similar but even finer material produced by the Tibetan antelope or *chiru*, an undomesticated species. Although the precious wool has always been procured by slaughtering the *chiru*, the amount consumed was negligible, probably less than 1,100 pounds (500 kilograms) a year, insufficient to make a dent in a population estimated in the millions. By the early twenty-first century, however, the situation had changed; wholesale slaughter in the late twentieth century brought the *chiru* population down to a few thousand. It is recognized as an endangered species, and trade in its products is banned.

Manufacture of Shawls

The transformation of the raw *pashm*, a mass of greasy fibers, into a fabric renowned for its fineness involved a series of processes. The shawl entrepreneur supplied the *pashm* in its raw state to women who, in the seclusion of their homes, undertook the painstaking and laborious task of removing the coarse outer hairs from the fleece; they then cleaned it with rice-flour paste, and spun it on wheels similar to those used everywhere in India. The

skill of spinning such delicate fiber was passed down over generations from mother to daughter.

Meanwhile the entrepreneur had employed a pattern-drawer to design the pattern of the proposed fabric. The pattern was passed to a color-master who filled in the colors, and finally to a skilled scribe who reduced the colored pattern to a shorthand form known as *talim*, which enabled a complex pattern to be recorded on quite a small piece of paper. The dyer then dyed the spun yarn in the required colors. Other workers prepared the warp and fixed it to the loom; only then did the actual weaving begin.

The classic Kashmir shawl employs a weave technically known as 2:2 twill tapestry, which is unique to this product. Tapestry implies that the design is woven into the very structure of the fabric; the weft is inserted not by a shuttle, but by a series of small bobbins filled with various colored yarns. Depending on the complexity of the design, one line of the weft may involve dozens or scores of such insertions. In Kashmir the technique is known as *kani* or *tilikar*; referring to different names for the bobbins.

Tapestry is an ancient textile technique, practiced in different areas all over the world in a plain weave, in which the weft passes alternately over and under one warp-thread at a time. It was only in Kashmir, however—and to some extent in Iran—that shawl weavers used a twill weave for tapestry, in which the weft passes over and under two warp-threads at a time, the pairing of the warps changing with every line of the weft. It is presumed that this modification was adopted to minimize the strain on the delicate pashmina warp-threads. Fabrics woven in twill exhibit a characteristic very fine diagonal rib, which enlivens the finished pattern. The borders were often woven on a silk warp, to strengthen the shawl's edging, and sometimes on a separate loom, being attached to the main body, with almost invisible seams, by the *rafugar*, or needleworker.

The creation of intricate patterns in tapestry requires an extraordinary level of manual dexterity, though in the case of shawls this was exercised with no scope for creativity, rather in mechanical response to the instructions read out from the *talim* by the master weaver. The shawl weavers were bonded to their employers by a system of perpetual debt, paid barely enough to sustain them and, on top of that, were taxed to the limit by the government. The rooms where they worked were often dimly lit and badly ventilated, and it was said that a weaver could be distinguished by the pallor of his face, his sickly physique, and above all, his delicate hands.

Tapestry weaving is a highly laborious and time-consuming technique, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, as the designs became ever more elaborate, particularly fine shawls took months and even years to complete. Accordingly, the manufacturers adopted two distinct methods of speeding up production, both exploiting the skills of the *rafugar*. On the one hand, not only the borders, but also the main bodies of the shawls began to be woven in pieces—sometimes literally hundreds, for elaborate all-over patterns—using several looms. It was the *rafugar*'s job to join these with seams so fine that only the expert eye can discern them. The other method was to abandon the twill-tapestry technique altogether, the *rafugar*'s skill being applied to the creation of patterns by embroidery in silk on plain pashmina fabric.

The word “shawl” originally referred not so much to a garment as to a fabric, and the long shoulder mantle—in India originally worn by men—was only one of many varieties of shawl-goods. Shoulder mantles were woven in pairs, and often stitched together back-to-back; they were called *do-shala*. Square items, *qasaba* or *rumal*, were made for women's wear, and long narrow ones, *patka* or *shamla*, for men's sashes. Lengths of shawl fabric in all-over designs, *jamarwar*, were intended to be tailored into men's coats (*jama*). Apart from these four main categories, about twenty-five varieties of shawl-goods were pro-

duced, including turbans, stockings, horses' and elephants' saddlecloths, carpets, curtains and other kinds of hangings, bedspreads, and shrouds for tombs.

Shawl Design

The earliest extant shawl fragments, probably from the mid- to late seventeenth century, have the two ends decorated with a simple and elegant repeated design of single flowering plants—a favorite motif of Mughal decorative art from about the 1620s—enclosed in a floral meander. Gradually the single flower evolved into a bouquet, or a flowering bush (*buta*), assuming a cone shape, typically with the topmost bloom inclined to one side. In the later eighteenth century the plain background acquired a sprinkling of small flowers; by the 1820s, as this grew denser and more elaborate, it necessitated an outline to emphasize the main motif. Thus emerged the quintessential theme of shawl design, the bent-tip *buta*, which later became known as the “paisley,” after the town in Scotland whose weavers, in the mid-nineteenth century, cornered the British market for imitation Kashmir shawls. This perennially popular design motif, noticed on objects as diverse as nineteenth-century buckles in Cyprus and contemporary coffee mugs in Scotland, to say nothing of fabrics for all sorts of uses, may be regarded as Kashmir's gift to the world.

The bent-tip *buta* found expression in myriad forms, often incorporated into other design formats, of which the most common were flower-filled stripes—especially for *jamarwar*—and roundels. Square shawls often had a large floral medallion in the center, with quarter-circles in the four corners. They are known as *chand-dar*, or moon shawls.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the patterns on the shawl's ornamented ends became increasingly complex, and also larger, often invading the central field entirely, leaving no empty space at all. At the same time, French manufacturers were adapting and developing Kashmiri design for their own Jacquard-woven shawls, while sending such modified designs to be made up in Kashmir. The resulting elaborate and fanciful shawls represented an astonishing degree of technical virtuosity. Today's embroidered shawls are made up in the whole gamut of traditional designs, modified only by the difference in technique.

History of the Kashmir Shawl

The earliest explicit documentation of the Kashmir shawl comes in the late sixteenth century in the *Ain-i-Akbari*, a comprehensive description of the Mughal empire in the time of the emperor Akbar. The *Ain*, however, is clearly referring to an already mature industry, which must have been flourishing for decades if not centuries. Kashmiri tradition attributes its origin to the great fifteenth-century sultan, Zain-ul-Abdin, who is said

to have encouraged the immigration of textile workers from abroad, possibly from Iran and central Asia.

For over two centuries Kashmir shawls and shawl-goods were an essential element of the Indian royal and aristocratic lifestyle. Demand was such that by the middle of the eighteenth century there were said to be 40,000 shawl looms in and around Srinagar. In 1752 Kashmir was wrested from the Mughals by the Afghans, who ruled until 1819. They, and the Sikh and Dogra governments that followed, imposed such heavy taxes that in the 1820s the revenue to the state from the shawl-weaving industry was greater than that from all other sources combined. As a result of these exactions the number of looms fell, and those weavers who could escape from the serflike conditions under which they were employed emigrated to the Punjab and elsewhere in North India. Even so, according to a report in the early 1820s, at least 130,000 people were working in the industry, while the value of shawls exported was about 60 lakhs (6 million) rupees.

Shawls were commissioned in designs according to the demands of different markets. As well as plains India, many Asian countries also imported Kashmir shawl-goods from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. They are mentioned in Ottoman customs records as early as 1624. *Jamawar* was popular in Iran, while both there and in the Ottoman Empire shawls were part of men's wear, worn as turbans, or around the waist as sashes. Even distant Egypt imported shawl-goods; they were admired by officers of Napoleon Bonaparte's army in 1798, some of them purchasing shawls to take home as gifts. The empress Josephine's passion for shawls set an enduring fashion in France. They had already entered the fashion scene in Britain around 1780, brought home by returning officers of the East India Company, and were regularly imported from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Over the next seventy years, export to Europe became the mainstay of the industry. At the same time, flourishing industries in "imitation Indian shawls" sprang up in both France and Great Britain; in fact, the Jacquard loom was invented as an attempt to reproduce the intricacies of Kashmir design by mechanical means.

Decline and revival. The decline of the *kani* shawl in the last decades of the nineteenth century is often attributed to changes in European fashion; but the story is more complex. Social and political shifts in India and elsewhere in Asia led to erosion of the luxurious lifestyles of elites; as they started to adopt Western fashions, the shawl became irrelevant. By the early twentieth century, reduction in demand had led to the almost complete disappearance of *kani* work. The industry was kept alive by increased production of embroidered shawls, which came to be considered an essential accessory to the winter wardrobe of middle-class women in north India.

Remarkably, however, in the early years of the twenty-first century there are indications of a purposeful revival of the *kani* shawl. The development of a wealthy business class in India, especially after the economic reforms of the 1990s, created a market for such highly priced luxury goods, in response to which some astute Kashmiri shawl-makers have initiated the resuscitation of almost extinct skills. Thus, despite political upheavals, Kashmir's craftspeople—the designer, the spinner, the plain weaver, the *rafugar* and now once again the *kani* weaver—continue to keep alive the region's tradition of manufacturing textiles of unparalleled delicacy and beauty.

Janet Rizvi

See also **Textiles: Early Painted and Printed**

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KASI (BANARES). *See Geography; Varanasi.*

KATHAK. *See Dance Forms.*

KATHAKALI. *See Dance Forms.*

KAYASTHS The Kayasth caste has been historically important in all three of its regional incarnations, in North India, Maharashtra, and Bengal. The Chitragupta Kayasths of North India, the Prabhu Kayasths of Maharashtra, and the Bengal Kayasths of Bengal, with mother tongues of Hindi, Marathi, and Bengali, respectively, fulfilled similar roles in their regional political systems. All three were “writing castes,” traditionally serving the ruling powers as administrators and record keepers. Although there is a modern tendency to see the three regional divisions as part of a single caste, they did not historically intermarry, and when Kayasth is used alone, it usually means the North Indian or Chitragupta community.

Members of all three communities were noted for their adaptability. Their linguistic and administrative abilities gained them key places in service to various rulers, and the Chitragupta and Bengal communities in particular were noted for their early movement into service with the incoming Muslim rulers of North India. They learned Persian, Urdu, and even Arabic, and many Chitragupta Kayasths accompanied the Mughals to Rajputana and the Deccan, becoming significant intermediaries in these new regional administrative systems as well. One theory about the historical origin of the Kayasths postulates that the caste arose only in medieval times, formed by those who adapted themselves earliest to service with the new rulers.

In fact, this Kayasth caste is hard to place in the Brahmanical *varṇa* system, the four caste categories elaborated in post-Vedic Sanskrit literature. The men participated fully in the various Muslim and Mughal court cultures developing throughout India since medieval times. They typically learned Arabic, Persian, or Urdu from Muslim clerics and began their education with a *bismillah* ceremony, like Muslims in those days. Sometimes the men’s names reflected their competence and membership in India’s medieval bicultural synthesis: Iqbal Chand, Jehangir Pershad, or Mahbub Karan. However, in their domestic life the Kayasths subscribed to high caste Hindu regulations governing social intercourse and life-cycle rituals. Their marriage and death customs followed high caste Hindu models, and they maintained hereditary relations with specific Hindu service castes, Brahmans and barbers, for example.

Historical sources fail to link many medieval and modern castes to the Brahmanical four-*varṇa* system, yet

attempts have been made, by Kayasths themselves or by the British Indian legal system at various times and places, to place Kayasths in one of the four *varṇas*. The Kayasths have been considered either Brahmans because of their literacy and learning, Kshatriyas because they were closely linked to rulers (and, at least in the Deccan, often to military service as well), or Sudras because they deviated significantly from the orthodox practices enjoined upon the first three *varṇas* (this last in a legal decision in British Bengal, but elsewhere as well, where Kayasths ate meat and drank wine).

The most common Kayasth myth of origin avoided this problem of *varṇa* classification by cleverly postulating the creation of a fifth *varṇa*, the Kayasths, to keep records concerning the other four. Brahma, they say, after creating the four *varṇas*, created the first Kayasth, pen and inkpot in hand. This was Chitragupta, and his chief employment was for Yama, the god of death, recording the good and bad activities of all men. Chitragupta then had twelve sons by two wives, and the subcastes or endogamous divisions among the North Indian Kayasths are traced to these sons. The subcastes have patron deities, home areas, and nominal *gotras* (exogamous divisions within the endogamous subcaste, a feature of Brahman caste organization); in reality, family distinctions, or *als*, played important roles in marriage arrangements.

Members of an urban literate caste wherever they appear in India, the Kayasths seem to have always reflected a close association with the ruling power. This was true under the Mughals, when a number of outstanding Kayasths attained very high rank in the Mughal empire, and true under the British in British India, when Kayasths were among the first to learn English and continue their administrative service. It is true today in independent India’s modern democracy; Lal Bahadur Shastri, prime minister of India from 1964 to 1966, was a Chitragupta Kayasth, and there have been other distinguished Kayasths in government service. In the past, Kayasths have sometimes been criticized for this adaptability, most often in connection with their service to the Mughals (it is said that they are like a cat on a wall, they can fall to either side), but Kayasths are not the only caste or caste cluster notable for its adaptability to ruling powers, and sometimes men said to be Kayasth are actually Khatri or Brahmo-Khatri, castes with similar names and traditions. In fact, Kayasths, like many other upwardly mobile individuals or castes in Indian history, exemplify flexibility and adaptability. They continue today to use their administrative and now professional capacities to integrate India’s diverse communities.

Karen Leonard

See also Caste System; Hyderabad



Communist Party Leader E. K. Nayanar. The longest-serving chief minister of Kerala, Communist Party leader E. K. Nayanar before his death in 2004. The portraits of his idols (Marx, Engels, and Lenin) look on. INDIA TODAY.

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KERALA, COALITION POLITICS In parliamentary democracies, political parties constitute the most essential elements for a nation's successful functioning. In India, coalition politics came rather late, mainly because the omnibus Indian National Congress, the institutional vehicle that brought freedom to India, remained the multipolar party that ruled India's central government for three decades after independence. Non-Congress parties could not effectively organize coalition opposition to

Congress at the national level prior to 1975. In Kerala state, however, soon after its formation in 1957, Congress lost to the Communist Party of India, elected with minority parties who supported its Left Democratic Front.

Between 1957 and 2003, there were twelve midterm elections to Kerala's state assembly. Of the eighteen state governments since 1957, only two were led by a single party, and both of these were short-lived. Congress led its own United Democratic Front coalition, which alternated in governing Kerala with the Left Democratic Front. The United Democratic Front government, led by Congress's A. K. Antony, has ruled the state since May 2001.

The Bharatiya Janata Party could not win even a single seat in Kerala's 140-member state assembly, or any of Kerala's 20 seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament) or its 9 seats in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of India's Parliament).

Coalition politics in Kerala has built consensus among parties and public, and political discourse in Kerala is constantly energized through the dynamics of multiparty debates within the coalition framework. As in London's

parliamentary democracy, Kerala's opposition is expected to play a constructive, responsible role. The Treasury Bench, on the other hand, estimates the potential of the rival front to come to power in the next election, thereby providing much-needed political stability and continuity. Viewed from this perspective, Kerala can serve as a model to most other Indian states, though forging an ideological unity is hardly possible in a democratic pluralist culture.

G. Gopa Kumar

See also **Kerala, Model of Development**

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KERALA, MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT Modern Kerala formally emerged as a constituent state of the Indian Union on 1 November 1956, comprising three regions: Travancore, Cochin, and Malabar. The Linguistic Reorganization Committee, which recommended the reorganization of India's states based on the majority's common language, created modern Kerala as a state in which Malayalam was the unifying language. Kerala has 392 miles (631 kilometers) of narrow coast in India's southwest, facing the Arabian Sea. It occupies a narrow but fecund strip of land (1.5 percent of the total land area in the country), supporting 4.5 percent of the nation's population. Beautiful Kerala, called "God's own country," is one of the world's most popular tourist destinations.

Kerala, a model for other Indian states, has achieved social and educational development comparable to most Western nations; this achievement is not yet matched by industrial growth or economic development. Its excellent record in education, health, and land redistribution provides a unique case for arguing that the basis for true development is social and human, rather than economic.

As of 2003, Kerala enjoyed a literacy rate of over 90 percent, only slightly higher among males than females. Kerala pioneered equitable land reforms and elected India's first Communist state government by democratic

means in 1957. The population growth rate in Kerala is the lowest in India (0.9 percent per annum), competing with China's near zero population growth rate. Population pressure on Kerala's meager land is very high, however, with 819 persons per square mile (the third highest in India). The low level of infant mortality (14 per thousand) is an indicator of the excellent health standards of the population, among both males and females. Life expectancy, averaging over 70 years for males and 75 for females, is the highest in India. The social status of Kerala's women is very high, supported by nuclear families, and Kerala has a high rate of females in the workforce. The state also recorded the lowest rate of child labor in the country. The younger population of Kerala is well trained in both software and hardware programming. Many people born in Kerala work in other parts of India, as well as in the Gulf countries, Europe, and North America. One in four Kerala households has received some of its income from the Gulf states since 1973. Of the total of some 40 million people born in Kerala, more than 8 million were living and working outside Kerala State in 2003.

However, Kerala's high levels of human development are not matched by industrial growth or generation of employment opportunities within the state. The economy became stagnant and nonproductive in many sectors, except tourism. Globalization policies had already affected its traditional industries, such as coir, hand-loomed textiles, and cashew nuts, thereby multiplying the number of unemployed in the state (25 percent in 2003, the highest in India). Nearly 4.2 million people were unemployed, and the proportion of nonworkers (including children, the elderly, and the disabled) in Kerala (68 percent) is higher than the national average (61 percent). The per capita income in Kerala, however, is estimated at 19,460 rupees, compared to 16,047 rupees at the national level.

All the villages and towns of Kerala are electrified and 91 percent of the rural habitations have access to potable water. According to the National Sample Survey, the population below the poverty line constituted only 12.5 percent, the lowest of any state in the country.

At the political level, Kerala has a healthy tradition of bipolar coalition politics in the backdrop of a multiparty system. The Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) are the two leading parties. Smaller parties, like the Communist Party of India, the Indian Union Muslim League, the Kerala Congress (M), the Kerala Congress (J), and the Kerala Congress (B), compete for power in the coalitions. The State Legislature has 140 seats, besides 9 seats in Delhi's Rajya Sabha (the Upper "House of the States" in Parliament) and 20 seats in Lok Sabha (the Lower "House of the People").

Though in 2003 54 percent of Kerala's population were Hindus, it had the largest concentration of Muslims (25 percent) after Jammu and Kashmir. It also had 20 percent Christians and a small but ancient Jewish minority.

Political History

The princely states of Travancore and Cochin were not under the direct control of Britain's paramount imperial power, but the Malabar region was part of the British Raj's Madras presidency. Historically, Travancore led the other regions in terms of social development. Its maharaja welcomed Christian missionaries, who established churches, schools, and colleges, offering a liberal Western education to the masses. The missionaries also pioneered the state's struggles against harsh Hindu practices, including untouchability and slavery. The struggle for responsible government in Travancore and the national freedom struggle in Malabar gave Kerala a galaxy of social and political leaders, known as the "four Ms": maharajas, missionaries, movements, and Marxists.

Kerala's Communist Party transformed itself into a powerful social democratic force, and adapted to India's parliamentary democratic framework. It headed seven coalition state governments, besides its own brief interlude of Communist rule, implementing land reforms and decentralization measures long before other states. High wages for workers and powerful trade unions were also contributions of the Communist Parties in Kerala.

The Kerala model of social development is unique in several respects. Its nearly egalitarian society, positive records in health, education, decentralization, and population planning, and its active coalition system of governing have made the state a vibrant civil society, transforming itself from traditional, ancient feudal roots. Kerala concentrated more on investing in its people rather than in markets. Human resources are the mainstay of its development.

G. Gopa Kumar

See also **Development Politics**

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KERKAR, KESARBAI (1892–1977), Hindustani classical singer. Kesarbai Kerkar, who hailed from the state of Goa, was born into a community of professional singers. Her first tutelage was under Abdul Karim Khan of the Kirana Gharana (lineage) for a brief period. It was followed by intermittent study under Ramkrishnabuwa Vaze for a period of ten years. Barkatullah Khan, a leading sitar player of the early twentieth century, also tutored her in singing. She mastered the complex singing style of Alladiya Khan of the Jaipur-Attarauli Gharana, under whom she studied from 1921, training for at least eight hours a day.

Kesarbai sang with a broad and flawless "aa" (a musical utterance of the vowel "aa"), which invested her music with a unique luminosity. Her vigorous, weighty execution of double-stranded fast tonal patterns left listeners speechless with wonder. She could swoop from a high octave to a deep, resonant low octave, while retaining a remarkable uniformity of volume. Continuity of sound through amazing breath control was one of the principal tenets of her singing style, and this seemingly unending breath lent grandeur to her music. Fast tonal patterns woven into the rhythmic passages compelled the constant attention of the listener. Kesarbai won many national honors. Her recording of a *thumri* in Bharavi was selected by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration for inclusion in a collection of Earth's best music, which will be sent on the spaceship *Voyager*.

Amarendra Dhaneshwar

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KESARI. See **Tata, Jamsetji N.**

KHAJURAHO Khajuraho, a medieval temple town, situated in the state of Madhya Pradesh in central India, preserves twenty-five magnificent Hindu and Jain temples. Known in inscriptions as “Kharjura-vahaka,” it flourished between A.D. 900 and 1150 as the capital of the powerful Chandella Rajputs, who ruled the region called Jejakabhukti, now the Bundelkhand area in Madhya Pradesh and southern Uttar Pradesh. Surrounded by hills of the Vindhya Range, the original town extended over 8 square miles (21 sq. km) and contained, according to tradition, about eighty-five temples, built by the successive Chandella rulers, their ministers and merchants.

The Chandellas were originally local chieftains and feudatories of the imperial Pratihara monarchs of Kannauj, but by the middle of the tenth century they consolidated power and became independent rulers. The Chandella prince Yashovarman acquired the prestigious image of Vaikuntha-Vishnu from his Pratihara overlord, and he celebrated his victory by building a splendid temple (now called Lakshmana temple), the first in the elite Nagara style, at Khajuraho around 950. The Chandella kings encouraged poetry, drama, dance, and music. Two of the rulers were themselves poets. Above all, they were great sponsors of temple art. Under them Khajuraho became one of the most important temple towns of northern India. In 1022 the Muslim historian Alberuni mentioned “Kajuraha” as the capital of the Chandella kingdom. From the twelfth century, however, the Chandellas shifted their activities to the nearby town of Mahoba and the hill forts of Kalinjar and Ajaygadh, and consequently the temple building at Khajuraho lost momentum. Even so, it remained a religious center, important enough to attract the attention of the Arab traveller Ibn Battuta, who visited Khajuraho in 1335 to see its *jogis* (yogis, mendicants) and their magical feats. Thereafter, Khajuraho gradually slipped into oblivion.

Some five centuries later, Captain T. S. Burt, a British engineer, spotted the vanished temples amidst a jungle growth that had all but covered them, and he presented his colorful account to the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1838. The local maharaja of Chhatarpur undertook extensive repair work on the temples between 1842 and



Vishvanatha Temple, Part of the Khajuraho Complex. The progressive ascent of the temple's numerous indentations and projections converges at the pinnacle, a soaring curvilinear spire. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the temple, like others in the tenth-century complex, has provided the backdrop for dramatically lit, nighttime dance performances. AFP / GETTY IMAGES.

1847. Major General Alexander Cunningham, later the first director general of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), visited the site from 1852 onward and systematically described the temples in his ASI Reports. Khajuraho monuments have remained under the care and supervision of the ASI, which has identified eighteen mounds and has undertaken excavation of at least two. Today Khajuraho is a small village, serving the tourist trade with its fine hotels. It has three museums: the Archaeological Museum, the Jain Antiquities Museum, and the Tribal and Folk Art Museum. It can be approached by road from Jhansi (109 miles [175 km]) and Satna (73 miles [117 km]), and by air from Delhi, Varanasi, and Agra. Khajuraho was designated a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in 1986.

The Temples

Of the twenty-five temples, eighteen are dedicated to the two main Hindu deities: ten to Vishnu, including his powerful composite form, Vaikuntha; and eight to Shiva. There is one temple dedicated to the sun god, one to the esoteric Yoginis (goddesses), and five to the Jain patriarchs of the Digambar sect. A colossal inscribed image of the seated Buddha was also found at this site, indicating the prevalence of Buddhism as well, though on a limited scale. An inscribed image of Hanuman attests to the worship of this monkey god. Khajuraho thus was a religious center where many cults flourished. A synthesis of cults is also indicated by a number of syncretistic icons that combine divinities, as well as by the presence of sculptures of Hindu divinities on Jain temples, and vice-versa. The Hindu religious systems of Khajuraho were Tantra-based but, unlike the skull-bearing Kapalika sect, were not extreme Tantric.

The temples are clustered in three zones. The western zone, located near the Shivasagar tank, is associated with the Chandella royal family, and it includes some of Khajuraho's most magnificent monuments: the Varaha shrine (c. 940); Lakshmana or Vaikuntha-Vishnu temple, built by King Yashovarman (consecrated in 954); Vishvanatha, built by King Dhangadeva (inscribed 999); Matangeshvara (c. 1000), originally a memorial shrine with a colossal lingam 8 feet (2.5 m) in height; and the Kandariya Mahadeva, possibly built by King Vidyadhara (c. 1030). The eastern zone comprises Jain temples built by merchants, most notably the Parshvanatha (c. 955), Ghantai (c. 970), and Adinatha (c. 1075). The southern zone includes the Chaturbhuj temple (c. 1100) with a majestic 9-foot-(5.6 m) tall icon of a unique form of Vishnu—some scholars believe it to represent the Dakshinamurti (Teacher) form of Siva—and the Duladeva temple (c. 1130), the latest in the series, built on a stellate plan. An open-air sanctuary, dedicated to the Sixty-four Yoginis (c. 900), is situated to the southwest of the Shivasagar tank, away from the main western group of temples.

Recent excavations by the Archaeological Survey of India at the Shatdhara mound in the northeastern zone have yielded early Chandella (pre-950) sculptures and architectural remains of a temple complex, affiliated to Vishnu (Dwarf incarnation). Excavations at the Bijamandala mound, in the southern zone, have exposed remains of an eleventh-century Vaidyanatha Shiva temple (112 ft [34 m] long), the largest discovered at the site.

Architectural features. Though affiliated with different religious sects, the temples have a cognate architectural style. Except for the early shrines of the Sixty-four Yoginis (c. 900), built of rough granite, and the Lalguan Mahadeva (c. 900–925) and Brahma (c. 925), constructed of both granite and sandstone, other temples from the

middle of the tenth century are constructed of fine-grained sandstone in the Nagara style with its typical curvilinear spire over the sanctum. Unlike the Orissan temples in eastern India, which have their halls as separate structures, the Khajuraho temples are compact, integrated monuments consisting of four or five units: the cella or sanctum (*garbhagriha*), vestibule (*antarala*), large hall (*maha-mandapa*), hall (*mandapa*), and porch (*ardhamandapa*). Four of the large temples are *sandhara*; that is, they have an inner ambulatory. Two of these, namely the Lakshmana and the Vishvanatha, are five-shrined (*panchayatana*), with subsidiary shrines in the four corners of the platform. Most of the temples are erected on the east-west axis and get the direct rays of the rising sun. They have no enclosure walls, as in the case of the South Indian and Orissan temples, but they have their own separate platforms to demarcate their sacred space.

The Khajuraho temples stand on a tall *jagati* (platform). They have three main divisions on elevation: basal story (*pitha*), wall (*jangha*), and the roof or spire (*shikhara*). The basal story consists of a series of ornamental moldings depicting rows of human activities (*narathara*), “masks of glory” (*kirtimukha*), and geometrical designs. The wall section is divided into two or three sculptural zones, consisting of figural sculptures—celestial maidens (*apsaras*), griffins (*vyalas*), couples (*mithunas*), and divinities. The numerous indentations and projections carried upward from the ground level to the superstructure of the temple produce a wonderful dramatic effect.

The architectural imagery of the Khajuraho temples helps us to conceive of the temple as a model of the cosmos. While the subordinate structures such as the porch and halls have pyramidal roofs, the sanctum is covered with a soaring curvilinear spire with graded peaks clustered around it. The architect creates the semblance of a mountain by emphasizing the progressive ascent of superstructures of the component units, converging at the pinnacle. Significantly, the inscriptions of Khajuraho compare the temple with Mount Kailasa, the abode of Shiva, and Mount Meru, the center of the universe. The Kandariya Mahadeva, 102 feet (31 m) high, mountainlike with its eighty-four minispire clinging to its central spire, is a masterpiece of Indian temple art.

The plan of the cella of the large temples (Lakshmana, Vishvanatha, Kandariya, Parshvanatha) resembles a three-dimensional *yantra* (geometric diagram), with the eight corners guarded by the regents of space (*dikpalas*). The three cardinal niches represent manifestations or incarnations of the main divinity enshrined in the sanctum. The iconic scheme is integrated with the religious cult of the temple.

Sculpture

Sculpture in the Khajuraho temples is harmoniously integrated with their architecture. The unified design of the temple, with its horizontal bands of sculpture, is perfectly balanced with the rising verticality of the building. Both the exteriors and interiors of the temples are lavishly carved. Ceilings are decorated with intricate geometric and floral designs. Pillar brackets bear sculptures of griffins alternating with maidens, standing under trees, carved in high relief. The sanctum doorway is decorated with conventional auspicious motifs: *mithunas* (couples), creepers, and dwarfs. It is guarded by *dvarapalas* (doorkeepers) and is “purified” by the river goddesses, Gaṅgā and Yamuna, sculpted in human form. Indeed, the profusion of figural sculptures is overwhelming. Cunningham counted 646 figures on the exterior and 226 in the interior of the Kandariya Mahadeva alone.

Style. The human body is depicted in sensuous charm in a variety of postures and attitudes. The figures are not muscular, as in Greek sculpture. The beauty of the human form is revealed from many angles through diaphanous clothes. Sculptors were adept at turning the figure around its axis. The figures of nymphs combine two views of the front and the back. Divinities smile softly and stand with languid grace. The measured elegance of the divine images, as well as the spontaneity and lyricism of the loving couples on the walls, is remarkable.

There are three phases in sculptural portrayal: prior to 950, in the excavated Shatdhara mound, revealing elements of the style prevalent in Kannauj and other sites of the Pratihara overlords; c. 950–1100, in the principal temples starting with the Lakshmana up to the Chaturbhuja temple, with typical Chandella features such as serenity of expression, tight volumes, and full modeling of figures; c. 1100–1200, the style seen in the Duladeva temple (c. 1130), with sharp features, angular bodies, and heavy ornamentation, represented also in other late Chandella sites such as Jamsot, near Allahabad.

Several categories of sculptures are seen in temples, among which are divinities, sacred and mythic animals, celestial maidens, and secular themes, including erotic figures.

Divinities. Divine images consist of cult icons in the sanctum, generally standing formally in *sama-bhanga* (equipoise, or weight equally on two feet), and carved according to canonical formulae; and multiple manifestations of the principal deity in the cardinal and surrounding niches. Also present are the *dikpalas* (regents of space), Matrikas (Divine Mothers), *grabas* (planets), and numerous lesser divinities, demigods such as flying *vidyadharas*, *gandharvas* (celestial musicians), and *ganas* (dwarfs) placed in different parts of the temple. There are

hundreds of images of divinities holding manuscripts in hand, suggesting the importance of knowledge and learning. Several deities—Vishnu, Shiva, Surya, Devi, and Jinas—sit in yogic positions.

Sacred and mythic animals. There are carvings in the round of Nandi, Shiva’s bull, and of Varaha, the boar incarnation of Vishnu. The zoomorphic icon of Varaha (c. 925), installed in the western complex of the site, is represented as a cosmic form, carrying more than 650 divinities of the Hindu pantheon carved in relief on its massive animal body. The *vyala*, a mythic composite animal, is seen in its many varieties, with faces of different animals and birds, combined with the body of a lion. Mythic aquatic creatures, *makaras*, decorate arches and niches.

Secular scenes. Warriors, dancers, musicians, hunting parties, sculptors at work, and royal figures are mainly sculpted in relief on the rows of the plinth, and in small niches of the superstructure. Men fighting a *vyala* or a lion is a favorite theme. Idealized portraits of a king and queen performing a ritual, carved in the round, are now in the site museum.

Erotic figures. It should be clarified that Khajuraho is neither synonymous with erotic sculpture nor do the temples illustrate the Indian handbook of love, the *Kāma Sūtra*, as is generally believed. Erotic themes constitute not even one-tenth of the total sculpture on the temples but have drawn undue attention. Erotic depiction was believed to be a good omen because it symbolized regeneration, and it was part of a larger tradition prevalent across India. As an auspicious and apotropaic motif, it is depicted on most temples of India—Hindu, Buddhist, Jain—built between 900 and 1300, and it is represented according to the sculptural canons of the region in which the temple is situated. Generally, however, the figures are small and placed in insignificant location. At Khajuraho, as in Orissan temples, erotic figures are placed, apart from several parts of the temple, conspicuously on the main wall. The sculptures are large in size and in graceful postures. Significantly, at Khajuraho the artists have made creative use of this already established theme, the conjunction of opposites, the union of the male and female principles, by placing it on the juncture walls (of *sandhara* temples) that link the hall for devotees and the sanctum of the divinity, to metaphorically convey something beyond the erotic. Though the surface meaning is erotic, a hidden meaning lies beneath, expressing a subtle yogic-philosophic concept—the goal of nonduality.

Maidens. *Apsaras* or *nayikas* appear on all temples of the Nagara style, whether Hindu or Jain. They are shown absorbed in various everyday activities, such as applying makeup, removing a thorn from the foot, writing a letter, or carrying a baby. One of the favorite motifs of Khajuraho

artists is a woman undressing to throw a scorpion from her body, a poetic device that expressed a fertility theme. The *apsaras* of Khajuraho and other medieval temples are auspicious art motifs whose origins can be traced back to vegetation spirits (*yakshis*) and fertility figures of early Indian art at Sanchi, Bharhut, and Mathura. In fact, the architectural Vastu texts specifically ordain sculptures of female figures on temple walls.

Meaningful Form

The art of Khajuraho reflects the highly sophisticated and Sanskritized ethos of the Chandella court. Knowledge of Sanskrit and its grammar was highly appreciated by the elite. Sculptors were innovative in creating images with unique iconography, for instance, the god Sadashiva with four feet (*padas*), suggestive of (by way of a pun on the Sanskrit word *pada* = foot = part) the four parts (*padas*) of the Shaiva religious texts.

The architects of Khajuraho were learned in Shastric (textual) traditions, as inscriptions and designs in the temples testify. They place sculptures in architectural schemes not just to decorate temples or to fill space, but also to convey concepts of cosmological import. In the Lakshmana temple, for instance, the architect arranges collective images of planetary divinities (*grabas*) on the exterior plinth, as if encircling the temple, thereby projecting the concept of the temple as Mount Meru, the mythical mountain in the center of the universe, around which the planets revolve.

The most refined achievement of Khajuraho art, the Kandariya Mahadeva temple, embodies the symbolism of the *yantra* in the plan of its sanctum, the imagery of the cosmic mountain in its multiturreted spire, and a visual expression of the Shaiva metaphysical system in its iconic scheme. Shiva-*linga*, considered the sign of the unmanifest ultimate reality, is installed in the center of the sanctum, with graded manifestations of Shiva, emanations and subemanations, in the surrounding niches, as if radiating the power of the divinity enshrined within. The temple is an ordered whole in which images are part of an integrated scheme. The Khajuraho temples represent a creative moment in Indian art when artistic talent combined with religious aspirations to produce a meaningful form.

Devangana Desai

See also **Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay**

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
KHALSA. See **Sikhism**.

KHAN, ABDUL GHAFAR (1890–1988), Pakhtun leader, opponent of partition, proponent of a Pakhtun state. Jailed for twelve years by the British and for fifteen years by Pakistani authorities, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, born in 1890 in Utmanzai in the North-West Frontier province (NWFP), remains a symbol of the values of non-violence and Pakhtun dignity.

Ghaffar Khan’s towering figure was often seen alongside Mahatma Gandhi’s smaller frame, both faithfully adhering to *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and opposing the partition of India. “Badshah” Khan endured long prison terms and solitary confinements, and was admired as much for his fearlessness as for his principles. He did not hesitate to urge his male Pakhtun followers to acknowledge their harshness to women, or to urge all of South Asia’s Hindus and Muslims to live in friendship.

Living on both sides of the boundary between the NWFP and Afghanistan and distributed among numerous tribes, the Pakhtuns were never wholly subdued by armed expeditions launched by the British, who divided Pakhtun territory into insulated “tribal” preserves governed by chiefs loyal to the British and “settled” districts directly run by Britons. Ghaffar Khan’s uneducated father Behram Khan, belonging to the Muhammadzai tribe, possessed lands in the “settled” part—in Utmanzai and elsewhere in the fertile Charsadda valley, watered by the Indus and Kabul Rivers and also by canals built by the British.

Though British occupation had offended the Pakhtuns, Behram Khan sensed its longevity and saw its



Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Freedom fighter from the northwest provinces of India, Khan was the tireless advocate of Pakhtun autonomy and peaceful Muslim-Hindu coexistence. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

advantages, and sent his boys Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Ghaffar (Jabbar was older by eight years) first to a British-run municipal school and then to the Edwardes Mission School conducted by a Reverend Wigram. Ghaffar Khan would always say that he learned the service of fellow humans from Reverend Wigram.

In 1912 Ghaffar married Mehr Qandh of Rajjar village, near Utmanzai. Two years later he made an unsuccessful bid, in company with a few others, to set up a secret anti-British base in the village of Zagai in the tribal territory of the Mohmand Pakhtuns. By this time Ghaffar had come close to Haji Fazli Wahid of Turangzai, a leading Pakhtun foe of British rule. He also visited the nationalist Muslim center of Deoband in the United Provinces, and he started a school, free of British influence, in Utmanzai.

In 1915, after having given birth to two sons, Ghani and Wali, Mehr Qandh died of influenza. Five years later, Ghaffar Khan married Nambata, also from Rajjar, who gave birth to a boy, Ali, and a daughter, Mehr Taj, but died in 1924. Two of Ghaffar Khan's four children—Ghani, later a poet and painter of renown, and Mehr Taj—were sent to the West for their studies.

Ghaffar Khan advocated both Pakhtun reform and Pakhtun autonomy. In 1919 Mahatma Gandhi, who had returned four years previously from his long struggle for Indian rights in South Africa, called for a nationwide nonviolent protest against the repressive Rowlatt "Black" Acts. The anti-Rowlatt rally in Utmanzai that Ghaffar Khan organized and addressed on 6 April 1919 marked the beginning of his nonviolent struggle for Pakhtun and Indian independence. It would bring him bitter prison terms in 1919, 1922 to 1924, 1930 to 1931, 1931 to 1934, 1934 to 1935, and 1942 to 1945. In 1928 he launched the journal *Pakhtun* and the following year his "Red Shirt" Khudai Khidmatgar (Serving Volunteers of God) movement, which included a political dimension.

Though most Khudai Khidmatgars were Muslims, the organization included Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, and Parsis. During the 1930s and the early 1940s, the volunteers added up to more than thirty thousand. Each took a pledge to eschew violence and revenge, and to reduce feuds in Pakhtun society. Ghaffar Khan's nonviolence was doubtless connected to his association with Gandhi, whom he first saw in 1920, but even more to his longing to rescue the Pakhtuns from the custom of *badal* (revenge) and to the violence of British reprisals.

One of the dramatic episodes during the India-wide campaigns of the 1930s occurred in Peshawar's Kissa Khwani Bazaar. On 23 April 1930, during a crackdown in which a number of Pathans were killed, soldiers of the Raj's Garhwal Rifles refused to obey their officer's order to fire at a crowd of unarmed Pathans. In 1934 the presidency of the All-India Congress was offered to Ghaffar Khan, who claimed inadequacy and declined the honor, wary perhaps of being drawn too deeply into non-Pakhtun affairs.

After elections for provincial power held in 1937 and again in 1946, the Khudai Khidmatgars, who had merged into the Indian National Congress, formed ministries in the NWFP, headed by Ghaffar Khan's older brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, as Abdul Jabbar was then called.

On philosophical as well as practical grounds, Ghaffar Khan opposed the Pakistan demand articulated from 1940 by the Muslim League. His tolerant Islam sanctioned Muslim-Hindu coexistence. Moreover, he feared for the future of Pakhtun culture in a Punjab-dominated Pakistan. Preferring a wider polity, he allied with the Congress until the spring of 1947, when the Congress accepted the subcontinent's partition. Feeling betrayed, Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars left the Congress, boycotting the NWFP plebiscite (which went in Pakistan's favor), calling for a state of Pakhtunistan (land of the Pakhtuns). In the years that followed, when he and his followers were persecuted and imprisoned, Ghaffar

Khan repeatedly insisted that his Pakhtunistan would remain connected to Pakistan, but Pakistan's rulers considered him a secessionist. When not in prison he continued to advocate Pakhtun autonomy, nonviolence, and antipoverty policies. Some of his agenda was taken up by his son Wali Khan, who became the president of the National Awami Party that Ghaffar Khan helped found in the early 1950s.

From 1965 until his death, Ghaffar Khan divided his time between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he wrote his autobiography and where, in the town of Jalalabad, he built a home. Visiting India in 1969, the centenary of Gandhi's birth, he spoke candidly about the vulnerability of India's Muslim minority and what he saw as India's rejection of nonviolence. In 1987 India honored him with its highest award, the Bharat Ratna.

Ghaffar Khan's death in a Peshawar hospital in 1988 was followed by an unprecedented procession of thousands of Pakhtuns accompanying his coffin across the Khyber Pass to Jalalabad, where, by his choice, he was buried.

Rajmohan Gandhi

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KHAN, ALI AKBAR (1922–), musician and educator who helped popularize North Indian classical music in the second half of the twentieth century. The son of Allaudin Khan, Ali Akbar Khan was born in Shivpur, East Bengal, in 1922. He studied with his father (who also taught sitarist Ravi Shankar) in a context of royal patronage and experimentation. His professional career has included a diversity of roles, including court musician (to the Maharaja of Jodhpur), film composer (including *Devi* for Satyajit Ray), radio station music director, concert performer, and prolific teacher, and he has received

numerous awards and honors. Khan, perhaps more than any other modern Indian classical musician, has demonstrated a flair and an interest for melding Indian sensibilities and Western materials.

Ali Akbar Khan's distinctive approach to the sarod, a North Indian lute, has emphasized original ideas, a rhythmic flair, and collaborative dynamics. His fluent melodic adeptness is evident in his creation of new *rāgas* from existing tunes and motifs as well as in his ability to draw new ideas from old *rāgas*. His performance style features a masterful control of rhythm and time and recognition of the drummer's art.

His Ali Akbar College of Music has two campuses—one in Kolkata and one in the San Francisco area—that have trained a new generation of performers and helped to educate the world about Indian music. More recently, in keeping with his previous musical experiments for film, he has explored cross-cultural musical idioms.

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KHAN, LIAQUAT ALI (1895–1951), Pakistan's first prime minister (1947–1951). Muhammad Liaquat Ali Khan was born in Karnal, Punjab, India, on 1 October 1895. He was the second son of the *nawāb* of Karnal (his elder stepbrother, Sajjad, inherited the title). Liaquat received his early education at home, studying the Qur'an and the Hadith and taking music lessons. He was fond of singing, dancing, and theater. Throughout his life he was known as an amiable and warmhearted person, though reserved. In 1910 he joined the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College school at Aligarh. Matriculating in 1915, he entered the college, and graduated in 1918. He was married to his cousin Jehangira Begum; their only child, a son, Wilayat, was born in 1919.

Liaquat entered Oxford University in 1920 as a "non-collegiate student," enrolling in Exeter College there the following year. He received his bachelor of arts in jurisprudence in August 1921. The following year he was called to the Bar from London's Inner Temple. He returned to India at the end of 1922 and enrolled as an advocate in Punjab's High Court. Independently wealthy, he did not practice law, instead devoting his life to politics and education, joining the Muslim League in 1923.



Liaquat Ali Khan. In May 1950 the principled Liaquat journeyed from Pakistan to solidify his country's relations with the United States. Here he addresses a New York City audience. His refusal to tolerate political corruption among his cabinet ministers is widely believed to have led to his assassination a year later. BETTMANN / CORBIS.

He stood, unsuccessfully, in 1923 for election to the Legislative Assembly of India for East Punjab. In 1926, however, he was elected to the Legislative Council of the United Provinces, as an independent from Muzaffarnagar District, a Muslim constituency. In the council he founded his own political party, the Democratic Party. He was also one of the leading figures of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindars' Association, an organization devoted primarily to landlord interests. He had a very successful career in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council, being elected deputy speaker in 1931. In social matters he was liberal, speaking, for example, in favor of education for women; he was conservative, however, on fiscal issues. As a landholder he was concerned about agricultural issues and as a Muslim he was devoted to Muslim interests. He was no bigot, however; his second wife was a Christian, the educator and social reformer, Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan. They had two sons, Ashraf and Akber. In 1937 Liaquat was elected to the Legislative Assembly of the United Provinces.

In 1928 Liaquat was one of twenty-four Muslim League delegates chosen to attend India's All-Parties Convention to consider the Motilal Nehru Report on Constitutional Reforms. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the Muslim League spokesman at the convention, and from that time Liaquat became his lifelong devoted follower. In 1933 Liaquat testified before the Joint Statutory Commission in London, where he again met Jinnah.

In April 1936 Jinnah, as president, asked Liaquat to become the general-secretary of the Muslim League. He was to hold that position until 1947, and he was to become Jinnah's most trusted lieutenant and political adviser. Liaquat was totally loyal, and Jinnah came to depend heavily upon him. In 1939, when Jinnah signed his last will and testament, he appointed Liaquat one of the executors and trustees of his estate. All of the organizational work involving the Muslim League's committees, conferences, and publications was handled by Liaquat, who spent long days working in the League

office in Delhi, while continuing his legislative and educational responsibilities, serving as president of the Anglo-Arabic College in Delhi and as a member of the board of trustees of Aligarh University.

Liaquat was elected to the Legislative Assembly of India in 1941, joining Jinnah on the Muslim League bench there, serving as deputy leader of the League's parliamentary party. In Jinnah's absence Liaquat became the League's spokesman. He established the League's first newspaper, *Dawn*, as a weekly in 1941, and the following year turned it into a daily. In 1943, when Liaquat was reelected general secretary of the Muslim League, Jinnah called him "my right hand." In 1945 and 1946 Liaquat was Jinnah's chief associate at the two Simla summit conferences. In 1946 Jinnah nominated Liaquat to be the British viceroy's finance member and asked Liaquat to accompany him to London for constitutional talks with Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In 1947 Liaquat issued the controversial "Poor Man's Budget," and Governor-General Jinnah later appointed him prime minister of the new state of Pakistan.

As prime minister, Liaquat worked diligently to establish the country on a sound organizational footing, a task for which he was ideally suited. Until Jinnah's death on 11 September 1948, however, Liaquat was overshadowed by the towering figure of Jinnah, whose authority in Pakistan was supreme. From 1947, the issue that poisoned India-Pakistan relations and made an enormous impact on the political and military history of the country was the conflict over Kashmir, which had been given to India by its Hindu maharaja. Liaquat was successful in raising the issue of Kashmir at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in 1949. The same year he arranged for the passing of a Directive Principles Resolution, which established the basic principles of Pakistan's Constitution, which would later be promulgated. Liaquat made a successful trip to the United States in 1950, helping to establish a friendly and lasting relationship between the two countries.

Liaquat and the new government had to deal with several serious problems, including the settlement of millions of Muslim refugees from India; the setting up of a central government in Karachi almost from scratch, including the creation of a sound economic system; and the crisis over Kashmir, which immediately led to war between India and Pakistan. Only the Kashmir crisis was not solved within a short time, through herculean efforts by Liaquat and the government.

Liaquat was an exceedingly generous man, and when he migrated to Pakistan, he refused to accept any property in Pakistan in exchange for his landholdings in India. His property was all given to his first wife and their son. His refusal to tolerate political corruption among his

cabinet ministers is thought to have led to his assassination at Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951, when he was shot at close range. His assassin, Said Akbar, an Afghan, was shot dead immediately by police, and no one was ever charged in what many believed was a conspiracy by members of his own government.

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See also **All-India Muslim League; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Pakistan**

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KHAN, VILAYAT (1924–2004), classical North Indian musician. Vilayat Hussain Khan's virtuosic sitar playing and international tours have helped to define Indian classical music, both in India and abroad, in the second half of the twentieth century. His family's musical tradition often describes itself as the Imdad Khan *gharanā*, after his renowned grandfather, although they also trace their lineage to the even more celebrated musician Tan Sen. Vilayat Khan studied with his father, Inayat Khan, until his death in 1938; he then continued his studies with his mother and her father, Bande Hasan Khan. The family tradition has emphasized the sitar and the *surbahār*, but Vilayat Khan's unique background (he had both instrumental and vocal teachers) has led him to integrate vocal devices and idioms into his performances. Indeed, a sitar performance by Vilayat Khan is likely to have a section in which he sings the principal melody. This *gāyaki ang* (singing style) approach to playing the sitar and *surbahār* marks both his performances and those of his brother, Imrat Khan, and now continues in the playing style of Vilayat Khan's son, Shujaat Khan.

Vilayat Khan's style of playing and his demeanor on stage hark back to the courtly origins of India's modern classical music. When Satyajit Ray sought someone to compose music and to direct the music sequences for his film about an aging aristocratic *zamindar* (*Jalsa Ghar*; The music room), he chose Vilayat Khan. Khan's recordings of the *rāgs* Yaman, Bhairavī, and Jaijivanti are iconographic for many musicians; the recording of his duets with *shahnā'ī* virtuoso Bismillah Khan may be one of the most popular recordings of North Indian classical music. Also noteworthy are his illustrative examples for Jairazbhoy's *The Rāgs of North Indian Music* (1971) which serve as *rāga* references for many music scholars.

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KHAYAL *Khayal* (Arabic-Persian, “lyric” or “imagination”) is perhaps the most important vocal genre in the Hindustani *sangīt paddhati*, or musical tradition. The origins of *khayal* are often associated with the famous musician Amir Khusrau. (1253–1325).

The sultans of Jaunpur—notably Mohammad Sharqi (1401–1440) and Hussain Sarqi (r. 1458–1499), who were contemporaries of the Mughal emperor Babur—were patrons of musicians who developed *khayal*. In that era, the genre was “ornate and romantic,” most popular with Muslim musicians, and reflected the growing dominance of Islamic power.

Khayal grew in importance in seventeenth-century Jaipur and found a prolific champion in Sadarang (Niyamat Khan), a musician in the court of Muhammad Shah (r. 1719–1748) and a descendant of Tansen. Sadarang was a *dhrupad* (he composed praise and/or Hindu devotional music) singer who apparently adopted the musical techniques of *qawwālī* (Sufi devotional music) musicians to create a genre that was both artistically sophisticated and a compelling vehicle for virtuosic performance. Because he and his nephew Adarang were officially *dhrupad* singers, the performance of this new genre was not part of their duties. However, others could perform *khayal*, especially if they were disciples, not in direct line with Sadarang and Adarang. *Khayal* thus offered a contrast to the more austere *dhrupad*.

Chronicles of the seventeenth-century Delhi-Agra rule of Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658) mention *khayaliyās* (singers of *khayal*) among the royal performers. In eighteenth-century northern India, hereditary musicians consolidated their power by fostering musical knowledge within their families. The *khayaliyās* of the mid-eighteenth century came from families who specialized in either *dhrupad* or *qawwālī*. However, they came to focus increasingly on *khayal* as their primary performance medium. The earliest performers were primarily Muslim. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, performers further developed *khayal*, and this style of singing became the predominant vocal genre in the improvisatory system of North Indian music.

A full performance of *khayal* is organized of two main parts—*badā khayal* and *chotā khayal*—and each of these has at its core a musical theme, the *cīz* (Persian, “thing, idea”). The melodic structure of a *cīz* serves as the frame-

work around which performers improvise. Sometimes, the melody is the framework upon which the singer creates elaborate melodic detail. At other times, the singer presents the *cīz* in a simple, unadorned form, contrasting the fixed composition with elaborate extemporizations.

In the *badā khayal* (Hindustani, “big” *khayal*), a singer performs in very slow tempo (*ati vilambit lay*). Tīntāl, Ektāl, and Jhūmrā are the most common *tālas* (in 16, 12, and 14 beats respectively). The *badā khayal* also serves as a parallel to the *ālāp* (free-time melodic introduction) of *dhrupad* in that the performer has considerable rhythmic freedom. The tempo of the *badā khayal* slowed considerably in the twentieth century, notably through performances by Ustad Amir Khan.

The *cīz* consists of two parts: *sthā'ī* (composed in *mandra sthān* [lower octave] and the bottom half of the *madhya sthān* [middle octave]) and the *antarā* (composed in the upper half of the *madhya sthān* and the lower half of the *tār sthān* [upper octave]). The former is the more important, recurring regularly as a refrain, while the latter generally has more text content.

In the *badā khayal*, the *sthā'ī* and *antarā* imitate the structure of the *rāg ālāp* found in other South Asian forms. In the *badā khayal*, the singer often refers only briefly to the original *cīz*, singing just the *mukharā* (face) of the composition.

The *cīz* in the *chotā khayal* (Hindustani, “small” *khayal*) is in fast tempo (*drut lay*), commonly set in Tīntāl, and is more plain than in *badā khayal*. Here, the focus of the singer is on virtuosic extemporization, featuring fast melodic figures and difficult rhythmic elaborations.

Khayal texts can be of a variety of types, ranging from historic poems to contemporary creations by musicians or patrons. Their subjects can be advice, religious devotion, deities (e.g., Krishna), praise of patrons, or descriptions of seasons. Love, both divine and human, is a common theme.

Although the *badā khayal* replaces the *ālāp* of other forms in the Hindustani *sangīt paddhati*, some similarities remain. The *rūpak ālāpti* (Sanskrit, “shape” or “form” *ālāp*) is an *ālāp*-like section of the *badā khayal*, sung to the preexisting shape of the *cīz* and set metrically rather than in free time.

Most of the musical attention in *khayal* focuses on the various kinds of *tan*, fast melodic figures of a virtuosic nature. These commonly include *ākār tāns* (Hindustani, literally “to do ‘a’”; elaborations in which the singer uses only the syllable “a”), *gamak tāns* (*gamak*, Hindustani, “syllable”; elaborations using a heavy glottal shake), and *bol tāns* (*bol*, Hindustani, “syllable”; elaborations

intended to expand upon the meaning of the words of the text).

A number of these improvisations are common to both *khayal* and *dhrupad*. Examples include *bol bānt* (Hindustani, “syllable distribution”; the use of the *cīz bols* for purposes of rhythmic play [*laykārī*], such as the creation of *tibā’īs* using the text), *sārgam* (Hindustani, *sā-re-gā-mā*; elaborations using the mnemonic pitch syllables *sā-re-gā-mā*, etc.), and *nom-tom* (elaborations with a rhythmic pulse created through the use of syllables like “*nom*,” “*tom*,” and “*ta-ra-nā*”).

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
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KHILAFAT MOVEMENT. See **Afghani, Jamal-uddin; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

KHUSRAU, AMIR (1253–1325), poet, writer, and musician. Amir Khusrau was born in Patiali, in the Braj-speaking Indo-Gangetic Plain, in 1253, the son of a central Asian, Turkic-speaking father and an Indian mother. Sometimes known as Amir Khusrau Dihlavi or Amir Khusrau-e-Dihlavi, Khusrau was the most important poet, writer, and musician of his age and the subject of much musical speculation. His poetry, both in Persian and Hindi, remains popular both for its imagery and as a source of musical settings. His riddles, like his poems, draw on the sound and meaning of words and continue to entertain readers. Some have credited Khusrau with the creation of specific melodies and rhythms, of instruments such as the *sitār* and the *tabla*, and even of genres such as *qarwālī* and *khayal*. Although most of these attributions are mythic, Khusrau was influential in the fusion of West Asian (particularly Persian) musical ideas with those of India. (Some confusion may exist because of the similarity of his name to that of Amir Khusrau Khan, an important eighteenth-century Delhi musician.) Khusrau was influenced by the Sufi teacher Khwaja Nizamuddin Auliya for whom music was an important mode of experiencing the divine.

Of the courts in which Amir Khusrau was known to have been active, that of Ala’-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji, sultan of Delhi (r. 1296–1326), proved to be particularly fertile ground for cultural exchange. The Muslim rulers of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Delhi attempted to raise the prestige of their courts by patronizing scholars and artists as advisers and courtiers.



Rudyard Kipling. In his lifetime, as a firm believer in British imperialism, Kipling went from being the unofficial poet laureate of Great Britain to one of the most denounced writers in modern history. As his literary reputation declined, Kipling’s work matured and by his death he had compiled one of the most diverse collections of poetry in the English language. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

Probably as a consequence of his role as a courtier, Khusrau studied and described many musical theories and performance practices of his era.

Gordon Thompson

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KHYBER PASS. See **Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier; Geography.**

KIPLING, RUDYARD (1865–1936), British poet and novelist. Joseph Rudyard Kipling was Britain’s greatest poet of the Raj. His works, including his “White Man’s Burden” (1899) and *Kim* (1901), sought to extol the “virtues” of racial prejudice and imperial power. Born in India, where his father, John, worked as an architectural

sculptor in the Bombay School of Art, Rudyard's first five years were carefree; but when shipped "home" to live with a mean-spirited "pious" family in Southsea, he suffered wretched "beatings and humiliations." His mother, Alice, returned from India in 1877 to rescue him from the tyranny of pious discipline, entering her brilliant son in the United Service College, Westwood Ho. Five years later, Kipling returned to India as a reporter, hired by Lahore's *Civil and Military Gazette*, for which he wrote *Departmental Ditties* (1886) and *Plain Tales from the Hills* (1888), as well as *Barrack-Room Ballads* (1892), which soon made his name and poetry more famous than any viceroy of India.

Nor was his fame limited to India, for in 1889, Kipling traveled to Japan and to the United States, living four years in Brattleboro, Vermont, where he wrote *The Light That Failed* (1891) and started his two *Jungle Books* (1894–1895), anticipating his later *Just So Stories for Little Children* (1902). Kipling believed so deeply in the virtues of British imperialism that he wrote his "White Man's Burden" to help Theodore Roosevelt persuade many doubting Americans to seize the Philippines in 1899.

Take up the White Man's burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need.

When World War I started, Kipling pushed his own sixteen-year-old son to a tragically early grave on the Western Front, pulling strings with friends at the War Office, to hustle underage John off to Loos, where he was killed after less than a month of bloody combat.

Take up the White Man's burden—
The savage wars of peace—
Fill full the mouth of Famine
and bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hope to nought.

For Kipling believed that it was, indeed, to "civilize" India's darkly "benighted natives," not to exploit and bully them, that thousands of "selfless servants" of the British Raj hefted their daily "burdens."

"And the end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the name of the late deceased," another of Kipling's popular poems reminded his comrades in the Great Game of shaking South India's "Trees" bare of their golden pagodas, and milking North India's sacred cows dry. "And the epitaph drear: 'A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.'" Born to India though he was, Kipling's contempt

for its "natives" was imbibed with his ayah's milk, even as Jallianwala Bagh Brigadier Dyer's was. As Kipling put it: "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet!" That was the theme as well of his novel *The Man Who Would Be King* (1899).

In 1907 Kipling won the Nobel Prize for literature. He started to write his autobiography, *Something of Myself*, but died in London, on 18 January 1936, before it was finished.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British Impact**

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KĪRTANA The Sanskrit word *kīrtana* (recital, glory) refers to the praise of God. The South Indian *kīrtana* is a simple song with a main theme or refrain (*pallavi*) and several stanzas (*charana*). Here, as in many other parts of the country, the *kīrtana* or *kīrtan* forms the basis for responsorial singing (*bhajana*). Under the guidance of an experienced singer (*kīrtanakār*), the practice of *nāma sankīrtana* (singing His praises) is conducive to ecstatic experiences, as described by Tyāgarāja in his piece "Intakannānandamēmi" (*rāga Bilahari*): "Is there any bliss greater than this—to deem it sufficient to dance, to sing divine music, to pray for His presence and to be in communion with him in mind . . . to become one with Him." (Raghavan).

With reference to a tripartite concert item in a South Indian concert, the term *kīrtana* is also used as a synonym for *kṛiti*. Wherever the *anupallavi* (middle section) is dispensed with, for instance in Tyāgarāja's invocations of the "divine names" of Vishnu (*divyanāma kīrtana*), the term *kīrtana* is used more appropriately. During a Karnatak concert, several *kīrtanas* and *kṛitis* by famous as well as less-known composers are usually heard.

When Tānjāvūr came under Marāthā rule (late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries), *barikathā*, the narration of stories (*kathā*) about Vishnu (*hari*), developed into a popular form of art and entertainment. The *Gītā Govinda*, Jayadēva's celebrated Sanskrit work (twelfth century), facilitated the spread of the cult of Krishna and Rādhā and inspired South Indian poet-musicians (*vāggēyakāra*) to explore its erotic symbolism through Telugu lyrics. While the concept of "classical" Karnatak music began to evolve, there was widespread appreciation for the vernacular lyrics of many devotional *bhakti* poets.



Shabad Kirtan at Nehru Park. Musicians and signers perform in a *kīrtana* concert at a park in New Delhi, 2003. AVINASH PASRICHA.

For Tyāgarāja, as for his father before him, the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic provided ideal role models in terms of righteousness and self-control. He and other learned musicians (*bhāgavataṛ*) refined their presentations of songs and stories for the purpose of expounding ideas derived from *advaita* (nondualist) philosophy, emphasizing the divine origin and destination of all human existence. Several poet-singers called for reforms and condemned social evils such as the caste system and ritualism. The time-honored literary motifs and musical techniques employed by these “saint-singers” of South India were consolidated and refined in the course of the eighteenth century, when artists from many parts of India were brought into contact with one another either through involuntary migration or in search of patronage.

As the court and temple establishments of Tamil Nadu promoted scholarship and the arts throughout history, the *kīrtana* evolved as a flexible musical form that could capture and convey the ideas and feelings of all sections of society in many different ways. In this sense, the *kīrtana* not only absorbed some of the elements from tradition (*sampradāya*) but effectively superseded older musical forms such as the medieval *prabandha*. Other

genres—most notably the *kṛiti*, with its emphasis on musical refinement, and the *jāvāli*, which is based on erotic lyrics—can therefore be traced back to the new type of *kīrtana* of South India.

Kīrtanas (Tamil *kīrtanaṭi*) have enriched other branches of South India’s performing arts. A case in point is the art of narrating and expounding religious stories in a musical context, known as *harikatā kālakṣēpam*. This genre is traditionally presented by learned male performers (*bhāgavataṛ*), although at a later stage, several women became famous exponents in their own right. A close relationship among the various genres, including the dance music for *bharata nāṭyam*, *kucchipudi*, and *mōbiniyāttam*, and also for drama (*Mēlattūr bhāgavata mēlam*), has characterized all devotional poetry and music of South India since time immemorial. As a result, numerous poetic references to other artistic and literary genres are found in the lyrics of the *kīrtana* repertoire heard today, for instance the fast rhythmic passages (*sholkattu*), reminiscent of dance movements, contained in the songs of Ūttukādu Venkata Subba Ayyar (c. 1700–1765).

By way of endowing the patriotic sentiments of South India’s educated classes with a religious dimension, the

customary *kīrtana* has also contributed to the freedom struggle that led to India's independence in 1947. Through the lyrics of patriotic poets and social reformers like Bhāratiyar, elements from Karnatak music found their way into popular music, and other famous musicians and composers of the twentieth century introduced elements based on the *kīrtana* into radio, film, and television productions. The same applies to cross-cultural ventures variously described as *jugalbandi* (joint performances by Indian musicians) and fusion music outside India's borders.

The lyrics of several contemporary poets whose names are listed as "composers" are commonly presented during concerts without mentioning the names of the musicians who have composed the music. This is indicative of the prestige associated, even today, with the lyrics (*sābitya*) rather than the melodic and rhythmical framework (*varnamettu*) of a song. The prevalence of such notions, not to mention the vast creative scope within Karnatak music, leaves many questions about the authenticity and integrity of the songs by most early composers unanswered. In the case of most "rediscoveries" of songs by composers who lived before the late nineteenth century, experienced musicians are widely believed to have demonstrated their compositional skills by providing suitable tunes and rhythms to existing lyrics. Ascribing one's art or knowledge to a revered personality of the distant past has long been a common practice in different fields of learning in India.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Kriti; Music: South India**

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KOLKATA. See **Calcutta**.

KRISHNA. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

KRISHNA IN INDIAN ART The origin and history of the myth of Krishna are complex. Over a period of a thousand years or more, many strands coalesced to form a predominant, multifaceted character called Krishna. Myths and legends associated with him pervade India's literature as well as its visual and performing arts. Concurrently, there are theological and liturgical works that interpenetrate into the aesthetic theories and artistic expressions.

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa consolidates the several myths into an impressive narrative, which has held the imagination of artists and devotees alike for a millennia or more. Jayadeva wrote a poem titled *Gītā Govinda* in the twelfth century, in which he introduced the character of Rādhā, a special beloved of Krishna. There was but a faint mention of her in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Jayadeva's poem gave a new twist to the perennial theme of Krishna and the *gopis* (cowherdresses). From then on, a further coalescing of Krishna as Vishnu and of Rādhā as Sri and Lakshmi and Shakti (female energy personified) took place. Sculpture, painting, theater, music, and dance rely heavily on these principal literary sources of varying periods. In turn, theology and liturgy has been affected by them. Many theological schools evolved, known as *Sampradayas*; each was a distinctive cult that incorporated the verbal, visual, and kinetic arts as an integral part of Krishna worship and ritual. The kernel of the myth of the baby child, adult king, and counselor was retained, but many modifications took place in India's regional literatures and in its visual and performing arts until the nineteenth century.

The Krishna Theme in Sculpture

The first examples of the Krishna theme in Indian sculpture belong to the Kushan period, during the first and second centuries A.D. The thematic context of these sculptures revolves around Krishna Vasudeva, not Krishna Gopala. There are, however, a few important exceptions. A relief in the Mathura Museum depicts Vasudeva carrying baby Krishna across the Jamuna River to the village of Gokula. Besides these, other Kushan sculptures depict Krishna-Vasudeva, of the Virshni lineage, along with his kinsmen, particularly Samkarsana Balarama, his elder brother, and sister Ekanamsa.

A clear change in emphasis begins with the Guptan period, fourth to sixth centuries, roughly A.D. 320–530. There are many more sculptures on the Krishna theme, especially in his aspect as Krishna Gopala of Braj. The Krishna Gopal theme becomes pervasive not only in Mathura and Rajasthan, but is equally popular in South



Painting of Young Krishna. Krishnalila remains a favorite theme of contemporary art schools in India. Here, painting of the young Krishna in his opulent palace. Image photographed c. 1925. BETTMANN / CORBIS.

India. While the Mandor and Osian panels are important evidence from Rajasthan, no less important are the Krishna life panels from South India, particularly Badami. All these belong to the fifth to seventh century.

From the tenth century onward begins another phase of medieval Indian sculpture. Several major temples were built in the north, south, west, and east. In many of them there are friezes portraying the episodes of Krishna's early life. Sometimes they are single panels, as in the Lakshman temple in Khajuraho, Madhya Pradesh. At other times there are continuous serialized depictions, as in the Hoysala period temples of Belur, Halebid, and Somanathpur in Karnataka. An elaborate visual panorama unfolds on these walls, almost like a painting scroll.

While friezes of continuous narration are one methodology, there is the other of equal importance. It is largely during this period that single images of Krishna appear both in stone and in bronze. The baby Krishna

with a butter ball is popular among the Chola bronzes. Equally important and impressive are the bronzes of Krishna dancing on the serpent Kaliya, and Krishna as the flute player (Venugopala), and Krishna the dancer supreme. The South Indian bronzes, especially those of Chola, are outstanding for their artistic skill.

The Krishna theme appears on the wooden chariots of practically all parts of South India. There are intricate carvings on the different parts of the chariot, including the spokes of the wheels and the frame of the chariot seat. Krishna is depicted in the metal sculpture of Nepal. Some sculptures, especially of the dancing Krishna and Krishna with flute (Venugopala), display exquisite craftsmanship.

The Vishnupur temples of the eighteenth century of Bengal began to use the medium of terra-cotta. The brick and terra-cotta temples of Bengal belong to the last phase of the Indian architects' and sculptors' preoccupation with the Krishna theme.

The Krishna Theme in Indian Painting

The inspirations provided by the Bhāgavata Purāṇa gave rise also to devotional poetry in many Indian languages: Braja Bhasa in the north; Gujarati in the west; Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada in the south; and Bengali, Oriya, and Asamiya in the east. By the fifteenth century there was a vast body of poetry, which was not only the preserve of the elite or Sanskrit speaking, but was the language and literature of the high and the low, the affluent and the poor.

Painting, music, dance, and theater were the visual, aural, and kinetic counterparts of this powerful and pervasive movement. Any account of the Krishna theme in Indian painting has necessarily to recognize the rise of Vaishnavism, the popular *bhakti* movement, and the impact of the poetry of the *bhakti* poet-saints.

Evidence of the Krishna theme in Indian mural painting has to be traced to the magnificent large-scale depiction of the theme in South India, particularly Kerala. The Padmanabhapuram palace, the Mattancherry palace of Cochin (18th century), and the Padmanabhaswami temple (17th century) murals are striking examples of a distinctive style of painting that is analogous to the performing arts tradition of the region, particularly Kathakali.

However, by the fifteenth century and more particularly the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was a prolific popularity of miniature paintings based on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Gītā Govinda. Later, the poetry of Suradas, Keshavadasa, Bihari, and other poets became the backdrop or springboard for their pictorial visualization of the theme. The paintings have been

considered as mere illustrations of the text. However, a closer analysis reveals that the painters employed a variety of means to create their own visual text, which did not literally follow the verbal text.

It is in the varied schools of Rajasthani painting that we encounter a major preoccupation with the Krishna theme. Indeed, besides portraits and a few other local legends, such as Dhola Maru, most Rajasthani painting, in all its schools and styles, revolves around Krishna. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is central, but the Gītā Govinda is not far behind. A Muslim artist, Sahibdin, executed a Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Housed in the Bhandarkar Institute of Pune, it is an exquisite example of the Mewari school of Rajasthani painting. He also painted over two hundred leaves of the Gītā Govinda. He followed the poem canto by canto, verse by verse, and yet made his paintings as if to sing the songs of praise of Lord Krishna. The artistic excellence of these paintings is clear proof of the artist's deep immersion in the theme and his acquaintance if not subscription to the symbolic import of the meaning of the text he was interpreting.

While the Mewar school has other sets, the paintings of the schools of Bundi, Kotah, Bikaner, and Keshangarh, from the seventeenth to late eighteenth centuries, largely revolve around the Krishna theme. So far more than thirty sets of the Gītā Govinda alone have been identified. There are perhaps others. Their content and stylistic analysis is beyond the scope of this article. There are other Bhāgavata Purāṇa sets besides those of Mewar, including important sets from Malwa. The poet Surdas's work *Bbramar Gītā* is another favorite, and so is the *Rasikapriya* of Keshavadasa, on the love of Krishna and Radha.

Two developments should be noted. First, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, especially canto 10 (*Dasamaskanda*), provides the basis of pictorially depicting the Krishna dance *rasa*. Second, the other childhood pranks or plays (*lila*) of the Gītā Govinda place Rādhā as a special *sakhi*, central to the theme. The theme of love in separation and union becomes the theme not only of the paintings illustrating the Gītā Govinda but also of others that revolve around the seasons, such as *Barabmasa* (the 12 seasons), and the paintings that revolve around the hero-heroine typologies (*Nayaka-Nayika*). While the *rasa* symbolizes the love of the human and the divine, Rādhā and Krishna begin to represent the yearning of the individual soul for the universal (*jivatma* and *paramatma*). This aspect is subsumed; even when explicit, these paintings appear amorous, sensuous, and profane, yet they are largely sacred and devotional in essence. The sensuous and spiritual become two levels of the same pictorial image.

Finally, there is another group of paintings, which are directly related to ritual. In the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, Braj became the center of Krishna worship. This was the result of the overpowering influence of Saint Chaitanya (1485–1533), who was responsible for establishing through his followers a special type of Vaishnavism called Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Music, dance, and floor painting were integral to the ritual. All revolved around the couple Rādhā and Krishna. Also, a Vaishnava saint called Vallabhacharya came to Braj from South India, establishing a sect called the Vallabhacharya. An important temple was built in Rajasthan, and Krishna was worshiped as Sri Nathji. Cloth curtains were hung behind the “icon.” These painted clothes, called *pichchavars*, were many; the costume of the icon was changed according to the seasons and the cycle of the ritual calendar. The cloth paintings were also used as hangings. More than twenty-four iconographic types developed, each with its specific color and costume of Krishna, and the accompanying episode in his life.

No account of the Krishna theme in the visual arts would be complete without at least passing reference to the many folk forms of paintings still extant and flourishing in different parts of India. Among these are the Paithani paintings, so popular in Maharashtra and Karnataka. These paintings were used by itinerant bards who were reciters and singers of the epics. This style of painting is akin to the shadow puppets of the region. Profiles and extended eyes are prominent. The scenes of the epic battle of Kurukshetra, with Krishna as Arjuna's charioteer, are popular. The preoccupation of these painters was not with the Krishna of Braj; it was instead with the counselor of the Pandvas.

In Bihar, in the region called Mithila, women used to paint the mud walls of their homes, both outside and inside, on auspicious occasions. The depiction of Krishna and Rādhā in the inner chambers of young newlyweds was considered auspicious.

Concurrently, with the evolution of Kalighat paintings in Bengal, there was an equally significant movement in South India, spearheaded by the painter Raja Ravi Varma. Raja Ravi Varma's style of painting is deeply indebted to European naturalism. Indeed, it was this image of Krishna that became popular, largely through the oleographs that adorn the walls of domestic shrines in many Indian homes.

The myths and legends of Krishna have permeated contemporary Indian art in many ways. One modern Indian artist, Anjalie Ela Menon, captures the image of the child Krishna. Her medium, however, is modern: the Moreno glass of Italy. Of course, there is the extensive and popular world of Indian films, in which Krishna regularly appears.

The Krishna theme, as is obvious from even this brief and general survey, has for over two thousand years

captured and enraptured the Indian psyche. Behind the phenomenon of a staggering diversity and distinctive regional, local, or individual and changing style, there is an unmistakable unity of vision and dependence upon the literary sources, in most if not all parts of India. The perennial and the ephemeral, the ancient, medieval, and modern move as if in tandem, not conflicting or negating, but building upon the received and given. The scope of improvisation and variation within an ambit is vast. Perhaps this is the enigma of the Krishna theme, which has held the imagination of the ancient and continues to engage the contemporary and modern.

The Krishna Theme in the Performing Arts

As in the case of Indian miniature painting, the theater, music, and dance revolving around Krishna was a medieval phenomenon. Many forms that evolved were coeval with the evolution and development of the varied schools of Indian painting. The variety of the performance genres was as rich and extensive as the styles of Indian painting. Krishna theater forms and specific genres of music and dance are known to practically all parts of India. Each is distinctive in style and technique, yet there is an underlying unity of vision and purpose. A brief account of some will be given here, though not all genres of theater are still extant in India.

Important among these is the genre of theatrical performance known by the generic name *rasa lila* (the “play of *rasa*”). It is performed during specific seasons for particular occasions in the Braj area. From references in the literature, it is possible to say that the *rasa lila* performance in the precincts of the temple was well established by the time of Akbar. It has a complex history of development, and there are varying views among scholars. It may be more pertinent to restrict this account to a brief description of the contemporary performance of *rasa lila*.

The contemporary *rasa lila* of Vrindavana is the special domain of the *svamis* and the *gosvamis* (priests) who trace their family history back many generations, in most cases to the sixteenth century. The special organization of the contemporary performers of the *rasa lila* is popularly called the *rasadbari mandalis*. In all cases, the *rasa lila* demands a special stage. It is normally a circular platform of stone or concrete, 3 feet (.9 m) high. The symbolic significance of the circular stage is clear, for it recalls the descriptions of the *rasa mandala* (the round arena of the *rasa*) in the Shrimad Bhāgavata. On one end of the stage is a dais or platform called *rangamancha* (the stage of the dance) or a raised throne called the *simhasana*. All the scenes in which Rādhā and Krishna appear in their deified forms, and to which they return at the end, are performed on the raised back stage; other scenes suggesting the passage of time or change of location are performed on the lower

stage. The performance is divided into two clear-cut portions: the *rasa* and the presentation of the *lilas*.

Throughout the performance, the objective is to emphasize the symbolism or the dual level on which the theatrical spectacle moves. The *rasa* is performed exclusively by child actors, as suggestive of happenings elsewhere, and at no point is there a realistic presentation of the theme. The nature of stylization and the techniques used are very different from those in epic dramatic forms, which revolve around the Mahābhārata theme. In the *lilas*, it is truly a play, a vision or glimpse with a mystical significance. A dreamlike lyrical form, swiftness of movement, and lightness of touch are characteristic.

The end of the *rasa* is the beginning of the *lilas*. There are enactments of the early life of Krishna that has been mentioned in the context of painting. Many literary sources are employed, which include the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as well as the poetry of the *ashtachhapa* school (eight poets of Braj of the 17th century). Night after night the life of Krishna as child, adolescent, and youth is re-created sequentially. Each night a new theme is presented. Popular among these is the famous *Govardhana lila*, in which Krishna lifts Mount Govardhana on his little finger, and the *chirabaran*, in which Krishna steals the clothes of the *gopis*. Unlike the *rasa*, the *lilas* are presented more realistically, with actual earthen pots being broken and milk and butter strewn across the stage.

It was this *rasa lila* of Vrindavana that traveled to distant Manipur and Assam in the easternmost regions of India. It reached Assam without the character of Rādhā but in Manipur she was included. Vaishnavism entered the valley only in the sixteenth century, with Rangba (in A.D. 1568) the first king to be initiated. He was followed by Garib Nivas, who was the principal ruler instrumental in converting the valley inhabitants into Vaishnava *bhaktas*. The origin of the famous *rasa* dances is attributed to Rajarshi Bhagya Chandra Maharaj (1763–1798), who, along with Chandra Kirti (1850–1886), laid the foundations of classical Manipuri dance.

Among the most beautiful lyrical manifestations of this transformation of an earlier layer of Manipuri culture to Vaishnava culture is the *rasa lila*. Today it is easily the most highly intricate and refined form of dance-drama. The message of Chaitanya was taken to Manipur by a disciple, who introduced the tradition of community singing and dancing. In the fields and open spaces of Manipur, one can still regularly participate in dances that extol the name of Lord Krishna.

There are several types of *rasa lila* in Manipur. The *Basantrasa* (spring *rasa*) is performed at full moon in March, and the focus of the story is the union of Rādhā

and Krishna after a painful separation. The *Kunjrāsa* is lighter in spirit and is performed during the early autumn festival of Dussehra. It represents the daily life of Rādhā and Krishna, who are portrayed as ideal lovers, amusing themselves and revelling in a relationship unmarred by separation. The *Maharāsa* is performed on a full moon in November–December and depicts the separation of the divine lovers.

The *Viṣṇu* and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa also traveled to Assam. In the course of time, through the genius of one man, Shankaradeva, a whole genre of theater was created around the Krishna theme. A poetic language called *Braja boli* was the vehicle of communication; the tool of their missionary zeal was a theatrical form, today called the *bhaona* or *ankia nata*. It continues to be performed in the monasteries of Assam, called *sattras*.

Among the many important forms of dance and drama in South India, there are two widely known forms called Kathakali and Krishnattam. While it is impossible to elaborate on the history of these important forms, it should be pointed out that Krishnattam also emerged in Kerala as a result of the influence of the Bhāgavata and the Gītā Govinda. The two works transformed the earlier Shaivite traditions into Vaishnava theater. King Manavedan, who reigned in Kerala from 1655 to 1658, was a renowned poet and the author of a work titled *Krishnagiti*. He was also a great patron of the famous Guruvayur temple, which is today the most important center of the Krishna faith in the South. His work, the *Krishnagiti*, was deeply influenced by the Gītā Govinda, but is significantly different. Today it is performed in an eight-day serialized enactment in the precincts of the Guruvayur temple, by an all-male cast. Except in the performance of the *rasa krida* on the third night of the cycle of plays, little else is lyrical or romantic. The episodes are played throughout the night, and by morning the spectators are moved to an elated state of wonder and devotion. This dance-drama is confined to the precincts of the temple.

Kathakali, the related dance-drama of Kerala, moves into the open spaces. It is the same world of gods and demons, heroes and villains, but now the life of Krishna is based on the episodes from the epics, especially the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. The libretto is in Sanskrit or in Malayalam. It is sung and narrated; the dance is highly stylized, with a fully developed language of hand and facial gestures. Krishna appears in two roles, as the young brother of Balarama and as the warrior hero.

The poetry of the medieval poet-aunts—whether of the south, north, east, or west, written in Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Hindi, or Oriya as the base—has inspired great dancers in the solo classical dance forms recognized as Bharatanatyam, Odissi, and Kathak. The poetic line is set

to a melody (*rāga*) and metrical cycle (*tala*). The verbal imagery is then interpreted through the movements and gestures and mime in endless permutations and combinations, depending upon the creative genius of the performer. Great dancers have kept large audiences spell-bound by the presentation of a single verse or line. The dancer's ability to improvise and present variations is the test of both artistic skill and devotional and spiritual involvement. Other lyrics revolving around the child Krishna have inspired dancers to present memorable performances. The episode of the child Krishna eating mud and being reprimanded by Yashoda has been danced by one of India's greatest dancers, T. Bālasarasvati, who performed the piece for over four decades. Each time the cosmos was re-created through her mime, and the audience was transported to a mystical state, oblivious of time. Other great dancers have chosen verses from the Gītā Govinda, Surdas, Vidyapati, or the Ālvārs, and have transformed the stage into the universal Vrindavana of Krishna. The sacred and the profane, the romantic and the mystical, the poetic and the pictorial, the aural and the visual, the movement and the stillness of love in separation and in union, all come together in these performances of Krishna, the blue God, and Rādhā, the yellow heroine. The earth and the sky unite, the clouds pour rain through the sound of music, ankle bells, and speaking hands to re-create the vision of the blue God, eternal and ever new.

Kapila Vatsyayan

See also **Bhakti; Dance Forms: Kathakali; Miniatures: Bundi; Miniatures: Kotah; Miniatures: Marwar and Thikanas**

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KRISHNAMURTI, JIDDU (1895–1986), spiritual figure and author. Admired by millions throughout the world for his philosophic wisdom, Jiddu Krishnamurti was hailed by India's Theosophical Society president, Annie Besant, as a "world master" and new "Messiah." Born in Madras (Chennai), Jiddu and his younger brother, Nityananda, were introduced by Charles Leadbeater to Besant at their Theosophical Society's headquarters in Adyar. She agreed that young Jiddu's "aura" was "divine" and sponsored his education and global travel, taking him with her first to London, and later to California, where she had a lovely home (Arya Vihara) built for him on the grounds of Theosophy's West Coast headquarters in Ojai's "Happy Valley." Jiddu returned to Ojai annually for most his life, but his frail brother died there in 1922, just a few years after they first arrived.

Krishnamurti was worshiped as Master of the Order of the Star of the East, founded by Besant a year after his initiation, “At the Feet of the Master,” in 1911. The Order of the Star enrolled over 50,000 Theosophists, many of whom gathered annually at Adyar to hear their Master speak, believing him “divine,” until 1929, when he shocked his followers by announcing “I am not the Messiah.” Some disciples, refusing to accept him as a fellow mortal, considered his denial proof positive of his soul’s “divine” character. From 1910 until his last year of life, Krishnamurti wrote and published over fifty books, mostly philosophical dialogues, recording views and ideas that emerged during his popular evening “talks,” which were often filled with longer intervals of silence than speech. All of his books have been reprinted by the press of the Theosophical Society in Ojai, which keeps his writings and lectures in its fine library, and in print, with tens of millions of copies sold and still read the world over.

Most of Krishnamurti’s works are dialogues, much like the ancient Upanishadic Vedanta texts that predate the common era, embodying the wisdom of Hindu sages’ philosophic responses to questions posed by disciples seeking enlightenment. His answers were often pithy and paradoxical: “To know is to be ignorant, not to know is the beginning of wisdom.” Or “Nobody can put you psychologically into prison. You are already there.” And “It is truth that frees, not your effort to be free.” Laughter, love, and silence were vital aspects of his philosophy. Shortly before his death he said: “If you don’t know how to laugh and love . . . you’re not quite a human being.” Krishnamurti was one of India’s greatest modern sages.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Theosophical Society**

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KRITI In South Indian or Karnatak music (*Karnataka sangītam*), the Sanskrit term *kṛiti* (work or composition) refers to a tripartite song with Sanskrit or vernacular lyrics. As most solo performers acquire their repertoire of *kṛitis* from a *guru* belonging to a lineage of several teachers and

disciples (*guru shishya parampara*), associating oneself with a well-established tradition (*sampradāya*) or personal style (*bāni*) remains a matter of prestige.

History

The term *kṛiti* is widely regarded as being synonymous with *kīrtana*, although some scholars make a distinction and reserve *kṛiti* for the more differentiated form of art music. Any simple devotional song is referred to as *kīrtana*, *pada*, or *dēvarnāma*. The sparing use of text in a *kṛiti* has resulted in a melismatic and expressive style. Many scholars believe that Tyāgarāja (1767–1847) was the composer who perfected the *kṛiti* form.

In the early twentieth century, the *kṛiti* became the main Karnatak concert item, as it provides all participants with ample scope for solo improvisations and spontaneous interaction. Until then, the creative aspect of art music (*manōdharma sangīta*) consisted mainly of formal and highly complicated elaborations of a single theme (*pallavi* or *rāgam tānam pallavi*).

With its mellifluous quality, Telugu continues to be the favorite Dravidian language for *kṛiti* lyrics. Tamil, the medium of the earliest *bhakti* poetry, has played a greater role since the Tamil music movement (Tamil Ishai) was institutionalized in the 1940s.

Structure

A *kṛiti* consists of three main themes: (1) an opening theme or refrain (*pallavi*, P, “sprouting”); (2) a secondary theme building on the *pallavi* (*anupallavi*, A); and (3) the concluding stanza, or several stanzas (*charanam*, C, “foot”). The typical arrangement of these *kṛiti* parts (*anga*) can be summarized as P-A-P-C-(A)-P. Any section may comprise several lines and repetitions. The three themes are often enriched with complex variations (*sangāti*), either as intended by the composer or in the form of additions made by other musicians. Both the profusion and refinement of *sangātis* are regarded as the hallmark of Tyāgarāja’s *kṛitis*.

For his short *kṛitis*, Dīkshitar employed a different format known as *samashti charana*, in which the *anupallavi* is omitted, much as in a *kīrtana*. Some of the *kṛitis* of Shyāma Shāstri and Dīkshitar, and also those of several later composers, are characterized by the use of meaningless sol-fa syllables (*chittasvara*), each syllable representing the name of a note (*svara*). A less common but important variant is known as *svara sābhitya*, in which a composer amalgamates meaningless sol-fa syllables (*svara*) with meaningful syllables as part of the lyrics (*sābhitya*), usually as an extension of the *charanam*. Tyāgarāja did not normally employ such techniques, the

notable exceptions being found in the *kritis* popularly known as the five gems (*pancharatna*). Thus all the *chittasvaras* performed along with his pieces constitute additions made by others.

More than any other genre, the *kriti* facilitates the exploration of melodic and rhythmical intricacies. This important quality manifests itself in two ways, namely in the variations (*sangati*) provided by a composer, and in the optional solo improvisations (preludes and interludes) by concert musicians. A nonmetrical *rāga* exposition (*rāga ālāpana*) creates the appropriate mood (*rāga bhāva*) for a *kriti* in a manner that can be compared to the first part of a *rāgam tānam pallavi* performance. Sometimes the *kriti* that is presented as the highlight of a concert includes a *tānam* (a pulsating variant of the *rāga ālāpana*); then three more improvised sections are typically inserted in the *anupallavi* or *charanam* section before returning to the *pallavi* of the *kriti*: (1) *niraval* (filling up), which initially follows the distribution of the text syllables in order to heighten a particular mood; (2) several rounds of *kalpana svara* (decorative notes); and (3) *tani āvartana*, an extensive drum solo that concludes the main concert item. To establish their identity and discourage others from altering their songs, most *kriti* composers incorporate a seal (*mudrā*) toward the end of their lyrics, be it a pen name, their personal name, or that of their chosen deity (*ishtadēvatā*).

Themes

A *kriti* leads its listeners through a series of experiences that appeal to their artistic sensibilities as well as their innermost spiritual longings. In the *kritis* composed by Tyāgarāja, Shyāma Shāstri, Muttusvāmi Dīkshitar, and many of their successors, the aim of art music has been transformed radically: they refused to entertain or eulogize a powerful patron (*narastuti*), traditionally a highly cultured person belonging to a royal dynasty, often credited with divine qualities. Instead they focused on songs that praise their personal deity (*ishta dēvatā*), for instance Srī Rāma, the divine king whose glory is described in most of Tyāgarāja's songs. Far from feeling intimidated by the grandeur he describes in such detail, Tyāgarāja

even feels entitled to converse with God in rather familiar if not jocular terms, depending on the context of a song and his own disposition: "In *Brovābhāramā*, he asks if he is too much of a burden for Rama to bear and points out the huge burdens that the Lord had borne in the past, the mountain of Mandara and Govardhana on his back and palm, and the entire universe in his stomach" (Raghavan). In several songs, the saintly composer skillfully resorts to mocking praise (*nindāstuti*) and social satire with the help of succinct lyrics whose expression required a corresponding range of musical means. The Telugu is lyrical and minimal, possessing classical dignity and meaning.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Kīrtana; Music: South India; Rāga**

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KSHATRIYAS. See **Caste System**.

KUCHIPUDI. See **Dance Forms**.

KURUKSHETRA. See **Mahābharāta**.

KURUS. See **Vedic Aryan India**.



LADAKH. See *Jammu and Kashmir*.

LAKSHMĪ. See *Devī*.

LAND TENURE FROM 1800 TO 1947 The pattern of land tenure in India at the beginning of the nineteenth century was far from egalitarian. A substantial portion of India's agrarian population comprised a class of agricultural laborers who neither owned arable land nor held any customary rights to occupy and cultivate it. In South India, about 20 percent of the agricultural population, mainly Dalits and other low caste members, were employed by landowners to cultivate their land. In Bengal, also, there is considerable evidence that during early British rule, a system of agricultural labor prevailed. Landless agricultural laborers were reported to form about 20 percent of the agricultural population in Dinajpur in 1808, although the rate of the landless population was likely to be lower in some other regions, especially in eastern Bengal, where the majority of villagers were peasants cultivating their lands. In western India, while agricultural laborers were few in the Deccan, there was nevertheless a system of hereditary farm servants in some districts of Gujarat.

Those who either owned land or had customary rights to cultivate it were not homogeneous in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the Tamil district of South India, a handful of village elites called *mirasidars*, very often belonging to Brahman and other high castes, asserted their rights of ownership over the land of the entire village and controlled village affairs. Under them was a group of farmers who either held permanent rights to cultivate village land or were temporary tenants

belonging to other villages. Under the *ryotwari* settlement system, the government recognized *mirasidars* as the sole proprietors of land, dismissing tenants' rights completely. Only in villages where no *mirasidar* system existed were those villagers holding permanent occupancy rights recognized as landholders responsible for the payment of land revenue. In Bengal, under the *zamindari* settlement, *zamindars* who had ruled a wide area covering a large number of villages were recognized as the proprietors of land, collecting rents from farmers (*ryots*), paying only a small fraction of those revenues to the government. In some regions, like Dinajpur, in addition to a group of small peasants who cultivated their land mainly with family labor, there was a class of rich *ryots* who held many acres of land, which they leased to sharecroppers. In North Indian districts, where a system of joint holding of village lands called *bhaichara* tenure was prevalent, shares of the holdings were unequally distributed, even by the 1820s.

Even though the aggregate result of changes in the size of landholdings appears negligible, the composition of each landholding-size group seems to have changed over time, hinting at transformations in village agrarian structure at least in some regions of India. In South India, some merchants, moneylenders, and other nonagricultural interests expanded their landed property and grew to be large landlords, who let their lands to tenants, whereas the previous large landholders of Brahman and other high caste origins gradually moved to urban areas and decreased their holdings in rural areas. The aggregate result of these mixed changes was that there was no substantial expansion of large landholdings. At the other end of the landholding scale, migration to overseas plantations provided landless agricultural laborers with a chance to emancipate themselves, and some among them acquired tiny pieces of land, whereas a new group of agricultural

laborers appeared as a result of the dispossession of the landholdings of small peasants. A similar change in the composition of agricultural laborers has been reported for Bengal. A reduction in the number of landless laborers as a result of their migration to cities was witnessed in British Gujarat between 1911 and 1931. For the eastern part of Bengal, the occupancy *ryots* seem to have disintegrated into village landlords and sharecroppers with no occupancy rights. Taking into account these different trends in landholding, sometimes counteracting one another, the process of the differentiation of landholding peasants may not be ruled out, and it may have been actually witnessed, at least in some regions.

Another change noticed in some areas of India was a decline in communal land tenure. In some regions, landholders collectively held village land, each owner holding only a share at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Such collective landholding was divided among shareholders over the next several decades. While the direct cause for this division was the government policy to settle land revenue on the individual holder for each plot of land, a gradual loosening of unity among landholders also contributed to this end.

Various factors contributed to these changes in land tenure. The impact of the commercialization of agriculture on the peasant classes was complex. It sometimes strengthened small peasants by providing a higher income, but often the growing fluctuation in prices led them to disintegrate into a group of richer peasants, who benefited from the fluctuation, and others who came under the grip of moneylenders and merchants. In general, it contributed to the expansion of landed property by the nonagricultural population, though the extent of such transfer differed by region. The trend among high-caste landowners to move to urban areas resulted in reducing their landownership, whereas the migration of laborers provided them with opportunities to purchase small pieces of land.

***Jajmani* System**

In the 1930s, Willam H. Wiser found a system of hereditary obligations of payment and of occupational and ceremonial duties between two or more specific families of different castes in the same locality. Each member of the village service castes had his own client families to whom he was entitled and responsible to serve and who, for his service, gave some stipulated amount of remuneration. He called this dyadic type of relationship the *jajmani* system. The dominant view presupposed that the system was rather dominant before the nineteenth century but was gradually declining in the twentieth century.

Peter Mayer, however, questioned the presupposition and argued that the *jajmani* system is of recent origin and is essentially a feature of the Gangatic Plain. According to him, the system that prevailed widely in North India, at least until the second half of the nineteenth century, was one in which the artisans and others, like Chamars, had general obligations of service to the entire class of village landholders and were compensated for these services by all cultivators, either directly by payment at harvest time or indirectly through grants of village land.

Evidence from western India of the pre-colonial period provides an interesting case, indicating a mixture of collective and individual remunerations to service providers. Washermen served an entire village body and were rewarded for their services by the village as a whole. At the same time, they could get perquisites from individual peasants when they provided a specific service to them, indicating that there existed a dyadic and individual relationship between each service provider and each peasant, operating within the framework of the holistic system of dividing labor in a village. An 1811 report from South India describes a case in which the share of harvested grain to which servants of landholders were entitled was insufficient for their subsistence, so they were to receive further payments in grain by their masters until the total reached a stipulated amount. This also seems to indicate the existence of a dyadic relationship together with a collective form of remuneration.

Even if it would be an exaggeration to deny the existence of an individual and dyadic relationship between service providers and other villagers, there is no doubt that a holistic system of dividing labor predominated in pre-colonial India. The loosening of the village community in the nineteenth century surely weakened such a holistic system. The colonial land policy was generally to deny the collective landholding system that had prevailed in some regions of India, and it was reluctant to recognize revenue-free land having been granted to members of service castes, though the policies differed by region. As the result of the decline of the holistic remuneration system, the *jajmani* system gradually came to be the dominant form of remuneration in the course of time.

Haruka Yanagisawa

See also **Agricultural Wages, Labor, and Employment since 1757**

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LAND TENURE SINCE 1950 British rule established in India a system of intermediaries—called “landlords” by the British—who were to collect rent from the cultivators on behalf of the state and who would in turn receive a share of the revenue collected. Those intermediaries had largely controlled the land tenure system during India’s pre-independence period, though the role of intermediaries varied across the country. The land tenure system of pre-independence India was broadly divided into three categories: the *zamindari* system, the *mahalwari* system, and the *ryotwari* system. In the first two categories, the intermediaries—*zamindars* and village headmen, respectively—were responsible for the collection of rent from the cultivators; in the third category, there were no intermediaries, and cultivators paid the rent directly to the state. The control of intermediaries over land ownership and the tenure system led to exploitation of cultivators. In order to eliminate intermediaries and to pass on ownership rights to the actual cultivators, the process of land reforms was initiated after independence. The objective of land reforms was to abolish intermediaries and to bring changes in the revenue system that would be favorable to cultivators. Tenancy reforms were considered the most important component of land reforms, and many changes were effected in India’s land tenure and revenue system.

Legislation of Land Tenure

First Five-Year Plan. Efforts to abolish the landlord system were actually enacted in the early 1950s with the *Zamindari Abolition Act*. India’s Planning Commission introduced its national policy on tenancy regulation in its Five-Year Plans. The first proposition of the National Policy on tenancy reforms, as presented in the First Plan, recommended that large landowners be allowed to evict

their tenants and to bring under personal cultivation land up to a ceiling limit to be prescribed by each state. It was further suggested that tenants of nonresumable land be given occupancy rights on payment of a price to be fixed as a multiple of the rental value of the land. The term “personal cultivation” was defined as cultivation by the owner or by other members of the family.

Though precise definitions were not provided for small and middle owner-cultivators, a distinction was made to consider “owners of land not exceeding a family holding as small owners.” Land belonging to small and middle owners was divided into two categories: land under personal cultivation, and land leased to tenants at will. However, limited protection was envisaged for such tenants of landowners possessing land below the ceiling restriction. It was suggested that tenancy should be for five to ten years and should be renewable, and that the maximum rent payable should not exceed 20 to 25 percent of the gross produce.

Second Five-Year Plan. To provide effective protection for tenants and to bring a degree of uniformity across the states, the definition of “personal cultivation” was amended with three elements: risk of cultivation, personal supervision, and personal labor. It was suggested that the produce rent should be converted into cash rent and the maximum rent should be fixed as a multiple of land revenue. The Second Plan also suggested that tenants of nonresumable areas should be enabled to acquire ownership rights on purchase at a reasonable price. Further, the payment should be allowed in installments that might be fixed in such a way that the burden on the tenant did not exceed 20 to 25 percent of the gross produce.

Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans. Based on a review of the steps taken in the First and Second Plan periods, the Third Plan stated that the impact of tenancy legislation on the welfare of tenants had been less than expected. Hence, the Third Plan reiterated that the final goal should be to confer rights of ownership to as many tenants as possible. Though it was considered appropriate to confer the rights of ownership to tenants of nonresumable land of small holders, the Third Plan did not make any recommendation in this direction, but suggested that the states should study the problem and determine the suitable action in light of prevailing conditions. However, the condition of tenants did not improve, and remained precarious even after the Third Plan period. With a view to ensuring the security of tenure to tenants and subtenants, the Fourth Plan recommended measures such as “to declare all tenancies non-resumable and permanent except in the case of landowners working in defence services or with any disability.” In the exceptional cases, the tenancy should be for a period of three years and subjected to renewal. Provisions were made for

complete security of tenure in homestead lands where cultivators, agricultural laborers, and artisans had constructed their houses.

Fifth Five-Year Plan. The Fifth Plan contained the recommendations of a special task force for appraising the progress of problems of land reforms. Subsequently, the National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) in its report gave the following recommendations:

- In view of the prevailing land-man ratio, tenancy could not be banned completely until a large-scale transfer of the population from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors occurred.
- The NCA reiterated the provision of ownership rights for all tenants of land except the landowner of marginal holding and special cases. It further recommended that the price should be lower than the market price and the tenant should be provided with credit either by the state government or by financial institutions.
- The sharecroppers should also be recognized and recorded as tenants and should be bestowed with all due protection.

Sixth Five-Year Plan and After. Until the Sixth Plan period, many regulations were passed, but their implementation appeared lacking. In order to fulfill this goal, the Sixth Plan emphasized measures to ensure the effective implementation of the accepted policies. A time-bound schedule was given to the states to implement the measures of land reforms. It further recommended that the states in which legislative provisions for conferment of ownership rights on all tenants did not exist should immediately introduce appropriate legislative measures within one year (by 1981–1982). Even in the Seventh Plan period, the recommendation for appropriation of legislative measures by the states to secure the rights of tenants remained the major issue. Thus, the major legislations on land tenure were created in the first three Plans, and their implementation was given priority in the subsequent period.

Progress in the Implementation of Tenancy and Revenue Reforms

Progress of land reforms can be assessed in terms of three important aspects: regulation of rent, security of tenure, and conferment of ownership rights to tenants.

Regulation of rent. The rent paid by the tenants during the pre-independence period was exorbitant; it varied between 35 and 75 percent of gross produce throughout India. With the enactment of legislation for regulating the rent payable by the cultivators in the early 1950s, fair rent was fixed at 20 to 25 percent of the gross produce level in all the states except Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and

Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, and the Andhra area of Andhra Pradesh. In these states, the rent payable by the tenants varied between 25 percent and 40 percent, depending on the available irrigation facilities. However, the effectiveness of fair rent was observed only for tenants who actually enjoyed security of tenure. As per the 1981 census, about 80 percent of the tenants were insecure. As a result, the majority of tenants could not derive benefit from the legislation on fair rent. Further, field studies conducted in Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal during 1971 and 1972 indicated that though the Tenancy Act in these states fixed the maximum rent payable at 25 percent, most of the tenants, particularly sharecroppers, were paying 50 percent of gross produce.

On the other hand, the mode of payment was flexible, either by cash or kind or both, depending on the option of the tenant, in almost all states except in West Bengal and the Bombay area of Maharashtra. In the case of West Bengal only kind payment was allowed, while in the Bombay area only cash payment was allowed.

Security of tenure. Providing security of tenure was the second important legislation brought about during the first three Five-Year Plans. Legislation for security of tenure had three essential elements: ejection could not take place except in accordance with the provision of the law; land could be resumed by an owner, but only for personal cultivation; and in the event of resumption, the tenant was assured of a prescribed minimum area.

Tenancy laws were enacted in all states in accordance with the guidelines under this legislation, though their implementation varied widely across the states. Depending on the pattern of tenancy laws enacted, all the states can be broadly grouped into four categories: restricted leasing out to certain special and disabled categories (Andhra Pradesh–Telenaga Area, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh); no restrictions on leasing out (Andhra Pradesh–Andhra Area, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal); leasing permitted but the tenant acquires rights to purchase land (Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Punjab); and prohibition of lease (Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and Manipur). The NSS (National Sample Survey) reports suggested that despite the tenancy laws, concealed tenancy existed in almost all the states. Further, in the majority of states, sharecroppers were not explicitly recognized as tenants and thus were not protected under tenancy law. However, sharecroppers in West Bengal were provided with heritable rights on the leased land through Operation Bargha in 1971. The term “tenant” was reported to be wide enough to cover sharecroppers but not wide enough to provide tenancy security in the majority of states. In some states, like Punjab and Haryana, sharecroppers were recognized as hired laborers as

defined under personal cultivation. Further, a recent study (Haque) on tenant reforms indicated that even after four decades of initiation of tenure reforms, secured tenancy exists only in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal, and the flaws in the definition of personal cultivation have rendered tenancies insecure in all other states. In addition, security of tenure had also faced serious problems from the “voluntary surrender.” Taking advantage of this clause, powerful landlords compelled their tenants to give up the tenancies on their own and thus evaded the tenancy laws. An important deficiency identified in this regard has been lack of proper land records in a majority of states. Security of tenancy can be ensured only when there are reliable and accurate records on tenancy.

Conferment of ownership rights to tenants. The third important component of tenancy legislation was the conferment of ownership rights to tenants. Despite repeated emphasis in the plan documents, only a few states, like West Bengal and Kerala, have passed legislation to confer rights of ownership to tenants. No estimate is available at a nationwide level, but some state-level evaluation studies have estimated the number of tenants and the extent of land entitled for conferment of ownership rights. A committee set up by the government of Maharashtra in 1968 for the evaluation of land reforms reported that only 375,000 of a total of 2,600,000 entitled tenants acquired ownership rights until the mid-1960s. The number was reported to have reached 1,118,000 during the 1980s. In the case of West Bengal, the inception of Operation Bargha in 1977 led to conferment of ownership rights to 1,500,000 sharecroppers covering about 2,700,000 acres (about 1,100,000 hectares) up to December 1998. In Karnataka, about 489,000 tenants have been conferred rights for nearly 4,500,000 acres (1,850,000 hectares) of land up to 31 July 2000. Further, in Gujarat, about 462,000 tenants were benefited from 2,400,000 acres (970,000 hectares) of land, and in Rajasthan, 199,000 tenants were benefited from 940,000 acres (382,000 hectares).

The Impact of Tenancy and Revenue Reforms

Agricultural productivity and growth. As the implementation of tenancy reforms coincided with a technological revolution, isolation of the specific impact of tenancy reforms on agricultural productivity and agricultural growth became a difficult task, particularly after the 1970s. However, some studies attempted to separate all the other effects and concluded that there was correlation between the growth in production and the progress of tenancy (Banerjee and Ghatak). Studies also indicated that it was the consolidation of management around tube well command areas that triggered the growth in

West Bengal agriculture (Webster). It was also reported that Operation Bargha in West Bengal had led to changes such as greater social equity and self-confidence among the poor (Gazdar and Sengupta). Contrary to this, there were also arguments that Operation Bargha had not been successful in augmenting production and productivity on the sharecropped land due to the poor resource base (Pal). On the other hand, Haque opined that Operation Bargha and other land reform measures might not be solely responsible for rapid growth in agriculture in West Bengal but had led to indirect effects in the form of a changing rural power structure, accessibility to irrigation, and modern inputs.

Size of the farm. Apart from agricultural productivity, major changes in the pattern of owned and operated holdings, as per the latest agricultural census (1995–96) and NSS rounds, indicated that the proportion of landless agricultural households in the rural area had stabilized at around 11 to 12 percent. About 80 percent of the cultivators were reported as marginal (less than 2.5 acres, or 1 hectare) and small (2.5–5 acres, or 1–2 hectares), and their land holdings accounted for 36 percent of the total cultivated area in 1995–1996. Nearly 18 percent of cultivators owned semi-medium (5–10 acres, or 2–4 hectares) and medium (10–25 acres, or 4–10 hectares) holdings, which accounted for 49 percent of the total cultivated area in 1995–1996. However, the number and the area under large holdings (25 acres, or 10 hectares, and above) have been declining consistently.

The steady increase in the area under the marginal and small holdings group could be attributed to the legislative measures supplemented by market processes, but an increase in their number might be the result of an increase in population and lack of alternative employment opportunities in the rural areas.

Employment. There are no systematic studies to arrive at specific conclusions on changes in the pattern of employment induced by tenancy reforms over a period of time. The census data indicated a steady increase in agricultural laborers (from 21.8 percent in 1961 to 33.2 percent in 2001) as well as an increase in other workers (from 12.9 percent in 1961 to 22.9 percent in 2001).

The liberalization of tenancy has become the latest issue of debate, and many recent seminars have supported and recommended the same. According to a proposal of the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, the liberalization of tenancy, particularly in the less developed areas, would help in improving the access of the poor to land through the legalization of leasing. However, thus far no steps have been taken in this direction.

With the initiation of economic reforms and liberalization, agriculture has been moving toward commercialization. As a part of this trend, the practice of contract farming has been initiated by multinational companies, such as Pepsi Company and Hindustan Level Limited in Punjab. So far contract farming has been mostly informal and has taken place without any written agreement. However, an institutional mechanism is expected to help the small and marginal farmers to access the benefits of contract farming without compromising their ownership rights.

L. Thulasamma

See also **Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950; Contract Farming**

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LANGUAGES AND SCRIPTS The Indian subcontinent has been a virtual laboratory of humanity, from its first settlement by modern humans while on their way to Australia and East Asia, some 50,000 years ago. The remnants of this founding population can still be found in genetics, linguistically in some of the "tribal" languages (Andamanese, Kusunda), and in various substrates. The initial settlement was followed by the immigration of speakers of diverse languages belonging to a number of major language families.

Languages

India's language families are, from north to south: Tibeto-Burmese, Indo-European (Iranian and Indo-Aryan), Khamti (Tai), Austro-Asiatic (Munda, Khasi), and Dravidian. There also are several isolates. Burushaski is regarded by some as the eastern extension of the Macro-Caucasian (Basque–N. Caucasian–Burushaski) family; Kusunda and Andamanese are perhaps linked to Indo-Pacific (Papuan, Tasmanian). In the past, many more languages must have been spoken, as the little studied substrates indicate. Substrates are found in Nahali, Tharu, Vedda, and even in Hindi, where some 30 percent of the agricultural terms are from an unknown source. The same seems to be true for many other North Indian languages; southern Indian substrates have hardly been touched as yet. In sum, South Asia was as linguistically diverse then as it is today.

Most South Asian languages now belong to the Indo-Aryan subgroup of the Indo-European language family that stretched, before the colonial period, from Iceland to Bengal and Sri Lanka. Speakers of Old Indo-Aryan (OIA) must have entered South Asia in the mid-second millennium B.C. OIA, beginning with the Vedic form of Sanskrit, is a close relative of Old Iranian, which has been preserved in some Old Persian inscriptions (519 B.C.) and in the Avesta, the sacred language of the Zoroastrians (Parsi). Dating the earliest OIA is difficult; however, the Vedic dialect that was brought into the Mitanni realm of northern Iraq/Syria (c. 1400 B.C.) is slightly more archaic than the oldest Vedic text in India, the Rig Veda. The early forms of Sanskrit show clear substrate influences, in part from the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex (2400–1600 B.C.) and from the Hindu Kush–Pamir areas, all of which points, together with the Mitanni, to evidence of an influx of OIA speakers into South Asia from the northwest.

Other forms of OIA include middle and late Vedic; Classical Sanskrit, still a fully inflectional language like Greek and Latin, emerged from a conservative form of OIA. It was codified by the ingenious grammarian Pāṇini, who lived near Attock on the Indus (c. 400 B.C.). Vedic OIA was spoken from this area up to the borders of Bengal and also in western Madhya Pradesh and northern Maharashtra. In its classical form (Sanskrit) it expanded, as the language of the learned, all over South Asia and beyond, to Bali, Vietnam, and, with Buddhist missions, through Afghanistan into Central Asia, China, and Japan.

By the time of the Buddha (c. 400 B.C.) OIA had been supplanted as popular language by Middle Indo-Aryan (MIA); some MIA forms are occasionally visible in Vedic texts. The Buddha taught in MIA, though texts in his own eastern dialect have not been preserved; instead, they have come down in the western Pali variety of MIA. Fragments of Buddhist texts also survive in some more

recent forms of MIA, as in the oldest Buddhist manuscripts from the first century A.D. The first datable testimony of MIA are the inscriptions of the emperor Ashoka (c. 250 B.C.) They are found, in various dialect forms, all over South Asia. They are, however, in Greek and Aramaic in western Afghanistan, and they are absent in the deep (Dravidian) south.

MIA differs from OIA by a number of phonetic and grammatical innovations, such as the assimilation of consonant groups and the restructuring of the verb system. MIA has heavily influenced the epic Sanskrit of the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. Around the beginning of the common era, several later Prakrit forms of MIA emerged that were used in classical Sanskrit dramas: Śaurasenī in the midlands, Māhārāstrī in southwest India, the little used “popular” Māgadhī in the east; further, the little known Paīśācī, the Ardha-Māgadhī preferred by the Jains, and the Gāndhārī of some Buddhist texts. For a millennium, Prakrit languages were used in inscriptions and poetry as well as in Jain texts, until they gradually gave way to early forms of New Indo-Aryan (NIA) during the latter part of the first millennium A.D. Further loss of grammatical endings is a characteristic of NIA; therefore, both the noun and verb systems were completely restructured, somewhat along the lines of the change from Latin to the Romance languages.

The earliest form of NIA is the Apabhraṃśa, preserved in quotes recorded by medieval writers and in the Buddhist stanzas in an eastern dialect. Most of the religious poets of the High Middle Ages used early NIA. Apabhraṃśa and its later form Avahaṭṭha developed into the modern NIA languages during the second millennium A.D. These languages can be divided into central languages (various forms of Hindi) and outlying ones, or into some eight separate subgroups: the conservative northwestern Dardic (such as Kalash, Khowar, Shina, Kashmiri); the partially conservative Pāhārī (in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarkhand, and Nepālī, which is spoken up to Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam); the languages of the Punjab (Lahnda, Panjabi) and Sind, of western India (Gujarati, Marathi, with its Konkani dialect in Goa); the southernmost languages Sinhala (Sri Lanka) and Dhivehi (Maldives); the eastern group with Maithili and Magahi (Bihar), Bengali, Oriya, and Assamese. The large central part of North India is covered by various forms of Hindi. Next to the standard language, there are Bhrāj, the more divergent Bhojpuri, and Sadani, or Nimari in the South. Urdu is a variant of central NIA and virtually the same language as Hindi, though with much more Persian and Arabic vocabulary; it is written in a version of the Arabic script. Consequently, Pakistan and Kashmir use Urdu, and most states of North India, from Himachal Pradesh up to Andhra and West Bengal, use Hindi.



Kannada Stone Inscription. A stone inscription in the Kannada language near the town of Banavasi (in the Uttara Kannada district of Karnataka). In the early 1970s, archaeologists stumbled on a stone pillar (where this piece was unearthed) that shed light on the powerful Kadambas, who ruled Karnataka from A.D. 325. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Compared to the dominance of NIA languages and their speakers, the Dravidian languages are by and large limited to South India, where Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, Tulu, and Kannada are the dominant languages today. Its earliest forms are attested, from about 200 B.C. onward, in the Tamil inscriptions of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and in the classical Tamil texts of the Sangam poems. The early inscriptions indicate influences from a lost proto-Kannada. The other Dravidian languages have been attested only hundreds of years later, and many “tribal” ones only over the past two hundred years. The time and exact location of the influx of Dravidian into the subcontinent is unclear, but there are clear remnants in topographical terms in Sind, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. These and early cultural influences on Dravidian all point westward: agricultural words came from Sumerian or Elamite, and some even from farther west. However, the language(s) of the Indus Civilization (2600–1900 B.C.) are uncertain, as its inscriptions cannot be read (if indeed they are a script). The supposed linguistic remnant of that time, modern Brahui in Baluchistan, however, is a

late medieval immigrant from central India (as is Kurukh/Oraon and Malto in Jharkhand). Central India has also retained various Goṇḍī dialects, and South India, especially the Nilgiris (with Toda), has other “tribal” Dravidian languages. A conservative dialect of Tamil has been spoken in northern and northeastern Sri Lanka for many centuries and has considerably influenced the Indo-Aryan Sinhala.

Proto-Dravidian is an agglutinative language like its supposed relative, Uralic. It shares many areal features with Central, North, and Northeast Asia and, surprisingly, highland Ethiopia. Some scholars unite Dravidian and Indo-European, along with South Caucasian (Georgian), Afro-Asiatic (Semitic, Old Egyptian, Berber, etc.), Uralic, and Altaic (including Korean and Japanese) in a Nostratic superfamily or, according to a recent proposal, in Eurasiatic. The historical development of the Dravidian languages has been investigated only on a limited basis thus far, in spite of its importance both for the history of the subcontinent as well as for the little-studied southern influence on the literary and religious history of the North. There also has been an enormous influence of Dravidian on the northern languages, starting with certain parts of the oldest OIA text, the Rig Veda. While its earliest stages seem to lack Dravidian words, the text otherwise has a number of early Dravidian loans. Their amount increases throughout Vedic literature, and their impact continues until today, though most speakers of Sanskrit or NIA do not recognize that such words as *daṇḍa* (stick) are loans from Dravidian. Strong Dravidian influence is also seen in phonology, word formation, and syntax of OIA, MIA and NIA: we can therefore speak of a South Asian “linguistic area” (*sprachbund*). This linguistic area also includes the Munda languages.


Northern Munda is now spoken in eastern and also in western India (Korku, on the Tapti River). In the east, Santali (West Bengal, Jharkhand) and Mundari are the languages with the most speakers; however, Northern Munda (Kherwari) also includes Asuri, Ho, and so on; Central Munda includes Kharia, Juang, and others; and Southern Munda, spoken on the borders of Orissa and Andhra, includes Sora, Pareng, Gutob, and others. Munda itself is the western branch of Austro-Asiatic, which includes, inside India, also Khasi and War (Meghalaya) as well as Nicobar, and outside India, Mon-Khmer, the related Tai languages, and Vietnamese. Khamti (northern Tai) was the language of the medieval Ahom kingdom and still survives in northeastern Assam. Austro-Asiatic must once have been spoken in a much larger area of North India, as many prefixing loans (often closer to War-Khasi) survive in the Rig Veda. Proto-Munda, which has been reconstructed only over the past few decades, was a largely mono/bisyllabic language

working with prefixes and infixes. Under the *sprachbund* influence of Indo-Aryan, it has shifted to a (largely) suffixing language, especially Northern Munda, which also has an enormous number of NIA loans. The largely uninvestigated Munda and War/Khasi languages (and their oral literatures) contain much that is important for the linguistic, religious, and cultural prehistory of the subcontinent. In the Jharkhand and Meghalaya states, at least Santali/Mundari and Khasi may be maintained, while many of the small tribal languages face quick extinction due to the pressure of neighboring NIA and Dravidian languages.

The northern rim of South Asia is occupied by Tibeto-Burmese languages that are linked to Chinese (Sino-Tibetan). Their early history in the subcontinent is unknown; however, even early Vedic texts speak of a mountain people, the Kirāta. The earliest documentation is found in place names and in the Licchavi inscriptions (Kathmandu Valley, c. A.D. 200–750), which also refer to the Kirāta. After A.D. 983, there are land sale inscriptions on palm leaf in early Newari, the dominant language of the Kathmandu Valley until the Gorkha conquest in 1768–1769, when NIA Nepālī became the official language. Most other Tibeto-Burmese languages of the Himalayan belt have not left records until very recently. From west to east, they include among others: Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Lepcha, Bodo, Naga, Meitei (in Manipur). In the northernmost Himalayan uplands, various forms of Tibetan are spoken, such as the archaic western dialect of Ladakh, the eastern one of the Sherpa, or the southern one of Bhutan (now the official language, Dzongkha). Early influence of Tibeto-Burmese on OIA can be discerned in the Vedas, such as the topographical names Kosi and Kosala, or the word for cooked rice (Hindi, *cawal*; Nepālī, *camal*).

The rest of the South Asian languages, whether remnants or substrates, have been recorded only over the past two centuries. Taken together, they open a wide vista of early relationships: westward to the Caucasus (seen in Burushaski, Dravidian), to Central Asia and beyond (Vedic Sanskrit, Indo-Iranian), Southeast Asia (origin of Munda, Khasi, Khamti), and Greater Tibet (Tibeto-Burmese). Even wider relationships emerge in the remnant languages and substrates (Kusunda with Andamanese/Papuan, Nahali with Ainu, which is now also evident in genetic data, i.e., sharing the early Y chromosome haplogroup IV videlicet D). The predominance of retroflex sounds found from the Hindu Kush east and southward perhaps was a feature of even the earliest substrates (as in Andamanese).

In spite of the great diversity of the prehistoric, ancient, and modern South Asian languages, it has been



Sanskrit Inscription. The Qutub Minar (a mosque in Delhi also known as Quwwatu'l Islam, “the might of Islam”) was constructed using the components of the Hindu temples it replaced. In its courtyard stands this massive iron column that bears a Sanskrit inscription in Gupta script, paleographically assignable to the fourth century, a date also confirmed by the peculiar style of the column’s capital. D. J. RAY / FOTOMEDIA.

the Vedic form of Sanskrit (still used in ritual) and especially Classical Sanskrit that have exercised a dominant influence on the languages of the subcontinent. Sanskrit has functioned as the language of administration, scholarly discourse, and religion, not unlike Latin in Europe. In spite of the dominant role of Persian in most of northern India after A.D. 1200–1500, Sanskrit remained the language even of some diplomatic and administrative contacts well into the British period. According to census figures (1991), some 45,000 people still claimed it as their (near-)native tongue. Like Latin and Greek in the West, Sanskrit continues to supply technical terms for administration (*rāṣṭrapati*, “president”; *antārāṣṭrīya*, “international”) or technology (*ākāśvānī*, “radio”; *dūrdarśana*, “television”; *jala vidyut āyoga*, “hydel (or hydro-electric) project”). Sanskrit influence on the “officialese” of most modern languages is so strong that one jokes that one cannot listen to “the news in Hindi” but rather has to look for “the Hindi in the news.” There is a stealthy Sanskritization of most South Asian languages.

However, since the British colonial period, and now with globalization, English has increasingly become the lingua franca, largely supplanting the official language, Hindi. South Asian English has developed into a distinct dialect with strong substrate influences, such as pronunciation of dentals (t, d, th) as retroflexes, a peculiar pitch intonation with partially misplaced accents, lack or hypercorrect insertion of the definite article, colloquial changes in the verbal system (“I am knowing this”), and an abundance of substrate words (*dacoit*, “bandit”; *godown*, “storage”) and frequent code switching with the local language.

Scripts

The earliest scriptlike symbols of the subcontinent belong to the Harappan or Indus Valley Civilization (2600–1900 B.C.). They remain undeciphered, though they have been claimed to represent an early form of Dravidian, and though it is entirely uncertain whether

Dravidian was indeed spoken there and to what extent. The substrates in Vedic rather point to a number of Indus languages. In addition, there even is no consensus about the exact number of the Indus signs (400–600), as to their mutual combinations, and whether the signs represent an alphabet, a syllabo-logographic script, or no script at all. In spite of some regional differences, however, the signs are fairly well standardized throughout the large Harappan area (Pakistan, Punjab, Haryana, and Gujarat). Whether the symbols were used in trade or to indicate political dominance, they quickly disappeared when the Indus Valley Civilization disintegrated. Attempts to link these symbols with later scripts are doomed. Barring a decipherment, the Indus signs provide enough simple, often geometric forms that can be connected with any early script, or even with some potter's and mason's marks. Further, there is a millennia-long gap between the last Indus inscriptions (c. 1900 B.C.) and the first ones in later Indian scripts (under Emperor Ashoka, c. 250 B.C.).

The first writing in South Asia appears only after the impact of Persian domination of much of Pakistan (530 or 519–327 B.C.). Indeed, Karoṣṭhī, the earliest script of the northwestern subcontinent, is an Aramaic-based, rather cursive, Semitic-style alphabet. Aramaic was the language of administration in the Persian empire and even in some of Ashoka's inscriptions (in Kandahar and Taxila). Unlike all other Indian scripts, Kharoshthi is written from right to left. It is a true alphabet: all vowels that begin a syllable and all consonants are represented by individual signs, but vowel length is not marked. However, due to the abundance of *a/ā* sounds in MIA, postconsonantal *a/ā* are not written but are inherent in the consonant sign. All other postconsonantal vowels are marked by small diacritical signs above, below, or crossing the consonant sign in question. Certain consonant clusters are expressed by ligatures or special individual signs. Unlike Semitic alphabets such as Aramaic, the script therefore is well attuned to the Indian phonetic system. Kharoshthi is older than its sister script, Brahmi, and continued to be used until the third century A.D. in the northwest and in Central Asia (Xinjiang).

The other script used in Ashoka's inscriptions in the rest of India was Brahmi. It seems to have been derived from Semitic scripts (Aramaic, Kharoshthi), but it was completely reconfigured, perhaps under contemporary Greek (Hellenistic) influence, which would be plausible if Brahmi was indeed created under Ashoka. Like Kharoshthi, Brahmi perfectly fits the various contemporary MIA languages; however, it clearly was not designed for Sanskrit. Several Sanskrit phonemes or their allophones (such as *ṛ*, *ṝ*, *ḥ*) that are missing in MIA are not represented, and Sanskrit inscriptions begin only in the first century B.C. (Ayodhya, Mathura). Brahmi also lacks

a method to mark the final vowel-less consonants of Sanskrit words, a feature that does not occur in MIA. As in Kharoshthi, short postconsonantal *-a* is not written but inherent in the consonant sign. However, long *ā* and all other postconsonantal vowels are marked by small diacritical signs above, below, and to the right of the consonant. Only superficially, this system may look like a mixture of an alphabet with a syllabary. With little variation, the system has been followed until today (except in the early Tamil Brahmi script). Consonant groups are mostly represented by writing a single consonant (in MIA), and later on by a ligature with one subscribed consonant below the other (for Sanskrit). The perfect match between MIA/Sanskrit phonemes and the script has often been explained as the influence of the well developed Vedic phonetic sciences and of Pāṇini's grammar. Indeed, Indian alphabets follow, unlike the Semitic ones, a strictly phonetic arrangement, beginning with vowels, then with the consonants arranged from their place of realization at the back of the mouth (velars) to the front (labials), followed by resonants and sibilants.

Recently, the finds of some small fragments of inscribed pot shards in Sri Lanka (and then in Tamil Nadu) have cast some doubt about the age of the Brahmi script. Various early dates have been claimed for the finds, all of which are pre-Ashoka. However, small pottery shard fragments can easily be transported through rat holes into lower archaeological levels. More finds are to be awaited. The Brahmi inscriptions must also be viewed in the context of early Tamil Brahmi used in southernmost India (Tamil Nadu and Kerala). Since the second century B.C., Brahmi has been used to write early Tamil, with four signs added for sounds restricted to Tamil. Other than in Ashokan Brahmi, a short postconsonantal *-a* and all other vowels were indicated by a diacritic, thus *k+a*, *k+ā*, *k+i*, and so forth. Thus, unlike in all other Indian scripts, double consonants could be written simply by doubling the sign. It is unclear whether this system was based on Ashokan Brahmi that was used in nearby Karnataka, Andhra, and Sri Lanka, or whether it went back to a lost early South Indian form. In sum, Brahmi was used, with little regional variation, all over South Asia, with the exception of the northwest (Kharoshthi). All later alphabets of South Asia (and most of Southeast Asia and Tibet) are derived from Ashokan Brahmi. Even the ordering of the native Japanese Kana syllabary is based on the Indian alphabetic order. During the first centuries A.D., the Brahmi script gradually developed nail-like extensions at the top of the letters (head markers) and, due to writing with ink on palm leaves, a more cursive form as well as some regional variations. A few letters were added that were necessary to write Sanskrit (*ṅ*, *ḥ*, intervocalic *l*, allophones of *h*, *ḥ*, *h*). A diacritic indicating vowel-less consonants was added, as well as

increasingly more conjuncts (ligatures) for consonant groups (a system used until today). Also, an (invisible) square frame was gradually developed for all letters, which resulted in the squarish northern Gupta script (due to use of ink and pen, c. A.D. 300) and the more rounded southern variety (due to use of stylus for incising letters on palm leaf).

The intricacies of paleographical development cannot be traced here. However, the early split between northern and southern alphabets increased. The northern Gupta script developed, during the sixth century, into the angular Siddhamātrikā script that was widely used—even, due to the spread of Buddhism, in China and Japan (where it still survives as Siddham script). A subvariety emerged in the northwest: the early Śāradā script, used in Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Gandhara, Swat, and the Punjab, where modern Gurmukhi is a distant descendant. Śāradā slowly developed over the Middle Ages and was used in Kashmir by Brahmans well into the twentieth century. Another variety developed in the east: Eastern Nagari (or Proto-Bengali, Gauḍī). It took local forms in Bengal, Mithila, and in the Kathmandu Valley (Newari script with many attested subsequent forms: Bhujimol/Kuṭilā/Raṅjanā, etc.) Modern Newari script is still used for ceremonial purposes. Early Bengali script developed, around 1400, into the Oriya script that favored, as in South India, round shapes of letters.

The mainstream Siddhamatrika developed, around A.D. 1000, into early Devanāgarī, with its typical horizontal top line (not maintained in all Siddhamatrika-derived scripts). It has been used in the central area, but also in Gujarat, where it was used by Jains and Brahmans well into the nineteenth century, when it developed its modern Gujarati forms separately. Devanāgarī has also been used in Maharashtra. In the middle ages, a somewhat variant form (Nandināgarī) was used in the southern Vijayanagara and Tanjore kingdoms. Due to the selection of Hindi as India's official language, the use of Nagari has spread to the Himalayas, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Bihar. Sanskrit publications everywhere now use Devanāgarī, though Sanskrit, which has always been written in local scripts, is still written in local forms for local use.

In South India, scripts deviated at the same time as in the North. The Pallava script of Tamil Nadu (c. A.D. 500) also had a profound influence on the development of all Southeast Asian scripts. In Karnataka and Andhra, the rounded southern characters became almost fully closed, resulting in the modern Telugu-Kannada scripts. In the deep South, the Grantha script (for Sanskrit) and Tamil were developed from earlier southern scripts. They retain, to some extent, the less rounded forms of the late South Brahmi and Pallava scripts. Tamil has the shortest

Indian alphabet, due to an ingenious system of writing only phonemes (neglecting predictable allophones, thus k [k, x]) and because of the lack of ligatures, as vowel-less consonants are marked with a superscripted dot/circle (*pulli*). Thus, Tamil script has been easiest to learn, a feature of Tamil writing systems from the beginning. In the middle of the second millennium, Malayalam script was developed out of the Grantha script. The Sinhala script of Sri Lanka is another development of southern Brahmi script. It has been influenced by other medieval South Indian scripts while achieving its typical, rounded modern form.

The Siddhamatrika-derived Tibetan script, close to early Sharada, is used in Tibet and in the northernmost areas of the subcontinent, as well as for the national language of Bhutan (Dzongkha). The Limbu, Lepcha, and Meitei scripts are based on a version of the Tibetan script and were used for religious writings. One recently developed form of the Meitei script has been revived as the quasi-official script of Manipur.

All Indian scripts are unique and perfect adaptations to the Indian sound systems (phonemes, including some allophones). Most of them, however, remain unwieldy (even in computer use) due to their heavy reliance on individual ligatures for consonant clusters, by positioning Nagari i- before consonants, or due to the split up of the signs for medial -e-, -o- (Bengali, Orissa, southern alphabets). Similarly, the Arabic script used for Urdu and some regional languages (Khowar, Shina, Kashmiri) remains inadequate in expressing the complex vowel systems of NIA. One can only read the Urdu script well if one knows the words intended. However, in Bangladesh the Bengali alphabet (and many Sanskrit loanwords) have been retained. Persian language and script were widely used during the Middle Ages and in the early British colonial period, until Persian was replaced by English in 1835.

The English alphabet has been used since for a variety of goals, such as street signs or film advertisements. Some tribal languages (and Nepālī as used by the British army) have also been written in the Roman alphabet, though Devanāgarī has been introduced in many areas more recently. After independence, some had proposed to make a variety of the Roman alphabet the national script, but this idea did not take hold. The recent adaptations for computer use have given a further boost to South Asian alphabets, though the quick spread of computers has also substantially increased the use of the English language, which is still spoken by only a tiny minority of South Asians.

Michael Witzel

See also Indus Valley Civilization; Literature; Vedic Aryan India

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LANSDOWNE, LORD (1845–1927), fifth marquis of Lansdowne, viceroy of India (1888–1894). Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, the fifth marquis of Lansdowne, was born into a powerful Anglo-Irish family closely associated with progressive Indian policy. His predecessors had sponsored Sanskrit and English education on the subcontinent. The "father of modern India," Ram Mohan Roy, was once a guest in the home in which Lansdowne was born. Charles "Clemency" Canning (viceroy, 1858–1862) was a close family friend. As a result, Lansdowne came to view his service as undersecretary for India (1880) and his assumption of Canning's former office as a family obligation.

Upon his arrival on the subcontinent, Lansdowne found that his predecessor Lord Dufferin had left him

with an empty treasury, a constrained scheme for political reform, and a more active policy on India's northwestern frontier that had alienated the amir of Afghanistan and had unsettled relations with the peoples of that borderland. He soon encountered several new problems, including a bloody revolt in Manipur (1890–1891), an attempt by Parliament to slow the growth of indigenous Indian industry (1891) and a series of political debacles that he largely attributed to the Indian Civil Service's "lack of sympathy for those they ruled."

Believing that the rise of Indian nationalism was an inevitable by-product of British administration, Lansdowne legitimized the work of the Indian National Congress in an official circular (1890). His relations with Congress leaders were not always smooth, but Lansdowne never strayed far from his faith in India's political advancement. He overcame harsh Indian Civil Service opposition to his own expanded and more liberal version of Dufferin's Provincial Councils plan, which was passed into law as the Indian Councils Act of 1892. This act, a pale reflection of the more democratic legislation Lansdowne would have preferred, was cropped by the home government, and the viceroy had to settle for an indirect, rather than explicit mention of the right of Indians to elect their representatives. The act nonetheless became the foundation for India's further political development. As leader of the House of Lords in 1909, Lansdowne silenced opposition to the expansion of the 1892 legislation (the Morley-Minto Reforms) by George Curzon and other Tory officials. He also secured their acceptance of the appointment of an Indian to both the Council of India and the viceroy's Supreme Council.

Lansdowne was less fortunate in sustaining what was then thought to have been his greatest triumph in India: the making of the Durand Line (1893–1894). This demarcation of the Indo-Afghan border divided several indigenous communities between British India and Afghanistan, but was designed to both amicably settle a host of disputes with Afghan amir Abdor Rahman and provide a new footing for the defense of British India's northwestern borderlands. Immediately upon his return to England, Lansdowne urged home officials to create a North-West Frontier province that would be managed so as to secure the amir's good will and also win the support of the Pathans along the frontier by offering the latter the benefits of closer relations with the British, without threatening the political autonomy they cherished. Lansdowne was convinced that unless this change was made immediately, the frontier would soon erupt with catastrophic results. His concerns and advice were ignored, however, and the British military debacles in Chitral and the Tirah followed shortly thereafter.

Lansdowne deeply regretted the cost to India of these "little wars" for empire. This may explain his interest in India during his later service as secretary of war (1895–1900) and foreign secretary (1900–1906). While at the War Office, he testified before the Welby Commission in support of Gopal Krishna Gokhale's contention that India had long been wrongly charged for military expenditures made in defense of imperial, rather than Indian, interests.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British Crown Raj**

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LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY, 1850–1950 The term "large-scale industry" refers to factories that combine at least three characteristics: use of machinery, employment of wage labor, and the application of regulatory measures such as the Factory Act or Disputes Act. These features were of recent origin in nineteenth-century India and, to a large extent, products of British colonial rule. In employment statistics, the units registered as "factories" under the Factory Act can be considered large-scale industry. In reality, the registered factories included a fair number of units that did not employ machinery, but with few exceptions, registered factories did possess the other two features.

Scale, Spread, and Composition

Employment in factories in British India increased from 317,000 in 1891 to 1,266,000 in 1938, or from 5 percent of industrial employment to 11 percent (it was 29 percent in 1991). The share of factories in real income generated by industry increased from about 15 percent in 1900 to 45 percent in 1947 (it was 55–60 percent in the mid-1990s). Factory employment in all princely states increased from 130,000 in 1921 to 299,000 in 1938.

Impressive as it was, the growth was an uneven one. Industries around Bombay (Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata) accounted for about half of factory employment. Ahmedabad, Madras (Chennai), and Kanpur saw limited development of factories. In the interwar period,

key resources such as capital, labor, knowledge, railway connection, and electric power were no longer concentrated, and industrialization began to spread. As much as 45 percent of factory employment in the early twentieth century was engaged in cotton and jute textiles. Other important groups included tobacco and leather. The share of chemicals, metals, and machinery was very small. Machinery and manufactured intermediate goods were still largely imported. From about World War I, a few bold industrial initiatives were taken, the Tata iron and steel venture being the most significant example.

Chronology

The first burst of investment in cotton and jute mills occurred in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The capital came partly from foreign investment and partly from capital accumulated in the early-nineteenth-century trades in opium and cotton. The growth of India's trade with China after the British East India Company's monopoly in China trade ended (1834–1835) played an important role in the growth of mill enterprises. The U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), which cut off supplies of American cotton to Lancashire, created a boom in Indian cotton and large profits, part of which found its way into building cotton mills. A tea mania of a similar nature in Calcutta and a gold mania in Madras stimulated the local stock exchanges.

World War I was a landmark event. Massive excess demand for Indian goods developed, but at the same time, the flow of machinery, raw materials, spare parts, and chemicals normally imported from Britain or Germany stopped. The immediate impact of supply constraints was rapid inflation from which cotton, jute, and steel emerged as major gainers, though many other constituents of India's economy were heavy losers. Until the war, the British Raj had followed a hands-off policy with respect to Indian industries, and a buy-British policy with respect to all machines required for defense, railways, or administration. After the war, the government began to look toward local sources and became more open to promoting them. Three events that represent this shift in attitude are the establishment of the Indian Munitions Board (1918), the Indian Industrial Commission (1916–1918), and the Indian Fiscal Commission (1921–1922). All three bodies underscored the need to develop local capability, and endorsed the use of fiscal measures for that purpose. The Fiscal Commission sanctioned the use of protective tariffs for industrial promotion.

The interwar period saw rapid industrialization as well as mounting crises. Protective tariffs enabled dramatic growth in sugar, steel, cement, matches, paper and woolen textiles. Within older industries, such as cotton and jute mills, the period saw both the start of new firms

in new locations as well as crises in old firms in old locations. Competition in textiles and steel was more intense in this period than before. In textiles, competition came from Japan and from many new mills that were started in small towns far from Bombay. The Indian nationalists convincingly argued that the rupee was an overvalued currency in the late 1920s. In steel, world capacity had advanced faster than demand. In jute, Indian capacity grew faster than world demand. The result in each case was low or fluctuating profits. Tariffs alone could not solve these problems. There were attempts to introduce new technology and management practices and to voluntarily restrict supplies.

The Great Depression thus came at a bad time for industries like steel, paper, sugar, cement, and jute. Yet turmoil in the financial market, caused by debt crisis and gold exports, led to a conversion of idle rural assets into industrial-commercial uses.

World War II again saw excess demand in the presence of supply constraints, and massive inflation. But Indian industry in 1939 was more diversified and better equipped to diversify than it had been in 1914.

Capital and management. Pioneers in modern industry came from communities that had specialized in trading and banking activities. On the west coast, the Parsis, Khojas, Bhatias, the Gujarati traders and bankers based in Ahmedabad, and the Bombay-based Baghdadi Jews were the early mill owners. Several of these communities had a history of collaboration with Europeans. Some had withdrawn from the maritime trade as European firms based in London took control of it. In Calcutta, and in North and South India, Europeans dominated import-export trade, banking and insurance, and eventually jute, engineering, mines, plantations, railways, power, and dockyards. Commodity trade, however, was not in European hands, but in the hands of Indian traders, chiefly the Marwaris. By the end of the interwar period, prominent Marwari firms in Calcutta had entered the jute industry, and on a smaller scale, sugar, paper, cement, construction, and share-broking. The European capitalists did not welcome this trend. Consequently, a schism opened in Calcutta's industrial-commercial world that took a toll when large European firms became targets of predatory takeovers shortly after independence.

Industrial capital was persistently scarce in India, and financial market institutions were undeveloped. The major government-backed Presidency Banks of the period did not supply long-term capital. Indian joint-stock banks were prone to bankruptcy. The informal money market served too narrow a clientele with too few instruments.

The British “managing agency system,” wherein the owners of a company contracted its management to

another firm for a fee was common in India since the nineteenth century. Principals and agents then belonged to a small network, but that situation changed when limited liability became popular beginning in the 1870s. The small shareholder could no longer monitor the managing agent, paving the way for mismanagement and fraud. Despite these problems, the system continued until 1970, in part because the agent facilitated loans and deposits. With the expansion of professional managers and the use of the “holding company” for control, the system became redundant.

Limits on industrialization. Large-scale industry entered the processing of natural resources, abundant and cheap in India, with knowledge imported from Britain. Machinery and intermediates did not develop to a comparable extent because Indian factories could more easily import than produce such things as electrical machinery, transport equipment, or heavy and fine chemicals. It could also import foreign technicians. India’s import-dependence for technology and knowledge had weakened, however, by the mid-twentieth century. Significant changes came only after independence, with protection for the capital goods industries, and substantial government funding for higher and technical education.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947;**
Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947;
Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947

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LEADERS, CHRISTIAN The Protestant Christian communities in South India can be traced back to the work of two German missionaries, George Bartholomeaus Ziegenbalg and Heinrich Pleutschau, of the Royal Danish Mission, at the Danish settlement of Tranquebar, in 1706. Missionaries of various societies from England and America later strengthened the Tranquebar community, so that by the end of the nineteenth century the South Indian Protestant missions were well coordinated, concentrating their energies on winning converts and establishing

Christian churches. Christian doctrines, traditions, and institutions spawned by the missionary community were, of course, interpreted and appropriated by indigenous groups to fulfill their own needs and aspirations. While accepting the “new faith,” the converts evolved their own agendas, which did not necessarily conform to that of the missionaries.

The interaction between the missionaries and the Indians among whom they worked set in motion unpredicted consequences. The earliest and the most fascinating account unfolded in rural Tirunelveli, where Robert Caldwell (1814–1891) achieved the largest conversion among the low caste Shanars, known today as Nadars. Caldwell, a missionary of unparalleled importance, left his imprint on almost every aspect of Tamil society. He established schools and churches, and evincing a keen interest in Indian culture and religion, learned several Indian languages. Caldwell’s greatest impact was in education. He produced a number of works, most important of which were *The Tinnevelly Shanars: A Sketch of Their Religion and Their Moral Condition and Characteristics as a Caste* (1849) and *A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages* (1856).

Rankled by the derisive portrayal of Nadars in Caldwell’s *The Tinnevelly Shanars* and the authoritarian behavior of the missionaries, Arumainayagam (also known as Sattampillai), a Nadar catechist, founded his Hindu Christian Church of Lord Jesus in 1857 at Prakasapuram in Tinnevelly district. Sattampillai (1824–1919) established the new church to subvert the missionary authority, developing a substantial critique of Western Christianity, which he claimed was corrupt and inauthentic. He also appropriated elements of Judaism for his new church, which he represented as the restoration of the original, pure form of Christianity, thus investing his adherents with a spiritual superiority. Sattampillai’s Hindu Christian Church signaled the first wave of indigenization of Christianity.

Caldwell’s magnum opus, *A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages*, was a pioneering philological work, constructing a new genealogy for South India’s Dravidian languages and culture, as opposed to the Sanskritic languages and culture. It was appropriated by upper caste non-Brahman Hindus to forge a non-Brahman ideology to counter the socio-cultural and intellectual hegemony of the Brahmans in South India. Another notable missionary in the Tirunelveli district, G. U. Pope (1820–1907), a colleague of Caldwell, continued his philological tradition by translating Tamil literary works such as *Tirukural*, *Tiruvagasagam*, and *Nalad-iar*; as well as publishing Tamil dictionaries and grammars, extolling the historic glories of Tamil culture. Pope’s work helped to generate theories concerning the

autonomy and purity of the Tamils, stimulating the revival of Tamil language and literature.

Indian nationalism's encounter with Christianity added another dimension to the story. Prominent among the Protestant missionaries in this regard was H. A. Popley (1868–1960), who supported Indian nationalism, openly expressing his solidarity on one occasion by unfurling the Indian National Congress flag next to the Union Jack on the roof of his bungalow during an official visit by the governor of Madras. Popley was keenly interested in traditional music and Tamil literature, and he was the first to set the Gospel hymnal to indigenous melodies. Influenced by Tamil forms of Hindu devotion, he was in the forefront of musical evangelism, assimilating traditional music and performing it during his Christian preaching. He prepared a *Hand Book of Musical Evangelism* to illustrate the adoption of Indian notation in his work. *The Music of India* is Popley's most celebrated work, which reveals the rich heritage of Indian musical culture. He translated the Tamil classic *Thirukural* into English and quoted from it profusely in his sermons.

Among the educated Christians of high social standing, John Lazarus, V. Chakkarai, and P. Chenchiah, prominent public figures in Madras, developed a deep awareness of Indian nationalism. John Lazarus (1849–1925) was a missionary and pastor of the Danish Mission Society in Madras and a firebrand of the Christian community there. Deeply concerned about the prospects and challenges confronting the Indian Christians, he was instrumental in founding the Madras Native Christian Association (1888), aimed at promoting the welfare of the Indian Christian community “by legitimate means” and furthering the political, social, moral, and intellectual advancement of its members. In 1890 he launched the *Christian Patriot*, an English weekly newspaper of “social and religious progress” in Madras. He was an ardent advocate of the National Church of India, which he tried to revive after the demise of its founder Dr. Pulney Andy. He exhorted Indian Christians to unify by shedding Western sectarianism and creating a united indigenous church in South India. Lazarus evinced keen interest in the Indian National Movement. He praised the Indian National Congress's role in creating a nation, and he made an appeal to the Christian community to spend “their time and strength and their means” for the welfare of the “Indian nation.” A Tamil scholar, writer, and translator, he was involved in bringing to the fore the richness of Tamil literature and the great antiquity of the Tamil people. He made an intense study of Tamil, translating the grammatical work *Nannul* and part of the Tamil classic *Thirukural* into English. He also translated and published a corpus of ten thousand Tamil proverbs.

V. Chakkarai (1880–1958) converted to Christianity while a student at Madras Christian College, influenced by William Miller, principal of the college and a well-known Christian liberal, who joined Indians in their social reform initiatives. Graduating from Christian College in philosophy, Chakkarai completed his bachelor of law degree at Madras Law College in 1906. In 1907 he attended the Indian National Congress session at Surat and became a follower of the extremist leader B. G. Tilak. In 1917 he participated in the Home Rule Movement, and in 1920 he joined Mahatma Gandhi's movement. Active in the Indian National Congress, he was also an executive member of the Madras Presidency Association, a non-Brahman enclave within the Congress. As a member of the Madras Presidency Association, he favored reservation of electoral seats for non-Brahmans. In 1926 Chakkarai left the Congress, protesting against the practice of serving meals separately to Brahman and non-Brahman students at Shermadevi Gurukulam, a nationalist educational institution run by V. V. S. Aiyar.

One of the founding fathers of the trade union movement in India, Chakkarai served as president of the Madras Provincial Trade Union Congress from 1943 to 1958 and as president of the All-India Trade Union Congress from 1949 until his death in 1958. He was a Madras Municipal Corporation councillor for more than thirty years, between 1916 and 1948. He was elected mayor of Madras city in 1941 and was a member of the Madras Legislative Council from 1952 to 1958. Chakkarai's theological concerns centered on building an indigenous Christian theology. Along with P. Chenchiah, he was one of the founders of the Madras Christo Samaj (Christian Society), which worked for the Indianization of the church. A powerful orator, he was also a prolific writer; his theological quest was reflected in two of his works, *Jesus the Avatar* and *The Cross and Indian Thought*.

P. Chenchiah (1886–1959) converted to Christianity, along with his entire paternal family, in 1901. In 1906 he graduated from Madras Christian College, where he was influenced by William Miller. He obtained his degree in law in 1908 and began his legal career under veteran politician T. Prakasam, who later became the first chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. Qualifying himself for the master of law degree in 1913, he worked for a while as part-time professor at the Madras Law College. He practiced as an advocate, and from 1929 to 1941 served as chief judge of Pudukottai State High Court. He went to England in 1919 on a political mission to give evidence, as an Indian Christian, before the British Joint Parliamentary Committee in connection with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. An ardent nationalist, he was also recognized as a stimulating thinker in conceptualizing an

Indian Christian theology and he was actively involved in the Christo Samaj.

Indigenization of Christianity was possible within the framework of the Indian church organization. Those who stood outside the church were concerned more about the nationalists' critique of Christianity than the anxieties of the Christian community, which was drawn largely from the lower castes. In this process of Indianization, they could function within a miniscule community of Christian intellectuals based on an estrangement with the Christian community and the church organization.

Vincent Kumaradoss

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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LEGAL SYSTEM. See **Judicial System, Modern.**

LIBERALIZATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF In July 1991, just a month after assuming power, and with India facing an acute balance-of-payments crisis, the government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao announced a major reorientation of economic policy. Rao's finance minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, quickly began lowering trade barriers, scaling back industrial regulation, and inviting in foreign investors. The gradual process of policy change, which came to be known generically as "liberalization" or "economic reform," was sustained until the Congress Party coalition lost power in 1996. Succeeding governments—of the left and right—have continued to steer India's economic policy toward a greater reliance on markets and increased exposure to the world economy.

Not every reform recommended by market-oriented economists, or proposed by the government itself, has

been introduced. Almost a decade and a half after liberalization began, the long-promised "exit policy," to relax laws that restrict firms' ability to shed workers, had yet to be implemented. Reforms to India's agricultural economy also lagged behind, as did pledges to rein in government expenditure and privatize state-owned firms. India's import tariffs remained consistently higher than many had hoped for, and important controls on the movement of capital were retained.

Nevertheless, the shift of economic paradigm beginning in 1991 has been profound. Liberalization's radical implications emerged only slowly over time, as key policy reforms became rooted and new measures accumulated. Surely, this slippery-slope approach—hoping that early reforms would acquire a self-propelling momentum—helped to neutralize some of the political resistance to liberalization. Of considerable value to reformers was the widespread idea that the reforms were limited in scope, not permanent, and, most of all, were being introduced by prominent members of a political class that had seemingly no interest in shrinking a state to whose largesse they served as gatekeeper.

Indeed, in 1991, the new economic policies were greeted by many observers as yet another doomed attempt—one in a long line of half-hearted reform episodes dating at least to the mid-1960s—to fundamentally change India's *dirigiste* framework. Even so, for analytical purposes, it is helpful to treat the politics of these two processes—of initiating and then sustaining economic reform—separately.

The Politics of Initiation

The theoretical backdrop to the politics of economic reform was a widely held set of assumptions concerning the change-resistant qualities of Indian democracy. Powerful interest groups were thought to exercise a collective veto over any attempt to restructure the policy regime. Pranab Bardhan's model of the "dominant proprietary classes"—widely quoted during the late 1980s and early 1990s—was the classic statement of this view. The clout wielded by these groups appeared to have been demonstrated conclusively when attempts to reform the Indian economy—by Indira Gandhi during the early 1980s, and by Rajiv Gandhi later in the decade—faltered. In both cases, relatively modest policy initiatives were seen to have given way to politically inspired backtracking, or at least a failure to follow through with more far-reaching reforms. The lack of constancy was blamed on the influence of such powerful constituencies as subsidized farmers, protected industrialists, and rent-seeking bureaucrats, though some accounts highlighted ideological attachments as much as material incentives.

Much of the debate during and since 1991 focused on the role of the international financial institutions (IFIs), namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in provoking India to introduce a new, more radical wave of market-oriented reforms than had been contemplated during the 1980s. There were conditions—or “policy conditionalities”—attached to some of the loans that the Indian government received from the World Bank and the IMF at the height of the foreign-exchange crisis. The government’s insistence on remaining vague about the nature of the agreements, and widespread awareness within India that conditionalities contained within such loans to other developing countries were in some cases draconian, fueled domestic political speculation that the new government had been forced to announce a wholesale change of policy orientation. Critics of the new wave of reforms argued that India was suffering only a short-term balance-of-payments crisis, not a fundamental economic catastrophe. Only IFI pressure, said the critics, could explain why a short-term crisis was met with such far-reaching policy reversals.

Another view, expressed at the time and bolstered considerably since then, was that India was not pushed by the IFIs into reforming, but that it jumped of its own volition. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the chief official at the finance ministry during the early 1990s, subsequently argued that India’s reform effort was “homegrown,” a view also taken by scholars who have examined closely the sequencing of reform initiatives in such policy domains as financial markets and telecommunications regulation. During the mid-1980s, when India was not under direct pressure from the IFIs, decisions were taken to liberalize slowly in these and other areas, and government-appointed commissions had offered recommendations that subsequently formed the basis of government policy. From this perspective, the IFIs were by 1991 pushing at an open door, not one locked shut by interest groups fearful of losing their perquisites.

Others see the IFIs as an important element in the push toward reform, but as actors operating less through coercion and more through a process of modified persuasion. Devesh Kapur (2004) argues that remittances sent back home to India by its global diaspora include “social remittances,” among which he classifies the knowledge and networks of India’s large cadre of foreign-trained economists. Mitu Sengupta (2004) focuses on the key role played by economists of Indian origin who had previously spent time working in the World Bank and the IMF. There were indeed—in the 1980s, but particularly in the 1990s—a sizable number of high-profile “lateral entrants” to the upper echelons of India’s extended economic bureaucracy, people who because of their expert

knowledge and transnational professional networks were brought into the policy process, either as special advisors, as secretaries to government, or as economists running government-affiliated research institutes, like the National Council of Applied Economic Research, or working within bodies such as the Planning Commission. The lateral entrants brought with them an intangible clout due to their training and experience at elite institutions abroad. This cut both ways, of course, since some of their opponents charged them with being out of touch with Indian realities, or in the thrall of abstract models; others questioned their motives, claiming that plum jobs in Washington awaited them if they towed the IFI line while serving as government officials.

Sengupta takes a more nuanced, and plausible, position on this question. What secured these lateral entrants their positions was a widespread (and probably correct) perception among senior Indian political leaders that the lateral entrants were likely to be treated favorably by IFI representatives when arguing India’s case for additional funding, better terms, and so forth. In other words, the lateral entrants would enter government largely due to their ability to act as external interlocutors, officials who could speak the language of the “Washington Consensus.” They were like ambassadors to a foreign court. Even so, the internal influence of lateral entrants on policy debates was not expected to be great: after all, the politicians who appointed these lateral entrants could arrange for them to exit laterally as well. As it turned out, a number of these “official economists” proved politically deft, in some cases relying on privileged access to bank-conducted research studies in order to prevail in policy battles raging within the upper echelons of Indian officialdom.

The Politics of Sustainability

The second key question concerned the ability of India’s reformers to overcome the daunting political obstacles facing them, whatever their motivation for initiating reforms in the first place. Rob Jenkins argued that the reorientation of India’s development strategy could be characterized, to a considerable degree, as “reforming by stealth”—a process in which various tactical maneuvers were employed by governing elites. Based on a strategy of delay, key actors deliberately refrained from highlighting the longer-term implications of initial reform decisions. Narasimha Rao, after leaving office, said of effecting this kind of policy reversal: “What it really entails is a complete U-turn without seeming to be a U-turn.”

Jenkins’s explanation stressed three interrelated factors: the political skills of India’s reformers, the fluid

institutional environment within which they operated, and the incentives created by the initial policies employed to address the 1991 crisis. The institution of federalism, for instance, meant that politicians in the central government could pass the burden of fiscal reform to the states. Politicians in New Delhi could also rely on state governments to fall in line with the liberalizing ethos, regardless of their preferences: once the central government loosened restraints on private investors the states would be forced to compete for inward investment by reforming their own policy environments. Over time, federalism began to influence the nature of India's engagement with institutions of global governance. Several state governments entered into structural reform agreements with the World Bank. Moreover, states ruled by "regional" parties became points of leverage for regionally concentrated economic interests adversely affected by the central government's approach to the World Trade Organization (WTO). With a well-placed regional party advocating their case, such interests were sometimes able to exploit the fact that regional parties had become key elements in national coalition governments. Increasingly, a regional party's support for a national coalition government was conditioned upon policy favors from New Delhi that would help provincially important economic interests—including measures to cushion them from the effects of WTO agreements.

Another explanation for the political durability of India's reform program of the 1990s was offered by Ashutosh Varshney (1999), who claimed that the government had, during the first several years of reform, focused mainly on issues of little concern to India's masses, such as financial-sector reforms and trade policy. In other words, reform was politically durable only because India's was a skewed, cautious, version of reform. India's reformers had thus mastered the "elite politics" of reform, but had not tackled the "mass politics." The reformers had achieved what they had, moreover, only by relying on the enormous social cleavages—particularly in the rural sector—that impeded collective action among adversely affected constituencies. Ultimately, Varshney argued, India's reformers would need to devise a political discourse through which the idea of markets as a social instrument could be sold to a mass audience. The explanations offered by Jenkins and Varshney are not, however, fundamentally in contradiction. Jenkins argued that one of the three factors identified in his framework for understanding the politics of reform—the political skill to cloak policy change in the guise of continuity—is in fact one of the means by which India was able to prevent any reform decisions from entering mass politics. Rather than disagreeing on the nature of causal mechanisms, the difference between these two authors is that Varshney considers one of the variables fixed (the degree to which

policy decisions enter mass politics), whereas Jenkins sees it as susceptible to the exercise of political skill.

Future Questions

The future research agenda in this field lies largely in sectoral studies, or in research that charts the political implications, rather than the political determinants, of policy choices. These will respond both to existing theories as well as to new challenges to the orthodoxy surrounding India's economic performance. Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian (2004) represent one such challenge, arguing that whatever one thinks about the intensity (or political durability) of the reforms ushered in by Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, the reformers of the 1990s had the distinct advantage of taking office at the end of a decade—the 1980s—during which India's long-term "Hindu rate of growth" (3–3.5 percent annually) had jumped to 5 percent and more. This performance during the 1980s was achieved, according to Rodrik and Subramanian, without fundamental reforms having been undertaken. It was a matter of government sending the correct signals to business interests at the beginning of the 1980s.

This could be interpreted to mean that India's 1980s growth performance relieved the Narasimha Rao government of the obligation to undertake, in 1991, the truly difficult (mass-affecting) reforms for which many analysts called. Another reading would be that the twenty-year time frame merely indicates how important is a gradual approach to achieving sustained reform.

Rob Jenkins

See also Development Politics; Economic Reforms of 1991

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LINLITHGOW, LORD (1887–1952), viceroy of India (1936–1943). Victor Alexander John Hope, second marquis of Linlithgow, was viceroy of India from 1936 through October 1943. A graduate of Eton, and a colonel in World War I, Lord Linlithgow chaired Parliament’s Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform from 1933 to 1934. His committee’s plan was adopted as the Government of India Act of 1935. Linlithgow went out to India a year later to implement that act, succeeding Lord Willingdon as viceroy. A Tory landlord and avid hunter, “Hopey,” as friends called him, expanded the Council of India from seven to fifteen members by the end of his long tenure, hoping perhaps to foist an illusion of representative government on his Indian subjects, despite keeping India’s most popular leaders of the Congress, especially Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, at bay or locked behind British bars. His hatred and distrust of Mahatma Gandhi was no less irrational than Winston Churchill’s.

During World War II, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India on his famous mission to try to win wartime cooperation from the leaders of India’s National Congress and of the Muslim League. He was authorized to offer India

full dominion status after the war ended, though any province wishing to “opt out” of that dominion would be permitted to do so, thus implicitly conceding Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s “Pakistan.” Linlithgow so resented Cripps’s private meetings with Nehru and Gandhi, as well as with Colonel Louis Johnson, Franklin Roosevelt’s special emissary to India, that he angrily wired Prime Minister Churchill, undermining Cripps’s negotiating power, forcing that one and only wartime Cabinet overture to India to collapse. Then, as soon as Gandhi attempted to launch a final *satyagraha* movement against the British Raj in August 1942, Linlithgow ordered Gandhi’s predawn arrest, together with that of members of Congress’s Working Committee, doomed to rust for the remaining years of the war behind British bars.

Like Churchill, Linlithgow preferred dealing with Muslim leaders, primarily Jinnah, the Muslim League’s Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), than with any member of the Congress. The British Indian army remained heavily dependent on its Muslim and Sikh recruits. Linlithgow knew that as long as Jinnah’s League remained strong, it would serve to contradict Congress’s claim to represent “all” of India’s population, not just its Hindu majority. Churchill and Linlithgow were not the only Tory leaders to play that Muslim “green card” in their political negotiations with Congress, but they were two of the most powerful.

Linlithgow was succeeded as viceroy by India’s commander in chief, Field Marshal Lord Wavell. Linlithgow returned home to chair the Midland Bank, and also served as Lord High Commissioner of the Church of Scotland. He died during a bird shooting party on his vast estate in 1952.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Government of India Act of 1935; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Wavell, Lord**

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LITERATURE

This entry consists of the following articles:

MODERN

TAMIL

MODERN

Throughout its history, the literature of the Indian subcontinent has been characterized by an exuberant diversity of languages and has been enriched by ever-shifting dialogues among these languages and the regions and cultures they represent. The development of modern Indian literature in the second half of the nineteenth century was the result of such dialogues—between the English language, a colonial import that replaced Sanskrit and Persian as the medium of education, and the more than twenty regional languages of India, many with literary traditions stretching back a thousand years or more. In the nineteenth century, some Indian writers wrote in English, but the majority adapted European genres, such as the novel and the short story, to the “vernacular,” regional languages, writing on modern themes and forging new literary languages and styles. The second half of the twentieth century saw the adoption of English as a major language for Indian fiction, and from the 1980s onward, Indian and South Asian writers in English have been leading figures on the global literary scene. Modern Indian literature mirrors the diversity and vibrancy of modern India. From its very beginnings, Indian fiction has offered—often more discerningly and more reliably than documentary sources—imaginative commentary on India’s social and political realities, and on the negotiations of India’s traditional cultures with the West and with the modern world.

The British Colonial Period to 1947

Modernity, the novel, and the nation. The rise of modern Indian literature in the nineteenth century reveals the complexity of India’s encounter with colonialism, and of the country’s entry into modernity. As early as 1835, the British colonial government had introduced English education for upper-class Indians, so that they could serve in the administration of the colony. With the establishment, in 1857, of universities in the three Presidencies of Madras (Chennai), Bombay (Mumbai), and Calcutta (Kolkata), a significant number of Indians gained access to European thought. The colonists had hoped that an English education would teach their Indian subjects Western values, and would wean them from what they considered pernicious ideas propagated by Indian religious and literary texts. British condemnation extended to the aesthetic of Indian literature as well. However, the creation of an English-educated upper

middle class affected Indian literary production in ways that the colonial government could hardly have anticipated. The new education had brought with it the nineteenth-century European ideals of individualism, progress, and nationalism. Stung by British criticism of Indian society and literature, yet exhilarated by European Orientalist scholars’ celebration of ancient Indian culture, Indians began writing in modern literary forms to represent new realities, but also to reimagine India’s history, and to advocate for social and political change. And they wrote in the Indian languages, rather than in English. Prose fiction, marked by realism, linear narrative, and a focus on the individual, displaced the earlier Indian literary modes of myth and poetry, with their emphasis on ideal images and social types. Not surprisingly, the novel, a form whose development in Europe was linked with the rise of the middle class and the concept of the nation, became the principal genre of Indian literature in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, from the very beginning, Indian writers shaped the Western literary form to suit Indian linguistic, literary, and cultural sensibilities, drawing eclectically from the diverse literary traditions they had inherited, both classical and popular, in Sanskrit, Persian, and the regional languages.

The “Bengal Renaissance” in Calcutta, the British capital, was at the vanguard of the new literary and cultural movements. The pioneering writer Bankim Chandra Chatterji wrote Bengali novels on social reform and resistance to colonial rule. In *Bisha briksha* (1873; translated as *The Poison Tree*, 1884), Chatterji treated the plight of upper caste Hindu widows, who were forbidden to remarry. His *Rajsingha* (1881) was a fictional account of the glory of the Rajput chiefs, suggestive of the grandeur of Indian civilization; in *Ananda Math* (1882; translated as *The Abbey of Bliss*, 1906), in the guise of a historical novel about an earlier period, he allegorized the violent overthrow of British rule in India. By 1885, the date of the founding of the Indian National Congress, an organization dedicated to economic and political reform, the ideals of nationalism and social justice had become the inspiration, not only for political activists, but also for Indian writers.

Many early Indian novelists dealt with social issues, and especially with controversies relating to the treatment of women in Indian society, the object of the most trenchant European criticism, and a sore point with Indians, both reformers and traditionalists. The early novels focused on the ways in which Indian women of the middle and upper classes were oppressed by the denial of personal freedom, education, and economic autonomy. The writers were also deeply engaged with the question of women’s entry into the modern nation and public life, and the tremendous social upheavals these developments

entailed. Chatterji's *Poison Tree*, Baba Padmanji's *Yamuna paryatan* (Yamuna's journey, 1857, in Marathi), and *Chokher bali* (1901, in Bengali; translated as *Binodini*, 1968) by Rabindranath Tagore, a great humanist and a towering figure in the history of modern Indian writing, were only three among a large number of novels focusing on the condition of widows. In *Indulekhā* (1889), the first novel written in Malayalam, Chandu Menon presented his eponymous heroine as the ideal "modern" woman. In *Ghare bāire* (1915, in Bengali; translated as *Home and the World*, 1919) Tagore criticized fanatic nationalism, while sympathetically portraying the dilemmas of women caught in the debate between tradition and modernity. In the 1880s and 1890s, publishing short stories that sensitively depicted the lives of ordinary villagers in East Bengal, the multifaceted Tagore introduced the short story genre to Bengali (e.g., *Chuti*, 1892; translated as *The Homecoming*, 1916) and to Indian literature.

Poetry and other genres. Departing from the archaizing cadences of the Bengali verse of the pioneering poet Michael Madhusudan Dutt (*Meghnādbadh*, 1861; translated as *The Slaying of Meghanada*, 2004), Tagore also pioneered a modern poetry for the Bengali language. In 1913 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for *Gītānjali* (Song offering, 1912; translated as *Gitanjali*, 1916), a collection of his poems that he translated into English at the request of the poet W. B. Yeats. Tagore's many musical dramas (e.g., *Dāk-ghar*, 1912; translated as *The Post Office*, 1914) were performed at Santiniketan, the modern school he founded near Calcutta to nourish Indian culture and arts, and throughout India. Like her predecessor Toru Dutt, Sarojini Naidu, a Bengali by birth, wrote poetry in English. While Dutt died at a very young age, Naidu became a celebrated leader of India's freedom movement and published, in addition to several volumes of poetry on Indian culture and Indian women's lives (e.g., *The Golden Threshold*, 1905), speeches and essays in English. Modern poetry flourished in all the Indian languages, and grew to maturity in the middle years of the twentieth century. The Tamil writer Subramania Bharati's passionate poems espousing the cause of freedom from British rule are among the first examples of modern writing in the Tamil language. Other writers, such as the noted Hindi poets Sachidananda H. Vatsyayan ("Agyeya"), Suryakant Tripathi ("Nirala"), and Mahadevi Varma (a woman writer and winner of a major award from the Indian Academy of Letters), wrote poetry of a more introspective, personal character.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, women from the rising Indian middle class became authors of fiction as well as nonfiction, especially memoirs and works centered on women's issues and social change. Celebrated examples include: *The High-Caste Hindu*

Woman (1887, in English), reformist Pandita Ramabai's book about the condition of Hindu women; Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain's Bengali writings on the constraints of seclusion (*purdah*) on Muslim women (e.g., the collection of essays *Avaroddbasini* [1928–1930; translated as *Inside Seclusion*, 1981]); and Krupabai Sathianadhan's autobiographical novel *Saguna: A Story of Native Christian Life* (1894, in English). Tarabai Shinde argued for the superiority of women's character in her Marathi essay *Stri-purusah tulna* (1882; translated as *A Comparison of Men and Women*, 1991); in *Sultana's Dream* (1905, in English), Rokeya Hossain imagined a utopian world in which women ruled benevolently and ushered in progress through scientific achievement.

Indian writing from World War I to 1947. Two movements influenced and stimulated Indian writing between World War I and II: the nonviolent movement toward freedom for India, led by Mahatma Gandhi, and the international Marxist-socialist movement advocating social justice for laborers, peasants, and the masses. Two great novels of social realism and critique of injustice were published in 1936: *Godām* (translated as *The Gift of a Cow*, 1968), the Hindi writer Premchand's epic novel of peasant life in North India; and the Bengali novelist Manik Bandyopadhyay's *Putul nācher itikathā* (translated as *The Puppet's Tale*, 1968), a novel about rural Bengal. By the 1930s and early 1940s, the short story had become a major genre in Indian literature, and Premchand and other writers of this generation are celebrated for their classic short stories on similar themes. Bibhuti Bhushan Banerjee's *Pather pāncbālī* (1929, in Bengali; translated as *Song of the Road*, 1968), a classic evocation of a rural childhood, stands out as a novel in the humanistic tradition of Tagore.

The 1930s also saw the rise of the Indian novel in English. Raja Rao's *Kanthapura* (1938) was revolutionary, in terms of both theme (the involvement of Indian villagers in the Gandhian freedom movement) and style. Rao himself declared that he had written this novel not in the standard language and style of English fiction, but in an English reshaped to reflect the Kannada language speech of women in a South Indian village and the style of storytelling in the Sanskrit Purāṇas (mythological texts) and women's folktales. Mulk Raj Anand's English novels *Untouchable* (1935) and *Coolie* (1936), dealing with the injustice of caste and oppressive labor practices, are representative of the progressive stream in Indian writing in this period. R. K. Narayan, who began a long and illustrious literary career with the novel *Swami and His Friends* (1935), is an exception among the writers who flourished in the mid-1930s, since his novels focus on character and the flow of human life, rather than on larger social and political issues.

Autobiography as a genre gained in popularity during this period. Mahatma Gandhi's *An Autobiography: Or, The Story of My Experiments with Truth* was quickly translated from Gujarati into English (1929). Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi's disciple and the future prime minister of India, published his English autobiography in 1936 (*An Autobiography*). Nirad C. Chaudhuri's *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951, in English) is second only to Gandhi's autobiography in fame.

Modern Indian Literature from Independence to the Twenty-first Century

Major themes and trends, 1947–1980s. The year 1947, in which India became free of British colonial rule, marks a watershed in the development of modern Indian literature. Independence impelled writers to grapple with the ideals and realities of post-colonial nationhood. On the one hand, there was the euphoria of freedom. On the other, the division of the Indian subcontinent into two separate nations, India and Pakistan, and the ensuing violence traumatized the Indian people. Through the years of the freedom movement, Hindus and Muslims had become increasingly divided on the issue of cultural-national identity, and the partition of India was accompanied and followed by great communal violence, especially on the new territorial borders, in the divided territories of Punjab and Bengal and in the disputed area of Kashmir. The agony of partition became a part of the experience and memory of the people of India and Pakistan, many of whom were uprooted from their home territories or suffered from the division of their families. Indian fiction from 1947 to the present reexamines India's recent past, both positive and negative aspects, explores the political and social problems and issues that have emerged in independent India, and comments on the changing Indian society in an era of increasing globalization and the migration of South Asians to Western countries.

In the years following independence, the humanistic and progressive trends represented by earlier writers such as Manik Bandyopadhyay and Mulk Raj Anand continued to flourish in fiction from every region in India. Examples include: U. R. Ananta Murthy's Kannada novel *Samskāra* (1965; translated as *Samskara: A Rite for a Dead Man*, 1976), a work about the decaying Brahman priestly community in a Karnataka village; the Hindi writer Shrilal Shukla's *Rāj Darbārī* (1968; translated as *Raag Darbari: A Novel*, 1992), a novel about politics in a North Indian provincial town; *Chemmeen* (Shrimp, 1956), Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai's celebrated Malayalam novel about the fate of the individual in a fishing community in Kerala; and Vyankatesh Madgulkar's *Bangarvādī* (1955; translated as *The Village Had No Walls*, 1967), a Marathi novel about the shepherds of Maharashtra. Modern Indian

drama often undertakes social and political critique. Marathi playwright Vijay Tendulkar directs mordant satire at Maharashtrian society in plays such as *Shāntatā, kort chālū ābe* (1967; translated as *Silence! The Court Is in Session*, 1978) and *Ghāshīrām Kotwāl* (Ghashiram the constable, 1972). Drama has also been the medium for avant-garde and experimental work such as Girish Karnad's Kannada plays *Hayavadana* (Horse-head, 1971), a meditation on reality and personal identity through a folktale, and *Nāgamandala* (1989; translated as *Play with a Cobra*, 1990) a play that illuminates the power of stories through its evocation of a folk ritual.

From the 1970s onward, activist and feminist women writers have become major voices in Indian fiction. In her Urdu short stories, written between the 1950s and 1970s (e.g., *Badan kī khusbbū*, translated as "Scent of the Body" in 1994), Ismat Chughtai uses bold and direct language and vivid, detailed descriptions to depict the ironies and injustices of women's lives in Indian society, especially in Muslim circles in India. Mahasweta Devi, winner of the Indian government's Jnanpith award, combines social activism among tribals and other marginalized groups in eastern India with an extraordinary writing career. Creating an array of memorable characters in her powerful Bengali short stories and novels (e.g., *Stanadāyini*, translated as *Breast-Giver*, 1988), Devi exposes with devastating clarity the convergences between the exploitation and subordination of women and the lower classes. Recent anthologies of fiction in translation, such as *Women Writing in India* (edited by S. Tharu and K. Lalita, 1990–1993), have helped make Indian women writers accessible to a wider audience.

The recent movement of Dalit ("oppressed") writing, in which men and women of marginalized and low caste communities write poetry and fiction about their own lives, communities, and points of view (e.g., the Marathi poems and essays by Namdeo Dhasal and others, in English translation, in *Untouchable!: Voices of the Dalit Liberation Movement*, edited by Barbara R. Joshi, 1986), is a significant development in modern Indian literature. Dalit writers have produced poetry and fiction in all of the Indian languages. Autobiography, with its power to document and bear witness to the struggles of the disenfranchised, is a major genre in Dalit writing (e.g., Vasant Moon, *Growing Up Untouchable in India: A Dalit Autobiography*, translated from the Marathi in 2000).

The partition of the Indian subcontinent is perhaps the single most persistent theme in Indian and Pakistani fiction since 1947, appearing in writing in English as well as in the regional languages. Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* (1956, in English) is one of the earliest novels to evoke the horrors of the violence that accompanied partition, while Saadat Hasan Manto, who lived first in India

and then in Pakistan, bears witness in his eloquent Urdu short stories to the personal trauma of divided identities and the societal and national tragedies brought about by partition. Manto's most famous story is *Tobā Tek Singh* (translated in *Kingdom's End and Other Stories*, 1987), in which he depicts the dislocation of populations at partition as an absurd event viewed from the perspective of the inmates of a lunatic asylum. Indian writer Bhisham Sahni's Hindi novel *Tamas* (translated as *Darkness* in 1989), a chronicle of partition, was made into a film for Indian television. In the Pakistani woman writer Bapsi Sidhwa's gripping English novel *Cracking India* (published as *Ice-Candy Man*, 1988), we see the events of 1947 through the eyes of a little girl.

Indian writers in English: From the 1970s to the present. The most striking change in Indian literature from the 1970s onward is the accelerated rise of English as a major language for Indian literary endeavor. In the post-independence era India has produced a noteworthy body of poetry in English, by such figures as Nissim Ezekiel, Arun Kolatkar, Jayanta Mahapatra, and Arvind Krishna Mehrotra. Fiction, however, is the chosen vehicle of the majority of Indian writers in English, who apparently feel more at home in English than in any other literary language. The acclaim they have won, both among the increasingly cosmopolitan urban middle classes in today's India and among an international audience, attests to the fact that English is now firmly a part of the Indian literary landscape.

The earlier generation of Indian writers in English (often called "Indo-Anglian" writers) is represented above all by R. K. Narayan, who is celebrated for his humanism. Between the 1950s and 1980s, with the publication of more than twenty novels, including the celebrated *The Financial Expert* (1952), *The Man-eater of Malgudi* (1961), and *The Vendor of Sweets* (1967), Narayan became the preeminent Indian author in English. The idiosyncratic, likable characters in Narayan's novels, who live in the world of middle-class South India as seen through the author's ironic yet compassionate eyes, and the mythic town of Malgudi, created as the setting of his major fictional works, are well known throughout the world. Prominent among Narayan's contemporaries are the women writers Kamala Markandaya (*Nectar in a Sieve*, 1954) and Ruth Praver Jhabwala (*Heat and Dust*, 1975). Anita Desai is another powerful voice in Indian English fiction of the 1970s and 1980s. In her finely crafted novels Desai explores the sensibilities of Indian men and women of the English-educated middle classes in the post-colonial era. Among her major novels are *Clear Light of Day* (1980), in which she portrays the relationship of siblings in a Delhi family against the background of partition, and *In Custody* (1984), a comedic yet

profound treatment of the fate of Indo-Islamic Urdu poetry and aesthetics in post-independence India.

The publication of Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* in 1980 marks a turning point, not only in the history of modern Indian literature, but in English fiction worldwide (the novel won the Booker Prize in 1981). This spectacular novel narrates the life and adventures of Saleem Sinai, a child of mysterious and contested parentage, who is born at midnight on 15 August 1947, the precise moment of India's birth as an independent nation, and who is thus "handcuffed to history"; through this narration, Rushdie offers remarkable insights into the problems of personal and national identity in post-colonial nations. As a South Asian author who had lived in India, Pakistan, and Britain, in 1980 Rushdie was uniquely positioned to interrogate the conception of nationality in the late twentieth century. Equally remarkable is the host of innovative stylistic features in the novel, including a highly original narrative style, a uniquely Rushdian magical realism, and an English that is effectively infused with words, phrases, and entire registers from Indian languages. Rushdie's other works include *Shame* (1983), a novel about Pakistan, and *The Moor's Last Sigh* (1995), in which his wonderfully inventive imagination and linguistic facility are fully in evidence.

Since *Midnight's Children*, a growing number of young Indian writers have written novels in which they explore the issues of national and transnational identity and history within the Indian context. In *A Fine Balance* (1996), a novel set in Bombay, Rohinton Mistry deals with the modern Indian politics of class and communalism in the setting of the "National Emergency" declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. Upamanyu Chatterjee's *English, August: An Indian Novel* (1988) explores the cultural and political dilemmas of the young Indian bureaucrat; Vikram Seth's epic novel *A Suitable Boy* (1993) traces the history of a family in a fictional town in post-independence India. Among the most ambitious and innovative of these new authors is Amitav Ghosh, whose first novel, *The Circle of Reason* (1986), offers a bold new approach to the issue of cultural identity. In *The Shadow Lines* (1988), Ghosh simultaneously traces the histories of two families, one Indian and one British, and exposes the senselessness of the violence engendered by the division of the Indian state of Bengal, leading to the formation, in 1947, of East Pakistan and, in 1971, of Bangladesh. *The Shadow Lines* questions the validity of boundaries of all sorts, interpersonal as well as international.

The latest Indian author in English to achieve world renown is Arundhati Roy, whose *The God of Small Things* (1997) won the Booker Prize and has since been translated into a large number of world languages. In her novel, Roy makes masterful and original use of language, metaphor, and narrative style, both to evoke the deeply vulnerable



Arundhati Roy. With the new crop of Indian writers describing the experience of life in a post-colonial world, Indian writing in English has become a major phenomenon in world literature. In her acclaimed *The God of Small Things*, Arundhati Roy, photographed here, has made original use of language, metaphor, and narrative style to deliver a powerful critique of oppression. AMIT BHARGAVA / FOTOMEDIA.

emotional world of childhood and to deliver a savage critique of oppressive social institutions. Her powerful, crystalline images and musically resonant sentences have a haunting beauty, even as they convey a stunningly vivid sense of human emotion. Estha and Rahel (Roy's "dizygotic twin" protagonists), Sophie Mol (the cousin whose death transforms their life), and the love between the twins' mother Ammu and Velutha, the Paravan "untouchable," have become part of the cultural memory of communities as far apart as Finland and Thailand, and the small Kerala town of Ayemenem is now a familiar and beloved place the world over. With this new generation of Indian authors, who have written powerful novels about the experience of living in a post-colonial world, Indian writing in English has become a major phenomenon in world literature.

In the final decade of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first, a new group of writers is

becoming increasingly prominent among authors of fiction on themes related to India and South Asia. Various identified as "diaspora writers," "Asian American writers," and so on, these are writers of Indian (or Sri Lankan, or Pakistani) origin who live abroad, or who have grown up outside South Asia, and who write about the conflicts and challenges of negotiating hybrid and transnational identities. An accomplished and pioneering writer in this group is Bharati Mukherjee, whose fiction ranges from the novel *The Tiger's Daughter* (1971), in which she portrays the cultural dilemmas of a young upper class Bengali woman who visits her family in Calcutta after marrying an American, to the short stories in the collection *The Middleman and Other Stories* (1988), in which she depicts both the exhilaration and the conflicts of the immigrant experience in the United States, portrayed through characters of varied class affiliation and national origin. Jhumpa Lahiri won acclaim (and a Pulitzer Prize in 2000) for the short stories she published in *The Interpreter of Maladies* (1999), in which she maps, with great restraint, and in spare, elegant prose, the delicate emotions and complex inner worlds of Indian immigrants. In *The Namesake* (2003), her first novel, Lahiri fulfills the promise of her earlier work, using the powerful trope of naming to illuminate the complexities of the immigrant experience of self, identity, and belonging. When her protagonists Ashima and Ashoke Ganguli, a traditional Bengali couple who have settled in Cambridge, Massachusetts, are forced by circumstances to bestow on their newborn son the improbable name of "Gogol," entire worlds are thrown out of balance, but wondrous epiphanies are also made possible.

Global fiction, global audiences: "Indian" writing today. The high visibility of Indian English authors in the global arena has prompted some critics to wonder whether English writing will deflect the world's attention from equally good writing in the Indian languages, and whether, within India itself, the rise of English might stifle literary production in the other languages. So far, however, Indian writers of every description, those who live abroad and those who live in India, those who write in English and those who write in the Indian languages, continue to produce vibrant works, and to command avid readerships. Within India, the Sahitya Akademi (India's national "Academy of Letters," established by the government in 1954), and private organizations such as Katha (Story), work diligently to promote the translation of contemporary regional language fiction from the original language to other Indian languages and English, and from English to Indian languages. With the rapid growth in travel, migration, and communication between India and the rest of the world, there is reason to believe that works from all the Indian languages will in time gain global circulation.

There are undeniably major differences in the concerns, approaches, and audiences of modern writing in English (especially by diaspora writers) and writing in the Indian languages. While the former is inevitably preoccupied with issues such as cultural identity and post-colonial hybridity, the latter is often focused on highly localized cultural experiences within the diverse, intensely particularized linguistic, cultural, and physical landscapes of India. And yet, perusal of the boldly conceived anthology of modern Indian writing (*The Vintage Book of Modern Indian Literature*, 2004), in which the writer Amit Chaudhuri has juxtaposed Indian English fiction and nonfiction with works in translation from the regional languages, reveals surprising and exciting linkages between the two categories of works. Both the Asian American writer Bharati Mukherjee, in the short story "The Tenant" (1988), and the Chennai (Madras)-based author Manjula Padmanabhan, in her English short story "Mrs. Ganapathy's Modest Triumph" (1996), are interested in a recurrent theme in South Asian fiction: single women and the Indian arranged marriage system. Ambai (C. S. Lakshmi)'s use of an innovative mix of realism and counter-realistic description in her Tamil short story "Velippadu" (1988; translated as *Gifts*, 1992) aligns her as much with Salman Rushdie as with any other writer, and the quality of her writing is evident even in translation. Neela Padmanabhan's Tamil novel *Talaimuraikal* (1968; translated as *The Generations*, 1972) exudes the very smell of the soil of a village in Nanjilnadu in South India; Manil Suri's *The Death of Vishnu* (2001, in English) and Rohinton Mistry's *A Fine Balance* (1996, in English) make the apartment houses, bustling streets, and the diverse inhabitants of intricate social networks in the modern city of Mumbai palpably real; and Pankaj Mishra's *The Romantics: A Novel* (2000, in English) breathes the atmosphere of the ancient Indian city of Benares and the River Ganges. More than 150 years after its inception, modern Indian literature seems to be alive and well, as productive and as irreducibly plural as ever, and English and the Indian languages appear to be engaged in a new series of conversations.

Indira Viswanathan Peterson

See also **Anand, Mulk Raj; Chatterji, Bankim Chandra; Chaudhuri, Nirad C.; Naidu, Sarojini; Narayan, R. K.; Tagore, Rabindranath**

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TAMIL

Tamil, the oldest of the Dravidian language group spoken in southern India, has a history dating back to the early centuries before the common era. The earliest Tamil literature to survive is known by later Tamil commentators from the seventh century as the poetry of the Caṅkam or “academy” of Madurai. This poetry is diverse, and it was organized into anthologies of different sizes some time after their composition. The Caṅkam literature is thematically divided into *akam*, “interior” love poems with anonymous characters, and *puram*, “exterior” poetry on war, the praise of kings, and other subjects. The Caṅkam poetry relies on a complex and highly conventional system of seasons, times, and landscapes to indicate different moods and situations. These conventions are laid out, inter alia, in the earliest grammar of the language, known as the *Tolkāppiyam*, composed perhaps in the first centuries of the common era.

The Caṅkam age, sometimes characterized as the “heroic” period of incipient state structures, gave way to a more established agrarian society of settled kingdoms, in which longer poems and didactic works were composed, between the third and sixth centuries A.D. The most famous of these were Iḷāṅkō Aṭikal’s “Tale of an Anklet,” or *Cilappatikāram*, a long narrative and lyrical poem telling the story of the widow Kaṅṅaki, and the *Tirukkural*, a collection of gnomic verses on love, politics, and righteousness by Tiruvaḷḷuvar. Many works of this period were strongly influenced by the religions of Jainism and Buddhism. By the seventh century the Hindu cults of Shaivism and Vaishnavism gained widespread popularity through songs known as the *ālvār* and *nāyanmār*; composed by wandering saint devotees. Though these poems sometimes built on earlier Caṅkam poetic conventions, they tended for the most part to be composed in a simpler and more direct style, in keeping with the message of devotion to the Shiva or Vishnu. The hymns of the saints were collected and anthologized from the twelfth century, during the apogee of the famous Chola kingdom of Tanjavur (c. A.D. 950–1250). The Chola period saw numerous important literary innovations at court, which were heavily influenced by Sanskrit *kāvya*. The courts of the later Chola kings produced some of the most famous poems of the medieval period, like Kampan’s *Irāmavatāram* (a Tamil version of the Rāmāyaṇa) and the courtly epic *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi*, by Cayaṅkoṅṭar. The *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi* formed one of a large number of

new genres, called as a class *prapantam*. The *prapantam* literature formed the staple of literary accomplishment until as late as the nineteenth century, and acted as the umbrella under which a number of folk and courtly genres met during later medieval times.

From the late Chola period a rich commentarial and scholastic literature also emerged in a number of fields, including grammar, poetics, and theology. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, under the Nāyaka kings of Madurai, Senji, and Taṅjavur, northern languages, like Telugu, Marathi, Urdu, and Sanskrit, were often heavily patronized by the elites. The study of Tamil literature was confined almost entirely to Shaiva monasteries, or *mathas*. European missionary activity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to important new developments, chief of which was the proliferation of indigenous printing presses from 1835. Modern genres like novels, autobiographies, and essays, and newspaper writing became widespread throughout the nineteenth century. By the first decades of the twentieth century, a number of important writers had sparked a new public interest in Tamil literature and history, which became caught up in the anti-Brahman movement and organized Dravidian nationalism.

Daud Ali

See also **Chola Dynasty; Languages and Scripts**

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LOK SABHA. See **Political System**.

LOVE STORIES The composition of full-length love stories in Indian literature can be traced back to the epic Mahābhārata, long before the beginning of the common era. The Mahābhārata narrates the stories of King Nala and Damayanti, and of King Dushyanta and Shakuntala,



Nineteenth-Century Painting by Ravi Varma. The painting recounts a scene from Mahakavi (“Great Poet”) Kālidāsa’s *Abhijnana Shakuntalam*, written in the fifth century A.D. It is the popular tale of the inconsolable Shakuntala who is destined to search endlessly for her lost husband Dushyanta until the gods restore his memory of her and their idyllic love. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT’S POTPOURRI.

in detail; both tales acquired great popularity. Mahakavi (“Great Poet”) Kālidāsa was the first to dedicate a full-length drama to the story of Dushyanta and Shakuntala in his *Abhijnana Shakuntalam*, written in the fifth century A.D. Subsequently a number of romantic tales were written either in the form of drama (*natakam*) or in the form of story (*akhyana*, or *Akhyayika*, or *Mahakavya*) in Sanskrit by writers like Bana, Bhavabhuti, Subandhu, and others, but these never captured the imagination of painters.

The practice of illustrating love stories, however, came into vogue with the development of Indian miniature painting from the sixteenth century onward. Moreover, these artists did not have to depend on Sanskrit compositions, as romantic literature had become available in local dialects, such as Apabhramsha, Hindi, and Avadhi. There is a vast literature in the Prakrit language,

including *Tarangavai*, *Lilavai*, *Malayasundari Katha*, and others, and in Apabhramsha, including *Bhavisayatta* and *Nayakumara Chariyu*. These were illustrated particularly in Rajasthan and western India, but since these Jain compositions have heavy religious overtones, they are not looked upon as secular love stories.

The popularity of romantic literature in Avadhi can be attributed to the spread of Sufism after the fourteenth century, which uses the imagery of human love to symbolize the love of the soul for the Supreme. Love stories provided an excellent vehicle to communicate this philosophy to the elite as well as the masses and hence were often illustrated.

Love Stories Inspired by Sanskrit Literature

Abhijnana Shakuntalam. This famous drama in Sanskrit, by the legendary poet Kālidāsa, narrates the romance between King Dushyanta and Shakuntala, the adopted daughter of sage Kanva, who lived in a hermitage in the forest. King Dushyanta fell in love with Shakuntala at first sight, and they were married in a private ceremony, the king giving her his ring. Dushyanta then returned to his wife in his royal capital. Later, when Shakuntala went to his kingdom, pregnant with his child, she found to her dismay that he had forgotten her, for enroute to the palace she had lost his ring in a rushing stream. She suffered for years until one day the royal ring was recovered from a fisherman and returned to Dushyanta, restoring his memory of Shakuntala and their idyllic romance. The drama ends with a happy reunion. A beautifully illustrated Shakuntala manuscript, painted in the Nagpur region and dated 1789, as well as a series of paintings from Hindur, painted in the nineteenth century, are preserved in the collection of the National Museum in New Delhi.

Nala and Damayanti. Originally the story narrated in the Mahābhārata was rendered in the form of a Sanskrit *mahakavya* (epic poem), *Naishadbiya Charita*, by the famous poet Shri Harsha in the eighth century A.D. Subsequently several versions of the story were written in Apabhramsha, Hindi, and Deccani Hindi, centered around the love, separation, ordeals, and eventual reunion of King Nala and Damayanti. An Avadhi version of the story, titled *Nal Daman*, was written by Suradasa of Lucknow in 1637, and the *Nalaraya Davadanti Charita* was written by a Jain monk, Rishivardhanasuri, in Apabhramsha around 1465, illustrated in the popular Mughal style. The folios of these works are now scattered in several museums and private collections. *Nal Daman* has been a part of the repertoire of the artists of most schools of Indian miniatures, including Mughal, Rajsthani, Pahari, and late Mughal. A profusely illustrated manuscript of *Nal Daman*, written by Babulla in Deccani Hindi and preserved in Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Museum of

Mumbai, is an exquisite example and is evidence of its popularity in the Deccan region as well.

Madhavanala Kamakandala Katha. The love story depicting the intense love affair between Madhava and Kamakandala was written in different forms of literature by various writers. The earliest version in Sanskrit is a story titled *Madhavanal Akhyana* by Anandadhara, believed to have been written in 1300. Jodh, the court poet of Emperor Akbar, wrote *Madhavanala Kamakandala Katha* in 1583. It was also composed in a *prabandha* form as *Madhavanala Kamandala Prabandha* by the poet Ganapati. This is a story of a vina (Indian lute) player Madhava and the court dancer Kamakandala, with overtones of the traditional concept of rebirth, in which Madhava was the incarnation of the love god Kama, and Kamakandala the incarnation of his wife Rati. The story, which ends in a happy union, was very popular in North India during the Mughal period. A beautiful illustrated manuscript in Sanskrit, painted in a horizontal format, datable to the seventeenth century, and now scattered in various museums, is one of the earliest illustrated manuscripts of this love story. It was later illustrated in the Deccani and the Pahari schools of painting as well.

Love Stories Inspired by Folklore and Legend

Dhola Maru. Composed around the fourteenth century, *Dhola Maru ra Doha* is the earliest love story written in Hindi that seems to be based on some folk legend. *Dhola Maru* by Kushalalabha, composed in 1560, and *Dhola Maravani* by the poet Kallol of Jodhpur, written in 1620, are the best known versions of this tale. Both tell the story of Dhola, who was engaged to Maravani at a young age but later was married to Malavani, the princess of Malwa. Maravani sent her emissaries, who narrated her lovelorn state to Dhola. He realized his folly and, mounting a camel, went to bring Maravani. The story ends with a happy union of Dhola and Maravani. Rajasthani artists delighted in painting colorfully attired Dhola and Maravani riding a beautifully decorated camel, against a plain desert background. Several illustrated manuscripts of *Dhola Maru* from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all from Rajasthan, where it was particularly popular, are preserved in the libraries of Rajasthan as well as in other collections; a very colorful one is the *Dhola Maru* series of about 1820, now in the Maharaja of Jodhpur Palace Library in Jodhpur.

Madbumalati. Another story in which the hero and the heroine are incarnations of the god of love and his wife Rati is *Madbumalati*. The most popular version of this story was written in Avadhi by Chaturbhujadas in the first half of the sixteenth century. Madhu, the son of an important trader, fell in love with the princess Malati.



Wedding of Rāma and Sītā, Cloth Painting. Upon breaking a sacred bow, Rāma won the hand of Sītā, daughter of Janaka. This colorfully painted cloth depicts their festive wedding: They remain the world's quintessential lovers. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

There was a long period of separation, dejection, frustration, and ordeals, after which the hero and the heroine were united with the help of a friend. Profusely illustrated manuscripts of the work are available from Rajasthan, particularly notable ones being from Kota, painted in 1771, and from Mewar, painted sometime in the eighteenth century.

In addition to these love stories, there are others, such as *Adamant* by Lakshmansena, *Rosaria*, *Mainmast*, *Rope Mandarin*, and others, which, though popular as literature, do not seem to have been patronized by art lovers; no illustrated manuscripts of these have thus far come to light.

Love Stories Inspired by Sufi Philosophy

Around the mid-fourteenth century, Sufi poets in India started writing the *masnavis* (long narrative poems

in rhyming couplets with a common meter) in Hindi or in the local dialects. Amir Khusrau (A.D. 1253–1325) was one of the great Indian Sufi poets of the time who is believed to have especially favored writing in Hindi. The Indian Sufi poets and writers based several compositions on the available resources in Indian as well as Persian literature and contemporary folklore. Besides the compositions in Hindi and local dialects, several original famous Persian love stories were also illustrated in India, the most notable being Nizami's *Laila Majnu*, *Khusrau-wa Shirin*, and *Yusuf-wa-Zulaikha*. A number of illustrated manuscripts were commissioned by Muslim patrons.

Emperor Akbar patronized illustrations of love stories and is thought to have commissioned illustrations of *Khamsa-e-Nizami* (Five poems of Nizami); *Raj Kurvar*, a Hindu romance of a prince who disguised himself as a mendicant and went through ordeals and adventures to win his beloved, written in Persian; *Duval Rani Khizr Khan* by Amir Khusrau, a Persian text narrating the tragic romance between Khizar Khan, the son of Ala'-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji, and a princess of Gujarat Duval; *Nal Daman*; and others. An extensively illustrated manuscript of *Raj Kurvar*, dated 1603–1604, is in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin. *Duval Rani Khizr Khan*, illustrated in 1567, is in the collection of the National Museum of New Delhi.

Sufism concentrates on the agony and longing of the lovers and the beauty of the beloved as the reflection of divine beauty. In fact, the expression of love in Sufi poetry itself contains the seeds of pain and suffering that symbolize the hardships of the spiritual journey to attain ultimate union with God. The non-Sufi literature, on the other hand, is a combination of diverse sentiments and perspectives, including eroticism, conjugality, truthfulness, and devotion. The illustrations of the non-Sufi romances therefore illustrate the erotic aspect of the romance between hero and heroine, whereas the Sufi-based stories avoid directly erotic representation.

Laur-Chanda. One such popular love story, laced with Sufi ideology, was *Laur-Chanda* or *Chandayan*, written by Mulla Daud in the Avadhi dialect in 1380. Based on a Dhalmai folk tale, Laur-Chanda is a popular ballad of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal, and central India, even today. The story narrates the romance of Laurak and Chanda and the hurdles they faced after their elopement. Illustrated copies of this manuscript were commissioned from the mid-fifteenth century, as evidenced by the manuscript of Laur Chanda in the Staat Bibliothek of Berlin, painted sometime between 1450 and 1470. It was a popular text for illustrations in the sixteenth century as well; two of these manuscripts are available, one preserved in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Museum in Mumbai and the other in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester, England.

Mirgavat. Kutban wrote *Mirgavat* (*Mrigavati*) in Avadhi in 1504; it became popular in the early sixteenth century, when it was profusely illustrated. It is a story of romance between Prince Rajkunvar and Princess Mrigavati, incorporating adventures and fairy tales with episodes of romance, separation, longing, and final reunion.

Madhu Malati. A commonly illustrated Sufi poem, especially in the Rajasthani styles of painting, is *Madhu Malati*, written by Manjhan in 1545. This is another version of the *Madhumalati* by Chaturbhujdas.

Sufism was thus gradually spreading its roots in India. The seventeenth century was particularly productive as far as the Sufi love stories are concerned. Some of the popular works of the time were *Kutb-Mushtari* and *Sabras* by Mulla Vajahi, *Saif-ul-mulk* or *Vadi-ul-Jamal* by Gavasi of Golkonda, *Chandrabadan Mahiyar* by Mukini of Bijapur, *Gulshan-e-ishq* by Nusarati, *Yusuf-wa-Zulaikha* by Hashmi of Bijapur, and *Kissa-e-Bebram-wa Gulbadan* by Tawai of Golkonda. The works were often illustrated, especially in the Deccan.

Gulshan-e-ishq. Composed sometime in the late seventeenth century by Muhammad Nusarat of Arcot, *Gulshan-e-ishq* is one of the most popular love stories in the Deccan. The poet was a court poet of the Bijapur sultan Ali Adil Shah II. *Gulshan-e-ishq*, also sometimes known as *Madhumalati*, narrates the story of Prince Manohar, the only son of king Surajbhan of the city Kanayagiri, and Princess Madhumalati. The earliest manuscript of *Gulshan-e-ishq* thus far known is dated 1669. It is preserved in the collection of the Salar Jung Museum, Hyderabad, which has a total of eight manuscripts of the same, copied and painted at different times.

Single Paintings Representing Love Stories

In addition to the illustrated manuscripts and series of illustrations that narrate these stories, there are some legends that were depicted by a single, particular visual composition incorporating the most significant episode of the story, serving as an iconographic representation of the story. These were the tales of the legendary lovers Baz Bahadur and Rupamati, Sohni and Mahiwal, and Sassi and Punnu.

Rupamati and Baz Bahadur. Bazid Khan (1531–1561), also known as Baz Bahadur (Brave Falcon), was the last king of Malwa; Rupamati was the daughter of a Rajput chieftain from Dharampur. Baz Bahadur saw Rupamati bathing in a pool in the forest and fell in love with her. Infuriated by this, Rupamati's father decided to poison her. However, Baz Bahadur rescued her and they eloped.

The story is illustrated either by depicting them riding horses or resting during their flight, as in a Mughal

painting of the mid-seventeenth century in the Punjab Museum at Chandigarh and a Garhwal painting of the eighteenth century in a private collection at Ahmedabad. The theme was popular even in the Deccan area. The other type shows Rupamati climbing down the fort wall to elope with Baz Bahadur, who is waiting for her below, as seen in a Jaipur painting in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Museum of Mumbai.

Sohni Mahiwal. Izzat Beg, later known as Mahiwal, was a merchant from Bukhara who settled in a city on the banks of the river Chenab. He fell in love with Sohni, a potter's daughter, but the family disapproved of the relationship. The tale ends with the death of Sohni, who drowns while crossing the river to meet Mahiwal. The last scene, depicting Sohni in midstream with her pot, is representative of the story. Several Pahari and Rajasthani paintings depict this scene; some of the outstanding ones include a Kangra painting of the late eighteenth century in the Bharat Kala Bhavan at Varanasi, a Bundi painting dated 1790 in the Kunwar Sangram Singh Museum of Jaipur, and one from Farrukhabad, painted around 1770, in the collection of Edwin Binney of Dublin.

Sassi Punnu. This folktale is well-known throughout Punjab. Sassi, because of an unhappy prophecy, was abandoned by her parents and was brought up by a Muslim washerwoman. She grew up to be a beautiful maiden. Punnu, son of a prosperous chief, fell in love with her, and they married secretly, much to the dismay of his parents, who carried him away while he was asleep. Sassi set

out to look for Punnu, and after a misadventure, she died. Punnu met the same fate, and the two were united in death.

The illustration generally depicts Punnu being carried away on a camel while Sassi laments behind. A painting from the Kangra region, datable to the eighteenth century, poignantly depicts the lamentation of Sassi trailing behind the kidnapped Punnu. The Victoria and Albert Museum in London has a beautiful set of five paintings of this theme, painted at Siba around 1800.

Kalpana Desai
Vandana Prapanna

See also **Literature; Miniatures**

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MACAULAY, THOMAS BABINGTON (1800–1859), British politician and writer. Thomas Babington Macaulay, brilliant historian of England, was the first law member of the British East India Company's Supreme Council in Calcutta (Kolkata; 1834–1837). A precocious genius, reading from age three, Macaulay started writing his compendium of “universal history” at seven. He took up residence at Trinity College, Cambridge, at eighteen, was called to the Bar from Gray's Inn at twenty-six, and entered the House of Commons at thirty. Four years later he left for India, joining the executive council of Governor-General William Bentinck as British India's first law member.

Macaulay compiled British India's Code of Criminal Procedure almost single-handed, as both of his original collaborators soon fell too ill to continue. His contempt for ancient Indian religious philosophy and literature—based on his total ignorance of both—led him to argue that “a single shelf” of “paltry abridgements” of works based on Western science was of much greater value to Indian students than the entire corpus of ancient India's “false” and “superstitious” Sanskrit Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, and epics. Lord Bentinck's Calcutta Council was so impressed with Macaulay's rhetoric that they voted against “wasting” any company funds allocated for higher education on “Oriental learning” for Indians, who were only to study “Western learning” in English. Indian civilization's richly wonderful cultural roots and scientific wisdom were thus left undiscovered by most of the brightest young Indians of the nineteenth century, who memorized works of John Milton, Geoffrey Chaucer, and William Shakespeare instead. Macaulay's goal, as he put it in his famed 1835 “Minute on Education,” was “to form a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.”

Though Macaulay sailed from Calcutta less than four years after he arrived there, his impact on India's educational

future, as well as upon its entire legal system, was perhaps greater than that of any other nineteenth-century Englishman in the service of the East India Company. A year after returning home, he joined the British Cabinet as secretary of war (1839–1841), and was later appointed paymaster general (1846–1847). His health started to fail, however, so he devoted most of his last years of life to writing his monumental *History of England*, five volumes of which he finished before being honored by the Crown as Baron Macaulay of Rothley in 1857, the year Britain almost lost India, following the “Sepoy Mutiny” at Meerut in early May.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Educational Institutions and Philosophies, Traditional and Modern**

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MĀDHAVIAH, A. (1872–1925), Tamil writer and proponent of women's rights. A. Mādhaviah was a modern Tamil humanist who championed women's rights through literature; he defined as well the contours of modern Tamil fiction. Mādhaviah used his literary talents

to help change attitudes toward misogynistic customs, enhancing the humanism of Tamil society in colonial Madras (Chennai). In his short life of fifty-three years, he wrote over sixty Tamil and English novels, plays, biographies, essays, nonsectarian hymns, and translations. His brilliant critiques of the hypocrisies of Hindus and Christians, Indians and Westerners won him a wide circle of admiring middle-class readers. Mādhaviah's writing helped to crystallize the intersecting identities of Tamil ethnicity and pan-Indian nationalism. He contributed patriotic English essays to the *Hindu* journal, and Tamil articles for the *Swadēsamitran* (Friend of independence). He edited two journals, *Tamil Nēsan* (Friend of the Tamils) and *Panchāmritam* (Nectar).

Born on 16 August 1872 to upper caste parents in the *brāhmana* village of Perunkulam near Tirunelvēli, he hated parochial caste exclusions, which he described in his later writings. He attended a local Tamil school, then studied English at a government high school in Pālayamkōttai, a Protestant missionary center. He contributed English poems to the Madras Christian College journal under the guidance of Reverend William Miller. Mādhaviah, a sharp critic of certain Hindu social and religious inequities, also attacked Christian proselytizing. Some chapters of his "Savitri Charitram" (Savitri's story) on upper caste women were first published in the journal *Viveka Chintamani*, and later rewritten as the novella *Muthumeenaksbi* in 1903. It promoted widow remarriage, and criticized child marriage and marital rape. In 1898, his Tamil novel *Padmāvati Charitram* (Padmavati's story) was published, and it has been acclaimed as his greatest work. Its revelations of female illiteracy, male lust, and mercenary marriage customs startled its many readers. For thirty years, Mādhaviah worked as a Salt and Excise Department official, touring remote areas by day, returning to write late into the night by candlelight.

His Tamil writings include a semihistorical novel, *Vijaya Mārtāndan* (1903); the plays *Tirumalai Sētupati* (1910) and *Udayalan* (1918); *Siddhārthan* (1918) on the Buddha; *Rajamārthandam* (1919), a dramatization of his English novel *Lieutenant Panju* (1915–1916); the nonsectarian hymnal, *Podu Dharma Sangeeta Mañjari* (Collection of new hymnals for all) in 1914; and marriage songs, *Pudu Mābhiri Kalyāna Pāttu* (1925). His English works include *Tbillai Gōvīndan: A Posthumous Autobiography* (1903); *Satyāmanda* (1909) about an illegitimate Christian hero; *Clarinda* (1915) about a Brahman widow Christian convert; and *Tbillai Govīndan: A Miscellany* (1907). He retold Indian myths like *Mārkandēya* (1922), *The Story of the Rāmāyana* (1914), and *Nandā: The Pariab Who Overcame Caste* (1923), which became school texts. His humorous *Kusikar Kutti Kathai* (Kusikar's short stories) was published in 1924.

Inspired by Vēdanāyakam Pillai's use of Tamil fiction to promote change, Mādhaviah's literary realism made him the more effective reformer who skillfully cited Indian humanistic texts to promote Western social liberalism. He believed that one remained a slave by remaining silent in the teeth of injustice. As he never feared to speak out, he was often ostracized. He died of a heart attack while addressing the Madras University Senate, urging them to make Tamil a compulsory subject for the bachelor of arts degree. That resolution was finally passed sixty years later.

Sita Anantha Raman


See also **Madras; Women's Education**

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MADRAS Madras was founded in 1639 by the British East India Company as their mercantile gateway to South India. The modern city grew from Fort St. George, named after the legendary "soldier of Christ" who was regarded as the special patron of British soldiers. Francis Day and Andrew Cogan, the East India Company factors, purchased approximately 2 square miles (5 square kilometers) of the sandy fishing village of Mandaraz (Chennai-pattinam) from the local governor of the South Indian Vijayanagar kingdom. In time it was to grow into a metropolis of roughly 66 square miles (170 square kilometers) with a population of over 7 million, the fourth-largest city of modern India.

Before coming under British control, Madras, or Chennaipattinam—from which the city acquired its present Tamil name, Chennai—had been a popular trading port in the spice and cotton trade, frequented by Portuguese and Dutch merchants in the sixteenth and



View of Madras, Once the Hub for the East India Company. Here, part of the eighteenth-century Pantheon Complex, formerly an exclusive meeting place for wealthy British traders, that has since been transformed into a government museum, the National Art Gallery, and the Connemara Public Library. The stately pink edifice is a striking example of the fusion of styles that is often characteristic of Indian architecture. LINDSAY HEBBERD / CORBIS.

seventeenth centuries. Madras's primacy in maritime trade made it a contentious city among the European colonial powers. The French East India Company (*Compagnie des Indes Orientales*), founded in 1664, set up its headquarters a decade later at Pondicherry, about 85 miles (137 kilometers) south of Madras on the Coromandal coast. Thus ensued the Anglo-French rivalry for the control of the Carnatic kingdom, with its capital at Arcot on the Palar River, 65 miles (105 kilometers) southwest of Madras. Arcot played an important part in the Carnatic Wars that ensued between the French and British trading companies during the eighteenth century. Robert Clive, who later became governor of Bengal, captured Arcot from the French in 1751 with only a small force of about 500 British and Indian soldiers. This compelled the French to give up their siege of the British-held town of Trichinopoly (now Tiruchirappalli). The French and their Indian allies, numbering 10,000, then laid siege to Clive's forces in Arcot. Clive and his small army defeated the French. These and later victories broke French power in South India and gave the British a stronghold in

that region. In 1780, Hyder Ali, the Muslim ruler of Mysore (modern Karnataka), conquered Arcot; however, in 1801, the British gained full control of the Carnatic region, including Arcot.

The British occupation notwithstanding, Madras retained its old traditions and rural ties: consequently, in spite of soaring population, the city has grown horizontally rather than vertically, retaining its rural character, its slow pace, and its traditional southern hospitality. The best British building effort is reflected in George Town. The strong and solid township contains many historical sites: Clive's Corner, Robert Clive's house; St. Mary's Church, inaugurated in 1680, the oldest Protestant church in the East; and the oldest British tombstones in India. Wellesley House was the residence of Governor-General Wellesley during his first active military duty. The legislative assembly and the secretariat of the Tamil Nadu government are built around what was Fort House, the home of the governors of Madras. The Fort Museum is a fine repository of artifacts dating back to the early

British period. On the site of Fort St. George's first Indian town, which once housed the first lighthouse, now stands the splendid Indo-Saracenic buildings of the High Court and the Law College. Near the college was an old British cemetery; all that is now left of it here are a couple of tombs, including one of David, son of Elihu Yale. Near the High Court building is the city's second lighthouse tower, and the highest point in the court building, which once housed the third lighthouse. George Town is a warren of straight and narrow intersecting streets that developed as Madras grew. Today, it is the crowded commercial hub of the city. In the northern part of the city are to be found more traditional eighteenth-century homes. Rajaji Salai (North Beach) Road separates George Town from the harbor and, along one side of it, starting with the earliest British commercial house, Parry's, are several of the major commercial institutions in Madras, dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including Bentinck's Building (the British Collectorate), once the home of the city's first Supreme Court.

Among more modern British constructions in Madras is the Ripon Building, home of the Madras Corporation, the oldest municipality in India. This splendid white domed building, built in 1913 in Indo-Saracenic architectural style, foreshadows the British vision of New Delhi, and is a part of a large municipal complex that also includes parks and gardens, Nehru Stadium, Victoria Public Hall, and Moore market, a fascinating shopper's paradise. Not far away are the College of Arts and Crafts and the imposing headquarters of the Southern Railway, built in stone. Once the exclusive meeting place for Englishmen and Europeans, the eighteenth-century Pantheon Complex has since developed into the Connamara Library, one of India's best examples of fusion between Rajput-Hindu Jaipur and Mughal architectures. The Government Museum is another impressive British building.

The economic liberalization of the 1990s that helped spawn commercial culture in India has produced in the city theme parks—such as Kishkinta, MGM Dizzy World (mimicking Disneyland), Vandalur Zoo, VGP Golden Beach Resort, Crocodile Bank, and Muttukadu Boat House—shopping malls, fast-food restaurants, and other architectural icons of modern consumerism. Madras has joined Bangalore and Mumbai in the race to become the premier Indian city in information technology, attracting young professionals from around the country. Like its presidency cousins, Mumbai and Kolkata, Madras's burgeoning population is pushing the city's infrastructure to its limits. The income disparity between the young professionals and the old residents has created myriad social problems. Much like the British attempt to build a modern

city in their own image, this generation's attempts to transform the old culture have resulted in incompleteness. Madras, or Chennai, with its respect for tradition and its search for continuity with the past, could never become an Anglo-Indian city in the manner that Kolkata could subvert British rule, or Mumbai could become the financial center of post-colonial India. Modern Madras, correctly understood, shares with its contemporary condition an underlying connection with its cosmological Tamil past.

Ravi Kalia

See also **British East India Company Raj; Urbanism**

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MADURAI Formerly called Madura, Madurai is the second-largest city in Tamil Nadu. It is located on the river Vaigai and is surrounded by the Anai (elephant), Naga (snake), and Pasu (cow) hills. Between the first and fifth centuries A.D. it was the capital of the Pandya dynasty when three dynasties—the Pandyas, the Cheras, and the Cholas—ruled South India. In the medieval period it was the capital of the medieval Pandyas (6th–10th centuries), and in the mid-sixteenth century it was the capital of the Nayaka dynasty, founded by Vishvanatha around 1529, which came to an end in 1736. In 1801 it came under control of the British. Madurai was most renowned for its Tamil academy (*sangam*, or *cankam*) from about the second century A.D. Over two thousand *sangam* poems are extant in nine anthologies written by some five hundred poets. In addition, the *Tolkappiyam* grammar tells us not only about the grammar of the early Tamil language but also a great deal about their social life, from their castes based on geographical location to their matriarchal succession. The city was occupied and sacked around 1310 by the Muslim Tughluqs from Delhi and for almost fifty years was a province of the Tughluq empire. It was rebuilt by the Nayakas, originally viceroys of Vijayanagar; its walls were demolished by the British in 1837 to allow for expansion. Madurai-Kamaraj University was established in 1966.

The heart of the old city was built by the Nayakas and corresponds to the classical Hindu square *mandala* oriented to the four cardinal directions. In the center is the great Minakshi Sundareshvara Temple (*koyil*) complex,



Minakshi, or Sundareshvara, Temple Complex in the Center of Madurai. Here, two of the complex's soaring towers, each approximately 160 feet (49 m) high, rise from solid granite bases, adorned with stucco figures of deities, mythical animals, and monsters painted in vivid colors. CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS / CORBIS.

dedicated to the god Shiva and comprising two separate sanctuaries and twelve towered gateways (*gopuras*). Minakshi ("fish-shaped eyes," a metaphor for feminine beauty) is the goddess Devī or Shakti, a warrior queen, and Sundareshvara (beautiful lord) is her husband, the god Shiva; after their marriage they are depicted as monarchs. The god Vishnu, in Tamil mythology Shiva's brother-in-law, gave the bride away in marriage. The temple is usually known as the Minakshi Temple, after the local popularity and preeminence of the goddess. Coronation and marriage festivals about the two deities dominate the ritual life of the city. The Chittirai festival celebrates their coronation and marriage. A series of plays (*ilias*) are the main events of the Avani Mula festival, and in the Teppa Festival, the deities are portrayed as monarchs, placed on a raft, and pulled around the golden lily tank.

Roger D. Long

See also **Chola Dynasty; Literature, Tamil; Shiva and Shaivism**

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MAGADHA One of sixteen major states (*mahajanapadas*, or "great tribal regions") in North India, stretching from Bengal to the North-West Frontier province between about 770 and 450 B.C., Magadha was one of the two most powerful. (The other was Kosala, the site of Ayodhya and Kashi and adjacent to the Buddha's home, Kapilavastu.) With its capital at Rajagriha (the King's House), a city surrounded by five hills that formed a natural defense, Magadha's prosperity depended on its fertile land, favoring the cultivation of rice, its forests, which

provided timber and elephants, the mineral resources of the Barabar Hills, especially iron ore and copper, and control of the eastern Gangetic trade through its command of the trade on the river Ganges. Attacking east and south, Magadha incorporated its Bengali neighbor Anga, thereby controlling the ports in Bengal and trade from the east coast. Its most renowned rulers were Bimbisara (c. 555–493 B.C.) and his son Ajatasatru (c. 459 B.C.), who murdered his father to ascend the throne. Bimbisara was the great patron of the Buddha (c. 563–483 B.C.), who won him over, according to the Pali canon, by preventing a Brahman priest from sacrificing fifty of the king's goats. Another Buddhist text talks of Ajatasatru visiting the Buddha. If Buddhism and Jainism owe their creation and survival to the business classes—the Jain leader Vardhamana Mahavira (c. 540–468 B.C.) was also born and taught in the area—then Magadha is one of the most important sites in history.

Bimbisara adopted the catapult and the chariot, enabling him to dominate the region militarily. He also formed marriage alliances with neighboring states, including a marriage into the Kosala royal family. Bimbisara started a land revenue collection system, which his successors expanded. Each village headman (*gramani*) was responsible for collecting taxes, which were handed over to a set of officials responsible for their transport to Rajagriha. Wasteland, which came to be considered the property of the king, was cleared in the forest, further expanding revenue. The king's customary share was reflected in the term for the monarch, *shadbhagin* (one-sixth). Ajatasatru continued his father's policies but also founded the city of Pataligrama (later Pataliputra, then Patna) on the south bank of the Ganges, where it became an important source of revenue as it controlled the river trade.

After the death of Ajatasatru a number of ineffectual kings ruled over Magadha, and Sisunaga founded a new dynasty which in turn was ousted by the Nandas, whose vast armies may have caused Alexander the Great's Greek army to mutiny and to refuse to march farther east than the Punjab. Maghada, with its capital at Pataliputra, was also the site of the great Mauryan dynasty (4th–2nd century circa B.C.), and the state once again dominated all of North India and a great deal of the south as well. It declined in the early centuries A.D. but rose again under the Guptan dynasty in the fourth century. It was finally destroyed by Muslim invaders in the twelfth century but was refounded in 1541.

Roger D. Long

See also **Alexander the Great; Bimbisara; Buddhism in Ancient India; Guptan Empire; Jainism**

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MAHĀBHĀRATA The Mahābhārata describes itself as “sprung from the oceanic mind” (1.53.34) of its author Vyāsa, and to be his “entire thought” (1.1.23; 1.55.2) in a text of a hundred thousand couplets (1.56.13). Although no version reaches that number, when the Mahābhārata describes texts of that size it denotes the originary vastness (see 12.322.36). Indeed, the Mahābhārata mentions a “treatise” (*śāstra*) of 100,000 chapters (12.59.29) that undergoes four abridgments. To describe its magnitude, many cite a verse that claims, “Whatever is here may be found elsewhere; what is not here does not exist anywhere” (1.56.33; 18.5.38). Some take it to indicate that by the time the Mahābhārata reached its “extant” mass, it would have grown from oral origins into a massive “encyclopedia” that had agglutinated for centuries. Many such scholars also cite another verse in support of this theory, which says that Vyāsa “composed a Bhārata-collection (*saṃhitā*) of twenty-four thousand couplets without the subtales (*upākhyānair vinā*); so much is called Bhārata by the wise” (1.1.61). Although a hundred-thousand verse Bhārata is also mentioned (12.331.2), translators have tried to help the developmental argument along by adding that Vyāsa composed this shorter version “first” (van Buitenen, I, p. 22) or “originally” (Ganguli, I, p. 6). But the verse says nothing about anything coming first. Since “without” implies a subtraction, and since the passage describes Vyāsa's afterthoughts, the twenty-four thousand verse Bhārata would probably be a digest or abridgment (Shulman, p. 25) that knowers of the Mahābhārata could consult or cite for purposes of oral performance from a written text. Another passage tells that the divine seers once gathered to weigh the “Bhārata” on a scale against the four Vedas; when the “Bhārata” proved heavier in both size and weight, the seers dubbed it the “Mahābhārata” (1.1.208-9), thereby providing a double “etymology” (*nirukta*) for one and the same text. Yet despite nothing surviving of this shorter Bhārata, scholars have used it to argue for an originally oral bardic and heroic story that would have lacked not only subtales but frame stories (narratives that contextualize the main narrative), tales about the author both in the frames and elsewhere, didactic additions, and devotional passages with “divinized” heroes.

New developments have complicated this profile. These include the completion of the Pune Critical Edition, along with wider recognition of Mahābhārata's design; intertextual studies positioning the Mahābhārata in relation to both Indo-European and Indian texts;



Kamasan-Style Painting by Nyoman Mandra. The final episode of the *Mahābhārata*, the longest epic in world literature, in which the central character of Yudhishthira approaches paradise. As painted by the contemporary artist Nyoman Mandra, proponent of the highly stylized Kamasan school. LINDSAY HEBBERD / CORBIS.

genre study, including the history of *kāvya* (Sanskrit “poetry” composed according to classical aesthetic norms); and debate on the likely period of the Mahābhārata’s composition in written form. Similar developments apply to the Rāmāyaṇa.

A signal result of the Pune Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata is its establishment of a textual “archetype.” There remains debate as to whether this archetype takes us back to the text’s first composition, or to a later redaction that would put a final stamp on centuries of cumulative growth. This essay favors the first option. In either case, this archetype includes a design of eighteen Books, or *parvans*, nearly all of the epic’s hundred “little books,” or *upaparvans* (the list of these at 1.2.30–70 problematically includes parts of the *Harivaṃśha* as the last two), its often adroit chapter (*adhyāya*) breaks, and its subtales, or

upākhyānas. The latter present a topic whose significance has yet to be appreciated.

The Whole and the Parts

As observed, the *upākhyānas* are precisely the units mentioned as omitted in the “Bhārata.” *Upākhyānas* must first be considered among the multigenre terms by which the Mahābhārata characterizes itself and its components. The epic’s two most frequent self-descriptions are “narrative” (*ākhyāna*) fourteen times and “history” (*itihāsa*) eight times. But it also twice calls itself a work of “ancient lore” (*purāṇa*), a “collection” (*saṃhitā*), a “fifth Veda,” the “Veda that pertains to Kishna” (*Kārsṇya Veda*, probably referring to Vyāsa as Krishna Dvaipāyana), and a “great knowledge” (*mahaj-jñāna*). And once it calls itself a “story” (*kathā*), a “treatise” (*śāstra*; indeed, a *dbarmashāstra*, *arthashāstra*, and *mokshashāstra* [1.56.21]), an *upanishad*, an “adventure” (*carita*), a “victory” (*jaya*), and, surprisingly, a “subtale” (*upākhyāna*: 1.2.236)! In addition, while not calling itself one, it is also a “dialogue” (*saṃvāda*), for it sustains the dialogical interlacing of each of its three dialogical frames, not to mention the multiple dialogues that the frame narrators and other narrators report.

Indeed, most of these terms are used doubly. The more “didactic” (*veda*, *saṃhitā*, *upanishad*, and *śāstra*) not only describe the Mahābhārata as a whole, but refer to sources outside of it that the epic’s narrators cite as authoritative and sometimes quote in part or digest—particularly the many *śāstras*, or “treatises,” mentioned in Book 12. But the more “narrative” terms (*saṃvāda*, *ākhyāna*, *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *carita*, *kathā*, and *upākhyāna*) can also be cited as authoritative tales. In this way the Mahābhārata sustains itself as a multigenre work in both its multiple self-designations for the whole and in the interreferentiality between the whole and its parts. This contrasts with the Rāmāyaṇa, whose poet composes his work under the single-genre title of *kāvya* (poem). The Mahābhārata is not called a *kāvya* until a famous interpolation in which the god Brahmā appears to Vyāsa to pronounce on the genre question. Says Vyāsa, “I have created this highly venerated *kāvya* in which I have proclaimed the secret of the Vedas and other topics” (Pune Critical Edition 1, App. I, lines 13–14), to which Brahmā replies, “I know that since your birth you have truthfully given voice to the *brahman*. You have called this a *kāvya*, and therefore a *kāvya* it shall be. No poets (*kavya*) are equal to the excellence of this *kāvya*” (lines 33–35). In a later interpolation, Brahmā then recommends that Gaṇeśha be Vyāsa’s scribe (1, App. I, from line 36).

One striking thing about the epic’s self-descriptive “narrative” terms—that is, the terms themselves, even though the genres they describe all develop, change, and overlap by classical times—is that they are all but one

Vedic. Indeed, the Vedic resonances of three of them—*ākhyāna*, *itibāsa*, and *saṃvāda*—are so strong that a century ago they were at the heart of debates over an “*ākhyāna* theory” of the origins of Vedic poetry. But even *carita* (Rig Veda 1.110.2) and *kāvya* (Rig Veda 8.79.1) have Vedic usages. The one non-Vedic term is *upākhyāna*, which may have been given first life in the Mahābhārata.

To distinguish *upākhyāna* from *ākhyāna*, there would be an analogy between the usages of *ākhyāna*: *upākhyāna* and *parvan*: *upa-parvan*. In both cases, *upa-* implies “subordinate” and “lesser” (as in *upa-purāna* for the “lesser purānas”), and denotes ways of breaking the Mahābhārata down by terms that relate its whole to its parts. But *ākhyāna* and *upākhyāna* are also frequently used interchangeably (as are the other “narrative” terms mentioned above). Sometimes, especially in the *Parvasaṃgraha*—the “Summaries of the Books” that forms the epic’s second *upaparvan*—it would seem that metrical fit decides which of the two terms was used (e.g., at 1.2.124–125). But the first usage of *ākhyāna* to self-describe a sub-narrative in passing may suggest a useful distinction. The first *ākhyāna* narrated in its entirety, “the great Āstika *ākhyāna*” (1.13.4), is the oft-interrupted *āstikaparvan* (1.13–53). Like the oft-interrupted Mahā-Bhārata-*ākhyāna*, it brims with substories of its own. It is delivered by the bard Ugrashravas to the seers of the Naimisha Forest as the main introductory piece to entertain that audience in the epic’s outer frame. In contrast, *upākhyāna* designates major *uninterrupted* subtales told to rapt audiences usually composed of the epic’s heroes and heroines, or, alternately, of one or another of its frame audiences.

There are sixty-seven narratives that the Mahābhārata calls *upākhyānas* in one or more of three contexts: in their traditional titles (which are usually mentioned in the colophons), in the *Parvasaṃgraha*, or in passing. Fifty-six of these are addressed to main heroes and heroines. Of these, forty-nine are told primarily to the eldest of the five Pāṇḍava brothers, Yudhisṭhira; forty-eight of these to him and his five brothers together; and forty-four of these also to their wife-in-common Draupadī (all of these, once they are in the forest). On the Kaurava side, three are addressed to the chief villain Duryodhana and two to his great ally Karṇa, who is secretly the Pāṇḍavas’ real eldest brother. Adding one narrated to the Pāṇḍavas’ father Pāṇḍu by his wife Kuntī (the only *upākhyāna* spoken by a woman), which bears on the Pāṇḍavas’ birth, and one addressed to Draupadī’s father by Vyāsa that explains the legitimacy of their polyandrous marriage to her, one finds that all fifty-six concern the larger Pāṇḍava-Kaurava household to which all these listeners (if we can include the Pāṇḍavas’ father-in-law) belong, and of which Yudhisṭhira is clearly the chief listener. Of the rest, ten are told by Vyāsa’s disciple Vaishampāyana to

King Janamejaya, the Pāṇḍavas’ great-grandson, as the chief listener of the epic’s inner frame; and one is told by Ugrashravas to the Naimisha Forest sages who listen from the outer frame.

Another statistical approach to the *upākhyānas* is to think about volume and proportion. Taking the Mahābhārata’s own numbers, on the face of it, if the epic has 100,000 couplets (1.56.13) and Vyāsa composed a version of it in 24,000 couplets “without the *upākhyānas*,” the *upākhyānas* should constitute 76 percent of the whole. That proportion is nowhere near the present case. Calculating from the roughly 73,900 couplets in the Critical Edition (Van Nooten, p. 50; Brockington, p. 4), the full total for the sixty-seven *upākhyānas* is 10,521 couplets or 13.87 percent; and if one adds certain sequels to four of the *upākhyānas* totaling 780 verses to reach the most generous count of 11,031 verses, one could say that, at most, 14.93 percent of the Mahābhārata is composed of *upākhyāna* material. While we are nowhere near 76 percent, these proportions are not insignificant. Moreover, one can get a bit closer to 76 percent if one keeps in mind the interchangeability of the epic’s terms for narrative units and calculates from the totality of its substory material. According to Barbara Gombach, “nearly fifty percent” of the Mahābhārata is “represented by ancillary stories,” with Books 1, 3, 12, and 13 cited as the four in which “the stories cluster more densely” than in the other Books (2000, I, pp. 5 and 24). Gombach (I, pp. 194, 225) gives 68 percent for the ancillary stories in the *Shāntiparvan* (Book 12), which has fourteen *upākhyānas*; 65 percent for the *Anushāsanaparvan* (Book 13), with eleven *upākhyānas*; 55 percent for the *āranyakaparvan* (Book 3), with twenty-one *upākhyānas*; and 44 percent for the *ādīparvan* (Book 1), with eleven *upākhyānas*. Of other Books that contain more than one *upākhyāna*, the *āshvamedhika-* (Book 14) with two, *Shalya-* (Book 9) with two, and *Udyoga-parvan* (Book 5) with three are comprised of 54, 28, and 17 percent ancillary story material respectively—but still, nothing near 76 percent.

Fifty-seven of the sixty-seven *upākhyānas* thus appear in *parvans* 1, 3, 12, and 13 where “stories cluster” most densely. There are, however, two major differences in the ways that *upākhyānas* are presented in the two early Books from the two later ones. Whereas Books 1 and 3 provide multiple narrators for their thirty-two *upākhyānas*, all but three of the twenty-five *upākhyānas* in Books 12 and 13 are spoken by one narrator, Bhīshma. And whereas Books 1 and especially 3 show a tendency to cluster their *upākhyānas* (two in a row told by Vaishampāyana and three in a row by the Gandharva Chitraratha in Book 1; nine, five, and two in a row by *rishis* whom the Pāṇḍavas encounter while pilgrimaging in Book 3), in Bhīshma’s run of 450 *adhyāyas* in Books 12

and 13, he tends to present his twenty-one *upākhyānas* there only intermittently. Yet there is one run, from the end of Book 12 through the first third of Book 13, where he concentrates nine of them. These two books run together the totality of Bhīshma's postwar instructions to Yudhishṭhira in four consecutive *upaparvans*, which James Fitzgerald calls "four large anthologies" (2004, pp. 79–80). Both books abound in dialogues (*saṁvādas*) and "ancient accounts" (*itihāsam purātanam*). Why then does Bhīshma start telling *upākhyānas*—or, perhaps better, resume telling them (he has already told the *Ambā* and *Viśva-Upākhyānas*)—only in the *Anuśāsanaparvan*? This question will be taken up in the synopsis.

The *upākhyānas*' content should also be important. But they are too varied to summarize fruitfully. It does not seem possible to break the sixty-seven down by their primary personages into less than ten categories: seventeen about leading lights of the great Brahman lineages, fifteen about heroic kings of varied dynasties, eleven about animals (some divine), seven about gods and demons, four (including the first two) about early kings of the main dynasty, four about women, three about the inviolability of worthy Brahmans and hurdles to attaining that status, three about revelations concerning Krishna, two about current background to the epic's main events, and one about the Pāṇḍavas as part of the main story. From this, the only useful generalization would seem to be that all this content is represented as being of interest to the rapt audiences that listen these tales. But this leads to an important point. Regarding the most famous of all the Mahābhārata's *upākhyānas*, the *Nala-Upākhyāna*, Fitzgerald regards "Nala" and some other non-*upākhyāna* stories as "good examples of passages that do exhibit an inventive freedom suggestive of 'fiction'" (2003, p. 207). More pointedly, Gombach credits Madeleine Biarreau's study of "Nala" as a "case for regarding this *upākhyāna* as a story composed in and for the epic to deepen its symbolic resonances" (2000, I, p. 73). "Nala" is what Biarreau now calls one of Book 3's three "mirror stories" (2002, I, pp. 412–413): stories that reflect on their listeners' (the main heroes and heroine's) current trials. But once one admits that one story is composed to fit one or another feature of the epic's wider surroundings, the principle cannot be easily shut off, as shall often be implied in the synopsis.

In any case, to summarize the Mahābhārata, it should not be enough to tell its main story, especially with the suggestion that its main story would have been the original "Bhārata." Even though it must require shortcuts, one owes it to this grand text to attempt to block out the main story against the backdrop of its archetypal design, which includes its frame stories, *upaparvans*, *upākhyānas*, and the enigma of the author.

The Mahābhārata, Book by Book

Of the Mahābhārata's eighteen books, only the first nine and Books 12–14 will be summarized in any detail. That takes one to the end of the fighting of the Mahābhārata war and the last Books to include *upākhyānas*.

Book 1, the *ādi Parvan* or "Book of Beginnings," comprised of nineteen *upaparvans*, takes the first five to introduce the three frames: how Vyāsa recited the epic to his five Brahman disciples, first to his son Shuka and then to the other four, including Vaishampāyana (1.1.63); how Vaishampāyana recited it at Vyāsa's bidding to Janamejaya at his snake sacrifice so that he could hear the story of his ancestors; and how Ugrashravas, who overheard Vaishampāyana's narration, brought it to Shaunaka and the other seers of the Naimisha Forest. *Upaparvan* six, "The Descent of the First Generations," then takes one through the birth of Vyāsa (son of the seer Parāshara and the ferryboat girl Satyavatī) and the descent of the gods to rescue the goddess Earth (who seeks their aid in ridding her of oppressive demons) to an account of the origins of gods, demons, and other beings.

Upaparvan seven begins with the epic's first two *upākhyānas*, on *Shakuntalā* and *Yayāti*, to take us into the genealogy of the early Lunar Dynasty and down to the youths of the main heroes, with heightened attention given to the second generation before them: beginning with the third *upākhyāna* about Mahābhīsha, a royal sage residing in heaven whose boldness with the heavenly river Gaṅgā leads to their marriage on earth, he as King Shāntanu; Bhīshma's birth as their ninth and sole surviving son, and Gaṅgā's departure once Shāntanu asks why she drowned the first eight; Shāntanu's second marriage to Satyavatī, now a fisher-princess, upon her father's obtaining Bhīshma's double vow to renounce kingship and women, for which Shāntanu gives Bhīshma the boon to be able to choose his moment of death; Bhīshma's abduction of three sisters, two of whom become brides for Shāntanu and Satyavatī's second son, who dies soon after becoming king, leaving the two as widows, and the third, the unwedded Ambā, with thoughts of revenge against Bhīshma; Satyavatī's determination to save the line by getting the two widowed queens pregnant, first by asking Bhīshma, who refuses to break his vow of celibacy, and then, admitting her premarital affair, recalling her first son Vyāsa; Vyāsa's unions with the two widowed sisters, cursing the first to bear a blind son because she had closed her eyes at his hideous ascetic ugliness and the second to bear a pale son because she had blanched; the births of the blind Dhritarāshṭra, the pale Pāṇḍu, plus a third son, Vidura, sired with the first widow's low caste maidservant. The fourth *upākhyāna*, named after the sage Aṇimāndavya, then tells how Vidura came to suffer a

low caste human birth because this sage cursed the god Dharma (lord of postmortem punishments and thus tantamount in this debut to Yama, god of the dead) to undergo such a birth after the sage learned that he had been impaled “unjustly” as Dharma’s punishment for a childhood sin in his previous life. Then comes the marriage of Dhritarashtra to Gāndhārī and the birth of their sons, the hundred Kauravas, incarnate demons headed by Duryodhana; the marriages of Pāṇḍu to Kuntī and Mādri and, after Kuntī tells the eventually impotent Pāṇḍu *upākhyāna* five about a queen made pregnant by her husband Vyushitashva even after he was dead, she reveals the means that make possible the birth of the five Pāṇḍavas as sons of gods—Yudhishtira of Dharma, Bhīma of the Wind god, Arjuna of Indra (all sons of Kuntī), and the twins Nakula and Sahadeva sired by the Ashvin twins with Mādri. The young cousins then begin their early lives up to their initiations in weapons, to which they are introduced, via Bhīshma, to the Brahman guru Droṇa, and continue on to the friendships and rivalries they form with others who receive Droṇa’s martial training, notably Ashvatthāman (Droṇa’s son) and Karṇa (born from Kuntī’s premarital union with the Sun god), both of whom will ally with the Kauravas; and the Vrishṇis and Andhakas (1.122.46)—unnamed for now, but among whom one cannot exclude Krishna and Sātyaki who will join the Pāṇḍavas and Kritavarman who joins the Kauravas.

Upaparvans 8 to 11 then tell how the Pāṇḍavas must hide in the forest after Duryodhana tries to kill them. There Bhīma marries a Rākshasī (demoness) who bears him a Rākshasa son, Ghaṭotkaca, who goes off with his mother to the wilds but remains available for filial tasks. At Vyāsa’s prompting, the Pāṇḍavas then live in a village for a while disguised as Brahmans, and then, upon another appearance of Vyāsa, make their way to Pañcāla, where Vyāsa tells them they will meet their destined bride (1.157). On the way, the Gandharva Citraratha challenges Arjuna and is defeated, and upon being shown mercy by Yudhishtira, tells the Pāṇḍavas they are vulnerable without keeping a priest and holy fires, and then relates the *upākhyānas* of Tapatī, Vasishtha, and Aurva—stories about one of their ancestresses and two Brahmans, which prepare them for forthcoming adventures while imparting some positive and negative information on sexuality. *Upaparvan* 12 then tells how the Pāṇḍavas, still disguised as Brahmans, marry Draupadī. Arjuna wins her in an archery contest, and then all five find the pretext to marry her jointly in some mistaken yet irreversible words of Kuntī. Both Krishna and Vyāsa sanction the marriage, the latter by telling Draupadī’s father Drupada the ninth *upākhyāna* (so called in the *Parvasaṅgraha*) about the “Five Former Indras,” which reveals that Draupadī is the goddess Shrī incarnate and that the Pāṇḍavas were all former husbands of hers as previous Indras, making the

marriage virtually monogamous. After some amends are made between the two camps, and the Pāṇḍavas are given the Khāṇḍava Tract in which to found their own half of the kingdom (*upaparvans* 13–15), the seer Nārada arrives at their new capital, Indraprastha, to tell the tenth *upākhyāna* (so called in the *Parvasaṅgraha*) of “Sunda and Upasunda” about two demonic brothers who kill each other over a woman, thereby warning the Pāṇḍavas to regulate their time with Draupadī and providing them a reverse mirror story of their own situation (*upaparvan* 16)—and the very rule that will send Arjuna into a period of exile in which he will marry three other women, including Krishna’s sister Subhadrā (*upaparvans* 17–18). Finally, *upaparvan* 19 tells how Arjuna and Krishna’s burning of the Khāṇḍava Forest satisfies the fire god Agni and reveals their former identities as the great *rishis* Nara and Nārāyaṇa. The conflagration clears the ground for the construction of Indraprastha, and leads into the narration of *upākhyāna* eleven about four precocious birds reminiscent of the Vedas, who escape the blaze.

Book 2, the *Sabhāparvan*, or “Book of the Assembly Hall(s),” takes seven of its nine *upaparvans* to tell how the great audience hall at Indraprastha was built; how Nārada convinced Yudhishtira to assert paramouncy there by performing a Rājasūya (royal consecration) sacrifice, and the obstacles that entailed—most notably, at Krishna’s urging, the killing of Jarāsandha, a rival for paramouncy as king of Magadha who had forced Krishna’s people to flee from Mathura to Dvārakā, and Krishna’s killing of his obstreperous cousin Shishupāla. Its last two *upaparvans* then enter the epic’s dark heart, describing events that occur in the Kaurava assembly hall at Hāstinapura: how Duryodhana, spurred to jealousy, plotted with his maternal uncle Shakuni to challenge Yudhishtira to a “friendly dice match”; how Shakuni, playing for Duryodhana, won everything, leaving Draupadī to be the last wager after Yudhishtira had bet himself; how Draupadī, knowing this, asked if Yudhishtira had bet himself before betting her, setting the court to debate this question as one of *dharma* while Yudhishtira, the son of Dharma, kept silent “as if he were mad”; how Duhshāsana, second oldest of the hundred Kauravas, tried to disrobe Draupadī, and was frustrated when Krishna miraculously multiplied her saris; how Dhritarashtra then terminated the unresolved debate by offering Draupadī three boons, of which she said two were enough: her husbands’ freedom and the return of their weapons; how Duryodhana, grumbling at this result, invited the Pāṇḍavas to a return match with a one-throw winner-take-all stake—that the loser undertake twelve years of forest exile followed by one year incognito as the condition of recovering their half of the kingdom; and how, having lost again, the Pāṇḍavas made vows of revenge and departed with Draupadī for the forest.

Book 3, the *Aranyakaparvan*, or “Book of Forest Teachings,” then comprises sixteen *upaparvans* and tells twenty-one *upākhyānas*. After a transitional *upaparvan* 29, in which Krishna tells Book 3’s first *upākhyāna*—the *Saubhavadha-Upākhyāna* (3.1–23)—to explain his absence from the dice match, the most notable *upaparvans* are the second through fourth and the last three. The first series tells of the Pāṇḍavas’ forest-entering encounter with the monstrous Rākshasa Kirmīra, killed by Bhīma; Arjuna’s encounter with Shiva on Mount Kailasa to obtain divine weapons; and Arjuna’s further adventures in the heaven of his father Indra (*upaparvans* 30–32). Then, after many wanderings, the last three *upaparvans*, 42–44, tell how Draupadī was abducted by the Kauravas’ brother-in-law Jayadratha, how Karṇa gave his natural-born golden armor and earrings to Indra in exchange for an “unfailing dart” that he can only use once, and how, in closing, Yudhishtīra saved his brothers’ lives by answering a *yaksha*’s (goblin’s) questions (an *upākhyāna* according to the *Parvasaṃgraha*). Between these episodes, seers tell the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī numerous stories, many billed as *upākhyānas*. Most are told to edify them on their pilgrim routes. Thus nine are told during the “Tour of the Sacred Fords” (*upaparvan* 33) to the group (minus Arjuna)—eight of these by their traveling companion, the seer Lomasha. The best known of these are the first three: the *Agastya-*, *Rishyasbrīṅga-*, and *Kārtavīrya-Upākhyānas*. And the next six are later narrated by the ageless sage Mārkaṇḍeya to the reassembled Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī in *upaparvan* 37.

But the second and last two *upākhyānas* stand out as what Biardeau calls “mirror stories”: the *Nala-Upākhyāna*—the love story about Nala and Damayantī told by the seer Brihadashva while Arjuna is visiting Shiva and Indra, and Draupadī misses this favorite of her husbands; the *Rāma-Upākhyāna*, the Mahābhārata’s main Rāma story focused on Sītā’s abduction and told to all five Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī by Mārkaṇḍeya just after Draupadī’s abduction; and the *Sāvitrī-Upākhyāna*—the story of a heroine who saved her husband from Yama, death, as told by Mārkaṇḍeya just after the *Rāma-Upākhyāna* when Yudhishtīra asks, having already heard about Sītā (and perhaps slighting her), if there ever was a woman as devoted to her husband(s) as Draupadī. The book ends as it began with the encounter of a monster, who, appearing first as a speaking crane, for the moment “kills” the four youngest Pāṇḍavas by a lake where they have gone to slake their thirst. But whereas the first monster was a Rākshasa, this crane turns into a one-eyed *yaksha* before he reveals himself, after questioning Yudhishtīra, to be Yudhishtīra’s father Dharma in disguise. Gratified at his son’s subtle answers to his puzzling questions, Dharma revives Dharmarāja Yudhishtīra’s brothers and gives him the boon of “the heart of the dice”—something that had

saved Nala in the *Nala-Upākhyāna* and is now a cue to Yudhishtīra not only to remember that story but to disguise himself as a dice-master in Book 4.

Book 4, the *Virāṭaparvan* or “Book of Virāṭa,” has four *upaparvans* (45–48). The first tells how Yudhishtīra chooses the kingdom of Matsya (Fish) for the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī’s thirteenth year of living incognito, how each chooses a disguise, and how they fool the Matsya king Virāṭa with these topsy-turvy identities when they enter his capital: Yudhishtīra as a Brahman dice-master, Bhīma a cook, Draupadī a chambermaid-hairdresser, Arjuna an impotent dance master dressed in skirts, and the twins as handlers of horses and cattle. The other three *upaparvans* tell how Bhīma kills Kīcaka, the Matsya queen’s brother, who had abused Draupadī; how the effeminate looking Arjuna, first driving the young Matsya prince Uttara’s chariot and then reversing charioteer/warrior roles with him, singlehandedly defeats a raid on the kingdom by the leading Kauravas; and how Arjuna refuses the thankful Virāṭa’s offer of his daughter Uttarā to him in marriage and arranges instead that she marry his son with Subhadrā, Abhimanyu, an incarnation of the splendor of the moon, who is destined to carry the genealogical thread of the lunar dynasty forward to Janamejaya.

Book 5, the *Udyogaparvan* or “Book of the Effort,” a book of surprising symmetries and asymmetries, comprises eleven *upaparvans*, the front nine of which occur as efforts are made by messengers from both sides to state terms for peace or war even while everyone prepares for the latter. The initial *Upaparvan* 49 also traces how both sides try to secure the alliance of certain asymmetrically mutual kinsmen. Arjuna and Duryodhana come to Dvārakā to seek aide from Krishna, Arjuna’s mother’s brother’s son and also his wife Subhadrā’s brother. Krishna says bafflingly that his relation to each is equal, but since he saw Arjuna first he gives him the first choice of two options: Krishna as a noncombatant charioteer, or a whole army division composed of Krishna’s Gopā Nārāyaṇa warriors. Arjuna chooses Krishna, and Duryodhana departs content (5.7). Then Shalya, king of Madra and brother of the twins’ mother Mādrī, sets out to join the Pāṇḍavas but has his mind turned after he finds elegant way-stations along his route prepared for him by Duryodhana. Traveling on, he tells Yudhishtīra that he has just allied with Duryodhana, and Yudhishtīra, foreseeing that Shalya will be Karṇa’s charioteer, asks him to destroy Karṇa’s confidence in combat. Telling Yudhishtīra that even Indra had ups and downs, Shalya consoles him with Book 5’s first *upākhyāna*, a cycle of three ultimately triumphant Indra stories called the *Indravijaya-Upākhyāna*. Before this *upaparvan* is over, the Pāṇḍavas have seven army divisions and the Kauravas eleven.

As negotiations continue through the next eight *upaparvans*, events come to center on the lengthy sixth, *upaparvan* 54, titled “The Coming of the Lord,” in which Krishna as divine messenger comes as the Pāṇḍavas’ last negotiator with the Kauravas while a host of celestial seers descends to watch the proceedings and tell stories: one of them an *upākhyāna* told as a warning to Duryodhana by Rāma Jāmadagnya about how the arrogant King Dambhodbhava was humbled by Nara and Nārāyaṇa. When arbitrations break down, Duryodhana tries to capture Krishna, who displays a divine and heroic host emanating from his body while bestowing on some in the court the “divine eye” to see it. Then Krishna quits the court. *Upaparvan* 55 then begins with the beautiful scenes in which Karṇa, even learning that he is Kuntī’s firstborn son, resists the double temptations offered by Krishna and Kuntī to break his friendship with Duryodhana and side with the Pāṇḍavas. The negotiations end in *upaparvan* 58 with a last abusive message delivered to the Pāṇḍavas by Shakuni’s son Ulūka (Duryodhana’s mother’s brother’s son, who thus has the same relation to Duryodhana that Krishna has to Arjuna). Then, after all the armies have gathered and their heroes been evaluated by Bhīshma, Book 5 closes with *upaparvan* 60, the *Ambā-Upākhyāna-Parvan*, most of which, from its beginning, comprises Book 5’s third *upākhyāna*, the *Ambā-Upākhyāna*, in which Bhīshma tells Duryodhana how Ambā, determined to destroy him, came to be reborn as Draupadī’s brother Shikhaṇḍin, and why he will not fight Shikhaṇḍin because he was formerly a woman. Book 5 thus has one *upākhyāna* in its first *upaparvan*, leaving its listener Yudhishtīra with a fateful secret about Karṇa that will advantage Yudhishtīra in the war, and another in its last *upaparvan* leaving its listener Duryodhana with a fateful secret about Bhīshma that will disadvantage Duryodhana in the war.

Books 6 through 9 span the war’s actual fighting through eighteen days at Kurukshetra, the Field of the Kurus. Each of the four war books is named after the marshal who leads the Kaurava army and is slain by the book’s end. Although various side- and background-narratives are told in these books, only five of them are called *upākhyā*.

Book 6, the *Bhāshmaparvan*, contains five *upaparvans* (60–64). In the first, on Bhīshma’s consecration as marshal, Vyāsa gives the Kaurava court bard Saṃjaya the “divine eye” with which to see the war in its entirety and report on it to Dhritarāshṭra, and promises that Saṃjaya will survive the war to do so. Then, after two *upaparvans* on cosmological matters, the fourth (63) includes the Bhagavad Gītā: just before the war, Saṃjaya reports how Krishna tells Arjuna various legal, philosophical, and divinely ordained reasons why Arjuna cannot renounce

his duty to fight, and provides the disciplines (*yogas*) whereby Arjuna can perform action without desire for its fruits. The bulk of Book 6 is then the “Parvan on the Death of Bhīshma” (64), which begins when Yudhishtīra crosses the battlefield to take leave of his elders Bhīshma, Droṇa, the Brahman Kripa, and Shalya. Early in the fighting Bhīshma pauses to tell Duryodhana the *Vishva-Upākhyāna*, revealing mysteries about Krishna. After ten days of fighting, Bhīshma falls at the hands of Arjuna and Shikhaṇḍin. So filled with arrows that no part of his body touches the ground, Bhīshma makes this his “bed of arrows” and uses the boon his father gave him to postpone his death for fifty-eight days until the winter solstice.

Book 7, the *Droṇaparvan*, contains eight *upaparvans* (65–72) and covers the war’s next five days. Its train of deaths is fraught with sacrificial symbolism and deepens a theological current, especially in an overture and coda that balance the mutual impact of Krishna and Shiva. Early in the first *upaparvan*, in what Gombach calls “a surprising turn” (2000, II, p. 174), Dhritarāshṭra composes himself to hear about the killing of Droṇa by recounting to Saṃjaya the “divine feats” of Krishna, including that he saw Krishna’s theophany in his own court in Book 5. Then, as *Upaparvan* 66 takes us from the eleventh into the twelfth day of battle, a group of sworn warriors that includes Krishna’s Gopa Nārāyaṇas detains Arjuna at the southern end of the battlefield while Droṇa attacks Yudhishtīra. Later that same day, Arjuna directs Krishna toward King Bhagadatta of Prāgyotisha, who uses mantras to change his elephant hook into a Vaishṇava weapon, which Krishna intercepts on his chest before it hits Arjuna, turning it into flowers.

Upaparvan 67 then describes day thirteen, in which the chief event is the entrapment and killing of Abhimanyu in a circular array from which Jayadratha, thanks to a boon from Shiva, is able to block his exit. Arjuna then vows to kill Jayadratha on day fourteen or commit suicide, and Krishna helps him fulfill this incautious vow just before sunset by making it seem the sun has already set: Jayadratha raises his head to look at the atmospheric and loses it (*upaparvans* 68–69). Fighting continues deep into the night, and Krishna connives to get Karṇa to exhaust the one-use “unfailing dart” he got from Indra. Krishna prods Ghaṭotkaca to use his prodigious night-fighting powers as a Rākshasa against Karṇa, drawing Karṇa to use up the dart. And at Ghaṭotkaca’s titanic fall Krishna does a little dance of joy, explaining that the dart can no longer spell Arjuna’s death (*upaparvan* 70). Then, on day fifteen, Droṇa is killed by Dhriṣṭadyumna, another brother of Draupadī, after he lays down his weapons, convinced that Yudhishtīra could not have lied when he told Droṇa that his son Ashvatthāman had been killed (*upaparvan* 71).

Upaparvan 72 then closes Book 7 with a kind of theological coda on Shiva. While the Pāṇḍava ranks betray shame and blame over the foul means used to kill Droṇa, Ashvatthāman vows revenge with a Nārāyaṇa weapon Droṇa had given him, which must never be used against anyone abandoning their chariots. Krishna gets everyone to dismount and the weapon is neutralized. After using up another weapon against Arjuna and Krishna, Ashvatthāman flees but suddenly sees Vyāsa standing before him. Vyāsa explains why the weapons failed: Arjuna and Krishna are the two eternal seers Nara and Nārāyaṇa. Moreover, Shiva and Krishna worship each other. Vyāsa also knows Ashvatthāman's previous lives in which he pleased Shiva and was his devotee. Ashvatthāman bows to Shiva and acknowledges Krishna. Vyāsa then "arrives by chance" before Arjuna, who questions him about the fiery being he has seen preceding him in battle and killing foes. Vyāsa reveals this to be Shiva, recites a hymn to him, and goes "as he came." As Gombach observes (2000, I, pp. 216–219), the *Dronaparvan* is notable for its ancillary stories involving Shiva, of which there are two more (7.69.49–71; 119.1–28). Jayadratha's blocking of Abhimanyu is also enabled by a boon from Shiva.

Surprisingly, Book 8, the *Karnaaparvan*, is an *upaparvan* in itself, number 73. By the end of day fifteen the Kauravas regroup, and make Karṇa marshal that night. After minor skirmishes on day sixteen end with the Kauravas demoralized, Karṇa promises to kill Arjuna on the seventeenth, and Arjuna likewise promises Yudhishtira—by now obsessed about Karṇa—that he will kill Karṇa. Karṇa requests Shalya as his charioteer, since he regards Shalya as the only match for Krishna's charioteering, and Duryodhana tells Karṇa and Shalya an *upākhyāna* about how Brahmā came to be Shiva's charioteer in the conquest of Tripura, the "Triple City" of the demons. Shalya agrees, on the condition that he can say what he pleases, and engages Karṇa in a duel of insults that includes still another *upākhyāna* in which he compares Karṇa to a crow challenging a gander (probably as part of fulfilling his promise to Yudhishtira to undermine Karṇa's confidence). As the day wears on, Bhīma drinks Duhshāsana's blood, fulfilling a vow he had made at Draupadī's disrobing, and Arjuna, prompted by Krishna, finally beheads Karṇa at sunset.

Book 9, the *Shalyaparvan*, usually has four *upaparvans* (74–77). Shalya is quickly slain in *upaparvan* 74 by Yudhishtira, who marvelously changes from mild to fierce. Duryodhana rallies his forces briefly. But when he is unable to find his remaining allies, he tells Saṃjaya to tell his father he has entered a lake. He does this by solidifying the waters with his *māyā*, or power of illusion. This is the Dvaipāyana Lake (29.53) one that bears the name of the author.

Upaparvan 76 begins with Duryodhana recuperating in the lake. The three Kaurava survivors, Ashvatthāman, Kripa, and Kritavarman, learn his whereabouts and implore him to come out and renew the fight, which Duryodhana says he will do tomorrow. Some hunters overhear and tell the Pāṇḍavas. Krishna urges Yudhishtira to force Duryodhana out of the lake by counteracting Duryodhana's *māyā* with his own. But Yudhishtira, "as if smiling" (when dealing with Krishna, Yudhishtira, unlike Arjuna, tends to have a mind of his own), only scolds Duryodhana for retreating from battle. Duryodhana says he is resting and will come out to fight tomorrow, adding that, with his brothers gone, he has no desire to rule and would offer the earth to Yudhishtira. Boldly replying that Duryodhana no longer has the earth to offer, Yudhishtira goads him into making a challenge to duel one Pāṇḍava. And to Krishna's dismay, he also offers Duryodhana the choice of both foe and weapon. Duryodhana breaks up through the solidified waters shouldering his iron mace, and returns the challenge to the Pāṇḍavas to choose which one will fight him. Alarmed at the predicament, Krishna says Bhīma is the only possible choice, and that it will be Bhīma's might versus Duryodhana's skill. As the two begin to taunt each other, Krishna's brother Balarāma, who trained them both, has neared Kurukshetra on his forty-two-day pilgrimage up the Sarasvati River, and hurries to see the duel between his disciples. From this point, the rest of *upaparvan* 76 is a flashback in which Vaishampāyana describes the pilgrimage while supplying stories, including two *upākhyānas* (one so called only in passing, at 9.42.28) relevant to sites along the way.

Once Balarāma arrives, the narrative returns to Saṃjaya with *upaparvan* 77, "The Battle of the Bludgeons." When the going gets tough, Krishna prompts Arjuna to signal Bhīma to strike Duryodhana's thighs. Shattering both thighs and driving Duryodhana to the ground, the savagely indignant Bhīma also kicks his head with his left foot. Yudhishtira tells Bhīma to desist. Balarāma wants him punished for breaking the rules of mace-fighting. But Krishna tells Balarāma the Pāṇḍavas are "our natural friends" (59.13), reminds him of all the vows and debts that Bhīma has just fulfilled, and urges him to recall that "the Kali Age has arrived" (21). Seeing Krishna and the Pāṇḍavas celebrate, Duryodhana denounces Krishna for his dodgy tactics, and hearing Krishna rebuke him in turn, proclaims himself to have lived a glorious life—words met by a rain of celestial flowers. Krishna then justifies his tactics by the argument of divine precedence. While the Pāṇḍavas visit the forlorn Kaurava camp, Duryodhana sends a final message through Saṃjaya to his parents and his three surviving allies. When the three see him in his grim plight, Duryodhana asks Kripa to consecrate Ashvatthāman as his (fifth) marshal, and the three leave to hatch their plot.

Book 10, the *Sauptikaparvan* or “Book of the Night Raid,” tells how Ashvatthāman (possessed by Shiva), Kripa, and Kritavarman massacre the sleeping remnant of the Pāṇḍava army in their camp, which the Pāṇḍavas have vacated at Krishna’s recommendation. They kill all the remaining Matsyas and kinsmen of Draupadī, as well as her children. Book 11, the *Strīparvan* or “Book of the Women,” treats the women’s lamentations for the slain warriors.

Books 12, the *Shāntiparvan* or “Book of the Peace,” begins to tell how Yudhishtira, beset by grief over all the warriors slain so that he could rule, is persuaded by his family, counselors (including Krishna, Nārada, and Vyāsa), and Bhīshma to give up his guilt-ridden aspirations to renunciation and accept his royal duties. In its early going, Krishna contributes three *upākhyānas*. At the capital, he recites two in a row: first, a string of sixteen vignettes about ancient kings whose deaths were also lamented, and then a death-and-revival tale about a boy named “Excretor of Gold” that briefly lightens Yudhishtira’s mood. On the way to joining Bhīshma at Kurukshetra, he then describes Rāma Jāmadagnya’s twenty-one massacres of the Kshatriyas there, answering Yudhishtira’s curiosity about how the warrior class kept regenerating. For the rest, ten *upākhyānas* are dispersed through Bhīshma’s multigenre instructions in the three anthologies on *Rājadharmā*, “laws for kings,” *Āpaddharmā*, “law for times of distress,” and *Mokshadharmā*, “norms concerning liberation” (*upaparvans* 84-86). Bhīshma’s *Shāntiparvan upākhyānas* are noteworthy for the long drispells between them. There are never two in a row; in the *Mokshadharmā* one finds intervals of as many as sixty-four (12.194-257) and seventy-six (12.264-339) *adhyāyas* between them. Yet there is a striking pattern. Four of these *upākhyānas* confront the Dharma King Yudhishtira with “puzzle pieces” about *dharmā* in which lead characters are either his own father, the god Dharma, in disguise, or figures who bear the word *dharmān/dharmā* in their names. Moreover, one such tale occurs as the last *upākhyāna* in each anthology. Thus Dharma himself appears disguised in the *Sumitra-Upākhyāna* or *Rishabha Gita* near the end of the *Rājadharmā*; a magnificent crane bears the name Rājadharmā in “The Story of the Ungrateful Brahman” (*Kritagbna-Upākhyāna*) that ends the *Āpaddharmā*; and, after Dharma appears in another disguise in the *Jāpaka-Upākhyāna*, the *Mokshadharmā*’s first *upākhyāna*, that sub-*parvan* ends with the story of a questioning Brahman named Dharmaranya, “Forest of Dharma,” who, like Yudhishtira at this juncture, has questions about the best practice to pursue toward gaining heaven—which turns out to be eating only what is gleaned after grains and other food have been harvested (*Uñchavrittī-Upākhyāna*). Since Book 3 ends with an episode (an

upākhyāna, according to the *Parvasamgraha*) where Dharma appears disguised as a crane and a *yaksha*, it would appear that one strain of the epic’s *upākhyānas* carries a major subcurrent through such puzzle pieces, especially in that they frequently punctuate the ends of major units. Moreover, with one such story ending the *Shāntiparvan*, we have reached the juncture mentioned earlier where Bhīshma is launching his only concentrated stretch of *upākhyānas*.

Book 13, the *Anushāsanaparvan* or “Book of the Further Instructions,” begins with Bhīshma’s fourth anthology: his closing instructions to Yudhishtira on *Dānadharmā*, “the law of the gift” (*upaparvan* 87). Here we must consider Fitzgerald’s hypothesis that the four anthologies demonstrate decreasing “tautness” and increasing relaxation as the result of “a progressive loosening of editorial integration” (2004, pp. 147-148) over centuries, from the second century B.C. down to the fourth-to-fifth century A.D. (p. 114). Fitzgerald’s point is buttressed by the general impression scholars have had that the *Anushāsanaparvan* is loose and late. R. N. Dandekar, the Critical Edition editor of this last-to-be-completed *parvan*, perhaps puts it best:

The scope and nature of the contents of this *parvan* were such that literally any topic under the sun could be broached and discussed in it. . . . This has resulted in poor Yudhishtira being represented as putting to his grandsire some of the most elementary questions—often without rhyme or reason. Not infrequently, these questions serve as mere excuses for introducing a legend or a doctrine fancied by the redactor, no matter if it has already occurred in an earlier part of the Epic, not once but several times (1966, xlvi).

No doubt Dandekar had the *Bhagāshvāna-Upākhyāna* principally in mind, in which Yudhishtira, indeed quite out of the blue, asks, “In the act of coition, who derives the greater pleasure—man or woman” (13.12.1; Dandekar 1966, p. lix), and thereby launches Bhīshma into a tale that makes the case that the luckier ones are women. But Yudhishtira is hardly a simpleton. He is portrayed throughout as having an underlying guilelessness that sustains him. The four anthologies repeatedly reinforce this trope, but nowhere more pivotally than in the transition from Book 12 to 13, which marks Yudhishtira’s revived interest in stories. He begins Book 13 stating that he is unable to regain peace of mind, even after Book 12, “out of the conviction that he alone had been responsible for the tragic catastrophe of the war,” and that he feels “particularly unhappy at the pitiable condition” of Bhīshma (Dandekar 1966, pp. lvii-lviii). But once Bhīshma tells him the opening “Dialogue (*Samvāda*) Between Death, Gautamī, and Others,” Yudhishtira

replies, “O grandsire, wisest of men, you who are learned in all the treatises, I have listened to this great narrative (*ākhyāna*), O foremost of the intelligent. I desire to hear a little more narrated by you in connection with *dharmā*, O king. You are able to narrate it to me. Tell me if any householder has ever succeeded in conquering Mrityu (Death) by the practice of *dharmā*” (13.2.1-3). This appeal launches Book 13’s first *upākhyāna*, the *Sudarshana-Upākhyāna*, on how, by following the “the law of treating guests” (*atithidharma*), Death may indeed be overcome, a tale that reveals that the divine guest through whom a householder can overcome Death by showing him full hospitality—even to the point of offering him his wife—is Dharma himself. This would be a clever, beautiful, and relieving revelation to Dharma’s son Yudhishtira, who, just after hearing the *Mokshadharma* on “the norms of liberation,” which he knows cannot really be for him if he is to rule, hears a story that points the way to understanding how he can still overcome death by cultivating the generosity of a gifting royal householder.

Why is Bhīshma unbottled at this juncture? Granted that the *Dāmadharmaparvan* is relatively loose and likely late, to the point of including entries down to “the last moment,” it need be no later than its literary unfolding within the Mahābhārata’s primary archetypal design. The four anthologies get more and more relaxed from one to the next because the interlocutors do as well. In the *Dāmadharma*, they are at last beginning to enjoy themselves, to put the war behind them, to treasure the dwindling light of leisure they still have to raise questions and delight in stories on the bank of the Gaṅgā before Gaṅgā’s son Bhīshma puts his learned life behind him. Cutting away for Vaishampāyana to describe the scene to Janamejaya, we hear, amid praise of the Gaṅgā, how forty-five celestial seers arrive to tell stories (*kathās*) “related to Bhīshma” (13.27.10), stories that cheer one and all—even at the seers’ parting, when Yudhishtira touches Bhīshma’s feet with his head “at the end of a story (*kathānte*)” (13.27.17) and returns to his questioning, which leads Bhīshma to tell him the *Mataṅga-Upākhyāna*. This anticipatory theme of not ending at the end of a story, of keeping the story going with a new story, comes up again when Bhīshma winds up the *Vipula-Upākhyāna* by telling how Mārkaṇḍeya had formerly told it to him “in the interval of a story (*kathāntare*) on Gaṅgā’s bank” (13.43.17). It is as if living in ongoing stories alongside the salvific river is a main current in Yudhishtira’s atonement, and that after the relative dialogical stringency of the three anthologies of the *Shāntiparvan*, it is good to get back to *upākhyānas* in “The Book of the Further Instruction.” This bears further on the matter raised by Dandekar of returning to stories “no matter if” they have “already occurred.” When Bhīshma

and Yudhishtira return to such stories—most notably the *Vishvāmitra-Upākhyāna* (13.3-4) with its familiar cast of revolving characters (Vishvāmitra, Vasishtha, Jamadagni, Rmā Jāmadagnya, etc.)—it is from a new and different angle and, as always with any story, from the pleasure of hearing it again.

Book 13 then closes with a short *upaparvan* 88, describing Bhīshma’s final ascent to heaven from his bed of arrows, attended by his celestial mother Gaṅgā.

With Book 14, the *Āshvamedhikaparvan* or “Book of the Horse Sacrifice,” Yudhishtira, grieving once again over Bhīshma’s demise and his guilt over the war, agrees to perform a sin-cleansing Horse Sacrifice at Vyāsa and Krishna’s bidding. While the Pāṇḍavas prepare for it, Krishna wants to see his people in Dvārakā, and on the way he meets the sage Uttānka for the multistoried *Uttānka-Upākhyāna*. Arjuna then has many adventures guarding the horse. But immediately upon the rite’s completion an angry half-golden blue-eyed mongoose appears from his hole to disparage the grand ceremony as inferior to the practice of gleanings. With this incident comes the *Mahābhārata*’s final *upākhyāna*: this time a double puzzle story that reveals the mongoose to have been Dharma in disguise, and before that a mysterious guest who tested the anger of the *rishi* Jamadagni. It addresses the question of whether a king’s giving to Brahmans and others in sacrifice is comparable to the gleaner’s “pure gift” (*śuddha dāna*; 14.93.57), done with devotion and faith and without anger, to Dharma, that ever-demanding guest. Again, a major unit ends with an *upākhyāna* puzzle piece on this theme.

Book 15, the *Āshrāmavāsikaparvan*, or “Book of the Residence in the Hermitage,” tells of the final days of the Pāṇḍavas’ elders Dhritarāshtra, Gāndhārī, Vidura, and Kuntī at a hermitage. Book 16, the *Mausalaparvan*, or “Book of the Iron Clubs,” tells of the final days of Krishna’s people in Dvārakā, including Krishna and Balarāma.

Book 17, the *Mahāprasthānikaparvan*, or “Book of the Great Departure,” describes the final journey of the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī. Book 18, the *Svargārohaṇaparvan*, or “Book of the Ascent to Heaven,” describes how Yudhishtira gets to heaven in his own body after one last test by his father Dharma in the disguise of a dog, and what he finds in heaven and in hell, before he gets back to heaven.

The Essence of the Subtales

There is one other reference to the epic’s *upākhyānas* that is yet to be plumbed. It occurs toward the end of Book 12 in the highly devotional *Nārāyaṇīya* (which includes the *upākhyāna* narrated by Ugrashravas to the

Naimisha Forest *rishis* about Vishnu's manifestation as the Horse's Head). This takes us back where we began: to the "oceanic mind" of the author, and also to the *Āstīkaparvan* substory called "The Churning of the Ocean" (1.15–17). One should also recall that Duryodhana finds his last relief in an otherwise unheard of Dvaipāyana Lake.

About one-third of the way through the *Nārāyaṇīya*, itself an eighteen-chapter epitome of the Mahābhārata (although the Critical Edition splits a chapter and makes it nineteen), Bhīshma says that the story he has just told Yudhishtira about Nārada's journey to "White Island" (*Śvetadvīpa*)—an island somewhere on the northern shore of the milky ocean—is a "narrative (*ākhyānam*) coming from a seer-based transmission (*ārsheyam pārampariyāgatam*) that should not be given" to anyone who is not a devotee of Vishnu (12.326.113), and, moreover, that it is the "essence" of all the "other *upākhyānas*" he has transmitted:

Of those hundreds of other virtuous subtales (*anyāni . . . upākhyānaśatāni . . . dharmaṇḍī*) that are heard from me, king, this is raised up (or extracted, ladled out: *uddhatā*) as their essence (*sāro*); just as nectar was raised up by the gods and demons, having churned (the ocean), even so this nectar of story (*kathāmṛitam*) was formerly raised up by the sages. (12.326.114–115)

Hearing this, Yudhishtira and all the Pāṇḍavas become Nārāyaṇa devotees. This suggests that one could count the "White Island" story as a sixty-eighth *upākhyāna*. More than that, Bhīshma holds that it is the essence of them all. He has also used *ākhyāna* and *upākhyāna* interchangeably with each other and with *kathā*, story. And when he speaks of the "hundreds of other virtuous *upākhyānas* that are heard from me," he probably implies not only those he has just told Yudhishtira in the *Shāntiparvan*, but all the others he has told or will tell elsewhere, and those which have been recited by others, which Bhīshma, given his heavenly and earthly sources, would be likely to know.

Still within the *Nārāyaṇīya*, just after its next major narrative, Shaunaka (correcting the Critical Edition, which makes the speaker Vaishampāyana) says to the bard (*sauti*) Ugrashravas:

O Sauti, very great is the narrative (*ākhyāna*) recited by you, having heard which, the sages are all gone to the highest wonder. . . . Surely having churned the supreme ocean of knowledge by this hundred thousand (verse) Bhārata narrative (*ākhyāna*) with the churning of your thought—as butter from milk, as sandal from Mount Malaya, and as

Āraṇyaka (forest instruction) from the Vedas, as nectar from herbs—so is this supreme nectar of story (*kathāmṛitam*) . . . raised up [as] spoken by you, which rests on the story (*kathā*) of Nārāyaṇa. (12.331.1–4)

Although Shaunaka commends Ugrashravas for "having churned the supreme ocean of knowledge by this hundred thousand (verse) *Bhārata-ākhyāna* with the churning of your thought" (that is, Ugrashravas's thought), we must remember that Ugrashravas is only said to be transmitting the Mahābhārata to the Naimisha Forest *rishis* as the "entire thought" of Vyāsa (1.1.23). This suggests that the full hundred thousand verses—with the *upākhyānas* included—of the *Bhārata-ākhyāna* were churned first by Vyāsa before they were re churned by Ugrashravas, with Vaishampāyana, their intermediary, having also delivered Vyāsa's "entire thought" (1.55.2) at Janamejaya's snake sacrifice, where Ugrashravas overheard it.

Then, still within the *Mokshadharma* anthology of the *Shāntiparvan*, before these two passages but leading up to the story of Shuka (12.310–320), there is a third passage that uses the same metaphor and similes. It occurs within Bhīshma's account of the lengthy instruction that Vyāsa gives to his firstborn son Shuka (12.224–246), who is not only one of Vyāsa's five disciples (Vaishampāyana being another) to have first heard the Mahābhārata from him, but the son who will obtain liberation before the Mahābhārata—despite Shuka's having heard it—can have fully happened. Says Vyāsa,

Untraditional and unprecedented, the secret of all the Vedas, this treatise (*śāstra*), of which everyone can convince himself, is instruction for my son (*putrānuśāsanam*). By churning the wealth that is contained in all the narratives (*ākhyānas*) about *dharma* and all the narratives about truth, as also the ten thousand Rigvedic verses, this nectar has been raised—like butter from curds and fire from wood, as also the knowledge of the wise, even has this been raised for the sake of my son (*putrabetoḥ samuddhritam*). (12.238.13–15)

The churning metaphor thus finds Vyāsa at its bottom, since he would be the first to use it—before Bhīshma or Ugrashravas. Indeed, Shuka is born when Vyāsa sees a nymph and ejaculates his semen onto his churning firesticks (12.311.1–10). Vyāsa's instruction to Shuka would also be churned up from all the *ākhyānas*—presumably of the Mahābhārata, which would imply as well the *upākhyānas* and likewise imply that this "treatise" for his son epitomizes the Mahābhārata itself. Shuka's agenda of seeking liberation (*moksha*) is set here, and he attains *moksha* toward the end of Book 12 as a boy, soon after he is born, and just before the *Nārāyaṇīya* and Bhīshma's

grand run of *upākhyānas* from Book 12 into Book 13. Taking the passage literally, it seems to say that Vyāsa churned all the Mahābhārata's narratives about *dharmā* and truth for the sake of Shuka's liberation, the very thing that Yudhishtira, shortly after hearing that story, accepts that he must do without, while asking for further stories.

These churning passages are heightened reflections on at least two of the purposes of narrative within the Mahābhārata's overall grand design: that it all rests on Nārāyaṇa, and that its essence is liberating instruction on both truth and *dharmā*. They would seem to reflect the exuberant overview from within on the part of those who were involved in the production of the earliest totality of this work.

Alf Hiltebeitel

See also Rāmāyaṇa; Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata
Paintings

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MAHARASHTRA The name Maharashtra, meaning "the land of the Marathi-speaking people," appears to be derived from *Maharashbtri*, an old form of Prakrit. Some scholars believe that it was the land of the *mabarathbis* (great charioteers) while others consider the term to be a corruption of Maha Kantara (the Great Forest), a synonym for Dandakaranya of the Rāmāyaṇa.

The Land and Its People

The state of Maharashtra is located in the northwest and center of peninsular India, bounded by the Arabian Sea to the west, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh to the north, Andhra Pradesh to the east, Karnataka and Goa to the south. In area (118,828 sq. mi., or 307,762 sq. km), the state ranks fourth below Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, while in terms of population (96,752,000; 2001 estimate) it ranks third in the country, below Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Maharashtra's physical features divide it into three distinct regions: the Konkan coast; the mountainous Sahyadri Range; and the "Desh" Deccan plateau. The Sahyadri Range, the physical backbone of Maharashtra, rises on an average to 3,280 feet (1,000 meters), with steep cliffs dropping westward to the coastal strip of Konkan; the hilltops, locally called the Ghatmatha, drop in steps eastward through a transitional area known as Mawal to the large Deccan plateau. Lying between the Arabian Sea and the Sahyadri Range is the Konkan, a narrow coastal lowland, barely 30 miles (48 km) wide, alternating between narrow, steep-sided valleys and low laterite plateaus. In the north, the Satpuda Range and the eastward extension of the Bhamragad-Chiroli-Gaikhuri ranges provide natural borders for the state, historically serving as a barrier to invasions from the north.

Maharashtra's Traditions

Maharashtra is proud of its three heritages and of its cosmopolitan capital, Mumbai. First, it is the land of the historic Marathas, who produced a great Indian hero, Shivaji, and built a power structure lasting more than 150 years, administering both directly and indirectly three-quarters of the subcontinent at the time of the British takeover. Second, predating Shivaji and continuing to date, is Maharashtra's nine-centuries-old *bbakti* tradition, a movement unifying masses, urban and rural, rich and poor. Third, it was in its capital, Mumbai (Bombay), that the Indian National Congress was born in 1885, and it was from the same venue that Mahatma Gandhi launched the historic "Quit India" movement in 1942. Mumbai, its capital since the birth of the state on 1 May 1960, is also regarded as the country's industrial and financial capital.

The power center during Shivaji's early days and throughout the period of the Peshwai (1714–1818) was Pune (120 miles [193 km] southeast of Mumbai), the



Lithograph of a Maharashtra Warrior. The story of Maharashtra is the story of the great seventeenth-century warrior Shivaji Maharaj who, surmounting monumental difficulties, encouraged a spirit of independence among his people that enabled them to withstand, for well over 150 years, all attempts to conquer them. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

heart of Maharashtra, which also produced the first major nonviolent challenge to British rule through the leadership of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, as well as the violent alternative provided by Vinayak Damodar Sawarkar, Chaphekar Brothers, and Vasudeo Balwant Phadke. The city also boasts an array of excellent academic institutions in diverse fields, leading the country in the study of archaeology, linguistics, anthropology, and Sanskrit. Its engineering and medical education facilities stand among the top ten in the country.

The *Bhakti* Cult

A great social leveler in Maharashtra has been the sustained popularity of the *bhakti* (devotion to Krishna) cult, with an unbroken tradition, at least for nine centuries, of pilgrimage to the temple of Vithoba at Pandharpur. Every year, several hundred thousand *warkari* devotees, from all ranks of society, walk scores of miles from different towns and villages all over the state to converge on the temple. Along the way and at the temple, they sing

bhajans (devotional songs) composed by poet-saints from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and eat together, regardless of caste or economic status.


Leading the *bhakti* tradition in Maharashtra was Jnanadeva or Jnanesvara (1271–1296), who synthesized philosophy, mysticism, and poetry in his Marathi rendering of the Bhagavad Gītā, which is still widely read in Maharashtra. The tradition was continued by many saint-poets, notably Namdev (1270–1350), Chokhamela (c. fourteenth century), Eknatha (1533–1599), and the much-loved Tukaram (1598–1650), whose poetry marked the peak of the *bhakti* tradition. Ramdas (1608–1684), regarded as Shivaji's political and spiritual guru, also belonged to the same poet-saint tradition. All these saint-poets focused on Vithoba of Pandharpur, which became the devotional capital of Maharashtra.

Together, these poet-saints established a “spiritual democracy,” bringing the philosophy of the Vedānta in simple terms to ordinary people, who were encouraged to disregard caste distinctions in a common devotion to the Divine. The *bhakti* and *warkari* traditions are basic to the understanding of Maharashtrian ethos communality, a sentiment that provided a common platform for the Maratha polity founded by Shivaji and that was continued through the eighteenth century by the Peshwas and the Pentarchy, whose members were drawn from different communities.

Brief Historical Account

Major parts of Maharashtra came under different dynasties, such as the Chalukyas of Badami in the sixth century A.D. and the Rashtrakutas in the eighth century. The most notable rulers were the Yadavas of Deogiri (later named Daulatabad) immediately preceding their defeat by the northern sultanate, first by Ala'ud-Din Muhammad Khalji in 1307 and later by Muhammad bin Tughluq in 1327. The latter's peremptory orders for thousands of people to move from Delhi to Daulatabad, his “second” capital, incited rebellions. One such rebel, Hasan Gangu, established in 1347 an independent kingdom over the Deccan and named it Bahamani in honor of a Brahman who had treated him well while in adversity. The Bahamani dynasty lasted nearly two hundred years before it broke into its five components, centered respectively in Ahmednagar, Bijapur, Golkonda, Bidar, and Berar.

Barring a few exceptions, the rulers of the Bahamani dynasty as well as of its five successor states treated its majority Hindu population well, even taking some of them into service as noblemen and generals. Shivaji's grandfather, Maloji Bhosle, served in Ahmednagar; his son Shahaji served both the rulers of Ahmednagar and Bijapur.



Shivaji's urge to establish an independent kingdom owed as much to his personal pride in freedom as his perception of the need to reestablish the tradition of religious tolerance so gravely disturbed by the reigning

Adilshah of Bijapur and the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. The latter's bid after Shivaji's death in 1680 to eliminate Maratha power only helped to reinforce Maratha proto-nationalism, which found a new manifestation and urge,

under the Peshwas in the eighteenth century, to carry the Maratha flag to large swaths of territory in both north and central India.

D. R. SarDesai

See also **Bombay; Peshwai and Pentarchy**

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MALDIVES AND BHUTAN, RELATIONS WITH

With Maldives and Bhutan, India has evolved harmonious relations virtually free of bilateral problems. Since 1965, when the Maldives became independent, its relations with India have developed through close cooperation and mutual understanding. In 1976 the two countries reached an agreement to demarcate their maritime boundary. Considering that the atoll islands of Maldives are inherently weak and vulnerable, India has often promised to respect its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Maldives has reciprocated by respecting India's regional security sensitivities by, for example, refusing to lease its strategically important Gan Island to foreign powers during the cold war period. On its part, India remained responsive to the small state's security needs and provided prompt military assistance to foil a coup in 1988. During Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee's visit to Male in September 2002, India offered to train and equip the Maldivian security forces in coastal defense.

India has extended a variety of economic and technical assistance, helping to develop infrastructure in Maldives. Its first project was a fish canning plant. In 1977 India set up the Maldivian airlines and modernized the country's only airport. Under the 1986 economic and technical cooperation agreement, India established a 200-bed general hospital, a nurse training center and a coronary unit and extended assistance in telecommunications, meteorology, and the preservation of ancient monuments. In January 1990 India helped Maldives establish an environmental program to arrest the greenhouse effect as well as a training program for civil servants in its foreign

office. Over the years, India's assistance has increased to include information technology, tourism, and agriculture.

Similarly, India-Bhutan relations represent a rare case of harmony and friendship between two unequal states. Unlike Maldives, which has not had a friendship treaty with India, Bhutan's special relations are formalized by the treaty of perpetual peace and friendship signed on 8 August 1949. Clause 2 of the treaty is central to their relationship. It pertains to India's commitment to non-interference in the internal administration of Bhutan which, on its part, has agreed to be guided by the former's advice. On matters of defense, Bhutan has agreed to import its arms either from or through India. The treaty has established a bilateral free trade regime and includes provision for extradition of each other's citizens. It is a treaty in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent. Bhutan has continued to adhere to the treaty provisions, notwithstanding some criticisms and unofficial demands for its revision.

Being a landlocked, underdeveloped country, Bhutan depends heavily on India for its economic support and development. India fully financed Bhutan's first two five-year plans, and subsequent plans received partial funding. India has undertaken several development projects, including the significant Chukha hydroelectric project at the cost of 2,440 million rupees (Rs. 244 crore). About 40 percent of Bhutan's external revenue is collected from the sale of electricity to India. Bhutan receives about 50 percent of the total Indian aid earmarked for the developing countries. India has provided over thirteen transit routes to Bhutan; trade with India constitutes about 70 percent of Bhutan's imports and 90 percent of its exports, though Bhutan is seeking to expand its commercial interactions with other countries. The five decades of India-Bhutan relations have been characterized by warmth and friendship.

Ponmoni Sabadevan

See also **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**

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MANDALA THEORY. See **Artha Shāstra**.

MANDAL COMMISSION REPORT On 20 December 1978 India's prime minister, Morarji Desai of the Janata Party, announced the formation of a second



Demonstration against the Mandal Commission Report. In August 1990, then Prime Minister V. P. Singh announced before Parliament his intention to implement the Mandal Commission's recommendations. Violent demonstrations soon broke out, especially in the North among the upper castes, who feared the commission's recommendations on advancing the socially and economically backward classes of India would reduce their access to higher education. INDIA TODAY.

Backward Classes Commission under chairman B. P. Mandal, a former member of Parliament. The commission's assignments were: to determine criteria for defining India's "socially and educationally backward classes"; to recommend steps to be taken for the advancement of those classes; to examine the desirability of reserving state- and central-government jobs for those classes; and to present a report to the president of India. On 31 December 1980 the Mandal Commission submitted its report to President N. S. Reddy, recommending ways to advance India's "socially and educationally backward classes."

Historical Background

Efforts to develop some version of affirmative action for India's "untouchables" and depressed classes began in various parts of British India during the nineteenth century. After India became independent in 1947, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, spokesperson for India's "untouchables" and an architect of India's Constitution, made certain that the Constitution abolished "untouchability" and provided political and economic benefits for "scheduled castes"

and "scheduled tribes." India's Constitution also authorized the state to make special provisions "for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens."

Since 1936, official lists ("schedules") had existed of India's castes and tribes that occupied a "degraded position in the Hindu social scheme." However, no official lists existed of India's "backward classes," that is, poor or otherwise disadvantaged groups that did not occupy a "degraded position in the Hindu social scheme." To address this deficiency, on 29 January 1953 the president of India appointed India's first Backward Classes Commission under Chairman Kaka Kalelkar. On 31 March 1955 the Kalelkar Commission submitted its report, including a list of 2,399 "backward" groups, 837 of which were considered "most backward," using caste as the major evidence of backwardness. The central government, fearing that the report's "caste test" would delay the ultimate creation of a casteless, classless society in India, rejected the recommendations of the Kalelkar Commission. From then until 1977, when the Janata

Party won India's national elections, the issue of determining nationwide criteria for "backward classes" remained effectively dormant.

Procedures and Recommendations

The Mandal Commission developed eleven indicators of social, educational, and economic backwardness. One indicator was being considered backward by other castes or classes. Other indicators included depending mainly on manual labor for livelihood and having an average value of family assets at least 25 percent below the state average. In addition to identifying backward classes among Hindus, the Mandal Commission identified backward classes among non-Hindus (e.g., Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists) if they had belonged to "untouchable" castes before they converted to a non-Hindu religion, or if Hindu castes with the same occupational names, such as *dhobi* (launderer), *lobar* (iron worker), *nai* (barber), or *teli* (oil presser), were considered backward.

In February 1980 the Mandal Commission conducted a nationwide socioeconomic field survey in which it gathered interview data from two villages and one urban block in 405 of the nation's 406 districts. The field survey data, combined with information from the 1961 census, various states' lists of their backward classes, and personal knowledge of Commission members and others, enabled the Mandal Commission to generate an all-India "other backward classes" (OBC) list of 3,743 castes and a more-underprivileged "depressed backward classes" list of 2,108 castes.

The Mandal Commission concluded that India's population consisted of approximately 16 percent non-Hindus, 17.5 percent Brahmans and "forward castes," 44 percent "other backward classes," and 22.5 percent scheduled castes and tribes. However, since the 16 percent non-Hindus presumably included approximately the same proportion of "other backward classes" as did the Hindus (i.e., another 8%), the total proportion of "other backward classes" (Hindu and non-Hindu) came to 52 percent (44% + 8%) of India's population.

The Mandal Commission would have recommended that 52 percent of central government posts be reserved for OBCs. However, the Supreme Court had already ruled that the total proportion of reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution should be below 50 percent. Since the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes already accounted for 22.5 percent of India's population, only a little more than 27 percent of government posts could be reserved for backward classes without exceeding the below-50 percent limit. The Mandal Commission therefore recommended that 27 percent of central

and state government jobs should be reserved for OBCs, and that the 27 percent figure should be applied to other "compensatory discrimination" or "compensatory protection" benefits, including those provided by universities and affiliated colleges.

On 7 August 1990 Prime Minister V. P. Singh, of the National Front coalition, announced to Parliament that he would implement the Mandal Commission's recommendations. Violent objections ensued, especially in northern India among the upper castes, who feared the commission's recommendations would reduce their access to higher education. Southern Indian responses to Prime Minister Singh's announcement were considerably milder. In several southern states the proportions of backward classes combined with scheduled castes and scheduled tribes had already approached 50 percent prior to the Mandal Commission's recommendations.

On 16 November 1992 the Supreme Court upheld the Mandal Commission's 27 percent quota for backward classes, as well as the principle that the combined scheduled-caste, scheduled-tribe, and backward-class beneficiaries should not exceed 50 percent of India's population. The Supreme Court also ruled that "caste" could be used to identify "backward classes" on condition the caste was socially backward as a whole, and that the "creamy layer" of the backward classes could not receive backward-class benefits. The "creamy layer" included children of constitutional office holders, class I and class II officers, professionals, owners of large agricultural farms, and those with annual incomes of over 100,000 rupees. In September 1993 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, of the Congress Party, announced that he was prepared to implement the Mandal Commission recommendations. This time there was little public resistance.

Joseph W. Elder

See also **Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; Caste System; Dalits; Scheduled Tribes**

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MANGESHKAR, LATA (1929–), popular Indian vocalist. India's greatest Bollywood "playback" singer, Lata Mangeshkar's voice is known to over four generations of Indian film fans, as she has lent her voice to countless screen heroines, enhancing the impact of their portrayals through her songs. Mangeshkar's home state is Goa, which has been home to many talented musicians, but she was born in Indore in Madhya Pradesh. Her father, Dinanath Mangeshkar, was a leading actor-singer of his generation. He owned a theater company, which staged musicals throughout the former Bombay Presidency. When Dinanath heard Lata correcting one of his students, who was not singing a phrase correctly, and also humming perfectly in tune with the *sarangi*, he decided to give her lessons. His life, however, was cut short by alcoholism.

Mangeshkar first appeared as a child actress in a few films. Her first song was for a Marathi film, *Kiti Hasal?*. Her first Hindi song, for the film *Aap ki Sewame*, was recorded in 1947. Since then, she has sung for over 200 music directors, 300 lyricists, and has done voice-overs for 100 male and 61 female performers. Mangeshkar had to struggle in the initial phase of her career, but by 1948 she became established as a "playback" singer, creating voice-overs for films, and soon rose to prominence.

Mangeshkar studied classical music under Aman Ali Khan of the Bhendi Bazar *gharana*. She also received guidance from Amanat Khan and Tulsidas Sharma and the composers Ghulam Hyder and Anil Biswas. Before her, the vocalist Noorjehan was the most sought-after "playback" singer. Noorjehan left for Pakistan, however, paving the way for Mangeshkar's rise, under the influence of Kundanlal Saigal. Her early songs reflect Noorjehan's vocal style, but Mangeshkar soon developed her own unique style.

Mangeshkar's voice is supple and velvety, its mellifluous quality enriching the lyrics of her songs. She is one of India's very few multilingual singers. Her most popular songs were from films made between 1947 and 1962, considered the golden age of Hindi film music. With melodies relegated to the background in later years, the quality of Indian movie music suffered an inevitable decline. Mangeshkar was awarded India's highest civilian honor, and the president of India nominated her as a member of Rajya Sabha, the upper house of India's Parliament.

Amarendra Dhaneswar

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MANIPUR A state in northeast India, Manipur has an area of 8,628 square miles (22,347 sq. km), and its population in 2001 was 2,388,634. Its capital is Imphal. Most of its people speak Manipuri, a Tibeto-Burman language. The name of the state means "jeweled place," and Manipur has been called the "jewel of India" because of the beauty of its green valleys and deep blue lakes, set on a highland plateau surrounded by jungle-covered hills that rise to elevations of 8,500 feet (2,590 m). Manipur, which has long been an integral part of India's history and culture, is mentioned in the epic Mahābhārata, the Purāṇas, and ancient Chinese texts. The game of polo, called *sogol kangiei* in Manipuri, is believed to have originated there. Manipuri dances, including its famous *ras lila*, are together considered one of the six major dance traditions of South Asia. It was also the site of bitter fighting against Japanese forces during World War II.

Manipuri polity has historically been controlled by the majority Hindu Meitei people. Christian Nagas (25%) and Kukis (15%) and Muslim Pangals (7%) make up most of the remainder of the population. Ethnic rivalry, recurrent patricide and fratricide among its former traditional rulers, and their predilection for waging war with the powerful neighboring kingdom of Burma ensured that premodern Manipur was continually subject to threats both internal and external. Burmese forces occupied Manipur in 1819 until the Anglo-Burmese War of 1826 forced the invaders to waive their claims to the region. This step saved Manipur from certain absorption into the Burmese state, but also established a precedent for British control. What remained of its independence withered away after a series of assassinations, self-interested regents, and popular rebellions led the British government of India to repeatedly intervene in Manipuri affairs, usually at the behest of the ruling prince. The last of these debacles led to the Anglo-Manipuri War of 1891 and the formal assumption of British paramountcy in August of that year. Subsequent attempts by the British to force the pace of modernization in the state strained political relations between the increasingly Christian Naga and traditional Hindu Meitei populations. It also poisoned center-state relations, which were further exacerbated in 1949, when Manipur was compelled to merge with newly independent India under unfavorable terms, which included the cession of the Kubaw Valley to Burma (present-day Myanmar). These tensions persisted after Manipur became a Union Territory in 1956 and a state on 21 January 1972, and increased thereafter due to political corruption and poorly conceived development policies emanating from Delhi, such as a *panchayati* reform program that acted to exclude women, long a force in modern Manipuri politics and society.

The early 1960s witnessed the emergence of an ethnically exclusive Meitei nationalist movement, which opposed what they declared to be the Indian occupation of their land. A decade later, Naga political aspirations across the Northeast region of India included the incorporation of Naga districts in Manipur and elsewhere into a sovereign state of Nagaland. This angered the Meitei population, but also attracted the wrath of the government of India. In 1980, in an effort to quash any secessionist ideas, the Indian authorities evoked the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 in support of counterinsurgency operations across the entire state. These operations not only added fuel to existing secessionist fires, but also sparked demand for an independent Kuki homeland. Since the mid-1980s, several of these competing movements joined to form the Manipuri People's Liberation Army (PLA) and other umbrella groups, though its members were and remain chiefly united only in their desire to break free of Indian control and act against the migration of Muslims and others into the state from Bangladesh and elsewhere.

However, continued malfeasance in the management of development funds and the brutality of the paramilitary Assam Rifles have helped to sustain these otherwise hopelessly splintered independence movements. All sections of the population were enraged at the Assam Rifles' arrest, torture, and murder of a thirty-two-year-old woman activist, Thangjam Manorama, on 11 July 2004. In response, the state government has sought to nullify the operation of the Armed Forces Act and has demanded that the Assam Rifles be withdrawn. Long-term unrest in the state has opened the door to drug lords, whose trade in heroin and other narcotics operates freely within this chaotic political environment.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Burma; Ethnic Conflict; Insurgency and Terrorism; Nagas and Nagaland**

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MANIPURI. *See* **Dance Forms.**

MANSABDARI SYSTEM. *See* **Akbar; Aurangzeb; History and Historiography.**

MANTRA. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma).**


MANU, LAWS OF. *See* **Dharma Shāstra.**

MARITIME COMMERCE, 1750–1947 India was an open economy for most of this period as controls over external transactions were confined to the two world wars and their aftermath, and the 1930s depression. Yet even at its height, India's foreign trade accounted only for a small proportion (15–17 percent) of its estimated national income. However, from the late nineteenth century, foreign trade affected the economy and people's livelihoods disproportionately because of its impact on money supply, and the colonial government's determination to collect India's external obligations, or the notorious "home charges," at any cost.

The story of India's foreign trade from 1750 to 1947 may be described most simply as its transformation from an exporter of fine handicraft manufactures, for which India was traditionally known, to an exporter of raw materials and an importer of cloth and other industrial manufactures. This transformation took place chiefly between 1815 and the 1870s. In the preceding decades India's external trade largely followed traditional patterns, while from the 1880s it resumed exporting manufactures in modest quantities. Changes in the external and domestic environments and the organization and financing of Indian trade also influenced the volume, composition, and structure of trade, and its overall impact on the economy.

1750–1815

Until the nineteenth century, India's great coastal trading regions—Bengal, the Coromandel coast, the Malabar coast, and Gujarat—were major nodes in a worldwide trading and financing network with dense concentrations in other parts of Asia. This network attracted diverse participants, from the large European companies to numerous indigenous traders, some of whose operations were equally diverse. Our knowledge of these networks and their activities remains incomplete, but it is clear that cotton textiles were the principal Indian export during this period. In 1811–1812 they accounted for a third of the estimated value of India's



Nineteenth-Century Print of Steam Vessel. The steam pilot vessel, the *Lady Fraser*, anchored in the Hoogly River. From 1871 to 1947, at the height of colonial rule, India's foreign trade witnessed a slow structural shift, with the staple exports of the past, such as opium and indigo, replaced by new commodities. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

exports, followed by opium (about a quarter) and indigo (about a fifth). The share of cotton cloth would have been greater in earlier decades.

Indian trade was also geographically well distributed. Even for Bengal, where the British East India Company was predominant, the American share in imports was 23 percent between 1799 and 1804, exceeding by a small margin the share of imports recorded as having been shipped from London. In the mid- to late 1790s, when the American share was only 13 percent, imports from London made up only a fifth of Bengal's total imports, with other Asian ports accounting for over half. Though a bigger share of Bengal's exports went to Britain (about 35–40 percent) during the late 1790s and early 1800s, America and other ports, including those in Asia, accounted for 55 to 60 percent of the wares leaving the region.

The organization and financing of India's overseas trade during these decades witnessed the growing political and trading ascendancy of the British East India

Company and the eclipse of all other European trading companies. Yet as late as 1790, trade carried or licensed by the British East India Company accounted for only about 40 percent of India's commerce with Europe. The East India Company's acquisition of the revenues of Bengal, after which its surpluses and servants' private profits displaced imports of bullion as the means to pay for Indian exports, marked a more profound transformation.

1815–1870

Striking evidence of the structural transformation of Indian exports during this period is offered by the sharp drop in the share of cotton textiles from about one-third in 1811 to less than 15 percent in 1815. By the 1870s this proportion had fallen below 3 percent. Raw cotton, on the other hand, expanded its share from about 5 percent in 1811 to 35 percent in 1870, the rise being particularly steep in the 1860s because of the U.S. Civil War. Indigo remained an important export in the first half of this period. Opium exports, principally to China, gained

ground rapidly after the 1820s and emerged as India's largest single export by the mid-1830s. Britain's opium war with China further confirmed this status and helped maintain it through the next two decades.

The transformation of India's trading basket was mirrored in the composition of its imports. The share of cotton textiles rose from around 5 to 10 percent in 1820 to nearly 50 percent in 1870. Cotton twist and yarn was another major import, its share rising to about 13 percent by the 1870s as India's craft-weaving sector adapted to the challenge of industrial competition by switching to cheaper imported inputs.

The reversal of the trading relationship between India and Britain since 1815 was starkly reflected in the imbalance that developed between the sources of India's imports and the destinations of its exports. By the 1820s Britain's share of Indian imports had risen to over 60 percent. By 1870 this proportion stood at 80 percent. However, Britain now accounted for only about 45 percent of India's exports. India therefore ran a substantial trade deficit with Britain. However, it continued to run substantial trade surpluses overall. Only a small part of this was now liquidated by imports of treasure, the larger part (for example, more than 70 percent in 1828) being used to finance unilateral transfers to Britain. Until 1833 the latter were mainly the profits of the East India Company and private remittances of its officials. Thereafter, unilateral transfers comprised the British "home charges" that included, apart from private remittances by British officials and traders, service transfers, interest payments on railway and other loans from the 1860s, and British civil and military pensions.

Large opium exports to China were a major feature of Indian trade from 12 million rupees in 1820 to 143 million rupees in 1880 and transforming China into India's second-largest overseas customer. Britain, however, ran a large deficit with China because of its enormous imports of tea and silk. The opium trade thus formed the third side of the triangular pattern of settlements that enabled Britain in one stroke, as it were, to collect its tribute from India and liquidate its deficit with China.

1871–1947

During these decades India's trade witnessed a slow structural shift. Some staple exports of the past, such as opium and indigo, were replaced by new commodities, mainly raw jute, tea, and wheat, the last two each accounting for 10 percent of India's exports on the eve of World War II. A depreciating rupee, tied to silver until 1893, also stimulated the export of manufactures such as jute fabrics and cotton yarn and cloth. Assisted by the wartime disruption of Britain's staple export trade and

the trade boom of the mid-1920s, exports of cotton cloth and jute goods expanded to account together for about 30 percent of Indian exports in the mid-1920s. Both of these exports, however, were hit hard by the global depression, during which primary or semiprocessed exports, such as raw cotton, hides and skins, seeds, and tea, reclaimed their former preeminence. Domestic industrialization had a more enduring effect, however, on the composition of imports. The share of cotton cloth declined steadily from a peak of 47 percent in 1871 to about 13 percent by the mid-1930s. Machinery also accounted for a growing share of imports on the eve of World War II.

Britain's importance to India's external trade declined steadily in the half century after 1871, its share of imports falling from 85 percent to 61 percent between these dates, before plummeting to 37 percent in 1939. Britain's share of Indian exports fell from 54 percent to 24 percent between 1871 and 1931. Britain's decline was offset by the rise of Japan and the United States as India's trade partners during the interwar years.

Trade and economic transformation. Between the 1870s and the 1940s, a modern global economy had emerged, which then suffered disruption and collapse in the wake of World War I and during the interwar depression. These decades witnessed the industrial transformation of many countries, notably the United States and Japan. India's economic and trading transformation was unimpressive, however, even by comparison with countries such as Australia and Brazil.

Viewed from the perspective of external trade and economic relations, India's lack of freedom to adopt tariffs until 1919, and restricted freedom thereafter, and Britain's enduring control of short-term macroeconomic instruments such as the exchange rate must count as key factors. The institutional transformation of the link between foreign trade, the monetary system, and the domestic economy after 1900, when remittance instruments sold in London replaced shipments of precious metals as the principal means of financing Indian trade, also retarded the development of India's financial system. The control that Britain thereby came to exercise over metallic flows to India was used to relieve the former's external financial needs in the 1920s and the 1930s, at the expense of growth and incomes in India. India's large gold exports in the 1930s, arising from rural economic distress, were viewed by economist John Maynard Keynes as a major factor in promoting Britain's swift recovery from the depression, while India's economy languished deeper in the slump.

G. Balachandran

See also **Trade Policy, 1800–1947**

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MARRIAGE LAWS. *See* Caste System; Dharma Shāstra; Judicial System, Modern.

MATHEMATICS. *See* Āryabhatīya; Astronomy.

MATHURA. *See* Krishna in Indian Art; Vishnu and Avatāras.


MAURYAN EMPIRE Arising in the kingdom of Magadha, the Mauryan empire (321–185 B.C.), with its capital Pataliputra (modern Patna), was the first imperial polity in South Asia. Under the able leadership of its founder, Chandragupta Maurya (r. 321–297 B.C.), and his successors Bindusāra (r. 297–272 B.C.) and Ashoka (r. 268–231 B.C.), the empire integrated several key regions of the subcontinent into a loosely structured but tightly drawn imperial network, and bequeathed a significant historical legacy to the subcontinent's history. The sources of Mauryan history include archaeological remains, Brahmanical and Buddhist textual sources, foreign travel accounts, and most importantly, the public edicts of Ashoka.

By the middle of first millennium B.C., a number of small polities called *mahājanapadas* had grown up along the Ganges. The more powerful of these at the time—the kingdoms of Kashi, Koshala, and Magadha, and the more distant Vriji confederation—were clustered in the middle Gangetic Plain, which had seen extensive development in agriculture, intensive urbanization, and the rise of new religious movements like Buddhism and Jainism. By the beginning of the fifth century B.C., Magadha had gained the upper hand over its rivals through the leadership of the raja (king) Bimbisāra, whose line was eventually displaced by the Nanda dynasty at the beginning in the fourth century B.C. Nanda imperial ambitions might have brought them into conflict with the generals of Alexander the Great, who conquered the eastern provinces of the Achaemenid empire in northwestern

India, but his usurpation by Chandragupta Maurya in 321 B.C. brought a swift end to Nanda rule.

With the Gangetic Plain largely under his dominion, Chandragupta pursued campaigns in central India and the northwest, where by the end of the fourth century B.C. he had gained territory from a Greek successor state ruled by Seleucus Nicator. An envoy of Seleucus, Megasthenes, visited the Mauryan empire and its capital at Pataliputra and left an account of it called *Indika*. Toward the end of his life, Chandragupta is said to have embraced the Jain faith, abdicated the throne, and migrated to Sravana Belgola in present-day Karnataka, where he fasted to death in Jain tradition. The events of the reign of Chandragupta's son, Bindusāra, are uncertain, but by the time that Ashoka inherited the kingdom in 268 B.C., the empire was considerably expanded. Knowledge of Ashoka's reign is drawn from a series of public edicts, which reveal the specific policies and vision of the emperor, and provide crucial information about Mauryan society. The edicts of the earlier half of his reign were carved on rock surfaces and distributed widely through the empire, while those toward the end were issued mostly in its Gangetic heartland and were inscribed on polished sandstone pillars, each surmounted with a finely carved animal capital. Most of the inscriptions were issued in the Prakrit language written in Brahmi script, but in the northwest some have been found in Greek and Aramaic, written in the Kharoshti script used in Iran. Ashoka extended the influence of the empire even farther than his forefathers, with the southernmost limits of his inscriptions being found in the lower Deccan. Sometime around 260 B.C., Ashoka conquered the region of Kalinga (present-day Orissa). The devastation wrought by his campaign so impressed him that he publicly expressed remorse in his thirteenth rock edict. Judging from this edict, Ashoka seems to have curtailed further wars of expansion and maintained cordial relations with neighboring polities, both within the subcontinent and beyond.

Many of Ashoka's edicts have a distinctly ethical dimension—enjoining his subjects to honor elders, show consideration to menials, refrain from hurting living beings, avoid needless ceremony, and most of all, follow *dharmā* (right action, teaching). Many of these exhortations bear a distinctively Buddhist stamp, and indeed, Ashoka considered himself a lay convert to the faith and gave generously to its institutions. Perhaps as a concession to these principles, he deterred the performance of Vedic sacrifices that involved the killing of animals. In the Buddhist tradition, he became a legendary figure, being viewed as the paradigmatic Buddhist emperor, or *cakravartin*. The degree to which he actually propagated Buddhist doctrine, however, remains an open question,



and it would seem that the *dharmā* of his edicts did not refer to Buddhist doctrine as such but had a more general ethical sense. Yet the connection between Ashoka and Buddhism is undeniable, and it remains a fact that Buddhism grew into a powerful and influential religion, with imperial and universal ambitions, during the Mauryan period.

Regular agricultural revenues from the Gangetic heartland provided the basic wealth of the Mauryan empire, and punch-marked coins circulated as currency in certain sectors of the economy. Urban life continued to be important, with manufacturing and commerce forming an important source of individual and state wealth. Beyond inscriptions, another source used by

scholars to understand the structure and functioning of the Mauryan empire is the *Artha Shāstra*, a treatise on government attributed to Chanakya (Kautilya), minister of Chandragupta. While the existing text was probably not compiled in Mauryan times, certain parts may be as early, and thus provide a normative perspective on Mauryan society and polity. Ashoka's edicts and the *Artha Shāstra*, read together, confirm that a set of regularized ministerial offices, service cadre, judges, and revenue assessors formed the core of the state apparatus. The inscriptions themselves mark the first widespread use of written records (after the undeciphered Indus Valley script). Assessing the structure of Mauryan polity from the evidence is more difficult. Until recently, historians tended to portray the Mauryan empire as a centrally organized, uniformly administered, bureaucratic polity. Recent work has suggested, however, that such an image, driven by modern theories of state, may not be correct. It has been argued that the Mauryan empire should be seen as a metropolitan hub (Magadha) linked to a number of core and peripheral "nodes." Cores and peripheries were not distinguished by geographical location, but by socioeconomic articulation. Core areas, typically represented by clusters of Ashokan inscriptions, were regions where the metropole significantly influenced local economy and society, while peripheral areas, less populated and developed, were largely incorporated for revenue extraction alone. Thus the empire was composed of a network of different local economies and social structures, linked through a relatively simple, but horizontal, imperial system. Although this system disintegrated not long after Ashoka's death in 231 B.C., the Mauryan empire—with its innovations in the technology of rule and its integration of economic networks—had a lasting effect on early India, acting as a catalyst for further economic and political development in many of the empire's core and peripheral regions.

Daud Ali

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MEDIA With a population of over 1 billion, speaking eighteen officially recognized Indian languages and almost two hundred minor languages, it is not surprising that India has one of the largest media in the world. As literacy has increased from about 20 percent at the time of independence in 1947 to over 65 percent in 2005, the print media has expanded enormously to keep pace with rising literacy. Literacy in India is defined as the ability to read and understand a simple newspaper, and presumably a large portion of the adult literate population read the English or vernacular press. In 1950 there were 214 daily newspapers, with 44 in English and the rest in Indian languages. In 1990 the number of daily newspapers was 2,856, with 209 in English and 2,647 in indigenous languages. By 1993 India had 35,595 newspapers—of which 3,805 were dailies—and other periodicals. The audio-visual media, largely run by the government until liberalization in the 1990s, had long reached the hundreds of millions of illiterate people in the countryside. Large projected television screens were set up in earlier decades in the villages of India to provide mass access to the rural population.

Except for a brief period during the "National Emergency" of 1975–1977 declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the private Indian media has been free and independent, providing unshackled news and incisive analyses without fear of government retribution. Some of its limitations are not unlike those in Western countries, where corporations control the stock of the news media and where editors may use some discretion to avoid alienating corporate owners.

Newspapers

English-language newspapers. The pioneering English-language newspapers were started by the British in Bengal during the time of the British East India Company in the eighteenth century. The first of these was the *Bengal Gazette* in 1780, which mainly carried the news and social affairs of the British in Bengal. This was soon followed by the *India Gazette* and the *Calcutta Gazette*. As the empire took root in Madras and Bombay, the *Madras Courier* was published in 1785 and the *Bombay Herald* in 1789. The *Bengal Gazette*, the *Madras Courier*, and the *Bombay Herald* mainly carried official news of the British Raj in the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay presidencies. Some competition arose in Madras with the start of the *Madras Gazette* and the *India Herald*.

The establishment of the mainstream English-language Indian newspapers began from the mid-nineteenth century, founded by resident English entrepreneurs. *The Times of India* of Mumbai (Bombay) (initially the *Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce*) is the oldest of these,

founded in 1838. The *Times of India* is published by India's largest media group, Bennett, Coleman and Company, now owned by an Indian conglomerate. It is published concurrently from six cities and has a circulation of about 650,000. Known as the Times Group, the company also publishes the *Economic Times*, *Navbharat Times* (in Hindi), and the *Maharashtra Times* (in Marathi).

The *Statesman* of Kolkata (Calcutta) began publication in 1875. It was the successor to *The Englishman*, founded in Calcutta in 1811. Until independence, it was owned and run by the British. The *Statesman* has been considered among the most independent and hard-hitting of the English-language daily newspapers of India. It was critical of the British during British rule, and has been highly critical of Indian governments, especially the previous Hindu nationalist government of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The *Hindu*, established in 1878 in Chennai (Madras), has arguably made claims to being the best of the English-language dailies in terms of the quality of its reporting and analyses. It claims to have a shared readership of 3 million. Its daily circulation is about 500,000.

The *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi, the first major newspaper that was not initiated by the British, was begun by a pioneering Indian newsman, Pothan Joseph, as the flagship newspaper of the Indian National Congress during the independence struggle. The *Hindustan* became its Hindi language partner later. Joseph subsequently established the *Dawn* in Karachi for the new state of Pakistan. He returned to India and published the *Deccan Herald* in Bangalore. The most widely distributed newspaper in India is the *Indian Express*, which has a daily circulation of 520,000 and is published in seventeen cities. There are also another half dozen English-language daily newspapers with circulations between 134,000 and 477,000, all competitive with one another.

Before independence, the content of the English-language newspapers was addressed to British residents and the rising English-speaking Indian elite. Today, these English-language print media are a highly secular and modern group of newspapers, their quality being comparable to the best in the Western world. They shape the attitudes of the Indian elite and the direction of Indian government policies.

Indian-language newspapers. The many Indian-language newspapers have large circulations, though usually on a statewide or citywide basis. With a daily circulation of 673,000, the Malayalam-language *Malayala Manorama* from Kerala has the largest circulation of any newspaper, but is read mainly in Kerala and its Malayalam-speaking diaspora. The Kerala population of 25 million is nearly 100 percent literate, hence the high readership. On the other hand, the Hindi-language *Dainik Jagran* has a

circulation of 580,000, circulating mainly in Uttar Pradesh, which has a population of 140 million but a literacy rate of under 50 percent, and in New Delhi with a population of 8 million. The *Punjab Kesari* in Hindi sells in Punjab and New Delhi, with a daily circulation of 562,000. The *Anandabazar Patrika*, published in Kolkata in Bengali, has a daily circulation of 435,000. There are several smaller publications throughout India, the result of different voices demanding to be heard, and of Indian journalistic entrepreneurship. The combined circulation of India's newspapers and periodicals is more than 60 million, published daily in more than 90 languages.

Overall, there are four major publishing groups in India, each of which controls national and regional English-language and vernacular publications: the Times of India Group, the Indian Express Group, the Hindustan Times Group, and the Anandabazar Patrika Group.

News Agencies

Press Trust of India (PTI) and United News of India (UNI) are the two primary Indian news agencies. The former was created after it took over the operations of the Associated Press of India and the Indian operations of Reuters soon after independence in 1947. PTI is a non-profit cooperative of the Indian newspapers. UNI began its operations in 1961, though it was registered as a company in 1959. India has more than forty domestic news agencies, many with their own foreign correspondents. Many are the appendages of major newspapers, such as the Express News Service, the Times of India News Service, and the Hindustan Times News Service.

Audio-Visual Media

Until socialism was ended and economic liberalization policies were initiated in the early 1990s, the audio-visual media was owned and run by the government of India's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. They included the national television network (Doordarshan) and the radio network, known as All-India Radio in English and Akashvani in Hindi. Their news reporting customarily presented the government's point of view. Complaints that these media supported the ruling government's candidates against opposition candidates during elections led to the introduction of the Indian Broadcasting Act in Parliament in 1990. The bill provided for the establishment of an autonomous corporation to run Doordarshan and All-India Radio. The corporation was to operate under a board of governors, in charge of appointments and policy, and a broadcasting council to respond to complaints. However, real change came in the early 1990s when television broadcasts were transmitted via satellite, effectively limiting the pro-government bias of the government-controlled electronic

media. Today, BBC, CNN, CNBC, Pakistan TV, and other foreign television channels may be received in India.

In 1993 about 169 million people were estimated to have watched Indian television each week, and by 1994 it was reported that there were some 47 million households with televisions. There also is a growing selection of satellite transmission and cable services available. Star TV began broadcasting via satellite, bringing to India an array of Western television shows. Zee TV entered the market, offering competition to Star TV, whose prospects were then bolstered by billionaire Rupert Murdoch, who acquired the network in July 1993.

In response to international competition, Doordarshan started five new channels in 1993 and transformed its fare to more controversial news shows, soap operas, and coverage of high fashion. But only the new Metro channel of Doordarshan, which carries MTV music videos and other popular shows, survived in the face of public demands for more exciting Western fare.

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MEDICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION India has multiple medical systems, including Āyurvedic, homeopathic, allopathic, and *unani*; the most widely practiced and accepted is the allopathic medical system. After finishing high school, students go straight into medical school, based on their achievement in high school and their rank on the medical college entrance exam. There are two main types of medical schools, state medical schools and federal schools; the state schools require residence within the state in order to be admitted. Recently, schools owned by trusts have developed, and admission to these schools is based on high school performance and the size of a monetary donation to the school.

The course leading to a degree in medicine is five and a half years long, which includes four and a half years of didactic training and one year of compulsory rotating internship in various major disciplines, as compared to United States, where students are admitted for four years

of medical school after finishing undergraduate work. A significant number of Indian students, after receiving their bachelor's degree in medicine and surgery (M.B.B.S.), continue on to specialized training in their fields of interest. This training may vary from three to four years in length, with the end result being a doctorate of medicine (M.D.) or masters of surgery (M.S.), depending on the field of specialization. A small number of the physicians pursue further studies to obtain doctorate of medicine (D.M.) or master of churgery (M.Ch.) in a subspecialty of their choice, which may require another two to three years of training.

Medical training in India is predominantly based on the European system of education, which includes not only didactic lectures but also time spent with patients to interpret the physical symptoms and signs in a diagnostic fashion, despite limited resources for expensive laboratory and radiological studies. Teachers who train the prospective doctors must adhere to the very strict requirements laid down by the Medical Council of India.

India has 229 recognized medical schools, and 25,000 students pass through these colleges every year. After completing the compulsory rotating internship, these graduates are required to be registered with the State Medical Council or the Medical Council of India in order to practice in the country.

The science of healing the suffering through natural herbs is the basic principle of Āyurvedic medicine. Founded around 5000 B.C., Āyurvedic medicine is one of the oldest systems still in practice today. The physicians who practice Āyurvedic medicine are called *vaidyas*. Āyurveda is considered the "science of life," and its goal is physical, mental, social, and spiritual well-being. In 1916 the government of India decided to develop this ancient and indigenous system on a scientific basis and to increase its usefulness. The *vaidyas* are trained in special medical schools dedicated to this traditional form of medicine; their education is five and a half years long. After the completion of this study, the students are awarded a bachelor of Āyurvedic medicine and surgery (B.A.M.S.). There are 196 Āyurvedic medical colleges in India that provide not only a bachelor's education but postgraduate education as well.

Another system of medicine practiced in India is *unani* medicine. It was founded by the great Greek philosopher and physician Hippocrates (460–377 B.C.) and it was introduced to India in A.D. 1351 by the Arabs. It is based on the principles of earth, air, water, and fire, all of which have different temperaments—cold, hot, wet, and dry. A new temperament comes into existence after the mixture and interaction of these four elements along the simple and compound organs of the body. This system of medicine

believes in the promotion of health based on six essentials: atmospheric air, drink and food, sleep and wakefulness, excretion and retention, physical activity and rest, and mental activity and rest. The diseases are diagnosed with the help of a pulse and physical exam of urine and/or stools. The practitioners of this system of medicine are called *bakims*. India has thirty-three *unani* colleges and 19,685 practicing *unani* doctors. There are 177 hospitals dedicated to *unani* medicine, with a total bed count of 3,892.

The German physician Dr. Samuel Hahnemann founded the principles of India's fourth system of medicine, homeopathy, two hundred years ago. Its roots originate in the Greek words *bomoi*s (minute dose) and *patbos* (suffering). It is based on the "law of cure," which claims that a compound given in large quantities to normal person may cause symptoms of a disease, but that same compound in minute amounts to an afflicted person may result in the cure of that disease. This minute dose of the compound acts as a triggering agent to stimulate and strengthen the existing defense mechanisms of the body. Compared to other systems of medicine, treatment is individualized under the homeopathic system and is unique to each person with the same disease. Homeopathy was brought to India in 1878, and by 2005 there were 124 five-year homeopathic medical schools in India. Nineteen of these colleges are maintained by the state and the others are privately owned. After the completion of graduate or postgraduate work, the student receives a bachelor of homeopathic medicine (B.H.M.S.) or a doctorate of homeopathic medicine (D.H.M.S.).

The Central Council of Indian Medicine oversees the standards of education and its practice in all of India's systems of medicine. A Central Council of Research has also been established, dedicated to all the disciplines, to promote advancement.

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See also **Health Care**

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MEDICINE. See *Āyurveda*.

MEDIEVAL TEMPLE KINGDOMS The nearly eight-hundred-year span from the fall of the Gupta empire to the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in the beginning of the thirteenth century has been a period of intense debate among historians of India. The sources for this period are extensive, comprising thousands of stone and copper plate inscriptions issued by scores of royal families and local lords; large numbers of religious, literary, and legal texts in both Sanskrit and regional languages; travelers' accounts in Arabic and Chinese; coins, monuments, and archaeological remains. In British colonial times, this period was judged to be one of "Hindu weakness," characterized by a bewildering array of petty dynastic houses engaged in constant internecine warfare—what one scholar called the "mutually repellent molecules" of Indian polity when not checked by a superior power. Until as late as the 1950s, the major concern of historians was simply to order the copious dynastic records into some sort of reliable political chronology. Since then, a number of more sophisticated cultural and social history perspectives have emerged.

One way to make sense of the diplomatic history of the royal houses of this period is the celebrated theory of the *rājamandala*, or "circle of kings," set out in the *Artha Shāstra*. According to this idea, the kingdoms of the subcontinent formed a great hierarchy of antagonisms and alliances, imagined as a vast set of concentric circles, at the center of which stood the ambitious king. A king seeking imperial status, signified by taking titles like *mahārājādbirāja* ("Great King over Kings"), sought to expand his sphere of influence by conducting wars of submission against contiguous kingdoms and by seeking alliance with those beyond their borders. While as a theory the *rājamandala* may explain the almost predictable diplomatic behaviors of kings during this period, it fails to capture the complexity of political relations on the ground. First, there was always more than one king (often there were several) who sought imperial status through such policies. This made the *rājamandala* in practice a highly complex, unstable, and multifocal structure. Second, the *rājamandala* was a theory of diplomacy rather than a theory of state. It tells us very little, in other words, about the structure and functioning of polity. All of the inscriptional evidence suggests that political conquest in these empires rarely entailed the direct annexation of territory; defeated kings were instead integrated into a loose imperial affiliative structure as underlords



Hoysaleswara Temple, Halebid. The height of Hoysalan (or Karnatic) architecture survives in the form of the ornately carved double-shrine Hoysaleswara Temple at Halebid, a city legendary for its former wealth and splendor. Laborers worked on its construction for some eighty years, beginning in 1121. The temple was never completed. CLAIRE ARNI.

(called *sāmantas*). They retained their ancestral territories and gained the protection of the imperial center, in return for tribute, military support, or service at court. Such imperial systems were most stable during periods of expansion and warfare, but tributary lords tended to assert their independence in times of either peace or imperial contraction.

As Gupta power in Gangetic and central India contracted at the beginning of the sixth century, a number of royal houses, some of whom had once been Gupta underlords, asserted independence and joined the Hūnas in vying for supremacy. Among these were the Maukharis of Kanauj, the Aulikāras of Mandasor, the Vardhanas of Sthānvīshvara, the Maitrakas of Valabhi, and the kings of Gauda, Vanga and Kāmarūpa. By the middle of the seventh century, the Vardhana king Hasha had annexed the neighboring kingdom of the Maukharis, with its prized city of the “Hump-backed Maiden,” or Kanyākubja (Kanauj), and pursued an aggressive policy eastward against Gauda. Southward, the Chalukyas of Badāmi established themselves as the most powerful kings of the

Deccan under the leadership of Pulakeshin II (r. 610–643), subduing many local kings like the Western Gangas, Kādambas, Bānas, and Alūpas—partly at the expense of the Pallava kings based farther south in Kānchi, who had earlier been dominant in the lower Deccan, but who from the sixth century were forced to turn southward for resources and allies. The Vardhanas of Kanauj, the Chalukyas of Badāmi, and the Pallavas of Kānchi thus formed three major foci in the overlapping hierarchies of the *rājamandala* system. This period set the pattern for the next six hundred years. By approximately 750, a new configuration had emerged, which saw three major imperial courts struggling for putative paramountcy: the Gurjara-Pratīhāras, an aristocratic clan with pastoral origins, who established a major empire from the city of Kanauj; the Rāshtrakūtas, a vassal house who defeated their overlords, the Chalukyas of Badāmi, in 757 to build a major empire in the Deccan and South India; and finally, the Pālas of Monghyr in eastern India, famous for their patronage of Buddhism, who rose to prominence in present-day Bihar and Bengal. Masudi, the Arab traveler who visited India in the tenth century,

recognized these kings as the most powerful in the subcontinent. Their fortunes varied, and though regionally based, they spent great energy and resources in pursuing transregional imperial projects, assisted by their underlords.

In the latter half of the tenth century, a new crop of powerful dynasties rose to prominence. In North India, the Pratihāra empire disintegrated into smaller kingdoms, some of whom claimed to be the “sons of kings,” or *raja-putras*—the ancestors of the famous rajputs of the Sultanate and Mughal periods. The more powerful among these were the Chahāmānas of Ajayameru, the Gāhadvālas of Kāshi, the Chandellas of Kalanjara, the Kalachuris of Tripurī, and the Paramāras of Dhārā. A king from the last of these families, Shīyaka II, destroyed the Rāshtrakūta capital Mānyakheta in 973, and not long afterward, a former Rāshtrakūta vassal established a Chalukya kingdom based in the northern Deccan at Kalyāni, claiming links with the earlier Chalukyas. In South India, the Cholas overthrew the Pallavas of Kanchi, then underlords of the Rāshtrakūtas, and under the illustrious leadership of Rajaraja Chola (r. 985–1016) defeated the Pāndyas of Madurai to establish an empire in the south powerful enough to make its presence felt in Southeast Asia. After the success of Turkish armies on the northern Indian plains at the end of the twelfth century, and the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi in the thirteenth, the political dynamics of northern India, and a century later of southern India as well, changed irreversibly.

The great majority of these kingdoms ascribed to the political ideologies, ritual programs, and historical worldviews of the theistic religions of Shaivism (the worship of Shiva) and Vaishnavism (the worship of Vishnu), as they were embodied in cosmological “ancient tales,” the Purāṇas, and ritual manuals called Āgamas and Saṃhitās. Though Shaivism and Vaishnavism had their origins in earlier times, it was during the post-Gupta period that they were transformed into powerful temple-based cults, gaining extensive royal patronage and dominating both rural and urban landscapes. This transformation was achieved in part by providing rulers with compelling new royal liturgies and imperial ideologies. The theistic cults largely dispensed with the older public Vedic fire-sacrifices like the *asvamedha*, or horse sacrifice, and placed image worship in temples at the center of both public and private ritual. Temple building became a major preoccupation of Hindu rulers after the Gupta period, and dynasties like the Pallavas of Kanchi, Chalukyas of Badāmi, the Rāshtrakūtas of Mānyakheta, and the Cholas of Tanjavur built spectacular imperial temples and endowed them with large numbers of tax-free land holdings. Inside those temples were ritually established icons of Hindu gods and goddesses that were endowed with juristic personalities. Worship was governed

by the ritual of *pūjā*, or “honoring.” Unlike the distant divinities of the Vedic pantheon, to whom men dispatched offerings through the fire oblation, theistic ritual was based on a radically “immanent” and “emanative” conception of the divine. Vishnu and Shiva as cosmic overlords were thought to take many forms, both in the heavens and on the earth, to create, protect, and even destroy the cosmos. This theology had many implications for medieval life, but at the level of polity, it allowed kings to claim partial divinity (typically as an embodiment of Vishnu, the solar protector). Moreover, it provided kings with a rich language of imperial power. If the vast hierarchy of divine and human agencies was continuous with and mirrored the world of men, then it is perhaps not surprising that the language of sovereignty, the vocabulary of affiliation, and sumptuary palace routines of kings and gods were largely identical and reinforced one another.

The rise of dynastic kingdoms and temple cults in early medieval India overlay more complex social processes. Chief among these was the expansion of what one historian has called “state society,” which saw the incorporation and transformation of relatively simple, clan- or kin-based societies into more economically specialized, socially differentiated, and ideologically elaborate social formations characterized by the existence of state apparati and an intellectual class largely freed from the strains of manual labor. The basis of these developments was an expanding agrarian economy—an expansion that saw tribal pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, and occasional agriculturalists transformed into settled, revenue-producing peasants. Historians have pointed out that the institution of the temple facilitated this long process of social and cultural integration by disseminating the values and ideologies of the elite (like devotion and submission to authority) among the lower orders as they were incorporated into caste society. Tribal and local gods were often absorbed into the prodigious pantheons of Vishnu and Shiva as lesser gods and local incarnations in the same way that tribal leaders could potentially convert their power into lordly status by taking on aristocratic norms. Despite these processes of dissemination and absorption, evidence suggests that the cultural change was multidirectional, as the persistence of tribal features in high caste pantheons and the spread of more egalitarian religious movements in the temple environment, which were hostile to landed interests, readily indicate.

Daud Ali

See also **Ashvamedha; Chola Dynasty; Guptan Empire; Harsha**

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MEDITATION. See **Yoga**.

MEGHALAYA The "abode of clouds," Meghalaya is the wettest state in India. Also known as the Meghalaya Plateau or the Shillong Plateau, it lies between 450 and nearly 6,000 feet (137–1,829 m) above sea level. In the east of the state are the Jaintia Hills; in the center, the West and East Khasi Hills; and in the west, the East and West Garo Hills. Over a dozen waterfalls grace the state, which is also subject to earthquakes; a major quake destroyed Shillong on 12 June 1897. In the west of the state in the South Garo Hills District is a vast tableland known as the "Land of Perpetual Winds," containing one of the richest areas of biodiversity in India. Known as the "Scotland of the East" for its resemblance to the Scottish Highlands, Meghalaya has one of the largest golf courses in Asia, the "Glen Eagle of the East," created in 1898. The capital, located in the east, is Shillong, 4,987 feet (1,520 m) above sea level, which is also the headquarters of a number of Indian military forces, including the Assam Rifles and the Eastern Air Command.

In the year 2000, the tribal Khasis, who call themselves Hynniewtrepsf (belonging to seven celestial families), and the tribal Jaintia made up 49 percent of the population of 2,175,000; the tribal Garos at 34 percent, Bengalis at 2.5 percent, and a variety of other ethnic groups, including Biharis, made up the rest of the population. Sixty-four percent of the population were Christian (most of the Khasis are Presbyterian or Roman Catholic, and the Garos are mostly Baptist), 17 percent animist, 15 percent Hindu, and 4 percent Muslim. The languages of the state are Khasi, Garo, and English. The tribals are said to have immigrated into the area before the common era and are of Mon-Khmer and Tibeto-Burman extraction. They are all matrilineal, and each tribe was formerly ruled by a raja. They practiced shifting cultivation. Rice cultivation continues to be the main agricultural occupation. Like all the tribals of the North-east region, they celebrate the stages of the year with colorful dance festivals, which celebrate holidays originating in animistic practices, including the sacrifice of chickens and goats.

The British incorporated Assam into Bengal in 1838. The British occupied the Garo Hills in 1872, and Shillong became a hill station with a number of churches and cathedrals and Christian schools. They established a tribal district council, and Shillong became the capital of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District. In 1874, when the province of Assam was created and became a Chief Commissioner's Province, Shillong became its capital. In 1946 the Khasi-Jaintia Association was formed to demand a federation of the Khasi states, the same year the Hills Union called for a Hill State, and the Garo National Conference wanted a district administration with full political autonomy. This was the beginning of tribal political consciousness. In 1954 Shillong was made the capital of the North-East Frontier Agency. A number of political parties, including the Eastern Indian Tribal Union (1954), the All-Party Hill Leaders Conference (1960), and the Hill States People's Democratic Party (1968), were created to demand a separate state and to defend various tribal languages and interests. Meghalaya became an autonomous state within Assam on 2 April 1970, and it was inaugurated as a state of the Indian Union on 21 January 1972.

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See also **Assam; Tribal Politics**

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MENON, V. K. KRISHNA (1896–1974), *Indian nationalist leader and politician*. Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon was a prominent Indian freedom fighter against British rule. With an intellectual orientation in common, Menon and Jawaharlal Nehru had forged a close friendship during the independence struggle. V. K. Krishna Menon was first appointed minister without portfolio (1952–1956) and then defense minister (April 1957–November 1962) in Prime Minister Nehru's government. During this time, Menon also served as leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations (UN; 1952–1953 and 1954–1962).

He first gained international prominence in 1957 for an eight-hour improvised speech at the United Nations Security Council in defense of India's position on Kashmir. As leader of the Indian delegation, he was prominent

in the negotiations that resolved the Korean War and the Suez crisis. In 1961 the West condemned India when, on Menon's advice to Nehru, Indian forces invaded Goa, seizing this colonial territory from the Portuguese in what was claimed to be a violation of the UN Charter on nonaggression and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. A year later, Menon was pressured to resign as defense minister, following India's disastrous military defeat by Chinese forces along the Himalayan frontiers in October 1962. He was blamed for India's lack of military preparedness against China. Ironically, Prime Minister Nehru, the architect of Sino-Indian friendship, escaped blame.

Krishna Menon was born in Calicut, Cochin, now part of the state of Kerala, in 1896. He took an interest in the independence movement in the 1920s, first as an undergraduate student at Madras Presidency College, and then as a postgraduate law student at Madras Law College. As a law student he became associated with Annie Besant and her Home Rule Movement for India. Besant, impressed with the young Krishna Menon, sent him to England to study. In England he studied at the London School of Economics and at Lincoln's Inn, London, from where he was admitted to the English Bar as a barrister-in-law.

Menon founded the India League in London in 1928, and it became the center of Indian nationalist activities in England. The British Labour Party was impressed with his political skills and public oratory and made him one of its spokesmen. In 1934 he was elected to the London Municipal Council from St. Pancras on a Labour ticket. He continued to be reelected from there until he became India's first high commissioner (ambassador) after India gained independence in 1947. During his time as a London councilman, Menon appeared as a barrister in several cases on behalf of London's poor. For his services, St. Pancras conferred on him the "Freedom of the Borough," an honor that until then had only been conferred on George Bernard Shaw. Menon also became a member of the Communist Party in London, an affiliation that plagued him later as a member of Nehru's Congress Party government. He was accused of excessive sympathy for China, blinding him to the threat from the north. Menon died in 1974 at the age of seventy-eight.

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See also **China, Relations with; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

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METALWARE There is an extremely long and highly developed tradition of metalworking in India and greater South Asia. Although the rich heritage of its sculptural manifestations and, to a lesser extent, coinage and jewelry are justly renowned, their equally sophisticated corollary artistic expressions of decorative metal vessels and containers, weaponry, and ritual objects are today much less known, rarely collected systematically by public institutions and scarcely studied by contemporary art historians. This lack of modern attention is curiously paradoxical because traditional handmade Indian metalware in particular was greatly admired during the Arts and Crafts Movement in England in the nineteenth century. This interest led to a prominent place for Indian metalware in many of the great international expositions and British Empire coronation celebrations held between 1851 and 1925. These exhibitions typically featured numerous examples of distinct geographical types of Indian metalware, with awards often bestowed for the best workmanship and design. Significant research on Indian metalware was also published in over a score of important articles, surveying its diverse regional forms and technical variations, that appeared in the *Journal of Indian Art and Industry* from 1886 to 1916. Conversely, for much of the remainder of the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first, the focus of most research on South Asian art switched from a media-based approach to a thematic one, centering on works of art and architecture affiliated with Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, or Islamic patronage and subject matter.

Early Material Evidence

Archaeological finds from the earliest periods of Indian protohistory attest to the existence of a well-developed tradition of metalworking. Excavations of the mature phase (c. 2600–1900 B.C.) of the Indus Valley Civilization, located in present-day Pakistan and northwestern India, have yielded copper, copper alloy (bronze), and silver vessels. No comparable gold examples have yet been discovered, but gold ornaments survive in considerable numbers. These early metal vessels replicate forms used widely for terra-cotta vessels, particularly cooking pots, water containers, and plate ware. They have been found primarily in burials and hoards, their preservation in this context certifying their high

level of socioeconomic worth. After the decentralization and decline of the Indus Valley Civilization at the beginning of the second millennium B.C., extensive metalworking continued during the Late Bronze Age (c. 1700–1000 B.C.) in occupational communities dispersed primarily within the Ganges River valley and adjacent plains. Substantial hoards from this period have been discovered that contained a wide range of copper or copper alloy implements, weapons, and anthropomorphs (stylized human figures, perhaps of ritual significance). With the dawn of the Early Iron Age (c. 1200–1000 B.C.), iron weapons, tools, and domestic artifacts began to be produced and survive from a number of important archaeological sites throughout the Indian subcontinent. The Bronze Age and Iron Age evidence of Indian metalworking is well supported by contemporaneous literary references, which appear as early as the Rig Veda, approximately 1500 B.C.

Select Historical Masterpieces

In spite of the tragic fact that the vast majority of Indian decorative metalware and metal ritual objects created before the eighteenth century have not survived the ravages of time, warfare plunder, and the melting pot, sufficient isolated masterpieces survive, and myriad literary descriptions exist to create a compelling impression of what must have been a plethora of extraordinary artistic accomplishments.

One of the most accomplished examples of Indian metalware from the Early Historic period known to survive is the so-called Kulu Vase in the British Museum (OA 1880–22), which has been dated on stylistic grounds to the first century B.C. Once thought to be from Kulu in the Kangra District of the modern state of Himachal Pradesh, it is now known to have been found in a ruined monastery further north in Gondla in the Lahul and Spiti District. Made of bronze with a high tin content, the water vessel is fashioned in the traditional bulbous shape called a *lota*. The vessel is decorated on the shoulder and base with complex incised geometric designs, but its most remarkable feature is an elaborate procession engraved around the body. The highly detailed, sequential scenes present a king or prince performing a Buddhist religious ceremony and riding variously in a chariot, on an elephant, or on horseback. Several elegant females accompany the lead character. The engraving is exceptional not only for the artist's attention to detail and the lyrical grace of the stylized figures, but also for the sophisticated, subtle manipulation of the linear forms to accommodate the curved surface of the vase without betraying any hint of awkwardness or hesitation in draftsmanship.

The reigns of the imperial Guptas, who ruled the heartland of India from A.D. 319 to 484, and that of their



Bejeweled Brass Samovar from Jaipur. From Jaipur, Rajasthan, rare seventeenth-century brass samovar inlaid with jewels. During the Mughal period, there was significant evolution in the technique and materials of Indian metalware, as enabled by the astounding wealth of the court. SUDHIR KASLIWAL.

contemporary southern neighbors, the royal Vakatakas (r. A.D. 275–518), are rightly regarded as among the pinnacles of cultural and artistic achievement in ancient India. Painting and sculpture reached extraordinary heights of development during this grand epoch, as evidenced by the famous late fifth-century murals at Ajanta in Maharashtra. A silver plate, now in the Cleveland Museum of Art (1972.71), is perhaps the finest extant example of the palatial decorative arts of this refined period. The plate is embellished with two registers depicting lively scenes of revelry. Each scene has a prominent male figure in the center, flanked by amorous females and male servants. The underside of the plate is decorated by a broad band of fluting surrounding a shallow foot, with a narrow band of elephants marching around the rim. The dense composition and rounded figural forms of this extraordinary silver plate stylistically resemble those found in the Ajanta paintings, which are important also for their pictorial documentation of contemporary metalware.

Indian metalware made during the medieval period (9th–15th centuries) perpetuated the superb aesthetic



The cup was of gould, sett all over with small turkyes [turquoise] and rubies, the cover of the same sett with great turquises, rubyes and emralds in woorks, and a dish suteable to sett the cup upon. The valew I know not, because the stones are many of them small, and the greater, which are also many, are not all cleane, but they are in number about 2,000 and in gould about 20 oz.

Sir Thomas Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615–19*, ed., Sir William Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1899; rev. ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 225.

qualities of its ancient antecedents, but was also often distinguished by its complexity of design. The best surviving example of this more evolved stage of Indian metalware is a double-bodied ceremonial ewer dating from the early fourteenth century, which was found in a hoard in 1924 in Kollur in the Bijapur District of present-day Karnataka. It is now in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya, formerly called the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India, in Mumbai (Kollur, no. 200). The complex vessel has twin globular bodies, coupled together with a double concave bracket emblazoned with a leonine mask called a *kirttimukha* (face of glory). Each body is surmounted by a narrow neck and flared mouth, and each rests on a diamond-shaped pedestal foot graced with incised pipal (*Ficus religiosa*) leaf motifs. The dual vessel bodies are interconnected so that a single curvilinear spout with branchlike protrusions suffices for pouring.

The Mughal Period

During the Mughal period (1526–1858), northern Indian metalware was conceptually revitalized by a cross-fertilization of new vessel forms, types, and decoration introduced from the extensive panoply of Iranian and Central Asian Islamic metalware, and by the artistic inspiration of the reigning Mughal emperors themselves. Judging from the examples depicted in the oversize painted illustrations of the *Hamzanama* (The adventures of Hamza, created between 1556 and 1565), early Mughal metalware perpetuated Iranian and Central Asian metalware (and glassware) conventions of form and function. Its decoration consisted primarily of geometric designs, with stylized animal heads only occasionally serving as terminal and spout motifs. Soon, however, northern Indian metalware was transformed into a dynamic hybrid creation.

The exposure of the Mughal emperors to engravings in European herbal books and to the rich flora and fauna of the South Asian landscape, particularly the visit of the Mughal emperor Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) to the lush, flower-filled valleys of Kashmir in 1620, combined to engender a major artistic transformation in Indian metalware and its companion arts. Naturalistic flowering plants formally arranged against a plain background became the Mughal dynastic leitmotif, as exemplified on the Taj Mahal (1632–1643), and there was also an increased predilection for floral and animal imagery. In Mughal metalware, and the decorative arts in general, the ornamentation and often even the overall external shape of a vessel, container, weapon hilt, or other luxury object was typically derived from forms found in the natural world.

In addition to the artistic and conceptual developments that occurred in Indian metalware during the Mughal period, there was also a significant evolution in technique and costly materials that was enabled by the astounding wealth of the Mughal court. Gold and silver pouring and serving vessels made during the seventeenth century were particularly sumptuous, sometimes being inlaid with well over a thousand spectacular gemstones. These ornate Mughal palatial vessels are exceedingly rare today because most were stripped of their jewels and melted down for their cash value. The finest surviving examples are those looted from Delhi by the Iranian king Nadir Shah in 1739 and presented by his embassy in 1741 to Elizabeth Petrovna (reigned 1741–1762), daughter of Peter the Great of Russia. They are now in the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia. One of the most lavishly adorned of these vessels (V3-714) is a rose-water sprinkler made of gold with delicately chased floral and vegetal designs. Its surface is further enriched by the inlay of 40 diamonds, 1,439 rubies, and 509 emeralds. Mughal vessels of precious materials are often shown in contemporary paintings and are described in the journals and letters of seventeenth-century European travelers, such as Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to Jahangir's court, who tells of being presented by the emperor in 1616 with a bejeweled golden cup.

Bidri-ware

During the Mughal period, a distinctive metalware tradition known as *bidri-ware* evolved in the Deccan region (south-central India). *Bidri-ware* was first made for temple use in the early fifteenth century in Bijapur in Karnataka, but an offer of full royal patronage by 'Ala' al-Din Ahmad Bahmani II (reigned 1436–1458) soon lured its artisans to his kingdom in Bidar (whence its adjectival name) near Hyderabad in modern Andhra Pradesh. The production of *bidri-ware* flourished at Bidar and Hyderabad

during the late sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, achieving its artistic zenith between 1650 and 1725. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, *bidri*-ware was also being produced at other Muslim courts in northern India, principally at Purnea in Bihar, Murshidabad in Bengal, and Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh.

Technique. *Bidri*-ware is made from a predominately zinc-based alloy, along with smaller amounts of lead, copper, and/or tin. Its technical process is complex and involves three metalworking specialists (metalsmith, engraver, and inlayer) and five manufacturing stages (casting, designing and engraving, inlaying, blackening, and polishing). *Bidri*-ware ornamentation is produced by means of several, often combined techniques: the inlay of sheets of precious metals (*tehnishan*) and single strands of wire (*tarkashin*), and the overlay of a sheet of silver with designs cut out in silhouette (*aftabi*). In the Deccan and eastern India, inlaid designs are rendered flush and burnished (*zarnishan*). In contrast, Lucknow *bidri*-ware often features designs in bold relief (*zarbuland*), in which the inlaid metals protrude slightly above the surface and are adorned with incised motifs or a thin overlay of gold or silver. Regardless of technique, silver was the favored metal used for inlaying *bidri*-ware in all of the major centers of production. The use of brass or brass mixed with gold as an inlay was confined to the Deccan and generally ceased around 1725.

Types of *Bidri*-ware. A broad spectrum of object types and forms were made in *bidri*-ware, including circular salvers (*tbali*), octagonal plates (*tasbtari*), water-pipe (hookah, *buqqa*) bases, containers (*pandan*) for prepared *pan* leaves (the popular Indian and Southeast Asian betel nut digestive), spittoons (*ugaldan*) necessary for disposing of the masticated betel nut remnants, candelabra (*shamadan*), and even furniture. A late eighteenth-century water-pipe base from Hyderabad, now in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (M.2001.101), exemplifies the complexity of form and elegance of design found on the most accomplished *bidri*-ware. Its overlaid silver decoration consists principally of a meandering grape leaf and bunch motif.

Enameled Metalware

The use of enameled decoration (*minakari*) on Indian metalware is traditionally said to have begun in the late sixteenth century at Amber, near Jaipur in Rajasthan, when the Rajput ruler Man Singh (r. 1592–1614) reportedly established a royal enameling workshop with five Sikh enamellers brought from Lahore in the Punjab. This seems unlikely, however, considering that Man Singh is not regarded as an energetic patron of the arts, and no enameled metalware survives that can be attributed to Amber with certainty. The earliest historically plausible

reference for Indian enameled metalware is during the rule of Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605), when enameling in the imperial ateliers was recorded by the official court chronicler, Abu'l-fazl 'Allami, in his *A'in-i Akbari* (The institutes of Akbar). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, additional knowledge of enameling techniques was imported by a number of European and Iranian goldsmiths and jewelers who are known to have been employed in various royal ateliers in India. By the nineteenth century, the production of enameled metalware had become widespread throughout South Asia. The leading centers were Delhi; Alwar, Bikaner, Nathdwara, and, especially, Jaipur in Rajasthan; Lucknow and Varanasi (Banaras) in Uttar Pradesh; Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh; Kangra and Kulu in Himachal Pradesh; Kashmir; and Hyderabad and Multan in present-day Pakistan.

Almost all Indian enameled objects were created using the *champlevé* technique, which requires various stages of development: designs are engraved or ground into the surface of the metal; filled with a paste of powdered glass and the particular metallic oxide that would determine the desired brilliant enamel color; fired sequentially several times because of the different melting temperatures of the various enamel pastes; usually ground smooth; and polished. The *cloisonné* technique of separating areas of enameling with thin wire was only occasionally used. Enamel decoration was also simply painted onto the surface of the metal before firing. In early Mughal examples, the enamel is typically opaque, while in works created during and after the rule of Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), it is generally translucent. A particularly fine example of late eighteenth-century Lucknow enamel metalware is a brilliant hookah base, which is now in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London (IS 122-1886). Its distinctive blue and green enameling consists primarily of stylized poppy plants encircled by oval cartouches, with a twin border of a flowering vine.

“Ganga-Jumna” Metalware

Another important type of Indian metalware is known as “Ganga-Jumna” metalware. Its name is derived from the simultaneous use of two contrasting colors of metal, which symbolically refer to the two mighty rivers of North India: the Ganges (Ganga), considered light in color; and the Jumna (formerly called the Yamuna), thought to be dark. In the original and most costly Ganga-Jumna metalware, silver and gold were used to represent the two rivers. In most surviving examples, however, the less expensive metals of brass and copper or brass and bell-metal were used respectively to symbolize them. Ganga-Jumna metalware was once believed by Western scholars to be produced only in Varanasi, where

the term is geographically appropriate. Yet, brass-and-copper vessels displaying engraved or inlaid inscriptions in South Indian languages and Hindu iconic decoration using South Indian figural styles prove that the distinctive two-tone metalware was also produced in the regions of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, especially in Thanjavur (Tanjore). Regardless of origin, the two primary vessel types are the *lota* and the *chambu* (differentiated from the *lota* by its flattened spherical body, conical foot, constricted neck with ring molding, and wide-lipped mouth).

This brief survey skims only the surface of the deep well of Indian metalware. Numerous other important regional, temporal, ritual, secular, and folk traditions exist, such as the wide range of everyday brassware; the sophisticated silver metalware produced in the eighteenth century in Rajasthan and in Pune (Poona) in Maharashtra during the Maratha period; the Hindu “Swami” metalware of Thanjavur; the delicate silver filigree work of Cuttack in Orissa, Karimnagar in Andhra Pradesh, and Dacca (Dhaka) in modern Bangladesh; the European-influenced gold and silver metalware of Kutch in Gujarat; and the colonial-period silver of Kolkata (Calcutta) and Delhi.

Stephen Markel

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MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

From the standpoint of small South Asian states, the “India factor” in their security has both negative and positive connotations. India’s large size and huge military power are considered the fundamental sources of their perception of potential danger. At the same time, India’s centrality in the region, coupled with its capability to respond swiftly to an urgent call for assistance, is a positive feature. India has indeed rendered military assistance to Myanmar (then Burma), Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, even though some of these countries have at times perceived India as a threat. India’s security interests are integrated with those of the entire region; its neighbors’ interests are closely linked to its own. If friendship with India is considered important for the security of its small neighbors, their internal political stability and independence remain vital factors in Indian security.

Indian military assistance has been rendered only upon the request of beleaguered South Asian states facing rebellion, insurrection, insurgency, or a coup d’état. States that sought Indian military assistance have been inherently weak, lacking sufficient military strength to defend their national interests. Decisions to commit Indian forces for security duties abroad were all taken by Indian Congress Party governments headed by three powerful prime ministers—Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi—who belonged to the same family and pursued much the same foreign policy, with modifications to suit the changing international or regional situations. Nehru intended to make India the leader of Afro-Asia’s third world; his daughter and grandson strove more to project India as the leader of South Asia. In this context they used the military as an instrument of diplomacy, projecting Indian power over South Asia. Though India readily extended military assistance during the cold war period, it has since grown more reluctant to undertake a security role. In 2000, for example, India did not consider Sri Lanka’s request for military help. It also declined to accept a combat role against the Maoist insurgents in Nepal.

Early Instances of Military Involvement

Burma. Burma (now Myanmar) was the first to seek limited Indian military help in 1949, when the Anti-Fascist



Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), in Sri Lanka. The IPKF arrive in Sri Lanka, July 1987. Part of the 70,000 troops dispatched there to enforce an accord reached by India and Sri Lanka to end the ethnic Tamil conflict in the latter nation. INDIA TODAY.

People's Freedom League government was threatened by a series of combined rebellions launched by the Communists and the Karen National Defense Organization, as well as by mutinies in the army. For Burma's Communists, who were excluded from power, the newly won "independence" seemed false, because Burma remained within the sphere of British power and influence. They wanted to create a Communist state through armed struggle. At the same time, the Karen ethnic group revolted against discriminatory treatment. Aggrieved over the denial of their right to secede from the union, which had been extended to the Shan and Kayah states, and the government's refusal to accept their boundary demands for a new Karen state, the Karens launched an armed secessionist movement. Simultaneously, other disgruntled minorities also revolted. The orgy of violence by the rebels pushed the entire nation into chaos. The Karen military rebels undermined the government so severely that it could control only the capital, Rangoon, and a few other cities. Burma badly needed external support to prevent its disintegration.

Nepal. In Nepal the level and intensity of rebel threat was much lower. Militant activities by K. I. Singh, a dissident Nepali Congress leader, helped by several criminal groups from 1951 to 1953, had caused political instability and lawlessness. Singh had mobilized Nepal's disgruntled Mukti Sena members against the Congress government's decision to share power with the autocratic Ranas, launching a nationwide reign of terror in 1951. In the same year, the separatist Kirantis living along Nepal's border with Tibet also refused to recognize the government's authority over the Eastern Hills. Singh, who was briefly jailed, escaped from prison on 11 July 1951 and declared himself local governor, seizing a government treasury. After his second escape from prison on 23 January 1952, he launched an attack on the capital, Kathmandu, with the help of 1,200 rebel soldiers, capturing the treasury, arsenal, broadcasting station, and airport. Nepal's communication links with India were disrupted. That revolt was crushed, but in April 1953, some 700 Nepalese rebels, led by Bhim Dutt Pant, attacked police stations and looted private property in Nepal's Western Terai region. Unable to crush the menace, the Kathmandu

government sought Indian military assistance. India sent one battalion of its army and a constabulary force from Uttar Pradesh.

Sri Lanka. Insurrection and ethnic conflict had necessitated India's involvement in Sri Lanka twice, in 1971 and from 1987 to 1990. In April 1971, Sri Lanka faced a threat to the integrity of its polity when the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP; the People's Liberation Front), a Sinhalese Buddhist youth movement with a strong ideological commitment to Marxism, launched an abortive insurrection to capture state power. It planned attacks on police stations and army camps, and hoped to abduct or kill the prime minister and capture the capital, Colombo. However, it was successful only in capturing a large number of police stations. The government lost control of over fifty major towns. To regain control and end the insurrection, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike requested military assistance from many countries, including India. The second time, the need for military support arose in July 1987, when India and Sri Lanka signed a peace accord to end Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamil conflict. The accord itself made provision for India's military role. At the request of Sri Lankan president J. R. Jayewardene, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi sent a contingent of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), some 70,000 troops, to implement the accord. In fulfilling its obligations, India was obliged to wage a war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a separatist militant group that rejected the autonomy solution offered by the accord.

Maldives. The Maldives were threatened by external mercenaries in November 1988, when a group of about 400 men, allegedly recruited by some disgruntled expatriate Maldivians, invaded the capital, Male, with the aim of overthrowing the regime headed by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. They stormed the presidential palace and easily took control of the government secretariat as well as radio and television stations. President Gayoom and some of his senior ministers took refuge at the headquarters of the National Security Service (a paramilitary force of 350 men in 1988, now increased to over 1,500); from there he appealed to India for military assistance. India sent three warships and some 1,600 paratroopers to secure the capital. Fortunately for the president, the mercenaries could not disrupt the atoll island nation's vital communication links, and India's timely intervention saved the Gayoom regime.

Motives and Results

Clearly, a combination of factors motivated India to undertake military roles in its neighborhood. In protecting the national interests of its distressed neighbors,

India sought to promote regional stability, considering such political turmoil in neighboring states a threat to regional peace. In India's view, violence by the rebels in all these countries threatened democracy, whose maintenance has been a cardinal principle of India's South Asian policy. India has also remained opposed to the involvement of any extraregional powers in South Asia. By rendering military assistance to Burma and Nepal, India hoped to prevent Chinese intervention. Similarly, its unprecedented military role in Sri Lanka in the 1980s was designed to thwart President Jayewardene's attempts to become a strategic ally of the West (by, for instance, providing naval base facilities to the United States) and to prevent any further inroads by Pakistan and China. The 1987 peace accord also enforced India's dominant influence in matters of Sri Lanka's security.

As in Sri Lanka, where Indian military involvement was guided by its obligations under the accord, the Indo-Nepalese peace and friendship treaty of 1950 imposed specific obligations on India to protect Nepalese security. India's friendship with troubled neighboring regimes remained an important motivating factor. Leaders who were at the helm of affairs at the time of crisis in each country—Prime Minister U Nu (Burma), King Tribhuvan and Prime Minister Koirala (Nepal), Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka), and President Gayoom (Maldives)—all maintained friendly relations with the Indian leadership.

In some cases, India feared that violent developments among its neighbors would cause adverse effects on its own society and economy. For instance, the success of a Communist revolt in Nepal or the Karen ethnic movement in Burma might encourage or strengthen secessionist ethnic movements in northeast India. Prime Minister Nehru felt that Burma's disintegration would not only affect India's economic interests but would also endanger the lives of about 700,000 Indians living there.

Whatever little gains India's military interventions won, in most cases the benefits did not endure. After the rebellion in Burma, India was viewed as a trusted friend for some years, and on 7 July 1951, the two countries signed a friendship treaty valid for five years. Similarly, Nepal became openly pro-Indian for some years, and its leaders acknowledged India's importance to Nepal's economic development and security. Simultaneously, however, there existed a growing sense of discontent over India's frequent military involvement, which some opposition parties used to create a strong anti-Indian feeling. The Nepalese government leaders were condemned as puppets of India, and the opposition soon overthrew them. In Maldives, however, India's military help left a durable imprint of friendship. Expressing his government's deep appreciation and gratitude for Indian support,

President Gayoom disagreed with others' descriptions of India as a regional "hegemonic" power.

In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the IPKF operations eventually turned into a costly politico-military affair, and by mid-1989, the presence of so many Indian troops became a divisive issue in bilateral relations. Sri Lanka demanded their withdrawal long before the assigned task of implementing the accord was achieved. In economic and military terms, India paid a heavy price: about 1,200 soldiers dead and 2,500 were injured, at a cost to India of about U.S.\$180 million. Dismayed at the shabby treatment given their troops by the Sri Lankan government, the Indian government withdrew its forces in early 1990. Soon after, in March 1990, External Affairs Minister (later prime minister) I. K. Gujral declared that India would never again send troops to any neighboring country. Despite many changes in Delhi's government and leadership, this position has remained unchanged.

Ponmoni Sabadevan

See also **Burma; Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with; Nepal, Relations with; Sri Lanka, Relations with**

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MINIATURES

This entry consists of the following articles:

BIKANER

BUNDI

CENTRAL INDIA

HAREM SCENES

KISHANGARH

KOTAH

MARWAR AND THIKANAS


BIKANER

An important branch of the Rajput maharajas of the Rathod clan, under Rao Bikar, established the state of Bikaner in 1478 in the semibarren Thar Desert in north-west Rajasthan. Bikaner remained prominent under the imperial Mughals through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Bikaner painting, as well as other aspects of society, evinced a profound and sophisticated Mughal influence, to a greater extent than other schools of Rajput painting. Despite this impact, the Bikaner school lacked the liveliness and subtlety of the latter.

Royal archival day-to-day account diaries (*bahis*) and numerous inscriptions on Bikaner paintings make this one of the best documented of the Rajput schools. Inscriptions, mainly in the Marwari dialect but occasionally also in Persian script, reveal dates and artists' names and in some cases even the place of production and the occasions for which the works were commissioned. Evidently, there were interactions between visiting Muslim painters from neighboring Rajput states with local novices, who later adopted Islam and were called *ustas*. Political successes continued to draw more wealth, and painting flourished as well, attracting other Hindu and Jain painters.

Accomplished master artists, called *gajdhars* (or *sutr dhars*, "who hold a yardstick"), served as links between the patrons and their respective ateliers. In order to secure projects and their positions in court, they secured material, supervised the production of paintings, and disbursed stipends to other artists. They not only trained junior artists but also gave finishing individualized touches, which contributed to the style and trend of the traditional royal school.

Fewer than five hundred artists worked at the Bikaner court. They produced over fifteen thousand individual paintings and numerous illustrated manuscripts for the royal library, as well as *zananas*. Works were usually done on paper, but wood, hide, cloth, and ivory were also used. Surviving fine examples from the Bikaner Fort indicate that wall paintings, painted doors and furniture and even goddess statues (*Ganvar mata*, a form of Devī) were also painted by these artists. Modern postcard-size portraits of dignitaries as well as of Hindu divinities, especially Krishna with his flute, were produced as offerings to be presented on birthdays or after a death. Talented artists received high recognition and rewards, including money, land, and secure employment.



Bikaner Wall Painting. Inspired by contemporary events, Bikaner artists often delved into the pomp and circumstance of the royalty. AMIT PASRICHA.

The paintings delved into popular subjects, connected either with royalty or religious events, inspired by contemporary issues and by other Rajput and Mughal courts. The paintings depicted royal activities (male and female *durbār* scenes, amorous scenes), hunting and war expeditions, *Ragmala* sets depicting the modes of music, *Barabmasa* sets illustrating the twelve months of the year, and *Krishna-lila* and other purely religious compositions, such as the acclaimed *Vaikuntha Darsana* (Vision of Vishnu's paradise).

Typical of the school were dwarfed human figures with large heads, awkwardly proportioned, appearing to float in the air. Rajputi-style trees were placed in a Mughal landscape, which was highly finished but less expressive than other Rajput styles. The male figures in the painting were inspired by the *shabibs* of the maharajas, but the females were more similar to the prototypes that were first introduced in Bikaner by the visiting master painter Ustad Ali Raza of Delhi (fl. 1645–1665).

Beginning from Raja Rai Singh (r. 1571–1612) to the first quarter of the seventeenth century, with the help of imperial *karkhana* and visiting imperial artists, Bikaner

royal *karkhana* started producing Mughalized and Popular Mughal style works. Maharaja Karan Singh (r. 1631–1669) and Anup Singh (r. 1669–1698), both great connoisseurs of art, gave Bikaner painting its distinct character, that is, an artistic combination of Mughal elegance with a forceful Deccani palette, resulting in an aesthetic visual Rajput adaptation. This style, initiated by Ali Raza in the second half of the seventeenth century, became a trendsetter for local masters such as Usta Ruknuddin (fl. 1650–1700), Nathhu (fl. 1650–1695), Isa (fl. 1680–1715), and Rashid (fl. 1675–1695). Out of eight, two lineages of promising painters, named after their founders—Umrani and Lalani—found long-lasting patronage. Usta Ruknuddin, from the Umrani house, and his son Ibrahim (fl. 1675–1700) supervised extensive production during Anup Singh's reign. Themes were executed in great length, and a major production of a *Rasikpriya* series was accomplished, in which local Bikaner style was more or less crystallized; it continued to influence Bikaner painters for centuries.

Some of the masterpieces of this period include the *Vaikuntha Darshana* (Abode of Vishnu, c. 1650, Bharat Kala Bhavan, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi) executed by

the master painter Ali Raza; *Ladies' Party* (c. 1665), by Ruknuddin; and *Lady Looking into a Mirror* (1665) by Usta Natthu.

Influences of the Deccan and neighboring Rajput states of Jodhpur are evident in the works created during the period of Maharaja Sujana Singh (r. 1700–1736); here the approach was simple and direct. Following the existing trends, another set of *Rasikapriya*, under the supervision of painter Usta Nure (fl. 1646–1715), was produced. Human figures, trees, and architecture became slender and elongated, reminiscent of artistic trends during Aurangzeb's reign. Though some artists continued to prefer Ruknuddin's squarish faces, the majority followed Nure's preference for small oval faces. Until the third quarter of the century, human expressions remained lively, and landscape was well treated. However, compared to other Rajput schools, the compositions were less properly integrated.

The decline of the Mughals and political and matrimonial ties with Jaipur and Jodhpur witnessed another wave of pleasant interaction of local and neighboring artists during the reign of Maharaja Zorawar Singh (r. 1736–1745) and the first half of the reign of Maharaja Gaj Singh (r. 1746–1787). Jodhpuri influences dominated the prevalent conventional trends. Noteworthy, with its sinuous lines and delicate colors, is the portrait of *Zorawar Singh Hunting* (c. 1740, National Museum, New Delhi). Court master Usta Abu, son of Kasam, heavily inspired by Europeanized Mughal features, captured the grandeur of the court of Gaj Singh, who is said to have patronized over two hundred artists.

More artists arrived when further political and matrimonial ties with Jaipur were solicited during the period of Maharaja Surat Singh (r. 1827–1851). A new Bikaner hybrid style emerged with the coming together of the disintegrating Jaipur approach and the limping Bikaner style. Jaipur artists soon seized the prestige and landholdings of practicing painters such as Usta Abu, his son Ahmad (fl. 1804), and Ibrahim (fl. 1764). Crudely modeled figures, ornamental foliage and trees, and a preference for an unusual shade of acidic green characterize this new style. The technique seems to have been initiated by Usta Katiram of Jaipur (fl. 1815) and Gajdhar Sukharam and his son Balu (fl. 1754–1760).

The advent of the Company school of painting caused the further decline of the Bikaner school, as was the case throughout India. However, a small group of artists continued to work in the declining royal ateliers of Maharaja Sardar Singh (r. 1851–1872) and his successors.

Naval Krishna
Manu Krishna

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BUNDI

The state of Bundi in Rajasthan, formerly known as Haraoti, was the stronghold of the Hara Rajputs. It is surrounded by Jaipur and Tonk on the north, and the state of Mewar on the west. To the south lies the state of Kotah, where an identical style of painting prevailed. This entire region is mountainous, with fast-flowing rivers, dense forests and greenery. These natural physical features proved conducive to a picturesque landscape, which Bundi painters exploited to the fullest extent. The history of Bundi began in the era of Rao Surjan (r. A.D. 1554–1585), a vassal of Mewar, who after 1569 became a feudatory of the Mughals. The recently discovered Chunar Ragamala, dated to 1591, painted at Chunar near Banaras (Varanasi), provides conclusive evidence of the close relationship between the Mughal and the Bundi rulers. The Chunar Ragamala, apart from revealing some visual similarities between Mughal and Bundi painting, has a detailed colophon in Nastalique script, giving a date, place of execution, and a genealogy of painters, whose origins leads us to the period of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605). Thus it stands to reason that early as well as late Bundi painting had been influenced by contemporary Mughal painting up to the nineteenth century.

As a result of the Vaishnava renaissance (in Rajasthan), which passionately captured the hearts of the Hindu masses with its doctrine of *bhakti* (devotion) to Vishnu and his *avatāra* Krishna, propagated by Vallabhacharya, various schools and styles of paintings sprang up, producing abundant devotional art. Authors and artists took great delight in writing about and painting themes of divine love, as in the *Gītā Govinda* of Jayadeva (c. 12th century), the *Rasikapriya* of Keshavadasa (c. 16th century), the *Sur-Sagar* of the blind poet Surdas, as well as the *Dasama Skanda* (tenth canto) of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Painters' repertoires also included sets of *Barabmasa* (pictorial descriptions of the Indian seasons) and the *Rāgamala* (pictorial renderings of the Indian musical modes in color), which became the favorite subjects Bundi and Kotah artists.

Apart from these devotional works of art, there were also many paintings of court life and outdoor activities,

particularly hunting. Large *sbikar* (hunting) scenes, music and dancing parties, and portraits of Bundi chiefs and their favorite animals, especially the elephant, became the stock and trade of the Bundi painters. They produced some exquisite studies of elephants in fury, engaged in intense battle, or escaping through narrow gateways. The taming of wild elephants has always been a subject of delight to Indian painters and patrons alike.

The discoveries of certain inscribed and dated paintings toward the middle of the seventeenth century helped to reconstruct a rough chronology of the development of Bundi style. Examples include: *Nobleman and the Lady Watching Pigeons*, Bundi, dated 1662; *Lovers in a Pavilion*, dated 1682, from the collection of the Bharat Kala Bhawan Banaras; and *Lovers Pointing to the Crescent Moon*, gift of the painter Mohan. All of these exhibit salient features of the school, which determine the definition of Bundi painting.

Female figures are tall, with narrow waists, having somewhat prominent noses and almond-shaped eyes. Their costumes consist of a *ghaghra*, a very high *choli*, and an *odhni*, and black tassels are attached to their wristlets and armllets. Men wear a long transparent *jama*, a long and narrow *patka*, and a *churidar pajama*. Mughal mannerisms, such as shading below the armpit, are also seen in many cases. A variety of turban types are depicted, among which the Khanjardar turban type (having a pointed top) invariably indicates nobility. Pictures are composed either in open courtyards or inside pavilions with lush green vegetation as a backdrop.

Bundi style also exhibits certain Deccani influences, due to close contacts with the Deccani ruler Rao Satrasal (r. 1631–1656), who was installed by Mughal emperor Shah Jahan as governor. Subsequently, there were many appointments of Bundi rulers in the Deccan, reinforcing the Deccani influence on Bundi style.

The eighteenth century witnessed a prolific production of portraiture on the one hand and depictions of the Krishna legend on the other. Most of the *Barahmasa* and *Ragamala* sets were produced by Bundi and Kotah painters during this period. Later Bundi paintings excel in certain prominent features, such as lush green vegetation with a variety of flowering vines and plants, ever-green plantains, and dramatic skies with grey, orange, and blue hues. Another peculiarity of Bundi painting is a cast shadow behind the faces and figures, highlighting the contours of the body. Nineteenth-century Bundi paintings developed a pale phase, in which artists preferred light hues and cool color notes, and there was an emphasis on outdoor scenes. The figures appear squat, and the cast shadows dominate. Toward the late nineteenth century there was a decline in the technique and

quality of Bundi paintings, and folkish and pedestrian works were produced by undistinguished painters.

Sbridbar Andbare

See also **Barahmasa; Rāgamālā**

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CENTRAL INDIA

The art styles of Raghogarh, Malwa, and Bundelkhand define the Central Indian school of art. Central India, the Madhyadesh of the ancient scriptures, with no consistent geography, is almost an abstract concept, the unity of which may be discovered in its arts, architecture, culture, literature and language. In them and in performing arts, sculpture and religious and intellectual pursuits, Central India has a past receding to the Vedic days. As for the art of painting, it has the fifth–sixth century murals and Mandu, once the capital of Malwa, was one the earliest seats of miniature painting in India and the prime inspiration of the Rajasthani art style. Even the Mughal miniatures of Akbar's early days and the early art of Ahmednagar and Bijapur in Deccan borrow some of the features of Mandu art style.

Raghogarh

Raghogarh, an erstwhile small state of Central India, situated between Malwa, Rajasthan, and Bundelkhand, is little known for its art activity, though it has had a massive tradition of painting spreading over two hundred years. Its artists excelled both in portrait painting and the serialization of legends and mythological themes.

The patrons of these paintings, the Khichi rulers of Raghogarh—Raja Dhiraj Singh (r. 1697–1726), Vikramaditya Singh (r. 1730–1744), Balbhadra Singh (r. 1744–1770), and Balwant Singh (r. 1770–1797)—appear to have been quite moderate in their rule, political aspirations and personal lives. They believed in good relations with all, the Rajputs (of Jaipur and Mewar) and the Mughals. The Raghogarh paintings reflect these aspects of their patrons, as many of them portray their contemporary chieftains visiting Raghogarh.

Raghogarh artists produced a large number of paintings during this era, which began in 1697, when Raja Dhiraj Singh initiated the Khichi dynasty at Raghogarh. This prolific artistic output could not have been possible unless Raja Dhiraj Singh and his successors had promoted

and patronized it. Portraiture seems to have been the primary passion of Khichis, as most of the best paintings, reported from Raghogarh, are portraits. It seems that the Khichis maintained a galaxy of painters who rendered paintings, which had suited their patrons' taste. They portrayed the royal family, their favorite men and women and their pets, as also rendered various traditional themes, such as *Rāga-Rāginīs*, the love legend of *Ūshā-Aniruddha*, and legends related to Hindu gods and goddesses, and several folk themes and important occasions, such as visits by kings and princes. The Raghogarh painters also rendered portraits of various Mughal emperors and Rajput princes. This they must have done to record their visits to Raghogarh, or to accord to them state's honour. These portraits have no lavish or luxurious backgrounds and are rendered with great simplicity. The Raghogarh artists abstained from glamorizing their subjects. They preferred painting on flat backgrounds with bright colors and red borders. They derive their excellence from the careful and graceful depiction of a figure's features, overall demeanor and style of clothes. The Khichis' patronage of the arts was one of the most important activities of their court.

The Raghogarh paintings have a distinctive character that distinguishes them from the paintings of any other school of Indian art. The Raghogarh painting style incorporates many attributes of the art styles of Rajasthan, Malwa, and Bundelkhand, though it has excellence of its own.

Malwa

Malwa, the heartland of Central India, has a great creative past. Its literary history began centuries before the common era, and that of painting around the fifth or sixth century A.D. The sixth-century wall paintings of Bagh caves in Malwa, in the tradition of Ajanta, bear testimony to its glorious past. The earliest miniature paintings at Malwa—the illustrations of the Jain Kalpa-Sūtrā, appear during the first phase of the medieval renaissance. The stylistic accomplishment of Kalpa-Sūtrā illustrations rendered at Mandu, the capital of Malwa, suggest that Mandu had by then assumed the position of one of the great centers of art in India. In 1401 A.D., Dilwar Khan, a descendant and the *subedar* (governor) of Mohammad Ghori, declared himself independent ruler of the region of Malwa. This period in the history of Malwa was full of turmoil. In 1405 Malwa fell into the hands of Hoshang Shah, a local Khalji Muslim. He made Mandu his capital, and under his patronage Indo-Islamic art and architecture flourished. The third Khalji ruler, Mahmud I, continued the tradition of his grandfather.

In 1540, after Sher Shah Sur defeated the Mughal emperor Humayun and captured all of his territories,

including Malwa and Gujarat, he appointed Shiya Khan as governor of Malwa. Shiya Khan's son Bayazid, the well-known hero of the legend of Baz Bahadur and Rupamati, was also a great patron of arts and music. In 1555 he declared himself the independent ruler of Malwa. In 1562 Akbar defeated Baz Bahadur, and henceforth Malwa became a Mughal *subab* (province). In 1690 the Maratha ruler Peshwa Baji Rao entered Malwa and, in 1743, annexed it finally to Maratha state. Peshwa made formal grant of deputy governorship of Malwa in favor of Holkar and Scindhia, his two generals, who had rendered great help in conquering it. With this ended the Mughal hold over Malwa.

In Mandu, there already existed an earlier tradition of illustrating texts. *Niamatnama* (Book of delicacies) was illustrated during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. The dated Kalpa-Sūtrā of 1439, was also an early work of art. These texts were illuminated using fine combination of ultramarine, red, and gold colors. Later Malwa artists of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries preferred a more fluid grouping in place of the tight geometrical compositions of earlier renderings. The style of luxuriant trees with swaying creepers creating a soft meandering rhythm, the use of vibrant colors, simplifications, and boldly primitive idioms for the depictions of plants and animal life are some of the main attributes of the Malwa paintings of this phase.

Though rendered at Mandu, *Niamatnāmā* and Kalpa-Sūtrā do not define Malwa style. *Niamatnāmā* represents the Islamic and Kalpa-Sūtrā the Jain style pursued alike in other parts of India. It was actually in Rāmāyaṇa, Rāgamālā, and Rasikapriyā illustrations of the period from 1630 to 1640 that Malwa discovered its stylistic distinction and its earliest examples. The Rāmāyaṇa paintings offer a rich background to the subsequent painters. Monkeys and demons add color to the epic. Similarly, the birds, rivers, ponds, and even the architecture appear as symbols, presenting attractive groups in their idealized and decorative forms. The achievement of these Rāmāyaṇa illustrations is their form of composition and arrangement of different episodes of the story. The musical instruments—*dolaka* (double or two-way drum), *shabnāi* (wind-blown musical pipe), and large cymbals—depicted in these paintings are still in common use in the Malwa region.

The Rāgamālā and Rasikapriyā paintings reflect deep influences of prior indigenous art traditions. Short *choli* (blouse), striped *ghāgharās* (long skirt), *chākdār jāmā* (long gown with all four lower ends having angular formation), and the flat Akbarī turban are some of their special features. The Amaru-Sataka paintings of 1652 and the serializations of Puhakar's Rasavēli of 1660 depict emotional expressions of these love lyrics and represent the symbolic

delineation of the *nāyikā bhēd* concept (the literary theory that classifies various heroines engaged in love) in color.

The Rāmāyaṇa series of 1634–1640, 1652, and 1660, the Amaru-Sataka of 1652, and the Rasavēli of 1660 represent various phases in the development of the Malwa school. Another significant set of Rāgamālā paintings painted in 1680 by the artist Madhodasa at Narsingharh, a centrally located small state in Malwa, represents a culmination of earlier traditions. These Rāgamālā paintings are known for their bright colors, lyrical draftsmanship, and careful rendering. The miniature series of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa of 1690–1700 is highly elaborate and is in exact adherence to the text. The primary themes of the Malwa artists were Hindu myths and legends. In illustrating such subjects, these paintings are very well defined, as also extremely elaborate and often imaginative. They frequently represent also the less significant aspects, events, themes, and characters of Indian mythology.

Malwa artists generally used bright red, purple, yellow, green, and blue colors, creating a harmonious, enamel-like effect. The delicately molded features of men and women formulate the model of ideal beauty. These paintings are simple but balanced, and at the same time have powerful compositions and are considered pure classical statement of Indian abstract principles.

Bundelkhand

Bundelkhand, forming the northern part of Madhya Pradesh, is a cultural region bounded by the river Yamuna in the north, the escarped ranges of the Vindhya plateau in the south, the river Chambal in the northwest, and the Panna-Ajaigarh ranges in the southeast. It is the state of Orchha, with its bifurcated state Datia, that primarily denotes the Bundelkhand school.

In A.D. 1531, Raja Rudra Pratap came across a panoramic site suitable for building his capital. He later laid there the foundation of his capital city, Orchha. His son Madhukar Shah (r. 1554–1592) was a great patron of arts, and the earliest art activity at Orchha in the form of wall painting is from his period. These murals, rendered primarily on the walls of Rajmahal, are endowed with miniature-like finesse and precision. The episodes from the Rāmāyaṇa and Krishna-lila as also various myths and legends are their main themes. They are broadly narrative in style, which constitutes a characteristic feature of the subsequent Bundelkhand miniatures.

Raja Bir Singh Ju Dev (r. 1605–1628), the most powerful grandson of Madhukar Shah, was a close ally of the Mughal emperor Jahangir (r. 1605–1627), who bestowed on him many honors, including a royal palauquin and a *mansabdārī* of seven thousand (the authority under which

he could maintain an army of seven thousand soldiers). Bir Singh Ju Dev built at Orchha a palace known as Jahangirī Mahal, consisting of seven floors, for the state visit of Jahangir. The Jahangirī Mahal is one of the best examples of Indo-Islamic architectural style. The paintings that embellish the walls of this palace represent the second phase of Bundelā art. There is a significant shift from the earlier mythological themes to scenes of hunting, war, dance, and various floral designs and patterns. These wall paintings, with simple form and pronounced lines, largely influenced the theme and style of the subsequent miniature art of the region.

In 1626 Orchha was bifurcated into Orchha and Datia. Datia, the newly formed state, continued also the tradition of wall painting. The Datia's newly built Bir Singh palace was embellished with paintings on various themes and subjects, some of which, such as Rāgamālā, reflected the initial tradition of Orchha murals.

The miniatures from Datia too were more akin to the earlier mural tradition of Orchha. A set of miniatures in the collection of the National Museum, New Delhi, have great stylistic unity with the Orchha wall paintings serializing the story of Mahiravana, the son of King Ravana. This story is an offshoot of the Rāmāyaṇa. Both the random and the text illustrating paintings continued to depict the same myths, legends, and themes, as had the Orchha murals, but now to them were added portraits of rulers and themes like *nayikā bhēd*, and Bārahmāsā. Portraits formed the majority of these miniatures. In texts Keshavdas' Rasikpriyā and Matiram's Rasrāj were more prominent. The personality and the religious attitude of the rulers of Orchha and Datia added new dimensions to these mythological and religious themes. An outstanding work of art that was executed at Datia is its Rāmāyaṇa series rendered with great Mughal stylistic touch. It has inscriptions in Bundelī dialect on the reverse, which are translations from Valmiki's Sanskrit verses. These works not only bear eloquent testimony to the Bundelkhand's distinction as art style but also to its great contribution in the field of miniature paintings.

Bringing the art of portrait painting to new heights of popularity by infusing it with realism is one of the most notable contributions of this school. Portrait painting was a task that required great skill to create a realistic likeness, as there were no subsidiary or secondary objects, and the artists had to concentrate fully on a single figure. The Datia portraits, such as those of Raja Shatruijit-ju-Dev (r. 1762–1801), the eldest son of Raja Indrajit, achieved a new level of realism. These portraits of Raja Shatruijit represent him as a gallant and handsome prince. Dressed with elaborate care and in an imposing fashion, he is seen wearing a long *jāmā* and fine pearl jewelry. These paintings are intimate and real, with warm color

tones. The Datia miniature painters of the eighteenth century blended facile craftsmanship with colorful ornamentation, putting their art of portraiture in a class by itself.

Despite the ethnic relationship with Rajasthan, Bundelkhand paintings have simpler compositions and are not overcrowded. Their episodes are complete in themselves, though sometimes compartmentalized, as in the Malwa and Mewar schools; their emphasis, however, is always on conveying a look of completeness. Ornate architecture, rich costumes, and gallant and handsome heroes engaged in the courtship of beautiful heroines form part of the poetry of the famous court poet Keshavdas of Orchha and are characteristics of Bundelkhand miniatures. The men invariably wear turbans crowned with a *kalagi* (crest), *jamas* (long gowns) painted with flowers, striped trousers, *kamarbandh* and slippers. The costumes of the women include the *choli* (blouse), transparent *odbani* (a cloak-type outer covering used by ladies), *ghagra* (a long skirt with large frill) and sari. They have besides beautiful pearl jewelry. These costumes are significantly shaded with lines. A rich color scheme with warmer tones, simple composition, and long eyes with sharp facial features are some of the important characteristics of Bundela paintings. The artists generally used coarse paper, locally known as Chattarpuri *kāgāz*, for their paintings.

Daljit Khare

See also **Ajanta; Jahangir; Rāgamālā; Rāmāyaṇa**

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HAREM SCENES

The practice in India of having segregated accommodations for women is very old. Large residences of the wealthy and the titled always had a separate protected enclosure for women, known as the *antahpur*, or inner courtyard. Detailed descriptions of the *antahpur* abound in Sanskrit literature, especially in the dramas and epics. The Valmiki Rāmāyaṇa (1.5), describes the various buildings of the city of Ayodhya, including theaters, gardens, and sporting areas for females. The women, who generally resided on the top floors, were provided small windows (*gavāksha*), which gave them a glimpse of the outside world (Tulasi Rāmāyaṇa 1.224). When leaving on exile to the forest, Rāma says to his people, "Gaze upon Sita to your fill since you may look upon a royal lady only at the time of the *yajna* (sacrifice) and marriage, during a calamity and *vanagamana* (exile to the forest)" (*Pratimā Nātaka* by Bhasa, 1.29).

Cloistered they may have been, but the women enjoyed creative freedom, as reflected through the dramas of the period, which depict the heroine and other women as generally distinguished in the various performing arts. They play musical instruments like the vina and the flute, and are often artists and painters. Once a center of cultural activities, the *antahpur* was labeled *harem*, meaning a forbidden area with restricted entry, during the medieval period (Arabic, *harim*; Turkish, *harem*). Other names for it were *haramgarh*, *zanana* (from the Persian *zan*, meaning "women"), and *ranivas* (abode of queens). A velvet-lined cage for its women, the harem reflects the social structure of the male-dominated medieval society.

The trend of maintaining a large harem was set by the Delhi sultans, beginning in the late twelfth century in pre-Mughal India. Both the Mughal emperors and the Hindu rajas adopted the tradition. Fazal Abul writes in his *Ain-i-Akbari* about Akbar's harem: "His Majesty has made a large enclosure with fine buildings inside where he reposes. Though there are more than five thousand women, he has given to each a separate apartment. He has also divided them into sections, and keeps them attentive to their duties" (Abul, p. 46).

The size of the harem was a status symbol among kings. Along with the wives, all the other female members of the family—mothers, sisters, daughters—resided in the segregated area. The king's first wife was designated chief queen and was given accorded special privileges. Each queen was provided a special room and a staff of attendants.

At the next level came *kaniz*, or concubines, then *kancbanis*, or slaves of a higher rank, who provided entertainment like dance, drama, and music. Further down were *bandis*, who worked as maidservants. Women captured in war were also placed within this hierarchy. There was some upward mobility as well. A king could maintain relationships with any of the attendants. If a slave girl pleased the royal, she was given concubine status, with her own chamber and a high salary.

A governess and a chief eunuch supervised security. Eunuchs guarded the consorts so that they could not see or meet any man other than their husband. There were also female guards. The interiors were lavishly decorated, but the buildings were designed to preclude outside views. Gardens complete with flowering bushes and fountains were also incorporated into the royal harem. The only glimpses the women had of the outer world was through *jharokhas*, or roofed balconies located at great heights.

Niccolao Manucci, the Italian resident in the Mughal court who had a privileged access to the harem, described the miserable conditions of these women. He says, “The women, being shut up with this closeness and constantly watched, and having neither liberty nor occupation, think of nothing but adoring themselves and their minds dwell nothing but malice and lewdness” (Manucci, p. 352).

Nevertheless, there are notable cases in which the harem played a decisive and aggressive role in dynastic politics. The most notorious example is from the early life of Akbar, who was enthroned as a teenager. His wet nurse and foster mother Mahem Anega made her impress on politics by combating the ambitions of the young emperor’s regent. Nur Jehan, consort of Akbar’s son Jahangir, was entitled to signed *firmons*, or official orders. Neither were the princesses and queens illiterate. They had basic training in reading and writing and in the fine arts. Miniature paintings from Hyderabad and Golconda elaborately depict women writing, reading letters, and playing musical instruments.

Through Artists’ Eyes

Royal memoirs, official records, and accounts by travelers and historians do provide some information on the harem, secret and guarded though it was. The subject fascinated artists, and the miniature paintings provide interesting glimpses of life in the women’s quarters of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.

Earlier, the Delhi sultans, who possessed large harems, strangely did not favor it as a theme for their paintings. There are some scenes of women engaged in various activities in the inner chambers, but in design and decor they pale in comparison to the later lavish harem pictures of the Mughal era.

In the time of Akbar (r. 1556–1605), harem scenes were depicted as part of a biographical series. One painting in *Akbarnama* depicts the birth of Prince Salim in the Fatehpur Sikri palace harem. The subject was favored by painters of the post-Jahangir era and by the Rajasthani miniaturists, particularly of the Bundi and Thikana styles. Among the Pahari schools, mention must be made of the Guler style, particularly the paintings done in the time of King Govardhana Chand (r. 1741–1773), whose capital was Guler. Govardhana Chand was married to a Basohli princess, Balauria Rani, who is well represented in the paintings of this period. A painting in the collection of the Retberg Museum, Zürich, bears the inscription *Harem Patsab ki* (the king’s harem). It may have been part of a series depicting various events in the women’s quarters.

The Queen Prepares

Most commonly, the artists depict the king seated with his queen or concubine in a beautiful garden with fountains, drinking and enjoying music, with a range of women attendants at his service. Royal paraphernalia, such as perfume bottles, a betel nut box, goblets, and a rosewater sprinkler, all find their place within the scene, especially in the Thikana paintings. A eunuch stands guard. *A Ruler with his Zanana*, Jodhpur, Rajasthan, from the Maharaja Gaja Singhji Umed Bhavana Palace Jodhpur Collection, provides a good representation of the pavilion, garden, and their overall grandeur. The king seems to have the full harem in attendance.

Each night the king would select a particular queen of his thousand-odd wives to visit. The extensive preparations of the privileged queen to make it a memorable evening for the king was another favorite theme. Beautiful women prepare sandalwood paste, decorate the bed with flowers, dance and sing, and adorn themselves in pleasurable anticipation of the evening ahead. However, for every woman it was not a cherished moment. Some paintings show a eunuch or a female guard forcing a young girl to surrender to the king. One of the Malwa paintings from the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya Collection depicts a eunuch forcing a young girl to have a drink so that she will be in no condition to resist.

Drinking and smoking were common practices among the royal women, especially during the Mughal period, to escape their loneliness. A well-dressed woman, looking despondent though surrounded by attendants and musicians, is another common theme of the miniatures. Drinking scenes depicted during and after the rule of Muhammad Shah are pointers to the decay in the court culture so carefully maintained by Akbar.

Other Subjects

Terrace party scenes are commonly depicted in the later Mughal and Deccani paintings. Bathing and sex scenes are in abundance, with the king and his partner inevitably surrounded by attendants and guards. In *By the Light of the Moon and Fireworks* (1740, Kishangarh School, Harvard University art museums, Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Cambridge) an elderly and drunk Mughal king is titillated by a beautiful young woman. He is almost lost among the many intoxicated ladies surrounding him, some of whom have taken lesbian partners. Among the women, the dark-skinned eunuch stands out.

Certain areas in the harem, such as the *rang mahal* and the *sheesh mahal*, whose walls were lined with mirrors and colored glass, were designated for various kinds of pleasurable activities. Some special rooms in some *zananas* were decorated with paintings of erotic themes (for example, *Raja Shreenathji in the Zanana*, Thikana, Marwar, 18th century, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya collection).

On very few occasions, the women were allowed to emerge from the palace doors. A visit to a religious place or a spiritual guru, hunting, playing polo, and hawking were some of these occasions. Women playing polo became the favorite theme of the Deccani paintings, especially those from Golconda. In quite a few paintings Chandbibi, the queen of Ahmednagar who bravely defended the Mughals in 1600, is shown playing polo. Hawking was another favorite game of the Mughal queens, who enthusiastically adopted this Iranian sport, as did the Rajput queens. This theme is depicted in the Pahari miniatures, particularly those of Guler.

Playing *chaupar* (chess), buying jewelry, flying kites, and taming pigeons were some of the indoor activities depicted in paintings. A common subject painted by the Bundi school is a cat catching a pigeon or a parrot, with the agitated women trying to save the bird. Other paintings show the king enjoying festivals like Teej, Holi, and Gangaur with his queens. One of the beautiful illustrations of a king enjoying the Teej festival, painted in 1770 in the Bundi style, is in the collection of Victoria and Albert Museum, London. In the same museum can also be seen a painting depicting *Maharana Chhatarsal of Kotah Celebrating the Festival of Gangaur*, painted at Kotah in 1870.

Painting by Hearsay

A large number of terrace party scenes showing the queen attending a musical concert were done during the later years of Muhammad Shah (r. 1719–1748). Due to the king's inability to govern, his wife Udham Bai became politically powerful. A very interesting painting by Meer

Moran, in the collection of Edwin Benny, depicts women in European dress entertaining the queen, who sits authoritatively on a decorated *chowki* (throne). The inscription on the painting states that it was a New Year's gift to the queen in the twenty-third regnal year of Muhammad Shah, 1742.

How were these depictions of the forbidden areas painted? As male outsiders were not allowed inside the harem, it is likely that these paintings were based on eyewitness accounts, with information provided by one of the queen's attendants supplemented by the artist's imagination. And some of the artists were women. A famous artist of the Mughal period, for instance, was Safia Banu, who was well-known as a painter around 1620. Some women were also experts in the art of calligraphy.

*Kalpna Desai
Vandana Prapanna*

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KISHANGARH

Bordered by the Rajput Rathor centers of Jodhpur and Jaipur, close to the sacred Lake Pushkar, Kishangarh was founded in 1609 by Maharaja Kishan Singh (r. 1609–1615). His descendant Rup Singh (r. 1643–1658) developed the state and supported its unique arts, as did Rai Singh (r. 1706–1748).

A synthesis of Mughal artistic idioms with the conventions of the provincial schools of Rajput Rathor in the eighteenth through the late nineteenth centuries gave birth to the brilliant school of Kishangarh painting, with its lyrical and delicate yet exaggerated treatment of human figures. Kishangarh landscapes, with their huge white palace backdrops, also reveal a distinct individuality, in contrast to those of the late Mughal and neighboring Rajput schools of Marwar, Jaipur, Bundi, Mewar, and

Malwa. Kishangarh paintings are specially dedicated to the Vaishnava *bhakti* (devotion), or the passionate love of Krishna and Rādhā, unlike other schools dominated by Brahman painters.

A new golden era of Kishangarh art began from the period of Maharaja Savant Singh (r. 1748–1758), who helped the Marathas fight against his brother Sardar Singh, forcing a partition of the state in 1755. Savant Singh's romance with a singer and concubine, Bani Thani, became a very popular subject of local paintings.

The artist Nihal Chand (1710–1782?), a *surdhaj* Brahman, started his artistic career at the age of fifteen. His palette consisted of rich reds, white, and greens, with a range of grays to black. He received training in the local styles from the masters, and he is thought to have initiated *bhakti* paintings in the Kishangarh school. The most famous among his (attributed) works is the *jharokha* bust portrait of Bani Thani, which incorporates all the unique qualities and exaggerated features of this school, such as the large curving eyes with arched eyebrows, pointed nose, and chin. His other notable work, *Godbuli vela* (The hour of cowdust), at the National Museum, New Delhi, depicts a tall blue-colored Krishna with an hourglass waist.

Based on the poetry of Nagari Das, the conventional three-tiered painting *Boat of Love* (National Museum, New Delhi, c. 1730–1735) depicts, against a late night background, finely rendered grand local palaces, lush greenery on the bank of a river, and stylized human figures (especially the haloed Krishna-Rādhā). The naturalistic treatments of cows in *Krishna Milking Cows* (National Museum, New Delhi) is reminiscent of late Mughal idioms.

Between 1755 and 1766, Kishangarh paintings flourished, including a small number of large-sized miniatures, among the most interesting works of the style. Sardar Singh (d. 1781) of Rupnagar, like his father Savant Singh, was a significant patron. Secular subjects, such as hunting, boating, and *darbar* scenes, emerged as common themes. The brilliant painter Amar Chand (1754–1812) succeeded Nihal Chand, working at both Rupnagar and Kishangarh. His *Moonlight Darbar of Sardar Singh* (c. 1764) is outstanding in size and workmanship, depicting monumental architecture and tiny human figures. His colleagues Joshi Sawai Ram and Suratram, his son Budhlal, and Surajmal (son of Nihal Chand) also enriched the atelier. Later Mughal styles were blended with local Kishangarh idioms. Other painters of the time, like Sitaram (another son of Nihal Chand), tried their best to follow Chand's idioms, but created disproportionate and unromantic figures, rendering female bust portraits or *darbar* and outdoor scenes. Bahadur Singh, a cousin of Savant Singh, evoked *vir ras* (valor) in

Kishangarh paintings. The stiff figures delineated by Sitaram indicated his decline, yet he produced some new compositions, including scenes from the epic Rāmāyana. But his style was more rigid in form and his figures more angular.

Birad Singh (r. 1781–1788) stabilized Kishangarh's political situation. During the reigns of Rai Kalyan Singh (1797–1838), Mokham Singh (1838–1841), and Prithvi Singh (1840–1880), Kishangarh painting declined. Perhaps due to both the advent of the British Company school and the new medium of photography, the delicacy and lyrical quality of the earlier paintings was replaced by a static, harsh appearance. In modern times, some artists attempt to continue the style, using large panels and shading their figures, but one can hardly consider this an actual continuation of the unique Kishangarh style.

Naval Krishna
Manu Krishna

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KOTAH

The state of Kotah, near Bundi, is located in the eastern part of Rajasthan, surrounded by Jaipur and Gwalior on the north, the state of Bundi to the west, the state of Udaipur on the south, and Rajgarh in the east. Like Bundi, Kotah enjoys extraordinary physical features. It has vast expanses of fertile land, sprawling mountain ranges, and river gorges covered with dense forests and abundant wildlife, including tigers. Its rich flora and fauna, reflected through its paintings, have made this state well known the world over.

Due to the close proximity of Kotah and Bundi, there is a uniformity of cultural traditions. Initially, Kotah style began as a simple variant of the Bundi idiom, so much so that in some of the early examples of paintings, the similarity of style, treatment of landscape, color schemes, and identical subject matter made it difficult even for scholars to differentiate between the two. Since the same dynastic family ruled the entire area, it was natural to find close contacts between states and artists.

Kotah, the land of the Hada Rajputs, was called Hadaoti, which comprised the old states of Bundi and

Kotah. Though Kotah began as an offshoot of Bundi in A.D. 1624, it surpassed Bundi in its economic and cultural progress. It was the fifth largest among the native states to enter the Indian Union in 1948. The antiquity of the Hada Rajputs goes back to A.D. 1241, to Rao Deva ("Rao" is the title of the Hada Rajputs), whose grandson Jaitsi pushed the Hadas across the Chambal River where Koteya, the chief of the Bhil tribes, ruled. After killing Koteya, Jaitsi offered his severed head to the construction of the citadel and the palace complex as a human sacrifice, and the town that grew around it was named Kotah.

According to some scholars, the earliest evidence of Bundi painting can be traced to an early *Ragamala* series painted at Chunar near Banaras in A.D. 1591. The painters of this series were Muslims who may have had some formal training at the Mughal atelier. It is apparent that Kotah artists may have treated these sets as a model, later developing (by about 1650) their own style, with certain elements borrowed from the nearby Mewar school. At the same time, a marked Deccani influence is also discernible in both schools, as the Hada rulers had campaigned in the Deccan from early Mughal rule until the end of Aurangzeb's reign in 1707.

A long genealogy of monarchs followed Kotah's first independent ruler, Rao Madho Singh (r. 1624–1640). Rao Jagat Singh (r. 1657–1684) deserves special mention; during his reign Kotah assumed an independent status as a school of painting. A few portrait studies, as well as the famous Kotah Bhāgavata, are attributed to this period. Maharao Durjan Sal (r. 1723–1756) and Maharao Ummed Singh (r. 1770–1819) were hunting enthusiasts, and *shikar* paintings (hunting scenes) became immensely popular during their reigns. The Kotah repository includes breathtaking hunting scenes from the Kotah palace collection.

The uniqueness of Kotah painting lies in its wonderful landscapes, which appear throughout its range of subjects, from mythological to political to social and genre paintings. Lush green vegetation, with a great variety of trees, plants, and vines, is depicted under a sky that is often filled with tumultuous rain clouds in hues of orange, grey, and blue. Large expanses of green undulating mounds, tall palms, and flowering shrubs and bushes, inhabited by colorful birds and animals, are the usual settings for the *Barahmasa* and *Ragamala* paintings. Architecture is limited to single- or double-storied buildings with prominent *chhajas* (weather sheds), windows and doors with rolled-up curtains, and floors overlaid with carpets. Men and women have flesh of an almost orange tint, with prominent stippling suggesting a cast shadow that highlights the contours of the face and body. Outdoor settings invariably have plantain groves, waterfronts with aquatic birds, and pairs of Saras cranes.

The upsurge of Vaishnavism in Rajasthan in the seventeenth century resulted in the production of a number of miniature paintings and manuscripts devoted to Krishna *bhakti* (devotion to Krishna). Popular poetic works like Bhāgavata Dashama Skanda (the tenth canto of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa), the *Gītā Govinda* of Jayadeva, and the *Rasikapriya* and the *Kavipriya* of Kashavadasa became favorite subjects of the Kotah painters, as did the *Rāgamālā* and the *Barahmasa*. Among these subjects, the *Barahmasa* (the depiction of 12 seasons indicating the responses of the divine couple, Rādhā and Krishna), painted against the background of seasonal flora and fauna and festival celebrations, particularly caught the eye of the Kotah painter. Two such complete sets are in the collection of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (formerly known as the Prince of Wales of Museum) in Mumbai. The *Rāgamālā* (the pictorial representation of musical modes in color) were also appreciated by the masses and the elites alike.

In keeping with the Rajasthani tradition of maintaining an atelier or *karkhanas* (workshop) of painters, the Kotah rulers, impressed and influenced by the contemporary grandeur of the late Mughal emperors, encouraged portraiture and *darbar* (court) scenes on the one hand, and *shikar* (hunting) scenes on the other. Toward the end of the eighteenth century emerged some of the most astonishing elephant studies ever produced. The painting of Maharao Durjan Sal's elephant, *Kishnaprasad*, by Sheikh Taju, reveals a careful rendering of the contours of his dark and wrinkled body within a composition that dramatizes swift action; the elephant lifts a cheetah in his trunk, while the excited *mahavat* (driver) raises his *ankush* (an item of armor with a spearhead-like front) to control the elephant's fury. Tiger hunts in the jungles of Kotah were also among the favorite subjects of Kotah painters. *Maharao Ummed Singh I and His Chief Minister Zalim Singh Shooting Tigers*, attributed to Sheikh Taju, is one such breathtaking visual narrative.

The last known ruler of Kotah was Ram Singh II (r. 1827–1865). A king with nominal political authority, he was the last great patron of the arts. The political decline of Kotah during his time favored the development of painting to a great extent, as the king devoted all of his energy to religious festivities, court celebrations, and patronage of the arts. Fond of jewelry, clothing, hunts, the harem, and performances, his art collection included a large number of dated and inscribed drawings, as well as paintings using a peculiar green color imported from Germany of the nineteenth century. One such masterpiece, *Ram Singh II of Kotah and Companions Celebrating Holi*, inscribed with the name of Kishan Das, dated 1844, is now at the National Gallery of Victoria in Melbourne.

Shridhar Andhare

See also **Barahmasa**; **Rāgamālā**

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MARWAR AND THIKANAS

Marwar, a region in western Rajasthan, corresponds to Jodhpur state, formerly ruled by the Rathor dynasty of Rajputs. Other Rajput states founded by members of the same clan include Kishangarh and Bikaner. Marwar painting developed mainly in the court at Jodhpur, though subclans of the Rathors also held smaller territories (called *thikanas*) within Marwar, and some of these smaller courts also developed a distinctive local, *thikana* style.

Jodhpur was founded by Rao Jodha in 1459, but came under Mughal rule in 1570. The Jodhpur rulers married into the Mughal dynasty and were given appointments as military commanders of the Mughal army, in an attempt to ensure their loyalty. Their constant attendance at the Mughal court and their exposure to Mughal arts and culture is reflected in Marwar court art from the mid-seventeenth century onward. Mughal-inspired portraits and hunting scenes developed, however, alongside a parallel stream of traditional Hindu paintings, which were being produced at the Jodhpur court and in the *thikanas* during the same period.

The earliest surviving example of painting from the Marwar region is the so-called Pali *rāgamālā*. This charming set of thirty-seven paintings illustrating musical modes (*rāgas*) has a dated colophon, which states that it was painted at Pali in Marwar by Pandit Virji in 1623 for Sri Gopal Dasji and his son Bithal Das. The style of the paintings is related to that of Jain manuscript paintings and book covers from Rajasthan and Gujarat, but the style also contains elements of what has come to be known as the Early Rajput or Chaurapanchāsika style. These elements include flat, boxlike architectural settings, a dark background that does not meet the top of the page but instead terminates in a jagged edge, strong colors, and bold decorative patterns, especially chevrons, checks, and stylized lotus petals.

Although the Pali set is the only securely datable evidence for painting in Marwar at this time, other undated manuscripts and dispersed pages confirm that this was not unique. The dispersed manuscript of the *Kathakalpataru*, for example, shows the same distinctive figures as does the Pali set, and may have been made for a Rajput patron, perhaps even Bithal Das. Unrelated *ragamala* pages dating from the first half of the seventeenth century also bear witness to the development of styles in Marwar as well as in neighboring Mewar (Udaipur).

While these very traditional themes and subjects dominated painting in Marwar at this time, Mughal forms, especially portraits, started to become popular from the middle of the seventeenth century under Maharaja Jaswant Singh (r. 1638–1678). Several very fine group portraits of Jaswant Singh and his nobles survive in the form of both drawings and finished paintings, dating from about the 1640s to 1660s, which show the extremely high quality attained by the Jodhpur artists, who must have been exposed to Mughal training. This emulation of Mughal forms would remain the basis of the Jodhpur court style until its demise in the mid-nineteenth century, and conventions such as the *jharokha* portrait, the group portrait, and the equestrian portrait all continued to play major roles.

After Maharaja Jaswant Singh's death in 1678, a succession dispute arose over the legitimacy of his posthumous son Ajit Singh. As a result, Jodhpur once again came under direct Mughal rule until the death of the emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, when Ajit Singh was able to reclaim his throne after nearly thirty years in hiding. Two paintings from his reign show that the Jodhpur artists were starting to move from the static portraits of the seventeenth century to adopt more ambitious compositions, and on a larger scale. One of these paintings, dated 1722, depicts a procession; the other is a hunting scene, dated 1718. In both, Ajit Singh is the center of attention, surrounded by courtiers and attendants who have already started to take on the distinctive appearance characteristic of eighteenth-century Marwar painting. Their large almond eyes, curling moustaches, and prominent noses recall the figures in the Pali *rāgamālā* and other early paintings, and there is also some influence from the neighboring state of Mewar, where Ajit Singh grew up in exile, and where he married a local princess. The earthy colors, dominated by yellow and green, and angular profiles that appear at this period continue to characterize painting in Marwar, and especially that of the *thikanas*, throughout the eighteenth century.

Several single paintings datable to around 1720 to 1730 are typical of this newly emerging Marwar style, in which Mughal traces are visible in the format (that of the group portrait, for example), while the palette of colors and the style of drawing are clearly far removed from the refined late Mughal style of the same period. Among the most characteristic of this type is the elegant portrait of a nobleman with a buck, now in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (formerly known as the Prince of Wales of Museum), Mumbai; others are in the Victoria and Albert Museum, the British Museum, and private collections. Around this time, painting in the *thikanas* of Marwar also started to develop, and among the most active patrons of painting were the *thakurs* of Ghanerao, situated on the border of Marwar and Mewar. A fine

group portrait of Thakur Pratap Singh of Ghanerao (r. 1714–1720) and his nobles, datable to around 1715 or 1720, shows the same earthy colors and sparse line as the portrait of the noble with a buck. Several portraits have survived of his successor, Thakur Padam Singh (r. 1720–1742). Probably the finest is a *darbar* (court) scene of the *thakur* with his nobles, sons, and officials ascribed to a Jodhpur artist named Chhajju and dated 1725, which is now in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya. Much of the work produced for Padam Singh and his successor Viram Dev (r. 1743–1778) has an undeniably “folky” feel, and was undoubtedly created by local artists rather than those (like Chhajju) who were connected to Jodhpur itself; they are still, however, very recognizable within the Marwar tradition (for example, a group portrait of Padam Singh and nobles by Manno, dated 1721, and a scene of Thakur Viram Dev worshipping at a Shiva shrine, from about 1745, both now in the Victoria & Albert Museum).

While this local style was developing in Jodhpur and the *thikanas* in the early eighteenth century, Maharaja Abhai Singh (r. 1724–1749) was commissioning some exceptionally fine paintings in pure Mughal style from a Delhi artist named Dalchand whom he employed in Jodhpur. Dalchand was the son of Bhawani Das, a renowned artist in Kishangarh, and elements of the Kishangarh style (for example, the exaggerated, curving lines of the horses, and of women’s eyes) are also sometimes visible in Dalchand’s work. Superb paintings by Dalchand from around 1725 include a large scene of Abhai Singh watching a nautch (a dance performance), an equestrian portrait of the maharaja with attendants (both still in Jodhpur), and two standing portraits of Abhai Singh with the poet Prithvi Raj (one dated 1727). Court paintings from Jodhpur of the mid-eighteenth century show Dalchand’s influence in their formality and attention to detail. Abhai Singh’s son and successor, Ram Singh, ruled for only two years (1749–1751), but left many highly distinctive portraits of himself and his nobles, wearing the toweringly tall turbans that were the fashion in Jodhpur in the mid-eighteenth century.

The next major phase in Marwar painting comes with the reign of Maharaja Man Singh (r. 1803–1843), the last period in which creative and innovative artists were at work in Jodhpur. After the murder of his Nath sect guru by discontented nobles in 1815, Man Singh became a virtual recluse, and in 1839 the British army took control of Jodhpur. In spite of what must have been a somewhat subdued atmosphere at court, many exuberant scenes of court life and festivities were produced during Man Singh’s reign, including many large scenes showing the celebration of Holi and other festivals, and hedonistic scenes of Man Singh with his consorts in his gardens or at the hunt.

Man Singh also commissioned many sets of immense paintings to illustrate Hindu texts such as the Durgā Charitra, the Shiva Rahasya, the Shiva Purāṇa and the Rāmāyaṇa. Measuring between 47 inches (120 centimeters) and 53 inches (134 centimeters) in width, these huge sets range from 56 folios (the Durgā Charitra) to 109 (the Shiva Purāṇa) and are vibrantly colored and superbly painted and composed. Man Singh also commissioned sets of large paintings illustrating subjects relating to the Nath sect: the Siddh Siddhant, the Nath Purāṇa and the Nath Charitra. There are also hundreds of single paintings either of solitary Nath gurus, or of Man Singh paying homage to them.

Although Man Singh’s successor Takhat Singh (r. 1843–1873) continued to patronize painting, employing several of the same artists who worked for Man Singh, the paintings produced during his reign were mostly stiff and unimaginative. This decline in artistic standards paved the way for the demise of painting in Jodhpur with the adoption of photography during the reign of its modernizing maharaja, Jaswant Singh II (r. 1873–1895).

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MINTO, LORD (1845–1914), viceroy of India (1905–1910). Gilbert Elliot, the fourth earl of Minto, was viceroy of India from 1905 to 1910. Great-grandson of the first earl, who had been Whig governor-general of India from 1807 to 1813, Lord Minto served as governor-general of Canada from 1898 to 1904 before being sent to India by A. J. Balfour’s Tory government. Though his name is historically linked to Secretary of State for India John Morley (as coauthors of the Morley-Minto Reforms), “Mr. Rolly” (Minto’s nickname) was more interested in riding horses than in constitutional reforms.

Soon after Minto reached India, Balfour’s Tory government was soundly defeated in the 1905 general elections in Britain by Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberals, bringing reform-minded John Morley to Whitehall as India’s secretary of state. Imperial London’s old palace

guard feared, however, that recalling Viceroy Minto from India so soon after he had reached Calcutta (Kolkata), in the heart of recently partitioned, rebellious Bengal, might send a “dangerous” signal of “weakness” to India’s National Congress leadership. They chose to leave India to suffer four years of harsh repression under Minto’s inept governance, rather than immediately replacing him. Minto’s predecessor, Lord Curzon, had left India following his October 1905 division of Bengal through its Bengali-speaking midland. This most provocative legacy was viewed by India’s National Congress as “perfidious Albion’s” plan to divide and rule with a vengeance.

Minto’s own major legacy was to receive a delegation of thirty-five Muslim aristocrats, led by the Aga Khan, at his viceregal mansion in Simla on 1 October 1906, and to assure them that any “electoral representation” granted by any constitutional reform would “safeguard” their “Mohammedan community,” giving them special weight and separate electorates. That promise, made from Minto’s viceregal “throne,” irrevocably committed British India to granting its Muslim minority a disproportionate number of separately elected representatives on every legislative council, central as well as provincial, from that time until the British left India divided in 1947. That single promise was, as one of Minto’s officials so effusively told him, nothing less than “the pulling back of sixty-two million” Muslims from joining the “seditious opposition” of India’s National Congress. Two months later, the All-India Muslim League held its first meeting in Dacca (Dhaka), capital of the newly created Muslim-majority province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Forty-five years after that, the Muslim League’s Dominion of Pakistan was born, carved out of Muslim-majority provinces of northern India.

Minto left India in 1910, when Morley, after appointing Liberal Viceroy Lord Hardinge to succeed Minto, left Whitehall. One of Hardinge’s first acts was to propose the belated reunification of Bengal, announced by King George V at his coronation *darbar* in Delhi on 12 December 1911. But Minto’s separatist legacy assured its second division in 1947, and along the very same line as the first; with the latter partition, what had been Eastern Bengal became East Pakistan (and after 1971, Bangladesh).

Stanley Wolpert

See also **All-India Muslim League; Bengal; British Crown Raj; Morley, John**

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MĪRABAI (c. 1500–1545), bhakti saint and poet.

Mīrabai is one of India’s most popular *bhakti* saints, a Rajput princess who wrote fourteen hundred ecstatic *padas* (short devotional songs) to Krishna as Giridhar Gōpal, the divine cowherd who lifted a mountain to save his followers. Mīrabai composed hymns in Rajasthani; in the Hindi dialect of Braj Bhāsha, the language spoken in Mathura, Krishna’s mythical birthplace; and in Gujarati, the language spoken in his mythical kingdom of Dwārakā. Her *padas* were sung, and her imprint on North Indian classical music is seen in the name of the *rāga* (melody) “Mīrabai ki Malhār.” Mīrabai’s sensuous verses highlight her divine lover’s beauty, the agony of separation, and their beatific union. In one metaphor, Krishna’s lips are like nectar, as sweet as curds; in another, her pain at separation is like the agony of a tree gnawed by insects. Despite her tone of intimacy with Krishna, her poems focus on her yearning for a surreal, sublime union, in contrast to Andal (6th century) and Akkamahadevi (12th century) who sometimes described their spiritual journey in sensual lyrics.



The Bhīl woman tasted them, plum after plum,
and found one she could offer him.
What kind of genteel breeding was this?
and hers was no ravishing beauty,
Her family was poor, her caste quite low,
her clothes a matter of rags,
Yet Ram took that fruit—that touched, spoiled fruit
for he knew that it stood for her love.
What sort of Vēda could she have learned?
But quick as a flash she mounted a chariot
And sped to heaven to swing on a swing,
tied by love to God.
You are the Lord who cares for the fallen;
rescue whoever loves as she did:
Let Mīra, your servant, safely cross over,
A cowherding Gōkul girl.

(Translated by John Stratton Hawley and Mark Juergensmeyer, in Susie Tharu and K. Lalitha, eds., *Women Writing in India: 600 B.C. to the Present*, vol. 1, New York: Feminist Press, 1991.)



Painting of Mirabai. With Krishna (here present as an apparition) never far from her heart, she was said to propagate *bhakti* (eternal devotion) through her music. RASHROTHAN PARISHAD / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

For Mirabai, Vishnu was the Lord of the universe yet resided in the soul (*antarayāmin*). Inspired by the Bhāgavata Purāṇa like the other North Indian upper caste saints, Chaitanya (b. 1486), Sūrdās (sixteenth century), and Tulsidās (1532–1623), Mirabai worshiped a God with attributes (*saguna bhakti*), using metaphors to revel in his names (*nāma*) and forms (*rūpa*). In contrast, working-class saints (*sants*) like Kabir, the fifteenth-century weaver, drew upon the Upanishadic vision of an “Unmanifest Being beyond attributes” (*nirguna*), encompassing the universe, yet uncontained by temple or icon. The difference between the two traditions lay only in the paths, as they shared an identical goal, that of spiritual knowledge and *moksha*, or freedom from the cycle of births and deaths (*samsāra*).

The earliest hagiography is dated 1712 as facts enriched by legends. Mirabai's father was the powerful Rathor clan *rānā* (ruler) of Jodhpur (Marwar), and her family ruled Mēṛta near Ajmer. In 1516 they allied themselves politically with Chittōr (Mewar) by marrying Mīra

to Bhōja Rājā, heir to the Sisōdia Rānā Sangha, who met the Mughal Babur in battle in 1527. Even as a girl, Mīrabai distanced herself from courtly preoccupations by visiting *sadbhus* (renunciants) who gave her an image of Krishna, with whom she became enamored.

Declaring that Krishna was her true husband, Mīrabai rejected her husband's bed, and she remained childless. She sought *sadbhus*, and danced in front of the temple, in direct opposition to patriarchal Rajput notions of chaste wives and clan loyalties. Tradition states that Bhōja Rājā first suspected her infidelity, but realized that her lover was divine. In any case, at his death, she repudiated widowhood and refused to become a *sati* who immolated herself on her husband's funeral pyre. Mīrabai describes his family's attempts to kill her, and her escape through Krishna's intercession. Their gift of a basket of snakes turned into a garland around her neck; when they sent her poison, it turned into ambrosia when she drank it. She appears to have left then for Dwārakā, but she was hounded by the powerful Rajput community. Mīrabai is believed to have finally disappeared into Krishna's image at a shrine.

Despite her acts of marital insubordination, some feminists suggest that Mīrabai was a conformist who reinforced the hierarchy between the genders by calling herself Krishna's *dāsi* (slave). Others point to her dismissal of Rajput paradigms for women, and of caste boundaries, as demonstrated by her poem in which she identifies with the low caste woman Sabari, who tasted plums before offering them to Lord Rāma.

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MISSIONARIES, CHRISTIAN. See **British Impact; Portuguese in India.**

MIZORAM One of the “Seven Sisters,” Mizoram is one of seven small tribal states in the Northeast region of India. The picturesque capital of some 350,000 people, Aizawl, at 3,715 feet (1,132 m) above sea level, is built on tiers on the steep hillside. The twenty or so major hills of the state have an average altitude of some 2,600 feet (792 m). In the south is Mizoram’s second-largest town, Lungleh, with about 140,000 people, and nearby is the “Phawngpui,” the Blue Mountain, from which there is a breathtaking view of the Bay of Bengal. The heavy rains of the monsoon from May to September define the life of the state, allowing the cultivation of rice, which Mizos eat at least three times a day and with which they make the rice beer, *zu*, that plays an important role in their numerous dance festivals. The *cheraw*, or bamboo dance, the most popular and the most colorful Mizo dance, is performed using long pairs of horizontal staves that are tapped open and together in rhythmic beat as the dancers step in and out. It is a dance similar to those of parts of Southeast Asia. The *khullam*, or dance for the guests, is performed by guests wearing the traditional Mizo cloth of black, red, green, and blue stripes wrapped around the shoulders.

The population of Mizoram, of over a dozen tribes, was by 2004 about 9 million people, most of whom are Christians. The state has the highest literacy rate in India, an average of about 90 percent for men and 86 percent for women. The Mizos, first known as Kukis, were part of the great wave of Mongolians who settled in Western Burma before moving on to northeastern India. The Lushais came later, and the area became known as the Lushai Hills. A tribal chief ruled the village. The Mizo code of ethics revolves around *tlawmngaibna*, hospitality and kindness and self-sacrifice for others, which young men learn while they live in a bachelor dormitory, or *zawlbuk*. In theory, the youngest son inherits all property, but in practice the inheritance is shared among all the sons. A bride price is paid by the groom, but the money is shared by the parents, elder sister, and paternal aunt in the bride’s family, as a spirit of family and community well-being pervades Mizo society. Everyone who receives any bride price money is also responsible for the care of the bride. The care of widows and orphans is also a collective family responsibility.

In 1895 the British declared Mizo Hills as part of British India, and the Mizo Common People’s Union, later known as the Mizo Union, was formed on 9 April 1946 to represent Mizo interests. The United Mizo Freedom Party demanded that the Lushai Hills join

Burma on independence, but under the Indian Constitution the Lushai Hills Autonomous District Council came into being in 1952. In 1955 the Eastern India Union was formed of tribals in eastern India, the same year the Mizo Cultural Society was formed, with noted Mizo leader Pu Laldenga as its secretary. In 1959 the “Mautam famine” devastated the Mizo hills, and the Mizo Cultural Society became first the Mautam Front and then, in 1960, the Mizo National Famine Front, and finally, in 1961, the Mizo National Front. It initiated the widespread violence of the Mizo Insurgency of February 1966 and was outlawed the following year, but Laldenga and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed on 20 February 1987 that Mizoram would become the twenty-third state of the Indian Union.

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See also **Gandhi, Rajiv; Tribal Politics**

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MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY ART

Modernity in Indian art can be said to have begun at the end of the seventeenth century with the setting up of trading interests in Calcutta by the British East India Company. The British occupation of India swiftly replaced the indigenous miniature schools with naturalistic company painting, and institutions such as art salons and art schools generated a new breed of Indian elite painters who turned to oils and watercolors in a British style, though often with Indian subjects from myth, portraiture, or landscape.

Raja Ravi Verma (1848–1906) of Kerala was among the most popular of this first generation of Western-style painters. In sculpture, this phase was characterized by academic classicism as exemplified by G. K. Mhatre. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the nationalist (*swadeshi*) movement in Bengal spawned a new movement in art: the artist Abanindranath Tagore (1871–1951) and his students broke away from Western painting styles and self-consciously sought aesthetic standards and techniques rooted in Indian and Japanese traditions. This movement was also accompanied by and closely connected with the appearance of the discipline of Indian art history, largely the creation of British Orientalists and South Asian nationalists such as E. B. Havell (1861–1934) and Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877–1947).



M. F. Husain. Whatever the medium of his work—whether a painting or an installation—his is an art grounded in both the Hindu and Muslim cultures of village India. INDIA TODAY.

Later designated the “Bengal School,” the fantasy-laden paintings of this movement served as a pervasive influence for many artists throughout India, as major practitioners of this school became heads of art pedagogical institutions by 1925. Particularly in Bengal, the Bengal School has been a major influence to recent times, due largely to the practices of the art school Kala Bhavan, at Rabindranath Tagore’s educational center in Shantiniketan, where Abanindranath Tagore’s foremost disciple Nandalal Bose (1882–1966) headed a progressive offshoot of this school. Nandalal Bose, along with his senior students and other teachers at Kala Bhavan, such as Benodebehari Mukherjee (1904–1980), Ramkinkar Baij (1906–1980), and Prosanto Roy (1908–1973), fashioned a contextual Bengali modernism that has left its enduring stamp on this region. As a sculptor, Baij’s monumental groupings of tribal life opened the way for an indigenous vital expressionism in modern Indian sculpture.

Another institution founded by Gaganendranath and Abanindranath Tagore and prominent in the dissemination of Bengal School styles and ideas was the Calcutta-based Indian Society of Oriental Art, headed by Kshitindra Nath Majumdar. Two major sculptors to emerge from this school were Chintamani Kar (b. 1915)

and Meera Mukherjee (1923–1998). Taking after the Neo-Primitivism of Ramkinkar Baij, Meera Mukherjee adopted the tribal technique of Bastar lost-wax bell metal casting to create monumental single and multiple figure compositions of empathic tenderness taken from everyday life (*Boatman*, *Bauls*, etc.), myth (*Cosmic Dancer*, *Buddha*), or history (*Asboka at Kalinga*).

Contemporary artists who can be seen as continuing in some way the legacy of the Bengal School include Ganesh Pyne (b. 1937), Ramananda Bandyopadhyay (b. 1936), Lalu Prosad Shaw (b. 1937), Suhas Roy (b. 1936), Sakti Burman (b. 1935), Biswarup Datta (b. 1951) and Anjan Chakrabarty (b. 1956). The most celebrated contemporary figure among these is Ganesh Pyne. Shy and reclusive by nature, Pyne’s haunting fantasies draw viewers into surreal landscapes where history, reality and folklore intersect. Superb draftsmanship and very subtle washed color tonalities combine in his paintings to bring to life his worlds of magic.

The Bengal School’s attempt at defining an Indian “national” style was not without contestation or alternate formulations; artists such as Abanindranath’s brother Gaganendranath Tagore (1867–1938) and their uncle,



Anjolie Ela Menon. Menon before her work in 1995. Though the artist disdains facile categorization of her work, the human figure is prominent in much of it, as is an iconography of distance and loss. MATTHEW TITUS / FOTOMEDIA.

the famous poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), were among the earliest to embrace Western modernist idioms in their work. While Gaganendranath expressed a critical sensibility through his expressionistic cartoons and evoked magic worlds using a Cubist-influenced style, Rabindranath mined the inchoate forms of the subconscious in a mode reminiscent of German Expressionism. These two were also responsible for India's first exhibition of Western modernist painting, with a showing of Bauhaus artists in Calcutta in 1922. More grim versions of Gaganendranath's political and social satire may be seen in the paintings of some contemporary artists, like Paritosh Sen (b. 1918) and Chowdhury (b. 1939). The late 1920s and 1930s saw the gradual growth of other approaches towards Indian modernism. Jamini Roy (1917–1972) in Bengal adopted a decorative iconic style based on folk scrolls and the urban folk art of Kalighat, which became a powerful influence for later painters of Bengal. Artists like Dharmanarayan Dasgupta (1939–1998),

Ramananda Bandyopadhyay (b. 1936), Biswarup Datta (b. 1951), and Paresh Maity (b. 1965) are among those who have assimilated this trend.

The 1940s

Amrita Sher-Gil (1913–1941), of half-Punjabi and half-Hungarian descent, was among the first twentieth-century Indian artists to be trained in Paris and to fashion a personal artistic style combining Paul Gauguin's Post-Impressionism with the frescos of Ajanta. The fact that the successive art movements of modern Europe drew on non-Western sources for inspiration is here mirrored in an Indian seeking affiliation with Western modernism. The recognition of modernity as a global phenomenon, emanating from Europe and producing forms of cultural critique with international applicability, becomes the basis for developing indigenous national or regional adaptations or reflections of these forms. A cross-cultural vocabulary thus comes into existence where, for instance, Henri Matisse finds a regional echo in Jamini Roy, and both artists can influence the contemporary adaptations of Paresh Maity.

This trend of looking westward for an international idiom gained momentum in the 1940s, along with an impending sense of India's national independence. A number of artists' collectives were organized in major cities such as Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, and Madras. The Calcutta Artists' Group, founded in 1942, was among the earliest of these, with a number of its members expressing leftist sentiments and traveling to Paris for training. Gopal Ghose (1913–1980), Nirode Majumdar (1916–1982), Rathin Maitra (1913–1997), Paritosh Sen (b. 1918), and Govardhan Ash (1907–1996) were some of the prominent members of this group. Of these, it is the Post-Impressionistic lyricism of Gopal Ghose and the sharp political satire of Paritosh Sen that are perhaps the most memorable. The simultaneous rise to prominence of the Communist Party, along with the disaster of a manmade famine in Bengal in 1943, spawned a sterner strain of Marxist-inspired iconography, with artists like Zainul Abedin (1914–1976), Chittaprosad (1915–1978), and Somenath Hore (b. 1920). Hore is better known as a sculptor, his emaciated figures of oppressed and poverty-stricken life executed with striking originality.

Modernist ideals and tendencies similar to those of the Calcutta Group were behind the Progressive Painters' Association founded in Madras in 1944, the Progressive Artists' Group (PAG) in Bombay in 1947, and the Delhi Shilpi Chakra in Delhi in 1949. One of the painters of the Delhi Shilpi Chakra, Ramkumar (b. 1924), also trained in Paris, went on to become one of India's most celebrated painters of semiabstract landscape. Another prominent contemporary artist encouraged by

the Delhi Shilpi Chakra, Satish Gujral (b. 1925), studied under David Alfaro Siqueiros in Mexico and developed a highly individual painterly idiom based on an expressionistic Surrealism. Another art institution, the Triveni Kala Sangam, was founded in New Delhi in 1951 and has fostered a new breed of prominent contemporary artists. At its inception, the art division of Triveni was headed by K. S. Kulkarni (1918–1994), a role currently filled by Rameshwar Broota (b. 1941). Some of Broota's students at Triveni who have earned international recognition are Vasundhara Tewari (b. 1955) and Surinder Kaur (b. 1955).

The Progressive Artists' Group (PAG) of Bombay, several of whose members have assumed iconic status in India's modernist canon, was the most vocal and assertive of the collectives of the 1940s. The founding members of this group were M. F. Husain (b. 1915), F. N. Souza (1924–2002), K. H. Ara (1913–1985), S. K. Bakre (b. 1920), H. A. Gade (b. 1917), and S. H. Raza (b. 1922). Powerfully instrumental in the rise to prominence of this group were three Germans, Rudy von Leyden, Walter Langhammer, and E. Schlesinger, who had immigrated to India after the rise of Nazism. The first two were art writers working for the English-language newspaper the *Times of India*. The third was a businessman-patron of the PAG. Also influential, as a teacher of contemporary art to several members of the PAG and other Bombay artists of this period, was S. B. Palsikar (1917–1984). The three most important painters of the PAG, Souza, Husain, and Raza, hail from minority religions of India, the first born a Roman Catholic and the other two Muslim, and each has staked a distinctive claim as a visual spokesman for a national modernism. Each of these has also been influential as a formative source for different directions of contemporary Indian art. Souza can be seen as the most individualistic of these artists, his paintings exerting powerful expressionistic distortions to landscapes and human forms, suggesting a sexuality intensified through repression. Husain, the most celebrated living Indian artist today, aligned himself from the beginning with a Nehruvian project of secular nation-building, and has woven eclectic modern myths from varied religious and popular sources in his works. Raza, beginning with abstraction, has settled into an experimentation with the mystical geometric forms of Tantra, a message of personal transformation that has gained increasing popularity since the 1960s. V. S. Gaitonde (1924–2001), another important artist, joined the PAG in 1950. Gaitonde's abstractions turned increasingly toward a minimalism of color and form dictated by the contemplative exigencies of Zen combined with textural and compositional affinities as varied as the works of Paul Klee and the miniatures of Basholi.

A number of the artists of this generation traveled to Europe to absorb firsthand the exciting legacy of the

successive movements of modernism. Paritosh Sen of the Calcutta Group, Ramkumar of the Delhi Shilpi Chakra, and S. H. Raza of the Progressive Artists' Group traveled to Paris in the 1950s and came under the tutelage of André Lhote, an important figure in the dissemination of Cubism. Another Bombay-based artist who was influenced by Cubism in Paris was Jehangir Sabavala (b. 1922), who went on to distill his own essence of a monumental nomadic serenity from Synthetic Cubism. Souza moved to London in 1949. Another close associate of the PAG from Bombay, Tyeb Mehta (b. 1925), moved to London in 1959 and worked there until 1964, before returning to Bombay (Mumbai). Mehta's work extends a *Guernica*-like anguish into an exploration of existential angst expressed in mythical and spatial terms. Akbar Padamsee (b. 1928), also from the Sir J. J. School of Art in Bombay and a friend of the PAG, moved to Paris in 1951 and worked there until 1967. Padamsee, in his portraits and landscapes, combines an intellectual rigor with a burning sensitivity that expresses tenderness and pain.

The 1950s and 1960s

The 1950s and 1960s saw the consolidation of a rich and varied Indian modernism through the assimilation of the successive vocabularies of modernist movements of Europe and America into regional perceptions and ontologies. This was particularly fostered by the founding of regional centers of art headed by artists with articulate ideologies. The Baroda School of Art and the Madras College of Art are two such schools. The art division of the Maharaja Sayajirao University at Baroda, initiated by the lyrical Bengal School-derived modernism of the artist N. S. Bendre (1910–1990) and the sculptor Sankho Chaudhuri (b. 1916), developed an exciting artistic and art critical voice in the 1960s, veering away from internationalism and abstraction to figuration and regionalism. Two major artists of this school are Bhupen Khakkar (1934–2003) and Gulammohammed Sheikh (b. 1937), who eschewed prevailing canons both of Western modernism and a rural or traditional indigenism to open up an urban popular space for Indian modernism. Also seminal in this shift were the efforts of art critic Geeta Kapur. Other important artists to graduate from this school include G. R. Santosh (1929–1997), Himmat Shah (b. 1933), Jyoti Bhatt (b. 1934), and Ratan Parimoo (b. 1936). Among the sculptors from Baroda were students of Sankho Chaudhuri, such as Nagji Patel (b. 1937) and Balbir Katt (b. 1939). While Nagji Patel and Himmat Shah share a vocabulary of primitive naturalism, Balbir Katt chisels monumental stone sculptures, often with metaphysical themes. Mrinalini Mukherjee (b. 1949), daughter of artist Benodebehari Mukherjee, is another major sculptor from Baroda. She studied under K. G. Subramaniam and makes massive shapes using fibers

such as jute or hemp, emulating plant or human forms. Suspended from the ceiling or heaped on the floor, her knotted, twisted and twined three-dimensional forms have a textured organic quality, which is unique. The tradition of originality in sculpture has continued at Baroda; recent names to make a mark include Latika Katt (b. 1953), Dhruva Mistry (b. 1957), and G. Ravinder Reddy (b. 1956). Reddy's fiberglass realism emulates American Pop Art, while Mistry's cool surreal creations seem to have walked out of the paintings of Max Ernst.

Allied to the sculptural experimentations of the Baroda School in the 1960s are the works of two Bombay sculptors, Adi Davierwala and Pилоo Pochkhanawala (1923–1986). Along with Raghav Kaneria of the Baroda School, these two Bombay sculptors turned to junk metal welding for their expression. Davierwala, who worked with wood in the 1950s creating heavy angular geometric forms, discovered a new vocabulary of shapes in junk metal, creating monumental sculptures which protrude and thrust into space while retaining a balanced stillness. Pилоo Pochkhanawala experimented with a number of media and techniques in the 1960s and 1970s, including direct carving, cement and metal casting, finally settling on junk welding, using found forms. Her works highlight the texture and form of her materials and her technique and have tended to move away from solid modeling toward flattened forms that reach out into space. Amarnath Sehgal of Delhi is another important modern pioneer of metal sculpture. His assemblages of human forms are modulated with an eye to their expressive potential in describing social themes, often of inequity or cruelty, as in *Tyranny* or *The Tortured*.

The Madras School, among the early art institutions established by the British in India, underwent a transformation under the leadership of K. C. S. Paniker (1911–1977), who was also instrumental in the founding of an artists' village named Cholamandalam near Madras (Chennai). In his own work, Paniker utilized the geometric mystical symbols of Tantra, though with an intent more visual and aesthetic than spiritual. In doing this, he opened up a new direction for an indigenous form of modern abstraction, which fused the iconic and calligraphic visual aesthetics of artists such as Paul Klee with Indian folk and mystical meditative designs. This coincided with the enhanced interest and presentation in the 1960s of Tantric art by Ajit Mookherjee and others, leading to an important field of Indian abstract exploration, in which spiritual practices are brought together with pure visuality to engender internal transformations. This trend in art has been termed Neo-Tantra after the traveling exhibition of that name which toured Europe and North America in 1984–1986. In addition to S. H. Raza, mentioned above, other Neo-Tantric artists include

G. R. Santosh (1929–1977), Biren De (b. 1926), and Sohan Qadri (b. 1932). Many younger contemporary artists, such as Biswarup Datta (b. 1951) and Amrita Banerji (b. 1965), also make use of visual metaphors taken from this direction, though not with any principled adherence to the forms or ideas of Tantra. The influence of Neo-Tantra can also be seen fused with an American Op Art inspiration in the paintings of diasporic artist Anil Revri (b. 1956), who lives and works in Washington, D.C.

In sculpture, D. P. Roy Chowdhury (1899–1975), a Bengal School follower, was influential as a teacher at the Madras School. Though his own work emulated an Indian version of Rodinesque allegories, his students such as S. Dhanapal (1919–2002) branched off into original terra-cotta and metal figures. Extending Dhanapal's work, metal sculptures in repoussé resembling religious icons became the hallmark of P. V. Janakiraman (1930–1995), and this, in turn, became the basis for the welded shamanic figurines on sheet metal compositions created by S. Nandagopal (b. 1946).

The quest for a modern indigenism in the work of Paniker was paralleled by a number of other artists from different parts of India, such as K. G. Subramanyan (b. 1924), a student of Shantiniketan who later joined the faculty of the Baroda School, and J. Swaminathan (1928–1994), whose own paintings showed a mysticism similar to those of Paniker, drawing on Indian folk and tribal patterns as well as the iconic arrangements of Paul Klee. Swaminathan founded Group 1890 with a number of other artists, with the aim of expressing an immediacy based on regional and local experience. Artists affiliated with this movement include Laxma Goud (b. 1940) and Manjit Bawa (b. 1941). Thota Vaikuntham (b. 1942), a student of K. G. Subramanyan from the Baroda School, also exemplifies this form of indigenism.

Recent Developments

The acceptance of the visual vocabularies of Western modernism as an international affiliation for the global condition of modernity took a further step with the increased technological and economic integration of the world since the 1980s. This has led to diasporic Indian populations all over the world, who, rather than finding an international voice for a regional experience, are presented with the reverse dilemma of articulating global experiences in terms of a subjectivity often formed in India or under conditions of an Indian upbringing. Though several artists who have made their mark in India have gone on to reside abroad, like S. H. Raza (Paris), F. N. Souza (London and New York), and Sohan Qadri (Copenhagen), already mentioned here, a number of artists of Indian origin or upbringing have grown into prominence in the artistic milieu of the West. Anish

Kapoor (b. 1954) is a well-known sculptor from the United Kingdom. Natwar Bhavsar (b. 1934), another renowned artist, lives and works in New York. Bhavsar's cosmic abstractions and Anil Revri's focused optical meditations present a context-free internationalism, like that of Anish Kapoor—an important direction in diasporic art. However, another perspective on the diasporic experience is that presented by photographer and installation artist Allan DeSouza (b. 1958) of Los Angeles. DeSouza's work provides an intelligent social and psychological commentary on nation and identity, working from outside national boundaries to explore their effects on the human psyche.

Since the 1980s, a powerful body of art has been produced by contemporary artists focusing on gender issues. The homoerotic fantasies of Bhupen Khakkar or the feminist polemics of Nalini Malani (b. 1946), Arpana Caur (b. 1954), Arpita Singh (b. 1937), Gogi Saroj Pal (b. 1940), Nilima Sheikh (b. 1945), and others constitute a prominent direction of contemporary Indian art. Moreover, in keeping with contemporary art's revision of its own limits and functions throughout the world, photography, printmaking, video, computer, installation and performance art have gradually come to take center stage in India, displacing the primacy of painting and sculpture. The attempt to de-privilege the masculine spectatorial gaze from its vantage as viewer in context-less galleries or as the possessor of collections has led increasingly to the movement of art from the pictorial space of walls to more intimate and participatory social contexts. This may be interpreted as a movement from the modern to the postmodern in art, and, since the late 1980s, increasing numbers of Indian artists are presenting their ideas, interpretations, and social questions in these forms. Artists like Vivian Sundaram (b. 1943), Ranbir Kaleka (b. 1953), Subodh Gupta (b. 1964), and Sheela Gowda (b. 1957) have been at the vanguard of Indian installation art, producing some of the most exciting contemporary artworks of our time.

This however has not meant the extinction of painting as an art form. A number of artists have attempted to destabilize the conventional boundaries and viewing expectations of painting through the use of semiotic intertextuality and self-referentiality. Thus the diverse discourses of myth, fantasy, consumerism, and politics are often overlaid as coexisting pictorial signifiers offering a critical commentary on varied aspects of contemporary Indian lived experience. Atul Dodiya (b. 1959), Surendran Nair (b. 1956), and Anandajit Ray (b. 1965) are three prominent artists who have taken this direction. Atul Dodiya has moved from the play of memory using a faded photo-realism in the 1980s to a series of allegorical self-portraits locating himself critically at the intersection

of myth and history since the 1990s. Surendran Nair, in an ironic variant of Tantric meditational anatomy, depicts the human body as a passive site of emblematic inscriptions or punctures effected by political and consumerist interests. Anandajit Ray splices science fiction, manga, anime and action movie images to create pop nightmare fictions of contemporary Indian life.

Other contemporary subversions of painterliness include emulation of and interplay with virtual reality and the hyper-modern. The canvases of Baiju Parthan (b. 1956) and Jitish Kallat (b. 1974), for example, are loaded with icons and hypertext depicting the human as a post-structural indefinable under the constructional impulses of new sciences and technologies and their political or commercial deployment as well as futuristic trans-technological scenarios. In the case of Parthan, the metaphor of cyberspace goes one step further through the exploration of the painted image alongside web-based virtual versions of the same. Nalini Malani, a senior woman artist, whose works transit between painting, performance, installation and collaboration, makes creative use of video projections in much of her work. Her themes focus on the inequalities and violences of gender, religion and class.

As with painting, the stand-alone aesthetic of traditional sculpture has also come to be questioned and replaced by a number of alternate or reconfigured objects. N. N. Rimzon (1957), for example, installs his sculptures within larger contexts often made of mass-produced objects to explore the dialectic between the spiritual and the socially unjust. A well-known work of his is *The Inner Voice*, where a nude male Tīrthānkara-like figure, symbolizing austerity and spiritual purity is placed iconically within a circle of swords, making a powerful, if ambiguous, visual statement on austerity and power, nonviolence and violence.

The decentering of the art gallery or museum as a viewing space and of patronage from the possessive intents of collectors has also led in the direction of site-specific installations and performance art. Site-specificity populates public spaces with objects which reference both the site and the viewer (user of the site) to create reflexive environments which bring submerged meanings of collective lived experience to light. These installations are often treated as events or performances which are durationally limited and thus cannot be bought or sold. Patronage here usually takes the form of sponsorship, often by the corporate sector. The Mumbai-based Kala Ghoda Association's Artfest 2000, for example, featured a number of installations scattered through public buildings in the precinct of Kala Ghoda, between 1 February and 14 February 2000. Titled "Making an Entrance," the project was conceptualized by art critic Ranjit Hoskote

and included works by Jahangir Jani, Sudarshan Shetty, Kaushik Mukhopadhyay, Baiju Parthan, and Bharati Kapadia. According to the Kala Ghoda Association's web site, "The concept of 'Making an Entrance' has evolved from the perceived need to construct a new venue for art, an exhibition site that is neither gallery nor museum . . . [but] an unbound public space. Indeed, new viewing habits and practices may arise from such new viewing situations." Similarly, Vivan Sundaram used the lobby of the Victoria Memorial in Kolkata to present his 1998 installation *Journeys towards Freedom*. Here, the Victoria Memorial, a cultural and political landmark, is chosen for its sedimented memory of colonialism and nationalism and made the site for Sundaram's interpretations of political bondage and liberation.

Debashish Banerji

See also **Miniatures; Mughal Painting**

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MOHENJO-DARO In 1922 Mohenjo-Daro was discovered by R. D. Banerji, two years after major excavations had begun at Harappa, some 366 miles (590 km) to the north. Numerous large-scale excavations were carried out at the site by John Marshall, Ernest Mackay, K. N. Dikshit, and other directors through the 1930s. Excavations were banned after excavations by George F. Dales in 1964, and only salvage excavation, surface surveys, and conservation projects have been allowed at the site in recent times. Located on the east side of the Indus River in the semiarid region of Sind province, Pakistan, this site was spared the looting of bricks that destroyed most sites in the Punjab. It is the largest and best-preserved urban center of the Indus civilization (2600–1900 B.C.), extending over 618 acres (250 hectares). Numerous mounded ruins rise up above the plain, while others are partly buried under the silts of the encroaching Indus River. The earliest levels of the site are inaccessible due to the high water table that is the result of modern irrigation canals. Pottery recovered from the deeply submerged levels are similar to pottery found at the nearby sites of Kot Diji and Amri, dating to around 3500 B.C. These discoveries suggest that Mohenjo-Daro has an earlier Kot Diji Phase occupation, like the site of Harappa. No cemetery area has been located at the site, though there have been reports of occasional chance burials discovered in the course of site conservation.

Most of the excavations at Mohenjo-Daro were focused in the uppermost levels of the site, which date to the last part of the Harappa Phase (c. 2200–1900 B.C.). The citadel mound on the west is the highest sector of the city and contains the famous Great Bath and so-called Granary as well as numerous other large buildings and impressive streets with covered drains. One portion of the citadel mound has not been excavated because it is covered by a Buddhist stupa dating to the Kushana period, circa 2nd century A.D. A massive mud-brick wall that had a large brick gateway in the southeast originally surrounded the citadel mound.

The other mounds of the city on the east are somewhat lower in height and have been referred to collectively as the "Lower Town," but in fact they form several distinct habitation areas set apart by massive mud-brick walls and platforms and wide streets. Additional suburbs are located further to the east and south. Each sector has numerous large brick houses that could have been the mansions of powerful merchants or landowners. No temples have been identified, though there is one building with a double staircase that may have had a ritual function.

Important crafts were carried out in different sectors of all the major mounds and include copper working, shell and ivory carving, and lapidary and stone tool production; in addition, many different types of furnaces



Excavation Site, Mohenjo-Daro. Mounds at the Mohenjo-Daro excavation site, discovered in 1922 and the subject of numerous digs in the 1930s. Located in present-day Pakistan, Mohenjo-Daro is home to the remains—some still to be unearthed—of the largest and best-preserved urban center of the Indus civilization. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

existed for the manufacture of terra-cotta pottery, stoneware bangles, glazed faience ornaments, and fired steatite beads. Seal-manufacturing workshops have been discovered in very restricted locations, indicating strong control of production. The variety of raw materials at the site demonstrates the vast trading networks that linked the city to distant resource areas.

Rare discoveries of gold and silver ornaments provide evidence of a class of wealthy merchants or landowners, similar to that seen at Harappa. At Mohenjo-Daro there are stone carvings of seated male figures that may represent some of the ancestral leaders of these communities. One of these fragmentary figures is called the “Priest-King,” even though there is no evidence that either priests or kings ruled the city. This bearded sculpture wears a fillet around the head, an armband, and a cloak decorated with trefoil patterns that were originally filled with red pigment. Male and female human figurines as well as animal figurines were made of terra-cotta, bronze, faience, or even shell. Different styles of ornaments and headdresses on the human figures suggest that many different classes and diverse ethnic communities inhabited

the city. The painted pottery of Mohenjo-Daro is similar to that seen at Harappa, but there is some regional variation that reinforces the distinct character of these two important cities.

At the end of the Harappa Phase, people using a slightly different type of pottery and new styles of geometric seals that did not have writing occupied Mohenjo-Daro. The transition from one culture to the next was gradual, as seen at Harappa, and there is no evidence for an Indo-Aryan invasion. The region around Mohenjo-Daro continued to be inhabited throughout the Early Historic period, and a modern village is located near the mound today.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also **Harappa; Indus Valley Civilization; Sind.**

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MOKSHA. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

MONETARY POLICY FROM 1952 TO 1991

Indian monetary policy, as it was designed and implemented during the planning period of 1952 to 1991, with a heavy accent on government intervention, differed considerably from the normal concept of monetary policy in economic literature, which is identified with the regulation of quantity of money through indirect methods of changing the cost and availability of bank credit, rather than through direct methods of controlling its quantity. It was required to reconcile multiple objectives as embedded in India's first Five-Year Plan (1951–1956). The objectives were:

1. Price stability should be maintained.
2. Savings of the community should be mobilized, and its financial component (i.e., savings held in bank deposits, shares, etc.) should be steadily enlarged.
3. Savings so mobilized should be allocated to the sectors in accordance with national economic goals as set out in the country's Five-Year Plans.
4. The resource needs of the major sectors in the economy, that is, the public sector, should be met as a priority.

Little thought was, however, given to the mutual inconsistency of these objectives, desirable though they were. The goal of price stability often conflicted with meeting the resource needs of the public sector. In fact, channeling the resources to the public sector and the government undermined efforts to contain inflationary pressures. The mobilization of savings was admirably achieved, but savings so mobilized could not be allocated in an efficient manner to the sectors in accordance with plan priorities. In pursuing these goals, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), a central bank, could not avoid a “mismatch between its responsibility to supervise and control the functioning of the monetary system on the one hand, and its authority to do so on the other” (RBI).

Monetary Policy Framework

Monetary policy under planning was formulated in rather a crude way by going through the following procedure. To begin with, a desirable level of supply of money was estimated on certain assumptions based partly on historical experience and partly on expectations about the movement of future economic events such as output growth and trends in prices; demand for money was assumed to grow in proportion to income growth. The magnitude of quantity of money so projected to match the demand for it was considered to be noninflationary. Working backward, using the balance sheet of the banking system, reserve money, that is, currency in circulation plus cash with banks and their deposits held with the RBI was calculated. It was the changes in the reserve money that the RBI targeted in order to ensure an appropriate level of bank credit both to the government and the private sector.

Monetary Policy Instruments

The RBI had recourse to the following instruments both for regulating the level of money and credit and for directing bank credit to the high-priority sectors of the Indian economy. These were: cash reserve ratio; open market operations; refinancing facilities from the RBI; administered interest rates; statutory liquidity ratio; and selective credit controls, known in economic literature as directed credit. The first three of these were used to regulate the reserve money changes, though the cash reserve ratio was more effective in the Indian conditions than the open market operations, or the refinancing facilities to neutralize the impact of reserve money changes on the credit operations of banks. This ratio was very high, at around 14 percent of deposits, entailing a heavy tax on the banking system, and for that reason it was difficult to make changes in it beyond a certain limit. Refinance facilities were not large enough to make a dent on reserve money variations. As regards the open market operations, they were employed more to “maintain a desired pattern of yields on government securities and generally to help the Government raise resources from the capital market” (RBI, 1985, pp. 262–263) than to bring about variation in the reserve money. Thus it became more a fiscal policy and less a monetary policy instrument.

India relied on the administered interest rate regime rather than on market mechanism to bring about the desired changes in interest rates. The RBI, through periodical issue of directives, fixed the minimum and maximum deposit and lending rates and maintained the return on government securities at a level consistent with that on banks' assets and liabilities. In addition, financial institutions of all types—provident funds, insurance companies, and so on—were guided by the government

through the RBI as to how they should invest their funds. As a consequence, until the 1980s real interest rates, that is, money interest rates adjusted for changes in the wholesale price index, turned negative. There was, however, a welcome change after the mid-1980s, when the real interest rates turned positive, even when the administered interest rate regime system prevailed.

The statutory liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio of cash on hand of banks, net interbank balances, unencumbered government and government guaranteed securities, and gold to the total deposit liabilities was used to preempt bank resources for investment in government securities and away from the private sector. This ratio introduced a distortive element in the financial system inasmuch as the return on government securities was almost always lower, until 1990, than on bank loans. The height of this ratio at around 33 percent was also a serious disincentive to banks.

Selective credit controls were used to channelize credit flows to certain private sectors of the economy considered to be priority sectors. This instrument relied on setting margins, quantum of credit in terms of proportion of total credit and the interest rate subsidy. The proportion of such credit varied over the years, depending on the public policy objectives of the government, but generally accounted for around 40 percent of total bank credit. These credits turned out to be very costly as the default rate was very high. The accumulation of bad and doubtful debts, estimated to be roughly 25 to 30 percent of deposits, had virtually wiped out the entire capital base of several banks in 1989 and 1990.

Consequences

The monetary policy apparatus that evolved in the context of Indian planning made the RBI more a facilitator of fiscal policy with monetary intent rather than conventionally defined monetary authority. Given the institutional imperatives, as well as the exigencies of government finances, the RBI could only influence the operations of banks by stipulating and administering the cash reserves and statutory liquidity ratios, or adjusting floors and ceilings on interest rates charged by banks on their assets and liabilities, rather than by its perception of the monetary events and the practical precepts of central banking. Because of the obsessive preoccupation with government finances, the RBI had perforce to crowd out private sector investment, which should have been the main domain for the exercise of its monetary policy. It also became a helpless spectator for the growing public debt over time, which turned out to be one of the most destabilizing factors in the Indian economy since the mid-1980s. Only when the Indian economic policy changed

radically after 1991 did the RBI come into its own to wield a monetary policy without fiscal apron strings.

Deena Khatkhate

See also Monetary Policy since 1991; Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of

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MONETARY POLICY SINCE 1991 Monetary policy operations since 1991 reflect the responses of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to the challenges posed by the Indian economy's transformation from financial repression to a liberalized market orientation. Recent efforts to develop and integrate financial markets established a closer linkage of monetary management operations with internal debt management, exchange rate, and reserves management operations. The basic objective of monetary policy to maintain price stability and support growth by ensuring adequate flow of credit continued to be paramount, while its scope was broadened to encompass aspects of financial stability by maintaining orderly conditions in financial markets and achieving greater interest rate flexibility. Greater transparency has also been imparted through institutional mechanisms for internal coordination within the central bank and for external consultations.

With procedures increasingly shifting to market-based interventions, monetary policy operations have become primarily a process of managing liquidity on a day-to-day basis. These operations are, however, consistent with the overall policy announced in April and reviewed in October for every fiscal year. These announcements are considered useful as a framework for relevant measures, for capturing events affecting macroeconomic assessments including fiscal management and seasonal factors, and as a means of greater transparency, better communication, and an effective consultation process.

The period up to 1996–1997 reflected the challenges of macrostabilization and adjustment against the background

of a high inflation rate, a difficult balance of payments situation, and massive draw down of foreign exchange reserves. The focus was on reining in inflationary pressures, and therefore a tight and cautious policy stance was taken. This period also saw far-reaching financial reforms, such as rationalization and liberalization of interest rates, greater autonomy for the central bank with elimination of automatic monetization of fiscal deficits, financial markets development and integration, and considerable easing of operational constraints on the financial system. The latter half of the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium represented a gradual phase of easing liquidity, softening interest rates reflecting the lowering of inflationary expectations, and further deepening of financial markets. This period also witnessed, however, a comparative slowdown in industrial and economic activity until 2003–2004, contributed by a variety of domestic and external shocks. Consequently, the focus was upon containing volatility in markets, particularly the foreign exchange market, strengthening reserves, and efficiently coordinating internal debt management with monetary operations.

A comparison of projections with actuals in respect to major monetary policy parameters, namely the growth rate, inflation rate, and M3 (broad money) reveals some interesting features (see Table 1).

During the period 1992–1993 to 1996–1997, since there was acceleration in economic activity due to easing of constraints, the growth projections were consistently underestimated; and actual inflation rates and M3 growth rates were mostly higher than the projections. During 1994–1995 and 1995–1996, the actual growth rates turned out to be higher than projections by about 2 percent. A very cautious and tight monetary policy stance was adopted in 1995–1996 to contain inflationary pressures. This was viewed by the market as a period of credit crunch, and the central bank had to defend its position very strongly by arguing that the credit growth was high enough. The inflation rate, which exceeded the projection in 1994–1995 by more than 3 percentage points at a double-digit level, was brought down by nearly 6 percentage points, to less than 5 percent in 1995–1996. The M3 growth was the lowest, at below 14 percent that year, and the ten-year gilt yield rate peaked to around 14 percent. There was practically no backtracking on the inflation front since then, and the inflation rate since 1995–1996 remained moderate throughout the period. The inflation projection has been brought down to less than 5 percent in the last two years. But, the economy consistently underperformed since 1997–1998, compared to projections. The softening of interest rates did not produce the 7 percent growth rate, the upper range of projections until 2000–2001. The success story of this period lies in the containment of inflation and inflation-

ary expectations, substantial easing of interest rates, considerable strengthening of the external sector, reflected in a buildup of substantial foreign exchange reserves, deepening of financial markets, and the sharpening of debt and monetary management tools.

Since 1997 the bank rate, repo rate, and cash reserve ratio have been used more frequently to meet short-term monetary policy objectives in the light of the emerging domestic and external situations. Markets also perceive these changes as signals for movements in market rates of interest. Deposit and lending rates of banks also respond to these changes, though in varying degrees.

Open market operations, including repos operations under a Liquidity Adjustment Facility, combined with participation in primary issues of government securities serve the central bank to steer interest rates across the maturity spectrum, besides modulating volatility in government securities yields. This greatly helped effective monetary management, smooth debt management, and completion of the large borrowing program by the government. The daily repos operations lend considerable flexibility and leverage to the central bank in managing liquidity and the repo rate has gained prominence as a signaling instrument since 2001.

Institutional arrangements for monetary policy formulation had also undergone changes since 1997. An interdepartmental Financial Markets Committee now monitors developments in financial markets, reviews market developments with regard to both volume and rates in money, foreign exchange and government securities, and makes quick daily assessments of liquidity conditions for market interventions. The central bank also conducts resources management discussions with selected banks to get feedback on market perceptions for possible policy action. A Technical Advisory Committee on Money and Government Securities Markets has also been appointed, with representation from financial, banking, and academic communities to advise the central bank on new policy procedures.

Impact of Monetary Policy Operations: Some Key Indicators

From a macroeconomic perspective, there are key indicators that capture the impact of monetary policy operations since 1991. The interest rates in respect to call money and deposits in general have softened significantly after their peak in 1995–1996, though the bank lending rates showed some inflexibility, despite showing some decline (see Figure 1). As a result, alongside lower inflation rates, the real interest rate is perceived to be high. The effect of monetary policy, particularly on lending rates, is observed to be asymmetric, showing some downward stickiness.

TABLE 1

| Major monetary policy parameters: Projections and actuals since 1991–1992 | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----|-------|-------------------------|------|------|-------------------|------|------|
| Year (April–March) | Annual increases in percent | | | | | | | | |
| | Real GDP | | | WPI threshold inflation | | | M3 (Broad money) | | |
| | P | A | A–P | P | A | A–P | P | A | A–P |
| 1991–1992 | 4.0 (3.0) | 1.3 | –1.7 | 7.0 | 13.6 | +6.6 | 14.0 (13.0)(1) | 19.3 | +5.3 |
| 1992–1993 | 3.5 (2) | 5.1 | +1.6 | 8.0 | 7.0 | –1.0 | 11.0 | 14.8 | +3.8 |
| 1993–1994 | 5.0 | 5.9 | +0.9 | — (3) | 10.8 | — | 12.0 (14.0) | 18.4 | +6.4 |
| 1994–1995 | N.A. (4) (5.5) | 7.3 | +1.8 | 7.2 (5) (6.8) | 10.4 | +3.2 | 14–15 (16) | 22.4 | +7.9 |
| 1995–1996 | 5.5 (well above 5.5) | 7.3 | +1.8 | 8.0 | 4.3 | –3.7 | 15.5 | 13.6 | –1.9 |
| 1996–1997 | 6.0 | 7.8 | +1.8 | 6.0 | 5.4 | –0.6 | 15.5–16.0 | 16.2 | +0.5 |
| 1997–1998 | 6.0–7.0 | 4.8 | –1.7 | 6.0 | 4.5 | –1.5 | 15.0–15.5 | 18.0 | +2.8 |
| 1998–1999 | 6.5–7.0 (6.0) | 6.5 | –0.25 | 5.0–6.0 | 5.2 | –0.3 | 15.0–15.5 | 19.4 | +4.2 |
| 1999–2000 | 6.0–7.0 | 6.1 | –0.40 | 5.0 | 6.4 | +1.4 | 15.5–16.0 | 14.6 | –1.2 |
| 2000–2001 | 6.5–7.0 (6.0–6.5) | 4.4 | –2.35 | 4.5 | 5.5 | +1.0 | 15.0 | 16.8 | +1.8 |
| 2001–2002 | 6.0–6.5 (5.0–6.0) | 5.6 | –0.65 | 5.0 | 1.6 | –3.4 | 14.5 | 14.2 | –0.3 |
| 2002–2003 | 6.0–6.5 (5.0–5.5) | 4.3 | –1.95 | 4.0 | 6.5 | +2.5 | 14.0 | 15.0 | +1.0 |
| 2003–2004 | 6.0 (6.5–7.0) with an upward bias | | | 5.0–5.5 (4.0–4.5) | | | 14.0 | | |

Notes: GDP=Gross Domestic Product; WPI=Wholesale Price Index; P=Projected; A=Actual. Figures given in parentheses are as reset in October Statements of Policy. Differences between Actual and Projected have been calculated with reference to April Statement and to the midpoint, where a range is indicated.
(1) Reset based on fresh information and acceleration in inflation rate to 8.9 percent up to 21 September 1991.
(2) Projection given in October statement.
(3) No projection for inflation given; some further moderation in inflation rate was indicated.
(4) No projection for growth rate was indicated in April; in October, an implicit rate was given.
(5) A reduction in inflation rate by 4 percentage points was envisaged.

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

In contrast to domestic assets, the net foreign exchange assets have emerged as a significant contributing source of reserve money (see Figure 2).

The growth rates in both reserve money and broad money have been contained since 1998, and correspondingly, the price level remained stable and showed some decline (see Figure 3).

The money multiplier showed a secular increase, whereas the income velocity showed a similar decline (see Figure 4).

Some Key Issues in Perspective

While there is a growing consensus that central banks should have operational independence and

concentrate on a single target, such as inflation, there is some sense of discomfort in India as to whether this will survive the test of time. This is particularly true as a result of a conflict between the goal of preventing future inflation, and avoiding a sharp downturn in industry. Under such circumstances, the reliance on mechanistic, simpler, and narrower rules restricting discretion or judgment does not appear feasible. The RBI is likely to pursue its multiple indicator approach for some time to come.

In the area of exchange rate management, a basic question is how much flexibility should be allowed. Based on the experience of many other countries, India has managed “floating” with no fixed rate targets. The rate is primarily determined by market forces, but India’s foreign

FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3





FIGURE 4



exchange market being thin, the RBI intervenes in foreign exchange market to contain volatility and to maintain orderly market conditions.

Yet another issue dominating recent discussions of central bank autonomy is the separation of debt management and monetary management functions. The fundamental question is whether monetary policy can operate on an exclusive basis, outside fiscal constraints, before a sustainable level of fiscal deficit is attained. Integration of India's financial markets is yet to attain adequate depth before the central bank can completely withdraw from direct debt management. A Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act was passed in 2003.

In the context of large capital inflows since the turn of the twenty-first century, questions about the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves and the sustainability of sterilizing such inflows have been raised. Limitations on instruments available for sterilization have recently been addressed by a Working Group. Its recommendations should enable the RBI to adequately shore up its capacity to sterilize large capital flows.

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See also **Balance of Payments; Debt Markets; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets**

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MONEY AND CREDIT, 1858–1947 The singularity of India's monetary experience derives from the fact that India witnessed practically every type of monetary regime, passing successively from a silver standard to a managed inconvertible silver currency, then almost fortuitously to the gold exchange standard; subsequently to a paper standard, a gold bullion standard, and after 1931 to a sterling exchange standard. Also, India moved from a fixed fiduciary to a proportional reserve system without ever adopting the 100 percent reserve Currency Board system of the British colonies. There were no less than six high-powered official commissions of inquiry between 1893 and 1931, a number unmatched by any other country.

Monetary Standard

The major issues, which related to the exchange rate of the Indian rupee and the size and composition of India's currency cover, were hotly debated between the principal interest groups, namely, the British business community in India, the government of India, and the India Office in London under the secretary of state for India, and Indian public opinion, which was fractured by the rivalries between the regional financial centers, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.

The recent history of Indian currency falls into well-defined periods from 1835, when the silver rupee of 180 troy 11/12th fine was declared the sole legal tender. India was on a monometallic silver standard from 1835 to 1893, and a paper currency reserve with a maximum of 40 million rupees (Rs.) in government securities, the rest in silver coin and bullion, with provision for the inclusion of gold coin and bullion up to 25 percent. The period from 1893 to 1898 was one of transition because of the depreciation of the silver rupee, whose gold value had remained at fell from about 2s. since 1871, fell to 1s. (shilling) 2d. (pence) in 1892, precipitating the amendment of the Indian Coinage Act of 1879 and the Indian Paper Currency Act of 1882, following the recommendations of the 1892 Herschell Committee. The subsequent improvisations, following the recommendations of the Fowler Committee (1898) and the Act of 1899, resulted in an effective gold exchange standard, which was more economical than a gold standard and ensured practically

TABLE 1

| Commercial bank deposits for selected dates, 1870–1946 | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| (in millions of rupees) | | | |
| | Presidency banks (1) | Others (2) | Exchange banks |
| 1870 | 118 | 1 | 5 |
| 1921 | 726 | 802 | 752 |
| 1946 | 2,717 | 7,337 | 1,812 |

(1) Refers to Imperial Bank of India from 1921 onward.
 (2) Banks with paid-up capital and reserves of Rs. 100,000 till 1945 and all categories for 1946.

SOURCE: Adapted from *Banking and Monetary Statistics of India*, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, 1954, Table 1, pp. 6–9.

all the advantages of a gold currency. Nevertheless, proposals for gold coinage and a gold mint led to the appointment in 1913 of the Royal Commission, which broadly endorsed the existing standard. The extraordinary rise in the price of silver to about 89d. per ounce in February 1920 made it extremely difficult to maintain exchange stability. The British government therefore decided to raise the exchange rate in accordance with the silver price and appointed yet another committee in 1919 to make recommendations for a stable gold-exchange standard. Its report recommended stabilization of the rupee at 2s. gold, with a fixed exchange value for the rupee in terms of gold at 11.30016 g of fine gold. But the effort to maintain the rupee at 2s. gold failed, and with the return of sterling to gold in 1925 the rupee exchange rate fell back to 1s. 6d.

In 1926 the Hilton-Young Commission recommended: the creation of a gold bullion standard; an exchange rate of 1s. 6d. for the rupee; amalgamation of India's paper currency and gold standard reserves; and the creation of a central bank. Thus, the Currency Act of 1927 established a gold-bullion-and-sterling currency. But the rupee ratio of 1s. 6d., rather than a fairer 1s. 4d., provoked Indian public opinion and led to the heated ratio controversy in the following period (1927–1939). Following the British home government's decision to abandon the gold standard, the rupee was linked to sterling from 24 September 1931. The unchanged rupee-sterling ratio, however, led to a depreciation of the rupee in terms of gold and a rise in the price of gold in terms of rupees, which led to India's massive exports of gold over the next decade, a dramatic reversal of India's previous role as a perennial magnet for gold.

Commercial Banking

Since before 1860 there was no legal provision in India for limited liability, virtually all banks were started on the basis of unlimited liability, and until the Indian

TABLE 2

| Bank failures at selected dates, 1913–1946 | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| | Number of banks | Paid-up capital (thousands of rupees) |
| 1913 | 12 | 3,154 |
| 1925 | 17 | 1,876 |
| 1939 | 117 | 2,491 |
| 1946 | 27 | 922 |

SOURCE: Compiled from *Banking and Monetary Statistics of India*, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, 1954, p. 279.

Companies Act (1913), which contained a few sections relating to joint-stock banks, there was no special legislation dealing with commercial banking. The amended Indian Companies Act of 1936 added many provisions relating to minimum capital, cash reserve requirements, and other operating conditions, but there was still no integrated statutory regulation of commercial banks in India until 1949. The main constituents of modern banking were: the quasi-official Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, which were amalgamated in 1921 into the Imperial Bank of India; the foreign-owned exchange banks; and the Indian joint stock banks, which played a marginal role in foreign exchange business and rural credit and specialized largely in short-term urban credit against conventional collateral. Bank failures occurred mostly because of individual imprudence and mismanagement and occurred in years when the system as a whole did not experience any exceptional stress; the failure rate was much higher among foreign-owned exchange banks.

Central Banking

The Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency (1913–1914) requested one of its members, J. M. Keynes, to prepare a scheme for a central Indian bank. It is particularly noteworthy that Keynes exhorted the framers of the Indian central bank's constitution to "put far from their minds all thoughts of the Bank of England" and to look to the state banks, especially those of Germany, or perhaps of Holland, for the "proper model." Ironically, when India did establish the Reserve Bank of India, it was modeled on the Bank of England under the influence of the then governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman. What finally emerged was the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks into the Imperial Bank of India in 1921, as a commercial bank, but with the functions of banker to the government and manager of the public debt. Although there was no statutory provision, major commercial banks kept the bulk of their cash balances with the Imperial Bank, which also granted them liquidity credit and managed the clearing houses. But the note issue and

foreign exchange were entrusted to the Finance Department of the government of India, until the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance (1926) strongly recommended the creation of a full-fledged central bank, to be called the Reserve Bank of India.

The Reserve Bank of India was inaugurated on 1 April 1935, with a share capital of Rs. 50 million, divided into 500,000 fully paid-up shares of Rs. 100 each, subject to a maximum dividend of 6 percent. The first Indian Governor was C. D. Deshmukh, who assumed office in 1943.

The Reserve Bank of India in its initial phase had limited monetary powers. It was unable to activate the bank rate until about 1951, and its open market operations were largely net purchases in a narrow market. In its formative years (1935–1939), the Reserve Bank, in addition to promoting agricultural credit and acting as India's lender of last resort, was better able to coordinate the different segments of the money market, which resulted in a narrowing of seasonal and regional differentials in interest rates. The wartime phase (1939–1945) of the Reserve Bank was most notable for its well designed government borrowing program and the innovative technique of open market gold sales as an anti-inflationary device.

Anand Chandavarkar

See also **Balance of Payments; Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947**

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The primary statistical source is the *Banking and Monetary Statistics of India*, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, 1954. A fascinating insider's account is *Central Banking in India (A Retrospect)* by Sir Chintaman D. Deshmukh, Poona: Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, 1948. A classic on the reform of the rupee and the pioneering case for a state bank for India is J. M. Keynes, *Indian Currency and Finance*, Collected Writings, vol. 1, London: Macmillan, 1971.

MONEY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS The Indian financial sector may be viewed as comprising the money, foreign exchange, capital, credit, debt, insurance, and derivatives markets. For India's monetary policy, "call/notice" money and "repo transactions" are most critical. Call/notice money consists of overnight money and money at short notice (i.e., up to 14

days). In the heavily regulated system of nationalized banking, directed credit, and the automatic monetization of government deficits that prevailed in India throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it was inevitable that this market remained narrow and undeveloped. Rate ceilings were also frequent in those days of volatile call money rates. The Chakravarty Committee (1985) and the Vaghul Committee (1987) suggested several measures for developing the Indian money market. Following these suggestions, extensive attempts were made to increase the number of money market participants. Currently India has two major types of entities participating in the call/notice market: (1) Banks (commercial and cooperative) and primary dealers acting as market makers. These are allowed to lend as well as to borrow; their total number is 112; and (2) All-India financial institutions, mutual funds, and insurance companies. These are permitted to operate as lenders only, and their number is 53. The average daily turnover in this market is now Rs. 12,000 crores (1 billion = 100 crores).

The Indian call/notice money market departs from international practice in not being a pure interbank market. The ease of transacting in the call/notice segment, especially the absence of documentation, has attracted non-bank participants, who often favor this funding channel over the repo channel. The fact that the call money rates are usually higher than the repo rate reinforces this tendency, non-bank institutions operating as lenders only. The strong presence of non-bank participants in the call/notice segment impedes the establishment of a risk-free short-term yield curve. Limits on non-bank activity in this segment have been imposed since May 2001.

Repo transaction represent an important stage in the evolution of the Indian money market, distinguished by the introduction of repos/ready forward contracts by the Reserve Bank of India in December 1992. A repo is essentially the sale of a security against immediate funds with a promise to repurchase the same at a predetermined date and price. The future repurchase price reflects the repo interest rate adjusted for the coupon interest earned on the security during the period of the repo. The repo interest rate is usually lower than the interbank loan rate, since the former represents collateralized lending against a high-grade security.

A stable framework for the repo system in India emerged by 1997, with two types of operations: interbank repos (covering banks, primary dealers, and select financial institutions); and Reserve Bank of India repos. In a typical interbank repo, the seller (a bank) might be attempting to meet an anticipated cash reserve ratio shortfall, while the buyer (also a bank) may be bridging a potential statutory liquidity ratio default. Banks also resort to repos as a hedge against interest rate volatility.

The Reserve Bank of India uses repo operations for day-to-day liquidity management via the so-called liquidity adjustment facility.

Foreign Exchange Market

The foreign exchange regime in India has undergone a number of vicissitudes since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in the early 1970s. In 1975 India's rupee was de-linked from Britain's pound sterling, and a managed exchange regime was put in place, based on a currency basket. In 1978 banks were allowed to engage in strictly controlled trading in foreign exchange. Following the balance of payments crisis in 1991, moves toward a greater role for markets in exchange rate determination were introduced in a series of important stages. The culmination of this process was marked by the rupee being made fully convertible on the current account on 20 August 1994, thereby paving the way for India to subscribe to Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Subsequent developments in the foreign exchange market have been driven by the recommendations of the Expert Group on Foreign Exchange Markets in India (1995) and the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (1997).

Currently the Indian foreign exchange market is made up of three major segments: authorized dealers, numbering about one hundred, mainly foreign banks and large domestic banks; customers including foreign institutional investors, large domestic public sector units, and corporates; and the Reserve Bank of India.

Major transactions in the foreign exchange market arise from current account transactions of the balance of payments (imports, exports, and invisibles) as well as capital account transactions relating to foreign direct investment, portfolio investments (including American and Global Depository Receipts), external commercial borrowings and amortization, nonresident Indian deposits, external aid, and (since 1996) debt service repayments of the Indian government and the Indian Oil Corporation.

The forward market is an active segment of the foreign exchange market, with contracts permitted up to one year. The bulk of forward contracts, however, range from one-week to three-month maturity, with rollovers quite common. Since 1996 a number of far-reaching changes have been made in the foreign exchange market.

Two questions often raised in the context of the Indian foreign exchange market are about the prospects of capital account convertibility and the appropriate level of foreign exchange reserves. The Tarapore Committee (1997) laid out a detailed road map toward the goal of full convertibility over the three-year period from 1997 to 2000. Subsequent events, especially the Asian crisis, has

made the Reserve Bank of India adopt a much more cautious stance.

The level of foreign exchange reserves in India in July 2004 was about \$120 billion, and fears had been expressed by unofficial commentators that this level was excessively high. The Reserve Bank of India itself seems inclined to follow the rather loose guidelines set out under the so-called Guidotti Rule, or "liquidity at risk" factor, which relates reserve-adequacy to the foreseeable risks of financial crises, capital risk, and exchange market pressures that a country might face. Based on this consideration, the official line of the Reserve Bank of India seems to be that the current level of Indian reserves is adequate without being excessive.

Financial Markets and Monetary Policy

Since 1991 a two-way process was at work in India's financial markets, marked by the progressive removal of barriers to the flow of international funds, and the rolling back of rate and quantity restrictions in the various segments of the financial markets. Together, these have brought Indian financial markets closer to one another, as well as to their global counterparts. This has had fundamental consequences for the operation of Indian monetary policy. In particular, the maintenance of such increasing integration of India's financial markets has become an important monetary policy objective. The key guidepost of this market-oriented approach is a flexible multiple indicator (based on interest rates on a variety of financial assets together with some other macroeconomic variables) with open market operations as the major operating lever of monetary stimuli, and with the bank rate and the repo rate playing crucial roles as signaling devices.

To illustrate the current working of India's monetary policy, in a situation of excess demand for dollars in the foreign exchange market, leading to a surge in forward premia on expectations of rupee depreciation, if money market rates are lower than the forward premia, arbitrage opportunities exist for shifting funds from the money market (especially the call/notice segment), the government securities market, and the capital market. The Reserve Bank of India in these circumstances, could, of course, follow a passive wait-and-watch policy, allowing call rates to rise above the forward premia, and thus letting equilibrium restore itself. More likely, it may intervene actively in the foreign exchange market by selling dollars, depleting its reserves, encouraging nonresident Indian deposits (e.g., by reducing reserve requirements on such deposits), and discouraging exporters from delaying repatriation of proceeds.

Dilip M. Nachane

See also **Capital Market; Debt Markets; Monetary Policy since 1991**

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MONSOON. See **Geography**.

MONTAGU, EDWIN S. (1879–1924), secretary of state for India (1917–1922). John Morley's Liberal protégé as undersecretary of state for India, Edwin S. Montagu served as secretary of state for India from 1917 to 1922, the only person of Jewish faith ever to hold that office. Calling himself "Oriental," Montagu was also the first secretary of state for India personally to venture East to tour the realm over which he presided, meeting with leaders of India's major nationalist parties, the Muslim League's M. A. Jinnah as well as Congress's Mahatma Gandhi. He was so impressed by Jinnah's eloquent brilliance that he considered it "a shame . . . so remarkable a man" could not become British India's viceroy. He underestimated Mahatma Gandhi, however, as "a pure visionary."

Montagu raised fervent Indian hopes and expectations of post-World War I independent Dominion status as

Britain's reward for India's wartime cooperation and martial participation, when he announced from the floor of Britain's Parliament on 20 August 1917 that "the policy of His Majesty's Government . . . is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration . . . with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India." It certainly sounded hopeful to all factions within India's Congress and other parties, and only appropriate given the unstinting level of Indian forces, funds, and goods shipped off to the Western front and Mesopotamia. But the aftermath of 1918's Allied victory brought a plethora of disasters to India, first a million flu deaths, then bullets rather than free ballots in Punjab.

Montagu tried, nonetheless, to deliver some measure of political reform to India. The Government of India Act of 1919, also called the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, was hardly Dominion status, however. More elective seats were added to provincial and central government councils, and several more Indians were to be invited to join Viceroy Chelmsford's administrative council, but Congress felt so disappointed by the crumbs thrown to them—instead of the freedom they expected—that Gandhi led a mass boycott in protest, launching his first nationwide *satyagraha* (hold fast to the truth) against British extensions of martial "laws" in peacetime.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Government of India Act of 1919; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Morley, John**

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MONUMENTS

This entry consists of the following articles:

EASTERN INDIA


MUGHAL

SOUTHERN INDIA

WESTERN INDIA

EASTERN INDIA

To serve the needs of various religious sects, the architects of eastern India and Bangladesh built structural



Sun Temple in Konark, Orissa. The temple's entire complex was designed in the form of a huge chariot drawn by seven spirited horses on twelve pairs of exquisitely carved wheels, to symbolize the majestic stride of the sun god (Arka) and mark the culmination of Orissan architectural style. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

monuments such as stupas, *caityagribas*, monasteries, and temples. The stupas and *caityagribas* were primarily for Buddhist worship, though evidence of stupas with Jain affiliation has been found. The monasteries were built for Brahmanical as well as Buddhist and Jain monks but, despite epigraphical references, no Brahmanical monasteries have yet been found. Temples were generally Brahmanical, sometimes Jain, but seldom Buddhist. Unable to withstand nature's fury, human indifference, and the fury of iconoclastic Turko-Afghan invaders, most of these monuments have disappeared, leaving many gaps in the history of their evolution.

Stupas and *Caityagribas*

The Buddhist tradition affirms that the Licchavis of Vaishali had built many Buddhist stupas (mounds). Archaeological excavations at Vaishali (Bihar) led to the discovery of an earlier earthen core within a stupa that underwent successive enlargements. This earthen structure, containing a relic casket, is believed to be the stupa built by the Licchavis. Stupas built later are all in ruins.

Presumably, as in other regions, eastern India's earliest stupas were large hemispherical domes, resting on circular drums, crowned by a parasol. Fragmentary remains, votive models, and sculptural depictions, dating from the seventh century A.D., indicate that over the centuries the stupa acquired an elongated shape by the addition of a square base, an increase in the height of the drum, and conversion of the crowning umbrella into a tapering row of flat discs. Sometimes a chapel, with an image of the Buddha in it, was provided at one or each of the four cardinal points of the stupa. Sites at which evidence of such stupas has been found include Nalanda in Bihar, Bharatpur in West Bengal, Paharpur, and Mainamati in Bangladesh, and Ratnagiri, Lalitgiri, and Udayagiri (Jajpur District) in Orissa.

A *caityagriha* was a Buddhist shrine, rectangular in plan with an apsidal back. A votive *caitya* (the other name of the stupa), within the apse, was the object of worship. Excavations have unearthed the foundations of two such *caityagribas*, one at Lalitgiri and the other at Udayagiri (Jajpur District, Orissa).

Monasteries

Monastery architecture in eastern India began with a number of rock-hewn caves in the Barabar hills of Bihar. Donated by the Mauryan sovereigns (3rd century B.C.) to the Jain Ajivika ascetics, these caves are usually single-celled. Only two of them, Sudama and Lomasha Rishi, have double chambers. The facade of the Lomasha Rishi resembles the gabled front of a contemporary wooden house, suggesting a carpenter's hand in these rock constructions.

Kalinga rulers of the first century B.C. honeycombed the Udayagiri and Khandagiri hills near Bhubaneswar (Orissa) with caves excavated for Jain monks. Some of these caves have pillared verandas in front. Two caves, at Mancapuri and Ranigumpha, are double-storied and sculptured. In the arrangement of these caves, no systematic plan was followed.

The monastery architecture was systematized by the Buddhists. Known as *vihara* and *samgharama*, the monasteries had in common four rows of cells with continuous pillared corridors around an open rectangular court. Approach to the inner court was provided by a gate pavilion on one of the shorter sides. In the center of the rear row of cells was a sanctuary chamber, whose back side projected beyond the line of the monastery wall. Some of the monasteries, referred to as *mahaviharas*, attained fame as great centers of Buddhist learning. One of them, the Nalanda Mahavihara in Bihar, dating from the fifth century A.D., comprised a row of storied blocks, each in the usual plan of a monastery. Near the front of these blocks was a row of temples, each enshrining an image of the Buddha.

Deviating from the conventional plan of a monastery, the Somapura Mahavihara at Paharpur (Bangladesh) and a few others contained the sanctuary of a terraced plan in the center of the court, rather than the middle of the rear row of cells. In Orissa, the dwelling blocks of the monks, though following the general monastery pattern, sometimes had an imposing stupa outside as their principal object of worship. The Ratnagiri Mahavihara on the Ratnagiri hill was one such monastery.

Temples

A period of experiments with different forms marks the early phase of temple architecture of the region. The ruins of an apsidal Jain religious edifice of the first century B.C. have been discovered on the Udayagiri hill near Bhubaneswar. A temple of cylindrical shape, known as Maniyar Math, at Rajgir (Bihar) was raised on an earlier circular base, which may have been the foundation of a lost stupa. Now in a fragmentary condition, it once displayed fine stucco sculptures in the Gupta style of the

fifth century A.D. A Kumrahar (Bihar) clay seal, bearing a second- or third-century A.D. inscription, depicts a Buddhist shrine with an arched facade and a pyramidal roof tower. That depiction may be the prerestoration Mahabodhi temple at Bodhi Gaya (Bihar), or a temple of that type. An octagonal temple of Shiva, famous as Mundeshvari (a corruption of Mundeshvara) Shiva, stands on the hilltop at Ramgarh (Bihar). In its interior, four pillars on four corners of a raised dais support the flat ceiling. The roof of the temple has collapsed. If the year 30 inscribed on the foundation stone, discovered loose, refers to the Harsha era, the Mundeshvari may be ascribed to A.D. 636.

At about the beginning of the seventh century A.D., architects of eastern India introduced a few standardized temple styles, the most important of which was the one defined as *nagara* in Indian canonical literature. Its two distinguishing features were a cruciform ground plan and a curvilinear *shikhara* (towering roof). Found all over eastern India, the *nagara* temple style displayed regional variations in the course of its evolution, though without changing its basic characteristics.

In Bihar the emergence of the *nagara* style may be recognized in the *triratha* (three-wall) plan. Segments were produced upon the face of the temple wall, creating part of it on a more forward plane. Some walls were divided into three segments; other walls were divided into five (*panca-*) or seven (*sapta-*) segments; with three moldings (*vedibandha*) on the exterior wall, as on the older base of the modern Siddheshvaranatha temple on the Suryanka hill of the Barabar range. Reference to this temple is made in a seventh-century cave inscription found nearby. In course of time, the temple became *pancaratha*, as in the Narasimha temple at Gaya, and acquired a pillared *mukhashala* (forward hall) as demonstrated by the preserved core of the Sun temple at Dabthu. A roof cover in either instance is missing. In the succeeding years, the earlier *pancaratha* plan was continued, but a horizontal molding divided the part of the wall between the *vedibandha* and the entablature into two vertical halves. A curvilinear *sikhara* rose upon the temple. The *mukhasala* in front had balconied windows at the sides, and four interior pillars on four corners of a central platform. The dilapidated Shiva temple at Umga, while attesting to these developments, gives, in the summary treatment of its features, clear evidence of a decadent trend. This decadence only quickened in the following years.

The early *nagara* temples of Jharkhand were invariably built on a *triratha* plan. In elevation, the *bara* (perpendicular wall section) had three divisions: molded *vedibandha*, *jangha* (part of the wall between dado and entablature) with a niche on the *raba* (projected central *ratha*) and a recessed *baranda* (entablature). The *shikhara* upon the *bara* was divided into a number of

bhumi (horizontal stages) by right-angled *bhumi-amalakas* (ribbed quoins). In the *mastaka* (set of members crowning the *shikhara*), the most conspicuous element was a large flattish *amalaka* (spheroid, ribbed at the edges). Representative examples of the period include the Durgā temple at Diuri and the Mahishasuramardini temple at Haradih. Sometime later the *pancaratha* plan was introduced. Other developments included the presence of Gaṅgā and Yamuna, two river goddesses, at the door flanks and *navagraha* (nine planets) panel on the door lintel. The Tānginath Shiva temple at Majhegaon is a shrine of this type. Now roofless, the temple appears, from its detached architectural parts lying about, to have once been covered by a curvilinear *shikhara* (tower) that supported a *mastaka* with a *kalasha* (pitcher) finial. Further development of the style is obscured by the absence of proper examples.

The extant *nagara* temples of Bengal were built either in stone or in bricks. The stone temples, now found only in West Bengal, are simple unpretentious structures. They began, as elsewhere, with a *triratha* plan, threefold division of the *bara*, curvilinear *shikhara*, and round *mastaka*. Of the three sections of the *bara*, the *vedibandha* was composed of three and sometimes four moldings, the *jangha* was plain except for a niche on the *ratha*, and the *baranda* was indicated by a recessed frieze between two moldings. The *shikhara* had *bhumi* divisions by right-angled *bhumi-amalakas*. In the *mastaka*, the most prominent member was a large flattish *amalaka*. The two surviving examples of this early period, one Jain and the other Brahmanical, stand respectively at Charra and Tuisama. The developments in later temples showed an increase in the number of *vedibandha* moldings from an initial four to six, three pilasters in a row on the *kanika* (outermost *ratha* segment) in the *jangha* section, the occasional presence of *navagraha* panel on the door lintel, near-perpendicular rise of the *shikhara*, rounding off of the *bhumi-amalakas*, and a vertical band of interlacing *caitya* arch (horseshoe-shaped arch motif) design on the *shikhara*. Temple numbers 16 (now lost) and 18 at Telkupi and a deserted temple at Banda are a few examples illustrating the different phases of these developments. In the succeeding years, elaboration of details continued, but with simultaneous decline of the style. Finally, the temple acquired a *saptaratha* plan, the number of moldings in the *vedibandha* rose at times to nine, the *jangha* became divided into upper and lower sections by a *bandhana* molding, and the protruding double cornice of the entablature sharply interrupted the free and flowing transition from the *bara* to the *shikhara*. The *bhumi-amalakas* disappeared from the *shikhara*, whose almost vertical ascent was awkwardly broken by a sharp inward, virtually straight-lined, bend near the top. In the

mastaka upon the *shikhara*, the *amalaka* was disproportionately small and the *kalasha* finial narrow and tall. Among the temples showing those features, three are standing at Barakar. One of them is dated in Shaka 1382 (A.D. 1461).

In striking contrast to the simplicity of the stone temples, the few surviving brick temples of Bengal are remarkable for the splendor of their decorative embellishments. All of them belong to the *nagara* order. *Pancaratha* earlier and *saptaratha* later, they show a two-storied *jangha* with a *bandhana* running between, a double corniced *baranda*, and a vertical sequence of subdued *angashikharas* (miniature replicas of a temple) on the *shikhara*. The *bhumi-amalakas* in the earlier examples are right-angled, but those of later temples are round. Embellishments on stucco plaster display an amazing variety of elegant and graceful designs and motifs. Most remarkable of them is the stylized but exquisite and large *caitya* arch design that constitutes the central theme of the *shikhara* decoration. Two brick temples, now standing at Deulghata (West Bengal), are the finest specimens of the type.

Less affected by the iconoclastic frenzy of the early Muslim invaders, Orissa retains a series of temples representing the three principal stages of evolution of the *nagara* style of the region: early, transitional, and mature. The style lost its force once the mature phase was over.

Like other regions, the *deul*, the local name of the sanctum to distinguish it from its other adjuncts, was *triratha* in plan at the beginning. Its perpendicular wall section, *bara*, had a *vedibandha* (*pabbaga* in Orissa) of three (subsequently four) moldings, a *jangha* with a niche on each of its *ratha* facets, and a *baranda* composed of a recessed frieze between two moldings. The gently curved *shikhara* rose in *bhumi* stages, each *bhumi* being demarcated by a square *bhumi-amalaka*. The *mastaka*, when found complete, showed a *beki* (short cylindrical neck), a flattened *amalaka*, a low *khapuri* (skull-like member), and a cylindrical (later *kalasha*) finial. The *deul*, though alone initially, was complemented sometime later by an oblong *mukhashala*. The niches on the *jangha* of the *deul* contained images of family members and manifestations of the deity enshrined. On the door lintel of the sanctum, a panel of eight *grahas* (planets) were carved. All the adornments, including the figure sculptures, were done in bas-relief. The Parashurameshvara at Bhubaneswar, the Kutaitundi at Khiching, and the Lingaraja at Bhawanipur are some of the temples bearing these features.

In the transitional period, the *deul* acquired a *pancaratha* plan, the *vedibandha* moldings increased to five, *nagastambhas* (pilasters entwined with human-headed snakes) appeared on the *jangha*, vertical bands of interlacing

caitya arch designs textured the *shikhara*, and the door lintel of the sanctum bore a panel of nine *grabas*. Figure sculptures were shown in high relief. In a major development, a pyramidal roof of gradually receding tiers came to surmount the *mukhashala*, as in *Bhadra deuls* in Orissa. In later years, most of these features were included among the invariable characteristics of Orissan architecture. This transitional phase is represented at its best by the small but pretty Mukteshvara at Bhubaneswar. For its perfect proportions, graceful sculptural embellishments, delicate surface treatment, and unobtrusive decorative scheme, this exquisite little shrine ranks as the “gem of Orissan architecture.”

In the fully evolved form of Orissan architecture, the principal features of the *deul* were *pancaratha* ground plan, fivefold division of the *bara*, lofty near-perpendicular *shikhara*, round *bhumi-amalakas*, rise of *angashikharas* in graded height on the *anuratha* (intermediate *ratha* facet between *raba* and *kanika*) of the *shikhara*, lion rampant on elephant projecting from each face of the *shikhara*, and *mastaka* composed of short *beki*, ponderous *amalaka*, emphatic *khapuri* and bulbous *kalasha*, and *dhvaja* (emblem of the deity enshrined). Images of the incarnations or family members of the installed divinity were contained by the central niches, and those of the eight *dikpalas* (guardian deities of the quarters) were housed by the subsidiary niches on the *jangha*. As a convention, the *navagrabas* were displayed on the door lintel. The entire temple complex, comprising the *deul*, the *mukhashala*, and sometimes a *natamandapa* (dancing hall) and a *bhogamandapa* (refractory hall) in the same axial length, was placed within a walled enclosure.

The majestic Lingaraja at Bhubaneswar embodies all the features specified above, in their most finished and perfect shape. The temple, surrounded by a massive wall, has four components: *deul*, *mukhashala* (commonly called *jagamohana*), *natamandapa*, and *bhogamandapa*, the last two being later additions. The *deul*, the principal member of the complex, is remarkable for the soaring verticality of its great tower. Subduing every detail of the temple to this vertical urge, the *shikhara* moves up in a rapid sweep to produce the effect of one continuous line on its profile. In this accent on the unbroken linear ascent of the *shikhara* profile, *rekha* (line), the local name of the *nagara deul* finds its ample justification. A masterpiece of Indian temple architecture, the Lingaraja stands as the model for all later temples of Orissa. An in situ inscription, dated A.D. 1114–1115, fixes the upper limit of its date.

The glorious tradition set by the Lingaraja was raised to a new height by the stupendous Sun temple at Konarak. In the novelty of its conception as a huge Sun chariot and the solemn grandeur of its masterfully executed sculptures,

the temple, even in ruins, represents the supreme achievement of the Orissan architects.

D. R. Das

See also **Temple Types (Styles) of India**

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MUGHAL

Babur (r. A.D. 1526–1530) who founded the Mughal rule in India also made a modest beginning of the architectural style that was developed by his successors, Akbar (r. 1556–1605) and Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658).

Babur’s Bagh-i-Gul Afshan (Flower-Scattering Garden) at Agra

Babur founded several terraced gardens at Agra, of which Bagh-i-Gul Afshan has survived intact. It is a vast garden, laid out in three descending terraces, on the bank of the river Jamuna. Water flowed through stone canals, cascades, and tanks, from one terrace to the other. Tree avenues and flower parterres were symmetrically laid out with these water courses. It was later renovated by Babur’s great grandson Jahangir and renamed Bagh-i-Nur Afshan (1615–1619). Thus the concept of landscaping was introduced to the medieval architecture of India.

The Din-Panah, Sher-Mandal, and Qal’ a-i-Kuhna Masjid, Old Fort Delhi (1533–1540; 1555)

The most ambitious architectural project of Humayun (r. 1530–1540; 1555–1556) was the building of Din-Panah (now called the Old Fort) on the river Jamuna at Delhi. Founded in 1533, its inner citadel with the three

gateways; the Sher Mandal and Qal'a-i-Kuhna Masjid were completed by 1540. The gateways, built of red sandstone, have *jharokhas* (upper floor windows with their own pedestal, pillars, and roof) on the facade and *chhatris* (free standing pillared pavilions on the superstructure, roofed by a dome or cupola) on the superstructure. The Sher Mandal is an octagonal tower of red sandstone. The ground floor has closed alcoves. The upper floor alcoves are deeper, and four of them, on the cardinal sides, open into the interior, which is a square hall. Dados and spandrels have inlaid motifs. It is surmounted by an octagonal *chhatri*. Humayun was greatly interested in astronomy, and it was in this building that he died.

The Qal'a-i-Kuhna Masjid (the Mosque of the Old Fort), also built of red stone, has five bays and, correspondingly, five arches on the facade, which have a fringe of lotus buds. Wings are protected by slanting *chhajjas* (angled roof eaves) supported on upright brackets. The nave is roofed by a single dome, which is crowned by sheath of lotus petals, *amalaka* (myrobalan), and *kalash* finials. Multistoried octagonal towers are attached to its rear corners. Prominent *jharokhas* project on the side walls. Qur'anic (Arabic) inscriptions are carved on the *mibrab* arches. It seems to have been completed by Humayun after his restoration in 1555.

Humayun's Tomb at Delhi (c. 1560–1570)

Commissioned by Haji Begum (Bega Begum), Humayun's chief queen, and built during Akbar's early reign, it is the first monumental tomb of the imperial Mughals. It is planned in the center of the four-quartered garden (*chahar-bagh*) which had such pleasing water elements as stone canals, lotus tanks, lily ponds, and cascades, surrounded by the garden. The tomb building is square in plan, 156 feet (47.5 m), but its angles have been chamfered to give it an octagonal conformation. There is no minaret or tower at the corners of its plinth, and the absence of any flanking architectural member has left this grand mausoleum incomplete and isolated.

Each facade is composed of a central *iwan* (a large hall), containing a portal, flanked by wings that also have smaller central portals flanked first by blind ornamental double arches and then by double alcoves at the inclined angles, all in a two-storied arrangement. White and black marble has been used with red sandstone, and this simple color combination, more than its design, gives this tomb an exceedingly pleasing architectural effect. Its interior is composed of a central octagonal hall, octagonalized square rooms on the corners, and oblong portals on the sides, all interconnected through corridors. The tomb is roofed by a bulbous, double dome of white marble, flanked at the corners by red stone octagonal *chhatris*.

Agra Fort and the Bengali-Mahal (1565–73)

Akbar (r. 1556–1605) founded a fort of brick masonry and red sandstone at Agra in 1565. It was completed along with a large number of palatial mansions, also of red stone, in eight years. Situated on the bank of the river Jamuna, it is semicircular in plan, with its chord lying parallel to the course of the river. The massive enclosing walls are 70 feet (21.3 m) high and 30 feet (9.1 m) wide. Double ramparts have been provided with broad circular bastions at regular intervals. A deep moat (except on the river side) separates it from the mainland, from which it is accessible only by two drawbridges, attached to the Delhi Darwazah and the Akbar Darwazah. Of its four gateways, these two are monumental buildings. The former, completed in 1569, was the principal and ceremonial gate of the royal citadel. Protected by high bastions and ramparts with embrasures and loopholes, it has a crooked entrance with sharp curves and steep rises, rendering it impossible for the enemy to storm it. The inner archway had two life-size stone elephants on its sides, and it was therefore called Hathi-Pol (Elephant Gate). It has a four-storied elevation on the rear (eastern) side, in receding terraces, with living rooms, *dalans* (verandas), pavilions, and terraces. It has decorations in inlay and mosaic, stucco in arabesques, painting, glazed tiling, and, above all, stone carving in geometrical, animate, and *jali* (latticed) designs. The Akbar Darwazah (now called Amar Singh Gate) was similarly designed, though on a smaller scale and without the ostentations of the formal gateway.

Of other buildings of Akbar, in the fort, now only the Bengali Mahal has survived. It was also completed in 1569. At present, it is split into two complexes, Akbari Mahal and Jehangiri Mahal. Built of red sandstone, both are composed of such trabeated elements as pillars, brackets, lintels, beams, *chhajjas*, *jharokhas*, and *chhatris*. Besides a wide variety of flat ceilings, it also has some vaulted ceilings, built ingeniously by stone ribs and panels.

The western facade of these palaces had a uniform plan extending to about 430 feet (131 m), with two entrance portals and three towers, of which only one portal (*poli*) with two flanking towers, creating the western facade of the Jehangiri Mahal, has survived. It has, on its facade, a series of ornamental red stone arches with a white marble fringe of lotus buds, looking like silk tapestries or carpets hanging on the wall. Designs have also been inlaid on the portal, while its frieze has polychrome glazed tiles. Each palace is a complex arrangement of rooms and halls, corridors and galleries, *dalans* (verandas), terraces, and open courts—all grouped together in two stories around a large central quadrangle. Openings are protected by *chhajjas*, which are supported on exquisitely designed, three-tiered stone brackets, which give each facade a distinct personality.

Fatehpur Sikri and Its Monuments (1572–1585; 1601)

Akbar founded a large township at Fatehpur Sikri and he lived there from 1572 to 1585. Unlike Agra, which was an ancient habitat and grew by itself, Fatehpur Sikri was properly planned on three descending levels with three complexes: the mosque complex, the royal complex, and the public complex, respectively, in accordance with the slope of the ridge. All the buildings were so laid out as to have northern or eastern orientation, with perfect arrangement of drainage and water supply.

The Stone-cutters Mosque (c. 1562), situated in the mosque complex, is composed of simple pillars, arches, and a flat ceiling. Arches are built of stone slabs, and have no voussoirs. Qur'anic verses are carved upon them and also on the *mihrab* niche. The most distinctive feature of this small mosque, however, is the use of beautiful monolithic struts (serpentine brackets) on its facade to support the broad and slanting *chhajja*.

The Rang Mahal, situated nearby, is also an earlier building (c. 1565–1570). Originally it was a large, residential palace, of which only a single house with an inner court has survived. The interior is accessible by a crooked entrance to ensure *pardab* (segregation of women). *Dalans* (verandas), rooms and *kothas* (inner closed cells), composed of red stone pillars, brackets, *chhajjas*, and flat ceilings, are regularly disposed on all the four sides of the court, in two stories. All this gave an impression of open and airy spaces and ensured a comfortable living in this climate.

Founded by Sheikh Salim Chishti in 1564, the Jami Masjid of Fatehpur Sikri was completed by Akbar in 1571. The central court measures about 360 feet (110 m) by 439 feet (134 m). There are spacious *dalans* (cloisters) of 38 feet (12 m) width on its eastern and northern sides. The *liwan* (sanctuary) on its western side measures 288 by 65 feet (87.8 x 19.8 m). It is divided into several sections. The central nave (*babu*), which is 41 feet (12.5 m) square, is roofed by a single, high dome. Each wing is composed of a large colonnaded hall which has a square domed room in the middle, attached to the western wall. The *mibrabs* (arches of the western wall) have been gorgeously ornamented by inlaid mosaic of stone and glazed tiles, and carved and painted Qur'anic inscriptions. The side domes are supported on beautifully designed corbelled pendentives in the phase of transition, instead of vault, squinch, or stalactite.

The facade of the sanctuary has a deep central portal and an arcade on its either side. Arches are similarly ornamental and are protected by identical *chhajjas* supported on brackets. While there is one *chhatra* over each pillar of the *dalans*, arches of this facade each have an additional central *chhatra*, which gives an impression of

profusion of *chhatris* on the skyline. The Persian inscription in the central portal records its construction in 1571.

The stupendous Buland Darwazah, built in 1601 to commemorate Akbar's conquest of the Deccan, in place of the original southern gate of the Jami Masjid, is a complete monument with large halls, small chambers, passages, and stairways. Raised on a stepped platform 42 feet (12.8 m) high, it rises to a total height of 176 feet (53.6 m) above the road, with which it is connected by only a series of broad stairs, rendering its use as a gateway impossible. It measures 130 feet (39.6 m) across the front. The wings recede (offset) at a 135 degree angle, proportionately, giving the facade an exceedingly beautiful architectural effect. It is here, in fact, that the *iwān* formula has been most magnificently expressed in medieval art. *Chhatris* of different denominations have been used on the superstructure.

The Tomb of Sheikh Salim Chishti is situated in the court of the Jami Masjid, facing the Buland Darwazah. It is a small but extremely beautiful white marble building, square in plan, measuring 48 feet (14.6 m) on each side, with an entrance porch attached to its southern side. The tomb chamber, roofed by a single dome has, on all sides, a spacious *dalan* (veranda), divided into square bays, spanned by corbelled slabs in *ksipta* (lantern) style and closed by exquisite *jalis* (latticed screens) of white marble. The broad slanting *chhajja*, which rotates on all external sides, is supported on gracefully designed monolithic struts, which look like carved ivory rather than chiseled marble. This feature bestows upon the tomb a distinct personality and impression. Qur'anic verses are carved on the porch entrance and on ornamental panels in the *dalan*. The tomb was completed in 1581, as is inscribed on the porch entrance. It was originally finished in red sandstone. Jehangir rebuilt its porch (portico), *dalan*, and dome with white marble between 1605 and 1607. Owing to its exquisite *jalis* and struts, the tomb is reckoned among the masterpieces of Mughal architecture.

The royal complex, situated at a little lower level, has the Raniwas (*harems*, seraglio) and some other buildings associated with Akbar's cultural activities. The Raniwas (wrongly called Jodhbai's Palace; 1569–1572) is the largest of Akbar's extant palaces at Fatehpur Sikri. It has double-storied residential suites, with *dalans*, rooms, *kothas*, and open terraces on all the four sides of the spacious inner court, which is approached through a crooked gateway and enclosed on all sides for strict *pardab* and security. Besides the open terraces, there are *chhatris*, *chaukhandis*, and *khaprel* (tiled) roofs on the upper floors, where the residents could spend their evenings pleasantly. Toilets are annexed on the southern side. A temple has also been provided.

The Mahal-i-Ilahi (1582; wrongly called Birbal's Palace), is a double-storied mansion built entirely of red sandstone of the finest quality. It has four square rooms, of equal size, measuring about 17 feet (5.1 m) on each side, open on all sides and interconnected by common doorways, and oblong porches on the north and south sides, on the ground plan. While rooms have flat ceilings, porches have triangular *chbappar* (hut) ceilings with pyramidal roofs on the first floor. A broad slanting *chbajja* supported on graceful three-tiered brackets protect it on all the external sides. They have been used dominantly and impart the building a distinctly ornate character. The two rooms on the first floor have domed ceilings made of ribs and panels, with *jharokhas* opening on the court. The domes were originally tiled. The most important feature of this palace, however, is the surface carving, in incised, low, and medium relief, with which it has been entirely ornamented in the interior as well as on the exterior, in a wide variety of designs, including arabesques, geometrical, and stylized florals. It was a formal building used by Akbar for the initiation ceremony of the Din-i-Ilahi.

The public complex has several palatial mansions arranged judiciously around a large, stone-paved court. The Khwabgah palace (1572) is situated on its southeastern segment, overlooking the magnificent Anup Talao. It is composed of several buildings: arched and colonnaded halls, open pillared *dalans*, terraces, pavilions, and curtained passages, all built tastefully in red sandstone. The *bujrah* (room) of Anup Talao was ornately finished and was personally used by Akbar. The upper floor pavilion has *khaprel* (tiled) roofs on its verandas and figurative paintings in the interior, with Persian inscriptions in praise of this palace.

The Panch Mahal (1572–1575) is a rectangular building of five stories, open on all sides, composed of red sandstone pillars, with jali (latticed) balustrades on the edges, or *chhajjas* and brackets, carved friezes, stairways, and flat ceilings. It is crowned by a square *chhatri*. Obviously, it dominates on elevation. Its stairs are on the western side, and it distinctly offsets toward the east, or the court, on which side is its facade. Akbar used this palace for daily worship of the rising sun and for showing himself, simultaneously, to his people, an indispensable function of the Mughal king.

On its northern side are situated the Record Office (1572–1575) composed of three oblong halls of equal size and the Ekastambha Prasada (1572–1575; the House of Unitary Pillar, wrongly called Diwan-i-Khas). The latter is a square building of red sandstone, measuring 43 feet (13.2 m) on each exterior side. The double-storied four facades are identical. Four *chhatris* at the corners compose its superstructure. Its internal architecture is unique. The single-storied square hall measures nearly

29 feet (8.7 m) on each side. In its exact center is a huge column of red stone. It is square at base, octagonal on the shaft, and 16-sided and round above it, from which point rise 36 beautiful three-tiered brackets to support a circular platform above it. Four narrow bridges radiate diagonally toward the angles where they meet the inner balconies. The platform, bridges, and balconies are protected by latticed balustrades. The central column with its platform and bridges is certainly the *raison d'être* of this building. It is not functional but rather a symbolic monument, representing Akbar's belief in the "nitary pillar" concept of the sun.

The Diwan-i-ʿAm (Hall of Public Audience, 1572–1575) is spread on the eastern side of this court, at a lower level. It is a spacious oblong complex with a large court and raised pillared *dalans* around it. In the middle of the western side is the Throne Pavilion. It has five openings made of pillars and brackets, with *jali* (latticed) screens separating the apartments. The most important feature of this pavilion is the *khaprel* (stone-tiled) roof over the veranda. It slopes gently from the frieze down to the capitals of the pillars and combines the effect of the *chbajja* and the superstructure. It is in this element that facade and superstructure are combined marvelously. The throne chamber faces east, the direction of the rising sun, in accordance with Akbar's faith. It may be noted that *dalans* were not meant for actual use, but to provide an architectural accessory so that plain walls did not look monotonous. This feature was a constituent of the style used invariably with public buildings.

The Diwan-i-Khas (Hall of Private Audience, 1572–1585, wrongly called Daftar Khanah) is situated to the south of the Khwabgah. Planned with a court and pillared *dalans* around it, it is composed of an oblong hall and a wide, spacious *dalan* (veranda) on east, north, and west sides, all connected by doorways. On the southern side, overlooking the ridge, are three openings and a central *jharokha*. This is thus an extremely open and airy building. It has a high *ladaodar* (wagon-vaulted) ceiling of stone ribs and panels. These features confirm that it was used as an assembly hall. The interior was originally painted with figurative subjects depicting contemporary life.

Tomb of Akbar, Sikandara Agra (1605–1612)

The tomb of Akbar at Sikandara Agra was built by his son Jahangir. It stands in the center of a vast enclosed garden divided into four quarters, on the Char-bagh plan, by causeways, of stone masonry, of 75 feet (22.9 m) width, with narrow water channels, tanks, and cascades. In the middle of each side is a monumental gate, the main one on the south side, the other three being ornamental only. The two-storied main gate on the south side is much larger and more ornately finished. It measures 137 feet

(41.9 m) east to west, 100 feet (30.5 m) north to south, and 75 feet (22.9 m) in height. Its north and south facades are identical, each having a colossal *iwan* (portal) 61 feet (18.6 m) in height and 44 feet (13.5 m) in width in the center, and double alcoves on the sides. The whole red stone exterior is finished in mosaic and inlay of multicolored stones, chiefly in geometrical designs. The spandrels of arches bear exquisite arabesque scrolls. Soffits of arches are painted in red and white. The most important feature of this gate is the use of four circular tapering minarets of white marble on the corners of the terrace which, along with the *chhatris*, make up a wonderful superstructure.

The main tomb is square and has five receding stories. Each facade has a central *iwan* (portal) superimposed by an oblong eight-pillared *chhaparkhat* of white marble. Octagonal towers surmounted by *chhatris* are attached to the corners. The ground floor has spacious *dalans* (veranda) of 22-foot (6.71-m) width. Four upper stories are composed of arched and pillared *dalans* and superimposing *chhatris*. There is no dome. The uppermost story is entirely built of white marble. The tomb has a large number of Persian inscriptions. Those on the main gate praise Jahangir and the tomb, and also give the date of its construction. The uppermost story has thirty-six Persian couplets, in praise of Akbar and on philosophical subjects.

Tomb of I'timad-ud-Daulah Agra (1622–1628)

Situated on the left bank of the Jamuna, it was built by Nur Jahan for her parents Mirza Ghiyath Beg, titled I'timad-ud Daulah, and Asmat Begum. It is also planned in the center of the *char-bagh*, as usual, with a beautiful garden setting and water elements. The white marble tomb is square in plan, with towers attached to the corners. These towers are octagonal but assume a circular form above the terrace and are surmounted by circular *chhatris*. Each facade has three arches, the two on the sides closed by *jalis*, and protected by a *chhajja* and a balustrade. The interior is composed of a central square hall for cenotaphs, four oblong rooms on the sides and four square rooms on the corners, all interconnected by common doorways. It is essentially the typical *navagrha* (nine-house) plan of the Mughals. The building is not roofed by a dome, but by a square pavilion, having three arched openings on each side, and a pyramidal (*chaukhandi*) roof. The *chhatris* of the towers combine impressively with this *barahdari* and make up an extremely beautiful superstructure.

Its exterior ornamentation by mosaic and inlay of multicolored natural stones in a wide variety of designs and motifs is the most important feature of its architecture. It is spread on almost every inch of the white marble surface with unprecedented lavishness, and the

decorative aspect has superseded the structure in this tomb. It marks the transition from red stone to white marble, and also from carving to inlay and mosaic.

Shah Jahan's Palatial Mansions (1628–1640); Agra Fort

Soon after his accession to the throne, Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658) commissioned the Diwan-i-Am of Agra Fort. Before it, the *durbār* (court) of public audience was held in a large tent. His Diwan-i-Am (1628–1635) is situated in a spacious quadrangle having arcaded *dalans* (verandas) on all sides. It is a rectangular colonnaded open hall, three aisles deep, with nine bold, nine-cusped arches on the facade. Double columns have been used to support these massive arches, which are well proportioned. Though the construction is in red sandstone, the whole of it has been covered by white shell-plaster, giving the effect of white marble. Bays have flat ceilings. *Chhajja*, as usual, is supported on brackets, but there are no *chhatris* on the superstructure. The throne chamber, in the middle of the eastern wall, is built of white marble and is exquisitely ornamented with inlaid stylized floral designs. It presides over the building functionally, as well as architecturally.

Shah Jahan did not like some of his grandfather Akbar's red sandstone palaces in Agra Fort and he ordered them to be rebuilt with white marble. The Muthamman Burj (Octagonal Tower) is the earliest of them. The spacious white marble pavilion surmounts the circular bastion, on the riverside, facing east, with five of its octagonal sides projecting forward. It is composed of pillars, brackets, lintels, *chhajjas*, and a beautiful *jbarokha*—all of white marble. On its western side is a spacious *dalan* (veranda), which has a sunken water basin in the middle of its floor. Walls have graceful dados with stylized floral borders, and carved natural plant compositions in the center. Ceilings are flat. Exquisitely inlaid pillars, brackets, and lintels make up the three openings on the court side. Inlay art in stylized designs dominates the ornamentation of this building. An eight-pillared marble *chhatri* crowns it. It was here that Shah Jahan spent the years of his captivity (1658–1666) and died, in full view of the Taj Mahal.

Situated with the Jamuna on one side, and the Anguri Bagh garden, with its enchanting water devices, including a waterfall, on the other, the Khas Mahal (Arambagh; 1631–1640) is the most beautiful palace of Shah Jahan in Agra Fort. It is also built entirely of white marble. The interior is a spacious hall, on the river side, which has a three-aisle-deep *dalan*, with five nine-cusped arches on the facade, on its front. The hall was originally painted with stylized designs. A *chhajja* projects on the exterior, as usual. In its front is a large scalloped tank with fountains.

Its water flowed, through a waterfall, to the four-quartered Anguri Bagh, which is situated at a much lower level and provides the palace with a beautiful setting. On both sides of the palace, on the terrace, are oblong *bangladar* pavilions (with curved roof and *chhajja*) and open courts, secured by thin marble screens to ensure *pardab*. Though a regal building, it has been designed with abundant open spaces to facilitate cool breezes from the river, a pleasant garden front and landscapes, to ensure comfortable living in the hot climate of Agra.

The Diwan-i-Khas (1635) of Agra Fort was built of white marble. It consists of two halls, an outer pillared hall and an inner closed hall, both connected by archways. The outer hall, which is essentially a spacious *dalan* (veranda) has double pillars, supporting five nine-cusped arches on the facade, on the northern side, and three seven-cusped arches on eastern and western sides. These have been tastefully ornamented by inlaid and carved designs in low relief. A broad *chhajja*, supported on brackets, rotates on these three external sides. The palace has no superstructure. *Durbār* (court) was held in the outer hall. The inner hall, which was reserved for conducting important and confidential business, has alcoves in the southern wall, and raised seats with semisoffits on the eastern and western sides. *Jalis* (lattices) have also been used. The most important aspect of this palace, however, is its dados. Plant motifs are carved, in double rows, in the center, while a stylized vine design is inlaid in polychrome on the border. A Persian inscription distributed on twenty-eight oblong cartouches on the northern wall of the outer hall, dated in 1635, praise the king and the palace.

Red Fort Delhi and Its Palaces (1639–1648)

Shah Jahan transferred the formal capital from Agra to Delhi in 1638 and founded there a city, Shahjahanabad, and a citadel, the Red Fort, which were completed in nearly ten years (1639–1648). Palaces were built in the fort, where there was virgin space to lay out these buildings on a uniform plan. It has an octagonalized rectangular plan and measures 3,100 feet (944.9 m) north to south, 1,650 feet (493 m) east to west, and 75 feet (22.9 m) in height. Built of brick masonry, it is entirely finished in red sandstone. Its battlemented walls have the usual embrasures, machicolations, bastions, and a moat. The Lahori Gate on the west and Delhi Gate on the south are its main gates. The former has a covered market. The palaces are symmetrically laid out, with the Naubat Khanah (House of Ceremonial Music), Diwan-i-Am (Hall of Public Audience), and Rang Mahal (the Painted Palace) on the east-west axis, and the Rang Mahal, Shah Burj (the King's Tower), and Diwan-i-Khas (Hall of Private Audience) on the north-south axis, along the course

of the Nahar-i-Bahisht (The Heavenly Canal), on a raised terraced. The gardens that originally connected the palaces have not survived.

The Diwan-i-Am was situated, originally, in a court of its own, with *dalans* and gateways on all sides. They no longer exist. It is a three-aisle-deep, colonnaded hall with nine nine-cusped arches on the facade, built of red sandstone that was originally white plastered and polished to look like white marble. Overlooking the central bay is a white marble throne balcony in the eastern wall. It has a latticed balustrade in front and seats with pedestals on the sides. On its front, attached to it, is a beautiful white marble *bungla* (four-pillared pavilion with curved roof and *chhajja*), 12 by 9 feet (3.6 x 2.7 m) in size. Both the throne balcony and the *bungla* are gorgeously inlaid in a wide variety of floral and stylized designs. The back wall has, in addition, floral compositions with birds. On the top of it is the famous plaque depicting Orpheus playing to the animals. Essentially a Florentine work, this plaque was imported and placed here after Aurangzeb, sometime during the eighteenth or early nineteenth century.

The Rang Mahal, measuring 153 by 69 feet (46.79 x 21.11 m) is three aisles deep with five nine-cusped arches on the facade, thus having fifteen bays, each 20 feet (6.1 m) square, with a flat ceiling. But instead of pillars, piers have been used to support them. The whole interior was originally painted and gilded. On the river side are five window openings closed by *jalis*. The Nahar-i-Bahisht flowed through it in the middle, across its length, dividing it into two equal sections, as if the palace was pleasantly laid out on its two banks. In it, in the center of the building, exactly on the same axis as the throne chamber of the Diwan-i-Am, is a beautiful shallow marble basin sunk in the pavement. Designed as a lotus flower of 24 petals, it occupies the entire 20-foot (6.1 m) square side. It has a triple border with flowing curves. Floral and arabesque designs are inlaid in rare multicolored stones. When water rippled softly from the edges of the petals, it produced an optical illusion, and the petals appeared to rise and fall.

The Shah Burj, also known as Baithak, Khwabgah, Muthamman Burj and Khas Mahal, is a large palace complex, consisting of several *dalans* and rooms, to serve as a full-fledged residential palace. The Nahar-i-Bahisht flows through it. Built entirely of white marble, it was profusely painted and gilded in stylized compositions. On the walls, overlooking the canal, are two Persian inscriptions, eulogizing the king and the palace, specifically the ethereal water devices. On its eastern side, overlooking the Jamuna, is attached the Muthamman Burj (Octagonal Tower), which was used by the king for appearing to the public.

The Diwan-i-Khas is situated on the same 4.5-foot (1.4 m) high terrace, overlooking the river, with the same

Nahar-i-Bahisht flowing through it. Originally, it also had its own court and arcaded *dalans*, which have not survived. It is a rectangular colonnaded hall, built entirely of white marble. It measures 102 feet (31.1 m) north to south and 78 feet (23.8 m) east to west. Made up of 24 square and 8 oblong piers, it is 5 aisles deep, with 5 nine-cusped arches on the facade. Square piers have dados, with stylized vines on the border, and a natural plant composition in the center, both inlaid in multicolored stones. The remaining mural surface in the interior, including the ceiling, was originally painted and gilded. Riverside arches are closed by *jalis*. A broad, slanting *chhajja* protects it on the exterior. Four *chhatris* on the corners of the roof make up a simple yet graceful superstructure.

Mosques of the Age of Shah Jahan (1628–1658)

Akbar (r. 1556–1605) and his son Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) built no public mosque at Agra, Lahore, or Delhi, the three metropolitan towns of the Mughal empire, and no private mosque in the forts of Agra and Lahore where they lived. It was left to Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), Jahangir's son, to commission mosques in these forts and the Red Fort Delhi, and also a large public Friday (Jami) mosque each in the cities of Agra and Delhi.

The small white-marble mosques—Mina Masjid (c. 1630) and Nagina Masjid (c. 1635) in Agra Fort; Moti Masjid in Lahore Fort (1630–1635); and Moti Masjid in Red Fort Delhi (c. 1658)—built by him were of a private nature and were attached to the royal harem. The last one is the most beautiful mosque of this class. Built entirely of pure white marble, it measures 40 by 30 feet (12.2 x 9.14 m) and is two aisles deep with a three-arched facade. Arches are engrailed. They are supported on square piers and are protected by a *chhajja*, which has no brackets. It is curved in the middle, above the central arch, and, correspondingly, the frieze is also curved. This *bangladar* (curved) feature gives prominence to the central part of the facade, as did the *iwān* portal. Like the Nagina Masjid, it also has triangular and vaulted ceilings, and three domes, which are fluted and are harmoniously set against the skyline. Combined with the mini-*chhatris*, which crown the pinnacles on all sides, they make up a marvelous superstructure. Called the Pearl Mosque, it ranks among the masterpieces of the Mughals.

The Jami Masjid of Agra (1644–1648) is a simple mosque of brick masonry finished in red sandstone with ornamental use of white marble. It stands on a high plinth, with the *iwān* (sanctuary) on the western side of the central court and *dalans* (verandas) on three sides. The *dalans* have seven-cusped arches supported on pillars, and are superimposed by square *chhatris*. The main eastern gate no longer exists. The side gates are also

surmounted by *chhatris*. The sanctuary is two aisles deep and is composed of extremely high, broad and massive arches supported on equally massive piers, all built of brick masonry that was plastered. Its facade has a broad *iwān* (portal) in the center and two smaller archways on either side. All these arches are plain. Square *chhatris* have been used on the parapet of the facade. The sanctuary is roofed by three domes, which are somewhat flat and disproportionate. Octagonal towers, surmounted by *chhatris*, are attached to the corners of the sanctuary and also to the eastern corners of the mosque. This profusion of *chhatris* on the skyline make up, altogether, a gorgeous superstructure. The Persian inscription inlaid on its facade, along the *iwān* portal, records its completion in 1648, in five years, at the cost of 500,000 rupees.

The Moti Masjid (1647–1654) of Agra Fort is also built on a high plinth. Internally, it is built of pure white marble around the central court, which measures 154 feet (47 m) east-west by 158 feet (48.2 m) north-south. The *dalans* are nearly 11 feet (3.3 m) wide and are composed of nine-cusped engrailed arches supported on typical Shahjahanian pillars having square bases, twelve-sided fluted shafts, and stalactite capitals, all of white marble. These are protected by *chhajjas* that do not have brackets. *Chhatris* are also absent, and these *dalans* are crowned by a cresting. The main gate is on the river (eastern) side. Side gates are approached by double staircases. These gates are surmounted by *chhatris*. The sanctuary situated west of the court measures 159 by 56 feet (48.46 x 17.07 m) and is three aisles deep with an arcade of seven arches of equal dimensions on the facade. These arches are nine-cusped and are supported on massive square piers, all of white marble. Ornamentation by carved designs is minimal and the composition is plain and simple, yet graceful. Out of twenty-one bays of the sanctuary, only three have vaulted soffits (roofed by domes exteriorly), others have flat ceilings. The facade is protected by a *chhajja*, which also does not have brackets. Square *chhatris* have been placed on the parapet, one over each arch. Larger octagonal *chhatris* have been used on all four corners of the sanctuary, and also on the two octagonal towers attached to the eastern corners of the mosque. Three bulbous domes, with the usual sheath of lotus petals and *kalash* finial, crown the sanctuary. The combination of these graceful forms of the *chhatris* and the domes on the skyline, in pure white marble, is incredibly beautiful. The Persian inscription inlaid on the facade, below the *chhajja*, records its construction in seven years (1647–1654) at the cost of 300,000 rupees.

The Jami Masjid of Shahjahanabad Delhi (1650–1656) is one of the largest and the finest mosques. It is built of red sandstone with liberal use of white marble. It stands on a plinth of 30 feet (9.1 m) height. This grand

elevation enabled its three gateways, approached by a flight of stairs, to tower over its surroundings majestically. It is composed of an open court 328 feet (100 m) on each side, with a central tank, *dalans* on its three sides with a gateway in the middle of each one of them, and a sanctuary, which measures 200 by 90 feet (61 x 27.4 m) on the west. Its facade is composed of a central *iwān* portal with an arcade of five arches in each wing, and two lofty minarets 130 feet (39.6 m) high, crowned by *chhatris*, on the sides. Arches are cusped and are supported on white marble piers. There is only one *chhatri* on each wing, but there is no *chhajja*. The sanctuary has been ingeniously planned in the interior. The nave, roofed by the main dome, has a large *iwān* portal on its front. Each wing of the nave (along the western wall) is divided, by massive piers, into three sections: a square bay in the middle and two oblong bays on the sides. The square bay is roofed by a dome, while oblong bays have *chaukhandi* (pyramidal, wagon-vaulted) ceilings. Thus, there are three domed and four wagon-vaulted ceilings on the western section of the sanctuary. But this arrangement is not repeated on its front side, which has, on either side of the *iwān* portal, a *dalan* of five arches. Each *dalan* is a hall with a continuous ceiling. Thus, though externally it appears to be a two-aisled mosque with eleven bays, owing to eleven arches on the facade, in fact, it is only a single-aisled building with seven bays, alternatively oblong and square, having an *iwān* portal and two side *dalans* on its face. This is a unique design, representative of the genius of the Mughal architects, who could consistently organize space in a novel way. Ten oblong panels on the facade above the ten arches of the wings bear a long Persian panegyric in praise of the King Shah Jahan and the mosque. The *mibrab* arch bears Qur'anic verses. There is practically no ornamentation and its beautiful effect is essentially architectonic.

The Taj Mahal Agra (1631–1648)

Shah Jahan built this wonderful monument of love in the memory of his most beloved Queen Mumtaz Mahal, who died in 1631. Its site on the river Jamuna is ideal, environmentally as well as architecturally. The Taj was laid out in several descending terraces on a south-north axis, in accordance with the slope of the river bank. Beginning from the south side, a city, now called Tajganj, was founded with squares, markets, inns, and houses, obviously to support its institution. On the second terrace, at a lower level, is the main court, which has the main gate of the tomb, *dalans*, annexes, and subsidiary buildings, providing a beautiful approach to the monument. The garden and the tomb are situated on the third terrace at a still lower level. As usual, it is an enclosed garden, divided into four quarters (*char-bagh*) by broad, stone canals which have fountains; double, stone-paved causeways, with the intervening cypress avenues in the

middle; and flower parterres and tree avenues on the sides. Ornamental red stone buildings called Jal Mahal (Water Palace) are placed in the middle of east and west sides, to complete the architectural coherence. But the tomb building is not sited in the center of the garden, as was done in all earlier Mughal tombs. Instead, there is a raised lotus pond of white marble. The tomb is placed, on its north, just on the riverbank, in the middle of a rectangular red stone platform which measures nearly 971 feet (295.8 m) east to west and 365 feet (111.2 m) north to south, and is 4 feet (1.2 m) high from the garden and 42 feet (12.8 m) high from the river. It is flanked by a mosque on the west and Jam'at Khanah (Assembly Hall) on the east, with the garden lying at its feet. This was an innovation in the traditional *char-bagh* plan. The tomb stands in the background of a blank blue sky against which its white image silhouettes, almost magically. The sky changes its color every moment, and the Taj is always seen in this ever-changing setting, in a variety of tints and tones, and in innumerable moods and moments. The secret of its aesthetics lies in its novel layout, with the river on its one side and the garden on the other. The mosque and the Jam'at Khanah (also called Mehman Khanah) are identical, three-arched, three-domed, red stone buildings, with liberal use of white marble. It is noteworthy that each one of these annexes—the mosque, the Jam'at Khanah, the two Jal-Mahals, and the main gate—is a complete monument that can stand independently anywhere else, though here, each one stands beneath the architectural suzerainty of the Taj Mahal.

The mausoleum, built of brick masonry skeleton and finished entirely in white marble, stands in the middle of a square white marble plinth which measures 328 feet (100 m) on each side and 19 feet (5.8 m) in height from the red stone platform. It has four tapering circular minarets at the corners flanking the tomb building symmetrically. They are 132 feet (40.2 m) high, in three stories separated by balconies supported on brackets, and surmounted by octagonal *chhatris*. The tomb is, essentially, a square of 187 feet (57 m) on each side, but its angles have been chamfered to give it an octagonalized square plan. All facades are identical. Each one has a grand *iwān* (portal) in its center, practically occupying its whole height up to the parapet. It is flanked on both sides by double alcoves, one over the other, on a rectangular plan. Double alcoves given on the corners with a semi-octagonal plan are distinctly visible from the gate. The *iwān* and alcove spandrels bear stylized arabesques, inlaid with multicolored natural stones on white marble. Portal dados have inlaid vines on the borders and carved natural plant compositions in the centers. Other mural surfaces are plain, giving a marked emphasis to this rare inlay ornament.



Taj Mahal. With its white marble and symmetry crisp against the background sky, the Taj Mahal rises almost magically. Built between 1631 and 1648 by Shah Jahan as a memorial, a “monument of love,” for his beloved queen. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

Each section of the facade is demarcated by attached pilasters or miniature turrets which, beginning from the plinth level, rise above the parapet and are crowned by beautiful pinnacles with lotus buds and finials. A bulbous double dome with a broad, overspreading sheath of lotus petals and *kalash* finial (which originally measured 30.5 ft., or 9.3 m) majestically crowns the Taj. It rests on a high drum and rises to the total height of nearly 146 feet (44.4 m) from the base of the drum to the apex of the finial, and 285 feet (87 m) from the river level. Emphasis of its design is, obviously, on its elevation, in which its dome plays the decisive role. It is flanked on all four angles by four octagonal *chhatris* placed at an extremely symmetrical distance from it. As a whole, it makes up an unbelievably gorgeous superstructure.

The interior plan has a central octagonal hall 58 feet (17.7 m) in diameter and 80 feet (24.4 m) in height, with four oblong rooms on the sides and four octagonal rooms on the corners, all interconnected by passages. This plan

is repeated on the first floor, which overlooks the central cenotaph hall. Except for the entrance in the south portal, all arches are closed by marble screens, set with translucent glass to allow only a subdued light into the interior. The main cenotaph hall has been magnificently, though sparingly, ornamented. Spandrels of arches have inlaid stylized arabesque designs. The panels on the dados have beautiful floral compositions in high relief, with borders in inlaid stylized vine patterns. In each case, it is a beautiful *ghata-pallava* (vase and foliage) motif. An exquisitely finished marble *jali* screen (*jhajjhari*) with similar inlaid borders encloses the cenotaphs, which also bear Qur’anic verses. Chapters from the Qur’an have also been inscribed around the interior arches, on the *iwān* portals on all facades, on both sides of the main gate, and inside the mosque. There are short Persian inscriptions on the cenotaphs, recording the dates of the death of Mumtaz Mahal and Shah Jahan.

Completed in seventeen years in 1648, at the cost of 40 million rupees in an age when gold was sold at 15 rupees per tola (11.66 g), the Taj Mahal marks the zenith of Mughal architectural style; it is here that its idioms are perfected. Its site on the riverbank; its terraced layout with the garden setting; and above all, its wonderful design—with extremely harmonious and symmetrical placement of its components, ideal geometrical precision and proportions—have made it the most beautiful architectural work of the world, justifying the poetic definition “a resplendent immortal teardrop on the cheek of time” (Nath, *The Taj Mahal and Its Incarnation*, pp. 13–15).

R. Nath

See also **Agra; Akbar; Babur; Jahangir; Shah Jahan**

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SOUTHERN INDIA

South Indian monuments of the premodern period represent two distinct regional styles of temple architecture: the Deccan style, which spread over the plateau of peninsular India; and the Dravida, or Tamil, style, which developed mainly in the Tamil region but which had a significant impact on the later phases of architecture in the Deccan and in Andhra Pradesh. The Deccan style in its early stage (6th–8th centuries A.D.) marks an initial attempt to use either the Nagara style or the Dravida style, but in its later stage develops into what may be called the Deccan style by combining some of the major elements of both. The main features of the Deccan style are a shrine with a *sikhara* (pyramidal roof), pillared halls, perforated stone screens, sloping roofs of passages around the shrine, and porches with sloping seat backs, all of which are evident in the later Deccan monuments

of the eighth to the seventeenth centuries. The Dravida style evolved with a clear focus on the vertical ascent of the square shrine, or *vimāna*, with a pyramidal storied *sikhara* and a series of *mandapas* (columned halls) in an east-west alignment, enclosed by a *prākāra* (wall) with a rectangular entrance, or *gopura*. These two styles developed in the early medieval period (6th–12th centuries) in two phases, the twelfth century marking the apogee of both, together with their design and iconographic program. Their further elaboration took place in the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries. While in the first period the focus was mainly on the plan, design, and elevation of the architectural components (such as the shrine with its tower and the pillared halls aligned with it), the emphasis in the later period was on the horizontal magnification of the temple and its precincts, to serve the increasing ritual, festival requirements and iconographic developments. As the social and economic outreach of the temple expanded, so did the community's participation in its architectural expansion and in ritual worship. The temple's art and architecture served as the symbols of political authority as well as social and economic integration, thus becoming the focus of rural settlements and urban complexes.

Paṭṭadakal

Situated on the banks of the Malaprabha River, Paṭṭadakal is one of the three sites (Aihole, Bādāmi, and Paṭṭadakal) with magnificent early Chalukya temples of the seventh and eighth centuries, built of gray-yellow sandstone, with several additions made during the Rashtrakuta period (9th–10th centuries). The Virūpāksha and Mallikārjuna complexes mark the culmination of the early Chalukya series.

Of the early Shiva temples (7th–8th centuries) with a rudimentary Nāgara plan (a pyramidal superstructure with curvilinear top), the ruined Galaganātha (7th century, reign of Vijayāditya) is the earliest of the Paṭṭadakal temples, similar to the early Chalukya temples in Ālampūr. Its tower is more sophisticated and refined in design than the others. Raised on a broad terrace, it follows the Deccan style in all its components. A marked feature of the Galaganātha temple is the eight-armed figure of Shiva in the *gavāksha* (windowlike projection/niche on the first tier). The Sangamesvara temple, patronized by Vijayāditya, has the usual plan of aligned structures of the Deccan style, while the Kāshivishvanātha temple combines a Nāgara *sikhara* with Dravida architectural motifs. The small Chandrashekhara temple is the only Rashtrakuta period structure within the same compound.

The Virūpāksha temple (A.D. 745), commissioned by Lokamahādevi, the chief queen of Vikramāditya II, to commemorate her husband's conquest of Kānchīpuram,



Avittathur Shiva Temple. Avittathur Shiva near Thrissur, Kerala, approximately a thousand years old. V. MUTHURAMAN / FOTOMEDIA.

is a grand complex with an entrance gateway, Nandi pavilion (a pillared structure for placing the *nandi* or bull), a porch, a *mandapa*, and a *linga* sanctuary, all aligned on an east-west axis with subsidiary shrines. It represents the climax of the early Chalukya series in terms of layout, exterior treatment, and sculptural décor. Its square pyramidal tower has three diminishing tiers or stories, a potlike finial, 57 feet (17.5 meters) above ground level, and a large *gavāksha* (a horseshoe-shaped window or niche for an icon or some decorative figure) in front with a dancing Shiva. Not only in its architectural aspects, which combine the Nāgara with Dravida elements, but also in its sculptural decoration, wall panels, column reliefs, and ceiling compositions, the temple surpasses in number and variety those found on any other religious monuments of the period; its rich repertoire of iconography includes a large number of Shiva and Vishnu and other deities, richly sculpted mythological narratives, and epic scenes from the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata on the *mandapa* walls and columns, which are striking for their dynamic composition. Flying Mithuna couples (amorous couples usually shown in erotic postures) and lyrical figures of river goddesses on the sanctuary doorway, elaborate ceiling panels in the

porches, and figures of musicians and dancers are other decorative features. The thirty-five panels on the outer walls, finished by different hands, along with the images in the minor shrines of Gaṇeśha and Mahishāsūramardini, represent masterpieces of early Chalukya style. Ornamental parapets, perforated stone windows, porches and balconies, elephant torsos and lions, animal friezes and foliate devices provide a rich exterior.

The Mallikārjuna temple, built by Trailokyamahādevi, the younger queen of Vikramāditya II (Trailokeshvara), is a matching monument to Virūpāksha, and the two are laid out in unique diagonal formation. It is a smaller version, complete with its own walled compound, entrance gateways and subshrines, with a greater three-dimensional massing of volumes. Its iconographic scheme shows Shiva and Vishnu in various forms. The Kirātārjunīya story, the *Panchatantra*, and Rāmāyaṇa scenes are sculpted on the columns of the *mandapa*.

A short distance from the main group is the Pāpanātha temple, completed in the reign of Kirttivarman II (r. 634–645), in a mixed architectural style; Nāgara features mingle with Dravida elements like *kūḍus* (horseshoe-shaped windows) marking the cornice (*kapota*). The

Rāmāyaṇa reliefs of this temple represent the most complete cycle on any early Chalukya monument. This is the only temple with a pair of interconnecting *mandapas*, due to three successive phases of construction.

The rich iconography of these temples shows a variety of Shaiva and Vaishnava forms in their interior and exterior, creating a rich repertoire of Purāṇic deities (the Hindu pantheon) and their mythology. Some distance west of the main group is the Jain temple, a well worked but somewhat austere structure, with a tower containing an upper chamber with a Dravida *kūṭa* roof. Its basement carries extraordinary life-sized torsos of elephants and *makaras* (crocodiles).

Belūr and Halebīḍ

Situated 25 miles (40 kilometers) northwest of Hassan in southern Karnataka, the Hoysaḷa temple of Chennakesava at Belūr, built in the reign of Vishnuvardhana in 1117 with a revolutionary design, represents the beginnings of a new tradition in architecture. The ground plan of the Hoysaḷa temples is stellate, or star-shaped, the one at Belūr being a half star for the main shrine, with a vestibule and an open *mandapa* (*navaranga*) in front, later closed with stone screens. It is a towerless *eka-kūṭa* shrine (a single shrine with a single story), measuring 34 feet (10.5 meters) corner to corner at its exterior. The length of the entire structure is 138 feet (42 meters), and the width of the open hall is 95 feet (29 meters). It is a *pancharatha* (a shrine that has five exterior projections) with Bhumija superstructures over the multiaedicular Nāgara shrines.

Standing on a 3.3-foot (1-meter) high platform, the whole temple is accessible through three flights of steps and three entrances, each flight flanked by miniature shrines with Nāgara roofs. The elevation has three main parts: the base, the wall surface, and the tower. The base is decorated with friezes of elephants, horses, and lions in horizontal rows, a forerunner of all other Hoysaḷa temples. In the *mandapa*, the perforated stone screens rise above the half pillars, resting on a parapet. *Madanika* (female) figures decorate the top of the pillars below the protruding *chadya* (eave) and are purely ornamental. The sculptured wealth is extraordinary, covering the surface from the base to the cornice (*kapota*), including mythological stories of Krishna and icons of Vishnu in various forms, with floral canopies. The interior has rich decorative carvings, especially the ceiling and the pillars. The large two-story wall shrines located in the middle have mixed Dravida and Nāgara elements, but without a Dravida or even a clear Nāgara structure.

Halebīḍ (Dvārasamudra, the Hoysaḷa capital) is 9 miles (15 kilometers) northeast of Belūr. Here the temple design is innovative and introduces the typical Hoysaḷa style. Unequaled in size and extent, it is a double temple

with a *dvikūṭa* Dravida *vimāna*, with both towers missing and with a half-star plan. Two open halls, linked together, have two additional shrines at the connection of the two. The pillars appear to be lathe turned. Facing the open halls are Nandi pavilions and a Sūrya shrine, all of which share a large platform following their outline. The ground plan is more detailed and schematic, with each *vimāna* measuring 26 feet (8 meters), the *vimāna* and the hall together 108 feet (33 meters) long, and the two halls 154 feet (47 meters) wide. Both *vimānas* are *pancharatha* and have staggering projections and recessions, notably at the back, with six wall shrines. The temple has two entrances in front, and two lateral entrances to the open halls, all flanked by miniature Dravida shrines.

The base has eight lavishly sculptured friezes with horizontally arranged figures (elephants, horses, lions, and epics) and above, the wall surface has large images, representing almost the full Hindu pantheon and mythological scenes. The *antarāla* (vestibule) doorway decoration is equally rich, and the interior on the whole has decorative carvings on the ceiling and other surfaces. The decorative carvings have a fragile filigree effect, and no space is left uncarved. The Hoysalesvara at Halebīḍ undoubtedly influenced the architecture of all later Hoysaḷa temples, of which the Somanāthapura triple shrine, with well preserved towers, pillared *navaranga*, base friezes, and decorative sculptures, is the best example.

Shravana Belgoḷa

The most celebrated Digambara Jain center in South India, Shravana Belgoḷa, in southern Karnataka, has a long history, starting from the Mauryan period to the present day. The early name of the town was Gommaṭapura, but after the twelfth century, the names Belgoḷa (white pond) and Jinanāthapura seem to have come into use, while the name Shravana Belgoḷa is not known before 1810. It has the largest number of Digambara Jain temples (33), located on two hills, known as Vindhyagiri/Indragiri (Doḍḍabetṭa/Pēr-Kaḷvappu) and Chandragiri (Chikkabetṭa/Kaḷvappu), and the surrounding areas. The monuments range in date from the ninth to the nineteenth century, but the most important ones were erected from the tenth through the fourteenth centuries under the Hoysaḷas and their subordinates, the Gangas, and under the Vijayanagara rulers of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries. Its inscriptions number 579, the largest for a single center, although many of the early ones are *nisidbi* (memorial) inscriptions of those who followed the *sallekhaṇa*, or the ritual of death by fasting.

The chief monument is the famous Gommaṭa (Bāhubali) statue, the colossus within an open quadrangle on the Vindhyagiri. The statue is 58.8 feet (17.7 meters)



Durgā Temple. Dating to the late seventh or early eighth century, the Durgā Temple in Aihole, Karnataka. Dedicated to Vishnu and sitting atop a platform, the elaborately carved and decorated monument appears to be a Hindu adaptation of a Buddhist *chaitya* (great hall). FREDRIK ARVIDSSON.

high, the largest consecrated monolith anywhere in the world, and was commissioned by Chāmuṇḍarāya, the Ganga general of the Hoysaḷa kingdom, in 981. Endowed with a physiognomy that suggests an unmatched serenity, with half-closed eyes, the image re-creates a superhuman personality. An anthill at the base, with hissing snakes and a creeper that climbs the figure of Gommaṭa, are characteristic of a renouncer's stance, while a circular stone basin, called *lalita sarovara*, at the foot of the image, collects the ceremonial water, when the ceremonial bath (*abbisheka*) for the image is performed.

The Bhaṇḍara Basti (Chaturvimsati Tīrthānkara Basti), the largest temple of the complex, was consecrated in 1159. Along with the cloister around Bāhubali (Gommaṭa), it enshrines the images of the twenty-four Tīrthānkaras of Jainism. The ceilings of the cloister have carvings of the eight guardians of the directions, with Indra holding a pot to anoint the image of Bāhubali. While the Gommaṭa statue is of the Ganga style, nearly all other images in the Suttālaya are of the Hoysaḷa style. Subsequent renovations added a *gopura* (gateway) tower, a high walled outer enclosure, a pillared porch (*mukha maṇḍapa*), and

an ornate doorway. The Sarasvatī *mandapa* in front was added by Mahāpradhāna Bukkarāya in 1527.

The small hill, Chandragiri-Chikkabeṭṭa (Kaḷbappu or Kaṭavapra), has 13 temples, 7 mandapas, 2 freestanding pillars, a crude enclosure on the top of the hill, and a few ponds. Tradition associates it with the migration of Jains from the north, led by Bhadrabāhu, accompanied by Chandragupta, the Mauryan king. The natural cavern, housing the footprint of Bhadrabāhu, has great sanctity and was converted into a temple after the eleventh century, with a porch added in the seventeenth century. The Chandragupta Basti, a small temple at the summit of the enclosure, enshrines Pārshvanātha, Kushmāṇḍini, and Padmāvati in three chambers opening from the vestibule. Its twelfth-century doorway, with stone screens on each side, carries the stories of Chandragupta and Bhadrabāhu in relief.

Of the several Jinalayas (Jain temples) on these two hills and the surrounding areas, the architecturally and historically significant ones are the Chāmuṇḍarāya Basti on the smaller hill and the Bhaṇḍara Basti on the larger hill, which are built of granite, while most of the others are in brick and mortar. The Akkaṇa Basti (A.D. 1181) in

the town and the more ornate Shantīsvara Basti (A.D. 1200) in Jinanāthapura, both built in dark blue schist, are perfect specimens of the Hoysala style. The reliefs of Tīrthānkaras, *yakshas* (nature spirits), and other attendants in these temples are of considerable iconographic significance.

Archways and *mandapas*, housing commemorative columns, were memorials, or *nisidhis*, of Jain teachers and royal members. The Mahānavami *mandapa* of the twelfth century, on the larger hill, and the Nisidhi *mandapa* of the Rashtrakuta Indra IV (built in 982), and the Ganga-raja *mandapa* (erected in 1120–1123) on the smaller hill, are such memorials. Historically important are the freestanding pavilions like the Tyāgada *kambha* (pillar of abandonment), of tenth-century Ganga workmanship, and the freestanding Yaksha pillar, both on the larger hill, the latter with an inscription of 1422, recording gifts made to Gommaṭa by Irugappa Daṇḍanāyaka, the Vijayanagara general. The Kuge Brahmadeva pillar of 974 is a fine specimen of Ganga workmanship, a commemorative column with a 113-line inscription giving a glowing account of King Mārasimha.

Jain *nisidhi* stones are numerous in the period from the sixth to the tenth centuries, but there was a significant decrease in *nisidhis* and an increase in *bastis*, attracting pilgrims to the center from the tenth century. As a pilgrimage center, a large number of temples, ponds, and villages similar to the *agrahāra* (Brahman settlements) emerged.

Hampi

Hampi, or Vijayanagara, is one of the largest medieval cities in Asia. As the capital of the Vijayanagara rulers (14th–16th centuries), it is the earliest site with remains of both religious and secular (courtly) architecture. The remains of nearly 150 shrines and temples are found in the site, on the hills near the site, and in the valley. More important, the remains of a complex hydraulic system in the royal center reveal the importance given to irrigation and water supply under Vijayanagara.

The pre-Vijayanagara temples are located mostly in the hills (Rishyamukha, Hemakūṭa, Matanga, and Malyavanta) and date from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries, with some additional structures of the Vijayanagara period. They follow the Deccan style in general, but also include the Dravida type of *sikhara*, as in the Rashtrakuta temples of the tenth century. The Shaiva temples on the Hemakūṭa hill are of the Kadamba-Nāgara style (10th–14th centuries). They are of the *dvikūṭa* (double shrine) and *trikūṭa* (triple shrine) variety, with niches of the Kalinga, Dravida, and Nāgara types. *Phāmsana* towers (pyramids of deeply cut tiers) appear over both Hindu and Jain temples of the Deccan style on the Hemakūṭa hill. The Jain *mānastambha* (ceremonial pillar) is an additional

feature. The Kalinga-style *sikhara* with the stepped pyramidal form in diminishing tiers, is also common.

Other temples in the area and its suburbs (like Kamalāpura and Ānegondi), including the Jain temples, of the period from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, combine the Dravida *sikhara* with the Deccan style features of the pillared *mandapas*, with rich carvings. The entrance *gopura* with a brick and mortar superstructure and with high *prākāra* (enclosure wall) emerged as the major Vijayanagara components.

The Vijayanagara temples in Hampi represent the Karnāṭa-Andhra style in three phases. The first two phases—the early Sangama phase of 1336–1404 and the second Sangama phase of 1404–1485—have temples that are modest in scale and decoration. A highly ornate sculptured idiom emerged with the Rāmachandra temple, and predominantly Dravida architectural components appear in the elevational treatment and columns. The third phase of the Karnāṭa-Andhra style, under the Śāluvas and Tuḷuvas (1480–1570) was mainly inspired by Chola models. A coordinated layout of temple complexes as seen in the remodeling of the Virūpāksha temple under Krishna Deva Rāya (r. 1509–1529), became the paradigm for all subsequent architectural developments, showing further stylistic evolution in the *mandapas*, as in the the Mahā *mandapa* of the Viṭṭhala temple (1534). Intricate decorative schemes on the *mandapa* ceilings became the hallmark of the Vijayanagara temples.

The single *prākāra* scheme, with *gopuras* on two sides, is the most popular. Yet more elaborate temple complexes, sometimes with double shrines, huge *mandapas*, and multiple subsidiary shrines, contained within one or more rectangular *prākāras*, and larger and more ornate *gopuras*, continued to evolve. A unique aspect of temple planning in this era is seen at the capital, where some temple complexes (Virūpāksha, Tiruvengalanātha, and Viṭṭhala) are provided with long colonnaded streets leading up to the main *gopuras*. The use of local granite was common in temple architecture, while statues, like the gigantic Narasimha monolith (22 feet [6.7 m] high) near the Krishna temple, were shaped out of gray-green schist.

The site of Hampi may be divided into the sacred and royal complexes, the royal complex also having a number of temples in and outside the fortified area. The Virūpāksha temple, dating from the seventh century A.D., was already an important religious center and became the focus of the sacred complex, housing the tutelary deity of Vijayanagara. Renovations and additions made it into a fairly large structure by the Vijayanagara period (by the 16th century). The temple has a Garbha *griha* (sanctuary), and three antechambers, a *sabbā mandapa* or *navaranga* (pillared hall for sacred congregations, rituals and discourses)



Interior of the Junagarh Fort in Bikaner, Rajasthan. Never captured in battle, the fort encloses a series of ornate stone palaces with lattice screens. Within its brightly painted rooms the maharajas ruled from 1589 until 1949. AMIT PASRICHA.

and *mukha mandapa* (front hall), pillared cloisters, entrances, and small shrines; the main entrance is the east *gopura* of nine stories, 173 feet [52.6 m] high. It combines Dravida features in its *sikhara* and plan, but carries distinct characteristics of the Deccan style in its *navaranga* with rich carvings of Shaiva themes, while the *mukha mandapa*, or *ranga mandapa*, has thirty-eight pillars, carved with scenes from the epics Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, and ceiling paintings, of which the sage Vidyāraṇya's procession is well known. Significant additions made in the Tuḷuva period are the *maharanga mandapa* (hall with highly decorative elements) and porches, and a one-hundred-columned hall, the *gopura*, and the painting on the ceiling of the *mabā mandapa* (outer hall).

The Hazāra Rāmachandra temple in the northwest corner of the palace complex, built in the fifteenth

century under Devarāya I, has the usual plan of a square sanctuary, a Dravida style *vimāna* with a storied *sikhara*, a *sabbāmandapa*, an eight-pillared porch, a *ranga mandapa*, and two antechambers. The *sabbāmandapa* has reliefs of Vaishnava themes, the Dasavatāra, and even Shaiva deities, Gaṇeśha and Mahisamardini. The temple is a veritable picture gallery, as its outer walls are richly carved with bas-reliefs of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. The external face of the enclosure wall contains five friezes of a unique series of royal processional scenes—elephants, horses, soldiers, dancers and musicians, with royal figures within pavilions, depicted as if watching these parades. On the inner face of the wall, between the north and east gateways, are the panels of relief carvings of the entire story of the Rāmāyaṇa, repeated again on the outer walls of the *mandapa* of the principal shrine. The east-facing goddess shrine is situated north of the

main temple. Under Krishna Deva Rāya, the Kalyāṇa *mandapa*, a high *prākāra* with two entrances, east and north, were added in 1521.

The Viṭṭhala temple (originally enshrining Viṭṭhala and Rukmiṇi), built on the south bank of Tungabhadra in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the Tuluva period, has the usual plan with a *garbha griha*, *antarāla* (vestibule), *pradakṣhiṇā paṭha* around both, *sabhā mandapa* (*navaranga*), and *mahā mandapa*. To these were added several shrines, a high-walled *prākāra*, and gateways (east, north, and south), the whole complex measuring 500 feet x 310 feet (152.5 by 94.5 meters). The spacious *mukha mandapa* has fifty-six pillars, fashioned out of large blocks of granite, each forming a distinct sculpted group. Of particular interest are the clusters of delicately shaped columns, 4 or 5 feet (about 1.5 m) across, with animal motifs interposed between them, half natural and half mythical. With molded pedestals below and massive capitals above, these closely spaced columns have a bewildering intricacy. The pillars also contain large sculptures of deities, forms of Vishnu, and musicians and dancers. The *mandapa* has three entrances and is the finest example of religious architecture in Vijayanagara. The ornate basement of this *mandapa* has friezes of horses with attendants and miniature shrines housing images of the ten incarnations of Vishnu. There are the so-called musical pillars and *yālī* (a mythical monster) pillars, the latter being a favorite motif. The ceiling has elaborate lotus designs and other motifs. This structure stands out as a masterpiece of both Vijayanagara architectural technique and sculptural art. The Garuda shrine in the form of a chariot in front of this temple is an interesting and unusual structure as the only *vāhana*-shrine built like a chariot.

The Achyutarāya (Tiruvengalanātha) temple in the valley at Achyutapura enshrines Venkaṭeṣa. Built in 1534, it has the usual plan, but with two *prākāras* and a large Kalyāṇa *mandapa*, the main *gopuras* being those on the north and west.

Hampi has the earliest known secular architecture of South India in its remains of the royal center, including the palace complex, other courtly structures, and military fortifications. Some of the structures with a definite ceremonial purpose are the great platform known as the Mahānavami *dibba*, the throne platform, and the hundred-columned audience hall. These seem to have had stone basements, probably with a wooden or brick superstructure. The annual royal festival of Mahānavami symbolized the imperial status of the Vijayanagara rulers, when all their subordinates and royal functionaries assembled at the capital to pay their tributes and homage to the king. The basements of the platforms preserve interesting moldings and a series of horizontal friezes of sculptured decoration consisting of floral and geometric

devices, animals (elephants), and figures of human couples and dancers. The balustrades to the steps leading to the platforms are an interesting study in animal and mythical or hybrid creatures as decorative motifs.

More important are the Islamic-styled forms. These are the square water pavilion, which has a central basin constituting a square courtyard, around which is a corridor of twenty-four vaulted bays; two octagonal fountains, which have a central basin and arched entrances and pointed arched openings; the nine-domed structure, perhaps a reception hall; and the multidomed structure overlooking the approaches to the royal center. All of these show typical Deccani-Islamic features. The most monumental of all the Islamic-styled structures is the colossal building identified as the royal stable (for elephants). Apart from arched entrances, its eleven square chambers have domes of varying designs, with a ruined two-story structure in the middle of the roof. Another celebrated monument is the Lotus Mahal, a two-story pavilion, symmetrically laid out as a series of projecting squares to create thirteen bays and a staircase tower on the northeast. The superstructure consists of nine separate towers. It has a complex but impressive facade and a varied vaulting design.

Mahābalipuram (or Māmallapuram)

Māmallapuram (Kadal Mallai or Mallai), about 37 miles (59 kilometers) south of Chennai, is the famous seaport of the Pallavas, where the early phases of Dravida architecture evolved, as seen in the rock-cut caves, monoliths, and structural temples of the seventh century A.D. Narrative sculptures of epic and Purāṇic myths of great artistic merit also make this center aesthetically the most remarkable of the South Indian sites.

The caves, carved out of rock, are found mostly in the hill area. These are called *mandapas*, because of their plan and design, which consists of a single or multiple cells with a pillared veranda in front or a pillared hall on the three sides of the cell. Of these, the most architecturally and sculpturally interesting are: the Ādi Varāha cave, with portraits of the royal family, in addition to powerful representations of the Varāha *avatāra* of Vishnu; the Varāha cave, with episodic narratives in dynamic compositions of the stories of Vāmana-Trivikrama *avatāra* and Varāha; the triple-shrined Mahishmardani cave, with huge panels of Vishnu as Anantasayi and Durgā (Mahishamardini) in combat with Mahishāsura; the Trimūrti cave, with three shrines for Shiva, Vishnu and Brahmā; and the Krishna *mandapa*, with a large relief composition of the Govardhana scene. Many such caves carry the characteristic features of a Dravida shrine, with a facade marking the tiers with rows of miniature *kūḍus*, *śbālas*, and *pañjaras*. The pillars invariably have the characteristic lion base,

with multifaceted shafts and ornamental brackets. Sculptures of Gajalakshmi also form part of the panel decoration in the caves. The iconography of the caves is a fascinating study in the evolution of various forms of Shiva and Vishnu, drawn from Purāṇic mythology and depicted as per Āgamic tradition, predominantly the *avatāras* of Vishnu and several forms of Shiva as metaphors for power and benevolence. The Somāskanda is perhaps the most important, symbolizing royalty, as it finds a prime position on the shrine's rear wall and is a composite icon evolved under the Pallavas.

The Panchapāṇḍava *rathas* are freestanding monolithic shrines found in one group of five, with a few more scattered in the periphery. The Gaṇeśha *ratha* at the southern end has a wagon-topped *sikbara* and is one of the finest monolithic temples, with a three-story, elaborately worked roof topped by nine vase-shaped finials; it is a precursor of the later *gopura*. The huge open-air rock sculpture, often described as Arjuna's Penance in the story of Kirātārjunīya, is carved on two large boulders with a narrow fissure between. The composition is bewildering in its variety, with gods, goddesses, celestial beings, wild animals, monkeys, and elephants, and *nāgas* (hybrid serpents combining human and serpent forms). The cleft between the rocks, through which the river water (Gaṅgā) must have been shown as descending from the hill, would suggest that the theme of the huge rock relief may well be Bhagīratha's penance, which is supported by the presence of a four-armed Shiva and an emaciated man doing penance.

The Shore temple, built by Rājasimha, has two shrines, facing east and west, with a separate perambulatory for the east-facing, larger shrine. Both shrines house the relief of the Somāskanda group. Rampant lions, characteristic of the Rājasimha temples, and sculptured panels are found on the exterior walls. Panels depicting scenes from the history of the Pallavas, as in the Vaikuṅṭha Perumāḷ temple, also lie scattered. Between the two Shaiva shrines is the reclining form of Vishnu, in a rock-cut oblong cell.

Kānchīpuram

Once ranked as one of India's seven most sacred cities, Kānchīpuram is on the banks of the Vēghavati River. As the Pallava capital, it had wide contacts with the South-east Asian region, transmitting Indian civilization into Thailand, Cambodia, Java, and Vietnam. A major center of Sanskrit learning and culture, Kānchīpuram had a heterogeneous tradition, representing Jain, Buddhist, Shaiva, and Vaishnava religions. It became a temple town with seventy-two temples, big and small, of which the most significant are those of the Pallava, Chola, and Vijayanagara

periods. Several early shrines praised by the Shaiva and Vaishnava hymnal literature were built probably of brick and mortar, and were later rebuilt in stone or merely enlarged under the Cholas and Vijayanagara rulers.

Incessant temple building in stone began under the Pallavas. The Kailāsanātha (700–728), the first royal temple built by Rājasimha (r. 690–728) in the structural mode, is the most significant, both for its impressive architecture and iconography. The *vimāna* is a unique double-walled structure with three stories and with lateral and corner shrines attached to the main shrine. The shrine is preceded by an *antarāla* and *mandapa*, and the whole temple is surrounded by a series of small shrines along the cloistered enclosure, each with a single tiered roof. All of them, like the main *garbha griha*, enshrine a Somāskanda relief, a composite icon symbolically representing the royal family. The *linga* could well be a later addition or, together with the Somāskanda relief on the back wall, may stand for a conceptual equation between Shiva and the royal family. Another smaller shrine was added by Rājasimha's son Mahendravarman in front of the main shrine facing east and abutting the enclosure wall. Traces of mural paintings still remain in the shrines of the cloister.

The temple is a veritable treasure house of iconography, establishing Shiva as a major Purāṇic (Brahmanical Hindu) deity, central to the Āgamic form of temple worship. Vedic deities, such as Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, and Vāyu, become subsidiary or attendant divinities (*dikpālas*) to Shiva, who is here shown as Somāskanda. A variety of Shiva's forms are sculpted on the temple walls and the shrines, while Vishnu and Brahmā are shown in a subordinate position.

The Vaikuṅṭha Perumāḷ temple, built by Nandivarman II in the eighth century, is a different architectural experience. Its *vimāna* has three vertical sanctums and a *mandapa* in front. More interesting is the covered veranda, which runs along the enclosure wall, its pillars carved with lions facing inward. This corridor has a two-tiered sculpted history of the Pallava dynasty up to the accession of Nandivarman II Pallavamalla. The *vimāna* walls have sculpted panels signifying cosmography and Vishnu's Vyuhās (emanatory forms which are repetitions or a variety of a god's own godhead), *avatāras*, and feats as related in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and praised by the Vaishnava saint Tirumangai Alvar.

The Varadarāja temple on the southeast of the city also dates from Pallava times, although the present structure is not older than the Chola period. The sanctum of Vishnu in the inner *prakāra* is raised on a hill-like terrace and has a two-story oblong tower of the wagon vault type. The base or terrace has a low masonry sanctum

fronted with a hall to signify a cave in the “hill,” enshrining the icon of Narasimha as a yogi. The “hill” is encircled with a two-story cloistered veranda with colonnades, with a Chola style gateway on the west, the open courtyard within having shrines of Lakshmī and Sakti.

In the fourteenth century, a larger open courtyard was created, with an encircling wall to enclose the bathing tank and gardens; its western gateway was topped with a seven-story tower in the late Chola–Pāṇḍya style. The Vijayanagara rulers developed that area and built structures with minute carvings and embellishments, mostly in the early sixteenth century, including shrines for a Malayāla goddess and for Āṇḍaḷ. The fourth courtyard has a Kalyāṇa *mandapa* of 5,974 square feet (555 square meters) on a 6.6 feet (2-meter) carved plinth. Its ninety-six monolithic pillars have geometric designs, *yālis*, and rampant horses. This outer enclosure has on the east a slender 164 foot (50-meter) gateway of nine stories, topped with eleven vase finials.

The Kāmākshi temple, where the Kamakoṭi Pīṭha (Yantra-Shri Chakra) is believed to have been established by Adi Shankara in the ninth century A.D., was built probably in the eleventh century amid or replacing Buddhist structures. Its disoriented layout began in the fourteenth century, with the present Shri Chakra installed in the sixteenth century, along with a four-armed Lalita Kāmākshi. The Ēkāmranātha temple on the northwest of the city has a similar history; a small shrine of Pallava times was renovated and elaborated with several *prākāras* and gateways under the Chola and Vijayanagara rulers.

Tanjāvūr

Tanjāvūr, 200 miles (322 kilometers) southwest of Chennai, on the southern bank of Vaḍāvāru, a distributary of the Veṅṅāru (Kaveri delta), was the capital of the Cholas, the Nayakas, and the Marāthas. The Brihadīshvara (Rājarājeshvara) temple complex is situated within the Sivaganaga “little fort,” surrounded by a moat on the west, north, and east, and the Grand Anicut (dam) canal on the south. The total area of the Sivaganga fort is over 45 acres (nearly 18 hectares), of which the temple itself covers 7 acres (2.85 hectares).

The Tanjāvūr temple is a stupendous imperial project, which marks the apogee of the Dravida style of architecture. The plan follows a ratio of 1:2 (790 feet east to west and 395 feet north to south), with a low two-story cloistered structure against the outer walls. This inner *prākāra* is further enclosed by another surrounding wall, which in turn is enclosed by a vast brick fortification known as the Sivaganga “little fort.” Its imposing *vimāna* of thirteen tiers, rising to a height of over 200 feet (61 m), is a *sāndbāra prāsāda*, or double-walled structure, with a

mādakkoyil, a shrine on the terrace. The inner ambulatory between the two walls is well known for its Chola frescoes representing stories of the *bbakti* saints and iconographic forms of Shiva, including Naṭarāja, Tripuraāntaka, Dakṣiṇāmūrti, and others. The first story of the *vimāna* has a series of sculptures representing Shiva in various Bharata Natya poses.


In alignment with the shrine are the *ardha mandapa* (front hall) with huge Dvārapālaka (doorkeeper of the god) images usually represented on either side of the entrances of the shrine, a *mabā mandapa*, and an entrance porch, all with plain pillars and no interior decoration. The exterior of the *vimāna* and the aligned structures are organized into niches flanked by pilasters, with different forms of Shiva and other deities (Tripuraāntaka occupying a special position, repeated on the second tier of the *vimāna* walls). The temple’s iconographic program marks the most creative period in Chola art and in South Indian iconography.

The Rājarājeshvara represents a ceremonial complex, symbolizing Chola sovereignty through cosmic structures. The various aspects of the temple, including its architecture, sculpture, painting, and inscriptions, collectively provide an integrated view of this synthesising role. The temple had an impressive economic outreach under the Cholas. The architecture of the temple was planned and designed to represent the cosmos, in keeping with the Chola ideology, which equated the temple with the cosmos at one level and with territory at another level. Well conceived and majestic, the temple’s architecture is the product of an imperial vision. The entire temple complex was designed to achieve a perfect balance between architecture and sculpture. The temple is conceived of as Dakṣiṇāmēru, or the axis of the universe, while the *dikpala* shrines, located at the cardinal points of the pillared cloister running on all four sides of the temple courtyard, complete its cosmic symbolism.

Chidambaram

Unique among the southern Dravida style temples, the Chidambaram Naṭarāja temple is a rare example of the coexistence of two shrines dedicated to both Shiva and Vishnu in a single (central) *prākāra* with a common *dvajastambha* (pillar which carries the god’s flag). It developed into a major Shaiva pilgrimage center and as the symbol for the whole Shaiva community under the royal patronage of the Cholas from the tenth century, with Vishnu receding into the background.

Chidambaram (also known as Tillai, Perumbaṅṅappuliyūr, Puliyūr, and Chambalam) is the center for the worship of Naṭarāja, king of dancers, the Sabhanayaka. In Chidambaram, Shiva performed the cosmic dance



Gol Gumbad Mausoleum. Built in 1656, the Gol Gumbad in Bijapur, Karnataka. The acoustical system within this mausoleum (tomb of Mohammad Adil Shah) is no minor feat and it is thus often referred to as the “Whispering Dome.” CLAIRE ARNI / FOTOMEDIA.

(*ānanda tāṇḍava*) to celebrate his victory over the ritualistic ascetics, representing the *pañcakṛityas* of creating, preserving, and destroying the visible universe. Among the five elements—earth, water, fire, wind, and ether—represented by the *līṅga*, the *ākasha* (ether) is manifest in Chidambaram’s *līṅga* and hence invisible.

The temple, in fact, consists of five *sabhās* located in different *prākāras*. In the first is located the Chit *sabhā*, or Naṭarāja shrine, enshrining the *akasa līṅga* (ether), which is invisible, hence the Cidambara *rahasya* is represented by a string of *vilva* petals in gold, hung over the *prabhā*, with a black curtain of *ajṇāna* over it. The shrine is believed to have been gilded by Pallava, Chola, and Pāṇḍya rulers. The Chit *sabhā* has wooden walls, its roof being supported by twenty-eight freestanding wooden pillars. The exterior of the Chit *sabhā* has a double colonnade of round columns of highly polished black stone. The original Tiru Mūlasthāna (main) shrine of Naṭarāja, facing east, is located in the second *prākāra* and is of the same style. This became secondary at the time of the temple’s enlargement, to six times its original size under Kulottunga I (r. 1070–1112) and his successors.

The Edirambalam (Kanaka *sabhā*) was built opposite the Naṭarāja shrine within the first enclosure. The Kanaka *sabhā*, opposite the *dvajastambha*, is built in the form of a *tērkkoyil*, or wheeled chariot. The roof of the Kanaka *sabhā* is supported by eighteen wooden pillars, with copper-plated wooden doors between the pillars. They have rectangular, curvilinear roofs resembling that of the Draupadi *ratba* at Māmallapuram. The Chit *sabhā*, Kanaka *sabhā*, and Vishnu shrine of Govindarāja are the principal sanctums of the innermost enclosure.

The Deva *sabhā* is located within the second enclosure, where the *dīkshitaras* who control the temple’s worship and administration meet. In the second enclosure are located the shrines of the Vaishnava goddess Puṇḍarika Nacchiyār. The western gateway of this enclosure is called the Akaḷankan Tiruvāsal of Vikrama Chola.

The Raja *sabhā*, the thousand-pillared hall in the third *prākāra*, where the first exposition of the hagiographical work, the Periya Purāṇam, was held under Kulottunga II, is one of the most striking monuments in the temple. Measuring 194 feet by 331 feet (59 meters by 101 meters),

it has huge pillars and brick vaulting with radiating arches. The *abbisheka* ceremony of Naṭarāja and Shivakāmasundari, the culminating session of the two great festivals, is held here. The hundred-pillared hall is another *mandapa* located in this enclosure.

Under Vijayanagara, considerable remodeling occurred in the temple structure and administrative control with the restoration of the worship of Govindarāja. The four *gopuras*, each 138 feet (42 meters) high, have granite bases and brick and mortar superstructures. The western is the oldest, started by Vikrama Chola and completed by Kulottunga II (12th century). The southern *gopura* is of the period of Kopperunjinga and Sundara Pāṇḍya (13th century). The *gopura* on the north is of the period of Kulottunga II (12th century), of which the superstructure was begun by Krishna Deva Rāya and completed by Achyuta Deva. Beyond the *gopuras* are coconut groves and flower gardens. The *gopuras* are richly sculpted with forms of Shiva, the Navagrahas, and other celestial beings and sages, like Patanjali and Vyāghrapāda. Dance poses based on the *Nāṭya Shāstra* are carved on the doorways of each *gopura*, with labels in Grantha script.

Madurai

Madurai, on the Vaigai river, is one of the oldest Tamil cities, dating from the early centuries A.D. as the political center of the Pāṇḍyas down to medieval times, when Nayaka rule was established. It is also known as Tiru Ālavāy in Shaiva religious literature. The central core of the city was constructed mostly under the Nayakas, with the Mīnākshi temple as its focus. Mīnākshi is believed to be a Pāṇḍyan queen who married Shiva, from whom the Pāṇḍyas descended. Following the classical Hindu design of a square *mandala*, a grid with concentric squares, the temple covers a vast rectangular area, 843 feet by 787 feet (257 meters by 240 meters).

Built in three periods—the Pāṇḍya, Vijayanagara, and Madurai Nayaka—Pāṇḍya survivals of the temple's structures are few in number. The temple is a classic example of the Vijayanagara–Nayaka style. Its double shrine, large pillared halls, twelve towered gateways and large tank, and the layout and location of different deities are defined by a sacred architecture that is too complex to be described here. Under the Nayakas, it developed into a huge temple complex, especially under Tirumala Nayaka, the great builder, and Vīrappa Nayaka (r. 1572–1593), when significant additions were made.

The goddess Mīnākshi's special prominence is a later development of the fourteenth century, with Mīnākshi emerging as the chief deity, after the Muslim invasions of 1310; the temple's restoration changed the focus of the temple to the goddess. Yet Sundareshvara, the god of the

main shrine in the first *prākāra*, is still the main deity, the sovereign at the center, represented as a *liṅga* in the shrine but as a Somāskanda image for procession. All ritual activity centers around the relationship between Mīnākshi and Sundara. The royalty of the deities is particularly striking, as they are identified as the Pāṇḍyan queen and king, with the city the microcosmic image of the kingdom and the universe, in a symbolic representation of Madurai as a sacred royal space.

The present extent of the temple is 720–729 feet north to south (219–222 m), and 834–852 feet (254–260 m) east to west. It has three major *prākāras* and a double shrine for the god and the goddess. The shrines are small Dravida style *vimānas* with the usual *mandapas* in alignment, but it is in the horizontal elaboration, through *mandapas* and *prākāras* with *gopuras*, that the architectural importance of the temple lies. The first *prākāra*, measuring 250 feet by 150 feet (76 m x 46 m), has the Sundareshvara shrine, called the Indra *vimāna*, followed by a *mahā mandapa* and *mukha mandapa*. Images of Shiva in various forms, along with eight *dikpāla* figures and stucco panels of the *Tiruvīḷaiyāḍal Purāṇam* (divine sports of Shiva) on the *mahā mandapa* walls, are the decorative and iconographic features of the Shiva shrine.

The second *prākāra*, measuring 420 feet by 320 feet (128 m x 98 m), has the Mīnākshi shrine, with its *ardha mandapa* and Shakti images in the niches, datable to the first half of the fifteenth century. The most remarkable of the structures here is the Golden Lily (*poṟṟāmarai*) tank east of the Amman (goddess) shrine, with several *mandapas* around the tank and four *gopuras* in the outer walls. The north and east walls of the Chitra *mandapa* have murals, modern (post-seventeenth century) paintings of the sixty-four *lilas* of the *Tiruvīḷaiyāḍal Purāṇam*. The most ornamental Kīlikaṭṭi *mandapa*, in front of the *gopura* of the goddess shrine, is a single corridor with richly carved pillars, statues of various deities, and painted ceilings. The Mandapa Nayaka *mandapa*, a hundred-pillared hall, has a Sabhāpati (Naṭarāja) shrine. Stucco figures of Tirumala Nāyaka and his queen are found in the northeast corner.

The second *prākāra* has several *mandapas*, including the Kalyāṇa, or Kolu *mandapa* for the Navaratri festival and a thousand-pillared hall. This hall, built under Vīrappa Nayaka in 1572, is a huge edifice (240 ft. x 250 ft., or 73 m x 76 m) with a Sabhāpati (Naṭarāja) shrine and beautifully carved icons. The Kambattaḍi *mandapa* in front has a Nandi shrine of Vijayanagara style and monolithic pillars with icons. Images of the sixty-three Shaiva saints are found in the southeast corner. Other shrines include that of the Navagraha within the nave of the *mandapa*. In the Vijayanagara style *mandapas* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, apart from a few

“musical” pillars, the *yāli* and equestrian pillars are favored. The characteristic Vijayanagara pillars, with groups of slender columnettes, are absent in Madurai. Several shrines (Īshvarams) exist in the first two *prākāras*, dedicated to Vigneshvara and to Kumāra or Subrahmaṇya. There are a number of subsidiary shrines to folk deities, such as Karuppaṇṇa Svāmi and Madurai Vīran, in the outer *prākāra*.

The Madurai temple has both styles of *gopuras*, the straight-edged pyramid and the more ornate style with a concave outline. The outer *gopuras* are of stone but with brick and stucco superstructures. All have nine stories, with a height of 150 feet (46 m) each. The high *gopuras* date from the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries (east), fourteenth century (west), and latter half of the sixteenth century (south), with later Vijayanagara and Nayaka characteristics. The superstructures are straight-edged pyramids; the south *gopura* near the Golden Lily tank, however, has a concave sweeping curve, more elegant than the rest.

Axially in front of the east *gopura* is the Pudu *mandapa* (330 ft. x 105 ft., or 101 m x 32 m) built by Tirumala Nayaka (r. 1626–1633), and remains in an unfinished stage. The Rāya *gopura*, east of the Pudu *mandapa*, nearly twice the size of the east *gopura*, a stupendous structure, is the largest but is also incomplete. Its origin is dated to the time of Tirumala Nayaka, and it has monolithic lion-based pillars 50 feet (15 m) high. This *mandapa* is highly ornate, with massive carvings and large-scale ornamentation on the jambs. There are also reliefs of Tirumala Nayaka and his queen in the Madura style. There are several other *gopuras*, built in the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, making a total of twelve *gopuras* in the Mīnākshi temple.

The twelve-day Chittirai festival celebrates Mīnākshi's conquest of the world, or Digvijaya, with her coronation on the eleventh day. On the ninth day, the defeat of the goddess by Sundara in battle and their subsequent wedding transforms a warrior queen into a gracious bride. Involvement of Vishnu as Kaḷḷaḷagar at Aḷagarkoyil and Subrahmaṇya from Tirupparankuṇṇam in the marriage in Madurai forms part of the festival. The city is ritually represented as being much more closely integrated with its surrounding area. The entire city and the region around it, between Alagarkoil to the northeast and Tirupparankuṇṇam in the southwest, become one vast sacred royal space, whose focal point is the Mīnākshi temple itself.

R. Champakalakshmi

See also **Chola Dynasty; Temple Types (Styles) of India**

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WESTERN INDIA

Gujarat and Rajasthan, which share a cultural and artistic identity, at the same time possess individual stylistic idioms. The combined geographical extent of the states is over 200,000 square miles (518, 000 sq. km).

Political History

Early Hindu kingdoms. The medieval period in western India witnessed the gradual disappearance of the early ruling dynasties and the emergence and consolidation of powerful new Hindu kingdoms. Some of these, like the Pratiharas, the Chaulukyas, and the Chahamanas, attained imperial status; other dynasties, such as the Grahapatis, the Mauryas, and the Guhilas, remained mere provincial potentates.

Harichandra, the progenitor of the Mandor branch of the Pratiharas, was a Brahman. His descendant Nagabhata, in the seventh century, shifted his capital to Medantaka-Merta. The Pratiharas ruled over northern Gujarat up to the first quarter of the tenth century, when the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan extended their political influence north.

Pratihara Vatsaraja (reigned c. 775–800) was a powerful monarch who conquered both Bhillamala in modern southwestern Rajasthan, and Malwa, in central and eastern Rajasthan. Vatsaraja was embroiled in the triangular struggles for power among the Pratiharas, the Deccani

Rashtrakutas, and the Bengali Palas. He lost power to the Rashtrakutas, but his son and successor Nagabhata II (r. c. 815–833) regained the lost fortunes of the dynasty.

Nagabhata II's powerful successor, Bhoja I (c. 836–c. 890), was a strong ruler. During his long reign of over fifty years, he regained control over Gujarat and central and eastern Rajasthan. His successors were Mahendrapala and Mahipala. The Pratiharas, all great patrons of the arts and architecture, disappeared after the third quarter of the tenth century.

The Chaulukyas. The Chaulukyas, also known as Solankis, of Gujarat, ruled in 941 over Anhilwad Patan, eventually rising to the status of an imperial power. The dynasty continued to rule over all of Gujarat until 1220. The dynasty's founder, Mularaja (r. 942–997), and his successors, Chamundaraja (r. 997–1010), Durlabharaja (r. 1010–1022), Bhimadeva I (r. 1022–1066), Karnadeva (r. 1066–1094), Siddharaja Jayasimha (r. 1094–1144), Kumarapala (r. 1144–1174) and Bhimadeva II (r. 1174–1242), had hundreds of enduring stone religious monuments, temples, monasteries, tanks, and reservoirs constructed. The temples at Modhera, Patan, Sidhpur, and Prabhas Patan, and the reservoirs or wells at Anhilwad Patan are all Chaulukya constructions.

The Chahamanas. In both Rajasthan and Gujarat, the eighth century saw powerful kings and prolific artistic activity, encouraged by the Guhilas of Mewar and the Pratiharas of Marwar, particularly Jabalipura or Jalor, but also those of Mandor and Medta. In Mewar the Grahapati king Manabhanga founded two imposing monuments on Chittor hill, now known under the names of the Kalikamata and Kumbhashyama.

In the tenth century, the Chahamanas, whose founder Vasudeva was a Brahman, succeeded the Pratiharas in the Marwar region. They encouraged and supported artistic enterprises, especially two of their maharajas, Simharaja (r. 944–971) and Vigraharaja II (r. 971–998). Another Chahamanas dynasty was independently established at Nadol, under Lakshmanaraja, who also supported architectural projects throughout the region.

The Guhilas shifted their capital from Chittor to Ahar, a modern suburb of Udaipur, in the tenth century. Nagda, 15 miles (24 km) to the north, was also an important center of Chahamanas art activity. The period between the rule of Allata (c. 950) and Shaktikumara (980) witnessed the construction of many stone monuments in Mewar.

Maha-Gurjara, Maha-Maru, Surashtra, and Maru-Gurjara Styles

The exact limits of the architectural and sculptural styles of Rajasthan and Gujarat are from Parnagar in



Stone Sculpture, Vishnu. Stone relief of Vishnu (as the dwarf avatar of Vamana), dating to fifth-century Maharashtra. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

district Barmer of Rajasthan in the north to Parol near Mumbai in the south, and from Osian and Kiradu in the west to Atru in the east.

Medieval North Indian temple styles may be classified into four geographical varieties: the eastern, the central, the northern or upper India, and the western. Of these, the western variety was of the longest duration and was the most prolific; also called the Maru-Gurjara, this style appeared around the beginning of the eleventh century.

The styles of western India that predate the appearance of the Maru-Gurjara style may be divided into the following three schools: the Maha-Maru, the style of Rajasthan; the Maha-Gurjara style of northern Gujarat, the northern part of the Saurashtra peninsula, Cutch, and southern Rajasthan; and the Surashtra style, which was limited to the southern part of the Saurashtra peninsula of Gujarat.

The Maha-Maru style was essentially a homogenous style, though it expressed itself through two schools, the Maru-Sapadalaksha in the north and the Medapata-Uparamala in the east. From the early eighth century—when the Maha-Maru began its independent course after

the post-Gupta phase—to the end of the tenth century, when it merged into the Maru-Gurjara, three phases can be detected in its evolution.

The first phase lasted from the early eighth to the mid-ninth century; the second from mid-ninth to the mid-tenth; and the third phase can be placed in the second half of the tenth century.

The Maha-Maru school is reflected in many temples. The Kumbhashyama temple at Chittorgarh, built between 644 and 743 by the Grahapati dynasty's Raja Manabhangha, is the earliest example. Other securely dated monuments are the Mahavira temple at Osian, constructed during the reign of the Pratihara king Vatsaraja (r. 777–808), and the Vishnu temple at Buchkala, from the reign of his son Nagabhata II in 815. Similarly, an inscription dated between 956 and 973 provides the date for the Harshanatha temple at Sikar.

The temples of the early phase normally stand on a platform, and have a single projection. Their walls are decorated with sculptures of the divine regents of the quarters (Dikpalas) and other gods of the Hindu or Jain pantheon. The images are crowned by tall pediments. The superstructure (*shikharā*) has a meshwork of creepers, a distinguishing feature. The door frames are richly decorated, with motifs that include *naga* pairs (*nagashakha*), pilasters with vases, foliage above and carved panels below, and amorous couples embracing. On the walls and on the other parts of the structures a rich variety of figures and motifs are represented.

The Medapata-Uparamala branch of the Maha-Maru style saw the production of such large temples as the Kalikamata and Kumbhashyama at Chittorgarh (later renovated extensively in the fifteenth century). The Maha-Gurjara style, with its three branches of Anarta, Arbuda, and lower Medapata, enjoyed an almost unbroken continuity between the second half of the eighth century until about the end of the tenth. Among the securely dated temples are the Ambika temple at Jagat (961) and the Lakulisha temple at Eklingji (972).

The earliest shrines of the Maha-Gurjara style belong to its Anarta variety and are located at Roda. These early temples are rather plain when compared to contemporary Maha-Maru constructions. They have *shikharas* with meshwork patterns. In contrast to Maha-Maru shrines, Maha-Gurjara monuments have plain walls and a solitary niche on the main offset, with a short pediment. Most often there is no hall in front but only a short wall on two pillars, and a roof of the stepped pyramid type known as *phamsana*. The door frames of Maha-Gurjara temples are lavishly decorated. They may have three or five jambs, with floral bands, jewel bands, *vyalas* (mythical animals) and decorated pilasters. The best examples of the Maha-Gurjara

style are from the second half of the tenth century, and their walls display the full range of statuary, with divine images, *apsaras* (nymphs), *gandharvas* (heavenly musicians), *vidyadharas* (supernatural beings possessing magical powers), and *vyalas*. Their *shikharas* are arranged in multiples around the central spine, with excellent meshwork on the surface.

The merger of two of the three styles, Maha-Gurjara and Maha-Maru, in the eleventh century resulted in a new style whose sway extended over nearly all of Rajasthan and Gujarat up to the end of the thirteenth century. The form of the Maru-Gurjara temple is not very dissimilar to any other example of contemporary date from anywhere in North India. It is in the organization of its component elements and in the details of its decoration and sculpture that a Maru-Gurjara temple is distinctive.

Temples and Sculptures

The Shitalleshvara temple, Jhalrapatan. The Shiva temple of 689, known as the Shitalleshvara (Lord of Shitala, the goddess of smallpox), is the earliest securely dated standing temple in western India. An inscription recording the name of Raja Durggagana was found associated with the temple. Rather simple and heavy in form, the Shitalleshvara consists of a sanctum and a frontal chamber, to which a pillared hall was added in the tenth century. The walls of the sanctum have prominent projections and pilasters, elaborately carved with bold floral designs and other motifs. The superstructure is no longer preserved.

The Shitalleshvara is one of a small but significant group of monuments situated within a limited area in this part of Mewar-Rajasthan, the others being the Kalikamata and Kumbhashyama, two shrines at Menal, one at Joganiamata nearby, and an as yet unpublished ruined shrine at Khor, near Chittorgarh. All these shrines have the features of the styles of Malwa and Mewar, and all are datable to the late seventh or early eighth centuries. Some sculptures from the site have been preserved in the local museum. Images of seven goddesses from this site are housed in a small chamber near the Shitalleshvara. From their attributes—their total nudity, the winnowing fans, brooms and daggers in their hands, a donkey mount for at least some of them—they could be the images of Shitala, the goddess of smallpox. Since Shiva here is Shitalleshvara, or the “lord of the goddess of smallpox,” the presence of her representations, of the same date as Shiva's temple, is not unusual.

Abhaneri. Ancient Abhanagari, “city of splendor,” about 60 miles (96 km) to the east of Jaipur, has preserved two very significant monuments of the eighth century, of the

Chahamana period, even though both have suffered much damage. The Vishnu temple is now standing only up to the walls, as are parts of the vast terrace on which it stood. The plinth moldings have twelve panels with scenes of royalty—princes with beautiful female companions—in varied romantic situations, and the style of carving is among the most charming of all Indian art.

The large square-shaped stepped tank, known as the Chand Baodi, was also adorned with beautiful carvings. It was renovated during the Rajput period, when arched pavilions typical of the time were built. A large number of sculptures from the tank's shrine and the great Vishnu temple are stored in the compound of the tank.

Osian. Before the two styles of architecture, the Maha-Gurjara and the Maha-Maru, merged to form the pan-western Indian style of Maru-Gurjara in the early eleventh century, the two individual parent styles did occasionally encroach upon each other's territory. Osian was, however, one center where the Maha-Maru style retained its pristine purity.

The many temples at Osian, near Jodhpur, are datable to a period from the eighth to the eleventh century, and are scattered all around the small town. The two Harihara temples (numbers 1 and 2), the two Surya temples (numbers 2 and 3), and a tank for sacred water are the earliest monuments here, and are all datable to the eighth century. Fine sculptures of Hindu gods, such as Vishnu's Narasimha (Man-Lion) incarnation, in which he killed a demon king, and Trivikrama (Three-Strike) incarnations, in which he "measured" the entire universe in just three steps, adorn the walls of Harihara 2. Surya 3 has sculptures of Ganesha and the Sun god, Durgā, in its sanctum walls. Many of the temples have lost their superstructure, but where they are intact, they are the elegantly curving northern Indian *shikharas*.

To the Jains, Osian's importance rests in the fact that the prominent Ukeshvala sect originated here, and the earliest Jain temple of western India, dedicated to the Tīrthānkara Mahāvīra, was built here. The Mahāvīra temple, together with its adjuncts, was built during the reign of the Pratihara ruler Vatsaraja, while other structural parts were added in the tenth century.

Roda. Just as Osian possesses the perfect examples of early Maha-Maru architecture, and was never influenced by any Maha-Gurjara elements, Roda in Gujarat is the site that displays the Maha-Gurjara idiom in its clearest form, without any alloy from the Maru. The seven temples here are small, having only a sanctum fronted by a porch. The walls, sometimes with single central offsets, the columns, and the *shikhara* all exhibit the pure Maha-Gurjara elements. The temples, as well as a tank at the site, have been dated to the eighth century.

Harshagiri. The temple of Shiva Harshanatha (Lord of Joy) on the Harshagiri hill, is worth noting, especially for its sculptural art, even though it has suffered great damage. The site is a strikingly beautiful plateau, on a high hill some 8 miles (13 km) to the south of Sikar in northern Rajasthan. The temple possesses a sanctum, whose floor is about 2 feet (.6 m) lower than the floor of the hall, an antechamber, a hall, a porch, and a separate pavilion for a Nandi (Shiva's "bull" *vahana*) image. Parts of the temple were reerected haphazardly in the thirteenth century and later; its superstructure has vanished entirely. The surviving sculptures, however—one of Pārvatī performing her penance of the "five fires," flanked by a dozen young maidens, and a Lingodbhava Shiva preserved in the museum at Jaipur—testify to the high standards of the sculptural art. On the basis of an inscription of 956, the Harshanatha has been ascribed to the period of the Chahamana raja Simharaja I. The beautiful columns, architraves, and sculptures collected from the site have been transferred to the town of Sikar at the foot of the hill, where they form the nucleus of a local museum.

Baroli. A group of nine temples of the Maha-Maru style were built at Baroli, 30 miles (48 km) southwest of Kota in eastern Rajasthan, during the first half of the tenth century. They are all of modest size, and of a homogeneous style, with a shrine fronted by a narrow chamber, to which is attached a porch. They are dedicated to Shiva, Vishnu, the Devi Mahishasuramardini ("Mother Goddess, destroyer of the Buffalo demon"), and elephant-headed Ganesha. Only the Ghateshvara temple has large sculptures in the niches of its walls, the walls of all the other temples being quite plain.

The Maheshamurti aspect of Shiva in the temple dedicated to him is particularly interesting. Maheshamurti, or Shiva as "the Great Lord," is that aspect in which the totality of his being is revealed, including his tranquil central face, with a fierce demon (Aghora) face on one side, complemented by a female or Mother Goddess (Uma) face on the other. Shiva as the Great Lord was a favorite theme in southern Rajasthan's art. At Baroli his bust is 6 feet (1.8 m) high and equally wide; it is severely damaged, but even these mutilated Aghora and Uma faces are very expressive of Shiva's contrasting characters. What is equally interesting is that the sculpture is not independently carved and installed in the shrine; rather, the inner face of the slabs forming the back wall of the shrine is carved with Shiva's form, with the outer faces forming the wall's surface.

Shiva as Gajasurasamharamurti ("Slayer of the Elephant Demon") on the south wall of the Ghateshvara temple is an especially spirited image, standing diagonally in the rectangular niche. The human busts, complete with flailing arms, which form his garland, create a

macabre effect. On the other hand, the *apsara* clinging to a column of the temple has an alluring look.

Jagat. The village of Jagat is situated 40 miles (64 km) to the south of Udaipur, where there is a well-preserved temple of goddess Ambika. The temple stands in a large enclosure with an entrance structure in the east, and consists of the sanctum, a closed hall, and also a small structure for collecting bathing water. On the three sides on the walls at the level of the plinth there are small but deep niches, which house the images of Devi Mahishamardini (“Mother Goddess destroyer of the Buffalo demon”). On either side on the walls, following a fixed pattern, are the regents of the four directions, celestial nymphs, and mythical animals. A multiturreted *shikhara* crowns the sanctum. An inscription helps to fix the date at 961.

Eklingji. About 15 miles (24 km) to the north of Udaipur is a group of temples at a site called Eklingji. The Guhila dynasty of Mewar held Shiva Lakulisha as especially sacred, and his temple at Eklingji is the one where Mewar’s kings worshiped. This is a simple shrine of the third quarter of the tenth century, comprising a sanctum, a narrow chamber, and a hall. The sanctum has a superstructure with many turrets. On the walls of the sanctum are sculptures relevant to its Shaiva dedication.

Nagda. 15 miles (24 km) to the north of Udaipur, close to Eklingji, are the twin temples of Vishnu, with their own subshrines known as the Sas-Bahu, or “Mother-in-Law’s” and “Daughter-in-Law’s” temples. It is a late tenth century temple of the type known as *panchayatana*, with Vishnu enshrined in the main temple, and with four smaller corner shrines dedicated to four lesser Hindu divinities. The whole complex is built on a high platform, situated in the middle of much greenery, and is fronted by an ornamental arched entrance gateway. The name of the site derives from *nagadraba* (snake pool), inspired by the nearby lake.

Toos. About 20 miles (32 km) to the east of Udaipur on the road to Chittorgarh is a mid-tenth century temple of the Sun god Surya in the village of Toos. Built in the Mewar idiom of the Maha-Gurjara style, the temple has lost its original superstructure (the present one is much later); it has a sanctum fronted by a narrow passage and a hall with three entrances on the east, south, and north. The outer walls have a repertory of sculptures: seated figures of Surya in the wall niches, standing Surya on the outer walls of the passage in front of the sanctum, and the regents of the four directions, *apsaras*, and mythical animals in their allotted places on the offsets and recesses.

Modhera. Modhera in northern Gujarat can be said to occupy the same position in western India that Khajuraho does in central India. It is the finest example of a mature temple of the Maru-Gurjara style. The temple is part of a large complex comprising a tank with small

shrines punctuating the landings on the steps, a dancing hall, and an ornate entrance archway. There are other shrines within the premises as well, as also an old stepped well to the northeast of the temple complex.

The temple, known since the nineteenth century as the Sun temple, consists of a closed hall in front and a shrine at the rear, connected by means of a narrow passage. Curiously, the floor of the shrine is no less than 12 feet (3.6 m) below the floor of the hall, a phenomenon that has never yet been satisfactorily understood. The statuary on the outer walls of the temple neatly divides itself into two groups: solar and Shaiva; on the walls of the shrine are the sculptures of the twelve Adityas, or solar gods, and on the hall’s walls are twelve images of Gauris, or Shaiva goddesses. Inside the temple, however, the solar element predominates, but on the shrine doorway there is an image of Shiva presiding over the lintel. The Solanki kings under whose patronage the complex at Modhera was built were devotees of Shiva. Ancient Hinduism also has a syncretic god, who is a blend of Shiva and the Sun god Surya, called Martanda-Bhairava. It is more likely that the temple at Modhera was dedicated to this combined deity rather than to Surya alone.

Vimala Vasahi, Mount Abu. Jain temples were also erected during the reign of Bhima I. The beautiful Adinatha temple on Mount Abu was one of them. It was built by Vimala, a minister at the court of Bhima, and is therefore commonly known as the Vimala Vasahi. The original structure, founded in 1033, consists of a sanctum, a closed hall, and another hall known as the *trikamandapa*; to this nucleus other structural members were added in the twelfth century. The Vimala Vasahi is justly famous for its minutely carved columns and its ceilings, which are covered with semidivine female figures and other delicately carved decorative friezes.

The Mahavira temple, Sewadi. Temples of the style known as the Bhumija were principally built in Malwa, or central India. A variety of the North Indian Nagara style, the Bhumija is distinguished by the form of its *shikhara*, which has a central mesh running from base to finial on all its four sides, with a *chaitya* (decorative trifoliate dormer window) at the base. The quadrants between the tall mesh are filled with miniature *shikhara* models resting on columns, known as *kutastambhas* or *stambhakutas* of five to seven stories in three to five horizontal rows. The base of the frontal mesh always has a large antefix, which displays an image of the god enshrined within the sanctum. The Mahavira temple at Sewadi has a well-proportional *shikhara* of bricks with three vertical and six horizontal rows of miniature *stambhakutas*.

Menal. Other temples of this Bhumija class in Rajasthan are much later, of the Chahamana period. The

Mahanaleshvara (“Shiva the Lord of the Gorge”) is so called because it is built facing a 100 (30.5 m)-foot-deep gorge and a waterfall. Its tall *shikhara* has four busts of Shiva at the top of its central *latas* (creepers). The walls of the *rangamandapa* (pillared hall) and the shrine have the usual complement of sculptures, regents of the four quarters, *apsaras*, and divinities of the Hindu pantheon, but they are rather stereotyped and lack the verve of earlier sculpture.

Bijolia. A few miles from Menal is another group of temples at Bijolia. The Undeshvara is so named because the *linga* of Shiva is here installed some 10 or 12 feet (3–3.6 m) below the floor of the hall; probably it was a *svayambhu linga* (self-manifested *linga*), over which the shrine was erected. The temple has a stellate plan; it has a *shikhara* that is *navabhauma* (having 9 stories). The *shukanasa* antefixes at the bases of the *latas* have sculptures of Shiva. It can be dated to the first half of the twelfth century.

Mahāvīra temple, Kumbhariya. If the Vimala Vasahi was built on Mount Abu in 1032, in the early years of the reign of Bhima I, the Mahāvīra temple at Kumbhariya was built toward its end, in 1062. It was planned on an ambitious scale, with a sanctum, a closed hall, several other halls, and several small nichelike shrines, all standing on a high platform. The interior columns, brackets, ceilings—indeed, all available surfaces—display carvings that have an almost lapidary quality, more intricate even than the Vimala Vasahi, which has rarely been equaled.

Ranakpur. The complex of Jain temples at Ranakpur built in the fifteenth century is a virtual temple town. Measuring over 300 feet by 300 feet (91.5 m x 91.5 m), it possesses four smaller shrines and several pillared halls surrounding the central shrine in honor of Adinatha, the first Jain Tīrthānkara. A high terrace with entrances on all four sides accommodates the central shrine of Adinatha, with a multiturreted tower and with pillared halls on the four sides. The corner shrines are smaller, with simpler superstructures. Hundreds of tall and slender columns and an infinite variety of delicately carved ceilings made this complex a marvel of architectural planning.

Shatrunjay. This temple town, situated on a high hill near Palitana in Gujarat’s Saurashtra peninsula, has a large number of Jain temples datable from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Monuments of a still earlier period must have existed at one time; but no trace has survived. The Jains hold this entire hill in great reverence because of its associations with their first Tīrthānkara Adinatha, and it remains one of their most sacred pilgrimage centers. Its Adinatha temple of the sixteenth century, with its two-storied hall and complex superstructure, has a towering statue of Adinatha in its sanctum.

The Tower of Victory, Chittorgarh.

Maharana Kumbhakarna, better known as Kumbha, erected this monument on the Chittor hill in the second half of the fifteenth century. Conceived as a hollow column, the tower is about 120 feet (36.6 m) high and is divided into nine stories. Its surfaces are adorned with hundreds of sculptures from the Hindu pantheon; gods and goddesses, and characters from the epics and mythology are all identified with brief labels, a virtual handbook of Hindu iconography. Rana Kumbha is known in Indian artistic tradition for the renaissance of Indian culture that he attempted, documented by the Tower of Victory.

Reservoirs and Stepped Wells

No account of the art of western India can be complete without a reference to its hundreds of stepped wells and reservoirs. With its semidesert climate and scant rainfall, there was a constant need to create sources of water. Thousands of stepped wells, lakes, and drinking places have been excavated since early times, often in memory of dead relatives.

The grandest and most elaborate of all stepped wells, known as the Queen’s Stepwell, was at Patan, capital of the Chaulukya, or Solanki, dynasty. It was built by Udayamati, queen of Bhimadeva I, after his death in 1064. It has seven underground stories, and its draw well attains a depth of more than 100 feet (30.5 m). The total length at ground level is 220 feet (67 m). The walls of the corridor and the well are adorned by sculptures of the Hindu pantheon. Vishnu, his incarnations, Shiva, Gaṇeśha, Pārvatī performing penance for reunion with Shiva (an allusion perhaps to Udayamati’s own aspirations after her separation from Bhimadeva), are all there, together with hundreds of other divine or semidivine beings.

The Sahasraliṅga reservoir. Bhimadeva was followed to the throne by his son Karnadeva. He created, at Patan, the Sahasraliṅga (Thousand *Liṅga*) reservoir in the later years of the eleventh century, by digging a channel from the Sarasvati River nearby. In the bed of this channel one thousand small shrines were erected, each housing a *liṅga* of Shiva, hence the reservoir’s name.

The Adalaj Stepwell. The stepped well at Adalaj, about 10 miles (16 km) north of Ahmedabad, was built by Queen Ruda in memory of her deceased husband in 1499. In size, it is comparable to Udayamati’s monument but, being a construction of the time when Muslim rule was firmly established in Gujarat, it is bereft of figure carvings, since Islam forbids figurative depictions. It is also a rare example of a stepped well with three entrances.

Kirit Mankodi

See also **Temple Types (Styles) of India**

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MORLEY, JOHN (1838–1923), British Liberal secretary of state for India (1906–1910). John Morley launched a number of significant Constitutional reforms during his half decade at the helm of Whitehall's India Office. Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone's biographer and his Irish secretary, strongly in favor of Home Rule, "Honest John" Morley's reputation as a man of courage and sterling principles raised nationalist India's hopes too high as soon as his appointment was announced. Unfortunately, the previous Tory government had so recently sent Conservative Lord Minto to India as viceroy that to recall him was hardly a viable option. A few months before Morley's appointment, moreover, Lord Curzon had inaugurated the ill-considered partition of Bengal.

Impact of Bengal's Partition

That partition divided Bengal's province into West Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam, provoking heated opposition from the Bengali-speaking leaders of India's National Congress, who viewed it as imperial "divide and rule" with a vengeance. The line divided the Bengali-speaking majority just east of Calcutta, the heart of long-uniited old Bengal, leaving its Hindu Bengali-speakers as



John Morley. Also an advocate of universal suffrage and Irish home rule, Morley implemented several important reforms within the Indian Constitution, but anti-partition forces within the National Congress only grew louder and more influential during his tenure as British Secretary of State for India. MICHAEL NICHOLSON / CORBIS.

a minority to Bihari- and Oriyya-speakers in West Bengal, while elevating its Muslim Bengali-speakers to majority control over their own province. British India's first Muslim-majority province thus emerged with its new capital of Dhaka, where the Muslim League was born in December 1906. When Morley was pressed by Congress leaders like Gopal Krishna Gokhale to reverse that "cruel partition," he refused, calling it "a settled fact." He hoped that would silence opposition, permitting him to move on to what he considered more important reforms. But Congress's antipartition forces only grew louder throughout Morley's tenure, its extremist "New Party," led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, introducing bombs to add explosive emphasis to their petitions and pleas. Before leaving office in 1910, Morley drafted Bengal's reunification announcement made by King George at his Delhi Durbar in 1911.

India Council Reforms

Morley introduced several major reforms in British India's Constitution, enacted as the Indian Councils Act of 1909, less accurately termed "Morley-Minto Reforms,"

since Minto's role was primarily to delay and undermine the effectiveness of the original bill Morley had proposed. Great Liberal that he was, Morley pressed for and achieved the introduction of two Indian members, the first in 1907, to his own India Office Council in Whitehall, the second, Satyendra P. Sinha (1864–1928), to the Viceroy's Administrative Council of the Government of India in 1910. Expanded Legislative Councils under Morley's act all had many new directly elected Indian members, another principle doggedly opposed by Minto and his die-hard British civil servants. Another of Morley's gifts to India was to prevent the appointment of Lord Kitchener, whom he considered an arrogant racist, to the job Kitchener coveted: viceroy of India.

Stanley Wolpert

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MOUNTBATTEN, LORD (1900–1979), last British viceroy of India. Lord Louis (Dickie) Mountbatten was Britain's last viceroy of India (1947) and independent India's first governor-general (1947–1948). Queen Victoria's dashing great-grandson, Dickie, the son of First Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg (obliged to Anglicize his German name at the start of World War I), initially followed his father's career at sea, becoming a naval officer. He first visited India with his cousin, the Prince of Wales, in 1922, hunting tigers and becoming engaged to wealthy Edwina Ashley, who was the house guest of Viceroy Lord Reading in Simla.

The Mountbattens first met and befriended India's National Congress leader, soon to become India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in Singapore in 1946. A year later, Britain's newly elected Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee invited Mountbatten to replace wartime Field Marshal Lord Wavell as Britain's viceroy. The Labour Party was weary of wastefully exorbitant British imperial costs and martial commitments in South Asia, resolving to leave India no later than June 1948. Mountbatten flew to India in April 1947 with the blessings of cousin King George as well as Attlee's Cabinet.

Two months after he reached Delhi and met with Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, M. A. Jinnah, and other leaders of British India's political parties, as well as his own officials and generals, Mountbatten decided that Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were too volatile and enraged to risk waiting as long as a year to withdraw British troops. He insisted instead that Attlee's government transfer all British power to two new dominions of India and Pakistan by mid-August 1947. He ignored the advice of much wiser men, including both Gandhi and Jinnah, who warned him that dividing Punjab and Bengal down the middle of those multicultural provinces would unleash disastrous forces of murder and mayhem. But Mountbatten raced ahead, so eager to protect his own troops and Britain's royal reputation and his own image that he left India naked to the slaughter of a million innocents during the desperate migration of more than 10 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs across newly drawn "international borders" that a day earlier had been rural byways.

Mountbatten's royal birth helped him persuade all but three of India's 562 princes to accept pensions, agreeing to allow their states to be integrated into India's Union by signing instruments of accession. He failed, however, to persuade either the nizam of Hyderabad or the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, India's two largest states, to transfer their quasi-sovereign powers before the independent dominions of India and Pakistan were created. Mountbatten remained in Delhi as governor-general of the Dominion of India until June 1948, after which he returned to the Royal Navy, over which he presided seven years later as First Sea Lord. In 1979 he was assassinated by Irish revolutionaries, who blew up his yacht in Irish waters.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

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
MUGHAL EMPIRE. See **History and Historiography.**

MUGHAL PAINTING The Mughal dynasty was founded by Zahir al-Din Muhammad, called Babur (r. 1526–1530), a member of the princely Chagatai Turk clans of the Ferghana Valley in modern Uzbekistan, who claimed descent from the great conquerors Timur and Genghis Khan. Although no works of art can be attributed to Babur's patronage, his royal seal can be found in a number of extant manuscripts attesting to his bibliophilic interests. According to his own autobiography the *Baburnāma* (Story of Babur), he was a connoisseur well versed in the artistic works produced by contemporary Persian and Central Asian painters.

Humayun

Only two years after assuming rule in Delhi, Babur died and was succeeded by his son Humayun (r. 1530–1540; 1555–1556). Only a handful of paintings can be ascribed to Humayun's reign; however, two incidents noted posthumously in the *Akbarnāma* (Story of Akbar), a biography of his son and heir Akbar (r. 1556–1605), indicate that Humayun treasured rare books and kept them with him even while traveling. Included among the manuscripts mentioned is a copy of the history of Timur's rule, said to be illustrated by Bihzad, the highly esteemed Persian painter, and probably one of the many volumes he inherited from his father Babur. Early examples of painting from this period include illustrations to a manuscript of *Yusuf and Zulaykha* (New York Public Library), painted in a style resembling that of contemporary Bukharan works, made about 1530–1553 for Humayun's brother Kamran, governor of the fort at Kabul.

In 1540 Humayun and his court fled from Delhi after losing a battle to Shir Shah Suri, an Afghan chief, and was granted safe haven at the court of the Safavid Persian ruler Shah Tahmasp at Tabriz. After gathering financial and military resources, Humayun returned to the sub-continent via Kabul in 1555 and wrested Delhi from Shir Shah. Accompanying the returning Mughal entourage were two accomplished artists of the Safavid atelier, Mir Sayyid 'Ali and 'Abd al-Samad, who had been given permission by the shah to leave. Other artists from the Persian court joined their colleagues in Delhi, including Mir Sayyid 'Ali's father, Mir Musavvir. These émigrés took their place at Humayun's court, and in concert with local painters, prepared works, such as a manuscript of the *Khamsa* (Five poems) of Nizami (Ahmedabad, private collection), that display the varied artistic influences of the newly formed atelier, including Bukharan, Safavid, indigenous Indic, and Indo-Persian styles. Historical manuscripts and depictions of court scenes were appar-



Babur in the Chaharbagh. This sixteenth-century painting commemorates the first Mughal emperor's love of the garden. He later imported this concept of the formal garden from Persia to India with great success. Mughal miniatures similarly evolved from Persian painterly traditions. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

ently favored by Humayun, as evidenced by a painting from about 1550, *Humayun and His Brothers in a Landscape* (Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz), attributed to the Persian painter Dost Mohammad. Not long after his return to Delhi, Humayun tumbled down a stairway as he was rising from his prayers. At Humayun's untimely death, his son Akbar ascended the throne at the age of thirteen.

Akbar

Akbar inherited his father's library and his atelier of artists, calligraphers, and illuminators who produced manuscripts in the *karkhana*, or imperial workshop. Following Timurid and contemporary Safavid practices, the

atelier was organized hierarchically, and duties were be assigned according to the experience and skill of the individual artist. Senior artists supervised the production of manuscript illustrations and would often lay out preliminary drawings, leaving space for the text to be added later by the calligrapher. One or more artists collaborated in the painting of the composition, with portraits and other detailed areas left to be completed by master artists.

Young apprentices (usually the sons or nephews of artists) would first learn how to prepare pigments and brushes. Pigments were made by grinding minerals such as lapis lazuli, resulting in a rich ultramarine, and other substances, such as gold in leaf and powdered form, which were then mixed with a liquid vehicle. Brushes were made from fine animal hair, such as that of a squirrel, and would be carefully arranged and tied to terminate in a sharp point. Preparation of the paper ground consisted of burnishing an individual sheet by placing it on a flat surface and repeatedly rubbing a smooth stone over the front and back surfaces. Between applications of pigment, the folio would be turned over and the back would be burnished to create a brilliant enamel-like surface on the front side. After the illustration was complete, it was inserted into an ornamented border and bound with other folios.

Akbar was an enthusiastic patron of the arts, and numerous marvelously colored and detailed manuscript paintings were produced at his capitals at Delhi, Agra, Fatehpur Sikri, and Lahore. One of the earliest challenges for the Mughal atelier was Akbar's request that a manuscript of the *Hamzanāma* (Story of Hamza) be produced. This epic story conflated the heroic exploits of Hamza, the uncle of the prophet Muhammad, with the fantastic tales of an adventurer by the same name. Mir Sayyid 'Ali and then 'Abd al-Samad oversaw the production of the ambitious project, which took fourteen years to complete and resulted in fourteen volumes, each containing one hundred folios. The unusually large illustrations (averaging approximately 26.6 x 20.2 in., or 67.6 x 51.2 cm) were painted on cotton cloth, and the Persian text, written on paper, was affixed to the back of the cloth painting. The now dispersed manuscript took fourteen years to complete (c. 1562–1577), and featured unusually large folios (averaging approximately 26.6 x 20.2 in.) as compared with other manuscripts that could be easily held in the hands of a single person. The composition, coloration, and figural representations of the *Hamzanāma* exemplify an early stage of experimentation and synthesis in Akbar's atelier. An examination of the 140 or so extant folios now dispersed in public and private collections reveal the use of brilliant saturated colors influenced by traditional indigenous artistic sensibilities, combined with elegant Persianate patterned textiles and architectural elements.

Epic, historical, and poetic manuscripts were among the preferred subjects produced for Akbar, including illustrated copies of his grandfather's autobiography, the *Baburnāma*. The emperor's biography, the *Akbarnāma* (Story of Akbar), was commissioned in 1590–1591 and was written by Abu al-Fazl, Akbar's close friend and panegyrist. One of the earliest volumes produced enumerated the emperor's many activities and accomplishments between the years 1560 to 1578. In these richly embellished folios, he was often portrayed centrally in the composition, as shown in a folio painted about 1590–1595 by Basawan with Nand Gwaliari that documented Akbar's journey on foot from Agra to Ajmer in fulfillment of a vow following the birth of his son and heir Salim (London, Victoria and Albert Museum). Although some compositions may have been conceived in the mind of the painter, it was not unusual for one or more artists to accompany the emperor and his court on military campaigns, hunts, and other forays, where documentary sketches made on the spot would later be used as the basis of a fully realized folio. The identification of the hand of a specific artist during this period is aided by the occasional inclusion of signatures within the painting or noted on the border.

When the Mughal court was in residence at Lahore (1585–1598), a number of exquisitely rendered illustrated literary works were produced for Akbar. Among these are two poetic anthologies, painted with precision and jewel-like colors: the 1588 *Divan* (Collected poems) of Anvari (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums), and a 1595 copy of the *Khamasa* (Five poems) of Nizami (London, British Library and Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery). Diverging from an earlier tradition whereby one or more artists would collaborate in the production of a single folio, many of these paintings were completed by a single artist, a practice that would be further developed under the patronage of Jahangir.

The translation of Hindu texts from Sanskrit into Persian are evidence of Akbar's ecumenical nature and philosophical curiosity. A brilliantly delineated folio from a dispersed copy of the *Harivamsa* (Lineage of Hari [Krishna]) produced about 1585–1590, depicts the slaying of the demon king Samvara by the hero Pradyumna. Although this composition includes a fantastically colored landscape similar to those found in mid-sixteenth-century Safavid manuscript illustrations, there is also evidence of artistic influences from contact with European models. European artistic influences are manifest in the form of the representation of atmospheric perspective, a naturalistic depiction of forms receding in space, and the chiaroscuro modeling of figures.

The first documented gift of a European work to the Mughal court was in 1580, when a copy of the eight-volume

Royal Polyglot Bible printed in Antwerp between 1568 and 1573 by Christopher Plantin was presented to the emperor by a mission of Portuguese Jesuit priests who visited the Mughal court at Akbar's invitation. Subsequently, numerous religious publications and prints were sent as gifts to the emperor and his courtiers in the hope of influencing Akbar's conversion to Christianity and in order to negotiate trade agreements favorable to the Portuguese crown. These religious and allegorical prints, largely the works of northern European artists such as Georg Pencz and Albrecht Dürer, were studied closely by Mughal artists, who integrated European representational elements into their works and sometimes faithfully copied entire compositions.

Rochelle Kessler

See also **Akbar; Aurangzeb; Babur; Humayun; Jahangir; Shah Jahan**

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MUGHAL PAINTING, LATER Although it was the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) who, by virtue of prosperous and stable reign, contributed toward the blossoming and development of a Mughal school of painting distinct from the Persian models from which it originated, it was under the brilliant reigns of his successors, emperors Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) and Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), that Mughal art and painting reached their apogee.

Emperor Jahangir's interest in painting dates to his early years, when he avidly collected the European

engravings brought to the Mughal court by Jesuit missionaries. He was attracted to the "exoticism" of these works from the Flemish and German schools. When the young prince, rebelling against his father, Akbar, established an independent and short-lived court in Allahabad between 1599 and 1604, he did not neglect to take with him a few of the painters from the imperial studio, such as Aqa Reza and his son, Abu al-Hasan, as well as Mirza Ghulam and Bishandas. When he acceded to the imperial throne, Jahangir quite naturally inherited painters from the royal studio founded by Akbar. His taste for painting grew and became more discerning through contact with the delicate and refined works produced by these experienced artists, who placed their talent in service of his reign. An aesthete and a demanding connoisseur, Jahangir took legitimate pride in his aptitude for distinguishing without the slightest hesitation the work of a particular artist from that of his colleagues. Hence he notes in his memoirs, the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*: "As regard myself, my liking for painting and my practice in judging it have arrived at such a point that when any work is brought before me, either of deceased artists or those of the present day, without the names being told me, I say on the spur of the moment that it is the work of such and such a man. And if there be a picture containing many portraits, and each face be the work of a different master, I can discover which face is the work of each of them. If any other person has put in the eye and eyebrow of a face, I can perceive whose work the original face is, and who has painted the eye and eyebrow" (vol. 2, pp. 20–21). The emperor even went so far as to grant flattering and prestigious titles to some of the most eminent painters in the imperial studio. Hence the title of *Nādir az-Zamān* (wonder of the time) was bestowed on Abu al-Hasan in 1618, and *Nādir al-ʿAsr* (wonder of the age) on the animal painter Ustad Mansur.

The extensive illustration of historical, literary, and epic manuscripts characteristic of Akbar's reign declined rapidly under Jahangir. Whereas the earlier illustrations were the work of two or three artists collaborating on a single painting, the new emperor preferred miniatures executed by a single artist, whose talent and style could thereby be displayed more freely and brilliantly. These isolated miniatures were then mounted on album pages (*muraqqa*), where they alternated with brightly colored pages of text done by renowned calligraphers. The albums assembled during Jahangir's reign thus bear witness to the eclecticism of the sovereign's tastes. The dazzling calligraphies and Mughal miniatures executed by the masters of the imperial studio were complemented by European engravings and Persian and Deccani miniatures. The borders and margins surrounding these paintings and calligraphies were highlighted with floral motifs painted with extraordinary mastery and extreme delicacy

and sometimes augmented with small human figures or delicate little scenes depicted with phenomenal intensity. They attest to the virtuosity that the painters in the imperial studio had achieved. Their art was no longer confined to miniatures alone but extended to the entire surface of the page.

Beginning with Jahangir's reign, Mughal painting was dominated by the art of the portrait. These were psychological and realistic portraits (no longer idealized, as in the Persian aesthetic tradition), in which the artist was sometimes unsparing in his endeavor to capture and express his model's personality. The greatest artists in the imperial studio were extraordinary portraitists, who gave the Mughal art of the portrait its pedigree: Abu al-Hasan, Bichitr, Hashim, Govardhan, and Bishandas, among others. Recall that in the last decades of the sixteenth century, Emperor Akbar had already expressed the desire to better know the dignitaries and nobles of his empire through individualized portraits. Abu-al-Fazl, the chronicler of Akbar's reign, mentions in *A'in-i-Akbari* the sovereign's original decision to put together a vast portrait album of the grandees in the kingdom: "His Majesty himself sat for his likeness, and also ordered the likenesses taken of all the grandees of the realm. An immense album was thus formed: those that have passed away have received a new life, and those who are still alive have immortality promised them" (vol. 1, p. 115). The albums assembled during Jahangir's reign were adorned with brilliant and penetrating portraits of emperors, princes, and major dignitaries. Based on a rigorously static conception of the human figure, Mughal portraits traditionally depict their subject with the face represented in profile (bodies are generally represented in three-quarters profile) to allow better definition and legibility of facial features. The human figures, fixed in sober and often hieratic poses, stand out sharply against the bare and light-colored ground of the page. There were both individual and group portraits. Nobles and dignitaries gathered together at formal royal audiences (*darbar*) were always captured in poses marked by stiffness and deference. Mughal portraits were hence also a brilliant reflection of the court, which was governed by strict etiquette and ceremonial, designed to glorify the sovereign and extol his power and majesty. Jahangir's interest in the individualized and intensely realistic portraits sometimes led him to ask his painters to observe the ravages of the human body caused by illness and then to reproduce them with complete fidelity in their pictorial works. Hence in 1618 the emperor commanded his painters to do a portrait of one of his dignitaries, Inayat Khan, who was dying from an illness and from the overconsumption of opium. A drawing and a painting depicting Inayat Khan a few hours before his death are known to us. In their poignant and morbid realism, they bear witness to

the extraordinary degree of expressiveness and naturalism henceforth achieved by Mughal portraits. A similar propensity for naturalism also governed depictions of fauna and flora painted during Jahangir's reign. The monarch, captivated by the sight of the odd or unusual, readily assigned the great animal painter Ustad Mansur (Nādir al-ʿAsr) the task of representing all animal species whose presence at the Mughal court might seem out of the ordinary. For instance, in 1621 the talented Mansur did a striking portrait of the famous zebra brought back from Abyssinia by Mir Jaʿfar, which the emperor presented as a gift to Shah Abbas I of Persia. Jahangir's interest in the animal and plant world was inherited from Emperor Babur, whose memoirs are bursting with lively and detailed descriptions of the flora and fauna found in the recently conquered India. That interest was catered to by incomparable painters whose works were to achieve the same degree of realism and objectivity as the brilliant portraits of imperial dignitaries.

One of the most original contributions of Jahangir's painters to the history of imperial Mughal painting was unquestionably the extraordinary "allegorical portraits" commissioned by the sovereign in 1616–1620. The subtle and erudite iconography of these complex, ambitious works was derived in large part from European imagery discovered by the Mughals in Flemish and German engravings brought by the Jesuit missionaries in 1580. They show Emperor Jahangir illuminated by vast golden nimbi and shining like a star. Sometimes he is standing on a large globe, laden with gems or endowed with the attributes of royal power. In other works he is surrounded by putti, who fly through the clouds holding parasols, a symbol of dignity and sovereignty, or the sword or the Timurid crown. These brilliant and profoundly symbolic works show that a few of the greatest painters in the imperial studio, such as Abu al-Hasan and Bichitr, deliberately assimilated foreign motifs: the crown, the earthly globe, the hourglass, the shining nimbus, or putti brandishing the insignia of sovereignty. These motifs were subtly integrated into imperial iconography and were sometimes associated with ancient Islamic symbols that also celebrated royalty and dynastic legitimacy. These "allegorical portraits," which bear striking witness to the iconographical and pictorial eclecticism of Mughal art, continued to be produced—though in a less exalted and less grandiloquent form—during the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan. Among their iconographical sources were obviously the European paintings that Sir Thomas Roe, ambassador to King James I of England, brought to the Mughal court when he was received by Jahangir in 1615. In particular, the emissary to the king of England presented the Mughal emperor with portraits done by the famous English miniaturist Isaac Oliver, and with one or several portraits of the king himself.

These works obviously played a role in enriching the thematic and aesthetic repertoire of the Mughal painters charged with executing the famous “allegorical portraits” designed to exalt the majesty and omnipotence of the Great Mughal.

Emperor Akbar, obsessed with the majesty and legitimacy of the Mughal dynasty, had already commissioned imperial painters to illustrate important historical manuscripts that related the great feats of his ancestors Genghis Khan and Timur (*Chingīznāma*, *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān i Tīmūriyya*). His successors Jahangir and Shah Jahan took upon themselves that desire to constantly define and remember the historical and political meaning of the Timurid line and the Mughal dynasty. Under their reigns, imperial painters created many “dynastic portraits,” works that are brilliant at a symbolic level and yet sometimes repetitive and formulaic. On a single page, they show Timur offering the imperial crown to Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty in 1526, in the presence of his son and successor Humayun; or they depict Akbar, seated between Jahangir and Shah Jahan, handing over the Timurid crown to the latter.

In 1605, the year of his coronation, Emperor Jahangir began to write his memoirs, the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* (or *Jahāngīrnāma*), which covered the time between his accession to the throne and the nineteenth year of his reign (1624). Several pages of this manuscript are illustrated with remarkable paintings that bear the signatures of the greatest painters of the imperial studio. These illustrations are now dispersed, housed in various public and private collections. This was the only historical manuscript of importance to have been illustrated during the reign of Emperor Jahangir, who preferred superb albums of paintings (*muraqqa*) to the amply illustrated historical and literary manuscripts in vogue under the previous reign.

Hence it is from the reign of his successor, Emperor Shah Jahan, that the most sumptuous of the imperial Mughal manuscripts dates, the famous *Pādshāhnāma* housed in the Royal Library of Windsor Castle. This two-volume official chronicle of the reign of Shah Jahan, composed by ‘Abd ul-Hamid Lahori, relates the first twenty years of the imperial reign. The manuscript of the first volume includes forty-four illustrations of great beauty, done by the best imperial painters and depicting for the most part royal audiences (*durbār*), feasts, ceremonies, hunts, and military campaigns. In some sense, this splendid imperial manuscript with dazzling illustrations using a sumptuous palette constitutes the most accomplished synthesis of Mughal pictorial genius, the result of diverse influences and reminiscences subtly assimilated and transposed in a profoundly original style.

All the same, Emperor Shah Jahan displayed more interest in architecture than in painting. Hence the pictorial currents that emerged during his reign cannot be fundamentally distinguished from those seen during that of Jahangir. There was, however, a revival of interest in the theme of the prince visiting a Hindu or Muslim holy man at his retreat to benefit from his wisdom and teaching. (Painters in Akbar’s studio had often illustrated this theme in the last decades of the sixteenth century.) These miniatures illustrating the “visit to a holy man” or a “gathering of ascetics” can no doubt be attributed to the patronage of Prince Dara Shikoh, Emperor Shah Jahan’s eldest son and heir apparent, who was by nature inclined toward philosophy, spirituality, and the study of religions and who had a well-known penchant for mysticism. Some of the greatest imperial painters, such as Govardhan, produced superb and poignant studies of holy men depicted in solitude and contemplation at their woodland hermitages, happened upon by a prince or nobleman in quest of wisdom or spiritual truth. These profound and often moving works allowed the artist to evoke the opposition between spiritual power, incarnated by the holy man, and temporal power, incarnated by the prince, and to allude symbolically to the preeminence of the former over the latter.

The chief aesthetic characteristics of Mughal painting were maintained under the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), though the works produced in his imperial studios were usually marked by a less accomplished and less brilliant style than during the previous reign. That austere reign was clearly less favorable to the flourishing of the fine arts. (In 1659 Aurangzeb did not hesitate to condemn his brother, Prince Dara Shikoh, to death for impiety and apostasy toward Islam.) In 1665 Aurangzeb, whose interest in painting was on the decline, even went so far as to shut down the imperial studios. Artists, henceforth deprived of imperial favor and support, sought to place themselves in the service of new patrons, often chosen from among the nobles and major dignitaries. A brief pictorial revival characterized the turbulent and unhappy reign of Emperor Muhammad Shah (r. 1719–1748), which the sack of Delhi by the Persian Nadir Shah in 1739 would bring to a brutal and tragic end.

Amina Okada

See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; Babur; Jahangir; Shah Jahan

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MUMBAI. *See* **Bombay.**

MUSIC

This entry consists of the following articles:

AN INTRODUCTION

KARNĀTAK

SOUTH INDIA

AN INTRODUCTION

The Sanskrit word for music, *saṅgīt(a)*, meaning “with song,” refers to both vocal and instrumental music as well as music for the accompaniment of dance. Some reserve use of this term for the classical traditions of urban, elite India and for religious music, describing other forms of music as “folk music” (*lok gīt*, possibly following the European model) or, in the case of music for the cinema, *filmigīt* (film song).

Early India

Regional musical styles, both secular and sacred, have existed for millennia in India, though we have little documentation of their existence prior to Matanga’s eighth/ninth-century A.D. text, *Brhaddesī* (which also includes the new, probably regional term, *rāga*).

One of the earliest descriptions of Indian musical ideas comes in the context of Vedic chant, particularly in reference to the musical intervals of the Sāma Veda’s presentation. Portions of the *Nāradyashikṣhā* (Narada’s manual) date from about the fifth century, with other portions added later. The students for whom Narada intended this work learned about religious chant (Vedic chant), how to deal with the all-important issue of pronunciation, and, notably, issues of musical pitch. In this last context, the author links the musical scales used in sacred chant and in secular singing.

The approach of Narada’s culture to deriving intonation may well have paralleled that of the Greeks. Given the contact between India of this era and Hellenistic culture (particularly in the aftermath of Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Punjab), the similarities between those systems may have been more than mere chance. Narada spoke of two important pitch distinctions: *svara* and *shruti*. The former refers to the musical pitches of a musical scale, while the latter refers to the quality of a tone that the listener may hear but have difficulty distinguishing.

An even earlier text, Bharata’s *Nāṭya Shāstra*, dates from the beginning of the first millennium of the common era and details many aspects of music in the context of dramatic presentation. Bharata describes the instruments



Tabla and Sitar Players. Tabla and sitar players, c. 1948. Although hereditary musicians are still important in India, greater access to education and social mobility have also created musicians who have chosen their careers by avocation. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

and some of the musical forms of his era, along with details about musical scales, including an enigmatic description of the term *shruti* (heard). Notably, the *Nāṭya Shāstra* describes a musical system that is already highly developed, one that reflects a well-established musical heritage.

Later Development

Although the Indian subcontinent has been subject to many waves of migration and cultural change, the successive waves of Turks, Persians, and Mughals who invaded South Asia between the eighth and eleventh centuries A.D. brought with them dramatic infusions of Western and Central Asian musical ideas.

In North India, successive waves of migrants and rulers patronized Indian music as well as their own in their homes, communities, and courts. The music of the West and Central Asian Muslims, particularly that of Persian, enriched Indian music in the court setting. Eventually a blend of the two traditions emerged, with singers from Gwalior (India) joined by instrumentalists from Mashhad, Tabriz, and Herat (Persia and Afghanistan).

The court of Ala’-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji, sultan of Delhi (r. 1296–1326), was a particularly fertile ground for this exchange. By far the most notable musical figure in this context was Amir Khusrau, an expert in the music

of both India and Persia. Many scholars credit him with inventing the sitar and tabla, many *rāgs* and *tāls*, and several vocal forms.

Indian courts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sponsored resident scholars who wrote numerous treatises describing the aesthetics of music, including the association of sentiments (*rasa*), colors, Hindu deities, and so forth, with particular *rāgas*. A particularly important era in the patronage of Indian music came during the reign of the Mughal emperors. Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) had two outstanding musicians at his court, Miyañ Tansen and Baz Bahadur; Emperor Jahangir (1605–1627) had musician Bilas Khan; and Emperor Shah Jahan (1628–1658) patronized Lal Khan. Many modern hereditary musicians trace their lineage to these eminent musicians.

The treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries show an evolution from the tradition of the *Nāṭya Shāstra* and an increase in the importance of Arabic and Persian musical ideas. Toward the end of Mughal period (18th and early 19th centuries), court scholars translated early Sanskrit treatises into Persian, allowing them to learn about the music of ancient India and in some cases to attempt to reconcile differences between millennia-old treatises and contemporary practice.

The Mughal era also marked the ascendancy of the British Raj and a flourishing of Indian musical life in provincial capitals and courts. There, musicians worked in smaller and less affluent settings than Delhi for less powerful patrons, some of whom knew a great deal about the music, some who simply wanted to hear it and enjoyed the prestige.

British Orientalists took an active interest in India's music and culture. Sir William Jones, a linguist and translator, compiled his *On the Musical Modes of the Hindus* (1799) largely from Indian sources, but without much comment on current practice. However, Captain Augustus Willard, in his *Treatise on the Music of Hindustan* (1834), drew attention to the gap between theory and practice and observed that much contemporary musical practice in Indian courts was a mix of Indian, Persian, and Afghan musical ideas. Indian treatises of the period reveal continued shifts in musical thinking, with the "major" scale (*Bilāval thāt*) as the "natural" scale replacing the "minor" (Dorian) scale that had long been associated with Bharata's intonational root scale, *shadjagrāma*.

Perhaps the most important figure in twentieth-century Indian musical theory is V. N. Bhatkhande. In his *Hindusthāni Sangīt Paddhati* (1932) and *Kramik Pustak Mālikā* (1937), he attempted to derive theory from observations of practice, interviewing court musicians, collecting their music, and analyzing and cataloging contemporary

rāgas. Many twentieth-century writers on Indian music continued this trend, attempting to reconcile ancient practice with contemporary musical practice and terminology. In general, however, scholarship has separated the study of ancient musical practice from examination of modern performance practice.

Until the twentieth century, musicianship in South Asia was a combination of hereditary legacy and cultural adaptation. For many Hindus, the *guru-shishya*, or teacher-pupil relationship, was the context for the transmission of traditional musical knowledge. The relationship was sometimes familial, but the artistic "lineage," or *parampara*, resulted from generations of teaching and learning. For Muslims, the *gharānā* (household) delineated the transmission of musical knowledge and the line of musical authority. The teacher-student relationship between an *ustād* (master) and his *shagird* (student) provided instruction in everything from musical performance to conduct in public. The ultimate official arbiter of disputes in these extended familial relationships was the senior male, the *qalifā*. In the early twenty-first century, although hereditary musicians are still important, music schools fostered by Bhatkhande and others (e.g., Palushkar), along with an increased sense of social mobility, have created musicians who have chosen their careers by avocation.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Nāṭya Shāstra; Rāga; Sitar; Tabla; Tāla**

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KARNĀTAK

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the musical tradition of India divided into two main schools, that of the Hindustani tradition of North India, influenced by Persian music, and the Karnātak, or Carnatic, school of South India. The Karnātak school drew on Tamil and Telugu literary as well as Hindu devotional traditions. The earliest Karnātak music was devotional, performed in temples, but then royal families and prosperous

landowners patronized musicians who would perform for them in their palaces and mansions. The royal courts at Tanjore, Pudukkottai, and Ettayapuram became renowned centers of Karnātak music with Tanjore at one time employing some 360 musicians in concerts known as *arangam*, *sabba*, or *sadas*. The kings of Vijayanagar and, after its fall in 1565, the Wodeyars of Mysore were also great patrons of Karnātak music. The music developed in *sampradayas* (music schools), and although four types of improvisation are the norm, these occur along well-defined and well-organized lines. Karnātak music is almost exclusively devotional, but there are also children's songs, humorous compositions, and film songs.

Karnātak music is performed by a small group of musicians consisting of a vocalist, a primary instrumentalist playing such instruments as the vina or violin, sometimes a wind instrument such as a flute, a drone instrumentalist perhaps playing a tamboura or *shruti* box, and a rhythm instrumentalist who might play a percussion instrument such as a *mridangam* or *ghatam*. The two main components of Karnātak music are the *rāga*, a melodic pattern, and the *tāla*, a rhythmic pattern, where singers keep the beat by moving their hands in specific patterns. There are seventy-two primary or parent *rāgas*, and each one is associated with one of nine feelings: *shringara* (romance), *basya* (humor), *karuna* (longing), *raudra* (anger), *veera* (heroism), *bhayanaka* (fright), *vibhatsa* (disgust), *adbhuta* (wonderment), or *shanta* (contentment). *Rāgas* are also associated with the seasons of the year or time of day. The songs usually eulogized the Hindu Gods, especially Vishnu and his incarnations. The songs usually consist of three verses: the *pallavi*, the refrain of two lines; the *anupallavi*, the second verse, also of two lines; and the *caranam*, the final verse, usually of three lines and one that borrows from the *anupallavi*.

One of the earliest composers was Purandara Dasa (1480–1564), who systematized the laws of teaching music and was reputed to have composed 475,000 songs in Kannada and Sanskrit, although only a hundred survive. He invented the *tāla* system and preached the virtues of a pious life in his songs, known as *padas*. They were simple metrical devotional songs of the *bhāgavata* tradition, sung in a simple language, that also appealed to the illiterate. He sang the praises of the Hindu God Krishna, and his four compositions in praise of the Hindu God Gaṇeśha are practiced today by students of the Karnātak tradition. He inspired the three greatest composers of the Karnātak tradition, Thyagaraja (c. 1759–1847), Mutusvāmi Dīkshitar (1776–1827), and Syāmi Sastri (1762–1827), who are considered to be the “Trinity” of Karnātak music. In the twentieth century, Semmangudi Srinivāsa Iyer (1908–2003), a teacher of three generations of Karnātak musicians, was acclaimed

as the second Pitamaha (Great Father) after Purandara Dasa. One of his most famous pupils is the female singer Madurai Shanmukhavadi Subbulakshmi (b. 1916), popularly known as M. S. or M. S. S., who completely charmed both Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Damal Krishnaswamy Pattammal (b. 1919) is often referred to as the second of the “Female Trinity” of Karnātak music; M. L. Vasanthakumari is the third. Modern Karnātak music is sometimes played as a musical composition without singers.

Roger D. Long

See also **Dīkshitar, Mutusvāmi; Rāga; Subbulakshmi, M. S.**

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SOUTH INDIA

The music of South India (Sanskrit, *Karnātaka Sangītam*) is referred to as Carnatic or Karnātak music in English. It has absorbed a number of traditions, theories, and stylistic features over a long period of time. Many of the features discernible in today's concerts, be it the lyrics of a song, an instrumental style, or a typical rhythm, can be traced to different parts of a vast area comprising Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. As the four southern states were created on the basis of linguistic considerations following India's independence in 1947, it is important to recall here that this music is not confined to Karnataka, nor can it be ascribed to any particular group on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, or social categories.

History

Only in the last few centuries has “music” in the modern sense of the word become an art in its own right, and early Indian music was by definition subservient to the needs of drama, dance, public festivities, and religious rituals. Much of South India's musical evolution has therefore eluded the scrutiny of historians concerned with factual and biographical accounts rather than hagiography or the intricacies of current Karnātak music theory: “It is very difficult to make a purely chronological survey of musicological writing. . . . Many streams of musical

systems existed; little is known about their time of origin and extinction. Some overlap others in time, some stay independent of one another, and some cross one another's path; sometimes the impact of one is seen on the other" (Ramanathan).

Inscriptions and evidence in Tamil literature, for instance the *Cilappadikāram*, leave no doubt that there has been a give and take between dance, temple and concert musicians since ancient times: "Provisions of endowments were made for the maintenance of professional dancers, singers and instrumentalists who were attached to temples. Available evidence makes it more than clear that they were expected not only to perform before the deities as part of divine services but also to entertain the visitors to the temples through public performances. As a matter of fact the *ranga-mandapa*, the theatre for performing arts, became an integral part of the architectural features of any temple worth the name" (Ramesh).

Rāmāmātya, a sixteenth-century scholar and minister who flourished at Vijayanagar, is regarded as the first writer who outlined a distinct South Indian music system in his treatise titled *Svara Mēla Kalānidhi*. Like other music scholars before and after him, he sought to reconcile the discrepancies between conventional music theory and established practice. With the defeat of the Vijayanagar empire in 1565 and the subsequent destruction of its splendid capital, the focus of Karnātak music shifted farther south. Patronage was available in plenty at Tānjāvūr (English, Tanjore), Thiruvananthapuram (Travancore), and Mysore. The Nayaka rulers, a Telugu-speaking dynasty flourishing in the seventeenth century, and their successors, the Marathas who ruled from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, are regarded as the patrons under whom Karnātak music acquired its present characteristics. Since then, members of several erstwhile royal families of South India, most notably those of Travancore and Mysore, have continued to play an active role in every aspect of South Indian musical life, be it as patrons, scholars, composers, or performers.

Music Education

Formal education has never been the sole source of musical knowledge. Semmangudi Srinivasa Iyer (1908–2003), the most influential Karnātak teacher and vocalist of the twentieth century, leaves no room for doubt about the important role played by the community of hereditary temple musicians: "In the past, Carnatic music was nourished by the *nadaswaram* tradition. As a child I followed the pipers through the four streets round the temple in the procession of the deities. Now and then the pipers would stop and ruminatively elaborate a *raga*. The crowds would throng to worship the gods as well as to listen to the music." He continues to highlight

the value of personalized music education: "Staying with the guru for years and absorbing music by listening as well as learning is no longer feasible. . . . I find that those who learn from classes held in the home of *vidwans* show better results than government college students." The informal "family" environment (*gurukulavāsam*) in which most performers and teachers of the past were formed has thus been substituted by the courses offered by private and government institutions. Yet, as far as the family members of prominent musicians are concerned, it still plays as significant a role as it did several generations ago.

A distinct feature of South Indian music is the body of exercises and didactic compositions known as *abhyāsa gāna* (practice music). Many months are devoted to the lessons included in this basic curriculum, during which a teacher supervises the exact repetition of pitches, phrases, embellishments, and increasingly complex metric arrangements in several tempi. The skills acquired through these exercises, and also the ability to discern minute stylistic details, are needed by soloists and accompanists alike. The importance of this learning method lies in the common denominator it provides for all performers, thus enabling most experienced Karnātak musicians to perform together without any prior rehearsals.

Purandara Dāsa (1484–1564), the most prolific among the saint-composers, is credited with establishing the current curriculum of Karnātak music. His method was disseminated by his fellow members of the *Haridāsa* movement ("servants of Hari" or Vishnu). His songs provide students with colorful mental images and an appealing, endearing tone. In his most popular piece, the composer addresses Gananātha as the "big-bellied, elephant-faced Lord" (Gaṇeśha) who has the "power to remove all obstacles," a gift for which he is "praised by the patron deities of the arts and sciences." This small composition, "Shrī Gananātha," belongs to a genre known as *gītām*, wherein the practice of musical skills is easily combined with involvement and expression (*bbāva*). The *lakshana gītām* is a variant containing lyrics that inform the learner about the special features (*lakshana*) of the underlying *rāga*.

Concert Repertoire

A Karnātak concert (*kachēri*) gives ample scope for spontaneity, precise ensemble work, and the rendition of compositions belonging to different genres that evolved quite independently from one another over several centuries. Ariyakkudi Ramanuja Ayyangar (1890–1967), a vocalist whose style has influenced many of his disciples and admirers, first introduced the concert format now followed on most occasions: artistically conceived études known as *tāna varnam* form the opening item; then follow several pieces belonging to the vast and varied repertoire

of elaborate art and devotional songs (*kṛiti*, *kīrtana*); the *rāgam-tānam-pallavi* “suite” is sometimes performed as the main concert item. As an extension of this conventional concert format (*kachēri paddhati*), one or several compositions belonging to the traditional dance repertoire, are presented toward the end: the rhythmically conceived *tillāna* (the only song genre devoid of “meaning”), and a *padam* or a *jāvali*, based on lyrics with an erotic theme (*srīngāra bhāva*). In addition, many performers present Tamil pieces such as the lively *Tiruppugal* or their own musical adaptations based on devotional lyrics in any Indian language (e.g., Sanskrit *ślōkam*, Tamil *viruttam*). Among the “minor” (*tukkadā*) items included in the final stage of a concert are popular versions of pilgrim songs (*kāvadi chindu*) and adaptations of North Indian genres set to hybrid (*dēshya*) *rāgas*.

During a concert, several compositions alternate with solo and group improvisations in the form of *rāga ālāpana* (unmetered *rāga* exposition), *tānam* (pulsating yet unmetered *rāga* exposition), *niraval* (sequences based on tonal variations of a given theme), *svāra kalpana* (“imaginative” tone combinations), and *tani āvartana* (rhythmic interlude by one or several performers).

In view of the artistic freedom enjoyed by all South Indian performers, it is important to highlight their respect for a concept that connects them with the music of their ancestors, namely that of the learned composer whose task is to create elaborate pieces that have pride of place in a modern concert. In Lewis Rowell’s translation of a passage in the thirteenth-century *Saṅgītaratnākara*, a *vāḡḡeyakāra* (literally, “word singer”) is “one who composes both music and text.” This master composer is endowed with “a thorough knowledge of grammar, proficiency in lexicography, knowledge of prosody, proficiency in the use of figures of speech, comprehension of aesthetic delight (*rāsa*) as related to emotive states of being (*bhāva*), intelligent familiarity with local custom, knowledge of many languages, proficiency in the scientific theories of fine arts, expert knowledge of the three musical arts, a lovely tone quality, good knowledge of tempo, *tāla*, and *kalā*, discrimination of different intonations, a versatile genius, a beautiful musical rendering, acquaintance with regional (*deśi*) *rāgas*.” These characteristics still account, in the view of most Karnātak musicians and critics, for the lasting appeal of the songs bequeathed by the “Trinity” of South Indian music (Tyāgarāja, Shyāma Shāstri, and M. Dīkshitar) and their musical heirs. The intricacies underlying their compositions has also opened floodgates to individual artistic expression. Following the advice given in the lyrics of these *vāḡḡeyakāras*, musicians now dare to express themselves for the sake of artistic and spiritual fulfillment.

Our understanding of the music prior to the “Trinity” is quite limited, however, as these three were evidently the first composers who succeeded in passing on many of their compositions to posterity by way of oral transmission: “In India composers till the beginning of this century did not notate their compositions. In other words, no original scores are available. Songs have come down only in the oral tradition” (Ramanathan).

Rāga

The melodic and rhythmic theories of Karnātak music are referred to as *rāga* and *tāla*, respectively. Although Hindustani music has similar concepts, and both systems have their roots in the same ancient theories, several major differences remain, both in the realms of theory and practice. The most obvious difference concerns the theory that prescribes either the day or night for the performance of North Indian *rāgas*. South Indian musicians and theorists, generally observant of traditional customs (*sampradāya*), regard such restrictions as obsolete and counterproductive from an artistic point of view. The sole reminders of similar restrictions are certain *rāgas* originally associated with temple rituals and therefore performed at certain hours of the day. Conversely, certain moods, such as those associated with loneliness at night or the excitement of spring, are often evoked by specific *rāgas* in the Karnātak music composed for *Bharata Nātyam* dance and dance drama.

A musician is expected to portray the finer points of a *rāga* in a manner that discerning listeners (*rasika*) would recognize and relish. The “shape” of a *rāga* (*rāga rūpa*), traditionally regarded as a “personality” unlike any other, is largely defined by compositions. In the absence of detailed notation, most musicians rely on learning by hearing, particularly for the study of specimens belonging to the *gītam*, *varnam*, and *kṛiti* genres. These items provide the musical context for all the phrases included during the exposition (*ālāpana*) of a given *rāga*.

On similar lines, ornamentation (*gamaka*) depends on the melodic context of each note, either as part of an ascending or a descending series of notes, or within an oblique phrase. Auxiliary notes (*anusvāra*) provide the contours and “colors” characteristic of Karnātak melody, and color is indeed implied by the Sanskrit word *rāga* (from the root *ranj*, “to color,” or “to be attached to”). The rich texture achieved by the skillful and appropriate application of embellishments helps a musician to endow a melodic line with continuity and expressiveness, even in a slow tempo.

An estimated two hundred to three hundred South Indian *rāgas* (recognizable melodic entities) are currently performed, more or less regularly, during concerts and in

dance recitals. In theory, several thousand different *rāgas* could be formed by way of applying all the conceivable combinations of the basic seven notes (*sapta svāra*), the twelve semitonal variants (*svārasthāna*), the enharmonic variants assigned to four out of the five “variable” notes (*vikṛta svāra*), and numerous microtonal shades (the proverbial 22 *śrūtis*). On a more practical level, South Indian music is based on 72 scale types, from which 72 corresponding “parental” *rāgas* (*janaka rāga*) as well as their numerous “offspring” (*janya rāga*) are derived for the purpose of classification.

Tāla

The South Indian concept of *tāla* is based on a cyclic arrangement of units (*kriyā*, “gestures”), which helps all participants to coordinate the rhythmic flow (*laya*) of a concert in an appealing manner, either as part of a song or in any improvised concert item. Many distinct *tālas* and their innumerable variants enable Karnātak musicians to create an astonishing variety of intricate rhythmic figures and cross-rhythms.

Among the unique features of Karnātak rhythm are the different starting points (*eduppu* or *graha*), for the beginning of a song or theme, and the subdivisions (*nadai* or *gati*) of each “beat” within a given *tāla*, while maintaining the basic tempo (*kālapramānam*) throughout a concert item. Specialists in the rhythmic aspect (*laya*) of Karnātak music manage to increase or decrease the tension and density of rhythmic patterns with mathematical precision and at any given moment. Such flights of imagination may either be subjected to the rules of prosody, as in the case of items based on lyrics (e.g., *pallavi* or *kṛiti*), or may be meant only to heighten the aesthetic pleasure of listeners on the basis of abstract rhythmic patterns (*yati*) and pleasant combinations of sounds, as in the case of a drum solo.

The elaborate climax of a drum solo (*kōrvaī*) consists of carefully constructed sequences of complex patterns in which all the aforementioned concepts are translated into practice. Ideally, this process should manifest itself in a spontaneous and effortless manner, making listeners forget that a drum solo is nowadays rarely, if ever, performed without some amount of calculation.

Later Developments

Music and dance. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, prominent dance masters (*nattuvarar*) and the musicians belonging to their dance ensembles (*chinnamēlam*) have assimilated as well as enriched the concepts and playing techniques now associated with Karnātak “art” music: melodic expressiveness (*rāga bhāva*), aesthetic appeal (*rasa*), and rhythmical variety (*tāla*). As a

result, *bhāva* (bha), *rasa* (ra), and *tāla* (ta) are commonly said to be the very essence of the dance now called *Bharata Nāṭyam* (bha-ra-ta dance), a dance style that was still known as *sadir* in the early twentieth century.

Women as performers. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, a “respectable” musician was understood to be male: “Another tremendous step forward is the emergence of women as equals of men in this male-dominated field” (Semmangudi Srinivasa Iyer). As the rich legacy of “artful” songs (*kṛiti*) permeated the educated classes of South Indian society, many women from different social backgrounds could, for the first time in history, pursue successful musical careers without being stigmatized. The list of prominent female singers includes pioneers like “Vīnā” Dhanammāl (1867–1938), “Bangalore” Nāgaratnamāl (1878–1952), Sarasvati Bai (1894–1974), T. Brinda (1912–1996), M. S. Subbulakshmi (b. 1916), D. K. Pattammal (b. 1919), and M. L. Vasanthakumari (1928–1990). They acquired the skills and knowledge to develop individual styles (*bāni*) of their own, and thereby encouraged their own disciples and other educated women to perform in concerts and broadcasts and to produce recordings.

Vocal and instrumental music. With the emergence of an affluent and cultured urban class from the late nineteenth century onward, and especially following the foundation of societies (*sabhā*) for the promotion of musical excellence, solo and ensemble performances by instrumentalists have ceased to be regarded as inferior to a vocal recital. Interestingly, though, there still exists no instrumental repertoire as such; all musicians have learned their music through singing, and the *gāyākī*, or “vocal” type of expression, continues to be regarded as superior to any style that emphasizes the technical possibilities of an instrument. Even a *vīna* (long-necked lute) is meant to “sing,” and the human body has been referred to as *gātra vīnā*, the human counterpart of the wooden lute mentioned in ancient texts.

For at least four centuries, the tamboura (a long-necked lute serving as a drone) has been the main support and common denominator for most traditions of Karnātak music. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the humble bamboo flute (Tamil, *pullankuzhal*; Sanskrit, *vēnu*), which was introduced into concert music by Sharabha Shāstrigal before the turn of the twentieth century. As evidenced by numerous sculptures in South Indian temples, as well as its mention in ancient Tamil literature, the transverse flute had been a leading instrument in dance music for most of the last two millennia. Along with the violin, the flute has since acquired the status of a full-fledged instrument. Several other melody and rhythm instruments, including the saxophone, mandolin, and *ghatam*, have either been newly introduced or have

gained prestige. The prevalence of electronic amplification during concerts has also facilitated the formation of ensembles with instruments that would have been incompatible in the past.

The inclusion of at least one extensive drum solo (*tani* or *tani āvartanam*) is a conspicuous feature of contemporary Karnātak music. Palghat Mani Iyer (1913–1981), an exponent of the *mridangam* (double-faced drum), became a legend in his own lifetime as the musician who elevated the perfunctory *tani* to a highlight of all the concerts in which he participated. Most modern percussionists seek to emulate his precision, virtuosity, and imaginative treatment of any given *tāla*; his sense of self-restraint, so conducive to the aesthetic balance of a concert, is much harder to come by.

The future. Many South Indian performers are now in a position to interact with appreciative fellow musicians, composers, and audiences all over the world. In spite of the alarm periodically raised by experts and critics, the proven resilience of authentic Karnātak music, combined with a profound regard for classical standards (*sampradāya*) on the part of many young musicians, will ensure its survival.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Dikshitar, Muttusvāmi; Rāga; Shyāma Shāstri; Tāla; Tyāgarāja**

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MUSLIM LAW AND JUDICIAL REFORM Family law, also called personal or customary law in contexts of legal pluralism, governs features of family life such as marriage, separation, divorce, the consequences of divorce (such as alimony and property division), maintenance for children and other dependents, inheritance, adoption, and guardianship. Distinct family laws govern most of

India's major religious groups—Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, and Jews—as well as many so-called tribal groups. (Hindu law governs Sikhs, Jains, and Parsis.) Muslim leaders pressed for the retention of legal pluralism far more than did the leaders of other religious groups soon after Indian independence, especially during the debates of the Constituent Assembly. Concerns about the recognition of distinct religious identity were most strongly felt among Muslims in the aftermath of the formation of Pakistan, which was associated with considerable collective violence, and which substantially reduced the Muslim share in India's population, middle classes, and political elite. Some leaders of the Congress Party gave these concerns of Muslims considerable weight, as they had suggested through the 1940s that Muslim law would continue to govern Muslims in family matters, in return for the support of some Muslim religious elites. As demands for the retention of Muslim law crucially influenced the choice to retain legal pluralism, public debate about Indian family law gives considerable attention to Muslim law.

While the legislature introduced major changes in Hindu law in the 1950s, major policy makers claimed that they were leaving changes in the laws of the religious minorities to the initiative of unspecified representatives of these groups, who in practice were typically conservative religious and political elites. The conservatism of such elites made major changes in these laws seem unlikely. Nevertheless, some changes took place in Muslim law and in India's other family laws that potentially gave women greater rights, particularly over the last generation. The judiciary was the main agent of change, although legislatures and some religious leaders and religious institutions played secondary roles. Both formal courts and community courts adjudicate matrimonial disputes in India. The changes the judiciary introduced are relevant to adjudication in the formal courts. Change was slower in Muslim community courts, which included prayer groups (*jamaats*), popularly recognized judges (*qazis*), and courts established by Muslim religious institutions (*dar-ul quzats*).

Women's Rights

The limited codification of Muslim law gave the judiciary considerable autonomy in interpreting Muslim law. Of the three acts pertaining to Muslim law in India, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act governed the grounds on which Muslim women could get judicially mediated divorce since its passage in 1939, and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act primarily governed the rights of Muslim women to postdivorce maintenance after it was passed in 1986. The other act, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937, stated that the Shari'a would apply to Muslims in

family matters without specifying the rules it recognized, although the “Islamic laws” applied in different regions of the world vary considerably. This act’s silences left much of the content of India’s Muslim law to the judiciary’s discretion.

Indian legislatures gave the content and implementation of Muslim law little attention after independence. Reflecting this, not one of the 182 official Law Commissions of the post-colonial period assessed the functioning of Muslim law or considered possible changes in Muslim law. Only a few legislative changes were introduced in Muslim law after independence: the passage of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, which is applicable throughout India, and amendments to the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act in certain states, which made Muslim law rather than local custom applicable to succession to agricultural land. The amendments of the Shariat Application Act gave daughters the right to half the shares of sons in their parents’ agricultural land (along with the half share they already had since 1937 in other forms of parental property), in contrast with most of the local customs, which gave daughters no share whatsoever in agricultural land. Legislative restraint was meant to give Muslim leaders the primary role in determining the future of Muslim law, but in effect gave the judiciary that much more control over shaping Muslim law.

Despite the autonomy it enjoyed, the Indian judiciary largely followed the precedents of the colonial period in Muslim law adjudication through the first post-colonial generation. Muslim law in the colonial courts was based largely on later commentaries and compendia of Hanafi law, the legal tradition taken to apply to the majority of South Asian Muslims, although local custom rather than earlier Islamic jurisprudential traditions determined many features of adjudication. Judges interpreted the provisions of Hanafi law in light of British common law traditions, and did not recognize some laws that they considered incompatible with “justice, equity and good conscience” (e.g., the recognition of slavery, the death penalty for adultery and apostasy), a standard they used in a rather unsystematic way. They rarely referred directly to Islam’s founding texts, the Qur’an, the Hadis (the reputed sayings of the prophet Muhammad), and the Sunna (accounts of the Prophet’s life). Colonial Indian Muslim law assumed a definite shape, somewhat resistant to change, from the late nineteenth century. It had rather conservative implications for gender relations, particularly in comparison with family law in countries that saw the extensive reform of Muslim law through the 1960s and 1970s, such as Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and Malaysia. For instance, Muslim men were allowed to have up to four wives, unilateral and irrevocable male

divorce was recognized, and Muslim men were obliged to support their ex-wives only for three months after the pronouncement of divorce in India. Some features of Indian Muslim law were changed through infrequent legislation, mainly in the 1930s and 1940s, and judicial reform, especially from the 1970s.

Deepening of Democracy

The courts introduced only one major change in Muslim law in the first post-colonial generation: taking bigamy to create a presumption of cruelty toward a wife claiming divorce in the *Itwari v. Asghari* case of 1960, making the wife eligible for divorce on the ground of cruelty, although the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act did not recognize bigamy as a ground on which women could claim divorce. Some changes urged the judiciary toward greater activism, beginning in the 1970s, in many areas of law, including family law and Muslim law. Sections of the legal elite felt pressed to enable the deepening of democracy after the experience of the “National Emergency,” when democratic institutions were suspended for eighteen months in the mid-1970s. This led to the growth of public interest litigation, to bring the attention of the judiciary to various concerns of underprivileged groups. Concerns about different forms of gender inequality were more prominently voiced in public debate, especially because the women’s movement grew in strength and became more autonomous of political parties through this period. These concerns influenced the legal elite more than they did the political elite. Activist lawyers periodically contested the unequal provisions for the genders and the different laws governing the relevant religious and other cultural groups in family law.

While policy makers did not respond to all pressures to reduce gender inequality, ongoing political and social changes led more of them to prioritize state intervention to address some of the inequalities in family law and matrimonial life. Judges in particular became more willing to depart from precedent to provide women protection in matrimonial cases. Their activism was tempered by two concerns: the need to recognize cultural pluralism and the need for judicial restraint. However, a critical awareness grew among both judges and lawyers of the directions of family law reform elsewhere, especially of reforms in Muslim law that often involved the appropriation of earlier Islamic texts and traditions that recognized more rights for women. This context made more judges willing to initiate reform within the framework of legal pluralism by departing from precedent and by amending particular statutes. Judges justified reform through somewhat novel interpretations of statutory law and group normative tradition, as well as with reference to the fundamental rights recognized in the Indian constitution to life, liberty, dignity, and equality.

The two main reforms the judiciary introduced in Muslim law were in alimony rights and the conditions under which unilateral male divorce would be recognized. Until the 1970s, the courts restricted the obligation of Muslim men to maintain their ex-wives to the three-month *iddat* period after divorce is initially pronounced, a period during which the ex-wife is expected to remain in seclusion, leaving it up to the ex-wife's successors or local *wakf* boards (Muslim social service institutions funded largely through private donations) to provide for her if she is indigent. They did so although verses of the Qur'an suggest that the man provide for his ex-wife's future, or require such provision from the ex-husband according to some interpretations. The parliament amended Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973 so that a man's obligation to support a wife he deserted or from whom he is judicially separated was extended to ex-wives. The requirement of permanent alimony was meant to apply to all religious groups, but Section 127(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code deducted any amount the ex-husband may have given his ex-wife following the customary or personal law governing the couple from the payment due from the husband. Most courts resolved this ambiguity in favor of women from 1973 to 1985, taking the legislative amendment of 1973 to apply to all Indians and referring for justification to a verse of the Qur'an that suggests the ex-husband provide for his ex-wife's future. A Constitution Bench of the apex court (the Supreme Court) did so in the *Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum* case of 1985, sparking intense conservative Muslim opposition, led by the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, the main organization demanding adherence to conservative precedent in Indian Muslim law.

The Indian Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986 to contain conservative Muslim mobilization, but some of the act's provisions did not clearly fit the conservative position that the obligation of Muslim husbands to provide for their ex-wives be limited to a three-month period. While Section 3 restricted the husband's maintenance obligations to the *iddat* period, Sections 3(1)(a) and 4 called for the husband to pay for his ex-wife's "fair and reasonable provision" (perhaps in addition to maintenance) for an unspecified length of time "within the *iddat* period." The courts resolved the resulting ambiguity about the period for which ex-husbands needed to provide alimony by decreeing alimony until the woman's remarriage or death in the majority of cases between 1986 and 2001, until the Supreme Court made this interpretation binding on all courts in the *Danial Latifi v. Union of India* case in 2001.

Until 1978 the courts recognized men's unilateral divorce of their wives in a single sitting through the

so-called triple *talaq*, more formally called the *talaq-ul ba'in* (irrevocable divorce), through the oral or written statement "*talaq, talaq, talaq*" ("I divorce you," repeated thrice). They did so although there were many grounds on which this interpretation of Islamic law could be opposed: such pronouncements of unilateral divorce in one sitting were deemed revocable in the early Islamic community; some schools of Islamic law did not ever consider such divorces valid (including the Shafi'i, Ithna Ashari, Musta'lian Isma'ili, and Ahl-e-Hadith schools, whose adherents account for a significant minority of India's Muslim population); and all schools of Islamic law considered other forms of divorce preferable, with the claim that such a method of divorce is "good in law, though bad in theology." Some courts ruled the triple *talaq* revocable from 1978 onward, and established two conditions for the validity of unilateral male divorce, based on verses of the Qur'an: the husband providing a reasonable cause, and spousal reconciliation being attempted through the mediation of relatives of both spouses. The Supreme Court made this the law binding on the lower courts in a case of 2002 (*Shamim Ara v. State of Uttar Pradesh*).

The judicial reform of Muslim alimony and divorce law effected partial convergence with Hindu law, the law governing about 78 percent of India's population. In the reform of both alimony and divorce law, the courts introduced only those changes that they felt could find justification in Islamic normative tradition, and resisted the efforts of activist lawyers to systematically remove the gender inequalities in family law with reference to the constitutional rights to life, liberty, dignity, and equality. For instance, they did not deem Muslim law irrelevant to divorce or alimony among Muslims, grant Muslim women rights to either unilaterally pronounce divorce or to shares in matrimonial property upon divorce, or give sons and daughters equal inheritance rights. The restrained nature of judicial reform contained conservative Muslim opposition, and so made the subsequent legislative overturning of these reforms unlikely. It suggests that the judiciary is unlikely to use the Indian constitution's egalitarian principles to systematically address the gender inequalities in Muslim law and in the other family laws.

The recent judicial reforms of Muslim law encouraged and drew indirect support from ongoing changes in matrimonial practices among Indian Muslims. Partly in response to these reforms, some conservative Muslim elites began attempts to reduce the incidence of the triple *talaq* and polygamy, to include in marriage contracts rights for women to initiate divorce and to get a substantial dower from their ex-husbands upon divorce, and to get community courts to recognize these rights.

As community courts consider the majority of Muslim matrimonial disputes, the future of Muslim law in India depends crucially on patterns of adjudication in these courts, over which all the branches of government exercise only limited influence.

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See also **Family Law and Cultural Pluralism; Muslims**

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MUSLIM LEAGUE. See **All-India Muslim League.**

MUSLIMS There has been an ongoing controversy for many decades regarding the ways in which Islam entered Indian civilization and culture. This controversy has been largely connected to varying political characterizations of Indian Islam—its opponents seeing it as a fundamentally “foreign” imposition and “alien” presence in the subcontinent, and its advocates and believers viewing it as a brilliant and positive contribution to the heritage of Indian civilization. Historically, Islam came to be a religious, cultural, and political force in India in three different ways: through trade, conquest, and conversion. Its effects on Indian civilization then cannot be fairly seen from any one-dimensional perspective, but have from the beginning been multifaceted, diverse, and complex.


The Arrival of Islam in the South

It is generally believed that Islam first spread in South India with Arab traders passing through what is now Malabar. Commercial contacts were present between regions of the Arabian Peninsula and several western Indian coastal towns, which were conduits to centers of trade within southern India. Thus it is known that in the Malabar region (today part of Kerala) the presence of Arabs was quite common in pre-Islamic times. As Islam emerged in Arabia, these traders began to engage not only in trading goods but also in sharing their new faith with the people they encountered during their travels.



Namaz (Friday Prayers) at the Taj Mahal Mosque. In recent years, tensions between Muslims and Hindu nationalists have again mounted, with violence toward Muslims on the upswing. Many fear that this will soon result in a more militant brand of Islam in India. MARYAM RESHI / FOTOMEDIA.

According to most accounts, Islam received a warm welcome in the southern regions of India. Muslim traders constituted an important link to prosperous intercontinental trade that benefited local Indian merchants and consumers alike. In addition, early Muslim settlers in southern India were seasoned traders who were cognizant of their responsibilities and for the most part did not harbor any political ambitions. As they built mosques and community institutions, their religion, Islam, became known and attracted converts. As a different ethnic group, they were seen as having a distinct caste status, equivalent to the Hindu high caste, and thus were able to associate with Hindu nobles and other upper caste people of influence. They were also able to intermarry, which gave these non-Hindus greater status among the locals. The intermarriage between Arabs and South Indians and the raising of children in such marriages as distinctly Muslim in the Indian environment created a



fusion of cultures and traditions at various levels. Since Arabic was fast becoming the dominant language of culture, scholarship, and commerce, these indigenous Muslims consciously retained their Arab heritage and used

their Arabic language skills as a bridge between natives and Arabs in the pursuit of commercial gains. The Arabs and the native Indian rulers and traders benefited by complementing each other; the Arabs benefited from the

trade of Indian goods, and the Indians learned the art of seafaring from the Arabs. Thus several examples of such mutual exchange and cooperation can be found during this period. Some are even found in legends and folklore.

Conquest and Alliance in the Northwest

In the northwestern region of the subcontinent, Islam arrived through various forms of conquest. In 711 when Muhammad bin Qasim arrived in Sind, he was not greeted with the same hospitality as the Arabs in the south. The reasons for the invasion of Sind by Qasim, who later became governor of the region in the Umayyad caliphate of Damascus, were—from the historical records we possess—retaliations for having his trading caravans attacked by local “bandits.”

Muhammad bin Qasim made alliances in the region and declared Hindus (Brahmans) and Buddhists as *dhimmis* (protected groups). They were allowed to practice their religion and maintain their religious institutions under Muslim rule in exchange for their services, which included the collection of revenues from subjects of the state. Religiously speaking, considering Hindus and Buddhists as *dhimmis* was a remarkably “liberal” step, as they are not mentioned in the Qur’an or in the sayings of the Prophet as being such. This was an act of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) on the part of Qasim, who was supported in his judgment by the ulama (Islamic religious scholars) of the Umayyad court, who had previously declared the Zoroastrians of Persia as deserving of *dhimmi* status.

The first major sultanate to emerge in North India was the Ghaznavid (997–1175), which marked the beginning of the rule of the “slave kings,” so called because prior to their rule, they served as trained and compensated soldiers within the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258), guarding its outposts in the regions of Afghanistan and northwestern India. The most famous figure from this dynasty is Mahmud of Ghazni (971–1030), reputed to have championed temple destruction in many regions of northern and western India. He plundered the wealth from many of the famous temples, including the Somnath, and used this wealth to strengthen his hold on power. Mahmud staged more than a dozen invasions of Sind over a period of approximately fifteen years, though he was clearly less interested in establishing an outpost of the Abbasid empire in North India than he was in buttressing the wealth of his own empire and its center in Ghazni.

In the employ of Mahmud of Ghazni worked one of the most famous medieval scholars, Abu Rayhan al-Biruni (973–1048), the first to study and write extensively on Indian religions and intellectual traditions. His work on India, *Kitab al-Hind*, was a compendium of India’s religious and philosophical traditions. Al-Biruni, though

under Mahmud’s patronage, was critical of the latter’s destruction of the Hindu temple in Somnath.

Historically, growth in the numbers of practicing Muslims in India has been a subject of controversy. Muslim rulers were not interested in converting the masses to Islam as much as they desired to maintain political and economic control over their territories.

From the ninth through the twelfth centuries, the Muslim populace expanded due to multiple factors. Some emigrated from other Muslim lands in North Africa and Arabia through Central Asia and Afghanistan. There were also conversions to Islam from various Hindu castes and subcastes. The single largest factor in conversions seems to have been an egalitarian form of Islam displayed by the Sufis and others who seemed open to a wide variety of spiritual practices. Sufis were apolitical and sometimes antiestablishment. They were often critical of the institutional religious and political hierarchy; hence they were closer to the masses than to the Muslim elite. They established *khanqahs* (community centers) for spiritual guidance, which were open to all.

There were other factors that led to the growth of Muslim communities in India, notably political patronage by the Muslim rulers, which attracted artisans, scholars, landed gentry, and other high caste Hindus. Some historians in recent times have argued that there were also forcible mass conversions to Islam, but a general consensus of scholars opposes this view. There are several examples of the destruction of Hindu temples at the hands of some rulers, but these were exceptions to the norm. Rulers were often interested in increasing their political capital, and where it suited them they destroyed temples, while in other places they granted land and other resources for temple building. Indeed, indigenous Hindu groups were often militarily aligned with both centralizing and anticentralizing forces during the six successive dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate (1192–1526).

The Sultanate Period (1192–1526)

As Ghaznavid power declined, it gave way to the reign of other “slave kings,” which included the dynastic succession of the Ghorids (1192–1290), the Khaljis (1290–1320), and the Tughluqs (1320–1398), culminating in the Lodi (1451–1526) dynasty. The Sultanate period, which lasted from the late twelfth to the early sixteenth centuries, began with the invasion of India by Muiz al-Din Ghorī, who was of Turkish origin. Unlike Mahmud of Ghazni, who came to India simply to plunder and loot, Ghorī and his descendants aimed to establish political control which manifested itself as the Delhi Sultanate.

The sultanates created a relatively stable political structure during this period, while the ultimate political

authority rested with the Turkic sultans who, at least nominally, displayed Islam as their religious as well as political ideology. Among the populace, the religion of Islam meant something different. It was not synonymous with power or political dominance, and mostly grew among the poor. In fact, in the multifaceted social structure that developed in the midst of this complex period, it was generally acknowledged within the Muslim populace that the ulama held a religious authority that could not be subordinated or abrogated by the sultan, be he a local or imperial sultan. Instead, sultans generally attempted to legitimize their rule by acknowledging the authority of local ulama and particularly of Sufi saints.

It should be noted that during this period there was a creative cultural melding of traditions, which resulted in systems of military cooperation strong enough to head off the powerful Mongol advance, agrarian management systems that would survive well into the British colonial period, and an artistic and architectural synthesis so compelling that its creations still draw tourists to India today. Through the medieval period, Muslim intellectuals, Sufis, artisans, and travelers in general were attracted to South Asia from all parts of the Muslim world. This resulted in an administrative system resembling Islamic structures developed in the Muslim caliphates of Iraq and Syria.

The role of the Sufis was central to the growth of Islam, as they were generous in establishing their *khanqahs*. These centers also served as places for devotional and therapeutic needs. Sufis and religious leaders filled the need for education as well as spiritual fulfillment.

As the Delhi Sultanate became weak at the center, it resulted in the emergence of regional dynasties—in Bengal in the east and Gujarat in the west. The Bahmani kingdom in the south became independent of the Sultanate in 1347 and lasted for almost two hundred years before being split up into four smaller kingdoms. Its rulers, patrons of Sufi saints, also supported a variety of forms of Indo-Islamic art and the spread of Islamic tradition in South India.

In this regional arrangement of political power, Muslim culture developed in collaboration with local linguistic and social norms. This contributed to the increasing diversity of Islamic societies, cultures, and traditions. Muslim rulers and nobles formed alliances based on political and economic interests that went beyond religious and sectarian (Shi'a-Sunni) affiliation. Hindu kings fought with Turkish rulers, Muslim rebels collaborated with Hindus to secede from the Sultanate's center, and so on.

The Mughal Empire (1526–1858)

The Mughals were heirs to the earlier Muslim dynasties that were sustained by their concentration of power

within the Turkic ruling classes. By contrast, the Mughal empire thrived through power-sharing practice with Hindus and other Muslim elites. The Mughal rulers often had alliances that cut across religious and ethnic divides. The two major concentrations of power at the dawn of the Mughal period in India were with the Lodhi dynasty and the Rajputs.

As the Sultanate of Ibrahim Lodi became divided into many regional kingdoms, it was successfully invaded by Zahir al-Din Babur (1483–1530), who himself hailed from the central Asian region of Ferghana. There he laid the foundations for what became the most powerful and extensive Muslim empire in India. Babur also had to defeat the Hindu Rajput kingdom before consolidating his power. Babur's son Humayun ruled India from 1530 to 1556, except for a period of fifteen years (1540–1555), and eventually recaptured the throne by absorbing many regional kingdoms in the fold of the empire. He died a year later, in 1556, leaving behind a very young Akbar in charge.

Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar (r. 1556–1605) has been credited for laying the foundations for the empire by initiating a number of innovations, such as a centralized political administration. His fiscal reforms were also effective. Akbar had the acumen to draw on his knowledge of both Persian and Turkic administrative practices on the one hand and those of the Rajputs and Indian Muslim dynastic rulers on the other. He was successfully able to fuse elements from these systems to construct his own administrative structure, which became the sustaining factor of the empire and continued to be implemented during the reigns of all the great Mughals until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Under Akbar, the Mughal empire continued to expand. This was possible because of alliances through marriage and royal patronage with other powers such as the Rajputs. Akbar was succeeded by his son, Jahangir (r. 1605–1627), and his grandson, Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658).

The political expansion of the empire continued during the reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707). With a centralized power structure and an elaborate system of promotion of the nobles, the Mughals were successful in politically uniting most of the Indian subcontinent. But the wars of succession weakened the empire after Aurangzeb and eventually led to the British political takeover of parts of the empire. Rival Muslim rulers twice sacked Delhi, the seat of Mughal power, first in 1739 by Nadir Shah of Persia and again in 1761 by the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali. In 1757 the British East India Company defeated the Muslim armies at Plassey, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Delhi, too, was effectively under the control of the British, although a figurehead Mughal emperor remained on the throne until after the "Mutiny" of 1857.

British Rule in India (1757–1947)

After the 1857 mutiny (also known as the “Sepoy rebellion”) was crushed and Delhi was under the control of the British, the East India Company was no longer in charge, and the rule was administered directly by the British Crown.

Muslim power had been reduced to a few regions. Despite attempts to assert its legitimacy, Muslim rule had basically come to an end, and the British were firmly established throughout most of the Indian subcontinent. From their humble beginnings in the early eighteenth century as a trading company in Bengal, to a full-fledged empire with millions of Indian subjects, the British succeeded the Timurid Muslim (Mughal) power, which had constructed a unique cultural landscape in its three-hundred-year presence in India.

There were several attempts to reverse the course of British expansion during the three centuries of British presence in India. The Muslim loss of power meant that as a political minority they would stand to lose the most under non-Muslim rule. It was generally believed that Muslim rule was essential to the implementation of Shari‘a (Islamic law), which governs all aspects of Muslim life. Without Shari‘a Muslims would not be able to fully practice their faith.

There were calls for jihad, or armed resistance against the British, such as the one made by the Muslim scholar Sayyid Ahmad Bareli (1786–1831). He argued that because of the loss of Muslim power, India was no longer *dar al-Islam* (house or land of Islam). India had fallen into opposite category—*dar al-harb* (territory open to war)—and thus it became incumbent for Muslims to wage war against the British establishment. Sayyid Ahmad led many of his followers into the movement and died in 1831 while fighting the Sikhs in the northwestern India. He is widely regarded as a *shahid* (martyr).

Muslim Modernist Reformers (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries)

Many Muslim scholars, Sufis, and political elite challenged the authority of the British on religious grounds. There were some, however, who chose the path of cooperation with the British. One such scholar, who later founded the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875 (later renamed Aligarh Muslim University), was Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898). Khan was primarily concerned with the welfare of Muslims in light of what he saw as the intellectual and scientific advancements made by the British. He wanted Muslims to learn from the British in order to improve their educational and social status. While Khan promoted British-style educational

curriculum and called for Muslim women’s education, other ulama (Muslim religious scholars) established the Dar-ul ‘Ulum at Deoband, which became the center of Islamic learning and continues to enjoy an international reputation as such.

Sayyid Ahmed Khan inspired other reformers. Sayyid Ameer Ali (1849–1928) was a Western-educated Shi‘a scholar whose major contribution was his work on Islam for a Western audience. Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) was also trained and educated in the West and steeped in its philosophical tradition. Iqbal, the poet and the philosopher, inspired some Muslims to see in his thought an argument for a separate Muslim homeland, later translated into a demand for Pakistan in the mid-1940s.

Independence from the British in 1947

The idea of a Muslim homeland surfaced as the anti-British nationalist movement was about to witness the realization of its main objective, freedom from the British. The Indian National Congress (the Congress Party), which was established in 1885 as a political organization for and by the Indian elite, increasingly began to challenge the legitimacy of the British in India. In the early twentieth century, the Congress became the principal agency representing the aspirations of millions of Indians seeking to rid India of the British Raj. It coexisted and sometimes cooperated with other nationalist and religious movements, such as the All-India Muslim League (established in 1906), which worked toward similar objectives.

Muslims and Hindus both participated in the Congress’s efforts to establish what they called “self-rule.” Even though the British had tried and, to some extent, succeeded in creating separate communal identities for Hindus and Muslims, the two communities resisted such compartmentalization based solely on religious differences. Most Muslims and Hindus shared common cultural and ethnic backgrounds, their linguistic and social commonalities more significant than their religious differences. But the British, based on the Orientalist constructions of the two communities as two different peoples, continued their policy of treating them as such. Politically, this worked in favor of the British; by pitting one group against the other, they were able to continue their political and economic subjugation of India. Hindu-Muslim unity was a major threat to the existence of British power.

The key players in the Congress Party, Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1947), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), and Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), worked tirelessly to deconstruct the idea of Hindu and Muslim separateness. Other Muslims, such as the prominent leader of the

Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), argued that Muslims in free India would not be able to receive just treatment as a minority and that their interests would not be protected. He and some others demanded special autonomous powers for the Muslim-majority regions as part of a federal system once India became free. The alternate solution was to partition India into two separate states. The new state, Pakistan, would be fashioned out of the territories in the northwest and the eastern half of Bengal (the latter was to become independent from Pakistan in 1971 as the separate nation of Bangladesh). Neither proposal was acceptable to the leaders of the Congress Party.

Among the Muslims who opposed the idea of partition were two influential community leaders, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988) and Abul Kalam Azad. Ghaffar Khan was an admirer and follower of Gandhi who believed in and implemented the latter's principle of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) by forming what he called the Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of God) movement, in which members vowed to serve God by serving others, while utilizing nonviolence as their only weapon. He worked among his ethnic community of Pathans in the North-West Frontier province and was quite successful in mobilizing his people to engage in nonviolent social activism against British rule.

Azad, an erudite scholar of Islam and a colleague and admirer of Gandhi, was particularly distressed by the idea of a separate Muslim homeland causing a permanent rift between Hindus and Muslims. Unlike some other Muslim elite who dreamed of restoring Muslim rule in India, Azad focused on possible models in which Hindus and Muslims would be able to share power in a democratically governed India. Azad was a nationalist and a committed anti-British activist.

The early 1920s brought Indians of all stripes and vocations closer together. Even Muslim religious organizations such as the Jami'at 'Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian Islamic Scholars) supported the nationalist struggle against the British and were opposed to partition. In fact, a vast majority of Muslims were not enthusiastic about the "two-nation" idea because of sheer practical concerns. Muslims were spread all over India and lived side by side with Hindus. The partition, as it was imagined in the minds of the handful of Muslim elite, was neither possible nor desirable.

Another major Muslim institution that came into being during this time, with the support of Gandhi and other nationalists, was the Jamia Millia Islamia (Muslim Nationalist University). Established in 1920 at Aligarh (later moved to New Delhi in 1925), it began as a reaction to the then famous Aligarh Muslim University,

which had been founded on the principle of cooperation with the British and remained to some extent oriented toward British intellectual traditions. Many nationalist and secular-minded Muslims later became associated with the Jamia, and others emerged from its ranks as the institution developed into a full-fledged university in a democratic republic of India.

The Partition

The movement for Pakistan based its rationale on religious and cultural notions of self-preservation. Its proponents argued that Muslims must preserve their culture and religious way of life by implementing the Shari'a. This would not be possible in a free India where Muslims, being a minority, would not have the power to ensure governance according to Islamic law. The main thrust of this movement was a desire to return India to Muslim rule, albeit with a twist of religious flavor. This was a classical Islamist proposition. Maulana Abu'l 'Ala Maududi (1903–1979), the founder of the religious organization Jama'at-i Islami (Islamic party, founded in 1941), who was at first against the partition of India, became the chief proponent of the idea of implementing Islamic law in a newly created Pakistan. There were others who had similar objectives on the grounds that Muslim cultural and economic interests would not be met in a Hindu-majority India. Jinnah, a secularist leader of the Muslim League, was in the forefront of this struggle. Earlier in the Congress's struggle for independence, he had worked with Gandhi, but toward the mid-1930s he parted ways and worked in competition with and against the Congress Party.

Eager to remove themselves from the subcontinent, the British, under the pretext of being concerned for minority rights in a Hindu-majority India, seemed willing to accept the Muslim League's proposal of a "two-nation" solution. Gandhi, Azad, and other leaders of the Congress Party were against the division of the country, but they reluctantly accepted it; the alternate solution, having a federal system with greater autonomy for the Muslim provinces, drew even more severe objections from the members of the Congress, including Nehru, who advocated a centralized power structure. Thus on 14 August 1947, the dominion of Pakistan was created and consisted of two noncontiguous territories, the northwestern region as well as the eastern half of Bengal. Jinnah became the new nation's first governor-general and president of its legislative assembly. However, he did not live long enough to see the struggle that ensued between Islamic and secular forces, each vying to move Pakistan toward their respective visions of a Muslim homeland. Hours later, just past midnight on the 15th, India was declared independent, dividing the Muslims of British

India into two roughly equal halves. Nehru became the first prime minister of independent India.

While celebrations for independence were underway, a tragedy of massive proportions unfolded. Thousands of Hindus and Sikhs had to leave their belongings and migrate from what had become Pakistan, the west Punjab, and Sind, while Muslims from various parts of India migrated toward Pakistan and eastern Bengal. The partition of India was a major tragedy for Indians in general. Members of the same family found themselves at opposite sides of the great political divide, afraid at times to even communicate with each other lest they become suspected of compromising their loyalty to the state in which they resided.

Indian Muslims since Independence

The partition caused a serious blow to Indian Muslims. Even though India became a secular and not a Hindu state, the blame for the division of the country (at least unofficially) was placed squarely on Muslims. Since independence, Muslims as a minority have experienced large-scale violent campaigns launched against them. Known as communal riots, many of these are deemed to be planned and well-organized “pogroms.” The net result of the violence has been that, over fifty years after independence, there is little mutual trust between members of the two communities.

The recent rise of Hindu militant nationalist groups has once again raised the issue of Muslims’ loyalty to India in light of their erroneous reading of Indian history. Since the reasons given for the partition were religious and communal, Muslims, as a religious community distinct from Hindus, were seen as misplaced and unwelcome in independent India. They suffered the most politically, by not being part of the Pakistan movement, but also in social, economic, and psychological terms. The wounds of the partition incurred by many Muslim families on both sides of the border took three decades to heal, since they found themselves divided physically as well as psychologically.

Hindu-Muslim riots, or what many have recognized as pogroms against Muslims, have become increasingly organized and coordinated over the years. Before the 1990s they were more sporadic, and while highly organized, the element of local initiative was crucial. But, during the height of the Babri Mosque controversy, the organized efforts to destroy and uproot Muslim communities received far greater national-level support from right-wing resources than was imagined before. The act of destruction of the historic mosque in Ayodhya was carried out locally, but it was planned, supported, and funded by the vast network of Hindu nationalist elements

throughout India. It was a tragedy of international proportions, one that shook the secular foundations of the democratic Constitution of India. Even the central government was unsuccessful in preventing the destruction because, as Paul Brass in *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India* rightly observes, anti-minority violence is coordinated in the sense that most of the time the police forces are found to be prejudiced against Muslims; therefore, despite its best intentions, the government is unable to act because this essential arm of the law becomes paralyzed.

Muslims in the Twenty-first Century

Even though the notion of “Indian Muslims” may appear somewhat reasonable given the unifying nature of the fundamentals of Islam, it is, in fact, a construction like its counterpart, “the Hindus.” Muslims are a very dissimilar group with respect to their religious practices, ideological affiliations, and social, cultural, and political preferences. Such construction of identity is also problematic in dealing with issues of gender justice. The Muslim religio-cultural discourse tends to define women as well as their roles in homogenous terms, disallowing full realization of their potential. During Muslim rule between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries, however, Muslim women made significant contributions as poets, authors, mystics, and teachers. Princess Jahanara (1614–1681), the eldest daughter of Shah Jahan, was one such famous intellectual and mystic. Women were not completely absent from public life either; the Sultanate period had its first queen in Razia Sultana (r. 1236–1240). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the throne of Bhopal was occupied by women rulers; the last to be named was Abida Sultaan (d. 2002) who ruled the state from 1935 to 1949.

Within Muslim communities, Muslim women are among the most disadvantaged. Women’s educational rights are only recently being recognized, while they remain politically marginalized for cultural and economic reasons. Despite these challenges, Muslim women have made and continue to make significant advances in promoting female education and in removing barriers preventing their economic independence.

Even though Muslims are a diverse people, both the right-wing Hindus and the politically motivated Muslim leaders continue to insist on identifying Muslims as a monolith block of people with one agenda, one culture, and one religion. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, as recent studies (by Peter van der Veer and Cynthia Talbot) have shown, individual identities were understood in flexible terms in the past, and they were not compartmentalized in a single characteristic form, such as Muslim, Hindu, or Christian. Rather they were

perceived in terms of geography, culture, state, profession, and language. Thus in medieval India, one could not simply be identified as Muslim without also being recognized as, for example, a Bengali, an easterner, a trader, a speaker of Bengali, and so forth.

In the post-Babri Mosque era, steps have been taken in building bridges between Hindus and Muslims and highlighting their shared history and common objectives in a democratic India. Several Muslim leaders, such as Wahiduddin Khan (b. 1925) and Asghar Ali Engineer (b. 1939), have made significant intellectual and social contributions through their writings, dialogue, and personal examples.

The legacies of Islam in India are, despite the minority framework imposed during the colonial period, inextricably intertwined with the legacies of Indian society as a whole, and both of these continue to unfold in the present. In the entire millennium of its presence in India, from architecture to music, from language to community belonging, from history writing to history making, Muslims have joined with Hindus and other groups in constructing the edifice of a great civilization. It lies to Indians of the twenty-first century to find paths through their communal frameworks and to continue to build upon this edifice.

Irfan A. Omar

See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; Ayodhya; Babur; British Crown Raj; Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Humayun; Iqbal, Muhammad; Islam; Jahangir; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement; Shah Jahan

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MUTUAL FUNDS, ROLE OF The foundation for the mutual fund industry in India was laid in 1963 with the passage of the Unit Trust of India (UTI) Act. The act entrusted the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with the task of setting up an institution that could facilitate the mobilization of resources from investors across the country. The UTI then floated its maiden open-ended fund in 1964, Unit-Scheme 1964, popularly known as "US-64"; the UTI Act had provided for an initial capital of 50 million rupees to be invested in this first plan. Several insurance companies, finance institutions, and banks, including the RBI, contributed to this initial corpus.

The initial years of the UTI Act laid down the milestones of policies, standards of conduct and practices, and processes of management. The Board of Trustees initially decided to offer the sale of units at a nominal value of 10 rupees each at par for the entire month of July 1964, attracting of 175 million rupees from 125,000 investors. US-64 underwent many changes, with added features, including a reinvestment plan, under which the unit holders automatically reinvested dividend earnings, and a children's gift plan.

During the initial years of development, from 1964 to 1987, UTI was the lone mutual fund, managing five open-ended funds. The second phase started in 1987 with the arrival of new mutual funds, sponsored by nationalized banks and other public sector financial institutions. The State Bank of India (SBI) and Canara Bank set up an SBI Mutual Fund (SBI MF) and Canbank Mutual Fund (Canbank MF), respectively, in 1987. Subsequently, other public sector banks and insurance companies joined the race by the end of 1990. With the beginning of economic liberalization, the financial sector industry also witnessed liberalization, with new players,

new regulations, and a new structure. In 1993 the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the capital market regulator, for the first time issued mutual fund regulations, which permitted entry to private sector mutual funds.

The UTI Act of 1963 was repealed in February 2003, and consequently UTI bifurcated into two distinct organizations: Specified Undertaking of Unit Trust of India (popularly known as UTI I) and UTI Asset Management Company Limited (UTI AMC). The UTI I is under the supervision of the government of India, and UTI AMC is regulated by SEBI.

The first growth fund (mutual fund), Mastershare, was launched in 1986 by the UTI. The success of Mastershare provided impetus to float more growth-oriented funds. Consequently, new entrants to the industry, namely Canbank MF and SBI MF, joined the race. The year 1989 witnessed further product innovations: venture capital funds began operating for the first time, and tax saving funds also entered the market. SBI MF was the first to offer a tax saving fund, while UTI offered a venture capital fund. Assured return funds started functioning from 1990 with the launch of Candouble. With a view to meeting the objectives of different sectors, the industry has responded by introducing products such as regular income, capital appreciation, and a children's gift growth fund. The industry is in the process of introducing more new products, including a commodity mutual fund and a real estate mutual fund.

Growth and Status

By June 1974, investable funds under UTI's management reached 1,720 million rupees (unit capital 1,520 million rupees). There were 6 lakh (600,000 rupees) unit holding accounts under four plans. US-64 investors were rewarded well, with their investment consistently earning better returns than deposits in banks. It was during the 1980s that UTI grew in stature to emerge as one of India's large nationwide financial institutions. From 1981 to 1984, UTI introduced more than six new open-end and closed-end schemes; investable funds quadrupled from 5 billion rupees to 20 billion rupees; the number of unit holding accounts grew from 1 million to 1.7 million; and the number of branch offices increased to eleven. From 1986 to 1990, UTI launched a large number of innovative products, strengthened the marketing network, and promoted new organizations in the financial sector.

The industry has, however, experienced a sporadic expansion of late. The assets under management slowly grew from 32,180 million rupees in 1985–1986 to

1,396,160 million rupees in 2003–2004. The yearly resources mobilized also have had ups and downs. In the year 2003–2004, the industry mobilized 468,090 million rupees, the highest in its history. As of 31 March 2004 there were 403 different plans.

Consolidation in the Indian Mutual Fund Industry

India's mutual fund industry, under its new regulatory environment, is quite young. There was an initial exuberance, and many domestic as well as overseas professional and industrial houses sought regulatory licenses to set up asset management companies to manage mutual funds. Many of them have been granted licenses. A large number of mutual fund houses have been set up. Some mutual fund houses could not attain a critical mass for many years, and several foreign funds found it very expensive to operate in India.

Competition in the industry increased pressure on marketing expenses, and the relatively small investor base made it difficult for smaller players to survive. For all these reasons, consolidation of the Indian mutual fund industry began, and since 2000 some of the industrial houses have sold their assets to other mutual funds.

Challenges

Though the industry started with one lone player, in 1986 the government of India allowed others to enter, and now many public, private, joint, and foreign sector mutual fund houses operate in India. Yet the growth of the industry has not been very impressive. Unlike most countries, in which retail and small investors are the major investors in mutual funds, in India the share of retail investors has recently been coming down. Corporations and institutions accounted for about 57 percent of total investors as of 31 March 2003, and individuals accounted for only about 41 percent.

Close examination of the investment pattern of Indian mutual funds reveals that there is a heavy tilt toward fixed income products (government debt, money market instruments, and corporate debt). Mutual fund industry champions need to initiate mass level investor education about the mutual fund industry and its pros and cons. Many investors still believe that investments in mutual funds cannot give negative returns.

Frequent change in tax policy has caused aberrations in the functioning and performance of the funds. Incentives are extended, withdrawn, and reintroduced many times, without sufficient notice, causing disturbances to the industry in its assets and performance. The industry, after a long period of existence, is still confined to large cities and towns. Most investable funds come from urban

areas. In order to grow and serve larger economic functions, the industry must spread its scope to other areas.

A very skewed interest rate environment exists in India. There are certain guaranteed return plans of the government of India that offer higher rates of fixed coupons, some of which provide tax breaks. For certain categories of investors, the effective rate of return is very high over time. Therefore, among small investors in semiurban and rural areas, there is a lack of interest in mutual funds. This is a major hurdle that has inhibited the development of a more vital mutual fund industry.

M. T. Raju

See also Capital Market; Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI); Stock Exchange Markets

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MYSORE A city in the state of Karnataka, Mysore had a population of 742,000 in 2001. It was the old capital of the maharajas of Mysore before they shifted their capital to Bangalore. The name Mysore is derived from the mythical buffalo demon, Mahisasura, who was slain by the goddess Durgā, who is worshiped in Mysore under

the name Chamundeshwari. Her temple on the Chamundi Hills is placed high above the city. Mysore is located at the center of a high plateau surrounded by mountains. Thus it was well suited as a stronghold of regional rulers such as the Wadiyar dynasty that controlled Mysore after the power of the Vijayanagar empire declined. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Wadiyars were temporarily replaced by the usurper Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. Hyder Ali was a very competent general who imitated European methods of warfare and military organization. Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan were fighting against the British and the Marathas. In the first Mysore War, the British were defeated, but in the second one, Governor-General Lord Cornwallis defeated Tipu Sultan, annexing a large part of his domain; wanting, however, to retain Tipu as a counterweight to the Marathas, Cornwallis let him rule the remnant. In the third Mysore War, Tipu Sultan died on the battlefield in 1799. The new governor-general, Lord Wellesley, had been eager to get rid of Tipu, who was in league with the French. Wellesley's brother Arthur, later known as Iron Duke of Wellington, defeated Tipu just as he vanquished Napoleon Bonaparte.

The Wadiyar dynasty was later reinstated by the British, and a legislative assembly was also established. In subsequent years, Mysore became a model state as its rulers took a personal interest in its industrial advancement. Oil and soap made from sandalwood became major products of Mysore. It was also known for its fine silks. Even a small steel mill was started in the 1920s. Hydroelectric power was generated at Krishnarajasagar near Mysore city, another successful ambitious project.

Dietmar Rothermund

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NABOB GAME The “Nabob Game” is a modern term to describe the early method of imperial expansion in India by agents of European trading companies, especially the British East India Company and the French East India Company (La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes), usually with the support of their respective governments. The French governor-general Joseph François Dupleix and the Englishman Robert Clive were pioneers in the Nabob Game. The term itself, and the related “Nabobism,” derive from the Persian *nawāb*, meaning governor. “Nabob” was a pejorative rubric for East India company agents, such as Clive, who had garnered power and wealth in India. Methods used ranged from negotiation and diplomacy to bribery, extortion, coercion, threats, and force. Their motives were often mixed, intended to gain commercial advantage, military supremacy, and influence and power over Indian rulers and territories, as well as personal aggrandizement. By the 1770s, Nabobs were mistrusted, even reviled, upon returning to Europe. Nonetheless, the Nabob Game laid the foundation of the British Empire in India, especially the system known as “indirect rule.”

Nabobism filled the political vacuum in India following the death of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. Within a decade, the Mughal empire began to disintegrate, and the nizam of Hyderabad and the *nawābs* of Arcot, Mysore, Oudh, and Bengal could govern autonomously. They nominated and appointed tax collectors, used revenues and resources as they wished, conducted diplomatic and military activities among themselves, minted coins locally, and selected their successors. They no longer maintained the fiction that they were courtiers, and paid little more than lip service to the Mughal who gave them legitimacy.

Among Europeans, the French East India Company was the first to gain from the Mughal disintegration.

French success in the Nabob Game depended largely on Dupleix, but even before he became governor-general in 1742, the French company had obtained the Mughal title of *nawāb* and the rights to maintain an armed force, collect land revenue, and mint rupees in Pondicherry. Dupleix’s diplomacy was instrumental in obtaining the title of *nawāb* for the French company while he was governor of the French trading colony in Chandarnagar (near Calcutta), where he had regular contact with the Mughal court in Delhi. Dupleix and Governor-General Benoit Dumas both insisted that the Mughal rank be bestowed upon the company, although the powers and honors of the title were to rest with the governor-general in Pondicherry. Governors-general were, of course, chosen by the company directors, not the Mughal authority, so the choice of successors belonged, in practice, to non-Indians. The company’s private army, needed for protection, was legitimized, and the company negotiated the right to mint rupees from imported silver in order to reduce minting costs. The French also obtained grants to collect land revenue from specified territories. The direct collection of land revenue, ostensibly to support troops, meant that the European *nawāb*, just as its Indian counterparts, had neither to depend on the Mughal treasury nor account for the revenue collected. In the case of the French East India Company, their territories constituted a trade zone closed to competition and a buffer from the depredations of warlords, brigands, and armies. The British had also sought land grants for the same reasons some years earlier. The assumption of Mughal titles was primarily a commercial decision, and their political and military benefits were secondary, albeit substantial.

As Anglo-French rivalry intensified during the War of the Austrian Succession (1742–1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), the respective East Indian

companies found themselves enemies by proxy. In 1746 the French East India Company took Fort St. George (Chennai) from the British and was challenged by the *nawāb* of Arcot, who had forbidden hostilities. A small detachment of French troops defeated the *nawāb*'s much larger army, demonstrating European military superiority. Henceforth, the threat or use of European military force against an Indian force was a hallmark of the Nabob Game. The struggle for the throne of Hyderabad, the most powerful post in the south, was a more convincing example of the uses of force in the Nabob Game. With the deaths in short order of the aged Nizām al-Mulk in 1748 and his immediate successor, Nasir Jang, late in 1750, the throne of the nizam of Hyderabad was contested by Muzaffar Jang. Dupleix, in league with Chanda Sahib, a claimant to the throne of Arcot, successfully backed Muzaffar, who in return confirmed Chanda Sahib as *nawāb* of Arcot and ceded large and valuable land grants to the French. It is doubtful Dupleix sought anything more than commercial and strategic advantage, because he did not try to make either Chanda Sahib or Muzaffar Jang instruments of French policy. Even when French interests alienated Chanda Sahib, Dupleix did little to undermine his protégé, leaving Chanda Sahib to rule until 1752, when the Marathas, with British connivance, deposed him. Unsurprisingly, his successor on the throne was more congenial to the British.

Before being recalled in 1752, Dupleix treated appeals from the nizam of Hyderabad for help against the Marathas, led by the *peshwa* Balaji Rao, as more of an annoyance than an offer to ally against a real threat. Dupleix sent only a protective force commanded by the Marquis de Bussy, thinking of them as profitable mercenaries. Upon the unexpected death of the nizam, Muzaffar Jang, de Bussy backed Salabat Jang, and the grateful new nizam rewarded de Bussy handsomely, and, for the next seven years, the Marquis de Bussy was his senior political adviser and the prototype for “political agents” in Indian courts. Under the British, such political agents were to make policy and create kings for nearly two centuries.

French policy was more focused on fortune than power, but the Englishman Robert “Bully” Clive turned that on its head. He had intrigued against the French, using rivals to the nizam of Hyderabad and *nawāb* of Arcot, but nothing in the French experience prepared him for the next step when he was ordered to Bengal. The British had held a grudge against Siraj-ud-Dawla, the young and impetuous *nawāb* of Bengal, ever since his capture of Calcutta had resulted in the atrocity dubbed the “Black Hole.” Clive easily recaptured Calcutta and, using the Seven Years’ War as an excuse, took the nearby

French settlement at Chandarnagar for good measure. Clive’s defeat of Siraj-ud-Dawla’s army at the battle of Plassey in June 1757 was based on a small but well-trained European force, large bribes provided by a Hindu banker, and the perfidy of Siraj-ud-Dawla’s Muslim nobles. In a mere six months, Clive established British commercial and military primacy in Bengal, placed a friendly ruler on the throne in Bengal, and, almost in passing, acquired a huge personal fortune. His success made him the stereotypical Nabob.

Although other Nabobs and the British East India Company profited greatly from the war in Bengal, Clive’s wealth dwarfed theirs. In victory, he received an incredible sum in cash and land grants worth an annual fortune. When the newly retired thirty-two-year-old Clive triumphantly stepped off the gangplank in London, he was one of the richest men in England. Unfortunately for him, public discomfiture at the enormous wealth of Clive and other East India Company servants—and the manner in which they had acquired it—was so great that the term “Nabob” was used to mock them. This censure was based on accurate suspicions that the Nabobs had been greedy in pursuing wealth through fraud, extortion, and violence. Furthermore, the Nabobs were spending their wealth in ostentatious and socially disruptive ways and were tainted by “oriental” manners and morals. These last indictments reflected upper-class snobbery against parvenus from the commercial classes. Although Clive and the other Nabobs could buy the trappings of English gentry, they were not accepted by the titled elites.

The most serious charge against the Nabobs was, of course, the manner in which they had obtained their wealth. Whereas bribery, violence, and treachery to Indian interests might be overlooked, the defrauding of East India Company investors could not. Agents of European East India companies had always been allowed to supplement their pay by engaging in “country” or “private trade,” usually by consigning them free portage in a company ship. The directors of the companies had, perforce, to recognize the entrepreneurial spirits of their servants and were never successful in banning private trade. Company directors even rationalized that privately developed “country trade” exposed new markets from which the company could also profit. Of course, the conflict of interests inherent in such country trade did drain company profits. Agents could coerce concessionary prices or rebates for themselves as they negotiated larger company purchases or deal only in goods with higher profit margins, leaving the company to transport the bulkier items, and could demand bribes and kickbacks from suppliers. Investors could suspect double-dealing, but even when company servants made fortunes from private trade, as did Dupleix, or profited from

company-financed military actions, as in the case of Clive, the directors objected but did little. That benign official attitude changed between 1765, when Clive returned to India as governor-general, and 1772, the year that *The Nabob* opened on the London stage. *The Nabob* was a play by W. Foote skewering Nabobs returning from India with disproportionate wealth and airs of becoming titled gentlemen. While English society was comfortable with successful businessmen becoming country gentlemen, this new breed was more rapacious and ambitious.

The change in English attitudes rested on class consciousness and a residual suspicion of fraudulent conflicts of interest, but what perhaps tipped the scales against the Nabobs were events in Bengal. By the time Clive returned to Bengal, a British army had defeated an alliance of the Mughal emperor and the *nawāb* of Bengal at the battle of Baksar in 1764. The victory established the British East India Company as the strongest political force in eastern India. The Mughal emperor had to cede his enormous land revenues (known as the *divāni*) of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa; in the years following, company servants extorted wealth and plundered the resources of eastern India with an unprecedented rapacity and corruption. Clive left after two years, railing against what he saw as Bengal's march to disaster. But he was ignored, as he had done nearly the same thing in his day. Then, in 1770, famine hit Bengal and an estimated one-third of its peasantry, already reduced to penury, starved to death. English opinion was outraged at the Nabobs, who were blamed for this inhumanity. Clive was held responsible for the disaster, even though he had condemned the way his countrymen were conducting themselves in Bengal. Parliament acted, in large part because the East India Company was unable to repay a loan to the Treasury. The resultant "reforms," introduced to India by Warren Hastings, led to a crackdown, and more of the wealth of eastern India reached company coffers, and not the pockets of company agents. Hastings's Bengal administration thus marked the beginning of the end of Nabobism. Nevertheless, Indian rulers were forced to follow the advice of their British political advisers, who served British interests first, and to underwrite the expenses of the British-led troops that protected and controlled them. Indirect rule thus continued as the predominant method of British rule in much of India until the integration of most of the princely states into India's union at independence in 1947.

J. Andrew Greig

See also Clive, Robert; Dupleix, Joseph François; French East India Company; French Impact; Hastings, Warren

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NAGAS AND NAGALAND Nagaland became the sixteenth state of the Indian Union on 1 December 1963. It has a rapidly expanding population (about 2 million in 2004) and is divided into sixteen districts, with Kohima as the capital. Its official languages are English and six tribal languages. The literacy rate is nearly 70 percent. The Nagas are a tribal Indo-Mongoloid people who live in the Northeast region of India, the Himalayas, and Burma (Myanmar). More than a dozen tribes, including the Angamis, Aos, Chakhesangs, Changs, Khienmungans, Konyaks, Lothas, Phoms, Rengmas, Sangtams, Semas, Yimchangurs, and Zeliangs, make up the Naga tribes. The Nagas were a warlike people who engaged in head-hunting raids on each other, on Nagas across the border in Burma, and on the people of the lowlands. The *morung*, dormitories for young bachelors, served as training centers, barracks, and centers for ceremonial purposes, where skulls and other trophies of war were also displayed. Rice beer and meat such as beef and pork were the Nagas' favorite diet. Each of the Naga tribes enjoys elaborate festivals, some of which last several days. Although suspicious of outsiders, they have a highly developed sense of hospitality and generosity. The Naga tribesman was fiercely loyal to his family, his clan, his *kebel* (the village), and his land, and he brooked no interference by outsiders in these or the village and tribal courts. Beginning in the 1840s, Christian missionaries converted many Nagas. The major Naga tribes each had representatives in the Naga Baptist Christian Convention. In 1881 the British established the Naga Hills District, with Kohima as the chief administrative center, and they initiated punitive expeditions to avenge head-hunting raids. After 1947 head-hunting raids continued and involved Naga tribes on both sides of the Indo-Burmese border.

In 1945 the Nagas had set up the Naga Hills District Tribal Council, which in 1946 became the Naga National Council (NNC), published the *Naga Nation*, and called for separation from India upon independence. In March 1956, the Nagas founded the Naga Federal Government with its own flag, and created the Naga Home Guards of

five hundred men from each tribe. Eventually 15,000 men were under arms, attempting to achieve independence through a campaign of terror; throughout the struggle, however, the Nagas have been divided on whether to fight for independence or to accept statehood within the Indian Union. The Indian army was sent into the province in 1957. Accusations of atrocities by both sides were made. Moderate Nagas began to realize that secession was unrealistic, and they formed a Naga Peace Organising Committee. In 1957 they met in an All Tribes Naga Peoples' Convention. The "Naga Hills" was a district of the state of Assam, but the Naga Hills Tuensang Area was created on 1 December 1957. In 1963 the state of Nagaland was created. In spite of this, violence continued. On 23 May 1964 a cease-fire agreement was signed by both sides. On 31 August 1972 the underground NNC, the Naga Federal Government, and the Naga Federal Army were all banned, and the government ended the cease-fire. On 11 November 1975 the two sides signed the Shillong Accord, and the rebels surrendered large numbers of weapons, and many gave up the struggle. From the mid-1980s there were renewed bouts of violence, which led to the cease-fire agreement of 25 July 1997. An uneasy peace followed.

Roger D. Long

See also **Assam; Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Peace Accords; Insurgency and Terrorism; Tribal Peoples of Eastern India; Tribal Politics**

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NAIDU, SAROJINI (1879–1949), Indian poet, feminist, and nationalist leader. Sarojini Naidu was born on 13 February 1879, the eldest child of Brahma Samajist parents: Varada Sundari Devi, who wrote Bengali lyrics, and Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya, scientist and founder of Nizam's College in Hyderabad. Sarojini Naidu's verses were published in four volumes: *Songs* (1895), *The Golden Threshold* (1905), *The Bird of Time* (1912), and *The Broken Wing* (1917), all highly acclaimed for their evocative and romantic descriptions of India.

Raised by liberal parents, her creative talents awoke in a home open to scholars and diverse visitors. Sarojini

later made passionate speeches on the importance of women's education. In 1891, when she was twelve, she achieved the highest rank in the Madras presidency matriculation exams, and her literary talents impressed the nizam, who gave her a scholarship to study at Girton College, Cambridge. In England she cultivated the friendship of famous writers, and later briefly traveled in Europe. In 1898 Sarojini challenged caste by marrying Govindarajulu Naidu, a non-Brahman Telegu doctor and widower, with whom she had four children.

Sarojini Naidu's nationalism was underscored by feminism, and from 1904 onward, her oratory drew large crowds. At the Framji Cowasji Institute, where practical Ramabai Ranade urged affluent women to help their poorer sisters, Naidu recited "Ode to India," calling upon Mother India to "awaken from slumber." In 1906 she addressed the Indian National Congress (INC) session in Calcutta on women's education, and also spoke to the Indian Social Conference there. Awarded the colonial Kaiser-I-Hind in 1911 for flood relief work, Naidu remained a political activist.

She became a close associate of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Mahatma Gandhi, and a friend of Rabindranath Tagore and Sarladevi Chaudhrani. In Madras in 1909 she met Muthulakshmi Reddi, her future colleague in the Women's Indian Association (WIA). On 18 December 1917 Naidu led the WIA delegation to Secretary of State Edwin Montagu, requesting equal female suffrage in the next elections. When appealing earlier for support from the INC, she argued that women voters and leaders would not usurp male authority, and that all Indians would be inspired by their nationalism and maternalism. As a founding member of the All-India Women's Conference in 1927, Naidu was considered one of India's feminist luminaries. She addressed women's groups on obstacles like child marriage, *pardab* seclusion, bigamy, and widow immolation (*sati*), while she fought for female suffrage. Yet, some modern feminists call her a "traditional feminist" because she praised women for being true *satis* for their self-sacrifice.

Naidu's speeches were marked by idealism, humor, and a cascade of poetry. At Lucknow and Patna, she urged a Muslim-Hindu dialogue based on shared Indian ethnicity and humanity. On 21 December 1917 she pleaded with the Madras Special Provincial Council to support the Lucknow Congress League Pact of the previous year. Between 1917 and 1919, Naidu joined Gandhi's *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) movement, actively participating in the 1920 campaign, and in 1925 she became the first Indian woman president of the INC. Tensions developed between Indian feminists and male nationalists in 1930, when Gandhi initially refused to include women *satyagrahis* in the arduous Salt March. He



Patriotism is not a thing divorced from real life. It is the flame that burns within the soul, a gem like Flame that cannot be extinguished. . . .
 . . . but if you are united, if you forget your community and think of the nation, if you forget your city and think of the province, if you forget you are a Hindu and remember the Musalman, if you forget the Brahmin and think of the Pan-chaman, then, and then alone will India progress.

Sarojini Naidu, *Speeches and Writings*, G. A. Natesan, 1919, p. 219.

later relented, however, after being persuaded by Naidu, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya (1903–1990), and Khurshed Naoroji (1894–1966). Naidu led the women marchers and, like countless others, she was jailed for manufacturing salt. Naidu was jailed by the British in 1932, and again in 1942 during the Quit India movement. In 1947 she was appointed the first governor of Uttar Pradesh in independent India. She died in 1949.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also Congress Party; Nightingale, Florence; Women and Political Power; Women's Indian Association

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NAINSUKH (1710–1778), Pahari painter. The son of Pandit Seu of Guler, and younger brother of the celebrated Manaku, Nainsukh is the Pahari painter about whom we know the most. He must have started painting while still quite young, for an early work, almost certainly a self-portrait, datable to around 1730, shows him, brush held in right hand, poised to paint upon a sheet of paper. In another portrait, done some twenty years later, he appears standing behind his patron, hands folded and body bent at the waist, looking at a painting that his prince holds in his hand. But the most detailed information comes from an entry made in 1763 in his own hand, in the pilgrims' register of a priest at Haridwar, in which he speaks of his lineage at length. There is a remarkable self-awareness in this entry, and he prefaces the ten-line text with a delicate little drawing of Shiva and Pārvatī seated even as the river Gaṅgā emerges from Shiva's matted locks, while Bhagirath, the devotee, stands offering obeisance to the Lord.

Virtually nothing is known of Nainsukh's early training, presumably under his father, but about 1740 he seems to have left his hometown of Guler and moved to Jasrota, a little principality to the west, across the river Ravi. Nainsukh apparently worked first for some senior members of the Jasrota royal family, and then attached himself to the young prince, Balwant Singh, whose side he apparently never left for the next twenty years. In swift sketches or elaborate paintings, he captured his patrons in a range of moods and situations to which there are virtually no parallels outside the work of the Mughal ateliers. Nainsukh's work reflects his patrons' interests, their pursuits,

even their dreamlike visions of grandeur. With Balwant Singh he appears to have developed a very special bond, for in these paintings and drawings we see him shadowing his patron everywhere and, with singular warmth, rendering him in what is truly an extraordinary range of situations: writing a letter, stalking a duck, watching a group of professional mimics, examining a painting, riding out in a litter for a hawking expedition, striking a lion down with his bared sword, having his beard trimmed, listening to petitioners, supervising a construction, standing in front of a fire before retiring, offering prayers, or simply smoking a *buqqa* in a camp bed, wrapped in a quilt and staring into space. Close to sixty such works have survived, some of them bearing inscriptions that make both patron and painter spring to life for the viewer.

After Balwant Singh's death around 1763, Nainsukh moved from Jasrota to the state of Basohli to take up work under its ruler, Amrit Pal. The work he did between 1763 and 1778, the year of his own death, has a different orientation, a distinctive flavor: an image of Vishnu seated in all his glory; the opening leaf of what might have been a series based on the celebrated poetic work of Bihari, the *Satsai*; and three paintings of what might have been a large *Rāgamālā* series bear witness to this change. Another possibility that can be entertained is that as he grew old, Nainsukh, following established practice among painters, occupied himself with planning rather than executing a series of paintings, preferring only to put down first thoughts in the form of sketches on paper or to create a body of drawings to leave to his sons. One of the series that Nainsukh made sketches for, and helped plan, is likely to have been the great *Gītā Govinda* series that is seen as a crowning achievement of Pahari painting.

Nainsukh's work is subtle, and its appeal lies not in surface skills, but in its deep humanity. Beginning with copying, or closely following, some late Mughal works that appear to have reached the hills at that time, Nainsukh swiftly began to alter them, bringing in fresh elements of observation and introducing little twists or surprises that infused them with lyricism. It is certain that even at a young age, Nainsukh was armed with prodigious skills: the ability to observe the tiniest, most casual of details with a clear eye; the use of a remarkable, supple line; the power to make clean, uncluttered paintings with a poetic air. His portraits are fine studies, well grasped, cleanly drawn, studded with the most appropriate details, conveying the true sense and presence of the person portrayed. But, interestingly, the more formal the portrait, the less interested he was in it. His interest lay apparently not in static or ceremonial studies, but in rendering, around his central figure, groups of related people over whom he trained a warm, mellow light. In his painting of the Jasrota prince Zorawar Singh watching the dancing girl Zafar

(now in the Chandigarh Museum), for instance, the prince does appear closely observed, but the dancer and the musicians are animated and wonderfully depicted, their necks arched, fingers nimbly playing the instruments, their bodies utterly and totally absorbed in what they are doing. In the celebrated painting of Balwant Singh examining a painting with Nainsukh himself, the prince is naturally the center of attention, with his regal bearing and all signs of elegance, but the eye travels quickly, and with eagerness, to the minor characters in the work: a tall courtier respectfully seated, the man standing behind him with his hands folded across his waist and a box of implements tucked into his belt, and, above all, to the three musicians who are seen playing in one corner of the painting. Nainsukh lavished so much attention upon them—their gestures, the liveliness of their figures, the subtle differences in their complexions—that it is with effort that one's eye moves away from them back to the prince, or even to Nainsukh himself.


In the range of his work—close to a hundred works, now widely dispersed all over the world, can be attributed to him at present—Nainsukh conjures up stillness and tumult with equal ease, quiet moments melding seamlessly into situations astir with energetic action. But there is also discernible, under the surface, a certain playfulness, even open humor. Yet idioms do not dominate Nainsukh's work. What shines forth is his ability to seize a detail and exalt it, to grasp a moment and render it timeless.

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NAOROJI, DADABHAI (1825–1917), Parsi politician from Mumbai, the "Grand Old Man of India." Dadabhai Naoroji graduated from Elphinstone College, Mumbai (Bombay), in 1845, and became a professor of mathematics in 1854. He was cofounder of the Students' Literary and Scientific Society and of the Bombay Association (1844). After the Mutiny of 1857—which shattered British self-confidence but also ended as a setback



Dadabhai Naoroji. As head of the Indian National Congress, Naoroji presided at its 1906 session in Calcutta, where Congress first called for *swaraj* (self-rule). K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

to the precocious nationalism of India's Western-educated elite—Naoroji dared to launch the East India Association in 1866. He later became a cofounder of the All-India National Congress in 1885. Subsequently he sailed to England and was elected one of the first Indian members of the British Parliament, representing Finsbury in the House of Commons from 1892 to 1896 as a member of the Liberal Party.

In 1901 he published his most famous book, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*, in London. Assessing the British in terms of their own liberal standards, he found their colonial rule “un-British.” He blamed them for the increasing poverty of India and expounded his theory of Britain’s “drain of India’s wealth.” Checking the export and import data of British India, in the long run, he found out that lucrative gains from trade accrued to the British, whereas India did not receive adequate returns. His theory was an important contribution to India’s economic nationalism, which gained more and more adherents over time.

Naoroji presided over two earlier sessions of the National Congress, but his most important presidency was in 1906 at the Kolkata (Calcutta) Congress, when Congress first called for *swaraj* (self-rule). The partition

of Bengal in 1905 had fanned revolutionary radicalism in India, but in 1906 the Liberal Party won national elections in Great Britain, and the moderate wing of Congress hoped for major constitutional reform in India. Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the great moderate leader, implored Naoroji to keep the Congress united by presiding at this important annual session; at the age of eighty-one, Dadabhai traveled home and succeeded in preventing a split of the Congress, though it broke apart a year later, in 1907. Service to his country was the greatest principle of Naoroji’s life, and he is still revered in India for that.

Dietmar Rothermund

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NARAYAN, JAYA PRAKASH (1902–1979), Indian political figure and nationalist leader. A prominent socialist leader in the Indian nationalist movement against British rule and in postindependence politics, Jaya Prakash Narayan was known popularly as “J. P.” and was often referred to as Lok Nayak, the “people’s leader.” Narayan was born in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) in 1902. He studied at Patna College in Bihar and married in 1920. He thereafter went to the United States for graduate studies in sociology, leaving his wife behind at one of Mahatma Gandhi’s ashrams. In the United States, Narayan worked part time in grape fields, factories, and restaurants to pay for his education. He changed universities a few times until settling at the University of Wisconsin for a doctoral degree in sociology; there, his paper “Social Variation” was described as one of the best papers of the year. He was influenced by Karl Marx’s *Das Kapital*, which inspired much of his socialist ideology. He had to cut short his doctoral studies and return to India in 1929 when his mother became seriously ill.

On his return, Narayan joined the Indian National Congress at Jawaharlal Nehru’s invitation, becoming part of the freedom movement. He declared, however, that freedom was more than freedom from British rule, but freedom from poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance. In 1934 he founded the Congress Socialist Party, a socialist wing of the Congress Party. He was arrested several times by the British during the nationalist movement, and he served several years in jail for his nationalist activities.



Jaya Prakash Narayan. Here photographed in 1938, Narayan eventually broke with the Praja Socialist Party to pursue *lokniti* (politics of the people). In 1977 his Janata Party was voted into power, becoming the first non-Congress party to form a government at the center. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

The Congress Socialist Party after independence became the Praja (People's) Socialist Party. In the first national general elections of 1952, his socialist party lost badly to the Congress Party. Nehru nevertheless invited Narayan to join his Cabinet, though he could not promise to fulfill Narayan's fourteen-point plan to reform the Constitution, the administration, the judicial system, redistribute land to the landless, nationalize banks, revive "Swadeshi" (home-produced goods only), and set up village cooperatives. Narayan therefore declined to join Nehru's Cabinet. In 1954 Narayan joined Vinobha Bhave's Sarvodaya Movement to redistribute land to the landless in India's villages. He was also active in India's trade union movement. Narayan in 1976 established the People's Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights, an organization that sought to draw people from various political parties together for the defense of civil liberties and human rights.

Narayan achieved national prominence during the Congress Party rule of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In 1974 India faced a severe economic crisis, with high

inflation and unemployment and a shortage of basic necessities. Narayan was alleged by the Congress government to have called upon the armed forces to overthrow Indira Gandhi. A year later, in June 1975, following Indira Gandhi's conviction by the Allahabad High Court for the misuse of government vehicles in her election campaign, the prime minister declared a state of "National Emergency." Fundamental rights were suspended. Under that "National Emergency," Narayan was arrested and sent to prison.

In March 1977 the emergency was lifted, and Narayan spearheaded the opposition campaign in the subsequent elections, forging an alliance of almost all opposition parties (except the Communist parties) into a new party, the Janata Party. The Janata Party, led by Narayan, defeated the Congress Party in 1977, the first time that Congress had lost since independence. Narayan declined to lead the new Janata government as prime minister, or to accept any other public office, epitomizing the combination of Gandhi's philosophy with the practice of Western democracy. His book, *The Reconstruction of Indian Polity*, reflected this blend and won him the Ramon Magsaysay Award as Asian statesman of the year. J. P. Narayan died in 1979.

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See also **Bhave, Vinoba; Congress Party; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

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NARAYAN, R. K. (1906–2001), renowned author of novels, short stories, and essays. Regarded by many critics as India's greatest writer in English, R. K. Narayan's birth name, Rasipuram Krishnaswami Narayanaswami, was shortened at the suggestion of his first English publisher for the convenience of Western readers. Born on 10 October 1906 in Madras (Chennai), he was the third of eight children of Gnanambal Iyer and Rasipuram Iyer. His father was a well-educated school teacher in the education department in the princely state of Mysore, but Narayan was brought up in Madras by his maternal grandmother. In his memoir, *My Days* (1974), as well as in

his last novel, *The Grandmother's Tale* (1992), he acknowledged his debt to her, not only for maternal care but also for a deep introduction to South Indian traditional culture. His knowledge of the wealth of Hindu legends and myths reflects her storytelling, but she also taught him Sanskrit, the classical language of religion and literature, as well as Tamil, the South Indian language rich in song and poetry. From her he learned to understand and enjoy classical Canatic music, one of the most complex of Indian musical systems. In his old age, he remarked that “We don't have that kind of granny nowadays.”

While immersed in his grandmother's culture, at the same time he was also introduced to the greatest literature of the West, thanks to an uncle—a college student who lived in the family house—who was taking part in a production of William Shakespeare's *Tempest*. Narayan knew it, he said, before he knew anything else. Part of Narayan's greatness as a writer is explained by the “Indianness” of his early upbringing as well as his love of English literature, acquired from his father and his college teachers. No other Indian writer reflects so unself-consciously the seamless inheritance of these two rich, but very different, cultures. Of the many Indian writers in English, none impresses readers as does Narayan, conveying an authentic voice of the unique historical experience of the making of modern India in the context of the modern West, mediated through the imposition of British rule on a traditional society. An interviewer once asked Narayan whether the creative writer is a free spirit or a spokesman of the community in which he lives. A writer, Narayan replied, must be a free spirit if he is to be a creative writer, but he is always a spokesman of the community in that he is a product of his society. So a writer must keep a tricky balance between the two.

Narayan's formal introduction to Western learning began in 1912, when he began attending kindergarten in Madras, at a school founded by Swedish Lutherans. Readers of his novels, as well as of his memoir and his collection of essays, conclude that he hated school, but his unhappiness appears to be the normal response of an intelligent child being taught by boring, unimaginative teachers. He hated arithmetic, dreaded exams, and, like the schoolboys in his novels, welcomed the freedom of summer holidays. “No child with red blood in his veins,” he said in *A Writer's Nightmare* (1956), “could ever think of its school with unqualified enthusiasm.” Narayan neatly summarized his views on childhood by saying that children are “existentialists,” living in the moment, sometimes happy, sometimes miserable. He was, he insisted, the same person that he had been eighty years before: “Inside, the sense of awareness, of being, is the same throughout. The chap inside is the same, unchanged.” When he graduated to the better-known Madras Christian

College High School, the “chap inside” rejoiced in having nicer classrooms, a good library, and educated, reasonable teachers, but his father summoned him to Mysore to live with his siblings, one of whom, R. K. Laxman, was to become India's best-known political cartoonist and the illustrator of many of Narayan's books. In Mysore, where he was to live most of his life, he attended Maharajah's Collegiate High School, where his father was headmaster. The great bonus of being the headmaster's son was that he had free range of the library, and he read voraciously, including the romantic poets and the novels of Sir Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, and Leo Tolstoy, as well as those of contemporary writers like Rider Haggard and Marie Corelli, his favorite. Through English journals, he became familiar with all the literary greats of the era, including G. B. Shaw, H. G. Wells, and Thomas Hardy. He also learned about American writers through *Harper's* and the *Atlantic*. People unfamiliar with the fascination that England had for educated Indians of that time speak of the English language being “forced” on Indians, but nothing could be further from the truth. English was the key to another world, sought with eagerness by young Narayan. Despite his eclectic reading, for two years in succession he failed the university entrance examination, the first time in English, the second in Tamil literature. In *My Days*, he says his failure in English was due to concentrating on Dickens and poetry, while the questions were from the dull books he had left unread.

After managing to pass the exams, he attended Maharaja's College, got his bachelor of arts degree, and, when nothing else was available, took a job as a teacher. By his own account he was a disastrous failure, and after two attempts at maintaining discipline, gave it up and went home, deciding to devote himself full time to becoming what he always wanted to be—a writer. “I want to finish my novel,” he announced, “and when it is published, it will solve all problems.” Making a living from writing novels in India, especially in English, was virtually unknown, and the comment of an old friend expressed the almost universal reaction of his family and friends: “Unwisdom! Unwisdom! You could write as a hobby. . . . The notion is very unpractical” (*My Days*, p. 92). Making a living became an urgent necessity in 1934, however, when Narayan, defying the customs of his society, did not settle for a marriage arranged by his family; he fell in love with a beautiful girl, Rajam Iyer, and made the arrangements himself. Two years later, their daughter Hema was born. She became his lifelong companion.

The novel that he was writing was *Swami and Friends*, which drew very heavily upon his school experiences and was set in Malgudi, the imaginary South Indian town that figures in many of his later books. “As I sat in a room nibbling my pen, Malgudi with its little railway station

swam into view, all ready made with a character called Swaminathan running down the platform” (*My Days*, p. 79). For most foreign readers, Malgudi is their entry into the complex world of India, in many ways physically chaotic but with a carefully articulated social order. There was little hope of a novel of this kind, written in English, being published in India, but in any case his dream was to find a publisher in England, and against all probability his dream came true. *Swami and Friends* was rejected by a number of publishers, but he had sent the manuscript in 1935 to a friend, Purna, who was studying at Oxford, who persuaded Graham Greene, already one of England’s most famous authors, to read it. Greene was delighted with the novel and recommended it to Hamish Hamilton, the publisher. Purna was able to send Narayan a telegram: “Novel taken. Graham Greene responsible” (*My Days*, p. 115). This was the beginning of a friendship that was of great importance to Narayan, for it brought him into the literary and academic world of Great Britain and the United States. He and Greene corresponded regularly, and Greene read and commented on his manuscripts, though they met only once, in 1956.

Other novels followed regularly, all marked by kindly ironic wit as he observes the comic absurdities in the lives of many of his characters; at the same time, he conveys the disappointments and tragedies of their everyday lives as they confront the conflicts engendered by their ambitions, their weaknesses, their self-delusions, and society’s demands. His second novel, *The Bachelor of Arts*, published in 1937, is also autobiographical, and in some ways is his most humorous book, ending with the central character falling in love and marrying, euphoric in his happiness. His next novel, *The Dark Room* (1938), explores new territory, perhaps less successfully, with the story of a woman who, against all conventions, leaves her bullying husband.

There was a long break before *The English Teacher* was published in 1945 (in the United States it was published under the title *Grateful for Life and Death*). It is the most somber of Narayan’s novels, and the most autobiographical. The story of the death of the young wife of a struggling schoolteacher replicates the death of Narayan’s wife in 1939, leaving him utterly bereft, with his small daughter. Unable to work, he turned to spiritualism, and he believed that a medium had put him in contact with her. The friendship of the English mystic Paul Brunton helped him to return to writing in 1945, and Narayan began editing a literary journal, *Indian Thought*. He gave this up, however, to become his own publisher. Narayan entered a new and fruitful period, publishing some of his work in both England and the United States, including *The Financial Expert* (1952); *The Guide* (1958), which many readers consider his best work; *The Man-Eater of Malgudi* (1961); *The Vendor of Sweets* (1967); and *The Painter of Signs* (1976).

The Guide was made into a widely publicized but unsuccessful movie, which many reviewers, including Narayan himself, considered a serious distortion of the novel. In addition, he published collections of short stories, essays, and notable retellings of the great Sanskrit epics *The Mahābhārata* (1978) and *The Rāmāyaṇa* (1972).

In 1956 he made his first visit outside India, stopping in London, where for the first time he met Graham Greene, on his way to the United States. There he met many authors, film personalities, and intellectuals. In *My Dateless Diary* (1960) he gives a humorous but very penetrating account of American life, including delightful meetings with actress Greta Garbo, who wanted him to discuss mysticism, which he felt unable to do. He subsequently became fond of travel, traveling often to London and New York as well as to many cities in Europe and Asia. He received numerous literary honors in foreign countries, as well as one of India’s highest national awards, the Padma Bhushan. In 1985 the president of India appointed him a member of the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, as one of the country’s most distinguished citizens; there, he took a special interest in the welfare of children. This was in keeping with his literary work, which, as an obituary declared, expressed “a philosophic depth and a strikingly original moral analysis” (*Manchester Guardian*).

Ainslee T. Embree

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Only the dates of the first publication of Narayan’s books are given above, because almost all of them were published by different publishers in India, Great Britain, and the United States, and often by more than one publisher in the same country. The best biographical study is Susan Ram and N. Ram, *R. K. Narayan* (New Delhi: Viking, 1996), which relates the novels to Narayan’s life. John Updike wrote a sensitive appreciation of his work in “Books,” in *The New Yorker*, 12 Sept. 1974, pp. 80–82. Narayan has been the subject of many critical studies. N. P. Nair, *Irony in the Novels of R. K. Narayan and V. S. Naipaul* (Trivandrum, Kerala: CBH Publications, 1993), offers interesting insights and has an almost complete listing of Narayan’s many books. Michael Pousse, *R. K. Narayan: A Painter of Modern India* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), stresses the value of his writings for their insights into Indian culture. Geoffrey Kain, editor, *R. K. Narayan, Contemporary Critical Perspectives* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1993), examines many of his works. While these are all useful, Narayan’s artfully crafted autobiographical works give insights into his life and work. These include *My Day* (New York: Viking Press, 1974) and *My Dateless Diary* (Mysore: Indian Thought Publications, 1960), as well as his collections of essays, including *A Writer’s Nightmare* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1988). An early insightful American review is found in Glendy Dawedait, *Washington Post*, 3 November 1956, E, p. 6). An affectionate obituary by Susan and N. Ram appeared in *The Guardian* (Manchester,

U. K.), on 14 May 2001. Narayan gave a selection of his private papers to Mugar Library at Boston University.

NARAYANAN, K. R. (1921–), *president of India (1997–2002)*. Kocheril Raman Narayanan became vice president of India in 1992, and in 1997 he was elected the nation's president. Narayanan was born on 4 February 1921 into a poor Dalit (formerly called “untouchables”) Hindu family in what was then the Indian princely state of Travancore and Cochin (now Kerala). The elevation of a former “untouchable” to the highest office in India was an indication of his remarkable intellectual and professional qualities, and demonstrated as well that a person born to the lowest caste could reach the highest pinnacle in India. Although an excellent student, he had to be pulled out school once because of his impoverished family's inability to pay his tuition fees. But his determination and dedication saw him graduate from school and college.

He obtained a master's degree in English literature from the University of Travancore in 1943. Thereafter, he worked as a journalist for the *Economic Weekly for Commerce* in Delhi. The Indian industrialist J. R. D. Tata was favorably impressed with his credentials, and Narayanan received a scholarship from the Tata foundation to study in England. He subsequently studied under the renowned scholar Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, graduating with a first class degree in economics and political science in 1948. He taught at the Delhi School of Economics in 1954 and 1955. He served as vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University, and as chancellor of Delhi University, Punjab University, Pondicherry University, Assam University, North Eastern Hill University, and Gandhigram Rural Institute.

Narayanan successfully passed the Indian Foreign Service examinations in 1949 and was posted as second secretary at the Indian Embassy in Rangoon, Burma. There he met his Burmese-born wife, Ma Tint Tint, who changed her name to Usha Narayanan after their marriage. Subsequently, he served as the Indian ambassador to Thailand (1967–1969), Turkey (1973–1975), China (1976–1980), and the United States (1984–1988). He was a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. During his ambassadorial tenure at Beijing and in Washington, Narayanan undertook the difficult tasks of seeking rapprochement with China after fourteen years of hostile relations following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and of explaining India's continued close ties with the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its continued military occupation there.

Thereafter, Narayanan left the Indian Foreign Service to enter Indian politics. He was elected to the Lok Sabha

(the lower house of India's Parliament) from Kerala in 1984 on a Congress Party ticket, and was reelected in 1988. As Congress member of Parliament, he held the portfolios of minister of state for planning, minister of state for external Affairs, and finally, minister of state for science and technology.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Presidents of India**

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NATARAJA. *See* **Shiva and Shaivism.**

NATIONAL CONGRESS. *See* **History and Historiography.**

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. *See* **History and Historiography.**

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING

When India won its independence in 1947, it had little experience in security policy making. Then, Field Marshal Kodandera Madappa Cariappa was the only Indian who had reached the highest rank of brigadier. British officers manned all higher echelons of the government's security establishment. Nor was the army always provided with everything necessary for an effective defense of the nation, as was evident in the border war with China in October 1962. Till then, India spent annually only 2.6 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru distrusted armed forces and at times questioned their loyalty to a democratic India. He desired to prevent army chiefs from interacting directly with the civilian heads of the government. Hence, members of the Indian Administrative Service, successor to the British Indian Civil Service, occupied higher echelons of the defense department, preventing chiefs of the armed services from directly placing their ideas and plans before the defense minister or the prime minister.

The British had left the structure of Defence Committee of the Cabinet and a Defence Minister's Committee. On the first, chiefs of three armed forces were attending as advisors while the latter was the only

institution that gave the armed forces a chance to place their views before civilian authorities. These institutions, however, fell into disuse after the 1950s. As a result, independent India national security policy decision-making has been controlled by a few civilians and is ad hoc, responding to crises rather than being proactive.

During India's formative years, the morale of ministers and civil servants declined because of a lack of coordination in the decision-making process. These defects were distinctly noticeable in the ministry of defense, where internal tensions, favoritism in promotion to the top military offices, reduction of power of the chiefs of staff, and lack of discipline among civilians and military personnel led to the early resignation of the army chief of staff, General Koodendera Subayya Thimmayya, in 1961. Instead of investigating the situation, Nehru congratulated the defense minister, Krishna Menon, and snubbed General Thimmayya. A year later, as General Thimmayya had warned, China invaded and Krishna Menon was forced to resign in the wake of a humiliating Indian defeat.

Yet, the Indian army had earlier performed well in 1947–1948, expelling from two-thirds of Kashmir the Pakistani so-called tribal invaders. Even then, Nehru accepted the advice of Governor-General Lord Mountbatten to take India's charge of Pakistan's aggression to the Security Council of the United Nations, which arranged for a cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir on 1 January 1949.

Institutions Making Security Policy

Nehru's successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri and, especially, Indira Gandhi, appreciated the need for coordinated security policy making. Shastri established in 1965 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to coordinate intelligence with an additional Secretary in Cabinet secretariat as its chairman. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and intelligence agencies of three services hitherto functioning independently of one another were placed under the chairman, JIC. Gandhi realizing the importance of integrated intelligence in the making of security policy created the Research and Analysis Wing, a new intelligence agency to gather external intelligence in 1968 after splitting the IB, which was restricted to the work of domestic intelligence gathering. There was an apex committee under the cabinet secretary as the chairman with secretaries of ministry of external affairs and defense as members. She also established a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which considered a security matter before bringing it to the civilian authorities.

In spite of pragmatism exhibited by Prime Minister Gandhi in prosecuting the Bangladesh war in 1971, she was led to believe an "oral assurance" of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to gradually initiate action to make the Line of

Control between India and Pakistan in Kashmir into an international border. Her secretary, P. N. Dhar, wrote on 4 April 1995 that she did not wish "to appear to be dictating terms to a defeated adversary." Equally disastrous was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's decision to send Indian troops to Sri Lanka in July 1987 to "keep the peace" between Sri Lankan troops and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). This decision turned India into a party to the dispute, an unfortunate change from its earlier role as an honest broker of peace between Sri Lanka's government and its rebellious Tamil minorities. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made his crucial decision to send Indian troops to Sri Lanka on peacekeeping mission without proper deliberation within the cabinet or proper staff work, confident that he would prevail upon LTTE leader Prabhakaran to force his cadre to lay down the arms. The absence of adequate deliberations in decision-making thus landed India into a state of perpetual crisis with Sri Lanka.

Much of Indian security policy making before 1962, however, concerned relations with Pakistan. Thereafter the border war with China created a triangular security problem between India, China, and Pakistan. It then became a pentagonal problem during the Bangladesh war of 1971, with the Soviet Union and India on one side, and the United States, China, and Pakistan on the other. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has changed the focus of Indian security policy.

This ad hoc approach to national security policy continued, however, under former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the coalition government led by his Bharatiya Janata Party. During the Agra Summit in July 2000, India agreed with Pakistan's proposition that all references to previous summits at Simla and Lahore be "dropped" in return for a Pakistani promise "to discard reference to the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir." Ultimately the Agra Summit between Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf failed.

Even after fifty years of Indian independence, there has never been any structured interaction between the departments of defense, home, and external affairs, the three primary departments involved in security policy making. Modern national security policy, however, involves many other departments, including commerce, industry, petrochemicals, and finance. Coordination of policy took place, if at all, when the secretaries of these ministries met one another. J. N. Dixit, former foreign secretary noted that in the 1990s "an informal sort of National Security Advisory Group" existed in the cabinet secretariat.

National security coordination has assumed greater significance since the end of the cold war because secu-

rity threats do not emanate from external conflicts alone but from internal issues as well, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, the narcotics trade, illegal immigration, the criminal-terrorist nexus, and money laundering by the groups indulging in anti-national activities in league with international intelligence agencies inimical to India.

National Security Council

Should India establish a National Security Council (NSC) similar to that of the United States? Those who have opposed the idea argue that the NSC is a unique institution suitable for a presidential system of government, in which there is a concentration of powers in one individual. Hence, there is a dire need for advice in security policy making. However, in the parliamentary government, there is a collective body that works with the prime minister as its head; thus there is no need for another advisory or decision-making body. However, because India's Cabinet is so large a body, its political affairs subcommittee, consisting of the prime minister and the ministers for home, defense, and external affairs, considered issues of national security before any directions were given to officials.

Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh in 1989 promised to establish an NSC for effective national security decision-making; and though he did establish one by executive order in September 1990, his government went out of office the same year. When the Congress Party assumed power in 1991, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao emerged as a successful dodger of the idea even though he did not deny the need for an NSC, and he left office without establishing it.

Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, who had initially been minister of external affairs, during the brief tenure of the United Front government in 1996-1998, was committed to the idea of establishing NSC. He proclaimed it as his first priority on the first day in office but instead established a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The Bharatiya Janata Party led the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government that came to power in 1998, also committed to the formation of NSC. Thus, all of India's main political parties were agreed on the creation of an NSC, which was established by executive order.

The NSC, constituted by Prime Minister Vajpayee during the NDA coalition government, has the prime minister as its chairman, and the ministers for external affairs, home, defense, finance, and the deputy chairman of the planning commission as its members. Below the NSC, there is a National Security Group consisting of the secretaries of departments represented in the council and the chiefs of Research and Analysis Wing and the

three services. This is the principal body to plan, coordinate, and integrate policy at the middle level of India's policy-making process.

The secretariat can function to coordinate security policy if it has an independent official called either national security adviser or the executive secretary of the NSC. However, the Vajpayee government made the prime minister's principal secretary act as the part-time national security adviser. Because the principal secretary to the prime minister is always overloaded with work, making him national security adviser added too great a burden on him. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government under Manmohan Singh, which came to office in May 2004, has continued the office of national security adviser, appointing J. N. Dixit to it without burdening him with a role of principal secretary to the prime minister. He died, however, of heart failure within a few months.

The NSC has also been given a National Security Advisory Board consisting of many retired officials and former leaders of the armed forces. But, since its establishment, the government has not used it effectively to coordinate policy. The government has made it a practice to use CCS as its policy-making mechanism.

Proliferation of Agencies in Security Decision-Making

The major problem that afflicts national security policy making is the proliferation of agencies involved in decision-making. The latest one is a Nuclear Command Authority with Political Council, with the prime minister at its head. An executive council, with the prime minister's national security adviser as its head, was created as part of India's national security doctrine. Nuclear weapons are under a Strategic Forces Command, headed by the chief of command. These collectively decide on the ultimate use of nuclear weapons and on issues like the deployment of short-range or long-range nuclear capable missiles.

Defense Minister George Fernandes revived the defense minister's committee after the Kargil crisis of 1999. As of 2005 there was a proposal before the government to create the post of chief of defense staff, which would rotate among the three service chiefs for a term of two years. Ongoing efforts to integrate the defense department with civilian authorities are designed to increase the accountability of India's defense forces.

P. M. Kamath

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NATYA. See **Dance Forms; Nātya Shāstra**

NĀTYA SHĀSTRA Nātya Shāstra (*nātya*, Sanskrit, “drama” + *shāstra*, Sanskrit, “treatise”), is one of the earliest Indian treatises on the varied aspects of drama, including important sections on dance and on music (particularly instrumental music) with passages on tuning, scales, modal patterns and functions, instrument types, performance techniques, and accompaniment styles. The core parts of the treatise are the work of the dramatist Bharata, who compiled them around the beginning of the first millennium of the common era. The work is probably a compendium of material by different authors, some of whom may predate Bharata, as he clearly describes a flourishing tradition that is already well developed. The *Nātya Shāstra* serves essentially as a manual on how to organize and to perform a drama, complete with passages on the characteristics of particular character types and their demeanor, how they move, and the music that should accompany them. As such, the work is perhaps the most important reference text on Indian musical practice in this era. The *Nātya Shāstra* continues to have importance today for musicians and scholars, some of whom reference contemporary practice with ancient models.

Musically, Bharata speaks of *dbruva* (Sanskrit, “fixed”), a category of song type that probably served both as a dramatic device to help establish and reinforce character and mood as well as a vehicle for commentary and diversion. *Dbruva* is one of the earliest Indian references to the notion that a listener might link sentiment and music. The principal melodic concept of this period of ancient Indian music was *jāti* (Sanskrit, “family”), a mode (that is, an identifiable pattern of notes in which some pitches are more important than others) set in a scale (*mūrccana*). A *mūrccana*, however, derives from either of two possible heptatonic and intonational parent scales: the *shadja-grāma* (a scale based on the note *shadja*) and the *madhyama-grāma* (a scale based on the note *madhyama*). The only difference between these two parent scales was the placement of a microtone, the *sbruti*. The *sbruti* (Sanskrit, *sbru*, “to hear” or “that which is heard”) is one of the most enigmatic ideas of this musical system. Bharata recognizes twenty-two possible microtonal divisions within an octave, although he does so in the context of *mūrccana*. The distances between notes in a scale,

consisting of intervals of three sizes—four, three, or two *sbrutis*—formed the basis for ancient scales (most probably derived from the intonation patterns associated with Vedic chant). Later authors such as Venkatamakhi preserve the notion of *sbruti* in their systems, even if the implications of Bharata’s musical system had not been in effect for well over a millennium. Modern musicians still use words such as *sbruti* to describe their playing.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Bhajan; Music; Rāga**

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NEHRU, JAWAHARLAL (1889–1964), nationalist leader and first prime minister of India (1947–1964).

Jawaharlal Nehru was born in Allahabad on 14 November 1889. The Nehrus originally came from the valley of Kashmir and had migrated to Delhi at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Jawaharlal’s grandfather, Gangadhar, was a police officer in Delhi at the time of the Revolt of 1857. When the victorious British troops stormed their way into Delhi, he escaped with his family to Agra. Early in 1861, at the age of thirty-four, he passed away. Three months after his death, his wife gave birth to a son, who was named Motilal. He was brought up by his elder brother, Nandlal. Motilal Nehru, the father of Jawaharlal, forged his way to the forefront of the Allahabad Bar, where he built up an enormous practice; he was noted for his natural shrewdness, persuasive advocacy, and ready wit. Genial, fond of good food and good wine and good conversation, he was known among his friends—British and Indian—for his generous hospitality.

The Early Years

As a child, Jawaharlal was the recipient of much anxious solicitude from his parents. His mother, Swarup Rani, showered on him, as he wrote later, “indiscriminate and excessive love.” Motilal decided that the schools in Allahabad were not good enough for his son, and arranged for his instruction at home by European tutors. Though he was spared the straitjacket of a conventional education, solitary instruction at home deepened the loneliness of the boy, who as the only child for eleven years had little opportunity to play with children of his own age. One of his tutors, Ferdinand T. Brooks, a young man of mixed Irish and French extraction, inspired in him a zest for reading and an interest in science.


From English tutors to an English public school must have seemed to Motilal Nehru a natural, perhaps a necessary step. In 1905 he took his son to England and had him admitted to Harrow public school. Jawaharlal entered the school routine of studies and sports, though he did not seem to leave any impression on his contemporaries, nor did they find his company intellectually stimulating. "My tastes and inclinations," he wrote to his father, "are quite different. Here boys older than me and in higher forms than me take great interest in things which appear to me childish."

In October 1907 Jawaharlal was admitted to Trinity College at Cambridge. His interest in science led him to take the Natural Science Tripos for his subjects. The three years he spent at Cambridge were, as he recalled later, "pleasant years with many friends . . . and a gradual widening of the intellectual horizon." The days were taken up with work and play, and the long winter evenings passed in interminable discussions on life, literature, politics, ethics, sex, and people, until long after midnight the dying fires sent Jawaharlal and his friends shivering to their beds. Cambridge also imparted a keen edge to Jawaharlal's political thinking. His letters from Harrow and Cambridge exuded nationalist fervor and aggressive anti-imperialism, which alarmed his father, though it was not uncommon for Indian students at British universities to pass through a phase of intellectual rebellion and political extremism.

A Political Calling

After graduating from Cambridge, Jawaharlal qualified as a barrister and returned to India in 1912 to practice at the Allahabad High Court as his father's junior. He was soon bored by what he called "the technicalities and trivialities of much of the legal lore." Deep down in him, there was a vacuum, which required filling with something more than personal and professional ambition. It was politics that seemed to strike a vital chord in him, but politics in Allahabad were too tepid for him. It was only in June 1917, when the arrest of Annie Besant, the leader of the Home Rule movement, created a political storm that he was drawn into the vortex of political agitation. However, soon afterward, a declaration by the British government affirming the British policy of "developing self-governing institutions" in India brought down the political temperature. The politics of Allahabad relapsed into their wonted torpor; the Nehrus fell back into domestic and professional grooves.

Advent of Gandhi. Meanwhile, Jawaharlal had married Kamala Kaul, the daughter of a Delhi businessman, in 1916. In November 1917 Indira, their only child, was born. Like many of his contemporaries, educated in British universities, young Nehru would have slid into the comfortable anonymity of a well-off up-country lawyer,



Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's diplomatic style as India's first prime minister was distinctly his own. Often suggesting solutions in strong intellectual and moral terms, his candid comments on world events, especially in the early 1950s, evoked much resentment in the West. CORBIS.

were it not for the emergence of a new leader on the Indian scene. M. K. Gandhi had returned to his homeland in 1915 after twenty years' sojourn in South Africa, where he had led the small Indian immigrant community in its struggle against racial discrimination. In the course of this struggle, Gandhi had evolved *satyagraha*, a new method of rectifying injustice and resisting oppression nonviolently. Nehru first met Gandhi in 1916. He was somewhat puzzled and baffled by his political philosophy but attracted by his personality. Reports of an agrarian agitation that Gandhi led against European indigo planters in Bihar in 1917 impressed Nehru; they indicated that Gandhi possessed a keen political sense and an effective weapon of nonviolent resistance, which was a promising alternative to the armchair polemics and the sporadic acts of terrorism between which Indian politics had so far been oscillating.

Nehru's real initiation into militant politics came in the spring of 1919, when Gandhi launched a campaign against the Rowlatt Bills restricting civil liberties, one of which was passed by the Imperial Legislative Council in the teeth of the opposition of Indian members. Jawaharlal felt an irresistible call to follow Gandhi, but his father, a

moderate and constitutionalist Congress leader, strongly disapproved of his twenty-nine-year-old son plunging into an unconstitutional agitation. Having failed to dissuade his son, Motilal Nehru sought Gandhi's intervention. Gandhi visited Allahabad and advised Jawaharlal to be patient. Soon afterward the British massacre in Amritsar and martial law in the Punjab alienated millions of Indians from the British Raj and brought both Nehrus, father and son, into political alignment with each other and with Gandhi. Motilal was the first front-rank leader of the Congress to cast his lot with Gandhi when the Mahatma launched a campaign of "nonviolent noncooperation" in September 1920. The call to nonviolent battle against British rule swept young Nehru off his feet. "I gave up," he was to write later in his autobiography, "all other associates and contacts, old friends, books, even newspapers, except insofar as they dealt with the work in hand. I almost forgot my family, my wife and my daughter."

In December 1921, Jawaharlal and his father were arrested and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The noncooperation movement was fast gathering momentum when in February 1922, alarmed by a riot in a remote village in eastern India, Gandhi called it to a halt on the ground that the atmosphere in the country was not conducive to nonviolent mass civil disobedience. Not surprisingly, he was arrested soon afterward, and his campaign collapsed.

Visit to Europe. The sudden revocation of civil disobedience by Gandhi shocked Jawaharlal. During the next five years, nationalist politics were in the doldrums. Gandhi's followers in the Congress Party were themselves divided on the issue of entry into the legislatures. There was also a deterioration in Hindu-Muslim relations. Jawaharlal disliked factional and communal politics and kept out of them. In March 1926 he left for Europe for the treatment of his wife, who was suffering from tuberculosis. While she was convalescing in Switzerland, Nehru had time for reading, reflection, and travel. In February 1927 he attended the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism at Brussels, where he met radicals and revolutionaries from four continents. In November 1927 he paid a short visit to Moscow when the Soviet Union was celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. What impressed him was the planned Soviet assault on poverty, disease, and illiteracy, and the tremendous push toward industrialization and away from customs that impeded social progress.

The European visit gave a radical edge to Jawaharlal Nehru's politics. His speeches and writings acquired a sharp anti-imperialist and pro-socialist slant. At the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta in December 1928, he clashed head-on with the "old guard" of the party on the issue of dominion status versus

complete independence as the goal of the party. Thanks to Gandhi's ingenuity, a compromise was reached, and a split was averted. It was decided that if by 31 December 1929 dominion status was not conceded by the British government, the Congress would demand complete independence for India and fight for it by resorting to civil disobedience.

The Calcutta Congress stirred the stagnant pools of Indian politics. For Nehru, politics again acquired a sense of purpose, urgency, and adventure. All signs pointed to Gandhi's return to active leadership of the Congress. Gandhi was in fact elected president of the Congress session to be held in December 1929, but he declined the honor in favor of Jawaharlal. The fact that it fell to young Nehru to preside over the momentous session at Lahore, and to unfurl the flag of *purna swaraj* (complete independence), gave a tremendous boost to his popularity throughout the country.

Salt Satyagraha. As the new year dawned, Gandhi announced that he would launch his campaign by marching the 240 miles (388 kilometers) from Ahmedabad to Dandi, a village on the western coast, to break the salt tax law, which made the manufacture of salt a state monopoly. The first impulse of the government, as of the Congress intellectuals, was to ridicule the idea that there could be any connection between salt and *swaraj* (self-government). However, the political scene was quickly transformed under Gandhi's magic.

The Salt Satyagraha electrified the country. It drew the entire Nehru family into the political arena. Jawaharlal was the first to go to prison; he was followed by his father, his sister, and his wife. Jawaharlal was thrilled by the tremendous response of the people to Gandhi's call. More than 60,000 people courted imprisonment. But a year later, in March 1931, Jawaharlal was shocked, when after talks with Viceroy Lord Irwin, Gandhi agreed to call off civil disobedience and to attend a Round Table Conference in London to discuss constitutional reforms. A few days later, however, at the annual Congress session at Karachi, he piloted a resolution supporting the Gandhi-Irwin Pact.

Nehru and Gandhi. This was not the first, nor would it be the last, time that Nehru differed with Gandhi. There were numerous occasions when he was assailed by doubts about Gandhi's policies, but he did not press his differences to the breaking point. They were divided by twenty years of age as well as intellectual and temperamental differences. Contrary to the common impression, however, it was not always Nehru who gave in. Gandhi knew that young Nehru was not a blind disciple; he wanted to harness Nehru's talents and dynamism for the national cause, and was confident of containing his impetuous and

rebellious spirit. It was not without much inner conflict that Jawaharlal was able to reconcile the conflict between his mind and his heart, between his own views and his loyalty to Gandhi. He knew that Gandhi was open to argument and compromise on important issues. There were several planks in the Congress program that Nehru sponsored and Gandhi accepted, such as the declaration of fundamental rights in 1931, the struggle for civil liberties in the princely states, and the unequivocal denunciation of Nazism and fascism in Europe.

Nehru and World War. In 1935, when Nehru's wife suffered a serious relapse of her pulmonary tuberculosis, he was released from prison—he had been arrested in February 1934—to take her to Switzerland. This visit increased his sensitivity to the currents and crosscurrents of international politics and his hatred of the totalitarian regimes that were casting the shadow of war over Europe. When World War II broke out in 1939, Nehru wanted the Indian National Congress to throw its weight on the side of the democracies, but he realized that the people of India could hardly be inspired to wholeheartedly participate in the war effort unless the British government gave India a real stake in the war. Nehru hated the totalitarian regimes and wanted India to strengthen the Allied cause but, to his dismay, the British government headed by Winston Churchill failed to make any imaginative gesture to nationalist India. In 1940–1941, after the fall of France and after the entry of Japan into the war, the Congress had offered to join a national government to resist the Axis powers. In March 1942 the British government sent a Cabinet minister, Sir Stafford Cripps, with proposals on the future constitution of India to enlist the support of Indian political parties, but no agreement could be reached.

Independence. In the aftermath of the failure of the Cripps mission, Gandhi's decision to embark on mass civil disobedience created a painful dilemma for Nehru, but he fell in line with the decision of the party. The government unleashed a massive repression. All Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, and more than 60,000 adherents of the party were imprisoned. This was Nehru's longest spell in jail; it was also his last. He was released in 1945, just in time to attend the abortive Simla conference convened by the viceroy, Lord Wavell, to break the political deadlock. Soon after, the Labour Government was voted into power in Britain, and it decided to concede self-government to India. Nehru played a prominent role in this conference as well as in the subsequent negotiations with the Cabinet mission in 1946, and later with Lord Mountbatten, for transfer of power from British to Indian hands. In these negotiations the most vexed question was the position of the Muslim community in India after the withdrawal of the British power.

Nehru was a rationalist and a humanist and was remarkably free from religious passions and prejudices. The communalism of India, he told Lord Lothian, a British Liberal politician, in 1936, "is essentially political, economic and middle class." He had observed upper-class politicians, both Hindu and Muslim, who had little contact with the masses, and were wrangling endlessly over the distribution of seats in legislatures and jobs under the government. The Muslim League had been the principal proponent of Muslim separatism since the beginning of the twentieth century. It was founded in 1906 with a two-fold program: loyalty to the British Raj, and provision of safeguards for Muslims against a Hindu majority in a future constitution. The League had met with an electoral disaster in 1937. But nine years later, in the general election of 1946, it won a landslide victory under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the president of the All-India Muslim League. He owed his victory to his undoubted tactical and polemical skills, but he was also able to exploit the antagonism between the Congress and the British government that prevailed throughout World War II. The vision he held forth of a separate Muslim state, reminiscent of the glory of the Mughal empire, struck the imagination of his coreligionists. Nehru has been blamed for underrating Jinnah, but in retrospect, it seems it was beyond the power of Nehru and the Congress Party to stem the tide of Muslim separatism, which had been rising since the beginning of the twentieth century, and which took the form of secession and nationalism in the 1940s. The stand taken by Nehru, and indeed by the Congress leadership, was that religion was not a satisfactory basis for nationality, and that the best course for multiracial and multireligious countries was to seek a solution within the framework of a federal constitution, as the United States and Canada had done. Such a proposition was, however, not acceptable to the leaders of the Muslim League; its truth was to dawn upon them much later, in 1971, after the breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh.

Nation Building

When Nehru assumed office as prime minister, he was fifty-eight. Although his entire working life had been spent in opposition to British rule—nine years actually spent in jail—he made a remarkably effortless transition from rebel to statesman. His political philosophy was eclectic. It drew upon nineteenth-century British liberalism, Fabian socialism, Marxist dialectics, Soviet economics, and Gandhian ethics. In spite of a penchant for political theory, Nehru's approach to critical issues was pragmatic. In 1949 he led India into the Commonwealth despite the long history of conflict with Britain and his own vehement opposition to dominion status twenty years earlier. Similarly, even though he had avowed his

allegiance to the socialist ideal in the 1930s, he sought, after he assumed office, to reconcile socialism with economic growth and stability.

Immediately in 1947, Nehru's government was faced with formidable challenges: the restoration of order after the terrible upheaval caused by the partition of the subcontinent, the resettlement of the uprooted 5 million refugees from West Pakistan, and the rehabilitation of the transport system and the administrative machinery. The five-hundred-odd princely states, with the exception of Kashmir, were integrated into the Indian Union with remarkable speed and smoothness. Nehru took an active part in the Constituent Assembly in framing the constitution of the Indian Republic, which was inaugurated on 26 January 1950. He had to lay the foundations of a new political and economic order. He had never been a member of a legislative body, but he quickly became a great parliamentarian. Unlike many other leaders of newly liberated countries in Asia and Africa, he submitted himself to the verdict of three successive general elections, the fairness of which was never questioned. He nurtured institutions and traditions indispensable for the growth of parliamentary democracy, such as a free press, an independent judiciary, and the supremacy of the civil government.

Economic policy. Nehru had studied Marx and admired Soviet attempts at planned economic development, but his socialism was not of the doctrinaire variety. After he came to power, he sought to reduce economic disparities, but without hampering the growth of the economy. He knew India had been bypassed by the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. His aim was "to convert India's economy into that of a modern state and to fit her into the nuclear age and do it quickly." He lifted Indian science from its small beginnings to a national effort. There was a tremendous expansion of higher education, especially in science and technology; the result was that the country was able to build a large reservoir of scientific manpower, second only to that of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The establishment of the Planning Commission in 1950 was a landmark in Nehru's economic policy. The commission fixed levels of investment, prescribed priorities, apportioned investment between agriculture and industry, and allocated resources between the state governments and the central government. Nehru envisioned economic planning as a long-term strategy. He used it not only to make the best use of available resources, but also to forge links of economic unity in the Indian federal system, and through public debate to make it an instrument of democratic education and peaceful social change. The results of the first fifteen years' efforts were substantial; the area under irrigation increased by 45 million

acres, food production rose from 55 million to 89 million metric tons, installed power generating capacity increased from 23 million to 102 million kilowatts, and industrial production grew by 94 percent. Unfortunately, most of the gains of these years were offset by an unexpected and unprecedented increase in population.

Foreign policy. Nehru's entire term as prime minister was contemporaneous with the peak of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but he refused to ally India with either of them. Originally, this policy was an assertion of India's right, after attainment of independence, to conduct her international relations without being tied to the apron strings of Great Britain or any other great power. But it also became, in Nehru's hands, a calculated and sophisticated response to the postwar scene, dominated as it was by the rivalry of the two superpowers. Nehru, who, besides his lifelong association with Gandhi, had been trained as a scientist and was a self-taught historian, was quick to perceive that the two power blocs were poised for mutual destruction, which, in the post-Hiroshima era, posed a serious threat to the future of humankind. India's refusal to be stampeded into either bloc blazed a trail that most of the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa followed. The organization of the nonaligned movement remained somewhat loosely knit and amorphous, but it nevertheless became a force to reckon with inside and outside the United Nations, and it acted as a vocal pressure group in the battle against neocolonialism and racism and in favor of world peace. At the Bandung (1956) and Belgrade (1961) conferences of nonaligned countries, Nehru's was on the whole a reassuring voice and a steady hand on the leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc.

Nehru's diplomatic style was peculiarly his own; it owed much to his experience as a nationalist leader for three decades, when he was continually, and publicly, analyzing problems and suggesting solutions in intellectual and moral terms. His instant and candid comments on world events, especially in the early 1950s, evoked much resentment in the West. It was alleged that his criticisms of the actions (such as in Hungary) of the Soviet Union tended to be more cautious and modulated than his criticisms of the actions (such as over Suez) of the Western powers. The fact is that Nehru's sharp criticism of particular policies of the Western democracies was intended to bring to bear the pressure of public opinion in these countries on their governments. Since this method could not work in the case of the Soviet bloc (the media being controlled by the state), the use of the diplomatic channels was a better option for Nehru than was public criticism. Nehru's object was, as he once put it, "to bring about results rather than put up people's backs." On such issues as West Berlin and the independence of

Austria, his moderating influence through personal appeals to Soviet leaders, exercised behind the scenes, was much greater than what has been commonly assumed. Willy Brandt, the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) during the Berlin crisis, told the author of this article in 1971 that Nehru had used his influence with the Soviet Union to calm the crisis. Similarly, according to Chancellor Kreisky of Austria, Nehru had already before 1955 begun to mediate between Austria and the Soviet Union. "We asked Nehru," Kreisky recalled, "to tell the Soviets that if the Soviets were to sign a treaty, Austria would become a neutral country."

It was a great disappointment to Nehru that he failed to win and sustain the goodwill of India's two great neighbors, China and Pakistan, but it was not for lack of trying. "The root cause" with Pakistan, as Nehru explained to President Harry Truman in 1949 during his visit to the United States in 1949, was "the emotional climate of Pakistan whose people were being constantly encouraged by the government and leaders to pursue a policy of inspired fear and hatred towards India. Kashmir was thus not so much a cause as an illustration of tensions between the two countries."

India was one of the first countries to recognize Communist China. Nehru showed extraordinary restraint when Chinese troops marched into Tibet in 1950. He even incurred the displeasure of the Western bloc by supporting China's entry into the United Nations. But from 1959, India was faced with territorial claims and encroachments on the India-China border. Three years later came a surprise attack in full force. On the Indian side, there were doubtless lapses both in diplomacy and defense. The Indian positions on the mountainous terrain in the northeast were not well defended; India suffered a defeat that deeply hurt Nehru and perhaps hastened his death in May 1964.

Conclusion

Nehru was a writer of distinction. His major works, *Glimpses of World History* (1934), *Discovery of India* (1946), and *An Autobiography* (1936), were all written in prison. His *Autobiography* is considered his most important work. It is less a chronicle of his life than that of the nationalist movement. It was too much to hope that the British public would take to sharp criticisms of British rule in India from one of the most radical leaders of Indian nationalism, but the book became a best-seller in England. It had ten printings in 1936 and was translated into thirty-odd languages. Besides being an exercise of the author in introspection, it presented for the first time the case for Indian independence under Gandhi's leadership in an idiom that the West could understand.

No political leader, with the exception of Gandhi, stirred the minds and hearts of the Indian people for so long and so deeply as Nehru did. As one of the principal architects of Indian freedom, as a nation builder and as a champion of world peace, Jawaharlal Nehru was among the tallest figures of the twentieth century. He led his country during the difficult years of transition from colonialism to democracy, from traditionalism to modernity, and from a stagnant to a developing economy.

As prime minister of India, the task Nehru undertook was a formidable one: the simultaneous pursuit of national integration, political democracy, economic development, and social justice; in all these objectives he achieved a measure of success. But there were losses as well: the failure to foresee the population explosion, to strictly enforce land reforms, to accelerate universal elementary education, and to stem the slide in the standards of administration. These deficiencies and failures were partly attributable to Nehru's own limitations, partly to the actual working of his party and the political system. Unlike Gandhi, Nehru lacked the gift of identifying and harnessing political talent, and he failed to build up a second line of leadership. However, the charge that he sought to set up a political dynasty is untenable. It is true that he stubbornly refused to nominate a successor. A week before his death, he said, "If I nominate somebody, that is the surest way of his not becoming prime minister. People would be jealous of him, dislike him." However, during his last illness, when he recalled Lal Bahadur Shastri to join his Cabinet, it was taken as a hint that he favored him as his successor. As for his daughter, Indira Gandhi, her opportunity was to come seventeen months later, after Shastri's sudden and untimely death, when she was elected leader of the Congress Party in an open contest.

B. R. Nanda

See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gandhi, Rajiv; Nehru, Motilal; United States, Relations with**

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
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NEHRU, MOTILAL (1861–1931), attorney and political leader, president of Indian National Congress (1919 and 1928). Motilal Nehru was the father of India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; the grandfather of the third prime minister, Indira Gandhi; and great-grandfather of her son, the fourth prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. One of British India's wealthiest and wisest lawyers, Motilal abandoned his life of Western luxury in the aftermath of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre at Amritsar in 1919 to follow Mahatma Gandhi's call for nonviolent noncooperation (*satyagraha*). That December, Motilal presided over India's National Congress, which met in Amritsar.

Motilal Nehru was less revolutionary, however, than either Gandhi or his own son, Jawaharlal, and he refused to boycott elections to India's new Legislative Councils following the enactment of Edwin Montagu's 1919 Government of India Act. Motilal joined forces with his Bengali barrister friend, Chitta Ranjan Das (1870–1925), to start their Swarajist (Freedom) Party in 1923, sponsoring Indian candidates to run for council seats in local elections, which Gandhi and his Congress disciples boycotted. The Swarajists did fairly well, but when their candidates won seats to provincial legislative councils, instead of supporting the British viceroy and his government, their strategy was to vote against and criticize every measure proposed by the government from within its own council chambers. Nehru and Das both knew the new viceroy Lord Reading, a jurist, well enough to argue with him personally, while Gandhi retreated to his rural ashram, spinning and weaving cotton, focusing his energies on village self-help as the best means of attaining self-rule (*swaraj*), or "freedom."

Soon after Das died in 1925, Nehru lost faith in the efficacy of the party they had founded, and before the end of his own life he returned to Gandhi's way. Together, they worked to revive Congress demands for changes leading to independence, too long ignored by British Tory indifference and arrogance. Nehru accepted for one last time the heavy burden of presiding over the Calcutta Congress in 1928. His own heart was weakening by then, but he went to Calcutta more to keep his only



Motilal Nehru. Shown here with his wife Swarup Rani and son Jawaharlal c. 1899, Motilal Nehru, one of British India's wealthiest barristers, later abandoned his life of Western luxury to follow Mahatma Gandhi's call for nonviolent action. GETTY IMAGES.

son from leaving the Congress in disgust and frustration. He sponsored Jawaharlal, with Mahatma Gandhi's support, to preside over the next Congress in Lahore, which resolved to call in December of 1929 for *purna swaraj* (complete freedom) from the British Raj in one year.

Motilal and Jawaharlal would both be back in jail, however, long before India's freedom was finally won. Yet by securing for Jawaharlal the helm of the Congress when he did, Pandit Motilal assured his son the first premiership of independent India, sixteen long years after his own death.

Stanley Wolpert

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NEOLITHIC PERIOD A general term used by archaeologists, “Neolithic” (or New Stone Age) identifies cultural adaptations that involve the transition from mobile hunting-gathering strategies to sedentism and the domestication of plants and animals. Numerous different Neolithic transitions were taking place in South Asia, but there are only a few regions that have evidence for the initial processes that led to the domestication of animals and plants. In the northwestern subcontinent, the regions of Afghanistan and Baluchistan provide the earliest evidence for the use of domesticated sheep or goats, cattle (humped zebu), and wheat and barley between 9000 and 7000 B.C. In other regions, mobile hunter-gatherers continued to live by hunting and gathering a broad spectrum of animals and plants, but they began to settle down in large communities near these abundant resources. These Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) communities continued quite late in some parts of the world, and in South Asia the evidence for long-term Mesolithic adaptations is seen in the Gangetic region. In the subsequent Gangetic Neolithic period, there is evidence for domesticated rice and possibly a separate episode of cattle domestication. The Southern Neolithic of peninsular India may represent the initial domestication of local millets and also of cattle, though there may be a connection between the cattle of the middle Ganga and those of South India. In Kashmir, the Neolithic sites of Burzahom and Gufkral may represent connections to a separate Neolithic transition linked to Tibet and China. Other regions that have yet to be fully explored are the Chotanagpur Plateau and the southern Gangetic Plain in Bihar and Bengal, as well as northeastern India in Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur.

Northwestern Neolithic

In the northwestern subcontinent, between 20,000 and 15,000 B.C., Upper Paleolithic communities in the Aq Kupruk area had begun to focus their hunting on wild sheep and goats as well as cattle, and they may have begun gathering wild grains such as wheat and barley. Between 9000 and 8000 B.C., the first evidence of domestic sheep or goats and possibly cattle has been found at the cave sites of Gar-i-Mar and Gar-i-Asp, Aq Kupruk, Afghanistan. These communities did not produce pottery and were still involved in hunting and probably gathered wild grains, but they provide important evidence that the processes leading to domestication were occurring in this region at about the same time as in the Near East.

The preceramic Neolithic sites of Afghanistan provide a clue to the importance of this region, but the site of Mehrgarh, in Pakistan, gives a much clearer picture of the complex processes leading to a sedentary lifestyle based on domestic plants and animals. The transition at Mehrgarh was part of a larger process occurring

throughout Baluchistan and Afghanistan, and extending all the way to the Zagros Mountains and the Fertile Crescent region of the Near East. In Baluchistan the earliest agricultural settlements have not been located, but excavations at the site of Kili Gul Mohammad (4600–3900 B.C.), near Quetta, suggest that the earliest communities in the highlands may have harvested wild or cultivated cereal grains and possibly managed sheep, goat, and cattle herds. With the approach of winter, many communities would have moved through the passes with their herds and bags filled with grain to spend the winter next to the rivers or springs along the piedmont. Today, winters in the Kachi Plain are quite pleasant, with only occasional frost, but the summers are unbearably hot and dry. In the past, from 16,000 to 7000 B.C., there may have been a slightly stronger summer monsoon and more seasonal variation in temperature. Over time, communities began to cultivate grain crops on the plains. These crops were probably planted in October, at the end of the summer monsoon, and were watered by the winter rains in December and January. The annual migration back to the highlands would have taken place after the spring harvest in much the same pattern as we see today among agro-pastoral communities living in the Kachi Plain.

Mehrgarh is located at the foot of the Bolan Pass that connects the highland plateaus of Baluchistan to the Kachi Plain at the edge of the Indus Valley. From around 7000 B.C., the initial settlers used wild as well as cultivated barley and grew domestic wheat, but they relied primarily on hunted wild game, with only a few examples of domestic goat. Wild game included gazelle, deer, pigs, sheep, and goats, as well as larger animals such as wild cattle, water buffalo, and onagers. Even elephants may have been hunted; a large tusk was found in one of the early houses. An important wild fruit that was collected is the jujube, a plumlike fruit that ripens in the spring. This fruit can be dried or preserved as sweet chutney. Date seeds found at the site indicate the collection of summer crops, but it is not possible to determine if they are from wild or domestic plants. At first the site was inhabited seasonally, and through repeated flooding from the nearby Bolan River and subsequent rebuilding, the mound grew to a height of over 33 feet (10 m). By 5500 B.C. agriculture and animal husbandry became more important. The use of sheep, goats, and cattle increased, with the humped variety of cattle, *Bos indicus* being the most important. Although it is not clear if sheep and goats were domesticated indigenously or brought in from the Zagros to the west, the humped zebu was locally domesticated, and recent genetic studies show that it is distinct from the nonhumped cattle (*Bos taurus*) of the Near East.

The first inhabitants of Mehrgarh used stone blades, polished stone adzes, and bone tools, but no pottery was

produced. Numerous ash layers filled with fire-cracked rock indicate that some foods, such as grain and stews, were cooked in skins or baskets with hot rocks. The earliest inhabitants were, however, familiar with the plastic properties of clay; they made small clay figurines and small unfired clay containers, as well as hand-formed mud bricks. Most of the evidence for early grains comes from impressions of wheat and barley preserved in the mud bricks. Mud-brick houses separated by refuse dumps and passageways were oriented in different directions and not as a planned settlement. The earliest houses were square or rectangular and were subdivided into four or more internal rooms. Later structures had larger rooms with numerous internal subdivisions set below the floor level for storage of grain and other valuable commodities.

Although the early inhabitants may have left the site for short periods, they buried their dead in open spaces between the houses and over time built new houses on top of earlier burials. The graves were made by digging a vertical shaft, then excavating a side chamber in which the corpse was placed, lying on its side in a flexed position. Funerary offerings were placed around the head or at the feet of the individual, and they often included a variety of ornaments. In many of the earliest burials, dating to about 6500 B.C., young goats were slaughtered and buried with the dead, a practice that has also been noted at other Neolithic sites in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Utilitarian objects were included with the dead, presumably for use in the afterlife. Men were often buried with polished stone adzes, blades, and blade cores, while some of the female burials had bone and antler tools, baskets coated with bitumen, lumps of red ochre, and grinding stones. Ornaments were included in the burials of men and women as well as children. The most common ornaments were necklaces, bracelets, and anklets made of various types of beads, using locally available yellow-brown limestone as well as exotic materials: azure blue lapis lazuli, blue-green turquoise, black unfired steatite, white fired steatite, red-orange carnelian, banded agate, and various colors of marine shell. A single copper or malachite bead was found in one of the burials, but no other precious metals were used at this time.

Wide shell bangles made from a single large conch shell (*Turbinella pyrum*) and worn by women on the forearm have also been found in the earliest burials. This species of shell was probably traded up the Indus Valley from the Makran coast near modern Karachi, some 310 miles (500 km) to the south. Many of the marine shells and pendants made from mother-of-pearl (*Pinctada*) may have come from areas farther to the west along the Makran coast, and possibly even from across the Persian Gulf in Oman. Copper and malachite, as well as banded agates, probably came from central and northern

Afghanistan; lapis lazuli was brought from the far northern mountains of Afghanistan, and turquoise from northeastern Iran. These different varieties of ornaments indicate that long-distance trade networks had been established as early as 7000 B.C., linking the coastal regions of the Indus Valley with the interior plains and on into the highlands of Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Numerous sites like Mehrgarh were scattered along the edges of the Indus Valley, and by 5500 B.C. they had established the basic subsistence economy, the trade networks, and patterns of craft specialization that set the foundation for later Chalcolithic cultures.

Gangetic Neolithic

Settled agriculture in the central Gangetic Plain emerges from indigenous Mesolithic communities that appear to have settled in large villages, with a focus on the hunting of wild cattle and the collection of grains such as wild rice. At the site of Koldihwa, early evidence for cattle and domestic rice has been confirmed by the discovery of numerous other sites. At Mahagara, the earliest Neolithic village had circular huts made of reeds and mud plaster, with a large central pen for keeping cattle. The animal bones from the site include sheep or goats and cattle as well as wild animals. Because the remains of animal bones are fragmentary, it is possible that the sheep or goat bones could have come from gazelle or antelope, but there is no question that the cattle remains represent domestic animals because of the presence of a pen filled with cattle hoof prints. Stone blades and ground stone axes were used, along with bone and antler tools. Pottery, made with basket or cord impressions as decoration on the exterior, has impressions of rice grains in the clay. The earliest dates from Koldihwa suggest that rice and cattle were being domesticated around 6700 to 4500 B.C., but the charcoal used for dating may belong to a hearth from the earlier phase of occupation. Additional charcoal samples from both Koldihwa and Mahagara, combined with dates from other sites with similar material culture, place the occupation of Koldihwa and Mahagara between 2400 and 1700 B.C.

Southern Neolithic

Neolithic transitions in South India are the result of similar processes seen in other regions, but the plants and animals are somewhat different. There is also more variation in the material culture because the sites are located in a large area of the central Deccan Plateau (Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu), with some settlements scattered along the Andhra coast. The earliest date comes from the lowest levels of Watgal, Karnataka (2900–2600 B.C.). Two major types of sites have been identified. Ash mound sites such as Utnur and Kodekal are the result of repeated accumulations and burning of

cattle dung. Some habitation areas are found alongside the ash mounds, but in other areas like Watgal, the site is not associated with an ash mound. Early scholars argued that the people who established these sites were semi-nomadic herders who migrated to the Deccan from northeastern Iran, but this view is no longer supported. In fact, the pottery and stone tool technology appears to be the result of local processes not at all related to the Indus Valley or Gujarat to the northwest. Urn burials of infants and some adults are also found in association with ash mounds and habitation sites.

While detailed studies have not been conducted on the cattle bones, some scholars suggest that the bones represent two different breeds, which may have been domesticated locally. Sheep and goat bones have been reported, but as mentioned for the Gangetic sites, these bones are easily confused with gazelle and antelope. The most convincing evidence for local domestication comes from the botanical remains of indigenous millets, grams, and pulses (edible seeds of certain bean and lentil crops). Earlier reports of African millets in the early Neolithic have proven to be unfounded. Tubers were also collected and processed at the sites.

In the later Neolithic and early Iron Age sites in South India, there is evidence for the introduction of African millets, wheat, and barley, as well as the horse, that would have come from Gujarat or farther north. This evidence of northern contacts may have begun quite early, based on the presence of copper tools that would also have been traded from the Aravalli region of Gujarat and Rajasthan. Overall, the Southern Neolithic represents a combination of indigenous subsistence strategies that eventually incorporated external subsistence practices and cultural traditions. One of the main questions that scholars need to address is the relationship between these early Neolithic communities and later Dravidian-speaking peoples.

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See also **Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age; Goddess Images; Indus Valley Civilization**

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NEPAL The kingdom of Nepal, centered in the Kathmandu Valley, has existed for more than fifteen hundred years. On the north, it is bounded by China and the Himalayas, including Mount Everest, and on the south, east and west it borders India. Modern Nepal dates from the founding of the Gurkha dynasty in the sixteenth century. At their apex, Gurkha conquests reached from Garhwal, India, in the west, through Sikkim in the east. The Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–1816) reduced the kingdom to its current, much smaller boundaries. Nepal is the world's only official Hindu state. It includes multiple ethnic and caste groups that include Brahman, Chetri, Newar, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Sherpa, and Tharu. The population in 2004 was 25.7 million, according to United Nations figures, while per capita annual income was about U.S.\$240, according to the World Bank. About 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas.

The Ranas, the Panchayat System, and Democracy

From 1846 to 1950, Nepal was ruled by autocratic hereditary prime ministers, the Ranas, supported by the army. Their legal code institutionalized the caste system. Nepal remained isolated from the outside world. The monarchy regained executive powers in 1951, with the support of India and anti-Rana leading party, the Nepali Congress Party formed a government. In 1960, however, King Mahendra seized control, suspending Parliament, the Constitution, and party politics. In 1962 Nepal's king devised a multitier, partyless the political system known

as *panchayat* for village, district, and national government. Although incorporating some democratic feature, the system remained firmly under the control of the monarch. Popular pressure from a democratic movement, established in 1980, led to the end of the *panchayat* system in 1990, the reestablishment of multiparty politics, and revision of the constitution. The Nepali Congress Party, which had collaborated with leftist groups in street protests against royal authoritarianism, won the country's first democratic elections in 1991. Democracy did not bring the desired degree of economic development or political stability, however.

Nepal's first political parties, the Nepali Congress Party and the Nepal Communist Party, though it has split and re-formed and been renamed many times, have remained the most important political parties. The Congress Party governed for most of the democratic period, while the Communist Party of Nepal/United Marxist-Leninist (CPN/UML) served as the main party of opposition. Elected governments were formed on average once a year, and corruption was rampant. Nepal remained one of the world's poorest countries, with profound economic, social, and educational inequalities, few roads or jobs, little electricity or health care, and with environmental degradation taking an increasing toll. Many young Nepalis left to work overseas or in India.

The People's War and Subsequent Instability

In 1994 a Communist Party government was elected, which lasted only a year. In February 1996, a small, left-wing faction of the UML renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN-Maoist, and presented forty demands for political, social, and economic reform to the Congress-led coalition. When the government failed to respond, the CPN-Maoists declared a "People's War," centered in remote parts of the mid-western hill districts of Rukum and Rolpa. The government was slow to take notice. By 2001, when the army was ordered to counter the insurgency, the Maoist elements were present in nearly all of Nepal's seventy-two districts.

Further weakening the country's stability and the institution of the monarchy, in June 2001 almost a dozen members of the royal family, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, were murdered by Crown Prince Dipendra, who then shot himself. Prince Gyanendra was crowned king. In October 2002, Gyanendra dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet. The king subsequently reinstated a multiparty government in June 2004, which he tasked with preparing for elections in the spring of 2005. Before they were held, however, the king seized power again.

The Maoists' key leaders, Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (known as Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai,

participated in parliamentary democracy but were disenchanted by its political squabbling and their party's inability to win more seats. They and others adopted Mao Zedong's belief in violent revolution, seeking to end Nepal's constitutional monarchy and the unequal treatment of lower castes. The Maoists also were inspired by Peru's Shining Path guerrillas. By 2005, various estimates put Maoist strength at between 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, in addition to tens of thousands of hard-core followers and perhaps several hundred thousand sympathizers. Up to 30 percent of the cadre and combatants may be women. Rounds of peace talks between the government and the Maoists in 2001 and 2003 failed.

Role of India in Nepal

Referring to their geographic location between their large neighbors, China to the north and India to the south, Nepalis sometimes compare their country's situation to that of a "yam between two boulders." Both countries have influenced Nepal's history and culture, but India has been the more prevalent force in trade, language, religion and custom. So dominant has India been that many Nepalis fear their country's cultural absorption if not annexation by India. For its part, India has viewed the Hamalyas as its northern strategic boundary, exacerbating Nepal's anxieties.

Nearly 8 million Nepalis reside in India. India is Nepal's largest trading partner, though Nepal imports almost three times as much from India as it exports there. Inhabitants of Indian descent are especially numerous in the Terai, Nepal's flat, fertile land near the southern border. Indians, many of whom come to visit the birthplace of the Buddha, are Nepal's most numerous tourists.

After China forcibly annexed Tibet in 1950, India sought to strengthen its security by signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and a trade and transit agreement with the Rana regime in Nepal. Indian advisers played key roles in reorganizing Nepal's armed forces, training the civil service and police force. In March 1989, in a dispute over the renewal of the agreement that began when Nepal purchased some military supplies from China, India effectively blockaded Nepal, cutting off most of landlocked Nepal's trade with the outside world. Other points of friction have been boundary disputes and the Mahakali Treaty with India of 1996 concerning the distribution of water and electricity. The government of Nepal has been looking to India for help in its conflict with the Maoists, believing that some of the insurgency's key leaders have taken refuge in India.

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See also **China, Relations with; Pakistan and India**

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NEPAL, RELATIONS WITH Nepal is a landlocked country adjacent to India, China, and Bangladesh. It lies in the foothills of the Himalayas, dominated by the Kathmandu Valley, where most Nepalis live. Nepal is the only Hindu monarchy in the world and one of a handful of Asian countries to have escaped European colonial conquest.

The foundations of modern Nepal were laid by its conquest by Gurkha ruler Prithvi Narayan Shan in 1768. China defined Nepal's northern boundary in 1792 by halting Nepal's territorial expansion toward Tibet. The Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–1816) culminated in a treaty that defined the southern territorial boundaries of modern Nepal. In 1846 the kingdom of Nepal came under the sway of hereditary chief ministers, known as Ranas, who isolated Nepal and wielded decisive influence over its fortunes late into the twentieth century.

The onset of armed rebellion, sponsored by the Nepali Congress Party (NCP), resulted in the end of almost one hundred years of Rana paramourcy in 1951 and restoration of the sovereignty of the crown. The anti-Rana Nepalese Congress Party (NCP), which had been operating from India, joined their Rana adversaries to form a government, though headed by a Rana. It collapsed shortly afterwards and the NCP itself split in bitter division. M. P. Koirala, heading a pro-Monarchist faction known as the RPP, became Prime Minister. Several palace nominees succeeded him until 1958. More political unrest led to Nepal's first parliamentary elections in 1959, which were won resoundingly by B. P. Koirala (brother of the more monarchical M. P. Koirala) and the adoption of a multiparty Constitution. But King Mahendra, who had succeeded his father, King Tribhuvan, in 1955, seized power in 1960, suspending Parliament. Another new constitution legitimated the exercise of absolute power by the monarch, and Nepal was still an absolute monarchy when King Birendra ascended the throne in 1972.

In 1980 King Birendra agreed to allow direct elections to Parliament again in response to agitation for reform, but the NCP rejected them because of the stipulation that elections should take place on a nonparty basis. A campaign of civil disobedience by the NCP, which enjoyed the support of India because of its espousal of pluralist politics, gathered momentum. King Birendra agreed to a new Constitution in 1990 in the face of widespread street protests, and G. P. Koirala of the NCP became the first prime minister of democratic Nepal in 1991.

Nepal, the home of the legendary Gurkha soldiers, who fought with great distinction for the British Empire and still provide important contingents for the Indian army, remains a largely illiterate and impoverished country. It has virtually no resources, except for the beauty of its mountainous environment, which attracts tourists, and a potential for generating hydroelectric power that could be destined for the Indian market beyond its southern borders. Remittances from migrant workers, including, until recent times, hard currency income from Gurkhas serving with the British armed forces, are an important source of national revenue. More than 70 percent of Nepal's national budget is funded by foreign aid.

Nepal's international trade is dominated by India and is governed by a Trade and Transit treaty signed in 1951. It is estimated that half of Nepal's population lives in India, which exercises no control over inward migration from Nepal. Nepal's highly asymmetric dependence on India has engendered severe mistrust between its elites, and popular Nepali sentiment displays overt hostility toward India. Specific Nepali grievances over trade relations, the sharing of water resources, and demarcation of the border have been worsened by acrimony over the use of Nepal as a base by Pakistani agencies for subversion against India. Nepal also occupies the strategic geographical position of a buffer between India and Tibet, which entails a difficult balancing act between the two giants of the region, India and China. An underlying cause of tension between influential opinion in Nepali society and India has been the latter's historic support for parliamentary politics in Nepal as well as its effective veto over unwelcome outcomes.

Political instability did not end in Nepal with the new democratic constitutional dispensation introduced in 1991, as various factions struggled for position. The NCP government was overthrown in 1994, and a Communist-led coalition came to power. The Communists themselves split, and a radical Maoist group, the Nepal Communist Party, began an armed insurrection, demanding an end to the monarchy and the establishment of a people's republic.

A succession of parliamentary governments, led by different political factions, failed to resolve the deepening

political crisis provoked by the Maoist rebellion. Nor did they institute good governance, although Nepal's socio-economic indices showed some improvement during the decade of parliamentary rule. King Birendra relinquished formal power, assuming the role of constitutional monarch. The army remained loyal to the palace, and despite abrupt administrative reforms, including the centralization of administrative power and wholesale retrenchment of the existing bureaucracy, the old Nepali elites retained considerable influence.

In June 2001 the monarchy almost came to an end when Crown Prince Dipendra Bikram Shah murdered King Birendra, his own immediate family, and other close relatives, fatally injuring himself as well. National grief and mourning followed, after which the sole surviving brother, Gyanendra Bikram Shah, ascended the throne.

The increasingly bloody Maoist rebellion continued, and the eleventh government in a decade of parliamentary rule seemed powerless to resolve the political crisis. A truce with the Maoists in July 2001 failed within months, and a state of emergency was declared, with the army launching a determined assault on Maoists strongholds. Controversy over extending the state of emergency led to the dissolution of Parliament in May 2002. A few months later King Gyanendra dismissed the caretaker government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba when he sought to postpone parliamentary elections.

King Gyanendra assumed constitutional authority himself, and has nominated two interim prime ministers from the small pro-monarchical Rashytria Prajatantra Party. A fresh truce was agreed with the Maoists and peace talks commenced, but they also failed, and the bitter civil strife resumed in August 2003. The parliamentary parties, with the exception of the pro-monarchical group, were increasingly alienated from the monarchy, refusing all cooperation until the king restores parliament.

In the following year, the former elected premier, Sher Bahadur Deuba, was renominated as prime minister by King Gyanendra. But he dismissed him in February 2005 yet again, allegedly for failing to make headway in peace talks with the Maoists and schedule parliamentary elections that the end to the conflict was hoped would allow. The declaration of an emergency and assumption of power directly by King Gyanendra, suspending civil liberties and arresting leading politicians, was greeted with emphatic international disapproval. Nepal found itself isolated, with the king at odds with parliamentary politicians, a disrupted economy and no end in sight to the bloody conflict that had already claimed thousands of lives.

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See also **China, Relations with; Pakistan and India**

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NEW DELHI Every conquering people of India used Delhi, because of its strategic location between the Indus and the Gangetic Plains, for the site of their capitals, from the ancient Hindu Indraprastha to the Turko-Afghan Sultanate of Tuglaqabad to the Mughal Shahjahanabad to the British Empire's New Delhi. And every ruler of India has manipulated architecture to leave his imprint on the city, giving the present city of Delhi the distinction of being the seventh capital. Following nearly a century and a half of struggling to tame "ungovernable" Calcutta, British India's premier city, the British shifted their capital to New Delhi after 1912. Their decision to employ an Indo-Saracenic visual language for the new capital's architecture was a demonstrated desire to encapsulate India's imperial past in its modern center of power, and to legitimize the British Raj in India.

Delhi's ancient Hindu heritage no doubt remains remote and shrouded in mystery, although archaeological excavations (the most recent conducted in 1991 at Anangpur, near Suraj Kund) reveal human habitation dating back to the late Stone Age. Indraprastha, mentioned in the great Aryan epic Mahābhārata (c. 1000 B.C.), is believed to have been located on the western bank of the Yamuna River, near the Purana Qila (Old Fort), where the Afghan Sher Shah established his capital. Excavations at Indrapat (near Purana Qila) have yielded painted gray earthenware dating back to 1000 B.C. The Aryan residents of Indraprastha used clay to make pots, made ornaments from precious stones, and lived in houses built from mud bricks, wattle, and daub.

Delhi was destined to play an increasingly prominent role as the capital of Muslim conquerors from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The Islamization of Delhi commenced with its conquest by Muhammad of Ghur in A.D. 1193, followed by invasions by rival Turko-Afghans, until the Mughal emperor Babur captured the city in 1526. The Turko-Afghan period, remembered as the Delhi Sultanate, left several important monuments,



Shoppers in New Delhi. New Delhi in the twenty-first century is a capital under siege from its own population. Teeming shoppers on Chandni Chowk (“Silver Street”), a commercial district near the Red Fort (named for its red sandstone walls). LINDSAY HEBBERD / CORBIS.

including the Qutab Minar, the tomb of Iltutmish at Mehrauli, the Ferozshah Kotla, Nizamuddin (named after a Sufi saint), Kotla Mubarakshah, the tomb of Sikander Lodi, and his fortress in the Lodi Gardens.

Mughal imperial Delhi enjoyed a cultural renaissance during the reign of Shah Jahan (1627–1658), known for his monumental architecture, with intricate designs of inlaid jewels and semiprecious stones. He envisioned a magnificent new capital in Delhi that would harken back to the splendor of his ancestral Persia, and in 1648 Delhi was renamed Shahjahanabad, serving as the twin Mughal capital along with Agra, about 110 miles (177 km) to the southwest. At Agra, Shah Jahan built the famous monument in white marble, the Taj Mahal, as a tomb for his beloved wife, Mumtaz Mahal; and at Delhi, he built the Red Fort in red sandstone and the Jama Masjid at Bhoja Pahadi. The Nahar-i-Bist (canal) linked the Red Fort with Chandni Chowk (Silver Street), a crowded commercial district that continues to offer goods to local residents and tourists alike.

The British understood the historical significance of Delhi when they shifted their capital from Calcutta. Among British India’s officials, it was widely believed that Delhi’s imperial associations would not only provide “a sense of historical continuity” but would also secure “permanency” for British rule in India. Viceroy Lord Hardinge kept the decision to build a new capital there top secret until the coronation durbar of King George V at Delhi’s historic Red Fort on 12 December 1911. On that occasion the king himself made the announcement.

New Delhi’s planning committee, appointed to determine the site for the new capital, selected municipal engineer John A. Brodie, Captain George Swinton, chairman of the London Country Council, Edwin Landseer Lutyens, a country house specialist, and Henry V. Lanchester, as a consulting architect. They decided to construct the new capital south of Old Delhi, in the area around Raisana Hill.

Covering an area of 3,200 acres (1,300 hectares), New Delhi was initially designed to accommodate a population of 65,000. British art critic Sir George Birdwood reminded the architects, “It is not a cantonment we have to lay out at Delhi, but an Imperial City—the symbol of the British Raj in India—and it must like Rome be built for eternity.” Lutyens and his associate Herbert Baker initially called for a tightly knit, high-density city with broad boulevards and high-rise buildings reminiscent of the Champs Élysées or Bombay; but they were opposed by other British officials who felt that in hot and humid India they must have space, greenery, and low-density bungalows on spacious parcels of land, ensuring distance between the English and the Indians, which had become the objective of British urban policy since the Great Rebellion of 1857. In New Delhi, the British produced mixed architectural results in their efforts to reflect British “achievement” while incorporating Indian tradition. Still, by blending European classicism with Indo-Saracenic motifs, they attempted to provide historical continuity to the new imperial capital of India.

Although New Delhi was planned adjacent to Old Delhi, the two cities were separated by open spaces and a railway embankment. New Delhi was accessible from Old Delhi through only two underpasses: the Minto and Lady Hardinge Bridges. New Delhi was laid out in a geometric pattern over a triangular base formed by Connaught Place (the commercial district), the government complex (housing the two secretariat blocks and the viceroy’s palace), and India Gate (that housed the statue of King George V, now removed). The centerpiece of the New Delhi plan is the use of a broad processional avenue, King’s Way (now Rajpath), linking India Gate with the viceroy’s palace (Rashtrapati Bhavan). The central secretariat complex is planned to dominate the skyline of New Delhi. The two

secretariat blocks are separated by the viceroy's palace in the middle, the three buildings occupying the highest land of Raisina Hill. The residential areas for lower- and middle-income employees were placed to the north of King's Way; senior British officials were provided bungalows with generous land to the south. In contrast to the old high-density walled city, New Delhi had a density of only twenty-five persons per acre.

It would take the Indian government two decades to complete the new capital before finally shifting all its offices from Calcutta to New Delhi in 1931. The capital had been conceived in the pomp and circumstance of the coronation *durbār*; it would be inaugurated in the throes of Mahatma Gandhi's *satyagraha* campaigns; and it would serve as the capital of British India for a mere fifteen years. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, declared New Delhi "un-Indian." What Nehru objected to, and what other Indian leaders have dutifully objected to since, was the grandiose monumentality of its official buildings, created as the urban centerpiece of British rule of India.

In retrospect, the British had been correct in selecting the southern site around Raisana Hill, for New Delhi has expanded unabated since the 1980s, and the city's population in 2004 topped 10 million. New Delhi's rapid growth and the centralization of resources have served to induce the development of new towns on its periphery: Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon, and Sonapat. New Delhi in the twenty-first century is a capital under siege from its own population, although its government has so far succeeded in protecting Lutyens's remarkable architectural vision.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Babur; Shah Jahan; Urbanism**

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NIGHTINGALE, FLORENCE (1820–1910), founder of modern nursing and champion of Indian reform. As a child, Florence Nightingale played upon



Florence Nightingale. In her final years, Nightingale feared that she had not done enough to further the cause of freedom in India, but took solace in the Bhagavad Gītā's reassurance that a soul was judged by its righteous action, not worldly results. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

the knee of Ram Mohan Roy, the "father of modern India," when he was a guest of her Unitarian parents in England. One of the first letters she penned as a young girl was filled with questions about the political status and social condition of women in India. In a natural extension of her interest in India and her work among the wounded during the Crimean War (1854–1856), Nightingale envisioned bringing a nursing corps to India during the War of 1857. Though this hope went unrealized, her interest in India thereafter deepened. She secured improvements in the health of the British army on the subcontinent through a Royal Commission (1859) and pressured the India Office into establishing a Sanitary Department in India (1868). She is credited with the founding of the modern nursing profession in India, dispatching ten qualified British army nurses for Indian service in 1888 and establishing a training scheme that benefited Indian nurses and midwives whose skills she admired.

As early as the 1870s, Florence Nightingale's Indian agenda began to expand beyond the army and immediate

health matters to nation-building issues, including political education. Her closest friends then sought to dissuade her from “wasting” her time on Indian affairs, pointing out the dominant characteristics of British Indian policy at the time that would impede her. These factors did, in fact, combine to thwart her initial appeals for Indian reform at the India Office in London, though she subsequently outmaneuvered her opponents there by working through intermediaries drawn from her many friends in India, who included all of the viceroys of her day and many Indian civil servants.

Nightingale ultimately found, however, that even her most loyal supporters among Indian officials were reluctant to pursue her ideas to their ultimate conclusion: the creation of an Indian nation capable of making its own choices in the spirit of what Mahatma Gandhi was to call *sarvodaya*, or the uplift of all. In an effort to overcome these obstacles, Nightingale broke ranks with the prevailing imperial ethos, much as she had broken ranks with the prevailing class structure of England through the elevation of female nurses from servants to middle-class professionals. While fear of being dismissed as a “dangerous woman” forced her to act largely behind the scenes in the politics of British India, she publicly championed the efforts of the marquis of Ripon to promote Indian self-government. She also lent assistance to those Indian nationalists, such as Gopal Krishna Gokhale, who identified themselves with the interests of India’s masses. Her long-standing friendship with several men who came to be presidents of the Indian National Congress heightened her awareness of that movement. She became one of its first and staunchest British supporters, publishing articles in its journal, *India*. She also met and inspired Cornelia Sorabji, who became known as the “Florence Nightingale of India” for her social activism. In her last years, Nightingale struggled to reconcile Western science and Indian tradition, but took solace in the Bhagavad Gītā’s reassurance that a soul was judged on its performance of righteous action, not by worldly results. Though acutely aware of the cultural blinders worn by so many British “reformers” of India, this “Lady with the Lamp” strove to promote India’s own unique light.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Congress Party**

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NIZAM OF HYDERABAD The first nizam, Qamaruddin, of Hyderabad traced his ancestry to Central Asia, while serving the Mughal emperor in southern India as the viceroy of the Deccan in 1724. He commanded the six Deccan provinces of Bidar, Berar, Bijapur, Adilabad, Golkonda, and Hyderabad. With later annexations of Khuldapur and Burhanpur and with access to the Bay of Bengal through Masulipatam, Hyderabad became the largest and wealthiest part of Mughal India. In subsequent times, though a process of reversal occurred with gradual reductions of its territory, the state survived.

The first nizam exemplified the virtues of common sense, pragmatism, balance, and restraint in his personal conduct—qualities that the last nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, sought to practice, not always with success. Indeed, the last nizam was frequently bizarre in his behavior, yet also able to solemnly direct the daily affairs of his court, remaining an enigma. He had the means to buy several banks, but he kept in his personal quarters a huge collection of dust-covered cartons containing hard cash and a fabulous range of jewels and precious metals, never cataloged during his lifetime.

A similar anomaly marked Hyderabad state. With a preponderantly Hindu population, its rulers were Muslim. Medieval, feudal patterns coexisted with some progressive modernist trends. Relations between Hyderabad and the new nation of Pakistan ranged from the explicit to the covert, from great expectations to reversed fortunes. There was empathy and understanding at the nizam’s court and among the Muslim population of Hyderabad for the Pakistan movement. At the same time, the sheer distance between both wings of Pakistan and Hyderabad precluded any possibility of major cooperation without India’s permission, which was not forthcoming.

Through his delegation, which met the founding father of Pakistan, M. A. Jinnah, on 4 August 1947, the nizam had inquired about the extent to which Pakistan—to be established ten days later—could provide economic, military, and political support to Hyderabad. Jinnah politely declined to make any precise commitments. Just six months later, on 10 January 1948, it was the nizam who extended emergency financial support to Pakistan.

The most crucial support by the last nizam remained the least acknowledged. Both giver and recipient had vital reasons to maintain secrecy and, indeed, to deny its occurrence. Soon after Pakistan became independent on 14 August 1947, its due share from the resource pool of the undivided British assets of India was not remitted to Karachi on schedule. A similar delay marked the transfer of military equipment. Mahatma Gandhi launched his

last “fast unto death” in January 1948 to persuade the Indian government to release the frozen assets.

The new Pakistani state experienced formidable difficulties, rushed into premature birth at ten weeks’ notice by Lord Mountbatten’s arbitrary deadline for South Asia’s partition, given on 2 June 1947. Resources were urgently required to manage an unprecedented structure, comprising two wings separated by a thousand miles of unfriendly Indian territory. Cash was desperately needed to pay salaries to Pakistan’s government staff and to meet basic expenses. Hundreds of thousands of refugees had begun to migrate across newly drawn borders of Punjab and Bengal to towns without adequate infrastructure.

At this critical time, the nizam provided lifesaving support. One part of the aid was official and publicly announced: a transfer of securities valued at about 1 million pounds (200 million rupees, or 20 crores). Announcing the country’s first budget on 28 February 1948, Pakistan’s finance minister included this amount in his calculations, ensuring a minor surplus, even in those extraordinary conditions. However, that loan could not be encashed because the Indian government immediately termed it a violation of the Standstill Agreement: New Delhi’s prior consent had not been obtained. The securities were thus frozen and eventually returned unused to Hyderabad.

But, according to several reliable sources, substantial sums of hard cash and gold bullion were secretly transferred by the nizam to Pakistan between August 1947 and September 1948. This secret and substantial aid was never openly announced or formally documented. One method of transfer used the exploits of a daring Australian entrepreneur-aviator named Sydney Cotton, who assembled a small fleet of Royal Lancaster planes and plucky pilots in Karachi to help break the Indian blockade of Hyderabad. Cotton’s team flew numerous missions by night between Karachi and Hyderabad, ferrying in vital supplies, including arms and ammunition. They sometimes brought back stacks of cash and gold.

By one account, the last flight by Cotton from a Hyderabad airfield to Karachi was on 17 September 1948, literally minutes before the Indian army took complete control of Hyderabad state. That flight carried a large wooden box stashed with four and a half million pounds sterling in currency notes. The nizam later confirmed to his outgoing prime minister that he had destroyed all “sensitive” documents in his possession: some of these must surely have recorded amounts secretly transferred. Within seven days of that final flight, Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Jinnah died. Jinnah’s steel-like determination had perhaps inspired the last nizam’s refusal—over a period of about 400 days—to accede to India despite suffering stiff sanctions.

Less than forty-eight hours after Jinnah’s death on 11 September 1948, no longer inhibited by his presence, the Indian government sent its armed forces into Hyderabad state. For a royal realm that had survived for well over two centuries through turbulent change, the collapse was cruelly rapid and complete, taking less than four days.

Thereafter, the paths of Pakistan, of Hyderabad state, and of Nizam Osman Ali Khan diverged completely. Pakistan explored its turbulent future. Though the last nizam retained his title, all his powers of governance were surrendered, as he became a loyal, royal citizen of India. On Republic Day, 26 January 1950, the nizam read the proclamation declaring India to be a “sovereign democratic republic” while being sworn in to his new office of *rajpramuk* (president) of Hyderabad state, a purely ceremonial position. Hyderabad state and the Asaf Jah dynasty thus reached a cul-de-sac, formed by the convergence of unchanging geography and unfolding history.

Javed Jabbar

See also **Hyderabad; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali**

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NOBILI, ROBERT DE (1577–1656), Jesuit missionary to India. Robert de Nobili was born in 1577 of noble Italian parents with impressive connections to the Vatican. He was intelligent, zealous, and a Jesuit. He arrived in India in 1606 to discover that nothing significant had occurred in the Roman Catholic Church since

the days of Francis Xavier. He made the strategic decision of settling in Madura, an influential center of Hinduism. De Nobili believed that Christianity, while retaining its essential core of doctrine, should be divested of its European cultural trappings in order to flourish in India. He assumed the dress and lifestyle of a Brahman *sanyasi*, learned Sanskrit, and studied the Vedas. Within a couple of years, a number of converts had been baptized. De Nobili did not insist that they break caste, change their dress or even their customs, save idolatry. Thus began the work of the Madura Mission.

Several of de Nobili's colleagues among the Roman Catholic community disapproved of his tactics. In 1610 letters were sent to Rome asserting that de Nobili was corrupting Christianity by compromising on Hindu practices, especially with regard to caste. De Nobili defended his methods as accommodation. In 1619 de Nobili's methods were condemned by a council that met in Goa. The council's decision was that the Brahmans and caste converts might retain their high caste appearance, but that they must forsake Hindu ceremonies.

Armed with Pope Gregory's approval, however, de Nobili wandered from town to town in the style of a Brahman guru. Many among the lower castes converted and were baptized. De Nobili lived extremely simply and sacrificially, often facing considerable humiliation; his health deteriorated and eventually he became totally blind. He died in Mylapore, 16 February 1656.

Many priests remained concerned over what was perceived to be the downright deception on which the work of the Madura Mission was founded. Only a remote resemblance of biblical identity remained among those the mission claimed were Christian. The Vatican commissioned the patriarch of Antioch to visit India in 1703 to conduct an inquiry. Once he understood the situation, he issued a decree that condemned de Nobili's system. At first the Jesuits refused to obey, but when Pope Benedict XIV issued a bull that described the Jesuits as "perverse," "rebellious," and "lost," they had to accept defeat, and in 1759 their order was required to leave India.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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NON-BANKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, GROWTH OF India's financial system contains many institutions other than banks, including: corporations set up by legislatures; cooperative societies; companies and unincorporated bodies; government-owned entities; nongovernment public limited and private limited companies; foreign companies; joint ventures among different types of owners; Hindu Undivided Families; clubs; unincorporated associations; and partnership firms. Many of the smaller entities are also engaged in financial services and nonfinancial activities.

Despite the unavailability of insurance for non-banking deposits, the higher rates of return, though marginal, have drawn large numbers of small savers to them. The gradual integration of domestic and external markets have also contributed significantly to the growth of this sector. With innovative market strategies, the non-banking financial institutions have mopped up public savings and command large resources.

Government-owned corporations and companies are governed by specific provisions in their respective statutes and state policies; cooperative societies function within a limited geographical area or particular business activity. The companies are permitted to operate in any part of the country, subject to compliance with the relevant regulations. Many of them are family-owned businesses, with financial support from a closely knit group of friends and relatives. With the liberalization and globalization of the economy, the role of private sector operators in the financial system has increased dramatically.

The small companies in towns and villages cater to the needs of local people, particularly for transport vehicles, and as such they supplement the role of banks. Entities engaged in leasing and purchase finance activities deserve special mention for their role in promoting capital investment in different sectors of the economy. They serve as the link between savers and users of money, mobilizing dormant savings into productive economic activities.

Linkages between Banks and Non-Banks

Non-bank and informal credit institutions are competitive as well as complementary to banks. The distinction between banks and non-banks has been blurred, since both engage in similar types of activities. Non-bank institutions supplement the role of banks in meeting the credit needs of traders and other businesses. Banks can perform the function of a wholesale credit institution; in recognition of this role, the ceiling on bank credit to non-banks was abolished. There is thus cohesion and working synergy between banks and non-banks, inasmuch as banks can function as wholesale credit providers, with the non-banks serving as their retail arm.

The government of India has permitted foreign direct investments in lease and finance, housing finance, and microcredit and rural credit activities. Any company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act of 1956 and engaged, as its principal business, in finance is identified as a non-bank financial company (NBFC). While the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is vested with powers to supervise the deposit-taking activities of all NBFCs, various authorities, like the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the National Housing Bank, and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, have been set up for closer regulation of the diverse functions of the companies such as capital market intermediaries, housing finance, and insurance.

The Reserve Bank of India Act, as amended in 1997, introduced comprehensive changes, vesting more powers with the RBI. The act now stipulates: a minimum entry point norm (Rs. 20 million); that all NBFCs obtain certificates of registration from the RBI; that the RBI may give directions to the NBFCs and their auditors and may file petitions and impose penalties against erring NBFCs; the maintenance of liquid assets as a percentage of deposit liabilities; the creation of a reserve fund and the transfer of at least 20 percent of their net profits to such reserve fund to strengthen their fund's base. Unincorporated entities engaged in financial business have been entirely banned from taking deposits from the public. Other entities engaged in nonfinancial activities have, however, been permitted to take deposits without any restriction or limitation. As such, the unincorporated bodies engaged in financial business have been marginalized.

A new RBI regulatory framework was devised in January 1998 to ensure that the NBFCs function on economically sound lines and strengthen the financial system of the country, while affording protection to depositors. A comprehensive supervisory and monitoring mechanism was put in place, encompassing ceilings on the quantum of public deposits (subject to the minimum investment grade credit ratings and capital adequacy ratios), interest rate on deposits, brokerage, period of deposits, methodology of accessing such deposits, maintenance of liquid assets as a percentage (currently 15%) of public deposits, and disclosure norms and requirement to furnish periodic returns. Investment patterns and the nature of securities in which the liabilities to depositors are to be invested has also been stipulated for non-banking companies. The prudential regulations on income recognition, accounting standards, asset classification, provisioning for doubtful debts, capital adequacy, exposure norms, and restrictions on investment in real estate and unquoted shares have been prescribed on lines similar to those applicable to commercial banks. The prudential standards relating to transparency in balance sheets and disclosure of the true and fair financial health of the com-

pany in the nature of income recognition norms, asset classification, and provisioning against nonperforming assets are also extended to non-banks.

The RBI has instituted a four-pronged supervisory mechanism over NBFCs. On-site examination is structured on the RBI's own CAMEL (capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity) system. Off-site surveillance helps the RBI pick up warning signals, which can result in prompt supervisory intervention.

Status of Registration of NBFCs

The RBI received 37,318 applications from existing and new companies seeking grants of certificate registration under the new act to function as non-bank financial companies. All these applications were assessed, and by the end of August 2003, some 725 were registered for "public deposit"; 13,136 were registered as "nonpublic deposit" companies; and 23,434 were rejected for various reasons, including serious irregularities and violations of RBI regulations, weak financials, or poor track records of management.

With the prescription of prudential norms, sound guidelines, comprehensive regulations and supervision, and weeding out the weak as well as the unscrupulous players, the non-banks should regain their credibility. The share of institutional credit to the total resources available to non-banks accepting public deposits has risen steadily. The unauthorized acceptance of public deposits may soon become a recognizable offense. There are certain other measures that the government of India is considering, including tax parity for non-banks, extension of the facility of Debt Recovery Tribunals, and special recovery mechanisms to help them recover their dues from defaulting borrowers as speedily as do banks. Private sector companies have strong survival instincts and should emerge as strong and vibrant partners with public banks in India's fast-growing financial system.

Mobinder Kumar

See also Bank and Non-Bank Supervision; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of

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NORTHEAST STATES, THE India's northeastern corner faces insurgencies or separatist movements from over fifty groups. Although each conflict has its own roots and history, the issues they raise include language and ethnicity, tribal rivalry, migration, control over local resources, access to water, and a widespread sense of exploitation and alienation from the Indian state. From the Indian government's perspective, these movements represent not just domestic discontent, but the danger of destabilization and possible interference by Chinese or Pakistani intelligence activities. People from India's smaller northeastern neighbors, Nepal and Bangladesh, as well as economic migrants from the rest of India, have swelled the destabilizing migrations at the root of some of these insurgencies, and dissident groups have used these countries, as well as Bhutan and Myanmar (Burma), for sanctuary.

The seven states (also known as the Seven Sisters) that make up India's Northeast—Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh—cover a total area of 98,470 square miles (255,037 square kilometers) and are linked to the rest of India by a narrow arm (the 13 mile-wide [21 kilometer] Siliguri corridor). The region borders on China, Burma, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Except for Assam, which has substantial plains areas, this is a region of high mountains and dramatic rivers. It is home to over two hundred tribal groups and subgroups, many of whose historic rivalries continue today. Christianity is the majority religion in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, and there are substantial Christian minorities in the rest of the region.

The energy-rich Northeast has substantial oil, natural gas, and coal resources, much of it unexploited because of political violence. Its rivers move enormous amounts of water, and could generate far more electricity than they now do, but harnessing them raises environmental issues as well as political and international ones. The area also has abundant forest resources. It is nonetheless one of India's most economically backward areas. As is the case with many areas of entrenched instability, the insurgencies have spawned extortion and violence, as well as high unemployment in a rapidly growing population. Despite the announcement of development packages for the area by the central government, insurgency and trade in small arms and narcotics remain attractive options for young people.

The Northeast region has complex historical roots. The Ahoms, from whom the term "Assam" derives, were

a people of Shan origin who came from Burma in the early thirteenth century but adopted Hinduism and the culture of the land they conquered. The Kingdom of Ahom, which included the entire present-day Northeast, remained independent of any Indian power, and withstood a dozen Mughal raids. An attack by another Burmese tribe in 1817 left it weakened, and the British were able to annex the kingdom in 1826. The Northeast has historically felt that modern India had no claim to its territories, and many of the tribes asserted their independence early on.

At various times since India's independence, the states of Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh were carved out of the territorial boundaries of the old Ahom kingdom to strengthen the administrative structure of the Indian state and to appease tribal demands for independence. During the 1947 partition of the subcontinent, parts of Assam, including the district of Sylhet, went to East Pakistan, present-day Bangladesh. These partitions did not pay sufficient attention to tribal groupings, with the result that considerable tribal populations were divided between states and nations. Assam remains the largest and most important state in the region.

The Principal Insurgencies

A complete account of the numerous insurgencies in the northeastern states is outside the scope of this entry. The most violent and destabilizing insurgencies in the region in the past few decades have been in Nagaland and Assam.

Nagaland. This area boasts the region's oldest insurgency, which served as a model for several of the others. The Naga tribes are divided by state and national boundaries. The principal Naga militant group today, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah; NSCN[I-M]), demands a united homeland, Nagalim, and claims a territory six times the size of present-day Nagaland, including most of Manipur, as well as parts of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Burma. Angami Phizo, the founder of the Naga insurgency, opened the Burma front to the insurgency in the 1950s. Phizo's group established links with Chinese leadership at the same time, and later with Pakistan. Tribal divisions within the Naga insurgency surfaced in the 1960s and continue to plague the movement today.

In 1997 the Indian government signed a cease-fire agreement with the NSCN (I-M), extending it in June 2001 to cover predominantly Naga areas outside Nagaland as well. The extension was greeted with widespread protests and rioting in the adjoining state of Manipur, which was put under president's rule. The northeastern

states saw this action by the central government as the first step toward redefining state boundaries and threatening the political status quo. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Home Minister L. K. Advani somewhat belatedly announced that the central government would never consider changing state boundaries, and the cease-fire agreement was revised to apply only to Nagaland.

Assam. Assamese nationalism was first articulated in 1979 as a protest against the influx of large numbers of economic migrants from the state of West Bengal, as well as from Bangladesh and Nepal. The first non-Congress party to come to power in Assam, the Asom Gana Parishad, did so on the “foreign nationals” issue in 1985. The most prominent insurgent group in Assam has been the United Liberation Front for Asom (ULFA), which demands secession from the Indian state, citing the economic exploitation of Assam. It represents Assamese-speaking Hindu descendants of the Ahoms, but has also made overtures to other groups. At the height of its power, ULFA exercised complete control over parts of the state, running a parallel de facto government. In the initial stages of the insurgency, ULFA enjoyed widespread support in Assam, but the violence of their tactics and extortion of local businesses, notably the tea estates, have done more harm than good for the local population. While ULFA has lost much of its power and popularity, it continues to be a source of violence and instability. Bitter resentment of “outsiders,” and of New Delhi, is keenly felt in Assam, and continues to be a useful rallying point for political parties as well. Attacks against minority migrant groups have persisted in the past two decades. As recently as November 2003, the state was rocked by attacks against Hindi-speaking settlers from Bihar. The Indian government’s political efforts to settle the problem, notably the Assam Accord of 1985, have been unsuccessful, and the state governments have been ineffective in negotiating with insurgent groups.

The Bodos. The Bodos are the largest plains tribe of Assam, and their movement is a quest for indigenous rights and tribal empowerment in a majority nontribal state. They mobilized in 1987 to demand the creation of a separate state of “Bodoland,” based on the historical precedent of forming new states out of Assam. India’s response to their insurgency has been predominantly military.

Indian military operations against insurgent groups in Assam resulted in the gradual move of the insurgents’ military training bases to the neighboring kingdom of Bhutan. In December 2003 the Royal Bhutan Army and the Royal Bhutan Guards launched a military operation against ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization training camps. Thirty such camps have been operating



Mompa Tribal Couple in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh is Northeast India’s largest and most remote state, with an amazing diversity of tribes (some 60 tribal languages are spoken in the state). Here, a Mompa couple in Tawang. The culture of the Mompa shares much with that of nearby Tibet. IPSHITA BARUA.

inside Bhutan since 1992. Press statements from Thimphu have stated that at the time its army launched the military offensive, the rebel strength was in excess of 3,000 heavily armed fighters. The military operations have been quick and successful, resulting in the dismantling of all thirty camps. Having confronted the militant groups, both Bhutan and India will need to remain vigilant against future infiltration along the thickly forested and highly porous borders between Assam and Bhutan.

Mizoram. Launched in 1966, the Mizo insurgency lasted for two decades of fighting from bases in Burma, and maintained active links with China and Pakistan. The leader of the Mizo insurgent group (the Mizo National Front), Laldenga, signed an accord with the central government in 1986, effectively ending the insurgency through dialogue and emerging as the chief minister in the newly pacified state. In the latest development



Monoliths in an Ancient Khasi (tribe) Graveyard. In the rugged terrain of the Khasi Hills (in the state of Meghalaya, literally “abode of the clouds”), a number of ancient monoliths—almost Celtic in appearance—commemorate the dead. IPSHITA BARUA.

package to the Northeast, Mizoram has been given a U.S.\$38 million “peace bonus.”

Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh. These areas have not been free from violence either. Manipur’s insurgencies have focused on different issues at different times: an ideological struggle based on Marxism and Maoism, a campaign to protect Vaishnava Hindu rights, and an ethnic struggle launched by the Meiteis, plains dwellers from the Imphal Valley. Tripura, like the state of Sikkim, has seen a complete demographic transformation since the 1950s. The nineteen indigenous tribes of the state, a mixture of Christians, Buddhists, and nature worshipers, are now a minority in a state dominated by migrants from the plains of West Bengal and Bangladesh. The tribes of Tripura share ethnic linkages with those of Myanmar (Burma) and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, and tribal insurgents have based themselves out of the CHT. Soon after the Mizo peace accords, the leading Tripura insurgent group, the Tripura National Volunteers Force, also signed a peace

agreement with the Indian government in 1988. While sporadic violence against Bengalis continues, the insurgency has lost its revolutionary force.

Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are the only two states in the Northeast that have not seen a full-fledged insurgency. The state of Meghalaya was carved out of Assam to meet the political demands of the Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia tribes, who felt that the Assam government did not represent their needs. Despite periodic attacks against Bengalis and Nepalis that paralyze the capital of Shillong, it is relatively better off than its neighbors. Arunachal Pradesh, along with Mizoram, became a separate state from Assam in 1987. The most remote of the northeastern states, the area was known as the Tribal Areas and, later, the North East Frontier Agency until 1972. Much of Arunachal has been a contested area between India and China since independence, and the two share the longest disputed border in the world. Much of India’s failed war against China in 1962 was fought in Arunachal, and China has had de facto control over parts of Arunachal’s territory since then.

Motivated by a range of issues, such as anti-immigration, ethnic separatism, intertribe tensions, or Marxism and Maoism in the case of Manipur, violence has taken a heavy toll on these states, leaving them underdeveloped and socially fragmented. There is widespread unemployment across the northeastern states, with a rising number of social problems as a result of protracted conflict. The prevalence of drug use in this region is the highest in India. Insurgency has curtailed political development in the region, with many political leaders rendered either ineffective or complicit vis-à-vis the insurgent groups, and corruption is endemic.

Sikkim. While Sikkim is not one of the “Seven Sister” states that make up the Northeast, it is an integral part of the northeastern region, and serves as a cautionary tale to India’s smaller neighbors such as Bhutan and Nepal. Sikkim was incorporated into the Indian state in 1975. India justified its action by citing misrule by the Chogyal (king) of Sikkim. However, the underlying cause of India’s move was an influx of Nepali migrants, which changed the demographics of the country, outnumbering the native Sikkimese. The demographic change and the demands of the Nepali population posed an insurmountable challenge to the monarchy, and India stepped in. Ultimately, fear of compromising their sovereignty underlies the resentment smaller neighbors feel toward India.

Regional Issues

The Indian approach. Indian scholars cite Mizoram as the model for a successful anti-insurgency policy, and attribute its good results to the Indian government’s willingness to allow an insurgent leader to emerge as an officially recognized leader within the political system. The Indian government appears to be trying the same approach in Nagaland, and has been willing to accept the NSCN (I-M) as its exclusive negotiating partner there. The Nagas’ territorial ambitions have complicated the picture, however, as has the fact that the NSCN (I-M) does not represent all the Naga tribes. Over time, the development of other entrenched interests makes it difficult to put together a “Mizo solution.” New Delhi’s intensive counterinsurgency operations and the militarization of daily life in the region have compounded the problem. The local population is trapped between a coercive government and intolerant militants, and the democratic process is in shambles. Governors appointed by Delhi in the Northeast play a dominant role in local political life, further fueling local leaders’ alienation from Delhi.

Agreements to resolve political unrest in tribal areas often restrict land ownership to local citizens and limit movement of people into the area. However, population growth in the nearby Indian, Nepali, and Bangladeshi

plains continues to push people off the land, generating a continuing source of conflict and difficulty in maintaining this type of restriction. Political parties, most notably the Congress Party, exacerbated the problem in earlier decades by actively assisting illegal Hindu and Muslim migrants from Bangladesh and the Indian plains in an effort to cultivate critical pools of voters in the states.

“The foreign hand.” The Indian government has always been quick to see Pakistani and Chinese intelligence activities, with the goal of encircling and destabilizing India, at the root of insurgencies in the Northeast. Many insurgent groups, including ULFA and the Nagas, have traveled to training camps in China and in Pakistan, and this connection has exacerbated New Delhi’s suspicions. The Indian government believes that the Northeast is a hotbed of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) activity, and that ISI also uses Nepalese soil for activities directed against India. This attention to foreign intervention tends to ignore the domestic realities in which the insurgencies are grounded.

The northeastern neighbors. One of the main difficulties in understanding unrest in the Northeast is the fact that insurgencies overrun not just state, but national boundaries. Thus, any discussion of the northeastern states must factor in India’s northeastern neighbors. Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh all share porous borders with India and will be part of the solution or the exacerbation of the problems facing the region. India’s relationship with Myanmar (Burma) was nonexistent since the 1960s, but has undergone a dramatic change since 2000. India is acutely sensitive to any indication of Pakistani or Chinese intelligence activity in these countries. In an attempt to keep China out of its “sphere of influence,” India poured development and infrastructure aid into Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim (prior to its incorporation into the Indian state). Illegal migration is a recurring bilateral problem with Nepal and Bangladesh, as is the insurgent groups’ use of territories of the three nations. The importance of India’s northeastern states in larger geopolitical calculations concerning China and regional security has influenced Indian response to the politics of the region. This geopolitical insecurity has encouraged military intervention in the region rather than more measured political initiatives. In fact, for some decades since independence, India’s policy for the Northeast states was formulated by the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, not the Home Ministry.

Myanmar (Burma). After a quarter century of little political contact, India has reestablished a relationship with Myanmar, motivated primarily by security considerations. Myanmar borders four of India’s northeastern states (Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh), and the border between the two countries is a

gateway for insurgents trying to destabilize both. A nexus between Naga and ULFA militants operating in India, and Chin and Karen rebels operating in Myanmar, has proved to be a challenge that the two nations can curb only through bilateral counterinsurgency measures. Indian fears of a growing Chinese naval presence in Myanmar, with dire implications for the security of the Bay of Bengal, was a further catalyst for building ties with its military junta, in spite of considerable domestic opposition. India also sees Myanmar as its gateway to South-east Asia, which has become a major priority in India's "looking East" foreign policy. During a February 2001 trip to Myanmar, then Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh inaugurated a highway connecting Manipur and Myanmar, a road that is expected to strengthen economic and security links between the two countries.

Bhutan. Bhutan's basic relationship with India is set by the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, which commits Bhutan to taking India's advice on defense and foreign affairs. Within these limits, India has respected Bhutan's sovereignty and has not meddled in its internal affairs. In return, Bhutan has steered clear of China, and has limited its foreign relations to avoid raising suspicions in New Delhi. The presence of ULFA and Bodo militants in Bhutan's densely forested foothills raised fears that India would upset the agreed balance of Indo-Bhutan relations and compromise Bhutan's sovereignty and strong national pride, which could in turn affect the institution of the monarchy. Successful operations to oust the insurgents from Bhutanese soil have stabilized the issue, but there is a real fear that this could unleash a backlash from the insurgent groups, embroiling Bhutan in a protracted conflict.

Bangladesh. Relations between India and Bangladesh have been fairly good on the surface, but Bangladesh is suspicious of India's overweening presence in the region. Cordial Bangladeshi political and defense ties with China and Myanmar have also aroused Indian suspicions. Illegal Bangladeshi immigration into India is a leading cause of insurgencies in the Northeast, as is the somewhat paradoxical fact that some of these insurgent groups have taken refuge in Bangladesh.

With India's cooperation, Bangladesh signed an agreement settling its tribal insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in 1997. Implementation has been somewhat uncertain, however, and the basic population pressures at the root of the insurgency remain strong. This dispute is intertwined with several of those in northeastern India. The Chakmas, the principal indigenous tribe of the CHT, are Buddhists of Tibeto-Burmese origin. The Bangladeshi government for years encouraged Muslim migration to the relatively sparsely populated CHT, as the Indian government had done in Assam. The

Chakmas mobilized in 1972 and attacked Bangladeshi installations under their armed wing, the Shanti Bahini. Army operations against the Shanti Bahini and displacement of people after the construction of a major dam led some 250,000 Chakmas to settle in nearby areas of India, including Tripura, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Nepal. Millions of illegal migrants from Nepal have contributed to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Bhutan too alleges that illegal Nepalese immigration is widespread, and the two countries are in a deadlock over Bhutan's decision to repatriate 100,000 illegal Nepali immigrants from Bhutan. The immigrants themselves claim Bhutanese citizenship and accuse Bhutan of deporting them for ethnic reasons, citing Bhutan's fear that its Drukpa national identity would be threatened and would be unable to cope with the impact of the Nepali minority on its system of government and sovereignty. Nepal's political instability, and the violent Maoist insurgency that it is struggling to deal with, will continue to be a problem for the region. Nepal's economy is in disarray, and its growing population pressures make migration a natural choice for some of its people.

India has intermittently tried to redress the imbalance in its bilateral relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal by finding areas of common interest and mutual cooperation. The only forum for multilateral cooperation in the region, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, is at best a weak organization whose mandate explicitly excludes any role in bilateral disputes, and which has been further debilitated by the conflict between India and Pakistan. Partly as a result, India has focused more on bilateral or other subregional mechanisms for cooperation. India has a hefty trade surplus with each of these neighbors. Energy trade could shift this balance and benefit everyone. Bhutan already exports hydropower to India and will be expanding this trade. A similar agreement with Nepal has been under discussion for decades, but faces both political and environmental obstacles. The export of natural gas from Bangladesh could also be beneficial to both states, but has been political dynamite within Bangladesh.

China. China is at the root of India's security concerns about the Northeast. The established Chinese relationship with Pakistan is already a major concern for India, as is the newer Chinese link to the military government in Myanmar. Any indication of active Chinese involvement in India's insurgencies or a serious move to undermine India's primacy in Nepal and Bhutan could send the uneasy relationship between the two dominant regional powers into a sharp decline.

The two countries have strikingly similar concerns about one another's roles in their Himalayan border

region. In China's case, the issue is Tibet, two of whose most prominent leaders, the Dalai Lama and the Karmappa, have taken asylum in India. In addition, China has always challenged India's sovereignty over Sikkim, as well as over parts of Arunachal Pradesh. India claims the Chinese-controlled area of Aksai Chin in Kashmir. The two countries have, however, reactivated their border talks and are trying to put their relations on a friendlier and firmer footing. The most positive sign of change in entrenched attitudes, and one that holds a key to addressing change in the Northeast, is the July 2003 bilateral decision to institute a border trade regime in Sikkim, creating a vital economic hub for the landlocked Northeast.

Creating a more stable future. India's preoccupation with the law-and-order aspects of its troubles in the northeastern states has tended to deepen those states' alienation from Delhi. The key to a more stable future lies in a better mix of Indian policies. The key ingredients in future stability are economic development, focusing especially on the region's energy resources; greater tolerance for local control; willingness to work with local leaders; and strengthening democracy and civil society.

Similarly, India's stress on maintaining and expanding its current primacy with its smaller northeastern neighbors has amplified their sensitivity about dealing with an overbearing India. Some adjustments in Delhi's operating style could ease this problem, and could lead to more cooperative policies to address both domestic problems in the Northeast, as well as bilateral issues in the region. Dealing with the problems of the northeastern states requires a twofold approach—one that addresses the domestic causes and consequences of the insurgencies, and another that works toward an integrated solution that involves the Northeast's surrounding states, creating opportunities for all.

Mandavi Mehta

See also Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; Bangladesh; Burma; China, Relations with; Ethnic Conflict; Geography; Insurgency and Terrorism; Manipur; Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Nepal, Relations with; Pakistan and India; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security

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NORTH-WEST FRONTIER. See **Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier.**

NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND POLICIES India took the world by surprise when it tested five nuclear explosive devices on 11 and 13 May 1998. Its capability to produce nuclear weapons had been well known within governmental circles even before 1974, when it conducted its first nuclear explosive test. At that time, however, the Indian government labeled the event a "peaceful nuclear experiment" (PNE) and refrained from producing nuclear weapons. After decades of hesitation and delay by successive governments in New Delhi, India's sudden willingness to defy the international proponents of the nuclear nonproliferation regime struck both the Indian public and foreign observers as an uncharacteristically brazen act of resolve. In subsequent years, however, India again appears to have slipped back into a relaxed nuclear policy. It has been slow to turn its nuclear weapons capability into an operational nuclear deterrent, although it has issued a nuclear doctrine and announced the basic outlines of a strategic command and control structure.

India's interest in mastering the technology to build nuclear weapons dates back six decades. Over this period, its nuclear programs and policies can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase began when India initiated a modest nuclear research effort in June 1944, more than one year before the U.S. nuclear attack on Japan and three years prior to winning its independence from Great

Britain. In fact, India was one of the first nations to realize the economic and military importance of nuclear energy. Although India's initial nuclear program had no military orientation, India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his chief nuclear adviser, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, built into the program from the very outset the technical, political, and legal features that would enable India to begin serious work on nuclear explosives in 1964, to conduct a nuclear test ten years later, and to become an acknowledged nuclear weapons power at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The second phase of India's nuclear program began in 1954, when Bhabha seized upon new opportunities for nuclear imports enabled by the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Before this period ended, with the deaths of Nehru in May 1964 and Bhabha nineteen months later, India had nearly the entire infrastructure needed to produce nuclear weapons. However, in the next phase of the program, which began in 1966, Nehru's successors refused to allow the nuclear establishment to build the bomb. Nehru's daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, authorized the 1974 PNE, but this period of hesitation continued until 1998, when India conducted its next round of nuclear tests, this time boldly declaring itself a nuclear-weapon state. The fourth phase of India's nuclear program and policy began in May 1998 and is characterized by a surprisingly lenient effort to field an operational nuclear deterrent—an endeavor that to this day is far from complete.

Phase 1: Initiating India's Nuclear Program

India's path to nuclear weapons acquisition was neither direct nor quick. The Indian government initiated its nuclear research and development program in the mid-1940s not as a response to an immediate military threat to its security, but rather because of the power of certain ideas about the scientific, political, and possibly long-term military utility of nuclear energy. Many of these ideas originated in the West, but Jawaharlal Nehru embraced them and fashioned them into official policy.

Nehru's vision. Nehru thought and spoke extensively about the military and economic utility of nuclear energy. When a reporter asked in August 1945 whether soon-to-be-independent India would seek nuclear arms, Nehru said that India would use atomic energy for peaceful ends, but if threatened militarily, the government "will inevitably try to defend itself by all means at its disposal" (Gopal, vol. 14, pp. 192–193). Despite India's poor scientific and industrial infrastructure, Nehru often asserted that India must obtain the latest military technology.

Nehru specified the role that nuclear energy should play in Indian defense in a key report of 3 February 1947

on "Defense Policy and National Development." First Nehru explained why science and technology must underpin India's defense industry: "Modern defence as well as modern industry require scientific research, both on a broad basis and in highly specialized ways. Even more than before, war is controlled by the latest scientific inventions and devices. If India has not got highly qualified scientists and up-to-date scientific institutions in large numbers, it must remain a weak country incapable of playing a primary part in a war." Calling India an emerging "major power in the military sense," Nehru declared: "The probable use of atomic energy in warfare is likely to revolutionise all our concepts of war and defence. For the moment we may leave that out of consideration except that it makes it absolutely necessary for us to develop the methods of using atomic energy for both civil and military purposes" (Gopal, vol. 2, p. 364).

The defense policy report concluded with an important directive: "An Atomic Energy Commission should be appointed for research work in the proper utilization of atomic energy for civil and other uses." Under Nehru's leadership, independent India embarked on a quest to become proficient in military as well as scientific and industrial uses of nuclear energy. Hardly warranted by India's relatively peaceful security environment, India's early nuclear policy was shaped by Nehru's worldview and his faith in the ability of science and technology to transform India's long-term security and economic welfare.

Bhabha's plan. Nehru's dream for India to become a nuclear power would have gone unrealized had it not been for the achievements of a handful of Indian scientists, most notably Homi Bhabha. Nehru popularized the belief that nuclear energy would enhance India's security and influence, but Bhabha was responsible for establishing the technical and economic feasibility of starting a nuclear research program, building and operating nuclear reactors, and later, developing nuclear weapons. Bhabha's stature as a physicist and his vision for using nuclear energy to pull India out of poverty and backwardness enabled him to establish the credibility of India's nuclear program at home and abroad, which in turn helped Bhabha obtain a very large share of the Indian government's scarce resources and considerable foreign nuclear technology, training, and materials.

Bhabha initiated India's nuclear program in March 1944, when he appealed to the Indian philanthropist Sir Sorab Saklatvala for financial support to develop nuclear energy for power production—several years before a nuclear reactor produced electricity anywhere in the world. Undeterred by the skepticism voiced by his Indian colleagues about obtaining usable energy from the atom, Bhabha was convinced of the possibility of producing

nuclear energy on an industrial scale by the proliferation of promising scientific literature on the subject before wartime secrecy terminated all public mention of nuclear energy.

Saklatvala and the government of India agreed to support Bhabha's plan, and in June 1945 Bhabha created the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). Initially consisting of a laboratory for work in cosmic rays and theoretical physics, the scientific areas in which Bhabha was most interested, TIFR expanded soon after independence into a broad-based center for training and research on all aspects of nuclear physics.

The Atomic Energy Act. After its independence, India took decisive steps to improve the internal organization of India's nuclear program, the most important of which was the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act, which provided sweeping authority over all nuclear matters to Nehru and Bhabha. Drafted on 15 August 1948 along the lines of the 1946 atomic energy acts of the United States and the United Kingdom, the legislation gave the Indian government exclusive authority to survey and exploit nuclear-related materials and to conduct research on the scientific and technical problems associated with the development of atomic energy. The act also established the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to manage all nuclear activities for the government.

Nehru always maintained close control over India's nuclear program. He set up the IAEC as his chief policy-making body for nuclear matters, and mandated it to: survey the country for atomic minerals; collect and develop such minerals on an industrial scale; set up a nuclear research reactor and, more generally, conduct research on the scientific and technical problems associated with the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy; recruit and train the scientific and technical personnel required for this undertaking; and direct fundamental research in nuclear sciences in its own laboratories and in India's other research institutions and universities. He also gave the commission sweeping authority to take such steps as may be necessary to protect the interests of the country in connection with atomic energy. Predictably, Nehru appointed Bhabha as the first chair of the IAEC, a post he held until his death in January 1966.

Right from the start, there was a small but significant domestic opposition to the idea of creating an independent atomic energy agency in India. Political activist Krishnamurthy Rao and India's nuclear physicist-turned-politician, Meghnad Saha, contended that the plan would remove fundamental research from India's universities. Saha opposed the IAEC, refused to be associated in any way with the nuclear establishment, and by 1954 became

the country's leading voice of dissent on the general structure and orientation of India's nuclear program.

Saha especially detested the strict secrecy with which Indian atomic activities were shrouded, and he also opposed plans for close collaboration between the Indian government, private industry, and foreign firms. Nehru understood Saha's objections, but insisted that nuclear research had unique requirements. When he introduced the atomic energy bill, Nehru stated, "atomic energy research, if it is to be effective and successful, must be on a big scale" (Gopal, vol. 4, p. 422). Nehru added that the government's unusual secrecy was needed to protect the findings of India's scientific research and to attract the cooperation of other countries which themselves insisted on conducting nuclear affairs under strict secrecy.

What Nehru did not reveal may have been his main motivation for creating a highly centralized and secret nuclear establishment—his abiding desire to develop a military nuclear option. After India achieved its independence, Nehru rarely talked about developing nuclear weapons, in contrast to his pre-independence musings on the necessity of military nuclear research for India. On more than one occasion, however, the prime minister implied that the development of nuclear energy for scientific and industrial purposes would provide India with a significant capability for pursuing military applications. On 29 February 1948, Nehru urged Defence Minister Baldev Singh to appoint a scientific adviser for the Defence Ministry to consider the defense aspects of nuclear energy:

Dr. Homi Bhabha . . . has given me a long report about atomic energy research. I am very much interested in this and I am sure that we should seriously start taking steps in this direction. I think this is important from many points of view. It will not, of course, bring immediate results. But the future belongs to those who produce atomic energy. . . . Of course, Defence is intimately concerned with this. Even the political consequences are worthwhile. (Gopal, 2nd series, vol. 5, p. 420)

Nehru then told the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament) that Indian scientists must create a nuclear program to serve military as well as industrial ends:

The point I should like the House to consider is that if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war—indeed, I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. It is in that hope that we should develop this. Of course, if we are

compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. (ibid., p. 427)

Nehru always declared that India would use nuclear technology for peaceful ends. On several occasions, however, he revealed his interest in exploiting the military potential of nuclear energy—an option that he and Bhabha had created in the initial design of India's nuclear program. Apart from the establishment of government control over all nuclear materials, facilities, and scientific activities, extreme secrecy was the most important feature built into the program for potential military uses. When Krishnamurthy Rao asked why secrecy was required for the entire program when the British insisted upon secrecy “only for defense purposes,” Nehru replied: “I do not know how you are to distinguish between the two” (ibid., p. 426). Nehru could not have been more honest. He ensured that the nuclear weapons option was an integral part of the nuclear program from its beginning until his death in 1964. And even after Nehru's death, his legacy continued. Every subsequent prime minister secretly protected this option until Atal Bihari Vajpayee exercised it in May 1998.

Phase 2: Developing the Nuclear Infrastructure

While Saha and other Indian politicians, scientists, and bureaucrats were wondering whether India's costly nuclear practices would ever lead to the operation of a nuclear reactor, Nehru and Bhabha took decisive steps to move the program back on course. Recognizing that the pace and scope of further growth was restricted by the nuclear program's outdated administrative structure, Nehru decided in August 1954 to fund a new nuclear laboratory at Trombay, near Bombay, and to create a Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to give the Atomic Energy Commission more resources and improved access to Nehru and the growing executive branch of the government.

Bhabha lobbied Nehru to locate the DAE headquarters in Bombay—close to the new atomic energy establishment at Trombay, but over 700 miles (1,126 km) away from the capital, where all other governmental departments were located. (After Bhabha's death, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renamed this facility the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.) The DAE was endowed with executive authority to carry out policies formulated by the Atomic Energy Commission. Nehru made himself the first minister of the department and appointed Bhabha as his secretary. With Bhabha serving simultaneously as DAE secretary, IAEC chairman, and TIFR director, and answerable in each of these positions only to the prime minister, he gained nearly absolute authority over India's nuclear program.

At this point, Bhabha's concept for India's nuclear future was fairly vague. He wanted to set up an electricity-generating reactor, but in 1954, no power reactor had gone into operation anywhere in the world (the first small-scale power reactor, Britain's 37-megawatt Calder Hall plant, did not produce electricity until 1956). So Bhabha decided to construct a small laboratory reactor as a research facility and then work on acquiring a larger reactor when the opportunity arose. Bhabha traveled to England to meet with the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Sir John Cockcroft, then director of the United Kingdom Atomic Research Establishment. Perhaps because Bhabha and Cockcroft had worked together at Cambridge, Cockcroft offered enriched-uranium fuel elements and the technical support that India needed to build a research reactor.

This still left the matter of obtaining a power reactor. Nuclear reactor technology was not widely understood at the time, but Bhabha knew that three varieties of power reactors were under development in the West: light-water (ordinary water) moderated reactors, heavy-water (deuterium oxide) moderated reactors, and graphite moderated reactors. American scientists were working on light-water reactors, but these facilities were fueled by enriched uranium, which India would have to import. In contrast, heavy-water reactors were fueled by natural uranium, which India already possessed. Apart from mining and milling the uranium and fabricating it into fuel rods, Bhabha's key challenge would be to produce heavy water to moderate the facility, but this appeared to be a manageable task (in fact it turned out to be very challenging). India soon started construction on a small facility in the north Indian state of Punjab to produce heavy water.

Foreign assistance. India's next task was to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, Bhabha took steps to produce, or import if necessary, all the facilities needed both to supply fuel for nuclear reactors and to make use of the reactor products for commercial and scientific purposes. His plan called for the acquisition of unsafeguarded plutonium-producing reactors (reactors for which there are no foreign inspection arrangements or other controls to ensure that the reactor products are not diverted to weapons uses) and then the construction of a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from the other elements in the spent reactor fuel (uranium and radioactive wastes). He claimed that the plutonium produced at the “back end” of the fuel cycle would be returned someday to the “front end” as fuel for a sophisticated energy-producing fast-breeder reactor. What Bhabha did not advertise was his intention to create an abundant stockpile of plutonium for the possible production of nuclear explosives.

India was not the only country to assemble a complete nuclear fuel cycle during the relatively permissive Atoms for Peace era, but its ability to avoid the strict safeguards that the United States and other nuclear exporters generally required was unique. This was a remarkable achievement considering the problematic relationship India had with the United States from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, when India opposed Western interests on nearly every vital world issue: nuclear disarmament, the Korean War, the Suez crisis, U.S. regional security alliances, Vietnam, and China. U.S. officials accepted New Delhi as an imperfect partner because they feared that if India or Pakistan came under communist influence, chain reaction effects, going as far as Western Europe, would result. With India positioned as a mainstay in their cold war struggle against communism, therefore, Washington and its allies took pains to enhance India's security, internal stability, and economic development. Especially during the Eisenhower administration, the peaceful uses of atomic energy played an important role in the American strategy to make India strong and to keep communism out of South Asia. What U.S. policy and intelligence experts failed to understand, however, was that Nehru and Bhabha secretly planned to use imported nuclear technology to produce nuclear weapons.

India's first plutonium production reactor. The plutonium India used to detonate its 1974 "peaceful nuclear experiment" came from the spent fuel of Cirus, a 40-megawatt research reactor supplied by Canada in the late 1950s. Canadian and U.S. officials knew that if Indian scientists reprocessed the spent fuel from this reactor, they could separate about 22 pounds (10 kg) of bomb-grade plutonium annually. However, Ottawa curiously did not insist on intrusive inspections or other control mechanisms to prevent the reactor from being employed for military ends. Because of India's stubborn refusal to accept safeguards, the bilateral reactor agreement simply contained a clause committing India to employ Cirus and its by-products for "peaceful purposes only." With uncharacteristic disregard for the proliferation potential of its exports, Canada provided India with its only unsafeguarded source of fissile material until the locally built Dhruva reactor went into operation in 1985.

U.S. assistance and safeguards. After the Canadian Cirus deal, Washington agreed to lend India the money it required to construct two American power reactors at Tarapur, but only with strict safeguards as a condition of the deal. U.S. officials had become worried that India might be toying with the idea of producing nuclear explosives. In April 1961, India began construction on a plant at Trombay, named Phoenix, to extract plutonium from the spent fuel produced in the Cirus reactor. Nehru

had authorized this secret project in July 1958. The unsafeguarded facility, which was based on the Purex (plutonium-uranium extraction) reprocessing technology developed and declassified by the United States, could provide India with a stockpile of bomb-grade plutonium. U.S. officials still believed that Nehru would not sacrifice his reputation as a crusader against nuclear weapons, and they accepted Bhabha's claim to use plutonium to fuel breeder reactors, though a growing body of evidence suggested that India was trying to keep its options open.

Then, in January 1961, Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian National Development Council: "We are approaching a stage when it is possible for us . . . to make atomic weapons" (Beaton and Maddox, p. 144). This statement came shortly after Cirus went into operation. The following month, Bhabha declared that India could build a nuclear bomb in two years or so if it wanted to.

U.S. officials became even more concerned when, on 31 August 1961, an Indian government spokesman declared: "We are against all tests and explosions of nuclear material except for peaceful purposes under controlled conditions." The implication was that Indian officials were now considering the use of peaceful nuclear explosives, which were becoming the fascination of scientists all over the world. Despite mounting Western concerns, Bhabha was able to negotiate amazing deals for the Cirus research reactor, the heavy water needed to moderate it, and the uranium required to fuel it, all at bargain-basement rates and without the provision of strict safeguards to prevent diversion to military uses. As a result, India was able to assemble in a period of ten years a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which produced a substantial supply of plutonium to fuel advanced power-production reactors and possibly to build nuclear bombs.

U.S. security assurances. The victory of Chinese forces over India in the 1962 Himalayan border war and Beijing's race for its own nuclear bomb created a serious security predicament for India. Although Nehru rejected a U.S. military plan for a semipermanent U.S. air and naval presence on Indian territory, he did believe that U.S. military threats helped deter China from both widening the 1962 war and launching subsequent incursions into India. The fact that these threats included a nuclear component strengthened Nehru's interest in a covert nuclear weapons capability. After 1962 it became difficult for Nehru, Bhabha, and a widening group of other senior politicians and bureaucrats to think about India's security without a nuclear weapons capability.

India's liveliest nuclear debate was sparked by China's nuclear explosive test in October 1964. Even before the

detonation, Homi Bhabha had established the technical and economic feasibility of building nuclear bombs in India, and then he lobbied to persuade key political elites to approve the development of a limited nuclear deterrent capability. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the humble politician who succeeded Nehru, initially rejected the bomb option, preferring a diplomatic solution to counter China's nuclear threat. But Bhabha lobbied him to reconsider the nuclear option. Finally giving in to the wellspring of political opinion favoring the bomb, in early 1965 Shastri authorized Bhabha to start work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project, a top-secret program to design and develop nuclear explosives. The project slowed after Shastri died of a heart attack in January 1966. When Bhabha perished two weeks later in an airplane crash in the Swiss Alps, the bomb program came to a virtual standstill. If Bhabha had survived, he might have persuaded Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter and Shastri's successor, to authorize a nuclear explosive test well before 1974.

Phase 3: Delay and Hesitation

Homi Bhabha died just one day after Indira Gandhi became the prime minister of India. Under her leadership, three key developments transpired to shape Indian nuclear policy for many years to come. The first was her controversial decision in the late 1960s not to sign the newly negotiated nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), which would have bound India to the legal status of a nonnuclear weapons state in perpetuity. The second was India's perception of a U.S. nuclear threat during the Indo-Pakistani war, which created Bangladesh as an independent country in 1971. And third, because of the cumulative impact of the first two developments, Indira Gandhi ordered the detonation of the India's first nuclear explosive test, which she called a peaceful nuclear experiment, in May 1974. Although diverse political, economic, and military factors affected all of these issues, Prime Minister Gandhi's NPT and PNE decisions were shaped heavily by the domestic political legitimacy that the nuclear program had acquired as a result of Bhabha's assiduous efforts a decade earlier.

India's PNE turned out to be a landmark event for the world as much as for India. It represented the first case of a country developing and detonating a nuclear explosive from an ostensibly peaceful nuclear effort. Stung by this experience, the world's leading nuclear suppliers, many of whom unwittingly had assisted the Indian program in one fashion or another, resolved not to make the same mistake again—in India or elsewhere. The explosion beneath the sands of Pokhran, therefore, fundamentally altered the manner in which the international community would henceforth handle the export, and even the

indigenous development, of nuclear technology and materials. The present-day nuclear nonproliferation regime owes its present composition more to India's 1974 nuclear blast than to any other event or condition.

While not ruling out further experiments with nuclear explosives, Prime Minister Gandhi declared that a second Indian nuclear explosion would be held only "when the need for a peaceful experiment is established." Whether because of the lack of an acute security threat, continued international pressures, severe domestic resource constraints, or possibly the lack of a proponent of Bhabha's stature, no subsequent Indian leader established the "need" for a second nuclear detonation—until May 1998, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee ordered another series of nuclear tests and openly proclaimed India a nuclear weapons power.

From the mid-1970s until the late 1990s, India's leadership was unwilling to defy the United States and other powerful proponents of international nuclear nonproliferation by testing another nuclear device. But the Indian nuclear establishment was not idle. They continued Bhabha's two-track plan of setting up numerous power production reactors across the country while at the same time secretly assembling the components to manufacture, test, and ultimately deploy—if the need ever arose—several nuclear weapons. The nuclear bomb program actually was accelerated in the mid-1980s after India learned that its chief rival, Pakistan, had also acquired the means to make nuclear weapons. It was also during this period that India put significant resources behind two ballistic missile systems—the short-range Prithvi and the intermediate-range Agni—the latter of which would become India's primary nuclear delivery system.

Phase 4: Building an Operational Nuclear Deterrent

After India conducted five nuclear explosive tests in May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India would pursue a "minimum but credible" nuclear deterrent and would not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. A government-appointed panel formulated the draft of a nuclear doctrine in August 1999, calling for India to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of its nuclear deterrent by developing a triad of air-, sea- and land-based nuclear forces, a robust command and control system, and the ability to shift rapidly from peacetime deployments to full operability. In January 2003 New Delhi formally reiterated its "credible minimum deterrent" doctrine and announced the creation of a National Command Authority, in which a political council, chaired by the prime minister, would be responsible for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and a Strategic Forces Command would manage India's nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

In keeping with India's long tradition of civil-military relations in which democratically elected civilians control the military, India's nuclear weapons program has always been under the firm control of the prime minister and his carefully selected confidants. Largely because of the system Nehru had established in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prime minister continues to deal directly with scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defence Research and Development Organization, whereas the armed forces generally have been kept out of the nuclear decision-making and advisory loop. Despite the creation of the Strategic Forces Command and other organizational changes implemented since the 1998 Pokhran tests, the Indian government's reluctance to more fully integrate the military into the strategic planning process has slowed the development of an operationally usable nuclear deterrent capability, especially compared to the state of affairs across the border, where the armed forces control all elements of Pakistan's nuclear program and policy.

Leaders of India's longtime rival, Pakistan, believe that they might have to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. If Islamabad were unable to deter a conventional attack, it might feel compelled to employ nuclear arms to prevent India from destroying Pakistan's armed forces or occupying large portions of its territory. Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, director of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, said in 2002: "Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces; India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan; or India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan."

Today each rival is increasing its stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week. Because neither has signed the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which limits ownership of nuclear explosives to the first five nuclear powers, Indian and Pakistani nuclear policies are not illegal. However, many countries viewed their nuclear tests as a challenge to the norm of nuclear nonproliferation, which underpins the NPT regime. Even today, the international community has not managed to integrate India and Pakistan into the NPT-based nuclear order.

The size, composition, and operational status of the Indian nuclear arsenal are closely guarded secrets. According to published sources, India produces approximately 55 to 88 pounds (25–44 kg) of weapon-grade plutonium each year. It probably has accumulated between 617 to 1,323 pounds (280–600 kg) of plutonium from the operation of its Cirus and Dhruva plutonium-production

reactors. Based on these assessments, it could possess enough fissile material to manufacture between 40 and 120 weapons.

India has several aircraft and missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons to their targets. In 2001 the U.S. Defense Department speculated that India would most likely use fighter-bomber aircraft—Jaguar, Mirage-2000, MiG-27, or Su-30—for nuclear delivery because its ballistic missiles probably were not yet ready for this role and because its superior air force could be expected to penetrate Pakistani air defenses. India's Prithvi missile can carry a 2,200 pound (1,000-kg) warhead, but because of its short 93 mile (150-km) range, India most likely will turn to its newer solid-propellant Agni 1 and Agni 2 missiles. The Agni 1 has a 435–560 mile (700–900 km) range and was rushed into development after the 1999 Kargil conflict. The Agni 2 has a 1,243–1,864 mile (2,000–3,000 km) range but is not yet operational.

The nuclear deterrent capability that India now possesses owes much to the pioneering decisions and activities of Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha some fifty years ago, when they set about developing a secret nuclear weapons option. Subsequent political and scientific leaders have perpetuated the nuclear policies and programs created by Nehru and Bhabha, albeit on many occasions with hesitation and restraint. Since 1998 India's political leadership has demonstrated much more boldness and resolve, but even today, because of lingering concerns about radically revamping long-standing civil-military relationships, India remains several steps away from fielding a truly operational nuclear deterrent. Therefore, in many important respects, India's original policy of creating a nuclear deterrent option remains in place today, even though the capabilities of the nuclear program are much more sophisticated and somewhat less secret.

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See also **China, Relations with; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Pakistan and India; Strategic Thought; United States, Relations with; Wars, Modern.**

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT

In 1945, when the first atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima, Mahatma Gandhi predicted that “unless now the world adopts nonviolence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind.” Following India’s independence in 1947, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) were founded by Homi Bhabha with encouragement from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who also served as science minister. TIFR’s function was solely to conduct pure research; BARC’s explicit role was to harness nuclear energy to help provide for the electric power needs of a post-independence industrial India. India in the early days managed to acquire nuclear reactor technology from a number of Western countries, primarily Canada (CANDU reactors) and the United States (Tarpur). Gandhi’s warnings against the use of nuclear energy for military ends may have helped to prevent the development of the Indian bomb well into the 1960s. It was only after the Bangladesh War of 1971 that India, under Indira Gandhi, was sufficiently emboldened by its military victory against Pakistan to test a nuclear device of its own. In 1971 Prime Minister Gandhi gave the order to go ahead with the test. It took two years to prepare for the test, which was reportedly beset with problems with electronic detonators. In 1974 India conducted its first test of a “peaceful nuclear device,” the underground “Smiling Buddha” detonation (on the Buddha’s birthday in May) in the Rajasthan desert at Pokharan. Estimates of the yield vary, but it is thought to have been around 12 kilotons of trinitrotoluene (TNT), somewhat smaller than the Nagasaki bomb of 20 kilotons.

China, on the other hand, had already made progress in the development of nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (16 October 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (25 October 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (14 June 1967).

On 11 May 1998 (again on the Buddha’s birthday), India conducted three underground nuclear tests of a 12 kiloton conventional fission bomb (an improved version of its 1974 device), a 43 kiloton thermonuclear device, and a device smaller than a kiloton. Enriched plutonium is the suspected fuel, although for the small devices, enriched uranium may have been used. These tests were followed days later by two small devices at a different site. In both cases, the devices concerned were

exploded simultaneously. P. K. Iyengar, former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and a key player in the development of the 1974 device, said in an interview that the tests show that India has three categories of nuclear weapon design: a low-yield tactical weapon, a full-size fission weapon, and a thermonuclear weapon. He added that these three options should satisfy the military’s interests.

Seismic test analysts have disputed India’s claim of the strength of the devices, but a report in the journal *New Scientist* (Mackenzie, p. 2138) supports the Indian claim, citing a University of Leeds seismic expert, Roger Clark, whose calculations tend to buttress the Indian claims of the yield. Debate continued over the strengths of the Indian tests and the ability of seismic monitoring to verify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India continues to maintain that it exploded a hydrogen bomb. R. Chidambaram, then IAEC chairman, has said that India can explode a 200 kiloton device if it chooses to do so. Some Western scientists have cast doubt on this claim, speculating that what was exploded was a fusion-boosted fission device, which is technologically less challenging.

India has developed missiles—the Prithvi, with a range of 155 miles (250 kilometers), and the Agni, with a range of 932 miles (1,500 kilometers)—that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These could already be mass-produced and are capable of reaching the Chinese cities of Beijing and Shanghai. India is thus capable of conducting retaliatory strikes against nations that threaten it with nuclear power, although the Indian government has foresworn any first use of nuclear weapons.

According to the publication *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (May 1999), Indian scientists are reportedly developing a longer version of their intermediate range ballistic missile Agni III, which will have a range of 2,175 miles (3,500 kilometers). Together with its 1,243 miles (2,000-kilometer) range Agni II (designed to carry a nuclear warhead) and its Agni I (already test-fired three times), and its short range surface-to-surface missiles Prithvi I and II and surface-to-air Akash and Trishul missiles, the Agni III will give India its minimum nuclear deterrent (MND). India is also on the threshold of deploying a submarine-launched ballistic missile, Dhanush, which could later be deployed on surface warships.

One factor that impelled the Indian government toward nuclearization was the preferential treatment that successive U.S. governments gave to the Communist government of Beijing. Since U.S. president Richard M. Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, U.S. governments largely ignored abuses of human rights in China, awarding the nation most favored nation status and a permanent seat in

the United Nations Security Council. It is no coincidence that the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are also the nations that constitute the “nuclear club,” namely Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and the United States. U.S. overtures to China even include cooperative scientific ventures. The U.S. position was that the only way to “wean” China away from its Communist political system was to teach it capitalist economics and to engage it constructively. The Indian defense minister at the time of the 1998 nuclear tests, George Fernandes, announced that it was China, not Pakistan, that was India’s “main threat,” perhaps thus signaling the imminent nuclear tests by seeking to clarify India’s defense concerns.

The harsh U.S. reactions to the tests (sanctions, suspension of scientific collaborations, repatriation of Indian scientists visiting the United States, denial of visas to scientists wishing to visit the United States, and preventing U.S. scientists from attending conferences held in India) contrasted sharply with Washington’s lack of reaction when China and France last conducted nuclear tests (1995), in violation of the CTBT, which neither have as yet signed.

An unfortunate and perhaps unforeseen effect of the tests by India and Pakistan is that the Kashmir issue, which was languishing on a bilateral backburner, suddenly found “legs” and was elevated to a high profile in the international list of “problems to be solved.” This clearly was not beneficial to the Indian position and may be seen as an unfortunate outcome of India’s nuclear tests.

On 13 May 1998 the U.S. government imposed sanctions on India, “in accordance with Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, also known as the Glenn amendment,” involving “termination of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for humanitarian assistance for food or other agricultural commodities; termination of sales of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act . . . termination of all foreign military financing under the Arms Export Control Act” and “denial of any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, agency or instrumentality of the United States Government.”

On 28 May Pakistan conducted tests, and equal U.S. sanctions were applied to Pakistan. In July 1998, seven Indian scientists were expelled from the United States, and a “blacklist” of sixty-three Indian and five Pakistani institutions was announced. TIFR and BARC were on that list.

It was only with the visit of U.S. president Bill Clinton to India in 2000 that the U.S. government relented. India has joined the United States as a “strategic partner,”

though neither India nor the United States has signed the CTBT, though India has announced a voluntary moratorium on further testing.

Nuclear tensions in the subcontinent have eased somewhat since the peace overtures made between India and Pakistan at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Islamabad in January 2004. Further easing of tensions may result with improved economic ties between the two nations and with India’s reaffirmation of the Gandhian principle of nonviolence.

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See also Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development; Ballistic Missile Defenses; Nuclear Programs and Policies

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NYĀYA *Nyāya* philosophy is also called *pramāna śāstra*, or the science of correct knowledge. The objective of the *Nyāya* is *ānvīkshikī*, or critical inquiry. Its beginnings go back to the Vedic period, but its first systematic elucidation is Akshapāda Gotama’s *Nyāya Sūtra*, dated to the third century B.C. This text consists of five books. After an overview, the text begins with the nature of doubt and the means of proof. Next it considers the nature of self, body, senses and their objects, cognition and mind.

The *Nyāya* system supposes that we are so constituted as to seek truth. Our minds are not empty slates; the very constitution of the mind provides some knowledge of the nature of the world. The four *pramānas* through which correct knowledge is acquired are: *pratyakṣa*, or direct perception; *anumāna*, or inference; *ūpamāna*, or analogy; and *śabda*, or verbal testimony.

Gotama mentions that four factors are involved in direct perception: the senses (*indriyas*), their objects (*artha*), the contact of the senses and the objects (*sannikarṣa*), and the cognition produced by this contact (*jnāna*). *Manas*, or mind, mediates between the self and the senses. When the *manas* is in contact with one sensory organ, it cannot be so with another. It is therefore said to be atomic in dimension. It is because of the nature of the mind that our experiences are essentially linear, although quick

succession of impressions may give the appearance of simultaneity.

Dharmakīrti, a later *Nyāya* philosopher, recognizes four kinds of perception: sense perception, mental perception, self-consciousness, and yogic perception. Self-consciousness is a perception of the self through its states of pleasure and pain. In yogic perception, one is able to comprehend the universe in fullness and harmony.

Anumāna (inference) is knowledge from the perceived about the unperceived. The element to be inferred may be the cause or the effect of the element perceived, or the two may be the joint effects of something else.

The *Nyāya* syllogism is expressed in five parts: (1) *pratijñā*, or the proposition: the house is on fire; (2) *hetu*, or the reason: smoke; (3) *udāharaṇa*, the example: fire is accompanied by smoke, as in the kitchen; (4) *upanaya*, the application: as in the kitchen, so too in the house; (5) *nigamaṇa*, the conclusion: therefore, the house is on fire. This recognizes that the inference derives from the knowledge of the universal relation (*vyāpti*) and its application to the specific case (*pakṣa-dharmatā*). There can be no inference unless there is

expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) about the hypothesis, which is expressed in terms of the proposition.

The *Nyāya* attacks the Buddhist idea that no knowledge is certain by pointing out that this statement itself contradicts the claim by its certainty. Whether cognitions apply to reality must be checked by determining if they lead to successful action. *Pramā*, or valid knowledge, leads to successful action, unlike erroneous knowledge (*viparyāya*).

In the twelfth century, the *Navya-Nyāya* system was founded by Gangesha Upadhyaya. It developed a highly technical language to formulate and solve problems in logic and epistemology.

Subhasb Kak

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PAITHANI The oldest weaving technique for the creation of multicolored woven patterns was the tapestry technique, using noncontinuous weft threads. Known in India as Paithani, after the city of Paithan, the technique uses multicolored silk weft threads to create intricate patterns on a gold background. The overall effect is similar to that of *meenakari*, enameling on gold jewelry. This ancient weaving technique was used throughout the world, in the Coptic textiles of Egypt, in the pre-Columbian textiles of Latin America, and in China's intricate silk hangings (*ko'sseu*). Central Asia's nomadic weavers created *gelims* with this technique on simple mobile looms from ancient times. The technique was possibly brought to India by migrations from Central Asia in the ancient past. Examples can be seen in the cotton *gelims* of North India, as well as in the intricately woven Navalgund *jamkbans* of Karnataka in South India. It is possible that the technique was adapted for the weaving of intricate borders and cross borders of saris for royalty.

Paithani weaving was centered in the western region of Maharashtra, where women wore long 9-yard (8.2 m) saris. The technique was named after the ancient city of Paithan, the capital of the powerful Satavahanas (c. 300 B.C.–A.D. 230).

Stylistic Variations

Chanderi in Madhya Pradesh produced fine-quality cotton saris with borders woven in Paithani technique. Saris from the collections of royal houses reveal intricate Paithani borders and cross borders in silk and gold thread. They carry complex patterns of *shikar-gab* (hunting), as well as the tree of life, shrubs, and curvilinear flowering creepers, often woven separately and attached. The royal families who patronized these saris extended from Madhya Pradesh to Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Andhra

Pradesh. Men wore the *patka*, a Paithani sash tied at the waist, and the ends of their turbans were adorned with gold and silk Paithani borders.

The Paithani saris were woven in heavy silk with borders carrying extra warp patterns; only the cross border was worked in gold using the Paithani technique of multiple weft silks, in interlocking tapestry. The design of the cross border had a rich gold surface, enclosed by borders woven in the tapestry technique; sometimes the central section had extra weft silk patterns of mango or shrub motifs.

Paithani textiles were later patronized by the Golconda court and by the ruling house of Hyderabad. These used a heavier silk and were renowned for the excellent quality of their *kalabatun*, or gold thread. Old examples of Paithani saris and *patkas* have gold threads that still shine like a mirror.

Other centers where Paithani technique was used were Yeola in Maharashtra and Gadwal in Andhra Pradesh. Yeola saris were woven in silk, but they were not as complex in their patterning as those of Hyderabad. The Gadwal saris were woven in cotton, often with intricate check patterns, with a silk border having extra warp gold thread patterns; the cross borders were in some cases woven in the Paithani technique.

Technique

The technique of weaving was simple, but the process painstaking, laborious, and complex. The main loom was a pit loom; the weave was a plain weave and was warp faced, so that the multiple weft threads would be dominant on the face of the fabric. When the borders were woven separately, the loom had no heddles. The multiple threads were wound on fine bamboo needles, which were



Weaver Works a Paithani Loom in Hyderabad. This ancient process is painstaking, laborious, and complex, requiring great skill. DAVID H. WELLS / CORBIS.

inserted by hand and interlocked with the next thread, and the thread was then reversed. Hundreds of bobbins rested on the woven section, and the weavers created the pattern by following a graph design on paper. This process required great skill, and only seasoned masters could weave these patterns.

The colonial influences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries changed the demands of the royal houses. Women of the royal households began to wear imported chiffon and georgette saris, lowering demand for the heavy cotton and silk 9-yard saris. Most centers weaving in the Paithani technique discontinued the practice. The only place where it survived was in Paithan. The Nizam of Hyderabad patronized the technique himself, setting up a center for weaving saris, veils, turbans, and sashes at Paithan. It was also mandatory for his courtiers to wear Paithani turbans when presenting themselves at court. Paithani weavers also copied floral patterns painted inside the Buddhist caves at Ajanta. The curvilinear motifs of lotus flower and bird were well suited to the Paithani technique and were woven into borders, which were stitched to georgette saris, creating a new fashion. European visitors to the Ajanta caves also

were happy to buy the intricately woven panels as souvenirs.

In the early 1950s, when Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya initiated India's movement for the revival of traditional handicraft skills, she visited Paithan with the author. The old craftsmen, who were weaving panels, were encouraged to weave saris in silk with traditional patterns. An exhibition was arranged to promote the saris, and it was probably then that the term *Paithani* came to be applied to the technique. Later traditional examples of Hyderabad and Gadwal saris were also revived through a government center at Wanaparti, in Andhra Pradesh, and elaborate saris with rich tapestry cross borders were once again brought back into the market. The government of Maharashtra began a program for reviving the Yeola tradition at the encouragement of Shilpi Kendra, a non-government organization in Mumbai. By 1970 Yeola saris with Paithani cross borders had returned to the market.

Chanderi, where the finest examples were once woven, could not revive the Paithani technique, as none of its surviving weavers knew the technique. A private center, near Hyderabad, run by Suraiya Hasan Bose,

brought two of the best workers from Paithan and reproduced some of the Chanderi border designs, weaving cotton saris with traditional tapestry borders and cross borders. They also trained young women from the village in the Paithani weave, which had earlier been the domain of men. Meera Mehta, a former student of the National Institute of Design in Ahmedabad, began work on improving the Yeola saris, and thanks to her intervention, weavers there are producing extremely refined Paithanis.

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PAKISTAN Pakistan came into existence as a homeland for Muslims on 14 August 1947, carved out of Muslim majority regions of British India. Partition accompanied the British grant of independence and the transfer of power to leaders of the Indian and Pakistani national movements, respectively. Approximately 14 million people moved from both sides of the border, Muslims to Pakistan, and Hindus and Sikhs to India, in an exchange that left at least a half million people dead in communal violence.

Pakistan owes its existence above all to the leadership and vision of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who headed the Pakistan national movement and was known to his followers as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader). As Pakistan's first head of state, he inherited a county beset with problems of identity and limited resources. Jinnah's death, only thirteen months after independence, followed by the assassination of his successor Liaquat Ali Khan three years later, left the country without clear direction on unresolved constitutional issues, including the balance of state and religion.

Pakistan is bounded on the west by Iran, to the north by Afghanistan, to the northeast by China, to the east and southeast by India, and to the south by the Arabian Sea. It has an area (excluding the Pakistani-held part of Jammu and Kashmir) of 307,374 square miles (796,095 sq. km). Pakistan's population in 2003 was nearly 150 million, and its growth rate was officially estimated at 2.5 percent per annum.

The country is comprised of four provinces, each with a distinctive language: Punjab, the most populated and agriculturally rich; Sind, which has important tracts of irrigated farmland but also large barren areas, and which contains several major urban centers, led by Karachi, the country's largest city and original capital; Balochistan, primarily desert and sparsely populated by Balochi tribes; and the North-West Frontier province (NWFP), which has large mountainous areas, is mainly Pashto speaking, and shares several Pashtun tribes with eastern Afghanistan. A Pashtun-inhabited Federally Administered Tribal Area, which hugs the border with Afghanistan, is outside any province and is vested with considerable political autonomy. Islamabad, the country's capital since 1960, is located in a designated federal area in northern Punjab.

Until 1971 Pakistan had an East and West Wing, separated by about 1,000 miles (1,609 km) of Indian territory. Dominance of the political system by West Pakistani elites resulted in economic exploitation and disparities favoring West over East, generating Bengali resentment and separatism. Bengalis, the country's ethnic majority, believed they were intentionally underrepresented in the government and the military. In a civil war that succeeded with Indian military intervention, the East Wing broke away to form Bangladesh.

Muslims constitute 97 percent of Pakistan's population, mostly divided between Sunnis, who make up 77 percent of Muslims, and nearly 20 percent who are Shi'a. Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians comprise the remaining 3 percent. The country's principal ethno-linguistic groups are Punjabis, Sindis, Pathans (or Pashtuns), Baluchis, and a significant, largely urban population of Muhajirs, Urdu-speaking refugees (who migrated to Pakistan from India following independence) and their descendants. Pakistan's official language is Urdu, but the dominant spoken language is Punjabi, the first language of 65 percent of the population, followed by Sindi (11 percent), Pashto (8 percent), and Urdu (9 percent). English is widely used in educational institutions, business circles, and in the government.

The task of national integration has been made difficult by deep fault lines that have formed over the contending aspirations and grievances of the country's provincially concentrated ethno-linguistic groups, the vesting of political power, and the appropriate role of Islam in public life. Social class disparities, economic instability and deprivation, and tribal and linguistic populations that overlap with India and Afghanistan have aggravated these differences. Divisions among Pakistanis have occasioned bitter ideological debates and have subjected the country to periodic political instability. Serious implications exist, moreover, for Pakistan's economic development and foreign policies.

There is contention among and within Pakistan's provinces, and between provinces and the federal government, over how the resources of the state should be equitably allocated. Most resentment today is directed against the politically ascendant Punjab. The NWFP, Sind, and Baluchistan all have had nationalist movements seeking greater political autonomy and larger representation in the country's civil bureaucracy, military, and key sectors of the economy. Sindis accuse Punjab of an unfair distribution of Indus River waters through major canal and dam diversions. Muhajirs concentrated in Karachi bitterly object to their lack of political influence in Sind province and complain about a system of federally legislated quotas for government jobs and college entrance. Rural Sindis, along with Pathans who have settled in the province's major cities, are discontented with past Muhajir and new Punjabi domination of commercial and industrial activities in Karachi and other urban centers.

An insurrection in Baluchistan against the federal government was put down militarily under the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, but grievances continue to simmer. Pashtun nationalism in the NWFP has been periodically at odds with the central government on foreign policy issues, and with the province's religious parties over the implementation of Islamic social and economic principles.

Pakistan has also been unable to settle on the kind of political system that promotes effective governance, needed social and economic development, and national identity to counter regional and ethnic diversity. It remains uncertain whether the country requires a more authoritarian, centralized state, primarily run by the military and bureaucracy, or is better served by greater federalism and democratic institutions. Nor has Pakistan been able to resolve whether it should be simply a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims or instead seek to realize the ideals of an Islamic state, with laws and practices that adhere to strict Islamic precepts.

At the time of independence, Pakistan was an agrarian society with very little industrial capacity. A small number of powerful landowners with large land holdings dominated the country politically and economically. Much of the country continues to have a land tenure system that is feudal, in which tenant farmers cultivate land owned by usually absentee landlords. Agriculture remains the nation's major source of income, employing almost half of the country's population, and accounting for roughly 25 percent of its gross national product. Wheat, cotton, rice, barley, sugarcane, maize, and fodder are the main crops.

The industrial sector has played an increasingly critical role in the country's economic development. Pakistan now has in place a broad industrial base, producing a wide range of consumer and industrial products in such

key industries as textiles, construction materials, sugar, food processing, paper products, and rubber. However, the industrial sector, which employs over 20 percent of the formal workforce, has failed to create jobs for an increasingly younger population. Neither has it succeeded in training and retaining a highly educated workforce. Importantly, political instability, corruption, and the threat of conflict with India have affected Pakistan's ability to attract domestic and foreign investment.

While domestic economic growth rates have averaged about 5 percent, economic disparities have increased, in both rural and urban areas. The poorest 20 percent of the people, or those with the lowest income, have a share of 6.2 percent of the income of the nation, while the richest 20 percent have an estimated 50 percent share. There is only a minimal safety net for the poor. The proportion of Pakistanis living below the poverty line is estimated to have risen in recent years, from about 26 percent in 1990–1991, to nearly 40 percent in 2003. In a global measure of health, education, and income, Pakistan's human development has been slipping year after year; by 2003 it stood behind that of many African countries. The country's literacy rate is only 36 percent.

Pakistan's leaders have relied heavily on foreign aid, remittances from workers in the oil-producing states, and international credit. Over the years, the United States has been the major provider of bilateral aid and was particularly generous during the 1980s, when Pakistan was a frontline state against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. U.S. economic and military aid was cut off in 1990, the year following the Soviet withdrawal, with Washington's decision to no longer ignore Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Economic and military support for Pakistan was resumed in 2002, as Pakistan won U.S. favor for its willingness to cooperate in the "war on terrorism," specifically U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The country has also been able to reattract greatly increased financial assistance from the international creditor community. However, despite rescheduling and some debt write-offs, Pakistan remains burdened in servicing its heavy external debt.

Pakistan confronted numerous social, political, and security problems as a consequence of the Afghan war to oust the Soviets and their Communist allies, and the subsequent civil strife in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Hosting millions of Afghan refugees and giving sanctuary to fighters turned urban areas in Pakistan into thriving markets for small arms and illicit drugs. The growth of Islamic religious schools through the 1980s and 1990s spawned volunteers for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir and also contributed to making the country's interethnic and sectarian politics more violent and intolerant.

Pakistanis have lived under military rule for more than half their history. The failure of Pakistan's elected politicians



Islamabad Market, Pakistan. Merchants sell their wares on a busy Islamabad street. In Pakistan, the number of Islamic fundamentalists continues to grow. INDIA TODAY.

to provide stable, honest, and effective government has repeatedly been used to justify the military's intervention to remove civilian leadership. Differences among political figures over regional and ethnic distribution of power delayed approval of a constitution until 1956. By October 1958 the army had suspended a collapsing parliamentary system. A year later, army chief General Mohammad Ayub Khan assumed full control of the military government. He introduced an indirect election system known as "Basic Democracies" that also provided the framework for local government and development. In 1962 a new constitution created a strong presidency, to which Ayub was elected in 1965. Ayub aligned Pakistan with the United States in military and economic agreements, and also reached out to China. Ayub was weakened politically, however, by Pakistan's failure to make gains against India in the 1965 war over Kashmir. Popular dissatisfaction with corruption and inflation, together with Ayub's ill health, led to his removal in 1969 by General Yahya Khan.

Following the disastrous war with India that resulted in the loss of the East Wing in December 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed the presidency. Bhutto's populist

Pakistan People's Party had run strongest in the West Wing in Pakistan's 1970 election, the first under universal suffrage. With the passage of a new constitution in 1973, Bhutto assumed the office of prime minister. He proceeded to forge closer relations with the Arab and nonaligned world than had his predecessors, and he undertook a controversial program of nationalization. Popular agitation in the wake of a discredited national election in March 1977 led General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq to depose Bhutto in July and, two years later, to have him executed.

General Zia's rule was defined most by his cooperation with the United States in supporting the insurgency against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which began in December 1979. He is also remembered for fostering the Islamization of Pakistan's politics. In 1985 he ended his martial law regime, allowing for the election of a nonparty government, over which he nevertheless remained in command as president. Zia was killed in a still mysterious explosion of his plane in September 1988, ushering in the restoration that November of democratic government with the election of Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the executed leader, as prime minister.

Over the course of the next eleven years, Bhutto's People's Party and the Muslim League headed by Nawaz Sharif, both essentially secular parties, alternated in power. During this time, no elected government completed its term of office. On three separate occasions, the prime ministers—Bhutto in 1990 and 1996, and Sharif in 1993—were dismissed on the grounds of corruption and incompetence by the country's presidents, acting on behalf of the military. In a direct civilian-military clash, General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif in an October 1999 coup. Musharraf assumed the office of chief executive and then president. Civilian government was ostensibly restored with the election of a National Assembly in October 2002. But whether formally in charge or not, the military has remained the final arbiter of Pakistan's politics.

Internal disorder and continuing concerns for Pakistan's security have helped to institutionalize the military's pivotal political role and assure its popular esteem. The large, highly professional standing army makes strong claims on the national budget and is heavily invested in key industries through wealthy and privileged foundations. An amply rewarded officer corps ensures internal cohesion and loyalty. For both foreign ventures and domestic security, the military employs a pervasive and powerful intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Division.

Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir remains a national obsession and largely shapes its defense policies and domestic priorities. Successive Pakistani governments have sought, both through diplomacy and assistance to militants, to undo the 1947 accession of the most prized half of the once princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. India has accused Pakistan of fostering infiltration and terrorism, while Pakistan has justified its resistance by citing the human and political rights violations suffered by the Indian state's Muslim majority. At a conventional military disadvantage, Pakistan considers nuclear weapons its most effective deterrent against a large-scale Indian attack. Concerns about nuclear proliferation from Pakistan and over the possible escalation of a conflict with India to a nuclear confrontation have heightened international attention to the region.

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See also **Afghanistan; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Kashmir; Pakistan and India**

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PAKISTAN AND INDIA After decades of unfulfilled promise, India now seems to be moving ahead, with more rapid economic growth, a more assertive foreign policy, better relations with the United States and China, and a modest nuclear arsenal. Adding these developments to India's traditional strengths—a unique and persistent democracy and an ancient, influential culture—it is no wonder that many predict the emergence of India as a major Asian power, or even a world-class state. However, this remains problematic as long as India's comprehensive and debilitating rivalry with Pakistan continues. If India cannot “solve” or better manage its relationship with Pakistan, which has become increasingly dangerous in recent years, then its wider strategic role is likely to remain circumscribed.

The origins of the India-Pakistan conflict have been traced to many sources: the cupidity of the British in their failed management of the partition; the cold war; the deeply rooted antagonisms between the subcontinent's major religious communities, Hindus and Muslims; the struggle for control over Kashmir; that province's importance to the national identities of both states; and the greed or personal shortsightedness of leaders on both sides of the border. These and other factors all play a role, but the conflict is greater than the sum of its parts.

Like many seemingly intractable disputes, the India-Pakistan conflict is a psychological, paired-minority conflict. Such conflicts are rooted in perceptions held by important groups on both sides—even those that are not a numerical minority and may even be a majority—that they are the threatened, weaker party, under attack from the other side. Paired-minority conflicts are most often found within states, but some occur at the state level, such

as that between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors. These extremely persistent conflicts seem to draw their energy from an inexhaustible supply of distrust, and are remarkably resistant to compromise or the good offices of third parties.


Indian Insecurity

In the case of India-Pakistan relations, one of the puzzles is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times larger, would be more secure, especially since it defeated Pakistan in 1971. This, however, is not the case, and historical, strategic, ideological, and domestic reasons all play a role in India's obsession with Pakistan, and in Pakistan's concern with India.

Generations and chosen grievances. The first generation of leaders in both states was devoted to achieving independence and building new states and nations. With the exception of Mahatma Gandhi, they did not believe that partition would lead to conflict between India and Pakistan. On the Indian side, some expected Pakistan to collapse, but did not see the need to hasten that collapse through war. On the Pakistani side, Mohammad Ali Jinnah hoped that the two countries would have good relations; he expected a multireligious Pakistan to be counterpoised against a predominantly Hindu India, with both possessing significant minorities whose presence would serve as hostage to good relations.

A second generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders was unprepared to solve the problems created by partition. Nothing in their experience had led them to place reconciliation ahead of their own political advantage. They reached a number of agreements that cleaned up the debris of partition, and there were trade and transit treaties, hot lines, and other confidence-building measures as early as the 1950s. India and Pakistan seemed to be headed toward an uneasy accommodation.

For India, what set the second generation apart from its predecessors was the defeat by China in 1962; for Pakistan, it was the division of their country by India in 1971. The ten-year difference is important: Indians have had longer to reconsider their great humiliation than the Pakistanis, and even the prospect of economic competition with China was met with equanimity by an economically resurgent India. In each case, the other side denies the seriousness of the other's grievances, and doubts the sincerity of the other's claim. In 1962 Mohammad Ayub Khan stated his skepticism that there was a real India-China conflict, and Pakistanis still belittle Indian obsessions with Beijing. Indians seemed to assume that Pakistanis have more or less forgotten the events of 1971



India's Prime Minister I. K. Gujral Meets Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan. In September 1997, concurrent with the 52nd session of the United Nations General Assembly in NYC, Gujral (left) meets Sharif. The two premiers failed to break the impasse over stalled talks on Kashmir. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

and cannot understand why Pakistani officials remain suspicious when New Delhi professes its good intentions. These two conflicts had profound domestic consequences, not a small matter in a democracy. No Indian politicians have admitted publicly that the Indian case against China is flawed or have suggested that there should be a territorial exchange. Until recently, no Pakistani could publicly talk about a settlement of Kashmir short of a plebiscite and accession, lest he or she be attacked as pro-Indian and anti-Islamic.

Each trauma led directly to the consideration of nuclear weapons and further militarization. In India's case, the lesson of 1962 was that only military power counts and that Jawaharlal Nehru's faith in diplomacy without the backing of firepower was disastrously naive. The link between the shock of 1971 and the nuclear option is even tighter in Pakistan, and for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a nuclear weapon had the added attraction of enabling him to reduce the power of the army. Ironically, Pakistan has wound up with both a nuclear program and a politically powerful army.



Hindus Migrate during Riots. Hindus flee to safety during the riots preceding the 1947 partition of India. Thousands upon thousands were driven to make such a journey. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

Traditions: New and invented. While many Hindu and Islamic traditions suggest ways of reducing differences and ameliorating conflict, each also has elements that contribute to the idea of what historian Elias Canetti terms a “war-crowd.” Indians and Pakistanis draw selectively from their own traditions, pointing to those on the other side that seem to “prove” the other intends to conquer and dominate. For example, Pakistanis cite the *Artha Shāstra* as “proof” that the Indian/Hindu approach to statecraft emphasizes subversion, espionage, and deceit. For their part, Indian strategists, especially at the Hindu nationalist end of the spectrum, emphasize those aspects of Islamic teachings that portray a world divided between believers and unbelievers, and suggest the former are obliged to convert the latter. Additionally, while Pakistani ideologues see the spread of Islam to South Asia as having purged and reformed the unbelievers, Indians read this history as reinforcing the notion of a comprehensive civilizational and cultural threat to India.

Indians also see Pakistan as an important example of neo-imperialism, meaning that when neighbors (that is, Pakistan) are allied to powerful intruders (such as Britain, the United States, or China), their domestic politics and their foreign policies become distorted. The U.S.–Pakistan alliance is widely believed to have militarized Pakistani politics and foreign policy, making it impossible for Delhi to come to an accommodation with Islamabad over Kashmir. Most Indians also believe that Pakistan compounded the error by allowing its territory to be used for the objectives of the cold war alliance, introducing a superpower into the region. The American tie is also seen as encouraging Pakistan to challenge the rightfully dominant regional power by providing the advanced weapons that enabled Pakistan to attack India in 1965. The preferred Indian solution to such a distortion of the natural regional power structure is for the international community to recognize regional dominant powers that are benign, accommodating, and liberal,

rather than allowing either a global hegemon or adjacent powers to meddle in South Asia.

Pakistan is seen as an essential element in a shifting alliance against New Delhi composed of the West, Islam, China, and other hostile states. Another focus of attention in recent years has been the extremist Islamic forces led by Pakistan, with China as a silent partner. Like the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, many in the strategic community see a grand alliance between Islamic and “Confucian” civilization. The ring of states around India provides a ready-made image of encirclement. India has threats from the north, east, west, and over the horizon; naval theoreticians eagerly point out the threat from the sea, from whence both the Arabs and the Europeans came, and—thirty years ago—the USS *Enterprise*.

The threat from Pakistan, Islam, China, and the West is attributed to jealousy of India: outsiders wanting to cut it down to size. India’s sense of weakness, of vulnerability, is contrasted with its “proper” status as a great power, stemming from its unique civilization and history. It is India’s very diversity, long regarded as a virtue, that offers a tempting target for Pakistan, the Islamic world, and others. In the views of some of India’s Hindu hawks, even the minorities (tribals, Sikhs, Christians, and Muslims) are a potential fifth column, awaiting foreign exploitation.

Pakistan as an incomplete state. The very nature of the Pakistani state is said to pose a threat to India. According to a 1982–1983 survey of India’s security problems, the “Pakistan factor” looms large for reasons related to Pakistan’s many shortcomings. These include Pakistan’s limited cultural and civilizational inheritance, its military dictatorship, theocratic identity, unworkable unitary system of government (as opposed to India’s flexible federalism), the imposition of Urdu on an unwilling population, the alienation of Pakistan’s rulers from their people, Islamabad’s support of “reactionary” regimes in West Asia (India identified its interests with the “progressive” segments of Arab nationalism, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), its dependency on foreign aid, and the failure to develop a strong economic base. This perspective has enjoyed a renaissance in the twelve years since Pakistan began to openly support the separatist and terrorist movements that emerged in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Pakistan is considered a threat also because it still claims that partition was imperfectly carried out; it harbors some revanchist notions toward India’s Muslim population; and it falsely accuses India of wanting to undo Pakistan. Thus Pakistan still wishes to claim Kashmir, and even to upset the integrity and unity of India itself. More recently, Pakistan has served as the base for Islamic “jihadists” who seek not only the liberation of Kashmir, but also the liberation of all of India’s Muslims.

The Pakistani Perspective

Pakistani leaders see themselves as even more threatened than their Indian counterparts but still more able to withstand the challenge than the larger, more powerful India. Its leaders have a profound distrust of New Delhi, and the latter’s reassurances that India “accepts” the existence of Pakistan are not taken seriously. The dominant explanation of regional conflict held by Pakistan’s strategic community is that, from the first day of independence, there has been a concerted Indian attempt to crush their state. This original trauma was refreshed and deepened by the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Many Pakistanis now see their state as threatened by an increasingly Hindu, extremist India, motivated by a desire for religious revenge and a missionary-like zeal to extend its influence to the furthest reaches of South Asia. There is also a strand of Pakistani thinking that draws on the army’s tradition of geopolitics, rather than the two-nation theory, to explain the conflict between India and Pakistan.

Like Israel, Pakistan was founded by a people who felt persecuted when living as a minority; even though they possess their own states (based on religious identity), both remain under threat from powerful enemies. In both cases, an original partition demonstrated the hostility of neighbors, and subsequent wars showed that these neighbors remained hostile. Pakistan and Israel have also followed parallel strategic policies. Both sought an entangling alliance with various outside powers (at various times, Britain, France, China, and the United States). Both ultimately concluded that outsiders could not be trusted in a moment of extreme crisis, which led them to develop nuclear weapons.

Further complicating India-Pakistan relations is the 1971 defeat, a great blow to the Pakistan army, which has governed Pakistan for more than half of its existence. Thus to achieve a normal relationship with Pakistan, India must not only influence Pakistan’s public opinion; it must also change the institutionalized distrust of India found in the army. The chances of this happening are slim.

Another source of Pakistani hostility is the Indian claim that Pakistan needs the Indian threat to maintain its own unity. This argument has an element of truth: distrust of India and the Kashmir conflict do serve as a national rallying cry for Pakistanis, and thus as a device for smoothing over differences between Pakistan’s dominant province, Punjab, and the smaller provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, and the North-West Frontier. “India as enemy” is also useful to distract the Pakistani public from other concerns, such as social inequality, sectarian (Sunni-Shi‘a) conflict, and the distinct absence of social progress in many sectors of Pakistani society.

Strategies in a Paired-Minority Conflict

States or groups that see themselves as threatened minorities have at least eight coping strategies. In the abstract, these include: fleeing the relationship, either physically or psychologically; demonizing the opponent; assimilation; accommodation; changing the behavior or perception of the enemy state; using outsiders to redress the balance of power; and finally, changing the balance of power by war or other means (such as increasing one's economy or population faster than the other side). Over the past fifty years, India and Pakistan, not to mention third parties, have contemplated each of these strategies.

Flight. India and Pakistan have tried to flee their relationship several times. The first instance was literally a physical escape; the others constitute symbolic, psychological, and strategic flight. Even though its founders had no interest in creating a theocratic state, Pakistan was created as a “homeland” for Indian Muslims, and most of its subsequent leaders left India to establish the new state of Pakistan. The key West Pakistani leaders were from Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Bombay; the key East Pakistani leaders were Bengali Muslims. Intermittently, India has pursued a policy of psychologically escaping the relationship with Pakistan by the “look East” policy, or by ignoring Pakistan, simply refusing to engage in serious negotiations with it.

Demonization. Demonization is another way of escaping a relationship. If the leaders of the other country are evil, misguided, or corrupt, then dialogue with them is immoral and dangerous. For many Indians, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, has long personified the misguided, evil leader who challenged India's civilizational unity with his two-nation theory, began the militarization of Pakistan by seeking arms from the West, and in a cold, undemocratic, and jealous spirit whipped up hatred and fear of India. His successors, largely military officers, are thought to lack even Jinnah's leadership qualities and the moral authority to place their country on a solid footing.

Pakistan's image of the Indian leadership is no less hostile. An important component of Pakistan's founding ideology was that Muslims could not trust the “crafty” Hindus, who still suffered from an inferiority complex. While Gandhi and Jinnah were once respected rivals, their successors in both states lacked even professional respect for each other.

Assimilation. Although many on both sides would like to flee the relationship, some Indians hope that Pakistan will someday rejoin India. Indeed, most of India's past leaders assumed that the Pakistan experiment would fail and that the state would come back to the fold. However, Pakistan's leaders have never contemplated assimilation. Indians no longer talk of reintegrating Pakistan into

India, but there are widespread (if generally private) discussions about how India might establish friendly relations with successor states to present-day Pakistan. Like Bangladesh today, these states might not like or love India, but they may fear and respect Indian power and would not dream of challenging New Delhi as Pakistan has.

Accommodation. If Pakistan did not rejoin India, many Indians expected it to accommodate Indian power. However, Pakistani strategists view the accommodation of Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and even Bangladesh as precisely the wrong model for Islamabad. These states have lost their freedom of action, they have been penetrated by Indian culture, and New Delhi has undue influence on their domestic politics, even intervening by force where necessary. For example, India absorbed Sikkim, intervened in Sri Lanka, and has a military presence in Bhutan. Because Pakistan is larger and more powerful than any of these states, many of its strategists contend, it does not need to accommodate India. This resistance to accommodation or compromise with India is especially powerful in the armed forces. Pakistan, its officers argue, may be smaller, but it is not weaker. United by religion and a martial spirit, it need not lower its demands of India, especially regarding Kashmir.

Altering perceptions. From time to time, there have been attempts to change perceptions of Indians and Pakistanis to promote better understanding between the two. Several nonregional states and organizations have tried to promote India-Pakistan cooperation or dialogue. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States wanted to broker a détente between the two states so that they might join in a common alliance against threats from the Soviet Union and China. Considerable diplomatic energy was expended on these efforts, but the only result was to provide each with enhanced diplomatic leverage against the other.

Within South Asia the regional organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has provided a venue for meetings between Indian and Pakistani leaders and sponsors some cooperative projects on regional issues. However, SAARC cannot deal with bilateral issues, and the smaller members are vulnerable to Indian pressure concerning the focus of SAARC initiatives. India has twice been able to force a postponement of its annual meetings when it was displeased with developments in Pakistan.

Most of the India-Pakistan dialogues, intended to promote understanding, wind up rehearsing old arguments, often for the sake of the non-South Asian participants present. History is used—and abused—to emphasize the legitimacy of one's own side and the misguided policies of the other. For years, meetings between Indians and Pakistanis rarely lasted long enough to systematically discuss



India's Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee (left) with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. At Musharraf's presidential palace, the two men met (for an hour) on 5 January 2004, before an upcoming SAARC summit, declaring their wish for normalized relations between both countries. INDIA TODAY.

the differences between the two sides and how those differences might be ameliorated or accommodated.

Proposals that emerge from the two countries were often not serious, their purpose usually being to convince outside powers of Indian (or Pakistani) sincerity. Much the same can be said of recent proposals for the institution of confidence-building measures (hot lines, summits, dialogues, and various technical verification proposals) between the two countries. Since the 1990s, there have also been at least one hundred programs to bring together students, journalists, politicians, strategists, artists, intellectuals, and retired generals from both countries. Much of the goodwill created by such efforts, however, was washed away by the 1999 Kargil conflict, an Indian Airlines hijacking, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and an extended military crisis that lasted well into 2002. A new round of dialogues, begun in late 2003, shows promise but has yet to yield concrete results.

The Indian and Pakistani governments have also tried to influence deeper perceptions across the border.

Several Indian governments—including those of Morarji Desai, Inder Kumar Gujral, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee—have undertaken major initiatives in an attempt to win over Pakistani opinion. Most efforts seem to have failed dramatically, with the Lahore meeting between Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the spring of the 1999 discredited by the subsequent Kargil conflict, and the Nawaz linkage destroyed by the army coup of October 1999. The Indian proponents of a conciliatory line toward Pakistan came under strong attack from both the opposition parties and more hawkish elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party, although the new (2004) Congress-led government seems to be showing more flexibility. On Pakistan's part, President Zia's "cricket diplomacy" of the late 1980s and President Musharraf's participation in the Agra Summit in July 2001 raised the prospect of a more forthcoming Pakistani policy. Nevertheless, Pakistan's two democratically elected prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, fearful of the army, both assumed a very hawkish stance toward India.

Seeking outside allies. The most consistent policy in both states for over fifty years has been to seek outside allies against each other. Pakistan has enlisted several Arab states, Iran, the United States, China, and North Korea in its attempt to balance Indian power, but Washington, uncomfortable shouldering such a role, has resisted Pakistan's efforts to extend the security umbrella to cover an attack by India. The Reagan administration drew the line at calling India a communist state, which would have invoked the 1959 agreement to take measures to defend Pakistan against communist aggression.

The Chinese have been less restrained, and while no known treaty binds Pakistan and China together, Beijing has provided more military assistance to Pakistan than it has to any other state. Beijing saw its support for Pakistan as serving a dual purpose, since a stronger Pakistan could counter the Soviet Union and resist Indian pressure. Yet, China has moderated its support for Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, and has gradually normalized its relationship with India. After 1988 New Delhi itself saw an opportunity to weaken the Beijing-Islamabad tie by moving closer to China and lately has been circumspect in its criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet and elsewhere. This trend has continued through 2004 with the reinvigoration of commercial trade, investment, and border talks between China and India.

India also saw the former Soviet Union as a major ally in its competition with Pakistan. The Soviet Union provided a veto in the United Nations, massive arms supplies, and general sympathy for New Delhi. However, this support was not directed so much against Pakistan as it was against China; when the Gorbachev government began to normalize relations with Beijing, its support for India gradually declined. This trend is likely to continue indefinitely, with India and Pakistan both seeking outside support against the other.

Changing the balance of power. Both India and Pakistan have also attempted to use their armed forces to change their balance of power. The closest the two have come to a decisive turning point was in 1971, when the Indian army secured the surrender of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan. However, rather than pressing on to a decisive victory in the West—which would have been very costly and might have brought other states into the contest—India settled for a negotiated peace and the Simla agreement. Both the United States and China provided verbal support for Pakistan in 1970 and 1971, but neither seemed prepared to take any direct action that would have prevented India from defeating the Pakistanis in East Pakistan. A second opportunity came in 1987 during the Brasstacks crisis, when India had conventional superiority and Pakistan had not yet acquired a nuclear weapon.

By 1990 both India and Pakistan had covertly exercised their nuclear options and seemed to have concluded that the risk of escalation had reached a point where the fundamental balance between the two could not be achieved by force of arms. This did not prevent the discrete use of force, and Pakistan adopted a strategy of hitting at India through the support of separatist and terrorist forces and, in 1999, a low-level war in Kargil. Now this raises the prospect of escalation to nuclear war, but so far there has been no Indian or Pakistani advocacy of a decisive nuclear war.

Resolution or Permanent Hostility?

A paired-minority conflict does not lend itself to the kind of sustained dialogue that leads to regional peace. Neither does it imply that war is likely. Other paired-minority conflicts have been moderated or appear to be on the road to resolution, or at least manageability. On the one hand, it is possible to envision a peace process that could resolve or ameliorate the core conflicts between India and Pakistan, though such a process would require major policy changes on the part of India, Pakistan, and the most likely “facilitator” of such a process, the United States. A regional peace now seems improbable, however, given Washington's reluctance (since 1964) to become deeply engaged in South Asian conflicts and the difficulty of arriving at political acceptance in both countries at the same time.

A more likely development is that steps will be taken to encourage India and Pakistan to accommodate one another and reduce their conflict. Such measures have already been gaining support since the early 1990s and in some quarters are seen as a prelude to a real peace agreement. The uprising in Kashmir and the nuclearization of India and Pakistan have stimulated this interest, as reflected in the expansion of “Track II” diplomacy as well as increasing research on ways to stabilize the India-Pakistan relationship and various confidence-building measures. The goal of all of these efforts is to increase regional cooperation and trust, and to moderate, if not transform, a relationship that seems to be based on fear, hatred, and distrust. These suggestions emphasize the gains and benefits that each side may reap from cooperation.

Finally, the possibility that the India-Pakistan relationship might undergo a major transformation cannot be ruled out. Several scenarios suggest themselves, and though some of these seem far-fetched at the moment, all merit at least a brief mention.

Pakistan could collapse under the weight of its own contradictions and cease to exist in its present form, perhaps splitting into several states. India could cause Pakistan to change its identity or cease to exist in its present form, instead emerging as

a state less able or willing to challenge India in any significant way.

Some Hindu nationalists believe that India's "civilizational pull" will triumph over the idea of Pakistan, and that Pakistanis will simply succumb to India's greater cultural and social power (though not necessarily merge with India).

India may underestimate Pakistani nationalism and power and take some action that would lead Islamabad to actually use its nuclear weapons in a final attempt to defend Pakistan and, if that fails, to bring India down with it by attacking India's cities.

Pakistan might change its priorities, putting development ahead of Kashmir—at least for a while. This seems to be the strategy adopted by Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf in 2003–2004.

India could accept Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state and move toward cooperating with it on a range of shared interests. Or, it could declare that it disagreed with this identity and point to the accomplishments of a secular democracy, but also acknowledge that on this irreconcilable point Pakistanis have the right to choose a different path.

None of these extreme outcomes seem likely, but together they add up to a possibility that the India-Pakistan relationship could take a dramatic and even dangerous turn. Without some fundamental changes in India and Pakistan, the most likely future of this dispute will be a continuing stalemate, one of hesitant movements toward dialogue, punctuated by attempts on both sides to unilaterally press their advantage in Kashmir and in international forums. This is a conflict that Pakistan cannot win and India cannot lose, a true "hurting stalemate."

India's dilemma. A state of stalemate is seen to be more attractive to each side than finding solutions. From the perspective of the Pakistan military, which has an absolute veto over any policy initiative regarding Kashmir, the ability to tie Indian forces down in Kashmir is an important consequence of the dispute; cynically, it could be said that Pakistan is willing to fight India to the last Kashmiri. For India, Kashmir has so many links to India's secular political order—especially the place of Muslims—that any settlement that appears to compromise this order is unacceptable.

Until a few years ago, the prospect of a "failed" Pakistan did not greatly disturb India. In the face of Islamic extremism, Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the state's economic collapse, however, the thought of a failed Pakistan is worrying India more and more. Pakistan could spew out millions of refugees, it might accelerate the spread of nuclear weapons to hostile states and terrorist groups, and it could serve as a base for

radical Islamic movements that target Indian Muslims. Strategically, a failed Pakistan might draw outside powers into the subcontinent. Conversely, a more normal India-Pakistan relationship could help India assume a place among the major Asian and even global powers. It would not be a question, as it is now, of Indian power minus Pakistani power, but of an India free to exercise its influence over a much wider range, without the distraction—and the cost—of a conflict with a still-powerful Pakistan.

India's strained relationship with Pakistan resembles a chronic ailment. It has not prevented the Indian economy from forging ahead, India has been able to pursue its great democratic experiment, and it is now recognized as one of Asia's major powers—with its sights set on a wider arena. Yet, Pakistan remains an obsession for a sector of the Indian elite, and Islamabad's new nuclear capabilities, plus its willingness to tolerate if not support separatist and terrorist groups operating in India and Kashmir cannot be ignored. Indians (and perhaps even more so, Pakistanis) need to come to grips with the relationship. The problem is that events may outrun the process of accommodation. In recent years there has been a summit, a miniwar, a coup in Pakistan, and a major crisis (in 2002). India, as of early 2005, appears to be searching for a stable relationship with Pakistan, but the most important question one can ask of the relationship is not whether Indians or Pakistanis can be trusted to fulfill obligations incurred in agreements where they had little incentive to comply, but whether, under the influence of a pessimistic vision of the region's destiny, they can be trusted in cases where it is in their self-interest to comply.

Stephen P. Cohen

See also **China, Relations with; Kashmir; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Pakistan; United States, Relations with**

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PALA DYNASTY. See **Bengal.**

PALAEOLITHIC PERIOD A general term used by archaeologists, *Palaeolithic* refers to the earliest period of human cultural development when the primary cultural remains are stone tools and occasional fossil bones of either early hominids or the animals that they butchered for food. The discovery of early Miocene hominoids such as *Sivapithecus* (14 to 7 million years ago, or M.Y.A.) and *Ramapithecus* (13 to 9 M.Y.A.) in the Siwalik deposits of northern Pakistan and India provide evidence for early primate evolution. Unfortunately, the crucial Pliocene deposits dating from 4 to 1 million years ago are badly eroded and contain none of the fossils that are needed to identify the presence of hominids that were ancestral to humans. Early scholars proposed that the roughly flaked tools of the Pre-Soan and Soan traditions belonged to a very early period of human evolution, but their discovery in eroded deposits made it impossible to accurately date them. Improvements in palaeomagnetic and other chronometric dating techniques have now confirmed very early stone tools in deposits at Riwat (+2 M.Y.A.) in the Potwar Plateau, Pakistan, and at Uttarbani (+2.8 M.Y.A.) in Jammu, India. These new discoveries have extended the Lower Palaeolithic in northern South Asia to more than 2 million years ago, during the late Pliocene Epoch. No fossil hominids have been found from this early period in South Asia, but early *Homo* fossils, possibly *Homo erectus*, have been found in China and date to approximately this same time period, while in Africa the main tool-using hominid was *Homo ergaster*. Considerably more evidence for tool-using hominids is found from sites throughout most of the northern and peninsular regions, dating from 700,000 to 500,000 years ago. While the earliest stone tools were made by irregular flaking on pebbles or large blocklets, the later forms demonstrate more refined bifacial flaking to produce bilaterally symmetrical hand axes and cleavers that fall within the Acheulian tool tradition. These early Acheulian stone tools were probably used to dig tubers, butcher animals, and make wooden tools. The Lower Palaeolithic period continues until around 100,000 years ago, when changes in tool technologies indicate the emergence of new subsistence strategies that may also be associated with more evolved species, such as archaic *Homo sapiens*.

The Middle Palaeolithic period extends from around 100,000 to 30,000 years ago, though it may end earlier or later in different regions of the subcontinent. The earliest hominid fossil to be discovered in South Asia comes from the site of Hathnora, in Maharashtra, on the Narmada River in central India. This fossil skull (frontal) fragment was initially identified as belonging to *Homo erectus* (1.5 M.Y.A. to 500,000 Y.A.), but more recent studies have confirmed that it should be classified as archaic *Homo sapiens* (400,000 to 100,000 Y.A.). The Hathnora fossil was found in eroded gravels along with late Acheulian tools that could date anywhere from 700,000 to 125,000 year ago, but most scholars place the fossil at around 125,000 years ago. The only other Middle Palaeolithic fossil is a temporal bone from the skull of an archaic *Homo sapiens*, similar to Neanderthal skulls from Skhul cave in the Levant. This important fossil was found at the site of Darra-i-Kur, Afghanistan, and is dated by the radiocarbon technique to around 30,000 years ago, using charcoal from an associated hearth. Numerous Mousterian-style tools, scrapers, a Levallois point, and small hand axes are comparable to tools from Neanderthal sites in the Near East and Europe. Faunal remains at the site indicate the people were hunting wild goats or sheep and possibly cattle. Many more cave sites and open air sites of the Middle Palaeolithic have been found throughout South Asia, and they demonstrate that archaic *Homo sapiens* populations were adapting to all of the varied environments, from the glacial highlands in the north to the rich alluvial plains near Rohri, Pakistan, to the deserts of Rajasthan and the tropical jungles of peninsular India.

The Upper Palaeolithic period dates from around 30,000 to 12,000 years ago and corresponds to the period of maximum glaciation in northern latitudes. The peninsular environment changed from moist to semiarid, resulting in a change in fauna from large Late Pleistocene mammals to smaller modern forms. Periodic interglacial episodes allowed human communities to expand into the mountainous regions, such as Kashmir and northern Afghanistan. The stone tool technology gradually became more specialized, with many backed blades and some burins, scrapers, ring stones, and geometric microliths. Few bone tools have been recovered, except from Kurnool Cave in South India. One of the important cave sites is Bhimbetka (III F-23), in Maharashtra, that has early levels dating to around 100,000 years ago in the Late Acheulian. The Upper Palaeolithic occupation at the cave dates from 30,000 to around 10,000 years ago. Near Bhimbetka are hundreds of caves and rock shelters with rock art. Some of the earliest geometric paintings made with red pigments and others that depict large pigs and bison may date to the end of the Upper Palaeolithic period, or Epi-Palaeolithic, but most of the caves belong to the subsequent Mesolithic period. Very little movable

FIGURE 1

| Time Line | | |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| PLEISTOCENE (10,000 TO 2 M.Y.A.) | | |
| Upper Pleistocene | Mesolithic | 8,000–9,000 Y.A. |
| 10,000 to 100,000 | Epi-Palaeolithic | 10,000 Y.A. |
| (127,000) | Upper Palaeolithic | 10,000–30,000 Y.A. |
| (100,000) | Middle Palaeolithic | 30,000–70,000 Y.A. |
| Middle Pleistocene | Lower Palaeolithic | 100,000–500,000 Y.A. |
| 100,000 to 1 M.Y.A. (.7) | Archaic <i>Homo sapiens</i> | |
| | Late Acheulian | |
| Lower Pleistocene | Lower Palaeolithic | to 1.9 or 2 M.Y.A. |
| 1 to 2 M.Y.A. | Early Hominids, | |
| (1.9, 1.7) | Soan, Acheulian | |
| ----- | | |
| Pliocene | Lower Palaeolithic | 2 to 4.5 M.Y.A. |
| 2 to 5 M.Y.A. | Early Hominids and Pre-Soan, origins of tool making | |
| ----- | | |
| Miocene | Higher Primates | |
| 5 to 25 M.Y.A. | | |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

art has been discovered so far except for a carved pebble and notched stone from the site of Gar-i-Asp (Horse cave), in Aq Kupruk, Afghanistan.

In central India, the site of Baghor I, in Madhya Pradesh, is an important Epi-Palaeolithic site dated to around 11,000 years ago. This open-air campsite was located next to an oxbow lake on the Son River and contained rubble floors for huts, hearths, and large quantities of manufacturing waste from heat treatment of chert nodules and stone tool manufacture. Many broken backed blades and geometric microliths indicate that hunting weapons were being hafted and repaired at the site; used stone tools indicate the processing of hides and woodworking. Ring stones that may have been used with digging sticks suggest that the people were also collecting tubers, and grinding stones indicate that they were processing wild plant foods. A small rubble platform with a unique triangular stone in the center is thought to represent the earliest ritual structure or shrine in the subcontinent. The ancient triangular stone is identical to modern stones used in local shrines to represent the Mother Goddess and female energy, or *shakti*.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also **Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age; Indus Valley Civilization; Neolithic Period; Rock Art**

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PALLAVAS. See **History and Historiography**.

PANCHAMAS ("FIFTHS"). See **Dalits**.

PANCH SHILA (FIVE PRINCIPLES). See **Nehru, Jawaharlal**.

PANDAVAS. See **Mahābhārata**.

PANDIT, VIJAYA LAKSHMI (1900–1990), *Indian political leader and diplomat.* Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was born on 18 August 1900, the daughter of Motilal Nehru, a wealthy lawyer, and his wife Swarup. (She too was given the name Swarup at birth; Vijaya Lakshmi, the name by which she became known in public life, was given to her when she married.) Her older brother, Jawaharlal, served as prime minister when India became independent in 1947 until his death in 1964. Her younger sister, Krishna (later, Hutheesingh), in her memoirs described her famous sister as docile, obedient, tactful, and eminently suited to high office. She was also beautiful, highly intelligent, at ease with people of all classes, witty, and, on occasion, sharp-tongued. She was educated entirely at home by tutors under the supervision of her English governess, Jane Hooper.

The family became involved in nationalist politics when Motilal Nehru gave his support to Mohandas Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress, in its opposition to British rule. In 1921 Vijaya married Ranjit S. Pandit, a lawyer and Sanskrit scholar, and they had three daughters. Both she and her husband were active in the freedom movement, and they were imprisoned at various times. He died in 1944 after a prison term. Elected in 1937 to the provincial legislature of the United Provinces, she became minister in charge of local self-government, medicine, and public health.



Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. At the United Nations, Vijaya Pandit poised to take charge of the General Assembly as its president. September 1953. TIME LIFE PICTURES / GETTY IMAGES.

Vijaya Pandit made her first visit to the United States in 1944 to see her daughters, Nayantara and Chandralekha, who were students at Wellesley College. She lectured widely on India, befriending influential Americans, including Eleanor Roosevelt. She represented India at the initial meeting of the United Nations in 1946 at San Francisco. When India became independent, she was appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union (1947–1949) and then to the United States (1949–1951). From 1952 to 1954, she was a member of Parliament, and from 1953 to 1954, she led India's delegation to the United Nations, where she became president of the General Assembly. From 1954 to 1961, she was India's high commissioner to Great Britain. Governor of the province of Maharashtra from 1962 to 1964, she was a member of Parliament from 1964 to 1969.

Her niece, Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal, had become prime minister in 1964, but there were increasing strains between them as the Gandhi administration became more authoritarian, culminating in the suspension of civil rights. Pandit joined the opposition party and in 1978 won a seat in Parliament in the election that defeated Indira Gandhi. On her retirement from parliament, she wrote her memoirs, *The Scope of Happiness*.

When she died on 1 December 1990, newspapers cited her as one of the most outstanding women of the century.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nehru, Motilal; Women and Political Power

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PANDITA RAMABAI (1858–1922), social activist, proponent of women’s rights in India. Pandita Ramabai was born in Mangalore District in 1858. Her father was a Chitpavan Brahman scholar, who taught her Sanskrit and refused to arrange her marriage. The family traveled from one pilgrimage site to another; her father supporting them by giving recitations of the Purāṇas. The famine of 1874 reduced the family to starvation. In the forest near Tirupathi, her father, mother, and elder sister died. She and her brother wandered all over India, mostly on foot, for the next six years, in an effort to attain to the forgiveness of sins. What they found was “insincerity and fraud” (Macnicol, p. 16). But Ramabai and her brother were not deceived. “We knew we were sinners,” she confessed, “though we did not acknowledge it.” Still it was in those years that Ramabai became profoundly aware of the sufferings of women. In Calcutta, her intellect and charisma while expounding the scriptures captivated the Sanskrit scholars of Bengal, who bestowed on her the title *Pandita* (mistress of learning). However, Ramabai eventually became disillusioned with Hinduism.

Pandita Ramabai became a champion of the oppressed, particularly women. In 1880 she married a Bengali lawyer; he died within two years, leaving her with a baby daughter, Monorama. Ramabai began an aggressive crusade in favor of female education and a higher marriage age for girls, rousing the opposition of orthodox Hindus.

In 1882 Ramabai published her first book in Marathi, *Sbree Dharma Neety* (Morals for women), which drew attention to the plight of child widows and married and unmarried women. Pandita Ramabai spoke out on women’s rights long before Mahatma Gandhi did. In 1883

she was called before the Education Commission, chaired by Sir William Hunter. “The educated men of this country are opposed to female education and the proper position of women,” she told them. “It is evident that women, being one half of the people of this country, are oppressed and cruelly treated by the other half.” She also appealed to the government to open medical schools to women.

In Britain, in September 1883, Ramabai and her daughter were baptized. Before returning to Poona in 1889, she wrote *The High Caste Hindu Woman, 1887*. It was the first book ever published in English by an Indian woman. A few months later she became the first woman to address the Indian National Congress.

The famines of 1896 and 1897 were a watershed in Ramabai’s life. She saw people dying, especially girls, and knew she must save some. She acquired a 500-acre property in Kedgaon, near Poona. It was dedicated in September 1898 and came to be known as the Mukti (Salvation) Mission. The residents were abandoned and abused women and girls. All were taught skills to earn their own living. Before the end of her life, the community had grown to two thousand residents. She was awarded the Kaiser-i-Hind gold medal in 1919 for her social contributions. She died peacefully on 5 April 1922.

Graham Houghton

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PANDITS. *See Jammu and Kashmir.*

PĀNINI, fifth-century-B.C. grammarian. Dākshīputra Pānini, author of India’s greatest grammar, *Ashtādhyāyī* (Eight chapters), was born in Shalātura in northwest India. According to tradition, he became a friend of Raja Mahānanda of Magadha (fifth century B.C.). Pānini’s grammar described, in four thousand *sūtras*, the rules to generate all Sanskrit sentences.

The Dakshas were a northern clan organized into a republican *sangha*. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsieu Tsang visited Shalatura in the seventh century and found that the grammatical tradition was continued there, and that Pānini had been honored with a statue. The *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* (Ocean of verse) of Somadeva (eleventh century) mentions that Pānini’s teacher was Varsha and his rival was Kātyāyana.

Pānini's *Ashtādhyāyī* is the greatest ancient masterpiece of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. It took the earlier Pratiśākhya rules on converting the word-for-word recitation of the Veda into a continuous recitation and created an abstract grammar of unsurpassed power. Pānini's grammar, along with its word lists, presents invaluable incidental information about life and society in fifth-century-B.C. India. It preserves the names of cities, towns, villages, and cultural and political entities called *Janapadas* (states), as well as details regarding social life, economic conditions, education and learning, religion, and political conditions. The Janapada states had different types of government; some were republics, others were monarchies. We learn that the king did not have absolute power and that he shared authority with his minister.

Pānini's references shed important light on the way religion was practiced. We find that images were used to represent deities in temples and open shrines. There were images in the possession of the custodian of shrines.

Pānini is aware of the Vedic literature and the Upanishads. He also knows the Mahābhārata. Pānini's work is thus invaluable in the dating of the texts of the Vedic period. Pānini describes coins that came prior to the period of Kautilya's *Artha Shāstra* (Textbook on material gain; 4th century B.C.).

Pānini appears to have traveled to Pātaliputra to participate in a great annual meeting of scholars.

Subhash Kak

See also **Ashtādhyāyī; Vedic Aryan India**

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PANT, GOVIND BALLABH (1887–1961), Indian politician, home minister (1954–1960). Born at Khunt, near Almora, United Provinces, in the Himalayas on 30 August 1887, Govind Ballabh Pant became India's "greatest parliamentarian," serving for ten years as chief minister of the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) and for six years as home minister of the Indian government. He grew up in Almora and was known as a *pahari* or, as Jawaharlal Nehru put it, "a son of the mountains." His father was a *naib tabsildar* (deputy collector of revenue). Pant was educated at home and was sent to school at the age of ten. In 1905 he enrolled in Muir Central College

in Allahabad and between 1907 and 1909 studied law. A serious student of politics, he kept a notebook and diary of contemporary events and modeled himself on the Congress moderate Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915). Pant began a law practice in Almora but moved his practice to Kashipur, which, although a political backwater, became the center of his legal and political life. In 1914 he established Prem Sabha, a literary and social organization, and became the secretary of the Uday Raj Hindu School. In 1916 he founded the Kumaun Parishad to voice the demands of the Kumaun people. In 1916 he attended the renowned Congress session at Lucknow. He fought his first election to the United Provinces Legislative Council in 1920 but lost by thirty-three votes.

In 1922 he gave up his legal practice to follow Mahatma Gandhi. In 1923 Pant was elected to the United Provinces Legislative Council on the Swarajist ticket and headed the party in the assembly. He was reelected in 1926 but resigned in 1930. Between 1929 and 1934 he served time in prison for his noncooperation activities, shared a cell with Nehru, and they became close friends. In 1934 he was elected unopposed on the Congress ticket to the Legislative Assembly of India. In 1937 and again in 1946 he was elected to the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, serving as chief minister between 1937 and 1939. Between 1946 and 1950 he represented Uttar Pradesh in the Constituent Assembly of India. From 1946 to 1954 he returned as the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh before finally accepting Nehru's offer to serve in the central government. He was the home minister until 1960. He had a prodigious capacity for work, and as a first-class administrator he was a master for details. Govind B. Pant died on 7 March 1961.

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See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

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PANTH. See **Sikhism**.

PAPERMAKING In India, paper came into use relatively late. In the Hindu tradition, from the ancient Aryan Brahmanic oral transmission of the Vedas, nothing was written until about the sixth century B.C. In South India, the earliest portable writing materials were *tadpatra* (palm leaves), *bhurja patra* (beaten birch bark), and cotton cloth. Perhaps for religious reasons, parchment, made



A Woman Making Rice Paper from Rags and Scraps. In the state of Sikkim, situated in the eastern Himalayas, a woman sifts through cotton rags and scraps of paper. This technique of using recycled goods to make new paper was introduced in contemporary India to revive a stagnating industry. EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL / CORBIS.

from the inner lining of the stomach of a calf, which was commonly in use in the Christian and Arab world, was not used in India.

The earliest mention of paper in India is in the records of the Cairo *Genizah*, a repository of Jewish manuscripts that cover the period from A.D. 1000 to 1250. These documents note that many Jewish traders were closely linked to Western India and that paper was sent as a present from Aden to India. It seems clear that paper first came to India through trade and was used long before it was actually made there. It appears to have been brought as a commodity into Gujarat by Arab merchants who sailed along the west coast of India. Inscriptional references of the thirteenth century attest to settlement by Arab traders in the ports of Cambay, Prabhas Patan (Somnath), Junagadh, and Anahilvad (Patan).

The earliest use of paper was to record religious scriptures, particularly in the Jain tradition. The Jain kings of the Chalukya period (10th–13th century) were great patrons of learning who established libraries. Commoners also gained merit by commissioning copies of sacred texts. After the Muslim conquest of Gujarat in the early

fourteenth century, the number of manuscripts increased. Palm leaf was no longer in use in western India by the latter half of the fourteenth century. In other regions, it was used well into the sixteenth century, and in Orissa as late as the nineteenth century for religious texts. Abu Hamid al Gharnati in his *Tuhfat ul Albab*, written in 1162, notes that “Indian paper” compared favorably with that made in Iraq and Khorasan.

In Kashmir, however, the craft of papermaking is believed to have been introduced by Zain ul-Ab-ud-Din in the fifteenth century upon his return from Samarqand, where he had been taken hostage by Timur. The emperor appears to have brought back craftsmen trained in the Persian tradition. From Nowshera, papermaking spread south to Sialkot and into North India.

Local lore in Khuldabad claims that Chinese craftsmen, among them papermakers, who were at the court of Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq (r. 1325–1351), moved with the court when the capital moved south from Delhi to Daulatabad, renamed Deogiri. The paper made there, possibly already in the fourteenth century, appears to have followed the Chinese tradition, with some local differences.

The first recorded use of paper is in Barani's *Tarikh I Firuzshahi*, where he refers to a *firman* that Sultan Balban (r. 1266–1286) ordered to be washed in order to annul a decree. This indicates that paper was not only strong but also valuable.

Raw Materials and Technique

The raw materials used for paper were never fresh fibers. Paper was made from discarded items of everyday use, for example, ropes, fishing nets, and gunny sacks, all made from *sunm* hemp (*crotonaria juncea*).

The rags would be chopped into small pieces with a hatchet and soaked in water for three to four days. They would then be washed, preferably in river water, by two men standing in the water with a cloth tied around their waists like a hammock. The rags would be scrubbed vigorously to release dirt. The washed rags would then be placed in a clay pot embedded in the ground and retted in a mixture of six parts crude carbonate of soda and seven parts quicklime. This system of cold retting broke down the fibers. After eight to ten days, the rags would be washed again and macerated either by rubbing on a roughened surface or by stamping underfoot. In the nineteenth century the *dhenki* was developed; a wooden stamper with a long horizontal beam, it could be operated by two men. The rags were then left out to dry in the sun. The entire laborious process would be repeated again three times to achieve the required whiteness. A small quantity of fiber was put into a clay pot, mixed with water, and shaken vigorously to check for an even dispersion of fibers, which was essential to the process. Country soap was added to serve as a bleaching agent, and then the pulp was made into cakes and dried in the sun.

When ready for use, the pulp was soaked in a small cylindrical vat, or *kundi*, and was trodden with bare feet to make a gruel. This was put into the main vat and left to soak overnight. The next morning the papermaker, or *kagzi*, squatted facing the vat and stirred the pulp vigorously with a bamboo pole to evenly disperse the fibers. He would lay the pole across the vat and place the *sacha*, a rectangular wooden frame with triangular ribs, on top of it. He would then spread the *chhapri*, a grass mat woven using hair from the tail of a horse, over the *sacha*, keeping it taut with two deckle sticks. The *kagzi* would hold the *sacha* with the deckle sticks loosely in his thumb and forefingers and dip the frame almost vertically into the vat; turning it horizontally in the water, he would lift out some pulp, shaking it gently to and fro. This shaking in all directions ensured a biaxial interlocking of the fibers, which made the paper strong. The *sacha* would be lifted out of the water and placed back on the bamboo pole; the excess water was allowed to drain away, and

then the deckle sticks were removed. The *chhapri* with the thin film of pulp would be lifted carefully and couched on a cloth stretched on a wooden board. For each sheet he made, the *kagzi* put a small stone in a clay dish to keep tally. After 50 sheets, another cloth was spread on the pile. Between 150 to 200 sheets were made in a day. The piles were then pressed between two boards and left to stand overnight. The next day, the sheets were peeled apart and pasted onto a wall plastered with lime mortar, using a brush.

When the paper was dry, it was scraped with a pumice stone to remove grit and was sized using either rice or wheat starch. This not only rendered the paper impervious but also strengthened it. Finally, the paper was burnished on a concave wooden board with an agate embedded in clay, a marble roller, or even a conch shell.

The best-known papers of the sixteenth century were the *Sabekkhan* of Ahmedabad, the *Khash I Jabangiri* of Sialkot, the *Daulatabadi*, and the *Kashmiri*, which was famous for its soft, silken texture, reputed to come from waste silk cocoons beaten into the pulp.

Papermaking in the Modern Era

With industrialization, a horizontal mechanical beater called the Hollander beater took some of the labor out of the process, which otherwise remained largely unchanged into the early years of the nineteenth century. In 1825 a Mr. Marsham of Serampore imported a papermaking machine. In 1850 Charles Wood, secretary of state for India, passed an order requiring all paper for the government if India to be supplied from Great Britain.

This edict was a great blow to the craft of papermaking. Waste paper was added to make the process easier, and the quality rapidly deteriorated. Mahatma Gandhi attempted in the early years of the twentieth century to revitalize the craft. Paper was made using waste cotton fiber rags, and orders were issued requiring government files to use only handmade paper. But there was little concern for quality.

Sanganer, Kalpi, Wardha, Ahmedabad, Junnar, Daulatabad, Gosunda, and Pondicherry, all centers long reputed for their fine paper, declined rapidly. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Indian government redefined handmade paper, permitting paper that was made entirely by machine using waste cotton fiber, but that was cut by hand, to be sold as handmade paper. This immediately improved sales as prices dropped, but as there was no regard for quality, the craft was still threatened. An attempt is being made in Daulatabad to revive the original tradition, but it has yet to prove sustainable.

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PARAMILITARY FORCES AND INTERNAL SECURITY India has undergone one of the fastest expansions of paramilitary internal security forces in the world. Though estimates vary, India's paramilitary strength is widely believed to be over 1 million, representing some 50 percent of the country's total armed forces, making India's the second-largest (after China) paramilitary force in the world.

The growth of India's paramilitary forces has been as diverse as it has been dramatic. The most remarkable rise has been that of the central paramilitary forces, light-infantry troops for service in border security, riot control, counterinsurgency, and close protection. The national government maintains six such forces, comprising half a million troops. Most of the remaining forces are organized by the states, in armed police units used for riot control and public order. The states have also raised special operations groups and special task forces to pursue specific criminal or rebel targets. In rebellious states, militias called village defense committees have been raised from among loyal elements. The national government's Intelligence Bureau is also actively involved in countering political unrest. The large paramilitary growth was meant to relieve the Indian army, but 30 to 40 percent of the regular army continues to be engaged in maintaining internal security, and the army has been forced to assign regular troops to counterinsurgency operations.

Growth

Under British rule, internal security had been maintained by Britain's colonial army. Though sparingly used in the twentieth century, the British Indian army's system of city garrisons supported its constabulary role, even when both world wars demanded overseas expeditionary duties. The British also had a practice of maintaining paramilitaries, such as the Cachar Levy (later Assam Rifles) and Punjab Irregular Frontier Force, but these were never quite separate from the army. Free India inherited paramilitary provincial constabularies in its largest states and a mounted infantry battalion, the

Crown's Representative Police Force, later renamed the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

The first spurt of post-independence growth of paramilitary forces occurred in the 1960s in response to external, rather than internal, threats. The threat from China led to the founding of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in 1962. The force was intended for surveillance and special operations along the northern border and inside Chinese territory. The ITBP was recruited from acclimatized Himalayan communities and Tibetan refugees and received significant but short-lived U.S. assistance. The force was placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs, rather than the Indian army, to facilitate coordination with the Intelligence Bureau. India's largest paramilitary, the Border Security Force (BSF), was similarly raised after the 1965 war with Pakistan, which had begun with Pakistani border incursions in Kashmir.

The BSF and the ITBP were subsequently engaged in internal security, mostly focusing on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in the border states. In Jammu and Kashmir, the BSF served as the leading paramilitary agency until 2003. The ITBP mostly provided close protection to political leaders and government officials targeted by rebels. The ITBP's select recruitment procedures made it less susceptible to infiltration and a natural choice for this duty.

The CRPF, which was established for internal security, expanded riot and crowd control and counterinsurgency capabilities. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the CRPF became a more mobile force, reconstituting its riot control squads into Rapid Action Force. In Punjab, the CRPF served effectively at the height of the Sikh rebellion. After the successful end of that insurgency in Punjab, the CRPF reverted to riot and crowd control, while continuing limited counterinsurgency in the Northeastern region. In 2004 the Indian government proposed to replace the BSF units in Jammu and Kashmir with new CRPF units, but held back the changeover following murderous suicide attacks on CRPF camps in the state that raised doubts about the force's capacity to fight effectively. This has led to some rethinking about the utility of paramilitary growth that has accompanied increased political efforts to resolve the dispute in Jammu and Kashmir.

In 2002 the central paramilitary forces consisted of over half a million troops. The BSF stood at 191,000, divided about evenly between border management and counterinsurgency. The force had gone from its initial 37 battalions to 56 in 1980 and 157 in 2002. The CRPF, the second largest, was 167,000, up from 15,000 in 1965. The ITBP went from a few battalions of special forces to 52,000 in 2002. The paramilitaries grew six times faster



India Border Security Force. Members of India's largest paramilitary group, the Border Security Force (BSF), patrolling the India-Pakistan divide. INDIA TODAY.

than the regular military between 1965 and 2002. Their budgets also increased dramatically: the BSF went from 3.5 billion Indian rupees in 1987–1988 to 11.8 billion in 1996–1997; the CRPF budget grew from 1.9 billion rupees in 1985–1986 to 12.5 billion rupees in 1997–1998.

Despite the fast growth, the central paramilitary forces have been overstretched. A CRPF unit, for example, was ordered to move thirty-three times in 1987. In the riot-prone city of Moradabad, in Uttar Pradesh, a single deployment of the force lasted four years, from 1980 to 1984. Between 1981 and 1992, the number of CRPF companies employed in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone rose from 50 to 208 (approximately 12 battalions, or 12,000 troops, to 50 battalions, or 50,000 troops). In the early 1990s as much as 45 percent of the CRPF was deployed in Punjab alone. Though the CRPF was the worst hit, other paramilitary forces were also extended beyond their limits.

A second tier of internal security forces, the provincial constabularies, passed into the hands of the state governments following independence. The bulk of the state

forces for the most part became unreliable and were practically abandoned. Uttar Pradesh's Provincial Armed Constabulary and Bihar's Armed Police, for example, committed some truly horrific human rights offenses. The security reorganization in the states, therefore, concentrated on using task forces for the most grievous threats. The first widely publicized special task force was established in the early 1980s by the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka against the infamous ivory poacher, Veerappan, who ruled the jungles between the two states and was finally killed in 2004. In the late 1980s in Punjab, CRPF officers and troops seconded the state police and formed the core of special teams (described as India's death squads) that targeted Sikh militants. In Jammu and Kashmir, the special operations group, comprising select provincial constabulary and central paramilitary troops, has fought effectively against the insurgents. Special teams have also been used by states such as Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat to fight organized crime. The choice of special teams reflects an effort to concentrate resources on small, uncompromising teams operating with some impunity.

The third tier of internal security forces constitute the village defense committee (VDC). The VDC is a militia constituting state-supporting elements armed, trained, and paid for by the government. They provide intelligence to central and state forces, and in some cases hold off insurgent attacks while calling in reinforcements. VDCs are usually organized in sections of six to ten men, but there are larger and more organized militias as well. The Ikhwan-e-Muslimoon in southern Kashmir, for example, comprised former rebels who worked with government forces against the rebels. In Manipur the government has similarly used ethnic Kuki groups to fight the Naga insurgency. The special police officer (SPO) innovation emerged most publicly from the suppression of the armed peasant and student rebellion in West Bengal in 1969–1970. The SPO was usually an undercover agent, often a former rebel, who gathered intelligence and helped apprehend other rebels. In Punjab some 10,000 men were organized in VDCs and as SPOs.

Legality

Despite the preponderance of central paramilitary forces, law and order is a state subject under the Constitution of India. The states must request help from the central government before military or paramilitary troops may be used. In most cases, the use of force occurs under the authority of the state government working through local administration officers, usually the district revenue collector, who doubles as a magistrate. The combination of executive and judicial authority is a colonial legacy that has enabled the internal use of force in free India as well. The Constitution also allows the national government to dismiss state governments that fail to preserve law and order and to impose emergency central rule. While these powers have been misused for partisan politics, the most serious interventions occurred as a result of rebellion.

The actual deployment and behavior of India's armed forces is governed by specific laws. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act passed in 1958 to aid in the pacification of rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram, has been extended to other areas as required, and allows military personnel to enter and search, make arrests, and use lethal force. Other laws mimic these provisions for the central paramilitary forces. A series of "disturbed areas" laws further allow the national government to deploy security forces without the direct supervision of a magistrate, as is otherwise required for "aid to the civil" operations.

In 2002 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government pushed through Parliament the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gave the police and security agencies broad authority to suspend civil liberties and due process. The new Congress government in 2004 allowed the law to

lapse and has been trying to push through a more lenient version as replacement. The previous two decades were marked by controversy over the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987, which gave similar powers to security agencies. A news report in April 1992 found that 13,225 persons had been detained under the law in the previous seven years, but only 78 were convicted, despite easy rules of evidence. As many as 65,000 persons, including opposition politicians, lawyers, and journalists, had been detained under the law in 1993. Not surprisingly, the number of complaints filed with the National Human Rights Commission have also increased rapidly, from 496 in 1993–1994, when it was founded, to 6,947 in 1994–1995 and 20,514 in 1996–1997.

Command and Control

The Internal Security Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) controls the central paramilitary forces. The forces receive their own budgets and are commanded by a powerful officer corps that safeguards their institutional interests. Only the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force in the Northeastern region, serves under the command of the Indian army. The separation of command between the military and the paramilitary, going up through the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs, is an important feature of post-independence institution building in India. By most accounts, the divided command arrangement has hurt the government's ability to fight internal security threats, but it continues to thrive, presumably, as an instrument of civil supremacy over the armed forces. Only during wartime can the military assert command over India's paramilitary forces.

The Indian army raised its own counterinsurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles), by reconstituting two army corps (about 75,000 troops) for service in the rebellious state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1993 a former Indian army chief appointed as governor to the state created a united headquarters to coordinate the various forces, but the arrangement did not quite work until the Kargil war in 1999, when the paramilitary forces were expressly placed under army command as part of wartime regulations.

Political leaders have supported paramilitary separation from the military in the hope of being able to better control the use of force, since the army's structure and institutional norms shut out state politicians from internal security campaigns. Army officers report directly to the national government through their own chain of command, and generally view state government officials as meddling and counterproductive to their military goals. Paramilitary forces, on the other hand, are more amenable to political control because they are part of the

policing structure over which states enjoy constitutional authority. A system of common officership between paramilitary and police forces consolidates civil political control over paramilitary forces. Key command positions in the paramilitary forces are occupied by members of the Indian Police Service (IPS), an elite civil service. IPS officers also occupy positions in the Home Ministry's Internal Security Division.

Causes and Consequences

The rise of paramilitary forces in India is the result of worsening internal security propelled by several governance failures since the mid-1970s. Punjab, the Northeast states, and Jammu and Kashmir have been torn by rebellion because of the inability of the national and state governments to accommodate the political and economic aspirations of important social groups in those states. Political violence also increased in the "mainland" states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and even in the political and commercial capitals of New Delhi and Mumbai, as a result of new aspirants claiming political power and the ruling elite seeking ways to prevent it. A gathering Hindu movement since the 1980s further added the possibility of Hindu-Muslim rioting. Disaffected groups have had increasing access to assault rifles and plastic explosives. Between 1990 and 1998, Indian security forces in Kashmir alone recovered around 18,000 AK series rifles, 7,000 pistols and revolvers, and 500 rocket launchers. In Punjab, an estimated 10,000 AK series rifles were captured between 1988 and 1994.

The Indian Institute of Public Administration lists 210 major incidents of communal violence—mostly caste and religious rioting—in the period 1951–1985; of these, 58 occurred in 1951–1970, and 152 in 1971–1985. The trend has since intensified. India's Ministry of Home Affairs reports that in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988–2000 there were 45,500 incidents of political violence, including 16,800 attacks on security forces, 13,000 incidents of explosion and arson, and 10,000 attacks on civilians by rebels. As many as 8,300 civilians and 2,200 security personnel (most of them paramilitary) died, and 11,479 rebels were killed. Militancy in Punjab in 1983–1992 caused about 12,000 deaths, including 1,400 police, 300 paramilitary, and 50 army troops. During more than a decade of deployment in Punjab, the CRPF alone killed 2,551 rebels and captured 12,977.

This massive use of force by the government has eroded the quality of Indian democracy. The long periods of quasi-martial law in the Northeast states and in Kashmir have led some observers to suggest that significant numbers of Indians actually live under authoritarian rule, belying the country's pride in being the world's largest democracy. What is most worrisome is the

majoritarian sanction for the growing use of force in the country, the logic of which has already led to increased civil violence, most notably in Gujarat and in Mumbai. The general willingness to allow the state to use force as a primary instrument of policy means that when leaders feel politically and materially constrained, they will use majority anger to fill the coercion gap. The police and paramilitary forces in these circumstances stand back to allow majority groups to commit violence, further politicizing their ranks and spirit. The fast growth of the paramilitary forces has already led to training and control problems that affect their performance. Though India's political institutions continue to show an ability to accommodate new interests, changes in the character of the coercive apparatus, combined with a greater willingness to use force, constitute a significant departure from the past, when the majority of Indians believed that politics was the best mechanism for conflict resolution in their deeply divided country.

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See also **Ethnic Conflict; Insurgency and Terrorism; Jammu and Kashmir**

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PARASHURAMA. See **Vishnu and Avatāras.**

PARLIAMENT. See **Political System.**

PARSIS The Parsis are among India's smallest minorities. They comprise less than 0.01 percent of India's population but have nevertheless made significant contributions to Indian society, economy, and politics. For example, India's largest industrial empire, the Tata group, is headed by a Parsi, as is Godrej, India's largest privately owned conglomerate, and Bombay Dyeing, one of the largest textile groups in India. The number of Parsis is, however, declining. The Indian census counted the Parsi population to be 85,000 in 1881, 115,000 in 1941, 76,000 in 1991, and 69,600 in 2001.

Parsis came to India from Iran (Persia), hence the name "Parsi." Fleeing religious persecution, they first arrived in Gujarat in the seventh century. Many settled in the port of Surat, where, in the fifteenth century, Portuguese, British, and Dutch merchants had been given permission by the Mughals to establish trading factories. In Surat, Parsis soon became prosperous traders and chief native agents, as well as shipbuilders. A few Parsis left Surat, moving south to Bombay, where they acted as brokers between Indians and Portuguese. When



Madame Bhikaji Cama, 1861–1936. Portrait of Madame Bhikaji Cama in her most celebrated act as Parsi nationalist: unfurling the first Indian national flag at the International Socialist Conference in Stuttgart, Germany, 1907. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

Bombay was ceded by Portugal to England's crown in 1665, and, three years later, handed over to the East India Company, Parsis were already a presence in the region.

The East India Company sought to make Bombay its leading commercial center and it needed Indian traders, merchants, and craftsmen to settle there. Parsis were quick to seize the opportunity. Parsi entrepreneurs became prominent in small and large business enterprises in Bombay. They also laid the foundation for India's textile and cotton mill industry from the 1850s onward. Parsi industrialist Naoroji Wadia and his sons controlled the textile mills Bombay Dyeing and Century Mills. The Lowjee Wadia family dominated ship construction.

Accomplishments

Parsi entrepreneurs not only developed business empires but were also philanthropists who contributed to national development. The Tata Group was founded by Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata, who initially established textile mills and later concentrated on the iron and steel industry, electrical power generation, and technical education.

Tata believed that India's political independence would be meaningless without economic self-sufficiency. His vision for creating national educational and industrial institutions, such as the Institute of Science in Bangalore, a steel plant in Jamshedpur (Bihar), and a hydro-electric company, was brought to fruition by his successor, Jamsetji R. D. Tata, who guided the Tata Group for over half a century. He headed Tata Sons in 1938, Tata Chemicals in 1939, and the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company in 1945. He also promoted civil aviation in the Indian subcontinent and founded Tata Airlines (which was later nationalized as Air India). Further, he funded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, which was the cradle of India's atomic energy program; started the Family Planning Foundation in 1970; established Asia's first cancer hospital (the Tata Memorial Hospital in Bombay); and in 1992 was awarded India's highest civilian honor, the Bharat Ratna, as well as the United Nations Population Award.

In politics, Parsis contributed to the Indian independence movement, and have been prominent in areas such as law, military affairs, and public service. Dadabhai Naoroji was a leading early Parsi nationalist who fought for the Indianization of the Indian Civil Service. In 1892 he narrowly won election to the British House of Commons as a Liberal from London's Central Finsbury. He was elected president of the Indian National Congress three times: in 1886, 1893, and 1906. The Congress's demand for *swaraj* (independence) was first expressed publicly in Naoroji's 1906 presidential address. Another Parsi, Madame Bhikaji Cama (1861–1936), who was exiled from India and Britain and lived in France, was a tireless propagandist for Indian independence. Pheroze-shah Mehta (1845–1915) was known as the "father of municipal government in Bombay." He drafted the Bombay Municipal Act of 1872, served as municipal commissioner in 1873, and was elected president of the Indian National Congress in 1890.

A full list of Parsis in public service would run many pages long. Parsi scientists were instrumental in developing India's nuclear program. Homi Bhabha established the nuclear program and also served as the president of the United Nations conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1955 and as president of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics from 1960 to 1963. Homi Sethna was chairman of India's atomic energy commission in the 1970s and 1980s. General Sam Maneckshaw was the Indian army's first field marshal, leading the Indian army to victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh War in 1971. In the 2000s, two Parsis were on India's Supreme Court (Chief Justice Sam Bharucha and Justice Sam Variava), and one was India's attorney general (Soli Sorabjee). An earlier legal luminary, Nani

Palkhivala, served briefly as India's ambassador to the United States. Feroze Gandhi, a Parsi, was the husband of prime minister Indira Gandhi and the father of Rajiv Gandhi.

Parsis have established and headed dozens of hospitals, educational institutions, and research centers, including the Tata Cancer Hospitals, Sir J. J. School of Arts, the Institute of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Fundamental Research. Parsis also established the first Indian newspaper and the first Indian-owned bank. In the arts, prominent Parsis include singer Freddie Mercury, of the British rock group Queen, and Zubin Mehta, conductor of the Israel Philharmonic since 1981, the New York Philharmonic (1978–1991), the Los Angeles Philharmonic (1962–1978), and the Montreal Symphony (1961–1967). Many Parsis have excelled in sports and in various professions at the national and international level.

Religious and Cultural Practices

Parsis are Zoroastrians. Zoroastrianism was founded on the teachings of the prophet Zoroaster, who lived around 1500 B.C. in Iran (then Persia). Parsis are the Zoroastrians of India, descendants of the Zoroastrians who fled Iran and came to India in the seventh century A.D. Another group of Zoroastrians continued to live in Iran. The World Zoroastrian population in 2004 was estimated at 124,000–190,000: 69,600 in India, 24,000–90,000 in Iran, 10,000 in the United States, 6,000 in Canada, 5,000 in the U.K., and some 2,000 each in Australia, the Gulf, and Pakistan.

In terms of customs, Parsis have been incorrectly called "fire worshipers." They do not worship fire, but fire has special significance to Zoroastrians. It is regarded as giving light, warmth, and energy, and therefore as vital to life. Zoroastrian temples have altars with fire within, and are thus called fire-temples. Eight large fire-temples in India include four in Mumbai and four in the state of Gujarat (two in Surat, one in Udwada, one in Navsari). There are no caste divisions among Parsis, and no religious restrictions concerning food.

One major controversy within the Parsi community is intermarriage, and this has implications for the dwindling Parsi population. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 1936 and its amendments state that children born to a Parsi man and non-Parsi woman can be admitted into the religion. But children of a Parsi woman and a non-Parsi man would not be admitted. However, over the past decades, a section of the community has been accepting such children, provided that the mother had continued to be a practicing Zoroastrian after her marriage. A new edict discarded these progressive changes. In this situation, especially because perhaps one in three

Parsis marries a non-Parsi, the number of Parsis in each successive generation will drastically decline. Partly to stem the decline in numbers, reformists argue that children of mixed marriages should be accepted as Zoroastrians.

Even if the intermarriage issue is resolved, declining numbers will still be a concern. A large proportion of Parsis do not marry, or marry late and have few children, aspiring to complete their education and establish themselves in a profession before considering marriage. The average age of marriage for Parsis is the early thirties for men and the mid- to late twenties for women. In India's 1991 census, over 70 percent of Parsi males and over 40 percent of females in the high-fertility age group of 25 to 29 were "never married"; in the age group of 45 to 49, about 20 percent of males and 10 percent of females fell in the "never married" group. In this situation, some reformists suggest allowing children of non-Zoroastrian parents (both male and female) to be initiated into the Zoroastrian religion, but this remedy has not been seriously considered.

Parsis have been and will continue to be prominent in Indian business and society. Yet their numbers are declining. India's 2001 census counted 69,600 Parsis, including 46,600 in Mumbai and 8,000 elsewhere in the state of Maharashtra. Their numbers in India could decline to perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 by the year 2020. This decline will stem from natural reasons—larger death rates than birth rates (India's 2001 census noted a Parsi death rate of 16–18 per 1,000 persons and a birth rate of 6–7 per 1,000 persons; other statistics for Mumbai's Parsis indicate some 367 births and 936 deaths in 1995, and 300 births and 858 deaths in 2002)—and from migration. Like other Indians, a large number of younger Parsis migrate to the West. Thus, while their numbers in India may fall, their numbers in the West could increase in the twenty-first century.

Dinshaw Mistry

See also **Naoroji, Dadabhai; Tata, Jamsetji N.; Zoroastrianism**

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PARTITION OF BENGAL. See **Bengal**.

PARTITION OF BRITISH INDIA. See **History and Historiography**.

PARVATI. See **Devī**.

PATALIPUTRA. See **Patna**.

PATANJALI, *second-century-B.C., Indian scholar and grammarian*. There is an old Indian tradition, accepted by ancient scholars such as Bhartrihari (who lived only a few centuries after Patanjali) that Patanjali contributed to yoga through the Yoga Sūtra, to grammar by his *Mahābhāshya*, and to Āyurveda through the *Charaka Sambhitā*. Modern scholarship has discounted the authorship of the *Charaka Sambhitā* by Patanjali, although he may have edited it. There is much evidence that the *Mahābhāshya* and the Yoga Sūtra were written by the same person. This article will consider only the contributions of Patanjali to grammar.

It is believed that Patanjali's mother was named Gorika and that he was born in Gonarda in Kashmir. He was educated in Takshashila, and he taught in Pataliputra. From the textual references in his works, it can be inferred that he lived during the second century B.C.

Patanjali's *Mahābhāshya* is a commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Although it comments on only 1,228 of the 4,000 rules of Pāṇini, it remains the most authoritative text on Sanskrit grammar. The *Mahābhāshya* is a most important text for Indian history, containing over 700 brilliant quotations from the Vedic texts, epics, and the Sūtra literature.

The *Mahābhāshya* calls itself the "science of words." It has three goals: to defend Pāṇini where Kātyāyana's emendations appear unreasonable; to examine the rules

of Pānini that were not discussed by Kātyāyana; to make additions to Pānini's rules where they cannot account for the usage in Patanjali's time.

The *Mahābhāṣya* is written as a dialogue among three speakers: Purvapakshin (who raises doubts), Siddhāntaikareshin (who refutes the objections and provides partial answers), and Siddhāntin (who gives the final verdict). The pattern of argument follows an alternating process of questions and answers until a resolution is reached. Patanjali deals with three important subjects: formation of words, determination of sense, and the relation between a word and its sense.

The *Mahābhāṣya* consists of 85 chapters. In the very first chapter, Patanjali's ideas on grammar and philosophy are summarized in his approach to his commentary. He speaks of the following tasks: (1) definition and nature of *śabda*, word; (2) methods of teaching words and their meanings; (3) meaning of grammar; (4) the uses of grammar; (5) knowledge of correct words and their uses; (6) the teaching of speech sounds; (7) whether words are permanent (*nitya*) or impermanent (*karya*); and so on.

Subhash Kak

See also **Ashtādhyāyī; Pānini; Vedic Aryan India; Yoga**

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PATEL, MANIBEN. See **Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai.**

PATEL, SARDAR VALLABHBHAI (1875–1950), Indian nationalist leader. Along with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the three foremost leaders of modern India, who inspired and awakened the nation during its arduous freedom struggle and in the precarious early years of independence. As India's first deputy prime minister, Sardar Patel unified the country and helped it survive its first harshest trials. Patel alone dealt with the complex problem of integrating over 560 princely states into India's federal union, achieving this monumental objective in little more than a year. Only three such states refused to join the Indian union initially: Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh, the latter integrated by martial pressure on orders from Patel.

Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai Patel was born on 31 October 1875 to a poor rural family of Nadiad in the Kheda



Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950). Shortly after this photo was taken, Patel was imprisoned by British authorities for three years. Upon his release in 1945, he declared, "My path is clear before me. I want freedom, I am going to get it." HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

district of Gujarat. His father, Jhaverbhai, was a small farmer with 10 to 12 acres (4–5 hectares) of land in Karamsad village, near Nadiad. Jhaverbhai was a sturdy, upright, and straightforward man of independent nature to whom the villagers flocked for advice in times of distress. Vallabhbhai inherited from his father the skill to organize and plan a political movement at the opportune moment.

Hardworking and conscientious from childhood, Vallabhbhai helped his father in the fields while still a student at the local primary school in Karamsad. For his secondary education he had to walk 9 miles (nearly 14 kilometers) from his village. He was an outspoken leader from his early school days. As a young pupil, Vallabhbhai clashed with a teacher who was in the habit of using his rod too frequently and punishing the students too harshly, imposing heavy fines on students who could barely afford to pay. Vallabhbhai was so outraged that he persuaded all the students of that class to abstain from attending. The strike went on into its third day, at which time the principal relented, sending for Vallabhbhai, recognized as the student leader, to assure him that the students would never again be punished so severely.

Unlike some of his contemporaries, especially the wealthy Motilal Nehru and his son Jawaharlal, Patel was

obliged to work for his education. He was twenty-two years old when he passed his matriculation examination. Having witnessed rural poverty and suffering, he was determined to fight for justice for the poor. He decided to study law, passing the District Pleader examination at the age of twenty-five. He then launched his career at Godhara, where his elder brother, Vithalbhai, had already made a name for himself. He later moved his practice to Borsad.

Vallabhbhai Patel was an excellent criminal lawyer, and he soon became well respected in Borsad. His common sense, courage, temperament, and understanding of human psychology proved to be assets in his chosen profession. He was not content, however, with his lot as a local lawyer. He wanted to go to England to become a barrister, but his father did not have the means to allow him to fulfill that ambition. With hard work and frugal habits, Vallabhbhai was able to save enough money within three years of setting up his practice at Borsad. He then applied for admission to London's Middle Temple in 1905. He wrote to the travel agency Thomas Cooke and Sons for arranging his travel to London. By a quirk of fate, when all the formalities were nearly complete, the company's last letter containing his travel documents, addressed to him quite properly as Mr. V. J. Patel, Pleader Borsad, was delivered to his elder brother Vithalbhai, who had the same initials. Vithalbhai was himself eager to go to London, and pleaded with his younger brother to let him go, suggesting that Vallabhbhai could go later. Vallabhbhai so respected his older brother that without hesitation he acceded to his request.

Fate dealt Vallabhbhai a harsher blow soon after. His wife Zaverbai died in Cama Hospital, where she had been admitted for surgery to relieve severe intestinal pain. Vallabhbhai was in Anand defending a client accused of murder. He was in court, cross-examining a witness, when he was handed the telegram informing him of his wife's death. He opened the telegram, read the tragic news, and silently put it in his pocket. He continued his cross-examination and did not disclose the contents of the telegram until court was adjourned. His client was acquitted, but never knew the price Patel had paid to defend him. He was left with a six-year-old daughter, Maniben, and a four-year-old son, Dahyabhai. Vallabhbhai, only thirty-eight years old at the time, resolved not to marry, first for the sake of his children, and later for the liberation of his country.

After the return of his brother Vithalbhai to India, Vallabhbhai left for London in 1910 and joined the Middle Temple Inn, as London's law colleges were called. That same year, Jawaharlal Nehru, fourteen years younger than Patel, was admitted to the Inner Temple. No record has been found of Patel and Nehru meeting in

London at that time, though their paths may well have crossed near London's courts.

Patel had to work hard in London due to his meager resources. He would walk daily to the library in the Middle Temple and rarely finished his reading until the library closed. His studious habits helped him to complete his course a year early, winning a first class in his finals and a prize of fifty pounds. He returned home to India elated.

After his return, Patel was offered a professorship at the Government Law School (College) by the chief justice of Bombay, but he preferred to live in Ahmedabad. Now completely Westernized, Patel built himself a reputation as a "smart young man," always well dressed, and his Ahmedabad practice prospered.

As G. V. Mavalankar, his lawyer friend, later to become speaker of the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament), noted: "His conduct of cases always exhibited thorough mastery of facts, a proper and correct estimate of the opponents case and line of attack." He was fearless as well, and it was this quality, Mavalankar felt, that assured his success in the legal profession as well as in politics. By 1916 Patel's fees were the highest in Ahmedabad. A year later, he contested a seat and was elected to serve as a municipal councillor of Ahmedabad.

Barrister Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi had also moved back to Ahmedabad in 1915, after spending over twenty years in South Africa, where he led the struggle for the equality and human rights of Indians. Soon after establishing his first Indian ashram on the outskirts of Ahmedabad in 1915, Gandhi became a familiar figure at the Gujarat Club, dressed in his Kathiawadi turban, *kurta* (a loose shirt), and dhoti (loincloth). Vallabhbhai reportedly brushed aside any idea of listening to Gandhi speak at the Gujarat Club. He would also comment sarcastically on Gandhi's faith in the nonviolent resistance movement called *satyagraha* (hold fast to the truth) for securing liberty from British rule.

Gandhi's heroic stand on behalf of exploited indigo workers in Bihar's district of Champaran changed Patel's outlook toward the Mahatma, who soon became his political guru and remained his leader. Gandhi, when ordered to leave Bihar by the district magistrate, refused to obey the order, welcoming imprisonment, as he had in South Africa. The news of Gandhi's stand against the Raj inspired Patel and many others. Brave as Patel was, Gandhi's courage found a ready response in the Sardar, who left his highly lucrative practice and dedicated himself to India's liberation, under Gandhi's leadership. When they differed, Patel would give his frank and independent opinion but ultimately did whatever Gandhi

directed. In his humorous way, Patel would say that he had locked his own brain and had given the key to Gandhi.

Patel began his own experiments in *satyagraha* from his position on Ahmedabad's Municipal Committee, inspired by what Gandhi had declared in 1917 at the first meeting of their Gujarat Political Conference: "Local Government has the key to *swarajya* ('freedom')." As chairman of Ahmedabad's Sanitary Committee, Patel remained in the city when the bubonic plague hit in 1917, refusing to move out for his personal safety. He became a familiar figure in the streets of Ahmedabad, urging workers to clean out the sewers and disinfect the plague-stricken areas.

Patel's first great *satyagraha* movement was the agrarian struggle he led in the Kheda district of Gujarat. The poor farmers of the district had pleaded with the government to lower the land revenues, as their crops had rotted due to excessive rains, requesting the suspension of revenue collection for some time. The government rejected their plea, adamantly insisting upon complete revenue collection. Gandhi asked him to take up the cause, and Patel toured every village, listening to the farmers and advising them not to pay any taxes despite the repressive measures of the government, which auctioned many houses and crops and threatened long terms of imprisonment. Most of the farmers stood firm, and the *satyagraha* continued for six months. Ultimately the government relented, and a decision was reached, with Gandhi and Patel, that only 8 percent of the land revenue was to be recovered.

On 1 August 1920 Gandhi launched his first national *satyagraha*, a nationwide boycott of British goods, promising "*swaraj* within a year." In Ahmedabad, people made huge bonfires and burned their foreign clothes. Vallabhbhai's barrister robes, imported suits, neckties, and many pairs of shoes were all consigned to those flames. Gandhi also exhorted students to boycott British schools and government colleges. He asked lawyers to withdraw from the courts, asked parents to remove their children from English schools, and urged everyone to wear *khadi*, the hand-spun and handwoven cloth that Gandhi himself wore until his death. Patel withdrew his daughter Maniben from her British school. His decision to give up his legal practice brought hardship to his family, as this was their only source of livelihood.

Patel was aware of the grave economic implications of the national boycott of British cotton cloth and other goods. On 6 December 1923 he informed his followers that "Englishmen import cotton worth five crores of rupees from India and send us textiles made from that cotton which are worth sixty crores of rupees. The money which they get from you is utilized to appoint Commissioners and Collectors, to buy guns which are

utilized to keep you under their heels." He also moved a resolution in the Ahmedabad Municipality to remove government control over primary education.

After Gandhi's arrest in 1922, Patel devoted all his energies to the propagation of his political guru's ideals. In 1928 Patel electrified the country by leading the poor farmers of Bardoli in an epic struggle against increased land revenues, the famous Bardoli *satyagraha*. The farmers were incensed by the unjust increase in land taxes, and Patel went from village to village advising them to turn their dismay into action. At the same time, he advised them to remain peaceful, even when tax collectors came to attach their property. The government came down with a heavy hand on the farmers, selling their attached land and movable property. Patel appealed to the governor, calling for an impartial tribunal to examine the excessive increase in land taxes, warning that otherwise the peasants would continue their noncooperation. The government finally had to relent. The tribunal found an error in the earlier assessment and recommended an increase of 7 percent rather than the 22 percent previously assessed, thus vindicating Patel's stand. It was indeed an inspiring *satyagraha*, in which not a single life was lost and a great victory won. Thereafter, Patel was hailed as "Sardar" (village leader), the title of respect by which he came to be known throughout India.

In March 1931 Sardar Patel presided over the annual Indian National Congress session at Karachi, where he stressed the need for *purna swaraj*, or complete independence, and for Hindu-Muslim Unity. It was during his presidency that India's national flag was adopted. The flag was to have three colors in equal horizontal stripes: saffron, white, and green, from top to bottom, with Gandhi's spinning wheel in the center of the white stripe. Saffron represented courage, white peace and truth, and green faith and chivalry; the spinning wheel symbolized national unity and the hope of the masses.

Under the Government of India Act of 1935, provincial elections were held, bringing Congress candidates to power in eight of eleven provinces of British India. Sardar Patel, because of his organizational skills and integrity, supervised and coordinated all the Congress provincial ministries.

In September 1939, when Great Britain declared war against Germany, Viceroy Linlithgow announced that India had also joined the Allies in that war, without consulting any Indian leaders. Patel was outraged at Linlithgow's announcement that "a country having one-fifth of the population of the world" could be made to join a war without its consent. He added that "Congress wants independence for . . . the whole of India." Linlithgow

opted, however, for “divide and rule,” frankly informing Patel that the “Raj would turn to the Muslims if Congress did not cooperate.”

The years from May 1940 to December 1943 were very significant in India’s struggle for freedom. The Cripps Mission reached India in March 1942, but failed to work out a political settlement. Gandhi, hitherto averse to launching a mass movement, sounded the call of “Quit India” on 8 August 1942 at the historic session of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay. He declared as his mantra “do or die”—either India must win its freedom or die in the attempt. Though Nehru had reservations about launching the movement, Sardar Patel supported Gandhi completely and told his countrymen that it would be better to die than to be “completely ruined.” He advised railway and postal employees, government servants, and police to leave their jobs and thus not allow the machinery of the government to function. Then the “Quit India” slogan would become a reality.

Sardar Patel was arrested and imprisoned in Ahmednagar Fort from 1942 until April 1945 and was subsequently held in Yeravade prison in Poona until June 1945. On his release, Patel returned to active political life, declaring “I want freedom.”

After the end of World War II, national elections in United Kingdom brought the Labour Party to power, with Clement Attlee replacing Winston Churchill as prime minister. The Labour government ordered India’s general elections for September 1945, testing the relative strength of India’s political parties. Sardar Patel resolved to run in the election, which resulted in a sweeping victory for the Congress Party, which won most of the general seats, while the Muslim League won an overwhelming majority of separate seats reserved for Muslims. The British government then decided to send three Cabinet ministers, among them Stafford Cripps, to negotiate a final settlement for the transfer of British power to a single Indian government, if possible. The Cabinet Mission proposal for a Constituent Assembly and an interim government was favored by Sardar Patel, who felt that the Muslim League would then lose its power to veto Congress legislation, and the Indian states would have to enter into treaties with the interim government. He also insisted that the single Constituent Assembly would soon draft a constitution for a unified India, which the British government would have to accept.

The Muslim League also accepted the interim government, despite their demand for a separate nation of Pakistan. However, Patel’s apprehension that the Muslim League’s entry into the interim government was to get a foothold to fight for Pakistan proved correct, as the violence in the Noakhali district of West Bengal, under

Chief Minister H. S. Suhrawardy of the Muslim League, seemed to indicate. Soon after M.A. Jinnah called for “direct action” to help propagate his theory of “two nations,” riots in Calcutta left Hindu temples destroyed, some three hundred Hindus murdered, and many others converted to Islam. There was immediate retaliation by Hindus in Bihar, where seven hundred Muslims were massacred. Despite Gandhi’s strong opposition, both Nehru and Patel agreed to India’s partition, hoping to free the country from more violent and disruptive politics by the Muslim League. Patel told Gandhi, that it was a question of civil war or partition. He viewed the loss of Pakistan as “like our agreeing to have a diseased limb shorn off so that the remaining part may live in sound condition.” Sardar Patel felt satisfied, moreover, that “we have 80 percent of the country with us which is a compact unit with great potentialities.” He was not prepared for the holocaust that followed in the wake of partition. He had believed that it would be an amicable division and did not expect bloodshed, nor did Nehru.

Sardar Patel became the home minister in British India’s interim government, and after 15 August 1947, when India became an independent nation, he was also appointed Nehru’s deputy prime minister. In addition to remaining in charge of the Home Ministry, he was also put in charge of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. He continued to serve as minister of the States, a most difficult job, which he held from 5 July 1947. Sardar Patel, for all practical purposes, was supreme in all the departments he directed, fully trusted by Prime Minister Nehru to act as he saw fit, during the painful and trouble-filled first three years of India’s independence. In many ways, Sardar Patel was the true architect of a viable Indian state, which without his steady control might not have survived the violence, uncertainty, disorder, and terror that followed partition.

It was indeed remarkable that the Sardar managed to achieve the peaceful merger of 562 princely states, comprising one-third of the total area of India, into the Indian union within the short span of less than two years. Within two years, with the exception of Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir, all the princely states contiguous to India acceded to the Indian union. Junagadh was integrated, with some support by the Indian army, by the people of the state, who voted overwhelmingly to join the Indian union. In Hyderabad, the Sardar felt he had no alternative but to order his troops to take over Hyderabad by force after other avenues had failed to convince the nizam to join India. Jammu and Kashmir was a strategic state with common borders with Pakistan as well as India, and the Sardar and Pandit Nehru were both determined that it should accede to India. Though Jammu and Kashmir should have been under Sardar’s ministry of states, Prime Minister Nehru insisted on

taking personal charge of Kashmir, which he always called his “ancestral home,” as his great-grandparents had been born there.

Patel was eager for India to take its proper place as a world power by raising its international status and military strength. He disagreed with Gandhi’s opposition to atomic energy and its use, if necessary, to protect India from any attacks. Sardar Patel also wanted a strong central government and a modern army, navy, and air force, ultimately subordinate, however, to the civil central government. He felt that India’s industrial development was absolutely essential for the production of all necessary military matériel for a strong modern army. He therefore insisted on accelerating the production of Indian iron and steel, cement, and other essential articles both for the civil population and for defense. He was, however, against the nationalization of industries, though he died before Nehru’s Five-Year Plans were fully launched.

Partition had also divided British India’s civil service, comprising some 1,500 officers, who had kept India’s administration together; all the British and Muslim officers had left before mid-August 1947. In April 1948 Sardar Patel informed Nehru that he had established two new services to take the place of the Indian civil service and the Indian police: the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service, for which he drafted special recruitment, discipline, and control rules. Patel was determined that IAS officers set high standards of discipline, urging probationers “to maintain the utmost impartiality and inoportunability of administration.” They should “not take part in politics” and keep in view “the achievement of the highest standard of integrity.”

While the unification of the states was successfully achieved, the evacuation and rehabilitation of refugees, another of Patel’s urgent postpartition responsibilities, proved difficult to accomplish. He attempted to give all help and protection to Muslims migrating to Pakistan. To India’s Muslim minority, Patel said, “as a friend of Muslims . . . it is the duty of a good friend to speak frankly. It is your duty now to sail in the same boat and sink [or] swim together.” Strong Hindu though he was, Patel was a stronger nationalist, insisting that every Muslim who chose to stay in India must first resolve to remain a loyal Indian. Patel invited every Indian citizen of every province to help him in the task of safe rehabilitation of all Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan. He worked for a safe, prosperous, united India until his death on 15 December 1950. The entire nation mourned his death and the loss of his courageous leadership.

*P. N. Chopra
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See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Princely States**

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PATNA Patna (Pataliputra), the capital of Bihar state, is a historic city located at the confluence of three rivers, the Ganga, the Gandak, and the Sone. The Ganga flows all along its northern boundary. The area in the south is generally low-lying and as such is prone to floods from the rivers Punpun and Sone. The city has a mean elevation of 173 feet (53 m) above sea level and is situated at 28°37′ north latitude and 85°10′ east longitude. It has been a center of learning, religion, and art since time immemorial. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism are deeply connected to this city. It is one of the longest and the narrowest among the largest cities of the country, with a population of over a million and a half spread over an area of about 30 square miles (77.7 sq. km).

The ancient city of Pataliputra was a mere village—Pataligram—in the time of the Buddha in the sixth century B.C. However, Ajatasatru realized its great strategic value for the growing kingdom of Magadha, facing the rival Licchavis republic of Vaisali on the northern bank (other side) of the Ganga, and erected a military outpost there. The natural advantage of the site made it commercially important and also helped its growth. The Magadhan king Uday transferred his capital from Rajgriha to Pataliputra. It remained the imperial capital under the Nandas, the Mauryas, and the Guptas. It was a prosperous and populous city when Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to the court of Chandragupta Maurya, visited it twice.

Pataliputra acquired the status of a capital city during the reign of Emperor Ashoka (ruled c. 268–231 B.C.). However, it later faced Indo-Greek invasion, and the city

was sacked in A.D. 185. But its glory again revived under the Guptas. Fahsien, the Chinese pilgrim who studied there for three years during the reign of Chandragupta I in the early fifth century A.D., not only considered it a famous center of learning but also the most beautiful and largest city of the world. The city again suffered destruction, and when Hsieux Tsang visited the city in A.D. 637, it had become desolate and deserted.

Pataliputra emerged from its political obscurity when Sher Shah, the great Pathan ruler, built a fort there in 1541, transferred the provincial capital from Bihar Sharif, and gave it the new name of Patna. It became an important commercial center during the seventeenth century. Mughal emperors further extended the city in 1704. Prince Azimusshan, the grandson of Aurangzeb, the new governor (*subedar*) of Bihar, renamed Patna as Azimabad. With the coming of the Europeans, the city had expanded beyond its fortified walls and became famous in Southeast Asia as a source of sugar and saltpeter. The importance of Patna was further enhanced when it was made the capital of the newly created province of Bihar in 1912. It also contributed significantly to India's freedom struggle against British imperial rule. More recently, Jaya Prakash (J. P) Narayan launched his "Total Revolution" against corruption from Patna in 1974.

Yuvaraj Prasad

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PATOLA One of the most complex techniques for creating multicolored patterning is the double *ikat*, in which warp and weft are tied and dyed in three to four colors, then woven so that the weft pattern is synchronized perfectly with the warp. There are only two countries where double *ikat* is woven: India and Indonesia. The finest double *ikat* is woven in Patan, Gujarat, by the Salvi community and is known as Patan *patola*; the others are the Vachitrapuri *saktapar* pattern in Orissa, known as *bandha*, and rare examples of Tilia *Rumal* in Andhra Pradesh. In Indonesia it appears as the sacred *gringsing*, woven in Tenganan in Bali.

From a study of ancient murals, it may be concluded that *ikat* was practiced throughout southern India. Sarongs with *ikat* technique were found in the Ajanta cave murals (6th–7th century A.D.) and later noted in the temple murals of Kerala. The murals of Mattancheri Palace in Cochin (16th century) depict *patola*. Literary references to double *ikat* do not occur prior to the fourteenth century, when Ibn Batuta mentions that Sultan



Salvi Patola Weavers. Here, a 1992 photograph of members of the Salvi community in Patan who continue to weave the rare double *ikat* fabric. The Salvi are one of the few remaining communities of *patola* weavers in India: Their spindles of silk thread rest in the foreground. LINDSAY HUBBARD / CORBIS.

Ala'-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji (r. 1296–1326) received a *patola* from Deogiri. Malayan Annals refer to *cendai*, a Malayan word for Indian *patola* from an earlier date. The oral tradition of the Salvis implies that the technique had evolved in the Deccan. The Salvis were Jains originally belonging to the Digambara sect, which dominated in southern India. They traveled with their family Trithankara. After moving to Patan they converted to the Svetambara tradition and covered the Trithankara with a brass sheet. Another factor that supports this assumption is that Patan is the only center in north India where *ikat* was practiced, while single *ikat* was widely used throughout the Deccan, specially for ritual purposes.

Technique

The complex technique of tying is carried out by masters by first degumming the silk and preparing the warp thread. The warp is divided into bunches, then stretched

in preparation for tying. A grid is prepared, using coal dust, and the border and cross border are demarcated. The outline of the pattern is tied down, along with those areas that are to be dyed a specific color. First the lightest color, generally yellow, is dyed. The areas that are to remain yellow and green are tied and those areas that are to be blue are opened and immersed in blue dye. The ties in areas that are to be green are opened when the threads are dyed with blue. In fact, when a pure color is to be obtained without any hues of the previous dye, the original ties are opened. Using a highly complex system of tying, dyeing, reopening, dyeing, and retying, the complete design is achieved.

After completing the dyeing of the warp and weft, the warp is stretched on the loom, where the warp beam is placed at an angle. The warp is approximately 49 to 59 feet (15 to 18 m) in length for weaving three saris. The tie-dyed weft is reeled into bobbins and placed in the shuttle. The fabric is a simple plain weave; two people, often husband and wife, sit and weave the sari. The weft thread is thrown across, and the weavers check both ends to see that the threads have matched the end border of colored stripes, as it is not possible to create patterns at the end. Further adjustments of the weft are made with a long needle, so that it lies exactly on the matching color of the warp. The weavers' aim is to create as perfect a line as possible and to prevent blurring of the outline. The weavers of Patan are known for their meticulous precision.

Ceremonial Use

The use of *patola* was essential in the ceremonies of well-to-do communities, supposedly providing magical powers of protection against evil. Except for Surat's Bora community, it was not used by the bride, but was worn by the mother of the bride at the most important part of the wedding, *kanya-dan* (bestowing of the virgin). *Patola* was worn by an expectant mother at the *simanth* ceremony, for the seventh month of pregnancy, to protect the mother and the unborn child. In some cases, the bridegroom wore a sash of *patola* as protection against the evil eye.

The *patola* was never discarded. Worn-out saris were used to make a quilted wrapper for a newborn baby; rags of old *patola* were tucked into the cradle for protection. The lamp wick for the newborn baby was made from old pieces of *patola*, so that the child's vision would be pure.

The use of *patola* in India outside Gujarat is found only in Kerala. Known as *virali pattu*, it was used by priests in the worship of the Mother Goddess Badrakali, and it was painted as a powerful symbol on temple murals, as well as at Cochin's Mattancheri palace. Cochin, the entrepôt of India's spice trade, was the center from which

patolas traveled to Southeast Asia, where they became an important part of ceremonies and rituals. Known in Malaysia and Java as *cendai*, it was an essential part of the dress of royal couples and was used as hangings for rituals and as canopies for processions. An extraordinary *patola* made for the Indonesian market has a repeat of two pairs of juxtaposed large elephants, with foot soldiers, horseback riders, lions, and chariot. In the covered howdah (seat), the elephant's *mabout* (driver) is seated in the front, holding an *ankush*, or elephant ear hook. Behind him is the seated king with a flower in his hand and possibly a *buqa* (smoking pipe), a typical portrayal of royalty. These ceremonial cloths, which were found at Toraja, have been carbon-dated to the fifteenth or sixteenth century.

A popular pattern for export was a circle of lotus flowers, buds, and leaves. Known in Gujarat as *chabardi bhat* (basket design), it was associated with fertility and was used in the wedding ceremony. This pattern was copied in single *ikat* and *batik* throughout Indonesia. *Patolas* in Southeast Asia were considered the "wealth" of women. In some areas, particularly in Sumba, the burial of a head of a family could take place only when the body was covered with a number of *patolas*.

The Patan *patola* has a market as a speciality sari throughout India. Three families of Salvis continue this work, which remains distinctive; though the *ikat* weavers of Poochampalli imitate the Patan *patola*, to the discerning viewer their work remains a pale copy of the original.

Jasleen Dhamija

See also **Textiles: Early Painted and Printed**

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PAUL, K. T. (1876–1931), cofounder of the National Missionary Society (1905). Kanakarayan Tiruselvan Paul was the first Christian statesman in India. Born in Salem, Tamil Nadu, of Christian parents, he studied in the London Mission High School, where one of his friends was Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, who became South India's greatest nationalist leader. In 1892 K. T. went to Madras Christian College; after graduating, he took an appointment with the Government Secretariat, studying law at night.

In December 1905 K. T. Paul and V. S. Azariah established the National Missionary Society, the first indigenous missionary society, organized to represent all Protestant denominations. Azariah was elected general secretary and Paul the treasurer. Paul also contributed to the formation in 1908 of the South India United Church, a union of Presbyterian and Congregational churches. He longed for a truly Indian church.

In 1912 Paul accepted an invitation to become a national secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). Extensive travel on behalf of the YMCA and the National Missionary Society made Paul deeply conscious of the economic plight of rural Christians. In 1905 the government had passed the Cooperative Securities Act, with the aim of providing credit for poor village farmers. K. T. Paul realized that the most sensible way to liberate village Christians and others from poverty was to extend the work and effectiveness of Cooperative Credit Societies.

Paul's plan was to foster habits of prudence and thrift, to increase the earning power of villagers, to enrich the pleasure of village social life by means of festivals and excursions, and to provide facilities for healthy and cheap Indian sports and gymnastics. To help finance his dream, Paul set up a Christian Central Cooperative Bank in 1916; its object was to provide loans for Christians and the rural poor. In the 1920s Paul coined the phrase "rural reconstruction."

K. T. Paul was involved in India's nationalist movement from its earliest phase, following the lead of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Mahatma Gandhi. He often met with Viceroy Lord Irwin, an ardent Christian. He deeply regretted the Christian community's aloofness from the freedom struggle. In March 1920 he resigned his offices with the National Missionary Society and the YMCA to allow himself the freedom to speak on matters of political

concern. He was invited to the first Round Table Conference held in London, representing Indian Christians.

The conference began on 12 November 1930, but Paul was generally exasperated over the outcome, and the stress proved too much for him. He returned to India early, only to arrive in Salem completely broken in health. He died on Saturday, 11 April 1931, aged fifty five. Mahatma Gandhi wrote, "I had the privilege of knowing K. T. Paul. The nearer I came to him the more I respected him." It would always be remembered to his credit, Gandhi went on, "that he stoutly opposed the demand for any special concessions for Indian Christians in the forthcoming constitution, believing . . . that character and merit would always command not only proper treatment, but respectful attention" (Eddy, p. 175).

Graham Houghton

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PENSION FUNDS AND SOCIAL SECURITY

India does not have a comprehensive old-age income security system. The vast majority of Indians continue to rely on support from their children as their main income in old age. Two important mandatory, albeit narrow, pension systems exist, however: the civil servants' defined benefit pension and the organized sector system run by the Employee Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO), which is an arm of the Ministry of Labour.

Traditional Civil Servants' Pension

The phrase "traditional civil servants pension" (TCSP) connotes the pension program that existed for employees of the central government who were recruited prior to January 2004. With small variations, the TCSP applies to most employees of state governments as well. The TCSP for central government employees is administered by the Department of Pensions and Personnel Welfare. The TCSP is a defined benefit pension. It was an integral part of the employment contract for government employees. There is a minimum requirement of ten years of service before a worker is entitled to this pension. There is no attempt at having contributions or building up pension assets—in other words, it is unfunded. The benefit promised by the TCSP is a pension that is roughly half of the wage level of the last ten months of employment. The benefit rate is computed as 1/60 for each year of service,

subject to a cap of a 50 percent benefit rate. In case of death after retirement, the spouse gets the full pension for seven years, after which the benefit rate drops to 30 percent until the death of the spouse.

There is a commutation provision, under which the pensioner can choose to forgo up to 40 percent of the pension payout for fifteen years, taking instead a lump sum. The TCSP is indexed to wages. There is a “one rank, one wage” principle, whereby all retired persons of a certain rank get the same pension, steadily revised to reflect growth in wages. Hence, the growth in pension payout in old age is typically higher than inflation.

The standard information released as part of the budgeting process only reveals information for the flow of annual pension payouts by both the central government and the states. Estimates of unfunded liabilities, that is, the implied pension debt, associated with workers and pensions under the TCSP are not computed or disseminated by the government. Over the period from 1987–1988 to 2003–2004, while nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by a compound rate of 14.5 percent, central pension payments grew at a compound rate of 17.8 percent and state pension payments grew at a compound rate of 21 percent. These magnitudes—with a fast-growing expense that is already at 1.64 percent of GDP—highlight the fiscal ramifications of pension reforms.

The Employee Provident Fund Organisation

The EPFO runs two programs: the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and the Employee Pension Scheme (EPS). Both plans are mandatory for workers earning below 6,500 rupees a month, in establishments with over 20 workers in 177 defined industries. As of 31 March 2003, there were 344,508 such establishments, and 39.5 million members.

The EPF is an individual account contribution system, using a contribution rate of 16 percent. The flow of contributions in 2002–2003 was 114 billion rupees, and the stock of assets was 1.03 trillion rupees. There are several provisions for premature withdrawal of balances under EPF, which are routinely exploited by most members, leading to small balances at the time of retirement and consequently limited old-age income security.

The EPS is a defined benefit system, based on a contribution rate of 8.33 percent. The government contributes an additional 1.16 percent. EPS was created in 1995, and it applies only to workers who entered the labor force after 1995. In 2002–2003, the flow of contributions that came into EPS was 48 billion rupees, and the stock of assets was 450 billion rupees. The EPS provides a defined benefit at a rate of 1/70 of the salary drawn in

the last twelve months preceding the date of exit, for each year of service, subject to a maximum of 50 percent. Upon death, the EPS provides a pension to the spouse for life or until remarriage.

Establishments covered under the EPF can seek an exemption from the EPFO for fund management and set up their own self-administered fund. These “exempt funds” are required to use identical investment regulations to those of the EPFO. There were 341,944 establishments with exempt funds as of March 2003, covering 3.75 million members.

Other Elements of the Pension System

“Gratuity” is a mandatory lump sum benefit, up to a maximum limit of 350,000 rupees, paid to the employee at the time of exit, under the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972. It is applicable to establishments with 10 or more people. The National Old Age Pension Scheme is a part of the National Social Assistance Program, which came into effect 15 August 1995. It is funded by the central government but administered by the state governments. It pays a benefit of 75 rupees per month to “destitutes” above the age of 65.

The most basic problem of India’s pension plans is that of coverage. Two systems, the TCSP and the EPFO, cover just 11 percent of the workforce. Hence, the majority of the workforce has no formal pension system. In the case of the TCSP, the major problem has been that of fiscal stress. The pension payout of the central government and states has risen at a compound average annual growth rate of 20 percent over the period from 1987 to 2004. The TCSP was designed in a world where most workers who retired at age sixty were likely to be dead by seventy. The value of the annuity embedded in the TCSP has gone up dramatically, owing to the elongation of mortality in recent decades. The fiscal stress has been particularly acute at the state level. Some states are reported to have delayed pension payments. In 2003 the state of Tamil Nadu chose to cut pension benefits by reversing recent increases in pensions that followed as a consequence of wage hikes to existing employees.

The EPFO has several shortcomings that undermine its service provision, financial stability, and hence effectiveness as a pension system. Its accounting systems and policies have certain weaknesses. The lack of computerized databases spanning information from the entire country has led to difficulties in reconciliation. More importantly, the valuation framework used is one in which all bonds are valued at 100 rupees, regardless of market price. The “interest rate” on EPF that is announced every year is the average coupon rate on the bond portfolio. It is announced at the start of the year,

which necessitates a difficult effort in forecasting interest rates during the year. There is an explicit subsidy in the form of assets of roughly 0.5 trillion rupees, which have been deposited with the government at an above-market rate of return.

A difficulty that runs across both the TCSP and the programs of the EPFO is that of taxation. Fiscal subsidies underlie EPFO, and these subsidies constitute a regressive transfer from the exchequer to the members of the EPFO, who are likely to fall into the top quartile by income. Further, even among EPFO customers, recently released distributional data has shown that only 7 percent of the accounts have an account balance of above 50,000 rupees, so that the bulk of the subsidy that EPFO members are enjoying is being captured by the richest among them.

Recent Initiatives in Reforms

Meeting the challenges of old-age poverty requires fresh efforts in many areas. Modern information technology needs to be implemented across the country, in order to deliver high quality customer service with low administrative costs. Members need portability that enables migration across multiple geographical locations, across different employers, and across multiple fund managers. Modern investment regulation needs to be in place, so that professional pension fund managers can produce the best risk/reward combinations for their members, using globally diversified portfolios and giving members the choice of exposing themselves to systematic risk factors. Clear separation is required between policy making, regulation, and service provision.

In recent years, EPFO has embarked on efforts to introduce computer technology and improve customer service. At the same time, there has been no progress in terms of the deeper policy problems. While there has been considerable public criticism and awareness of the deficiencies, significant progress in terms of EPFO reforms is likely to be infeasible without broad-based support in Parliament.

On the other hand, major progress has been made in recent years in civil servants' pensions and the problem of extending coverage into the unorganized sector. This progress flowed mainly from the recommendations of the Old Age Social and Income Security Committee, chaired by S. A. Dave, which was constituted by the Ministry of Social Justice in 1999. Through a multiyear process of debate and discussion, decisions have been made on the introduction of a New Pension System (NPS). The key elements of the NPS include the following: it will be an individual account system with defined contributions; there will be competition between multiple pension fund managers; and each pension fund manager

will offer roughly three standardized products. The three product types will differ in their exposure to equity. Individuals will be free to spread their pension wealth among all the available products. The selection of pension fund managers is likely to be based on an auction, focusing on the sum of fees and expenses.

There will be a centralized record-keeping agency, which will give customers a single account balance statement covering all products in the system. The agency will also reduce transactions costs. As befits a pension system, withdrawals prior to age sixty will be disallowed. There will be a network of banks, post offices, and other "points of presence" across the country, where consumers will be able to access the pension system. The focus of the NPS is on building pension wealth. Upon retirement, it is expected that there will be a minimum mandatory annuitization of 40 percent of terminal pension assets.

All new recruits into the central government (excluding the armed forces) who joined after 1 January 2004 have been placed in the NPS, using a contribution rate of 20 percent. Many states have also chosen to join the NPS. Once the institutional structure stabilizes, it will be opened to voluntary participation by anyone in the country. A new regulatory agency, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Agency (PFRDA), is expected to come into existence once suitable legislation is passed by Parliament. PFRDA will closely coordinate its activities with other modern Indian financial regulators.

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See also Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms

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PESHWAI AND PENTARCHY The power and polity that Shivaji established flourished far beyond the limits of his *swarajya* into North India under the brilliant

peshwas, whose office was invested with tremendous authority and made hereditary by Shivaji's grandson, Shahu. The period of the expansion of Maratha power under successive *peshwas*, with Pune as the seat of their power for nearly a century (1713–1818), is often called the Peshwai. There were two important political “arrangements” that helped the extension of Maratha polity, which exercised tremendous authority over the ruins of the fast declining Mughal empire.

During that period, the *peshwas* encouraged and supported some of their sirdars, notably the Shindes centered in Gwalior, Holkars in Indore, Gaikwads in Baroda, and Bhosles in Nagpur, to establish and maintain their own extensive semiautonomous fiefdoms, constituting, together with the *peshwa*, a pentarchy under the overall control of the *peshwas*. The second “arrangement” was between the *peshwas* and the *chhatrapatis*, or kings, of Shivaji's line in Satara: Shahu and his successors. It resembled the position of the hereditary shogun vis-à-vis the Japanese emperor, with separate capitals for the Maratha king and the *peshwa*, with the latter receiving the robes of investiture from the king. Although the *peshwas* lived virtually like kings in Pune with most of the royal accoutrements, they displayed the respect owed to their royal masters when visiting Satara. There, before entering the capital, the *peshwa* stopped the marching strains of his troops, dismounted from his elephant, and walked to the *chhatrapati's* palace, sitting on an ordinary low *baithak* (seat) in his presence. All grants of titles, honors, and lands to the sirdars were made on the recommendation of the *peshwa* but with the knowledge and seal of the *chhatrapati*. All treaties and important documents were explained, in most cases, personally by the *peshwa* to the *chhatrapati* before the latter's seal was affixed to make them final and legal documents.

The founder of the line of the *peshwas* was Balaji Vishvanath (r. 1713–1720), a Chitpavan Brahman who came from the Bhat family of Shrivardhan in Konkan. The crucial help he gave Shahu in rallying important sirdars and administrators from Tarabai's camp dramatically strengthened Shahu's position, and Shahu showed his appreciation by appointing Balaji his *peshwa* (prime minister). Balaji expanded his power far beyond the territorial limits of Shivaji's kingdom or that of his successors, far beyond Maharashtra, the home of the Marathas, to the capital of the Mughal empire in Delhi, where instability and weakness among Aurangzeb's successors afforded opportunities for someone with ambition and ability. In 1719 Peshwa Balaji Vishvanath marched on Delhi and secured not only Shahu's family from Mughal captivity but, importantly for the future of the Maratha polity, the Mughal court's recognition of the Maratha *swarajya* and additional *sanads* (deeds)—*chauthai* and

sardeshmukb (the rights, respectively, to collect and keep 25 percent and 10 percent of the revenues)—over six *subhas* (provinces) of the Deccan.

The origin of the *peshwa's* authority lay in two *yadya* (plural for *yadi*), or lists drawn up in a handwritten document by Shahu himself in 1714, stipulating the duties and obligations of the *peshwa* and making that office hereditary in the family of Balaji Vishvanath. After the childless Shahu's death in 1749, Ramaraja, then twenty-five years old, from the Kolhapur branch of the Bhosle family, was adopted and crowned as *chhatrapati* in the following year. Not trained to be a king and having little or no administrative abilities, he readily signed a second *yadi*, most likely drawn up by Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, giving the *peshwas* additional authority to act on behalf of the *chhatrapati* in all matters. The new *yadi* also validated the total authority of the *peshwa* over all Maratha domains.

Baji Rao I (r. 1720–1740)

Balaji Vishvanath's elder son, Baji Rao I, broke the traditional limits of the Bhosle kingdom as he adopted a forward policy that would extend the Maratha dominion into the north. In 1734 he captured the Malwa territory, and in 1739 his brother Chimnaji drove out the Portuguese from almost all their possessions in the northern Konkan, notably Salsette and Bassein. Baji Rao himself attacked the nizam of Hyderabad four times because he would not let the *peshwas* collect the *chauthai-sardeshmukhi*, which were the *peshwa's* due under the terms of the *sanads* (deeds) from the Mughal emperor. At the time of Baji Rao's early death on 27 April 1740, the *peshwa's* writ ran over all of Maharashtra and over large chunks of territory in central and northern India, through his new, loyal Maratha sirdars. Later, they would develop into a pentarchy: Gujarat under the Gaikwads of Baroda; Shindes (Scindia) in Gwalior; Holkars in Indore; and Bhosles in Nagpur—all under the overall authority of the *peshwa* or his council in Pune.

Balaji Baji Rao (r. 1740–1761)

Known as Nanasaheb Peshwa, Balaji Baji Rao succeeded Baji Rao I. He had two brothers, Raghunath Rao, who later betrayed the Marathas and joined hands with the British, and Janardan, who died in his early youth. Nanasaheb was talented in the arts of war, diplomacy, and administration. Soon after assuming the position of *peshwa*, he spent a year improving the civil administration of Pune. The period from 1741 to 1745 was of comparative calm in the Deccan, which enabled Nanasaheb to reorganize agriculture and introduce effective measures for protecting the villagers and their produce. There was a general improvement in Maharashtra in terms of revenue collection, services, and law and order. A major flaw in

Nanasaheb's policies was the destruction in 1756 of the Maratha navy, so farsightedly built by Shivaji under the Angres. Because Tulaji Angre would not toe his line, Nanasaheb accepted the help of the British East India Company in Bombay to attack the Angre navy and destroy it, thus leaving the field open for the English to establish their maritime supremacy on the west coast.

In 1761 the Marathas were dismally defeated at the third battle of Panipat against Shah Abdali, an invader from Afghanistan. He raided the Mughal capital, Delhi, several times in the 1750s. To save his capital, the effete Mughal emperor asked his vizier, Safdarjung, to sign an agreement (called the Ahmednama) with the Marathas, whereby the *peshwa* agreed to defend the Mughal emperor against his domestic and foreign foes. The nizam of Hyderabad, not too happy with the Ahmednama and the prominence it gave the Marathas, attacked them. The *peshwa* defeated the nizam's forces at Sindkhed in 1757 and Udgir in 1760. The Marathas also successfully drove out Abdali's forces from the Punjab, raising their own flag at Attock in 1756. When Abdali heard the news, he led a major force, which would end in challenging the very large force sent by Peshwa Nanasaheb under his own brother Sadashiv Rao and son Vishwas Rao.

On 14 January 1761 the third Battle of Panipat took place, which dealt a major setback to the Marathas in the north. They lost more than 100,000 men and dozens of important sirdars in the battle, in addition to elephants and countless horses, heavy equipment, and treasure. Both Sadashiv Rao and Vishwas Rao died in the battle. The news shattered Nanasaheb, who died shortly afterward on 23 June 1761. Panipat drew a dividing line in the fortunes of the Marathas; Nanasaheb's reign marked the highest and the lowest points of Maratha power.

Madhav Rao I (r. 1761–1772)

The second son of Nanasaheb and his wife Gopikabai, Madhav Rao became the *peshwa* because his elder brother, Vishwas Rao, lost his life at Panipat. This fourth *peshwa* was only sixteen years old and held office for only eleven years, but he was notable for reestablishing Maratha authority on almost all the lands that had been theirs before 1761.

Historians give much credit for the childhood education of Madhav Rao to his mother Gopikabai, who continued to guide him, particularly in handling his uncle Ragunath Rao. When Madhav Rao assumed the reins of power, he was besieged by many enemies, who wanted to take advantage of the post-Panipat weakness of the Marathas, whose power in the north had been devastated by loss of so many important members of prestigious

sirdar families. Nearer home, the nizam took advantage of the dissensions within the *peshwa* household, as the *peshwa's* warrior-uncle Raghunath Rao, in the early years of Madhav Rao's rule, did not hesitate to use the nizam's assistance to buttress his own ambitions. Very soon, Madhav Rao divided the work of dealing with the regime's external enemies: he took on the nizam and Hyder Ali himself, sending his recalcitrant uncle, Raghunath Rao, to the distant north to deal with the Bundelas, Jats, and Rohillas, who had challenged Maratha positions there. When the nizam, with the help of some Maratha dissenters, attacked Pune in 1763, young Madhav Rao led his regular as well as guerrilla forces against Hyderabad, looted the treasury there, and faced the divided forces of the nizam at Rakshasbhuvan on the banks of the Godavari, inflicting a defeat of such magnitude on 10 August 1763 that the nizam did not seriously attack the Marathas for the next twenty-two years. Madhav Rao maintained the new initiative by marching south in the following year against Hyder Ali, defeating his forces at three different locations in Karnataka and compelling him to return all Maratha territories north of the Tungabhadra in addition to a large tribute of 3.2 million rupees.

As for the north, Madhavrao reestablished Maratha authority there through the exertions of Raghunath Rao, Tukoji Holkar, and Mahadji Shinde (Scindia), who not only defeated the rebellious Bundelas, Jats, and the Rohillas, but also wrested control over Delhi from Najib Khan's son, Zabit Khan, and brought back Emperor Shah Alam from his refuge with the English in Allahabad, restoring him to the throne on 6 January 1772. They also recovered considerable portions of the loot Abdali's forces had hidden. The Maratha ascendancy in Delhi was continued for the remainder of the century, thanks to the leadership of Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar.

By 1772 Madhav Rao had largely made up for the defeat and losses suffered at Panipat. Additionally, he had shown impressive gains in administration, in the steady collection of revenues, the introduction of a number of programs for the welfare of the common man, and, above all, in the establishment of respect for the Maratha judicial system. Just when stability had returned to Pune as the center of power and administration, the young *peshwa* died of tuberculosis on 18 November 1772. His untimely death proved a great destabilizer of Maratha power, causing the noted English administrator-historian Grant Duff to comment: "The plains of Panipat were not more fatal to the Maratha empire than the early end of this excellent prince."

Ineffective Peshwai and the Rise of the Pentarchy (1772–1800)

Dissensions in the *peshwa* line largely arose from the ambitions of Raghunath Rao and led to the assassination

of Narayan Rao Peshwa (r. 1772–1773). Raghunath Rao's usurpation of the position of *peshwa* was not only opposed by the elite of Pune but was declared illegal by an upright judge, Ramashastry Prabhune, whose name has been ever since synonymous with integrity, courage, and justice in Maharashtra. When Narayan Rao's widow gave birth on 18 April 1774 to a son, Sawai Madhav Rao (1774–1795), he was recognized as the new *peshwa* by a council of twelve (Barbhai, or twelve brothers), which included Nana Phadnavis, Holkar, Phadke, and Shinde, who declared Sawai Madhav Rao, the posthumous child of the murdered *peshwa*, as the next *peshwa*. The arrangement lasted over a quarter century, until Nana's death in 1800. Appealing to the Maratha "destiny" and the importance of unity in the context of the fast disappearing, nominal Mughal "empire" and the rapidly rising empire of the East India Company, the frail but tenacious Nana virtually presided over the Maratha polity by judiciously giving adequate prominence and credit to the Pentarchy's constituents.

Early in this new phase of the Peshwai, Raghunath Rao sought refuge with the East India Company in Bombay, whose forces joined his in a march toward Pune in 1774. The Barbhai defeated them in what is known as the First Anglo-Maratha War. The company's headquarters in Calcutta, allergic to wars at that time, compelled the Bombay Council to sign a treaty with the Marathas in March 1776. The disgruntled Bombay Council took up Raghunath Rao's cause again, and the British forces were defeated again; the Barbhais demanded the British hand over Raghunath Rao. This time, it was Governor-General Warren Hastings's turn to disagree. He asked General Goddard to attack the Maratha positions in Konkan and Gujarat. For the third time in a decade, the Marathas prevailed, so the company was forced to sign the Treaty of Salbai in May 1782, by which they handed over Raghunath Rao to the Barbhais. He was confined thereafter at Kopergaon, where he died on 11 December 1786.

The Maratha triumphs in the north by the pentarchy, and nearer to Pune against the British, were all carried on in the name of Peshwa Sawai Madhav Rao. On 25 October 1795, in a delirious state induced by high fever, he jumped down from his quarters and died two days later. After Nana's death, Raghunath Rao's incompetent but ambitious son, Peshwa Baji Rao II (r. 1795–1818), following his father's example, signed with the British the Treaty of Bassein in 1802. This essentially ended the Peshwai. In 1804 General Wellesley proclaimed the Decan in a state of chaos, established British military rule, and the *peshwas* remained rulers only in name. In 1818 Baji Rao II was removed from his position as the *peshwa* and exiled to far-off Bithur in Uttar Pradesh, where the last of his line, the adopted son Nanasaheb, was not rec-

ognized by the British governor-general Dalhousie. Nanasaheb became a crucial leader of the 1857 uprising. He eluded capture and possibly disappeared in the wilds of Nepal.

The Marathas, particularly during the Peshwai, were India's major Hindu power prior to the British conquest of the subcontinent, and came closest to replacing the Mughals; with their indigenous pentarchy, the Marathas ruled from Pune a vast territory, extending at its mightiest peak from Delhi to the outskirts of Madras, from Bombay to the environs of Calcutta.

D. R. SarDesai

See also **British East India Company Raj; Maharashtra**

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PILLAI, SAMUEL VEDANAYAKAM (1826–1889), Tamil author and proponent of women's rights. Samuel Vedanayakam Pillai was a Tamil humanist who used his literary talents to promote women's rights and Tamil cultural unity. He revitalized his mother tongue by his use of elegant, simple prose devoid of archaic Tamil embellishments. He is best known for writing *Pratapa Mudaliyar Charitram* (Pratapa Mudaliyar's story), his first novel in Tamil, in 1879. Set in an idyllic, pristine era when Tamil society was relatively untouched by colonial encroachment, the novel relates the adventures of a heroine wiser and braver than her hero, a sage matriarch, and other romantic characters. It was highly popular, and it was soon adopted as a school text in Madras presidency.

A Christian of upper caste *vellala* ancestry from Kallatur near Tiruchirapalli town, Vedanayakam was raised by his educated mother Mariammal, and he was educated in Tamil and English at a missionary school. In 1868 Vedanayakam first discussed the importance of girls' education in a Tamil tract, *Penmathimalai* (Women's knowledge). In 1870 he elaborated on this subject in another tract titled *Pen Kalvi* (Women's education), which he dedicated to his mother and daughters. To anchor his ideas on equality and nonsectarianism within the Indian context, Vedanayakam Pillai drew upon earlier Tamil texts such as the *Tirukkural*, a classic of aphorisms by the Tamil Jain sage Tiruvalluvar, and the hymns of medieval *bhakti* saints whose spiritual visions transcended caste. Pillai also drew inspiration from the works of Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, his Western models of reason and equality. His second novel, *Suguna Sundari* (1887), challenged upper caste Hindu customs of early marriage and widow celibacy.

His other works included original essays, marriage songs based on folk models, and a translation of the legal codes into Tamil. He wrote popular nonsectarian hymns, such as *Sarva Samaya Samarasa Kirtanmai* (Perennial pleasing hymns for all); *Satyavedaka Kirtanmai* (Songs of the true Veda); *Tiruvarulmalai* (Garland of God's grace); *Tevastottiramalai* (Verses in praise of God); and two poems in the *antati* genre, *Tiruvarul Antati* (God's grace) and *Tevamata Antati* (Mother Goddess). He frequently signed his name simply as Vedanayakam Pillai, although in 1870 he may have edited the Christian journal *Narbobhakam* (Virtuous knowledge) under his full name. Vedanayakam Pillai argued that Tamil unity was based on a common language and on an ethical system transcending sectarian boundaries, so that all Tamils refer to an Unmanifest God as *katavul*. His nonsectarian hymns inspired later Tamil reformers A. Madhaviah and C. Subramania Bharati. At one time, when Vedanayakam Pillai served as a district official near Tiruvattur Saiva monastery, he came to admire the work of

Meenakshisundaram Pillai and U. V. Swaminatha Iyer, who were then editing and translating archaic Tamil palm-leaf manuscripts. Swaminatha Iyer wrote the preface to *Pen Kalvi*, in which he warmly praised Vedanayakam for spreading the message on how to cherish the girl child.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Literature: Tamil**

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PINGALA, c. fifth century B.C., Indian mathematician.

Binary numbers were known at the time of Pingala's *Cbhandab-shāstra* to classify Vedic meters. According to an old Indian tradition, Pingala was the younger brother of Pānini. This is so stated by Shadgurushishya in his *Vedārtha Dīpikā*. If this tradition is correct, he should be assigned to the fifth century B.C., the most likely period of Pānini's life. The fact that the *Cbhandab-shāstra* is in the early unversified *sūtra* style makes this conclusion quite plausible. In Europe, a rediscovery of the binary notation, in a slightly different form, was made by Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) at the end of the seventeenth century.

Most Vedic hymns are in stanzas of four quarters (*pāda*), though there are some with three or five divisions. The most popular meters have quarters that have 8, 11, or 12 syllables. The usual way to classify meters is by counting the number of syllables in each line. Thus the *gāyatrī* consists of 8 syllables in 3 lines (8 x 3), *anushtubb* is 8 x 4, *trishtubb* and *indravajra* (Indra's thunderbolt) is 11 x 4, *indravamsba* (Indra's family) is 12 x 4, *vasantatilakā* (the ornament of spring) is 14 x 4, *mālinī* (the girl wearing a garland) is 15 x 4, *prithivī* (the earth) is 17 x 4,

mandākrāntā (the slow stepper) and *harinī* (the doe) are 17 x 4, *shārdūla-vikrādita* (the tiger's sport) is 19 x 4, and the *sragdharā* (the girl with a garland) is 21 x 4. The meters *gāyatrī* (24), *ushnik* (28), *atishakkarī* (30 for half), *anushtup* (32), *brihatī* (36), *pankti* (40), *trishtup* (44), and *jagatī* (48) were used most frequently in the Vedic texts.

The syllables are prosodically either short (*laghu*) or long (*guru*). A *laghu* syllable is a short vowel followed by at most one consonant; any other syllable is a *guru*. Within each quarter verse, a sequence of *laghus* and *gurus* defines the meter; this is much like the representation of a number by a succession of 0s and 1s used in the binary arithmetic of computers.

Pingala presented a method where all the binary *laghu-guru* sequences were shown as a matrix, *prastāra*. Given a specific sequence, he showed how it could be converted into an equivalent decimal number; he also showed how a given decimal number could be expanded into the sequence of *laghus* and *gurus*. This suggests that an understanding of the basis of the representation of numbers existed. The Pingala octal assignment has much similarity with the Katapayādi notation for representing numerals as words.

Subhash Kak

See also **Pānini; Vedic Aryan India**

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PLANNING COMMISSION The Planning Commission was established in 1950 by the government of India. Thus it does not have statutory status by virtue either of a provision in the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Yet over the years it acquired the status of more than a ministry and at times gave the impression of being a parallel government. The prime minister has always been its chairman, but the deputy chairman has in practice been in charge planning. The finance minister is an ex-officio member of the commission, and from time to time other ministers have been appointed members, depending on the contemporary significance of their departments. The commission's original, primary function was to prepare a five-year plan of development. Planning was in fashion during the early years of India's independence, influenced by the Soviet Union's experiment. Pandit Nehru, prime minister of India, was fascinated by the

five-year plans, as was India's business community. The first "plan" of development was a rudimentary effort by the business community—the so-called Bombay Plan—to restore worn-out railway and industrial infrastructure.

Centralized Planning

The first five-year plan (1951–1956) was essentially a listing of development projects already in the pipeline (from the late war years, when the British regime had set in motion a process of postwar development). But it also provided a brilliant exposition of the state of the economy, the nature and magnitude of the development task, and an analytical basis for future effort.

The second five-year plan created a four-sector model for Indian development: large-scale industries for the production of capital goods; large-scale industries for the production of consumer goods; agriculture; small and household industries; and services. Accelerated growth, it was argued, required public investment in the production of heavy capital machinery, while investment for the production of consumer goods would be mostly in the private sector, some of which would follow labor-intensive techniques, securing additional employment. The machines-to-build-machines strategy, however, soon ran to ground as the marginal rate of saving proved insufficient to sustain it. Balance of payments problems forced a hiatus in planning, but by the late sixties, planning resumed with emphasis on poverty alleviation. As of 2002, India had implemented nine five-year plans. The current tenth plan (2002–2007) has a target of 8 percent growth rate.

The plans embraced the public and the private sectors. The plan for the private sector was intended to be merely indicative, though attempts were soon made to enforce targets through the elaborate mechanism of industrial licensing. The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1956 defined those sectors reserved for the public; other sectors were open for private investment, governed by the targets of the plan. The mixed economy model, well-defined in theory, led to serious problems in practice. The marriage of planning to licensing proved disastrous and eventually necessitated liberalization in the mid-1980s and more prominently since 1991.

The Economic Affairs Department of the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for the annual government budgets, and thus for raising tax and nontax revenues, argued that the size of the plan was constrained by the saving propensity of the economy and the possibility of mobilizing private savings through taxation and borrowing. The debate over financial planning, and between the virtues of a big plan as opposed to a moderate-sized



Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh Chairs a Meeting of the Planning Commission. Shortly after assuming office in 2004, Singh requested that the commission determine whether India's economic programs were, in fact, serving the segments of the population they were intended to help. INDIA TODAY.

plan, continued throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The Planning Commission is organized both territorially and functionally. Apart from the members, who constitute the decision-making body, the commission uses a number of advisers, drawn from the Indian Administrative Service, primarily economists and scientists. Each adviser looks after one or more sectors (e.g., rural development, energy, or transport) and also one or more states. Macroeconomic work is done by the Economic and Resources Division and the Perspective Planning Division, in close association with the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of India.

A draft plan is submitted for approval to the central cabinet and the National Development Council, including central ministers and the state chief ministers. The entire five-year plan is implemented through annual plans, which are formulated by the central and state governments and approved by the Planning Commission. A Programme Evaluation Organization generates periodic evaluations of the plan's schemes and programs.

Center-State Relations

The Planning Commission plays a major role in managing the economic relations between the central government and the states, approving the plans of the states after discussions with them. In addition, the center allocates some 25 percent of the assistance it receives from abroad to various states. The percentage has gone up over time, and all foreign aid that specifically pertains to projects in designated states is now passed on to them.

States also receive central funds for specific programs sponsored by the center, such as malaria eradication. The Planning Commission tries to use the leverage of resource transfers to introduce reforms and better practices in the states, for example power sector reforms and fiscal management reforms. The Finance Commission, which is a statutory body under the Constitution, appointed every five years, also tries to encourage reforms, though its basic task is to decide on the central transfers, by way of tax sharing and grants to fund non-plan revenue expenditures of states. The Finance Commission's work thus overlaps with that of the Planning

Commission. Most states seem to favor dealing with the Finance Commission, since whatever they receive from it is treated as their statutory right. Though the two commissions never meet, one member of the Planning Commission has usually been appointed to the Finance Commission to facilitate the coordination of their tasks.

The commission lost much of its power and glory during the economic crises in the 1960s. Rajiv Gandhi made no secret of his contempt for it by describing its members as jokers.

In the post-1991 liberalized economy, which relies more on the free market than governmental controls, the Planning Commission has had to redefine its role, adapting to India's new economic realities. Its focus is now on defining broad infrastructure and social sector goals. Nonetheless, it continues to play a role in managing center-state financial relations, seeking to improve fiscal discipline in the states and to provide general guidance on health, education, and poverty alleviation programs.

Manu Shroff

See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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PLASSEY, BATTLE OF. *See* **Bengal; British East India Company Raj; Clive, Robert.**

POLICE ATROCITIES. *See* **Human Rights.**

POLITICAL SYSTEM

This entry consists of the following articles:

CABINET

CONSTITUTION

PARLIAMENT

PRESIDENT

PRIME MINISTER

CABINET

Parliamentary democracies, including India, are more accurately described as cabinet governments. While the council of ministers has constitutional status in India, the cabinet does not get a mention in India's Constitution. Its powers are defined instead by convention and usage. The council of ministers consists, in order of precedence, of: cabinet ministers; ministers of state; deputy ministers; and parliamentary secretaries.

The full executive is the council of ministers, with the cabinet being but one of its four components. In reality, though, the cabinet is much more important, influential, and powerful than the full council. While the latter meets rarely, the cabinet meets frequently. In some respects, ministers of state and deputy ministers are closer to being departmental heads than cabinet ministers. With coalition governments and the resulting need to accommodate various political parties, their numbers have increased dramatically. In November 2003, there were 29 cabinet ministers (of whom 2 were women) in addition to the prime minister and deputy prime minister, and 49 ministers of state (5 women). Every minister must be a member of parliament (MP) of either the lower house (Lok Sabha) or upper house (Rajya Sabha). If this is not the case upon appointment to the cabinet, he or she must become an MP within six months of appointment, either through nomination or by election. A minister may take part in the proceedings of either house of parliament, but voting rights are restricted to the house to which he or she belongs.

The cabinet of India serves three principal functions: to determine government policy for presentation to Parliament; to implement government policy; and to carry out interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. Interestingly, the cabinet as a whole does not consider the budget, the responsibility for which rests with the finance minister, the prime minister, and one or more other related ministers.

What is the power and influence of the cabinet collectively, or of cabinet ministers individually? The answer depends not only on the personality of the prime minister of the day—whether he or she is assertive and domineering or more of the delegating type—but also on how powerful and independent-minded the cabinet ministers themselves are. On the one hand, they are rival centers of political gravity within the ruling party, and therefore a potential threat to the continuing position of the prime minister as head of government. On the other hand, they are of immense help to the prime minister in articulating and defending government policy in Parliament and in the nation at large, to both party faithful and political opponents alike. And the knowledge that the government is not a one-person band can be greatly reassuring to the

people and to business and investor confidence. In the 1998–2003 period, when Lal Krishna Advani served as deputy prime minister and home minister, the Vajpayee government had one of the most powerful deputy prime ministers in decades of Indian politics. For all his commanding stature in the country, even Jawaharlal Nehru (prime minister 1947–1964) had to contend with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was second only to Nehru in influence in the cabinet and the party. Patel was considered to be Nehru's equal in many respects.

In contrast to her father, Indira Gandhi (prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) established a more personalized and centralized form of prime ministerial government. Efforts by the Janata government (1977–1980) to restore the principle and substance of collective responsibility fell victim to internecine conflict within the cabinet. Prime Minister Gandhi's dominant role in her cabinet was reflected in the expanded size and enhanced status of the prime minister's secretariat, compared to that of the far more humble Lal Bahadur Shastri (prime minister 1964–1966).

“Responsible government” ensures that the head of state acts only on the advice of responsible advisers. As in other parliamentary governments, the Indian cabinet operates on the basis of the two further working principles: “cabinet responsibility” and “ministerial responsibility.” While cabinet responsibility places individual ministers under the cabinet as a collective entity, ministerial responsibility puts them in charge of government departments. Thus the former is more political and the latter more bureaucratic in nature.

All cabinet ministers must accept the principle of collective responsibility. That is, under collective leadership each minister accepts and agrees to share responsibility for all decisions of the cabinet. Doubts and disagreements may be expressed either diplomatically or forcefully, but they must be confined to the privacy of the cabinet room. Cabinet decisions are rarely taken by formal vote. Instead, the cabinet proceeds by a sense of the meeting after the discussion has taken place. If any member of the cabinet is unable to support government policy in public, in Parliament, or in the country at large, then that member is morally bound to resign. Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla resigned from the cabinet in 1967 because he believed that the government's educational policy, which obviously did not fall within his ministerial jurisdiction, was likely to endanger and undermine national unity. A dissenting minister may neither vote against government policy in Parliament, nor speak against it in public. Minister of State Mohan Dharia was dismissed from the council of ministers in 1975 because of public dissent from government policy on how to handle Loknayak (People's Leader) Jaya Prakash Narayan's

people's movement. Open bickering between members of the Janata government on matters of public policy proved to be the prelude to the collapse of the government in 1979. For more than two years the Janata cabinet was less a forum for reaching collective decisions than an arena for factional conflict. During 1998–2003, the problems for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government came from coalition allies rather than BJP members. But the numerical dominance of the BJP and the personal popularity of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee sufficed to overcome any dissidence within the coalition.

Each member of the cabinet accepts full political responsibility for all acts of commission and omission by officials of the department that falls under her or his portfolio. Officials are there to advise the minister and implement the minister's decisions. The minister, rather than her or his officials, reaps the rewards of the ministry's policy successes, and has to be prepared to pay the political price for its failures. Thus Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon was forced to resign by Prime Minister Nehru after the disastrous performance of the Indian military in the war with China in 1962. Serious railway accidents have led to calls for the resignation of railway ministers. When Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh accompanied alleged terrorists whose release from Indian detention was demanded by the hijackers of an Indian Airlines plane that had been taken to Afghanistan in 1999, the shame and ignominy was not transferred to the shoulders of his civil servants and advisers.

Ministerial responsibility is the doctrinal assertion of the supremacy of politicians over the entire machinery of government. Cabinet ministers accept responsibility for departmental acts because in the system of cabinet government they are expected and required to exercise firm control over the bureaucracy. One reason why Prime Minister Nehru did not abandon the bureaucratic structure inherited from the British colonial administration was that he and his ministers provided crisp and clear policy guidance to their civil servants. Furthermore, they also asserted and established the supremacy of political control over the military.

The cabinet is assisted in its many tasks by several committees. The most important of these deal with parliamentary, political, foreign, defense, and economic affairs. The key cabinet committees are always dominated by the senior ministers, starting with the prime minister. Important issues are usually examined in committee before being taken to the cabinet as a whole for debate and approval or rejection. The committee system can be used by a prime minister or an “inner cabinet” (sometimes referred to as the “kitchen cabinet”) to preempt decisions, using the full cabinet chiefly for ratification of the policy already agreed to by a powerful small clique.

In principle, nevertheless, the cabinet is the chief governing authority in the country. Its central role in government also makes it the focus of most interest group activity and lobbying, which in turn makes it one of the chief mediators and conciliators of sectarian and sectoral interests. It is the cabinet that tenders advice to the president for the exercise of all his or her functions, and that provides legislative leadership in Parliament, political leadership in the country, and administrative leadership of government departments. The cabinet is also the final arbiter of India's external relations, from declaration of general principles of foreign policy to decisions of war and peace and negotiations of trade agreements and military alliances. In 2003, for example, India was urged by the second Bush administration in Washington to contribute a division of troops (over 15,000) to Iraq. There was a split within the government ranks on how to respond, taking into consideration the government's wish to consolidate relations with the United States against the backdrop of the dominant public sentiment against the U.S. war. Some ministers wanted to agree to the U.S. request; others were initially sympathetic but changed their minds; and some stayed opposed from start to finish. In the crucial meeting of the cabinet committee on security on 14 July 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee sided with the opponents, and the matter was thus settled. The cabinet committee on security was the crucial body in which the decision was made.

Ramesh Thakur

See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations**

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CONSTITUTION

Constitutionalism is the technique of striking the proper balance between establishing a system of government that has sufficient enabling authority and power to permit it to perform the necessary tasks, and restricting the government with a system of restraints to preclude the creation of a tyranny. If a country has a written constitution that does not act as an effective restraint on the exercise of arbitrary power by the government of the day, it cannot be said to serve as the backbone of constitutional government.

As the highest law in its land, the constitution sets out the rules to ensure fair competition between official contenders, vying for the authoritative allocation of scarce resources through control of political office. It establishes the framework within which competing individuals and groups can pursue their struggles for power in a stable, orderly manner. Every political system needs clearly understood rules to make, interpret, implement, and enforce public policy. The constitution does this by specifying the organs of government; their powers and limits in relation to one another and to citizens; procedures for formulating and executing laws and resolving conflicts among units and members of the political community; and the conditions under which a polity may be defended against internal and foreign foes. The constitutional relationship between the state and its citizens—a government elected by and accountable to the people, both government and citizens being subject to the rule of law—contains the key to the organizing principle of every political system.

The Constitution of India tries to strike a balance between the liberty of citizens, the authority of the state, and the cohesiveness of society. The key to the successful establishment of constitutional democracy in India may lie in the quality and gradualism of British tutelage. Prior to independence, India went through a fairly long gestation period of parliamentary democratic institutions. The principle of gradualism guided the widening of suffrage to new classes of citizens, the extension of the principles of elective government from local to national levels, and the deepening of power-sharing arrangements between elected representatives and appointed officials.

India inherited its basic organizational structure of government from the British Raj, including a unitary system of government, albeit with strong federal features. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 extended the elective principle to the provincial (state) legislative councils, extended a limited central legislative council suffrage, and introduced communal electorates. They also initiated a far-reaching debate on three constitutional issues: a further broadening of the suffrage, and if so, the principles on which this was to be done; the further extension of the elective principle to all members of legislative bodies; and the appropriate power-sharing arrangements between provincial and national governments. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 divided authority between central and state governments and legislative functions between two chambers. The suffrage was still limited, however, to property taxpayers, landholders, and men with educational qualifications, who together accounted for under 4 percent of the population in rural areas and 14 percent in municipal areas. The Government of India Act (1935) of the British Parliament provided the



Supreme Court, New Delhi. Domed home to India's Supreme Court, arbiter of the Constitution. On Talak Marg, New Delhi, not far from the banks of the Yamuna River. INDIA TODAY.

structural link from the 1919 reforms under British rule to the 1950 Constitution adopted after independence. Independent India also inherited some of the actual institutions of the British Raj, including central and provincial legislatures, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the security services; and the conventions of parliamentary democracy, for example the requirement for the prime minister to be a member of the lower house of Parliament, and for his cabinet to resign if ever it loses a vote of "confidence" in that house.

The new Constitution of independent India, drafted by a specially convened Constituent Assembly, completed the democratization of politics begun by the British. Reflecting the Congress Party triumphs in the provincial elections of 1945, the Constituent Assembly was dominated by the Congress, which had led the struggle for independence. The president of the assembly was Rajendra Prasad, who later became the first president of India. The drafting committee was chaired by B. R. Ambedkar. Other influential personalities in the Constituent Assembly were Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar

Vallabhbhai Patel, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies in 1946, the Constituent Assembly aimed to set up a system of government that would facilitate social change and economic development within a democratic structure. The debates in the Constituent Assembly are a rich mine of information on the thinking and philosophy, the fears and hopes underlying the Constitution of India.

Divided into twenty-two parts of 395 articles, plus another eight schedules (since expanded to over 400 articles and a dozen schedules), the Constitution of India is among the longest in the world. It came into effect on 26 January 1950 and established a republic, with no hereditary rulers. The date of 26 January is celebrated every year with due pomp and ceremony as Republic Day. Under the terms of the Constitution, India is democratic, secular, federal, and republican. India has a representative and parliamentary system of government formed on the basis of elections held at prescribed intervals under the auspices of an independent electoral commission. Every adult citizen may vote in elections and seek public



office. While some drafters of the Constitution had wanted a decentralized Gandhian state, most felt comfortable with the system of parliamentary democracy bequeathed by Britain. A distribution of powers between

a federal center and component states, equally familiar from the colonial heritage, was regarded as the best institutional means of accommodating India's need for unity-in-diversity through appropriate power sharing on



a geographical basis. The history of difficulties in neighboring Pakistan, which broke apart in 1971, and Sri Lanka, which has struggled with demands for greater autonomy by the Tamils, has vindicated the formula adopted by the Indian Constitution. Secularism was a logical corollary of the Congress Party's passionate rejection

of the two-nation theory, by which Pakistan had been severed from India through partition-at-birth. The decision to become a republic was an assertion of freedom and independence from the British Crown. Nevertheless, India was allowed to remain a full member of the Commonwealth of Nations, through the creative formula of

accepting the British “Crown” as a symbol of the free association of Commonwealth member-nations, and as such the head of the Commonwealth.

The Constitution prescribes four methods for its own amendment (Part XX). Some clauses may be amended by a simple majority of Parliament, in consultation with or at the request of the states. A second category of clauses may be amended by a simple majority in Parliament. A third group requires a majority of the total membership of each house plus a two-thirds majority of members of Parliament present and voting in each house. The final class of clauses, pertaining to state borders and rights, requires, in addition to the preceding, ratification by half the number of state legislatures. The Constitution has been amended around one hundred times, but without altering the “basic structure” of the system of government established in 1950, whose custodian is the Supreme Court of India.

The philosophy underlying the Constitution of India reflects attractions and aversion to aspects of Western liberal democracy and Soviet-style Marxism. During the struggle for independence, many leading personalities in the Congress Party, although Western-educated, had flirted with communist ideals. India’s Constitution reflects this dual attraction and ambivalence. The Preamble declares India to be a sovereign democratic republic and proclaims the following goals: social, economic, and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; equality of status and opportunity; dignity of the individual; and unity of the nation. The simultaneous attraction of Western democracy and Soviet socialism is particularly apparent in the chapters on Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV), respectively.

In some respects the Indian framers borrowed ideas from the U.S. Constitution, starting with the need for a written constitution. The functions of rule making, rule enforcement, and rule interpretation are separated into the three institutions of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The U.S. influence is strikingly evident in the institution of the judiciary, including a Supreme Court as the final court, and the principle of judicial review. If constitutional government is to have practical and not merely theoretical meaning, then there must be an independent judiciary that can act as a check on the arbitrary exercise of legislative and executive power. If independent India was going to give meaning to the fine sentiments expressed in its Constitution—to protect minorities, to give practical content to the principles of equality of opportunity and equality under the law, to establish that democracy means that all votes have equal value and all officials as well as citizens are answerable for their actions in court—then the judiciary, led by the

Supreme Court of India, would have to provide firm guidance. By and large it has done so. For the rule of law to prevail, the judiciary must be seen to be universal, impartial, and impersonal. Its task is to expand individual rights and state power simultaneously. The judiciary is also the final arbiter on what the Constitution itself means. Though the Constitution of India lacks the longevity of its U.S. counterpart, and reverence for it is perhaps diminished by the ease and frequency of its amendments, it nevertheless has proven to be remarkably resilient.

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See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations**

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PARLIAMENT

In India both the prime minister and the cabinet are subject, or “responsible,” to control by Parliament. Indians were introduced to the institution of responsible parliamentary government by the British. The lineage of the Parliament of India created by the Constitution in 1950 includes the Indian Councils Act (1861), the Morley-Minto reforms (1909), the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms (1919), and the Government of India Act (1935). These various reforms each represented a gradual increase in the democratization and indigenization of responsible rule in India by the transfer of British imperial power to elected representatives of India, completed with independence and the adoption of parliamentary government modeled on that of Westminster.

The powers of the Indian parliament may be divided into legislative, financial, procedural, governmental, constitution-amending, and constitutive. Parliament



Parliament Building, New Delhi. On December 13, 2001, five terrorists firing AK-47 rifles breached the security perimeter around the Parliament House, but failed to enter it. In the gun battle that ensued, the terrorists, six security officers, and a gardener were killed. PREM KAPOOR / FOTOMEDIA.

enacts the law of the land, at least in theory. In reality, the legislative agenda is controlled by the government and usually rubber stamped by Parliament with the help of tightly maintained party discipline. If it chooses to act with the government, as is almost always the case, Parliament is all-powerful; if it chose to act independently of the government, Parliament would create confusion and unpredictability in the affairs of state; and by voting to act against the executive, Parliament indicates that a government has lost its confidence, bringing the business of that government to a standstill until new elections can be held.

The financial powers of Parliament empower it to raise and spend money as it sees fit, including discussion and approval of the annual budget, which is usually introduced in mid-February. Only Parliament has the authority to levy taxes and spend money from the consolidated fund. Its procedural powers are those that permit Parliament to make rules for the conduct of its own business. Parliament formally controls the reins of government in that the cabinet is required to have the confidence of the lower house, Lok Sabha, and is collectively responsible to Parliament. Under Article 368, Parliament is the main

body for amending the Constitution of India. Under its constitutive powers, Parliament can legislate to admit or create new states into the union of India; to create a high court for a union territory, and to extend the jurisdiction of a high court to or restrict it from a union territory; and to create or abolish the upper house for a state of the union, with the consent of its lower house.

The Lok Sabha

The Parliament of India is bicameral. The lower house is the Lok Sabha, or the “House of the People.” Its members are elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The distribution of seats among the states is roughly in proportion to their population. Thus Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the two most populous states, have 85 and 54 members of Parliament (MPs) respectively, while the smallest states and union territories have only one MP each. Of the 543 elective seats in the thirteenth Lok Sabha (1999–2004), 413 MPs were in the general category, 81 were from scheduled castes (formerly known as “untouchables”), and 49 were from scheduled tribes. Any citizen of India who is at least twenty-five years old may

seek election to the Lok Sabha from a constituency in which he or she has resided for a minimum of 180 days. In a reserved constituency, only members of the scheduled castes and tribes may run for office, but all adults within the constituency may vote. The two nominated seats are filled by the president with representatives of the Anglo-Indian community.

The system of voting is the single-member constituency. Each constituency is represented by only one MP in the Lok Sabha. Of those contesting from any constituency, the candidate with the highest number of votes is declared elected, even if the total is well short of a majority. The plurality rather than majority system of voting can produce, and generally has done so, governments that have substantial majorities in Parliament but lack endorsement from a majority of the voters. In 1984, for example, the Congress Party captured 77 percent of seats in Parliament but won only 48 percent of the votes. Conversely, in 1996, a drop of 8.4 percent in the popular vote saw the party's parliamentary representation halved. A proportional representation system would be more representative in a mathematically defined version of democracy. However, under Indian conditions (size, diversity, and complexity), it would almost certainly produce chaos in each general election.

The conduct of elections is entrusted by the Constitution itself to an election commission. The chief election commissioner is an independent official appointed by the president under conditions of service resembling those of senior judges. The tasks of the election commission include designing voting forms suitable for Indian conditions, determining the best dates for holding elections, whether the elections should be held simultaneously, on consecutive days, or at staggered intervals, and so on.

By and large, Parliament is fairly chosen. While individual seats may have been determined by musclemen or bribes, no general election in India has produced an overall result that was not a fair reflection of voter preferences. As with all political systems, the party in government has all the advantages of incumbency when contesting elections. These have not been sufficient to prevent spectacular electoral reverses for the party in power in several elections since 1967, including the elections of 2004. Indeed, in some ways, a notable trend in Indian elections is the anti-incumbency factor: voters seem to punish those in office for their shortcomings and failures as much as they reward newcomers for fresh promises.

In the early years after 1950, many MPs came from a background of activism in the struggle for independence. The first Parliament (1952–1957) was dominated by professionals, especially lawyers. In the thirteenth Lok Sabha

(1999–2004), 419 MPs were university graduates, including 30 with Ph.D. degrees. Over 70 percent were between 41 and 65 years old. (The oldest was born in 1913, the youngest in 1968.) In terms of castes, Brahmans are still overrepresented and the lower castes remain underrepresented. But the general trend is toward greater democratization. Such is not the case with regard to gender balance: only 44 of the 543 elected members of the thirteenth Lok Sabha were women.

The term of the Lok Sabha is five years, although in an emergency this may be extended for one year at a time. This has happened only once, after the 1975 “emergency.” While Parliament may be dissolved and fresh elections held because a government has lost the confidence of the Lok Sabha, the more common occurrence is for a prime minister to call for new elections when he or she deems it possible to maximize personal or party political gains. For this reason, the exact date for new elections is usually uncertain.

Required to convene at least twice a year, the Lok Sabha normally meets in three sessions each year. In 2002 the budget session met from 15 April to 17 May, the monsoon session from 15 July to 12 August, and the winter session from 18 November to 20 December. The language of parliamentary business is mostly Hindi or English, although a member may use any of the recognized official languages. The official records of parliamentary debates are printed in both English and Hindi.

The legislative process involves three stages, corresponding to the British three readings of bills: a bill's introduction, its consideration, and its enactment into law. At its first reading, the bill is introduced, along with an explanation of its aims and purposes. After the second reading, a bill may be referred to a select committee, circulated for public response, or taken up for immediate consideration. The most substantial consideration of any bill takes place in committee. The Lok Sabha operates with the aid of about a dozen committees of between twenty and twenty-five members. The composition of the committees is determined by the speaker and the chief whip with due regard to respective party strengths in the house. No minister who is in charge of a bill being considered by committee is permitted to participate in the deliberations of that committee, which helps to insulate the committee proceedings from undue executive influence.

The select committee reports back either unambiguously or with a majority recommendation and a minority note of dissent. The bill is then considered in the house clause by clause, with members allowed to introduce amendments. Once all clauses have been dealt with, the bill has successfully crossed the report stage, and is listed for its third and final reading. At this stage, only

tidying-up amendments are permitted, and the bill is put to a vote. If approved, and when formally authenticated as such by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the bill is sent to the second house, where the entire procedure is repeated. When both houses of Parliament have passed an identical version of a bill, it is presented to the president for formal assent, and becomes law upon receiving his assent.

“Ordinary” bills can be introduced in either house, the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. They must be passed by both houses before they can be sent to the president, and they only become law once they have been signed by the president. “Money” bills can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha (“no taxation without representation!”). While they may be taken up for discussion in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house cannot refuse assent to money bills. Nor may it frustrate the passage of a money bill by the simple expedient of procrastination: the bill is deemed to have passed if not returned by the Rajya Sabha within fourteen days.

The daily and sessional business of government is decided by the cabinet and its parliamentary affairs committee under the chairmanship of the chief whip. In parliamentary systems, party discipline in the legislature is far tighter than in presidential systems, and is maintained by “whips” for each party. A senior MP is chosen as the chief whip and is assisted by other whips. Their function is to maintain party discipline in the house, especially when it comes to voting on issues that are important to the party. Failure to obey instructions can lead to expulsion from the party.

Although any individual member of Parliament may introduce a private member’s bill, most of the Lok Sabha’s time is in fact devoted to dealing with government business. Individual members of Parliament can exert influence more in party forums than in Parliament itself. A private bill will have little prospect of enactment, but does help an MP to reassure, appease, or deflect criticism from constituents. Its main purpose often is, indeed, to play to the gallery.

Like the speech from the throne, each session of the Lok Sabha is opened with a presidential address. The quorum for the Lok Sabha to be able to meet is one-tenth of its membership. The daily session opens at 11:00 A.M. with a question hour, which is strongly reminiscent of the British tradition. Some twenty to twenty-five questions are asked, answered, parried, or successfully evaded each day. The form of the initial question is tightly disciplined, but supplementary questions are generally given fairly wide latitude by the Speaker. As in all parliamentary systems, question hour can break or make a minister. An opposition backbencher can make her or his mark by

displaying grasp of detail and mastery of debating skills, and might then be made a minister with a change of government; a serving minister can perform so poorly as to become a liability for the government in Parliament and the nation at large, and may be dropped from the cabinet.

The conduct of the house is in the hands of the Speaker. Selected by the governing party for formal election by the house and expected to conduct parliamentary business with fairness and impartiality, the Speaker recognizes members, keeps order, and has other duties that are required of presiding officers. The Speaker may not vote on an issue before the Lok Sabha, but can exercise a casting vote in the event of a tie on any motion being put to the vote.

Rajya Sabha

The Rajya Sabha (Council of States), the upper house, has 250 members, of whom 238 represent each of India’s states and union territories; the remaining 12 are nominated by the president, acting on the advice of cabinet. The latter are chosen on the basis of their special knowledge or skills in the arts and sciences, or in order to rectify a serious underrepresentation in parliament of any particular group, or in an exercise of political patronage to reward the party faithful or major financial donors. The distribution of Rajya Sabha seats among states is roughly in proportion to their populations, with some effort at equalization. Bihar, for example, has 54 seats in the Lok Sabha and 22 in the Rajya Sabha; Himachal Pradesh has 4 seats in the lower house and 3 in the upper. Members of state legislative assemblies elect Rajya Sabha representatives for their states on a proportional representation system.

Members of India’s upper house, as well as its lower house, are called members of Parliament (MPs). Rajya Sabha MPs are elected for six-year terms, with a biennial turnover of one-third of the house. Unlike the Lok Sabha, the upper house is not subject to dissolution. The quorum of the Rajya Sabha is 25 (one-tenth of the total membership), with decisions being made by a majority of members actually present and voting. The presiding officer of the Rajya Sabha is the vice-president of India.

There were three sets of reasons behind adopting a bicameral legislature for the union of India. First, the Rajya Sabha, as its name implies, was to be the custodian of states’ rights in a federal polity. Second, it provides an opportunity and a forum for second thoughts and wiser counsel, even after the passage of a bill by the Lok Sabha. And third, it enables a bill (other than financial bills) to be introduced in Parliament even when the Lok Sabha is not in session. As a result of this sensible procedure, much of the preliminary debate and work on the bill can be completed by the time the Lok Sabha reconvenes.

In theory, the Rajya Sabha provides the opportunity to bring into Parliament competent, skilled personnel who may not be prepared to face the uncertain rigors of political campaigns. They can be appointed to the Rajya Sabha and be inducted into cabinet without having to go through an election. In practice, however, the Rajya Sabha can provide a backdoor entry into Parliament for unelectable or defeated candidates whose loyalty to the party is believed sufficient for access to power.

The Opposition

The opposition in a parliamentary democracy is expected to play the role of an alternative government, complete with a “shadow” prime minister- and cabinet-in-waiting. Because of the large number of political parties in India, the status of the leader of the opposition can be conferred only on the leader of a party that has at least fifty seats in the Lok Sabha. The leader of the opposition in the thirteenth parliament was Congress Party leader Sonia Gandhi, widow of the assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and the heir apparent of the Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty. Following the success of the Congress Party in the 2004 elections, she would have become prime minister had she been willing to do so. (A naturalized citizen, her foreign birth would not have barred her from office.)

Opposition parties may not have many MPs in the house, and their claims to be a government-in-waiting may be utter fiction. Nonetheless, by their existence and their voice in parliament they express the diversity of opinions in a country as large and varied as India. Party discipline ensures that the opposition loses when the votes on any motion are tallied, but statements in Parliament are heard in the country at large and are often listened to within the ranks of the ruling party. This is particularly relevant in a country like India, where the major parties are not sharply distinguished by ideological differences. This has been especially noticeable with the proliferation of the increasingly influential independent electronic media during the 1990s. Although the debate in Parliament is ostensibly between the government and the opposition, it can also serve to structure the internal debates within an omnibus ruling party. This has been a distinctive feature of Indian politics.

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See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations**

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PRESIDENT

The president of India nominally stands at the apex of the country's political system. The executive power of government is vested in the president as both the formal head of state and as a symbol of the nation. In reality, the office of president confers status more than power. The president has symbolic authority and dignity but little power, except in times of emergency, and performs an essentially ceremonial role. The actual functions of government are carried out by the president only with the aid and advice of the prime minister and the cabinet.

The president is elected to office for five-year terms. Reelection is permitted, but to date only the first president of India, Rajendra Prasad, was given a second term. Any Indian citizen who is at least thirty-five years old and qualified for election to the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) is eligible to seek the presidency. The president is not directly elected by the people. Instead, in order to avoid creating a parallel center of authority in a parliamentary system of government, the president is chosen by an electoral college, consisting of both houses of Parliament and the state legislative assemblies. This method of election helps to keep in check presidential ambitions: chosen by legislators, presidents may not challenge those who have been directly elected by the people. The twin principles, of uniformity among states and parity between the central government and the states, are meant to ensure the election of a truly national candidate.

The weight assigned to each state elector's vote reflects population ratios: one-thousandth of the total population of each state is divided by the number of elected legislators in the state assembly. (The quotient is rounded to the nearest whole number.) This ensures uniformity among states. The aggregate value of the votes of the electors of all states (say 500,000) is then divided by



Vladimir Putin, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, and A. B. Vajpayee. Russia's President Vladimir Putin being welcomed by India's President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam and Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee. INDIA TODAY.

the number of members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (say 750 altogether) to determine the value of the vote of each member of Parliament (which in this case would be 667). Using this method, the aggregate vote of the Lok and Rajya Sabhas combined necessarily equals the aggregate vote of all the state assemblies combined, thus satisfying the principle of parity between the center and the states.

In order to be elected president, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast by the electoral college. The method of voting is the single transferable vote, with electors casting first and second preferences. As the lowest polling candidate is eliminated in each round, his or her preferences are transferred to other remaining candidates as per the electors' wishes, until such time as one candidate crosses the threshold of 50 percent of the votes cast. The lack of popular participation robs the choice of the excitement normally associated with elections in India, but it does serve to underline the dignity of the office.

The president is not answerable to any court for actions taken in the course of performing official duties,

but is subject to impeachment by Parliament for violating the constitution. A serving president can also resign, for example, for reasons of personal health.

The vice-president is elected for a five-year term by both houses of Parliament in a joint session, not by an electoral college. Responsibilities include presiding over the sessions of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house), deputizing for the president as necessary and succeeding the president if the office should fall vacant for any reason until new elections can be held. There is no necessary expectation that the vice-president should become the next president.

The choice of president and vice-president requires political judgment and balance, especially over a period of time. The offices must be rotated among India's major regions and among the major components of the Indian population (especially Hindu and Muslim, but also other minority groups, such as the Sikhs). The one balance that has not been struck so far is that of gender: no woman has yet been elected president of India. The professional background of India's presidents has mostly been political.

Powers

The powers of the president of India are normally ornamental, comprising appointive, dismissive, legislative, and symbolic functions. The president appoints the prime minister and also, on the advice of the latter, the cabinet; the justices of the Supreme Court and state high courts; the attorney general and the comptroller and auditor general of India; members of special commissions and other high public officials; and the governors of states. The choice of prime minister is not a discretionary prerogative to be exercised by the president, but is usually dictated by the party commanding a majority in the Lok Sabha. In most cases, the power to appoint is matched by the power to dismiss. The prime minister formally holds office at the pleasure of the president; in reality, the prime minister retains office as long as he or she can demonstrate majority support in the Lok Sabha.

The president calls Parliament into session, nominates twelve members of the Rajya Sabha, has the right to address both houses of Parliament, and the power to dissolve the lower house. A bill that has been passed by Parliament must be presented to the president for formal assent in order for it to become law. The president may withhold assent and return a bill—unless it is a financial bill—for clarification, reconsideration, or possible amendment by Parliament. However, such a presidential “veto” can be overridden if both houses of Parliament simply pass the bill again. Some types of bill, for example those seeking to alter state boundaries, can be introduced in Parliament only on the president’s recommendation.

Another legislative power is in the form of ordinances. When Parliament is not in session but immediate action is deemed necessary, the president is empowered by the Constitution (Article 123) to issue ordinances on the advice of the government. Although ordinances have the same force and effect as acts of Parliament, they must be laid before Parliament for formal enactment within six weeks of Parliament reconvening.

The president is the commander-in-chief of India’s armed services, receives ambassadors from other countries, represents India on state visits abroad, and presides in New Delhi’s Parliament or Old Delhi’s Red Fort on the great national occasions. The president has the power to grant pardons. However, in almost all cases, presidential powers are exercised only on the advice of the prime minister and the Cabinet.

Controversies and Debates

Sometimes the election of the president can itself become the arena for a power struggle between rival political factions. When President Zakir Hussain died in

office in 1969, Vice-President V. V. Giri took over as acting president until the election of a new president, which was required to be held within six months. The official Congress Party candidate was N. Sanjiva Reddy, a politician from within the party. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was locked in a struggle for power within her own ruling party, let it be known that her preferred candidate was V. V. Giri. His election underscored Gandhi’s power in Parliament over older Congress stalwarts who had long dominated the party organization.

Another debate that exercised an earlier generation but has become less salient in recent times is whether a president could abuse emergency powers granted under the Constitution in order to capture real power. The more interesting debate in recent times has been whether a presidential system of government might be better suited to Indian conditions and needs. A presidential system like that of the United States separates the executive from the legislature and places a directly elected president at the head of the executive branch. In a parliamentary system, the government is headed by a prime minister who is a member of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the legislature. The president has no equal; the prime minister is first among equals.

The debate on the relative merits and suitability of parliamentary and presidential systems is rooted in the belief that the performance of parliamentary government has been unsatisfactory. The desire for presidential government betrays a frustration among some Indians with the weakening of the central government under challenge from a number of states. A presidential type of government, its proponents believe, would help to restore order to a troubled country, dilute the corruption of the political system, and accelerate the pace of India’s economic development.

Most Indian analysts reject this view. Parliamentary democracy can be more stable, especially in societies riven by deep social and political cleavages. Under such conditions, parliamentary regimes have built-in mechanisms for power sharing, for example through coalition governments, whereas presidential elections are winner-take-all affairs that effectively disenfranchise the losing minority until the next election. Parliamentary governments also have the greater ability to rule in multiparty settings. A presidential system takes a zero-sum game approach to political power, with one winner and one or more losers for the entire term of presidential office. Parliamentary regimes place a higher premium on the political skills of bargaining and consensus building than do presidential counterparts. Coalitions can offer effective and continuous representation to a variety of interests that would be excluded from the administration in a presidential government.

The discretionary latitude available to a president depends less on the office or the incumbent and more on the state of party politics in Parliament or the Cabinet. If a prime minister commands the loyalty of the cabinet and the confidence of Parliament, and if the government in power is stable, there is little scope for independent presidential initiatives. Even within this limitation, nevertheless, when the Rajiv Gandhi government tried to enact a bill in 1987 giving the government new powers to spy on private correspondence, President Zail Singh withheld assent from a bill already passed by both houses of Parliament. With public opinion strongly on the side of the president, the government backed down. If the government is a coalition of different parties based in different ideologies, interests, states, or regions, then the president can play an interesting mediating role in center-state relations. For example, the prime minister and cabinet may recommend the replacement of an elected state government by direct “presidential” rule from the center, but the president may demur and seek further “clarifications.” This happened in Bihar in the 1990s, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)–led coalition government in New Delhi backed off from dismissing the non-BJP government in the state.

Ramesh Thakur


See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations**

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PRIME MINISTER

The prime minister of India, as in London’s Westminster, is the linchpin of India’s system of government. In Britain, the convention is firmly established that the prime minister must be a member of the lower house of Parliament. By contrast, at the time of her selection as prime minister in 1966, Indira Gandhi was a member of the upper house of India’s parliament, the Rajya Sabha. In order to deflect criticism and to consolidate her family’s political power base, Gandhi was subsequently elected to the Lok Sabha from Rae Bareilly, which had been her father’s constituency in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Rajiv Gandhi maintained the Nehru-Gandhi



Jawaharlal Nehru (prime minister 1947–1964). A complex man and perhaps India’s greatest prime minister, he once stated: “Peace is not a relationship of nations. . . . Peace is not merely the absence of war. . . . It is a condition of mind brought about by a serenity of soul.” NEHRU MEMORIAL TRUST / FOTOMEDIA.

family tradition of representing Rae Bareilly in the Lok Sabha, as would his widow Sonia Gandhi.

India’s Constitution defines the duties of the prime minister in Article 78. Sources of prime ministerial power include: leadership of the council of ministers, leadership of party, control of parliamentary activities, control of intelligence agencies, control of the bureaucracy, control of foreign policy, emergency powers, and personal charisma.

The prime minister has almost total freedom in appointing members of Parliament (MPs) to ministerial posts. In making the selections, nevertheless, the party leader must ensure adequate representation to India’s regional and sectarian interests, and also to the various factions within the ruling party. For example, in 1977, regardless of personal likes and dislikes, Prime Minister Morarji Desai had to include Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram in his Cabinet and give them powerful portfolios (finance and defense, respectively). Sometimes public



Three Generations of the Nehru Family. Jawaharlal (who served as India's first prime minister from 1947–1964), daughter Indira Gandhi (who served as prime minister from 1966–1977 and from 1980 until her assassination in 1984), and her sons Rajiv (who directly succeeded his mother, serving until 1989, and was later assassinated while mounting a political comeback) and Sanjay (who it was assumed would enter politics until a plane crash took his life in 1981). NEHRU MEMORIAL TRUST / FOTOMEDIA.

opinion may force certain changes even on the most powerful prime ministers. After the debacle of the war with China in 1962, for example, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had to remove Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon from the cabinet, since Krishna Menon had become identified in the public mind with the disasters of India's China policy. India has learned to live with coalition governments ruling in New Delhi for over two decades, and its prime ministers have had to manage fractious coalition allies with large egos. Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee sometimes used the threat of resignation to force recalcitrant allies to fall in line behind government policy. At other times he allowed some members of the coalition to resign from his Cabinet rather than meet their demands.

Still, in general a prime minister can exercise considerable influence on parliamentary colleagues, and therefore

on the destiny of the country, by constituting, reconstituting, and reshuffling the cabinet and chairing cabinet meetings. Prime Minister Gandhi began to assert herself against party elders almost from the start by inducting her own people into the cabinet, such as Ashoka Mehta, G. S. Pathak, and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed.

In parliamentary governments in the West, there is a tendency to leave particular individuals in charge of particular portfolios for a period of time so that they may develop and use specialized expertise. Confident of his stature in the country and his authority over his Cabinet, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru kept some Cabinet colleagues in charge of the same ministry for considerable lengths of time, allowing them to acquire expertise in their respective fields. Prime Minister Gandhi, on the other hand, was notorious for the continual reshuffling of the ministries. She did this in part to demonstrate her

power, and in part to prevent potential rivals from developing independent power bases by keeping them all off balance. The net result was to disrupt the efficient functioning of government. Rajiv Gandhi maintained his mother's tradition of frequent reassignment of Cabinet posts.

Shifting Cabinet portfolios enlarges the room for maneuver of a prime minister who wishes to control the agenda of government. The prime minister is the head of government by virtue of being the leader of the majority party in parliament. A party is elected to office on the basis of a policy platform spelled out in an election manifesto. The party leader is exceptionally well placed to influence and shape the translation of the party manifesto into government policy. The extreme example of prime ministerial control of parliamentary activities was probably the period of "National Emergency" rule by Indira Gandhi (1975–1977), when Parliament was in effect converted into her personal rubber stamp. All constitutional fetters were removed from the de facto exercise of power by the prime minister, and opposition leaders were, for the most part, in jail.

In parliamentary systems in the West, the functions and the functionaries of the leader of the party as an organization and the leader of the party in Parliament are usually separate. India is unusual among mature parliamentary democracies in having largely fused the offices of head of party organization and leader of the parliamentary wing of a political party; that was not the case after the 2004 elections, however, when Sonia Gandhi led the Congress Party and Manmohan Singh led Parliament as prime minister. In the early years after independence, Prime Minister Nehru had to learn to live with another person as Congress Party president—Purushottam Das Tandon. But Tandon, the protégé of the powerful Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, was outmaneuvered by Nehru soon after Patel's death. Nehru became Congress Party president in September 1951, thereby ending the so-called duumvirate, even though in later years he was to relinquish the party post, first to a weak and relatively unknown U. N. Dhebar, and then to his daughter, Indira Gandhi. The latter also acted as Nehru's social hostess, often accompanying him on many of his travels around India and abroad.

Indira Gandhi was minister of information and broadcasting under Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. When Shastri died after India and Pakistan signed a peace treaty in Tashkent in 1966, she was catapulted into power by the Congress Party bosses, who considered her a pliant woman, young in years and lacking in political experience. Her fierce independence was quickly demonstrated by her devaluation of the rupee in June 1966, a decision taken without prior consultation with such senior party colleagues as Morarji Desai and

Congress Party president Kamaraj Nadar. The 1967 general election saw the defeat of many of the old party stalwarts, including Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh, S. Nijalingappa, and S. K. Patil. When the ruling Congress Party split in 1969, Indira Gandhi turned to the many small parties of India's left wing for her political survival.

Indira Gandhi's fortunes revived with the general election of 1971 and the state elections of 1972, which together gave her a commanding position in New Delhi, with 352 seats for the Congress Party in the Lok Sabha, and with Congress majorities in fifteen states and one union territory. Thereafter, she began to dominate every party organ: the All-India Congress Committee (AICC), the Congress Working Committee (CWC), the Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB), and the Central Election Committee. Even in defeat in 1977, when the organizational sections of the Congress Party deserted her, she abandoned them and effectively took the Congress Party majority with her, as was only too vividly demonstrated by her electoral triumph in 1980. It may not have been entirely accurate to say, as her many sycophants did, that "India is Indira, and Indira is India," but she certainly proved that "Indira is Congress, and Congress is Indira."

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the final arbiter in the choice of Congress Party candidates for election from all constituencies throughout India. The party organization became an instrument for the prime minister of India to control, and thus to dominate state politics as well. In 1975, for example, in the context of factional infighting within the state unit of the Congress Party, Uttar Pradesh chief minister H. N. Bahuguna declared that "Mrs. Gandhi is our Supreme Court."

Heads of government can also abuse their control of intelligence services for personal and party political purposes. Intelligence agencies traditionally come under prime ministerial oversight, not least because heads of government would mistrust potential rivals in charge of such key operations. The size and complexity of India, as well as its colonial past, account for the emergence of several intelligence agencies, the most important of which are: the Intelligence Bureau, including a Research and Analysis Wing (RAW); the Central Bureau of Investigation; the Criminal Investigation Department (Special Branch); and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence.

Established in 1968 as an external intelligence agency, RAW was separated from the Intelligence Bureau in 1969 and placed under the cabinet secretariat, with the prime minister in the chair. Indira Gandhi expanded the powers and activities of RAW during the 1975–1977 "emergency" period and gave it an internal surveillance role, with the director of RAW reporting directly to her. The Shah

Commission report (withdrawn from sale and circulation by government order on 7 March 1980 after Gandhi's return to power) documented how the various branches of intelligence succumbed to political pressure and were used to harass, intimidate, and imprison political opponents during the two years of "emergency" rule. RAW was stripped of its internal surveillance functions by the Janata government (1977–1979). But Indira Gandhi was not the first nor the last prime minister of India to use the intelligence agencies to keep abreast of moves and countermoves by potential challengers and to harass political opponents. Similar allegations were also leveled against the Vajpayee government.

In addition to using intelligence agencies for maintaining a watching brief over opponents and potential rivals, the prime minister can exercise political control through the regular channels of bureaucracy (including the police). This is especially so in India, where the centralization of the elite administrative and police services facilitates vertical control of their activities. Early in her tenure, Indira Gandhi introduced such phrases as "committed bureaucracy" into her political vocabulary. Personal loyalty to the prime minister became the most important criterion in determining promotions and assignments of senior officials.

The greatest opportunity for a prime minister of India to exercise total power within the constitution comes during the declaration of a national emergency. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 1975–1977 experience was a period of prime ministerial dictatorship. The period of "emergency" rule was an aberration, even by Indian standards. Increasingly in the modern world, heads of governments of all countries have begun to play the most visible role in determining their countries' foreign policies. India is no exception to the rule. Nehru was a founding father of nonalignment and the chief architect of independent India's foreign policy. Prime ministerial dominance of foreign policy did not diminish under his successors. No one in India or abroad was in any doubt that the country's foreign policy during Indira Gandhi's premiership was determined first and foremost by her, regardless of who may have been foreign minister. The same remained true of Rajiv Gandhi. The chief spokesman for India's place in the world since the nuclear test of 1998 has been the prime minister.

An international role in turn enhances the domestic status and stature of the prime minister. Nehru profited from his image as a world statesman, and Rajiv Gandhi tried to carve out a niche by such means as the Gandhi-Gorbachev Delhi Declaration of 27 November 1986. All major international conferences, for example the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting, are



Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Sworn in on May 22, 2004, the low-key Manmohan Singh, India's first non-Hindu prime minister. In the mid-1990s, the course of economic liberalization he charted as finance minister helped to save India from the brink of bankruptcy. INDIA TODAY.

attended by the prime minister personally. Visits abroad to other countries and to such forums as the United Nations are treated as major political events, where the prime minister is on show. Prime Minister Vajpayee was a regular participant in the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly, and he used the sidelines of the event to meet with any number of counterparts from around the world (as well as to interact with the increasingly influential expatriate Indian community in the United States).

The final source of prime ministerial authority is the individual attributes and charisma of the person occupying the office. As one would expect, some are more charismatic than others.

Ramesh Thakur

See also Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Vajpayee, Atal Bihari

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PONDICHERRY. *See French Impact.*

POPULATION, GENDER RATIO OF India's gender ratio (females per 1,000 males, or FMR)—933 in 2001—is strikingly low compared to both developed and developing countries (about 1,050 in Europe, 960 in North Africa, and 940 in China). Moreover, the FMR has declined monotonically since 1901 (from 972), reaching its lowest level in 1991 (927) with small improvements in 1981 (934) and 2001. This secular decline has prompted estimates of “missing women,” based on standard census benchmarks. P. N. Mari Bhat (2002) estimates that the number of women “missing” in 1951, relative to 1901 age-specific FMRs, was 5 million; based on 1951 benchmarks, the number “missing” in 1991 was 9 million.

Though FMR declines in Indian states from 1901 to 1991 were diverse, they traced regional patterns that cut across state and district boundaries. Since antifemale bias in northern India is well documented, demographers initially focused on a north-south divide with a notional boundary at the Narmada River. In 2001, however, the Narmada boundary was breached. FMRs were low (below 925) not only in the north, but also in the west and center, and high (above 975) in the south and east.

The real causes of India's low and declining FMRs are hard to determine. Explanations have centered on spatial and demographic patterns, cultural phenomena, socioeconomic determinants, and the impact of poverty and growth.

Spatial and Demographic Patterns

State and regional patterns. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1995) identified declines in state-specific FMRs as proximate causes of India's falling gender ratio, noting that six states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh) were largely responsible. Bhat's regional analysis (2002) revealed that though FMRs declined across all regions during 1901–1951, the east (Assam, West Bengal) and center (Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa) led the fall; however, during 1951–1991, the central region clearly spearheaded the decline. The north (Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh), with the lowest FMR in 1901, was still at the bottom of the ladder in 2001. Though FMRs in the south (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) declined throughout the

last century, the region ended up in 2001 with the highest gender ratio. By 2001, FMRs for the center, east, and west (Maharashtra, Gujarat), which had started out at very different levels, had converged to a range of 920–935.

Three fallacies. An early explanation of low Indian FMRs, the underenumeration of females, buckled under scrutiny. Though occasional census undercounts (for censuses before 1931 and for 1971 and 1991) cannot be ruled out, a sustained and increasing underenumeration is implausible. Another explanation, the migration of males in search of economic opportunities, clearly cannot explain the secular decline in national FMRs. A third rationale, exceptionally high masculinity at birth in India, is spurious as Asok Mitra (1979) pointed out; India's sex ratio at birth has varied in the normal range of 104–107 male births per 100 female births (FMRs of 935–960) during 1901–1981.

Fertility. M. Das Gupta and Bhat (1997) demonstrated that in India where son-preference is strong, fertility decline itself could worsen child sex ratios. Even if son-preference falls with fertility decline, access to sex-abortion technology could exacerbate gender bias. However, fertility decline in India clearly reduced adult female mortality because childbearing declined.

Mortality. Pravin M. Visaria (1969) firmly established that India's low FMRs were due to sex differentials in mortality. Others suggested that a small sex differential in infant and childhood mortality persisting over a period might have caused India's high masculinity, but the decomposition of India's FMRs by Bhat and Drèze and Sen suggested greater complexity.

Adult FMRs. Drèze and Sen's analysis revealed that the overall FMR was driven by a sustained decline in the FMR of the thirty plus age group during 1901–1971. Bhat corroborated their conclusion for adults aged fifteen plus, surmising that the substantial survival advantage that women aged fifteen plus enjoyed over men in 1901 quickly eroded as mortality levels fell during the last century. Bhat also found that of the 5 million women estimated missing in 1951, all were aged fifteen and over. The central region had the sharpest decline in adult FMRs during 1951–1991, and contributed nearly half the women estimated missing in 1991 (using 1901 benchmarks).

Juvenile FMRs. Bhat found that the age structure of missing women changed dramatically after 1951: almost half the 9 million women missing in 1991 were children aged fourteen and under. This dramatic change justifies an in-depth focus on juvenile FMRs, but the definition of “juvenile” has varied.

Bhat argued that age misreporting could distort juvenile FMRs, because in societies with son preference, censuses tend to overestimate the age of males and underestimate

female ages beginning from early childhood. Such misreporting exaggerates early childhood FMRs, like FMR aged 0–4, and lowers FMRs in later juvenile age groups; however, as age reporting improves with increased literacy and birth registration, FMR 0–4 falls, and older juvenile FMRs rise. Bhat claimed that more accurate age reporting was therefore partly responsible for the observed fall in FMR 0–4 and the rise in FMRs for children aged 5–9, 10–14, and 0–14 during 1901–1951. On the other hand, the subsequent fall in FMR 0–4 (38 points) during 1951–1991 and the significant associated declines in FMR 5–9, FMR 10–14, and FMR 0–14 (27 points) indicated that these declines in childhood FMRs were largely real.

Satish B. Agnihotri's classic analysis (2003) of recent juvenile gender ratios was built on his insights that gender gaps in mortality affect FMRs more strongly than mortality levels; gender differentials in infant mortality rates affect FMR 0–4 most acutely, while gender differentials in mortality in the 1–4 age group affect FMR 5–9 most severely. Thus, since FMR 0–4 and FMR 5–9 levels and gaps are good indicators of gender differentials in mortality, Agnihotri focused on these FMRs. In the 1981 Census, low values of FMR 5–9s and large gaps between FMR 0–4 and FMR 5–9 in numerous districts indicated significant excess female child mortality and confirmed a north-south divide; low FMR 0–4s (<910) in Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh suggested excess female infant mortality. The picture darkened in 1991. Districts with FMR 0–4 of less than 910 increased, pointing to the prevalence of female infanticide and (possibly) sex-selective abortions, while the startling rise in districts with FMR 0–4 of less than 960 suggested that increased girl mortality in the post neonatal and 1–4 age groups was “pushing further and deeper into the south.”

The rural-urban divide and sex-selective abortions. Census and survey data confirmed that the rural FMR 0–14 fell continuously during 1951–1991, while the urban ratio fell precipitately after 1981. In 2001 the 18-point drop in the overall FMR 0–6 and the sharp plunge in the mean urban FMR 0–6 relative to the rural confirmed that the “northernization” of gender ratios was taking an urban route, thanks possibly to greater urban access to technologies for sex-selective abortion. Micro-research and S. Sudha and S. Irudaya Rajan's (2003) estimates of sex ratios at birth supported the hypothesis that the increased masculinity at birth over the last two decades was manmade, and confirmed that the pattern had extended beyond the north-northwest and had penetrated deeply into the four southern states.

Cultural Phenomena

Ethnicity. In 1961 FMRs of scheduled tribes (STs) and scheduled castes (SCs), which now constitute about 8 and

16 percent of India's population respectively, were higher than for the “rest of the population” (987, 957, and 934 respectively). Though FMRs of all groups declined during 1961–1991, the SC decline was so dramatic that the FMRs of the SCs and the “rest of the population” converged at about 922. Bhat found that almost two-fifths of the women missing between 1961–1991 were from SCs.

Proximity to Muslim influence is alleged to have lowered northwestern FMRs, but the notion is spurious: in both 1981 and 1991, Muslims were associated with less risk of excess female child mortality.

Kinship. Conventionally, the north-south divide in FMRs has been associated with different kinship systems. Northern women generally have low status associated with relatively high fertility and mortality, strong son preference, limited female property rights, low female labor participation, female seclusion, neglect of female children, and endogamous marriage; southern women enjoy stronger female agency. Agnihotri matched linguistic and kinship systems to arrive at a new binary classification of 1981 Census districts: a male-centered, Indo-Aryan “core” of 164 districts (primarily in the north and west, but including pockets in the south) with significantly low FMRs; and a “periphery” of the remaining 202 districts (including some female-friendly northern districts), combining Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, and Munda kinship and language systems, with high FMRs. Agnihotri found that in 1981 the “core” was associated with both excess female infant mortality and excess female mortality under the age of five.

Socioeconomic Determinants

Female labor participation (FLP). Demographers have long recognized that work affects FMRs by enhancing women's worth and their access to basic household resources. In 1981 FLP was highest among STs, lower for SCs, and lowest for the rest of the population. Agnihotri found that the relationship between FLPs and FMR 5–9s was strong in the “core” in 1961 and 1981, both for SCs and the “rest of the population.” However, Agnihotri found that kinship explained a larger part of the variance in FMR 5–9s than FLPs.

Multivariate analysis of other socioeconomic correlates of female disadvantage in child mortality revealed that the association between male literacy and female disadvantage was either positive or not significant, and that between female literacy and female disadvantage was negative but not consistently significant between 1981 and 1991.

Poverty and Growth

Both the literature and cross-section data indicate that poverty and gender inequality are negatively associated.

If so, are economic growth and poverty reduction likely to induce greater gender inequality and lower the FMR over time, or is a U-shaped Kuznets curve likely (whereby the FMR initially decreases, bottoms out, and then rises as income increases)? Analyzing National Sample Survey Organization data (for 1987–1988, 1992–1993, and 1999–2000), Agnihotri found a negative association between FMRs and per capita expenditures for the total, adult, and juvenile populations, and urban and rural areas. The results therefore appear to negate the prosperity optimism of proponents of the Kuznets curve. Thus, despite five decades of growth, declining FMRs persist as a symptom of gender inequality and female deprivation, which Drèze and Sen characterize as “among India’s most serious social failures.”

Jayati Datta-Mitra

See also Economic Development, Importance of Institutions and Social Aspects of; Poverty and Inequality

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POPULATION PRESSURE. See **Demographic Trends since 1757.**

PORTUGUESE IN INDIA The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in India by sea, thus securing a monopoly of Asia-Europe maritime trade for a century until the advent of the Dutch, English, and French in the region. Vasco da Gama’s “discovery” of the sea route to India inaugurated the Age of Colonialism, which brought revolutionary changes to economic, political, and cultural spheres in most of Asia.

The Portuguese exploratory enterprise vigorously supported by Prince Henry the Navigator in the mid-fifteenth century may be seen in the context of a major event—the discovery of the sea route—that affected both trade and religion. Thus, after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the Italian city-states that were trading in spices, sugar, and other Eastern goods demanded astronomical prices from their European customers on the pretext that it was much harder to get such goods through the Arab- and Persian-controlled Middle East. There was much profit in bypassing the traditional route and reaching the source of these products directly by sea.

Second, concerned with the threat of Muslims advancing toward Europe, Pope Alexander VI encouraged finding a route to India, which was then, albeit erroneously, believed to be Christian thanks to the exertions of Apostle Thomas in the first century A.D. The pope hoped that with the help of “Christian” India, it would be possible to attack the Muslims in a pincer movement.

The Papal Bull of 1492 specifically authorized the Portuguese with such a mission, which brought Vasco da Gama and his four ships to Calicut in present-day Kerala on 18 May 1498. Asked by two Muslim merchants of Tunis, who happened to be in Calicut, “What the devil



Statue of a Portuguese Nobleman in Diu. Diu is a former Portuguese colony on the western coast of India with a strategic location on the idyllic Gulf of Cambay. Along with Daman and Goa, it remained a territory of Portugal until liberation by Indian forces in 1961, when all three became the Indian state of Goa (since then each has been granted separate status). CHRISTINE PEMBERTON / FOTOMEDIA.


has brought you here? In search of what have you come from such a long distance?" a man in Vasco da Gama's party promptly replied, "We have come in search of Christians and spices." The Portuguese thought that the people of Calicut were Christians and that their temples were chapels. Vasco da Gama and his men offered prayers in a "chapel" before the image of "Mary" in what was, in fact, a Hindu temple. The mistake was not discovered until the second Portuguese visit, led by Pedro Álvares Cabral in 1500; the king of Portugal subsequently ordered conversions of as many Indians as possible to the Catholic faith. Profits from trade and the spread of Christianity remained the twin Portuguese goals, though relatively modest success crowned their prodigious efforts over the 450 years of their presence in the East.

The importance of da Gama's discovery was recognized by the Portuguese king, Manuel I, who made Vasco da Gama "admiral of the Indian Ocean" and assumed for himself, in 1499, the pompous title—reflecting more a hope than reality—"lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and of India."

Conquest, Commerce, and Christianity were closely intertwined as the intrepid Portuguese worked for God, gold, and glory for their king.

The Portuguese were very fortunate in the timing of their arrival in South India. The Bahamani kingdom in the Deccan had split into five entities, none of which had a significant navy. Historically, although India had distinguished itself in maritime trade, no Indian ruler (with the exception of Rajendra Chola in the eleventh century) had built a navy, for offense or defense, because no enemy had ever attacked India from across the seas. The rulers of Calicut, Cochin, and Cannanore, to mention only a few coastal states dependent on the substantial revenues coming from coastal and oceanic trade, were accustomed to large numbers of merchants from China, Malacca, Java, Arabia, and North Africa who came as peaceful traders and exchanged merchandise; some of them even left representatives behind to look after their trading interests, which included warehouses.

Initially, the *samuri* (*zamorin* in Portuguese parlance) of Calicut was friendly and hospitable to the Portuguese.



His attitude changed with pressures from both the anti-Portuguese Arab merchants as well as from Vasco da Gama himself, who demanded that the *samuri* abandon all trade with the Muslims and, in addition, grant the Portuguese exemption from customs duties.

In the first decade of contact with the Portuguese, the horrendous atrocities of both da Gama and Afonso de Albuquerque—including burning Arab ships carrying cargo and pilgrims (men, women, and children enroute to Mecca for *hajj*, or religious pilgrimage), wanton bombardment of port cities in Malabar and the Persian Gulf, chopping off the noses and ears of unarmed fishermen, forcing conversion of the widows and daughters of the defeated to Catholicism, and converting temples and mosques into churches—affected the attitude of the Hindu rulers of these coastal kingdoms. They approached the sultan of Gujarat, who in turn sought the help of Egypt and Ottoman Turkey to launch a combined naval attack on the Portuguese at Chaul in 1507 and 1508. To avenge the defeat, the Portuguese viceroy, Francisco d’Almeida, mobilized a large fleet and wrested a spectacular victory in 1509, defeating the combined Muslim fleets at Diu, a strategic location at the entrance to the Gulf of Cambay.

The Portuguese were not the best ambassadors of Christianity or of European culture. Their lack of personal hygiene, going unbathed for months, and their wild behavior under the influence of alcohol at all times of the day left an unsavory impression of Europeans among many Indians. And if the religion they professed was given by the “Prince of Peace,” there was no hint of it in the Portuguese propensity to violence even against unarmed people, including women and children. Far from being the harbingers of a respectable civilization, the Portuguese left impressions of unmitigated and wanton barbarism, no different from the uncivilized marauders who had destroyed civilizations in the past. Indeed, the Portuguese were, by and large, still medieval in their thinking, their religious fanaticism being typical of new converts from Islam to Catholicism. European renaissance had not yet touched Portugal to any significant degree.

The vision and foundation of the Portuguese thalassocracy in the East are appropriately attributed to Afonso de Albuquerque. With a view to secure and enforce a monopoly in the Asia-Europe trade, Albuquerque envisioned an empire of ports and forts at key points on the trade routes between South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. His conquest of Goa in 1510 (making it the headquarters of the Portuguese possessions in the East), Malacca (the major mart for spice trade in Southeast Asia) in 1511, and Ormuz (the key port in the Persian Gulf) in 1515 provided the beginnings of an empire that would, by the middle of the sixteenth century, extend

from Sofala in Southeast Africa to numerous islands and ports in the Indonesian Archipelago and Macau off the China coast.

In India, the Portuguese held almost complete maritime supremacy over the west coast and some limited control over the east coast and the Bay of Bengal. It was based on three cornerstones of policy: First, the Portuguese gained control over the high seas, disallowing Arab shipping, seizing it, either confiscating the cargo (and at times the ship itself) or setting it on fire. Such piratical acts were, indeed, aimed at dissuading non-Portuguese shipping in what had been for centuries, true to its name, the Arabian Sea. Second, the Portuguese built forts, equipping them with powerful cannon, at all major ports on the west coast from Cochin to Diu for the protection of the traffic and goods there. The Portuguese centered their trade on three great factories at Malacca, Calicut, and Ormuz, which made it possible for the Portuguese to purchase and store spices and other products at low prices during the season until ships arrived to take the goods to Portugal. Third, and most important, the Portuguese controlled trade traffic in and around India by requiring all non-Portuguese seacraft to carry a *cartaz* (pass), issued by the Portuguese for a fee. That “simple system,” as Portuguese economic historian Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho outlined it, was enforced by a fleet of two squadrons, supported in an emergency by naval units under the governor-general in Goa, and seven fortresses in other principal ports. Of the two squadrons, one was used to block the Red Sea and the other to patrol the west coast of India, stopping non-Portuguese craft.

In tune with the rise of religious bigotry in Europe and the establishment of the Jesuits and the Inquisition by the middle of the sixteenth century, and following the resolutions of the Council of Trent, the Portuguese banned the exercise of all religions other than Catholicism in their territories in Asia and Africa.

They destroyed Hindu and Buddhist temples in western India and Sri Lanka, burned their sacred books, and banned the public observance of non-Catholic religious rites associated with birth, marriage, and death. In the void thus created, large-scale conversions were carried out by the official use of force and direct threats to life and property. In the eyes of the Jesuits, “God’s purpose” in assisting the Portuguese in their seaborne trade with India was to increase “the harvest of souls.” The Portuguese monarchs were active partners in this religious enterprise by dint of their *padroado real*, or crown patronage, of the church.

The period following the arrival of Vasco da Gama in 1498 and of the Dutch in 1595, followed by the English and the French, is aptly called “the Portuguese century”

in Asia. Portuguese fortunes in the East first suffered when the crowns of Portugal and Spain were combined from 1580 to 1640. Their enterprise was, in any case, too overextended for a nation with a meager population of less than a million. In contrast to the Portuguese enterprise, the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company focused on trade and profit and stayed away from the propagation of religion.

Their success in India and Indonesia was at the cost of the Portuguese, whose once extensive empire shrank by the end of the seventeenth century to a few far-flung, poorly administered, hardly profitable territorial niches. By that time, they had lost their monopoly of the Asia-Europe maritime trade and the supremacy of the sea to their English, French, and Dutch competitors. After the loss of the relatively valuable Bassein in North Konkan to the Marathas in 1739, the Portuguese in India were limited to Goa, Daman, and Diu.

The Portuguese possession in India, miniscule in comparison to the vast British Indian empire, remained with them because of their special relationship with Britain as its “oldest ally.” Although Portugal professed to being neutral in the two world wars, it tilted toward Britain and was, therefore, able to keep its Estado da India (State of India).

Goa, Daman, and Diu survived economically because of the educational and economic opportunities in British India, notably Bombay, where one-fifth of the Goans lived and sent remittances to their families back home. Coincidentally, a year before India attained independence from the British, manganese and iron ore were discovered in Goa, which made the territory not only economically viable but earned valuable foreign exchange for Portugal. The leaders of the freedom movement in India, who had expected the Portuguese and the French to relinquish their possessions when the British would quit the subcontinent, were shocked when the Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar passed legislation altering the status of all Portuguese possessions into “overseas provinces,” entitled to protection from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Portugal was a valuable member thanks to the valuable NATO military base of Portuguese Azores in the Atlantic.

Under orders from Salazar, the Goa government shot down the peaceful, unarmed Goan and non-Goan Indian *satyagrahis* attempting to cross the border into Goa to demand independence for the territory. Unlike the French, who negotiated the transfer of their possession to the Indian government, the Portuguese refused to talk. On 19 December 1961, Goa was rid of the 450-year Portuguese rule after a thirty-six-hour Indian military operation. Ironically, the Indian takeover began with the aerial

disablement of the only Portuguese frigate in Goa, the SS *Albuquerque*, named for the conqueror of Goa, founder of the Portuguese Estado da India.


D. R. Sar-Desai

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de; British East India Company Raj; Christian Impact on India, History of; Gama, Vasco da; Goa

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POVERTY AND INEQUALITY An attempt to examine the intertwined issues of poverty, inequality, and growth in India in the 1990s involves an exploration of all three topics. The conventional view of what happened in the Indian economy in the 1980s and the 1990s is that economic growth averaged around 5.5 percent per annum; population growth was around 2 percent, so per capita growth averaged 3.5 percent. This rate of growth was a major acceleration from the past, and both the agricultural and the nonagricultural sectors of the economy shared in it. Agriculture grew at a robust 3.7 percent per annum, and nonagriculture grew at 6.6 percent. Rural India, where most of the poor reside, benefited enormously, and absolute poverty declined at a fast pace in the 1980s. The head-count ratio of poverty (the proportion of people below the poverty line, compared to the total



Poverty in the District of Madhubani, Bihar. The prevailing socioeconomic situation there (the second most populous state in India) is so alarming that Bihar is often described as the “state without hope,” a graveyard for the economic development projects that have achieved success elsewhere in the country. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

population) declined from 45 percent in 1983 to 37 percent in 1993–1994. This decline is remarkable because both in the 1950s and in the 1960s, the poverty ratio had, in some year or another, hovered around 45 percent. (For the same poverty line, poverty in 1951 was 45.3, and in 1961, it was 46.5 percent.)

In the early 1990s, the Indian economy ran into a balance of payments crisis, a situation that forced India to return for help to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The government of India then instituted major economic reforms from 1991 to 1993. The reforms were primarily oriented toward industry and external trade (the rupee was devalued by 20 percent in two quick steps, over two days, and tariffs were reduced from outright bans and astronomical levels to open imports, and lower levels).

These reforms led to an acceleration of growth for a few years (particularly from 1994 to 1997, when growth of the gross domestic product [GDP] averaged over 7 percent). However, except for these years, GDP growth for the eleven years following the reforms (1992 to 2002)

was exactly the same as ten years prior (5.7% per annum) to the reforms. Some have argued that the reforms were oriented toward the rich, urban sectors of the economy, that these sectors benefited disproportionately, and income inequality worsened.

According to this interpretation, four important pieces of evidence were cited. First, the rate of agricultural growth collapsed in the 1990s—from 3.7 percent per annum to only 2.6 percent. Second, and perhaps even reflecting this slowdown, the rate of growth of real wages in agriculture collapsed to less than half the robust rate of the 1980s—from about 5.0 to 5.5 percent per annum to only 2.5 percent. For considerations of poverty, this is significant, since agricultural households constitute the poorest of the poor. Third, the gap between urban per capita expenditure and rural per capita expenditure increased significantly. Fourth, the poorest states lagged behind the growth of richer states. The surveys of the National Sample Surveys Organization (NSSO) also showed that the rate of poverty decline was definitely slower in the 1990s. The critics of reforms further argue that in the 1980s the head-count ratio of poverty

declined by eight percentage points, while in the 1990s poverty declined by only five percentage points. This slower decline in poverty is all the more shocking, according to the critics, because it occurred with considerably faster economic growth.

The critics of the economic reforms further argued that the four factors mentioned above conclusively demonstrate that prior to 1990 India performed better than China, where inequality worsened by more than 30 percent in the short span of six years. India, in contrast, at least until 1993–1994, had witnessed generally declining inequality. Even more importantly, the skewed nature of growth in the 1990s represented a period of (relatively) jobless growth. Organized sector employment, after registering an annual growth of 1.6 percent in the 1980s, barely grew in the 1990s (0.4 percent per annum).

Some of the above conclusions are controversial. For instance, the estimates of poverty and inequality by Angus Deaton and Jean Drèze (2002) are biased downward if a more acceptable real measure of equality is used. Changes in inequality are more accurately measured by changes in inequality measured at constant prices. Furthermore, the trends in real consumption cited above are contradicted by the trends in growth in real wages, which almost doubled between the 1980s and 1990s. Whether taken separately or together, the evidence provided by the increase in real wages of the poor and/or the change in real inequality, is indicative of a very minor change in inequality, rather than the “pervasive increase” postulated by Deaton and Drèze.

Growth and Inequality

Poverty and inequality are generally ideological and emotive issues. Often, the discussion assumes that changes in the level of poverty are independent from economic growth and inequality. As for the latter, it is not overall inequality, but rather inequality around the poverty line and changes therein that are most important for the determination of poverty decline.

Part of the reason for varying estimates of poverty decline in India in the since the 1970s is the fact that there are several different estimates of what happened to growth. According to national accounts data, the estimate used by most analysts and policy makers, income (GDP) growth has averaged about 5.6 percent per annum for the last twenty-four years. Per capita growth, the one relevant for poverty calculations, has accelerated to 4.5 percent per annum in 2004 from 3 percent per annum in the early 1980s. India’s growth performance for the twenty-two-year period from 1980 to 2002 was bettered by only a handful of countries, led by China and Korea.

In cumulative terms, per capita income growth, if translated into consumption growth (i.e., no increase in

the rate of savings), would result in a per capita consumption level in 1999–2000 that would be about 80 percent higher than that which prevailed in the early 1980s. However, there has been an increase in the savings rate, so the appropriate measure of growth is that revealed by the growth in per capita consumption. This estimate of growth is an average of 2.4 percent per annum, or a per capita consumption level in 1999–2000 that is 48 percent higher than the 1983 level. With no inequality change, this would mean that the head-count ratio of poverty in India was in the low teens in 1999–2000, or about half the level indicated by official data.

Poverty, however, is not calculated on the basis of growth in national accounts data, but rather on the basis of growth as revealed by consumption as reported in household surveys. And the growth as revealed by household surveys has been considerably less than the growth revealed by national accounts. The most widely used forms of survey data, and indeed the official source for measurement of poverty, are the consumer expenditure (CE) surveys conducted by the NSSO, which conducted the first household surveys as far back as 1950–1951. The NSSO large-sample surveys indicate a ten-and-a-half-year growth rate from 1983 to 1993–1994 (hereafter the 1980s) of only 1.2 percent per annum, followed by the mildest of accelerations to 1.3 percent per annum growth rate in the six-year period from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 (hereafter the 1990s). Accordingly, for the entire period from 1983 to 1999, the average growth rate stands at only 1.25 percent per annum. With this growth rate, the cumulative increase in per capita consumption is only 23 percent, and it is this estimate of growth that results in a poverty decline from 43 percent in 1983 to 26 percent in 1999–2000.

This is a gross relationship and one which incorporates all inequality changes that may have taken place. Over this sixteen-and-a-half-year period, inequality thus diminished in India, as indicated by both the Gini (marginal change) and the share in total expenditures of the poor (bottom 40 percent). Thus, what is causing a huge divergence in the poverty estimates for India are not measures of changes in inequality, but rather the widely diverging estimates of growth in per capita consumption, as indicated by national accounts and household survey data.

It is difficult to identify which of the two estimates of growth is more accurate, though this divergence is a common phenomenon, observed in most parts of the world. For India, however, there is another NSSO survey-based estimate of growth for the period 1983 to 2000. For 1983 and 1993–1994, the NSSO surveyed the same households in each year, as canvassed by the CE survey. In 1999–2000, the same sampling frame was used. These

NSSO Employment and Unemployment (E&U) surveys also recorded, in great detail, the employment in different activities and the wages of each member of the household. Nonwage income was not recorded. Since the poor gain their incomes mostly from labor, the E&U survey data can be used to estimate the income growth of poor households. And this income growth is considerably higher than the consumption growth estimated for the same households (1983 and 1993–1994).

Rather than the 1.25 percent average for sixteen and a half years, per capita income growth averaged almost three times higher, at 3.2 percent per annum. But this is for all wage earners, including rich, educated urbanites. For rural India, where a large proportion of the poor reside, the average growth rate was only marginally lower, at 3.1 percent per annum. For the poorest of the poor, the agricultural labor households, the average growth rate was still 2.5 percent per annum. Thus, consumption growth of such households was at least twice the rate indicated by consumer expenditure surveys.

So we have three estimates of consumption and income growth in India: first, per capita consumption growth, national accounts, at 2.4 percent per annum; second, per capita consumption growth, NSSO CE survey, 1.25 percent per annum; and third, growth in incomes of the poorest of the poor, the agricultural labor households, 2.5 percent per annum. All other sources of income growth (e.g., surveys conducted by other survey organizations like the National Council of Applied Economic Research) are closer to the NSSO income growth estimate. There is no evidence, direct or indirect, that supports the NSSO CE low growth estimate of only 1.25 percent. A safe conclusion is that consumption growth of the poorest in India was at least 2.5 percent. Given the fact that average consumption growth was also at this level, consumption inequality could not have changed much for these years.

The question of which consumption growth estimate (NSSO consumer expenditure data supported by NSSO wage income data, or non-NSSO survey data) is correct has an obvious and large effect on conclusions about poverty levels and poverty decline. An overwhelming amount of recent poverty literature in India has been devoted to establishing the percentage by which the NSSO CE survey of 1999–2000 overstated the cumulative six-year growth between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. The “error” being talked about is only 1 to 2 percent, and this will have a very small effect on aggregate growth. However, the different cumulative NSSO survey estimates of growth (consumption and income based) diverge by about ten to twenty times this amount. Thus, the significant “growth gap” between per worker wage growth and per capita consumption growth during both

the 1980s and 1990s dwarfs any calculations of the overestimate or underestimate of mean per capita expenditures in 1999–2000.

It was generally believed that inequality worsened significantly in the 1990s, but to accurately assess trends in inequality, it is more appropriate to consider changes in real inequality (i.e., per capita expenditures deflated by an appropriate price index) rather than changes in nominal inequality (expenditures not deflated by any price index). Unfortunately, the latter has been used by those economists who contend that inequality worsened significantly.

If inequality change is estimated separately for the 1980s and the 1990s, the following results emerge: inequality either stayed flat, or its level improved slightly between 1983 and 1993–1994, both in absolute terms and in comparative terms (with other countries). Since overall inequality improved slightly between 1983 and the terminal year, 1999–2000, if inequality did worsen in the 1990s, it could not have worsened by a significant amount. But this result is contrary to the result of either a “pervasive” increase in inequality reached by Deaton and Drèze, or an increase comparable to that of China (Sen and Himanshu, 2004) or a trend increase in inequality (Ravallion, 2000). How is it possible that the official data yield such little change, yet experts document large changes?

This divergence is possible because in 1999–2000, the NSSO survey authorities changed the definition of per capita consumption from that which prevailed in 1993–1994 (and earlier) concerning different recall periods and different consumption items. Official data inequality levels were reported under the assumption that there was no bias concerning food expenditures and that the 1999–2000 consumption data are comparable to the 1993–1994 data. Given that the raw official estimate of inequality was biased upward, the measured Gini increase of 6 percent can be considered a likely upper bound to inequality change in the 1990s.

This increase was for nominal per capita expenditures. For real per capita expenditures (nominal data deflated by the Planning Commission poverty line deflator) the increase in the Gini was from .28 to 0.29, only a 3 percent increase.

Pooling all the results, a fair conclusion appears to be a mild V-shaped pattern of inequality change in India, meaning that inequality improved by about 2 to 8 percent in the 1980s, and deteriorated between 0 and 10 percent in the 1990s. For consistent definitions and estimation methods, a mild improvement was observed between 1983 and 1999–2000. Whatever worsening in inequality which occurred in the 1990s was small, mild, and less than the small improvement in the 1980s.

Poverty in India, 1983 to 1999–2000

The likely estimate of growth in the 1980s and 1990s was somewhere between 23 and 51 percent. The former is the estimate of per capita expenditures, NSSO surveys, and the latter is a lower-bound estimate of income growth of landless, agricultural laborers (also NSSO surveys). Inequality change, as documented in the previous section, is shown to have either stayed the same, or most likely improved slightly, since 1983. The juxtaposition of these two “facts” indicates that what matters for a realistic poverty decline estimate for India is a judgment of what happened to growth in India, and not what happened to inequality.

What level of poverty in 1999–2000 is suggested by growth in rural wages from 1983 to 1999–2000? If the distribution of consumption did not change between 1983 and 1999 (and all indications are that it did not worsen), then the 1983 distribution, along with growth in the wages of the poorest agricultural workers, can be used to estimate the poverty level in 1999–2000. This method allocates consumption growth to each household, the income growth of the poorest that is, a conservative, upper-bound estimate of poverty in 1999–2000. Thus, if real incomes are assumed to grow at 2.5 percent annum real for sixteen and a half years, the average real consumption in 1999–2000 would be 51 percent higher than that observed in 1983. Recall that 23 percent growth resulted in a decline of 17 percentage points in the head-count ratio (official data). So 51 percent growth would result in a reduction in poverty of approximately 38 percentage points, or a 5 percent level of the head-count ratio (HCR) in 1999–2000.

However, it is the case that often, and especially when the HCR is in the low teens or lower, more and more growth is needed to bring about the same decline in poverty. Calculations suggest that 51 percent growth would have reduced poverty by 30 and not 38 percentage points, that is, the level of poverty in India in 1999–2000 was close to 13 percent, rather than the 26 percent stated by the official data, or even higher estimates by some authors.

The 1990s was the beginning of several transitions in the Indian economy—a decline in fertility rates, population growth, labor force growth, and potential labor force growth. These transitions have not been emphasized by authors who emphasize that the 1990s were characterized by slow growth in jobs, or “jobless growth.” The “shortfall” in jobs is mostly explained by examination of a little emphasized statistic: the potential labor force (people between the ages of 15 and 59). This grew by only 1.9 percent per annum in the 1990s, a steep decline from the 2.7 percent growth rate of the 1980s. What this simple statistic implies is that the much-hyped jobless growth was much more about the supply of labor

bottlenecks in the 1990s rather than about jobless growth. This is the case because total output growth (GDP growth) stayed the same or was higher in the 1990s. With a declining rate of growth of the labor force, labor tightening was to be expected, even with the same rate of growth, let alone with sharply accelerating growth. Rural wages grew at 2.3 percent in the 1980s, somewhat ahead of urban wages, which increased at 1.4 percent. In the 1990s there was a significant across-the-board acceleration, a doubling in average growth rates. As a result, wage growth in rural areas jumped to a rate of 4.3 percent per annum, and in urban areas to 4.8 percent.

Surjit Bhalla

See also Development Politics; Economic Reforms of 1991

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PRAJĀPATI. See *Vedic Aryan India*.

PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY. See *Political System*.

PRASAD, RAJENDRA (1884–1963), first president of India, one of Mahatma Gandhi’s closest lieutenants.

Rajendra Prasad was born on 3 December 1884 at Zeradai village in Bihar. An outstanding student, an erudite scholar, a true humanist, and a deeply religious person, he committed himself to the cause of his country and remained in the vanguard of India’s freedom struggle, guiding the destiny of the new nation after independence. President of the Indian National Congress in 1934, 1939, and 1947, Prasad chaired India’s Constituent Assembly and was chosen as first president of the republic when the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. He left a permanent mark on the polity of independent India, as his career continues to inspire the nation’s citizens.

Early Years

Rajendra Prasad’s Bihar village was cosmopolitan enough to ensure communal harmony and self-sufficiency, allowing its people a comfortable life. He was married at the age of twelve to Rajvanshi Devi. He received his elementary education at the village and then studied at Chapra District School, where he excelled. Prasad stood first in the Entrance Examination of the University of Kolkata (Calcutta), whose jurisdiction in 1902 still extended over Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam. He then joined the prestigious Presidency College in Kolkata. He continued his academic career there, winning the admiration of his teachers and fellow students. As a third year student, he won the first election for the post of secretary of the College Union. Though he continued to excel in his studies, this was also the time—following the first British partition of Bengal in 1905—of a new political awakening. The antipartition movement greatly agitated young Prasad, and the popular Swadeshi and boycott movements inspired him to enter public life. He was instrumental in the formation of the Bihari Students’ Conference in 1908, an organization that provided political leadership to Bihar in the ensuing decades.



Rajendra Prasad. Both men in almost military-like formation, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Prasad meet in New Delhi, 1959. In fact, as India’s first president, Prasad exercised a moderating influence and molded national policies unobtrusively, never appearing to rule authoritatively. BETTMANN / CORBIS.

Rajendra Prasad impressed Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, vice-chancellor of Kolkata University, so deeply that the latter offered him a lectureship in the Presidency Law College. At the same time, he started practicing law under the apprenticeship of Khan Bahadur Shamsul Huda. Swayed by the nationalist movement, Prasad joined the Indian National Congress and was elected to the All-India Congress Committee. Gopal Krishna Gokhale had started his Servants of India Society in Pune in 1905; Prasad hoped to join the society, and Gokhale personally invited him to be a part of the movement. Prasad was deterred, however, by opposition from his elder brother, Mahendra Prasad. The economic needs of the family compelled him to pursue his legal profession, so he refused Gokhale’s invitation. He later recalled his feeling of “helplessness” in doing so. About that time, his mother had died and his only sister, Bhagwati Devi, had become a widow at the age of nineteen, coming back to her parents’ home.

Bihar became a separate British Indian province, following the reunification of Bengal, in 1912. The High Court was established at Patna in 1916, and Rajendra Prasad moved there to practice, swiftly making his mark as a lawyer. His incisive intellect and phenomenal memory were his great assets. His integrity and character impressed not only his clients and colleagues but the judges of the High Court as well. Often when an adversary

failed to cite a legal precedent, judges asked Prasad to cite a precedent against himself.

Ardent Freedom Fighter

Rajendra Prasad first met Mahatma Gandhi in 1915 at Kolkata. In the December 1916 session of the Congress held at Lucknow, they met again. In that session, Braj-kishore Prasad, a veteran Congress leader of Bihar, moved a resolution denouncing the exploitation of Champaran peasant by Bihar's cruel indigo planters, requesting that Gandhi visit Champaran. Gandhi could not turn down Rajkumar Shukla's appeal. En route from his Gujarat ashram to launch his fact-finding mission to Champaran, Gandhi first stopped at Patna to visit Rajendra Prasad. Mahatma Gandhi soon called Prasad to assist him in Champaran. Prasad rushed to Champaran and accompanied Gandhi wherever he went to interrogate the indigo workers. This proved a turning point in Prasad's life. Gandhi asked him to prepare a list of peasants who had been exploited by the planters. He undertook the task with enthusiasm and conducted the inquiry most effectively. Gandhi was arrested but was quickly released after the government agreed to appoint a committee to investigate the matter. Rajendra Prasad's contribution would not be forgotten by Gandhi, who later supported him to become president of the National Congress.

Rajendra Prasad was so shocked by the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in Amritsar in 1919 that he endorsed Gandhi's call for a noncooperation movement against British Raj. The special session of India's National Congress held in Kolkata in 1920 passed a noncooperation resolution, confirmed by the Nagpur Congress session that December. Rajendra Prasad played an important role in helping to pass the resolution. He left his lucrative legal practice at the call of Mahatma Gandhi, ceased serving as a senator of Patna University, and withdrew his sons, Dhananjay and Mrityunjay, from their British educational institutions. He started writing articles for *Searchlight* and *Desb*. He traveled all over the country, exhorting people to make the supreme sacrifice for their country. A number of new "national" schools were opened under his patronage in Bihar. Gandhi felt the need to start a *vidyapeeth* (seminary) at Patna for those students who had boycotted government educational institutions. Rajendra Prasad became the principal of this institution. After the tragic murder of police by *satyagrahis* in Chauri Chara on 4 February 1922, Gandhi immediately called a halt to his noncooperation movement. Rajendra Prasad remained with him wholeheartedly, agreeing that appropriate change could never be brought about by violent means.

Constructive programs. Rajendra Prasad now helped Gandhi to launch his constructive program of *khadi*

(hand-spinning of cotton) and village industries in the rural areas of Bihar. Like Gandhi, Prasad realized that without reviving India's traditional handicrafts, primarily cotton spinning and weaving, Indians could not recapture their former prosperity and self-reliance. He felt, as Gandhi did, the urgent need of transforming Indian villages. The Khadi and Village Industries program was to help India's rural people, including women, acquire greater self-confidence. The generation of self-confidence would stimulate political consciousness and prepare people for sacrifice for the sake of the country.

Disaster manager. Bihar was devastated by a terrible earthquake on 15 January 1934, after which Prasad immediately organized a massive relief campaign, raising a fund of 38 lakh (3.8 million) rupees. Prasad was widely admired for his selfless devotion to the relief effort. The same year he was elected president of the Indian National Congress in Bombay (Mumbai).

Congress presidency and other offices. The Government of India Act of 1935 awarded provincial autonomy to the people of India. Under the provisions of the Act, elections were to be held in the provinces in 1937. Congress won a majority in most of the provinces of British India, including Bihar. Rajendra Prasad was a member of the Parliamentary Board and played a key role in choosing candidates for election. When Subhash Chandra Bose resigned from the presidency of the Congress in 1939, Gandhi persuaded Rajendra Prasad to accept the difficult job, having the full support of his Working Committee. Congress was again faced with a similar crisis in 1947 when Acharya Kriplani resigned, and Prasad again took on the presidency, always trusted by his colleagues. Just prior to independence, Rajendra Prasad was invited to join the viceroy's Indian government in 1946. He was put in charge of Food and Agriculture, and he created the popular national slogan "Grow More Food." Prasad was then elected chairman of the Constituent Assembly, an important and challenging job, from which he guided, regulated, and controlled the drafting and adoption of India's Constitution from August 1947 until 26 January 1950.

First president of India. When the Constitution of India came into force on 26 January 1950, Rajendra Prasad was elected to serve as India's first president, retaining that high office for twelve years. He exercised his moderating influence and molded national policies unobtrusively, leading many to think that, unlike any other head of state, he never reigned or ruled. In 1960 Prasad announced his decision to retire. After retirement, he returned to Patna, living in Sadaqat Ashram, the headquarters of the Congress Party in Bihar. Within months of his retirement, his wife Rajvanshi Devi died, in September 1962. He himself had been suffering from

acute asthmatic disease and breathed his last in Patna on 28 February 1963.

Legacy and Contribution

Rajendra Prasad left a rich legacy of inspiration for generations to come. He shared Gandhi's great vision of peace and rural development, and to realize this goal, he argued for the need for a fundamental change in the prevailing system of education. He lamented the lack of character building or moral training of students in the prevailing system of British education. He believed that education would be useful only if it was integrated into the whole life of an individual. "Education today," he once observed, "is getting more and more divorced from actual life and its requirements. This, in turn, is responsible for the ever-increasing unemployment among the educated classes." (Datta 1970, p. 315) Prasad supported the establishment of new type of "rural university." He advocated the comprehensive development of the student as a person, the growth of close and meaningful contact between teachers and students, and the role of the teacher as a "man with capacity to communicate something good." He recognized the value of scientific research and the application of the results for amelioration of the conditions of India's masses. At the same time, he considered India's past to be a great source of inspiration for the present and the future, since it helped in meeting the challenges of modern times created by the technical achievements of science. He argued that India needed a true history of its glorious past, which should be not only an account of the wars and conquests of kings and emperors, but also one of how great religious, cultural, and literary movements have arisen and influenced hundreds of millions of people, and how art and science, industry and commerce have developed. He held the view that there should be a change in the medium of instruction and that it should be imparted through the "language of the people." He favored Hindi as the Indian national language, since it was "the most common and most widely understood" of all the Indian languages. However, he was opposed to any attempt to impose the study of Hindi on non-Hindi speaking people. He also attached great importance to the freedom and education of women for a healthy national reconstruction, economic development, and social uplift.

Village-based economy. Rajendra Prasad totally agreed with Gandhian values with regard to rural economic development. In his scheme of things, human needs and acquisitiveness were to be regulated through self-discipline, agricultural production should be maximized, village industries resuscitated and expanded, the old sense of community recaptured. He well understood that industrialism disrupted the web of village life, woven

and integrated for millennia. He therefore advocated the revival of old village industries and widespread use of the *charkha* (spinning-wheel) and *khadi* as efficacious means for rehabilitating India's village economy. It not only provided employment to agriculturists during their leisure time but also helped them in augmenting their income. He wanted cottage industries to play an important role in the economic growth of the country, and he recommended that government departments propagate and use *khadi* for official uniforms and clothes.

Social reform. A true humanist with an instinctive love for humankind, Rajendra Prasad helped ameliorate the living conditions of the despised and downtrodden Dalits ("untouchables"). He contributed significantly to important social changes to modern Indian society by the uplift those Gandhi called Harijans (children of God) and the removal of untouchability. He was also greatly concerned for improvement in the social and economic conditions of the Adivasis (Tribals). He believed that if the Adivasis remained backward for ages, it was not their fault. In free India, every citizen, including the Adivasis and Dalits, had equal rights. Rajendra Prasad wanted people to develop sympathetic attitudes toward the downtrodden, appreciating their customs and traditions in order to help bring them into India's mainstream of development.

World vision. Gandhi conceived of a human society based on love (*abinsa*). Rajendra Prasad, as a true disciple, also advocated the efficacy of Mahatma Gandhi's method of true nonviolence for the eradication of hatred and all conflicts between nations and within nations. He strongly pleaded for the cessation of nuclear tests, the banning of nuclear weapons, and total disarmament, and for abjuring the use of force altogether. It is no wonder that his views on world peace and harmony have great significance in the strife-torn world of today.

Rajendra Prasad's life is a saga of the self-sacrificing struggles of an idealist who possessed a combination of sterling qualities. He was a true representative of Indian culture, with deep admiration for its ancient noble traits. His gentleness, simplicity, and modesty made him the darling of the masses. He remains one of modern India's most revered leaders, honored for his patriotism, honesty, and selfless service to his motherland.

Yuvaraj Prasad

See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

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PRE-ARYANS. See *Indus Valley Civilization*.

PREMCHAND (1880–1936), prominent Hindi-Urdu author. Dhanpat Rai Srivastava, better known as Premchand, is widely regarded as the most important Hindi-Urdu author of the twentieth century. He has to his credit fourteen published novels, three hundred short stories, plays, film scripts, translations from English, and a vast number of editorials and essays. Born in Lamhi, a village near Benares (Varanasi), the son of a poor village postmaster, he acquired education by dint of his own efforts. His first career was as a primary school teacher, and he later became an educational administrator. He wrote first in Urdu but switched later to Hindi at the suggestion of his publishers. He remained important in both literary streams, and would continue to be claimed by both as a master storyteller.

Srivastava began writing under the pseudonym Premchand when early in his career he aroused the ire of the British government for writings that were considered inflammatory and seditious. He resigned from government service in 1921 in answer to Mahatma Gandhi's call for noncooperation and remained ideologically indebted to him, though his later politics were also clearly colored by socialist thought. His writings reflected this confluence of thought. He considered it important to portray noble and ideal aspirations, and to provide some ground for activism and optimism; his social realism was deliberately peppered with idealized figures and Gandhian resolutions to conflict. He himself participated actively in the political and social reform debates of his day; he wrote short stories not only for the premier journals of his times, *Saraswati* and *Naya Zamana*, he was editor of the important Hindi journal *Madhuri* (1927–1931) and of his own journals, *Hans* (1930–) and *Jagaran* (1932–), which he continued to publish until the end of his life, though plagued by government restrictions and dogged by heavy debts.

Premchand's novels and short stories drew from his own vast experience of the conflicts of village life, caste tensions, excessive revenue demands, and the never-ending chain of debts entailed by these. If these were grim tales, they were both deepened and lightened by psychological

insight, irony, and humor, and the broad canvas on which they were drawn, which came to link country and city in a manner previously unknown in Hindi-Urdu fictional literature. Women's issues, particularly in the urban sphere, occupied a large amount of space in his writing. He wrote women-centered stories for the radical women's journal *Chand*. Two well-known novels, *Sevasadan* (House of service; 1918), his first success, and *Nirmala* (1927), focused on the plight of attractive young women, yoked to older men for lack of dowry. In the one case, the young woman took to prostitution, where she achieved a measure of independence, only to be cast into fetters of another kind by the efforts of social reformers. In the later novel, the ending was much more tragic. Suspected of a liaison with her stepson, Nirmala experienced psychological pain and loss of almost unbearable intensity. Of his peasant novels, *Godaan, the Gift of a Cow* (1936) is considered a classic of modern Hindi-Urdu literature. Written at the end of his life, it is set within two overlapping narrative frames, one provided by the social codes of village life on the North Indian plains and the other by the wider network of colonial and nationalist politics in the city of Lucknow. *Godaan* is Premchand's most mature novel; it presents a clear-eyed vision of pre-independence politics with little utopian relief provided for the memorable peasant characters, Hori, Dhanian, and Gobar.

Premchand was elected president of the newly formed Progressive Writers Association in 1936. His view of the aim of literature, as presented in his address to the first meeting of the association in Lucknow, has remained formative for succeeding generations of radical writers in Hindi-Urdu: "Now literature does not view the individual as separate from society, on the contrary, it sees the individual as an indissoluble part of society! Not so that the individual should rule over society and make literature a means for pursuing his self-interests, as if eternal enmity existed between him and society, but because the individual's existence is dependent on the existence of society, outside of which his value is next to nothing." (*The Oxford India Premchand*)

Vasudha Dalmia

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PRESIDENT. See **Political System.**

PRESIDENTS OF INDIA Article 52 of the Constitution of India defines India's president as the formal head of state and the supreme commander of the armed forces. Since the Indian parliamentary system is modeled along the lines of the British parliamentary system, the role of India's president parallels that of the crown in Britain. An unusual aspect of the Indian Constitution, however, is Article 53, whereby Parliament has the authority to confer the powers and functions exercised by the president upon any other authority.

The president must be a citizen of India but, unlike the U.S. president, he or she does not have to be born in India. Unlike the hereditary king or queen of Britain, the president of India is elected indirectly by a complex electoral college system consisting of single and multiple votes assigned to members of both houses of India's Parliament (MPs), and members of the lower houses of the state legislative assemblies (MLAs), with the proviso that total votes cast by MLAs do not exceed the total multiple votes cast by MPs. The president is elected to serve a five-year term, with the possibility of several renewals, although no president has served more than two five-year terms. In case of the president's death or incapacitation, the vice-president serves as acting president until a new president is elected. Political rivalries among the parties tend to determine new nominations.

While the Indian president is the nominal executive head of the state and commander of the armed forces, actual executive power is exercised by the prime minister of India and his or her appointed council of ministers. According to Article 74 of the Constitution, the prime minister and council of ministers will "aid and advise the President who shall, in exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice."

However, the power of the Indian presidency rises when no political party is able to form a government in national elections, and there is no consensus among them in forming a coalition government, or when there are rival coalition groups seeking to form the government. This problem has been more acute in the politically unstable Indian states. Under these circumstances, "President's Rule" is imposed on the state by the president, acting on the advice of the prime minister. Under similar circumstances at the central level, when no prime minister and cabinet exist to advise him, the president must make independent judgments in forming the government. Such a situation usually occurs just after a general election in which no party gained a majority, or following a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government.



Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma and Dr. Narayanan Two former presidents of India: Sharma (left, an activist in the earlier struggle for freedom from British colonial rule who served from 1992–1997) and Narayanan (born to an “untouchable” family, he served from 1997–2002). INDIA TODAY.

The nomination of the president follows certain norms that allow for the presidency to shift between the linguistic Indo-Aryan northern states and the Dravidian southern states, with a preference for the southern minority. This is interspersed by the periodic nomination of minority religious and low caste groups. As of 2005, India has had four presidents from the North, including two Muslims and one Sikh, and seven presidents from the South, including one Muslim and one member of the Dalits (formerly called “untouchables”). There has been no Christian president, although Christians are the third-largest religious group after Hindus and Muslims.

The unwritten practice, until the nomination and election of A. P. J. Abdul Kalam to the presidency in 2002, has been for the ruling vice president to be proposed as the next president, especially if the president died in office or has completed his five-year term. All the presidents of India except Zail Singh, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and Abdul Kalam, were vice presidents before becoming presidents. Note that all three non-vice presidential



GOVERNOR-GENERALS AND PRESIDENTS OF INDEPENDENT INDIA

Governor-Generals

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Lord Louis Mountbatten (last British Viceroy) | 1947–1948 |
| Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari (South; Hindu) | 1948–1950 |

Presidents

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Rajendra Prasad (North; Hindu) | 1950–1962 |
| 2. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (South; Hindu) | 1962–1967 |
| 3. Zakir Hussain (North; Muslim) | 1967–1969 (died in office) |
| 3a. Mohammed Hidayatullah (acting president; North; Muslim) | July–August 1969 |
| 4. Varahagiri Venkata Giri (South; Hindu) | 1969–1974 |
| 5. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (North; Muslim) | 1974–1977 (died in office) |
| 5a. B. D. Jatti (acting president; South; Hindu) | February–July 1977 |
| 6. Neelam Sanjiva Reddy (South; Hindu) | 1977–1982 |
| 7. Giani Zail Singh (North; Sikh) | 1982–1987 |
| 8. Raman Venkataraman (South; Hindu) | 1987–1992 |
| 9. Shankar Dayal Sharma (North; Hindu) | 1992–1997 |
| 10. Kocheril Raman Narayanan (South; Hindu) | 1997–2002 |
| 11. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam (South; Muslim) | 2002– |

nominations were from religious minorities. The first two were brought in by the Congress governments to accommodate Muslim and Sikh political sentiments. The reasons underlying the appointment of Abdul Kalam instead of Vice President Krishan Kant, a long-time Congress Party member, were political. During the intense rivalry between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress in 2002, the ruling BJP coalition chose to depart from this usual practice, since the ruling vice president had been nominated and elected by the previously ruling Congress Party.

In 2002 the Christian governor of Maharashtra, P. C. Alexander, a native of Kerala, was proposed by the Hindu nationalist BJP and other nationalist parties as the next president to follow K. R. Narayanan, a Dalit who was also from Kerala. But this candidate was ruled out in favor of Abdul Kalam, a Tamil Muslim, when the secular Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi, refused to support Governor Alexander's nomination. Reportedly, the Congress Party feared that a Christian was being nominated by Hindu nationalists for the presidency as a strategic move in order to rule out the prospect of Sonia Gandhi, the Christian leader of the Congress Party, from becoming prime minister. A concurrent Christian president and Christian prime minister in Hindu-majority India would have been politically unacceptable. Given the precedent set in 2002, presumably the vice president will not automatically become the president following the president's death or retirement.

Following the rule of the first non-Congress government between 1977 and 1979, and the new era of changing coalition governments led by the Congress or the

BJP since 1989, there have been some demands that the president in office should reflect the party of the government in power, even if this meant that the term of the ruling president had to be curtailed. But this idea has not found favor, since the president is expected to be the impartial representative of the people of India, and in particular, to follow the advice of the prime minister and his Cabinet. Indian presidents have been of distinguished backgrounds, and have maintained the dignity and the impartiality of India's highest office.

In the period between Indian independence on 15 August 1947 and the promulgation of the Constitution of the Indian republic on 26 January 1950, there were two interim governor-generals of India: the last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and the distinguished Tamil Congress leader, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. Including Rajagopalachari and the Dalit president K. R. Narayanan, nine Indian heads of state have been Hindus, of which two were acting presidents. As of 2005, there have been three Muslim presidents, one Sikh, and one Dalit. The two acting presidents following the deaths in office of the president, were a Muslim from the North and a Hindu from the South. Thus, while the majority linguistic Hindu North has dominated elected political representation in Parliament, the nominal and formal presidency of India has been dominated by the minority linguistic South, and by religious minorities.

The Presidents

Rajendra Prasad (1950–1962). Born in 1884, Prasad was selected as the first president of India following the

adoption of the Indian Constitution in January 1950. He was a follower of Mahatma Gandhi and a believer in non-violence. He had briefly held the portfolio of the ministry for food in 1947 in the interim government of Jawaharlal Nehru. He was awarded the Bharat Ratna in 1962. Dr. Prasad died in 1963.

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1962–1967). Born in 1888, Radhakrishnan was a scholar, philosopher, writer, and statesman. He served as the first vice president of India (1952–1962). Dr. Radhakrishnan taught at Oxford University for sixteen years and served as chairman of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in the late 1940s. His books include *Indian Philosophy* (1923) and *The Hindu View of Life* (1942). He was awarded the Bharat Ratna in 1954. Dr. Radhakrishnan died in 1975.

Zakir Hussain (1967–1969). Hussain was born in 1897 and died in 1969 while in office. A great patriot, educator, and social worker, he previously served as chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University. Dr. Hussain received the Bharat Ratna in 1963.

Mohammed Hidayatullah (acting, July–August 1969). Born in 1905, Justice Hidayatullah was a judge of the High Court and served as chief commissioner of Scouts and Guides. He died in 1992.

Varahagiri Venkata Giri (1969–1974). Born in 1884, Giri was a lawyer by profession and a veteran trade unionist. He received the Bharat Ratna in 1975 and died in 1980.

Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (1974–1977). Ahmed, born in 1905, was active in the freedom movement. He served as a union minister from 1966 before becoming president. He died in 1977.

B. D. Jatti (acting, February–July 1977). Born in 1913, Jatti was a lawyer who had previously served as chief minister of Karnataka and as governor of Orissa.

Neelam Sanjiva Reddy (1977–1982). Reddy was born in 1913. He served as chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, union minister, and Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Parliament's lower house). He had been a freedom fighter and president of Indian National Congress. He died in 1996.

Giani Zail Singh (1982–1987). Born in 1916, Zail Singh's public life was long and varied. He was a freedom fighter, social reformer, state congress leader, successful chief minister, and union home minister. He died in 1994.

Raman Venkataraman (1987–1992). Venkataraman was born in 1910. He was elected to India's First Parliament (1952–1957), and reelected in 1957. However, he resigned his seat to join the State Government of Madras as a Minister. In 1980, Venkataraman was reelected to the



VICE PRESIDENTS OF INDIA

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| S. Radhakrishnan | 1952–1962 |
| Zakir Hussain | 1962–1967 |
| Varahagiri Venkata Giri | 1967–1969 |
| G. S. Pathak | 1969–1974 |
| B. D. Jatti | 1974–1979 |
| M. Hidayatullah | 1979–1984 |
| R. Venkataraman | 1984–1987 |
| S. D. Sharma | 1987–1992 |
| K. R. Narayanan | 1992–1997 |
| Krishan Kant | 1997–2002 |
| B. Shekhawat | 2002– |

Lok Sabha and was appointed minister of finance and later minister of defense in the government headed by Indira Gandhi. He was elected vice president of India in August 1984, then was elevated to the office of president after Zail Singh completed his five-year term in office.

Shankar Dayal Sharma (1992–1997). Born in 1918, he had served as vice president and was elevated to president after Venkataraman completed his five-year term. Dr. Sharma was a scholar and freedom fighter and had served as chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, president of the Congress Party, and cabinet minister. He died in 1999.

Kocheril Raman Narayanan (1997–2002). Born in 1920, Narayanan was born into a Dalit family in the village of Uzhavoor in the Kottayam district of Kerala. He was educated at the London School of Economics, and served as Indian ambassador to the United States from 1980 to 1984. On his return to India, he entered politics and won three successive General Elections in 1984, 1989, and 1991 from his constituency in Kerala. During this time, he was minister of state for planning, for external affairs, and for science and technology. He was elected vice president of India in August 1992 and assumed the presidency after President S. D. Sharma completed his five-year term.

Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam (25 July 2002–). Abdul Kalam was born in 1931 into a poor Tamil Muslim family in Dhanushkodi in the Rameshwaram district of Tamil Nadu. Having headed and directed the Indian missile program in India, Kalam has been recognized as the father of India's missile technology and is often called the "missile man" of India. Dr. Abdul Kalam formerly served as the scientific adviser to the government of India.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A. P. J.); Narayanan, K. R.; Political System; Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli

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PRICE MOVEMENTS AND FLUCTUATIONS SINCE 1860

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, price statistics for British India were fragmentary, pertaining to very few markets and commodities. In the first half of the nineteenth century, prices saw several cycles of steady fall or rise, over a span of six to seven years each. In the absence of other data on economic activity, historians have sometimes relied too heavily on these price cycles, which do not necessarily infer cycles in production.

By 1875, however, an unmistakable trend does emerge; prices rose for the next fifty years. The price of wheat at the end of period in 1925 was about three times what it had been at the beginning. The expansion of the world economy, with buoyant demand for primary commodities, played an obvious role in stimulating more rapid rises in the prices of exportable commodities rather than those of imports. Monetary policy also played a role, via devaluation of the rupee between 1873 and 1893. From the mid-1920s, however, world commodity prices began to be depressed. The monetary policy of the British colonial government was faulted, this time for its determined defense of an overvalued rupee in the interest of British stabilization.

Fluctuations

The longer trends and cycles were broken frequently by sharp short-term fluctuations. Prices in colonial India fluctuated rather more than either post-independence Indian or contemporary global prices. Between 1900 and 1935, for example, severe inflation of 20 to 30 percent was not uncommon, often as part of a price-cycle. On the other hand, during the Great Depression, prices fell by a factor of four or more.

Agricultural production, of course, depended too heavily on rainfall, which could change without warning. However, in the early twentieth century, unpredictable weather alone does not fully explain price movements. The correlation between prices and rainfall was mediated by other variables, such as addition to the money supply, and changing demand for nonmonetary gold. India functioned under currency regimes that left its money supply

sensitive to balance of payments, and perhaps as a result, more volatile than one would expect under a central bank. The central bank began operation in 1935, but for a long time after that date, there was no explicit stabilization policy at work. Real incomes, on the other hand, depended primarily on harvests, which were more weather-sensitive in the early twentieth century than a hundred years later. These features led to an inherent maladjustment between money supply and transactions demand for money, which J. M. Keynes considered a major weakness of the Indian monetary system.

For example, in a year that had seen a bad harvest, domestic income and consumption might fall. And yet, a buoyant world trade could lead to monetary expansion, adding fuel to an ongoing price-rise. The real effects of monetary expansion were relatively weak because of undeveloped asset markets. A bad harvest normally led to a contraction in the demand for nonmonetary gold import, further adding to currency growth. If inflation eventually depressed exports, a countercyclical mechanism could work. In the interwar period, harvest fluctuations were milder. Still, the Great Depression was an example of the same kind of maladjustment. A trade-induced monetary contraction coincided with normal, even unusually good, agricultural seasons, leading to a large fall in prices. The microeconomics of price formation might also contribute to fluctuations, depending on how quickly and easily information about harvests traveled from the production site to the wholesale markets, and finally to the retail market. Traders were known to collaborate to try to control this information as much as possible.

Episodes

In the early twentieth century, a conjunction of monetary and real pressures led to price instability. Each of the three major inflations—1903–1908, 1913–1914, and 1919–1920—was preceded by a major harvest failure. Real agricultural output declined by 7 percent in 1902–1904, by 15 percent in 1906–1907, by 14 percent in 1910–1913, and by nearly 30 percent in 1917–1918. Prices began to rise due to the shortage of agricultural goods. In each case, buoyant export demand led to expansion in money supply. These two factors combined to generate a very rapid rise in prices.

The intensity and duration of the inflations varied. Prices increased by 33 percent in 1905–1907; the average annual rates were about 6 to 10 percent in the second episode; whereas in 1919 prices increased by more than 50 percent over the previous year. This variation can be attributed to the extent of currency expansion. In the first of these three episodes, gold imports fell much more than agricultural exports, so that money supply expanded. In

the second case, the effect of inflation on commodity trade was more pronounced than the effect on gold, dampening monetary growth. In 1919 private gold transactions were suspended, as the government needed gold for currency reserve.

During both world wars, expanding world demand for war-related goods coincided with supply constraints, resulting in rapid inflation. In World War II, however, monetary policy complicated the picture. The government had to spend much larger sums and proportions of the budget on defense. Fiscal measures were insufficient to cover the deficit. In 1939, however, unlike 1914, India had a central bank and substantial monetary autonomy. Consequently, money supply increased to finance the deficit as never before.

In the interwar period generally, harvest fluctuations were milder. As a result, price and currency fluctuations in the interwar period were entirely due to trade shocks. While the exchange rate partially bore the impact of trade shocks until the mid-1920s, thereafter the exchange was effectively fixed again, so that a gradual decline in export demand induced steady deflation. From 1926, currency growth, and all prices, began a seven-year downward course, the climax coming in 1931, when a sharp fall in exports caused prices to crash.

India shared two conditions with nearly all other open economies that suffered the depression. First, there was a contraction in exports. Second, the gold exchange standard compelled a deflation. Whereas the threat of deflation forced Britain, like several other economies, to leave the gold standard and devalue, India could not devalue. British authorities determining Indian policy feared that devaluation would render the government unable to pay its foreign debt. The result was a steady and severe deflation, worsened by cuts in government expenditure and a series of good harvests. Rise in real interest rates crowded out private investment. Private debts and rents ballooned. As time went on, land and gold began to be sold. A great deal of rural unrest began, crystallized around debt and rent relief. The really effective counterdeflationary measures did not come from the government. These were the export of gold that reflatated the economy to some extent, and widespread cuts in money wages that restored profitability.

Prices and Production

Price trends have often been cited, and misused, as a link between politics and economic change under British rule. The earliest episode illustrating this is a price depression in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, which has been read widely as a sign of rural economic crisis, at some neglect of the fact that the prices of

major consumer goods like cotton textiles in this period were falling worldwide. In the period of the essay, the two particularly controversial episodes were the mild inflation of 1870 to 1890 and the Great Depression. Both episodes involved a monetary policy driven by British imperial interests rather than Indian ones.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Agricultural Prices and Production, 1757–1947**

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PRIME MINISTER. *See* **Political System.**

PRIME MINISTERS OF INDIA The prime minister is the leader of the ruling party in the national Parliament and the effective political head of the government of India, in contrast to the president of India, who is the constitutional head of state exercising the formal duties of government. The parallels are that of the prime minister and the crown in the British parliamentary system, which served as the model for the Indian political system. The prime minister, who oversees the functions of government, is assisted in this task by a Council of Ministers comprising cabinet ministers, ministers of state with independent charge, ministers of state who work with cabinet ministers, and deputy ministers. The Council of Ministers is appointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister.

By constitutional arrangements, the president of India appoints as prime minister the leader of the party or alliance that enjoys majority support in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament). If no single party or alliance has secured a majority of seats, the leader of the largest single party or alliance group is appointed prime minister. In these unclear circumstances, the appointed prime minister must demonstrate the party or coalition's ability to govern by securing a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha, that is, a majority of votes cast on the issue of governability.

The prime minister can be a member of either the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament) or the Lok Sabha. As prime minister, he or she is the leader of the house to which he or she belongs. The prime minister is



PRIME MINISTERS OF INDIA

| Prime Minister | Party | Dates in Office |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Jawaharlal Nehru (North/Hindu) | Congress | August 1947–May 1964 (died) |
| Lal Bahadur Shastri (North/Hindu) | Congress | June 1964–January 1966 (died) |
| Indira Gandhi (North/Hindu) | Congress | January 1966–March 1977 (defeated) |
| Morarji Desai (North/Hindu) | Janata | March 1977–July 1979 (defeated) |
| Charan Singh (North/Hindu) | Janata | July 1979–January 1980 (defeated) |
| Indira Gandhi (North/Hindu) | Congress | January 1980–October 1984 (died) |
| Rajiv Gandhi (North/Hindu)* | Congress | October 1984–December 1989 (defeated) |
| Vishwanath P. Singh (North/Hindu) | National Front Coalition | December 1989–November 1990 (defeated) |
| Chandra Shekhar Samavadi (North/Hindu) | Janata | November 1990–June 1991 (defeated) |
| P. V. Narasimha Rao (South/Hindu) | Congress | January 1991–June 1996 (defeated) |
| H. D. Deve Gowda (South/Hindu) | United Front Coalition | June 1996–April 1997 (replaced) |
| Inder K. Gujral (North/Hindu) | United Front Coalition | April 1997–December 1997 (defeated) |
| Atal B. Vajpayee (North/Hindu) | BJP-led Coalition | March 1998–April 1999 (lost vote of no confidence) |
| Atal B. Vajpayee (North/Hindu) | BJP-led Coalition | October 1999–2004 (defeated) |
| Manmohan Singh (North/Sikh) | Congress-led Coalition | May 2004– |

Defeated = ruling party or coalition defeated in elections Died = died in office Note: Gulzarilal Nanda was interim caretaker prime minister for a few weeks following the deaths of Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964 and Lal Bahadur Shastri in January 1966. *Rajiv Gandhi's father was a Parsi Zoroastrian although his religion is identified by that of his mother, Indira Gandhi.

also the chairman of the Planning Commission of India. As head of the Council of Ministers, the prime minister oversees the work of all the ministries. He or she presides over Cabinet meetings, which are normally held in the Cabinet room of the prime minister's office. The Union Cabinet functions on the principle of "collective responsibility."

The prime minister's office (PMO) is located at South Block, Raisina Hill, in New Delhi. South Block is one of the two secretariat blocks (the other is known as North Block) that flank Rashtrapati Bhavan, the residence of the president of India. The PMO staff provides secretarial assistance to the prime minister. It is headed by the principal secretary to the prime minister and is staffed by other civil service officers and clerical staff. The PMO also includes the anticorruption unit and the public wing, which deals with grievances.

The range of subjects that the prime minister examines directly depends on the ministerial portfolios that the prime minister has chosen to keep under his responsibility. Other subjects are the responsibility of the cabinet minister or minister of state (independent charge) in charge of the ministry. Most subjects and issues are dealt with by the cabinet minister or minister of state-in-charge. All important policy issues that the minister in charge feels require the attention of the prime minister are sent to the PMO. The prime minister has traditionally been the minister-in-charge of the Departments of Space,

Atomic Energy, and Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. The prime minister has traditionally been the chairman of the Planning Commission as well.

Important issues that usually require the Prime Minister's personal attention include the following:

1. Important defense-related issues;
2. Decorations, both civilian and defense, where presidential approval is required;
3. All important policy issues;
4. Proposals for appointment of Indian heads of missions abroad and requests for grant of agreement for foreign heads of missions posted to India;
5. All important decisions relating to the Cabinet Secretariat;
6. Appointments to State Administrative Tribunals and the Central Administrative Tribunal, Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), Election Commission, appointment of members of statutory/constitutional committees, commissions attached to various ministries;
7. All policy matters relating to the administration of the civil services and administrative reforms;
8. Special packages announced by the prime minister for states are monitored in the PMO and periodical reports submitted to the prime minister; and
9. All judicial appointments for which presidential approval is required.

Parliament questions relating to the ministries and departments of which the prime minister is the minister-in-charge are first examined and answered by his civil service staff of experts, then submitted to the prime minister for his judgments and views, and then presented to Parliament by the prime minister himself.

Prime Ministers since 1947

Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–1964). The first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru held office for seventeen years, the longest thus far of any Indian prime minister. He was born in 1889. An intellectual, he laid the foundations of India's secular democracy and is the author of the monumental *The Discovery of India*, a personal interpretation of Indian history and politics, much of which was written while he was jailed during the freedom struggle against the British. He died in office in 1964.

Gulzari Lal Nanda (May–June 1964, acting; 11–24 January 1966, acting). A follower of Mahatma Gandhi's movement, Gulzari Lal Nanda was born in 1898. A veteran labor leader, he was a long-time Congress Party member, and he held several portfolios in the Union Cabinet. He died in 1998.

Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–1966). Known for showing resolve during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri negotiated the subsequent Indo-Pakistani agreement at Tashkent with Pakistani president General Ayub Khan. He was born in 1904 and died in 1966.

Indira Gandhi (1966–1977; 1980–1984). The daughter and only child of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi was born in 1917. The second-longest ruling prime minister after her father, she held office for fifteen years in two separate terms. Her son Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister following her assassination in 1984. A strong, outspoken leader with an independent mind, she negotiated the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1971, and then led India to victory in the December 1971 war against Pakistan.

Morarji Desai (1977–1979). The first non-Congress Party prime minister of India, Morarji Desai was born in 1896. He was a member of the Congress Party for decades, serving as finance minister and deputy prime minister, until he defected from the Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. He served as chief minister of Maharashtra from 1952 to 1956. A staunch Gandhian and naturalist, he died in 1995.

Charan Singh (1979–1980). Born in 1902, Charan Singh occupied the position of president of the Lok Dal for many years. He was the deputy prime minister during the Janata regime from 1977 to 1979. He died in 1987.

Rajiv Gandhi (1984–1989). The son of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi was born in 1944. A commercial pilot turned politician, he was assassinated during an election campaign in Tamil Nadu in 1991.

Vishwanath Prathap Singh (1989–1990). A Union minister in the Janata Party government from 1977 to 1980, Vishwanath Prathap Singh was a senior leader of Janata Dal. Born in 1931 into a North Indian princely family, Singh was a renowned painter. He served as prime minister of a coalition government from 1989 to 1990.

Chandra Shekhar Samavadi (1990–1991). Born in 1927, Chandra Shekhar Samavadi was a parliamentarian and a socialist. He served as president of the socialist Janata Party from 1977.

P. V. Narasimha Rao (1991–1996). Born in 1921, P. V. Narasimha Rao served as chief minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1971 to 1973, external affairs minister, defense minister, and human resources minister in the Congress government from 1980 onward, then as prime minister.

H. D. Deve Gowda (1996–1997). Born in 1933, H. D. Deve Gowda was the former chief minister of Karnataka and a Janata Dal leader.

Inder K. Gujral (1997–1998). Born in 1919, Inder K. Gujral was formerly a minister in the Union Cabinet from 1967 to 1976 and from 1989 to 1990, minister of external affairs (1989–1990, 1996–1997), and ambassador to the Soviet Union (1976–1980).

Atal B. Vajpayee (1998–1999, 1999–2004). A long-time Jana Sangh and later Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) member of Parliament, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was born in 1924. A poet, journalist, and social worker with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, he was a founding member of the Hindu nationalist party, the Jan Sangh, and the former president of the BJP. He was the leader of opposition in the Lok Sabha in 1993 as a member of the BJP.

Dr. Manmohan Singh (22 May 2004–). Born in 1932, Manmohan Singh is best known as the “father of Indian reforms” for his role in the economic reforms of 1991, when he served as finance minister of the Congress Party government. An academician by profession, he has taught in several universities and also has held various positions in government service.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Political System; Singh, Manmohan; Vajpayee, Atal Bihari

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PRINCELY STATES The princely states of India and their rulers have been the subject of romantic novels and films, paintings, Orientalist and nationalist exposés, and advertising campaigns in which maharajas are synonymous with luxury, yet they have received relatively little scholarly attention. These political units reflected the political, cultural, and geographical diversity of the Indian subcontinent; their number varied according to different accounts that used varying criteria to define a princely state. The *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (1909) recorded 693 states, but that figure included the Shan states in Burma as well as Nepal. The Report of the Indian States Committee, issued in 1929, claimed 562 states. These statistics are deceptive, since many political entities included in these documents were small estates belonging to landholders who might exercise some magisterial powers. Over 360 such small states were concentrated in western India alone. The princely states that had sovereign powers of collecting taxes and distributing justice numbered less than a hundred.

When most sources refer to the princely states of India, they focus on those political units whose rulers had secured some type of quasi-legal relationship with the British colonial government in India from the late 1700s onward and then formally survived until the late 1940s. Many of these princely states had existed in India for centuries before the British emergence as a colonial political power in the late eighteenth century. Indeed, Hindu princes had been called various titles, such as *raja*, *rana*, and *rao*, that were more appropriately translated as “king” (or “great king” for those designated as *maharaja*, *maharana*, or *maharao*), but the British translated the titles of these rulers as “prince” to indicate their subordinate status to the British monarch as their suzerain. Thus the British did not create many of the princely states, but once the states entered into treaty relations, the British significantly controlled their external relations and communications networks and gradually extended their symbolic

suzerainty over the princes and their states. Still, during the colonial period, the rulers of eighty to one hundred states exercised considerable internal autonomy, collecting taxes, administering justice, and in some cases launching impressive economic developments and some social reforms.

Origins

Antique states. Princely states may be grouped in three categories according to their origins. The states ruled by the Rajputs may be labeled antique, since many were founded before the arrival of the British and some even before the establishment of the Mughal empire in 1526. Rajputs, whose name comes from the Sanskrit *rajaputra*, or “sons of kings,” migrated from Central Asia into the Indian subcontinent from around A.D. 200 onward. They spread in a broad arc from the western coast of Gujarat through the Thar desert, a region that came to be known either as Rajputana or Rajasthan, across the Indo-Gangetic Plain into the foothills of the western Himalayas. The major princely states of Rajputana include Mewar (or later Udaipur, after its capital); Marwar (or Jodhpur, after its capital); Amber (known as Jaipur, after its capital built in the early 1700s by Jai Singh); and Bikaner. The rulers of these states legitimated themselves by their military control, elaborate genealogies claiming divine descent or sanction, and assiduous maintenance of their *izzat*, or “honor.” The rulers of Mewar claimed primacy among the Rajputs for their defense of *izzat* when confronted with defeat in battle and their refusal to offer their daughters in marriage to the Mughal emperors. Other Rajput rulers, most notably those of Amber, Marwar, and Bikaner, provided daughters to the Mughal emperors, accepted ranks in the Mughal *mansabdari*, or administrative system, led Mughal armies in battle, governed Mughal provinces, and retained internal autonomy within their states. Their entry into the Mughal imperial structure prefigured their subsequent accommodation with the British Empire.

Successor states. The second major category were provinces of the Mughal empire, whose Mughal governors gradually asserted a quasi-independent status during the mid-eighteenth century, just when the British East India Company began its initial political expansion in Bengal. Labeled successor states, they were Awadh (Oudh), Bengal, and Hyderabad. By 1856 the British ruled both Awadh and Bengal directly, but Hyderabad would survive until 1948 as the premier princely state of India, with the largest population and revenues of any princely state. Its Muslim ruler, with the title of *nizam*, governed a political unit in which Hindus constituted 87 percent of the population and spoke Telugu (43%), Marathi (26%), and Kannada (13%), while Urdu-speaking




View of City Palace, Udaipur. This is the largest palace in Rajasthan (covering an area of 5 acres), in fact a complex of several palaces extended by twenty-two different Maharanas or kings between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. It is now home to a museum and several luxury hotels. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Muslims were a distinct minority at 10 percent of the population by 1911 (Census of India, 1921, XXI, 74, 192).

Warrior states. During the eighteenth century, the third category of warrior states arose with the decline of the centralized power of the Mughals. In return for their protection of cultivating peasants and local merchants, ambitious, enterprising, venturesome men with military resources gained political control. This group was the most disparate and ranged from Sikh-ruled states in Punjab, such as Patiala, to the Maratha-ruled states of central India, scattered from Gwalior near Agra to Baroda in Gujarat, Mysore in the center, and Travancore on the western coast of peninsular South India. Jammu and Kashmir, with the largest territory (85,885 sq. mi., or 222,442 sq. km) of any princely state, is the prime example of a warrior state created by imperial imperatives. Gulab Singh, a Dogra military ally of the kingdom of Punjab, parlayed his control over Jammu to acquire Kashmir for 75 lakhs of rupees (7,500,000 rupees) paid to the British after their victory in the first Anglo-Sikh war in

1846. At the other end of the size and geographical spectrum is the state of Pudukkottai (1,179 sq. mi., or 3,054 sq. km) near Madras (Chennai). In return for timely military service against the French and Mysore state, in 1806 the British acknowledged the Tondaimans as rulers of the internally autonomous state of Pudukkottai, which would survive until 1948. Most other rulers of such little kingdoms in South India were transformed into landlords.

Power and authority. The Rajput rulers and those of successor and warrior states owed their power to control of military forces that were in turn commanded by kinsmen, military entrepreneurs, or petty local magnates who were willing to ally with a stronger rival rather than suffer defeat and possible extinction. The successor states claimed their authority to rule from their appointments by the Mughal emperor. Rajput and warrior rulers frequently based their authority to rule on divine sanction. Thus some Rajputs traced their lineages back to the Hindu gods of the sun (Surya) or moon (Chandra). While the maharanas of Udaipur claimed to be the servants of Shiva in his form as Eklinga (an iconic pillar with one



Road and Division Map of India, 1784. Map of “Hindooland” as divided into princely states and recognized by colonial Britain, late eighteenth century. At India’s independence in 1947, nearly 680 such states or feudal monarchies existed, all led by hereditary rulers. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

face), the maharajas of Bikaner proclaimed themselves to be the prime ministers of an incarnation of Vishnu. Maharaja Martanda Varma (r. 1729–1758) of Travancore dedicated his state to an incarnation of Vishnu, and his successors claimed to rule as servants of this god. Muslim rulers, including the nizam of Hyderabad, sought to legitimate their political power by tracing their descent

from Muslim holy men and patronizing pan-Islamic institutions, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

Indirect Rule

Subsidiary alliance system. As European politics began to affect the activities of European trading companies in

India, the British East India Company obtained the *diwani*, or the right to collect land revenue, in Bengal, inaugurating its metamorphosis from a trading company into a regional Indian political entity. By the end of the eighteenth century, the company had waged several wars against the Maratha and Mysore states, its two main competitors for political domination. Upon his arrival as governor-general in 1798, Lord Wellesley embarked on a resolute policy of imperial expansion. Relying upon an increasingly effective military force of British officers and mixed other ranks of Britons and Indians, he constructed a subsidiary alliance system incorporating earlier treaties with Indian states. These new alliances extended British control, exterminated some Indian states, and ensured the continued existence of other Indian states. In return for British protection from external enemies and internal dynastic rivals and a guarantee of their internal autonomy, Indian rulers who concluded subsidiary alliances with the British achieved some security in exchange for accommodation. The Indian rulers had to relinquish the power to wage war, the right of direct relations with other princes and external countries, and their control of communications networks, and sometimes were required to pay an annual monetary subsidy or to support contingents of troops for British use.

The state of Mysore is one example of how this system worked. In 1799 Arthur Wellesley defeated Tipu Sultan, the Muslim ruler whose father had usurped the Mysore *gadi* (throne) from its Hindu rulers, the Wadiyars. The East India Company annexed the western coastal districts, attached them to its Madras presidency, gave some Mysore territory to Hyderabad, which had entered into a subsidiary alliance in 1798, and restored the Wadiyar family to its *gadi* in return for the largest subsidy that the British would demand of any princely state.

British officials—termed “residents” if they were posted to important states such as Hyderabad, or “agents to the governor-general” or “political agents” if in charge of several smaller states—conducted relations between the company and the princes. Replacing the *vakils*, the agents that states used to maintain at Mughal and other princely courts, the British political officers were to implement British policy in the states but also to represent the interests of the princes and activities within their states to the British official hierarchy. These company servants could intervene dramatically in the state administrations, especially when the heir was a minor and a council of regency governed.

Ambivalent British policies toward princely states. After Wellesley was recalled to London in 1805 because company directors deemed his expansionist policies too costly, despite the use of Indian allies, there was a temporary lull but not a total cessation of the expansion of this



DESPATCH OF LORD WELLESLEY DATED 4 FEBRUARY 1804 TO RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD

“The fundamental principle of His Excellency the Governor-General’s policy in establishing subsidiary alliances with the principal states of India is to place those states in such a degree of dependence on the British power as may deprive them of the means of prosecuting any measures or of forming any confederacy hazardous to the security of the British empire, and may enable us to reserve the tranquility of India by exercising a general control over those states, calculated to prevent the operation of that restless spirit of ambition and violence which is the characteristic of every Asiatic government, and which from the earliest period of Eastern history has rendered the peninsula of India the scene of perpetual warfare, turbulence and disorder.”

Tupper, *Indian Protectorate*, pp. 40–41.

system of indirect rule. Lord Moira, later Lord Hastings, governor-general from 1813 to 1823, offered treaties to the Rajput states in Rajputana. He sanctioned military campaigns that further reduced the territories of key Maratha rulers—Gaekwad of Baroda, Scindia of Gwalior, Holkar of Indore, and Bhonsle of Nagpur—and integrated them more firmly into the subsidiary alliance system. Lord Dalhousie, governor-general from 1848 to 1856, orchestrated the last major extension of British direct rule on the basis of three criteria. Defeat in war occasioned the final annexation of the kingdom of Punjab; the lack of an heir, the so-called doctrine of lapse, led to the annexation of the Maratha-ruled states of Satara, Jhansi, and Nagpur; and charges of maladministration were used to justify the annexation of Awadh (Oudh), an early entrant to the subsidiary alliance system.

Political Structure

During the early 1800s, most princely states had autocratic, relatively simple administrative structures. The prince was the source of political authority and power, combining the roles of policy maker, chief judge, and sometimes commander in chief of state forces or military units dedicated to British service. A council of ministers, sometimes with a *diwan* or chief administrator, supervised departments such as home (internal order), finance, justice, and household. In many states, princes had granted or confirmed the right to collect revenue from specified tracts within their states to relatives, military allies, or indigenous hereditary aristocrats in return for services rendered during the establishment of the state and for



RUDYARD KIPLING, "A LEGEND OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE"

Rustum Beg of Kolazai
slightly backward Native State
Lusted for a C.S.I.
So he began to sanitate.

Built a Goal and Hospital
nearly built a City drain
Till his faithful subjects all
thought their ruler was insane.

Rudyard Kipling, *Verse: Definitive Edition*.
Garden City, N.J.: 1940, p. 8. First published
in *Departmental Ditties*, 1885.

continued loyalty. By the middle of the nineteenth century, some Indian princes on their own initiative, along with some British officials, sought to centralize the administrations of princely states to enhance the power of the princes as well as that of the British at the expense of intermediate landholders. Their measures, frequently termed "reforms," tended to alienate the hereditary aristocracy, who would be losing both financial resources through new land revenue settlements and political influence at the princely *durbārs*, or courts, with the introduction of administrators recruited from outside the state, frequently men with education and bureaucratic experience in British India. A few British officials favored maintaining the nobility as a check on the autocracy of the princes, but increasingly the British supported more rationalized administrations. As late as 1938, Raja Rao Kalyan Singh, the *thikanadar* (holder of a small state or estate) of Sikar in Jaipur state, challenged the efforts of the Jaipur state to intervene in his internal affairs. A combination of British officials, Indian nationalists, and popular peasant leaders assisted the state administration in squashing his revolt.

Legitimation of British Suzerainty

By the end of 1856, the East India Company directly ruled three-fifths of the territory of the Indian subcontinent, and the Indian princes indirectly ruled two-fifths of the territory and one-third of the population. To reward the loyal support of most princes during the "Mutiny" or Revolt of 1857, the British Crown, which assumed the governance of India with the liquidation of the company, announced an end to any further annexation and extended treaties or *sanads* (letters of agreement) to many states, recognizing their right to adopt heirs. With minor variations, the map of princely states was set until the late

1940s. Although a few princely states, such as Hyderabad with prime cotton-growing tracts and some coal reserves, Mysore with the Kolar gold fields, and Patiala with fertile soil, were centrally located and had valuable natural resources, most princely states were concentrated in areas more remote and less economically productive than the British Indian provinces. The latter category ranged from Jammu and Kashmir, strategically important on the northern borders of India but dominated by inhospitable mountains, to states such as Bikaner and Jodhpur in the desert tracts of Rajputana, those in the salt marshes and dry lands of western Gujarat, and those in the ravines of central India and jungle tracts of Orissa.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the British articulated rhetorical and legal rationales for their system of indirect rule. The princes were declared the natural leaders of their people, in contrast to the ever more vocal Western-educated middle-class critics of colonial rule. To integrate the princes into an imperial hierarchy, the British granted various honorary titles to the princes and regularized a table of salute, with Queen Victoria accorded 101 guns, and the princes deemed most significant given salutes ranging from 21 guns (Baroda, Gwalior, Hyderabad, Mysore, and later Jammu and Kashmir) down to 9 guns. Princes could earn an increase in their salutes by notable contributions to British military ventures or by undertaking internal reforms that modernized their administrations. By 1945 the table of salutes embraced 117 princes. Schedules of personal and local salutes enjoyed by princes within their lifetimes or states were developed to assuage princely anxiety over their *izzat*.

The British as paramount power. The British claimed suzerainty over the princes because of the British self-proclaimed status as the paramount power in India. Their assertion of paramountcy was based on precedence that was cobbled together from earlier official correspondence and treaties. The elastic concept of usage was invoked to justify changing British policies. Political officers, such as Charles U. Aitchison (1832–1896) and William Lee-Warner (1846–1914), who usually had more experience at the provincial and central secretariats than in the princely states as political agents and residents, compiled procedural manuals and theoretical works to guide policy makers and political officers in the field. Lee-Warner averred that usage "amends and adapts to circumstances duties that are embodied in treaties of ancient date, and it supplies numerous omissions from the category of duties so recorded" (*Native States*, p. 204). Thus the British could demand new duties from their princely clients in order to adapt to changing circumstances. In other words, treaties and *sanads* were not written in stone.

In January 1877 Lord Lytton, the governor-general and viceroy from 1876 to 1880, presided at an Imperial Assemblage in Delhi at which Queen Victoria was declared the Kaiser-i-Hind, or Empress of India. Sixty-three princes paraded as loyal feudatories who received banners with newly created coats of arms from the representative of their empress. As late as 1893, Charles Tupper reiterated this interpretation when he declared that the British relationship with the princes was a feudal one since “the Indian Protectorate rests on ideas which are fundamentally indigenous. . . . There were many tendencies making for feudalism in the India of our predecessors; and . . . our protection has been sought in India as vassals sought the protection of their lords” (*Indian Protectorate*, p. 240).

The Twentieth Century

Twilight of empire and internal autonomy. Major challenges confronted both British power and princely rule by 1900. During the late nineteenth century, a few princes launched substantial administrative, economic, and social reforms and consequently acquired the reputation of being “progressive” rulers who were modernizing their states. Maharaja Sayaji Rao Gaekwad (1863–1939) of Baroda inaugurated universal compulsory primary education and mobile public libraries to help his subjects maintain their literacy, founded the Bank of Baroda, and fostered textile and chemical industries. Maharaja Krishnaraja (1884–1940) of Mysore undertook an ambitious program of industrial development and established both a university and an institute of technology. The rulers of Travancore and Cochin promoted education at all levels and extensive public works programs that fostered internal trade. By the 1930s all four states and about twenty others had representative assemblies and later legislative bodies with limited powers. Still, princes remained benevolent autocrats who retained much of their power and tried to contain or dampen popular political activity. In many states, reforms of revenue systems sought to increase state revenues and to eliminate intermediaries who might divert revenue and squeeze peasant taxpayers. Police departments were reconstituted to ensure more effective control over not only criminals but also popular political leaders critical of state policies.

Old and new roles for princely clients. Confronting defiance from Indian nationalist leaders and the burdens of World War I, the British government of India initially affirmed the role of the Indian princes and their states as military allies. Princely contributions included military contingents, money, and war matériel, and princely rulers in Punjab permitted extensive recruiting for the British Indian army within state territories. When urging his subjects to enlist, Maharaja Bhupinder Singh (1891–1938) of Patiala argued that it was far better to meet the angel of



SPEECH BY MAHARAJA BHUPINDER SINGH OF PATIALA ON 3 FEBRUARY 1930 AT PATIALA CITY ON OCCASION OF BASANT PANCHAMI DURBAR (CELEBRATION OF SPRING)

“[T]he new attitude towards us is that the States are interpolated pages, apocryphal additions, in this history of India. I need not point out to you how wrong this view is, how fundamentally opposed to the evolution of our history. To forget the persistent regionalism of our people which finds expression in the Indian states is an error which as from time to time spelt disaster for Indian in the past. If the nationalist movement in its desire for a symmetric pattern of Indian political life decides to act as if the States did not exist, the prospects before the whole country are gloomy indeed.”

Punjab State Archives at Patiala, Chamber Section, Case No. II (a) 34 of 1930, Vol. 2.

death on the battlefield than in bed. Nizām Osman Ali Khan (1886–1967) of Hyderabad issued a *firman*, or decree, declaring that the war was not a jihad but a war over politics; Indian Muslims could therefore legitimately fight with British forces against the Ottoman Empire, whose sultan was also the caliph of Islam.

Simultaneously, the princes began to function as political allies for their imperial patron or as representatives of their religious communities. In India the nizām of Hyderabad was strongly opposed to the Khilafat movement, and several Hindu princes intervened in a controversy over the construction of irrigation works on the Ganges near the sacred city of Hardwar. Abroad, princes began to attend imperial and international conferences as representatives of India. Maharaja Ganga Singh (1880–1943) of Bikaner was at the Imperial War Conference in 1917 and was a signatory of the peace treaty of Versailles.

Constitutional efforts to integrate the states. Among the British rewards to the princes for their support during World War I was the inauguration of a Chamber of Princes, an advisory body, in 1921. Dominated by a small group of princes from middle-sized states in North India and with the viceroy as presiding officer, the Chamber’s resolutions ultimately had relatively little impact on British policy. The Chamber was more significant for bringing together a group of contentious princes who began to debate common issues, to develop some contacts with moderate British Indian nationalists and conservative British politicians, and to lobby with British officials for a definition of paramountcy



CABINET MISSION'S "MEMORANDUM ON STATES' TREATIES AND PARAMOUNTCY" PUBLISHED 22 MAY 1947

"When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Governments come into being in British India . . . the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and . . . all the rights surrendered by the States to the paramount power will return to the states. . . . The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them."

V. P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Princely States*, Appendix II, 475–476.

that would reduce British intervention in the internal affairs of states.

Threatened with the Indian National Congress's demands for *swaraj*, or self-rule, and the possibility of a renewed civil disobedience campaign by Mahatma Gandhi, in 1930 the British invited the princes as well as a wide spectrum of Indian and British politicians to attend what became a series of three Round Table Conferences in London to discuss possible constitutional reforms. In 1935 a Government of India Act envisioned a constitutional federation of British Indian provinces and princely states in which the states would balance the British Indian provincial governments now to be formed from the majority parties in the provincial legislatures. Princely desires to reduce British intervention in their internal affairs, reluctance to concede essential powers to a federal legislature, and concern about any additional financial demands to support the federal institutions, as well as opposition from Conservative forces in Britain, stymied negotiations over federation. Upon the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the government of India suspended these negotiations.

Popular political activity. During the 1920s embryonic state's people's groups emerged to challenge princely autocracy and to demand certain civil rights, such as the freedoms of speech, of the press, and to assemble. These groups generally did not deny the authority of the princes to rule but frequently blamed corrupt or overbearing administrators for tyrannical policies. The Indian National Congress, under the direction of Mahatma Gandhi, did not formally become involved in the internal politics of the princely states until the late 1930s. Initially neither Gandhi nor other Congress politicians were particularly successful in either organizing a

mass base or achieving changes in state policies. By the 1940s, however, the Congress was able to develop effective organizations in a few states such as Mysore.

Integration. As the process of decolonization in India unraveled, the increasing demand for the creation of Pakistan and escalating communal violence overshadowed the situation of the princely states. Although the princes clung to the forlorn hope that their treaties with the British Crown would ensure their future existence, their fate was sealed once Lord Louis Mountbatten and the British government decided on the partition of the British Indian empire into two independent states. Governor-general and viceroy from 1946 to 1948, Mountbatten advised the princes that their future involved accession to either India or Pakistan. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950), the home and states minister in the interim government of India, and V. P. Menon (1894–1960), secretary of the states ministry, used a carrot-and-stick approach in their negotiations with the princes. Mollified with boons such as privy purses and various honorific concessions and threatened with possible deposition, most princes gradually agreed.

Three notable holdouts were Nawāb Mahabat Rasulkhanji, who sought to accede to Pakistan even though his state of Junagadh did not share a contiguous border with Pakistan, and the rulers of Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir, who wanted to remain independent. Jawaharlal Nehru launched a police action in 1948 that brought Hyderabad into the Indian union, and Maharaja Hari Singh (1895–1961) of Kashmir signed a letter of accession as Muslim tribesmen invading from Pakistan threatened his capital of Srinagar. In 2005 Pakistan controlled two-fifths of the former princely state as Azad (Free) Kashmir, and India had the other three-fifths.

The dispute over Kashmir has triggered three wars and several other military campaigns and remains the major impediment to normal relations between India and Pakistan. Smaller princely states that acceded to India were either integrated into new states created from British Indian provinces or were formed into unions of princely states. Hyderabad and Mysore were the only princely states to remain distinct political units, until 1956 when they were incorporated into the new states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, respectively.

Princes in independent India. The most important rulers were appointed as governors or deputy governors of these unions or other states and occasionally as ambassadors. A few princes or their consorts entered electoral politics. Most notable were Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur, who won a seat in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament) in 1962 with a plurality of 175,000 votes, and Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia (d. 2001) of Gwalior,

who moved from the Congress Party to a leadership role in the Bharatiya Janata Party. In 1971 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi secured a constitutional amendment that terminated the privy purses and other personal concessions to the princes. At the beginning of the new millennium some scions of former princely families enjoyed success in electoral politics. In 2005 Amarinder Singh from Patiala was serving as the Congress chief minister of Punjab state, and Vasundhara Raje (b. 1953), the daughter of Vijayaraje Scindia, was the Bharatiya Janata Party chief minister of Rajasthan.

Barbara N. Ramusack

See also Baroda; Hyderabad; Jammu and Kashmir; Pakistan and India; Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai; Punjab

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
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PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, ROLE OF

India faced a severe balance of payments crisis in 1990–1991. Thanks to this crisis, fairly substantive economic reforms have been introduced since 1991 to stimulate India's economy, especially its industrial sector. Import duties have been slashed, dropping from 47 percent in 1990–1991 to 16 percent in 2001–2002. Since this average duty of 16 percent is for all products, if one excludes agricultural products, the average import duty is lower still. By 2006–2007 the peak import duty is likely to be 20 percent for consumer durables and no more than 10 percent or lower for all other manufactured products. Most quantitative restrictions on imports have, moreover, disappeared, and income tax exemptions on export profits are being phased out. Barring a few strategic sectors reserved exclusively for the public sector, foreign direct investment in all other manufacturing activities is permitted, with no equity caps. However, equity caps continue in many services sectors, and foreign investment remains prohibited in agriculture. The Reserve Bank of India no longer administers the exchange rate, which is now market-determined, and India's rupee is already convertible on the current account, some steps having recently been taken toward capital account convertibility.

Historically, protected markets at home had led to inefficiencies and outdated technology for costly Indian industry, scant attention being paid to customer needs. Since such inefficient industry could not compete in the global market, export incentive “crutches” supported it. Now these are gone, or are in the process of being scrapped. Modern India's market-determined exchange rate no longer cushions the Indian economy from foreign exchange fluctuations. Simultaneously, with exchange controls eased, it has now become easier for Indians to borrow and invest abroad.

Private industry legitimately complains, however, that domestic reforms have not kept pace with external sector reforms, making it difficult for private investors to compete, even though industrial licensing has ended. Historically, such licenses had long been required for expansion, or for setting up fresh capacity. Additional licenses were required by companies that were under the purview of India's Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Such licensing is



Thermal Power Station, Tata Iron & Steel Works, in Jamshedpur, c. 1950. The Tatas were among India's first entrepreneurial families and have remained an industrial giant, with the recent economic boom having transformed their various holdings into a large multinational corporation. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

over, and in that sense, the so-called license raj has ended. There has also been a spate of reforms in the financial sector.

Nonetheless, other vital domestic reforms still remain to be implemented, starting with needed infrastructure improvements in power transmission, as well as repairs to roads, ports, and telecommunications systems. Proper targeting of subsidies and levy of right-user charges has not generally been possible. Because of high fiscal deficits, central and state governments were in no position to invest adequately in physical and social infrastructure. Downsizing of government expenditure has not as yet occurred. Because governments borrow, often at artificially high interest rates, interest rates for industry remain high. Indirect tax reforms are required, since—with a multiplicity of taxes—that structure is nontransparent and leads to costly cascading effects. An integrated

value-added tax has been talked about for quite some time, but its implementation keeps getting postponed. Nor have necessary agricultural reforms occurred. These are urgently required to stimulate income and consumption growth and to dispel the myth that reforms are pro-rich and anti-poor. In the absence of agricultural reforms, industry has neither the requisite demand nor the inputs required for industrial production. Thus, the evolution of India's food-processing industry has been totally inhibited. In India, "small-scale" industry is still defined by investments in plant and machinery being below a certain threshold, as elsewhere, not in terms of employment. Reservations of certain sectors for production by small-scale industries hence prevent those sectors from improving their technology or reducing costs. India's legal framework also needs reform. Some of this is statutory, such as the Industrial Disputes Act, which prevents retrenchment, lockouts, or closure without government

permission, discouraging the use of labor-intensive techniques. Other laws are not statutory, but executive, leading to an “inspector raj,” characterizing all three steps of private industrial entry, functioning and exit. The old licensing raj may be dead, but the inspector raj is still alive, and leads to deterrent procedures, bribery, and rent seeking. Finally, dispute resolution does not work fast enough, although a new Arbitration and Conciliation Act was passed in 1996 and a new Civil Procedure Code was amended in 2002.

The private industrial sector needs to be defined, since it is not a uniform or heterogeneous category. A broad distinction is sometimes drawn between the “organized” and the “unorganized” sectors. However, this definition is ambiguous, and there are at least three definitions of organized versus unorganized. First, any factory that employs ten or more workers and uses power (or twenty or more workers but does not use power) comes under the coverage of the Factories Act. This is the first definition of organized. Thus defined, around 8 percent of the labor force works in the organized sector, while 92 percent works in the unorganized sector, which of course includes all self-employment and agriculture. Second, there is a definition of small-scale industry, defined through investments in plant and machinery, and there is a similar definition for *khadi* (hand-spun cotton) and village industries. These are therefore equated with unorganized industry, and all other industry is organized. Such unorganized industry is exempt from some labor laws. Data for organized sector industry are obtained through the Annual Survey of Industries. Subject to this data, around 45 percent of industrial output (with similar figures for exports) is estimated to originate in the small-scale sector. Third, depending on threshold levels of turnover, some units do not have to pay indirect taxes. Those outside the ambit of indirect taxation are referred to as the unorganized sector. There is strong correlation between these three different definitions of organized and unorganized, but the definitions are not identical. Also, to avoid paying indirect taxes or to circumvent labor laws, units deliberately stay small by fragmenting production.

There are some 140,000 factories, of which India's factories employ fewer than one hundred workers. In number, most factories are in sectors like food products and small machinery, but in terms of value of products, most are in sectors like basic chemicals, heavy machinery, and electricity. Some factories are in the public sector, run by the central, state, and local governments. There are a few that are jointly public-private. However, 92 percent of all factories are completely private, more than 3,500,000 begin small-scale units. More than 250,000 units are estimated to be “sick,” their loans overdue to

banks and financial institutions that cannot enforce claims on collateral. But a new Securitisation, Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act—enacted in 2003—should make that much easier.

India's labor force in 1999–2000 was around 365 million. Because of unemployment, the working force was slightly lower, around 335 million. Of this 335 million, 59 million worked in industry, which does not mean only manufacturing but also includes mining, quarrying, construction, electricity, gas and water supply. Of the 59 million who worked for industry, 41 million worked in manufacturing; 28 million worked in the organized sector (19 million of those in the public sector and 9 million in the private sector). Because of reforms and a reduced role for government, growth in the public sector has stagnated.

There are significant differences across the Indian states. The pre-1990 industrial licensing policy sought to ensure that jobs were created where there was adequate workforce. Since the onset of reforms, however, the public sector has much declined in importance, and many “sick” units are in the eastern states, which have had little private sector employment. Faster growing, richer states are usually in the north and the west.

India's manufacturing sector began to recover in 1992–1993 and through 1995–1996 enjoyed a heady annual average growth rate of almost 12 percent. A deceleration began in 1996–1997, however, and from that fiscal year to 2002–2003, annual growth averaged less than 6 percent. This deceleration may finally be over in 2003–2004, but it is uncertain whether this recovery is sufficiently broad-based and robust.

The reasons for the manufacturing (and industrial) deceleration were that initial growth in the immediate wake of reforms was sustained through demand for consumer goods and cheaper consumer credit. Once this demand was satisfied, growth ran out of steam. Government capital investments then declined, triggering a negative effect. The initial boom led, moreover, to greatly expanded capacity, and once the boom was over, investments flagged. Increasing real interest rates and a slump in India's capital market from 1995–1996 made the situation worse, especially for new investments in the unorganized sector. Manufacturing growth was sustained through a very high rate of export growth, which slowed down from 1996–1997, thanks to the crisis in Asia, a global slowdown, and a real appreciation in the value of the rupee.

Deceleration was also attributed by some to a widespread scare that Indian manufacturing would be swamped by cheaper Chinese products. Chinese costs of production were half or even one-third the costs of

comparable Indian products. Two-thirds of Indian anti-dumping investigations (and actual antidumping duties imposed) were then levied against Chinese products, including chemicals, pharmaceuticals, toys, athletic shoes, and batteries. Though the Chinese paranoia has dissipated, the Chinese competitive advantage still remains, partly due to lower infrastructure costs of power and transportation in China, nontransparent input prices, and labor market flexibility combined with lower interest rates. Chinese advantages are no different from those articulated in global competitiveness yearbooks, but the Chinese also have better technology and economies of scale. This underlines the lack of adequate private sector investments in India. India missed the export bus in exports of low-tech consumer goods. Indian manufacturing often sought to relocate to China, especially in sectors like services and pharmaceuticals. India's official targeted annual real gross domestic product (GDP) growth figure is 8 percent. By the twenty-first century, industry accounted for 25 percent of Indian GDP, services accounted for 50 percent and agriculture for the remaining 25 percent. Industry is thus on the low side, especially when compared to East Asia. Industry's contribution to Indian GDP ought to be around 35 percent, if not higher.

Without domestic reforms, such an increase is hard to imagine, because the industrial sector (which increasingly means the private industrial sector) is still constrained. However, individual private companies have become much more competitive and efficient, although no remarkable productivity increases are detected for industry as a whole. There are now globally competitive Indian companies, not just in information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, but also in garments, jewelry, auto parts, bicycles, and electrical machinery. Competition consequent to reforms triggered such efficiency, one of the reasons since 2002 that Indian exports have tended to do so well, despite the rupee appreciating somewhat. Investments undertaken now are more efficient than investments undertaken before the mid-1990s, at least in the organized private industrial sector.

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See also Industrial Growth and Diversification; Industrial Policy since 1956

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PUBLIC DEBT OF STATES SINCE 1950 The steady accumulation of debt and the growing interest burden feeding back into its accumulation raises serious questions about debt sustainability at the state level in India and constrains the ability of the central government in its macroeconomic management of the economy. Growing debt-servicing burdens reduce the resources available for the provision of public services by state governments.

Article 293 of India's Constitution empowers the states to borrow within India upon the security of the consolidated fund of the state and to extend guarantees within the limits fixed by the state legislature. Thus, the states can borrow from the central government, and the latter can extend guarantees of loans raised by any state. The states can also borrow from the market within India, but if a state is indebted to the central government, it must seek the latter's consent. All the states are indebted to the central government, and therefore, states' market borrowing each year is determined by Ministry of Finance in consultation with Delhi's Planning Commission and the Reserve Bank of India.

Loans from the central government have increased mostly in order to finance five-year plans. In the plan assistance given by the central government to the states, until 2004–2005, 70 percent was given as loans and the remaining amount as grants. From 2005–2006, the central government has stopped giving loans the states based on the recommendations of the Twelfth Finance Commission (India, 2004). From 2005–2006, the states are required to access funds for their plans mainly from the market. The states also get temporary accommodation from the Reserve Bank of India as ways and means advances. Before 1985 the states accumulated loans in this category as well, and the central government converted the overdrafts into medium-term loans. Since 1985, however, the overdraft

regulation program was established, in which the central government disallowed continuous overdraft facilities for more than seven working days, the violation of which could invite dishonoring the states' checks. The present overdraft regulation limit is fourteen continuous working days, and a total of thirty six days in a quarter.

Thus, the Constitution envisages a hard budget constraint at the state level. However, the states have adopted a variety of means to soften the constraint. An important means used for this is to increase the liability in public accounts, particularly provident funds and small savings collections. Until 1998–1999, this was considered part of the loan from the central government. However, in 1999–2000, the National Small Savings Fund was created, and any loan from the fund is now treated as part of a state's internal debt. Since this source is uncapped and the central government has no control over it, the states have expanded their borrowing from this source.

In recent years, loans from banks and financial institutions have become an important source of state borrowing. These loans include borrowing from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the General Insurance Corporation, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Rural Electrification Corporation, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, the Industrial Development Bank of India, and other financial institutions. With the erosion of resources available for capital investment, these institutions have emerged as supplementary sources to finance infrastructure.

In recent years, off-budget borrowing also has become an important source of state liabilities. Many states resorted to borrowing through the public enterprises under their control, enabling them to float bonds by providing guarantees. Some states have floated special purpose vehicles to finance infrastructure projects, such as irrigation. These are contingent liabilities, and although they do not form an integral part of the states' debts, they carry a high degree of fiscal risk.

The aggregate indebtedness of India's states increased from a mere 3.8 billion rupees in 1950–1951 to nearly 7 trillion rupees in 2001–2002, or about 1,765 times. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), states' indebtedness increased from a mere 3.9 percent in 1950–1951 to over 25 percent in 2001–2002. The increase in states' indebtedness in the initial years of independence was a concomitant of India's planned development strategy, but later increases in indebtedness were mainly to finance current expenditures.

Recent Developments

An important development in recent years has been the emergence of multilateral lending to the states. Though

state governments cannot have direct access to loans from multilateral institutions, in recent years they have been allowed to negotiate loans contracted by the central government and passed on to the respective states as additional central assistance, by recasting the original terms of the loans. However, even after taking into account these multilateral loans, the share of central loans in total indebtedness of states has shown a steady decline, from 67 percent in 1990–1991 to 45 percent in 2000–2001, and this reflects the central government's own resource constraint.

Considering that there are constraints on all the states' borrowing powers, increase in their indebtedness during the 1990s mainly came about through borrowing from financial institutions and banks on the one hand, and increasing small saving loans on the other. Outstanding loans from banks and financial institutions increased from just about 2.6 percent of total loans in 1990–1991 to 6.5 percent in 2000–2001. Similarly, loans from small savings and provident funds increased from 15.4 percent to 18.5 percent during the same period. In absolute terms, outstanding loans from banks and financial institutions increased from 29 billion rupees in 1990–1991 to 322 billion rupees in 2000–2001, and liabilities from public account (small savings, provident funds, etc.) increased from 170 billion rupees to 920 billion rupees during the period. The increase in loans has been particularly sharp after 1997–1998, as many of the states impounded part of the additional emoluments and arrears in salaries in their provident funds or small savings certificates. In these sources, the central government cannot exercise any control over borrowing, and thus the states find an easy way to overcome hard budget controls.

Another important means adopted by the state governments to soften their budget constraints is to borrow through public enterprises under their control by enabling them to float bonds against state government guarantees. The contingent liabilities of the states are not fully recorded, and the available information shows that they have shown a sharp increase from 526 billion rupees in 1995–1996 to 1,687 billion rupees in 2000–2001. As a percentage of GDP, the contingent liabilities of the states increased from 5.7 percent in 1990–1991 to 7.2 percent in 2001–2002.

The attempt by the states to soften budget constraints by borrowing from sources not capped and controlled by the central government has steadily increased the average effective interest rate. The average interest rate on states' borrowing increased from 3.8 percent in 1960–1961 to 9.2 percent in 1990–1991, and increased further to 13.2 percent in 1999–2000 before tapering off at 12.5 percent in 2000–2001. The interest rate on small savings also reached a peak of 14 percent in 1998–1999, but was subsequently reduced to 9.5 percent by 2004. The rate of

interest on central loans increased from 7.5 percent in 1984–1985 to 15 percent in 1995–1996, and thereafter was reduced to 10.5 percent by 2004. The interest rate on market borrowings is the lowest. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the rate of interest was kept artificially low. As part of the financial sector reforms, interest rates on government loans was aligned to the market rate, gradually reaching a peak of 14.2 percent in 1995–1996, and declining thereafter to 6.2 percent by March 2003.

The sharp increases in the indebtedness of India's states as well as increases in average rates of interest have increased the debt service burden and have raised serious questions concerning debt sustainability. The fact that the proportions of loans in plan assistance is much higher than the proportion of capital expenditures indicates a lack of viability in the system of central loans to the states. Furthermore, the attempt by the states to soften budget constraints by contracting loans bearing high interest rates only adds to the problem. In fact, the debt to gross state domestic product (GSDP) ratio in some states, notably Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa, is in excess of 25 percent, and more than 30 percent of those states' revenues are spent on interest payments. Similarly, the debt-GSDP ratio in Rajasthan and West Bengal is more than 25 percent, and their interest payments are in excess of 20 percent of their own revenues. The problem is equally severe in the state of Bihar and the special category states of Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim, where more than 50 percent of their own revenues are spent in debt servicing.

Concerned at this serious problem of debt in so many of the states, the central government initiated a debt swap policy in 2004, under which high-interest borrowing of the past is repaid by borrowing at prevailing lower interest rates, thereby reducing the overall interest burden on the states. This will bring some relief, but the long-term solution to the problem of increasing state indebtedness will require changing the structural nature of state finances.

Another important development in the states' borrowing scene is the discontinuation of the practice of central government's lending to states. Based on the recommendation of the Finance Commission, the central government has discontinued the practice of lending to states for financing plans and instead the states have been asked to access the markets. This is likely to create transitional problems in the coming years as the primary debt market is still in its infancy. In addition, many states do not have the credit worthiness and the Reserve Bank of India and the central government will have to persuade the banking system to subscribe to the papers of these states.

M. Govinda Rao

See also **State Finances since 1952**

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PUBLIC EXPENDITURES The Indian constitution, which came into force in 1950, set forth expenditure responsibilities and spheres for the central and state governments in lists of subjects that are the exclusive domain of each, as well as a concurrent list of subjects that are dealt with by both levels of government. Local governments at the village, district, or county level received special recognition through the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. These amendments specified the range of expenditures that could be incurred by local administrative bodies, and the financial nexus between the state and local governments, to enable the latter to finance those activities. These amendments came into effect in 1992.

Activities financed by public expenditures are now carried out by New Delhi's central government, twenty-eight state governments, and nearly a quarter of a million local bodies, ranging from village councils and local urban bodies to district councils. The central and state governments are by far the largest spending agencies in India, their combined expenditure totaling about 28 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal year (FY) 2001–2002. (India's FY is from 1 April to 31 March of the following year.) Within the total expenditure of these two levels, the share of the central government was 49 percent, while the total of state expenditures was 51 percent in 2001–2002. The expenditure of local governments is still very small, amounting to little more than 1 percent of GDP, or less than 5 percent of the total expenditure of all governments. Slow progress has thus, as yet, been made in implementation of the goal of financial decentralization envisioned in the above noted constitutional amendments. Within the existing resource structure, the flexibility and the range of administrative decision making at local levels is limited to about 3 percent of total operations; most transfers from the central and state

governments continue to be made in the form of specific or conditional grants.

Government expenditures are incurred through a large network of government departments, autonomous agencies owned and controlled by the respective governments, state-owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, and several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The NGOs, which include parochial and faith-based organizations, form an important link in the delivery of services, particularly in education and health. They receive the bulk of their revenues in the form of grants-in-aid, mostly conditional, from both levels of government, but retain a major degree of autonomy in their operations. In some states, they play a crucial role, with approximately half of the educational budgets incurred through them.

The pursuit of a common fiscal policy by both the central and state governments is facilitated by several unifying features, arrangements for regular consultation between the two levels, and the monitoring of state finances on a regular basis by the central government and its agencies, such as the Reserve Bank of India (the central bank). A unique feature of the Indian budgetary system is that the budgets of both central and state governments follow the same budgetary classification and approaches toward the compilation of accounts. State government accounts are maintained by the Indian Audit and Accounts department, headed by an independent comptroller and auditor general. Fiscal policy and the determination of its associated annual objectives, which govern the formulation and implementation of budgets, are undertaken as a part of five-year and annual development plans. The broad aggregates of expenditure, as well as sectoral allocations, in particular for major investment expenditures, are determined as part of development plans, and state governments play an extensive role in this process. The compilation of development plans affords numerous opportunities for both levels to have extended consultations and to pursue coordinated fiscal policies. Although the share of plan expenditures is less than a quarter of the annual budgets, the rest reflects the continuing share of previously completed plans that becomes maintenance expenditure.

Federal financial arrangements also reflect the growing dependence of state and local governments on the central government and on market borrowing, which is coordinated by the Reserve Bank of India. State revenues as a ratio to aggregate expenditures declined during the 1990s from 43.5 percent to 41.5 percent. The transfers from the central government take several forms: shares in the devolution of total tax revenues, which is determined for every five-year period; grants for the pursuit of various development objectives; and loans extended by the

central government. Of these transfers, more than 60 percent is at the discretion of the central government. Part of the uncertainty about the availability of money generally associated with discretionary action is mitigated by the fact that there are jointly agreed upon formulas governing the determination of these transfers.

The central and state governments broadly use the same set of instruments to pursue the objectives of expenditure policies. These include direct-expenditures, tax expenditures and subsidies, trading activities, loans to government and nongovernment institutions, and provision of guarantees when governmental agencies engage in borrowing from the market. During the first two decades after India's independence (1947–1967), the central government also used quasi-fiscal accounts maintained at the central bank. Nonbudgetary accounts, such as the oil coordination account, have since been abolished. The overall structure of the expenditure management machinery implies a major role for the central government as exemplar and as lead “thinker,” but in practice neither role has been completely fulfilled.

Objectives, Policies, and Portfolios

The objectives of expenditure policies have changed over the years, reflecting the needs of each era. Immediately after independence, the focus was on postwar reconstruction, refugee rehabilitation, moderate buildup in defense (reflecting the conflict with Pakistan), and problems of dislocation stemming from partition. This was followed until 1963, when the emphasis shifted to economic development; as a part of this effort, there were greater expenditures on multipurpose river valley projects, establishment of essential infrastructure facilities, formation of a chain of national laboratories devoted to science and technology, and industrial development. Expansion took place through state-owned enterprises both at the center and in the states, which grew in number, size, and capital base. Most of their financial requirements were met through investment in their equity and through loans. There was a steady bonding between the central government and the states, as the latter began to receive extensive transfers of central loans and grants to finance regional development.

The war with China in 1962 contributed to a major change, with more development focused on expanding military defense. Heavy expenditure came to be incurred on defense production and on the acquisition of modern weaponry and technologies. To ensure food security, outlays on agriculture were stepped up, contributing to India's “Green Revolution.” A new set of subsidies were aimed at providing, on the one hand, fertilizers to peasant producers at a subsidized rate, and on the other, cushioning the impact on urban consumers through

subsidized public distribution of food. This was followed, in the early 1970s, by more intense efforts to alleviate poverty. Several affirmative actions were taken, measures aimed at providing free food, housing, water supply, electricity, and medical care. Education was generally provided free up to matriculation, while fees for college and technical education were kept very low. Many states began also to provide electricity free of charge to the agriculturalists, and the loans previously given to them for various development purposes were written off. New arrangements were made to address the problems of educated unemployment. Meanwhile, as food production grew, governments spent more on buying food grains at a price higher than the market price, and on maintaining buffer stocks of grain. The steady growth in subsidies and social transfers, as well as maintenance of capital expenditures at more or less previous levels, contributed, in the absence of revenue mobilization efforts, to more borrowing by the central government and the states, in turn leading to a situation in which interest payments, which hitherto were low, began to rise. A national economic crisis ensued in the early 1990s when India recognized that expenditures had to be severely restricted to be sustainable. A slew of measures aimed at moderating expenditure were introduced during the middle of the decade, and provisional relief has been gained through severe compression of capital outlays. These broad trends are illustrated in Table 1. The composition of expenditures at the central government and in the states during 1990–1991 and during 2001–2002 is shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.

As noted, there has been significant growth in interest payments, reflecting excessive reliance on borrowing as a means of financing budget deficits. Nearly a third of the total expenditure of the central government is devoted to the payment of interest. There has also been significant growth in salaries and pension payments both by central and state governments, reflecting the implementation of the Pay Commission's recommendations. Other central government revenue or current expenditure has gone up from a little more than a quarter of total expenditures, to more than one-third of total expenditures at the beginning of 2000. To contain total expenditure within reasonable limits, outlays on subsidies, capital, and loans and advances have been reduced, reflecting India's new policy to reduce subsidies on fertilizers.

Problems and Solutions

The adverse impact of growing expenditures on interest rates, macroeconomic stability, and the general sustainability of public finances was recognized by both the central and state governments, as well as by international financial institutions such as the Asian Development and

TABLE 1

| Consolidated cultural state expenditure (as percent of GDP) | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Category | 1950–1951 | 1960–1961 | 1990–1991 | 2001–2002 |
| Revenue (current) expenditure | 7.36 | 9.82 | 21.62 | 24.47 |
| Capital expenditure | 1.70 | 5.69 | 5.31 | 3.80 |
| Total expenditure | 9.06 | 15.51 | 26.93 | 28.27 |
| Interest payments | 0.71 | 1.27 | 4.40 | 6.30 |

SOURCE: Adapted from *Long Term Fiscal Trends in India, 1950–1951 to 2000–2001*, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Delhi, 2002. (The table has been updated for this study.)

TABLE 2

| Central government: Expenditure pattern (as percent of total) | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Category | 1990–1991 | 2001–2002 |
| Interest | 20.4 | 29.6 |
| Defense | 10.3 | 10.5 |
| Subsidies | 11.5 | 8.6 |
| Other current expenditures | 27.6 | 34.5 |
| Loans and advances | 18.7 | 9.5 |
| Capital outlay | 11.5 | 7.3 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: Data and growth calculations have been provided by the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.

TABLE 3

| Central government: Functional categories of expenditure (as percent of total) | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Category | 1990–1991 | 2001–2002 |
| General services | 42.3 | 54.9 |
| Social services | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| Economic services | 22.8 | 21.6 |
| Unallocable expenditure | 31.9 | 19.5 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: Data and growth calculations have been provided by the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.

the World Bank, which have begun to extend loans to subnational governments. The broad range of problems and the remedial measures have aimed at moderating the growth of expenditures, at improving delivery of services, transparency, and accountability.

The central government appointed an expenditure commission to inquire into the activities of each agency and to make recommendations for possible reduction in

TABLE 4

| States: Functional categories of expenditure (as percent of total)⁽¹⁾ | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Category | 1990–1991 | 2001–2002 |
| Social services | 32.9 | 31.0 |
| Economic services | 36.7 | 26.4 |
| Interest payments | 9.5 | 16.6 |
| Administrative services | 7.7 | 7.2 |
| Pensions | 3.4 | 7.5 |
| Other | 9.8 | 11.3 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 |

(1) At the local level (both in urban and rural areas), a significant part is devoted to the provision and maintenance of core services.

SOURCE: Data and growth calculations have been provided by the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.

TABLE 6

| Growth of expenditure: Central government (percent) | |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Category | 1990–1991 to 2001–2002 (annual compound rates) |
| Interest payments | 15.8 |
| Defense revenue expenditure | 12.1 |
| Subsidies | 8.9 |
| Other revenue expenditure | 14.2 |
| Loans and advances | 5.2 |
| Capital outlay | 7.4 |
| Total expenditure | 11.9 |

SOURCE: Compiled by the Reserve Bank of India from the budget documents of the central and state governments.

expenditures. As a result of the work of the commission, subsidies on fertilizers were reduced, and a voluntary retirement scheme for government personnel was announced. Moreover, recruitment to government was effectively stopped, and personnel positions that long remained unfilled were abolished. The range of measures taken at the state level was more extensive. Most have restricted creation of new positions, abolished unfilled posts, selectively moderated subsidies through efforts at higher cost recovery, and introduced voluntary retirement schemes as well as new pension schemes. Several state governments introduced fiscal responsibility, using restrictive legislation to limit amounts of guarantees, and introducing sinking funds to arrange for orderly repayment of public debt.

The limited impact of these measures is reflected in a slight change in total expenditure of central and state governments, moving up by only 1.59 points as a ratio of GDP from 1999 to 2002.

TABLE 5

| States: Expenditure pattern (as percent of total) | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Category | 1990–1991 | 2001–2002 |
| Interest payments | 9.5 | 16.6 |
| Pensions | 3.4 | 7.4 |
| Other current expenditure | 12.2 | 13.4 |
| Development expenditure | 53.6 | 46.0 |
| Loans and advances | 6.3 | 3.3 |
| Capital outlay | 10.2 | 8.5 |
| Other capital expenditure | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: Data and the growth calculations have been provided by the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.

TABLE 7

| Growth of expenditure: States (percent) | |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Category | 1990–1991 to 2001–2002 |
| Interest payments | 19.7 |
| Pensions | 22.1 |
| Other nondevelopment expenditure | 14.8 |
| Development revenue expenditure | 12.2 |
| Loans and advances | 7.2 |
| Capital outlay | 12.0 |
| Other capital expenditure | 13.9 |
| Total expenditure | 13.8 |

SOURCE: Compiled by the Reserve Bank of India from the budget documents of the central and state governments.

Structurally, expenditures by the central and state governments reveal a good deal of rigidity, reflecting in turn the share of interest payments, and other supply side factors that have steadily contributed to expenditure increases. Most personnel positions are formula-based and to that extent supply-driven. As a result of the application of these formulas and associated norms, there has been a grade inflation, particularly at senior levels. Moreover, at the end of each five-year plan, the bulk of maintenance expenditures moves from the capital to the current side of the budget, contributing in turn to a steady increase in expenditures. In some sectors, such as defense, the cost of modern equipment (mostly imported) has also gone up. The steady increase in personnel, as well as grade inflation, has contributed to higher costs of all services, which was further exacerbated by growing reliance on borrowing as an important instrument of financing government. Regular adjustment of wages and pensions to the cost of living index has had its own impact. The net result of these factors is seen in Table 6 and 7, dealing, respectively, with central and state governments.

Data on public employment also show that, while relative to 1997 there has been a decline in the overall public employment, reflecting in part the efforts at retrenchment (primarily in quasi-government), the overall effect on expenditures has not been significant, as the wage bill itself has risen due to the implementation of the Pay Commission's recommendations.

Liquidity problems are more apparent at state government levels. Many of them are in arrears of payments to contractors, and delays in the payment of salaries are common. Many run overdrafts with the Reserve Bank of India, and appear to have little margin in their financial arrangements. Late release of central assistance in turn contributes to slow implementation of projects and programs and to carrying over of funds, through irregular channels, to future years.

Most delivery of services, particularly in the educational and health sectors, takes place at the level of state governments, and frequently at lower levels. In most cases, links between the allocation of resources and final delivery of services are nebulous, and there are no performance norms against which actual progress can be measured. For the most part, it is the financial performance that is measured. Although an initiative has recently been taken in introducing performance measurement and evaluation, progress is uneven. There has also been a disconcerting increase in the bureaucracy required to undertake inspections. As a result, transaction costs have escalated, more than half of every rupee spent going to cover administrative costs alone. Also, corruption experienced in daily life appears to confirm the general perception of extended leakage in the system and failure of controls.

In a curious variation of laws on information, the greater the amount of information provided, the less comprehension seems to exist in the community. In part, arcane language used in budget documents helps to create, rather than lessen, an information gap. A greater part of the central government's budget was of late approved by the legislature during the "guillotine hour." At the state level, many public accounts committees have rarely met regularly, and as a result there has been an enormous increase in expenditures regularized on an ex-post basis. Legislators do not have an effective say in financial management, and for the most part, there has been a dramatic shift of power from the legislative to the executive branch of government.

The outlook for Indian public expenditures is critical. There are many growing demands (even as the government contemplates sending a man to the moon, there remain countless unmet daily pleas for potable water). Major changes are required in the way in which resources

are allocated and utilized. The need of immediate expenditure increases can only be met by abandoning wasteful expenditures, and through major reductions in existing manpower. With a view to reducing costs of services, less reliance must be placed on borrowing as a means of financing expenditure. Innovative alternatives must be found for the delivery of services. Progress remains to be made in the decentralization of expenditure. More and effective improvements are required for fiscal transparency and accountability. These add up to a considerable improvement in policies of expenditure and management. The imperatives of reform are such that they can no longer be postponed or ignored.

A. Premchand

See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations; Fiscal System and Policy since 1952; State Finances since 1952**

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PUJA. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma).**

PUNJAB Its name derived from a Sanskrit word meaning "five rivers," Punjab is a culturally and physically distinct region, part of which now constitutes one of Pakistan's four provinces, and part that forms a state in the Indian Union. It is named for five major rivers—the Jhelum, Chanab, Ravi, Sutlaj and Beas—all originating in the Himalayas, that cross a large plain in the northwest corner of the Indian subcontinent.

Punjab served as the juncture of a number of the world's great civilizations. Historically, the area west of Punjab fell within the sphere of influence of the Persians, Arabs held sway to the south, and the north was subject to Turko-Mongolian influence. To the east lay the heartland of the Indian civilization. Several religious movements that found wide appeal took root in Punjab, including Buddhism, Sikhism, and several schools of Sufi Islamic thought. Ethnic diversity is also reflected in the cultural mosaic of contemporary Punjab. Its strategic location and fertile lands attracted waves of migrants to



Sikh Farmer and Wife Survey Their Mustard Field. Beginning in the mid-1960s, Punjab (together with Haryana) became the centerpiece of India's "Green Revolution," which introduced high-yielding varieties of grain on irrigated lands. DINESH KHANNA.

the area so that, although originally of the Aryan stock, the people of Punjab are today descendants of the Iranians, Turks, Afghans, and Arabs.

Punjab has long been a battleground fought over by competing empires. After Mughal authority declined in the subcontinent, the Persians under Nadir Shah invaded from the northwest in 1737–1738 to sack Lahore and Delhi, and to carry off such Mughal treasures as the Peacock Throne and Koh-e-Noor diamond. The Afghans also launched a series of invasions of Punjab to loot and dominate the area. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the British vigorously accelerated their territorial aggrandizement at the expense of India's Hindu and Muslims rulers, expanding their paramouncy to northwest India at mid-century.

A large and powerful Sikh state, which included all of the Punjab, was put together by Ranjit Singh (1780–1839), who in 1798 embarked on ambitious plans to expand his territory and to unite all Sikhs under his rule.

He succeeded in creating a powerful Sikh state through clever diplomacy as well as the numerous wars he waged against rival Sikh princes, Muslim rulers, and Afghan invaders. Throughout his long and successful rule, he avoided conflict with the expanding British Empire. Following his death, however, civil strife among rival claimants to the throne and corruption brought on political chaos. When a Sikh army went to attack British territory in 1845, the British in a series of hard-fought battles defeated it. The British began direct rule of the Punjab after again defeating Sikh forces in a second war in 1848–1849.

The political boundaries of the Punjab were far less expansive when, in the partition of 1947, the territory was basically divided along religious lines. The predominantly Muslim western districts acceded to Pakistan, and nearly all Hindus and Sikhs fled to India in a massive population exchange. Indian East Punjab retained only a small portion of its once sizable Muslim community when an estimated 4.35 million Muslims left for Pakistan.

Partitioning the Punjab resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe, with an estimated half a million people killed overall. The deep-rooted communal beliefs gave vent to violence that engulfed village after village and did not spare women and children. Some of the worst atrocities occurred in East Punjab during August 1947.

Pakistan's Punjab

Pakistani Punjab covers 97,192 square miles (251,726 sq. km), 28.5 percent of the total area of Pakistan. Its population, according to a 1998 estimate, was 72.6 million, or approximately 56 percent of the country's total. Punjab is surrounded on the north by the North-West Frontier province (NWFP) and the Federal capital area of Islamabad. To the northeast is Azad Kashmir. To the east and south are India's Punjab and Rajasthan states. On the southeast is Pakistan's Sind province, and to the west lie Baluchistan province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Post-independence Punjab ceased to exist as an administrative and political unit when a Constituent Assembly in 1955 combined it with Sind and the NWFP West provinces. This One-Unit Plan, designed to balance politically Pakistan's West and East (Bengali) Wings, was dissolved in 1970. The restoration of federalism occasioned Pakistan's first election on the basis of one person, one vote for national and provincial assemblies. Under the 1973 Constitution, Punjab and the other provinces also acquired the right to elect their own chief ministers, instead of having them appointed by provincial governors representing the federal government.

Punjab is often referred to as Pakistan's "heartland." Though the idea of Pakistan was initially not as warmly received among West Punjab's Muslims as in central India and Bengal, Punjab's major city, Lahore, was the site of the famous Pakistan Resolution in March 1940. Today, Lahore is considered the country's cultural and intellectual capital, as it had been under Mughal and British rule. Together with Punjab's urban centers of Faisalabad, Multan, and Rawalpindi, Lahore ranks also among Pakistan's most important commercial hubs.

Agriculture contributes the largest part of Pakistan's economy, and Punjab, known as the country's granary, makes by far the largest contribution to agricultural production and export income. Summer and winter rains can deposit 15 to 20 inches (38–50 cm) of rain across areas of the Punjab. Even so, the province's agriculture is mostly dependent on irrigation, which makes possible major crops in wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane. The Tarbella Dam on the Indus and the Mangala Dam on the Jhelum Canal, along with numerous barrages and canals, are key components in a system of irrigation and flood control.

Canal irrigation has its downside, however. Poor water management and seepage, along with drainage problems, have resulted in severe waste and waterlogging, creating accumulated salts that make the soil uncultivable. Additionally, the southeast section of the province remains undeveloped and is extremely hot and dry.

During the British Raj, Punjab alone provided more than a quarter of army recruits, mostly Sikh and Muslim Indians. The disproportionate recruitment of Sikhs and Muslims reflected the notion that they were among the "martial races." With the creation of Pakistan, Punjabis came to dominate its army, and the other provinces were helpless to prevent Punjabis' ascendance in the country's higher civil service.

Resentment against the Punjab takes other forms as well. Sind is engaged in a virtual water war with Punjab. Sindis believe that the reason for an often dry Indus River is excessive use of water by Punjab. Baluchistan claims that it provides 50 percent of Pakistan's natural gas resources but is not given a fair share in jobs or in the allocation of funds in a federal government dominated by Punjab. Punjab is also accused of delaying a census in Pakistan for fear that it could change the distribution of resources and political power among the four provinces. Many non-Punjabi politicians, intellectuals, and journalists believe that Pakistan's periodic military interventions are taken on behalf of Punjabi interests. The transfer of the nation's capital from Karachi to northern Punjab in 1960 and the 1979 execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a champion of Sindi regionalism, are seen through this prism.

There have also been intraprovincial tensions. Though 90 percent of the population speaks Punjabi, Seraiki-speaking people in Multan and central Punjab have serious issues with Punjabi speakers, and Seraikis feel isolated and politically underrepresented. Punjab's 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya religious riots, which were carried out with local government officials' complicity, required military intervention. Violence between Muslim Sunni and Shi'a militants erupted beginning in the mid-1990s. A provincial landed elite, in control of the most productive land, is held largely responsible for keeping peasants uneducated and poor.

Even then, Punjab outranks Pakistan's other provinces on a United Nations Human Development Index. Punjab has the best performance in school enrollment and educational attainment. It closely matches the NWFP for highest rank in a health index and Sind for adjusted real gross domestic product per capita. Punjab's Jhelum district stands first among all of Pakistan's districts in a composite of education, health, and wealth indexes. In overall human development, Punjab also has the lowest disparity between urban and rural districts.

Punjab has mostly given its political allegiance to the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The party, whose origins lay in a pre-independence political organization, has relied heavily on the mobilizing strength and financial support of Punjab's major landlords and industrialists. But the PML did poorly in the 1970 elections against Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and lost out to the PPP in Pakistan's discredited 1977 elections. In the four national and provincial elections between 1988 and 1997, the PML could count on all but the province's southern pro-PPP districts, and PML candidates led by Punjab's once chief minister Nawaz Sharif scored a decisive victory nationwide in 1997. A breakaway faction of PML members backing President Pervez Musharraf captured the largest share of seats for the national and provincial assemblies in the 2002 elections.

Indian Punjab

Punjab occupies an area of 20,254 square miles (52,458 sq. km), 1.7 percent of India's total land area. The state's population in the 2001 census was 24.3 million, of which about a third are urban dwellers. Over 60 percent of Punjab's population is literate. Sikhs constitute upward of 60 percent of the state, with about 35 percent Hindu and 2 percent Muslim. In 1966 East Punjab was divided into three parts to form, along with a Punjabi-speaking Punjab state, the states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, both with greater than 90 percent Hindu populations. Punjab and Haryana share a state capital at Chandigarh.

Punjab is one of the most prosperous states in India. Together with Haryana, it became, beginning in 1965, the centerpiece of India's "Green Revolution," featuring the introduction on irrigated lands of high-yielding varieties of food grains. By 1980, overall crop production rose sixfold from the years following partition. Productivity gains through an input-intensive strategy have also depended on the province's adroit, independent farmers, and the incentives provided for larger producers. Newly introduced agricultural universities have offered highly valued extension services to farmers.

Punjab's Sikhs have been a restive population. Serious agitation for greater linguistic and religious separatism, political autonomy, and economic opportunities began in 1973. As a religious and ethnic group, Sikhs asked for greater recognition of their language, Punjabi, including the territorial incorporation of additional Punjabi-speaking areas from neighboring states. The leading Sikh party, Akali Dal (Eternal Party), demanded the transfer of Chandigarh, the state capital, from a union territory to Punjab. Among more symbolic demands, this nationalist, paramilitary party called for Amritsar, site of the religion's revered Golden Temple, to be designated a holy city, and for the sale of liquor and tobacco to be banned

in the vicinity of the holy shrine. Punjab's farmers were deeply upset over the division of Beas and Sutlej river waters with Haryana, while a new generation of better-educated, younger Sikhs complained about their underrepresentation in most urban and modern occupations, and the need for larger investment of central government funds in Punjab's industrialization.

Bitterness toward central authorities led to separatist and terrorist activities in what was called the Khalistani insurgency. Murder, arson, and looting were common occurrences, claiming both Hindu and Sikh victims as interfactional violence also engulfed the Sikh community. The Indian government insisted that arms and drugs from Pakistan encouraged the unrest. The conflict came to a head in May 1984 with the New Delhi government's order for troops to storm the Golden Temple complex to flush out extremists. At least 750 insurgents and army personnel were killed. Legislated mass detentions and secret tribunals to combat Sikh terrorism from a number of organizations further fueled the community's anger. In time, however, the insurgency waned with strong repressive measures by security forces and the capture of leading militants. Sikhs have shunned terrorism since the early 1990s, but many still harbor grievances, despite some concessions from the central government.

Before the division of India's Punjab, the Congress Party consistently outpolled the Akali Dal in state elections. During the 1950s, Akali Dal entered into alliances with Congress at the national level. In Punjab's first post-division state elections in 1967, an Akali-led opposition front was able to defeat Congress. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's party retook the state assembly in the 1972 elections with a substantial majority, Akali Dal remained in strong competition with Congress. In 1972, defections from Congress to the Akali Dal brought the state government's fall and the imposition of President's Rule. But Congress again prevailed in elections the following year. An Akali-Janata Party alliance overwhelmed Congress in 1977, taking power in the state assembly as well as in New Delhi. Instability within the state government and increased violence led in 1984 to Punjab being placed under direct rule by the central government. When President's Rule was lifted in 1992 and the assembly restored, the Congress emerged victorious in state elections. Though by the late 1990s a moderate faction of the Akali Dal led a governing coalition, the Congress returned to power in the state in April 2002.

For almost two decades after partition, Punjabis continue to provide a preponderance of those in the army's officer corps, in the mid-1950s, as much as a third. In August–September 1965, after Pakistan tried to foment a rebellion in Indian Kashmir and penetrated the state with armored units, the Indian army responded by attacking

across the international border toward Lahore. Despite the desire for greater autonomy among many Sikhs, those in the military as well as within the civilian community remained overwhelmingly loyal to India. Sikhs were rewarded by New Delhi with a Punjabi-speaking state, but the 1965 war prompted changes in recruitment patterns, leading over time to a more geographically representative Indian military.

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See also **Geography; Pakistan**

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PURĀṆAS. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma); Shiva and Shaivism; Vishnu and Avatāras.**

PURNA SWARAJ. *See* **Nehru, Jawaharlal.**

PURUSHA. *See* **Caste System; Vedic Aryan India.**

PURVA-MIMANSAKA. *See* **Brāhmaṇas.**



QAWWĀLĪ A form of ecstatic Sufi Muslim worship in which a soloist leads a group of singers, *qawwālī* (Arabic, *qawwāl*, “one who speaks well”) possibly derives its name from a community of performers. *Qawwālī* refers to both a nonliturgical religious musical gathering associated with the Chishti sect of Sufi Muslims, as well as the repertoire sung at these gatherings. The poetry of *qawwālī* draws upon the traditions of Urdu and Persian poetry, although folk genres such as *qawl* and *rang* are a historic part of this worship. The most common musico-poetic forms of *qawwālī* are *gazal* (expressions of divine mystical love or praises of God), *hamd* (praises of God), *naʿt* (praises of the Prophet, Muhammad), and *manqabat* (praises of saints or imams).

Qawwals are religious musicians and, more specifically, the community that performs Sufi religious song. Many *qawwāls* trace their performing tradition to Amir Khusrau (1253–1325) and to his ties with the Chishti sect of Sufism probably founded by Muʿinuddin during the twelfth century. Professional *qawwāls* and dedicated amateurs perform *qawwālī* at shrines and private homes, and increasingly in concerts, often on the death anniversaries (*urs*) of famous Sufi saints, as well as in informal weekly contexts. Today, *qawwālī* is also a popular form of entertainment for wedding ceremonies and other auspicious occasions; performers appear in films and on television, and tapes and records are widely available in the marketplace.

The performance model for a *qawwālī* ensemble is that of the *murshīd* (director/guide) *murīd* (aspirant) relationship of Sufism in which a knowledgeable guide assists a disciple in the pursuit of divine knowledge. The principle singer (*mohrī*) of a performance leads the ensemble of responding singers (*awāziya*, “voices”) and

instrumentalists, as well as other listeners in the pursuit of *bāl*, an ecstatic divine experience and personal knowledge of God (*maʿrifa*) through the musical performance. The services of the *mohrī* are essential both to performers and audience members who wish to transform the self (*fanāʾ*).

A *qawwālī* performance psychologically attempts to bring willing individuals from a state of passive observation to full involvement. The music often begins with an instrumental prelude (*naghmā*) and/or an *ālāp* (sometimes known as *mahfil-i samā*, “gathering for listening”) and gradually builds in intensity. The responsorial structure of the music, while requiring a knowledgeable professional, allows for the easy involvement of those present.

The accompanying ensemble of performers, like the Sabri Brothers, commonly consists of drums (tabla and/or *dbolak*) and harmonium; however, *qawwālī* performers are, if anything, eclectic. Today, *qawwālī* performances include instruments such as the mandolin, violin, *sārangī*, and *dibrūba*, and, perhaps, electric guitars and synthesizers. Notably, performers such as Nasrat Fateh Ali Khan demonstrated that not only can one incorporate new musical instruments into *qawwālī*, one can merge Western pop idioms (for example, a drum-and-bass groove/ostinato) with a traditional song, such as “Mast Qalandar” (a *manqabat* in praise of the Sufi saint, Lal Qalandar).

The musical materials are fundamentally simple. The *qawwālī* repertoire consists of both existing songs and new creations based on classical *rāgs*, *rāg*-like melodies peculiar to the *qawwālī* tradition, and folk melodies. Generally, *qawwālī* performances have featured only two short *tāls*: the four-beat *qawwālī tāl* and six-beat *dādra tāl*. Contemporary performances build on these immediately



Qawwālī Singer, Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan. *Qawwālī's* devotional themes of peace and love date back some 700 years. Recording artist Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, shown here before his death in 1997, helped make it a force within the popular culture. GETTY IMAGES.

perceivable meters, combining predictable cycles with internal syncopations. These catchy repetitive time cycles can have a hypnotic effect on performers and audiences alike.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music.**

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QUR'AN. *See* **Islam.**



RABBAN, JOSEPH, *one of the founders of the Jewish community in South India*. Joseph Rabban (Issuppu Irappan), also known as Rabbani, is revered by the Jews of Cochin, Kerala, as a prince among the founders of their community in India. He is the recipient of the famous copper plate grant from the region's ruler, Bhaskara Ravi Varma, allotting him and his descendants specific rights and privileges. Very little is known about the identity of this early Jew of South India. Even the approximate date of his arrival is obscure. Estimates of the period of the copper plate grant range from the fourth to the eleventh century A.D. The earliest memory of the Kerala Jews is related to the ancient port of Cranganore (which the document refers to as Muyirikkodu), also known as Shingly, about 20 miles (32 km) north of Cochin. The southern coastal ports of India, along the eastern edge of the Arabian Sea, were often visited in ancient times by traders seeking spices, particularly pepper, so it is possible that Jewish merchants were aboard the ships that docked along the Malabar Coast. These Jews might have been the founders of the Kerala communities. The exact reference of the term "Anjuvannam" from the grant is in dispute; although it has been understood as meaning Cranganore, more recent scholarship translates it as a town guild or corporation.

In the fourteenth century the port of Cranganore silted up, forcing the Jewish community to move to other towns, among them Cochin. According to oral tradition, the king of Cochin welcomed the refugees, granting them an area in which to settle. Perhaps as a result of the move, the Jewish community became divided into distinct groups: indigenous and "foreign" (*paradesi*), the latter group consisting of newcomers from Spain and Arab lands. Nonetheless, Joseph Rabban plays a very prominent role in the folklore of the Cochin Jewish community. He was the first in a line of Jewish "kings," men of

power and privilege who were recognized as such by the surrounding population. A Jewish visitor from Spain in the fourteenth century wrote a poem, preserved in a Cochin song book, that is sung in the synagogue: "I had heard of the city of Shingly, / I longed to see an Israeli king / Him, I saw with my own eyes" (Katz and Goldberg, p. 40). A Cochin Jewish wedding song in Malayalam, referring to the groom, contains the following verse: "Conches and drums are beautifully echoing in the palace. / When he comes in such splendor / Let us sing of Joseph Rabban" (Johnson, p. 165).

Brenda Ness

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RADHAKRISHNAN, SARVEPALLI (1888–1975), *philosopher, president of India (1962–1967)*. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was independent India's second president, serving from 1962 to 1967. From 1952 to 1962, he had served as vice president under India's first president, Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Radhakrishnan was the leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization from 1946 to 1952, becoming president of that organization during his last two years there. He served as India's ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1952.

Radhakrishnan, a Tamil Brahman born just outside Madras in 1888, was one of India's most distinguished philosopher-statesmen, and a world-renowned exponent of Hindu philosophy. His brilliant master's thesis at the University of Madras was titled "The Ethics of the Vedanta and Its Metaphysical Presuppositions." Between 1909 and 1929, Radhakrishnan held professorial positions at the universities of Madras, Mysore, and Calcutta. During this time, he received international attention for his flawless speeches when he represented Indian universities at the Congress of the Universities of the British Empire in June 1926, and at the International Congress of Philosophy at Harvard University in September 1926. At Harvard, he bemoaned the lack of spiritualism in modern civilization.

In 1929 Radhakrishnan became the principal of Manchester College, Oxford University. From 1936 to 1939, he held the chair of Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, and was elected Royal Fellow of the British Academy. He returned to India in 1939 and, until 1949, served as vice-chancellor of Benares Hindu University. Thereafter, during his vice presidency from 1952 to 1962, he was also chancellor of Delhi University. With the spread of his reputation for eloquence and brilliance, he was invited frequently to give lectures on Hinduism and eastern philosophy in the West.

Aldous Huxley observed that Dr. Radhakrishnan's mastery of the English language was beyond excellence and that Radhakrishnan was "the master of words and no words." American scholar George P. Conger noted: "Among the philosophers of our time, no one has achieved so much in so many fields as has Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India. . . . William James was influential in religion, and John Dewey has been a force in politics. One or two American philosophers have been legislators. Jacques Maritain has been an ambassador. Radhakrishnan, in a little more than thirty years of work, has done all these things and more. . . . Never in the history of philosophy has there been quite such a world figure. With his unique appointment at Banaras [University] and Oxford, like a weaver's shuttle, he has gone to and fro between the East and West, carrying a thread of understanding, weaving it into the fabric of civilization." Radhakrishnan died in 1975.

Raju G. C. Thomas

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RĀGA Rāga (Sanskrit, *ranj*, "color"), in the classical music tradition of India, is the combined concept of melody and scale. To the listener, a *rāga* is a category of melodies all sharing key melodic features and inflections as well as scalar relationships, not to mention psychological associations. To the musician-composer, *rāga* is a resource of melodic ideas upon which he or she can draw to create music that is at once unique and familiar. In the northern and southern traditions, multiple performances or compositions of any particular common *rāga* will yield realized melodies that share a general scale type, an emphasis on particular pitches, and characteristic ways of engaging these pitches; yet they can be unique utterances.

However, while North and South India share this melodic concept, their approaches to *rāga* are subtly different. No term is as fundamentally important to contemporary Indian classical music yet as descriptively elusive as *rāga*.

Pitch

Underlying India's *rāgas* is a sense of pitch that is fundamentally similar to that found in the West and that indeed may have common ancient historical roots. As in many cultures, the physics of pitch production seem to generate the primary underlying structures, while cultural practices have defined specific pitch relationships; that is, the primary overtones of pitch production (the unison, the octave, and the fifth representing the open string and string divisions of one-half and one-third) result in a generalized conception of the octave being divided into seven principal steps and twelve incremental steps.

Musician-scholars of ancient India—probably reflecting practices historically deriving from the intonational relationships of Vedic chant—recognized an even smaller pitch increment: the *sbruti*. The scholar Bharata describes how to derive twenty-two of these microtonal intervals in the *Nāṭya Shāstra* (c. 200 B.C.–A.D. 200), demonstrating that he clearly could hear the pitch relationship but generating many questions and interpretations. However, even for Bharata, the *sbruti* was never a functionally separate entity, but rather an intonational

difference between two intervals. Subsequent treatises show that the concept was increasingly vague, although in typical Indian fashion, scholars continue to reference the concept in their own works (particularly in the South).

The primary term relating to pitch is *svara* (Sanskrit/Vedic, *sur*; “sun, heaven”; Hindi, “voice, sound, note”). As in the West, South Asian music recognizes seven scale steps (see Table 1): *shadja* (Sanskrit, *sasa*, “of six”; *shadja*, “six-born”), the principal note from which the other six derive, the tonic; *rishabha* (Sanskrit, “bull”), the second note of the gamut; *gandhāra* (Sanskrit, “the name of a people”), the third note of the gamut; *madhyama* (Sanskrit, “the middle”), the fourth note of the gamut; *pañcama* (Sanskrit, *pañcha*, “the fifth”), the fifth note of the gamut; *dhaivata* (Sanskrit, *dhi*, “to think, perceive [?]”), the sixth note of the gamut; and *nishāda* (Sanskrit, *nishāda*, “to sink or go down”), the seventh note of the gamut. Musicians commonly abbreviate these note names as *sā*, *ri/re*, *gā*, *mā*, *pā*, *dhā*, and *nī*. (South Indian musicians use the abbreviation *ri* for the second scale degree, whereas North Indian musicians use *re*.)

South India

The *Karnātak Sangīt Paddhati* (South Indian musical tradition) emphasizes *rāga* as an organization of scale and pitch hierarchy. Moreover, various treatises demonstrate how the South’s systemic approach to *rāga* developed. *Rāga* in the South involves the concepts of *melā* (Sanskrit, “group,” or “scale”), *melākārta* (Sanskrit, “scale matrix”), and *svrasthāna* (Sanskrit, “note placement”).

Ramamatya, a minister of Rama Raja of Vijayanagar, finished the *Svara-melā-kalānidhi* (1550) fifteen years before that city fell to northerners. Remarkably, the treatise shows either relatively little influence from the Islamic north or steadfast resistance to the growing importance of western Asia’s music culture. Notable is Ramamatya’s description and grouping of *rāgas* according to the number of scale types necessary to accommodate the varying intervallic structure of *rāgas* in current practice. This grouping of *rāgas* by scale type probably dates from the fourteenth century, but most musicians today know Ramamatya’s sixteenth-century interpretation. Somanatha’s *Rāgavibodha* (1609) shows the court traditions of South India to be cosmopolitan and connected to other cultures around the Indian Ocean (e.g., *rāga Arabhi*).

The scholar Venkatamakhi in his *Caturdandī-prakāsika* (1661) features a classification of *rāgas* into seventy-two basic scales (*melās*) derived from a note placement (*svrasthāna*) of twelve available semitones in which some notes have enharmonic equivalents (i.e., the same pitch can have a different name, depending on context). This

TABLE 1

| Scale steps in South Asian music | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Solfeggio | Svara Name | Abbreviation |
| Doh | <i>Shadja</i> | Sā |
| Ti | <i>Nishāda</i> | Ni |
| La | <i>Dhaivata</i> | Dhā |
| Sol | <i>Pañcama</i> | Pā |
| Fa | <i>Madhyama</i> | Mā |
| Mi | <i>Gandhāra</i> | Gā |
| Re | <i>Rishabha</i> | Ri/Re |
| Doh | <i>Shadja</i> | Sā |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

system still prevails in South Indian classical music. His ingenious system makes maximum use of the available twelve semitones with the following premises:

1. Scales have a maximum of seven possible pitches.
2. These seven pitches occur in order (*sā*, *ri*, *gā*, *mā*, *pā*, *dhā*, *nī*).
3. The octave repeats (a named pitch in one octave is synonymous with a pitch of the same name in a different octave).
4. Some notes can enharmonically overlap in different scales.
5. Scales consist of two conjunct tetrachords: *sā-mā* and *pā-sā* (octave).
6. The natural (*shuddha*) position for every note is the lowest position.

Venkatamakhi describes three positions each for *nishāda*, *dhaivata*, *gandhāra*, and *rishabha*, and two positions for *madhyama*. *Shadja* and *pañcama* have fixed positions. The logic behind this lies partly in the physics of sound. *Shadja* and *pañcama* are the most prominent overtones produced by a vibrating string or column of air. *Madhyama* is at once the inverse of the *shadja-pañcama* interval (i.e., the distance from the upper *shadja* to *madhyama* is the same as from the lower *shadja* to *pañcama*) and the defining upper limit to the lower tetrachord. *Nishāda*, *dhaivata*, *gandhāra*, and *rishabha* lie in acoustically unstable areas. That is, the seventh, sixth, third, and second scale degrees have no strong harmonic overtones to support them. Interestingly, the concept of *sbruti* remains in the names for the variants of *rishabha* and *dhaivata* in the modifiers *sat-sbruti* (seven *sbrutis*) and *catus-sbruti* (four *sbrutis*).

In Table 2, each of the twelve discrete semitones has an assigned number from 0 to 11. Note that *nishāda* and *dhaivata*, as well as *gandhāra* and *rishabha*, share two note positions each. Also note that the examples in this entry

TABLE 2

| South Indian <i>svrasthāna</i> (note placement) | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---|-------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| <i>Shadja</i> | <i>sā</i> | 0 | <i>sā</i> | <i>shadja</i> | |
| <i>kakali nishāda</i> | <i>ni</i> [#] | 1 | | | |
| | | 1 | | | |
| <i>kaishiki nishāda</i> | <i>ni</i> [†] | 1 | <i>dhā</i> [#] | <i>sat-shruti dhaivata</i> | <i>uttarānga</i> |
| | | 0 | | | |
| <i>shuddha nishāda</i> | <i>ni</i> | 9 | <i>dhā</i> [†] | <i>catus-shruti dhaivata</i> | |
| | | 8 | <i>dhā</i> | <i>shuddha dhaivata</i> | |
| <i>pañcama</i> | <i>pā</i> | 7 | <i>pā</i> | <i>pañcama</i> | |
| <i>prati madhyama</i> | <i>mā</i> [#] | 6 | | | |
| <i>shuddha madhyama</i> | <i>mā</i> | 5 | | | |
| | | 4 | <i>gā</i> [#] | <i>antara gandhāra</i> | <i>purvānga</i> |
| <i>sat-shruti rishabh</i> | <i>ri</i> [#] | 3 | <i>gā</i> [†] | <i>sadharāna gandhāra</i> | |
| <i>catus-shruti rishabh</i> | <i>ri</i> [†] | 2 | <i>gā</i> | <i>shuddha gandhāra</i> | |
| <i>shuddha rishabh</i> | <i>ri</i> | 1 | | | |
| <i>Shadja</i> | <i>sā</i> | 0 | <i>sā</i> | <i>shadja</i> | |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

use the Western musical symbols of # (indicating a note is in a raised position by a semitone), † (indicating a note is in a lowered position by a semitone), or, as in this particular example, ## to indicate that a note is two semitones higher than the natural position. Similarly, the use of the numerals 0 to 11 is consistent with Western pitch-class analysis and is not generally a part of South Asian musical dialogue. Nevertheless, that both Western and Indian musical practices have enough commonalities to allow both the use of the concept of semitone and raised and lowered positions, not to mention seven note identities, is possibly indicative of cultural links over the centuries.

The principles underlying Venkatamakhi's system are as follows:

1. *Sā* and *pā*, as the most important notes in the harmonic series, are fixed in their positions. That is, the overtones produced by the fundamental *sā* include first its octave equivalent and the fifth (*pā*). In melodic contexts, these notes can be omitted, but they are inherent in the scale.
2. *Mā*, as the next most important note in the harmonic series, has two positions: *shuddha* (pure) *mā* and *prati* (raised) *mā*.
3. The second (*ri*), third (*gā*), sixth (*dhā*), and seventh (*ni*) of the scale have three variations, each beginning with a *shuddha* (pure or natural) position and two raised positions above. *Ri* and *dhā*, as the notes immediately above the immovable notes of *sā* and *pā*,



Mughal Painting, c. 1590. This painting honors the legendary singer Tansen. Believed by some to work miracles with his *rāgas*, he was regarded as one of the “Nine Jewels” of Akbar’s court. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

borrow from ancient terminology with the indication that they are four (*catus*) and seven (*sat*) *shrutis* above their respective notes. Thus, *ri* has a natural position (*suddha rishabh*) with two raised positions above (*catus-shruti rishabh* and *sat-shruti rishabh*). The third and the seventh employ a different nomenclature, but their *shuddh* positions are also the points above which their alternates are placed. In practice, these intervals are roughly equivalent to modern semitones, although Venkatamakhi would have used something closer to just intonation (with note positions based on string ratios).

4. When constructing a scale, the notes must always appear in the order *sā, ri, gā, mā, pā, dhā, ni, sā*, no matter which position they are in.
5. Venkatamakhi divides his scale into lower (*purvāṅga*) and upper (*uttarāṅga*) tetrachords (groups of four notes), reflecting the importance of stringed lutes in the definition of these scales. The *purvāṅga* consists of the notes *sā, ri, gā, and mā*. The *uttarāṅga* consists of the notes *pā, dhā, ni, and sā*.
6. The first *cakra* (cycle) has *sā* and *mā* fixed in the *purvāṅga*. *Ri* and *gā* are in their *śuddh* or lowest positions. Thus, the first *melā* (scale) of the first *cakra* has *sā, śuddha ri* (one semitone above *sā*), *śuddha gā* (one semitone above *śuddha ri* and a whole tone above *sā*) and *mā* (a perfect fourth above *sā*). The second *melā* of the first *cakra* has *sā, ri, and mā* in the same positions as the first *melā*, but raises *gā* one semitone. The third *melā* follows the same pattern with *gā* now two semitones above *ri*. The fourth *melā* starts with *sā* and *mā* in the same position, but raises *ri* to the *catu-sruti* position, two semitones or one whole tone above *sā*. This leaves only two positions for *gā* (*sadbhāraṇa* and *antara*). Finally, with *sā* and *mā* still fixed, *ri* raises to its highest position (*sat-sruti*) leaving only one position for *gā* (*antara*) so that the first *cakra* has six *melās*.
7. The *uttarāṅga* (upper tetrachord) functions the same way, except that now *pā* and *sā* are the fixed notes and *dhā* and *ni* move. More important, the six parallel changes in note position take place once for each *cakra*. Thus, in the first *cakra*, *dhā* and *ni* begin in their *śuddh* positions (*dhā* one semitone above *pā* and *ni* one semitone above *dhā*) and remain in those positions while *ri* and *gā* go through their mutations in the lower tetrachord. When the second *cakra* begins, *ni* raises one semitone to its first raised position (*kaisiki*) and remains there until the third *cakra*, when it rises to its highest position (*kākili*). Again, the upper tetrachord parallels the lower tetrachord in note changes, matching one change for every *cakra* (or set of changes in the lower tetrachord).
8. Matching the six positions of the lower tetrachord with the six positions of the upper tetrachord yields thirty-six different scales. Venkatamakhi then derives an additional thirty-six *melās* by repeating the process with *mā* in the *prati* position.

Performance practice places a number of qualifications on *rāga*. First, a *rāga* may use some or all of the notes available in a *melā*. A *sampurna rāga* (Sanskrit, “complete”) is a *rāga* having a heptatonic or seven-note scale. A *śhadava rāga* (Sanskrit, “sweetmeats”) is a *rāga* having a hexatonic or six-note scale. An *audava rāga* (the name of a constellation) has a pentatonic scale. And a *rāga* that introduces notes from other *melās*, or mixes *melās*, is a *janya rāga* (Sanskrit, *janya*, “derivative”).



Ustad Asad Ali Khan. In 2005 he remains one of the few active modern masters of the *rudraveena* (or *been*), the premier instrument of Indian classical music. His musical roots date back some seven generations to the eighteenth century, when his ancestors served as musicians to the princes of Jaipur. INDIA TODAY.

In describing a *rāga* and in defining its melodic characteristics, musicians and scholars employ a variety of terms. Among the most important are those describing a *rāga*'s ascending (*ārohana*) and descending (*avarohana*) scalar movement. Such movements commonly omit a note in one direction, only to include it in another. This movement may also be *vakra* (crooked) such that a momentary ascent may interrupt a descent and vice versa. Perhaps even more important are the notions of *jīva-svara* (Sanskrit, “life-note”) and *pitippu* (Telugu, “catch”). The former is the most important note of a *rāga*, the note that stands out and contributes to the melodic dynamics of the *rāga*. The latter is a characteristic melodic phrase commonly generated by the *jīva-svara* and which stands out as a principal way to identify the *rāga*. Scholars sometimes project this last idea into a *rāga-chāyā-saṅcāra* (Sanskrit, “*rāga*-image-phrase”), an extended notion of

characteristic melodic phrase. Another important component is the treatment (*gamaka*) that individual notes receive, of which there are numerous kinds of shakes, vibratos, and slides.

North India

While North and South Indian classical music systems hold many fundamental concepts in common, at the same time there is much that is different. The names of the seven notes of the scale are nearly identical (with some minor variations) and the word for melody is essentially the same, *rāga* (*rāg* in common Hindustani speech).

The word for scale in the north is *thāt* (Hindi, “framework,” or “skeleton”). Instead of the complicated and comprehensive system espoused by Venkatamakhi, North Indian musicians and scholars use a set of scales derived largely from practice, not theory. Furthermore, the North Indian *svrasthāna* is a straightforward approach with the five movable notes having only two positions each (rather than three). A *svar*’s position is either *shuddh* (natural) or one of two *vikrit* (altered) positions: *tīvra* (“strong,” “intense,” or “raised”) or *komal* (“soft,” or “lowered”). As in South Indian musical practice, *shadja* and *pañcama* are in fixed positions. The other notes—*nishāda*, *dhaivata*, *madhyama*, *gandhāra*, and *rishabha*—have two possible positions each (see Table 3).

The scholar V. N. Bhatkhande (1860–1936) collected and organized North Indian *rāgas* according to scale, describing *rāgas* in terms of ten *thāts*. Bhatkhande’s beginning scale, or *shuddh thāt*, is Bilāval *thāt*, which is parallel to the Western major scale. He describes the other *thāts* in terms of the ways in which they vary from Bilāval (see Table 4).

Melody is by far the most important defining aspect of *rāga* in the Hindustani *sangīt paddhati* (North Indian classical music tradition). In most *rāgas*, only one version of a *svar* occurs (either the *shuddh* or the *tīvra/komal* position of any one note). However, in some *rāgas* (especially the so-called light *rāgs* or in the Lalit group of *rāgas*), more than one note may appear. N. A. Jairazbhoy (1971) has commented on the historical mutation of *rāgas* and has proposed both an explanation for this evolution (in tetrachordal symmetry) and a thirty-two-*thāt* system to include all—not just ten—possible combinations.

As in South Indian practice, some North Indian *rāgas* use only some of the notes available in a *thāt*, which—while confounding classification by scale—contributes to the diversity of musical possibilities. Scholars recognize three such *jātī* (Sanskrit, “species”): *sampurn* (“complete”; heptatonic scales, i.e., those with seven notes), *shadav/khadav* (hexatonic scales, i.e., those with six notes), and *audav* (pentatonic scales, i.e., those with five notes).

TABLE 3

| North Indian <i>svrasthāna</i> (note placement) | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|----|-----------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| <i>Shadja</i> | sā | 0 | sā | <i>shadja</i> | |
| | | 11 | ni | <i>shuddha nishāda</i> | <i>uttarānga</i> |
| | | 10 | ni [♭] | <i>komal nishāda</i> | |
| <i>shuddha dhaivata</i> | dhā | 9 | | | <i>purvānga</i> |
| <i>komal dhaivata</i> | dhā [♭] | 8 | | | |
| <i>pañcama</i> | pā | 7 | pā | <i>pañcama</i> | |
| <i>tīvra madhyama</i> | mā [#] | 6 | | | |
| <i>Shuddha madhyama</i> | mā | 5 | | | |
| | | 4 | gā | <i>shuddha gandhāra</i> | |
| | | 3 | gā [♭] | <i>komal gandhāra</i> | |
| <i>shuddha rishabha</i> | ri | 2 | | | |
| <i>komal rishabha</i> | ri [♭] | 1 | | | |
| <i>Shadja</i> | sā | 0 | sā | <i>shadja</i> | |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

Indian music does not generally make use of equal temperament, but rather something closer to just intonation; that is, Indian musicians tend to tune their instruments to pure acoustic intervals. Individual musicians will further fine tune specific notes, for the most part, according to their prerogatives, paying particular interest to fine shades of intonation. Musicians commonly highlight particular notes with several “intonational” ornaments: *mīnd* (slides), *andolan* (exaggerated vibrato), and *gamak* (a quick shake). The word musicians commonly use to describe these fine discriminations in intonation is *sbruti* (that which is heard), which, while referencing the ancient microtone of Bharata’s time, has no specific or measurably consistent equivalent today.

Scholars and musicians in northern Indian practice describe the melodic movement of *rāgs* with a number of terms. They recognize *rāgs* by their characteristic melodic movement or *varn* (Sanskrit, “kind” or “class”). The terms *ārob* (or *ārohi varn*) and *avrob* (or *avrohi varn*) describe the ascending and descending aspects of the *rāga* in abstraction. Three other terms also find their way into contemporary usage: *sthāyī varn* (“steady” or “unchangeable” form, i.e., the *rāg* has characteristically straight ascents or descents), *sañcārī varn* (“wandering,” i.e., a mixture of *ārob* and *avrob*), and *vakr varn* (“crooked” or “oblique”). This last term describes the characteristic passages of some *rāgs*, which demand a deviation from the straight scale. The note from which a *vakr varn* must begin is the *vakr svar*.

One of the most important ways of identifying a *rāg* is through its *pakad*, or characteristic phrase. An even more

TABLE 4

| Bhatkhande's <i>thāts</i> | | Bilāval | Kalyān | Kamāj | Kāfi | Āsavārī | Bhairavi | Bhairav | Todī | Purvī | Mārwa |
|---------------------------|----|---------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| shadja | 0 | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā |
| shuddha nishāda | 11 | ni | ni | | | | | | | | |
| komal nishāda | 10 | | | ni ^b | ni ^b | ni ^b | ni ^b | | | | |
| shuddha dhaivata | 9 | dhā | dhā | dhā | dhā | | | | | | |
| komal dhaivata | 8 | | | | | dhā ^b | dhā ^b | dhā ^b | dhā ^b | dhā ^b | dhā |
| pañcama | 7 | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā | pā |
| tivra madhyama | 6 | | mā [#] | | | | | | mā [#] | mā [#] | mā [#] |
| madhyama | 5 | mā | | mā | mā | mā | mā | mā | | | |
| gandhāra | 4 | gā | gā | gā | | | | gā | | gā | gā |
| komal gandhāra | 3 | | | | gā ^b | gā ^b | gā ^b | | gā ^b | | |
| shuddha rishabha | 2 | re | re | re | re | re | | | | | |
| komal rishabha | 1 | | | | | | re ^b | re ^b | re ^b | re ^b | re ^b |
| shadja | 0 | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā | sā |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

elaborate description of a *rāg* is a *svar vistār*, a series of phrases illustrating the characteristic shapes of a *rāg* in a variety of registers.

Most *rāgs* have two notes of particular importance: the *vādī* and *samvādī*. The *vādī* (Sanskrit, “sonant”) or *amsba* is the most important note, often approached via the *sam vādī* (consonant), the second-most important note. Historically, scholars have used the terms *visranti svar* or *maqām shbām* to describe the terminal or resting notes, sometimes equating these with *vādī*. Modern musicians are more likely to use the term *vādī*. Two terms that are used often (but that are more commonly defined by what they are not) are *vivādī* (a dissonant note to be avoided, sometimes also described as the *varji svar*, “omitted note”) and *anuvādī* (an assonant note that is perceived neither as consonant nor as dissonant to the *vādī*).

According to Bhatkhande, musicians should perform between noon and midnight those *rāgs* that have their *vādī* in the *purvāṅg* or that emphasize the lower tetrachord. *Rāgs* that have their *vādī* in the *uttrāṅg* or that emphasize the upper tetrachord should be performed between midnight and noon.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music; Tāla**

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RĀGAMĀLĀ Literally meaning “a garland of melodies,” *Rāgamālā* paintings illustrate Indian melodic forms, or *rāgas* and *Rāginīs*. Indian musicians also use this term while playing several melodies in a continuous sequence. An Indian melody, or *rāga*, is a composition of musical modes having a sequence or structure with a specific mood or significance. *Rāgamālā* paintings visualize such melodies in pictorial forms.

The source of *Rāgamālā* illustrations lies in the descriptions of melodies, using vivid verbal imagery, by the Indian musicologists of the late medieval period. The *Sangeeta Ratnākara* of Sharangadeva, an important treatise from the twelfth century A.D., for the first time mentions the presiding deity of each *rāga*, associating the *rāgas* and *rāginīs* with certain gods. The growing number of *rāgas* and their increasing variety created the need for analytical study and classification into relative groups. The earliest systematic exposition of such classification divides them into eight major “male” *rāgas* and three derivative “female” *rāginīs*, each listed in the *Rāga Sāgara*, written around 1440. That work also gives the iconographic description of *rāgas* such as Bhairava, Bhupāla, Patamañjarī, Mālava, Rāmapriyā, Gurjarī, Todī,



Rāgamālā Painting Portraying Hindola. Though the mood of such a painting was inspired by the sound of the corresponding *rāgā*, the musician relies on it as a kind of guidebook, suggesting nuances of interpretation and clarifying the sentiment his performance should evoke. BURSTEIN COLLECTION / CORBIS.

and Madhumādhavī, in the chapter titled *Rāgadyāna Vidhānam*. Treatises on musicology of this period suggest that the names of the melodies have contextual origins, and it is possible that this context is reflected in the iconography of each *rāgā*. This context includes: the structure of the *rāgā*, its geographical area of origin, the festivals and seasons associated with each, and the tunes used by the people of certain professions while at work or engaged in religious celebrations. For instance, *Rāgini Āsavarī* is connected with the music of the *saperū*, or people belonging to a snake-charmer community, who entice snakes with the music of their special instrument, known as *bin*. *Rāgini Āsavarī*, therefore depicts a girl who, having lured snakes to her, is holding them in her hands. *Rāgā Vāsanta*, meaning the spring season, depicts the festival of colors celebrated at the advent of the spring; *Rāgā Megha-malbār* (*megha* meaning “cloud”) illustrates the monsoon season. *Rāgā Māru* (*maru* meaning “desert”) has a geographical context and is illustrated by depicting camel riders or camels. This *rāgā* must have its origin in the desert areas of Rajasthan. Melodies also relate to the

moods of heroes and heroines. *Rāgā Bibhāsa* (twilight), for instance, depicts a couple in a romantic mood, aiming an arrow at a rooster as he announces the advent of morning.

The art of miniature painting on paper was also gaining patronage during the seventeenth century, and the Rajput royal families and patrons also began commissioning secular paintings including the *rāgamālā*. The earliest visual depiction of melodies found to date is in a *Kalpasūtra* of about 1475, initially published by Sarabhai Nawab, in which the *rāgās* and *rāginīs* are shown in purely iconic form, as the forms of gods and goddesses. *Rāgamālā* acquired the importance of an independent theme during the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal rule, when secular themes were in demand. The earliest set of *rāgamālā* was painted in what is known as the Chaurapanchashika style of the Delhi Jaunpur area, in the mid-sixteenth century. It splendidly depicts the main iconographic features of each *rāgā*, the literary description of which is inscribed on the reverse.

However, the real precursor of the Rajasthani *Rāgamālā* of the later period is the famous Chawand *Rāgamālā* painting by the artist Nisardi in Chawand (Chanda), Mewar, in 1605. Set against a red lacquer background, a dark sky, and a variety of floral decorative plants, the *rāgas* and *rāginīs* are depicted with bold draftsmanship. During the same period, the *Rāgamālā* theme found patronage from circles more influenced by the Mughal idiom. A *Rāgamālā* dated 1605, painted in the popular Mughal style, offers an interesting companion to the set Chawand *Rāgamālā*. The paintings have much more realistic renderings, while the iconography remains the same.

The cultural climate of the Deccan was particularly vibrant during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries under the reign of Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah II (r. 1580–1627), who was a lover of painting and a fine musician himself. A few folios from several *Rāgamālā* sets, painted in Bijapur and Ahmednagar styles and dating from the late sixteenth century, are dispersed in various collections.

Later treatises on *Rāgamālā* were written in Hindi. Many more *Rāgamālā* were added to the original set of thirty-six, and the artists began to take more liberties in the iconography of the *Rāgamālā* of the later periods. From the seventeenth century onward, *Rāgamālā* paintings were commonly depicted by the painters of all schools of miniature painting in India. Though generally the iconographic details are the same, the northern and the southern versions vary considerably. In the north the literary version of *Rāgamālā* used by the artists of the Kangra Valley or the Basohli differs from that used in Rajasthan.

A number of sets from Sirohi, Bundi, Kotah, Marwar, Kangra, and Hyderabad have come to light. *Rāgamālā* paintings were also painted in the women's quarters of the Havelis. It is possible that the visual form of these paintings was easily understood by many people, or they may have been created only for the enjoyment of the connoisseur.

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See also **Miniatures; Rāga**

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RAHMAN, SHEIKH MUJIBUR (1920–1975), first president and prime minister of Bangladesh (1971–1975). Adored and loved as Bangabandhu (“Bengal’s Friend”), Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a charismatic, crowd-inspiring leader. The birth of Bangladesh was bloody; it passed through a nine-month gestation of massacre unleashed by the Pakistanis, and the intervention of the Indian army helped deliver it. The end of the Bangabandhu’s colorful and constructive career was equally bloody.

Sheikh Mujib, as he was popularly called, was born in 1920 in the Faridpur district of present-day Bangladesh. The son of a civil court official, Mujib graduated from a local missionary school in Faridpur in 1942, and from the Islamic College in Kolkata (Calcutta) in 1947. While attending high school, Mujib emerged as a student activist. In January 1938 he confronted Chief Minister A. K. Fazlul Haq when he came to Gopalganj, Mujib’s town, on an official visit. He asked the chief minister to provide funds for upgrading the school and its hostel, and Haq agreed to release funds for the school projects. Mujib was hailed as a local hero. This event marked the beginning of Mujib’s increasing entwinement with Bengal politics and with its Muslim leadership. It also marked the beginning of his intermittent run-ins with the police and, later, long spells of imprisonment: he was arrested twice at the age of eighteen for inciting fellow students to protest, and for unruly behavior.

Mujib Rahman joined the Muslim Students’ Federation of India in 1940. He was elected a member of the Bengal Muslim League Council in 1943. Soon he found himself in the front ranks of progressive Muslim student leaders who were enjoined by their leaders to oppose the communalists in the Indian Muslim League. Mujib joined with Shahid Suhrawardy against Kwaja Najimuddin. In June 1947 the British announcement of their plan to partition India into two sovereign nations, India and Pakistan, led Mujib to mobilize young Muslim leaders in a secret conclave at the Islamic College in Kolkata to work on a political organization in opposition to the Muslim League. Some consider this development to be the seed of Mujib Rahman’s Awami League, which would later lead to the movement for the creation of Bangladesh and the breakup of Pakistan in 1971.

Toward the end of 1947, Rahman left Kolkata for Dhaka and joined the Law College there as a student. He was expelled from the University of Dhaka for “inciting the fourth class employees.” In 1948 he helped establish the East Pakistan Muslim Student League, which was enlarged into the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League in 1949. In 1953 he was elected general secretary of the Awami Muslim League and later became its president in 1966. After the 1954 general elections, he joined Fazlul Haq’s government, and when it was dismissed by the Pakistani government after two months, he was arrested

along with the others in his party, which was renamed the East Pakistan Awami League. The word “Muslim” was dropped to suggest its secular character.

In more ways than one, the genesis of Bangladesh lies in the language movement in which Mujib and his cohorts in the Awami League took an active part, and for which they received prison sentences in the 1950s and 1960s. The demand to make Bengali the official language of the people of Bangladesh was first presented by Dhirendranath Datta in the Pakistan Legislative Council in 1948. He asked for the acceptance of Bengali as a national language, along with Urdu and English. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, governor-general of Pakistan, summarily rejected this demand, declaring Urdu the sole national language of all of Pakistan. The firm rejection only hardened the determination of students, intellectuals, and secular political activists to seek and establish Bengali identity in language rather than religion.

The movement to make Bengali a state language in Pakistan, and the only language of East Pakistan, gained in momentum and quickly enveloped the entire region. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who had seized power in 1958, ruling all of Pakistan with an iron hand, responded with more repression. He was supported by the Islamists, who saw in Rahman, the language movement, and the Awami League the seeds of the destruction of Pakistan as an Islamic republic. In 1966 Rahman issued a six-point program to reconstitute Pakistan as a parliamentary democracy, leaving the central government with only defense and foreign policy in its jurisdiction, with the rest of the powers to be vested in the states. He asked for a separate currency and armed forces for East Pakistan. Ayub Khan, convinced that Rahman was, in so many words, calling for independence, arrested him on a trumped-up charge. Ayub faced a populist upsurge in West Pakistan and decided to abdicate, handing over the presidency to Yahya Khan, the commander-in-chief of the army. Mujib Rahman was released from prison, and President Yahya Khan called for a general election.

The results surprised Khan. Rahman’s party, the Awami League, swept the polls in the East, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party won a majority of the seats in the West. With the plurality of seats in his favor, Rahman now expected an invitation from Yahya Khan to lead and form the new government in Pakistan. Khan decided to call the National Assembly to session on 25 March 1971. Neither Khan nor Bhutto was willing to hand the position of prime minister to Rahman. They invited him to talks, which failed. At midnight on 25 March, the army opened fire on students and faculty at Dhaka University’s dormitories and faculty housing complexes. Mujib Rahman was arrested. The die was cast. In his parting message to his people, Rahman declared them

citizens of a free country—Bangladesh. The army crackdown continued, causing some 10 million refugees to flee to neighboring West Bengal in India. An inestimable number of men, women, and children were killed and women raped. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, after signing a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, sent the Indian army into Pakistan on 23 November; on 15 December 1971, India’s chief-of-staff Sam Manekshaw formally accepted Pakistani General Niazi’s offer of surrender.

Soon after the army crackdown of 25 March, the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters) had launched a war of liberation and had formed a provisional government, declaring Mujib Rahman as its president. On 10 January 1972, Mujib returned to Dhaka after being released from prison in Pakistan. He became the first prime minister of independent and sovereign Bangladesh.

The birth pangs were, however, extreme. Mujib and his government faced gargantuan tasks of reconstruction and rehabilitation, attempting as well to stem the tide of mass revenge against those who had supported Pakistan. Mujib, the charismatic leader, was not a competent administrator. On 15 August 1975, disaffected members of the Bangladesh army assassinated Mujib Rahman and members of his family at the presidential palace.

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See also **Bangladesh**

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RAILROADS. See **British Impact**.

RAJAGOPALACHARI, CHAKRAVARTI (1878–1972), *writer and statesman, prominent in India’s independence movement; last governor-general of India (1948–1950)*. Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (often called C. R. or Rajaji) was born on 10 December 1878 to a family of poor Iyengar Brahmans in Thorapalli, near Hosur, in the Tamil country. The first Indian to serve as free India’s head of state, he was ninety-four when he died in Chennai (formerly Madras) on 25 December 1972.

Early Life

As the headman first of Thorapalli and later of the larger settlement of Hosur, Rajagopalachari’s father, Chakravarti Iyengar, earned a monthly salary of around five rupees (about one U.S. dollar at the time). The

youngest of three brothers, Rajagopalachari saw the blackboard as a blur in Hosur's government school, but at the age of thirteen, when he obtained spectacles, he understood, as he put it, "what green was" and that stars were not "just a vague mist of light" but "had points, and corners, and colours" (Gandhi, p. 5).


By this time he was studying in the British-run Central College in Bangalore, the city closest to Hosur. Graduation from Central College was followed by a course and degree in law in Madras and the start of a practice as a criminal lawyer in Salem, headquarters of the district to which Thorapalli and Hosur belonged and the seat of the district's British Collector.

Politics—Salem's civic affairs as well as the cause of Indian self-government—pulled Rajagopalachari, the more so following the illness and early death (at the age of twenty-six) of his wife Alarmelu Mangammal, or Manga, who bore him five children. He entered the municipal council, chaired it to much acclaim, took some steps, despite sharp opposition from orthodox Hindus, that reduced discrimination against "untouchables," followed events in the Indian National Congress, which had been founded in 1885, preferred the Congress's extremists to its moderates, and briefly day-dreamed about bombs and assassinations ending British rule.

Satyagraha. The possibility of another route to independence was suggested by press accounts of the nonviolent disobedience that Mohandas Gandhi and numerous Indians were practicing in South Africa from 1906, accounts confirmed to Rajagopalachari by relatives (in India) of Tamils indentured in South Africa. Sending Gandhi money for the South African effort, Rajagopalachari argued in a 1916 article that Gandhi's technique of *satyagraha* ("clinging to the truth"), pitting "soul force" against "the force of arms," was "a great question" for those wanting independence in India (Gandhi, p. 26).

Though by this time Gandhi was back in India, most Congress politicians considered him impractical; Rajagopalachari was probably the first to suggest that *satyagraha* might succeed in India. When, early in 1919, Gandhi proposed nonviolent resistance to the newly announced Rowlatt Bills that sought to curb free speech, Rajagopalachari, moving at this juncture from Salem to the city of Madras, at once offered his support. Gandhi's stay as Rajagopalachari's houseguest in Madras in March 1919 marked the end of his legal practice. Henceforth he would be a full-time, unpaid worker for independence, Gandhi's close colleague, and the commander of nonviolent battles in the south.

The British jailed him five times, for several months at a time, between 1921 and 1941. After independence, an



Rajagopalachari, Portrait of India's Last Governor-General.

A life long student of Hinduism, Rajagopalachari published a highly regarded edition of the Mahābhārata in his later years. His political writing spanned many decades and forms. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

entry in a diary that Rajagopalachari kept in Vellore—where, tormented by solitary confinement, filthy food, and sickness, he spent the first of these terms—would be recalled for its foresight:

Swaraj (independence) will not at once or, I think, even for a long time to come, be better government or greater happiness for the people. Elections and their corruptions, injustice, and the power and tyranny of wealth and inefficiency of administration will make a hell of life as soon as freedom is given to us. . . . The only thing gained will be that as a race we will be saved from dishonour and subordination. (Gandhi, pp. 72–73)

Leader of the Congress. From 1919 to 1942, Rajagopalachari was on anyone's list of five or six leading figures of the Indian National Congress. Referring to a Congress plenary held, while Gandhi was in prison, in Gaya in Bihar in 1922, where Rajagopalachari's debating skills turned the tables on numerous opponents of *satyagraha*,

Prafulla Chandra Ghosh, later a chief minister of West Bengal, would say, “Mr. Rajagopalachari became the leader of the Congress at Gaya” (Gandhi, p. 80).

Responding in 1927 to a question asked in Karaikudi in Madras province, Gandhi observed that Rajagopalachari was his “only possible successor” (Gandhi, p. 103). In 1930 Rajagopalachari led a defiant and strictly nonviolent “salt march” to Vedaranyam on South India’s east coast that wiped out, as the Raj privately acknowledged, any “sense of devotion to the Government” in the Tamil country (Gandhi, p. 123). This was followed by a fresh *satyagraha* campaign in 1932 and another in 1933, the year in which Rajagopalachari’s link with Gandhi was buttressed by the marriage of his youngest daughter, Lakshmi, to Gandhi’s youngest son, Devadas.

In the mid-1930s, Rajagopalachari played a major role in a switch in Congress strategy from *satyagraha* to measured cooperation with the Raj’s political reforms. After elections held in the first half of 1937, Congress ministries took office in eight provinces, and Rajagopalachari found himself prime minister of the extensive Madras presidency, stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea.

British civilian and police officers who had earlier monitored, curbed, or jailed Rajagopalachari were now his subordinates, though the British governor of Madras, Lord Erskine, held reserve powers and could block or even remove his premier. Rajagopalachari charmed the officers and also the governor, who, however, thought that his premier, radical in some areas but conservative in others, was “an odd mixture” whose “main object in life” seemed to be to “get India back to what it was in the days of King Asoka” (Gandhi, p. 179).

Rajagopalachari’s Madras ministry was doing very well and had entered its third year in office when Adolf Hitler attacked Poland in September 1939 and the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, declared that India too was at war with Germany. When Congress’s plea for a commitment of Indian independence at the end of the war was turned down, all its ministries, including Rajagopalachari’s, resigned.

The Postwar Years: Nationalism and Independence

The war had strengthened nationalist urges among the British and in the Congress, and also in the Muslim League, which, in March 1940, demanded the separation, as Pakistan, of the subcontinent’s Muslim-majority areas. After Japan’s sweep in 1941 and 1942 in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Rajagopalachari concluded that the Congress could not fight the British, the League, and the Japanese at the same time.

He did not join the Gandhi-led Quit India stir of 1942. Inviting the League to stand alongside the Congress in its bid for independence, he asked the Congress, on its part, to concede that contiguous Muslim-majority districts in India’s Northwest and East could separate after independence, if opting out was desired by their populations.

In the nationalistic heat of 1942, when Rajagopalachari’s Pakistan “formula” was first aired, it was dismissed as traitorous by many in the Congress and rejected as “moth-eaten” by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the League president. Yet that formula formed the basis of the partition to which, five years later, the Congress, the League, and the British would agree.

Well before Rajagopalachari took his stand over Quit India, popular opinion and Gandhi himself had determined the question of “succession” in favor of Jawaharlal Nehru. Yet the Congress needed his talents. In the summer of 1946, the party summoned him for negotiations with the Cabinet Mission that had arrived from London; in September of that year he became a Congress minister in the interim government formed as a prelude to a transfer of power to Indian hands.

Governor-general. When, on 15 August 1947, independence arrived, preceded the previous day by the creation of Pakistan, Rajagopalachari became the governor of Bengal’s western half; East Bengal had gone to Pakistan. The following summer, he succeeded Lord Mountbatten as free India’s governor-general; his is the last—and the only Indian—name in a line of governors-general starting in the eighteenth century with Warren Hastings. It was only in protocol, and not in political power, that Rajagopalachari ranked above Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Yet he wielded significant influence as a head of state who was also a founding figure of the Gandhi-led independence movement.

Closer, on questions involving India’s Muslims, to Nehru than to Patel, who was also the home or interior minister, yet closer to Patel on economic issues, Rajagopalachari seemed to be the preference of both Nehru and Patel for selection as India’s first president when, in January 1950, India became a republic. But rivalry in the Nehru-Patel relationship as well as lingering grievance inside the Congress over Rajagopalachari’s 1942 stand came in the way, and it was Rajendra Prasad, a lawyer and veteran congressman from Bihar, who became India’s first president. Rajagopalachari returned to Madras. In less than six months, however, invited by both Nehru and Patel—each of whom saw Rajagopalachari as a counterweight against the other—he was in the Indian capital again, as minister without portfolio. After Patel’s

death in December 1950, Nehru asked Rajagopalachari to take over the key department of Home.

Dealing with a Communist insurgency in some of South India's Telugu districts was one of Rajagopalachari's major tasks as home minister, but Patel's death had reduced Nehru's need for Rajagopalachari, who retired to Madras in November 1951. However, a political crisis in the southern province following elections held in early 1952 brought Rajagopalachari back as the chief minister of Madras. Refusing to contest an election, he ran the state government from a nominated seat in the upper house of the Madras legislature.

The arrangement was hardly democratic, yet Rajagopalachari seemed again to be doing very well as chief minister when, two years later, his educational policy forced him out of office. To double the number of pupils in the state's schools, and also in the belief that parents would impart skills in rural crafts to their children, he proposed a halving of school hours and an emphasis on learning crafts. Political opponents portrayed the policy as a Brahman's device to perpetuate the caste system, and Congress legislators asked for its abandonment, but Rajagopalachari, who never denied charges of stubbornness, preferred to leave. Within a few weeks, Kumaraswami Kamaraj, the new chief minister, withdrew the policy. By this time, Rajagopalachari was immersed in his writings. (His *Mahābhārata*, written in the 1940s, had been published in 1951.)

The 1950s and Beyond

In the late 1950s, after a socialist agenda had added to Nehru's continuing popularity, Rajagopalachari declared that bureaucrats would be disastrous in running businesses, and he attacked a proposal for joint ownership of cropland as being "as bad for the farm as polygamy is for the family" (*Swarajya*, Madras, 14 February 1959). It was "not an idea born of experience or thought" and tried only in countries "where personal liberty is absent and forced labour is commandeered" (*Hindu*, Madras, 6 January 1959).

In the summer of 1959—supported by, among others, Mino Masani, a former socialist from Bombay, and N. G. Ranga, a peasants' leader from Andhra—Rajagopalachari, who had turned eighty some months earlier, launched a new political party, Swatantra (Freedom). He also coined, for a state-controlled economy, the pejorative expression, "Licence-Permit Raj." While enthusing many with its platform of an open economy and individual rights, Swatantra faced long odds in a land where the vast majority were poor, and where Nehru (and later his daughter Indira Gandhi, who championed socialism for much of her career as prime minister) enjoyed a large and seemingly

unquestioning following. Confident, however, of his understanding of economics and of human nature, Rajagopalachari asserted in 1971, within six weeks of a bitter electoral defeat at the hands of Indira Gandhi, that Swatantra's policies were "bound to become the government's policies and programs, if not now, some years hence" (*Swarajya*, Madras, 1 May 1971). This prediction was offered twenty years before India's embrace of liberalization.

One of the first Indians to be publicly troubled by China's policies regarding Tibet and by what he saw as China's hopes of dominance in Asia, Rajagopalachari would nonetheless write in 1969, long before China's economy showed signs of booming, that "the industriousness of the Chinese people, their piety and their adherence to the rules of conduct laid down by Confucius have not ceased to be on account of the black shadow of Communism now upon them. These will shine again." (*Swarajya*, Madras, 24 May 1969).

Opposing nuclear weapons. From the end of 1954, when the *New York Times* published in full a 1,300-word letter from him on the subject, Rajagopalachari became known as one of the world's leading opponents of the nuclear weaponry, as well as its chief Indian foe. Asking for the initiation of nuclear disarmament, his *Times* piece said: "Let either America or Russia begin. . . . Indeed, she who has committed the mistake first is duty bound to begin now, not as a penalty but as a noble privilege" (Gandhi, p. 359).

Meeting visiting Soviet leaders Nikita Krushchev and Nikolai Bulganin at the end of 1955, Rajagopalachari asked them to give up nuclear weapons unilaterally. They said they could not, but added that the Soviet Union would accept a joint renunciation. Six years later, when the Soviet Union exploded a 50-megaton bomb, Rajagopalachari asked Premier Nehru to "ostracize" the Soviet Union. When the United States scheduled retaliatory tests in a portion of the Pacific, Rajagopalachari went a step further, endorsing the suggestion of Bertrand Russell that in protest India should send a ship to the designated waters. Rajagopalachari told Nehru that he would go himself on any Indian ship as a "resister." Nehru was unresponsive.

In 1962, when he was eighty-four, Rajagopalachari made his first trip outside South Asia, flying to the United States in a bid to persuade President John F. Kennedy to abandon nuclear testing. The meeting in the White House went beyond the allotted twenty-five minutes to about an hour and was preceded by an eighty-minute meeting with a team led by William Foster, head of the U.S. Disarmament Agency. On his way back to India, Rajagopalachari met with Pope John XXIII in

Rome, urging him to make a formal plea against further testing.

Whether or not at Rajagopalachari's urging, the next papal encyclical included just such a plea, and at the end of July 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed on a test ban treaty. In a letter that he wrote to Rajagopalachari on 9 August 1963, Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, said that the administration would defend the treaty in the Senate, a "persistence," added Bowles, that was "in no small measure due to your eloquent plea for just such a step as this . . . during your visit" (Gandhi, p. 400).

India-Pakistan relations. During the twenty-five years following the gory birth of free India and Pakistan, and the related beginning of the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, no one strove harder than Rajagopalachari to normalize relations between the two South Asian neighbors. In private letters and public statements, he asked successive Indian prime ministers and their Pakistani counterparts to find a rapprochement; he tried ceaselessly to influence Indian public opinion along similar lines; and three weeks before his death, in the last piece he ever wrote, he called for a fresh "summit meeting as soon as possible" to take the accord that Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had earlier reached in Simla "to its true fulfillment" (*Swarajya*, 9 December 1972).

The Later Years

A politician who both enjoyed and scorned power, Rajagopalachari seemed to embody other contradictions as well. Thus, while dismissing theories of nuclear deterrence, he defended capital punishment; while keeping an austere, almost bare, home for himself and his children, he called for free enterprise to banish Indian poverty. In some ways the inconsistencies added to his appeal.

Whether written or spoken, his words sparkled. Lionel Fielden, an English friend whose cousins had called on Rajagopalachari in 1962, wrote to him that "they—like me—thought you by far the most interesting and lively man in all India," much more so, Fielden added, than Nehru. Rajagopalachari answered that if Fielden's cousins "found me worthy of the time they gave me," it was perhaps because unlike Nehru, "who is big and too conscious and anxious about it, I don't care and let go" (Gandhi, p. 388).

The sparkle (some of it captured in Monica Felton's *I Meet Rajaji*) was joined to an attractive modesty. When, in 1950, Nehru as well as New Delhi-based diplomats referred to his success, Rajagopalachari, who was about to leave as governor-general, replied: "The Prime Minister says I have done very well and many of you, my

friends of the diplomatic corps, have been saying the same thing, before me at any rate—I do not know what you have said in my absence. What is the secret? I am a simple fellow. I do not hate anybody" (*Hindustan Times*, 26 January 1950).

A lifelong student of religion in general and Hinduism in particular, Rajagopalachari claimed in 1966 that "as long as there is suffering in the world, as long as there is the great curiosity to unravel truth, as long as men and women have some intense desire to be fulfilled, as long as there is wisdom in this world, the future of religion is assured" (Gandhi, p. 429).

His understanding of Hinduism, offered in his studies of the Gītā and the Upanishads and in his comment-laden renderings of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, was of an ancient perspective that remained valid for modern times, and he felt that "the children of the rishis (sages) of the Upanishads have a mission for the world" (*Swarajya*, 2 December 1972). Yet he disavowed any wish "to plead that the Gita is better or fuller than any other scriptures" (Gandhi, p. 429), and his respect for other religions and their followers was striking.

Writings

Apart from the prose renderings of the epics, Rajagopalachari's body of work includes, among other texts, commentaries on the Bhagavad Gītā and the Upanishads, a translation in English verse of the Tamil Rāmāyaṇa of Kamban, about three dozen short stories, and articles (in English and Tamil) published during a period of nearly six decades. All his short stories were written first in Tamil; all their characters are from rural South India. Basing his opinion largely on the short stories, the scholar K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar places Rajagopalachari among "the masters and makers of modern Tamil prose" (Gandhi, p. 431). The Sahitya Akademi (India's Academy of Letters) chose his version of the Rāmāyaṇa as "the best work in Tamil in 1955–1957" (Gandhi, p. 386).

A stream of political writing, often pungent and always trenchant, also flowed from his pen, both before and after independence—much of it in Gandhi's journals, which he at times edited (*Young India* and *Harijan*), and later in the weeklies that his associates published in Madras, *Swarajya* (English) and *Kalki* (Tamil). Often, however, his columns looked at a world beyond politics and at events outside India, offering urbane reflection and acute observation. They also included insightful, concise, and graceful obituaries of political and non-political contemporaries; because of his long life, Rajagopalachari would write many.

Rajmohan Gandhi

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**; **Nehru, Jawaharlal**; **Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai**


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RAJASTHAN. See **Geography**.

RAJ, BRITISH, PRE-BRITISH, AND PRINCELY.
See **History and Historiography**.

RAJNEESH, OSHO (1931–1990), controversial spiritual leader. Born to Jain parents in the small town of Kuchwara in central India, Rajneesh's original name was Chandra Mohan; he changed it to Osho toward the end of his life, referring to "oceanic experience," a term used by William James. He became a professor of philosophy early in life and claimed to have attained enlightenment on 21 March 1953. He regarded himself as a follower of no particular religion. Initially he delivered lectures in Mumbai (Bombay), but then moved to Pune in 1974, where he established an ashram at Koregaon Park. Many European and American disciples were attracted by him. His message of sexual liberation was praised by them but criticized by conservative Indians. In 1981 he left India for the United States for medical treatment. He then also transplanted his ashram, and his devotees acquired Big Muddy Ranch at Antelope, Oregon. Rajneesh settled there, and the place became known as Rajneeshpuram. He now remained silent for most of the time; most of the talking was done for him by his ardent disciple Sheila Silverman, who predicted in 1983 that the world would be destroyed sometime between 1988 and 1999. Her autocratic behavior annoyed the neighbors of Rajneeshpuram, and the numerous complaints finally drove him



Osho Rajneesh. Here photographed in the 1980s, during the height of his popularity when his cult numbered some 200,000 members worldwide, Rajneesh lived—without compunction—a lavish life in the United States. JP LAFFONT / SYGMA / CORBIS.

to resettle in North Carolina in 1986. He was imprisoned there, charged with transgression of the immigration laws. His sentence was suspended on the condition that he leave the United States. In 1987 he returned to India, once more settling in Pune, where he died in 1990.

Rajneesh was a controversial figure throughout his public life. His disciples led frugal lives, giving him all their money, but he and his secretaries lived in luxury. The twenty-seven Rolls-Royces donated to him by rich followers were only the most visible signs of his luxurious lifestyle. Most of his disciples came from Western countries, and he catered to their spiritual needs. Western thought and religion no longer helped them to overcome feelings of emptiness and frustration, so they turned to this self-confident guru, who told them how to conduct their lives.

Dietmar Rothermund

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RAJPUT (WESTERN, CENTRAL, AND HILL) PAINTING The history of painting in the Indian subcontinent has ancient origins with the first expressions of artistic creativity found in scenes depicted on prehistoric caves. In the early historic period, excavated Buddhist caves were embellished with beautiful murals. The first manuscripts in the region were produced on prepared palm leaves and years later on paper. Among the most vibrantly expressive and numerous paintings were those produced for the Rajput rulers of western, central, and northern India. These works consisted of illustrated manuscripts and poetic sets, as well as elaborate wall paintings on palace walls.

Cave Paintings: Early Artistic Expressions in South Asia

Due to their ephemeral nature, ancient narrative or ritual scenes painted on prepared animal or vegetal media would have little chance of survival; consequently, for the pre- and early historic periods, paintings found in rock shelters or excavated caves provide rare and invaluable information about the formative period of two-dimensional artistic representation in South Asia. Among the earliest examples are those found within rock shelters at Bhimbetka in Madhya Pradesh, where excavations revealed paintings ranging from the Upper Paleolithic (40,000–15,000 B.P.) to the Mesolithic (15,000 B.P.–8,500 B.C.) periods. The Upper Paleolithic paintings, tentatively dated to circa 40,000 B.C., contain scenes portraying humans dancing or hunting quadrupeds, delineated in green and red mineral pigments. By the Mesolithic period, the Bhimbetka paintings display expanded compositions that may represent more complex societal developments. Humans were now depicted as engaging in multiple aspects of the life cycle, such as pregnancy, childbirth, and funereal ceremonies. Ritual performances and allusions to mother and animal cults are indicated by depictions of costumed male and female dancers, numerous female figures, and monumentally drawn naturalistic or composite animals.

The caves at Ajanta in Maharashtra provide the most extensive evidence of artistic production in the early

historic period. Scholars date the first excavations at Ajanta to about 50 B.C. to A.D. 100, culminating in the twenty or more marvelously carved and painted rock-cut Buddhist shrines produced particularly under patronage of the Vakataka ruler Harisena (reigned c. 460–477). Only traces remain of the very earliest paintings, as they were either damaged or obscured by subsequent paint layers. The Ajanta artists produced beautifully colored wall and ceiling decorations in an apparent cohesive visual program that included geometrical designs and a profusion of naturalistically rendered figural and vegetal decoration. To prepare the rock surface for painting, layers of cow dung, mud, straw, and a final coating of lime plaster were applied. Pigments, primarily from mineral sources, were adhered with a binding material and applied with animal-hair brushes. When the composition was complete, artists burnished the surface to yield a lustrous surface. Among the most fascinating and gracefully rendered works were illustrations representing episodes of the Buddha's previous lives (*jātaka*). Aside from their inherent high aesthetic and narrative qualities, the *jātaka* compositions provide a veritable compendium of information about contemporary costumes, textiles, and architecture. There is a gap of many centuries in the artistic record after the magnificent Ajanta paintings, and only fragments, such as those found in the sixth-century caves at Badami in Karnataka and the mid-eighth-century paintings on the Kailasha Temple at Ellora in Maharashtra, give evidence of continued artistic activity through the centuries.

Painting on Palm Leaf and Paper: A.D. 1000–1550

Very few early manuscripts have survived from the Indian subcontinent, with the exception of a few examples, which include a cache of sixth- to tenth-century birch bark, palm leaf, and paper manuscripts found during excavations of a Buddhist site at Gilgit, Pakistan (now in New Delhi's National Archives and other collections). However, palm-leaf manuscripts with elaborately painted wooden covers datable to the early eleventh century to the thirteenth century survive from the eastern part of the subcontinent (particularly Bihar and Bengal); they were apparently produced for pious Buddhist patrons and donated to monastic libraries.

Illustrations of the Buddha, *bodhisattvas*, and Tantric Buddhist deities used a limited palette that featured tones of yellow, red, blue, green, and white. These compositions were delineated in a stylized and linear fashion, with flatly rendered as well as naturalistically modeled figural types that varied in execution between individual manuscripts. As the depiction of Buddhist teachers and deities was of primary importance, architecture and foliage appear in these compositions predominantly as framing

devices or as decorative embellishment. The only incidence of narrative subjects is found in *Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita* manuscripts, which include depictions of episodes in the Buddha's life. As exemplified in folio (c. 1150) from a copy of the manuscript produced in Bihar (Los Angeles County Museum of Art), in the hand of an accomplished artist, these subjects could be transformed into elegantly portrayed vignettes in miniature.

There is evidence that paper was manufactured as early as the sixth century in the northwest Himalayan regions, and from the twelfth century in Nepal; however, it was not used as the primary medium for manuscript production until the early thirteenth century, when Turkic and Afghan Muslim rulers gained suzerainty over northern regions of the subcontinent. Paper was imported to western India from the Middle East as early as the eleventh century, and records attest to the establishment of a paper mill in Kashmir in the fifteenth century. Some of the earliest examples of paper used as a medium for manuscript production are found in mid-fourteenth-century copies of Jain religious texts, such as the *Kalpa Sūtra* (Book of Ritual) and the *Kalakacharyakatha* (Story of the monk Kalaka), produced in western India. Emulating the format of earlier palm-leaf manuscripts, these folios were rectangular, and, perhaps to allow for larger and more complex compositions, the shape was modified by increasing the folio height. Further developments included an abandonment of pierced holes that were replaced by red or gold circles, or ornamented medallions. Instead of binding a text with a cord threaded through the folios, as was the tradition with earlier palm-leaf manuscripts, loose manuscript pages were gathered together and placed between cardboard and cloth covers.

All elements of these narrative compositions were rendered in a flat, linear manner using a palette of brilliant primary colors, particularly crimson and ultramarine, enlivened by white and gold accents. Figures were highly stylized and display purposefully distorted or idiosyncratic features. One of the most distinct features of this type is the representation of a projecting, or "farther," eye in three-quarter profiles, an artistic convention that continued in some western Indian paintings through the sixteenth century. An interesting exception to this mode of representation is seen in *Kalakacharyakatha* manuscripts, in which foreigners were differentiated by the absence of a farther eye and by a different skin tonality, and were clothed in distinctive regional costume. Both figural types are shown within the same illustration in a folio dated to about 1400 from western India, depicting the Jain monk Kalaka discussing the abduction of his sister with the Central Asian Sahi king and a retainer (Mumbai, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya). These illustrations are historically important, as

they provide visual evidence of cultural contacts between indigenous populations and foreigners during a period when much of the northern and central regions of the subcontinent had come under the rule of Turco-Afghan sultans. Elements of artistic exchange during this period can also be seen in the similar use of coloration and vegetal or geometric motifs to embellish manuscript folios for Jain and Muslim patrons, as exemplified in a mid-fifteenth-century Qur'an from the library of Mahmud Shah I Bigarha, the sultan of Gujarat (r. 1459–1511). Although naturalism is eclipsed in favor of representations in which gestures and symbols convey the narrative, these paintings reveal a brilliant use of decorative ornamentation (particularly evident in the representation of textiles), which visually enlivens the folios.

The format, figural, and decorative elements of these manuscripts were not restricted solely to Jain manuscripts, as evidenced in a folio of about 1450 from a copy of the Hindu text, *Balagopalastuti* (Eulogy of the Child Cowherd [Krishna]), made in Gujarat or Rajasthan, which depicts Krishna dancing with the *gopis* in Vrindavan (Los Angeles County Museum of Art), and in a fifteenth-century folio from a *Durgāsaptashati* (Seven hundred verses in praise of Durgā) portraying the multi-armed Durgā on her leonine mount battling demons (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums).

One of the classic Sanskrit Hindu texts most often illustrated was the tenth chapter of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (Story of the great lord [Vishnu]) which recounts the life of Krishna, the most beloved of Vishnu's *avatāras*. Among the earliest extant examples of the text is a now dispersed copy that may have been produced around 1520–1530 in the Delhi-Agra region. Illustrated folios from this text belong to a group of religious and secular texts produced for Hindu, Jain, and Muslim patrons described as the *Chaurapanchasika* group, as they are stylistically related to a 1550–1560 copy of the *Chaurapanchasika* (Fifty stanzas of a love thief) by the early twelfth-century poet Bilhana (Gujarat, Ahmedabad, Culture Centre). This group of works is related to the traditional western Indian paintings described above, and they were typically rendered with a limited palette of strong, brilliant colors applied in flat, unmodulated areas. Figures were often rendered in exaggerated, angular poses with faces rendered in profile with large almond-shaped eyes. Costume details often included a distinctive turban (*kulah*), and garments that terminate in spiky points or with fan-tailed flourishes. As illustrating the narrative elements of the story was of utmost importance, representations of architecture and foliage were highly stylized and served primarily to enhance the narrative and provide a visual setting. Illustrated works belonging to this group provide an insight into the dominant painting style

in North India in the early to mid-sixteenth century. The prevalence of the *Chaurapanchashika* stylistic elements is evident in folios from a Mughal copy of the *Tutinama* (Stories of a parrot, c. 1560–1565, Cleveland Museum of Art) and indicates the importance of indigenous artistic traditions in the formation and spread of the early Mughal style.

The Rajputs

For centuries, the Rajputs (*raja putra*, or “son of a king”), said to be descendants of warrior clans, ruled much of the northern and central parts of the Indian subcontinent. Although the origins of these clans are unknown, some scholars believe that they may have migrated from Central Asia in the sixth and seventh centuries, over time adopting the status of the warrior class to legitimize their place within the Hindu social system. By the ninth and tenth centuries, the Rajput clans had risen to political prominence and had proclaimed independent dynasties. Renowned for chivalry and valor on the battlefield, their combative spirit often led to internecine warfare, which undermined Rajput solidarity and ultimately made them vulnerable to invasions of various Turkic and Afghan groups who had begun to encroach upon Rajput territories in the thirteenth century. The most significant of these foreign intruders were the Central Asian Mughals, who established themselves as a dominant power under the leadership of Zahir al-Din Muhammad, Babur (r. 1526–1530). By the time of the emperor Akbar’s death (r. 1556–1605), most of the Rajput rulers had submitted to Mughal rule either voluntarily or by force, many making political and marital alliances to ensure Mughal beneficence.

Subjects for Illustration

Paintings and manuscripts produced in the Rajput courts before the seventeenth century depicted religious subjects such as the epic Mahābhārata (The great descendants of Bharata), the Rāmāyaṇa (Story of Rāma), and as noted above, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Stimulated by periodic upsurges in the devotional (*bhakti*) strand of the Hindu religion, texts and poems in Sanskrit and vernacular languages gained popularity, such as the Gītā Govinda (Song of the Herdsman) composed in Sanskrit by the twelfth-century poet Jayadeva, which describes the love of Krishna and Rādhā as a metaphor for the union of the individual with the divine.

A vast corpus of love literature inspired Rajput artistic interpretation, including the *Rasikapriya* (Connoisseur’s delight), a sixteenth-century Hindi poem by Keshavdas that analyzes the stages of love using the analogy of the love between Krishna and Rādhā. Keshavdas also wrote the *Kavipriya* (Poet’s favorite), based on the *Baramasa*

(twelve months) genre of poetry that describes the interrelationship of human love through the changing seasons. Other poetic works favored for illustration were those in which gods and mortals were characterized as personifications of various romantic situations or embodiments of heroic behavior. The *Rasamanjari* (Bouquet of delight) by the fourteenth-century poet Bhanudatta, one of the best-known Sanskrit works in this genre, categorizes and describes the various types of romantic heroes (*nayaka*) and heroines (*nayika*) according to their age, personalities, and circumstances. Numerous *Rāgāmālā* (Garland of melodies) series were produced for both Rajput and Mughal patrons. These visualizations of classical Indian musical modes (*rāgas*), accompanied by poetic verse, combined aspects of religion, love, and music. Each *rāga* is associated with a specific season and time of day, and personifies characteristics of love or heroic behavior.

With the increasing influence of Mughal artistic techniques and subjects during the seventeenth century, including naturalistic shading, subtly modulated colors, and secular subject matter, many Rajput artists incorporated these new elements into their works. Emulating Mughal royal portraiture, Rajput rulers were often depicted in hierarchical compositions depicting court gatherings or equestrian scenes. Blending ancient Indic and Mughal concepts of kingship, painters included halos around the heads of rulers, a symbol of their role as regents of the gods.

By the late eighteenth century, the need for extensive military campaigns had diminished, and elaborate hunts became an important outlet for the vital martial Rajput spirit. Perhaps another reflection of this time of relative peace and stability are the humorous and bawdy scenes of Rajput rulers presiding over drunken parties or dallying in lush gardens and pavilions with beautiful ladies of the court. With the increasing presence of the British, the influence of photography and European modes of artistic representation added yet another facet to the ever responsive and adaptive Rajput painters and their works.

Rajput Painting in Central and Western India

Malwa. Works from the Malwa, a region that roughly corresponds to the modern state of Madhya Pradesh, can be characterized as the most artistically conservative of the Rajput styles. Early paintings associated with the region, from about the first decade of the sixteenth century, include works painted in the Indo-Persian style prevalent in the Sultanate period. During the second quarter of the seventeenth century, a style emerged that blended elements of indigenous western Indian and *Chaurapanchashika* paintings. The earliest dated paintings from this period, from a dispersed 1634 *Rasikapriya*

series, feature unmodulated flat expanses of color and the use of a strong outline to delineate figural, architectural, and foliate elements. In many of these works, the artists used a brilliant juxtaposition of red, green, blue, yellow, and black coloration to enhance the dramatic visual impact of a composition. Women were usually portrayed wearing gaily colored skirts (particularly with horizontal stripes), and representations of architecture and foliage scenes, though highly schematized, were enlivened by the inclusion of preening peacocks or scampering monkeys.

About the mid-seventeenth century, a modified and more refined Malwa style was introduced, perhaps influenced by Mughal works, that included a more subtle palette with mauve and pink tones blended with other hues. This style is most clearly evident in two dispersed manuscripts of the *Amarushataka* (One hundred verses of Amaru), dated 1652 and about 1680, a text that features the romantic exploits of heroes and heroines. Distinctive to both sets is a decorative floral scroll placed at the bottom of the illustrated folios. By the eighteenth century, the distinctive Malwa artistic tradition appears to have all but disappeared, perhaps replaced by other styles, or perhaps due to a lack of patronage during a time of political turbulence. Traces of Malwa style can be observed in works produced at Datia and other central Indian centers, where aspects of Malwa-type compositions and format were apparently appropriated and combined with other artistic elements.

Mewar. With the increasingly close interaction of the Rajput clans with the Mughals, many Rajput rulers emulated Mughal court fashions, customs, and institutions such as in Bikaner, Amber, and Bundi. Others rulers, however, resisted Mughal political and cultural hegemony, as exemplified by the Mewar kings, who did not succumb to the Mughals until 1615. Although the Mewar *ranas* were patrons of the arts, the earliest dated example of royal patronage is a *Rāgāmālā* series made at Chawand, the temporary Mewar capital during the reign of Rana Amar Singh I (r. 1597–1620). The now-dispersed set was made by Nasir al-Din, a Muslim artist working in a lively style with elements reminiscent of *Chaurapanchashika* works.

After the capitulation of Mewar to the Mughals, Karan Singh (r. 1620–1628), then prince, was required to spend time in residence at the Mughal court, was accorded great respect and privileges, and became a close friend of Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), the future Mughal emperor. There are no works that can be specifically ascribed to Karan Singh's patronage, and so the relationship of Mughal and Mewar painting remains unclear during this period. During the reign of Maharana Jagat Singh I (r. 1628–1655), a number of extant works indicate a flourishing of artistic production at the Mewar court at

Udaipur. Of particular interest are the works of Sahib al-Din, Jagat Singh's senior artist, including a 1628 *Rāgāmālā* series and manuscripts with Vaishnavite themes, such as a 1629 *Gītā Govinda* manuscript, a 1648 *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, and his collaborative work on a magnificent multi-volume illustrated *Rāmāyaṇa* in 1650–1652. Sahib al-Din's paintings indicate that at some point he was trained in the popular Mughal style prevalent in many Rajput centers, but the specific method of transmission of these techniques is unknown. Some of his early works present an innovative use of elements borrowed from Mughal works, including a taller page format, a subtle outlining of figural elements that are rendered more naturalistically, and a softer palette. In later works attributed to Sahib al-Din, such as a *Rasikapriya* series painted about 1630–1635 (Udaipur, Government Museum), there is a return to more traditional brighter coloration, now interpreted with fresh and brilliant tones, and compositional schemes using both synoptic and framing elements to portray narrative episodes.

Works produced during the late seventeenth century were primarily reformulations or copies of earlier paintings, following the style of Sahib al-Din, but without his inventiveness in color and composition. In emulation of Mughal court compositions, royal portraiture was a new innovation added to the Mewar artistic repertoire. These works included depictions of maharanas riding horses, accompanied by attendants hurriedly shuffling along on foot, in formal meetings with courtiers or clansfolk, and enthroned, observing elephant fights and other amusements.

Under Maharana Amar Singh II (r. 1698–1710), a number of portrait scenes were produced by an anonymous artist who experimented with a stippled treatment similar to the *nim qalam* (half-brush) technique sometimes employed by early seventeenth century Mughal and Deccani artists to produce a grisaille effect that emulated the appearance of European engravings. During this time, a larger format was introduced, providing more room for complex compositions that afforded bird's eye or topographic views, such as the portrayal of Amar Singh celebrating the spring festival of Holi with his nobles within the lush vegetation of the royal Sarvaritu Vilas garden (c. 1708–1710, Melbourne, National Gallery of Victoria).

Other paintings document the multifarious activities of rulers such as Maharanas Sangram Singh II (r. 1710–1734) and Jagat Singh II (r. 1734–1751). These large compositions were filled with vignettes of the maharana and his companions, portrayed in consecutive narrative, as exemplified in a 1749 painting by the artist Jiva depicting Jagat Singh in sequences of a lakeside tiger shoot (San Diego Museum of Art). The verso side of

these works often include inscriptions detailing the artists' names, the date and place of the activity portrayed, and the participants.

By the early eighteenth century, a decline in patronage at Udaipur resulted in the departure of a number of artists, who sought employment at the courts of Mewar nobles. At Deogarh, the artist Bakhta and his son Chokha, and Chokha's son Baijnath, continued to produce works of the highest quality, surpassing those done in Udaipur itself. Chokha worked for both Maharana Bhim Singh (r. 1778–1828) at Udaipur and Gokul Das, the *rawat* of Deogarh, and interpreted court promenades, meetings, and intimate moments with observational insight, creating an atmosphere of dreamy sensuality.

During this period, the increased presence of foreigners is indicated in many Rajput paintings, as in the 1817 portrait (attributed to Chokha) of Lieutenant-Colonel James Tod, the British political agent, riding an elephant (London, Victoria and Albert Museum) and an 1825 painting (attributed to Ghasi) representing Maharana Bhim Singh formally receiving Sir Charles Metcalf and his entourage (Udaipur, City Palace Museum). Other compositions included fanciful portraits of Europeans that may have been inspired by imported prints. With the arrival of professional and amateur British watercolor artists, such as William Carpenter, who arrived at the court of Maharana Sarup Singh (r. 1842–1861) in Udaipur in 1851, Mewar artists were exposed to new techniques and modes of representation. From this period to the reign of Maharana Fateh Singh (r. 1885–1930), the last of the great Mewar rulers, two styles continued to be produced for the royal court: a modified version of the earlier court reportage genre, and European-style portraits in oil on canvas. With the advent of photography, a new form of expression for royal portraiture was introduced. Although some artists introduced photographic realism into their portraits, others abandoned their brushes and pigments entirely to take up the new medium.

Marwar. The Marwar region occupies much of the western part of the modern state of Rajasthan, and was ruled for centuries by the Rathor Rajput clan from their capital at Jodhpur. One of the only pre-Mughal works from Marwar that has come to light is a *Rāgāmalā* series dated 1623, produced by Pandit Virji in the provincial town of Pali. Its horizontal format and illustrative style indicates that the artist may have been influenced by earlier Jain and other western Indian models. Throughout the early to mid-seventeenth century, works from Marwar are distinguished by varied but conservative styles related to the earlier traditions, as well as those of contemporary Mewar and Malwa. Influences from Malwa-style painting is particularly evident in the introduction of a vertical

page format and a palette that juxtaposes somber green and brown tones with earthy and brilliant reds.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the close relationship between the Marwar and Mughal courts is particularly evident in paintings that display Mughalizing subjects and compositions. A number of portraits of Maharaja Gaj Singh (r. 1620–1638) painted by his Mughal-trained artists were based on portraits of Gaj Singh produced by artists at the Mughal court. He is depicted in an idealizing profile, wearing an elegant ensemble, and holding a long sword, befitting a Rajput ruler. Mughal-influenced court scenes continued to be produced under Gaj Singh's son Maharaja Jaswant Singh (r. 1638–1678). Toward the end of his rule, a few works suggest that there were attempts to experiment with stylistic elements, including a resurgence of certain Rajput-style elements combined with Deccani artistic modes, presumably influenced by Jaswant Singh's posting to the Deccan in 1667. This beautiful synthesis of traditions is exemplified in a painting from about 1667–1670, which depicts the maharaja listening to female musicians in a palatial garden within a verdant landscape inspired by Rajput prototypes. Deccani elements appear in the form of a visual play between the boldly patterned carpets and the garden's brilliantly colored flowers.

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, equestrian portraits, processions, and hunt scenes were added to the repertoire of Jodhpur court painting. The most accomplished artist to emerge from this period was Dalchand, a Mughal-trained artist who worked for Maharaja Abhai Singh (r. 1724–1749). His training in the Mughal court at Delhi is evident in an exquisitely composed and rendered portrait of the enthroned Abhai Singh watching a dance performance (c. 1725, Jodhpur, Mehrangarh Museum Trust). Under Maharaja Ram Singh (r. 1749–1751, 1753–1772), Mughal-type court scenes were still popular; however, human and animal forms were increasingly depicted in a more flat, schematic, and idealized manner. This style was also emulated by artists working at Ghanerao, Nagaur, and other districts, or *thikana*, of Marwar that were ruled by Rathor nobles swearing allegiance and paying tribute to Jodhpur. Characteristic of these compositions are depictions of a maharaja or a senior noble surrounded by members of his court, each man wearing lofty and elaborately wrapped colorful turbans that distinguished their specific clan affiliation.

The tendency toward idealized portraiture was taken to new heights under the enthusiastic patronage of Maharaja Man Singh (r. 1803–1843). Additionally, Man Singh was shown participating in a variety of court activities, including festive ceremonies and in playful dalliance with the women of his court, as in a painting from about

1840 depicting the maharaja riding on a Ferris wheel in the company of his ladies. Man Singh's piety was also documented in numerous paintings in which he is shown meeting with his guru Devnath or members of the Nath sect. These works display an idiosyncratic style developed by Dana Batiram, Bulaki Das, Amar Das, and other senior artists in Man Singh's employ. Characteristic of works from this period is the use of vibrant and rich colors, embellished with a generous application of gold to highlight details. Dramatic landscapes were created with hills and mountains represented by turbulent ripples and fantastic surging forms. Overall, there is a tendency toward using repeated curve or swirling patterns throughout paintings to delineate distinctive scrolling cloud formations, stylized palm fronds, banana trees leaves, the swelling chests of prancing horses and camels in procession, the upturned swing of hems in costumes for both genders, and the representation of arched eyebrows and exaggeratedly elongated and upswept eyes in portraits of men and women.

Under Maharaja Takhat Singh's (r. 1843–1873) patronage, the same style continued to be executed by many of the same artists that had previously worked for Man Singh. Toward the end of Takhat Singh's rule, Eugene Impey, an amateur English photographer, visited Jodhpur and took the first photographic portraits of the maharaja. During the rule of his successor, Maharaja Jaswant Singh II (r. 1873–1895), court painting severely declined in the name of modernity, as the maharaja increasingly preferred the medium of photography to document court life at the Marwar capital.

Amber and Jaipur. Maharaja Prithvi Raj (r. 1503–1527), of the Kachchhwaha Rajput clan ruling at Amber, was a member of the confederacy of Rajputs formed by Rana Sanga of Mewar to fight the Mughal emperor Babur. Years later, his son Maharaja Bharmal (r. 1548–1574) was introduced to Akbar, the young Mughal emperor, and a strong personal and political alliance was forged between the Amber rulers and the Mughals, which lasted for two centuries. The earliest mention of artworks commissioned at Amber is found in biographies of Raja Man Singh I (r. 1589–1614), who was also a senior member of the Mughal court under Akbar and his son Jahangir. These contemporary accounts mention that the walls of Man Singh's palace were painted with folk-story vignettes, *Rāgāmālā* compositions, and depictions of flora and fauna, traces of which still remain.

Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh (r. 1699–1743) continued to maintain close relations with the Mughals and was an enthusiastic patron of art and architecture. Folios from a now dispersed *Rāgāmālā* set, painted about 1709, display static compositions typical of local, more conservative Rajput artistic traditions, but include figural types influenced by

Mughal models. In 1727 Sawai Jai Singh moved his capital from Amber to Jaipur and established a large atelier of artists, papermakers, and bookbinders who were recruited locally and from the Mughal centers at Delhi and Agra. During his reign, the maharaja amassed a large collection of Mughal, Deccani, and Rajasthani illustrated manuscripts and single folios. The use of Mughal paintings as models for Amber works is evidenced by a nearly identical pair of portraits in the collection of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. The earlier of the two paintings is a portrait of Maharaja Jai Singh of Amber and Maharana Gaj Singh of Marwar (c. 1638), attributed to the Mughal painter Bichitr. Both rulers share a splendid gold throne set upon an elaborately patterned carpet. Two angels float above and carry an embellished canopy. The later work, made in Amber around 1710, is a portrait of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh of Amber, seated with Maharana Sangram Singh of Mewar. The compositions of both paintings are the same, although there are differences in execution, as the later Amber work implements a more subdued and dull palette and there is a lack of delicacy and accomplishment in the figural details. The blue and gold border decoration added to both folios matches works that were mounted together in a codex album format in the Amber atelier, and indeed these two folios may have been mounted facing each other in that album.

Painting at Jaipur continued, enthusiastically encouraged by Maharaja Sawai Madho Singh I (r. 1750–1768), and came to full flourish during the reign of Maharaja Sawai Pratap Singh (r. 1778–1803) when his painting workshop grew to include as many as twenty-five painters. Sawai Pratap Singh was a pious devotee of Krishna and must have looked favorably upon a magnificent large painting made in about 1790, depicting Krishna and Rādhā surrounded by concentric circles of *gopis* who sway in unison to the movements of the great *Rasa lila* dance (Jaipur, Maharaja Sawai Man Singh II Museum). A decline in Jaipur painting occurred during the rule of Maharaja Sawai Ram Singh II (r. 1835–1880) when works were done in a stiff and formulaic manner or were influenced or eclipsed altogether by the medium of photography. An fascinating portrait of Sawai Ram Singh II (c. 1870) depicts the ruler at worship within his private quarters, and is clearly influenced by the type of photographic realism that was practiced in many late nineteenth-century Rajput royal ateliers.

Bundi and Kota. The origins of the Bundi and Kota rulers, members of the Hara Rajput clan, are based on ancient tales of a fantastic weapon-bearing warrior who emerged from a gigantic fire pit. The Bundi ruler Rao Surjan (r. 1554–1585) surrendered the fort at Ranthambhor to the Mughal emperor Akbar in 1569, and thereafter Bundi rulers were accorded special status by the

Mughals. One of the earliest works attributed to Bundi patronage was a *Rāgāmalā* set produced at Chunar, near Varanasi, in 1591. Rao Surjan had been posted as commander of the Chunar fortress in 1575, and his son Rao Bhoj Singh (r. 1585–1606) spent some years there before being assigned to Agra. According to a colophon, the set was made by artists trained in the Mughal atelier, and although no specific patron is named, it has been surmised that the set was made for Bhoj Singh. This set is highly important to the understanding of the influence of Mughal painting on works created at Bundi, and it also indicates the close artistic relationship between Bundi and Kota. A consistency can be observed in the compositional format and stylistic elements used in the Chunar *Rāgāmalā* folios and the seventeenth-century *Rāgāmalā* sets made in Bundi, and later in eighteenth-century Kota *Rāgāmalās*. This continuity, with variations in coloration and details of ornamentation, is quite remarkable when a comparison is made between a folio from the dispersed Chunar set depicting *Vilaval Ragini* (Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University, Bharat Kala Bhavan) and an illustration of the same *ragini* made around 1760 in the Kota workshop (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts).

Wall paintings in the palace of Rao Ratan (r. 1607–1631) at Bundi vividly document the vitality of artworks produced during this period, which include richly colored depictions of Hindu gods and goddesses, and animal combat and hunting scenes set within lush landscapes. During the rule of Bundi by one of Rao Ratan's son, Rao Shatru Sal (r. 1631–1658), the evolution of a more distinct Bundi style emerged, as is particularly evident in portraits of the period, which often depicted figures in full profile, with large oval-shaped heads and pointy noses. In slightly later works, facial features became softened, more refined, and more delicately rendered. Typically, figures were placed against a monochrome background, as in one of the most beautiful works produced in the late eighteenth century at Bundi, which depicts a sympathetic lady-in-waiting attending to a lovesick lady yearning for her lover (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums). The two women are placed against a stark white background where the edges of the palace terrace and the sky almost seamlessly meet. At the very top of the composition, a glowing silver moon illuminates the sky, and a pair of Sarus cranes, said to mate for life, frolic as if to remind the damsel of her lonely status.

In 1631 Rao Madho Singh (r. 1631–1648 at Kota), the second of Rao Ratan's sons, was awarded the territory of Kota by Emperor Shah Jahan for his continued aid to the Mughals. Unfortunately, only a few posthumous portraits of Madho Singh remain, and so his contribution to the early history of Kota painting remains a

mystery. Under Rao Jagat Singh (r. 1658–1684), painting at Kota flourished, as indicated by a number of his portraits executed with great subtlety in modeling and coloration. A portrait of Jagat Singh in a garden, surrounded by female attendants (c. 1670), exemplifies Kota works inspired by contemporary Mughal portraiture; it also includes an abundance of floral patterning and varied colors that are evocative of landscapes portrayed by Deccani painters. The inclusion of Deccan-derived artistic elements here should not come as a surprise, as Jagat Singh and many other Rajput nobles spent considerable time waging campaigns against the Deccan sultans in the employ of the Mughals. Some Rajput rulers may have returned home with paintings acquired in the Deccan, or may have brought back Deccani artists (eager for employment after the vanquishment of their sovereigns) to work in the Rajput ateliers. During this time, Kota artists began to produce carefully observed and beautifully delineated studies of animals, particularly elephants, that were shown at play and at combat. These depictions sharply contrast the representation of humans, who are increasingly shown in a formulaic manner, with distinctively rendered large eyes that are ringed by an oval line representing the outer perimeter of the eyelids.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, both Bundi and Kota were subjected to internal intrigues and external turmoil, which included the threat of Maratha raids and interventions by the British. Paintings from both courts during this period convey a sense of escapism and the reluctance of the rulers to face their positions of political vulnerability. One might expect to find, during this period, scenes depicting strategic planning or military drills, but the paintings depict playful vignettes of court activities in which the rulers are shown hunting, gaming, and participating in ceremonies. The most spectacular of these works may represent visualizations of Rajput prowess in the form of magnificent and complex large-scale hunting scenes from Kota. Similar to contemporary works noted above at Mewar, these paintings were often inscribed on the verso with the names of the participants, the date, and the names of the master artists of that period, including Shaykh Taju, Hansraj Joshi, and Chateri Gumani, who produced a portrait in 1784 documenting a lion hunt attended by Maharao Umed Singh I of Kota (r. 1771–1819) and his minister Zalim Singh Jhala (Rajasthan, Rao Madho Singh Trust Museum, Fort Kota).

The last phase of artistic brilliance at Kota was under the patronage of Maharao Ram Singh (r. 1827–1866). Ram Singh was portrayed more often than any other Kota ruler and was shown in all manner of daily activities, including meeting with visiting dignitaries and playing

polo with courtiers. One of the most humorous events documented by the eccentric ruler's court artists occurred in 1851, when Ram Singh rode his horse up a ramp to the roof of the Kota palace. The painting is attributed to the artist Namaram and faithfully depicts those present at the event, including courtiers, dancing girls, musicians, and the local British agent, who is shown wearing a blue suit and a top hat (Philadelphia Museum of Art).

Bikaner. Bikaner paintings are among the most lyrical and refined of the Rajput styles and were the product of a synthesis of Rajput, Mughal, and Deccan artistic traditions. Maharaja Karan Singh (r. 1631–1669) is the first documented royal patron of Bikaner painting, and among his atelier were some of the early masters, such as Rukn al-Din and Natthu, who played important roles in the early evolution of the court style. One of the most beautiful of these works was done by 'Ali Raza, a painter originally from Delhi, who produced *Vaikuntha Darshana* (Vision of Vishnu, c. 1650), a painting based on a dream that Karan Singh had of Vishnu and Lakshmi enthroned in their heavenly palace (Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University, Bharat Kala Bhavan). Karan Singh's successor, Maharaja Anup Singh (r. 1669–1698), was a connoisseur who gave great impetus to the creation of artworks, as exemplified in the production of a Bhāgavata Purāṇa manuscript (now dispersed, c. 1675–1700), which presents episodes from Krishna's life in continuous narrative vignettes with delicately rendered figures that appear to float upon the softly toned landscape.

During the reign of Maharaja Sujan Singh (r. 1700–1736), more intimate compositions were produced, rendered in dreamlike tones of pink, purple, and pastel greens, influenced by Sujan Singh's posting to the Deccan, or by artists that may have accompanied him back to Bikaner in 1707. Many of these works can be attributed to the artist Ustad Murad, including a jewel-like painting dated to 1710 depicting a princely youth (perhaps Sujan Singh) and his ladies shooting heron from a terrace (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums). Another work by Ustad Murad was the production of a now dispersed *Baramasa* set painted around 1725. In a folio depicting the month of Jyestha (May–June), Ustad Murad carefully selected a palette of vibrant, glowing colors to evoke the intense heat of this season (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums).

During the mid- to late eighteenth century, Bikaner painting was increasingly influenced by works of art from Jodhpur and Jaipur, and the migration of artists from those courts to Bikaner, as a result of marital alliances between the rulers of Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Bikaner. The sensual refinement of earlier Bikaner works was discarded in favor of more conventional, stiff representations.

Kishangarh. Kishangarh was founded in 1609 by Maharaja Kishan Singh (r. 1609–1615), a son of the Jodhpur raja, who had close ties to the Mughal court. This amicable affiliation continued through the eighteenth century and is represented artistically by the flourishing of a Mughalized Kishangarh style. Bhavani Das was among three artists working at Delhi who joined the Kishangarh atelier during the reign of Maharaja Raj Singh (r. 1706–1748). Bhavani Das was highly esteemed by the Kishangarh royalty, and numerous works depicting members of the court and distinguished guests from other principalities can be attributed to him, such as the technically refined portrait (c. 1725) of Prince Padam Singh of Bikaner seated with his bard on a terrace (New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art).

The pinnacle of Kishangarh painting occurred under the patronage of Maharaja Sawant Singh (r. 1748–1757; d. 1764), an ardent follower of Krishna, who wrote romantic poems recounting the love of Krishna and Rādhā under the pen name Nagari Das. Although courtly subjects were also portrayed, the most distinctive and beautifully conceived paintings were those inspired by Sawant Singh's devotional tendencies. Krishna and Rādhā, the divine lovers, were portrayed trysting in a multitude of dark and lush romantic landscapes. One of the most exquisite examples of this genre, *The Boat of Love*, was made about 1750 or 1760 by Sawant Singh's primary artist, Nihal Chand. The painting presents an elaborate fantasy-landscape containing two vignettes of Krishna and Rādhā: in the foreground, Krishna tempts Rādhā to kiss him; in the midground, the two lovers are shown seated in a boat floating on a river dotted with lotuses (Delhi, National Museum). Facial features become a distinguishing feature of this mature Kishangarh style, characterized by the representation of attenuated heads, long noses, and prominent elongated almond-shaped eyes framed with arched eyebrows. It is thought that many of the Krishna-Rādhā paintings represent idealized portraits of Sawant Singh and his beloved, the poetess Bani Thani, with whom he went into self-imposed exile at Vrindavan. Artists continued to paint works for the Kishangarh rulers well into the nineteenth century in a style that was based upon the works of Nihal Chand but devoid of his complex subtlety and magnificent delicacy of execution; instead they presented overly exaggerated facial features and stylized, flat figural forms.

Rajput Painting in the Punjab Hills

Paintings produced for the rulers of the many small kingdoms found in regions that now consist of the modern states of Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir

are frequently referred to as “Pahari” (hill) or Punjab Hill paintings. One of the earliest manuscripts found in that region is an illustrated copy of the *Devī Mahatmya*, dated 1552, that establishes the existence of a pre-Mughal style in the Punjab Hills closely related to the *Chaurapanchashika*-type paintings produced in northern India (Himachal Pradesh State Museum, Simla). Beginning in the seventeenth century, two distinct styles appeared in neighboring Punjab Hill states. The first style implemented a bold palette of saturated brilliant colors applied in unmodulated, flat zones, as exemplified in the paintings at Basohli and Mankot (and other areas such as Nurpur, Kulu, and Chamba). Mughal-influenced details are included, but appear discreetly in the form of touches of color applied to the faces to indicate modeling, and in the depiction of richly patterned textiles. A second style, predominant in the works produced in Guler and Kangra, exhibits a strong relationship to Mughal works in the use of a subtle, varied palette, and the portrayal of naturalistically rendered landscapes.

Basohli and Mankot. One of the earliest group of paintings associated with Basohli is a seventeenth-century series of square-format paintings, each depicting Devī the great goddess in one of her Tantric forms. As if to match the divine subject matter presented, these works glow with a ferocious beauty. Embellishments distinctive to Basohli paintings are exhibited in this set: thickly applied dots of white pigment representing pearl ornaments, and iridescent green beetle-wing carapaces, applied to emulate emerald gemstones. Although no inscription identifies the patron or artist of the series, it has been stylistically associated with an illustrated copy of Bhanudatta’s *Rasamanjari*, produced about 1660 or 1670. As Raja Sangram Pal (r. 1635–1673) adopted the worship of Vishnu, or Vaishnavism, it has been suggested that he may have been the patron of this vibrantly rendered version of the *Rasamanjari*. A folio from the set illustrates *Guru Mana*, or the “intense pride of the *nayika*,” as identified by an inscription in *takri* script at the top margin. After a night spent with another woman, the *nayaka* (visualized in this series as the amorous god Krishna) sheepishly approaches the *nayika* (Rādhā) with a strand of pearls in his hand, the gift of a guilty lover (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums). Here we see quite clearly elements typically associated with Basohli works: flat juxtapositions of colors; figural, architectural, and foliate forms delineated by a strong almost calligraphic line; and idiosyncratically presented physiognomies, all contained within a wide, brilliant red border.

Another beautiful *Rasamanjari* series was produced in 1694–1695 for Raja Kripal Pal (reigned c. 1678–c. 1693) by an artist named Devidasa, a member of a family of painters originally from the nearby state of Nurpur.

A folio illustrating a spirited exchange between Shiva and Pārvatī during a game of *chaupar* depicts the pair seated on an upturned tiger skin that seemingly floats between two schematically rendered curving trees (New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art).

Works from Mankot are stylistically related to contemporary paintings produced at Basohli, as illustrated by a Bhāgavata Purāṇa series produced about 1700 (Chandigarh, Government Museum and Art Gallery). The destruction of the evil King Kansa at Krishna’s hand is depicted in a beautifully composed frame that conveys the chaotic scene just before Krishna lands the fatal blow.

Royal portraiture inspired by Mughal models produced for Emperor Shah Jahan was introduced in Basohli and Mankot during the seventeenth century. A portrait of Shah Jahan, attributed to either Basohli or Mankot, was painted in about 1690 and depicts the emperor in a manner similar to the way he would have been portrayed by his own artists (Los Angeles County Museum of Art). However, in this work, Shah Jahan is positioned against a flat bright orange ground, his figure is devoid of naturalistic shading, and his head is disproportionately large—stylistic elements that distinguish this hill painting from imperial Mughal portraits. A slightly later Mankot painting of Raja Ajmat Dev (reigned c. 1730–c. 1760), painted about 1730, is even more schematically composed and depicts the elegant ruler seated while smoking a *buqqa* (London, Victoria and Albert Museum). The artist’s virtuosity is especially displayed in the rendering of the raja’s form, which is composed of sweeping lines that are paralleled in the shape of his *buqqa*’s hose and the curve of his sword.

Portraiture at Basohli underwent a dramatic transformation beginning with works produced for Amrit Pal (r. 1757–1776), which were rendered in a naturalistic style. It is possible that this change may have been influenced by the presence of the artist Nainsukh of Guler, who moved to Basohli sometime after the death in 1763 of his patron, prince Balwant Singh of Jammu.

Guler, Jasrota, and Kangra. Nainsukh was a member of one of the most renowned families of Rajput artists; his father Pandit Seu and his elder brother Manaku also worked for the rajas of Guler. Raja Rup Chand (reigned c. 1610–c. 1635) of Guler and his descendants were closely affiliated with the Mughal emperors and went on military campaigns on their behalf. Although later artistic works from Guler appear to have been strongly influenced by the Mughal idiom, there is no evidence that yet explains this process of transmission.

Among the earliest works at Guler are those attributed to Pandit Seu while in the employ of Raja Dalip Singh (r. 1695–1741), such as a Rāmāyaṇa set painted about 1720, and a series of royal portraits. A wonderful

painting attributed to the artist from about 1730 depicts the gyrations of men dancing to the accompaniment of four musicians (Los Angeles County Museum of Art). Although the men are placed against a rich, solid-red ground reminiscent of compositions from Basohli, Mankot, and Nurpur, their delicately modeled and individualized portraits prefigure the works of his son Nainsukh.

Pandit Seu's elder son Manaku was also very active at Guler, and his early works, which include a *Gītā Govinda* series (c. 1730, Chandigarh, Government Museum and Art Gallery), are rendered in a more conservative style. A large-scale "Siege of Lanka" series, from about 1725–1730, was left unfinished, and the now dispersed folios provide an interesting study of artistic process in the Rajput atelier, as they display varied stages of execution from preliminary underdrawings to finished folios. A painting by Manaku (c. 1750–1755) illustrating an episode from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (in which the youthful Krishna and his brother Balarama play blindman's bluff with cowherd boys) displays the idealized beauty and naturalistic representation of landscape and figures that distinguish Kangra and later Guler.

Manaku's younger brother Nainsukh found patronage for many years at the small principality of Jasrota under Raja Balwant Singh, a prince of the Jammu family, until Balwant Singh's death in 1723. He arrived at Jasrota from Guler in about 1740, working first for Raja Mian Zorawar Singh, Balwant Singh's father. Nainsukh's many marvelous portraits of Balwant Singh provide the viewer with a compendium of the raja's activities and events. Nainsukh apparently accompanied his patron everywhere, making sketches and paintings of the prince, depicting him in quiet, intimate moments, as in a painting of Balwant Singh writing in his camp tent (c. 1750, Mumbai, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya). The works also include lively compositions, such as a painting dated 1752 that depicts Balwant Singh perched in a howdah on top of an elephant, slashing at an attacking lioness with his sword (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Art Museums). The superb delicacy of line and color with which Nainsukh rendered his works is matched only by his ability to transmit the emotional aspects of the people and events that he documented.

Kangra was a center of artistic production from the eighteenth through early twentieth century. Although there were many families of artists working in Kangra, the primary creative impetus came from the grandsons of Pandit Seu of Guler. One of the most important patrons of art in the region was Maharaja Sansar Chand (r. 1775–1823) of Kangra. One of the most beautiful sets, of which about 140 folios survive, made during the early part of Sansar Chand's reign, was a *Gītā Govinda* series painted around 1775–1780. This set is attributed to a

member of the Pandit Seu family, a generation after Nainsukh. An illustration depicting Rādhā and Krishna's tryst in a grove exemplifies the lyrical beauty and delicacy of line of early Kangra painting (London, Victoria and Albert Museum). Among other extant works from Kangra are numerous paintings from dispersed sets, including folios from a *Bihari Satsai* (c. 1780–1790) and illustrations that feature romantic and heroic *nayaka* and *nayika* themes. The refinement of Kangra paintings produced during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was eventually lost in favor of overly sentimental and repetitious compositions. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh (r. 1801–1839) occupied the Kangra fort, and Gurkha troops triumphed in battle over Sansar Chand, and so for some years life was disrupted at Kangra. Many artists, including those from Pandit Seu's family lineage, moved to other villages, where they worked for patrons from nearby small hill principalities.

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See also **Ajanta; Mahābhārata; Mughal Painting; Rāmāyaṇa**

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RĀMA. See *Rāmāyaṇa*.

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION. See *Vivekananda, Swami*.

RAMANANDA (1400–1470), Hindu religious teacher.

The founder of the Rāmanandis, a sect of Vaishnava Hinduism, Ramananda was part of the medieval Hindu devotional movement (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries) in North India, when focus moved from polytheism to the worship of one God and his avatars, especially Krishna and Rāma. Devotees did this through an emotional, passionate devotion or love of God, *bhakti*. In his youth Ramananda resided in South India and on his return was a follower of his great, great-grandfather Rāmānuja's Srivaishnava sect. Ramananda settled in Benaras (Varanasi) and developed his ideas of egalitarianism, preaching in a local dialect. He called for the love of God in as intense a manner as possible. He saw humanity as one large family, in which all men were brothers, and caste and creed were irrelevant. Accordingly, he preached to everyone, no matter how high on the social and ritual scale they were. His twelve personal disciples included women, an outcaste, and a Muslim. Ritual was unimportant, only personal love of God was meaningful. He also believed in "service to man," following the beliefs of Vaishnavite and Shaivite saints of the first millennium. He advocated devotion to Rāma and his *shakti*, Sītā, but a devotion devoid of eroticism. Accordingly, the devotee's attitude should be that of servant to master, rather than that of a lover, as epitomized by the service given by Hanuman to his master Rāma.

Ramananda's sect is of great historical significance because its followers started a number of other sects and movements in North India and inspired the Sikhs and Kabirpanthis, who adopted their social concerns. The Rāmanandis base their theology on the writings of Tulsidas (1532–1623), the author of *Rāmācaritmanasa* (The sacred lake of Rāma's deeds), in which Rāma is the supreme lord and the other deities are subordinate to him. It is composed in Hindi rather than Sanskrit and is derived from Valmiki's *Rāmāyaṇa*. The Rāmanandis are ascetically minded, and while all castes were welcome in the sect, including "untouchables," and caste duties were abolished, with devotion to Rāma replacing all obligations, the contemporary practice is to impose caste restrictions in Rāmanandi temples, where only Brahmans can be priests. Likewise, both sexes were originally initiated into the sect, but there are now very few nuns. Their most popular festival is Rāmlīla, which is celebrated throughout North India. The *Rāmācaritmanasa* is recited, and the story of Rāma and Sītā is enacted, from Rāma's

birth to the establishment of his *Rāmrajya* (“Rama’s Rule,” i.e., paradise).

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See also **Bhakti**

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RĀMĀNUJA (1017–1137), Hindu Vaishnava teacher and philosopher. A South Indian Brahman, Rāmānuja has a dual importance, as a thinker within the tradition of Vedantic philosophy and as a religious figure within the Sri Vaishnava community. Even though he is acknowledged today as a great expositor of the Vedāntic tradition, the many accounts of his life revere him more for his pious life and religious leadership than for his intellectual prowess. Rāmānuja lived at a time when Hinduism was firmly established in India, with Buddhism having almost disappeared and Jainism being confined to a few pockets of western India. Within the Hinduism of his time, Rāmānuja’s self-perceived role was to preserve the integrity of the ancient Vedantic tradition and to explicate it in a new context. This inevitably generated conflicts, both with other schools of thought and with some contemporary forms of religious practice. In particular, Rāmānuja saw his main opponents as the Shaivites in religion and the Advaitins in philosophy. This conflict accounts in part for the polemical tone of much of his writing.

Within the Sri Vaishnava community, Rāmānuja was acknowledged as the sixth great guru in their line of gurus. There is a well-known story that illustrates both his character and the impact he had on subsequent Hinduism. Rāmānuja was initiated into the community of the *ācārya* (authoritative teacher) Yāmuna by the latter’s disciples. When it came time to impart the all-important secret formula (mantra) of the community, they swore Rāmānuja to secrecy. The day after receiving the mantra, however, Rāmānuja shouted the mantra out loud to his fellow devotees from the temple top. Acknowledging that he might well go to hell for this radical act of disobedience, he justified himself thus: “But because of their connection with you [his teachers] these souls will be saved.” This concern for the spiritual welfare of others marked the active religious ministry of Rāmānuja. He became the head of the main Sri Vaishnava temple at Srirangam in South India and loosened the caste restrictions so as to honor both his own lower caste teacher and to open the

doors of worship to non-Brahmans. For this he suffered the persecution of the reigning Shaiva-oriented king in the South and had to flee to the Hoysala kingdom of the North, where he spent the last part of his life. As a result of his efforts, Brahmanic Hinduism was transformed: the quality of *bhakti* (religious devotion) rather than caste-based ritual purity was, at least in principle, made the criterion of authentic religious life.

Rāmānuja’s philosophy was of one piece with his religious practice. The three most important of the nine texts conventionally attributed to him are his commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtra: his famous *Shrībhāṣya* and the shorter *Vedāntadīpa* and *Vedāntasāra*. In them he provided his own exposition of the Vedānta, which in contemporary terms may be characterized as a version of *pantheism*. God and the world are both real and internally related in the way a human self is related to its body. God may be distinguished but not separated from the world, and just as the self transcends the body, so also God transcends the world. In laying out his own views, Rāmānuja severely criticized what he saw as the errors of Shankara. Rāmānuja moved Vedānta in a firmly theistic direction in contrast to the impersonal nondualism of Shankara. Īshvara as the lord of creation is the highest God, the *saguṇa* (“with qualities”) Brahman, above whom there is none. He disagreed, therefore, with Shankara’s hierarchy of *nirguṇa* (“without qualities”) and *saguṇa* Brahman. He likewise qualified Shankara’s nondualism—hence the name of the Vedāntic school with which Rāmānuja is associated, Viśiṣṭadvaita, or “qualified nondualism.” The reality of God is internally differentiated to create the space within the godhead for selves and matter. Unlike Shankara, for whom the primary religious act is that of right knowledge (*jnāna*), whereby one sees through and beyond the illusory nature of the world, Rāmānuja emphasized *bhakti*, or devotion. Being grounded in God, the religious acts of devotion and surrender are a form of ontological homage—the return of the creature to his or her source.

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See also **Shankara; Upanishadic Philosophy**

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RĀMĀYAṆA Traditional Rāmāyaṇa scholarship has been marked by what Robert Goldman calls a “zeal” (1984, p. 63) to demonstrate that most or all of this epic’s first book is late. Books 2–6 are taken to supply most or all of the poem’s “‘genuine’ portions,” and the closing Book 7 is taken as axiomatically late. For such scholars, Books 2–6 have presented the possibility that they narrate a largely consecutive heroic story of a man who is for the most part not yet “divinized.”

This view has been challenged over the last several decades. Pivotal to this rethinking has been the completion of the Baroda Critical Edition of the Rāmāyaṇa (1960–1975), which this article will use for its synopsis. Most of the key passages that speak of Rāma as an incarnation of Vishnu make the Critical Edition’s cut. Sheldon Pollock (1986, pp. 38–42) and Madeleine Biardeau (1997, pp. 77–119) have also introduced a consideration based on comparison with the Mahābhārata and the fruits of its Pune Critical Edition. Up to Book 2, each epic follows a similar archetypal design, with each Book 1 introducing the frame stories, origins, and youth of the heroes, and each Book 2 describing a pivotal court intrigue. This approach can be carried further: Book 3, Forest (in the title of both epics’ third books); Book 4, Inversions (the Pāṇḍava’s topsy-turvy disguises in Virāṭa’s kingdom of Matsya (Fish); Rāma’s engagement with the topsy-turvy world of the monkeys’ capital, Kishkindhā, in which the lead monkeys play out a reverse image of Rāma’s own story); Book 5, “Effort” (*udyoga*; see *Rām* 5.10.24; 33.66) made in Preparation for War (by both sides in the Mahābhārata; by Hanumān and all the monkeys in the Rāmāyaṇa) with Krishna and Hanumān going as divine messengers into the enemy camp, where there are attempts to capture them; War Books (Rāmāyaṇa 6; Mahābhārata 6–11), and denouements (Rāmāyaṇa 7; Mahābhārata 12–18). The Rāmāyaṇa’s term for its Books is *kāṇḍa*, meaning a “section” of a stalk of a plant, such as bamboo, between its joints; the Mahābhārata’s is *parvan*, which can mean the joints themselves of such a plant. Together they could describe a complete stalk of a noded plant. Such closeness of design cannot be accidental. This article favors the priority of the Mahābhārata and will be presented from that standpoint, with the corollaries that Rāmāyaṇa Books 1 and 7 are integral to its earliest design and that the Rāmāyaṇa poet is not only familiar with the Mahābhārata’s design but intent upon refining it.

Such a relation can be exemplified by the two epics’ frame stories, which are opened at the beginning of the first Books and left pending into the denouements. Unlike the Mahābhārata’s three frame stories, which present a serial layering of the first three recitals of supposedly the same text that are scattered over its first fifty-six chapters and resumed in late portions of its twelfth

Book, the Rāmāyaṇa frame, in only its first four chapters (known as the *upodghāta* or preamble), presents two progressive unfoldings of the story—the first by the sage Nārada to the hermit Vālmīki; the second by Vālmīki himself, now a poet—that trace its ripening into the third full unfolding, the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa itself.

In the first, in answer to Vālmīki’s opening question of whether there is an ideal man in the world today (1.1.2–5), Nārada satisfies the question with a brief and entirely laudatory account of Rāma’s virtues and adult life, presumably to date (1.1.7–76). Saying the minimum about Rāma’s killing of the monkey Vālin (1.1.49, 55), Nārada hardly hints at anything problematic in Rāma’s life and omits both Sītā’s fire ordeal and her banishment. Among the great *rishis*, or seers, that Rāma encounters, he mentions only Vasishtha (29) and Agastya (33–34).

In the second *sarga*, once Nārada has left, Vālmīki witnesses the cries of grief of a female *krauñca* bird (probably the large monogamous sarus crane) over the slaying of her mate by a “cruel hunter,” and is provoked into the spontaneous utterance that creates “verse” (and thus poetry) out of “grief” (*shloka* out of *shoka*; 1.2.9–15). As this verse is said to mark the origins of poetry, the Rāmāyaṇa is called the *ādikāvya*, or “first poem”—a term that does not occur in the Critical Edition, though it probably should since it occurs in a universally attested *sarga* where, after Sītā has vanished into the earth, the god Brahmā encourages Rāma to hear the rest of this *ādikāvya* (7, Appendix I, No. 13, lines 31–39). Now, however, the same Brahmā appears (22–36) to prompt Vālmīki to tell the story he has just heard from Nārada, and gives him the insight to see what he did not know and what is still yet to happen—confirming that his poem will all be true (1.2.33–35). Brahmā thus assures Vālmīki that he will know things omitted from Nārada’s encomium. When Brahmā leaves, Vālmīki conceives the idea of composing “the entire Rāmāyaṇa poem (*kāvya*)” in *shlokas* (1.2.40cd).

In the third *sarga*, Vālmīki meditatively enters into this project for the first time and has a sort of preview of the story (1.3.3–28): not a retrospective table of contents like the Mahābhārata’s *Parvasamgraha*, but a kind of first glimpse of what his poem will contain. Here he provides the first reference to some of Rāma’s encounters with important *rishis* (Vishvāmitra [4], Rāma Jāmadagnya [5], Bharadvāja [8]). Most important, he closes with Sītā’s banishment (28).

Then, looking back upon the poem’s completion, the fourth *sarga* hints at the context in which Vālmīki’s Rāmāyaṇa will finally be told by the twins Kusha and Lava to their father, Rāma. Just as information on the Mahābhārata’s frame is resumed with further revelations in Book 12, the Rāmāyaṇa’s frame will be picked up in

Book 7, when Kusha and Lava do just that. The main difference is that when the Rāmāyaṇa frame is reentered in Book 7, it is not just a matter of further revelations about the composition that are difficult to relate to the main story. Vālmīki's dramatic entry into the main story presents the occasion to reveal the poetic heart of the whole poem through its effects on its hero and its heroine.

Vālmīki thus gets a triple inspiration—from Nārada, the *krauñcī*, and Brahmā. Yet the *upodghāta* leaves us in suspense as to when Sītā came to his ashram. Was it before or after the *krauñca* bird incident? The poem never tells whether Vālmīki's response to the female bird comes before or after his familiarity with Sītā's grief at her banishment. But in either case, now that Vālmīki knows the whole story from Brahmā, he could connect Sītā's banishment with the *krauñcī*'s cry whenever she arrived. What we do know is that, having had pity (*karuṇa*) for the female bird, Vālmīki will compose his poem with pity as its predominant aesthetic flavor (*aṅgī rasa*) in relation to grief (*shoka*) as its underlying *sthāyibhāva* or “stable aesthetic emotion.” Vyāsa, the Mahābhārata's author, provides no such developmental inspiration story. The Rāmāyaṇa frame is thus shorter, more focused, and more poetically traceable into the main narrative and the whole poem.

Although the *upodghāta* concludes with Rāma, as chief-auditor-to-be, inviting his brothers to join him in listening to the boys he is yet to recognize, he interrupts their narration to question them only once: when he asks them who authored this poem (*kāvya*; 7.85.19). Otherwise he is the rapt and silent listener. He launches their recital in the penultimate verse of the *upodghāta*: “Moreover, it is said that the profound adventure (*mahāmubhāvaṃ caritam*) they tell is highly beneficial even for me. Listen to it” (1.4.26d). Who says this? Why beneficial to Rāma? The preamble leaves us with such implicit and subtle questions. In these passages, we see two of the three leading terms by which the Rāmāyaṇa describes itself: *kāvya* (poem) and *carita* (adventure), the third being *ākhyāna* (tale, narrative). *Kathā* (story) is also used, but with less specificity. These four terms are woven through the *upodghāta*. It is noteworthy that *itihāsa* (history), which along with *ākhyāna* is one of the two main terms to describe the Mahābhārata, is not only unused to describe the Rāmāyaṇa but is absent from the latter's entire Critical Edition. In this, it is like the absence of *kāvya* in the Mahābhārata's Critical Edition; as if the two texts were in early agreement to yield one of these terms to the other. Neither does *purāṇa* (ancient lore) describe the Rāmāyaṇa, which evidently places itself outside the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition that Chāndogya Upanishad 7.1.2 links with Nārada as a fifth Veda. Similarly, *upākhyāna* (subtale) is used only in the Mahābhārata, although there

is an interpolated verse in the *ashvamedha* recital scene in which the twins begin singing the poem and tell Rāma that the Rāmāyaṇa has twenty-four thousand verses and a hundred *upākhyānas* (7.1328*, following 7.85.20)—suggesting Mahābhārata influence.

Kāvya is used only at the Rāmāyaṇa's two framing points: nine times in the *upodghāta*, four in the *ashvamedha* recital scene. It thus has a kind of bookend function of describing the work as poetry, most notably that “it is replete with” all the “poetic sentiments” or *rasas* (1.4.8). In contrast to *kāvya*, *carita* implies the “movement” of the main narrative. Of its four usages in the *upodghāta* to characterize the Rāmāyaṇa, two present a juxtaposition. The first has Brahmā enjoin Vālmīki to “compose the whole adventure of Rāma” (1.2.30cd). The second, once it is implied that Vālmīki has composed it, calls “the whole Rāmāyaṇa poem (*kāvya*) the great adventure of Sītā” (1.4.6). This suggests that, although Rāma's adventure is Vālmīki's starting point, the complete poem is also about Sītā's. The “profound adventure” that Rāma prepares himself to hear at the end of the *upodghāta* would thus include the two adventures intertwined (4.26). *Carita* is also the main word to describe the Rāmāyaṇa when these adventures are in course (2.54.18; 6.114.4)—and even in the course of hearing it. When the twins begin reciting the poem and Rāma asks who composed it, they reply, “The blessed Vālmīki, who has reached the presence of the sacrifice, is the author by whom this adventure is disclosed to you without remainder” (7.85.19).

Meanwhile, *ākhyāna* is used four times in the *upodghāta*. It describes the benefits of hearing the tale's recital (1.1.78), that it is “unsurpassed” as a “tale exemplary of righteousness” (1.4.11), that it is a “wondrous tale told by the sage” that he “completed in perfect sequence” as “the great source of inspiration for poets (*kaṁvīnām*)” (1.4.20), and that Rāma urged his brothers to “listen to this tale whose words and meanings alike are wonderful as it is sweetly sung by these two godlike men” (1.4.25). It is also the first term to describe the Rāmāyaṇa when the recital of its main story begins: “Of these kings of illustrious lineage, the Ikhvākus, this great tale is known as the Rāmāyaṇa. I will recite it from the beginning in its entirety, omitting nothing. It is in keeping with the goals of righteousness, profit, and pleasure and should be listened to with faith” (1.5.3-4). *Ākhyāna* can also be used for tales told in course, most notably for the “glad tidings” that Hanumān brings at various points to others (5.57.1, 59.6, 6.101.17, 113.40). Complementary to both *kāvya* and *carita*, it links the narrative to the inspiration of poets while also bringing listeners into the poem's double adventure.

The Rāmāyaṇa thus makes very selective use of limited terms. In contrast to the Mahābhārata, they are used

strategically rather than as definitions, and they are not used to emphasize the interplay between the Rāmāyaṇa's parts and its whole. Emerging from and flowing back into the passages that frame the Rāmāyaṇa (the *upodghāta* and the *ashvamedha* recital scene), side-stories fall within a single poetic narrative that is portrayed as being addressed uninterruptedly (the one exception noted) to Rāma. It does not have multiple audiences in a threefold stacking of dialogical frames (Shulman 2001, pp. 28–33).

Synopsis

Book 1, the *Bālakāṇḍa*, or “Book of the Boy[s],” begins with the *upodghāta* (*sargas* 1–4), which leads directly to the main narrative, starting with the origins of the Ikshvāku dynasty and quickly narrowing to the one defect in the long reign of the current monarch, Dasharatha: he is sonless. At this time the gods and *rishis* (seers) are alarmed by the Rākshasa Rāvaṇa, who harasses the seers in their hermitages. With the help of a descendant of the sage Kashyapa, named Rishyashriṅga (whose story is told in the Mahābhārata's *Rishyashriṅga-Upākhyāna* [Mbh 3.110–113]), Dasharatha's three wives bear four sons, all partial incarnations of Vishnu: Rāma, Bharata, and the twins Lakshmaṇa and Shatrughna. Meanwhile Brahmā directs other gods to take birth as monkeys. Once the boys start their Vedic education, the sage Vishvāmītra (whose story is told in the Mahābhārata's *Vasishtha- and Vishvāmītra-Upākhyānas* [Mbh 1.264–273, 13.3–4]) arrives (*sargas* 5–17). He demands that Dasharatha allow Rāma and Lakshmaṇa to accompany him into the forest, and is supported by the sage Vasishtha. Once Dasharatha releases the boys, Vishvāmītra teaches them divine weapons and prepares them for a Rākshasa encounter. They kill Tātakā (a female) and Subāhu, but Mārīca escapes. Vishvāmītra then mentions that King Janaka of Mithilā will be performing a sacrifice at which a great bow will be presented as a test of strength (*sargas* 18–31).

Along the way to Mithilā, Vishvāmītra tells stories: the last of them about Ahalyā. Cursed by her husband, the sage Gautama, for being seduced by Indra (this story is told in the Mahābhārata's *Cirakāri-Upākhyāna* [12.258] and alluded to in its *Indravijaya-Upākhyāna* [5.12.6]), she is redeemed by Rāma's arrival at their hermitage—a cautionary tale about marriage and sexuality (Sutherland Goldman, p. 72)—before Rāma learns more about Janaka's sacrifice. Janaka's minister Shatānanda then tells Rāma the story of Vishvāmītra's former rivalry with Vasishtha (a topic, again, of the Mahābhārata's *Vasishtha-Upākhyāna* [Mbh 1.64–73]; *sargas* 32–65).

Janaka's sacrifice turns out to be Sītā's “self-choice” of a husband, where Rāma wins Sītā by breaking the great bow of Shiva. To unite the houses further, Janaka provides wives for Rāma's brothers. Vishvāmītra departs, and

on the way back to Ayodhya, Rāma is confronted by Rāma Jāmadagnya (who appears repeatedly in the Mahābhārata, notably in the *Kārtavīrya-* [Mbh 3.115–117], [*Bhārgava-*] *Rāma-* [12.48–49], and *Vishvāmītra-Upākhyānas* [13.3–4]). This older Brahman Rāma blocks the new Kshatriya Rāma's path and demands that he break a bow of Vishnu—which Rāma does, making the older Rāma yield. The young couples then return to Ayodhya for happy honeymoons. But Dasharatha sends Bharata and Shatrughna with Bharata's maternal uncle back to Kekaya, the country of Bharata's mother Kaikeyī (*sargas* 66–77).

Rishyashriṅga's contribution to the four brothers' births, the stories told along the way by and about Vishvāmītra, and the encounter with Bhārgava Rāma have often been viewed as “digressions” or “interpolations” because they depart from a straightforward Rāma saga. But this view overlooks an emerging pattern. The sequence of *rishis*—Rishyashriṅga (a descendant of Kashyapa), Vasishtha, Vishvāmītra, Gautama (with Ahalyā), and Rāma Jāmadagnya (son of Jamadagni)—has linked Rāma's early years to sages from five of the eight great Brahman *gotras*, or lineages, whose eponymous ancestors are connected with the composition of the Rig Veda and are regarded as the main *pravara rishis*—the ones to whom all Brahman families make invocation (*pravara*) when they give their line of descent.

At the beginning of Book 2, the *Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa*, or “Book of Ayodhyā,” Dasharatha—with the whiff of a scheme—announces his intention to make Rāma his heir-apparent with Bharata away. Kaikeyī's maidservant Mantharā arouses Kaikeyī's jealousy and reminds her that Dasharatha once granted her two boons, which she has yet to claim (2.9.9–13). In a wrenching scene that launches the Rāmāyaṇa's unending skein of pity and grief, the aged Dasharatha hears her two demands: Rāma's fourteen-year banishment and Bharata's installment as heir-apparent (10.28–29). At the news, Rāma calmly says he will honor his father's word, and does so even when Dasharatha urges him to ignore it. Sītā demands to accompany Rāma, who then approves Lakshmaṇa's offer to attend them. Nearing their departure, Kaikeyī contemptuously gives Sītā bark to wear over her sari, and when Rāma has to help Sītā put it on, Dasharatha gives Sītā garments and jewels to cover the bark (*sargas* 1–34).

The departure is then a long scene of grief from the principals down to Ayodhya's citizens. Crossing the Gaṅgā, the trio heads toward their first destination, the hermitage of the *rishi* Bharadvāja. When Rāma asks Bharadvāja to “think of some good site for an ashram in a secluded place,” the seer directs them to Mount Citrakūṭa, “a meritorious place frequented by the

great *risbis*" (2.48.25). Meanwhile, back at Ayodhya, Dasharatha dies after tortured recollections, leaving a widowed city, and messengers are sent to Bharata (*sargas* 35–65).

Bharata learns of Dasharatha's death at Ayodhya and grieves, denouncing Kaikeyī. Affirming the Ikshvākus' custom of primogeniture, he tells his deputies that he rather than Rāma will fulfill the terms of exile and orders them to prepare an army to help him bring Rāma back. Following the same route, Bharata reaches Bharadvāja's ashram. Bharadvāja tests him, conjuring up a feast for the army and a royal palace for him. Bharata rejects the royal seat, foreshadowing how he will steward Rāma's throne. Having seen Bharata's worthiness, Bharadvāja again gives directions to Citrakūta (*sargas* 66–86).

Descrying Bharata's approach with an army, Lakshmaṇa fears that he wants to kill them. Rāma attests to Bharata's trustworthiness. Bharata reaches Rāma alone, leaving the army camped below. Upon meeting, they embrace, and Rāma learns of Dasharatha's death. After long discussion, Bharata agrees to be regent for the exile's duration, and Rāma gives him his sandals. Having worn these on his head all the way back, Bharata leaves Rāma's throne empty and takes up residence in a village outside Ayodhya, where he consecrates the sandals and appries them before giving any order (*sargas* 87–107).

Soon sensing disquiet among the Citrakūṭa *risbis*, Rāma learns that Rāvaṇa's younger brother, Khara, has been cannibalizing ascetics in nearby Janasthāna. The sages retreat to a safer ashram and Rāma moves on to the ashram of Atri, where Atri's wife Anasūyā tells Sītā the duties of a faithful wife and gives her more apparel and jewels. Rāma gets his next directions from the ascetics there, who recommend, all other routes being treacherous, "the path through the forest that the great *risbis* use when they go to gather fruits" (111.19; *sargas* 108–111).

With this close of Book 2, Rāma has now been linked with seven of the eight *pravara risbis*—Vasishtha, Kashyapa, Vishvāmitra, Gautama, Jamadagni, Bharadvāja, and Atri—or their descendants. These original seven, who together constitute the northern constellation of the Seven Rishis (Big Dipper), have pointed Rāma south.

The first line of Book 3, the *Aranya Kānda*, or "Book of the Forest," finds the trio entering the "vast wilderness" of Daṇḍaka. As they move on from a circle of ashrams, a Rākshasa named Virādha ("one who thwarts") looms before them and seizes Sītā. Pained by seeing her touched, Rāma fills Virādha with arrows, and the brothers each break off an arm to release her. Virādha realizes he has been slain by Rāma, which relieves him from a

curse. Before going to heaven, he tells Rāma that the great *rishi* Sharabhaṅga "will see to your welfare" (3.3.22–23). Sharabhaṅga relays Rāma to the hermitage of Sutīkshṇa, who offers his ashram as a residence; but Rāma says he might kill the local game. The trio lives happily for ten years in another circle of hermitages before returning to Sutīkshṇa (10.21–26). Storytellers have now told Rāma about Agastya's ashram and he asks Sutīkshṇa how to find it in so vast a forest (29–30). Sutīkshṇa heads him due south, and along the way Rāma tells Lakshmaṇa stories told about Agastya that also occur in the Mahābhārata's *Agastya-Upākhyāna* (Mbh 3.94–108). Rāma intends to live out the remainder of his exile with Agastya (Rām 3.10.86), but Agastya, after meditating a moment, says that he knows Rāma's true desire and directs him to a lovely forest called Pancavaṭī near the Godāvārī River, where Sītā will be comfortable and Rāma can protect her while safeguarding the ascetics (12.12–20). These words of the eighth, last, and southernmost of the great *pravara risbis* resound with forebodings, as does the trio's meeting on the way to Pancavaṭī with the vulture Jaṭāyus, who offers to keep watch over Sītā whenever they are away (*sargas* 1–13). However kindly, a vulture is normally a bad omen (3.22.4).

At their Pancavaṭī ashram, the trio is soon visited by Rāvaṇa's sister Shūrpaṅkhā. Motivated by her rejection by both brothers to devour Sītā, she provokes Rāma to order Lakshmaṇa to mutilate her, and Lakshmaṇa cuts off her ears and nose. She rushes to her brother Khara in Janasthāna, where he heads a Rākshasa outpost in Daṇḍaka Forest. Khara and fourteen thousand Rākshasas are annihilated by Rāma. Shūrpaṅkhā then goes to Laṅkā and, with talk of Sītā's beauty, inspires Rāvaṇa to make her his wife. Rāvaṇa engages Mārīca to disguise himself as a golden deer, anticipating that Sītā will send Rāma and Lakshmaṇa to capture it. Mārīca knows Rāma from Book 1, and tries to warn Rāvaṇa against this plan. But unable to avoid Rāvaṇa's threats, he boards his celestial chariot. Sītā is enchanted by the golden deer. Rāma chases it. Its dying words convince her she hears Rāma crying for help, and she goads Lakshmaṇa to aide Rāma by accusing him of desiring her. Rāvaṇa comes disguised as a mendicant, sprouts ten heads, carries her off by her hair and thighs onto his chariot, and flies away. Sītā calls to Jaṭāyus, imploring him to tell Rāma and Lakshmaṇa all that has happened (47.36). Having slept through her abduction, Jaṭāyus flies up to challenge Rāvaṇa, destroys his chariot, and forces him to the ground. But Rāvaṇa severs his wings. Able to fly without a chariot, Rāvaṇa grabs Sītā to continue his journey. When she sees five monkeys on a mountain, Sītā drops some of her jewels and a garment, hoping they will mark her route. Once in Laṅkā, Rāvaṇa leaves her in a grove of *ashoka* trees outside his palace, giving her twelve months

to yield or be chopped into minced meat for his breakfast (*sargas* 14–54).

Rāma goes mad looking for Sītā until the brothers come upon Jaṭāyus, who, before he dies, tells them of her abduction by Rāvaṇa and that he headed south. They head south on an “untrodden path” (65.2), passing into the Krauñca Forest, still hoping to find Sītā. Instead they run into a Dānava-turned-Rākshasa, Kabandha (“headless trunk” but also a name for a sacrificial post). He guards the way past him as Virādha did for the Daṇḍaka Forest at the beginning of Book 3 (and as Kirmīra and the Yaksha do at the beginning and end of the Mahābhārata’s Book 3). Kabandha is a headless torso with a single-eyed face in his stomach, a huge devouring mouth, and long grabbing arms that suddenly seize the brothers, who quickly sever them. Realizing that this amputation by Rāma ends a long curse, Kabandha tells his story, and after Rāma has asked if he knows anything about Rāvaṇa and has cremated him, Kabandha rises lustrously from his pyre to say that Rāvaṇa’s abode may be found if Rāma allies with the monkey Sugrīva, whom Rāma should quickly make a “comrade” or “commiserator” (*vayasya*), sealing their pact before fire (68.13). Kabandha then directs them to Sugrīva’s haunt on Mount Rishyamūka. This path takes them through Mataṅga’s Wood to Mataṅga’s ashram, where all the *rishis* have passed away except the “mendicant woman” Shabarī (“the Tribal Woman”). As Shabarī soon corroborates, Mataṅga and his disciples ascended to heaven just when Rāma reached Citrakūṭa, but Shabarī has awaited Rāma’s arrival so that she can go to heaven after seeing him. For this, Rāma permits her to enter fire (70.26)—indexing an association between fire-entry and purification that will also apply to Sītā. Rāma now sees Mount Rishyamūka (*sargas* 55–71).

Book 4, the *Kishkindhā Kāṇḍa*, or “Book of Kishkindhā,” the monkey capital, begins with Rāma exploring Rishyamūka. Sugrīva, thinking the brothers could be his brother Vālin’s spies, sends his minister Hanumān to scout out their intentions. Learning of the similarities between Rāma and Sugrīva’s situations (forest exile; stolen wife), Hanumān says Sugrīva will help Rāma’s search, and Lakshmaṇa remarks that this help will come with Sugrīva’s own purpose. Hanumān brings the brothers to Sugrīva and tells him that they desire his friendship. As advised by Kabandha, “Sugrīva and Rāghava (Rāma) entered into *vayasya* by reverently circling the blazing fire” (5.16). Sugrīva tells Rāma he will recover his wife, like the lost Vedas, whether she is in the underworld or the heavens. He further recalls that he saw a woman drop her shawl and jewels when she saw him and four other monkeys on the mountain. She was crying “Rāma, Rāma! Lakshmaṇa!” while being carried off by Rāvaṇa. Rāma weeps, recognizing the articles as Sītā’s (6.1–19).



Painting Depicts Śrī Rāma, the Loyal and Chaste Sītā, and Hanumān. The centuries-old *Rāmāyaṇa*, the Hindu epic recounting Rāma’s struggles and victories, remains an intellectual and artistic force in the Indian world and beyond. DAVID CUMMING; EYE UBIQUITOUS / CORBIS.

Sugrīva now tells his account of how Vālin wronged him, which is only his side of the story. Rāma accepts it, even before fully hearing it, and promises to kill Vālin (8.23–26). Once Vālin was fighting the *asura* Māyāvin in a cave outside Kishkindhā and had stationed Sugrīva outside the entrance. After a year Sugrīva noticed signs of what he thought was Vālin’s death, so he blocked the cave to prevent the demon’s exit. Back at Kishkindhā, he replaced Vālin as king. But it was Māyāvin who had died, and when Vālin got out, he reclaimed the throne, took Sugrīva’s wife, and drove Sugrīva away. Rāma accepts that Sugrīva is innocent, assures him that Vālin sinned in taking his wife, and repeats that he will kill him (9–10). But behind this story lies another, in which Sugrīva discloses why Mount Rishyamūka provides him asylum. Māyāvin opposed Vālin because he had killed Māyāvin’s

older brother, “a buffalo named Dundubhi” (4.11.7). Dundubhi terrorized Kishkindhā with his horns; roaring like a kettle drum (*dundubhi*), he lured Vālin from his drunken amours. Grabbing Dundubhi’s horns, Vālin crushed him until blood oozed from his ears and hurled away the carcass. But “blood drops from the wounds fell out from its mouth and were lifted by the wind toward Mataṅga’s hermitage” (41). Mataṅga then cursed Vālin to be unable to enter his Wood on pain of death. Sugrīva now points to Dundubhi’s bones, which Rāma kicks off to a great distance with just his big toe.

Mataṅga’s departure thus defines his hermitage, along with Mount Rishyamūka, as a place cursed for its pollution. Though Mataṅga is a *rishi*, he is not a Vedic *rishi* or even a Brahman. Rather, his name denotes the “untouchable” just as Shabarī’s denotes the tribal. Dundubhi’s killing has behind it a buffalo sacrifice—a quite archaic one, with death by wrestling rather than the sword—in which this “untouchable *rishi*” takes on the pollution of this non-Vedic village rite. Rāma thus forges his “friendship” with Sugrīva in a place that is both cursed and beyond the range of the Vedic *rishis*, who up to now have marked his trail. In entering this topsy-turvy monkey world, where Vedic practices are distorted at the advice of Kabandha, a speaking sacrificial post, Rāma is all the while being drawn into a sequence of non-Vedic killings of questionable *dharmā* in which he himself is to make Vālin the next victim. Rāma tells Sugrīva to challenge Vālin to single combat and Rāma shoots Vālin from ambush. Against Vālin’s complaints that Rāma is a *dharmā*-hypocrite (4.17.18), Rāma has only dubious replies: he acts as Bharata’s proxy; princes go about the world guarding *dharmā*, which is subtle; Vālin is only a monkey and cannot understand *dharmā*, yet deserves this punishment for the sin of taking his brother’s wife; Rāma had promised Sugrīva to kill Vālin and his truth is unexceptionable (*sargas* 1–18).

Sugrīva is reconsecrated, and Vālin’s son Aṅgada is made heir apparent. With these events the main story enters the monkeys’ cave capital Kishkindhā. But Rāma does not. In keeping with his minimal contact with Mataṅga and Dundubhi, and on the pretext of having promised Dasharatha he would not enter any village or city during his exile (4.25.8), he lives outside Kishkindhā with Lakshmaṇa in a cave on Mount Prashravaṇa to await the end of the rainy season, when Sugrīva will summon the world’s monkeys to begin searching for Sītā. But when Sugrīva extends his debaucheries, Rāma grows angry and sends Lakshmaṇa to threaten him into action. Sugrīva says he has not forgotten, and summons the monkeys (*sargas* 19–38).

Sugrīva orders monkey squads to search each direction and return after a month. Noticing that Sugrīva pays

special attention to the southern party, which includes Hanumān, Rāma gives Hanumān a “ring engraved with his name” (43.11) to show to Sītā so that she will know whose message Hanumān bears and not fear him. A month later, all parties have returned but this southern one, which now emerges from a magical cave near the ocean. Dejected over their failure, they start fasting to death but are observed by a wingless vulture, Jaṭāyus’s older brother Sampāti, who thinks better of eating them and says that he and his son saw Rāvaṇa taking Sītā to Laṅkā, adding that the fierce *rishi* Nishākara told him to wait in this spot until Rāma’s monkey helpers should arrive. Mission accomplished, Sampāti sprouts new wings and flies away. The monkeys then decide that one of them must leap to Laṅkā, and decide it is a job only for Hanumān (*sargas* 39–66).

Sundara Kāṇḍa, “The Beautiful Book” (Book 5), then begins with Hanumān’s leap to Laṅkā. Landing and determined to search for Sītā, he makes his way at night to Rāvaṇa’s palace where he sees, sleeping after their carousals, Rāvaṇa, his harem, and a most beautiful woman—Rāvaṇa’s queen Mandodarī—whom Hanumān joyfully mistakes for Sītā, until he thinks through the implications, and soon recovers his propriety after taking such fascination at another man’s boudoir. Satisfying himself that there was nowhere else to begin looking for a woman, he goes to a nearby *ashoka* grove and finds a woman surrounded by *rākshasīs*, looking gaunt from fasting, unornamented and dirty, whom he barely makes out to be Sītā—as if faced with “some Vedic text once learned by heart but now nearly lost through lack of recitation,” or “as one might make out the sense of a word whose meaning had been changed through want of proper usage” (13.36–37; *sargas* 1–15).

As Hanumān looks on, Rāvaṇa pays another visit. Again, once Sītā defies him, his words turn to threats: before she becomes his breakfast she now has only two months to come to his bed. He orders the *Rākshasīs* to bend her will to his and walks off with one of them, who has begun seducing him. The browbeating goes on until an elderly *Rākshasī* named Trijaṭā recounts a dream that portends Rāma’s reunion with Sītā, Rāvaṇa’s death, and Laṅkā’s destruction. Trijaṭā observes that certain auspicious bodily signs indicate that her dream has encouraged Sītā, and these signs intensify even after Sītā has spoken of hanging herself while “holding the fillet for her hair” (26.17; *sargas* 16–27).

Hanumān, whose presence these omens register, now reflects that he must comfort Sītā lest she take her life. Not to alarm her, he starts a short “sweet” account of Rāma and Sītā’s story, down to her being found by the unknown voice she is hearing (29.3–9). When Sītā sees a monkey above her, she faints and first thinks it is a

dream—in which monkeys, she says, are inauspicious according to the *śbāstras* (30.1–4). But verifying that she is Sītā, they intertwine stories until Hanumān shows her Rāma’s signet ring. Sītā tells Hanumān to tell Rāma to make haste; she has only two months (35.7). As tokens for Rāma, Sītā tells an intimate story that only she and Rāma could know and, saying she has now but one month left, gives Hanumān a precious hair ornament that she has kept carefully concealed. Leaving Sītā, Hanumān rambles through the palace grounds, killing Rākshasa warriors sent to capture him until Rāvaṇa’s son Indrajit immobilizes him with divine weapons. Brought before Rāvaṇa, Hanumān tells him he faces the worst if he does not return Sītā. Rāvaṇa sets Hanumān’s tail afire and has him marched through Laṅkā. Making himself small, Hanumān slips his bonds; leaping from house to house, he torches Laṅkā with his tail. Then, thinking of Sītā, he reassures himself that she will survive since “fire cannot prevail against fire” (53.18; *sargas* 28–53).

Hanumān then recrosses the ocean to join his companions and bring them up to date. Nearing Kishkindhā, they break into Sugrīva’s honey grove to get drunk. The guardian reports to Sugrīva that they have destroyed the grove, but Sugrīva joyfully senses that this can only mean their mission’s success. Sobered and told that Sugrīva excuses their exuberance, the southern party reports back to him and the brothers. Hanumān tells Rāma the confirmatory story, gives him Sītā’s jewel, tells him she has but one month left, and poses the challenge of devising a way to cross the ocean.

Rāma clasps the jewel to his heart. Sītā had described it as “born from the sea” (63.22)—perhaps a pearl. Confirming these origins, Rāma adds that Janaka gave it to her at their wedding when it was “fastened to her head” (64.4). When Hanumān presents a fuller account of the jewel’s transfer, he says that when Sītā released it from her garment, she “gave me this jewel fit for being fastened (or, for the fillet) around her braid (*venyud-grathanam*)” (65.30). That compound also described the fillet when she thought of hanging herself. She thus seems to send the jewel that she would fasten to this fillet without sending the fillet, which would still be keeping her hair back in an *ekavenī* or “single braid”—a kind of ponytail that signals a woman’s separation in anticipation of her husband’s return, and in Sītā’s case is once said to be “matted” (55.27; *sargas* 54–66). Left pending, as it were, is the symbolism of fully loosened hair that could denote a woman’s widowhood or mourning—or, if one thinks of Draupadī, her Kālī-like anger.

The *Yuddha Kāṇḍa*, or “Book of the War” (Book 6), begins with prewar consultations on both sides, out of which Rāvaṇa’s younger brother Vibhīshaṇa emerges as a righteous, but rejected, adviser. Once the brothers and

monkeys reach the seashore, Vibhīshaṇa receives asylum from Rāma. Helped by his advice to call on Rāma’s ancestor Sāgara (Ocean), the latter grants permission for a bridge to Laṅkā, which the monkeys then construct. Rāvaṇa seems unable to focus on Rāma or the war until his wise maternal grandfather Mālyavān, counseling peace with Rāma and Sītā’s return, says the gods and *rishis* desire Rāma’s victory, differentiates *dhārma* and *adharma* as divine and demonic, alludes to the (Mahābhārata) idea that the king defines the age (*yuga*), says that throughout the regions the *rishis* are performing fiery Vedic rites and austerities that are damaging the Rākshasas, foresees the Rākshasas’ destruction, notes the sinister omens surrounding Laṅkā, and concludes, “I think Rāma is Viṣṇu abiding in a human body” (26.31). Mālyavān not only gets it right but provides analogs to features of the Bhagavad Gītā: a theology for the war about to happen; a prediction of its outcome; and a disclosure of the hidden divinity behind it—in this case, hidden so far mainly from himself. Rāvaṇa will hear none of this (*sargas* 1–30).

Rāvaṇa orders his warriors into action. Most just go through a routine of boasting, ignoring omens, and getting killed. Exceptions are his gigantic brother Kumbhakarna, who must be wakened from his half-year sleep, fed, and toppled, and Rāvaṇa’s magician son Indrajit, who immobilized Hanumān. Indrajit figures in the two main episodes that threaten Rāma’s side: he nearly kills the brothers with snake arrows until the celestial bird Garuḍa rescues them by routing the snakes; and he lays low nearly all the monkeys until Hanumān returns from the Himalayas carrying a whole peak, capped with healing herbs. The fighting is also interrupted by reminders that Sītā is at stake. Finally, Rāma kills Rāvaṇa and consecrates Vibhīshaṇa as Laṅkā’s king (*sargas* 31–100).

Now Sītā, who hears from Hanumān of Rāma’s victory and rejoices at her deliverance, is brought to Rāma by Vibhīshaṇa—who relays Rāma’s directive that she appear adorned with divine unguents and jewels and a washed head (102.7). She would rather see her husband unbathed, but takes this advice and wears (seems to choose) a white garment (13)—soon a symbol of what troubles Rāma: her purity, one supposes, though white is also worn in widowhood. When Vibhīshaṇa announces her, Rāma is filled with “joy, misery, and anger” (16). As she advances, an “unseemly commotion” (Shulman 1991, p. 91) breaks out as Vibhīshaṇa’s servants aggressively clear her way among the monkeys, bears, and Rākshasas struggling to see her. Rāma censures Vibhīshaṇa for injuring “my own people (*svajano mama*)” (25); since women can be seen in public during disasters, wars, and weddings, there is no reason to shield Sītā “in my presence (*mat samīpe*)” (28). As she stands anxiously before him, beginning to

weep, Rāma gives “utterance to the anger in his heart” (103.1). Barely mentioning her misfortune, he insists on how he fulfilled his honor, acting as a man should. Seeing more tears and hearing Sītā reply that such words are rather less than manly, Rāma’s mood further darkens: he fought not for her sake but to remove insults; she is now free to choose Lakshmaṇa, Bharata, Sugrīva, or Vibhīshaṇa! Rāvaṇa would not have left her alone in his own house (103.22–24). Meeting only Rāma’s silence after a last appeal, Sītā tells Lakshmaṇa to light a pyre; stricken by these false charges, she cannot live (104.18). Rāma gestures consent. Sītā takes Agni as witness that her heart has never strayed, asks his protection, circumambulates the fire and enters it—as the Rākshasas and monkeys scream (20–27). And all at once Rāma is beset by deities who have come to ask him, their hands cupped in adoration, “O Creator of the entire world and the very best of enlightened beings, how do you ignore Sītā as she is falling into fire? How do you not know yourself to be the best of the host of gods!” (105.5). Rāma replies, “I think myself a man, Dasharatha’s son Rāma. Who am I? From whom and whence do I come? Let the blessed one (Brahmā) tell” (10). Whereupon Brahmā names Nārāyaṇa, Purushottama, and Krishna as identities by which Rāma can now know himself as Vishnu; you have “entered a human body for the sake of killing Rāvaṇa” (26). Agni now restores Sītā unscathed (her garment now red) and attests to her fidelity and purity. Speaking in her presence for the first time since his insults, Rāma seems to seize on the outcome to offer excuses: had he taken Sītā back unpurified (*avishodhya*; 106.12) the good would have considered him foolish and driven by desire; he knew her fidelity all along; he could no more abandon her than his own fame (18)! Shiva now tells Rāma to return to Ayodhya to perform a horse sacrifice (107.6), and announces Dasharatha, now redeemed (*tārīta*) by Rāma, who has come from Indra’s heaven. Dasharatha embraces Rāma, and in the embrace of his two sons says, “I am now freed from misery (*dubkḥād*)” (107.15); he now understands that Rāma is none other than the supreme being ordained (*purusbottamam vibitam*) by the gods to have come to earth to kill Rāvaṇa (17); Rāma should see that everyone is reconciled back at Ayodhya. Rāma then gets Indra to resurrect the slain monkeys, and Vibhīshaṇa arranges for the trio to fly to Ayodhya in the Pushpaka chariot—most recently Rāvaṇa’s. The monkeys and Rākshasas then persuade Rāma to let them accompany him (110.16–20). Before they arrive, they stop at Bharadvāja’s ashram and learn that Bharata has continued to honor Rāma’s sandals. Bharadvāja recounts the trio’s whole adventure, which he knows by his penances (112.14). From there, Rāma sends Hanumān to Nandigrāma (Bharata’s village residence outside the capitol), to tell Bharata their story and to assess his expressions. At last

Rāma is enthroned in the presence not only of his rejoicing family and people but the monkeys, Rākshasas, and *rishis*. Twice it is said that Rāma ruled for ten thousand years (82, 90), the second time in this Book’s very last words (*sargas* 101–16)—surely sounding like a happy ending, as many Western scholars and some Indian vernaculars have taken Book 6 to be.

But the *Uttara Kāṇḍa*, or “The Final Book” (Book 7), opens with Rāma just consecrated and a series of departures and dismissals. First, the *rishis* come to his palace—Agastya and the original Seven among them (17.1.3–4). Rāma asks about the Rākshasas he conquered, launching their former near-neighbor Agastya on a lengthy Rākshasa genealogy, with tales of Rāvaṇa’s boon and his violations of women. These lead to stories about Indrajit and end with others about Hanumān and the monkeys. Rāma is repeatedly filled with wonder. Then “all the rishis went as they came” (36.46). Rāma also dispatches a hundred kings, and the Rākshasas, monkeys, and bears—Hanumān parting with the famous words: “As long as I hear *Rāma-kathā* on the face of the earth, so long will my breaths reside in my body” (39.16). Next Rāma dismisses the Pushpaka chariot while keeping it on call (*sargas* 1–40). And next he dismisses Sītā, who will not remain on call. All these dismissals subtract down to a great unraveling.

There is a time of felicity between Rāma and Sītā, but at news that Ayodhya’s citizens gossip about Sītā’s chastity in Rāvaṇa’s house, Rāma banishes her to protect his royal reputation. Sītā has just announced that she is pregnant and would like to visit some pilgrimage spots, so Rāma orders Lakshmaṇa to take her to the forest on that pretext and abandon her. Painfully, Lakshmaṇa leaves her at Vālmīki’s hermitage. Next Rāma hears that there are still some ascetics who live in fear of a Rākshasa named Lavaṇa. Shatrughna goes to tackle Lavaṇa, and stops over in Vālmīki’s leafy hut on the night Sītā gives birth to the twins. Vālmīki goes to bless and name the infants, and at midnight Shatrughna hears the good news and comes to bless Sītā and the boys. At dawn he resumes his journey, kills Lavaṇa, and establishes a kingdom at Mathura. Twelve years later he decides to visit Ayodhya. On the way, in a passage rejected by the Critical Edition even though it appears in all the manuscripts collated, he stops at Vālmīki’s hermitage, overhears the twins’ elegant recitals, and promises that he and his army will keep their birth secret (7, Appendix 1, no. 9; Shah, pp. 26–27). When Bharata sees Rāma, he mentions nothing about Vālmīki, Sītā, or the twins (*sargas* 41–63).

A Brahman now comes to Rāma’s palace gate with his dead son in his arms, announcing that Rāma must have committed some great fault for a child to die in his kingdom (64.9). The narrative thread seems to suggest that Rāma’s fault could be his abandonment of Sītā, for which,

in order to keep ignoring it, he would have to find a scapegoat. If so, the always clever Nārada provides a fitting cue: Rāma should look for someone unlawfully performing *tapas* (austerities), a Shūdra who would only be able to do this in the Kaliyuga (65.22), an age yet to come. Nārada knows of a Shūdra doing *tapas* somewhere and recommends that Rāma tour his kingdom. Recalling the Pushpaka chariot, Rāma finds the Shūdra Shambūka, who announces his intent to become divine. Rāma beheads him, reviving the Brahman's son and delighting the gods. Following the latter to Agastya's hermitage, Rāma stays there to listen to more of Agastya's stories before returning to Ayodhya and again dismissing the Pushpaka (*sargas* 64–73).

Rāma now tells Bharata and Lakshmaṇa he wishes to perform a Rājasūya sacrifice, but Bharata tells him a horse sacrifice is less destructive and Lakshmaṇa adds that the *asvamedha* removes all sins and purifies (75.2). Rāma approves the *asvamedha*. He orders Lakshmaṇa to make invitations to Sugrīva and Vibhīshaṇa to bring their parties, and to the regional *rishis* and their wives, and to prepare a vast sacrificial enclosure in the Naimisha Forest. Bharata is to lead a procession trailed by all the mothers from the inner apartments and “my golden wife (*kāñcanīm mama patnīm*) worthy of consecration (*dīkshā*) in sacrificial rites” (19). Sītā thus has a replacement-statue even while still alive. With the sacrifice proceeding, Vālmīki suddenly arrives with his disciples (84.1) and directs the twins to sing “the whole Rāmāyaṇa poem at the gate of Rāma's dwelling” (3–5)—twenty *sargas* a day (9). Rāma hears the boys sing the first twenty *sargas* beginning “from the sight of Nārada (*nāradaadarshanāt*)” (11)—that is, from the beginning of the *upodghāta* on. Once the twins tell Rāma who authored this poem that contains his whole adventure (19), they offer to continue singing it at intervals in the rite (21). After many days, Rāma recognizes them, misses Sītā, and summons her to attest to her purity by oath in the midst of the great *rishis*, Rākshasas, and monkeys, plus unnamed kings and the four castes in thousands (87.6–7). But when Vālmīki brings Sītā, he attests to her purity himself (19), and tells Rāma only that “she will give proof of her fidelity” (15, 20). No longer demanding the oath just announced, Rāma accepts Vālmīki's word as tantamount to being Sītā's: “Surely I have proof of fidelity in your stainless words. Surely Vaidehī gave proof of fidelity formerly in the presence of the gods” (88.2–3)—who by now have also come to witness (5–7). Indeed, in a phrase that occurs nowhere else in either epic, this conclave occurs “in the middle of the universe (*jagato madhye*)” (1, 4). Though not demanded to make an oath, Sītā nonetheless makes one implicitly in her only and last words: “If I have thought with my mind of none other than Rāma, let the goddess Mādhavī [Earth] give me an opening.” (10). Rāma, who had hoped for “affection” (*prīti*) from Sītā (4),

has thus accepted the author's word as Sītā's, only to be overwhelmed with grief and horror by what her word—and the poet's—actually is. This is the moment at which he comes to realize what it means to be caught up in his own story, which, if he heard it from the frame on, as we are told, he would know it to have also been Sītā's story and to have been inspired by the grief of a female bird. Rāma now threatens to destroy Earth unless she returns Sītā intact (7, Appendix I, No. 13, lines 18–20) until Brahmā repeats what he told him after Sītā's fire ordeal, that he is Vishnu, and invites him to listen with the great *rishis* to the rest of this “first poem,” which will now tell what is yet to happen (21–40). Once Brahmā returns to heaven, the *rishis* in Brahmāloka obtain his permission to return for the rest as well (43–49; *sargas* 74–88). Though the Critical Edition rejects this *sarga*, it is universally attested. For Rāma, the relation between Sītā's two ordeals seems to be that whereas his first self-recognition as Vishnu emerges out of a human identity crossed with uncertainty and confusion as to his all-too-human emotions, his second comes after he has learned of his divinity and has repeatedly pared his life down to a perfect rule through his dismissals of others, yet without consideration of what this has cost him since the banishment of his wife—not to mention what it has cost her. If so, the poem could be saying that Vālmīki's initial question to Nārada—whether there is an ideal man today—was not really convincingly answered.

Once the *asvamedha* ends, Rāma finds the universe empty without Sītā and again dismisses the kings, bears, monkeys, and Rākshasas (89.1). He never remarries, but at all his sacrifices there is a golden Sītā (*jānakī kāñcanī*; 4). For ten thousand years he rules a harmonious kingdom. Finally Death or Time (*Kāla*) comes to him as a messenger from Brahmā and tells him they must meet alone; anyone hearing them must be killed. While Rāma posts Lakshmaṇa at the door, “Time who destroys all” (94.2) tells Rāma it is time to return to heaven as Vishnu. As the two converse, the congenitally ravenous sage Durvāsas tries to barge in, threatening to curse the kingdom if he is prevented. Lakshmaṇa chooses his own death rather than allowing that of others and admits him. Durvāsas wants only something to eat after a thousand-year fast, which Rāma happily provides. At Vasishtha's advice, Rāma then banishes Lakshmaṇa as equivalent to death, and Lakshmaṇa, meditating by the Sarayū River, is taken up to heaven. Bharata then advises Rāma to divide Kosala into two kingdoms to be ruled by Kusha and Lava. Bharata and Shatrughna then follow Rāma, who enters the Sarayū and resumes his divine form (*sargas* 89–100).

The Rāmāyaṇa and the Rāmopākhyāna

The relation between the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata's *Rāmopākhyāna* is usually posed as one

between just these two Sanskrit Rāma stories, and as a question of whether there is a genetic relation between them. Which came first? Or do both rely on some prior *Rāmakathā*? On these questions, this article's position is twofold. First, the primary relation is not between the Rāmāyaṇa and the *Rāmopākhyāna*, but between the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, which it views as the slightly earlier of the two epics. On this point, it was noted that their similar designs could not be accidental. It is easier to imagine Vālmīki refining *kāvya* out of a multi-genre Mahābhārata than to imagine Vyāsa overlooking this achievement to spread disarticulation. In this vein, the *Rāmopākhyāna* opens with material about Rāvaṇa that the Rāmāyaṇa saves for Book 7. It thus cannot be explained as an epitome of the Rāmāyaṇa, since it lacks the structure that the Rāmāyaṇa shares with the Mahābhārata.

Second, this article holds that it is helpful to reflect on how *upākhyāna* material is used in both epics. As observed, the Rāmāyaṇa uses this term only in an interpolation. Rather than having stand-out "subtales," the Rāmāyaṇa folds all its secondary narratives into one consecutively unfolding poem. This is especially noteworthy in its stories about the eight great *rishis* encountered by Rāma, many of which include material that the Mahābhārata relates in its *upākhyānas*. Other than Vasishtha, a fixture in the Ikshvāku house, the *Rāmopākhyāna* does not know these *rishis*. It has no Vishvāmitra, Gautama and Ahalyā, Rāma Jāmadagnya, or for that matter, Vasishtha involved in the stories from youth through marriage; just this: "In the course of time [Dasharatha's] sons grew up very vigorous, and became fledged in the Vedas and their mysteries and in the art of archery. They completed their student years, and took wives" (Mbh 3.261.4-5). It has no Bharadvāja; just this of Bharata: "He found Rāma and Lakshmaṇa on Mount Citrakūṭa" (216.63). And from Citrakūṭa on, there is not a peep from Atri and Anasūyā or Agastya. There is also no Vālmīki, Mataṅga, or Nishākara. It is improbable that the *Rāmopākhyāna* would have strained out all these figures and episodes if it were a Rāmāyaṇa epitome. Vālmīki would seem to have worked such *upākhyāna* material into something he claims to be new: *kāvya*, "the first poem." And this would seem to be the best way to think about what he did with the *Rāmopākhyāna*: go beyond it to author a poem in which Rāma and Sītā move through their double adventure along paths signposted by *rishis* who impart Vedic authority as *dharmas*, who represent "all the *rishis*," high and low, who motivate the divine incarnations to cleanse the world of noxious Rākshasas, and who in turn are represented by Vālmīki himself, who frames all the paths that Rāma and Sītā take as ones that begin with his inspiration to tell their adventures in a poem that will lead them ultimately to him.

Alf Hiltebeitel

See also **Brāhmaṇas; Hinduism (Dharma); Mahābhārata; Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata Paintings**

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RĀMĀYAṆA AND MAHĀBHĀRATA PAINTINGS Stone and terra-cotta relief sculptures depicting participants and episodes from the two great ancient Indian epics, the Rāmāyaṇa (Adventures of Rama) and the Mahābhārata ([War of the] Great Bharatas), were made as early as the fifth century for use in the iconographic programs of Hindu temples. However, the earliest surviving painted illustrations of the epics (apart perhaps from no longer extant murals) are in a manuscript on paper of the Āraṇyakaparvan (Forest book) of the Mahābhārata, which according to its colophon was created at Kacchauva near Agra in 1516 (VS 1573) during

the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodi (1489–1517). Now in the Asiatic Society, Mumbai (MS.B.245), this profusely illustrated manuscript owes much of its artistic inspiration to slightly earlier Jain illustrated texts, such as the Jaunpur Kalpasūtra (Book of sacred precepts) of 1465, and it shares several stylistic characteristics with the renowned *Caurapañcbāsikā* (Fifty stanzas of secret love) series of paintings dating from 1525–1575, now in the Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. Following the seminal Kacchava Mahābhārata of 1516, many illustrated manuscripts of the great epics were produced, especially of the Rāmāyaṇa.

Early Mughal

Several important illustrated manuscripts of the great epics were produced under the enlightened patronage of the liberal Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605). In 1582 Akbar commissioned a Persian translation of the Mahābhārata, titled the Razmnāma (Book of wars), which was created in 1584–1586. It was followed by a translation of the Rāmāyaṇa made in 1588–1591. Both of Akbar's imperial presentation copies are now in the Maharaja Sawai Man Singh II Museum, Jaipur (MS. AG. 1683–1850 and MS. AG. 1851–2026 respectively). Akbar also ordered that his leading Muslim nobles have their own copies made of the two imperial manuscripts in order to promote a greater understanding of Hinduism. The extant copies of the Razmnāma, now dispersed, are dated 1598 and 1616 (another known copy dated 1605 is now missing). A Rāmāyaṇa manuscript dated 1587–1598 that was directly inspired by Akbar's imperial manuscript was commissioned by a leading patron of painting, the Mughal courtier 'Abd al-Rahīm, the Khān-i Khānān (commander-in-chief). The manuscript, classified as subimperial because of its nonimperial patron, contains 130 paintings and is now in the Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. (07.271). Another subimperial Rāmāyaṇa manuscript, now dispersed, is attributed to about 1595. A number of folios from these subimperial manuscripts survive in various museum and private collections, including the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (formerly called the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India), Mumbai; Indian Museum, Kolkata; British Library, London; National Museum, New Delhi; Victoria and Albert Museum, London; Chester Beatty Library, Dublin; Museum Rietberg, Zürich; Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.; Cincinnati Art Museum; Cleveland Museum of Art; Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles County Museum of Art; Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; Philadelphia Museum of Art; San Diego Museum of Art; and Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond.

Rajput

Presumably stimulated in part by the splendor and success of the imperial and subimperial Mughal manuscripts, illustrated Rāmāyaṇa manuscripts soon began to be created for the rulers and high nobles of the various Hindu Rajput (princely) courts in Rajasthan and central India that were encompassed within the greater Mughal empire. They were perhaps made for certain wealthy Hindu merchants as well. These manuscripts displayed varying degrees of Mughal-influenced naturalism, a stylistic feature that Rajput artists encountered due to their patrons' participation in the Mughal political world. One of the earliest surviving Rajput Rāmāyaṇa manuscripts features a bold palette, lively expression, and scant if any Mughal stylistic influence. The manuscript is generally ascribed to the central Indian regions of Malwa and Bundelkhand in modern Madhya Pradesh, although its exact place of origin remains a matter of scholarly dispute and is dependent upon the interpretation of two important later colophons. According to the manuscript's colophon on a folio in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi (6756-6815), it was made for Hira Rani, who can be identified as Hirade, the queen of Pahar Singh of Orchha (r. 1641–1653). The manuscript is attributed to about 1640, as its sophisticated compositions represent a slightly later stage of artistic evolution than those of a dispersed Malwa Rasikapriyā dated 1634, folios of which are now primarily in the National Museum, New Delhi. Other paintings from the 1640 Malwa Rāmāyaṇa manuscript are in the Kanoria Collection, Patna; Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.; Brooklyn Museum of Art; and Los Angeles County Museum of Art. It is relevant to note here that a newly published inscription on a Soratha Rāgiṇī dated 1687 (VS 1744) in the Collections of Basant Kumar and Sarladevi Birla, Kolkata, records that the painting was made in the city of Lalitapura near Jhansi in Bundelkhand, thus providing at least one definite place of creation for central Indian paintings during the seventeenth century.

One of the largest and most accomplished Rāmāyaṇa manuscripts is a now dispersed compendium of over 450 full-page paintings made between 1649 and 1653 for Maharana Jagat Singh I of Mewar (r. 1628–1652). Three master artists directed the production of different sections of the seven-book manuscript: Sahibdin (active c. 1628–1655), Manohar (active beginning c. 1640), and an unnamed Deccani artist. The first book, the Bālakāṇḍa (Book of childhood), was completed in 1649 and painted by Manohar. It contained seventy-nine illustrated folios, twenty of which are now in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya, Mumbai; two in the Baroda Museum; and approximately fifty-five folios in the family collection of the late Sir Cowasji Jehangir, Mumbai. The

second book, the *Ayodhyākāṇḍa* (Book of Ayodhya), has sixty-eight paintings attributed to Sahibdin. It was finished in 1650 and is now in the British Library. The third book, *Āranyakāṇḍa* (Book of the forest), has thirty-six paintings executed in the style of Manohar. It was completed in 1651 and is now in the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Udaipur. The fourth book, the *Kishkindhākāṇḍa* (Book of Kishkindhā), has thirty-four paintings primarily attributed to the Deccani artist and his assistants. It was finished in 1653 after the death of Jagat Singh I at the beginning of the succeeding rule of Maharana Raj Singh I (r. 1652–1680). It is now in the British Library. The fifth book, the *Sundarakāṇḍa* (Beautiful book), may have never been completed. However, eighteen paintings attributed to the Deccani artist and his assistants that are presumably from the fifth book have survived. They were probably executed early in Raj Singh I's reign, and are now in the India Office Library collection of the British Library. The sixth book, the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* (Book of the battle), has eighty-eight paintings by Sahibdin. These superlative works represent the mature phase of Sahibdin's production and are among the finest paintings ever produced during India's long and rich artistic heritage. The sixth book was finished in 1652 and is now in the British Library. The seventh book, the *Uttarakāṇḍa* (Final book), contains ninety-two paintings attributed to a follower of Manohar. It was completed in 1653 and is now in the British Library. Another notable Mewar Rāmāyaṇa containing 201 paintings was produced during the early rule of Maharana Sangram Singh II (r. 1710–1738). It was finished in 1712 and is now in the British Library.

Pahari

Illustrated manuscripts of the great epics were also produced by families of artists working in association with various courts located in the Himalayan foothills known as the Pahari region, primarily in present-day Himachal Pradesh but also in neighboring Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab. Although only five folios may have survived, perhaps the earliest Pahari Rāmāyaṇa was created at Mandi around 1630–1645, during the late rule of Raja Hari Sen (r. 1604 or 1623–1637) or during the early rule of his successor Raja Suraj Sen (r. 1637–1664).

One of the finest and best known, but until recently improperly understood, Pahari Rāmāyaṇas is known as the “Shangri” Rāmāyaṇa because it was once in the ancestral collection of the Shangri branch of the royal family of Kulu in Himachal Pradesh. Accordingly, most of the manuscript of at least three hundred paintings was once attributed to Kulu, with some later sections thought perhaps to have been finished in Mandi or even Bikaner

in Rajasthan. However, more current research indicates that the beginning portions of the manuscript were painted by an unknown master artist working about 1690–1710 at the Bahu branch of the Jammu court in the modern state of Jammu and Kashmir during the reigns of Raja Kripal Dev (reigned c. 1660–1690) and his son Raja Anand Dev (r. 1690–1730). The “Shangri” Rāmāyaṇa manuscript is now dispersed, with 168 folios now in the National Museum, New Delhi. Additional pages are in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Varanasi; British Museum, London; Victoria and Albert Museum, London; Museum Rietberg, Zürich; Brooklyn Museum of Art; Los Angeles County Museum of Art; Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; Philadelphia Museum of Art; San Diego Museum of Art; Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond; and various private collections.

Other significant Pahari Rāmāyaṇas, all now dispersed, include a Mankot manuscript of about 1700–1710, the Guler manuscript of about 1720 attributed to the master artist Pandit Seu (c. 1680–c. 1740), the Kangra manuscript of about 1775–1780 attributed to a first-generation descendant of Pandit Seu's son Nainsukh (c. 1710–1778), and the “Nadaun” Rāmāyaṇa done in Kangra around 1820. Although the Mahābhārata was apparently not as favored as the Rāmāyaṇa in the Pahari artistic traditions, there is also a Kangra manuscript of the Mahābhārata attributed to about 1775–1800.

Deccan

Although three South Indian Jain manuscripts survive from as early as the twelfth century, very few illustrated manuscripts from South India predate the eighteenth century. One of the earliest and most important such works is a dispersed *Mahābhārata* manuscript made for the Brahman Timaji Pandit in the Mysore region, probably at Seringapatam. The colophon records the manuscript's completion date of 1670 (VS 1592) and the name of its scribe, Govind Sharma from the village of Chaligram. Folios from the manuscript survive in the collections of the Jagdish and Kamla Mittal Museum of Indian Art, Hyderabad; Salar Jang Museum, Hyderabad; National Museum, New Delhi; Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles County Museum of Art; and Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond. There is also a mid-eighteenth-century Rāmāyaṇa manuscript from southern Andhra Pradesh, now in the State Museum, Hyderabad.

Vernacular Renditions

Finally, mention should be made of the numerous Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata manuscripts and individual illustrations created by folk artists across India in the

eighteenth through twentieth centuries, such as the so-called Paithan paintings of Maharashtra, northern Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh; the “Kalighat” paintings of Kolkata (Calcutta) in West Bengal; and the “Mithila” or “Madhubani” paintings of Bihar. These works form a rich corpus of epic imagery. Moreover, they are distinct from the Rajput and Pahari traditions in that they are often based on vernacular renditions of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata rather than the revered Sanskrit originals of Valmiki and Vyasa, respectively.

Stephen Markel

See also **Miniatures; Mughal Painting**

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RAM RAJYA. See **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

RANADE, MAHADEV GOVIND (1842–1901), Indian jurist and reformer. One of India’s most brilliant jurists, social reformers, and early nationalist leaders, Mahadev Govind Ranade inspired Gopal Krishna Gokhale and entire generations of young Maharashtrians to follow in his path of national service. Born to the Chitpavan Brahman community of Pune’s ruling Peshwas, Ranade graduated from the first class of Bombay University in 1862, receiving highest honors, then went on to study law; he was appointed a subordinate judge in Pune in 1871, the youngest Indian jurist of Bombay State.

Social and Religious Reformer

Ranade recognized the cruel and archaic inequities of Hinduism, especially its harsh household laws dealing with women, child marriages, widow immolation, and the treatment of “untouchables.” He resolved to start a society in Western India, similar to earlier reform groups that had been founded in Bengal, starting with Ram Mohan Roy’s enlightened “Brahmo Samaj.” Ranade called his organization Prarthana Samaj (Prayer Society), bringing several like-minded reformers together for its first meeting in 1869 in Bombay (Mumbai). They focused first on educational reforms and later on legislative widow-remarriage reforms, encouraging young Hindu widows, whose lives would otherwise have remained wasted in dismal neglect and total isolation, to improve their minds and to remarry. Ranade himself helped to arrange the first widow remarriage in Bombay. On 2 April 1870 Ranade took charge of Pune’s Sarvajanik Sabha (Public Society), which Gokhale later joined and helped him run, petitioning the governor, the viceroy, and the British House of Commons for various legal as well as sociopolitical reforms. In 1887 Ranade founded the National Social Conference, which met each year just after India’s National Congress, since Bal Gangadhar Tilak and other devout Hindus threatened to riot if social reform issues were ever raised in the annual meetings of the nation’s largest political association.

Political Reforms

As a justice of the High Court, Ranade could not become an official delegate to India's National Congress, but he was instrumental in inviting all seventy-three initial delegates to Bombay in December 1885 for the inaugural meeting of what was soon to become India's leading political association. In 1895, when the Congress and Social Conference both held meetings in Pune, Tilak protested against Ranade and Gokhale's desire to hold their Social Conference in the tent for which he had collected funds as "joint secretary" of the Congress. Bitter factionalism ensued and continued to divide the liberal Ranade-Gokhale mainstream of moderate political and social reform from Tilak's reactionary Hindu cultural traditionalism and radical anti-British political demands. "Sweet reasonable" Ranade died, however, before that conflict tore Congress apart in 1907.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Congress Party; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna; Maharashtra; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

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RANGŌLI *Rangōli* in Sanskrit means "colored creepers"; as such, it describes an art form that was created in ancient India to decorate the mud-covered walls and the mud floors of homes with attractive and colorful floral designs. *Rangōli* initially referred to this art as practiced in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rajasthan, but the term is now used to refer to any form of art drawn on the floor. Other types of floor art include *kōlam* and *alpana*. The former confined to the southern states, the latter to the eastern states.

Rangōli

Popular *Rangōli* designs, made with rice powder, charcoal, or chalk, are usually mythological figures, such as

the elephant-headed god Gaṇesa, Lord Krishna playing his flute, Goddess Sarasvatī playing the vina (a stringed musical instrument), and Goddess Lakshmī sitting on a large lotus flower. Designs drawn from nature are also popular, particularly those that are mentioned in Hindu mythology, such as peacocks, swans, and the leaves of the pipal tree.

Traditionally, the materials used were powders made from natural ingredients such as rice (white), turmeric (yellow), turmeric mixed with alum (red), and indigo (blue). Today one can find fillers made from cereals and pulses (legumes), flower petals in myriad hues, and even synthetic dyes. The effect, when completed, is breathtaking. Although more accomplished artists will always manage to achieve the right proportions, balance of colors, and overall effect, even an amateur can produce delightful designs.

Rangōli artists have become more and more creative in modern times. The traditional floor designs were always flat on the floor, since very fine powders were used to fill the design. Nowadays, texture is added through the use of roughly ground and whole grains as well as tiny rocks, stones, and even bricks, giving the work a three-dimensional effect.

Rangōli designs are very popular during India's festive seasons. One of the most popular Hindu festivals is *Navarātrī* (the doll festival), a celebration of nine nights, in September and/or October. A beautiful *rangōli* is created outside the front doors of the house or in front of the family's display of dolls. Some families may even create a different design each day to symbolize the Hindu deity being worshiped on that particular night. These designs are usually small and simple, in proportion to the floor space available, but that is not necessarily the case, and large designs with highly intricate compositions have also been created. While smaller motifs may be drawn freehand, the large ones are often executed with the help of grid lines drawn on the floor in chalk. *Rangōli* motifs not only decorate homes and wedding and festival venues, but are also created in hotels and at receptions for dignitaries.

Kōlam

Kōlam designs, on the other hand, are composed of line drawings and are more geometric in pattern. Though less spectacular because they are often drawn with white rice powder, they are the pride of every South Indian home. A common sight in every village, town, and city in the early hours of the morning is that of the woman of the house bending over, deftly drawing the *kōlam* on the front porch or street. As the sun rises and fills the streets with light, the *kōlam* creations come to



In Tamil Nadu, *Rangoli* Adorns the Ground, Marking the Festival of Pongal. The ancient coloring technique has evolved over the centuries, with texture now often part of the traditional floor designs, yielding an almost three-dimensional effect. CHRISTINE PEMBERTON / FOTOMEDIA.

life. During the month of Margazhi (mid-December to mid-January), the center of the *kōlam* is decorated with a bright orange-yellow pumpkin flower to enhance the design, the contrast of the single yellow flower against the whiteness of the rice powder imparting an understated elegance.

In contrast to *rangoli*, which is created mainly on festive occasions, the *kōlam* is drawn every day of the year, except when there has been a death in the family or when there a family member is seriously ill with an infectious disease. The latter communicates to the neighborhood that one should avoid visiting the family until the *kōlam* reappears.

The rice powder that is used for *kōlam* performs the added humane function of feeding insects and birds, giving the family the satisfaction of doing a good deed for the day. One disadvantage, however, of using dry rice

powder is that it is easily blown away when there is a gust of wind, leaving a rather untidy mess on the floor. A windswept *kōlam* could also be interpreted as a bad omen. Therefore, for special and auspicious occasions, a more permanent mixture is made by grinding soaked rice into a smooth paste. Using a wad of cotton cloth, dipped in the thick paste and held between the thumb and two fingers, designs are drawn by hand all over and around the entry and on the front porch. Once dry, there is no danger of it being wiped off. To make it even prettier, a paste of a special red brick, called *kāvi*, is used to outline the design, creating a pleasing contrast of red and white.

The *kōlam* is easier to draw than the *rangoli*, as it comprises lines joined to produce intricate designs with less effort. To enable even a novice to create well-executed designs, several devices are available to the modern practitioner. For example, there are numerous instruction books that show how dots drawn at regular intervals within an overall shape can be used effectively. By joining the dots, a beautiful mango bouquet or a temple with four *gōpurams* (steeple) can be drawn in minutes. Innovative shops sell templates for a variety of *kōlam* designs: slotted steel plates or rollers allow fine rice powder to flow through, resulting in pretty motifs. Also available these days are sticky plastic sheets with a *kōlam* design printed on them, ready to be peeled off and placed on the floor in front of the altar or the front door.

Modern Variations

Artists now use their imaginations to produce newer designs in both *rangoli* and *kōlam*. It is even possible to use water to make a *rangoli*, as demonstrated by one artist who filled a tub with water and spread a handful of powdered charcoal on top, creating a floating layer on the surface of the water. Next a variety of colored powders were deftly sprinkled over the charcoal layer, and a magnificent design was created. A well-known Indian dancer spread a sheet of cloth, which had the underside covered in red paint, on the stage and danced over it for some time; when the dance was over, she pulled away the cloth to reveal a *rangoli* in red of the elephant-headed god, Lord Gaṇesa.

Another unique floor art, a hybrid of *rangoli* and *kōlam*, is the *malar kōlam* (flower *kōlam*) of Kerala. Whole flowers, petals, and leaves may be used for this. The artist must first visualize the whole design and decide what colored flowers to use for the border, the center, and the fillers. Then, the artist draws the design on the floor or on a plastic sheet. Sometimes, moist sand is spread on the sheet and the floral decoration is made on the sand, filling it thoroughly so that no sand is visible at the end, creating the effect of a thick carpet. The beauty of the *malar kōlam* comes from the natural textures and hues

contributed by the flowers. A common sight at receptions for important guests is the *malar kōlam*, created around the base of a large brass lamp, which the guest of honor lights to open the occasion.

Robini Rajagopalan

See also **Folk Art**

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RASHTRAKUTAS. See **History and Historiography.**

RĀVAṆA. See *Rāmāyaṇa*

RAY, SATYAJIT (1921–1992), renowned Indian filmmaker. In 1955, with the release of his first feature film, *Pather Panchali*, Satyajit Ray became an internationally acclaimed filmmaker. His reputation further surged with the completion of the *Apu Trilogy* (1959), considered by some critics to be the greatest cinematic suite ever made. By the time of his death in 1992, Ray had made twenty-nine features and seven documentaries and shorts. Working with simple tools, he fashioned tales, both visual and literary, that were straightforward in their presentation yet richly complex in their capacity to suggest multiple meanings and interpretations. He wrote his own screenplays, handled the camera, and did his own editing work as well. After 1962, he began scoring the music for all his films. Trained as a graphic artist, he sketched out each scene before shooting and designed the posters that publicized his new releases.

Ray worked under two severe constraints: all his films, made for relatively small Bengali-speaking audiences in India, had to be modestly budgeted, and he had to rely on stories and themes that he found filmable in modern Bengali fiction. These included some of his own; he is Bengal's best-selling adventure and science-fiction writer to this day. During his life and filmmaking career, Ray received many honors. In addition to the Honorary Academy Award for Lifetime Achievement, which he received in 1992 in his hospital room, a few weeks before he passed away, he was presented with the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian honor. Oxford University conferred on him an honorary doctorate; the University of

California, Berkeley, awarded him the Berkeley Medal. President François Mitterrand of France went to Kolkata (Calcutta) to personally award him the Légion d'Honneur.

Satyajit Ray was born on 2 May 1921 in Kolkata to Sukumar and Suprabha Ray. He was born into a distinguished family of artists, writers, musicians, scientists, and physicians. His grandfather, Upendra Kishore, was an innovator, a writer of children's storybooks (popular to this day), an illustrator, printer, and musician. Ray's father, Sukumar, trained as a printing technologist in England, was Bengal's most beloved nonsense rhyme writer, illustrator, and cartoonist. He died when Satyajit was only two and a half years old.

Ray's mother, Suprabha, was a singer. After his father's death, they lived with Suprabha's brother's family and with Ray's paternal uncles. The extended family had many talented uncles, aunts, and cousins, including artists and musicians. One of the uncles was a cameraman, who later became a director of films. As a youngster, Ray developed two significant interests. The first was music, especially Western Classical music. He learned to read music, collected albums, and started to attend concerts. The second was movies. He saw silent films as well as "talkies," and began to compile scrapbooks with clippings from newspapers and magazines on Hollywood stars. As a young man, Ray developed an avid interest in the craft of cinema. He read books on filmmaking and theoretical works on cinema, and wrote screenplays for his own amusement.

Upon graduating from Presidency College, Kolkata, majoring in economics, he joined the art school Kala Bhavan, founded by Rabindranath Tagore, at Visva Bharati University in Santiniketan, at Tagore's personal encouragement. Tagore had been close to both Upendra Kishore and Sukumar Ray. At Santiniketan, Ray learned to draw from the great master teachers, Nandalal Bose and Binode Behari Mukherjee. Bose and Mukherjee were pioneers of what became known as the Bengal School, innovating and inventing an art form that emphasized an Asian style, combining Chinese and Japanese calligraphy with traditional Indian elements. Ray later developed this style in his illustrations and graphic designs.

While in Santiniketan, Ray was exposed to film theory and read books on cinema. He discovered that his two passions—music and film—actually converged. After returning to Kolkata, he began the habit of going to the theater with a notebook. He was not just watching, he was studying as well. His apprenticeship in filmmaking thus began.

Ray joined the British advertising agency D. J. Keymer in Kolkata in 1943 as a junior designer. The job helped him bloom into a graphic artist, typographer, book-jacket designer, and illustrator. He went to London



Satyajit Ray. From 1955 to 1964, Ray directed, arguably, his greatest films. This period coincided with the first flush of India's independence and Nehru's experiments with a secular democracy based on internationalism, and humanist and modernist principles. ASIT PODDAR / FOTOMEDIA.

in 1950 on a commission from the company. While there, he saw many films, including Vittorio De Sica's *Ladri di biciclette* (*The Bicycle Thief*, 1948) and Jean Renoir's *La Règle du jeu* (*Rules of the Game*, 1939), which made abiding impressions on him.

While returning from London by sea, Ray illustrated a children's edition of *Pather Panchali*, a semi-autobiographical novel by noted Bengali author Bibhuti Bhushan Banerjee. The sketches became storyboard elements when he elected to make a film from the novel. He managed somehow to make the film, using mostly amateur actors, shooting outdoors in natural light, financing it by pawning his rare music albums and his wife's jewelry, and calling on his mother's connections in government circles in Kolkata. This became typical of his mode of independent filmmaking—an endless search for the elusive producer who would agree to his nonnegotiable artistic terms.

The release of *Pather Panchali* in 1955 brought Satyajit Ray instant international as well as national recognition. It was first screened without subtitles at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1955 to critical acclaim. It was shown the following year at the Cannes Film Festival, where it won the Best Human Document award. The die was cast: Ray resigned from his post at D. J. Keymer, and he became a full-time filmmaker, directing one or

more films every year until 1983, when he suffered a massive heart attack. He remained an acute heart patient, which drastically reduced his ability to make films, though he continued to produce provocative work.

Ray earned very modest amounts from directing his small-budget films, not sufficient to support his small family. He started writing and illustrating stories for *Sandesh*, the children's magazine that his grandfather had founded, and which Ray revived in 1961. In 1968 the editor of *Desb*, a popular Bengali literary magazine, persuaded Ray to write a novella for its annual edition. Ray, the writer of mysteries, adventure stories, and science fiction, all appropriately illustrated by him, thus made his debut on Bengal's literary scene. This was the beginning of his prolific literary output of some seventy novellas, stories, and translations, each of which became a best-seller in Bengali.

One can identify three major compositional periods in Ray's life. The first period (1955–1964) was remarkable for its robust optimism, celebration of the human spirit, and creative satisfaction. Ray was not only directing and scripting, but also scoring the music and taking charge of the cinematography. During this period, he directed, arguably, his greatest films. This period coincided with India's early years of independence and Jawaharlal Nehru's experiments with secular democracy based on humanism, internationalism, and modernism.

The second period (1965–1977) saw India come under a dark spell. There was the war with China (1962), during Nehru's last years, and a war with Pakistan (1965). Growing urban unemployment and an agricultural crisis brought about by a command economy created near-famine conditions in parts of the country. The war in Vietnam and the Cultural Revolution in China had radicalized Kolkata's youth, artists, writers, and intellectuals. Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence gripped the city. Kolkata, once known as a friendly and safe city, became a dangerous place to live. The Bangladesh War (1971) caused an influx of millions of refugees fleeing the Pakistani army, filling Kolkata and its outskirts. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, battling a massive opposition to her government, imposed "National Emergency" rule on the country. India came under draconian control, but there were few signs of serious protests: people followed orders, the streets looked cleaner, the economy showed growth, and the trains were running on time.

Ray was troubled. The films he made during this period clearly projected a troubled vision of India. The Calcutta Trilogy—*The Adversary*, *Company Limited*, and *The Middleman*—created powerful portraits of alienation, waywardness, and moral collapse. *Days and Nights in the Forest* and *Distant Thunder*, made during the Bangladesh

War on the subject of the Bengal famine of 1943, showed rape and violence in a straightforward manner. *The Chess Players*, made during the Emergency, used the metaphor of a chess game to show how the king of Oudh, more a poet and composer than a ruler, submitted to the British takeover of his kingdom in 1856 as his people fled their villages. The two short films *Pikoo* and *Deliverance* raised the issues of adultery and untouchability. Even his so-called escapist films—the Goopy and Bagha musicals and the detective film *Golden Fortress*—carried messages against wars, criminality, and greed. In midlife, at the height of his creative powers, Ray seemed to have adopted a dark worldview. Socially, he became increasingly isolated.

In the third and last phase (1977–1992), Ray's worldview came full circle. In the 1980s he became even more isolated and distant. In the films he made during this period, he related his messages in definitive terms: unlike his early work, his films became didactic and frank. Gone were the carefully crafted shades of gray. *Home and the World* (1984), based on a Tagore novel, is a diatribe against nationalism, the mix of religion and politics, and political opportunism and dishonesty. Although the theme is the Swadeshi movement of 1905, *Home and the World* addressed issues of critical concern in the 1980s. Stricken by two heart attacks, Ray was not able to make films with his characteristic rigor. He made modest family dramas, shot indoors under the watchful eyes of his doctors. He made three films, all based on his own stories, in 1988, 1989, and 1990. The first, *Enemy of the People*, an adaptation of the Henrik Ibsen play to Bengali in 1988, addressed questions of capitalist corruption and manipulation of religion, people, politics, and environment. *Branches of a Tree* (1989) also addressed issues of capitalism as it impacts family values and ethics. The protagonist, a heart patient like Ray, is obsessed with honesty, mediated by mood swings of music and madness. The third film, *The Stranger* (1990), literally carries Ray's own voice in three places, where he sings. The protagonist is clearly Ray himself. His global concerns are articulated locally. Who is an artist? Who is civilized and who is primitive? The protagonist is against narrowness of all sorts, against boundaries and borders. "Don't be a frog in the well," he tells his grandnephew as the film comes to an end.

Ray was a product of the Anglo-Bengali encounter of the nineteenth century. His cultural, intellectual, and ideological roots can be traced to what is known as the "Bengali Renaissance." As a powerfully creative artist, his craft was influenced as much by the West as by the Bengal School. One can argue that, in the final analysis, he was more than a product of the "Calcutta modern"—a synthesis of the East and the West. His creativity, he

once remarked, remained grounded both in what is uniquely Bengali and in what is universal.

Ray's mother had taken him to visit Rabindranath Tagore when he was five years old. Young Ray extended his autograph book to Tagore. Tagore wrote in it in verse:

For a long time, over many miles,
I've been to many countries.
I've spent a lot of money.
I've seen the highest peaks;
I've seen the greatest oceans.
But I still have yet to open my eyes,
glance over at the field next to my house,
and see a dewdrop on a blade of grass.

Tagore then told Ray, "When you grow up, you'll understand what I've written for you here."

Years later, while filming *Patheer Panchali*, Ray realized that all his theoretical knowledge and study of film proved inadequate to the challenge he faced. He wrote, "One day's work with camera and actors taught me more than all the dozen books [I read on film making]. [I found out for myself] how to catch the hushed stillness of dusk in a Bengali village, when the wind drops and turns the ponds into sheets of glass, and the smoke from the ovens settles in wispy trails over the landscape, and plaintive blows on conch shells from homes far and near are joined by the chorus of crickets which rise as the light falls, until all one sees are stars in the sky, and the fireflies that blink and swirl in the thickets" (*Satyajit Ray: An Anthology of Statements on Ray and by Ray*, pp. 23–24).

Satyajit Ray died on 23 April 1992. A million mourners marched in the funeral procession, the greatest outpouring of public grief in Kolkata since Tagore's death fifty years earlier.

Dilip K. Basu

See also **Tagore, Rabindranath**

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READING, LORD (1860–1935), viceroy of India (1921–1926). Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs) was Britain's Lord Chief Justice in David Lloyd George's Liberal Cabinet prior to his appointment as viceroy of

India in 1921. Reading was one of the most distinguished jurists of his time, the only person of Jewish faith appointed viceroy of India. Arriving so soon after Amritsar's Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, in the midst of Mahatma Gandhi's first nationwide *satyagraha*, Reading ruled India during one of its most revolutionary half decades. His judicious temperament and calm patience helped keep India's body politic from further chaos during his era, when constitutional reforms inaugurated under the Government of India Act of 1919 were introduced.

Reading held six lengthy interviews with Gandhi, whose deep religious convictions and "sincerity" he "liked," but with whom he could reach no political agreement on any issue. Concerned about a possible Afghan invasion at the time, Reading asked Gandhi how he would deal with it, to which the Mahatma replied that he would go personally to "meet" the invaders and "conquer them by love." The viceroy tried his best to dissuade Gandhi from his boycott of the reforms and elections, insisting that they were honestly designed to help Indians enjoy a more representative form of government than had ever been possible before. But since the 1919 massacre in Jallianwala Bagh, and its aftermath of brutal martial "laws" (including crawling orders inflicted on Indians residing in Amritsar), Gandhi mistrusted British officialdom, even their most seemingly selfless acts, which he viewed as wily tactics of "divide and rule," designed only to keep all Indians permanently enslaved.

Reading also met with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, finding him less radical than Gandhi, but "rather extremist," nonetheless, and forthright in demanding the dismissal of Punjab officers who had committed the grossest violations of human rights. He rightly recognized barrister Jinnah's "acute sensibility and subtlety of mind," but failed to take advantage of Jinnah's willingness to serve as honest "broker" between himself and Gandhi, possibly helping to avert the tragedy of South Asia's partition two decades later.

Lord Reading hosted Edwina Ashley, granddaughter of his wealthy banker friend, Sir Ernest Cassel, on the eve of her engagement to Lord Louis Mountbatten, who first visited India as aide to his cousin Edward, Prince of Wales, in 1921–1922. The Mountbattens would return to India a quarter century later to preside over the British transfer of power and the partition.

In 1923 Reading's government introduced civil service examinations in New Delhi, held simultaneously with those in London, thus making it possible for young Indians to sit for those prestigious administrative tests without having to embark on a long expensive voyage to England. He also created a popular Tariff Board in New Delhi, which soon abolished cotton excise taxes, allowing

Indian cotton mill owners, including the Birlas and Tatas, to compete fairly with Manchester imports. But to compensate for the resulting annual loss of revenue, Reading doubled the salt tax, which was to become the prime target of Gandhi's most successful *satyagraha* campaign in 1930.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British Crown Raj; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Government of India Act of 1919; Satyagraha**

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REDDI, MUTHULAKSHMI (1886–1968), first female Hindu doctor in Madras; educator, legislator, and feminist. Muthulakshmi Reddi was a pioneering feminist, doctor, educator, and legislator in colonial Madras presidency. Born in 1886, she was raised in the princely state of Pudukōttai by her upper caste father, who was a college professor, and her mother, whose ancestors were *dēvadāsi* musician-dancers. Her upbringing led her to dislike caste and sectarian divisions, and as a rationalist, she fought against superstitions and misogynistic traditions that hindered modernization. She was sent to school to learn reading and arithmetic for household accounts. However, her father soon supported her entry into a local college. In 1912 Muthulakshmi graduated at the top of an all male class from Madras Medical College, the first Hindu woman doctor in this presidency.

She began working at a government hospital, treating women and children and the urban poor. In 1913 she became the resident doctor for R. S. Subbalakshmi Ammal's Brahmin Hostel for Widows. In 1914 she married Dr. Sundara Reddi, who shared Muthulakshmi's interests in medicine and social welfare. The couple established girls' orphanages and rehabilitation centers for destitute women. When treating vagrant children at the Dr. Varadappa Naidu Home in 1919, Muthulakshmi perceived the connections between women's low status, neglect, illiteracy, early marriage, childbirth death, prostitution, and disease, and she became politically active in the struggle for women's rights.

In 1917 Muthulakshmi Reddi cofounded the Women's Indian Association (WIA), and in 1928 the Muslim

Women's Association. As a member of nonsectarian organizations like the Madras Seva Sadan, Madras Vigilance Society, and Indian Ladies' Samaj, she worked with women of many communities, including Hindus (Pārvati Ammāl Chandrasēkharan and Mangalāmmal Sadāsivier), Muslims (Dr. Rahamatunīssa Bēgam and Shafia Mazeruddīn), Christians (Swarnam Appāsamy and Poonen Lukhose), Parsis (Hirābai Tātā), and Anglo-Irish women (Annie Besant and Margaret Cousins). She joined the 1917 All India Women's Delegation to Secretary of State Edwin Montagu, requesting provincial female suffrage under the Government of India Act of 1919. In 1926 she represented India at the International Suffrage Conference of Women in Paris, and in 1933 at the Congress of Women in Chicago.

In 1927 Reddi became the first woman legislator in colonial India, and she was chosen as the deputy president of the Madras Legislative Assembly. Reddi and her colleagues campaigned for the Sarda Act in 1930, which raised the age of marriage for girls to fourteen. She campaigned for increased state funding for girls' schools and occupational centers, low caste Ādi Dravida (aboriginal) girls' teacher training programs, and Muslim girls' education. She was a member of the Hartog Committee on education in 1928. Although she believed that the *purdab*, or veil, promoted female ill-health, as a pragmatist, she passed an Assembly resolution for separate wards and doctors for Muslim women in *purdab*. In 1929 she helped pass Act V of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, which severed the cultural tradition of *dēvadāsi* (slaves of the god) dedication to temples from its economic link to shrine properties. She supported Mahatma Gandhi's ideals of moral purity and the emancipation of women. Muthulakshmi Reddi was awarded the prestigious Padma Bhushan award for her services to Indian women before her death in 1968.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Feminism and Indian Nationalists;**
Women's Indian Association

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REINCARNATION. *See* **Upanishadic Philosophy.**

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, EVOLUTION OF

The shape of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) which was set up in 1935 during British rule, was influenced by two different attitudes, though with agreement that it should be independent of government. The British rulers were swayed by the prevailing monetary orthodoxy, of keeping the functions of raising and using money separate from that of creating money, while the nationalists wanted independence for the RBI in order to insulate it from the interference of the alien power. Despite this general agreement, the act establishing the RBI was so drafted that it left several gray areas for interpretation of the RBI-government relationship. As a result, the executive started, from the beginning, to encroach on the autonomy of the RBI, as evidenced by the finance member of the government of India selecting the composition of the RBI Board, and also by a virtual dismissal of its first governor, Sir Osborne Smith, on the ostensible grounds of disagreement on the issue of fixing the bank rate. During World War II, the authority of the RBI was further clipped in regard to its monetary policy, when it was forced to pursue a government-initiated low interest rate policy to keep the cost of financing the war low and to expand money supply through accumulation of sterling (foreign exchange) balances.

After a brief interlude of relative autonomy experienced after independence in 1947, the RBI's monetary policy domain shriveled rapidly when planning dominated India's overall economic policy. Since 1951, the government aimed at a mixture of public and private sectors, but much greater weight was assigned to the former. This had serious consequences for the RBI's functioning, organization, and the use of its policy instruments. Its main policy instruments, such as open market operations, and cash reserve and statutory liquid assets ratios, took the character of fiscal instruments directed more toward raising resources for the government than facilitating the financing of private sector investment—the main area for the exercise of monetary policy. Even more significantly,



Y. V. Reddy, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. Y. V. Reddy at a 2003 press conference in Mumbai, prepared to face his challenges as newly appointed governor of the Reserve Bank of India. A key player in the economic turnaround of the 1990s and former executive director of the IMF, Reddy has thus far responded creatively to the core issues facing the RBI, implementing a number of important reforms. INDIA TODAY.

the RBI was obliged to extend credit to government, which fueled inflationary pressures in the economy.

The erosion of the RBI's power was also reflected in its other two collateral functions, that is, the exchange rate management, and the supervision and prudential control of the banking system. Because of ill-defined provisions of the RBI and the Banking Companies Act, and the ideological dispensation of the government, the RBI was unable to efficiently discharge these functions. The five-year plans, implicitly based on the assumption of constant prices, took as axiomatic that the exchange rate—the price of Indian currency in terms of gold or other foreign currencies—should remain unchanged. As it turned out, however, the government had to devalue the rupee by force majeure in 1966—a decision in which the RBI played only a technical role. There was, however, some change in 1976, when the RBI was given greater leeway in regard to exchange rate determination. It adopted a multicurrency basket of exchange rate under which the rupee value was determined with reference to the exchange rate movements of a select number of currencies of India's trading partners.

In the area of bank supervision and inspection, the RBI's record was marred by government decree. In the beginning, the RBI discharged its prudential control policies efficiently, but with the advent of Indian official intervention, this function was increasingly politicized. In the case of Palai Central Bank of Kerala State, where the government disregarded the RBI's advice, a serious banking crisis emerged a few years later. The RBI's prudential responsibilities were further downgraded in 1969 when banks were nationalized, the government of India assuming more direct and tighter control of banks.

Back to the Basics of Central Banking

The economic context in which the RBI functioned was radically transformed in 1991, when economic rationality was given precedence over ideology and politics. The private sector was liberalized from the straight jacket of industrial licensing, trade barriers were lowered, the foreign exchange control regime was gradually transformed into a market-oriented foreign exchange management system and, most important, the financial sector was liberalized from the earlier restrictive regime, which had substantially erased the distinction between the monetary policy of the RBI and the fiscal policy of the government. Those economic and financial reforms gave primacy to markets, incentives, and prices, thereby creating ideal conditions so essential for the unhampered exercise of the RBI's monetary policy instruments.

The RBI's freedom to exercise its policies was facilitated by two important developments. First, India liberalized its current balance of payment account, almost totally by 1995, and followed that up by selectively eliminating some restrictions on the capital balance of payments account. This led to a large movement of capital across India's borders, requiring the RBI to remain alert to both the exchange rate and interest rate movements, since both of these affected capital flows. The second development was the deregulation of domestic interest rates, thereby giving greater leverage to the RBI to influence them through its various policy instruments.

The RBI regulates the cost and availability of aggregate money by controlling the determinants of reserve money, that is, currency in circulation and banks' cash on hand and bank deposits held with the RBI. The determinants of reserve money are net bank credit to the government and to banks, and its holding of net foreign exchange assets. Prior to 1991, the RBI regulated reserve money by changing the quantity of its credit to government and banks, and varying its cash reserve requirements ratio, but currently, the RBI relies more on open market operations, that is, the purchase and sale of government securities held by it, varying its lending rates on credit extended to banks as well as to the central and state governments.

Since 1994 and 1995, a concordat was entered into between the RBI and the government of India under which automatic financing of government deficit by the RBI (called monetization) was capped. Only short-term credit to government was extended, which was required to be cleared at the end of the fiscal year. Any credit beyond the limit was treated as an overdraft, permissible for not more than ten consecutive days and on which interest rate was charged at bank rate plus two percentage points. This landmark decision has strengthened the RBI as a monetary authority. In regard to the net credit to banks, the RBI made its bank rate and other refinancing rates more effective. It instituted a Liquidity Adjustment Facility for banks for meeting temporary liquidity shortages, the rates on which were linked to the bank rate, thereby reviving the bank rate as a reference rate as in many central banks.

The RBI's role in regulating net foreign exchange assets has become dominant. It now intervenes in the foreign exchange market by the purchase and sale of foreign exchange and offsets the impact of these transactions on money supply by countervailing sale and purchase of securities. During 1992 to 1993 and 1998 to 1999, when there was a large inflow of private capital in India, the RBI bought foreign exchange to maintain a stable exchange rate, but at the same time, it sold securities to absorb liquidity so as not to weaken its restrictive monetary policy.

Though the RBI has moved in the right direction of greater independence and power in formulating its policies, it has considerable ground to cover. To emerge as a central bank of truly modern mold, it has to shift, as Anand Chandavarkar (1996) emphasized, "from independent to effective central banking based on the highest professionalism and integrity."

Deena Khatkhate

See also **Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991; Monetary Policy since 1991; Money and Credit, 1858–1947**

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RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL. *See* **Human Rights; Judicial System, Modern; Political System.**

RIG VEDA. *See* **Vedic Aryan India.**

RIPON, LORD (1827–1909), *British politician, viceroy of India (1880–1884).* Lord Ripon was one of British India's most liberal and popular viceroys. The first marquis and second earl of Ripon, George Frederick Samuel Robinson was elected to Parliament from Hull in 1852 and served as undersecretary of state for India from 1861 to 1863, then as secretary of state for India in 1866. Eight years later, he converted to Catholicism, and six years afterward became the only Roman Catholic British viceroy of India, presiding over the Raj from 1880 to 1884.

A peace-loving, wise, and kindhearted aristocrat, Ripon was sent to India as Prime Minister William Gladstone's Liberal reflection. He swiftly ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War, which his predecessor, Tory Lord Lytton, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's imperial reflection, had started, recognizing Amir Abdur Rahman Khan as Afghanistan's king, and withdrawing all British troops in 1881. He also liberated India's press, repealing the hated Vernacular Press Act of 1878 that Lytton had imposed to silence Indian editorials critical of his autocratic martial imperial rule. Ripon's bravest policy was to appoint and fearlessly support Sir Courtney Ilbert as law member of his council. Brilliant jurist and humanitarian that Ilbert was, he immediately sought to rectify the gross racial inequity of British India's criminal system of jurisprudence, discriminating as it did against all high court judges of Indian birth, who were automatically "disqualified" from trying any criminal case that charged a "European" with unlawful action against an Indian. Ilbert's Criminal Jurisdiction Bill, which would have removed such racial prejudice from the system, was introduced to Lord Ripon's council in February 1883. The viceroy strongly backed his law member. But as soon as the new bill's proposed change was emblazoned in boldest type on the front page of every Anglo-Indian newspaper in Bengal, the British community, civil and judicial, most violently protested. Ilbert and Ripon were tarred as "traitors" to their "race" and nation, and images of both were burned in effigy in Calcutta (Kolkata). Mass meetings filled every hall in the capital, denouncing the Ilbert Bill as "unconstitutional" and demanding its emasculation by requiring that any trial of an Englishman in a "native's" courtroom should be judged by a jury, at least half of whom were of "European blood." The intensity of those anti-Ilbert protests taught generations of Indian nationalists how best to protest against government policies and officials, including the very viceroy. Leaders of India's

National Congress, born but two years after Ilbert's Bill was enacted in its disgracefully emasculated form, never forgot those powerful lessons in public protest.

Ripon was so dispirited by the narrow-mindedness of his countrymen that he resigned his office a year before his term would have expired. When he traveled by train from Calcutta across the full breadth of India to Bombay (Mumbai), where a P & O vessel waited to take him home, tens of thousands of bareheaded Indians lined the tracks, bowing to offer silent thanks to the British viceroy who had fought so hard for them that he incurred the enmity of his own people.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **British Crown Raj**

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RISHI A sage or seer, a *rishi* (ṛṣi) is a semidivine being gifted with insight, sacred knowledge, and special powers. Most famous are the seven *rishis* (*saptārshayah*), the Brahmans to whom the Vedas were revealed. The entire corpus of sacred texts, beginning with the Rig Veda, was orally passed on to humans and even today is recited by Vaidika Brahmans who consider the original seven as role models. Both the idea of seven and several individuals called *rishis* were known in the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda, but the generally accepted list of seven names did not occur until centuries later in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad and the Sūtras: Vishvāmītra, Jamadagni, Bharadvāja, Gotama, Atri, Vasishṭhathā, and Kashyapa. An eighth, Agastya, was added, associated with South India rather than the Gangā-Yamunā region usually given as the location of *rishi* ashramas. Bhrigu, Aṅgiras, and others were considered *rishis* as well. The core seven endured as a mythic nucleus, each one a progenitor of a distinct family. In modern times, if a person is asked to name a *gotra* (lineage) by a priest in a Hindu temple, for example, ancestry is declared by naming a specific *rishi*. And in the *pravara* included in personal prayers, an extended list of *rishi* ancestors is affirmed.

The signal features of the *rishi* were the gift of spiritual insight and his conduct of extraordinary asceticism. By means of *tapas*, powerful austerities, the *rishi* attained superhuman status rivaling the gods. Miraculous feats (*siddhis*) were accomplished, including the ability to

change shape, become invisible, or fly through the air. Various *siddhis* and the role of *rishi* continued to be important later in traditions of Yoga, Buddhism, and Jainism. By the seventh century B.C., however, early Upanishads directed spiritual insight and power beyond the results of sacrifice (*yajña*) on one hand, or miracle working on the other, toward liberation through a new definition of existence as *saṃsāra*, and this by means of the *ātman-brahman* identity. In other words, the *rishi* of the early Upanishads became a being with esoteric knowledge not of the Vedas or of the rituals but of the cosmic identity that conquers death. These Upanishads also elaborated earlier identifications of the seven *rishis* with the seven life-breaths (*prāṇa*) of the body.

Many additional *rishi* names appeared in the Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa, and the Purāṇas. Some groups were called the Seven Prajāpatis or Seven Mind-Born Sons of Brahmā. By virtue of *tapas*, the *rishis* achieved heaven (*svarga*). Myths note them in the night sky as the constellation Ursa Major, the Great Bear (or Big Dipper), first known in the Rig Veda as seven bears, later as seven *rishis*. Arundhatī was rewarded with the eternal company of her husband, *rishi* Vasishṭhathā; she is the tiny star Alcor immediately next to him, pointed out to the bride in marriage rites as a symbol of fidelity. Their enduring presence also resides in topography—in rivers, for example. *Rishis* are said to have made seven channels of the Ganga at Hardwar, and channels of the Godavari in its delta bear their seven names. The *rishis* belong to an ancient past, yet even today some village folk relate a lucky moment, a glimpse of the seven through the mist as they bathe in the river before dawn.

David M. Knipe

See also **Tapas; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedic Aryan India; Yajña**

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
ROCK ART Found in many different regions of South Asia, evidence for rock art dates back to the late Upper Paleolithic period (c. 15,000 B.C. and continues through

the Mesolithic (c. 8000 B.C.) and Neolithic (c. 7000 B.C.) up through the Historic period. While some rock art is painted or engraved on the walls of rock shelters and caves, movable rock art is found on smaller pieces of stone that could be set in special locations for rituals and then carried away. A carved stone pebble with what may be the face of a human and a slab of stone with incised lines that may be calendrical notations were found in the Upper Paleolithic cave site of Gar-i-Asp, Afghanistan. Recent research in the Zhob and Loralai valleys of Baluchistan have reported what may be Upper Paleolithic paintings and Chalcolithic engravings. More than thirty thousand rock carvings dating from the Upper Paleolithic to the Early Historic period have been reported along the upper Indus Valley and its tributaries in the mountains of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. Engraved rock slabs have been found in the Neolithic levels at Burzahom in Kashmir, and a Mesolithic/Chalcolithic chert blade core with an engraved geometric motif was found at Chandravati, Rajasthan. More than five thousand painted rock shelters have been reported in the hills of peninsular India, the most famous in the region around Bhimbetka, Madhya Pradesh.

Rock Art of Central India

Many different techniques were probably used to create graphic symbols and naturalistic representations on rock surfaces, but the only ones preserved are paintings made with permanent mineral pigments or engravings that physically modified the surface of the rock. Prehistoric rock art was usually executed on easily accessible surfaces in caves or rock shelters, but in some regions the paintings were clearly made with the help of elaborate scaffolds or ladders. The colors used for rock art are the commonly available iron minerals that come in red, orange, brown, and black (hematite) or yellow (limonite). White pigments were made using limestone, natural chalk, white kaolin clay, or scintered calcium carbonate (*kankar*) nodules. Occasionally, green pigments were made from glauconite (*terra verde*) or the greenish weathered surfaces of chalcedony nodules.

The simplest technique of application was to use the colored nodule as a crayon. Faceted nodules of hematite have been found in the Lower Paleolithic levels at Bhimbetka Cave, but the only modifications to the walls dating from this time are two depressions that may be the earliest evidence for cup-shaped petroglyphs. Faceted hematite nodules have also been found in the Upper Paleolithic levels of Bhimbetka and can be associated with the earliest prefigurative geometric designs. Green anthropomorphic figures often overlap the geometric designs and have been dated to the Upper Paleolithic, but some scholars believe that they may belong to later periods. The most complex forms of painting would have



Rock-Cut Jain Sculptures in Gwalior Fort. Near the southern entrance to Gwalior Fort (in the northern part of Madhya Pradesh), these imposing Jain sculptures rise from the cliffs. They were originally cut in the mid-fifteenth century, defaced by the marauding armies of Babur in 1527, but later restored. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

involved the preparation of pigments by grinding and mixing with water or organic solutions derived from plants or animal fat. Complex paintings of large animals that may represent deified bison or deer at Bhimbetka and other sites may have been produced with specially prepared pigments and brushes made from twigs or animal hair. Many of these large deified animal paintings are thought to belong to the end of the Upper Paleolithic or the subsequent Mesolithic period. Other techniques of application involve handprints or fine incising with sharp stone tools and filling the lines with color.

The major themes of rock paintings vary from region to region and change over time. The earliest Upper Paleolithic paintings appear to be geometric designs; these are followed by the introduction of depictions of humans and large-scale animals filled with cross-hatching and concentric designs. Mesolithic rock paintings follow some of these same trends, but there is more emphasis on

narrative scenes depicting the hunting of game with barbed spears or groups of animals and humans. The Neolithic paintings tend to focus on various everyday activities like hunting, gathering, collecting honey, and feeding pigs. The types of animals depicted in the paintings include all of the major animals seen in tropical jungles, from elephants and tigers to rabbits and lizards. Hunting is sometimes associated with male figures defined by clearly visible genitalia, while some figures of women with prominent breasts and large hips are associated with gathering activities. Most anthropomorphic figures are not distinguished by sex, unless that is the subject of the painting. Prehistoric rock art in peninsular India is followed by depictions of warriors with what appear to be classic iron weapons, riding horses or driving wheeled chariots. These paintings date to the early Iron Age, around 1000 B.C., and continue throughout the Historic period.

Rock Art in Northern Pakistan

Three of the great mountain ranges of South Asia come together in the northern regions of Pakistan: the Hindu Kush on the west, the Karakorum in the center, and the Himalayas, which extend east across India and Nepal to the edges of Myanmar (Burma). The Indus River and its tributaries emerge from the glacial lakes and snow fields of these mountains. Beginning in the Upper Paleolithic, some 20,000 to 10,000 years ago, people began moving up these rivers in pursuit of game during interglacial periods. The earliest anthropomorphic figures and animal petroglyphs of large horned goats, sheep, ibex, and snow leopards probably date to this time period. Petroglyphs, or rock engravings, are made by pecking or bruising the surface of large flat boulders using smaller hammer stones. Due to the heavy brown weathered surface or patina on the rock surface, the freshly produced lines reveal the light colored stone and show up very clearly. Over thousands of years, these engraved lines themselves become weathered, and later petroglyphs can be identified by the different color of the patina and by their superposition on earlier engravings.

Large engravings of humped zebu cattle indicate the presence of herders who would have begun to frequent the region during the Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods, moving up from the Indus plain and then returning with trade goods from regions farther north. Anthropomorphic masks carved on some boulders have parallels with Chalcolithic cultures of southern Siberia, providing evidence for early contacts with Central Asia in the third millennium B.C.

During the first millennium B.C., nomads from the Eurasian steppes began to move down these valleys, and their carvings of stags and ibex with large backward curving

horns can be linked to Scythian artistic traditions dating to the eighth century B.C. and even earlier animal-style art from Siberia that dates from the eleventh to the ninth centuries B.C. Later carvings of people, gods, temples, and ritual symbols can be attributed to the ebb and flow of pilgrims, traders, and armies along this major trade route. Achaemenid Persians, Sogdians, Hindu pilgrims who worshiped either Shiva or Vishnu, and Zoroastrian fire worshippers all contributed to the rock art of this region.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also **Neolithic Period; Palaeolithic Period**

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ROY, RAM MOHAN (1772–1833), *leading figure of the Hindu Renaissance, founder of the Brahmo Samaj.*

Ram Mohan Roy was born to a Bengali Hindu family with a history of service to Muslim rulers. He studied Persian and Arabic, as well as Bengali and Sanskrit, in preparation for a similar career. In 1797 Ram Mohan moved to Calcutta (Kolkata) and became wealthy through investments with the British East India Company and in rural estates. From 1803 to 1815 he was intermittently in the service of company officials stationed in rural Bengal; during this period he mastered the English language and culture and absorbed Western religious radicalism. About 1815 he settled permanently in Calcutta, mixing with Europeans and studying Vedānta.

During the next fifteen years Roy earned his fame as a key figure in the Hindu Renaissance. He was initially prominent in the religious arena. Drawing upon Hindu, Muslim, and Christian rationalist traditions, he championed the unity of God and challenged established doctrines and customary practices. His rationalist views drew him into heated public debates with both Hindu pandits and Christian missionaries: the former objected to his egalitarian reading of Vedānta texts, while the missionaries resented his embrace of Unitarian doctrines. His criticism of image worship and his campaign against *sati* (the immolation of Hindu widows on their husbands' funeral pyres) earned him further enmity among more orthodox Hindus. He enjoyed support from Western-educated Hindus, including those who joined the Brahma Samaj, the influential religious reform society he established in Calcutta in 1828.

Roy was also active in other areas. A pioneer of Bengali journalism, he founded, or supported, some of the first vernacular newspapers in Bengal and wrote brilliant defenses of freedom of the press. He encouraged Western education, helped establish English-language schools, and opposed the 1823 establishment of Sanskrit College, Calcutta, because he believed the British were obligated to introduce modern Western knowledge. He remained committed, however, to Sanskrit education and founded Vedanta College in 1826, while his many vernacular publications—including grammars, translations from Sanskrit, and Vedānta commentaries—have drawn comparisons to Martin Luther for their influence on the evolution of modern Bengali. His campaign against *sati* led Governor-General William Bentinck to seek Roy's advice before abolishing the practice in 1829. During the ensuing public outcry, Roy stood forth as a champion of *sati*'s abolition.

In late 1830 Roy left for Britain. One of the first Brahmans to cross the "dark waters," he traveled as the emissary of the Mughal emperor, who granted Roy the title of "raja" (king) to enhance his diplomatic status. Roy's private agenda included opposing the Dharma Sabha's petition to Britain that protested the abolition of *sati*. He was lionized in Britain by religious and political reformers, seated among the foreign ambassadors at King William IV's coronation, and encouraged by radicals to stand for Parliament. Largely unsuccessful in securing redress of the emperor's complaints against the East India Company, he was nevertheless present when the privy council upheld the abolition of *sati*, and he presented written testimony to Parliament regarding Indian affairs. He traveled briefly to France, where his republican sympathies were strengthened. Ram Mohan Roy died of pneumonia and was buried in Bristol on September 1833. His gravesite later became a place of pilgrimage for Indians in Great Britain.

Lynn Zastoupil



Ram Mohan Roy. Drawing on Hindu, Muslim, and Christian rationalist traditions, Roy challenged long-established religious doctrines and customary practices. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

See also **Brahmo Samaj**

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RURAL CREDIT, EVOLUTION OF SINCE 1952 India's rural credit system is divided into two segments: an unorganized or informal system of moneylenders, traders, and input suppliers; and a formal, organized segment constituted by cooperative banks,

regional rural banks, commercial banks, and non-banking financial companies. In recent years, the move to strengthen formal credit institutions was justified by not only the demands of modern inputs but also usurious moneylending practices that could not otherwise be countered effectively. India's ideological commitment to encouraging a "cooperative commonwealth" also played a role, especially in strengthening cooperative credit institutions at all levels.

Structure of Rural Financial Institutions

Rural credit needs in India are met by an elaborate structure of rural financial institutions (RFIs). The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) acts as the apex institution and also as the principal refinancing agency for the RFIs. The Reserve Bank of India, as the principal monetary authority of the country, has retained some powers of regulating and directing agricultural credit, though most of its developmental functions in this area have been ceded to NABARD. Cooperative banks, scheduled commercial banks, and regional rural banks are the three principal rural financial agencies. Numerous state-sponsored institutions and nongovernmental organizations established for development of special sections of the population or particular regions in the country also advance credit to the rural population.

Cooperative banks cater to the short-term as well as long-term requirements of credit in rural and semiurban areas. The short-term credit structure is a three-tier structure, with state-level cooperative banks, or SCBs (numbering 30), at the apex, district-level credit cooperative banks, or DCCBs (numbering 368) constituting the middle tier, and over 98,000 village-level primary societies. Each higher tier largely relies on the lower tier for credit dispersal and, to an extent, on deposit mobilization. State- as well as district-level cooperative institutions also operate, to a limited extent, through their branches. There are 847 branches of the SCBs and over 12,000 branches of the DCCBs. Long-term credit structure is also a tiered structure. There are 20 state-level cooperative agricultural and rural development banks. Some of these banks, mainly in the smaller states, operate directly through their branches. Others, especially those located in the larger states, operate through an intermediary level called primary cooperative agricultural rural development banks, the latter numbering nearly 800, with a branch network of nearly 1,100.

Ninety-eight scheduled commercial banks operate through more than 66,400 branches, of which nearly 32,000 are located in rural areas. The rural and the semi-urban branches of the commercial banks are controlled at the regional level by their regional offices, and the

regional offices are coordinated at the zonal level by zonal offices, with the headquarters of the banks responsible for overall control and supervision. The commercial banks have also sponsored, in collaboration with the central and state governments, local district level banks, known as regional rural banks (RRBs). The RRBs number 196, and have a network of over 14,000 branches, which are located preponderantly in rural areas.

There are more than 157,000 credit outlets serving India's rural population of nearly 742 million people. By the end of the financial year (April–March) 2001–2002, the flow of credit for agriculture and allied activities was estimated at 6204.5 billion rupees, of which 4050.9 billion rupees were disbursed as production credit and 2153.6 billion rupees as investment credit. A progressively larger share of ground-level credit in agriculture is accounted for by commercial banks. During the period 1994–1995 to 2001–2002, the share of the commercial banks in the total credit, short term and long term, increased from 44 percent to 54 percent. The share of the cooperatives declined to that extent.

A remarkable feature of the RFIs is their comprehensive coverage of different segments of rural society, including the small and marginal farmers. With the organization of self-help groups of poor farmers and artisans, now numbering over 780,000, and their coordination with the banking institutions, the RFIs now cover a large number of households among the disadvantaged sections of rural society.

Evolution of State Policies

Three distinct phases can be identified in the evolution of the RFIs. The first phase began in 1954, when the recommendations of the Rural Credit Survey Report were largely accepted and efforts made to encourage formal credit institutions, particularly cooperatives. The beginning of the second phase coincided with bank nationalization in 1969, when credit was considered an important instrument of eradicating poverty. The third phase began in 1991, when the RFIs sought to be reformed in consonance with the overall policy of economic reforms.

Serious efforts to revamp the rural credit system began with the publication, in 1954, of the Report of the Rural Credit Survey (RCS) sponsored by the Reserve Bank of India. The recommendations of the RCS made a profound impact on the rural credit structure. State policy was directed to provide a comprehensive and viable alternative to nonformal credit agencies such as moneylenders and traders. Among the formal credit institutions, it emphasized the importance of cooperatives. The

RCS was aware of the weaknesses of the cooperative movement, but considered it the best organizational form to meet the requirements of the rural population. It inspired the now famous slogan “cooperation has failed, but cooperation must succeed.” The committee was equally eager to make cooperatives financially viable, suggesting large-sized credit cooperatives, and rejecting the “one village, one society” norm.

An equally important recommendation of the RCS was state partnership in the cooperative structure at all levels. Two funds were created in the Reserve Bank of India: the National Agricultural Credit (Long-Term Operations) Fund for advancing loans to the state governments to subscribe to the cooperative institutions and to assist land mortgage banks; and a National Agricultural (Stabilization) Fund to help cooperatives convert short-term loans of members to medium-term loans during periods of natural calamity. Some attention was also given to bringing commercial banks into the rural credit arena. The RCS’s recommendation of nationalization of the Imperial Bank of India, enjoining the new State Bank of India to open a large number of branches in rural areas, heralded the entry of commercial banks as important players on the rural credit scene.

Some of these recommendations generated heated controversy. There were serious reservations in a section of cooperators, and also in some government quarters, but, by and large, the recommendations were accepted and were acted upon. Reforms in the credit institutions resulted, though not to the extent expected, in the desired direction, that is, the substitution of the formal sector in place of the informal sector. The proportion of credit from the formal sector increased from 3 percent in 1952 to nearly 30 percent in 1969. Similarly, the land mortgage banks, which had mainly financed redemption of old loans, changed into institutions for long-term funding for productive purposes. However, the major objective of strengthening cooperatives was not achieved. Neither the large-size cooperatives nor the state partnership helped in rejuvenating the credit cooperatives.

Meanwhile, the deepening agricultural crisis of the 1950s and the early 1960s led to greater attention being given to raising agricultural productivity, first by concentrating on a few potentially favorable districts under the Intensive Agricultural District Programme, popularly known as the Package Programme, and later, by spreading this program to a large area. The approach was based on the application of a package of modern inputs and improved practices. To implement such packages, the producers, obviously, needed credit. As efforts to develop agriculture intensified, the need for a higher scale of credit became obvious. The era of exclusive reliance on cooperatives was over, and a multiagency approach to

rural credit was initiated. The Agricultural Review Committee noted the need for a multiagency approach in its report in 1969, coinciding with the nationalization of fourteen major commercial banks, a measure that completely changed the character of the banking industry in India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi felt threatened by her political opponents and had to garner support from the general public with the slogan “*garibi batao*” (eradicate poverty). Subsequently, six more banks were added to this list of banks obliged to lend 40 percent of their advances to “priority” sectors, 18 percent of which were in agriculture. The banks were compelled to open branches in the rural areas. They came to be heavily involved in funding the beneficiaries of the poverty alleviation programs, such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme. Other measures in the same direction included the lead bank plan, under which the principal commercial bank operating in a district was given responsibility for coordinating the efforts of all the banks of the area for funding rural development and poverty alleviation.

These measures had an important bearing on the rural credit system. First and foremost was the extension of the credit delivery system to every part of the country. The number of credit outlets of commercial banks in the rural and semi-urban areas, for example, witnessed a phenomenal increase, from 8,262 in 1969–1970 to 60,220 by 1990–1991. The regional imbalances in the number of credit outlets did continue, however, the northeastern states receiving a much smaller number of credit outlets than some of the more advanced states. The absence of proper infrastructure of roads and communications did not inhibit the spread of formal credit institutions in rural areas. In coverage of India’s rural population, the objectives of bank nationalization were thus largely fulfilled. Major weaknesses also crept in, reflected in a growing share of overdue and nonperforming assets (NPAs). By the beginning of the 1990s, the percentage of recovery to demand had fallen to 41 percent in the case of RRBs, 54 percent for commercial banks, and 57 percent for primary cooperative societies. The accumulated NPA crippled the financial health of the RFIs.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the pace of economic reforms, that is, measures to liberalize the domestic economy and to achieve greater integration with the global economy, were accelerated. As a part of these reforms, far-reaching changes were introduced in the financial sector. These included:

- freeing larger resources of the commercial banks, which had previously been preempted by the government as cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio;
- interest rate deregulation;

- introduction of prudential norms with increase in capital adequacy ratio, risk weighting of assets, stricter norms for income recognition and asset classification;
- adequate provisioning for nonproductive assets, adherence to prudential norms, especially in income recognition, provisioning for sticky accounts and capital adequacy; and
- transparency in financial dealings.

The reforms were accompanied with many structural, legal, and procedural changes. Sick regional rural banks, as well as a few commercial banks, that had the potential for revival were recapitalized, after promising to stick to the norms suggested by the Reserve Bank of India and NABARD. A Multi-State Cooperative Act was passed by Parliament to free part of the cooperative credit system from the stranglehold of state bureaucracies.

Major initiatives were taken during the postreform period to bring down the transaction costs in rural lending and to extend the reach of the RFIs to the poor. One of these is the organization and development of self-help groups of poor people, and connecting them to the banking system. Nearly 800,000 groups, each comprising ten to twenty poor households, generally headed by women, have already been organized. They have encouraged savings among the members, reduced the transaction costs of the lending institutions, and ensured a high (more than 80%) rate of recovery. The self-help group movement of India is the largest, and arguably the most successful, micro-credit program of its kind. Another innovative measure is the introduction of the Kisan (Farmers') Credit Card, which enables cardholders timely and flexible availability of credit.

Another important change that took place during this period was the creation of a Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF). It was observed that very few commercial banks were able to fulfill the mandatory requirement of advancing 18 percent of their total lending to agriculture. At the same time, there was a crying need to invest in rural infrastructure to strengthen the production base of agriculture. A fund was created, to which the banks had to contribute to cover the shortfall. The Expert Committee on Rural Credit recommended the introduction of an element of penalty in terms of lower interest rates on the amount falling short of the mandatory requirement for advances to agriculture, deposited in RIDF.

Almost every medium-sized village in the country now has a credit outlet, cooperative or commercial. A substantial part of agricultural operations are financed by financial institutions. There is a wide variety of products offered to borrowers. At the same time, there are many unresolved issues. The most important are the

organizational problems facing the cooperative sector. As a delivery system, it is in a state of disarray. A large number of DCCBs are defunct, and the malady has spread to the state-level institutions. The long-term credit agencies, known as agricultural and rural development cooperative banks, are in a worse plight. Duality of control and supervision, by the registrars of the Cooperative Societies in the states and by the Reserve Bank of India and NABARD in the central government, has not helped matters. The role of the apex and secondary institutions in strengthening the primary units is proving ineffective. The ground level institutions, the cooperative credit societies, are proving to be high-cost credit-dispensing outlets, rather than genuine cooperatives of the members.

Regional rural banks have failed to prove themselves as low-cost, rural-oriented credit institutions, and have largely become deposit-mobilizing institutions for their sponsoring banks. Their cost for dispersing credit is high, and their reach is limited. Their present status and performance do not inspire much confidence. The commercial banks are reluctant to expand their lending to the agricultural sector beyond the statutory requirements, and even there, they fail by a substantial margin. Newer agencies—non-banking financial institutions, local area banks, input suppliers, and a few non-governmental organizations—are now coming into the picture.

At the policy level, the main debatable issue is the mandatory lending targets, for the priority sector in general, and agriculture in particular. As agricultural production is becoming diversified to more value-added products and enterprises, it is becoming much more expensive and capital intensive. If India's small farm sector, which accounts for not only a large number of holdings but also a progressively increasing area of cultivated land, is to participate in this second "Green Revolution," access to timely and low-cost credit will be required. Credit has an important developmental role in a poor country like India. The challenge before the country is to adapt its vast credit system to meet the legitimate demands of the population in India's vast rural areas, without impairing the viability of its financial institutions.

Vijay Vyas

See also Bank and Non-bank Supervision; Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990; Non-banking Financial Institutions, Growth of

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RUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) is the only great power with which India's relationship has been one of mutual trust, cooperation, and strategic partnership, bolstered by ideological convergence and cultural exchange, especially throughout the cold war. Though the post-cold war dominance of the United States in all fields of international affairs has transformed the dynamics of Indo-Russian relations, the basic foundation of the relationship remains intact.

Relations between India and Russia can be broadly categorized in four distinct phases. Relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union prior to India's independence in August 1947 form the first phase of the relationship. The post-independence era can be bifurcated into three distinct phases, with the India-China conflict of 1962 and the end of cold war and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union acting as the demarcating episodes.

Pre-Independence Era

The leaders of India's freedom struggle drew ideological support from the Soviet Union in their fight against British imperial power. The ideals espoused by India's Communist parties and Nehruvian socialism were inspired by the Russian Communist Party and its revolution. Being a communist power with strong anti-imperial leanings, Russia supported the decolonization efforts of many Afro-Asian nations, including India. This support formed the foundational basis on which the edifice of a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship was laid. The Indian National Congress, which led India's mass struggle to oust the British from India, had established a small foreign department in 1925 to publicize its freedom struggle and garner support. Jawaharlal Nehru and his father, Motilal Nehru, visited Russia two years later, on the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The youthful Nehru was personally fascinated by the socialist ideology of the Soviet Union, and he taught his daughter, Indira, to admire it as well.

1947–1962

India established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 13 April 1947. Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Nehru, who served as his own foreign minister, was determined to win the support of Moscow in helping India to achieve strategic security and economic independence from the West. Nehru sent his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, as the first Indian ambassador to Moscow. Thanks to Nehru, India adopted the Russian model of centralized planning, in the form of five-year plans, as its major approach to development.

The Soviet Union, however, was initially hesitant to embrace India, considering it a "tool of Anglo-American imperialism." Only after Josef Stalin's death in 1953 did the situation improve, and the Soviet Union expressed its hopes for "friendly cooperation." Russian fears were dispelled when India refused to be influenced by Washington's power bloc during the cold war era. India's anti-imperialist, anticapitalist Nehruvian policies tilted it toward the Communist bloc headed by Moscow, and Russia soon responded by providing direct as well as indirect assistance to India in economic, technological, and strategic fields.

On 7 June 1955, Prime Minister Nehru himself made an official state visit to Moscow. That event was reciprocated by the visit of Soviet leaders Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in November 1955. Pakistan's alliance with the United States throughout the cold war spurred India to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union. The relationship paid off rich dividends. Russia supported India's stance concerning Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council, where Russia exercised its veto power many times in favor of India. In 1956, during their visit to India, Russian leaders Bulganin and Aleksey Kosygin referred to Kashmir as an "integral part" of India. Russia's support proved crucial as well for India's integration of Goa in 1961. In addition to this vital strategic help, Russia's tacit support to India during the brief 1962 India-China conflict firmly established Russia as a dependable Indian ally.

China's invasion across India's northern border in 1962 was a rude awakening to Nehru's last government, and revealed the ill-prepared state of India's military establishment. New Delhi's determination to equip its forces with more advanced weaponry spurred India toward Russia, opening a new chapter in Indo-Russian relations, with sustained engagement between the two countries, primarily based on military cooperation.

1963–1990

Formal Indo-Russian cooperation began in 1962, when the two countries agreed to a program of military-technical cooperation. Indian acquisition of Soviet military equipment was significant militarily as well as

economically, as the purchases were made against deferred rupee payments, a major concession to India's chronic shortage of foreign exchange. India received extensive cooperation from the Soviet Union in developing its space project, setting up the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station, launching Indian remote sensing satellites, and sending the first Indian astronaut into space. On the economic front, the Soviet Union was by 1965 the second-largest national contributor to India's development, primarily to the public sector. On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Union played the role of peacemaker between India and Pakistan, brokering the Tashkent Agreement after the 1965 Indo-Pak War. Soviet premier Kosygin offered his services to help reach a settlement, which was embodied in the Tashkent Agreement on 10 January 1966.

The high point of Indo-Soviet friendship was reached with Indira Gandhi's signing of the historic twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August 1971. That treaty gave India the superpower support it needed to launch its army into East Pakistan in December 1971, led by Russian tanks and heavy artillery, defeating Pakistan's army in a few weeks and bringing about the new state of Bangladesh. Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the treaty committed both signatories "to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other." This acted as a deterrent against China. Because of this strategic partnership, India could comfortably make its decisive move of intervention in East Pakistan. During that war, Russia played a significant role in support of India in the United Nations. India in return turned a diplomatic blind eye to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

In the subsequent years, the leaders of both countries exchanged visits and made serious efforts to promote greater bilateral cooperation in various fields. The first state visit of a Soviet president came about in 1973, when Leonid Brezhnev visited India amid much fanfare. That year, India and the Soviet Union signed a fifteen-year Economic and Trade Agreement, which facilitated cooperation in industry and agriculture. The following year, the Soviet Union demonstrated its support of India's nuclear policy by refusing to condemn either India's first underground plutonium explosion or India's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Russia launched India's first satellite, *Aryabhata*, on 19 April 1975 in keeping with their 1971 agreement, by which both countries agreed to expand cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. In December 1976 the Soviet Union agreed to supply 5.5 million tons of crude oil to India over a period of four years. Indo-Russian cultural exchanges, including film festivals and visits of cultural groups, were also features of this phase of

increased friendship. By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had become India's largest trading partner.

In 1977, soon after the Janata government was elected in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi's "National Emergency," Soviet foreign minister Andrey Gromyko paid a visit to India. With growing Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation, New Delhi's government was well aware of the importance of friendly relations with Soviet Union. In October 1977, Indian prime minister Morarji Desai visited Moscow, affirming his faith in the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty. The return of Indira Gandhi to power in January 1980 brought even greater Indian reliance on the Soviet Union. After her assassination in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi continued his mother's policy of close relations with Russia. During his tenure, many high-level visits took place. Rajiv Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1989, while Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev visited India in 1986 and 1989. India and Russia signed agreements covering such important sectors of India's economy as power, steel, mining, coal, and oil. The Integrated Long Term Programme of Cooperation in Science and Technology (ILTP) was signed in July 1987. Despite some serious irritants, like the Soviet decision to supply arms and military hardware to Pakistan and the publication of Soviet maps showing parts of northern India as part of China, the cordial and warm bilateral relationship continued.

Post-Cold War Era (1990 Onward)

During the cold war the Soviet-Indian relationship rested on twin pillars of mutual interest: containment of a common threat, China; and the reduction of Western influence in Asia. With the end of the cold war, new challenges surfaced for both India and Russia. Coping with the post-cold war international order diverted their energies from bilateral relations to more urgent domestic issues. As a result, Indo-Russian relations saw a marked downtrend in the early 1990s.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the loss of Russia's status as a superpower, and caused a major setback to its economy and ideology. The collapse of the economy and loss of strategic power meant that the Russian federation could no longer continue to favor India in international politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted the shortcomings of a socialist planned economy, inspiring India to strengthen its resolve to liberalize its own economy and enter the era of globalization.

The emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower compelled both India and Russia to rethink their strategic relations. Both the countries started reestablishing their equations with the United

States, China, and Pakistan. India now realized the potential of closer economic, technological, and strategic cooperation with Washington, while Russia's worldview became more Eurocentric. After withdrawing from Afghanistan, moreover, Russia embarked on repairing its relations with Pakistan, which was unacceptable to India.

In the new global strategic environment, Russia realized that it could no longer match American superiority in any sphere, so it made a decisive strategic shift toward China, which also perceived the United States as a potential threat. India, on the contrary, no longer viewed the United States as a threat but as a potential strategic partner. Many Russian thinkers have proposed the formation of a Russian-Chinese-Indian triangle to counter U.S. global hegemony. The idea was supported by some Indian scholars as well. Yevgeny Primakov's visit to India in 1996 as foreign minister and in 1998 as premier of Russia was viewed as significant in this regard. During his visit to New Delhi in 1998, Primakov suggested the possibility of building a "strategic triangle" between Russia, India, and China as a "viable opposition to American supremacy." But in view of growing Sino-Russian military cooperation, with reportedly more than four thousand Russian scientists and technicians currently working in Chinese defense production facilities, India can hardly trust such potential strategic "cooperation." China appears neither ready to treat India at par nor to abandon its primary strategic nexus with Pakistan.

India no longer depends solely on Russia for strategic or economic assistance. India's defense purchases from Russia are no longer made on rupee payments but in hard currency. India's excessive reliance on Russian weapon systems left India vulnerable to coercive Russian pressure. India now realizes the need to diversify its strategic and economic relations in the new global environment. With that intention, it explored new channels of military support with the United States and the European Union.

The very cornerstone of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership, the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, was, moreover, questioned by the Russians themselves as early as 1992. All these reasons depict that the imperatives which shaped the India-Russia strategic partnership in the cold war era have either withered away or stand significantly changed.

Nonetheless, there remained continuity and congruency of interest. Russia declared itself to be the "state-continuator" of the erstwhile Soviet Union and India on its part recognized Russia as the successor-state to the former Soviet Union. Indo-Soviet relations moved seamlessly into Indo-Russian relations. In this transitory phase, an Indian delegation led by Prime Minister V. P. Singh visited Moscow in 1990. The joint statement

issued by the leaders of the delegations affirmed their commitment to a more equitable world order. In March 1992 there was another setback to bilateral relations, however, with Russia's decision to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future nuclear supply agreements with India. Though the move was a result of U.S. pressure, it caused a fair amount of resentment among India's leadership. To counter the downward trend in the relationship, in May 1992 an Indo-Russian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation was established. Within the framework of the commission, twelve working groups, covering different spheres, were established. But the credit for reviving Indo-Russian relations goes to Russian president Boris Yeltsin's visit to India in January 1993. A new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was then signed; the only change to the 1971 treaty was the dropping of the security clause and a new emphasis on economic cooperation. Russia was made India's Technical and Economic Cooperation partner country. The long-standing issue of the rupee-ruble exchange rate was also resolved during that visit. President Yeltsin committed to the delivery of cryogenic engines and space technology for the smooth progress of India's space program under a \$350 million deal between the Indian Space Research Organisation and the Russian space agency, Glavkosmos.

Positive developments, including the signing of the Moscow Declaration of 30 June 1994 between the two countries (on the protection of interests of pluralistic states and in the interest of mutual security, development, and prosperity of its citizens), put the bilateral relationship back on track. In March 1995, India and Russia signed agreements aimed at suppressing illegal weapons smuggling and drug trafficking. In October 1996, India and Russia agreed to exchange information on military interests and to hold joint military exercises. Indian prime minister H. D. Deve Gowda's visit in March 1997 was another landmark in Indo-Russian relations because many agreements were signed during that visit, including accords concerning extradition, mutual cooperation in customs-related matters, sports, and culture, and the avoidance of double taxation. India's testing of nuclear weapons in 1998 led to a slight downswing in the relationship, as Anglo-American members of the non-proliferation nations wanted Russia to put pressure on India to sign the NPT. But President Vladimir Putin's state visit to India in October 2000 put Indo-Russian relations back in high gear. Seventeen bilateral agreements were signed during Putin's visit, among which the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Commission for Military Technical Cooperation was of prime importance. The ILTP, which was signed between the former Soviet Union and India in July 1987, was extended until 2010. A Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed

by President Putin and Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee. This was in tune with the new Foreign Policy Concept released by Russian Federation on 10 July 2002, which stated that one of the crucial directions in the Russian policy in Asia will be to develop friendly relations with the leading Asian states including India. Though the post-cold war era has seen many ups and downs in the relations, mutual interest and politico-strategic compulsions kept them together. A testimony to the depth and enormity of the relationship is the eighty odd bilateral documents that have been concluded between India and the Russian Federation in this period alone.

Contemporary Concerns and Future Prospects

Russia and India have real problems of a similar nature. Economic problems related to increasing poverty and growing economic disparity among various sections of their citizenry, a rise in religious extremism and aggressive nationalism, growing regional imbalance and sectarian violence, weakening rule of law and increasing law and order problems, are causing domestic unrest, while externally aided terrorism and illegal activities like smuggling, drug trafficking, and money laundering are exacerbating the difficulties. Terrorism is now plaguing India as well as Russia, in Kashmir and Chechnya, respectively. Their Strategic Partnership Declaration allows India and Russia to share information, to mount international pressure, and to make joint decisions on international terrorism. Substantial efforts have been made by both countries to suppress illegal weapons smuggling and drug trafficking. Both the countries see many of these problems as ones not only impacting respective national and regional security but international peace, security and stability and hence advocate the need to combat them at all levels.

The common concerns have provided added impetus to bilateral relations. Russia still supplies India with military hardware in sizable quantities, including SU-27 fighter aircraft, TU-22 backfire bombers, SU-27 SK fighter aircraft, MI-17 helicopters, SU-30 MI multipurpose combat aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines (Typhoon class), KILLO class submarines, S-300 antimissile systems, and T-72 and T-80 tanks. Russia, to this day, remains India's most reliable defense partner. This was proved during the Kargil crisis of 1999, when Russia stripped its own army of spares to supplement Indian demands. Bilateral defense cooperation between India and Russia goes beyond procurement or a buyer-seller relationship to cover critical aspects of joint research, development, manufacture, and service.

On the economic front, bilateral trade between the two countries has remained sluggish since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It has stagnated at about \$1.5 billion.

In order to better that, the two countries have revamped the Indo-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission for trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, a crucial agency for facilitating trade and commerce. There is also a shift in the areas of economic interaction from coal, steel, pharmaceuticals, and consumer edibles to cutting-edge areas like space, information technology, robotics, and oil exploration. Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization will provide another common platform for the two countries to work on.

There are some real benefits in bettering India's relationship with Russia. Russia holds the world's biggest reservoir of natural gas, a potentially useful source of energy to the rapidly growing India. Aligning with Russia will also ensure Soviet veto power in India's favor on the Kashmir issue at the United Nations. India will receive Russia's unqualified support for its membership in the expanded United Nations Security Council, which it has been hoping to secure. Finally and most importantly, India will have a strong, vocal partner in striving for a multipolar international system and the strengthening of United Nations.

India's Ministry of External Affairs web site aptly terms the Indo-Russian relationship as "civilisational and time-tested," transcending party lines and political vicissitudes. The relationship is based on mutual respect, trust, understanding, and complementarity of interests. Consistent military cooperation and support for each other's strategic concerns and aspirations, moreover, form the basis of an enduring relationship.

Sultanat Aisha Khan

See also **China, Relations with; Kashmir; National Security Decision-Making; Pakistan and India; Strategic Thought; United States, Relations with; Wars**

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HANDICRAFT *India*



TOP: Covered with traditional veil and bejeweled in gold, a Bishnoi woman smiles for the camera outside the city of Jodhpur, in Rajasthan. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA



TOP: In Mysore, Karnataka, a worker applies final touches of white paint to 5-foot elephant intricately carved from rosewood. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM LEFT: This vendor's eclectic selection of straw hats mirrors the rich ethnic heritage of the city of Kochi (or Cochin) in Kerala. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Artisans sculpt miniature likenesses of legendary places from pith, a porous reed endemic to Eastern India with a pure white inner core. Their handiwork is astonishingly detailed and accurate. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA





TOP LEFT: In Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, seamstress painstakingly stitches a sari with gold thread, embellishing its floral motifs. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

TOP RIGHT Detail of royal heirloom from Jaipur, emblematic of traditional *zari*, dense gold embroidery. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: In Sualkuchi, Assam, spindles of vibrantly hued silk yarn. In this town, just about every household participates in the business of silk—from raising silk worms to weaving the final product. IPSHITA BARUA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: With careful precision, an artisan creates a *mridangam*, a double-sided drum, from a single piece of wood and goatskin. V. MUTHURAMAN/ FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: In India's rural communities, the exteriors of homes are frequently painted in swirling floral patterns to welcome the gods and ward off evil spirits. Practiced by women, this art involves mixing mud and cow dung, which is then plastered to the walls and decorated with rice paste and brightly colored powders. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA





TOP: In the hands of this craftsman in Kerala, a dancing Shiva (“Nataraj”) emerges from wood. AMIT PAS-RICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: In rural Rajasthan, young weaver deftly works her loom. AMITA PRASHAR GUPTA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Artisan crafts a long-necked *veena*, the traditional string instrument of South India that resembles a sitar. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: In Vishakapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, hand-woven grass mats and baskets for sale. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: Fair-goer sports embroidered vest at Tarnetar in Gujarat. For centuries, Gujarat has been identified with such intricate handiwork, a craft still practiced by the semi-nomadic communities of Kutch. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: In preparation for the ten-day Durga Puja festival in Bengal, a member of the Kumartuli (the artisan caste) creates life-size idol. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Before his painted and richly adorned chariot, revelers pay homage to Jagannath (Lord of the Universe). Photo taken at the Rath Yatra festival, held every June/July in Puri, Orissa. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Two members of the Salawas, a Rajasthan community, weave a dhurrie rug. Dhurries are typically made of cotton or camel's hair and distinguished by bold geometric patterns. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Colorful cast of characters in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Puppet theater is a long-standing tradition and remains an important form of entertainment. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA





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Stanley Wolpert, Editor in Chief

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SABARMATI. See Ahmedabad; Gujarat; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.

SABHAS AND SAMITIS The term *sabha* occurred eight times in the Rig Veda and seventeen times in the Atharva Veda. In one instance, *sabha* referred to a meeting hall. In other instances, *sabha* referred to a “body of men shining together.” The term *sabha* was often linked with the term *samiti* (meeting together), both words referring to a gathering, assembly, or council of people. The Atharva Veda identified *sabha* and *samiti* as two daughters of the high Vedic god Prajāpati. Whenever the terms appeared together, *sabha* preceded *samiti*, leading some scholars to infer that *sabbhas* might have existed before *samitis*. No ancient texts, however, have identified clear differences between *sabbhas* and *samitis*, their sequence in appearance, or their relationships to each other.

Sabha-sthanu (assembly-hall pillar) described a feature of the *sabha*’s physical structure. A variety of additional *sabha*-linked terms suggested actors and activities that may have taken place in the *sabha*: *sabha-vin* (keeper of the gambling/assembly hall); *sabha-saba* (eminent in the assembly); *sabha-pati* (lord of the assembly); *sabbheya* and *sabha-yogya* (worthy of the assembly); *sabha-chara*, *sabha-sad*, and *sabbyas* (member of the assembly); *sabha-vati* (woman member of the assembly); and *sabha-pala* (guardian of the assembly). According to the Rig Veda, people in the *sabha* called on the deity Indra to protect the *sabha* and its members and to grant their words effectiveness in the *sabha*.

The term *samiti* occurred nine times in the Rig Veda and thirteen times in the Atharva Veda. The Rig Veda stated that one could not rule without a *samiti*. One Vedic reference described a *rajan*’s (ruler) presence in a *samiti*.

Another reference described several rulers sitting together in a *samiti*. The Rig Veda reported people in a *samiti* discussing their cattle. One Rig Veda prayer called for agreement and unity of thought in the *samiti*. The Atharva Veda included the prayer of a Brahman priest on behalf of a *samiti*.

Despite occasional references to *sabbhas*, *samitis*, and *rajans* in the Vedas, none of the Vedas provided an unambiguous description of how *sabbhas*, *samitis*, and *rajans* related to each other. This did not prevent subsequent scholars from suggesting that *sabbhas* and *samitis* engaged in democratic (possibly even unanimous) decision making, served as councils to rulers, elected and removed rulers, collected taxes, and declared war. Nor did it prevent subsequent scholars from suggesting parallels between the Vedic *sabbhas* and *samitis*, anthropological descriptions of clan and tribal gatherings, Homeric agoras, Roman senates, Teuton councils of chiefs, and Anglo-Saxon witenagemots. In view of the scant number of references in the Vedas, all such scholars’ suggestions must be recognized as speculative.

The Rig Veda mentioned *jana* 275 times and *visv* 271 times, both terms referring to groups of interrelated families. The *vidatha* was a form of assembly referred to 122 times in the Rig Veda and 22 times in the Atharva Veda. Translated as a “family council,” the *vidatha* included women and elders as participants. The *vidatha* collectively worshiped Vedic deities such as Agni and Indra, offering sacred food and singing their praises. Occasionally the *vidatha* selected a priest to sing or lead the singing. The *vidatha* hoped that, in return for the offerings and songs, Agni or Indra would provide wealth and brave sons. Over the centuries, references to the *vidatha* gradually disappeared.

Another form of assembly referred to in the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda was a *parishad* made up of companions



Village Council Meets in a Town near Kutch, Gujarat. Though the *panchayat* is still the main arbiter of justice in rural communities, and many credit it with the relatively low crime rate and harmonious structure of such societies, in certain modern quarters there has been some talk of eliminating the centuries' old tradition (as evidenced by related cases now in India's courts). AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

who collectively owned cattle, worshiped Agni, and shared a common leader. The term *parishadi* implied the inclusion of women as members of the *parishad*. At the end of the fourth century B.C., the Sanskrit grammarian Pānini described a ruler as a *parishad-bala* (one who ruled with a *parishad*, or group of royal associates). Pānini also identified three types of *parishads*: academic, social, and administrative. Later, in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, *parishad* referred to a council of royal administrators or advisers—a form of assembly quite different from the *parishad* of the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda.

One of the last times the term *samiti* occurred in Vedic literature was in the Chandogya Upanishad, when the student Shvetaketu visited the Panchala *samiti* and was asked by its *rajanya* (leader) to answer five philosophical questions. Upon Shvetaketu's failure to answer any of the five questions, the *samiti's* *rajanya* asked how anyone unable to answer those questions could be considered to be educated.

Sabbas and Samitis in Post-Vedic Literature

While the term *samiti* gradually fell out of use, the term *sabha* continued to appear in the classical literature. As time passed, *sabha* acquired different shades of meaning. The Mahābhārata described a *sabha* in which the legitimacy of Yudhishtira (now a slave) gambling away his and his brothers' noble wife Draupadi was debated before King Dhritarashtra. The Mahābhārata also described three occasions when women entered a *sabha*. The Apastamba Sutra described the construction of a *sabha* to be used as a guest house and recreation hall for the three higher *varṇas*, the ancient Hindu social ranks: the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas.

At the end of the fourth century B.C., the grammarian Pānini referred to a religious *sangha* (assembly) that did not separate the high and the low ranks. With the subsequent spread of Buddhism, *sangha* came to refer to orders of Buddhist monks. The Buddhist Mahāparinirbbana Sutta prescribed procedural rules for the *sangha*. These included meeting publicly and regularly, observing established precedents, respecting the advice of elders, making decisions in concord, and supporting the Buddhist sages.

Sabbas and Samitis in Post-Independence India

Prior to India's independence in 1947, groups engaged in political, legislative, and social action gave themselves such English titles as committees, councils, associations, leagues, congresses, assemblies, and so on. Independent India's constitution called for two houses of Parliament: an Upper House (the Council of States) and a Lower House (the House of the People). The Hindi terms Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha were applied to these two Houses, reviving the old Sanskrit word *sabha* and infusing it with new meaning. The government of India established a rural self-government structure called *panchayati raj* (the rule of *panchayats*). *Panchayat* referred to a council of five elders who were thought to have shaped the affairs of their villages in former times. The government used the Sanskrit terms *samiti* and *parishad* (with no English equivalents) to label components of the *panchayati raj*. These included *gram panchayats* (village councils), *panchayat samitis* (executive bodies of all *panchayats* in the same administrative block), and *zila parishads* (executive bodies of all *panchayats* in the same district or *zila*).

Joseph W. Elder

See also Caste System

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SALT MARCH. See **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

SAMSĀRĀ The life-cycle ceremonies of Hinduism, known as *samskāras*, carry a sense of gradual perfection, purification, accomplishment, and consecration. Administered ritually to an individual even before birth, they continue to the “last sacrifice,” the funeral. *Samskāras* form a classical ritual system with strong connections to the ideology of Vedic sacrifice, both domestic (*grihya*) and solemn (*sbrauta*), and the nurturing presence of *agni*, the sacrificial fire. As many as forty *samskāras* are listed in ritual literature, but standard rites of passage would limit them to a traditional set of twelve to sixteen concerning birth and childhood, initiation, marriage, and death. More than half apply to the first three years of life. Late Vedic Grihya Sūtras and post-Vedic Dharma Shāstras begin lists with marriage, a ritual that in the ancient period included consummation and the presumed impregnation of the bride as *caturthī karma* on the fourth night. In later times this did not prevail. The following overview presents only the bare essentials of a single life cycle.

Garbhābhāna is the rite of conception, “impregnation,” or placement of a *garbha* (embryo). Originally this was marital consummation. Reduction of the age of brides to prepubescence, apparently to safeguard the purity of the lineage, meant postponing this rite until well after marriage.

Puṁsavana, “generation of a male,” is performed in the third or fourth month to secure a son, particularly during a first pregnancy. The husband feeds his wife two beans and a grain of barley in curds. According to another tradition, he presses into her right nostril a mixture of mashed berries and shoots from the *nyagrodha*, the banyan tree.

Sīmantomayana is “upward parting of the hair,” a rite in which the husband parts his wife’s hair from front to back three times with a porcupine quill and *darbha* or *kusha* grass stalks. She looks at a pot of cooked rice and envisions the child to be born. Unripe fruits are involved in this ceremony, which is performed in the fourth or a later month of pregnancy, with the welfare of the mother particularly in mind.

Jātakarma is the “ritual of birth” itself, formerly performed immediately upon delivery, before the umbilical

cord was cut. The first part is *medhājanana*, “production of wisdom,” in which the father touches the baby’s lips with a gold spoon or ring on which curds, honey, and ghee (clarified butter) have been placed. *Vāc* (speech) is whispered into the infant’s right ear three times. The second half of the rite, after cutting the umbilical cord, is *āyushya*, with mantras invoking *āyus* (long life) for the infant, who acquires a secret name, known only to the parents, before being given to the mother’s breast.

In *nāmakaraṇa*, a name-giving ceremony on the tenth or twelfth day after birth, the child receives the common name by which he or she will be known. This may be determined by the *nakshatra* (constellation) under which birth occurred. Names of gods and goddesses are often employed, including sectarian choices (Vaishnava, Shaiva, Shakta, etc.) special to the family. Ten days of offerings of rice and sesame, with a ritual fire or incense in the birth room, observe a period of ritual impurity due to childbirth. On the tenth or twelfth day, the normal *boma* (offering) fire is resumed, the mother’s confinement ends, and ritual purity of house and family is restored.

Nishkramaṇa, “going out,” usually in the fourth month, is the occasion for the baby to go out of the birth room for *darshana*, the “sight” of Āditya, the sun, and Candra, the moon. *Karṇavedha*, “ear-piercing,” most often performed in the seventh month, calls for rings of gold wire, the right ear first for boys, the left ear first for girls. *Annaprāshana* is the first “eating of (solid) food,” observed usually in the sixth month. The baby’s tongue is touched with cooked rice (*anna*) that will be the lifelong staple of nourishment. Mantras accompany this sacred moment, observed with affection by the entire family. A famous chant about the *ātman* in Taittirīya Upanishad 3.10 concludes repetitively *aham annam*, “I am food.”

Cūḍakarma (or *cūḍakaraṇa*, *caula*), the first “tonsure,” usually occurs in the third year. The *cūḍa* is a tuft of hair that remains on the child’s head after a trimming by the father, along with twenty-one stalks of *kusha* grass. The family barber then shaves the head, leaving only the *cūḍa*. In modern observance, this is often done in the next *samskāra*, the *upanayana*. *Keshanta* is another “tonsure” after the *upanayana*, for boys of sixteen or older, similar to *cūḍakaraṇa* except that it includes shaving facial hair as well as the head.

Upanayana, the rite of “leading near,” is the first approach to a guru for religious instruction. Formerly this was the indispensable second birth for all *dvijas*, “twice-born” classes, and took place ideally at the ages of eight, eleven, and twelve for Brahman, Kshatriya, and Vaishya boys, respectively. Now it is observed by few castes other than strict Brahmans. Elements that included the reception of a *daṇḍa* staff, a *mekhalā* grass

belt, and a deerskin as upper garment; a symbolic begging tour for food; offering kindling sticks into the ritual fire; investiture with the *yajñopavīta*, “sacred thread” over the right shoulder; instruction in the sacred Gāyatrī mantra (Rig Veda 3.62.10); and reinforcement of the childhood *medhājānana* were part of what had grown by late Vedic times into an elaborate ceremony of initiation into Vedic learning, the life stage of the *brahmacārin* who lived with or near a guru.

Samāvartana (or *snāna*) is a ritual “bath” to conclude the traditional period of instruction in the Vedas, after which the young man, usually in his late teens, is *snātaka*, “one who has bathed” and made the “return” (*samāvartana*) to his parental home. Expectations are that he will soon marry and advance from the *āśrama* stage of life of *brahmacārin* to that of *grihastha*, a “householder” with a ritual fire, established together with his wife.

Vivāha, “marriage,” had many variations in the ancient and classical periods. Since the traditional period of Veda study was twelve years, a groom was ideally twenty-four, and the prepubescent bride eight. Among the many features of the *vivāha* carried into modern times are *pāṇigrahaṇa*, when the groom takes the bride’s hand; establishment of fire and an initial *homa* offering to deities by the new couple; circumambulation of the ritual fire; *saptapadī*, taking “seven steps” north of the fire; *pratisarabandha*, tying a thread around the bride’s wrist; *parasparasamīkṣhaṇa*, gazing of bride and groom at one another after removal of a separating cloth; *ashmārohaṇa*, placing of the bride’s foot three times on a grindstone; pointing out the pole star Dhruva to the bride, as well as the star Arundhatī, wife of the *rishi* Vasishtha who, like Dhruva, was a model of fidelity. Added after the *sūtra* period was the significant tying of a *mangalasūtra*, auspicious thread, around the bride’s neck, one that bears the *tāli* pendant in South India. *Antyeshti*, the “last offering,” that is, of the body in the cremation fire, is the final rite of passage to another life.

In the classical period, all *saṁskāras* required fire, *homas*, and the presence of learned Brahmans, who were fed in an important closing step. Except for marriage and the funeral, it was the father or father-to-be who performed each ritual, after undergoing several preparations, orienting himself in space and time, and declaring the intention of the rite. In modern times, many *saṁskāras* have been bypassed or abbreviated—the *upanayana*, for example, appearing only as the groom’s symbolic preliminary to marriage. Ritual manuals always allow for “local practices,” an opening for widespread variation. It is noteworthy that appearance of first menstruation (*rajodarshana*, or *samartha*, “readiness” to bear children) is not a *saṁskāra*, although local customs in

South and eastern India observe this event ritually. Until the time of Manu, compiler of the Mānava Dharma Śāstra at the beginning of the common era, some girls were designated by certain ritualists as *brahmavadinī*, expounders of sacred texts, and received all *saṁskāras*, whereas other girls received only *upanayana* and marriage. From Manu on, writers of ritual manuals often observed that marriage should be the basic *saṁskāra* for females. Nevertheless, many childhood *saṁskāras* are common for girls today in different regions of India.

David M. Knipe

See also **Agni; Hindu Ancestor Rituals; Hinduism (Dharma); Shrauta Sūtras**

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SĀNKHYA The enumeration of categories as they arise in the space of the mind is the concern of the *Sāṅkhya*. It addresses evolution at the cosmic and the psychological levels.

The legendary systemizer of the *Sāṅkhya* is the sage Kapila, who lived in the beginning of the first millennium B.C., if not earlier. According to the *Sāṅkhya*, reality is composed of a number of basic principles (*tattva*), which are taken to be twenty-five in the classical system.

The first principle is *prakṛiti*, which is taken to be the cause of evolution. From *prakṛiti* develops intelligence (*buddhi*, also called *mahat*), and thereafter, self-consciousness (*abamkāra*). From self-consciousness emerge the five

subtle elements (*tanmātra*): ether (*ākāśa*), air, light, water, and earth. From the subtle elements emerge the five material elements (*mabābhūta*). Next emerge the five organs of sense (*jnānendriya*): hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell, and five organs of action (*karmendriya*): speech, grasping, walking, evacuation, and procreation. Finally, self-consciousness produces the twenty-fourth of the basic elements: mind (*manas*), which, as a sixth sense, mediates between the ten organs and the outside world. The last, the twenty-fifth *tattva*, is self (*purusha*).

The emergence from *prakriti* of intelligence and, later, of subtle and gross elements, mind and consciousness, appears to mirror the stages through which a newly conceived individual will pass. Here intelligence, as the second *tattva*, is what endows the newly fertilized cell the ability to organize and grow; self-consciousness represents the stage that allows the organism to sense the environment, and so on.

The doctrine of the three constituent qualities, or *gunas*—transparency (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*)—plays a very important role in the system. In its undeveloped state, cosmic matter has these *gunas* in equilibrium. The *gunas* may be viewed at the physical and the psychological levels.

The *Sāṅkhya* system presupposes a universe that comes into being and then is absorbed back in the substance of reality. This is what we see in the Purāṇic cyclic universe also. Within each cycle, a gradual development of intelligent life is assumed. It is postulated that the plants arose first, followed by animals of various kinds, and finally by man.

There is no ex nihilo creation in the *Sāṅkhya* but only a progressive manifestation. The *gunas* provide the necessary ingredient for the universe (be it physical or psychological) to evolve.

Cognition cannot be taken to arise out of the sensory organs. The cognitive organs, namely, *abamkāra*, *manas* and the ten senses, which are different from one another and which are distinct specifications of the *gunas*, present the whole to the *buddhi*, illuminating it for the *purusha* like a lamp.

Purusha is neither creative nor created. *Purusha* is discriminating, subjective, specific, conscious, and nonproductive. It is the witness—free, indifferent, watchful, and inactive. The *purusha*, in this characterization, does not interfere with *prakriti* and its manifestations. It is transcendent and completely free (*kaivalya*).

The mind is taken to operate in a causal fashion, just as the physical world does. The *Sāṅkhya* is a sophisticated materialist framework for the laws of nature. There is also a recognition that new enumerative categories are

needed in the characterization of empirical world. Thus in *Sāṅkhya*, we have for the mind eight fundamental predispositions (*bhāva*); eight resultant life trajectories; a set of five breaths that support the embodied condition; and five sources of action. Likewise, the description of the physical world requires categories that go beyond the twenty-five of the basic system.

Subhash Kak

See also **Vedic Aryan India**

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SAROD A lute popular in North Indian classical music, the sarod (Persian, *sarod*, *sarūd*, “music” or “singing”) is constructed from a single piece of wood, with a skin-covered resonating cavity in the base and a hollow metal-covered neck. The fingerboard is fretless so that performers stop strings with the nails or flesh of their fingers, allowing them to slide between notes after plucking with a triangular piece of coconut shell. A characteristic feature of the body is the symmetrical indents that delineate the division between the base and the neck.

Sarods have metal wires: four principal melody strings, two or more drone strings (the highest of which are the *chikārī*), and seven or more sympathetic strings (*tarab*). Like the sitar and the *sārangī*, the sympathetic strings extend from pegs in the side of the neck up through holes in the face of the neck and pass under the melody and drone strings. Both the sarod and the *sārangī* have membranes covering the base of the instrument, and both have holes in their broad, flat bridges through which their sympathetic strings pass. The result of this highly responsive surface is that when a performer plays the melody string, other strings also vibrate, especially if they are tuned to the note played by the melody string.

The sarod is probably a nineteenth-century modification of the central Asian *rabāb*, although similar instrumental traditions in Indian history (e.g., the *dhruvad* *rabāb* and the *sursingār*) undoubtedly contributed to the sarod’s development. The sarod is larger than the Afghani *rabāb*, and the metal fingerboard seems to have been an innovation of Nahamzamatullah Khan (1816–1911) while he was a musician at the Calcutta household of the exiled ruler of Lucknow, Wajid Ali Shah (fl. 1860s). A larger version of the instrument (without the skin-covered base), the *sursingār*, had limited popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.



Sarod Maker at His Workshop. An instrument of Indian classical music, the sonorous sarod possibly originates from the Persian *senya rabab*, played in India until the mid-nineteenth century. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

Two families have been responsible for the sarod's development and international popularity in the twentieth century. Allaudin Khan and his son, Ali Akbar Khan, have been adventurous innovators and tireless educators, while Amjad Ali Khan represents the Ghulam Ali Khan style of instrument and playing.

Gordon Thompson

See also Music

SASSOON, DAVID (1792–1864), Jewish merchant and philanthropist of British India. Born into a prominent Jewish family in Baghdad, David S. Sassoon became one of the foremost merchants of British India and a great philanthropist who contributed substantially to the cities of Bombay (Mumbai) and Pune. His descendants include businessmen, British aristocrats, Hebrew scholars, rabbis, and authors. David was the son of Sheikh Sason (later, Sassoon) ben Salah who, as part of a respected and powerful family that had long held the

office of banker (*sarraf bashi*) to the local ruler, was the *nasi* (head) of the Baghdadi Jewish community. When the governor of Baghdad was overthrown, the Sassoon family sought another place to live. In 1828 David left for Basra and continued on to Bushire in Persia, where his aged father joined him, bringing David's family with him. After the sheik's death in 1830, David moved his family to India, which was ripe with opportunity for entrepreneurs. Further, Bombay offered a tolerant environment and a safe future for the Sassoon children.

The Sassoons arrived in Bombay in 1832, just as the British East India Company's monopoly on trade was being relaxed. They joined other Iraqi Jewish families—the Ezekiels, the Ezras, and the Gubbays—in the cotton and opium industries that were engaged in burgeoning trade with points east, particularly China. The textile mills built and operated by David Sassoon, Sons and Company were so successful that the company opened a center in Calcutta (Kolkata). Flourishing trade prompted



Sassoon Library in Bombay. Its creation was conceived by a group of mechanics working at the Royal Mint and Government Dockyard in 1847; when the edifice's construction came to a virtual halt during an economic recession, David Sassoon stepped in to donate the funds needed for completion. The innovatively designed library went on to become a landmark, and is still one of the most beautiful spaces in the city. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM / FOTOMEDIA.

the creation of Sassoon branches in Rangoon and Shanghai, eventually expanding to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan. The U.S. Civil War generated an increased demand for Indian textiles by the British, which led to the creation of the first Sassoon establishment in England.

Sassoon enterprises consistently employed family and community members in their expanding mercantile empire. Wherever Sassoon businesses flourished, the surrounding communities benefited. By the 1850s, David Sassoon had gained vast real estate holdings in Bombay and Pune. In 1861 he built the Magen David (Shield of David) Synagogue as a gift to the community in the then fashionable area of Byculla, Bombay. The complex included a *mikvah* (ritual bath), a religious school, and a rest house for visitors. He also financed the David Sassoon

Benevolent Institution to provide assistance to newly arrived Jews from Arab lands who had come to work in Sassoon businesses. The building, near Bombay University, now houses the Sassoon Library. Beyond tending to the needs of his community, David Sassoon was also a great benefactor of the city of Bombay, for which, among other gifts, he constructed the Sassoon Reformatory and Industrial Institution for Juvenile Offenders and the Sassoon Mechanics Institute. In Pune, his summer home, he financed the David S. Sassoon Hospital, Infirmary, and nearby Leper Home. It was for the Jews of Pune that David Sassoon built the Ohel David (Tent of David) Synagogue in 1863. That structure became a Pune landmark with its tall steeple that long dominated the cityscape; it came to be known locally as the Lal Deul (Red Temple).

From his two marriages (first to Hannah Joseph, who died in 1826, and later to Flora Hyeem, 1812–1886), David Sassoon had eight sons and six daughters. In their mercantile success and wealth as well as their charitable activities, India's Sassoons were often compared to the European Rothschild family. David's grandson, Sir Edward Albert, married a daughter of the house of Rothschild. Their son, Sir Philip Albert (1888–1939), a scion of the house of Sassoon, inherited the prestige of his mother's family along with his father and grandfather's title.

Brenda Ness

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SATI. *See* **Devi; Human Rights; Shiva and Shaivism.**

SATYA. *See* **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Vedic Aryan India.**

SATYAGRAHA Mahatma Gandhi developed his revolutionary method of nonviolent noncooperation during his years in South Africa, naming it *satyagraha* (hold fast to the truth). That “truth” (*sat*), ancient Rig Vedic Sanskrit for “the real,” was a force in the realm of the “Shining Ones” (*Devas*), Rig Vedic gods whose magic powers could move the world. Gandhi equated *sat* to God and also to nonviolence, or love, as he defined *ahimsa*. Thus reaching back more than three thousand years to the roots of Indian civilization and his own Hindu faith,



Gandhi's Salt March. The Raj long enforced a stiff tax on the sale of salt throughout India. In the spring of 1930, Gandhi led a band of faithful disciples, including Sarojini Naidu to the right, on a 240-mile march to the shore at Dandi. At Gandhi's call, millions of Indians rushed down to the beach to freely take its sea salt: Their action effectively ended the British monopoly. BETTMANN / CORBIS.

Mahatma ("Great Soul") Gandhi offered millions of his unarmed followers the symbols of divine strength and his own passionate yogic powers, launching a mass national revolution against the mightiest "satanic empire" of the modern world, the British Raj.

Though rooted in the past, and drawing upon Hindu religious mantras, Gandhi developed *satyagraha* as a practical technique or method of "action" against social evil, believing it should be universally effective in its power to combat cruel and violent forces of every kind. *Tapasya* (self-suffering) armed Gandhi with yogic strength to endure the most intense physical pain, including food and sleep deprivation, without flinching or fear. His personal struggle throughout life was to achieve perfect *ahimsa* in thought and deed, to "see God" through the truth, or *sat*, of all he did, freeing his "soul" (*ātman*) of all fruits of selfish action (karma) that led to rebirth, thus achieving his Hindu ideal goal of "liberation" (*moksha*). Every *satyagraha* that Gandhi launched began with prayers of self-purification. He often fasted as well, and

he always reminded his followers that in cleansing their own hearts, bodies, and souls, they must pray for those against whom *satyagraha* was launched. He never hated any Boer or Englishman, nor thought of anyone as his enemy, feeling only sorrow and pity for those who lived in deluded realms of violence and falsehood. Before launching his most famous Salt March *satyagraha* in 1930, Gandhi wrote to Viceroy Lord Irwin, notifying him of his intention to break the "unjust" British monopoly on the sale of exorbitantly taxed salt by picking up free salt from the seashore. Gandhi saluted the viceroy, who would soon arrest him, as "Dear Friend." Nearer the end of his life, from his prison cell, he addressed Winston Churchill the same way.

Gandhi always gave clear notice of his specific demands or reasons for launching *satyagraha*. He offered those against whom his action would be launched ample opportunity to remove or rectify the offensive that triggered his action. The "cause" might be a "Black Act" of inherently harsh, or evil legislation, such as the poll tax demanded of every Indian in South Africa, or the cruel extension of martial "law" in India after the end of World War I, or inadequate wages for cotton mill workers in Ahmedabad, or for indigo farmers in Bihar, or exorbitant land revenue demands made in a year of failed rains and famine in Gujarat's Kheda District. There were times when Gandhi led mass national *satyagraha* movements, as he did in 1920 against the Rowlatt Acts, and in 1930 against the salt tax. At other times, *satyagraha* movements were "individual," as in 1940, when Gandhi sent his devoted disciple, Vinoba Bhave, out to be arrested upon his announced intention to break a British "gag order" against "any antiwar speech." Or Gandhi could turn the fiery powers of *satyagraha* against his own body, launching a fast "unto death" or fasting for a "limited period" that he announced before he stopped eating. His last "fast unto death," shortly before he was assassinated at the end of January 1948, was aimed at his two most powerful disciples, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who were reluctant to release British Raj funds owed to Pakistan in keeping with their promises prior to the 1947 partition. Gandhi also used that most passionate weapon of fasting in the personal *satyagraha* he launched against J. Ramsay MacDonald's "Communal Award" at the end of his London Round Table Conferences, in which MacDonald promised to reserve a special number of separate seats for India's "untouchables" on every expanded Council of British India under the new 1935 Constitution. Gandhi viewed that proposal as a lethal attack upon Hinduism and as Britain's meanest attempt to divide upper caste from lower caste Hindus in order more easily to rule over both. So he vowed to starve himself to death rather than quietly accept so nefarious an act. His

fast melted the hearts of all who opposed him, or fought one another. Gandhi viewed that as proof positive of the blessed powers of *ahimsa*, its irresistible force. But such thaws rarely lasted much longer than it took Gandhi to leave his fasting bed and resume his regular routine.

Martin Luther King Jr. greatly admired Gandhi's *satyagraha* method, writing that "the Christian doctrine of love, operating through the Gandhian method of non-violence, is one of the most potent weapons available to an oppressed people in their struggle for freedom." Despite Gandhi's singular successes in waging many passionate *satyagrahas* against tyranny and racism, he himself was the first to admit frankly that his lifelong "experiments with truth" had ultimately failed. It was less his "revolution," Gandhi well knew, that convinced the British to "quit India" half a decade after he had coined that mantra for his last mass *satyagraha* in August 1942, than their own depressed economy and post-World War II fatigue. No matter how hard he tried, moreover, he could not stop the slaughter of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees that left a million innocents dead following partition in mid-August 1947. Nor could he persuade his own former disciples, who ruled independent India, to stop fighting over Kashmir. "Today mine is a cry in the wilderness," Mahatma Gandhi cried on the eve of his assassination. "I yearn for heart friendship between Hindus, Sikh and Muslims. . . . Today it is nonexistent." For many years he had labored to teach his followers pure "*ahimsa* of the strong," rejecting arms and war entirely, but as soon as India used its armed power against Pakistan in the war over Kashmir, he saw he was wrong. Sadly, Gandhi wrote that "Today we have a larger army. . . . It is a tragedy and a shame. For so long we fought through the *charkha* (spinning wheel) and the moment we have power in our hands we forget it. Today we look up to the army" (Wolpert).

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Pakistan and India**

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SAVING AND INVESTMENT TRENDS SINCE 1950

There has been a consistent increase in the saving rate (gross domestic saving as a ratio of gross domestic product) in India through the post-independence period, from about 10 percent in the early 1950s to 17 percent in the early 1970s, and then to over 25 percent by the dawn of the new millennium (see Table 1). Private saving has accounted for the lion's share of total domestic saving throughout, with public saving declining from the early 1980s. Household saving has remained by far the most important component within private saving, despite the growth of corporate saving. The share of household saving in total private saving declined marginally from over 88 percent in the early 1950s to 84 percent in the late 1990s, reflecting increased corporate saving, from 1 percent to 3.6 percent of India's gross domestic product (GDP) over this period.

India's public saving rate steadily increased from 1.7 percent in the early 1950s to over 4 percent in the late 1970s, then declined persistently to less than 1.5 percent by the late 1990s. Public saving accounted for a mere 7 percent of total saving by the late 1990s, from over 20 percent in the late 1970s, a decline that can be attributed to the increasing fiscal deficits over this period.

An International Comparison

In the early 1960s independent India's saving rate (around 16 percent) was much higher than that of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, but from the early 1970s India's saving performance fell behind that of all these high-performing East Asian economies; by the mid-1990s, India's saving rate of 22 percent amounted only to a little over half their average rate. However, India's saving rate remained impressive by comparison to all other South Asian countries.

Differences in saving performance between India and the East Asian high-performing countries is a reflection of differences in overall growth performance. India's success in providing an economic setting conducive to domestic saving and financial deepening is in some measure thanks to the nominal interest rate India has maintained, an administered price, changed only infrequently based on budgetary considerations. Unlike many other developing countries, India has not seen adverse movements in real deposit rates, thanks to the long-standing official commitment to an anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy. Thus, the incentive for saving has remained positive. Perhaps more important, the rapid spread of banking facilities, following the nationalization of commercial banks in 1969, played a pivotal role in increasing private financial saving. Bank density (population per bank branch) declined persistently from over 90,000 in the mid-1950s to around 14,000 in the mid-1990s,

TABLE 1

| Gross domestic savings in India and its components as a percent of GDP (in current market prices) | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|-------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Period (1) | Household saving | | | Private corporate saving | Total private saving | Public saving | Gross domestic saving |
| | Financial | Physical | Total | | | | |
| 1950–1955 | 1.6 | 5.1 | 6.7 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 1.7 | 9.4 |
| 1956–1960 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 7.8 | 1.2 | 9.0 | 2.0 | 11.0 |
| 1961–1965 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 7.7 | 1.6 | 9.3 | 3.2 | 12.5 |
| 1966–1970 | 2.4 | 7.2 | 9.6 | 1.3 | 10.9 | 2.5 | 13.4 |
| 1971–1975 | 4.1 | 7.0 | 11.1 | 1.6 | 12.7 | 3.2 | 15.9 |
| 1976–1980 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 14.0 | 1.6 | 15.6 | 4.3 | 19.9 |
| 1981–1985 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 13.3 | 1.6 | 14.9 | 3.6 | 18.5 |
| 1986–1990 | 7.6 | 9.4 | 17.0 | 2.1 | 19.1 | 2.0 | 21.1 |
| 1991–1995 | 10.0 | 8.1 | 18.1 | 3.5 | 21.6 | 1.6 | 23.2 |
| 1996–2000 | 10.5 | 8.4 | 18.9 | 4.0 | 22.9 | –0.1 | 22.8 |

(1) Annual averages of figures based on the Indian fiscal year, from 1 April in the given year to 31 March of the next year.

SOURCE: Compiled from Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, *National Accounts Statistics of India, 1950–51 to 2000–01*.

improving the access of India's average household to banking facilities, reducing the cost of banking transactions.

Investment

Domestic investment in India has been predominantly financed through domestic saving. Foreign capital inflows accounted for less than 1 percent of GDP (compare the last columns in Tables 1 and 2). India has been a significant recipient of foreign aid, but total aid flows have remained negligible relative to the size of the economy. The role of foreign direct investment and other forms of private capital, portfolio investment, and bank-related flows has been even less important, reflecting the Indian government's unwillingness to invite foreign investment uncritically as well as the highly restrictive capital account regime. The saving–investment nexus has not undergone noticeable change, even after the reforms of 1991. The time pattern of the domestic investment rate has virtually mirrored that of the saving rate during the entire period (see Table 2).

The relative contributions of the public and private sectors to gross domestic capital formation have changed considerably from the early 1950s to the early 1980s. Public investment, which increased from about 30 percent to 50 percent, accounted for much of the total increase in investment. However, the rise in the investment rate after the mid-1980s can be attributed primarily to the increase in private investment. Private investment since the 1990s has mostly come from private corporate investment. The share of corporate investment in total private investment increased to over 45 percent in the 1990s. Relative to GDP, private corporate investment increased from 4.3 percent in the second half of 1980s to

7.1 percent by the mid-1990s. (Household investment, on the other hand, fell from 9.3 percent of GDP to 8.5 percent.) Market-oriented reforms since 1991 have begun to play an important role in promoting corporate investment, reflecting the declining cost of capital brought about by import liberalization and favorable changes in investor perception.

Investment–Growth Nexus

As already noted, throughout the postwar period, India has managed to maintain domestic saving and investment rates well above that of many other developing countries—not only those in a low-income category but also most of the middle-income countries in Latin America. However, in terms of growth performance, until the 1990s India remained a typical low-income country, with an average growth rate of around 3 percent. This incompatibility between saving/investment behavior and growth performance can be explained in terms of the nature of overall development policy stance. In the first three decades of the post-independence period and well into the 1980s, a highly interventionist (*dirigiste*) trade and industry policy regime constrained the potential growth effect of domestic investment. Thus, investment levels maintained through macroeconomic stability and financial deepening simply enabled India merely to keep its head above water.

Liberalization reforms since 1991 have set the stage for transforming the investment–growth nexus by lifting import restrictions and dismantling India's industrial “license raj,” thus lowering the relative price of capital goods, leading to more investment and the replacement of outdated machinery. Reforms have also contributed to

TABLE 2

| Period (1) | Private investment | | | Public investment | Gross investment |
|------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Household | Private corporate | Total | | |
| 1950–1955 | 5.1 | 1.5 | 6.6 | 3.4 | 10.0 |
| 1956–1960 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 7.8 | 6.0 | 13.8 |
| 1961–1965 | 4.7 | 3.3 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 15.6 |
| 1966–1970 | 7.2 | 2.0 | 9.2 | 6.3 | 15.5 |
| 1971–1975 | 7.0 | 2.7 | 9.7 | 7.7 | 17.4 |
| 1976–1980 | 8.4 | 2.2 | 10.6 | 9.1 | 19.7 |
| 1981–1985 | 6.8 | 4.7 | 11.5 | 10.3 | 21.8 |
| 1986–1990 | 9.4 | 4.1 | 13.5 | 9.8 | 23.3 |
| 1991–1995 | 8.2 | 6.8 | 15.0 | 8.4 | 23.4 |
| 1996–2000 | 8.4 | 7.1 | 15.5 | 6.9 | 22.4 |

(1) Annual averages of figures based on the Indian fiscal year, from 1 April in the given year to 31 March of the next year.

SOURCE: Compiled from Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, *National Accounts Statistics of India, 1950–51 to 2000–01*.

improved efficiency of investment, shifting business investment to machinery, which has a larger growth effect than structures and inventory investment.

Data Sources

The Indian saving and investment database is relatively good by developing-country standards, and data are available on a comparable basis from 1951. India's Central Statistical Organisation is responsible for generating and disseminating data through its annual publication, *National Account Statistics*. The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation of Mumbai has brought together all historical series in its electronic database, *National Accounts Statistics of India, 1950–51 to 2000–01* (<<http://www.epwrf.res.in>>).

*Prema-chandra Athukorala
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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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SAYYID AHMED KHAN AND THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT

After 1857 the Muslims in India significantly responded to the cultural thrust of the West. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) first grasped the challenge of modernization that British rule had brought to India. His intellectual legacy is abiding, though his political tactics are no longer relevant.

Born 17 October 1817 into a prominent family of the later Mughal nobility, Sayyid received a traditional Muslim education, which ended when he was eighteen years old. Subsequently, on his own initiative, he acquired a profound knowledge of Islam. The death of his father and elder brother required him to take a modest job as *sarishtadar* (recorder) in Delhi's criminal court. In 1841 Sayyid was appointed *munsif* (subjudge); the last Mughal king, Bahadur Shah II, granted him the ancestral titles of *Jawad ad-Daulah* and *Araf Jang* (Supporter of the State and Wise Strategic Thinker). From 1846 to 1854, he remained in Delhi, writing six books on traditional religious themes. In 1847 he published an archaeological survey of Delhi, *Athar Al-Sanadid*, in recognition of which the Royal Asiatic Society of Britain made him an honorary fellow in 1864. In 1855 Sayyid was transferred to Bijnore, where he witnessed the tragic upheavals of 1857.

Sayyid remained loyal to the British government, for which he was rewarded with promotion to the rank of *Principal Sadr Amin*. However, he had emerged from the ordeal of 1857 as a Muslim nationalist as well. He completed in 1859 his *Tarikh Sarkashiy-I Dhillah Bijnore* (History of insurrection in Bijnore district) and his critique of the British East India Company's misrule in India, *Asbab Baghawat Hind* (The causes for the revolt of India). To calm the outraged British government, he wrote in his *Risalah Khair Khawaban Musalmanan: An Account of the Loyal Mahomdians of India* that a large number of Muslims, throughout the "Mutiny" of 1857–1858, had remained loyal to the British government. To explore areas of harmony and to foster sympathetic understanding of Christianity among Muslims, Sayyid wrote *Tabiyin al-Kalam fi Tafsir al-Tawrat was al-Injil Ala Millat al-Islam: The Mohammedan Commentary on the Holy Bible*, publishing it in 1862. In 1864 he established the Scientific Society, translating European scientific works into Urdu and arranging public lectures on scientific subjects. At Aligarh, Sayyid launched his British Indian Association in May 1866 to lobby the British Parliament for the rights of Indians.

Sayyid took a leave of absence from his position of subjudge and sailed to London in 1869, remaining in Britain until October 1870. For his trip he had mortgaged his ancestral home in Delhi and had borrowed 10,000 rupees at a very high interest rate.

Sayyid was enchanted by the dynamism of British society and culture, though he also began to develop a greater awareness of his own cultural identity during that trip abroad. That process of self-realization, called *kbudi* (ego) by Indian Islam's poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), was evident as Sayyid wrote from England in 1869: "My faith in the fundamental principles of Islam was strengthened more by exposure to the conditions of Europe . . . than by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca." (Malik 1986, pp. 98–99).

Perceptions of 1857 and the Theory of Participatory Rule

Sayyid's view of the upheavals of 1857 was contrary to the prevalent British view of the events as a "grand mutiny." Sayyid argued that five major causes spawned the revolt: the people's misapprehensions of the intentions of the British East India Company government; the enactment of laws, regulations, and procedures that were not in harmony with Indian mores and their past political systems; the government's lack of information about the peoples' condition, folkways, and other "afflictions," which alienated their subjects from the government; the inefficient management and disaffection of the army; and the government's abandonment of practices that were essential to good government in India.

The Muslim rulers of India, reasoned Sayyid, were once, like the British, alien to India. Differing in faith and culture, the Muslims and the Hindus eventually succeeded in establishing friendship. Initially, and especially during the Turkish and Pathan Delhi Sultanate dynasties, contacts between Hindus and Muslims were minimal. A feeling of cordiality was first established in the reign of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605), and continued through the reign of Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), but unfortunately ceased during the anti-Hindu reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707). The British could have won the affection and the loyalty of the Indians by inviting the upper classes to attend their viceregal courts. Governors-General Lord Auckland (1836–1842) and Lord Ellenborough (1842–1844) observed this practice, which later fell into disuse. Personal contacts between the ruler and the ruled disappeared, Sayyid noted, and mistrust and suspicions arose.

Reflective of Sayyid's recommendation was the Indian Councils Act of 1861, which added three Indians—the maharaja of Patiala, the raja of Benares, and Sir Dinka Rao—to join the newly created eighteen-person Legislative Council. In 1878 Lord Lytton appointed Sir Sayyid as a member of the Legislative Council, and in 1880 his tenure was extended for two more years by Lord Ripon. Allen Octavian Hume's endeavors for the creation of the All-India National Congress may have been inspired, at least in some measure, by Sir Sayyid's cogent advice to the British Raj.

The All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference

Established in 1886, Sir Sayyid's Muhammadan Educational Congress sought to channel the restless flow of Muslims' energies, accentuated by the rising expectations of educated youth, into a national organization. The organization was to combine the functions of articulation and aggregation of Muslim educational, economic, and political interests, while enabling Muslims to define their role in the polity of British India. Finally, the Educational Congress aimed at the politicization of the Muslim masses. Thus, Sir Sayyid renounced his apolitical role after 1885, recognizing that the establishment of the All-India National Congress that year heralded the dawn of a competitive political environment in British India. In 1890 he persuaded the annual convention of his Educational Congress at Allahabad to adopt "Conference" as its title, instead of "Congress," generating a clearer struggle for power between the National Congress and the Educational Conference, and the ideological successor of the latter, the All-India Muslim League, which was established by the conference's leaders in 1906 in Decca. On 28 December 1887, while the Indian National Congress

met in Madras (Chennai), Sir Sayyid utilized a public session of the Educational Congress at Lucknow to oppose Muslim participation in the National Congress. On 16 March 1888, he reiterated more vigorously his opposition to the National Congress at a public meeting in Meerut.

To neutralize the growing power of the National Congress, Sir Sayyid organized a Patriotic Association in 1888. Hindus as well as Muslims of the land-owning classes of Bengal, Bihar, Madras, Bombay (Mumbai), Awadh, the North-West provinces, and Punjab supported the association. The Patriotic Association started sending memoranda to the British Parliament, articulating property owners' interests, which Sayyid believed were in harmony with those of Muslims, adding that the National Congress lacked true "national" representative capacity. However, regional Islamic associations were most conspicuous in the Patriotic Association's system of action, and gradually the role of Hindus virtually disappeared.

Theory of Muslim Nationalism

In the post-1857 period Sir Sayyid was the first to articulate the theory of Muslim Indian nationalism. Other leaders in subsequent generations essentially followed him, embellishing this concept in the light of their own time and erudition. Sir Sayyid, as a scion of Mughal nobility, discussed the concept of nationalism in the terminology of nineteenth-century Europe, and enunciated the creed of Viscount Bolingbroke's aristocratic nationalism. Sayyid believed that nationalism was an instinct, and that national solidarity distinguished man from animal. A mutual feeling of solidarity with those who share many common traits is the quintessence of Sir Sayyid's definition of nationalism. Muslims all over the world were a nationality because of their adherence to the creed of *Shibadeb-La ilaha illa-i Lab Muhammadur Rasula-Allah* ("there is no God whatsoever but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger of Allah"). Sir Sayyid maintained that "to Islam it was irrelevant whether a believer was white or black, Turkish or Tajik, an Arab or a Chinese, a Punjabi or a Hindustani." By Qur'anic dictum, "Muslims all over the world were the progenies of a spiritual father." Sayyid was aware that, despite their allegiance to a common creed, Muslims differed in their geographic locations and historical experiences. Consequently, he maintained that the Muslims' historical encounter with India had molded Indian Muslims into a distinct nationality. Muslim political power in India, from the advent of the Arabs in the eighth century to the heyday of Mughal power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maintained Muslim preeminence in politics, economics, and education.

In the nineteenth century, Sir Sayyid lamented, the Muslim nation was decaying rapidly from its lack of social

solidarity. Sayyid also opposed the Congress's demands for the introduction of elections for the Viceroy's Legislative Council, and for a competitive examination for the covenanted services to be held in India. Relatively backward in acquiring English education, Muslim youth were not yet prepared, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, to compete with Hindus. For a country like India, where cultural and religious heterogeneity was the rule, competitive examination, Sir Sayyid believed, would introduce elements of tension in the administration. On substantially similar grounds, Sayyid in December 1887 opposed the one-man, one-vote principle of election to the Viceroy's Council.

Framework of Social Reforms

Muslim leadership in India, traditional as well as modern, has always been called upon to define Islamic culture and the limits of its interaction with Hindu culture. Hindu culture has always been assimilative, but Islam in the Indian cultural environment faced the problem of preserving its distinct identity, which greater cultural relations with Hindu society would erode. Striking a balance between the two processes (i.e., cultural identity vs. cultural synthesis) has not been easy; and despite the creation of Pakistan in 1947 the problem for Indic Muslims has remained unsolved.

For Sayyid, Western science and technology strengthened Islamic convictions, since Islam was not dialectically opposed to reason. In fact, he expected modern education to be an ally of Islam, sustaining it with rationalist underpinning. However, Islam needed to be reinterpreted and updated in order to remove irrational accretions added by Muslim theologians. Consequently, for analysis, Sayyid's modernistic interpretations can be divided into three broad categories: the Qur'an and the Apostolic Traditions; the demythologizing of Islam; and finally, the emergence of a modern orientation for Islam.

Sayyid was keenly aware of the need for *ijtihad* (the right of interpreting Islam) in modern times. On this subject he went back to the original sources of Islamic law, the Qur'an and the Hadith (Prophetic Traditions). Essentially, Islamic mythology had developed through the Hadith literature and the Prophet's biographies. Twisting any Qur'anic statement regarding the Prophet, the traditionalists and biographers often allowed their imaginations to take irrational flights. To the believer, these stories became a source of delight, but in the age of reason they embarrassed the educated.

After his return from Europe, Sayyid graduated to the Newtonian view of nature. Consequently, he adopted a rational approach toward fundamental Islamic convictions, including the role of the Prophet, revelation, and

the “proofs” of prophecy, the miracles. This intellectual transformation earned him the sobriquet of Nechari, the “naturist.” In his scientific approach, Sayyid saw an alliance between science and religion. Like Victorian theologians, he argued that whatever science one chose, it disclosed the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. Moreover, science and religion had two different sets of concerns, but they were not dialectically opposed; while religion dealt with the ultimate cause, science carried out observations and experiments to search for networks of connections.

Sayyid dismissed the traditionally accepted miracles of the prophet Muhammad as fabrications of zealous Muslims, who sought to match Muhammad’s “miracles” with those of Moses and Christ. He did accept the Darwinian theory of evolution as a scientific and rational explanation of the descent of man, but refused to accept the alleged superiority of scientific knowledge over the Qur’an. He asserted that scientists interrogated nature objectively in order to yield certain knowledge. This accurate scientific knowledge only served to establish the existence of God, and his rational religion, Islam. In this view, man could scarcely expect to go beyond that level of comprehension. Thus, the theory of evolution was yoked, by Sir Sayyid, to the service of Islam.

Hafeez Malik

See also All-India Muslim League; Congress Party; Iqbal, Muhammad; Islam; Islam’s Impact on India

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SCHEDULED TRIBES India’s Constitution, enacted on 26 January 1950, established compensatory benefits for members of India’s “scheduled tribes.” For centuries, tribes in India had been called “aboriginals,” “hill tribes,” “forest tribes,” “animists,” “backward Hindus,” “criminal tribes,” “primitive tribes,” “backward tribes,” and “depressed classes.” They generally spoke their own languages, observed their own political and cultural patterns,

lived in isolated areas, and were regarded as economically and socially “backward.”

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indian and European reformers called on the British government of India to do something to improve the lot of India’s most disadvantaged groups. The 1935 Government of India Act announced that certain “degraded” groups in India would have special electoral representation in India’s forthcoming elections. In anticipation, in 1936 India’s provincial governments prepared lists (“schedules”) of local groups meeting the “degraded” criteria. Castes considered to be “degraded” because they suffered ritual disabilities (such as denial of admission to Hindu temples) were called scheduled castes (SCs). Tribes considered to be “degraded” were referred to as “backward tribes.” The 1941 census recorded 24.5 million tribals (about 6.6% of India’s population). In 1950, with the enactment of India’s Constitution, these “backward tribes” were referred to as scheduled tribes (STs).

Tribes in India’s History

Various terms for human groups appeared in the Vedas and post-Vedic materials. These included *jana* (people), *gana* (originally a nomadic group), and *visb* (a tribelike group). Other terms that might have referred to tribal phenomena included *vidatha* (tribal assembly), *rajan* (tribal ruler), and *purohit* (tribal priest who accompanied a *rajan* into cattle raids and other battles, protecting his *rajan* with prayers). Reference was made to the *sattra*, a sacrifice performed by *yajamanas* (sacrificers) to increase the number of sons and amount of wealth of the entire group. Men and women assembled in *sabbhas* and *samitis* and discussed various topics, including cattle. Buddhist and Jain texts referred to tribal groups living in the Himalayan foothills, including the Shakya tribe into which Siddhartha Gautama (later the Buddha) was born as son of the *rajan*, and the Jnatrika tribe into which Mahavir, the founder of Jainism, was born, also son of the *rajan*. Later narratives referred to the Shakyas and Jnatrikas as Kshatriyas, warriors in the Hindu four-*varna* system. Applicable Sanskrit terms for tribals included *atavika* (forest dweller), *avanyaka* (native), and *atavibala* (forest troops).

The Dharma Shāstra of Manu described certain tribes as the result of the mixing of the four original *varnas* (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras) who emerged from the mouth, shoulders, thighs, and feet of the Cosmic Being when the Cosmic Being immolated itself on the funeral pyre. For example, the Pukkakas and Kshattris who lived in mountains and groves and subsisted by killing animals in holes were produced in turn by Brahman males impregnating Shudra females and Shudra males impregnating Kshatriya females. The


Ugras, who also subsisted by killing animals in holes, were ferocious in manner, and delighted in cruelty, were produced by Kshatriya males impregnating Shudra females. The *Artha Shāstra* (Treatise on material gain) attributed to Kautilya (Chanakya) described how a wild tribe could obstruct a prince's movement and how a prince should use one army of wild tribes to attack another army of wild tribes. The Mauryan emperor Ashoka (3rd century B.C.) referred to the dangers posed in his empire by the forest tribes and to his desire to reform them through compassion rather than violence.

Tribes and forest dwellers appeared in the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa epics as well as in Purāṇic legends and folktales. Visitors to India also described tribes and forest dwellers. In 1666 M. de Thevenot, a well-educated Frenchman who traveled in Gujarat, described a tribe of Kolies, with no fixed habitation, who migrated from village to village picking and cleaning cotton. In 1676 another Frenchman, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, published a journal in which he described four North Indian tribes of Manari, nomadic tent-living caravaners. Each tribe numbered about a hundred thousand and had its own priests, portable serpent icon, and forehead marks or necklaces applied by priests. Each tribe specialized in the transportation of one kind of product: wheat, rice, pulse (legumes), or salt. Quarrels that interfered with trade occurred so often that the emperor Aurangzeb summoned the chiefs of the wheat and salt caravans and paid them generously—for the benefit of the common good as well as their own interests—not to quarrel.

Tribes and the British

The British East India Company developed a policy for dealing with tribals shortly after it acquired control of the Rajmahal Hills in Assam. To reduce potential resistance, the company paid tribal leaders to provide protection to the company's mail runners and to report any violent outbreaks in their territory. In 1782 the company turned over the administration of justice in the Rajmahal Hills to the hereditary tribal leaders, eventually converting the Rajmahal Hills tract into a rent-free government estate managed by tribal leaders.

In 1871 and 1872, following the military events of 1857 and the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British crown, the British recorded their first all-India census. They noted respondents' caste identities or tribal affiliations. Starting in 1872, M. A. Sherring published his three-volume *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, listing Brahmans and Kshatriyas at the top and continuing down the ranks of the *varṇas* to the lowest castes. The first decades of the twentieth century saw major publications describing castes and tribes in different parts of India, including Herbert Risley's two-volume *The Peoples*



Jhabua Tribesman. The state of Madhya Pradesh counts the largest tribal population in India—some 20 percent of the state's population and 23 percent of the nation's total tribal population. The district of Jhabua has the highest density of tribes in that state. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

of India and other authors' volumes of the castes and tribes of Bombay, the central provinces, South India, and the dominions of the Nizām of Hyderabad. In these publications, and in the district gazetteers, the lines between "castes" and "tribes" were often unclear. "Tribes" were generally considered identifiable because they lived in isolated areas, maintained their own subsistence economies, spoke their own languages, did not use Brahman priests, observed their own religious, cultural, and political customs, and differed from the majority of the populations in physical appearance or dress. Exceptions to these identifying features, however, were frequent.

British authorities differed in their opinions regarding the policies they should implement in territories occupied primarily by tribal groups. They wanted the tribes in these territories to be peaceful, which meant restraining the "criminal tribes." They also wanted to protect tribal groups from rapacious outside traders, moneylenders,

and landlords (the British failure to provide sufficient protection led to rebellions by the Santals, Oraons, Kols, Hos, Mundas, and other tribal groups). In 1874, shortly after the British government of India completed its first census, it passed the Scheduled Districts Act, declaring that certain tracts of land in Assam, Bengal, the central provinces, and other areas were “scheduled” for possible exclusion from rules applying to the rest of British India. In fact, in those tracts, laws could be enacted to protect the tribals from invasive outsiders. The Government of India Act of 1919 empowered the governor-general to declare any tract of land in India to be a Backward Tract. Furthermore, some of the Backward Tracts were to be “Wholly Excluded Areas” (in which no laws of British India applied), and other tracts were subject to “Modified Exclusion,” with the governor-general in council or the governor in council deciding which British-India laws did or did not apply to those areas.

Prior to the 1931 census, India’s tribals were listed as “Animists” rather than “Hindus.” Because of the permeability of both categories, it was difficult for census takers to make clear distinctions. The 1941 census abandoned the “Animists” category and referred to people of “tribal origin.” This enabled the inclusion of Christians and Muslims of “tribal origin,” swelling the census numbers and making it difficult to compare the 1931 and 1941 census figures. The Government of India Act of 1935 called for the first time for representatives of “backward tribes” in provincial assemblies. During the next few years, virtually every province in British India generated its list of “backward tribes,” including the names of tribes living in the “Excluded” and “Partially Excluded” areas.

Scheduled Tribes after India’s Independence

India’s Constitution called for equality of status and opportunity for all citizens. In an effort to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the scheduled castes and tribes, the government of India initiated a policy of affirmative action called “protective discrimination” or “compensatory discrimination.” Article 15(4) declared that the state could make “special provision” for the advancement of SCs and STs. Articles 330 and 331 reserved seats in the national Parliament and the state assemblies for members of SCs and STs. The percentages of seats in the legislative bodies were to match as nearly as possible the proportion of SCs and STs living in the represented territory. Article 325 declared that all voters—not just SCs and STs—could participate in the election of candidates for the SC and ST reserved seats. Article 335 reserved jobs in the central and state governments for members of the SCs and STs.

To address the guarantees in Article 16 of equal rights for all Indian citizens, the Constitution stipulated that these reservations of legislative seats and government jobs for SCs and STs would end after ten years. Over subsequent decades, Parliament periodically amended the Constitution to extend the SC and ST reservations another ten years. State governments introduced their own “compensatory discrimination” provisions for scholarships, admissions to colleges and professional schools, low-interest loans, and other benefits. The recipients of these benefits were members of the groups named on the government lists of SCs and STs. In 1960 the government of India published an all-India list of 405 SCs and 225 STs. In 1976 the government of India published an amended state-by-state list of 841 SCs and 510 STs, showing that certain tribes were “scheduled” in some locations but not in neighboring locations, and certain tribes were called by a variety of different names. When designations were unclear, India’s Constitution assigned to Parliament and the president the final decisions regarding a group’s “scheduled” or “nonscheduled” status. According to the published lists, SCs made up about 17 percent of India’s population, STs about 7.5 percent.

The Indian Constitution’s fifth schedule, in conjunction with Article 244(1), provided for the administration and control of scheduled areas and STs in parts of India other than Assam. The Constitution’s sixth schedule, in conjunction with Article 244(2), provided for the administration of autonomous tribal areas in Assam. The president of India had the authority to declare which areas were or were not scheduled. In most cases, the authority for administering the designated areas rested with the local governor (in consultation with advisory councils) and the central government. The local governor could decide which legislative enactments in the Republic of India applied to the scheduled area under the governor’s control. In the most autonomous regions, local councils were authorized to assign and collect taxes, regulate forms of shifting cultivation, manage unreserved forests, deal with inheritance, marriage, and social customs, administer justice, and control money lending and trading with nontribals. During the decades after independence, tribe-inhabited territories north, east, and south of Assam became states within the Republic of India. These included Nagaland (1963), Manipur (1972), Meghalaya (1972), Arunachal Pradesh (1987), and Mizoram (1987).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, India’s largest tribes included the Gonds, Santals, Bhils, Oraons, Khonds, Mundas, Bhuiyas, Hos, Savaras, Kols, Korkus, Malers, and Baigas. Although more than one-third of the STs lived in scheduled areas, the majority lived in parliamentary constituencies where they formed a majority of

the population. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, two new states formed by redrawing India's state boundaries in 2000, contained concentrations of scheduled tribes. India's scheduled-caste policies have aimed to reduce the socioeconomic differences between SCs and the rest of India's population. In addition, they have sought to preserve some degree of cultural distinctiveness for the STs by granting them considerable autonomy in designated scheduled and tribal areas.

Joseph W. Elder

See also Caste System; Ethnic Conflict; Tribal Peoples of Eastern India; Tribal Politics

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SCIENCE Indian archaeology and literature provide considerable layered evidence related to the development of science. The chronological time frame for this history is provided by the archaeological record that has been traced, in an unbroken tradition, to about 8000 B.C. Prior to this date, there are records of rock paintings that are believed to be considerably older. The earliest textual source is the Rig Veda, which is a compilation of very ancient material. The astronomical references in the Vedic books recall events of the third or the fourth millennium B.C. and earlier. The recent discovery that Sarasvati, the preeminent river of the Rig Vedic times, went dry around 1900 B.C. due to tectonic upheavals suggests that portions of the Rig Veda may be dated prior to this epoch.

The Harappan period is characterized by a very precise system of weights and monumental architecture using cardinal directions. Indian writing (the so-called Indus script) goes back to the beginning of the third millennium B.C., but it has not yet been deciphered. However, statistical analysis shows that the later historical script called Brahmi evolved from this writing.

Vedic Cosmology

Briefly, the Vedic texts present a tripartite and recursive view of the world. The universe is viewed as three regions of earth, space, and sky that in the human being are mirrored in the physical body, the breath (*prāna*), and mind. The processes in the sky, on earth, and within the mind are assumed to be connected. This connection is a consequence of a binding (*bandhu*) between various inner and outer phenomena. At one level, it is expressed as an awareness that certain biological cycles, such as menstruation, have the same period as the moon. At another level, other equations are postulated, such as the correspondence between the 360 bones of the infant (which fuse into the 206 bones of the adult) and the number of days in the civil year.

The connection between the outer and the inner cosmos is seen most strikingly in the use of the number 108 in Indian religious and artistic expression. It was known that this number is the approximate distance from Earth to the sun and the moon, in sun and moon diameters, respectively. This number was probably obtained by taking a pole of a certain height to a distance 108 times its height and discovering that the angular size of the pole was the same as that of the sun or the moon. The diameter of the sun is also 108 times the diameter of Earth, but that fact is not likely to have been known to the Vedic *rishis*, or sages.

This number of dance poses (*karanas*) given in the *Nāṭya Shāstra* is 108, as is the number of beads in a rosary (*japamālā*). The “distance” between the body and the inner sun is also taken to be 108, and thus there are 108 names of the gods and goddesses. The number of *marmas* in Āyurveda is 107, because in a chain 108 units long, the number of weak points would be one less.

The universe was understood to be a living organism, subject to cycles of chaos and order or creation and destruction. The Rig Veda speaks of the universe as infinite in size. A famous mantra speaks of how taking infinity out of infinity leaves it unchanged. The world is also taken to be infinitely old. Beyond the solar system, other similar systems were postulated. An infinite size of the universe logically led to the acceptance of many worlds.

An Atomic World

The knowledge that the mind can connect to only one sense at a time may have led to the conception that it should be atomic. This idea of atomicity was extended to matter. It was postulated that these atoms form molecules of different kinds that appear as different substances.

According to the atomic doctrine of Kanāda, there are nine classes of substances: ether, space, and time, which are continuous; four elementary substances (or particles)

called earth, air, water, and fire, which are atomic; and two kinds of mind, one omnipresent and another that is individual. The conscious subject is separate from material reality but is, nevertheless, able to direct its evolution.

Astronomy

Like astronomers in other cultures, Vedic astronomers discovered that the periods of the sun and the moon do not coincide. The Yajurvedic sage Yājñavalkya knew of a ninety-five-year cycle to harmonize the motions of the sun and the moon, and he also knew that the sun's circuit was asymmetric. The second millennium B.C. text Vedāᅅga Jyotiᅅha of Lagadha went beyond the earlier calendrical astronomy to develop a theory for the mean motions of the sun and the moon. An epicycle theory was used to explain planetary motions. Given the different periods of the planets, it became necessary to assume yet longer periods to harmonize their cycles. This led to the notion of *mahāyugas* and *kalpas* with periods of billions of years.

Astronomical texts called *siddhāntas* begin appearing sometime in the first millennium B.C. According to tradition there were eighteen early *siddhāntas*, of which only a few have survived. Each *siddhānta* is an astronomical system with its own constants. The great astronomers and mathematicians include Āryabhata (b. 476), who took Earth to spin on its own axis, Brahmagupta (b. 598), Bhāskara (b. 1114), Mādhava (c. 1340–1425), and Nīlakantha (c. 1444–1545). In the Nīlakantha system, which improves upon the system of Āryabhata, the five planets move in eccentric orbits around the mean sun, which in turn goes around Earth.

Evolution of Life

The Mahābhārata and the Purāᅅas have material on creation and the rise of humankind. It is said that man arose at the end of a chain that began with plants and various kind of animals. In Vedic evolution the urge to evolve into higher forms is taken to be inherent in nature. A system of an evolution from inanimate to progressively higher life is assumed to be a consequence of the different proportions of the three basic attributes of the *gunas* (qualities): *sattva* (“truth” or “transparence”), *rajas* (activity), and *tamas* (“darkness” or “inertia”). In its undeveloped state, cosmic matter has these qualities in equilibrium. As the world evolves, one or the other of these become preponderant in different objects or beings, giving specific character to each.

Mind and Consciousness

All Indian thought is permeated with questions about the mystery of mind and consciousness. The gods were

visualized as points in the inner sky. The Vedas speak of the cognitive centers as individual, whole entities which are, nevertheless, a part of a greater unity.

In the Vedic discourse, the cognitive centers are called the *devas* (deities or gods). The Atharva Veda calls the human body the city of the *devas*. In analogy with outer space, the inner space of consciousness is viewed to have three zones: the body (earth), the exchange processes (*prāna*, atmosphere), and the inner sky (heavens).

Limitation of Language

The Vedic texts express the idea that language (as a formal system) cannot describe reality completely. Because of the limitation of language, reality can only be experienced and never described fully. The one category transcending all oppositions was termed Brahman. Understanding the nature of consciousness was of paramount importance.

Knowledge was classified in two ways: the lower or dual; and the higher or unified. The seemingly irreconcilable worlds of the material and the conscious were taken as aspects of the same transcendental reality.

Systems of Philosophy

The idea of complementarity was at the basis of the systematization of Indian philosophic traditions, and complementary approaches were paired together. We have the three groups of: logic (Nyāya) and physics (Vaiᅅsheshika), cosmology (Sāᅅkhya) and psychology (Yoga), and language (Mimāᅅsā) and reality (Vedāᅅta). Although these philosophical schools were formalized in a much later, post-Vedic era, we find the basis of these ideas in the Vedic texts.

The Sāᅅkhya and the Yoga systems take the mind as consisting of five components: *manas* (mind), *ahamkāra* (ego), *chitta* (memory), *buddhi* (intelligence), and *ātman* (self).

Physics and Chemistry

In the Indian atomic theory, the atoms combine to form different kinds of molecules that break up under the influence of heat. The molecules come to have different properties based on the influence of various potentials.

Indian chemistry developed many different alkalis, acids, and metallic salts by processes of calcination and distillation, often motivated by the need to formulate medicines. Metallurgists developed efficient techniques of extraction of metals from ore.

Geometry and Mathematics

Indian geometry began very early in the Vedic period in altar problems, as in the one where the circular altar

(earth) is to be made equal in area to a square altar (heavens). Geometric problems are often presented with their algebraic counterparts. The solution to planetary problems also led to the development of algebraic methods.

Bharata's *Nāṭya Shāstra* has results on combinatorics and discrete mathematics, and Āryabhata's *Āryabhatīya* has material on mathematics. Later source materials include the works of Brahmagupta (seventh century), Lalla (eighth century), Mahāvīra (ninth century), Shrīpati (eleventh century), Bhāskara (twelfth century), and Mādhava (fifteenth century). A noteworthy contribution was by the school of New Logic (Navya Nyāya) of Bengal and Bihar. At its zenith during the time of Raghunātha (1475–1550), this school developed a methodology for a precise semantic analysis of language.

Grammar

Pāṇini's grammar *Ashtādhyāyī* (Eight chapters) of the fifth century B.C. provides four thousand rules that describe Sanskrit completely. This grammar is acknowledged to be one of the greatest intellectual achievements of all time. The great variety of language mirrors, in many ways, the complexity of nature and, therefore, success in describing a language is as impressive as a complete theory of physics. Scholars have shown that the grammar of Pāṇini represents a universal grammatical and computing system. From this perspective, it anticipates the logical framework of modern computers.

Medicine

Āyurveda, the Indian medicine system, is a holistic approach to health that builds upon the tripartite Vedic approach to the world. Health is maintained through a balance between three basic humors (*dosha*) of wind (*vāta*), fire (*pitta*), and water (*kapha*). Each of these humors had five varieties. Although literally meaning “air,” “bile,” and “phlegm,” the *doshas* represented larger principles.

Charaka and Sushruta are two famous early physicians. According to Charaka, health and disease are not predetermined, and life may be prolonged by human effort. Sushruta defines the purpose of medicine to cure the diseases of the sick, to protect the healthy, and to prolong life.

Indian surgery was quite advanced. The cesarian section was known, as was plastic surgery, and bone setting reached a high degree of skill. Sushruta classified surgical operations into eight categories: incision, excision, scarification, puncturing, probing, extraction, evacuation and drainage, and suturing. Sushruta lists 101 blunt and 20 sharp instruments that were used in surgery. The medical system tells us much about the Indian approach to science. There was emphasis on observation and experimentation.

Scientific Imagination in Literature

A remarkable aspect of Indian literature is its scientific speculation. The epic Mahābhārata mentions embryo transplantation, multiple births from the same fetus, battle with extraterrestrials who are wearing airtight suits, and weapons that can destroy the world. The Rāmāyaṇa mentions air travel. The medieval Bhāgavata Purāṇa has episodes related to different passage of time for different observers.

Other texts speak of 8.4 million species and note that the speed of light is 4,404 *yojanas* in a *nimesha*, which when converted to modern units turns out to be close to correct.

The Modern Period

Entering its modern era with the arrival of the English, India in the last two centuries has witnessed a renaissance of its science and a proper appreciation of the past achievements. The most important Indian scientists born in the nineteenth century who achieved international acclaim are Jagadis Bose (1858–1937) in electromagnetics and plant life, Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920) in mathematics, Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman (1888–1970) in physics, Meghnad Saha (1893–1956) in astrophysics, and Satyendra Bose (1894–1974) in quantum theory. More recent contributions of Indian science are part of the story of contemporary world science.

Subhash Kak

See also **Āyurveda; Ashtādhyāyī; Astronomy; Nāṭya Shāstra; Nyāya; Pāṇini; Sāṅkhya**

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SCIENTISTS OF INDIAN ORIGIN AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS

Ever since Vedic times, science and scientific inquiry have been integral to Indian intellectual endeavors. It is widely known that Indian mathematicians invented the concept of zero and the decimal system of numbers. It is perhaps not as well



Raja Ramanna. Raja Ramanna, the brains behind India's first nuclear test in the Pokhran Desert of Rajasthan. He was also the scientist primarily responsible for designing and installing the country's first series of nuclear reactors. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

known that the Pythagorean theorem was known in India many centuries before Pythagoras was born; or that the Rig Veda, thousands of years before Isaac Newton, asserted that gravity held the universe together; or that negative numbers, fractions, geometric progressions, simultaneous equations, and quadratic equations were all known to Indian mathematicians thousands of years ago. The Vedic civilization subscribed to a spherical earth, and ancient Indians determined the age of the solar system to be 4.6 billion years. The Indian medical system of Āyurveda reached great heights in Vedic India, its methods including surgery and plastic surgery as well as preventive health maintenance. The Āyurvedic texts of Charaka and Sushruta are still in use today, as are the works of the ancient Indian mathematicians Āryabhata and Bhāskara.

The educational and economic fabric of India was systematically destroyed during modern times by repeated invasions, beginning with the incursions of Mahmud of Ghazni (11th century A.D.), followed by those of the Mughals and the British. The British set up an educational

system designed to produce Indians trained primarily for the civil and administrative services. Indian medicine suffered a great setback when the British closed Āyurvedic colleges in areas under their control in 1829. Despite such handicaps, modern India has produced a number of eminent scientists who have made major contributions to science. A significant number of these scientists owe their origins to Presidency College, Kolkata (Calcutta), which was founded by Hindu reformer Ram Mohan Roy in 1817. Among these are Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose (1858–1937), Satyendra Nath Bose (1894–1974), Sir P. C. Ray (1861–1944), Meghnad Saha (1893–1956), and P. C. Mahalanobis (1893–1972). Presidency College of Madras (Chennai) produced two Nobel laureates, Sir C. V. Raman (1888–1970) and his nephew Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar (1910–1995). Several notable Indian scientists studied at Cambridge University, England, including Homi Bhabha (1909–1966), Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920), Vikram Sarabhai (1919–1971), Hargobind Khorana (1922–), and Harish Chandra (1923–1983). Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), first prime minister of India, studied natural sciences at Cambridge and was largely responsible for the founding of modern scientific institutions, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, after Indian independence. The institutes continue to spawn large numbers of Indian scientists and engineers, who help fuel modern India's economic expansion.

Jagadis Chandra Bose was a remarkable scientist whose research spanned the fields of microwave physics and botany. He was educated at Presidency College, Calcutta, and also at the University of Cambridge. By 1894, Bose developed the use of galena crystals for receiving short-wavelength radio waves. In 1895 Bose gave a public demonstration of electromagnetic waves, using them to ring a distant bell and to cause gunpowder to explode, predating Guglielmo Marconi's long-distance wireless demonstrations by a year. Indeed, Bose and Marconi knew each other, and Marconi's radio transmitter and receiver used a Bose "iron-mercury-iron coherer." After his work on radio and microwaves, Bose moved on to plant physiology, demonstrating that plants react to electrical stimuli and may feel pain. Honored with a knighthood in 1917 and named a fellow of the Royal Society in 1920, he founded Calcutta's Bose Institute in 1917 and has been acknowledged as one of the pioneers of radio.

One of Bose's students was Satyendra Nath Bose, who became renowned in the field of quantum physics. While a reader in physics at Dacca (Dhaka) University in the 1920s, he wrote a short article on the behavior of quanta of light, which he sent to Albert Einstein; Einstein had the article translated into German and published. Thus developed Bose-Einstein statistics, which describe the

behavior of elementary particles of integer spin. Such particles are now called bosons, and Bose statistics, as they have come to be known, explain phenomena such as superconductivity.

Sir Prafulla Chandra Ray was a chemist who began the manufacture of pharmaceuticals in India. He was educated at the University of Edinburgh. On his return, he began manufacturing chemicals at his home, eventually founding the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works in 1902. That same year he published his celebrated *History of Hindu Chemistry*, which deals with the knowledge of chemistry in ancient India. He became the first Palit professor of chemistry in the newly founded College of Science of Calcutta University in 1916. He was knighted in 1919, and was the first president of the Indian Chemical Society, founded in 1924.

Meghnad Saha made his name in astrophysics. A contemporary of Satyendra Nath Bose at Calcutta's Presidency College, Saha was taught by Jagadis Chandra Bose and P. C. Ray. In 1919 he published his paper "On Selective Radiation Pressure and Its Applications," about radiation in stars, in the *American Astrophysical Journal*. Saha's "ions theory" explained for the first time the unusual photon line spectra in starlight as being the result of the presence of ions in stellar matter, formed by the removal of various numbers of electrons from radiating atoms. This theory provided a way of estimating the temperatures of stars. In 1927 Saha was made a fellow of the Royal Society. In 1933 he founded the Indian Physical Society, and in 1947 he established the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Calcutta, later renamed the Saha Institute.

Sir Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman was the first Indian scientist to be honored by a Nobel Prize. He won it in 1930, for his discovery (along with K. S. Krishnan) of the Raman effect, which showed that when visible light interacts with matter, the scattered light consists of wavelengths of the incident light as well as degraded wavelengths due to the interaction of the light with matter with molecular energy levels. The Raman effect became an important tool in the hands of chemists and material scientists and is still used to study the properties of materials. Raman was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1924 and knighted in 1929. He became director of the new Indian Institutes of Science in Bangalore in 1934, and in 1948 he established the Raman Research Institute in Bangalore. He was awarded the Bharat Ratna, the nation's highest award.

Cambridge University proved influential in turning out scientists of Indian origin. Of these, the most unlikely and astonishing was Srinivasa Ramanujan, who, though



Portrait of Jagadis Chandra Bose. In 1895 Bose publicly demonstrated electromagnetic waves, using them to ring a distant bell and cause gunpowder to explode, predating Marconi's long-distance wireless exhibits by a year. KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

unable to pass a school examination in India, had an uncanny and intuitive mathematical talent. Ramanujan sent some of his proofs to three mathematicians in England. Of these, only one, G. H. Hardy, along with his colleague J. E. Littlewood of Trinity College, Cambridge, took the trouble to read the proofs. After some time, they decided that Ramanujan was either a crackpot or a genius, finally agreeing that he was the latter and inviting him to Cambridge. Ramanujan came to Cambridge in 1913 and continued to work with Hardy and Littlewood. His mathematical technique was intuitive, not formal, since he had no formal mathematical training. Yet his work continues to be of importance. One remarkable paper that he wrote with Hardy works out the formula (proven asymptotically by Hardy and Ramanujan and later by Hans Rademacher) for the number of partitions "p(n)" that one can make of the integer number "n." He was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1918 and later that year was elected the first Indian fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Ramanujan's health suffered from his solitary existence in postwar England, and he died upon his return to India in 1920, at the age of thirty-two.



C. V. Raman. Raman, who along with K. S. Krishnan was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1930 for their discovery of the so-called Raman effect. It became an important tool in the hands of chemists and other scientists and is still used to study the properties of materials. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

The second Indian to be elected a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, was Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, known simply as Chandra. He left India to study under R. H. Fowler at Cambridge at the age of twenty. While on the long sea voyage to England, he deduced that there is a limit to the masses of white dwarf stars (approximately 1.4 times the mass of the sun), now known as the "Chandrasekhar limit." Stars more massive than this will collapse into black holes once their fuel is exhausted. This was so surprising a result in the 1930s that astronomers such as Arthur Eddington refused to believe it, publicly ridiculing Chandrasekhar's theory. As a result, Chandra left Cambridge for the University of Chicago in 1937, where he remained until his death in 1995. Chandrasekhar was a master of mathematical astrophysics, acknowledged as the greatest of his generation. He would take on problems methodically over a span of several years, interspersed with seminal papers and culminating in a text on the subject, such as his *Introduction to the Study of Stellar Structure* (1939), *Principles of Stellar Dynamics* (1942), *Radiative Transfer* (1950), *Hydrodynamics and Hydromagnetic Stability* (1961), *Ellipsoidal Figures of Equilibrium* (1968), and *Mathematical Theory of Black Holes*

(1983). He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1983 and received numerous medals and awards, including the Copley medal. After his death, the X-ray telescope launched by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration was named Chandra in his honor.

Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis completed the Tripos exam in mathematics and physics in 1913 from King's College, Cambridge, and was elected to a research fellowship. Returned to India for a short vacation, he was prevented from traveling to Britain by the outbreak of World War I and was thus unable to accept his fellowship. He became interested in statistics and subsequently engaged in a lifelong collaboration with the Cambridge statistician R. A. Fisher. His work on the "D-squared" statistics that he derived while working in Karl Pearson's laboratory in London and his work on large-scale sample surveys are among his most enduring contributions. He founded the Indian Statistical Institute in 1931, received the Weldon Medal in 1944, was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1945, and was chairman of the United Nations Commission on Statistical Sampling in 1947.

Harish Chandra was educated at the University of Allahabad and went to Cambridge to study under Paul Dirac. While there, he met Wolfgang Pauli and pointed out an error in Pauli's work. The two became friends as a result. Harish Chandra obtained his doctorate in 1947 and went to work in the United States at Columbia University and, after 1963, at Princeton. His field of work was in group theory of semisimple Lie algebras. He was made a fellow of the Royal Society and of the National Academy of Sciences, winning the Cole Medal in 1954 and the Ramanujan Medal in 1974. The Mehta Research Institute in Allahabad has recently been renamed the Harish Chandra Institute.

Homi Jehangir Bhabha was renowned as a scientist as well as the founder of scientific institutions. He also possessed a remarkable interest in the arts. In 1927 he joined Gonville and Caius College, where he studied engineering, then physics and mathematics. He joined the Cavendish Laboratory, completing his doctoral degree in theoretical physics. In a seminal paper in 1937, Bhabha, with Walter Heitler, explained the phenomenon of cosmic-ray shower formation. Bhabha also determined the cross sections for electron-positron elastic scattering; such scattered pairs are today known as Bhabhas in particle physics. He returned to India in 1939 to work at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore. With the help of the Tata family, to whom he was related, he founded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1945. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in India in 1948 and the Atomic Research Center in 1954. Elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1941, Bhabha won many prizes and honors, including the

Adams prize (1943) and the Padma Bhushan (1954). He died tragically in an air crash in 1966.

Vikram Sarabhai was born in Ahmedabad to an affluent industrial family. He was admitted into St. John's College, Cambridge in 1940, but had to return to India during World War II; he worked with C. V. Raman during this period. After the war Sarabhai earned his doctoral degree at Cambridge and later returned to India to establish the Physical Research Laboratory in Ahmedabad. With the active support of Homi Bhabha, he set up a rocket-launching station at Thumba, near Trivandrum. Their first rocket was launched in 1963. He was instrumental in founding the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, designed to bring education to the masses, and he embarked on the task of fabricating an indigenous Indian satellite, *Aryabhata I*, which was launched in 1975 with a Soviet rocket. Sarabhai received many awards, including the Padma Bhushan and the Bhatnagar Medal, and can be credited as the architect of India's space program.

Hargobind Khorana was born in Punjab and educated at Punjab University in Lahore and the University of Liverpool. He spent his postdoctoral years at Zürich and Cambridge, where his interest in proteins and nucleic acids was aroused. He spent several years in Canada and the University of Wisconsin before being appointed professor of biology and chemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He shared the 1968 Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology for helping crack the genetic code of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).

Jayant Narlikar is a distinguished theoretical astrophysicist who collaborated with Fred Hoyle at Cambridge. He was the first director of the Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics, established in Pune in 1988.

India has also produced scientific administrators who have been instrumental in the research and development institutions of independent India, including M. G. K. Menon, who was educated at the University of Bristol as a cosmic-ray physicist, succeeded Bhabha as the director of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, and served as science adviser to the prime minister in the 1980s. P. K. Iyengar and Raja Ramanna played important roles in India's first nuclear test in 1974. They were heads of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission successively.

The United States has a considerable academic population of expatriate Indians. Over the years, several of them have distinguished themselves in their fields. George Sudarshan's name will always be associated with the V-A theory of weak interactions and quantum optics. Jogesh Pati and Robindra Mohapatra of the University of

Maryland are highly respected theoretical particle physicists. Pran Nath of Northeastern University is one of the pioneers of the theory of supergravity. Kumar Patel has become widely known as the inventor of the carbon dioxide laser, and Praveen Chaudhury has recently been appointed director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Indian physicists played an important role in the discovery in 1995 of the "top quark," one of the fundamental particles that form what has come to be known as the standard model of particle interactions. The top quark was jointly discovered by two large teams of experimental physicists working in two separate and competing experiments, called CDF and D-Zero, at the Tevatron, the world's highest-energy particle accelerator, at Fermilab in the United States. Rajendran Raja (Fellow, Trinity College, Cambridge, 1973), the first Indian physicist hired at Fermilab, established collaborative efforts with Indian institutions and served as leader of the top quark search team in D-Zero for four years. The University of Chandigarh, the University of Delhi, and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research became collaborators in the search. In addition, several Indian postdoctoral fellows and students from U.S. universities were involved in the effort. In 1995 both collaborations announced the discovery of this fundamental particle, making news worldwide.

Rajendran Raja

See also Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs); Nuclear Programs and Policies

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SCULPTURE

This entry consists of the following articles:

BUDDHIST

KUSHANA

MAURYAN AND SHUNGAN

BUDDHIST

Although Buddhism began in approximately the fifth century B.C., the earliest extant Buddhist sculpture can be found in conjunction with the first appearance of stone monastic architecture, dating only to the second century B.C. These earliest monastic complexes are both free-standing (as at Bhārhut) and rock-cut (as at Bhājā), but in all instances the earliest sculptural decoration is composed mainly of deities and spirits associated with popular religious practices. Along with these images of local deities, who seem to have functioned as guardians, we also occasionally find bas-relief narrative scenes depicting moments from the Buddha's life, as well as scenes detailing the events of his many past lives, known collectively as Jataka (birth) tales. However, in none of these sculptures is the Buddha himself ever depicted. In fact, no images of the Buddha were made prior to the late first century A.D. Even when artists sculpted narrative scenes, they would depict all of the major figures with the exception of the Buddha. Often his presence would be implied by the nature of the action in the scene, or would be indicated by the appearance of a symbol, such as a footprint, an empty seat, or an umbrella. Some scholars refer to this period prior to the first appearance of the Buddha's sculptural image as the "aniconic phase."

There has been some debate as to whether the earliest Buddha images were made in the northwestern region of Gandhara (in parts of modern Pakistan and Afghanistan) or in central India near the city of Mathura. The use of Buddha images seems to have become popular in both regions at roughly the same time, the end of the first century and the beginning of the second century A.D. During these centuries, both areas were under the political control of the Kushana dynasty, and the customs of this court may have had a significant influence over this change in religious and artistic practice. Although the Buddha images from these two regions are stylistically quite different, the iconography of the Buddha's image is remarkably uniform and appears to have become standardized very quickly. This iconography includes the presence of the cranial bump or *ushnīsha*, the mark between the eyes called the *ūrṇā*, simple monk's robes, and elongated earlobes. The earlobes make reference to the fact that the Buddha gave up his life as a prince, who wore heavy earrings, in order to pursue the life of an ascetic.

Freestanding images of the Buddha became common by the second century, and the practice of depicting narratives continued to remain an important part of the Buddhist sculptural tradition. In particular, scenes of the birth, enlightenment, first sermon, and death were notably popular. It is often possible to identify the event that is being portrayed by examining the iconography of

the sculpture and by recognizing links to textual descriptions of the event. For instance, the presence of deer and a wheel are important indicators of the first sermon because this event took place in the Deer Park at Sarnath, and the sermon itself is referred to as the "Turning of the Wheel of the Law." Additionally, the artists often used specific hand gestures, or *mudrās*, as visual indications of the event or individual being portrayed. These gestures were taken directly from Indian dance traditions and can be reliably associated with important events in the Buddha's life. For example, the "earth-touching gesture," in which the Buddha's right hand, with the palm turned inward, touches the ground, signifies the moment of the Buddha's enlightenment. These artistic practices form part of an iconographic vocabulary that became a standard part of the Buddhist sculptural tradition, making it possible to easily identify most of the figural imagery associated with Buddhist sites.

Within the Buddhist artistic tradition, the names of individual sculptors are not recorded. Instead, it is the names of the patrons who commissioned these works that have typically been preserved. The vast majority of the sculptures that decorate Buddhist sites were sponsored by individual donors, who paid for these works as acts of personal devotion and then donated the images to the monastery in order to accrue positive merit for themselves and their loved ones. These acts of personal generosity are understood to have a positive karmic result for the person in whose name the work of art is donated. For this reason, standard donative inscriptions will typically give the name of the person who paid for the work, the reasons for the donation, and the names of any other individuals (often deceased loved ones) whom the donation is to benefit. This positive karmic reward, or merit, is believed to help lead to a favorable rebirth and even eventual enlightenment.

As Buddhism spread across the subcontinent and beyond, into Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia, so did the Buddhist sculptural tradition. Also, as new forms of Buddhism developed within India, the artistic traditions changed to reflect these new sectarian differences. Shortly after the appearance of the first Buddha images, we find sculptural examples of *bodhisattvas* (those who have the essence of enlightenment) associated with the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. Within the Mahāyāna tradition, *bodhisattvas* are understood to be compassionate spiritual beings who postpone their own entry into Nirvāna in order to help others reach enlightenment. These beings are described as residing within special heavens, and they are recognizable in the artwork because they are typically adorned with elaborate garments and jewels, rather than the simple monk's robe worn by the Buddha. Likewise, along with the emergence



Sculpture of the “Second Buddha.” Sculpture of Guru Rinpoche (the eighth-century tantric master Padmasambhava), at Hemis Gompa in Ladakh. Having brought Buddhism to Tibet, he is considered the “second Buddha.” DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS / CORBIS.

of the Buddhist Tantric (Vajrayāna) tradition (starting as early as the late 4th century A.D.), there develops a tradition of complex sculptural forms and prominent depictions of female divinities.

By the eighth century, Buddhism was beginning to lose ground in India, and new Buddhist projects became scarce in many parts of South Asia. The notable exceptions to this trend can be found in parts of Bihar, Bengal, Kashmir, and Karnataka, where Buddhism continued to enjoy some patronage and support. Eventually, however, even these holdouts began to give way to the mounting influence of first Hinduism and, later, Islam. By the twelfth century, Buddhism was all but absent from the subcontinent. Interestingly, the latest images of the Buddha were created as part of the Hindu tradition, where he is identified as one of the incarnations of the Hindu deity Vishnu. Despite Buddhism’s eventual disappearance from South Asia, the Indian Buddhist sculptural tradition established and promoted many of the artistic forms and religious practices that are still known throughout the Buddhist world.

Robert DeCaroli

See also Buddhism in Ancient India; Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century

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KUSHANA

Central Asian Kushana warriors invaded India in the first century of the common era, galloping over the Northwest passes, across the Indus and all of Punjab and Sind, on to Delhi and Banaras (Varanasi). The mightiest Kushana monarch was Kanishka, whose prosperous era probably began in A.D. 78. Kanishka converted to Buddhism and was certainly the most illustrious Kushana king; under his patronage two great schools of sculptural art flourished, one in Mathura, the other around Gandhara.



Coin Depicting Kanishka. Kanishka, the legendary second-century ruler of the Kushan dynasty in India. A major patron of the arts, he authorized the construction of many Buddhist monuments and helped found the Gandharan school of sculpture, thus encouraging the spread of Buddhism to Central Asia. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Mathura School

Situated on the right bank of the Yamuna River, southwest of Delhi and northwest of Agra, Mathura has long been a sacred place of pilgrimage in the cultural history of India. Believed to have been the birthplace of Lord Krishna, it is a premier center of ancient Hindu worship. Buddhist texts, moreover, including the Divyavadana, Lalitavistara, and Anguttaranikaya, refer to the Buddha's visits to Mathura; and the twenty-second Tīrthānkara of Jainism, Neminatha, the cousin-brother of Lord Krishna, often visited there as well. The region around Mathura was also sacred to devotees of Shiva; antiquities of Shaivism and Mother Goddess Shaktism, as well as remains of *yakshas*, *nagas* and other folk deities, are found there.

For the development of Indian sculptural art, the Kushana period may rightly be called the golden age of Mathura. Although the town had functioned as a center of art from earlier Mauryan times, as supported by the tall image from Parkham and its inscription, Mathura emerged as a premier center in the Kushana era. The products of this great manufactory have been recovered in Taxila (Pakistan) in the west, Chandraketugarh (West Bengal) and Mahasthan (Bangladesh) in the east, and Shravasti and Kasia (Uttar Pradesh) in the south. The chance discovery of a stone railing at Sanghol, between Punjab's Chandigarh and Ludhiana in 1885 also indicates that Mathura's art products were exported over long distances.

The Mathura style of sculptural art in the Kushana period had the following distinguishing characteristics: use of spotted red sandstone; the emergence and multiplication of a plethora of images connected with Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jain, and folk sects; a progression from symbolism to anthropomorphism; provision of acolytes with deities; use of the lion pedestal (*simbasana*); depiction of feminine beauty with delicacy, charm, and inviting gestures; introduction of statues of ruling kings; useful Brahmi epigraphs on the pedestals; development of a large number of auspicious and decorative motifs, making India's religious architecture much more attractive; a rich variety of flora and fauna; assimilation of and exchange with Gandhara art; and the pursuit of a policy of eclecticism. Some of the stone masons of the Kushana period have been identified by name, including Rama, Sanghadeva, Jotisa, Dasa, Shivarakshita, Singha, Nayasa, Dehayu, Vishnu, and Jayakula.

Buddhist Images

The most remarkable contribution of the Mathura school of sculpture is the evolution and development of the image of the Buddha. Both Mathura and Gandhara schools are credited with the origin of the Buddha image, but some of the basic elements seem to favor the Mathura school. These elements are: the appearance of a yogi, the concept of *chakravartin* (universal monarch), the lotus seat, the meditating posture, the *urna* (upraised dot of "wisdom" between the eyebrows), and the *ushnisha* (protuberance over the Buddha's head). Already existing Hindu *yaksha* statues had served as a prototype, it seems, of the early Buddha images, which share the *yakshas'* volume, heaviness, corpulence, and frontal orientation. Early Buddhist texts, Nidanakatha and Majjhimanikaya, note a close resemblance between the *yaksha* and images of later *bodhisattvas*.

Several rudimentary representations may be dated to the pre-Kushana era: the *bodhisattva* figure in the State Museum, Lucknow (B.12b); a slab carved with the scene of conversation between the Buddha and Shuddhodana, also in the Lucknow Museum (J.531); a small Buddha on an architrave along with Buddhist symbols in the Mathura Museum (M.3); and the slab with the Buddha and *lokapalas* (H.12). These experiments paved the way, however, to shape the model Buddha/*bodhisattva*, as demonstrated by examples in the Mathura Museum (A.1, A.2, 76.32) and the Lucknow Museum (B.1, B.18, 66.48) and in Kolkata's Indian Museum (25.524). Stylistically, these belong to the Kanishka phase, that is, the last quarter of the first century A.D.

Seated Buddha. The most notable features of the seated Buddha are: its high relief, uncarved back, and sharp and clear details; a plain halo with a scalloped border; *bodhi* tree foliage at the top; upper corners occupied by celestials

hovering in the air with a wreath; acolytes with flywhisks on each side; the Buddha's shaven head with a topknot like a snail shell (*kaparda*), hence called *kapardin*; the right hand raised in *abhaya* mudra (protection) and the left hand resting on the knee, or sometimes clenched, suggesting the commanding attitude befitting a *chakravartin* (universal monarch); the *urna*; wide open almond-shaped eyes, small earlobes, and a somewhat smiling expression; an upper garment covering only the left shoulder; upturned soles in a cross-legged yogic posture, carved with auspicious motifs; and the seat shaped like an altar, with two lions sitting in profile and a central one facing forward. Probably to avoid confrontation with iconoclastic Buddhist sectarians of Hinayana (the "Lesser Vehicle"), the image, though shaped as the Buddha, was often recorded as a *bodhisattva* ("he who has the essence of enlightenment").

Standing Buddha. The standing Buddha/*bodhisattva* images of the same period have similar characteristics in the upper section; the lower half shows the left hand held akimbo, a waistband fastening the lower garment terminating in a double knot, sometimes a bunch of flowers or a turban between the feet, suggesting the superiority of the enlightenment of Buddhahood over kingship. The important citations are to be found in the Mathura Museum (39.2798 and 71.105), the Allahabad Museum (69), the Sarnath Museum (B.1), the State Museum of Lucknow (B.73), and Guimet Museum in Paris (17489). The Allahabad Museum figure is dated in the second Kushana era (A.D. 80), and the Sarnath Museum statue is inscribed with the year three (A.D. 81). Beside Gautama Buddha, the figures of other Mahayana ("Greater Vehicle") Buddhas, such as Dipankara, Kashyapa, Amitabha, and Maitreya, also appear.

The Mathura school came in contact with the Gandharas School in the post-Kushana era, and new traits emerged on the Buddhist icons as a result of interaction: the drapery covering both shoulders (*ubhayamsika sanghati*) with thick pleats; Vajrapani with his thunderbolt as an attendant to the Buddha; other postures, such as *dhyana* (meditation); and a *kusha* grass cushion on the seat. With the passage of time, the drapery becomes thicker, with schematic shutter-type pleats, the lions on pedestal face forward and the central lion disappears or is replaced by a meditating *bodhisattva* or some object of worship. The nimbus gradually becomes elaborate with added bands. By the end of the second century and the beginning of the third century A.D., the Gandharan impact recedes with the disintegration of the Kushana power, and the simpler, earlier traits revive.

Jain Figures

The Jain icons first appeared with the Ayagapatas (tablets of homage) profusely carved with symbols and

motifs and sometimes with a tiny figure of a Jina Tirthankara ("ford-crosser" divinity). In the Kushana period, independent Jinas (Tirthankaras) were carved and at times four were sculpted in one block of pillar called a *sarvatobhadra* or *sarvatomangala* ("auspicious in all four heavenly directions"). The Tirthankaras are naked, either in meditating seated pose (*dhyana*) or standing in penance (*danda* or *kayotsarga*), and each bears a mark of Shrivatsa on the chest. In this period, Adinatha (the first Jina) is recognized by the hair falling on shoulders, Neminatha (the twenty-second Jina) with his contemporary Hindu divinities Balarama and Krishna, and Parshvanatha or Suparshvanatha, seen through a snake canopy. A number of Jain images bear Brahmi epigraphs in Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit, furnishing useful historic information about the Jain community in the Kushana age. The carved stone railings around the Jain and Buddhist stupas and *chaityas* were the most attractive parts of those monuments, and the Mathura railings are full of wonderful details, including charming females from Bhuteshwar and Kankali.

Brahmanical and Folk Deities and Royal Portraits

Brahmanical and folk figures emerged in multiple forms during the Kushana period. Vishnu, Shiva, Surya, Kartikeya, Agni, Divine Mothers, Kubera, *yakshas*, and *nagas* were the most popular deities. Vishnu was generally sculpted as Vasudeva Krishna, with two arms, four arms, or eight arms. Composite forms depict Balarama and other figures emerging from a central Vasudeva icon (Mathura Museum, 13.392–95). One stela illustrates a scene of the flooded Yamuna reaching Gokula (Mathura Museum, 17.1344). Balarama is seen with a snake hood over his head, right hand raised in the *abhaya* mudra and the left hand holding a cup. Sometimes, he holds a lion-shaped plow, suggesting that he was worshiped as the divinity of agriculture. Surya (the "sun god") is depicted in royal Kushana garb, wearing stitched drapery and boots and driving a chariot.

Shiva is seen in his symbolic lingam as well as in human form. His one, two, or four faces project from the lingam. In complete human form, he is shown with matted hair and erect phallus (*urdhvalingin*). The Arddhanarishvara (androgynous composite form with Pārvatī) was also shaped in the Kushana period. Kartikeya, Shiva's war-god son, is seen as a young man with a lance (Mathura Museum, 42.2949). His brother Ganesha appears as a nude elephant-headed dwarf in the late or post-Kushana period (Mathura Museum, 15.758).

Among the Mother Goddess deities, Mahishasuramardini ("strangling the buffalo demon") was quite popular, generally shown with her powerful four arms.

Other goddesses from this era are Revati, Shashthi, Naigameshi (goat-headed), Pārvatī, Lakshmī, Gajalakshmi, and Ekanamsa (sister of Balarama and Krishna). The composite image of Shakti (female energy) is also seen.

Almost life-size statues of Kushana kings were recovered from a place known as Mat (10 mi [16 km] north of Mathura) where a Devakula (gallery of the statues of the Kushana dynasty) was erected. The sculptures, bearing alien features, represent Wema Kadphises, Kanishka, and Chashtana, and may suggest the indulgence of foreign sculptors.

The folk cults are represented by *yakshas* and *nagas*. As a result of German archaeological excavations in the region, some beautiful sculptures of a Naga shrine of the Kushana period were recovered from Sonkh in the Mathura district. *Yakshas* had by then become dwarfish in shape, suggesting a source of amusement rather than divine veneration.

R. C. Sharma

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MAURYAN AND SHUNGAN

India's Mauryan period (324–185 B.C.), which opened with the martial conquests and diplomatic matrimonial alliances of Chandragupta Maurya (r. 321–297 B.C.), culminated in the creation of a mighty Mauryan empire in

the last quarter of the fourth century B.C. India emerged as a vast united continent, thanks to Chandragupta's son Bindusara (reigned c. 297–273 B.C.) and grandson Ashoka (r. 268–231 B.C.), both of whom expanded Mauryan borders and enhanced Mauryan glory in multiple ways.

Ashoka expanded the empire, annexing Kalinga (modern Orissa) after a fierce battle, which proved to be the turning point of Ashoka's life and reign, reflected in edicts he had inscribed on pillars of stone erected throughout India. He aspired to abandon violence and hoped instead to make lasting peace the primary policy of his administration.

There are two distinct forms of Mauryan art: folk art, the tradition of which was handed down through the ages and which manifested itself mainly in clay, timber, early ring stones, and a few statues; and court art, which emerged under the patronage of Emperor Ashoka, and which is represented by monolithic stone columns, crowned by a "Wheel of the Law" or animals, and rock shelters at Barabar and the Nagarjuni hills in Bihar. The so-called Chandragupta Sabha (palace), the remains of which were discovered at Kumrahar, near Patna (Mauryan Pataliputra) was erected followed the earlier Mauryan timber tradition, although several stone fragments were also found there. It may be presumed that the palace and assembly hall constructed by Chandragupta Maurya in the fourth century B.C. served not only the Mauryan dynasty but was probably also used by the succeeding Shunga monarchs. Some of its remains are preserved in the Kolkata's Indian Museum, as well as in Patna's State Museum.

Mauryan Court Art

Rock-cut dwellings. The experiments in architecture by Mauryan stone masons were made in the hills of Barabar and Nagarjuni, in Bihar's Gaya district. These were excavated to provide shelter for Buddhist monks. The Lomasha Rishi Cave is the best preserved of the Barabar group. With its face to the south, the cave has two chambers; the outer chamber, gleaming with lustrous polish, measures about 32 feet by 17 feet (9.86 × 5.18 m); the inner one, measuring about 14 feet by 17 feet (4.33 × 5.18 m), is incomplete. The most striking feature is the facade bearing a fine polish, a hallmark of Mauryan court art, with a frieze in low relief depicting elephants and a Buddhist stupa between a crocodile at each end. The adjacent Sudama Cave bears an inscription, which states that it was carved in the twelfth regnal year of Ashoka. With two chambers, this cave is finished with a high polish.

About .6 mile (1 kilometer) to the east of Barabar are three caves: Gopi, Vapi, and Vadathika of Nagarjuni,

which were excavated at the instructions of King Dasharatha, grandson of Ashoka, and gifted to an order of *ajivikas* (Jain monks). Each has a single, highly polished chamber. One other cave is situated at Sitamarhi, 12 miles (20 kilometers) from Rajgir, but it bears neither Mauryan polish nor an inscription.

Aesthetically, the site of Dhauli in Orissa, with an elephant in front, is an outstanding example of Ashoka's rock-cut experiments. Captioned as *seto* in the Brahmi script, meaning "white," it may represent the dream of the Buddha's mother, Mayadevi, in which she saw a white elephant, symbolizing the Buddha, entering her womb. Art historian Nihar Ranjan Ray, on the other hand, speculates that the animal symbolizes the presentation of King Ashoka to the people of Kalinga. The site also has the a number of Ashokan edicts, inscribed in his twelfth regnal year.

Pillars. Ashokan court art is famed for the monolithic columns installed at several places in India and Nepal. The notable features of these columns are the use of light pink Chunar sandstone, tapering shafts, the figure of either a lion or other animals (such as a bull or an elephant) on the capital, auspicious motifs, and messages carved in beautiful calligraphy. Ashokan pillars have been found in the following places:

In Bihar: a lion capital at Basarh, Vaishali; a bull capital at Rampurwa (now in New Delhi, outside Rashtrapati Bhavan); a lion capital at Rampurwa; another lion capital at Lauria Nandangarh; a fragmentary shaft at Lauria Araraja; and some fragments from Patna (now in the Patna Museum).

In Uttar Pradesh: the famous symbol of India, the four-lion capital at Sarnath; an elephant capital at Sankisa; a pillar in the Allahabad Fort (originally from Kaushambi); a fragmentary pillar at Kaushambi; a fragment of an abacus with a lion's paw from Bansi, Basti (now in the State Museum, Lucknow); a pillar from Prahladpur (now in the Sanskrit University, Varanasi); a pillar without capital from Meerut (now on the ridge near Delhi University); a fragment of a pillar reused as a Shivalinga (in the Nageshwaranatha Temple of Ayodhya); and part of a pillar shaft, later shaped as a Surya image (now in the State Museum, Lucknow).

In Madhya Pradesh: a lion capital at Sanchi; and a pillar reused in Umrao Dulla Garden near Bhopal.

In Haryana: a pillar without capital from Topra, Ambala (now at the Firoz Shah Kotla, Delhi); a fragment of a pillar now used as the base of a Minar at Fatehabad; and a fragment of a pillar (now used in Lat Ki Masjid at Hissar).

In Nepal: a pillar at Lumbini; a fragmentary pillar at Nigalisagar; and a fragmentary pillar at Gotihawa.



Turbaned Male Head Sculpture. Sculpture dating to the Shungan epoch, second century B.C., excavated at Bharhut in Northern India. Though the Shungans were adherents of Brahmanism, their rule marked one of the most creative periods of Buddhist art. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

The erection of such monumental pillars was not only a remarkable aesthetic achievement but a demonstration of great technological and engineering skill, involving the transportation and installation of heavy materials at remote sites. The Ashokan pillars thus attested to India's power, while at the same time spreading the royal message of nonviolence and good conduct. The script used for most inscriptions was Brahmi, with some Kharoshti and Aramaic in the western border areas. The letters are beautiful, sharp and neatly incised, and reflect a meticulous handling and careful supervision. The Ashokan writing presents a highly developed stage of calligraphic art.

These tall, heavy columns were freestanding, requiring no platforms or additional support. The Mauryan sculptors seem to have resolved the problem of harmonizing the pillar shaft with the capital. The lion on the Basarh pillar sits on a square platform projecting from the capital; for this reason, it has been considered pre-Ashokan by some scholars. The Rampurwa bull, Sankisa elephant, and Lauria Nandangarh lion are integrated with the shaft. Further integration is noticed in the Sanchi, Rampurwa, and Sarnath lion capitals.

Sarnath pillar. The Sarnath lion (or wheel) capital pillar, the most remarkable specimen of Mauryan court art, was discovered in 1904. The elegance of its flawless rendering, its soft and lustrous surface, its perfect blend of shaft with abacus, and its majestically seated lions

make it a supreme example of Indian sculptural art. The symbolism and rendering of the four lions, the presence of four animals below them (lion, elephant, bull, and horse), and the fluted lotus below the abacus have been universally admired. The “Wheel of Law” (*dharmacakra*) surmounting the four lions suggests the supremacy of *dharmā* (right conduct, or Buddha’s law) above royalty. It may also indicate the initial turning of the Wheel of Law (*dharmacakrapravartana*) by the Buddha when he first articulated his four noble truths at Sarnath. The four animals symbolize Vedic Brahmanical deities: the lion is Durgā; the bull, Shiva; the elephant, Indra; and the horse, Surya. These may also stand for the four divine guardians of the four quarters of heaven: the lion is Vaishravana in the north; the bull, Virupaksha in the west; the elephant, Dhritarashtra in the east; and the horse, Virudhaka in the south. The major life events of the Buddha may also be symbolized here: the elephant represents his birth; the horse, his renunciation of royal luxury; the bull, his preaching as *muniṅgava*; and the lion, his clan (Shakyasimha). The four animals may also represent the four wheels of the chariot of a paramount ruler (*chakravartin*, the title of the Mauryan emperors).

Didarganj yakshi. The life-size standing female statue—variously described as a *yakshi* (semidivine being), a queen, or a representation of feminine beauty (*striratna*)—recovered from the Didarganj locality of Patna and now exhibited in the Patna Museum is a superb specimen of Mauryan art. This piece may represent both court and folk styles. The female figure, carved in the round, has full and rounded features with prominent breasts, broad hips, and a narrow waist. She wears a head crest, large triple-looped earrings, a pearl necklace, a double-stringed chain *stanabara* (falling between the breasts), five stringed girdles, heavy anklets, and a waist garment (*dboti*) with schematic pleats. In her right upraised hand, she holds a *chamara* (fly whisk); her facial expression suggests that she is keenly watching or supervising some event. The curves and contours are perfect, and the figure conveys a royal dignity and elegance. The Mauryan polish is noteworthy; the piece may be the product of the late third or early second century B.C.

Lohanipur torso. The torso of a Jina, standing in the *kayotsarga* or *danda* posture while performing penance, was recovered from Lohanipur near Patna, and is now displayed in the State Museum at Patna. This figure in the round bears the Mauryan polish. Some of the kings of the Mauryan dynasty, like Chandragupta, Dasharatha, and Samprati were inclined toward Jainism; hence the possibility of a Tirthānkara (Jain pontiff) image by the sculptors of the age cannot be ruled out.

Foreign influences. To what extent Mauryan art, particularly its court art, reflected any foreign influence has

been debated. The pillars and polish were supposedly derived from Persian (Achaemenid) imperial influence. An edict of Ashoka mentions the dispatch of his missionaries to the capitals of Antiochus II of Syria, Ptolemy of Egypt, Antigonos of Macedonia, Alexander of Epirus, and Magas of Syria. With these cultural ties, and the likely exchange of artistic commissions, the services of skilled foreign artists in Mauryan employ may be surmised. Prior styles of Indian architecture had used timber; hence the introduction of stone required specially trained and seasoned Persian artisans. The Hellenistic plastic conventions followed by Greco-Bactrian sculptors may also be traced in some specimens of Mauryan art. There is, however, a basic difference between the Achaemenid and the Mauryan pillars. The former were generally part of some larger architectural scheme, while the Ashokan columns were freestanding monoliths.

Mauryan-Shungan Folk Sculpture

Late Mauryan and early Shungan folk art is represented by a group of *yakshas*, ring stones, and other pieces.

Yakshas. The term *yaksha* is derived from *yaj*, “to worship,” meaning both “wonderful” and “terrible.” These semidivine beings are both benevolent and malevolent. Sometimes, the *yaksha* is viewed as the possessor of supreme power, or as a subject of Kubera. The *yakshas* are generally heavy, dwarfish, and corpulent. With the passage of time, their independent status disappeared, as they became subordinates to the emerging new deities of Vedic Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Much the same was true of the *nagas* (snake deities), which were assimilated into the Hindu mainstream. The installation of *yaksha* and *yakshi* statues became a national artistic phenomenon and something of a cult. These figures—of various sizes, from heroic to small—were installed on platforms outside villages as guardian deities. *Yaksha* statues stood at many different places, including Parkham, Basoda, Naglajhinga, Bharnakalan (all in the Mathura district); Rajghat (Varanasi); Noh (Bharatpur); Besnagar (Bhopal) and Pawaya (Gwalior); Patna; Shishupalgarh (Orissa); and Amin (Kurukshetra).

The 8-foot (2.4-m)-tall *yaksha* from Parkham, now in the Mathura Museum (No. C.1) is very important, since its pedestal bears a Brahmi inscription, which informs that it was carved by Gomitaka, the disciple of Kunika. This indicates that Indian sculptural art was practiced in the ancient Mathura tradition of teacher and disciple (*gurushishya parampara*) even before the common era. Similar information is furnished by the *yakshi* statue from Naglajhinga, now in the Mathura Museum (No. 72.5), whose carver is named Naka. *Yakshas* and *nagas* were frequently carved on the railings of early stupas.

Ring stones. Small circular brown alabaster or soapstone rings, measuring between 3 and 7 inches (7.6–18 cm) with minute carvings, are beautiful specimens of the Mauryan-Shungan period. These were found in India's northern belt from Taxila to Patna, including Ropar, Mathura, Kaushambi, and Rajghat. Specimens bearing a central perforation are known as ring stones; those devoid of holes are termed disks. More rings have been found in the west, more disks in the east, particularly near Patna.

The superb carvings on these specimens depict a female figure, almost nude, who stands majestically with splayed feet and somewhat outstretched arms. A wiglike coiffure, earrings, necklace, and bangles are conspicuous. The waist is narrow and the hips broad. In the complete circle, she is repeated several times, with a tree or honeysuckle motif (*nagapushpaka*), or a pillar, as a divider. Sometimes, the figure is surrounded by birds, animals, and acolytes. The female figure may be recognized as a Mother Goddess (*mahimata*). The pieces were most likely used for religious practices meant to ensure progeny, prosperity, and peace.

Caskets. Other items of artistic value from the Mauryan-Shungan age are relic caskets made of soapstone or crystal. The handling of the crystal, shaping it as a fine pot with a lid, demonstrates a high level of craftsmanship. These objects were excavated from the stupa of Piprawah (Basti) on the India-Nepal border in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of these (now in Kolkata's Indian Museum) bears an inscription in old Brahmi recording the deposit of the ash remains of the Shakyamuni Buddha.

Shungan Sculpture

Long after Ashoka, the crumbling Mauryan empire was smashed by Pushyamitra Shunga, who killed the last Mauryan ruler, Brihadratha, and seized power in 185 B.C., ruling for thirty-six years. Shungan art emerged as something of a negation of Mauryan art.

The distinguishing characteristics of Shungan sculptures are: a linear composition; the continuous narration of a story, with different scenes of an episode in one medallion; and an interweaving of religion and art. Shungan sculptors resolved the problem of spatial representation through overlapping figures, which all had a frontal orientation. The narrative sequence of the story was shown by repetition of the main figure at different stages of the episode; past, present, and future were combined in one medallion. An example is the depiction on the Bharhut stupa railing of Anathapindaka's gift of the Jetavana monastery to the Buddha. The same formula was adopted in the Shungan depiction of Buddhist Jataka tales.

The major sites of Shungan period (2nd–1st century B.C.) sculpture are: Bharhut (Madhya Pradesh); Kaushambi, Bhitia, and Mathura (Uttar Pradesh); and Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh), which is slightly later and may be called Shunga-Kanva. At the same time, there are several other sites from which Shungan sculptures have been recovered or are still seen in situ. These are: Bhaja, Karle, and Pitalkhora in Maharashtra; Jagayapeta, Amaravati, and Nagarjunikonda in Andhra Pradesh; and Udaigiri and Khandagiri in Orissa. *Yaksha* statues belonging to the Mauryan-Shungan phase form an independent group, as do the beautifully carved small ring stones or discs recovered from different sites.

Bharhut stupa. A great monument (stupa) once stood in the vicinity of the village of Bharhut, near Satna in Madhya Pradesh. Its ruins were noticed by A. Cunningham in 1874, and the following year most of the components were moved to Kolkata's Indian Museum. Other remains were later added to the collection of the Allahabad Museum. The Bharhut remains are the best specimens of the sculptural and architectural arts of the Shungan period. An epigraph on the gateway (*torana*) of the stupa states that it was erected in the Shungan reign.

A stupa generally contained some remains of the Buddha, or another venerable enlightened soul. These ashes were carefully kept in a small container (*manjusha*) of stone or metal, covered by earth or encased by bricks or stone. For the protection of the holy spot, a stone railing with gates was erected all around it, and this became a center of attraction for devotees. Though associated with death, the stupa was not a symbol of mourning or grief. It actually signified the enlightened soul's liberation from the bondage of the body and from the painful cycle of rebirth. The Buddha's release (*nirvana*) from the perishable body was much rejoiced. There are, therefore, many joyful scenes of music, dance, and sports carved onto the railings of Bharhut's stupa. On certain occasions, they are lit with thousands of lamps, appearing as a beacon in the night.

The Bharhut stupa, when complete, was a counter-clockwise cross with four gates; the distance between each was covered by sixteen monolithic pillars, which terminated in a return rail, allowing only an indirect entry into the sacred spot. Between the two rail posts, three crossbars were inserted into vertically cut sockets. The gateway (*torana*) in each direction had two tall pillars with a square base, octagonal shaft, and a bell- or vase-shaped capital with lions seated back to back. This motif must have come from Mauryan court art, with the addition of spiral ends representing crocodiles. The space between the two pillars of the gate was filled in by three architraves decorated with animals advancing toward an object of worship. Between the two architraves were set small

pillar statues. The uppermost architrave was crowned by an ornamental honeysuckle surmounted by a spoked Wheel of the Law (*dharmacakra*), which was flanked by three-jewel (*triratna*) motifs.

The railing is profusely carved with depictions of a variety of flora, fauna, Jataka narrations, processions, humorous scenes, *yakshas*, *nagas* (serpent deities), and the Mother Goddess Lakshmi, anointed by two elephants. The Bharhut stupa served as an open-air museum or sculptural gallery, and a number of its scenes have been labeled in Brahmi script. The names of several donors of different components of the monument are also inscribed. The sculptural renderings and the inscriptional evidence suggest that the Bharhut stupa was a national project, supported by donors and pilgrims from distant quarters of the country and emblematic of their Buddhist faith.

Bodh Gayā. Being associated with the attainment of enlightenment (*bodhi*) by the Buddha, Bodh Gayā is held in high esteem in the Buddhist world. Ashoka visited the holy spot and presumably built a temple, but no remains of that shrine have been found. The present temple is the reincarnation of an earlier temple, the fragments of which date back to the late second and early first century B.C., just after Bharhut. A second group of sculptures there were probably created a century later. The original railing of the stupa contained 64 pillars, 10 feet (3 m) high. An inscription notes that it was the gift of Kurangi, wife of King Indraghimitra, and Nagadevata, wife of King Brahmanitra.

Sanchi stupas. In 75 B.C., the tenth king of the Shunga dynasty, Devahuti (also known as Devabhumi) was murdered through a conspiracy by the minister Vasudeva, who founded the short-lived dynasty of Kanva. Four Kanva kings ruled for only forty-five years; their dynasty's end came at the hands of the Andhras in 30 B.C. The Sanchi stupas near Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh were built during this period, but it is not possible to trace the precise contribution of the Kanva rulers to this building complex.

The Sanchi region is full of stupas, which number 60 in all: 8 in Sonar; 5 in Satadhara; 3 in Andher; 37 in Bhojpur; and 7 in Sanchi. Most of these are miniature; only a few are large. The building of stupas commenced in the third century B.C., when Ashoka, then governor, married Devi, the daughter of a local businessman. He selected the site of the hillock, which after the construction of the great stupa was known as Mahachetiya. The dimensions of the original stupa are known, though the existing stupa was built two centuries later. A portion of the original Ashokan pillar can still be seen near the southern gate.

The Mahachetiya (Stupa I) is 54 feet (16.5 m) high and covers a circular area 120 feet (36.5 m) in diameter. The hemispherical dome has a truncated top, surrounded by a low railing (*barmika*) consisting of a stone shaft topped by umbrellas (*chhatravali*). The body of the stupa is made of bricks surrounded by stone balustrades. At the ground level runs the pathway for clockwise circumambulation around the stupa during worship. This path is surrounded by a railing with 9-foot (2.7 m)-high pillars, placed at an interval of 2 feet (.6 m), with three crossbars. Unlike the Bharhut railing, the Sanchi railing is uncarved.

The four gateways that provide access to the *stupa*, however, are of great aesthetic merit. An inscription on the southern entrance records that it was executed by the guild of ivory carvers of Vidisha. The minute, low-carved renderings vary from gate to gate, although some episodes have been repeated. The representations are of Jatakas (previous births of the Buddha), life events, *yakshas*, *nagas*, mythical beings, nymphs, flora and fauna, processions, and a number of decorative motifs. Like Bharhut and Bodh Gayā, Sanchi also suggests the presence of the Buddha through symbols. Similarly, Gajalakshmi, the goddess of prosperity, is standing on a lotus, anointed by two elephants. The number of Jataka tales narrated here is only four, while at Bharhut no fewer than thirty are depicted. Nevertheless, the stupa at Sanchi is one of the most impressive examples of ancient Indian art.

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SCULPTURE AND BRONZE IMAGES FROM KASHMIR

The ancient kingdom of Kashmir has come to be recognized as the center of a major regional tradition in the history of South Asian art, whose links and influence spread throughout the entire western Himalayan region, as well as to parts of Central Asia and Afghanistan in the post-Gupta and early medieval period. Few material traces of this ancient heritage remain today, which is so well documented by Kalhana in his twelfth-century chronicle of Kashmir, the *Rajatarangini*, since most of its monuments were destroyed during the Muslim conversions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Initially known from the sumptuous Buddhist bronzes preserved in Tibetan monasteries that came on the international art market in the 1960s and 1970s, following political upheaval in Tibet, the importance and antiquity of the style have been gradually realized through the study of the disparate collection of stone sculpture, much of it fragmentary, preserved in the Sri Pratap Singh Museum in Srinagar, and the relief work of such ruined monuments as Martand and Avantipur elsewhere in the valley. However, documentation prior to the seventh century is hampered by the lack of dated as well as representative material.

Formative Period

The early phase. The earliest evidence of an autonomous Kashmir style lies in a small group of Brahmanical sculptures from Bijbihara, in the south of the valley. They are all carved in the round from gray chlorite, and are notable for their static poses, linear modeling, and squarish faces. Some are of miniature scale, a feature that continues into later styles. Their ornamentation is simple, and the hair is usually bound up in a double-looped topknot. Designated as the early phase of the formative period, it dates from the first half of the fifth century and beyond, during the reign of the Kidarites. Though this is a high point of Gupta art elsewhere in north India—the Udaiyagiri cave sculptures are dated to the beginning of this period—here the influence is late Gandhara Buddhist art, in modeling, ornament, and dress, reflecting the still-flourishing state of that tradition as well as continuity with past centuries.

The most impressive example is the large six-armed Kumara standing with his *vahana* (an animal or bird that served as the mount or vehicle of the deity), the peacock. While the massive frame and arrangement of neck orna-

ments closely resemble those of a Gandharan *bodhisattva* figure, the lower garment reproduces that of a Brahman depicted in that style, while technical features such as the forked string folds and the zigzag and linen folds of the dhoti can be traced directly to the stucco sculpture of Jaulian and Mohra Moradu at Taxila. A Sassanian influence is evident in the corrugated form of the ribbons of the diadem. Two distinguishing masculine features of the formative period are the short single-stranded sacred thread and the garland, formed of overlapping flowers, that clings tightly to the thighs and reaches the knees, both of which are seen on the Kumara. These two accoutrements, though modified in future styles, are almost invariably depicted on Brahmanical and Buddhist deities in Kashmir. Three Mother Goddesses survive from this period, all somewhat stout and wooden in modeling, and clad in Hellenistic garments comprising a short chiton, an ankle-length lower garment, and a himation, of which one finds an almost exact counterpoint on a panel of figures on Stupa A15 at Jaulian.

Around the middle of the fifth century, Gupta features begin to appear in the form of regalia and jewelry, including the ubiquitous annular ear ornament, which is found on the later of the three female figures and on the detached head of a male figure, probably Vishnu, which also has a crown with a large central polygonal panel of Gupta influence. Only a single Buddhist example is known to survive from this period, a headless seated Buddha carved in relief, its robe pleated asymmetrically in ribbed folds, which was found at Baramula at the western entrance to the valley.

The later phase. Sculptures of the later phase of the formative period, carved from both gray chlorite and limestone, of which there are many examples from Bijbihara and Baramula, are notable for a predominantly Gupta influence. This is most evident in the increased volume of the body and limbs, and in the rounded faces and large almond-shaped eyes. The use of the short sacred thread, distinctive floral garland, and simple jewelry continues from the previous phase, but while the feminine attire is still Hellenistic, the masculine lower garment now more closely resembles the Gupta form, clinging tightly to the rounded thighs and tied with a plain belt, the long loose ends falling down the thigh. Images of Shiva retain the double-looped topknot, whereas the Vishnu crown is now of turreted form, derived from depictions of the busts of kings on Sassanian coinage, with a row of corkscrew curls, a Gupta feature, showing along the brow. These eclectic influences were gradually assimilated in the second half of the fifth century and early sixth, at a time when Gandharan art was in sharp decline through lack of patronage, and this phase appears to have reached its zenith around A.D. 525,

when the Hephthalite king Mihirakula ruled the kingdom. The Hephthalites, or White Hunas, had earlier defeated the Guptas in their heartland of Malwa, and were probably responsible for the introduction of several Gupta stylistic features to the northwest.

The most important example of the phase, which was found at Fattehgarh, near Baramula, is an adorsed Maheshvara, a form of Shiva, accompanied by his vehicle, the humped bull, in which the placid central Mahadeva head is framed by those of Bhairava and Uma. This iconographical form, in which the reverse figure is Shiva's faithful attendant Nandin, is described as Bhuteshvara in ancient Kashmirian texts. Although earlier examples may yet come to light, it is the first sculpture to combine two features that later become a hallmark of Brahmanical sculptures in the mature Kashmir style, namely, the frequent portrayal of the deity with three lateral heads, and the use of personified weapons in the form of diminutive side attendants. While the former feature has a long earlier history in ancient Gandhara, the depiction of *ayudhapurusbas* is commonly found in Gupta Vaishnava sculpture of the fifth and sixth centuries, including a rock-cut example at Udayagiri in Malwa.

The Pandrethan Period: Post-Gupta Influence

The next major stage of development marks the assimilation of post-Gupta influence in the Pandrethan group of sculptures, which probably dates from the second quarter of the seventh century, in the reign of the first Karkota king, Durlabha Vardhana. Most are displayed in the museum in Srinagar. Carved in high relief in large scale from gray limestone, they are distinguished by their exaggerated poses, vigorous modeling and ornamentation, and a new repertoire of dress. Though there are links to the previous style, which seems to have gradually died out, the form and decoration of these sculptures signal an abrupt transition with the past, and they are now in most respects prototypical of the Classical style. A notable feature is the complex detailing of the edges of garments, which was further refined in the following period. The corpus comprises a large group of Buddhist sculpture, much of it fragmentary, which was excavated in 1915 from the site of two stupas and a *vihara* (monastic residence) near the village of Pandrethan (a contracted form of Puranadhishtana, meaning the "old capital"), whence the name of the style derives, and a group of twenty Brahmanical sculptures accidentally discovered in 1926 in the adjacent area of Badamibagh. These comprise Shaivite deities, mostly depictions of Maheshvara, and a group of Mother Goddesses, many in a dancing pose, reflecting a North Indian post-Gupta development that dates from as early as the beginning of the seventh century.

Leaving aside representations of the Buddha, there is little difference between male or female deities of either denomination in dress and ornamentation. The male dhoti now covers the left thigh to the knee, while the outer fold falls to the right ankle, its edge detailed with pleated or plain zigzag folds, which becomes the subsequent standard. The sacred thread, now double-stranded, falls well below the waist, and subsequently never rises above it again. The masculine ornaments consist of a wide, boldly patterned necklace or torque, ear pendants, wide armbands, and a single thick bangle, while the headdress is of tall pentagonal form crowned by a diadem of three triangular leaves with scrolling foliate design and beading around a central gemstone. The centrally parted ribbed hair bulges out beneath the fillet in semicircular bunches around a compartment of pairs of lateral ribs, in what has been described as a "window effect," one of the most distinguishing features of the style, which continues for many centuries, excluding images of Vishnu. The female anatomy now more closely follows the usual Indian form, with pronounced breasts, narrow waist, and large hips, while the standard attire comprises a short-sleeved and tightly waisted long tunic that resembles a modern Punjabi *qamis*, and a diaphanous lower garment falling to the ankles, usually combined with a long floating scarf that covers the hair behind. The jewelry consists of a pair of short necklaces, pendant ear ornaments, wide bangle, and diadem, while the wavy hair is centrally parted beneath the fillet. Depictions of the Buddha are necessarily conservative, but rather than Gandharan influence, Mathura appears to be the main source for the design of the clinging robe, which is invariably asymmetrically pleated in string folds, the neckline treated in several variations. A large standing image already displays a twist to the pelvis, which is partly retracted, and the slightly protruding stomach, so characteristic of the Classical standing Buddha.

The various changes were brought about by a complex combination of borrowing and innovation produced by local and non-Kashmirian artists working together to produce a new dynastic style of sculpture. Artists were almost certainly brought from nearby Simhapura (the Salt Range in modern Pakistan), known to have fallen under the rule of Kashmir in the early seventh century, where there is firm evidence of an earlier Gupta tradition, and where post-Gupta currents must have also reached. Many of the new features can be linked to post-Gupta developments elsewhere in North India, particularly the predominantly Buddhist workshops of Sarnath and Nalanda, from where there was selective borrowing, especially of the window effect and the form of the dhoti. A North Indian influence is most notably lacking in the upper garment of the female figure, since elsewhere in North India in this period the female deity is usually

bare-breasted. It is at this stage in its history that Kashmir began to project political power well beyond its borders. One of the effects is a powerful artistic influence on the sculpture of Afghanistan and adjacent territory, which continued until the fall of the Hindu Shahi kingdom to the Yaminids in 1026.

The Classical Style

The Pandrethan features were refined in the Classical Karkota style, which absorbed further influences from mainstream Indian art to produce a rich, vibrant, and varied range of expression. Several of the recorded religious buildings of this period can be identified, the most important being the complex of royal buildings at Parhasapura, the court capital of King Lalitaditya (r. 724–761), the ancient kingdom's most illustrious ruler. Excavations at the site of the stupa built there by his minister Cankuna have yielded several Buddha and Atlas-like *yaksha* figures, which is the earliest datable group from the valley. The surviving sculpture divides into two groups: examples in stone, much of it now carved from green chlorite, terra-cotta, and bronze, mostly Brahmanical, which have been found in Kashmir itself, or its close vicinity; and examples in bronze and ivory, almost exclusively Buddhist, which have been conserved in Tibetan monasteries. Examples of both groups are now in private and public collections worldwide. Among them are several with dedicatory inscriptions in proto-Sharada script, some of which bear the names of the Potala Shahis of Bolur (the region of Gilgit and Baltistan in present-day Pakistan), which has led some scholars to talk of a local school based there.

The dates are in the cyclical Laukika era, of which the century must be inferred, and their interpretation has created disagreement between epigraphists and art historians in the past. However, new evidence demonstrates that the fully developed Buddha type, and thus the entire Classical style, emerged in the seventh century, and not in the eighth century, near the time of Lalitaditya, as previously thought. This takes the form of an inscription in metrical Sanskrit on the pedestal of a standing Buddha in the Potala Palace in Lhasa, which records its dedication during the reign of a King Durlabha. There were two King Durlabhas, who ruled consecutively for almost a century, Durlabhavardhana (r. 626–662) and Durlabhavaka (r. 662–712), and either could have been the king of the inscription. Fortunately, the wide range can be greatly modified by taking into account the date of the Pandrethan sculptures, which cannot be much earlier than the second quarter of the seventh century, and that of a seated Buddha in Classical style in the Norton Simon Museum, which can now be dated with certainty to 696. Until further evidence appears, the most likely date for

the emergence of the Classical style is from between 650 and 680. A slow decline appears to have begun toward the end of the eighth century.

The characteristic and almost invariable features of a Buddha in Classical style, and the standard facial type of the period, can be seen on the standing figure in a private collection, which closely resembles the Potala example, as well as a standing Buddha from Cankuna's stupa. The face is oval with arched eyebrows, an *urna*, large almond-shaped eyes, long nose, compact smiling lips, and small round chin. In profile, the nose and the brow form a continuous line, while the lower half of the face recedes. The robe is symmetrically pleated on the torso, the arms, and the sides, but plain on the legs, and falls from the wrists in two parallel parts, the edges rippled on the proper right, and detailed in a complex design of pleated zigzag folds on the left. A triangular-shaped panel formed on the left shoulder has the same complex pattern, while another on the right is patterned with concentric parallel folds. When the robe covers the left shoulder alone, a single triangular-shaped panel is formed. In the case of a seated image, the same rules apply, apart from the lower part of the garment, where the treatment shows a similar set pattern. Here the Buddha stands on the stamen of a multilayered lotus, which rests on a molded pedestal, as in many examples of this period. However, a wide variety of pedestals is found for the seated Buddha (most frequently depicted in teaching mode or earth-touching mode), ranging from an openwork-type with elaborate cushion, supported by columns, lions and leogryphs (a composite, mythical animal) and a seated *yaksha*; to an even more complex design of a rocky landscape, animals, and deities.

The most outstanding example of Kashmirian bronze Buddhist sculpture is undoubtedly the elaborate composition of the Buddha seated on a stylized mountain with attendants, now in the Norton Simon collection. Many of the more elaborate compositions such as this would have had aureoles, some depicting the various events in the life of the Buddha. A Maradharshana stone group with the Buddha assailed by his daughter Mara and a pair of demons, closely modeled on a Sarnath original, found just outside the confines of the valley and now in the National Museum, New Delhi, has an inscription and date in the year 5, equivalent to A.D. 729. This sculpture, with the Buddha seated on an hourglass pedestal on a rocky podium accompanied by a diminutive Earth Goddess and a mysterious kneeling male figure plucking a stringed instrument, has many of the features of some of the elaborate bronze groups inscribed with the names of the Patola Shahi rulers, which date from around this time; this demonstrates that the full repertoire of design of these so-called Gilgit bronzes was known in Kashmir,

and that the sculptures were almost certainly cast by Kashmirian artists.

Many stone sculptures of Brahmanical subjects in Classical style have survived in the valley, mostly fragmentary, of which many are three-headed, a feature peculiar to Kashmir. These were either carved with an integral stepped and molded pedestal, or mounted separately on such a pedestal, usually spouted to the right to drain off libations. These were placed in shrines or set in the niches of the peristyle that enclosed the courtyard of most temples. The most outstanding sculpture in the style is undoubtedly the majestic, richly ornamented three-headed Vishnu, holding his attributes, the lotus and the conch, which must date from the seventh century. It is now in the museum in Srinagar. This iconographical form, incorporating the naturalistically carved lion and boar heads of the *avatāras* Narasimha and Varaha, but lacking its *ayudhapurusas*, is often referred to as Vaikuntha Vishnu, though there is ambiguity concerning its exact identification. All the new features of the style can be seen in this image, including the distinctive facial type described above. The pose is now a gentle contraposto, with one foot placed slightly forward, which is common to all depictions of Brahmanical deities with the exception of Surya, and the Buddhist deities Maitreya and Avalokiteshvara. The dhoti is of standard form, and the complex pattern of pleated zigzag folds seen on the Buddha's robe appear on the open edge of the garment, with a characteristic fan-shaped collection of folds below the belt. The multistranded sacred thread now falls to the thigh, and the floral garland is of imbricated leaf pattern design. Among the sumptuous jewelry is a diadem formed of three horned crescents containing foliate designs, a more elaborate alternative to the triangular form, which survives from the previous style.

The Utpala Style

The style underwent a brief revival in the mid-ninth century during the reign of Avantivarman (r. 855–883), as can be seen in the sculptures of the Vishnu and Shiva temples at Avantipura, which are carved from a highly polished black marble. However, though they show new vigor, much stylization has crept in, and the facial features are hardened. The earlier complex patterning of the open edge of the lower garment and the foliate design of the crown is crudely interpreted, and the headdress is out of proportion to the head. Two iconographical changes are evident: the sacred thread is now triple-stranded, and a reverse Kapila (angry) head is added to three-headed images of Vishnu. Sculptures from the Shiva temples erected at Patan by his successor Samkaravarman (r. 883–902) partly reflect influence from the Pala art of northeastern India, and are the last signs of external

borrowing. The most important sculpture of the ninth century and one of the largest known castings of the medieval period in India is the almost 6.5 ft. (2-meter) high openwork aureole for a Vishnu image found at Divisar, which contains *avatāras* of Vishnu and other deities set in scrolling vine roundels. This period is one of pronounced influence on the sculpture of Chamba and adjacent hill regions, and the famous bronze four-headed Vishnu from the Hari Rai temple in Chamba town is closely modeled on the Kashmir type.

The tenth century was a time of political turbulence, economic decline, and increasing isolation, from which the kingdom never really recovered. A silver inlaid bronze of a six-armed Avalokiteshvara group, dated in the reign of Queen Didda in 989, shows a marked decline in the style. Though local demand declined, there was a ready market for stock images of the Buddha from Tibet in the following two centuries. A group of stone sculptures found at Verinag, attributable to the twelfth century, demonstrates that the style had greatly degenerated by that time, but little remains in Kashmir of the intervening period.

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See also **Bronzes: South Indian; Gupta Period Art**

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SECULARISM Political secularism may be defined as the separation of religious activities from that of the state, customarily referred to as "the separation of church and state in the West." The state in its governmental capacity will not promote any religion or religious group, or get involved in religious affairs. Freedom of religious belief and practice are confined to the private domain. Following India's independence in 1947, Congress Party governments under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors declared India to be a secular democratic state, thus distinguishing itself from Pakistan, which they judged to be a theocratic authoritarian state.

As evidence of equality and equal opportunity for Indian citizens of all religions, India points to three Muslim presidents since independence, a Sikh prime minister, a Christian president of the Congress Party, and several non-Hindu central and state government ministers, state governors, and other high-ranking political personalities—in a country in which 82 percent of the population is Hindu.

Interpretations of secularism in India have not, however, been consistent. Nehru's interpretation was that of the West: the state will not engage in religious activities nor promote any religion. Mahatma Gandhi's interpretation suggested that all religions are equal, and that the state should acknowledge and encourage the practice of all religions equally. If one particular religious ceremony were allowed at a state function, then the state must accord that privilege equally to other religions as well. Hence prayers are sometimes offered by all religions on special state occasions and at state funerals. A third position, derived from the Gandhian view, tends to be perceived as more threatening to other religions. In the Hindu nationalist perspective, Hinduism is capable of representing all religions because Hinduism acknowledges different pathways to God. Therefore, all religions are "true," and "all Indians are Hindus." Though all three interpretations of secularism existed concurrently in independent India, it was Nehru's Western concept that prevailed, on the grounds that the separation of state and religion was an essential prerequisite for the conduct of Western democracy. This perspective of secularism in its Western interpretation was disputed in the 1990s with the rise of Hindu nationalism, which advocated the third variant.

The Roots of Indian Democracy and Secularism

The foundations of India's democracy and secularism are drawn from the West, the roots of which may be found in the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789. The separation of church and state underlined both democracies. In the United States, the founding fathers wished to shield the fledgling democracy from the religious conflicts and issues that had plagued Europe for centuries. In France, one of the goals of the revolution was to restrict the power of the Catholic Church in political affairs. The fact that France was an overwhelmingly Catholic country was irrelevant in separating religion from the conduct of government.

In Britain, there was no conflict between church and state, except during the Reformation, when England, Wales, and Scotland broke from the Catholic Church in Rome to establish their own churches of England and Scotland. British secularism was embodied in the liberalism of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham in the late nineteenth century, and in the Fabian socialism of George

Bernard Shaw, G. D. H. and Margaret Cole, and Harold Laski of the early twentieth century. The evolution of parliamentary democracy in Britain as a system based on representative government and adult franchise, together with its secular character, was one of British rule's legacies to India.

Unlike India and virtually all other countries of the world, Britain has no written constitution. Its government is based on tradition and prevailing practice. In England, much of the ceremonial affairs of state, especially that of the Crown, involves the Church of England. Hindu nationalist leaders have referred to this aspect of Britain to advocate the primacy of Hinduism and Hindu traditions as the basis of the Indian state, especially since the Indian political system was based on the British political system. However, the British government's activities are strictly secular. Indeed, the formal practice of Christianity itself among the general population has nearly vanished in Britain, with a minority of the population involved in church affairs. A similar situation now prevails in much of western Europe, with the exception of some Catholic countries of postcommunist eastern Europe.

In Western democracies, especially in the United States and France, a secular state is considered an essential requisite of a democratic state. The founding fathers of American democracy, including Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, were particularly concerned about mixing religion and politics. James Madison, in a private letter, summed up his concerns: "Religion and government will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together." Efforts by right-wing Christian fundamentalists to define the United States as a nation founded upon Christian traditions and values, insisting that Christianity be central to the identity of the state, have thus far been rejected as unconstitutional. Even the reference to "one nation under God" in the American Pledge of Allegiance has been regarded by many as unacceptable in a secular state.

France has gone further. In December 2003, a constitutional committee in France sought to determine whether wearing religious symbols by individuals in public schools constituted a violation of France's secular identity. Such symbols would include the wearing of large crosses by Christians, the yarmulke, or skull cap, by Jewish men, and the head scarf by Muslim women. With a population of 6 million immigrant Muslims and their descendants, France has the largest Muslim population of any state in Europe. According to a preliminary observation of the investigating commission, secularism is not only "the separation of church and state, but it is also the respect of [religious] differences." The flaunting of religious differences in public schools was considered to be provocative and unsecular.

Secularism and India's Constitution

Secularism is not mentioned in the original Constitution of India; nor did the Constitution advocate a religious state, or a state that identifies with one particular religion. In Part III, titled "Fundamental Rights," under the section "Right to Freedom of Religion," all citizens are ensured "freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion." The Indian Constitution did not, however, specify non-involvement by the government in religious practice, as does the Constitution of the United States, nor did it define the government as secular, as does the Constitution of the French republic. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Article One of the French Constitution states that "France is a republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social; all citizens are equal before the law."

Although the original Indian Constitution made no specific reference to India as a secular state, the Indian constitution was implicitly secular. The post-independence Constituent Assembly was dominated by members of the secular Indian National Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, who was determined that, unlike Pakistan, independent India would be characterized by forward-looking scientific rationalism, not backward-looking religious traditionalism.

A formal declaration that India is a secular state was first introduced in 1976 in the Forty-second Amendment to the Indian Constitution. The amendment was passed by the Congress Party majority in Parliament during the "National Emergency" that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed on India from June 1975 to March 1977. The Emergency suspended the democratic process and introduced twenty-two months of authoritarian rule. Among the several sweeping changes introduced into the Indian Constitution by the Forty-second Amendment, which provided extraordinary authoritarian powers to the government, was a rewording of the Preamble to the Indian Constitution, under Section 2: "In the Preamble to the Constitution, (a) for the words 'SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC' the words 'SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC' shall be substituted; and (b) for the words 'unity of the Nation,' the words 'unity and integrity of the Nation' shall be substituted" [capitalization per the original].

The Forty-second Amendment was swept aside, almost in its entirety, following the defeat of Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party in the March 1977 elections. The new Janata Party coalition government (a motley group of parties that included the Bharatiya Jan

Sangh led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Samyukta Socialist Party led by George Fernandes), under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, a former Congress Party finance minister, passed the Forty-fourth Amendment in 1978. While the fundamental rights of all citizens were reinstated and protected from future abuse, the Forty-fourth Amendment reinforced the secular character of the state, noting that:

Recent experience has shown that the fundamental rights, including those of life and liberty, granted to citizens by the Constitution are capable of being taken away by a transient majority. It is, therefore, necessary to provide adequate safeguards against the recurrence of such a contingency in the future and to ensure to the people themselves an effective voice in determining the form of government under which they are to live. . . . It is, therefore, proposed to provide that certain changes in the Constitution which would have the effect of impairing its secular or democratic character, abridging or taking away fundamental rights prejudicing or impeding free and fair elections on the basis of adult suffrage and compromising the independence of judiciary, can be made only if they are approved by the people of India by a majority of votes at a referendum in which at least fifty-one percent of the electorate participate.

Hindutva and Indian Secularism

Hindu nationalist aspirations, promoted by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition government, which held power from March 1998 to April 2004, revolved around the concept of Hindutva. The idea of Hindutva was used in two separate contexts. First, it implied that all Indians should recognize the essence of being Hindu as a way of life, not just among Hindus in particular, but also by the followers of all other faiths in India. Second, the movement sought the eventual establishment of a political state called "Hindutva," the land of the Hindus, replacing other names such as "India" in English, "Bharat" in Hindi, and "Hindustan" in Urdu.

The name "India" is considered Western, derived from early Persian and Greek references to the land around the Indus River. "Bharat" is the name of the land referred to in Hindu scriptures, and was also the name of the country under Emperor Ashoka's rule (r. 268–231 B.C.), when he and all of his Indian empire became Buddhists. "Hindustan" was the name that represented the "two-nation theory" of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who claimed that Muslims and Hindus belonged in two separate states, Pakistan and Hindustan. The partition of India in 1947 carved out Pakistan as the homeland for India's Muslims. Ironically,

most Muslims in the Hindu-majority areas, who had demanded the creation of Pakistan because they feared Hindu domination, were left behind in India. With the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan, making the declaration of a “Hindutva” even more problematic. With the flight of all Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan at the time of the partition of British India, and following the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 (where some 15 million Bengali Hindus resided), Pakistan is 98 percent Muslim. Pakistan is a nonsecular, nondemocratic Islamic republic.

This demand for Hindutva, in the context of the essence of being Hindu, was controversial even among Hindus. Unlike Christianity and Islam, or even Buddhism and Sikhism, Hindus do not believe in organized religion. Hinduism makes no specific demands of its followers, either in its beliefs or its worship. Hindutva as a Hindu state would pose problems for India’s democracy. A state that is characterized or identified by a particular religion may be incompatible with the concept of a democratic state, even if all or most of its citizens belong to that religion, and even if the electoral process is continued. As illustrated in the French and American practice, secularism is a precondition for democracy. There are other complications in making India into a Hindu state: the sizable numbers of religious minorities; the uncertain religious-ethnic status of the former “untouchables,” now known as Dalits, meaning “the oppressed”; and the potential transformation of the traditional practice of Hinduism from what was essentially a secular way of life into a more intense faith.

In a Hindu state, democracy would be undermined in at least two ways. First, a state identified by its dominant religion would imply the rejection of equality for citizens of other religions. The political commitment of religious minorities would probably be deeply eroded. Second, when the religious clergy or religious-minded leaders are able to arouse the passions of citizens on the basis of religion, then the freedom to make choices becomes threatened, given the fear of retribution. The power to coerce citizens by the government, represented by the dominant religion and its religious leaders and clergy, becomes stronger. In a secular state, the government and religious leaders are unlikely to carry such coercive or persuasive powers over the minds of its citizens when the issues and the debate are confined to the secular domain. Thus, secularism would appear essential for the exercise of free choice in any democracy, even if all its citizens belong to the same religion.

The absolute numbers of religious minorities in India make the enforcement of a Hindu state, which would be a counterpart to Islamic Pakistan, difficult. Following the

flight of nearly all Hindus and Sikhs to India, Pakistan’s religious minority population is less than 2 percent. In India’s population of 1 billion at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 18 percent were non-Hindus, of which 14 percent were Muslims (140 million) and 2 percent Christians (20 million). There are fewer than 100,000 Parsis, who came from Persia in the eighth century to escape Islamic conversions, and who continue to adhere to the pre-Islamic religion of Persia, known as Zoroastrianism. The remaining 2 percent religious minorities (about 20 million people) are Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains, religions that were offshoots of Hinduism, founded in India. Hindu nationalists have declared these groups to be Hindus, but this inclusion is rejected for the most part by Sikhs and Buddhists. Sikhs reject the claim of inclusion for fear of being swallowed up by Hinduism. Some Hindu nationalists have called for the return of Muslims and Christians to their “original” religion, from which they were “converted” during various stages of Indian history, or propose declaring every Indian a Hindu.

There is also the problem of the religious identity of the Dalits, the former “untouchables” at the bottom of the Hindu social order. Some Dalits, including their most famous leader, B. R. Ambedkar, who converted to Buddhism, do not consider themselves Hindus. Dalits number about 250 million and constitute approximately 25 percent of India’s population. Hindu nationalists today include them in the Hindu fold, but there is no widespread acceptance of this embrace by the Dalits. Statistically, their exclusion—together with that of Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains—reduces the Hindu percentage of India’s population to about 60 percent.

Hindu Nationalism, Indian Secularism, and the West

The Hindu nationalist movement, led by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its activist wing, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), argue that secularism is a Western ideology imported from Britain. It was sustained in India after independence by Western-oriented Anglophile Indian intellectuals and political leaders, chief among whom was Prime Minister Nehru. This Western-oriented secularism is perceived by members of the Hindu right wing as anti-Hindu. Those Hindus who continue to advocate a secular Indian state are often branded as “pseudo-secularists,” implying a false or phony understanding of secularism. Alternatively, Hindus who oppose the Hindu nationalist agenda and support the secular character of the Indian state are declared to be “godless communists,” socialists, or other leftists. Such Hindu “pseudo-secularists,” “communists,” and “left-wing apologists” are alleged to pander excessively to Muslim and

Christian religious minorities and their religious practice, at the expense of Hindus and the Hindu way of life.

In particular, Hindu nationalist critics of the Nehruvian secular state argue that genuine secularism was not always practiced under Congress Party governments because of “unsecular” concessions to the Muslim minority. Two instances are often cited. First, the Indian government since independence has subsidized the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca for Indian Muslims, without similar subsidies to followers of other religions. Second, Muslim law for Muslims is allowed to override civil law that applies to all other Indians. The celebrated case alleging violation of the principles of the secular state is that of the Shah Bano case of 1985; this case involved a Muslim woman with four children, who was divorced by her Muslim husband, who then refused to pay alimony because Muslim law did not require it. The case went to the Supreme Court of India, which overruled Muslim law and granted Shah Bano alimony, thereby undermining the limited legal autonomy granted to the Muslim minority of India. Faced with adverse Muslim reaction, the Congress Party government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi passed legislation reiterating the rights of Muslim law for the husband.

The claims by some Hindu nationalists that secularism in India is a Western import is often countered by the claim India’s Constitution and democratic political system are likewise derived from the West. Parliamentary democracy embodied in India’s Constitution was based on the British political system; the federal arrangement between the central and state governments was modeled on the Canadian federal system; the list of “Fundamental Rights” was derived from the U.S. Bill of Rights; the “Directive Principles of Social Policy” in the preamble was an idea obtained from the Irish Constitution; and the financial relationship between the central and state governments in India was derived from the Australian system. These states are all secular democracies, even Catholic-majority Ireland, in that there is a separation of the spheres of church and state.

When the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gained a pluralist majority in the 1998 national elections and led a coalition government into office, the status of secularism in India became an issue. Perhaps because of the other motley group of parties that formed the coalition, without whose support the BJP could not remain in power, the BJP immediately declared that India would remain a secular state. This did not satisfy the more extreme members of the group of Hindu nationalist parties known together as the Sangh Parivar, which include the RSS, the VHP, and the Shiv Sena. Concerns remain, within the Congress Party and other secular parties, that a clear majority by Hindu nationalist parties in Parliament in future elections could lead to the

declaration of Hindutva, ending a secular India. These Hindu aspirations were halted in the April 2004 national elections, when the BJP-led coalition government was defeated by a secular Congress Party-led coalition, which formed a new government. However, the controversy over whether India should be a secular state along the Western model, as embraced by the Congress and left-wing parties, or a Hindutva state, representing Hinduism and Hindus as proposed by the BJP and other Hindu parties, remains unresolved.

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See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Congress Party; Dalits; Family Law and Cultural Pluralism; Hindutva and Politics; Muslims; Shiv Sena; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)**

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SECURITIES EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (SEBI) The Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was established in April 1988 by order of the government of India to regulate India’s securities market, but lacked statutory powers until 1992, when the Securities Exchange Board of India Act was passed. The board has nine members: its chairman and two members are full time; among the part-time members, two are officials of the government ministries of finance and company law matters, and one is from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central bank of the country. The core responsibility of the board is to regulate the securities markets and protect investors’ interests. SEBI was given further statutory powers under The Depositories Act of 1996.

SEBI's regulations are statutory in nature, and any infringements are punishable by monetary penalty and/or imprisonment. It has powers to put any market intermediary or participant out of business by suspending or canceling the registration granted to it under its relevant regulations. SEBI can also prosecute the offenders. This serves as an effective deterrent against market manipulation or disruption. SEBI's powers were enhanced significantly in 1995, when it became a quasi-judicial body that can adjudicate breaches to its regulations and impose fines. The affected parties have the freedom to appeal against SEBI's decisions to a three-member tribunal. The verdicts of the tribunal can be challenged only in the Supreme Court.

SEBI regulates stock exchanges, securities markets, stock brokers, subbrokers, share transfer agents, bankers to the issue, trustees of trust deeds, merchant bankers, underwriters, portfolio managers, investment advisers, mutual funds, depositories, depository participants, custodians, foreign institutional investors, and any intermediaries that are connected with the securities markets. Credit rating companies have been brought under SEBI's regulatory oversight to ensure that the rating companies enjoy professional independence and are not subject to unwarranted influence. SEBI enjoys strong powers to prohibit fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to securities markets. Recently its penal powers have been significantly strengthened to prohibit insider trading in securities. It also regulates substantial acquisitions of shares and the takeover of companies.

Since 1995 the standards of Indian securities markets have improved significantly. Indian markets, once considered risky and inefficient, are now among the best in the world, with state-of-the-art trading and settlement systems. However, only part of the credit for this improvement can go to SEBI. The two most important institutions that have significantly upgraded the quality and safety of the Indian securities markets are the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) and the National Securities Depository Limited. The record of SEBI in containing market manipulation is also rather patchy. The move to shift to rolling settlement in mid-2001, to avoid manipulation by market players taking advantage of different settlement periods at different exchanges, was taken only at the insistence of the government of India.

Out of the twenty-three stock exchanges, only the NSE and the Bombay Stock Exchange are really functioning, and all others have become practically defunct. The nonfunctioning exchanges are not debarred, however, from listing companies. SEBI has announced the creation of a Central Listing Authority to deal with the competitive devaluation of standards of listing that used to take place, with competition among exchanges to attract com-

panies for listing. The Central Listing Authority has yet to frame its own guidelines and business rules, however. The recent move of SEBI to grant unique identification numbers to all market intermediaries was ill-conceived (attendant complexities were perceived as intrusions into privacy); the intended purpose could have been achieved through an investor database available with the depositories. Therefore, although SEBI has been able to establish itself as the market regulator, it has yet to prove convincingly that it is effective, efficient, and proactive.

R. H. Patil

See also **Capital Market; Stock Exchange Markets**

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There are two web sites that provide exhaustive information on Indian securities markets and the regulative framework: the Securities Exchange Board of India (<http://www.sebi.gov.in/>) and the National Stock Exchange of India (<http://www.nseindia.com/>). The following reports and documents are particularly useful: Securities Exchange Board of India, Annual Reports, 1996–1997 to 2002–2003; Government of India: The Securities Exchange Board of India Act (1992), The Depositories Act (1996), The Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act (1956); and The National Stock Exchange of India's annual publication, "Indian Securities Market, An Overview," for the years 1999 to 2003.

SELECTED MACROECONOMIC MODELS A logical explanation of any phenomenon, or a set of mutually interdependent phenomena, is a model. This, referred to as theory, can be purely verbal in nature or mathematical in form. A model is an abstract and simplified picture of a realistic process, given in the form of mathematical equations. It helps in forecasting and policy analysis by government and business. Economists and public policy analysts not only require the direction of the effect of one variable on the other, but also the extent of impact and trade-offs. This necessitates casting theory in the form of mathematical equations, variable measurement, and impact calibration.

Three types of macroeconomic models were developed for India since the early 1950s. They are: input-output (I-O); computable general equilibrium; and econometric models. The objective of all models is structural analysis, forecasting and policy evaluation.

Input-Output Models

With the advent of planning in the early 1950s, focus was on models of plan-variety concerning growth and investment allocation. One aspect central to planning models is the sectoral interdependence and sectoral balance for a given macroeconomic growth rate. Input-output models form a core element of planning exercises.

The economy is viewed as consisting of n producing sectors, each producing ideally a single homogeneous output. The intersectoral flow matrix charts the flow of output of a sector to each of the sectors and to final demand over a specified period, generally one year. The final demand relates to consumers, government, investment, and the foreign sector. It is a two-way table (each sector appearing in a row and in a column) describing the production structure of the economy. The ratio of output of i -th sector used as input by j -th sector, divided by output of j -th sector, represents input-output coefficient. They are technological parameters. The configuration of such n -by- n coefficient matrix represents the I-O table. It is a linear production structure. Inputs bear a fixed proportion to output, constant returns to scale prevail, and no substitution possibilities exist between inputs. The model is static. The intersectoral commodity flow matrix that yields the I-O table is in value terms.

In the intersectoral flow matrix, final demands appear as a column. Imports appear with a negative sign. They balance supply and demand. Imports, which enter as inputs in the production process, appear in a separate row. Rewards for primary inputs, wages, and profits, as well as indirect taxes and subsidies can also be shown as additional rows. If the intersectoral flows are represented at producer prices, the column sums represent the total cost of producing that sector's output. This should be equal to the corresponding row sum, suitably adjusted for taxes and subsidies. The total of row sums should be equal to the total of column sums, and the grand total represents the gross value of goods and services produced in the economy. This represents not only intersectoral flows but also final demand and disposition of total output as inputs and rewards for primary factors. This can be viewed as a social accounting matrix.

The Indian Statistical Institute built an input-output table for 1950–1951 with thirty-six sectors. The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics published an input-output model for 1963. The Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Organization constructed the tables for 1968–1969 and subsequently published a new one every five years. The latest table refers to 1993–1994. The various tables differ in the extent of aggregation.

The analytical problem in the solution of the I-O model is one of solving linear simultaneous equations. Planning exercise involves setting an economy-wide growth target, calculating associated final demands, and solving the I-O model to yield sectoral output targets. These output targets aid in calculating sectoral investment requirements, employment, and other related dimensions. In each of the Five-Year Plan exercises in India, these calculations have been made in much detail.

The calculation of forward and backward linkages in an economy is crucial to evaluate alternative strategies of development. Backward linkages reflect the impact of a sectoral output change on all other sectors that supply inputs to it, while forward linkages measure consequent increase in demand for other sectors' output. Key sectors in development are those that have strong backward and forward linkages. These exercises have been made for India with the help of I-O tables. Another application relates to measuring the impact of price changes of primary factors or any other inputs on sectoral prices and overall price level. The estimates represent accounting exercise and do not reflect the effect of many other important factors that underlie price behavior.

Computable General Equilibrium Models

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have two facets. First, general equilibrium connotes viewing the economy as a complete system of interdependent economic activities by different agents, for example, producers, households, investors, the government, importers and exporters. The interrelationships are through a web of intersectoral output flows and price connections. The second term, "computable," signifies an empirical system that can be implemented. Rules for the functioning of individual markets and the behavior of agents in the markets, that is, causal links that determine equilibrium mechanisms, are specified. The underlying production structure is the I-O model. CGE models have a close interface both with the I-O and econometric models.

In the early 1980s substantive research on CGE models for India was initiated at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. The model is maintained, frequently updated, and improved over the years. Particularly notable is the recent effort to integrate segments of behavioral macroeconometric models with the CGE model. The model originally comprised eight sectors, including infrastructure, services, three in agriculture (food, other crops, and livestock), and three in industry (consumer, intermediate, and capital goods). Three income classes (agriculture income recipients, nonagricultural wage income earners, and nonagricultural nonwage income earners) were distinguished. Public finance and money were also later brought into the system. In recent versions, sectoral decomposition has widened. Agricultural output is determined outside the CGE model through an agricultural submodel, treated as exogenous to CGE solutions.

Since the early 1980s, the model is used regularly for making annual forecasts of important macroeconomic indicators, including output, prices, trade, and fiscal and external deficits. Forecasts are made for only one year ahead, and sequential forecast over time do not generally include dynamic interlinks. Many policy simulations have

also been made over the years. Policy simulations relevant to the 1990s, which witnessed far-reaching structural adjustments and macroeconomic policy reforms, to name a few, relate to reduction in tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, lower domestic indirect taxes, changes in the exchange rate, reduction in government investment expenditures, and changes in interest rates.

Macroeconometric Models

India has had a history of macroeconometric modeling dating back to the 1950s, unparalleled among developing countries. Many models were constructed, and to date about fifty models, covering different time periods and focusing on issues relevant to those times, have been constructed.

Macroeconometric models for India are based on annual time series data. They are estimated by econometric methods and are subject to statistical inference. They are also subject to in-sample validation, in terms of their ability to replicate historical series. Almost all of them have had a policy focus. Most of the models have had only a short- to medium-run character. They are dynamic in nature. Models have been concerned with the level of economic activity, aggregate and sectoral, price behavior, fiscal and monetary phenomena, intersectoral linkages, private investment and its linkages with public investment, consumption and savings, public sector resource mobilization, current and investment expenditures and their composition, budgetary deficits and pattern of financing, trade flows, balance of payments, exchange rate and nexus between the twin deficits, budgetary and external, among others.

The theoretical approach to macroeconometric modeling in India has been eclectic in character. Specification of components of final demand is Keynesian. Unlike in the simple Keynesian approach, the economy is not entirely driven by effective demand. Supply constraints are well jeweled in the models. Agriculture activity is determined by land, a limiting factor and natural resources. Harnessing these resources is facilitated by capital. In the nonagricultural sectors, output is viewed as constrained by stock of capital, the scarce factor and its utilization. Capital utilization is conditioned by effective demand, which, in turn, is influenced by level of overall economic activity in general, and agriculture in particular, and availability of critical inputs, such as agricultural raw materials, infrastructure and imported materials.

Level of activity in most of the recent models is disaggregated into agriculture, manufacturing, economic infrastructure, and services. Price determination in agriculture is governed by a flex price (supply-demand balance) mechanism, subject to public intervention through

procurement and support prices. Price formation in other sectors is based on markup over costs, including wage rate, administered prices of critical intermediates, and imported inputs. Markup is viewed as being influenced by excess demand/liquidity in the economy, proxied by money stock to overall output. This variable is also factored in the agricultural price determination. Money supply is modeled as the outcome of public desire to hold money, government operations, external factors, and monetary policy. Interest rate and exchange rate are also broadly influenced by a similar set of factors. Turning to foreign trade, imports are determined by domestic activity and relative prices, exports by world economic activity, relative prices, and domestic availabilities.

In most of the models large parts of public activity is given. External economic environment is a datum. Most of the recent models are driven by public investment-quantum and composition, current expenditures and their composition, monetary-fiscal policies and external economic environment, among others. In the short run, weather (rainfall) is a decisive factor.

One disappointing aspect of macroeconometric modeling in India has been that each model has turned out to be a one-time exercise. It is only since the early 1990s that sustained ongoing work on a structural macroeconomic model began jointly at the Institute of Economic Growth and the Delhi School of Economics. That model is the single largest macroeconometric model for India. The system has 347 equations. The model has five production sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, economic infrastructure, services, and public administration and defense. Agriculture is further subdivided into food and nonfood segments. Besides output, capital formation, and price behavior relating to each of the sectors, the model includes separate subsystems, dealing with trade and balance of payments, money and banking, public finance, private consumption and savings. The model is a constituent of the Global LINK Model, being operated under the auspices of the United Nations. Biannual (September and March) forecasts for LINK are made regularly, and several policy simulations have been carried out. The forecasts incorporate the dynamics of the model and are made for more than a year ahead. The India model is constantly undergoing revisions to incorporate policy changes, taking advantage of the latest data. The project is now housed at the Centre for Development Economics at the Delhi School of Economics.

Most of the models were subject to policy simulations. They mostly relate to increase in administered prices, enhanced public investment and change in its composition, pattern of financing public deficits, fiscal—monetary policy stances, exchange rate changes, and world economic scenario—world output, trade volume, and

international prices. Normal rainfall assumption is invariably a part of counterfactual or “what if” simulations for almost all the models.

Conclusion

The trilogy of models—I-O, CGE, and econometric—are complementary to each other. Common to all the three models is the estimation of final demand. Econometric models do not emphasize intermediate demands, as they deal with a net value-added output concept. Behavioral characteristics that underlie consumption, investment, prices, public sector, money, and trade receive more emphasis in macroeconomic models. Sectoral output interdependence is at the core of I-O and CGE models. The data requirements for each of the models are demanding, particularly in the case of developing countries. Whatever model is used, it is essential to maintain it, with refinements in specification, use of the latest data, and use of improved econometric methodologies to keep it relevant for policy analysis and forecasting.

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See also **Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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SEPOY MUTINY. See **British East India Company Raj; History and Historiography.**

SHAH BANO CASE The Shah Bano case resulted in the controversial enactment of the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act of 1986. Introduced by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress ministry, the act jeopardized India’s system of secular law, while it circumvented the Shari’a code governing the Muslim community. The priority of minority rights over women’s rights was at stake in this important case, which has seriously undermined Muslim women’s maintenance rights.

The case began in 1985 in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, where Shah Bano, a sixty-two-year-old destitute woman, filed a suit for nonpayment of alimony against her husband, Ahmed Khan, from whom she had been separated for forty-six years. Shah Bano asked for a monthly alimony of 500 rupees, based on Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC 1973). Citing the Shari’a, Ahmed Khan promptly divorced her, repaid 3,000 rupees of her dowry (*mehr*), and ceased all alimonies. The battle was taken to the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Y. V. Chandrachud upheld Section 125, as it did not conflict with Qur’anic injunctions (chapter 11, suras 141–142) on women’s property and maintenance rights. The chief justice also urged the creation of a uniform Indian civil code that would remove “disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies.”

Conservative Muslims protested against the Court’s authority over the Qur’an, whipping up fears over state encroachment of minority rights. A heated debate ensued over minority rights and women’s rights, but the prospect of protracted, expensive legal battles at first daunted many activists. In February 1986, to allay the fears of a

nervous Muslim electorate on whom the Congress depended for votes, Rajiv Gandhi shepherded the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act of 1986. Outside Parliament, the leftist All-India Democratic Women's Association and the moderate National Federation of Indian Women joined hands with local Mahila Dakshata Samiti to protest the bill. Arif Mohammad Khan, a Muslim Cabinet minister, resigned in protest, but Muslim Congresswoman Begam Abida Ahmed staunchly defended the bill.

The Act of 1986 redefines the legal grounds for Muslim women's maintenance, while jeopardizing both their secular and religious rights. It thus dilutes Section 125 (CrPC 1973), which stipulates that women are entitled to alimony from ex-spouses. Women have since presented petitions that the act also violates the Indian Constitution, Article 14 on legal equality, and Article 15 prohibiting religious discrimination. Second, the 1986 law also circumvents the Qur'an, which protects women's property and maintenance rights. Third, it places a new legal onus on the largely defunct Muslim welfare board (*waqf*), as it now requires her natal family to support a divorced or separated woman; and if this fails, it requires the *waqf* to do so. Since the *waqf* is governed largely by conservative men, Muslim women's rights have been substantially eroded. The clerical leaders of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board have frequently resisted government interference in Muslim laws, but they have acceded in this case, despite the act's blatant negation of the Shari'a, which requires the husband to maintain a woman, not the *waqf*. Moreover, if government funds were used by the *waqf*, this would constitute state interference in religion.

Inheritance and marriage customs vary according to region and community. In the nineteenth century, liberal Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, and Christian reformers supported uniform legislation to remedy child marriage, perpetual widowhood, and denial of divorce, resulting in such measures as the 1891 Age of Consent Bill and the Sarda Act of 1930. Muslim law was originally mediated through a Qazi, a judicial expert on Shari'a law, but the abolition of this post in 1864 left legal disputes unsolved. In an era of sectarian and national consciousness, Muslim purists charged that women's Qur'anic rights were forgotten when Muslims adopted Hindu customs. In 1937 the Shari'a Act was passed to protect Qur'anic laws favorable to women, while it helped Muslim jurists (ulama) to weed out non-Hindu practices. The Act of 1986, on the other hand, has eroded women's rights, pitted Muslim liberals against religious leaders, and promoted political opportunism.

Sita Anantha Raman

**See also Family Law and Cultural Pluralism;
Women and Political Power**

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SHAH JAHAN (1592–1666), Mughal emperor (1628–1658). Shah Jahan, whose reign has been dubbed the "Golden Age of the Mughals," was born in 1592 and was named Khurram (Joyous). He was able, ambitious, and ruthless in youth, and was later renowned for opulence and magnificence, a "Great Moghul." He built the Jama Mosque in Delhi, the Pearl Mosque in Agra, and the Shalimar Gardens in Lahore, as well as one of the most renowned buildings in the world, the Taj Mahal in Agra, which was built as a mausoleum for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, his partner in his government and the mother of fourteen of his sixteen children. Shah Jahan would be buried there next to her. In addition, he built a mausoleum for his father, Jahangir, and a new capital at Delhi, Shahjahanabad, completed in 1648, where he placed the gem-covered Peacock Throne in its Red Fort. Persian literature and art permeated Shah Jahan's court. His reign represents a return to Sunni Muslim orthodoxy, although he continued the Rajput Hindu alliance. He ordered a number of recently completed Hindu temples torn down, and his official court policy conformed to Shari'a laws. Muslim festivals were lavishly celebrated, and he resumed sponsorship of the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca for his courtiers and faithful servants.

Shah Jahan continued the expansion of the Mughal empire, supervising campaigns, though not leading the armies personally. The Bundela campaign of 1635, led by his third son, Aurangzeb, marked the change of formerly

tolerant Mughal religious policy and a reversion to orthodoxy, as a Hindu temple was demolished and a mosque built in its place, and forced conversions to Islam were ordered. In 1629 rebellion broke out in the south as Shah Jahan attempted to subjugate the Muslim Deccan states of Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Golconda, remaining in the south until 1631. Ahmednagar was captured in 1632, but the war dragged on and the Mughals were driven out of Bijapur. Shah Jahan returned to the south in 1636, and Bijapur and Golconda were obliged to accept a peace that endured for two decades. The Mughals then acquired four more provinces: Khandesh, Berar, Telingana, and Daulatabad. The Mughals also attacked and defeated a number of states in the north, and Sind was brought more firmly under Mughal control.

In 1638 Shah Jahan captured Afghan Kandahar. From there, the Mughals moved on Balkh in Central Asia, occupying it in 1646. The following year, harassed by Afghan tribal raiders, the Mughal army returned to Hindustan, losing thousands in the mountain passes, the expedition a total failure. In 1649 Kandahar fell to the shah of Persia, and three major Mughal campaigns to recover Kandahar all failed.

Shah Jahan then became more retiring, delegating more of the responsibility for governing the empire to his eldest son, Dara Shikoh. In the north, Lesser Tibet was subdued in 1637 and Garhwal in 1656. Turning to the south again, in 1656, the Mughals captured Golconda, and in 1657 Bijapur and Kalyani. In 1657 Shah Jahan became ill, and a murderous war of succession began among his four sons. His third son, Aurangzeb, emerged victorious. He imprisoned Shah Jahan in his Agra palace, where he spent the last year of his life, confined to Agra Fort, from which he could view, but never visit, the Taj Mahal. When he died, he left an expanded and prosperous empire with some quarter million men under arms.

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Aurangzeb; Islam's Impact on India; Jahangir**


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SHAKTI. See **Devī**.

SHAKUNTALA. See **Kālidāsa**.

SHANKAR, RAVI (1920–), classical musician and sitar virtuoso. Born in Varanasi on 7 April 1920, Ravi Shankar's international tours and teaching have contributed significantly to the global recognition of Indian classical music. The son of a diplomat/businessman, Ravi Shankar came to music as a boy through his brother Uday's dance troupe in Paris. In 1935 Uday invited Allaudin Khan to Paris to contribute the music for his choreographies drawing upon Indian religious stories, and in this context Ravi Shankar received his first musical training. Shankar continued residential study with Allaudin Khan until the days before partition and independence, at which time he became a music director for All India Radio. He toured extensively beginning in the 1950s, playing sitar with several popular drummers (including Catur Lal and Allah Rakha), at first primarily for the growing South Asian diaspora, but increasingly for broader European and American audiences.



Ravi Shankar Playing Sitar. *Nada Brahma: Sound Is God.* Photographed here at the 1967 International Pop Festival in Monterey, California, Shankar has traveled the globe to bring Indian music to millions. TED STRESHINSKY.

Ravi Shankar's experiences with Uday Shankar's dance troupe, with experimenter Allaudin Khan, and at All India Radio (where he composed music for an ensemble) uniquely prepared him to be a catalyst for change. He has composed celebrated scores for Satyajit Ray's *Apu Trilogy*, Richard Attenborough's *Gandhi*, and several other films. He championed the use of the bass string on the sitar, has composed new *rāgas*, and has ventured into new forms. His duets with Yehudi Menuhin and his concerti for sitar and orchestra have marked him as both innovator and interlocutor between India and the West. All the while, he has celebrated a reverence for Indian music and culture and for traditional modes of education. His style of playing is at once highly rhythmic (as is that of his brother-in-law and costudent, Ali Akbar Khan) and tuneful, which has contributed greatly to his popular appeal. He is the recipient of numerous national and international awards and honors and is one of the best-known South Asians in the world.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music; Rāga; Sitar**

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SHANKARA (A.D. 788–820), Hindu Vedāntic philosopher. In the opinion of many, Shankara was India's greatest Vedāntin and one of its greatest philosopher-theologians. He is considered a theologian insofar as he bases much of his thought on revelation (*sbruti*) and claims that many fundamental questions are unanswerable by reason alone. But he is also a philosopher because of his claim that his theological standpoint is supported by both reason and experience. What is most remarkable is how much he accomplished in his thirty-two years. Born in Kaladī, Kerala, to devout Shaivite parents, Shankara lived at a time when Buddhist influence in India was still strong—and skeptical of Brahmanic-Hindu orthodoxy. Shankara attempted to thwart this influence by absorbing what he considered useful from Buddhism—hence the ascription “crypto-Buddhist” given by his Vaishnava opponents—and then being fiercely critical of it. His ambition was to reestablish Brahmanism on a sound intellectual and institutional footing. To that end, he established four *mutts*, or monasteries, in the four corners of India: Badariē in the Himalayas (north), Sringeri in Karnataka (south), Puri in Orissa (east), and Dvārakā in Gujarat (west), plus an additional one at Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu. The religious ascetics who belong to this order are organized into ten divisions and are known as the *Dashanāmī Samnyasis*, all headed today by

Shankaracaryas. He was very concerned with the vitality of these monastic communities, traveling constantly to them, preaching and defending the tenets of his Advaitic (non-dualistic) position against opponents from a variety of Hindu and Buddhist schools.

The fundamental reality, according to Shankara's Advaita Vedanta, is Brahman, the name given for timeless, imperishable, immutable Being. Brahman by its very nature is beyond human language, but given the human tendency to describe the indescribable, Advaitins designate Brahman as *saccidānanda*, composed of *sat* (being), *cit* (consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss). These are not qualities of Brahman, because Brahman as such is quality-less (*nirguṇa*), but rather human ascriptions based on the experience of Brahman. The world has come into being from Brahman and is wholly dependent on it, but since the world is temporal and subject to change, it is “illusory,” a product of *māyā*. Shankara does not regard the world as a complete illusion because that would lead to nihilism and would contradict his own intense activity in the world. The world is “illusory” only when seen from the prospective of Brahman, the absolute reality. The “ordinary” human perspective (*vyāvahārika*) for the most part is that of relative, not absolute being but makes the mistake of identifying reality with the world. This congenital ignorance (*avidyā*) of which one is not even aware can be overcome only by the experience of Brahman, when the veil of *māyā* is pushed aside. This view is therefore called *a-dvaita*, or “nondual.” God and the world are neither two distinct realities nor one (the latter monistic position would require God to evolve or emanate into the world) but rather nondual, a position different from both dualism and monism. *Avidyā*, or ignorance, applies also to our account of selves. In our “ordinary” experience we are inclined to identify selfhood with our empirical ego, but our true reality is that of *ātman*, which is pure consciousness and not the intentional consciousness of any particular object, including the self. This pure consciousness is identical with Brahman and carries within itself the bliss (*ānanda*) of Brahman.

Shankara's Advaita is thus a philosophical mysticism that takes the reality of the world seriously but attempts to transcend or sublimate it into Brahman. Hence the two perspectives, that of the ultimate (*parāthika*) and the penultimate (*vyāvahārika*), and the two levels of Brahman, without qualities (*nirguṇa*) and with qualities (*saguṇa*). In the latter plane, Brahman appears as Īshvara, or God seen as personal, who presides over the world of appearances. Devotion to Īshvara (*bhakti*) is nonetheless seen as subordinate to the contemplative experience (*jnāna*) of Brahman.

Advaita Vedanta is not just a system of thought but a way of self-realization. Disease, says Shankara, is not

cured by pronouncing “medicine” but by taking it. In the same spirit, the purpose of philosophical contemplation is not just to know but to be Brahman, or rather to achieve the realization that one “always already” is Brahman. Shankara divides the Vedas into two sections, one dealing with duties and rituals action (*karmakāṇḍa*) and one dealing with right knowledge (*jnānakāṇḍa*). While the former is praiseworthy, it is the latter that leads to the overcoming of ignorance and the achievement of *moksha*, or liberation. This, however, calls for moral and spiritual purification prior to and alongside contemplation of Brahman, specifically for four conditions: discrimination between eternal and noneternal reality, detachment from the fruits of one’s actions both here and in the hereafter, rigorous self-control undertaken with serenity, and the desire for liberation. The devout reading of the Vedas is also an essential part of spiritual training, especially given that Shankara claims that his entire philosophy is in fact an exegesis of the Vedas. To that end, he endorses the traditional prescription of *śravaṇa* (hearing the scriptures), *manana* (reflection), and *dhyāna* (contemplation). It is this combination of profundity of thought and spiritual ardor that makes Shankara so attractive and powerful a figure to philosophers and spiritual aspirants alike.

Joseph Prabhu

See also **Upanishadic Philosophy**

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SHIVA AND SHAIIVISM Hinduism in the classical, medieval, and modern periods displays two powerful male deities, Shiva and Vishnu, in addition to multiple forms of Devī, the goddess. All have numerous manifestations with various names, mythologies, and rituals. For example, the Sanskrit names of Shiva include, among others, Ardhanārīshvara, Bhava, Bhīma, Hara, Īshāna, Kapardin, Mahādeva, Maheshvara, Naṭarāja, Parameshvara, Shambhu, Shaṅkara, Sharva, and Sthāṇu. Some roots

of Shiva and Vishnu may be traced to the Rig Veda. Although neither is dominant in that seminal text of the mid-second millennium B.C., both emerge to prominence in the post-Vedic period of the Sanskrit epics. Their roles in myths, rituals, and symbols have many intriguing parallels. They evolve, however, in essentially different directions, and their followers, known respectively as Shaivas and Vaishnavas, represent two options for Hindu life and practice. It could be said that all Hindus respect Shiva, Vishnu, and the great goddesses; some worship both Shiva and Vishnu as well as one or more goddesses; while many prefer to concentrate devotion and faithful allegiance to one as supreme deity.

Prehistory and Rudra-Shiva in the Vedas

Recent archaeological and linguistic studies have led historians of religion to new insights into possible prehistoric origins of Shiva. Two areas have drawn attention: the non-Aryan Indus Valley Civilization, centering on Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro around 2600–1800 B.C.; and Indo-Aryan migrations around 2100–1700 B.C. across the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex in present-day Turkmenistan and Afghanistan prior to the early Vedic period. A number of steatite seals from the Indus period depict a powerful male figure with erect phallus and horned animal mask, seated in what the Yoga tradition later calls *padmāsana*, or “lotus posture.” Other seals represent various bulls and trifoliate *bilva* leaves. An Indo-Aryan legacy may lie behind myths of an archer deity known as Sharva in the Rig Veda, with a similar name in the Avesta of ancient Iran.

The Rig Veda provides better focus, as hymns addressed to particular deities and references to key rituals supplant speculation about artifacts and language from the deeper prehistory. In a few hymns a mysterious, ferocious, highly dangerous god appears under the name Rudra, perhaps indicating a “Howler” (from *rud*, “to howl, cry, roar”) among animals in the mountains and wilderness. Rudra’s companion and alter ego is a wild bull (*vriṣabha*) that may have replaced an earlier wild water buffalo (*mabisha*). Rudra’s weapons are the *vajra* (thunderbolt), a bow, and burning arrows that kill with terror (*ugra*). Here, however, his essentially ambivalent character is revealed. The same missiles that slay can also cool and heal, and strangely enough, “cooling” (*jalāsha*) is a special epithet of this dreaded god. Clearly the poet of Rig Veda 2.33.11 hopes that his verses praising mighty (*bhīma*) Rudra will win his grace. Like a wise physician, Rudra has a thousand remedies (*bheshaja*). Equally fearsome are Rudra’s sons and warring companions, the Maruts, also known collectively as the Rudras, born from the cow Prishni. The Maruts, like their father and the great god Indra (whom they also serve), are associated

not only with bulls, war, and chariot driving but also with winds and storms that bring fertilizing rain.

Rudra is at times identified with Agni, the Vedic deity of the fire sacrifice (*yajña*). But it is precisely that complex ritual tradition at the core of Rig Vedic religion that separates Rudra from others. At first Rudra is excluded from the soma cult and offerings to dominant deities such as Indra and Varuṇa. Offerings to Rudra (for example, the collected blood and entrails of animal victims) are left to the north, his direction. Over time he is gradually accepted into the pantheon, although his “outsider” status, both as frequenter of untamed space remote from human habitation and as a god of unpredictable behavior, remains integral to his legacy and certainly contributes to his unique appeal.

Somewhat later than the Rig Veda, recensions of the Yajur Veda (Taittirīya Saṃhitā 4.5.1–11 and Shukla Yajur Veda or Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā 16.1–66) contain a litany of a hundred names and forms of Rudra, known as the Shatarudrīya *stotra*. This liturgy accompanied 425 offerings into the sacrificial fire and secured Rudra’s place among major deities. The names, which appear as lasting definitions, include: Dweller on Mount Mūjavat; Pashupati, Lord of Animals; Best Physician; Kapardin, Wearer of Braided Hair; Bhava, Existence; Nīlagrīva, Blue-neck; Lord of Thieves; Sharva, the Archer; and many others. In the late Vedic Shvetāshvatara Upanishad 3.4–5, a poet carefully addressed the fearsome, quick-to-anger, death-dealing Rudra as sole sovereign deity, a protector who is “benign, not terrifying, and auspicious (*shiva*).” Shiva is the name by which the god is best known today.

Shiva in Epics and Purāṇas

The post-Vedic Sanskrit literature of the Mahābhārata, Rāmāyana and Purāṇas expanded the many-sided and ambiguous roles of Rudra and generated new myths for the god known more often as Shiva. There also his unruly horde of sons and companions, the Maruts or Rudras, augmented his ferocious appearance. In this period the performance of worship (*pūjā*) to gods, either in homes or temples with permanent resident deities, gradually replaced the centrality of Vedic sacrifice and its temporary altars. In temples housing Shiva, the Shatarudrīya *stotra* became a standard liturgy; worshipers routinely heard his hundred names, and priestly discourses recounted his famous episodes. For personal devotions many ardent Shaivas committed the *stotra* to memory, a practice still prominent today.

Among the many enduring myths of Shiva in epics and Purāṇas, several feature his destructive nature. In myth and iconography a balanced triad of deities known as *trimūrti* appeared: Brahmā as creator, flanked by

Vishnu the preserver, and Shiva the destroyer. In the repetitive eschatology known as *pralaya* (dissolution), it is Shiva who incinerates the cosmos and all its beings, divine, demonic, or human, prior to a long rest and yet another remanifestation of the world in an endless cycle of *yugas*, or ages. Kāla, the personification of time, is in fact an appellation of this overwhelming god. One myth with roots in the Vedas recounts the demolition of three cosmic cities built by Māyā for the demons. So powerful was the fiery anger of the god that he pierced all three fortresses with a single arrow. In another set of myths he destroyed the Vedic sacrifice of Daksha after Shiva, alone of all the gods, had been excluded. Shiva’s wrath is sometimes righteous display, as in the myth of his killing the great god Brahmā (Prajāpati) for attempted incest. In a variant, Shiva in the form of Bhairava cut off Brahmā’s fifth head. In retribution for this sin of killing a Brahman, the severed head would not leave the hand of Bhairava. The trident (*trishūla*) is a weapon Shiva employs to dispatch demons, often in his terrible *tāṇḍava* dance of death. Naṭarāja, King of the Dance, another epithet of Shiva, was often rendered in sculpture and painting based on a conception of the sinewy four-armed god poised in elegant mid-dance within a ring of cosmic fire, two hands holding the drum and flame of destruction, another in the “fear not” gesture, one foot planted on the demon of ignorance, as the fourth hand points to the raised foot free of bondage.

The destructive power of Shiva is curiously balanced by his creative nature in many ways. His most visible icon is an erect phallus, the *liṅga*, a ubiquitous symbol in Shaivite temples and homes either as bare pillar or anthropomorphic organ, often with carved faces. Myths describe the *liṅga* as a cosmic center, an endless *axis mundi* penetrating the nether worlds and rising to the highest heaven. It echoes the sacrificial pole of Vedic ritual. With this inexhaustible member, Shiva and his wife Pārvatī famously made love for 36,000 years. But Shiva’s unruly sexuality is often chaotic, and his semen, like his celebrated third eye with a capacity to burn someone to ashes, is dangerously fiery. He seduced the wives of the Rishis, the Pine Forest sages, sons of Brahmā, a crime for which he was deprived of his wayward member. The Skanda Purāṇa reports that Kāshī, holiest of cities with its temple of Shiva as Vishvanātha, assembled in acolyte temples vast numbers of *liṅgas* from all over India.

Contradicting his powerful sexuality is Shiva’s role as lord of ascetics (*yogins*), those who renounce marriage, family, and society to meditate, perform austerities (*tapas*) in the wilderness and, scorning tonsure, allow their hair to grow into Shiva’s *jaṭā*, or matted locks. The Maitreyi Upanishad stresses the renouncer’s identification with the one eternal Shiva. When Pārvatī attempts to distract

him from meditation in order to make love, Shiva burns a third eye in his forehead to continue creative insight. The same eye also burns to ashes Kāma, god of love, Shiva's erotic impulse. He is motionless in meditation, earning him the name Sthānu, an immovable "post," although his *liṅga*, also postlike, sends a contrary message. The ashes that were Kāma identify a many-layered symbol and paradox: they are the result of Shiva's power to incinerate a being or the entire world, the reduction of every body through cremation, and the remnant of the sacrifice abandoned by a renunciant, whose first act is to internalize his ritual fires. Yet they are also Shiva's semen and therefore regenerative power. As Shiva, Lord of the cremation ground, covered his body with ashes, so do ascetics, and householder devotees touch fire and apply *vibhūti* ash to themselves in his worship.

In the wilderness or high on Mount Kailasa, Shiva, like ancient Rudra, is Lord of animals, often portrayed on or wrapped in a tiger skin, enclosed by *nāgas* (cobras). But his role as Pashupati is sovereign of domestic animals as well, and Shiva's *vāhana* (mount) is the bull Nandin, who lies in placid power as guardian god outside temple doors or serves as decorated processional vehicle in festivals. It would appear that the prehistoric cult of wild buffalo or bull, known in the days of Rudra as "Howler" in the wilderness, was tamed into the docile figure of the Purāṇas as mount or even multiform of Shiva.

Shiva's frequent consort is Pārvatī, also known as Umā or Gaurī, but Satī, Gaṅgā and other goddesses are his spouses in various myths. The marriage of Shiva and Pārvatī, considered a role model in South India, is an elaborate festival in Madurai and other temples. In one striking sense Shiva requires no consort: he has an androgynous form, Ardhanārīshvara, the Lord who is Half Female. Given the number of reconciled polarities in the nature of Shiva, it is not surprising to see him in sculptures and paintings in vertical nonsymmetry, his right side in male attire, left side—properly subordinate in Hindu physiology—with prominent breast and female ornaments. This two-in-one body recalls the Shiva-Shakti pairing that can be either a demonstration of *coincidentia oppositorum*, the transcendence of polarities, or as in Tantra and other Shaiva perspectives, the dominance of female energy (*shakti*). In sexual union with Shakti Shiva is even portrayed as a bloodless corpse, passive and inert under the dynamic female power.

Gaṇeśha, also known as Gaṇapati or Vināyaka, became popular as the son of Shiva and Pārvatī, although myths of his origins, perhaps in ancient elephant worship, are varied. One account in the Purāṇas is of his decapitation by his own angry father, his human head then replaced by that of an elephant. Another ancient

multifaceted deity drawn into the orbit of Shiva is Skanda, known in various regions and periods as Kārttikeya, Kumāra or Subrahmaṇya, and identified with the Tamil god Murugaṅ. Born from Shiva's fiery semen, this war god is also lord of *grahas* (seizers) who, like numerous ferocious goddesses, attack with diseases. One enduring myth presents him as a six-headed foundling, suckled simultaneously by the Krittikās, six stars in the constellation Pleiades, therefore called Shaṅmukha (six-faced). Other myths celebrate him as the son of Shiva and Pārvatī.

In the Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upanishad, Shiva is said to have five faces or manifestations (*pañcavaktra*) and in the Mahābhārata eight forms (*ashtamūrti*). Although the *avatāra* doctrine, with *bhakti* (devotion) to, and *prasāda* (grace) from, the several incarnations of Vishnu is perhaps more pronounced, it is in these multiple expressions that Shiva also extends his presence. As cosmic totality, he is simultaneously fivefold and eightfold. One name, Īshāna, declaring him supreme being, is expressed as both manifestation, along with Sadyojāta, Vāmadeva, Aghora, and Tatpurusha, and as form, beside Bhava, Sharva, Pashupati, Vāyu, Ugra, Mahādeva, and Rudra. Variant names occur in some texts, and eventually five mantras came to accompany the five faces. In his elevated role as supreme, Shiva is also frequently called Maheshvara, great Lord, and Parameshvara, Highest Lord.

Shaivas in Faith and Practice

The god with so many contrarities woven into vivid mythologies generated numerous theological perspectives and accompanying means of worship. Just as the god of dreadful habitat and custom was perceived to be an outsider early on, so also were many of his devotees shunned, in particular those Shaivas adopting yogic techniques or Shakta-Tantric worship. Vaishnavas had their clean, comfortable, more respectable god Vishnu and faith in the sufficiency of the householder's path rather than a renunciant's ascetic habits. Traditional expressions of devotion (*bhakti*), however, emerged as similar in both of these major Hindu divisions.

Among the first of many schools or sects devoted to Shiva were the Pāshupatas who recognized him as Pati (Lord) of *pasbus* (creatures). Their faith was in a god who could extend his *prasāda* (grace) in the form of release from bondage (*bandharva*) to worldly existence and ignorance, just as a cow can be freed from a tether. This spiritual image of the self as *pasbu*, the problem as fetter (*pāśha*), and the solution as freedom through divine grace and human effort became the hallmark of Shaiva theology through the centuries. The traditional founder of the Pāshupatas was Lakulīsha in the second century.



Joyous Shaivas at the Kumbh Mela in Allahabad. The Kumbh Mela is a Hindu festival that has been celebrated along the Ganges River for more than four thousand years: The faithful gather to literally wash away their sins. The 2001 Kumbh Mela was the largest gathering of humanity in recorded history, an estimated 70 million people gathered in Allahabad. AMIT PASRICHA.

Both Shiva and Vishnu emerged as principals in the epics and Purāṇas, but in the Guptan period two new and quite different genres appeared, Āgamas and Tantras. Āgamas of the Shaivas and Vaishnavas (those for the latter, usually known as Saṃhitās) were essential liturgical manuals that became known in the fifth and sixth centuries. The ritual texts of the Shaiva tradition eventually reached a collection of 28, with another 108 counted as Upāgamas of secondary authority.

Although the textual and iconographic history of Tantrism does not begin until about the fifth century, some historians of religion have considered deeper, even pre-Vedic roots for Shakta Tantrism in the goddess cults of ancient Mesopotamia. In any case, Tantrism as deciphered from its esoteric texts concerns extreme human quests for transcendence of polarities. No better deity could be found as model than Shiva, master of paradox who overcomes oppositions of the wild and the tamed, male and female, eroticism and asceticism, dynamic energy and silent passivity, creation and destruction. The *vāmācāra* (left-hand) division of Tantrism distinguished itself as a

path for heroes (*vīras*) and transgressive rites and behavior, perhaps a legacy of such communities as the Vṛātyas of antiquity. Essential identification with Shiva in unison with Shakti became a liberating ritual technique. Such explorers of the dangerous path considered themselves beyond routine practitioners of yoga in the right-hand division, and certainly above the unknowing herds of *pashus*.

Among the most horrific and uncontrollable manifestations of Shiva are Bhairava, also known as Vīrabhadra, and Sharabha, an eight-legged, flesh-eating monster. Kāpālikas (Skull-bearers), or Bhairavas, were named for the human skull carried in one hand as begging bowl (remembering Bhairava who could not release the head of Brahmā from his hand for twelve years), with a club in the other. Kālāmukhas were identified by black facial markings. Both were large communities of ascetics from the ninth century until their dissipation in the thirteenth century. Nātha (“protector, lord,” a name for Shiva) Siddha was another name for movements eclectically combining Shaiva, yoga, alchemical, and other perspectives in their quest for supernatural powers.

Since a devotee could become one with Shiva, it is not unexpected that great leaders and saints were considered to be incarnations. Such was the case with India's most revered philosopher, Śaṅkara, an eighth-century Kerala Brahman author of commentaries on the Upanishads and Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa that structured intellectually the nondualist Advaita Vedānta school. Reputed founder of monasteries at the four compass points of India for the ten branches of the Dashanāmi order of ascetics, he was awarded authorship of scores of works, including the beautiful Sanskrit devotional poem, Shivānandalaharī.

In the far north of India there developed from the early ninth century the Kashmir Shaiva or Trika theology, named for its triad of approaches and principles, all recognizing Shiva as universal sovereign, Shakti as cosmic energy, and a finite human self in the bondage of ignorance yet capable of liberation by mystical union with Shiva. Utpaladeva, a tenth-century Kashmiri poet, composed Sanskrit songs collected in the Shivastotrāvalī and frequently recited today. He shared with others his own pilgrim's spiritual progress, a journey through a stage of personal effort with rituals, recitations, and meditation leading to an acquisition of knowledge, followed by recognition of pure consciousness, then finally by the bliss of becoming one with the cosmic body of Shiva. Such means, said Utpaladeva, who was considered to have become a *siddha*, "perfected being," are available to all without restrictions of age, gender, class, or caste.

At the other extreme of the subcontinent in South India, two important Shaiva sects crystallized in the twelfth century. Tamil Shaivas, known also as Shaiva Siddhāntas, claimed roots in first-century Tamil teachings and included in their heritage such famed poets as Māṇikkavācakar of the ninth century. They stressed the transcendent otherness of God and his boundless love for humans under his protection. Siddhānta texts in Tamil supplanted the Sanskrit texts upon which they were based and brought themes from Tamil devotional poetry into play. Hymns of the 63 Nāyaṇārs, sixth- to tenth-century Shaiva saints (whose legends were collected in the Periyapurāṇam in the eleventh century), were the heart of Tamil Shaivism.

The other quite different and more aggressively independent sect was that of the Vīrashaivas or Liṅgāyats, with texts in the vernacular Kannada and Telugu languages. The iconoclastic founder, Basava, rejected the authority of the Vedas, traditional class and caste hierarchy, the doctrine of transmigration, and standard Brahmanical rites, including cremation. Also abandoned was image worship except for the *liṅga*, worn by devotees as an amulet and focus of devotion.

The names and forms of Shiva gleaned here from epics, Purāṇas, and communities by no means exhaust his

presence. Many regional deities and cults that do not bear his name are nevertheless marginally Shaiva. For example, spread across large areas of Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra is the worship of a set of powerful gods known variously as Khaṇḍobā or Mallanna, Mallikārjuna, Mailāra, Mallāri, Malhāri, and Mairāḷ. Here, as in other instances, particular folk deities of indistinct prehistory endure under the umbrella of Purāṇic Shiva.

The worship of Shiva as described in the Āgamas or observed all across the Hindu world today generally centers upon his *liṅga* as altarpiece. Before entering a temple the worshiper greets and touches the nose of the guardian bull Nandin, rings a brass bell to alert the god of a devotee's presence, and proceeds to the *liṅga* positioned in the *yoni* (female genitals) or *pīṭha* (seat) with a northern channel to carry off liquid offerings. Basic offering materials in a temple, home, or roadside shrine are leaves of the *bilva* tree special to Shiva, water, milk, honey, and other items. A Vedic five-syllable mantra, *namaḥ śhivāya*, praises him along with the litany of his sacred names, and the worshiper may also transfer powers from the five faces of Shiva to various bodily parts in a rite known as *nyāsa*. Cooked food (*naivedya*) may also be presented in a more elaborate *homa* fire offering.

Meditation upon Shiva as fire, light, and regenerative seed occurs not only in private devotions but also on his special nights when divine favors may be forthcoming. New Moon eve (*amāvāsya*), the fourteenth of each dark fortnight, is designated Shivarātri, the night of Shiva. Once each solar year, in Māgha (January–February) or Phālguna (February–March), there is Mahāshivarātri, his Great Night. Many Hindus, Vaishnavas as well as Shaivas, fast and remain awake in *jāgara* (vigil) all night in meditation. Monday (Moonday) is the weekday most auspicious for the worship of Shiva, as it has long been connected to soma, the sacred plant of immortality and worship of the dead. The ancient Vedic god Rudra, once considered unfit to attend the sacrifice, sits comfortably today as Shiva, one of the two foremost male deities, the object of devotion and worship from hundreds of millions throughout the Hindu world.

David M. Knipe

See also **Devī; Gaṇesha; Hinduism (Dharma); Śaṅkara; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vishnu and Avatāras; Yoga**

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
SHIVAJI BHONSLE AND HEIRS Shivaji (1630–1680), the father of Maharashtra and the originator of the Maratha polity, which lasted over 150 years from the middle of the seventeenth century until 1818, is more than a historical figure. His legend continued to inspire the Marathas long after his death, into the eighteenth century when Pune’s Peshwas established Maratha supremacy over most of the subcontinent. In the late nineteenth century, Shivaji’s spirit of independence was recalled in the Shivaji festivals organized by a major early leader of the Indian nationalist movement, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and by the Bengalis resisting the first partition of their province from 1906 to 1910.

Since its birth as a state of the Indian Union in 1960, Maharashtra has given Shivaji the pride of place by putting his picture in every government office. At least one political party, Shiv Sena, is named for Shivaji, and its Mumbai headquarters are architecturally a replica of one of his fortresses. Shivaji is thus a living legend, who continues to be the subject of biographies, plays, and movies, and whose name is held by millions of Maharashtrians, regardless of their station in life, in a reverence normally reserved for divinities. For them, Shivaji was not just a brave warrior or a great king, but a person of unsullied character and, like Rāma or Krishna, a divine incarnation whose timely appearance on earth not only protected hapless “women, Brahmans, and cows,” but protected Hinduism itself from being completely overwhelmed by the advancing tide of Islam.

Shivaji is one of the very few Indian historical figures who are respected outside the region of their activities. Thus, there is much adulatory writing about him in most Indian languages. India’s Nobel laureate in literature, Rabindranath Tagore, wrote and set to music two poems in praise of Shivaji’s character, military exploits, and administration. In the second quarter of the twentieth century, the celebrated poet of Gujarat, Javerchand Meghani, composed a melodic and inspiring lullaby about Jijabai and the infant Shivaji, which is still sung by thousands of Gujarati mothers while rocking their children’s cradles. Akbar and Shivaji were foremost in pre-British Indian history, providing ideal precedents for independent India’s polity.

Childhood and Early Years

Born at the Shivneri fort, 40 miles (64 km) north of Pune, on 19 February 1630, Shivaji was the second son of Shahaji Bhonsle. At the time of Shivaji’s birth, Shahaji served the nizām of Ahmednagar, holding a prosperous *jagir* (fief) covering Pune and Chakan, which he had inherited from his father, Maloji, who was given the title of raja by Ahmednagar’s ruler in 1595. In 1636 Bijapur took advantage of the defeat of Ahmednagar by the



Seventeenth-Century Deccan Miniature Painting by Mir Mohammad. Shivaji is a living legend, far more than a historical, regional hero of the past, whose name is revered by millions of Maharashtrians, rural and urban, regardless of their station in life. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Mughals to annex portions of the fallen kingdom. After a brief period of service under the Mughals, Shahaji joined the Bijapur ruler, who rewarded him with an extensive *jagir* in Bangalore.

Always on the march and concerned for the safety of his family, Shahaji kept his wife, Jijabai, and Shivaji on his Pune estate under the protection of his trusted lieutenant, Dadoji Konddev, a Brahman. Apart from administrative duties, Dadoji was responsible for educating his young ward in martial arts. Jijabai nourished Shivaji spiritually and instilled in him heroism and ambition by recounting stories from the epics, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*. At sixteen, Shivaji was placed in full charge of the *jagir*. By that time, he had rallied the youth of the neighboring Maval region, a 20-mile (32-km) wide mountainous region east of the Sahyadri range, inspiring them with the ideal of an independent kingdom, free of Muslim control.

Many historic accounts—Mughal, Maratha, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, and Jesuit—establish Shivaji's

astuteness, personal valor, military prowess, and tolerance toward people of all religions. Shivaji began his military exploits on a small scale in the neighboring areas, which were formerly under Ahmednagar but had recently been annexed by Bijapur, his father's current employer. His pretext for taking over those territories was to consolidate them on Bijapur's behalf. Beginning in 1657, however, he attacked and conquered several Bijapur forts. Disturbed by the new threat, the Bijapur court sent a powerful general, Afzal Khan, to destroy Shivaji. On his way, the khan detoured to Tuljapur to desecrate the temple of Bhavani, to whom Shivaji was deeply devoted. Afzal Khan audaciously slaughtered a sacred cow in the temple compound and challenged the goddess to save Shivaji. Afzal Khan also detoured to Pandharpur, where he damaged the temple of Vithoba, the focal point for centuries of an annual pilgrimage by hundreds of thousands of Maharashtrians.

Shivaji and his followers were now determined to avenge the atrocities. Aware that his own small force would be no match for Afzal Khan's well-equipped army of 15,000 in a conventional battle, Shivaji suggested a personal meeting in the thickly wooded region at the foot of Pratapgad fort, where his own knowledge of the terrain and of guerrilla warfare would offer him a distinct advantage. Both leaders came to the meeting armed. In a similar situation a decade earlier, Afzal Khan had used just such a "truce" meeting to imprison a disarmed Hindu general. When the much taller Afzal Khan rushed to embrace the diminutive Maratha leader and smother him, Shivaji used his left hand, armed with *wagh-nakhs* ("tiger-claws"), to dig out the khan's entrails, while his Bhavani sword, concealed under his right-hand sleeve, deftly decapitated Afzal's head from his torso. Shivaji sent the head to the Bhavani temple. As the khan fell, Shivaji signaled his own forces, hiding in the jungle, to attack Afzal's troops.

Following the news of Shivaji's spectacular success against Bijapur, Emperor Aurangzeb, concerned about the fate of his Deccan possessions, sent his own uncle, Shayista Khan, to deal with the "mountain rat." In a surprise nocturnal raid on Shayista Khan's residence, Shivaji cut off his hand, then proceeded to conquer several Mughal fortresses, raiding and looting the well-guarded Mughal port of Surat in 1664. Enraged, Aurangzeb sent a huge army under his most renowned Rajput general, Jaisingh, against Shivaji. Realizing that he would be forced to fight a losing battle against so powerful a force, Shivaji surrendered several forts to Jaisingh, who offered him peace, provided he appear at the emperor's court, and that either he or his son, Sambhaji, accept a court position of *mānsabdār*. Shivaji received Jaisingh's personal guarantee that he would be treated like a "king." Shivaji's

later loud remonstrations at court against the humiliating treatment he received led to his imprisonment. Undeterred, he planned a ruse to escape, sending daily presents of baskets laden with sweets, carried by his personal guard, to different Mughal dignitaries including those in charge of security. Both Shivaji and his son then escaped, hiding in two of the “sweets” baskets; adopting various guises, they returned to their homeland in a matter of months.

Shivaji's Military Strategy

Shivaji's spectacular military success was primarily attributed to his brilliant guerrilla warfare and his strategy of keeping nearly one hundred forts, to which his forces could easily withdraw for security. Ninety percent of his fortresses were located in the mountain fastnesses of the Sahyadri range; one of them, Raigad, was his capital.

Shivaji's strength lay in the swift movement of his cavalry, in contrast to the unwieldy Mughal armies, whom the Muslim Deccan rulers emulated. Shivaji's intimate knowledge of Maharashtra's mountainous terrain and fast-flowing rivulets, his dependence on the local population for support, and his ability to cut off the enemy's supply lines also contributed to his many victories. His personal leadership of almost all his military campaigns kept him in close touch with his followers, who were willing to sacrifice their lives for the dream of the *swarajya* (freedom), based on equity and fairness, regardless of religion, caste, or economic status.

Alone among the Indian rulers since the time of Rajendra Chola in the eleventh century, Shivaji realized the importance of maritime defenses—the lack of which, under the land-oriented Delhi sultans, Mughals, and Deccan Muslim rulers, had enabled the minuscule Portuguese navy to control all the coastal commerce from Bassein to Cochin. Shivaji's navy, commanded by the redoubtable Angria family, not only ended the Portuguese control of western India's coastal traffic and commerce, but stopped the early attempts of the English East India Company of Bombay to take over the Portuguese naval role.

Coronation and Administration

In 1674 Shivaji held his own coronation as *chhatrapati* (“lord of the umbrella”), or king, at Raigad, his capital. Consecrated by pandits led by Varanasi's Gaga Bhatt, Shivaji proclaimed a new era, the Raj Shaka, and issued a new gold coin, the Shivarai hon. Unfortunately for his *swarajya*, its illustrious founder did not live long; he died in 1680.

Shivaji's coronation was also marked by his proclamation of the *Kanujabata*, containing basic principles of

government, and *Rajyavyavaharkosh*, detailing instructions for the routine guidance of administrators. The *Kanujabata* provided for the *astapradhana* (eight ministers), with titles in Sanskrit: *mukhya pradhan* (prime minister); *amatya* (minister in charge of land revenues); *sachiv* (records); *sarnobat* (protocol); *senapati* (defense forces); *panditrao* (religion); *nyayadhisht* (judicial); and *sumant* (foreign relations). All ministers were paid cash salaries.

Shivaji's *swarajya* consisted of three large divisions, or provinces, each under a *sarsubbedar*, subdivided into *subbas* (each under a *subbedar* called *deshpande* or *deshmukh*), and further subdivided into *parganas*, *mabals*, and *tarfas*. At each level, there were central government nominees, such as *muzumdar* (accountant), *chitnis* (writer), and *daftardar* (recorder). Each village had a self-governing *gota*, or council, with representatives of the community and of twelve kinds of *balutedars*, or craftsmen, who were entitled, by tradition, to a portion of the village's agricultural produce in return for their services to the community. With primary jurisdiction in settling land disputes, the *gotas* were respected by Shivaji's central administration and by his successors in the Bhosle line, as well as by Pune's Peshwas.

Shivaji's policy toward Muslims. Shivaji's religious policy reflected respect for all religions, including Islam. None of his wars were religious conflicts. Paralleling the best practices under the Mughals and Deccan's Bahamanis, he employed Muslims in high positions and made grants to mosques and Muslim spiritual leaders. As Khafi Khan, a contemporary chronicler, generally a hostile critic of Shivaji, conceded: “Wherever Shivaji and his army went, they caused no harm to the mosques, the Book of God or the women of anyone.” His model was the Mughal emperor Akbar, who had accorded respect to Hindu beliefs and places. The distortion of Shivaji's image as a “founder of a strictly Hindu polity” was, according to Shivaji's latest (2003) biographer, James Laine, the outcome of biographies and ballads during the rule of Pune's Peshwas, who needed such an underpinning for their political agenda in the eighteenth century.

Successors

Sambhaji (1657–1689). Shivaji's elder son, Sambhaji, succeeded his father and was crowned *chhatrapati* at Raigad in 1680. The following year, Aurangzeb came to the Deccan at the head of a huge force, determined to liquidate the Maratha kingdom, which he expected to be in chaos in the wake of Shivaji's death. Instead, he found Sambhaji a valiant defender of his father's *swarajya*, able not only to deal with the Mughals but also with the Siddis of Janjira and the Portuguese in Goa. However, thanks to treachery, Aurangzeb's forces captured Sambhaji in 1689. Brought to the emperor's presence, he was

asked to convert to Islam. When he refused, Aurangzeb ordered him blinded, tortured, and killed. Aurangzeb sent Sambhaji's widow, Yesubai, and his son, Shahu, to the imperial harem, where Shahu would be brought up until after Aurangzeb's death in 1707. His successor would then release him, provoking a civil war of succession in Maharashtra.

Rajaram (1670–1700). Before the Maratha capital fell, however, Sambhaji's younger stepbrother, Rajaram, was quickly crowned the *chhatrapati* and was whisked away to the safety of far-off Jinji. The Mughal forces followed him there, besieging the Jinji fort for seven years, as it was ably defended by its loyal Maratha generals. Once again, Rajaram eluded the Mughals, and hurried back to Maharashtra. The ordeal exhausted Rajaram, who died on 2 March 1700 at his Sinhagad ("fortress of the lion") fort.

Tarabai. The leadership of the Maratha "war of independence" was now assumed by Rajaram's widow, the intrepid Tarabai, who crowned her infant son, also named Shivaji, as *chhatrapati* at Panhala, near Kolhapur. The aged and tired Aurangzeb, by then fighting in the Deccan for twenty years, was harassed by her guerrilla forces until his death in 1707. It was at this point that Aurangzeb's successor, Azam Shah, released Shahu, on condition that he would help the Mughal cause.

Shahu (1707–1749). Whether Shahu ever intended to assist the Mughals or not, the Maratha generals and civilian advisers who defected from Tarabai's side to join him did not appear to have any such plans. They helped Shahu to reach Satara, where on 2 January 1708 he crowned himself *chhatrapati*. The two rival claimants to Shivaji's throne at Satara and Kolhapur began an internecine war, which lasted a quarter century and ended with the Treaty of Warna on 13 April 1731, whereby Shahu and his able *peshwa* recognized the "minor" branch of the Bhonsle family as Karveer *chhatrapatis* of Kolhapur. It remained, after the final defeat of the Marathas in 1818, as a princely state under British protection until 1948, when it was integrated into the Indian Union.

Meanwhile, Shahu's state of Satara "lapsed" to the East India Company in 1848 for lack of a biological heir, as Governor-General Dalhousie refused to recognize Shahu's adopted son as heir to the throne.

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See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; British East India Company Raj; Maharashtra; Peshwai and Pentarchy

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SHIV SENA Founded in 1966, Mumbai's Shiv Sena ("army of Shiva") represents a xenophobic, sons-of-the-soil militant movement that has espoused pan-Indian Hindu nationalism throughout Maharashtra. The Shiv Sena has championed the indigenous Marathis, the "underdogs" of cosmopolitan Mumbai, who have angrily resented the economic success of industrious, better-educated migrants from South India in securing white-collar jobs and running lucrative small businesses. It subsequently articulated similar animosities against Gujarati and other communities in the city, envied for their apparent business acumen. It voiced the frustrations of unemployed Marathi youth and the concerns of older Marathis over law and order and the growing criminalization of Mumbai life. These issues and conflicts of interests were



Bal Thackeray, Ruler of Shiv Sena. His public pronouncements have increasingly labeled Islam (and Pakistan) as India's enemy and appealed to the private convictions of many Hindu nationalists. INDIA TODAY.

accentuated by a severe shortage of land in economically dynamic Mumbai, where housing was the most expensive in India.

The Shiv Sena enjoyed significant control over trade union activity in Mumbai once it aggressively displaced established communist unions. This control is an important factor in its organizational power in Mumbai and a source of involvement with extortion in the city. Recently, the Shiv Sena has reiterated its demand to curtail the entry of new migrants to Mumbai. More recently, it insisted that 90 percent of jobs in Mumbai's premier hotels and local public service employment should be reserved for Maharashtrians as well. However, in 2005, the Shiv Sena's public expressions of hostility toward Hindi-speaking migrants to Mumbai may have been at the cost of success in the politically critical state legislature elections.

The Shiv Sena proved popular with Marathis, especially the urban lower middle class, because it celebrated their proud history of military exploits, articulated genuine grievances, and gratified their sectarian resentments. Their claim on behalf of Marathis for a place under the sun is infused with an evocation of past glories and thus possesses both national and parochial resonance. It recalls the historic role of eighteenth-century Maratha Hindu kingdoms in hastening the decline of Muslim rule in India as well as the glories of the Maratha confederacy. The Shiv Sena itself is named after a remarkable Maratha military leader, Chattrapati Shivaji, revered as an illustrious ruler in the Hindu political pantheon. The Shiv Sena has also identified itself as a "Hindu-first" movement and has been an ardent campaigner for the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, a controversial issue in India. In 1992 it joined in the communal riots that overtook Mumbai in the

aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. Ugly retaliatory violence against Muslims, following attacks on Hindus, allowed the Shiv Sena to present itself as the defender of Hindu India.

Led by a charismatic former newspaper cartoonist, Balasaheb Thackeray (b. 1927), the Shiv Sena has enjoyed three decades of power in Mumbai, joining a coalition to govern the state of Maharashtra in 1995. Thackeray's authority was absolute, and he has wielded effective organizational power over Shiv Sena's activities. His pronouncements on public issues, such as Indian nationhood and national interests, have increasingly labeled Islam (and Pakistan) as India's enemy; these pronouncements evidently have appealed to the private convictions of many Hindus, which partly accounts for his popularity among nationalists across India. The strong-arm tactics of Shiv Sena cadres, its "Sainiks," over whom Thackeray enjoys remarkable authority, appalls many moderate Indians.

There is widely held conviction that the Shiv Sena's political activities have descended into extortion, and other illicit methods of raising money, such as smuggling and sponsorship of illegal real estate development. There are accusations that the Shiv Sena is competing to supplant the Mumbai criminal underworld in such activities, but the Shiv Sena's policies were not noticeably different from other political parties when it governed the state of Maharashtra between 1995 and 1999 in partnership with the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Gautam Sen

See also **Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindu Nationalism; Hindu Nationalist Parties; Hindutva and Politics; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)**

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SHORE, SIR JOHN (1751–1834), governor-general of India (1793–1798). John Shore was born on 8 October 1751. Appointed a writer, the clerical entry level, in the East India Company, he arrived in Bengal in 1769, just as the great trading company was taking over the collection of the land revenues, the key to political control of India. In the next twenty years Shore, through his mastery of how the revenue and judicial systems of

Bengal worked, persuaded his superiors that British control of India would only be possible through a just and stable settlement of the land revenue. For Shore, there were three great revenue issues. One was to find out who were the actual owners of the land; the second was to decide how much tax the peasants could reasonably be expected to pay; and third, what kind of revenue system the British should establish in Bengal to ensure the continuance of their rule.

After sixteen years in Bengal, Shore returned to England in 1785; in 1786 he was asked to go back to India as revenue adviser to the new governor-general, Lord Cornwallis, whose mandate was to increase the British government's control over the East India Company. Shore argued that throughout Mughal times the *zamindars*, or great landlords, had been the hereditary proprietors of the soil, and that although the fairest system would be to make a settlement directly with the peasants, the company had neither the knowledge nor the personnel to institute such a drastic change. A ten-year settlement, he was convinced, would give the government time to come to a clear understanding of how the system worked. In the end, however, Cornwallis decided for a permanent settlement, which meant recognizing the *zamindars* as the hereditary owners and guaranteeing that the revenue payment fixed at the beginning would be perpetual.

Shore returned to England in 1790 but went back to India as governor-general from 1793 to 1798. His contemporaries were critical of his preoccupation with revenue reforms, instead of seizing opportunities that might have brought more territory to the British. On his return to England, he was created Lord Teignmouth in the Irish peerage. Shore's organization of the bureaucracy to carry out defined revenue functions, while not glamorous, argues for claiming for him a significant role in shaping India as a modern state.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also **British East India Company Raj**

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SHRAUTA SŪTRAS Around 700 to 300 B.C., many schools or branches (*śākhā*) transmitting oral traditions known as Vedas developed brief ritual manuals called

Shrauta Sūtras. Of the Saṃhitās (anthologies) of the four Vedas, the Yajur Veda in its two main divisions, Krishna (Black) and Shukla (White), generated more than half of the extant Shrauta Sūtras. Such manuals were needed as concise guidelines for the four major priests, *adhvaryu*, *botā*, *udgātā*, and *brāhman*, each with three assistants, for increasingly elaborate and sophisticated sacrifices that had been detailed in the Saṃhitās and their respective Brāhmaṇa texts.

For example, the Taittirīya Saṃhitā of the Krishna Yajur Veda is matched by the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and the later Taittirīya Āraṇyaka and Taittirīya Upanishad. At least nine different Vedic schools preserved the enormous aggregate of Taittirīya texts as an oral tradition, recited by Vedic students who then taught the whole corpus to the next generation of sons and grandsons. For sacrifices known as *shrauta* (from *shruti*, “that which is heard,” meaning the Veda) the bulky Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa texts were mined to create versatile ritual manuals. Each of the nine schools of the Taittirīya produced its own Shrauta Sūtra in order to systematize the ritual tradition according to its own lights. Therefore, when the Vedic student learns the Shrauta Sūtra of his *shākhā* (for example, the Āpastamba), he is memorizing material on rituals already covered, perhaps years before, in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, Brāhmaṇa, and Āraṇyaka.

Similarly, various branches of the other Saṃhitās generated Shrauta Sūtras. The names of those extant, listed according to Saṃhitā, are:

Rig Veda: Āshvalāyana, Shāṅkhāyana
 Krishna (Black) Yajur Veda: Baudhāyana, Vādhūla,
 Bhāradvāja, Āpastamba, Hiranyakeshin, Vaikhānasa,
 Kāṭhaka, Mānava, Vārāha
 Shukla (White) Yajur Veda, also known as Vājasaneyi
 Saṃhitā: Kātyāyana
 Sāma Veda: Lātyāyana, Drāhyāyana, Jaiminīya
 Atharva Veda: Vaitāna

Although arrangements of rules for *shrauta* sacrifices may vary, the contents of the Sūtras are similar from school to school. For a typical example, the Āshvalāyana Shrauta Sūtra, a guide for the *botā* priest and his three assistants, all connected to the Rig Veda, begins with *ishti* (offerings) on new- and full-moon days and proceeds with the establishment of the fires, the twice-daily milk offering (*agnibotva*), offerings to ancestors, first-fruits offerings and other seasonal sacrifices, animal sacrifice, expiatory offerings, soma sacrifice (*agnishtoma*), and a lengthy discussion of sacrifices cataloged according to the number of *sutyā* (soma-pressing days) contained in each. The Kātyāyana Shrauta Sūtra, on the other hand, begins with general remarks on *shrauta* rituals before it outlines almost the same list of routine sacrifices with variant order and emphasis, but attention to such sacrifices as *pravargya* (a

special rite in a soma sacrifice, an offering of milk poured into boiling ghee) and *purushamedha* (human sacrifice).

The style of Sanskrit is the aphoristic *sūtra* (thread) genre, condensed and formulaic. Gradually, one or more commentaries (*bbāshya*) were attached during transmission of the Sūtras to explain their contents for changing circumstances. Also assembled were indispensable digests (*paddhati*, *prayoga*), often confined to a single type or example of a special ritual. The Vedic schools named here also produced Grihya Sūtras for domestic rituals, including the schedule of life-cycle rites known as *saṃskāra* and household offerings to deities, planets, and the deceased.

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See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Soma; Vedic Aryan India; Yajña; Yajur Veda**

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SHRENI Described in many classical Sanskrit and Pali texts, *shrenis* were occupational groups or guilds. The fourth-century B.C. grammarian Pānini, referred to *shrenis*, though without a clear description. Later Hindu *shastras*, Buddhist Jataka tales, and other Buddhist literature described *shrenis* as village or town occupational groups that brought together individual workmen as well as associations of workmen in corporate bodies to pursue their common economic interests. Different texts identified *shrenis* of priests, doctors, warriors, farmers, carpenters, makers of irrigation devices, ironworkers, potters, oil pressers, cloth dyers, weavers, gardeners, garland makers, ship pilots, fishermen, betel sellers, ivory sculptors, musicians, courtesans, and even beggars and thieves. Accounts exist of individuals changing their professions (and therefore their *shreni* affiliations) several times. Accounts also exist of members of one family belonging to different *shrenis*.

Communities of *shrenis* sometimes became entire villages or urban neighborhoods. To be close to their work, *shrenis* of foresters lived near forests. *Shrenis* of blacksmiths, carpenters, potters, and weavers would live outside

a city's walls in occupational villages or inside a city's walls in trade neighborhoods, located so that clients could find them and obtain their services. Such arrangements have sometimes been interpreted as precursors of India's later *jajmani* system. Where *shrenis* lived in identifiable neighborhoods, a head *shreni* (a *sbreshthin*) could find himself functioning as a village headman (*gramika*), with many of the accompanying responsibilities.

As geographical, political, and economic environments changed, *shrenis* and their leaders sometimes chose to move. A fifth-century A.D. inscription described a *shreni* of wealthy Gujarati silk weavers migrating to Mandasor, where they donated enough funds to repair a temple to the Sun God they had endowed more than three decades earlier. After arriving in Mandasor, the *shreni* members entered a variety of different occupations, while still maintaining some consciousness of their earlier guild affiliations as silk weavers.

Accounts indicated that *shrenis* engaged in a broad range of collective activities. Some Buddhist orders required a married woman to receive the approval of her husband and his *shreni* before becoming a nun. Some *shrenis* handled disputes between husbands and wives. Others provided welfare benefits for their members, supporting them during their illnesses and caring for their widows and children after their deaths.

Shreni Organization

Classical texts described *shrenis* as headed by a *sbreshthin* (the best, the elder, the most important). The *sbreshthin* established his position by heredity or through selection by a *shreni* assembly. According to texts, *shreni* heads were typically aided by a few senior members of the *shreni* and by secretaries (*kayasthas*). On occasion, wealthy and powerful *shreni* heads participated in their ruler's regional councils and sometimes even became their ruler's advisers. *Shreni* heads were also described as participating in elaborate royal horse sacrifices (*ashvamedha*).

According to some accounts, local rulers generally supported a *shreni's* rights to regulate its members' wages and prices, to make contracts with other *shrenis* and even with private individuals, and to punish (and even expel) members who violated *shreni* regulations. Local rulers also recognized their own responsibilities to uphold and enforce whatever *shreni* contracts had been agreed upon.

Certain *shrenis* adopted or were assigned banners, fly whisks, and other insignia of their corporate life, which they could display on public occasions. *Shrenis* could have their own seals made of terra-cotta, stone, bronze, copper, or ivory, similar to the seals of rulers and ministers. Some *shrenis* collected regular membership fees, to which they added fines collected from delinquent *shreni*

members and donations from contributors. Through the successful management of their funds, some *shrenis* became quite wealthy. They functioned as banks, lending money at lucrative interest rates to local merchants and other *shrenis*. They also lent money to local rulers, thereby gaining political advantages for themselves and their members. Records described *shrenis* organizing militias to protect their caravans and warehouses and then lending their militias (presumably under advantageous terms) to local rulers who wanted additional fighting men. Other records described merchant *shrenis* organizing caravans themselves and commissioning cargo ships for overseas trade.

Shrenis did not use their wealth exclusively to produce more wealth. An inscription at the famous Buddhist stupa at Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh, declared that in the first century A.D. an ivory workers' *shreni* donated funds to construct one of the stupa's four main gates. Hundreds of similar inscriptions with donors' names and affiliations gave evidence of *shrenis'* contributions through the centuries to building and renovating monasteries, stupas, temples, and religious communities.

Shrenis and Brahmanical Texts

The Buddhist Jataka tales made frequent references to *shrenis*. Although ostensibly tales of the lives of the Buddha before his final reincarnation in the sixth century B.C., the Jataka tales were not written down until perhaps as many as ten centuries later, during the time of the Guptan empire (4th–6th centuries A.D.). The world of *shrenis* described in the Jataka tales contrasted sharply with the world of ranked hereditary *varṇas* and occupations described in then-extant Brahmanical texts like the Laws of Manu. The Brahmanical texts elaborated upon the four *varṇas* of humans who emerged from the mouth, shoulders, thighs, and feet of Purusha, the original being. Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras were to marry within their *varṇas* and to follow their inherited *varṇa* occupations: Brahmans to teach and perform sacrifices, Kshatriyas to administer and defend the land, Vaishyas to produce and trade wealth, and Shudras to serve the three higher *varṇas*.

By contrast, in the Jataka tales a ruler assembled and consulted with eighteen *shrenis*—not Brahmans. Furthermore, the ruler created a new office, head of the *shrenis*, to which he appointed a capable leader. In the Buddhist Jataka tales, a Brahman voluntarily chose to engage in trade (the occupation of Vaishyas) without feeling the need to justify his choice on the Brahmanical basis of hard times. In the Jataka tales, parents discussed what profession their son should enter—unlike the Brahmanical texts, where the profession was preordained. In the Jataka tales, people could change their occupations

regardless of birth or background, and could change them again if they so chose. In one Jataka tale, a merchant's slave was brought up so much like a young merchant that he was able to pass himself off as a real merchant and to marry the daughter of a wealthy trader. The first merchant learned of his slave's fraud but revealed it to no one, and the story ended happily for all.

The social and economic life described in the Jataka tales was reflected in such later literary works as the *Panchatantra* (Five treatises) and the *Bribatkatha* (Great story). In these and similar writings, Brahman priests and Buddhist monks and nuns appeared but played a minor role. The leading characters were kings and merchants seeking power, profit, and enjoyment in a world distant from the many constraints of Brahmanical texts. One cannot know to what extent the Jataka tales (with their occupational groups and *shrenis*) or the Brahmanical texts (with their *varṇas* and Brahman priests) accurately reflected society as it actually existed at any time and place in India's history.

Joseph W. Elder

See also **Caste System**

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SHULBA SŪTRAS (VEDĀNGAS) The Shulba Sūtras belong to the Vedāngas, or supplementary texts of the Vedas. Although they are part of the Kalpa Sūtras, which deal with ritual, their importance stems from the constructions they provide for building geometric altars. Their contents, written in the condensed *sūtra* style, deal with geometrical propositions and problems related to rectilinear figures and their combinations and transformations, squaring the circle, as well as arithmetical and algebraic solutions to these problems. The root *shulb* means measurement, and the word *shulba* means a cord, rope, or string.

The extant Shulba Sūtras belong to the schools of the Yajurveda. The most important Shulba texts are the ones by Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Kātyāyana, and Mānava.

They have been generally assigned to the period 800 to 500 B.C. Baudhāyana's text is the oldest, and he is believed to have belonged to the Andhra region. Baudhāyana begins with units of linear measurement and then presents the geometry of rectilinear figures, triangles, and circles, and their transformations from one type to another using differences and combinations of areas. An approximation to the square root of 2 and to π are next given.

Then follow constructions for various kinds of geometric altars in the shapes of the falcon (both rectilinear and with curved wings and extended tail), kite, isosceles triangle, rhombus, chariot wheel with and without spokes, square and circular trough, and tortoise.

In the methods of constructing squares and rectangles, several examples of Pythagorean triples are provided. It is clear from the constructions that both the algebraic and the geometric aspects of the so-called Pythagorean theorem were known. This knowledge precedes its later discovery in Greece. The other theorems in the Shulba include:

The diagonals of a rectangle bisect each other.

The diagonals of a rhombus bisect each other at right angles.

The area of a square formed by joining the middle points of the sides of a square is half of the area of the original one.

A quadrilateral formed by the lines joining the middle points of the sides of a rectangle is a rhombus whose area is half of that of the rectangle.

A parallelogram and rectangle on the same base and within the same parallels have the same area.

If the sum of the squares of two sides of a triangle is equal to the square of the third side, then the triangle is right-angled.

A variety of constructions are listed. Some of the geometric constructions in these texts are based on algebraic solutions of simultaneous equations, both linear and quadratic. It appears that geometric techniques were often used to solve algebraic problems.

The Shulbas are familiar with fractions. Algebraic equations are implicit in many of their rules and operations. For example, the quadratic equation and the indeterminate equation of the first degree are a basis of the solutions presented in the constructions.

The Shulba geometry was used to represent astronomical facts. The altars that were built according to the Shulba rules demonstrated knowledge of the lunar and the solar years.

Subbash Kak

See also **Science; Vedic Aryan India; Yajur Veda**

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SHYĀMA SHĀSTRĪ (1762–1827), South Indian poet and composer. Shyāma Shāstri was the oldest of the three nineteenth-century South Indian poet-composers known as the the "Trinity." His compositions can be recognized by the name Shyāma Krishna, which he inserted in his lyrics as his signature (*mudrā*). Although barely fifty of his songs (*tānavarnam*, *kṛiti*, and *svarajātī*) have been preserved, they form an important part of the South Indian concert repertoire.

Having grown up in a musical environment, he became an accomplished singer with the help of a visiting musician. Pacchimiriyam Ādiyappayya, a prominent court musician at Tanjāvūr, then became his mentor. (Ādiyappayya's majestic piece in Bhairavi rāga, "Viribōni," is widely regarded as the best *tāna varnam* ever composed.)

A hereditary priest, he was entrusted with the responsibility of the Kāmākshi Amman temple in Tiruvārūr, his place of birth, where his ancestors had fled from Kanchipuram in the wake of the fall of Vijayanagar in 1565. The temple idol of Bangāru Kāmākshi, kept in their custody, was installed in a new temple in Tiruvārūr. In his lyrics, Shyāma Shāstri addresses this goddess as Devī, or divine mother.

He chose common as well as rare *rāgas* for his compositions, most of which yield their essence in a rather slow tempo compared to that preferred by Tyāgarāja and most later composers. His pieces are equally appreciated for their subtle rhythmic features and the poetic beauty of his Sanskrit, Tēlugu, and Tāmil lyrics. Ānandabhairavi, an important *rāga*, owes its characteristic form to four of his songs in the concert repertoire. He also developed the *svarajātī*, a didactic musical form for which he provided three most impressive examples in the *rāgas* Bhairavi, Tōdi, and Yadukulakāmbhōji.

A specialist in rhythmic intricacies, he employed a technique known as "note-syllables" (*svarākshara*), meaning that some of the sol-fa names (*sā, ri, gā, mā, pā, dbā, or nī*), otherwise used to merely represent the notes of a given *rāga*, are so arranged as to coincide with some of the text syllables that constitute his lyrics. Shyāma Shāstri had a predilection for lyrics containing groups of five syllables (e.g., *anudinamu*) that, if articulated through rhythmic syllables (*jātī*), mimic a pattern commonly employed by drummers (*ta din ki na tom*). Another speciality is referred to as dual rhythms, namely the scope he provided

for applying two different metric cycles (*tāla*) to some of his compositions.

Although primarily regarded as a scholarly musician and composer, he is also remembered for defeating Kēshavayya, a visiting virtuoso from Andhra who toured the land to challenge musicians patronized by local rulers during musical contests. This episode highlights Shyāma Shāstri's superior mastery of complex musical problems against the backdrop of his secure and uneventful existence, quite unlike the lives led by some of his prominent fellow composers. Several of his descendants, including his son Subbarāya Shāstri (a disciple of Tyāgarāja and an important composer in his own right) are regarded as outstanding singers and vina players (*vainika*).

Ludwig Pesch

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SIKH INSTITUTIONS AND PARTIES The pre-occupation of Sikhs with the political can be traced to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism. His experience of the condition of North Indian society during the fifteenth century inspired his formulation of parallel critiques of the Brahman and the Mulla, the respective representatives of Hindu and Muslim society. Guru Nanak was an eyewitness to the central political event of his time, namely, the change of North Indian power from the Lodi Sultanate to the Mughal empire, initiated by Babur's invasion of India in November 1525. Guru Nanak described this event as having brought inevitable suffering, including the rape and slaughter of innocent people. Although Nanak unambiguously condemned such violence, he was not opposed to violence or to politics, only to that which was unjust, and which stemmed from egoistic desire. He believed that the actions of the ideal ruler had to be grounded in certain norms of behavior derived from spirituality. Nanak translated his ideas into action through the establishment of a commune based on socioethical practices of *simaran* (self-emancipation through remembrance of the divine Name) and *seva* (compassionate service of others), both of which were instituted through the *sadb sangat* (the community of those committed to these principles) and *langar* (free kitchen).

During the reign of Nanak's successors, these early institutions were extended and supplemented with the

establishment of the *manji* system run by the *masands*, an order of territorial deputies who represented the living guru's authority in far-flung places. By the time of the fifth guru, Arjan, it had become common for the Sikhs to refer to the guru as *sacha patsbab* (sovereign king) and to the spiritual position of the guru (*gaddi*) as *takht* (seat of power) and to the congregation as *darbar* (the court), denoting unity between spiritual (*piri*) and political (*miri*) authority. To proclaim Sikhism's fluid synthesis of *miri* and *piri*, the sixth guru, Hargobind, established a platform opposite the Harimandir (Golden Temple) in June 1606, naming it the Akal Takht (Seat of the Timeless). Guru Hargobind thereby inaugurated the tradition of conducting the political affairs of the Sikh community alongside its spiritual and religious development, issuing the first *bukannama* (edict) asking Sikhs to include in their offerings gifts of weapons and horses. Bhai Gurdas became the first officiant (in contemporary parlance, *jathedar*) of the Akal Takht. Even today, the Akal Takht remains the premier seat of political decision making and the symbol of politico-religious authority, although Sikhs also recognize four other *takhts*: Takht Sri Kesgarh Sahib (Anandpur); Takht Sri Harimandar Sahib (Patna); Takht Sach Khand Hazur Sahib (Nanded); and Takht Sri Damdama Sahib (Talvandi Sabo). All of these four other *takhts* are connected with the life of the tenth guru, Gobind Singh, and the Khalsa, the politico-religious order that he established on the Baisakhi of 1699 and which henceforth became the driving force behind all Sikh politics and institution building.

Post-Guru Period (1708–Present)

During the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Khalsa, as representative of the Sikh body politic and led by the enigmatic figure of Banda Singh Bahadur, was locked in a struggle for its survival against the Mughal state. However, due to the increasing number of invasions by the Afghans during the middle of the eighteenth century, the balance of power in the Punjab had begun to shift in the Khalsa's favor, led at this time by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia. This period also witnessed the emergence of a new and different Sikh collective: the *misl*s, or independent units of Khalsa forces, each with its own *sirdar*, or chieftan. Though they acted independently, the *misl*s would combine and unite under a political configuration known as the Dal Khalsa, or combined Khalsa army, which met twice a year at the Akal Takht in Amritsar. On such occasions the Sikh community would constitute itself as Sarbat Khalsa (literally, the "entire Khalsa"). Collective political decisions taken by the *misl*s were known as *gurmata* (decision according to the guru's will), binding on all members of the Khalsa, even those who were absent at the time the decision was made. Despite the seemingly ad hoc nature of the Sarbat Khalsa and the



Simranjit Singh Mann. President of the Shiromani Akali Dal-Amritsar. In the Sangrur district of Punjab, in early June 2005, the fiery Sikh leader was arrested in connection with four different cases of sedition against the Indian government. INDIA TODAY.

gurmata, this institution nevertheless enabled the Dal Khalsa to act in a united manner, even though it was physically divided into twelve independent *misl*s. Despite the fall of the Mughal empire by the late eighteenth century (an event that also heralded rise to power of the British East India Company) the Sikh *misl*s degenerated into internecine warfare. Eventually the twelve independent *misl*s were superseded by the Sukerchakia *misl*, whose leader, Ranjit Singh, emerged as the supreme ruler or maharajah of the Punjab, establishing his independent Sikh kingdom there. Ranjit Singh ruled as the chief representative of what came to be known as the Sarkar Khalsa, or government of the Khalsa. Although his kingdom was administered from Lahore in the name of the Khalsa, Ranjit Singh also assumed trusteeship of the Harimandar and the Akal Takht, managing the affairs of these two premier religio-political institutions of the Sikhs through his trusted *sirdars*.

The death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 was followed by a period of conflict and eventual surrender of the Sikh

kingdom to the British in 1849; the British also took control of the Akal Takht and Harimandar complex. For the Sikhs this loss of political sovereignty ushered in a period of chaos, confusion, and humiliation. During this period (1850s to early 1870s) the British pushed through radical measures for the economic advancement of the Punjab, bringing about improvements in communication and education. In particular, the creation of a network of English-language mission schools helped to foster a new generation of Western-educated Sikh leaders who made it a priority to revive the pre-colonial Sikh tradition, which they believed had slipped into decadence following the demise of Ranjit Singh's kingdom. In 1873 a group of prominent Sikhs convened a series of meetings in Amritsar that eventually led to the formation of a society called the Singh Sabha, which would lay the foundations for modern Sikh political institutions to emerge in the twentieth century. The founders of the first Singh Sabha were mainly conservative Sikhs, like Baba Khem Singh Bedi, who emphasized caste distinctions, tolerated idol worship, and maintained close ties with Hindus. Such views naturally antagonized reformist Sikhs, who emphasized a more pristine version of Khalsa identity (Tāt Khalsa), which also found support with British administrators eager to promote the view that Sikhism was in danger of merging back into Hinduism if it lost its Khalsa identity. By 1879 the more radical members of the Singh Sabha had broken away to form a second branch of the Singh Sabha based at Lahore. Within a few years the radical Lahore Singh Sabha, guided by personalities like Kahn Singh Nabha, Giani Ditt Singh, and Bhai Vir Singh, completely superseded the Amritsar Singh Sabha as the result of a massive campaign of expansion, revivalist teachings, and political canvassing. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, all Punjabi cities and many villages had flourishing Singh Sabhas. However, given the sheer numbers of these organizations and with increasing need to consolidate mainstream Sikh opinion, the Amritsar and Lahore Singh Sabhas were merged in 1902 into a single representative body called the Chief Khalsa Diwan (CKD), whose explicit purpose was to represent all Sikhs in matters of religion and to further their political position in the province at a time of growing political rivalry and separation among Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communities.

Although one of the CKD's professed objectives was to safeguard the political rights of the Sikh community, its political stance was compromised from the outset by its need to maintain cordial relations with the British rulers. CKD leaders were therefore opposed to the agitational politics that had become the norm during the first decades of the twentieth century. Out of step with the anticolonial stance of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, who had successfully campaigned

for separate electorates and proportional representation for Hindus and Muslims, respectively, the CKD ended up far short of its expected share of the electoral seats in the Punjab Council. As a consequence, it was eventually superseded by a more strident voice in Sikh politics, the Akali movement.

In 1919 the CKD was dissolved into another organization, the Central Sikh League, which in turn gave rise to two separate organizations in 1920: the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). The SAD was founded on 14 December 1920 in the hope of protecting the political rights of Sikhs, to preserve their religious heritage, and to represent them in public bodies and legislative councils set up by the British. Closely related to the SAD was the SGPC, which was essentially an organization that administered the historical Sikh shrines and under whose control they were to function. Within three years of its formation, the SAD became the premier political party of the Sikhs, and its control over Sikh and Punjabi politics is still powerful today. Soon after its inauguration, the SAD aligned itself with the Indian National Congress and launched a campaign of peaceful agitation against the British, and immediately following, a separate agitation to wrest control of historical Sikh shrines from the *mahants*—the hereditary proprietors of the sacred Sikh shrines, most of whom were descended from the order of Udasis, wandering Hindu ascetics who had taken over the shrines during the time of Ranjit Singh, and many of whom were accused of misappropriating Gurdwara funds for personal gain. This agitation culminated in 1925 with the passing of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, which, through the SGPC, gave the Sikh community the rights to possess and manage their own shrines through an electoral process. The first leader of the SAD, Baba Kharak Singh, lost the leadership in 1926 to Master Tara Singh, who continued to steer its fortunes for three decades.

Political events and other episodes that have occurred in Punjab since 1925 are a testimony to the influence and longevity of the SAD and SGPC partnership. Key achievements include the reformulation and universal approval of the document called *Sikh Rabit Maryada* (Sikh Code of Conduct) published by the SGPC in the 1950s, and the Indian government's granting of Punjabi Suba (Punjabi state) to the Punjab. The severest test for the SAD and SGPC occurred during the 1980s, a fateful decade that saw a protracted political battle against Indira Gandhi's Congress Party; internal challenges from clerical organizations like the Damdami Takhsal, led by the charismatic preacher Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale; the Indian army's assault on the Golden Temple complex; and the destruction of the Akal Takht in June 1984 as part of the army's effort to oust Bhindranwale and his

supporters. The assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh guards in October 1984 followed, and thereafter Sikh insurgent groups demanded a separatist state called Khalistan. During the 1990s, coinciding with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the demise of the Congress Party, the SAD split into various factions: Akali Dal (Badal) led by former chief minister of Punjab, Parkash Singh Badal; Akali Dal (Longowal) led by Surjit Singh Barnala; and Akali Dal (Mann) led by former police officer Simranjit Singh Mann. Perhaps the real test for the SAD and SGPC is yet to come, as Sikhs living outside Punjab, constantly growing in numbers and financial strength, seek to articulate a notion of Sikh political sovereignty, derived from the dual sources of Sikhism's supreme authority: Guru Granth Sahib and the lived experience of its Khalsa Panth.

Arvind-Pal S. Mandair

See also **Gandhi, Indira; Sikhism; Singh, Maharaja Ranjit**

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SIKHISM Sikhism is the religious faith of those who call themselves Sikhs, the followers of Guru Nanak, his nine successors and their teachings, embodied in the Guru Granth Sahib, the sacred scripture of the Sikhs. The Sikh population worldwide at the beginning of the twenty-first century was estimated at 20 million; of these, 17 million reside in India, with 14 million living in Punjab. Of the 2 million or so Sikhs who live outside India, the Sikh diaspora, the majority are in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.

Origins and Early Sikh History

Sikhism originated in the Punjab region of northwestern India during a time when many religious teachers, known as "Sants," were seeking to reconcile the two opposing dominant faiths, Hinduism and Islam. The Sants expressed their teachings in vernacular poetry based on inner experience. Although the teachings of Guru Nanak were broadly aligned with some of the Sants, his own mission is thought to have emerged out of his direct experience of the divine, initiated with the words *na koi Hindu, na koi Mussalman* . . . ("there is no



Sikh Worshiper. A Sikh pilgrim worshipping at a stream in Anandpur Sahib, the "Holy City of Bliss." It has been a sacred site for centuries, closely linked with Sikhs' religious traditions and history. CHRIS LISLE / CORBIS.

Hindu, there is no Muslim") signaling a third way that was to become the Nanak Panth, or the path of Nanak. The first community of his disciples, those who chose to follow Nanak as their Guru (divine teacher), was composed primarily of former Hindus, who came to call themselves his "Sikhs" (followers).

For the details of Guru Nanak's life Sikh tradition relies on a body of hagiographical literature called the *janamsakhis* (life testimonies), which appeared a century and a half after Nanak's death, undergoing expansion for sometime until printed editions were made in the nineteenth century. Sikhs today mainly rely on the accounts given in the Puratan Janamsakhi, which expounds four main cycles in Nanak's life story. In the first cycle, Nanak was born in 1469 in Talwandi, a village 40 miles (64 km) from Lahore, and was acclaimed by Muslims and Hindus alike as a future religious leader. In the second cycle, Nanak was married at twelve, his wife joining him at age nineteen; they had two sons. Nanak experienced difficulty

settling into any profession, trying his hand as a herdsman, a trader, and finally as an accountant for a local official at Sultanpur. Nanak seemed to be mainly preoccupied with spiritual concerns, preferring the company of holy men and ascetics. Together with his closest associate, a Muslim bard named Mardana, Nanak organized regular nightly singing of devotional hymns, going to bathe in a nearby river before daybreak. During one of these sessions, at age thirty, Nanak underwent his first major mystical experience, in which he received a calling to teach people a path of devotion to the divine Name. According to the *Puratan Janamsakhi*, shortly after this experience Nanak entered the third phase of his life, in which he spent the next twelve years traveling eastward to Banaras (Varanasi), Bengal, and Orissa, southward to Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, northward to Tibet, and finally westward to the Muslim regions as far as Mecca, Medina, and Baghdad. In the final phase of his life at about the age of fifty, Nanak founded a settlement at Kartarpur where he led a community of disciples, instructing them in spiritual practice and study, with *nam simaran* (remembrance of the Name) and *kirtan* (singing hymns of praise) regular features of devotion. At the same time he insisted that his disciples remain fully involved in worldly affairs by doing practical labor (Nanak himself tended his own crops) while maintaining a regular family life.

Shortly before his death in 1539 at age seventy, Guru Nanak's appointment of a successor not only inaugurated a two-centuries long politico-spiritual lineage, with each successor taking the title of Guru, but also marked a break with prior Sant practice of not appointing spiritual successors. During the next two centuries the early Sikh Panth (community) underwent significant expansion and development into a defined and disciplined order, with different steps taking place under successive Gurus. The second Guru, Angad (b. 1504; r. 1539–1552) collected Nanak's hymns, developed the alphabetic script called Gurmukhi ("from the Guru's mouth"), and institutionalized the *langar*, or communal kitchen, to feed disciples who came to visit Nanak's *dharamsalas*. Guru Amardas (b. 1479; r. 1552–1574), the third Guru, encouraged the observance of separate Sikh shrines, pilgrimage traditions and festivals, as well as instituting the *manji* system of supervising distant congregations. The fourth Guru, Ramdas (b. 1534; r. 1574–1581), founded a new center called Ramdaspur (later named Amritsar), where he supervised the excavation of the sacred pool that later became the central site of Sikh pilgrimage. Guru Ramdas appointed *masands*, or deputies, to represent the Guru's authority in his more dispersed congregations.

Sikhism became more firmly established under the fifth Guru Arjan (b. 1563; r. 1581–1606), who introduced

several important innovations. Relying on extant collections, Arjan supervised the compilation and canonization of a scripture, the *Adi Granth* ("original text"), which contains the compositions of Sikh Gurus and other non-Sikh saints. The completion of the Harimandir temple, and the installation therein of the *Adi Granth* in 1604, proved to be highly significant for molding Sikh identity. Guru Arjan also founded new towns, such as Tarn Taran, Kartarpur, and Sri Hargobindpur, and extended trading links across India's northwestern frontier into Afghanistan and beyond. The increasing success and expansion of the Sikhs in Punjab inevitably led to confrontation with the Mughal authority under the emperor Jahangir. Guru Arjan was accused of supporting a rebellion led by Jahangir's son Amir Khushru. Charges of sedition were followed by imprisonment and finally execution in Lahore in 1606. Guru Arjan's martyrdom led to increased militarization and overt political involvement under his son and successor, the sixth Guru Hargobind (b. 1595; r. 1606–1644), symbolized by his donning of two swords, one representing spiritual authority (*miri*), the other representing political authority (*piri*). Maintaining a small but effective army, Guru Hargobind consciously prepared the Sikhs to resist willful state oppression. Although confrontation receded during the tenure of his successor Gurus, Har Rai and Har Krishan, they nevertheless maintained a similar style of leadership with a retinue of armed followers. It was the ninth Guru, Tegh Bahadur (b. 1621; r. 1664–1675), who again was forced to confront the increasingly restrictive policies of Jahangir's grandson, the emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), which included enforcement of Islamic laws and taxes and the replacement of local Hindu temples by Muslim mosques. Guru Tegh Bahadur's active resistance against such policies, his public defense of Hindus' rights to practice their religion freely, and his own refusal to accept Islam under pain of death led to his imprisonment and execution in Delhi's Chandni Chowk in 1675.

The Sikh Panth's involvement in political resistance came to a climax with the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh (b. 1666; r. 1675–1708). Shortly after the execution of his father, the ninth Guru, the young Gobind Rai moved from Anandpur deeper into the Himalayan foothills. Neighboring hill chieftans, nervous about the young Guru's increasing power, unsuccessfully attacked his men at Bhangani. Following this episode the Guru moved back to Anandpur, where he successfully fought a Mughal force at Nadaun. The Guru built several other fortresses at Anandpur, Lohgarh, Keshgarh, and Fategarh. His best-known contribution to the development of Sikhism was to redefine the very core of the Sikh Panth as a military-cum-spiritual order, the Khalsa ("sovereign" or "free"). According to tradition, he called his followers to assemble for the Baisakhi festival in 1699 at Anandpur.

There he called for five volunteers to pass a test of absolute loyalty. Those who passed the test, the so-called *panj piare* (five beloved ones) were initiated into the new Khalsa order by a ceremonial rite called *khande ka pabul* (baptism of the double-edged sword), thus forming the nucleus of a sovereign, casteless community. Each member of the Khalsa order undertook to wear the five external symbols, or five “K”s (*kesb*, long, uncut hair; *kirpan*, short sword; *kanga*, comb; *kara*, steel bracelet; *kaccha*, breeches), to adhere to a formal code of conduct (*rabit*), and to relinquish family surnames, with males assuming the name Singh (lion) and females assuming the name Kaur (princess), thereby removing sexual inequality while maintaining gender difference. The Guru in turn received the same initiation from the *panj piare*, thereby assuming the name Singh and signifying a merger of identities between Guru and disciples. Many thousands more accepted this initiation. The last nine years of Guru Gobind Singh’s life were spent either in protracted battles against the combined forces of Aurangzeb and the hill rajahs, in which the Guru lost his four sons and his mother, himself becoming a fugitive relentlessly hunted by the Mughals. Despite these setbacks, the Guru resurrected his army, and upon Aurangzeb’s death supported the succession of his son Bahadur Shah to the throne. While at Nander, the Guru commissioned a hermit named Banda Singh to inflict punishment on Wazir Khan, one of Aurangzeb’s generals.

The tenth Guru was a prolific writer, composing literature in Braj, Hindi, Persian, and Sanskrit. Much of this literature forms the Dasam Granth (Book of the Tenth Master), which contains devotional hymns such as *Jaap*, *Svaye*, *Chaupas*, mythological treatises such as *Chandi Ki Var* (Tales of the goddess), and a semiautobiographical work *Bachitar Natak* (The wonderful drama). Tradition records that Guru Gobind Singh also recomposed from memory the entire contents of the Adi Granth, since the extant copies were either lost during his battles, or remained in the hands of rival claimants to the Guru’s position. Guru Gobind Singh died in 1708 at the hands of an assassin. Before his death, however, he declared the line of living Gurus to be at an end, issuing a command for the Sikh community to look to dual sources of authority, namely, the scriptural text (Adi Granth), which henceforth became known as the Guru Granth Sahib, and the body politic of the Khalsa Panth.

The Post-Guru Period

The Sikhs faced their most difficult period during the first few decades of the eighteenth century, their fortunes depending on the degree to which they could assert themselves against Mughal forces in the southeast and the steadily increasing incursions of the Afghans in the

northwest, at the same time jockeying for position with the local Hindu princes in Punjab.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Sikhs had forged themselves into twelve independent militia units, or *misl*s, which were instrumental in eventually dislodging the Mughals from power. The twelve *misl*s were finally unified by the most illustrious Sikh ruler, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who took Lahore and was proclaimed maharaja of the Punjab. After a series of successful campaigns against the Afghans and Pathans, Ranjit Singh had also secured India’s northwestern frontier by the 1820s. Among other things, Maharajah Ranjit Singh is celebrated as the benefactor of the Harimandir (Golden Temple) in Amritsar, which he covered in gold leaf. Shortly after the maharaja’s death in 1839, however, in-fighting broke out among his successors, the Sikh kingdom fell into disarray, and, after a series of hard-fought battles, was annexed by the British Raj in 1849.

Emergence of Modern Sikhism

The advent of British colonial rule not only marks the entry of Sikhism into Western modernity, but also the emergence of three reform movements (the Nirankaris, the Namdharis, and the Singh Sabha movement), each attempting to revive a sense of separate religious identity among Sikhs at a time when most such traditions were considered to be sects of Hinduism. The Namdharis, founded by Baba Dyal Das (1783–1853), took their name from their condemnation of idolatry and participation in Hindu rituals that had become prevalent among many Sikhs. The Namdharis, founded by Baba Ram Singh (1816–1884), came to be regarded as a separatist movement when they instituted a separate baptismal ritual and code of conduct. Ram Singh advocated strict vegetarianism, the wearing of all-white dress, and loud chanting, which led to their nickname, *kukas* (howlers), because of their spontaneous outbursts during devotional trances. In 1871 the Namdharis came into conflict with the British when they violently opposed the colonial administration’s reintroduction of cow slaughter (previously banned by Maharaja Ranjit Singh), and in the process killed Muslim butchers in Amritsar and Ludhiana. The British ruthlessly suppressed the uprising by tying sixty-five Namdharis to the mouths of cannons, blowing them to pieces.

By far the most influential Sikh reformist movement was the Singh Sabha, founded in 1863 under aristocratic patronage. By 1879 the movement had suffered an internal schism that led to the formation of the conservative Amritsar-based faction, led by Baba Khem Singh Bedi, and the more radical (and ultimately far more successful) Lahore-based faction, led initially by Giani Ditt Singh and Principal Gurmukh Singh, and subsequently by

Kahn Singh Nabha, Teja Singh, Vir Singh, and Jodh Singh. Through its political functionary, the Chief Khalsa Diwan (CKD), a body set up in 1902 to jointly conduct the affairs of the Amritsar and Lahore factions, the Singh Sabha movement achieved the most successful reinterpretation of Sikhism adapted to modernity, which has, until recently, exerted a hegemonic influence on Sikh identity. Their reformulation was based on the colonially inspired distinction between, on the one hand, a monotheistic-historical Sikhism centered on the authority of a clearly recognizable scripture and embodied by the Tat (authentic) Khalsa ideal, and on the other hand, a pantheistic ahistorical Hinduism. Crucially the Singh Sabha redefined the means by which the tradition was communicated. Making use of British colonial patronage and new forms of transportation, commerce, and communication (especially the printing press), the Singh Sabhas were able to develop an extensive network of chapters across North India. Through the combined effect of tract publications and more systematic works of theology and history, the leading Singh Sabha scholars redefined the doctrinal foundations of Sikhism. Major political successes include the passing of the Anand Marriage Act in 1909, which prescribed circumambulation of the Guru Granth Sahib in Sikh marriages, replacing circumambulation of the Vedic fire. Under the banner of the Akali Dal Party, political successors to the CKD, a more violent campaign was launched in the early 1920s to wrest control of the Harimandir and other historical *gurdwaras* from the Mahants or traditional custodians, resulting in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925, which handed administration of these *gurdwaras* back to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), an elected body dominated by the Akali Dal, which continues to dominate the religious and political affairs of the Sikh Panth. An important milestone for the SGPC was the publication of the *Sikh Rahit Maryada*, or Sikh Code of Conduct, in the 1950's, which guaranteed greater uniformity of Sikh religious practices.

Following British withdrawal in 1947, the partition of India split the traditional Sikh homeland of Punjab into two parts, its western half going to Pakistan, and its eastern to India, with its capital in Amritsar. Amid widescale ethnic and religious violence, approximately 3 million Sikhs were displaced from western Punjab, fleeing across a hastily, ineptly drawn border to India's Punjab. At the time of partition, there were some who called for the creation of a Sikh homeland, to be called Sikhistan or Khalistan, but this suggestion received no official support. However, the desire to create a majority Sikh state in Indian Punjab encouraged the Akali Dal to agitate for a Punjabi-speaking state as part of the Indian Union, which was achieved in 1966 through the separation of Sikh-majority Punjab from Hindu-majority Haryana.

Continuing this tradition of political agitation into the late 1970s and early 1980s (when an increasingly Hindu-dominated India viewed Sikh demands for improving Punjab's economic resources with hostility) resulted in a violent confrontation between the central government of India, led by Indira Gandhi, and groups of Sikh militants. Events culminated in June 1984, when Prime Minister Gandhi ordered India's army to launch its deadly Operation Bluestar, sending tanks into Amritsar's Golden Temple to remove Sikh militants, led by the charismatic preacher Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, killing over a thousand Sikhs according to government records. In retaliation, Indira Gandhi was assassinated that October by two of her Sikh bodyguards; subsequently Hindu mobs launched reprisals against Sikhs, killing thousands in Delhi alone. More than five thousand innocent Sikhs were killed that November throughout India. Violence escalated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s as young Sikh militants, supported by Sikhs of the diaspora, revived the demand for a separate Sikh Khalistan.

Sikh Theological Doctrine, Worship, and Customs

The distinctive nature of Sikhism may be traced from Guru Nanak himself, embodied in his hymns that are part of the Adi Granth, and amplified in the lives and works of his nine Guru successors, explained in the exegetical writings of Sikh scholars, such as Bhai Gurdas in the sixteenth century, or Bhai Vir Singh in the twentieth century. For devout Sikhs the most succinct expression of Nanak's thought is encapsulated in the syllable *ik oankar*, which appears at the very beginning of Nanak's *Japji Sahib* (the first and most authoritative hymn in the Adi Granth), and which is often translated in conformity to the rationalized idiom of monotheism as "One God Exists," though it is more accurately translated as "The One Absolute, Manifested through Primal Word-Sound." According to Guru Nanak, the Absolute is nondual (One). From the conceptual standpoint of the human ego, however, the Absolute is perceived dualistically in terms of either/or distinctions, such as *nirgun/sargun* (without qualities/with qualities; formless/form), or in terms of the difference between God and man. A person limited to mere conceptuality is *mannukh* (ego-centered individual) and therefore unfree, ignorant, limited by a self-generating consciousness. For Guru Nanak, the Absolute cannot be conceptualized or obtained through rituals (*sochai soch na hovi*), through mere silencing of the mind (*chupai chup na hovi*), or by satisfying one's cravings (*bbukbian bbuk na uttari*). The Absolute can only be realized through experience. As such, the nonduality of the Absolute is conceptually inseparable from the notion of freedom (*mukti*) found in the classic mystical themes of separation and fusion between lover and beloved. To

realize the One, the individual must be grounded in a state of existence that relinquishes the individuality of the self, so that what remains when ego is abandoned—the *man* (heart/mind/soul)—emerges as the lover and is able to merge with the Other (its Beloved). In this state, one instinctively avoids relating to the One in terms of subject and object. Such a realized individual (*gurmukh*) no longer represents the Absolute to himself, since the conscious distinction between self and other, I and not-I, lover and beloved, disappears, leaving an ecstatic and purely spontaneous form of existence (*sahaj*).

In Sikh tradition, the figure of the *gurmukh* and the spontaneous freedom associated with it are seen as an intensely creative form of existence that is “oriented toward the guru” and aligned with the divine order (*bukam*) yet released from the mechanism of individuation (*baumai*). The transition from duality to nonduality (or, stated otherwise, the transition from *manmukh* to *gurmukh*) turns on the efficacy of *naam* (the Name), which is both the object of love and the means of loving attachment to the beloved. Being the point of contact between transcendence (God) and immanence (world), *naam* is the medium by which the ego loses itself in human communication with others, that is, the medium par excellence for experiencing the condition of nonduality. In Nanak’s hymns, *naam* is not a particular word or mantra, but is both written within and yet comprises the vibration of the cosmos. Being the link between mystic interiority and worldly action, *naam* is appropriated by the *gurmukh* through the practice of *simaran* (constant remembrance or repetition of the Name)—a form of meditation in which the One simultaneously becomes the focus of an individual’s awareness (*surati*) and his motivation to perform righteous action (*karam kamabe*). However, *naam* cannot be obtained voluntarily. Its attainment depends on grace or the favorable glance of the Guru (*kirpa/nadar*), receiving which the individual can change his predestined nature (*likhia nal*) into the spontaneous being of the *gurmukh*, which no longer generates *samskāras* (the soul passed from one life to another). Sikhs therefore hold a belief in the transmigration of souls, which come and go (*avan jan*) until one is liberated from the bonds of the ego. From the standpoint of the *gurmukh*, the conceptual duality between religion and politics, mysticism and violence, and so on, becomes superfluous, as is evident in the lived experience of the Sikh Gurus, for whom there was no contradiction between mystical experience and the life of a soldier or householder.

As one of the central terms in Sikh doctrine, the term “Guru” takes on theologico-political connotations that go well beyond its meaning and application in Hinduism, where it is limited to a teacher, initially of worldly knowledge, or a conveyor of spiritual insight. In Sikhism

the term “Guru” automatically incorporates this earlier meaning, referring thereby to Guru Nanak and his nine successor Gurus. Metaphorically it refers to the same divine light manifested in all ten Gurus; practically it serves to indicate the authority vested in the name “Nanak.” Thus the hymns of the different Gurus in the *Adi Granth* are cited by referring to their respective composers as sequential locations (*mabalas*) for the manifestation of the name “Nanak.” Just before the death of the tenth Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh, authority was jointly vested, on the one hand, in the *Adi Granth* (henceforth *Guru Granth Sahib*), leading to the doctrine of scripture or Word as Guru (*shabad-guru*), and on the other hand, in the collective wisdom of the initiated community, the *Khalsa*, giving the doctrine of *Panth* as Guru (*guru-panth*). Underpinning all of these notions is the fourth notion of Guru in Sikhism, namely, the *satguru*, or true Guru, which recurs in the hymns as identical to the divine principle itself: that which bestows or gives to those who follow in the way (*bukam*).

Sikh congregational worship takes place in the *gurdwara* (door of the Guru), which is essentially any building in which the *Guru Granth Sahib* can be appropriately installed. The modern *gurdwara* has evolved out of the *dharamsalas* (resting places) established by Guru Nanak during his travels. The principal congregational activities in the *gurdwara* include *kirtan* (the singing of hymns), *katha vachic* (narrative exposition of Sikh philosophy and history), and more recently, *akhand path* (unbroken recitation of the entire *Guru Granth Sahib*), funeral services, and marriage ceremonies. Any adult Sikh, male or female, can conduct religious ceremonies. Specialized readers of the sacred texts, called *granthis*, and professional singers are qualified to perform congregational duties by skill rather than by ritual ordination. In most *gurdwaras* meditational worship begins before dawn with recitals of Guru Nanak’s *Asa di Var*, followed at dawn with his *Japji*, and by Guru Gobind Singh’s *Jaap*.

Sikh festivals known as *gurpurbs* (the rising of a guru) are associated with an event in the respective Guru’s life. The most important *gurpurbs* are Guru Nanak’s birthday, celebrated on the full moon in November, Guru Gobind Singh’s birthday (December–January), and the martyrdoms of Guru Arjan and Tegh Bahadur (May–June), all of which follow a lunar calendar. Sikh festivals that follow a solar calendar include Baisakhi and Divali. Baisakhi, celebrated as New Year’s Day in North India, usually falls on the thirteenth of April. Originally a grain harvest festival for Hindus, it has acquired particular importance for Sikhs due to Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the *Khalsa* on Baisakhi of 1699. Sikhs today celebrate Baisakhi as a historical birthday for the community. Similarly, while for Hindus Divali is a festival of lights celebrating the return

of Ram Chandra to Ayodhya, for Sikhs Divali marks the return of the sixth Guru Hargobind from his imprisonment by the Mughal emperor Jahangir. Another Sikh festival is Hola Mohalla, the day after Holi (which Hindus celebrate by freely throwing colored powder on each other to commemorate an event in the life of Prahlad, a devotee of Vishnu). Sikhs follow the same custom but for different reasons. The emphasis Guru Gobind Singh gave to Sikh observance was to channel people's energies toward military exercises through organized athletic and literary contests.

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See also Amritsar; Bahadur Shah I; Gandhi, Indira; Guru Nanak; Jahangir; Sikh Institutions and Parties; Singh, Maharaja Ranjit

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SIKKIM. *See Geography.*

SIMLA The capital (since 1966) of Himachal Pradesh, Simla had a population of 145,000 in 2001. Its name is derived from the Hindu goddess Shyamali. Located at an altitude of about 7,900 feet (2,400 meters) above sea level, it was built as a "hill station" by the British in 1819 after they had acquired the location in the Gurkha War. From 1865 to 1939 it served as the summer capital of British India. The Kalka-Simla railway, completed in 1903, links Simla with the North Indian plains.

In July 1945 Viceroy Lord Wavell convened the Simla Conference, attended by delegates of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Lord Wavell was eager to install an interim national government, as he was faced with serious postwar problems, among them the demobilization of the large Indian army of about 2 million soldiers.

The conference failed because Mohammad Ali Jinnah, president of the Muslim League, insisted on nominating all Muslim members of the national government, which the National Congress would not accept, even though its president at the time was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a prominent Muslim. Jinnah's veto, which Wavell accepted, raised Jinnah's political stature.

Another Simla Conference of historical importance was held in 1972. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and the president of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, met at Simla after Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in December 1971. During the war of secession, 90,000 Pakistani soldiers had surrendered to the Indian army. Bhutto had to make a number of concessions in order to repatriate them. Gandhi insisted that Pakistan settle all future disputes with India, including Kashmir, solely through bilateral negotiations. Pakistan tried to forget this promise as soon as its prisoners were returned, and Simla thus became a symbol of political frustrations.

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SIND One of Pakistan's four provinces, Sind occupies the southeastern corner of the country, covering 54,407 square miles (140,913 sq. km), about the area of England. Sind is bounded on the south by the Arabian Sea, on the west and north by Balochistan and Punjab provinces, and on the east by India. Sindi, the native language of the province, is one of the major spoken languages of Pakistan, with a considerable literature.

Sind was conquered by Alexander the Great in 325 B.C. and was one of the first areas on the Indian subcontinent to be influenced by Arab invaders in the early eighth century A.D. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it came under Mughal Muslim domination. The administrative province of Sind was carved out of the much larger province of Bombay in British India in 1936. Sind's Muslim majority destined that the area would become one of the principal provinces of independent Pakistan after partition in August 1947. Yet unlike the strong identification of Muslim populations in northern and central India with Pakistani nationalism, the political leadership of Sind was not closely aligned with the Muslim League of Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Sind lost its status as an autonomous province when Pakistan's Constituent Assembly in 1955 adopted

its “One-Unit Plan” for West Pakistan. Sind’s provincial assembly and political identity were restored with the restoration of Pakistan’s federal system in 1970.

Sind’s population stood at 30 million in 2003, with roughly half its people living in urban centers, the largest being Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur. Sindi society is multiethnic. Sindi identity itself contains different strains historically, but a basic distinction is made between Sindis and Muhajirs (“immigrants”), an urban Urdu-speaking population that traces its origins to immigration from North India after Partition. Subsequently, large numbers of Punjabis and Pathans from the North-West Frontier, as well as Baluchis, migrated to Sind from other provinces within Pakistan. Non-Muslim religious minorities dominated Sind’s cities before the Hindu population fled with partition. Only very small Hindu, Christian, and Parsi (Zoroastrian) communities remain in the province.

A strong tradition of Sindi “nationalism” exists. Nationalists have championed greater provincial autonomy and have sought to defend politically and economically those in the population who have their roots in Sind. Sindi nationalists have long resented Pakistan’s politically dominant Punjabi community. They chafed at the allotment, after independence, of large tracts of irrigated land to absentee Punjabi landlords, mainly from Pakistan’s ruling Punjabi bureaucratic and military elites. Migrating Punjabis are also resented for taking over larger businesses and industries in the province. An unresolved and continuing bone of contention between Sindi nationalists and successive national governments of Pakistan has been the construction of numerous barrages and canals, which divert much of the Indus River’s flow to the Punjab.

Muhajirs had been prominent in the national bureaucracy until Pakistan’s capital shifted from Karachi to Islamabad in northern Punjab in 1960. Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first native Sindi prime minister of Pakistan, a quota system was introduced, guaranteeing that 60 percent of jobs and educational admissions provincially would effectively be reserved for rural Sindis, mostly at the expense of Muhajirs. An attempt to impose Sindi as the province’s official language incensed the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs and occasioned riots in 1972. The Pakistan army was called in to quell the disturbances. Bhutto’s policies of nationalizing industry also fell particularly hard on wealthy Muhajir businessmen.

Dedicated Sindi nationalists have never succeeded in an election. Pakistan’s popular People’s Party has dominated the province, its strongholds lying particularly in the rural districts of Sind, especially Larkara, the home district of the large landholding Bhutto family. During recent years, the county’s religious parties have expanded

their influence in the province, notably in Karachi. Although many Sindis follow a relaxed, though devout, Sufi Islamic tradition, there have been some inroads of more orthodox, rigid Islamic beliefs and practices, especially traceable to the growing number of party-affiliated religious schools.

Another challenge to the Sindi nationalists came in 1984 with the organized political opposition of the Muhajirs, latter called Muttahida Quami Mahaz (MQM), or Immigrant People’s Movement. Appealing mostly to urban dwellers from the educated middle and lower middle classes, the MQM has sought to break the political grip of the landlord class in provincial politics. To force attention to their political and economic grievances, the often fractious movement has at times formed alliances with national parties. But the MQM also has a vivid history of confrontation with the central government, which it accuses of using divide-and-rule tactics to disenfranchise Muhajirs. In 1995 MQM-instigated interethnic violence, centered in Karachi, was brutally put down by government security forces, and in 1998 Governor’s rule was imposed on the province, and military tribunals were introduced.

In human development terms, measured by achievements in health and education and real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Sind ranks second among Pakistan’s provinces. However, disaggregating the indices presents striking variability. Sind has the highest overall literacy rate at 51 percent of the population, but along with Baluchistan, the lowest school enrollment and the lowest infant survival rate. At the same time, Sind has Pakistan’s highest real GDP per capita. This disparity is explained by the province’s deep urban-rural divide. While urban Sind comes out highest on combined human development indexes, rural Sind ranks lowest among the four provinces.

Much of Sind is desert. Seasonal rains ordinarily do not exceed 7 inches (18 cm) per annum, and many sections of the province often receive much less. Although Sind contains only 7 million acres of cultivatable land, it is basically an agrarian province. Cropped areas, mostly in cotton, wheat, and rice, are irrigated from the Indus River, which carries water from the Himalayas and Karakoram ranges in the distant north. On 1 April 1948 India had cut off the flow of water from the Indus headwaters under its control. With the intercession of the World Bank, an agreement acceptable to both governments was reached in 1960. That treaty, commonly known as the Indus Water Treaty, is the only major peaceful agreement ever reached by India and Pakistan and, despite subsequent wars and tensions, it remains in force.

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See also **Pakistan and India**

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SINGH. See **Sikhism**.

SINGH, BHAGAT (1907–1931), Indian socialist and revolutionary. Born in Banga village, Lyallpur district (now Faisalabad, Pakistan), on 27 September 1907, Bhagat Singh represented the radical wing of the Indian freedom movement. Influenced by the Russian revolution and Leninist ideas, particularly toward the end of his brief life, Bhagat Singh differed from mainstream leaders in the Congress Party, both in his advocacy of revolutionary violence and armed struggle and in his belief that national liberation would be incomplete without ending social exploitation.

As a student in Lahore, Singh was inspired by the Ghadar movement and the execution of nineteen-year-old Kartar Singh Sarabha. Drawn to the band of radical young men—influenced by Sachindranath Sanyal and Chandrashekhar Azad—who believed that the only way to force the British out of India was through violence, Singh moved to Kanpur, then a center of revolutionary activity in the United Provinces, to work in the nationalist press run by Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi. There he joined the Hindustan Republican Association (HRA), whose aim was the establishment of a Federated Republic of the United States of India “by an organised and armed revolution.”

Moving back to Lahore, Singh started a youth organization, the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, to further the aims of the HRA, which had been weakened by the execution and arrest of key members following a daring raid on a train near Kakori in Uttar Pradesh (then called United Provinces) in August 1925. On 9 September 1928, Bhagat Singh and other revolutionaries met in Delhi to reestablish the old party, calling it, this time, the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA).

Following the police beating—and subsequent death—of Congress leader Lala Lajpat Rai in Lahore in November 1928, the HSRA decided to assassinate the city's police superintendent, J. A. Scott. Singh and Sukh Dev (the HSRA leader) planned and executed the plot,



Portrait of Bhagat Singh. Executed by the British in 1931, Bhagat Singh differed from mainstream leaders in the Congress in both his advocacy of revolutionary violence and in his belief that national liberation would be incomplete without a true end to social exploitation. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

but instead of the intended victim, they ended up killing a young assistant superintendent of police, J. P. Saunders. Singh escaped, but voluntarily surrendered following his next major action, when he and Batukeshwar Dutt threw two bombs and hundreds of leaflets into the chamber of the Central Legislative Assembly while it was in session on 8 April 1929.

Sentenced to life imprisonment for this incident, Singh was subsequently tried, along with Sukh Dev and revolutionary Shivram Rajguru, for the killing of Saunders. Conducted by a special tribunal established by Ordinance and fraught with violations of due process, the trial ended in the imposition of death sentences. Bhagat Singh refused to move a mercy petition and instead demanded he be shot dead rather than hanged, as he had been accused of waging war against the British state. The three young comrades were hanged in Lahore Jail on 23 March 1931.

Despite his youth, Bhagat Singh's politics were surprisingly modern, his commitment to socialism and secularism anticipating by several decades principles that continue to animate independent India's polity. His

Naujawan Bharat Sabha believed religion a matter of personal belief that should not be mixed with politics. In jail, he rejected terrorism, conceding that revolutionary violence had only limited utility, and stressed instead the need to politically mobilize India's millions. Only twenty-three years old at the time of his execution, Bhagat Singh was considered by British intelligence to be as popular a figure nationwide as Mahatma Gandhi.

Siddharth Varadarajan


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SINGH, MAHARAJA RANJIT (1780–1839), Sikh ruler of India. Maharaja Ranjit Singh ruled a large state in northwestern India that eventually encompassed

the Punjab, Kashmir, several districts to the west of the river Indus, and the region around Multan. Ranjit Singh's grandfather, Charhat Singh, and his father, Mahan Singh, were petty rulers of a Sikh state around Gujranwala, about 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Lahore. Ranjit Singh was a great warrior who lost an eye on the battlefield and was thereafter called the "one-eyed lion of the Punjab." He conquered Lahore in 1799, Amritsar in 1805, Multan and Peshawar in 1818, and Kashmir in 1819. After the Afghan conqueror Ahmad Shah had defeated the Marathas at the battle of Panipat in 1761 and had then withdrawn, there was a power vacuum in the region, which was filled by a number of Sikh chieftains with their indomitable war bands (*misl*s). They rarely acted in concert, proudly maintaining their autonomy. Ranjit Singh subdued them one by one, first compelling them to accept his suzerainty and to pay a tribute (*nazrana*) to him, then annexing their territory. The secret of his success was his devotion to modern warfare. He hired European officers as well as American artillerymen and created a large disciplined army. For this he needed a constant flow of land revenue, which he



Indian Postage Stamp. Indian postage stamp bearing images of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the eighteenth-century ruler who transformed Punjab's Sikhs into "lion-hearted" warriors. KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

collected more or less in the same manner as the Mughals had done before him. He also followed their example of giving military fiefs (*jagir*) to his commanders. He did not emulate the Mughal system of a hierarchy of ranks (*mānsāb*), yet like the Mughal *mānsabdārs*, his *jagirdars* received two distinct assignments, one in lieu of their own salary and one to pay for the cavalry troops that they had to maintain. Ranjit strictly inspected these troops and reintroduced the Mughal practice of branding horses so as to make sure that his officers did not deviate from the norms set by him.

As long as Ranjit Singh was alive, he was able to fend off the British, though he knew that he was fighting a rear-guard battle. When he was shown a map of India in which the areas captured by the British were colored red, he remarked that “one day soon” all of India would become “red.” Under his weak successors, the control that he had established over the indomitable Sikhs soon lapsed, and the British vanquished them in two bloody Anglo-Sikh wars. This victory was mostly due to the Indian soldiers of the British East India Company’s Bengal army, which was therefore hated by the Sikhs. During the mutiny of this army in 1857, irregular Sikh troops helped save the British Raj and thus emerged as one of the “martial races” that were recruited by the British in great numbers. The British thus seemed to be the heirs of Ranjit Singh, organizing Punjab’s “lion-hearted” Sikhs as a disciplined force that was rarely matched on the field of battle.

Dietmar Rothermund

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SINGH, MANMOHAN (1932–), finance minister (1991–1996), prime minister of India (2004–). Dr. Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, became India’s thirteenth prime minister, and its first non-Hindu premier, in May 2004. Additionally, he holds the portfolios of minister of planning and minister of nuclear energy and space. At the time of his appointment, he was not an elected prime minister, having been nominated by the Congress Party in 1991 to India’s upper house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. Credit for the victory of the Congress Party–led coalition in the 2004 general elections goes to Congress Party president, Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born wife of

the assassinated former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. Widespread opposition among extreme Hindu nationalists against the prospect of a foreign-born Italian-Indian Roman Catholic becoming prime minister prompted Sonia Gandhi to deny herself the position of prime minister. Instead, she chose Manmohan Singh to take her place.

Since the Congress Party did not receive enough votes in the 2004 general election to form a majority government, it heads a coalition government, supported by a group of parties called the “Left Front” that includes members of India’s Communist parties, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party of the state of Tamil Nadu, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, and other regional parties. Prime Minister Singh’s first cabinet of twenty-eight members included eighteen Congress Party ministers. Of the total of sixty-seven Cabinet ministers and ministers of state, the Singh ministry included forty-four Congress Party members.

Manmohan Singh was born on 26 September 1932 in Gah, a village in western Punjab (now in Pakistan). After graduating from Punjab University, Singh went to England to continue his education. He earned a bachelor’s degree in economics from Cambridge University, and then moved to Oxford University, where he obtained a doctoral degree in economics. He was subsequently a professor at Punjab University and the prestigious Delhi School of Economics. Singh is the recipient of several honorary doctorates and other awards and honors at home and abroad. Apart from publishing several articles in the field of economics in prominent journals, he is the author of *India’s Export Trends and Prospects for Self-Sustained Growth* (1964), an early critique of India’s planned economy and inward-looking trade policy.

Singh began his career in the administrative services of the government of India in 1971. He was economic adviser in the Ministry of Commerce, then chief economic adviser in the Ministry of Finance. He has occupied other positions in the Indian government bureaucracy as secretary in the Ministry of Finance, deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, and adviser to the prime minister. He was the leader of the Congress Party opposition in the Rajya Sabha between 1998 and 2004. He also worked in Geneva for some years at the United Nations Commission on Trade Development Secretariat and was secretary general of the South Commission in Geneva between 1987 and 1990.

Between 1991 and 1996, Singh was India’s finance minister in the Congress Party government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, and during his tenure he spearheaded the economic reform movement in India.

He is credited with the economic transformation of India from socialism to free market capitalism, policies that were continued subsequently by the coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. His economic initiatives have been continued under his new Congress-led coalition government of 2004. In the early phase of his prime ministership, some questioned whether Dr. Singh would have sufficient political clout to address India's myriad problems, especially given his modest demeanor. But the economic policies underlying the new government bore his stamp of authority and augured well for this future as prime minister.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Gandhi, Sonia**

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SINGH, SADHU SUNDAR (1889–c. 1929), *Christian mystic known for his attempt to “Indianize” Christianity.* Sundar Singh was born to a wealthy Sikh family on 3 September 1889. After converting to Christianity, he devoted his life to mystic preaching, trying as a saffron-robed *sadhu* (Hindu holy man) to present Christianity in a uniquely Indian form.

He studied at a Presbyterian Mission School, and there he first encountered the Christian faith, appealing to God to show him the “way of salvation.” He said that the room was flooded with light, “and I saw the form of the Lord Jesus Christ.” It was the turning point of his life. Though his family made every effort to dissuade him, he was baptized in Simla on 3 September 1905. Thirty days later, he decided to take up the saffron robes and mendicant life of a *sadhu*, preaching wherever he went.

In 1909 Sadhu Sundar Singh was admitted to St. John's Divinity College, Lahore; because he considered religion a matter of the heart, not the head, he left after eight months. Sadhu Sundar Singh has been described as a Christocentric mystic. By adopting the lifestyle of a *sadhu*, he was attempting to “Indianize” Christianity. He told the story of a Brahman passenger on a train overcome by heat and dehydration. At the station he was offered water in a white cup. He refused, saying, “I will not break my caste.” When the water was brought to him in his own brass vessel, he drank it willingly. It is the same with the “Water of Life,” said Sundar Singh. “Indians do

need the Water of Life, but not in a European cup” (Streeter and Appasamy, p. 228).

For several years he traveled across North India, from village to village, preaching. His fame spread far and wide. In 1918 he visited South India and subsequently went on several trips around the world. After his second trip to Europe, however, his health deteriorated, and he was last seen on 18 April 1929, setting off on a journey across the Himalayas and Tibet.

Many of Sadhu Sundar Singh's sermons and other writings have been published and translated into Indian languages. These include *Reality and Religion*; *The Search after Reality*; *Meditations*; and *Soul-Stirring Messages*. He spoke in colorful and descriptive language, coupled with appealing anecdotes. His name is still a household word in thousands of Christian Indian homes.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

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SINO-INDIAN WAR. *See* **China, Relations with.**

SIROHI SCHOOL PAINTING The school of Sirohi painting is synonymous with a *Vijnyptipatra*, or letter of invitation, which seems to have originated from this town. Until the 1960s the art world of miniature painting was completely unaware of this school. The first reference to Sirohi painting appeared in the Khajanchi Collection (New Delhi) catalog of 1960; its entry 64 is a *vijayptipatra*, titled Rajarthani, Sirohi, dated A.D. 1737. The entry related that “a congregation of citizens from Sirohi sent a letter of invitation to the Vijayadeva Suri (a famous Jain monk) inviting him to visit the city during Paryusana festival.” A long descriptive entry appearing in the same catalog reads, in part, “Sirohi, near Mt. Abu, seems to have been one of the centers of painting in southern Rajasthan in the early eighteenth century, and no doubt in the early seventeenth century. The facial types are very similar to another *vijayptipatra* from Sirohi dated A.D. 1725” (p. 48).

According to the Purāṇas, the present state of Sirohi was formerly called Arbutadea. Also, the name “Sirohi” is said to have evolved from the word “Sirnava,” a mountain range, at the foothills of which the town of Sirohi was established. The present town of Sirohi is situated in southwest Rajasthan, bounded on the north, northeast, and west by Jodhpur (Marwar), in the south by Palanpur, Danta, and Idar (Gujarat) and on the east by Udaipur (Rajasthan). The physical features of this region include a hilly and rocky region of the Aravalli ranges; the only river that flows is the Banas. It has a varied flora and fauna, though the countryside is mainly arid and dry, with extreme temperatures in summer and winter.

Sanis Mal, son of Rao Sobha, founded Sirohi in A.D. 1425. What seems to have brought renown to Sirohi is its proximity to archaeological and religious sites. It is located near the great Jain temples of Delvada at Mount Abu. The ruins of the ancient temple sites of Chandravati and Vasantgarh (Pindwara, c. 7th century A.D.) indicate socioreligious activities in this region in early times.

The town was situated on the trade route from Abu to Ranakpur and farther to Rajasthan via Pali, Ghanerao, Desuri, and the main Jain seat of learning, Patan. Itinerant Jain monks often demanded certain socioreligious artifacts (such as *vijnaptipatras*), cloth paintings, and paper manuscripts from time to time. To cater to this demand, a community of scribes known as Laiyas became established in Sirohi. Among them were painters, calligraphers, and teachers who belonged to the Mathen community of painters. They possessed blank letters of invitation, which were long and narrow paper scrolls (often measuring 50 feet × 12 inches [15m × 30.5 cm]), which were used for painting and for writing text in beautiful calligraphy. The themes of the scrolls were often repetitive. The top portion of the scroll contained the eight sacred symbols and the fourteen lucky dreams of the Jains, as well as the depiction of sermons, processions, temples, famous buildings, and marketplaces (represented by a street with shops on either side of the road and people shopping). Stylistically, such scrolls are painted in the established Marwar style, with bold figures and bright color schemes, though a number of them are painted in the distinctive Sirohi style.

Recent scholarship has brought to light a few dated examples with place names that determine the styles at least in the early eighteenth century. Two illustrated manuscripts—the Upadesamala, attributed to Sirohi, of the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, from the collection of the Deva Sano Pado Bhandar, Ahmedabad; and a Durga-Saptasati, dated 1710, painted at Sirohi, from the collection of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (formerly known as the Prince of Wales Museum), Mumbai—help establish the stylistic characteristics of Sirohi painting. There is another

complete manuscript of Devi-Mahatmya, dated 1726, painted at Ghanerao (a *thikana*, or smaller feudatory state in Rajasthan owing allegiance to the ruling chief, of Marwar), close to Sirohi, which is painted in Sirohi style.

These early examples, though within the known stylistic frame work of the Marwar school, possess certain peculiar features of the Sirohi idiom. In a horizontal Pothi format (of loose folios), they are executed in a refined Kalam style with a number of Mughal mannerisms. Male and female figures are squat and robust. Male costumes consist of a large turban with a broad sash, a long floral Jama, and a broad Patka. Women are clad in Ghaghra (long frilled skirt), *choli* (bodice), and *odhni* (long narrow piece of cloth which is meant to cover the head and the breasts). One of the distinguishing features of the Sirohi style is a kind of shading or modeling that appears on the faces and limbs, an element that is not found in the Marwar and Ghanerao styles. Another noteworthy characteristic of Sirohi style is the depiction of a colorful landscape. Sirohi artists were fond of a variety of flora and fauna, flowing rivers, and scenic waterfronts. The architecture in paintings consists of a domed pavilion with arches, balconies, and *chhajjas* (weather shades). Scenes take place in the middle plane; the foreground is a raised platform with colorful flowering plants and other objects placed below. Trees are often shown in bloom with a variety of foliage. All these elements are rendered in a naturalistic manner. The color palette is predominantly orange, brown, olive green, and brick red. The later paintings of Rāgamālās (garland of melodies) in Indian music are devoid of these subtle qualities. This school seems to have produced at least ten sets of Rāgamālās, dated from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries. Of these, at least one complete set from the collection of Kumar Sangram Singh of Navalgarh (Jaipur) has been separated; its folios are now in various museums and private collections in India and abroad. Sirohi Rāgamālā paintings do not have text on the top margin, but the name of the Rāga appears in Devanagari (script which has originated from Sanskrit).

Shridhar Andhare

See also **Miniatures: Marwar and Thikanas**

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SĪTĀ. See Rāmāyaṇa.

SITAR The sitar (Persian, *setār*, “three-string”) is a long-necked lute popular in North Indian classical music and commonly constructed from a dried gourd base with a hollow wooden neck. The neck of the contemporary sitar has metal frets, which arch over the face of the neck and which are tied from the back so that a single piece of string (made of gut or nylon) loops over indents at the edges of the frets. The advantage of these tied frets is that a musician can move them to adjust the intonation of individual notes. Performers wear a thick piece of twisted wire (*mizrāb*) over the index finger of the right hand as a plectrum.

Sitars have metal wires. The principal melody string (*bāj*, or sometimes, *gayakī*) is steel and is set in the middle of the neck, leaving room for the performer to pull the string over the arched frets (sliding the pitch). The principal drone string (*kharaj*) sits adjacent to the *bāj* (and to the left if facing the instrument) and acts as a secondary melody string. Three or more drone strings (*jorī*) sit next

to the *kharaj*, one or two of which sometimes double as additional melody strings. The highest pitched drone strings (*cikārī*) lie to the far left of the neck and attach to pegs protruding from the side of the neck. Underneath these plucked strings, seven or more “sympathetic” strings (*tarab*), tuned to the notes of the *rāga*, vibrate “in sympathy” without being plucked. Like the sarod and the *sārangī*, the sympathetic strings extend from pegs in the side of the neck, up through holes in the face of the neck, and pass under the melody and drone strings. These *tarab* strings rest on a separate bridge that sits just in front of the higher-sitting platform bridge for the melody and drone strings. The bridges have the distinguishing characteristic of appearing to be flat, although their surfaces actually have a very slight curvature from which the strings gradually leave. This shape produces the instrument’s characteristic emphasis on high partials as the very end of the string “buzzes” against the bone or wood platform.

The two best-known sitar performers of the late twentieth century are Vilayat Khan and Ravi Shankar. Vilayat Khan prefers to play sitars with the lowest of the *tarab*



Woman playing Sitar in Jaipur, India, 2000. In a recent interview, Anoushka Shankar (daughter of Ravi Shankar and an accomplished sitar artist herself) commented, “I’ve never actually come across much prejudice being a female sitar player. Though it’s not a common thing, there have been other well-known sitarists who are women.” MICHAEL FREEMAN.

strings slightly offset away from the other sympathetic strings. Ravi Shankar prefers a Bengali version of the sitar that features a string one octave lower than the *kharaj*.

The tuning of sitars similarly varies, with some aspects common to all sitars, and others peculiar to the playing tradition and to the particular *rāga* chosen for performance. The *bāj* (melody string) is set to the fourth (*mā*) so that the tonic fret sits midway up the neck. This allows performers to approach the tonic (*sā*) from both above and below. The *kharaj* (principal drone string) is always set to the tonic. The uppermost drone strings (*cikāri*) are also set to the tonic, with other strings set to the fifth or, in some cases the fourth or the fifth (or, sometimes, other notes), depending on the effect the sitarist is attempting to achieve.

The sitar first appears in references in the eighteenth century, and it appears to be related to a class of instruments that include the Persian *setār*, the central Asian *tambur*, and later regional variants such as the Kashmiri *setār*. Characteristics that distinguish the sitar are its lateral and frontal pegs, a gourd body, a nontapering neck, and a flat bridge.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music; Rāga; Shankar, Ravi**

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SIZE AND CAPITAL INTENSITY OF INDIAN INDUSTRY SINCE 1950

Conceptually, size and capital intensity have been recognized as important parameters in the evolution of any industry. While the importance of the size of an industry has always been a part of conventional wisdom, analytical growth models have also underscored the importance of capital intensity. Yet, the implementation of these notions is beset with a number of practical difficulties. In both cases, a menu approach is followed in measurement. Industry size is measured, variously, in terms of levels of sales, assets, value added, capital deployed, and employment. Likewise, capital intensity is measured as the amount of fixed capital used in relation to other inputs (especially labor) or to the overall output. Typically, capital-labor ratio and capital-output ratio are seen as alternative measures of the capital intensity of an industry.

Before independence, the British government of India had provided discriminating protection to some selected industries, accompanied by a “most favored nation” clause for British goods. Despite this, a number of domestic

industries, including cotton textiles, sugar, paper, and iron and steel, expanded. No effort was made, however, to foster the development of capital goods industry in India. Not surprisingly, on the eve of India’s independence in 1947, the Indian industrial sector was characterized by low levels of capital intensity, marked by a high concentration of employment either in the lowest size group (household enterprises and small factories) or in the highest size group (large factories). Medium-size factories were virtually absent from the Indian industrial sector. Low capital intensity in Indian industry was primarily due to the prevalence of low wages and the small size of the domestic market as a result of low per capita income. According to a study by the United Nations in 1958, capital intensity, as measured by capital employed per worker, was substantially lower in India, compared to the United States and other developed economies. Moreover, low capital intensity was reflected not only in consumer goods industries, such as textiles and sugar, but also in capital goods industries, such as iron and steel.

One of the early studies on the size and capital intensity of Indian industry (Rosen) attributed the smaller size and lower capital intensity of Indian industry, compared to that of developed economies, to the difference in the availability of factors and the lack of access to a capital market, which generally encourages the use of capital-intensive methods. Subsequently, on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of twenty-two industries during the period 1953–1958, J. C. Sandesara in 1969 concluded that while small-sized units in some industries were labor intensive, in some others they turned out to be capital intensive. In other words, there was little evidence of a clear and uniform relationship between size and capital intensity.

The average size of factories, in terms of assets, output, and valued added, has increased consistently since the 1970s. Assets increased from 8.7 million rupees in 1970 to 20.2 million rupees in 2002; output increased from 16.7 million rupees in 1970 to 45.9 million rupees in 2002. In contrast, average employment in Indian factories witnessed a decline, from 86 workers per factory during the 1970s to 78 during the 1980s. Clearly, output growth during the 1980s was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the generation of employment. The declining trend in employment persisted during the 1990s and was further pronounced during 2000–2001 and 2001–2002, when it fell to an average of 60 workers per factory. This was, perhaps, symptomatic of greater use of capital in the production process, leading to higher capital intensity over time. In fact, increases in real wages and job security regulations in the late 1970s seem to have induced entrepreneurs to shift over to capital-intensive techniques. It has also been argued that surplus

employment in the 1970s set a limit to the additional employment opportunities in the 1980s and beyond. Structural ratios calculated on the basis of data from the Annual Survey of Industries provide evidence to support this theory.

Almost all the indicators used as proxy for capital intensity show that production processes in Indian industry have increasingly become more capital oriented. Capital employed per worker has increased substantially since the 1970s. Capital-wages ratio increased marginally from 7.3 in the 1970s to 8.3 in the 1980s, but increased substantially following the economic reforms of 1991, to 12.64 by 2000 and to 14.25 in 2002. On the other hand, it should be noted that capital employed per unit of output did not undergo much change during the three decades from 1970 to 2000, reflecting a greater efficiency in the use of capital in the production processes.

A disaggregated industry-wide analysis by J. Thomas in 2002 showed that capital intensity varies widely across different industries. It has been the lowest in jute textiles, and the highest in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. Basic metals, chemicals, rubber, and petroleum also have high capital intensity, while jute, beverages, textile products, leather, wood products, and food products continue to be the least capital-intensive sectors in Indian manufacturing.

The relationship between size and capital intensity in the Indian industrial sector also seems to have witnessed a noticeable transformation since the 1970s. With the increase in the size of factories (in terms of output), capital per head of worker increased during the 1970s. Correlation coefficients between output (size factor) and capital-labor ratio demonstrate that the covariation strengthened further in the 1980s and in the post-1991 period. In contrast, the capital-labor ratio was inversely related to the size of the labor force in factories. The covariation of capital-output ratio and total output has been negative since the 1970s, probably because growth in output in most of the years since 1980 has been higher than growth in capital, indicating the efficient use of capital by Indian industries.

In retrospect, Indian industry has been undergoing a structural transformation since independence. With the government initially adopting an industrial development strategy that promoted heavy, capital-intensive industries, size indicators in the Indian industrial sector expanded substantially, facilitated by the evolving industrial policy and increased domestic and external demand. Thus, the predominance of primary raw material-based industries in the 1950s was gradually replaced by the emergence and faster growth of metal-based and heavy industries. The industrial policy initiatives since 1991

have led to a diversified Indian industrial structure. While the transition process has led to greater use of capital in relation to the labor force, productivity enhancements have resulted in a gradual decline in the capital-output ratio in recent years.

Narendra Jadhav

See also Capital Market; Economic Reforms of 1991; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Small-Scale Industry, since 1947

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SKANDA. *See Shiva and Shaivism.*

SMALL-SCALE AND COTTAGE INDUSTRY, 1800–1947 In 1800 India had a diversified manufacturing base, employing a significant proportion of the workforce. Textile production was the leading sector, and the weaving of cotton cloth by India's village artisans was a universal occupation. When cloth was produced for the village or local markets, the weavers sold the cloth directly to consumers. In such cases, the capital requirement was low, and the costs of preparatory processes, like spinning and preparation of yarn, were internalized through the labor of the nonweaving members of the household, usually women and children. The organization and relations of production were far more complex when cloth was produced on a commercial scale to produce finer textiles which catered to distant markets, especially for export. Even the preparatory processes of cleaning and carding the cotton were done by specialized workers, and spinning was a distinct and skilled occupation that provided employment to millions of women.

The hinterlands of the three major cloth exporting coastal areas—Gujarat, Coromandel, and Bengal—were best known for their textiles. But textiles were produced for external markets in many other parts of the country. Weaving remained largely a rural activity, though small



Women Spinning Yarn with Wooden *Charkhas*. In India's struggle for self-rule, Mahatma Gandhi forcefully advocated for the revival of this cottage industry as the solution to the nation's economic woes, as the center from which other industries would flow. He declared the wheel "the symbol of the nation's prosperity and, therefore, freedom." AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

towns and even larger cities also had a small population of weavers. The location of weaving itself was less relevant than the markets for which their products were intended, which were predominantly urban and upper-income classes. Weaving was a full-time occupation in most regions. The exception was Bengal and northeastern India, where weavers alternated between cloth production and agriculture. Weaving was also a caste-dominated activity that was carried out by various sub-castes of weavers; caste performed a role similar to guilds, providing organizational unity for each activity.

A noteworthy feature of textile production in India was the seemingly endless variety of plain and patterned fabrics produced in every region. Plain, or solid-colored, fabrics were produced in coarse, medium, and fine textures. Patterned fabrics were produced both on the loom, or by using complex dyeing, painting, and printing techniques on woven cloth. The dyeing of cotton was, in fact, India's unique specialty. Because cotton did not absorb dyes directly to achieve a permanent color, Indian dyers used a variety of mordants, resists, astringents, and other products in conjunction with dyes in order to fix a

permanent color to the cloth. Since many dyes were derived from plants, the cultivation of dye crops was an added supporting activity in textile production. With this extensive range of plain, dyed, and patterned cloth, India supplied the textile requirements of most of the world.

Production on a commercial scale, however, increased the requirement of working capital, particularly for purchasing yarn in the market. This capital was provided by merchant capitalists, who played a pivotal role in pre-modern trading. They advanced working capital to the weavers, usually secured against future deliveries of cloth. For the merchant, this negated a major uncertainty on the supply side by securing a large enough stock of cloth from many individual weavers. The merchant also provided the interface between distant markets and the weavers, ensuring a flow of information on the market so that production could be adjusted to consumer preferences.

The unit of production for this large volume of output was still the weaver, working from home on his own loom. The tools and equipment tended to be rudimentary and the techniques, especially of spinning and dyeing,

required a great deal of time. The key factors in maintaining a high level of quality and performance were the highly developed manual skills of the workers, and the empirically evolved intricate techniques of all processes. In such a system, the notions of productivity and wages related to productivity had little relevance. Though data on wages are sketchy, it is evident that wages were by and large pegged to subsistence levels. Low wages were partly the result of controls exercised by the merchants over the weavers, who had no direct access to the market. Textile production was characterized by a high ratio of net output to fixed capital and a low share of wages in the final price.

In crafts like ornamental metalware, master craftsmen worked with apprentices in workshops, which were usually located in urban administrative centers. Since the products were primarily intended for local elite and ruling classes, there were no uncertainties regarding the market or consumer preference, nor were the products traded to distant markets.

Impact of Colonialism

The impact of colonialism on Indian industry has been much debated, but the most widespread view was that the invidious policies of the British colonial government, aimed at protecting the interests of domestic industries in Britain, had destroyed India's handicraft manufactures, especially textiles. This "nationalist view" was first articulated by R. C. Dutt, who also stressed that, in this process, India was transformed from an exporter of manufactured goods to an exporter of raw materials, with most of its population forced into subsistence agriculture for survival. Further, Marxist theories of the world capitalist system cite India as a prime example of the process by which colonized economies were relegated to raw material production to feed the development of the capitalist center. Even where traditional manufacturing survived, this was possible only with the use of zero cost household labor and when the producer depressed his own wages to compete with the cheaper imported goods.

A contending school of thought, which argued that traditional Indian industry had declined because it was unable to compete with mechanized production, was too simplistic, ignoring the unequal power relations that were inherent in colonialism.

Survival of Handicrafts

The incontrovertible evidence of the viable functioning of many crafts, especially hand-loom weaving, well into the twentieth century has led to a reassessment that seeks to understand the dynamics of survival of artisanal industry and the complex processes of adjustment to the

forces of rapidly changing technology and improvements in transportation and communications. The latter integrated India's economy into the global economy at a time when costs were declining internationally.

The sector that was most vulnerable to these forces was the highly export-oriented indigenous textile sector, which had to compete with cheaper cloth in domestic as well as export markets. The general consensus is that textile production did decline during the first half of the nineteenth century, but this impact was both region and product specific, and Bengal as a region and a whole array of medium quality fabrics produced for export were the most affected. However, there was no noticeable decline in the volume of output in most regions.

Until about 1870, hand-spun yarn was still being used extensively, but imports of machine-spun yarn eventually wiped out hand spinning in India, with the resultant loss of employment and income for millions of women. The introduction of chemical dyes toward the end of the nineteenth century similarly pushed out traditional vegetable dyeing techniques. Hand-loom weaving and production of patterned cloth survived, however, by switching to the more cost-effective, though not necessarily better, inputs.

More reliable data are available from 1870 onward. Between 1881 and 1931, the proportion of male workers in industry declined, which happened not merely in textiles, but in many other activities. At the same time, real income per worker rose steadily, indicating that productivity-enhancing technology was being adopted in the crafts, and that nonviable workers were forced to shift to other occupations.

In all crafts, there was a distinct preference for maintaining production within a small, artisanal firm. Imported inputs and new technologies were adopted within the economic rationale of small-scale production. In textiles, a richer class of weavers was emerging, many of whom turned to trade or became entrepreneurs. Such entrepreneurs set up small-scale hand-loom workshops in urban centers in southern and western parts of India. More significant in the long term was the setting up of small power-loom manufactories in towns in western India. Weavers migrated to work in these workshops, shifting from self-employment to wage employment.

The individual weaver, however, remained the mainstay of hand-loom weaving and adjusted to the new macroeconomic environment. The most important reason for the survival of hand-loom cloth was the strong domestic demand for traditional dress materials, designs, and patterns, none of which could be produced through mechanical processes. But the weavers also responded to changing market preferences, producing new fabrics,

weaving with silk and manmade yarns, and gradually adopting new technologies, which were economically viable in hand-loom weaving.

Though the Indian mill industry dated back to the 1870s, it did not really compete with the hand looms until the 1920s. The hand-loom sector responded by shifting to higher value products in which it had an advantage. The major problem for hand-loom weaving during the 1930s and 1940s was the shortage of yarn. Weavers had to depend on middlemen merchants for credit to buy yarn and entered into highly disadvantageous tied transactions, which ultimately forced a high percentage of weavers into a debt trap, raising fears about the future of hand-loom weaving.

Kanakalatha Mukund

See also Large-Scale Industry, 1850–1950; Textiles: Block-Printed; Textiles: Early Painted and Printed

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SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY, SINCE 1947 India's real gross domestic product (GDP, in 1993–1994 prices) increased from 1,405 billion rupees in 1950–1951 to

11,939 billion rupees in 2000–2001, by 8.5 times. The share of manufacturing in GDP, which was 9 percent in 1950–1951, rose to 18 percent in 2000–2001. Manufacturing is divided into two sectors: registered (factories that use power and employ 10 or more workers, or that do not use power for manufacturing and that employ 20 or more workers) and unregistered (smaller units). In 1950–1951 the two sectors had roughly an equal share; in 2000–2001 the registered sector's share increased to two-thirds and the unregistered sector's share declined to one-third.

Modern and Traditional Industries

Small-scale industries (SSI) are divided into modern and traditional industries. Traditional industries are home-based, use simple tools and equipment, depend on family labor, and are completely manual. Modern SSIs may have a separate workplace, employ outside labor, and use machines and power. Nearly all of the traditional industries and a very large number of modern SSIs fall into the unregistered category, so the GDP of these industries will be roughly equal to the GDP of the unregistered sector. The share of modern SSIs has improved greatly both in production and employment between 1973–1974 and 2002–2003: in production from 68 to 94 percent and in employment from 28 to 43 percent. Over the same period, the share of traditional industries declined: in production from 16 to 6 percent and in employment from 58 to 55 percent.

An SSI is currently defined as an enterprise with investment in plant and machinery up to 10 million rupees (original value). This sector also includes ancillary, export-oriented, and women's enterprises, with an investment limit in each of 10 million rupees and with a special condition for each, and business and service enterprises in specified lines with investment limits of 2.5 million rupees and 0.5 million rupees, respectively, without any condition.

Growth and Change

Production, employment, and exports of SSI increased by 10.0, 5.9, and 12.7 percent per annum from 1973–1974 to 2000–2001. The subperiods 1973–1974, 1980–1981, 1990–1991, and 2000–2001 witnessed deceleration of growth on all the three measures.

In 1972 SSIs producing metals and electrical equipment had the largest share in the number of units, employment, and fixed assets and production, 43–49 percent. Other manufacturing, food, textiles, and services followed, in that order. In 1987–1988, other manufacturing was first in each of the above categories, with a share of 35–42 percent, followed in each category by metals

and electricals, food, textiles, and services. The share of food and textiles increased and that of metals and electricals declined, both substantially.

Support and Incentives

SSIs enjoy some advantages, but they also suffer from handicaps relative to large-scale industries in the marketplace. On balance, they are in a weak position. However, they have an appeal in terms of socioeconomic objectives and have, therefore, a strong case for state support. In India, capital is scarce and labor abundant. SSIs are thought to have lower capital-output and capital-labor ratios than large-scale industries, and to therefore better serve growth and employment objectives. Additionally, entrepreneurship has been restricted in India to certain castes, communities, and language groups, and has been male-dominated. It is the policy of the Indian government to widen this base by promoting entrepreneurs from other groups.


It is on these considerations that various assistance programs and incentives have been devised for SSI development. Since independence in 1947, especially since the late 1950s, development has been wide-ranging, both in terms of programs and regions. The programs include information and technology services, entrepreneurship development and training, modernization and technology support, industrial facilities, assistance in procurement of raw materials price preferences, finance, and nursing of “sick” industrial units. To operate these programs and to monitor their progress, new agencies and institutions have been set up, and the existing ones strengthened at the national, regional, state, and lower levels. There is also a special bank for SSIs. The SSIs have their own associations, and are also represented in the national- and state-level associations of large-scale industries.

An attempt was made to estimate the value of incentives on SSI production. The study examined nine programs or incentive schemes for six industries in seven states. It was estimated that the value varied from 70 percent in cosmetics and toiletries to 33 percent in gases.

Policy Issues

There is no doubt that the SSI sector has registered considerable progress. But there are also areas of concern in the policies and programs, arresting further progress. What are these concerns, and how do they influence the outcome? And what is needed by way of corrections?

Overcrowding and failure. The capital and skill required to start and operate an SSI are small, and product is undifferentiated. These easy entry conditions have led to overcrowding of the SSI sector. Assistance programs make



Textile Workers in Rural Rajasthan. Though rich in natural resources, Rajasthan lags behind other states in terms of high poverty and unemployment rates. In recent decades, New Delhi has commissioned numerous studies of small-scale industry in the state (how to make existing businesses more profitable and expand their corresponding markets). The textile industry figures prominently in current initiatives for the region. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

entry easier. Also, officials administering assistance may tend to be overgenerous, as more assistance improves their service record, adding to overcrowding.

It is therefore not surprising that a substantial number of SSIs close their doors within a short span of operations. The 1987–1988 census reported that of some 300,000 units that closed, one-half were closed within 5 years of the start of operations: 14 percent within 1–2 years and 36 percent within 3–5 years. Evidently, there is a case for a more focused and selective approach to assistance.

A presumption of the SSI policy is that SSIs have low capital-output and low capital-labor ratios relative to large-scale industries. Thus, they are in tune with factor

proportions, and thus, they serve growth and employment objectives better. Considerable evidence casts doubt on that presumption, and some studies have pointed to capital-output and capital-labor ratios being higher in SSIs than in large-scale industries.

Definition. The earliest definition of small-scale industries in 1950 had a limit of 0.5 million rupees in fixed investment, with fewer than 50 workers in units using power or fewer than 100 workers in units not using power for manufacturing. The definition has changed several times since then. In 2004 the definition had a limit of 10 million rupees for investment in plant and machinery (original value), without any additional conditions. With this amount one can now buy only an obsolete, low-grade, or secondhand plant and machinery. This limit seems to have more adversely affected the capital-intensive industries like metals and electricals. The SSI censuses show a sharp decline in the shares of this group in number of units, employment, fixed assets, and production between 1972 and 1987–1988. Also, the percentage of closed units to working units in this group was 59, against 52 for all units in 1987–1988.

There is clearly a need for raising the limit. Following the recommendation of the Expert Committee on Small Enterprises, the limit was raised to 30 million rupees in 1997, but in 1999 it was brought down to 10 million rupees. Considering inflation and the availability of better technologies since then, the limit needs to be increased substantially, perhaps to 45 million rupees.

Reservation. The policy of reservation of items for exclusive production in the SSI sector was first introduced in 1967 with 47 items. The number since then has been increasing, reaching a peak of 873 in 1984. Since then, the number is being reduced. As of October 2004, the number of reserved items was 605. Since then, 108 items have been identified for de-reservation, which will bring the number to 497. Under this policy, the production of items in this list by large-scale industries is frozen to their existing capacities, giving protection to small-scale industries in those categories. As a consequence, the SSI sector, especially the reserved part, is expected to improve its efficiency and grow faster.

This policy has been criticized on various grounds such as it has been ad hoc, obstruction of technology and scale up-gradation. Moreover, such evidence as is available on efficiency, profitability, and growth shows that in general the performance of SSI in the reserved items does not outshine that of other SSI, or is it poorer. It would thus seem that the government's policy of gradual de-reservation is moving in the right direction.

J. C. Sandesara

See also **Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry, since 1950**

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SOMA As a god, Soma is the most prominent deity in the Rig Veda after Indra and Agni; Soma as god and soma as sacrificial substance are one and the same in Vedic tradition. The ninth book of the Rig Veda is devoted solely to Soma, and some 120 hymns address him. The ritual texts of later Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Shrauta Sūtras are structured by sacrifices, many featuring two essential offerings: soma and *pashu* (animals). The god's name is also the name of a plant and its "pressed" juice (from *su-* "to press"). *Haoma*, the corresponding name of the plant, juice, and cult in the Avesta, attests to an Indo-Iranian origin, although mythologies of a divine plant or elixir that brings immortality, visions, and insight suggest an even earlier background. Poets of Rig Veda 4.26 and 27 celebrated the theft of soma by an eagle in one of the earliest and most enduring myths concerning a celestial or mountain origin.

Many substitutes for soma were named in Brāhmaṇa texts before 800 B.C. Possibly the plant known to early poet-ritualists became unavailable during migrations from steppe or highland regions onto the Gangetic Plain. Identification of Vedic soma or Avestan *haoma* has been vigorously debated since the late eighteenth century; botanists, archaeologists, and historians have proposed as candidates species of the genus *Ephedra*, as well as *Peganam harmala*, *Amanita muscaria*, *Cannabis sativa*, *Papaver somniferum*, and others. An asclepiad called *soma-lata* or *somatiga*, probably a species of *Sarcostemma*, a bitter-tasting green creeper, not hallucinogenic, is pressed

in parts of South India today by small communities of Vedic sacrificers.

The ritual process of extracting juice from plant stems was institutionalized in the soma sacrifice with three pressings each day. The pressings are filtered through wool; the liquid is collected in tubs, sometimes mixing in water, milk, curds, clarified butter, barley flour, or honey. It is then poured into offering fires for designated gods. Soma is served in special carved wooden cups to the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) and ten priests called by heralds (*somapravāka*) to perform the sacrifice. Both sacrificer and wife (*patnī*) are transformed by the rite and entitled to be renamed soma sacrificers. After the initiatory five-day *agnishṭoma*, they become eligible to perform other soma rituals of varying magnitude and duration, including the seventeen-day *Vājapeya* (drink of strength).

Whether from chemical inspiration, or exhaustion and sleep-deprivation during intense sacrificial sessions, an ecstatic response to the drinking of soma juice is clear from ancient poetry and formulas of ritual texts. After offering and drinking soma, a priest may recite Rig Veda 8.48.3, boasting on behalf of all, “We have drunk soma, become immortal, attained the light, reached the gods.” A common epithet of soma is *amrita* (not mortal). Several gods receive soma offerings, but none more than Indra. The consequence of his soma-drinking is an enthused battle fury, rendering him invincible in combat.

Associations with immortality led to an important role for Soma in traditions of death, particularly after the Upanishads distinguished the *pitṛyāna* as a “path of the fathers (ancestors)” that recycled an immortal *ātman* (self) down from the moon for rebirth in this world. In Hindu rituals, *amāvāsya*, new-moon day, is traditionally a time to offer rice as food for ancestors. Soma as the moon—therefore one of the *navagraha* (nine planets)—lends his name to the calendrical weekday *Somavaram* (Monday is from Old English “moonday”). In Sanskrit epics and *Purāṇas*, Soma lives on as *Oshadhīpati* (lord of plants), husband of the *nakshatra* (constellations), and guardian deity of the auspicious northeast.

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See also **Agni; Hinduism (Dharma); Shrauta Sūtras; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedic Aryan India; Yajña**

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SOUL (“ATMAN”). See **Upanishadic Philosophy**.

SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

Regional cooperation in South Asia is a recent phenomenon, even though the idea of regionalism long formed an important element of the foreign policy of India. It took the seven countries—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives—nearly four decades of the post-colonial era to set up a regional association, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The proposal for SAARC was first made by the president of Bangladesh, Zia ur Rahman, in January 1980. While the smaller countries welcomed the idea, India initially appeared reticent, apprehensive perhaps that the association would bring anti-Indian opinions together to limit its policy options. Similarly, Pakistan suspected the idea to be an Indian ploy to strengthen its regional hegemony. Amid such unfounded fears, diplomatic efforts resulted in a series of consultations and the meeting of foreign secretaries in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1981. Foreign ministers of all seven countries then met in New Delhi in 1983 to give a concrete shape to SAARC, which was formally established in December 1985, when the seven heads of South Asia’s states and governments held the first summit in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

SAARC has a well-defined charter specifying its objectives, principles, and mechanisms for formulation and execution of policies and programs. One of its principles is that contentious and bilateral issues are excluded from the scope of its deliberations. Decisions must be made unanimously at the summit, based on the recommendations of foreign ministers and a standing committee of foreign secretaries. Technical committees coordinate and monitor the implementation of programs. The overall responsibility for follow-up action on summit decisions is assigned to the SAARC Secretariat, located in Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu. Its secretary general is nominated by the member states on the basis of rotation.

Notwithstanding many difficult challenges to its growth, SAARC has begun to evolve a common regional approach to trade and socioeconomic development. Areas of cooperation include agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, sports, art and culture, science



South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Summit. Members of 11th SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit, in Kathmandu, Nepal, 5 January 2002. At this meeting, member nation-states pledged their commitment to creating a South Asian Economic Union. INDIA TODAY.

and technology, and women's development. Some of the noteworthy decisions of the member states pertain to the establishment of a food security reserve, the suppression of terrorism, the prevention of trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the establishment of a SAARC Chamber of Commerce, regional arrangements for preferential trading, and the establishment of a South Asian free trade area. A development fund has also been created. SAARC audiovisual programs seek to foster contacts and interactions among people.

Many laudable objectives of SAARC have not been achieved, however. In the eighteen years of its existence, it has held only twelve summits. Seven summits were postponed, mostly because of rivalry and confrontation between India and Pakistan. There is now a realization that the success of SAARC is contingent upon the resolution of contentious bilateral problems like the Kashmir dispute between the two countries. In addition, a lack of sufficient commitment on the part of some member states to implement summit decisions has contributed to SAARC's sluggish growth. For example, Pakistan still has not ratified a 1987 regional convention on the suppres-

sion of terrorism, thus weakening the association's record of cooperation. Nevertheless, SAARC's formation and its ongoing efforts have created a growing South Asian consciousness and have helped stabilize regional identity, enhancing interactions among the various peoples of South Asia.

Ponmoni Sabadevan

See also **Bangladesh; Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka**

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SOUTH ASIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal agreed in 1980 to form the South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which mandated cooperation in a number of areas, including trade and investment, economic development, environmental management and resource sharing, educational enrichment, and poverty alleviation. However, SAARC has yet to achieve its goals of enhancing regional economic cooperation and delivering prosperity to and well-being to its people. Geopolitical analysts may attribute the slow progress to the political tensions between India and Pakistan, but the reality is that South Asia needs to become more actively engaged in the global economy in order to optimize its resources, instead of being left behind in the race for better incomes and jobs.

The new economy has opened up several opportunities for South Asia to move beyond the focus of its traditional commodity trade items, harnessing the economic benefits of business cooperation in high value-adding areas such as natural gas, electricity and power sharing, telecommunications infrastructure, training and manpower development, information technology, and joint projects for foreign investment. The continuing boom in India's economy—especially in high-tech areas like business process outsourcing, information technology (IT) services, computer solutions, biotechnology, consumer call centers, and knowledge-based industries—has added new pressures for enhancing business relations among all South Asian countries.

Traditional Economic Relations: Limited Formats

Traditional trade relations in South Asia have been characterized by the following features:

1. South Asia accounts for less than 1 percent of world income, and its share in total global trade is negligible.
2. All South Asian countries show low volumes of foreign trade as a percentage of their respective gross domestic product (GDP), although South Asia is a major supplier of textiles and garments, raw cotton, rubber, jute, rice, tea, pearls, and precious and semi-precious stones to the rest of the world.
3. Regional trade among the SAARC countries has been a dismal 3 percent for the past decade. This compares poorly with European Union (EU) regional trade, which stands at nearly 65 percent, and trade among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which stands at about 35 percent.
4. India is central to South Asian trade, as it accounts for about 80 percent of the combined GDP and population of South Asia. It is also the largest trading partner for Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan, and significant for Sri Lanka. However, India has shown the lowest amount of intraregional trade (5.1%), as compared to its smaller neighbors Maldives and Nepal (29%), and Sri Lanka (21%), who are trading more intensively within the South Asia region.
5. While intra-SAARC regional trade is low, the South Asian countries do not hesitate to import large quantities of items from the rest of the world, many of which could be imported from within the South Asian region. For example, Pakistan imports tea from China and Kenya, instead of India, despite the availability of better quality, lower price, and geographical proximity of India.
6. The traditional export basket of most South Asian countries is dominated by semimanufactured products, and appears to be quite similar for all the countries, making it difficult for any one country to have a comparative trade advantage over the others. Primary commodities, however, still account for a significant proportion of their trade, which includes jute in the case of Bangladesh, rubber and tea for Sri Lanka and India, rice and raw cotton for India and Pakistan, and iron ore for India. Among manufactured exports, textiles and garments dominate the export basket.
7. All South Asian countries show a high dependence on a few commodities for their export basket. In fact, the top ten export commodities (mainly textile and garment items) account for nearly 82 percent of the total exports of Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal; 74 percent for Pakistan, 66 percent for Sri Lanka, and about 42 percent for India. As for imports, all South Asian countries show “industrial intermediates” and crude and processed fuel as major imports. Food deficit countries, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, continued to import food throughout the 1990s.
8. Most South Asian exports are directed toward developed countries. In the case of Pakistan, more than 60 percent of exports are accounted for by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, while the Middle East constitutes 11 percent of total exports. East Asian countries are providing a growing market for South Asian exports, particularly for India, Pakistan, and Maldives. Bangladesh mainly exports to China; Pakistan to South Korea, Indonesia, and China; and Maldives to Thailand.

Areas of Recent Business Cooperation

SAFTA: South Asian Free Trade Area. The South Asian nations launched a regional economic trade agreement in 1995 that would aim at providing “preferential trade concessions” to each other, under the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). After three successive rounds of SAPTA negotiations, a total of 5,550 commodities have been listed for trade under SAPTA.

Although SAPTA showed a high potential for success, its progress has been slow, due mainly to: the bureaucracy's lack of commitment to put aside narrow political interests and support each member state's economic interest; the continuing refusal of Pakistan to grant the most favored nation status to India, which is granted to all other trading partners in South Asia; technical limitations to the implementation of SAPTA, under which negotiating trade concessions on a "product-by-product" basis becomes very tedious.

At the twelfth SAARC Summit meeting in Islamabad in January 2004, it was agreed to initiate the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), beginning in 2006, to be completed in phases by 2008. However, for the success of any free trade area in South Asia, it will be critical to actively involve the business community in the negotiations as a primary stakeholder, not just as a beneficiary of governmental decisions.

The information technology (IT) sector. The South Asian region has been made aware of the high potential of the information technology and software industry through the recent success of Indian "high-tech" firms in the global market. The Indian software industry has grown consistently at a phenomenal rate of over 50 percent during the 1990s, rising from a modest revenue base of U.S.\$195 million in 1989–1990 to an \$8.3 billion industry by 2000–2001. India's software industry revenue growth is projected to reach U.S.\$85 billion by 2008, of which \$50 billion is to come from exports alone.

Software engineers and professionals of Indian origin currently constitute about 10 percent of the employees in the top four global IT companies (Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and Oracle). The Indian industry trains over 1 million people in the country every year in IT, and provides IT-enabled services at one-tenth of the global cost. Thus India has today become a major outsourcing base for businesses all over the world, offering a huge pool of highly qualified, English speaking, analytically strong, and talented professionals.

The South Asian region has the potential for being developed as a regional hub for offshore software development for clients within SAARC and in other countries, with India as its core. The larger challenge will be to attract Indian corporations into doing business with South Asian nations, given that the main markets for their products lie in the United States, Europe, Southeast Asia, and China.

Harnessing the power sector. South Asia is one of the richest sources of hydropower in the world. The estimated hydropower potentials of the countries in the region are: Bangladesh, 52,000 megawatts (MW); Bhutan, 21,000 MW; Nepal, 83,290 MW; India, 75,400

MW; Pakistan, 38,000 MW; and Sri Lanka, 2,000 MW. However, less than 11 percent of this vast regional potential is being exploited so far. Because power generation and supply in South Asia has been a state monopoly over a long period, it has been highly dependent on state subsidies and therefore deprived of a competitive and efficient working environment. A large number of reforms for private sector participation and restructuring in the power sector have been introduced in all the South Asian countries in recent years, which has opened up a valuable potential for private sector collaboration in harnessing the hydropower of South Asia.

India and Bangladesh have an arrangement under which surplus power from the eastern states of India is exported to the deficit western region of Bangladesh. India and Nepal have signed the Treaty for the Integrated Development of the Mahakali Rivers for mutual cooperation in the power sector. Nepal has set up four hydroelectric projects with Indian assistance. India purchases 50 megawatts of power from Nepal, with reliable transmission assured, and provides 70 million units of energy annually free of charge to Nepal from the Tanakpur power plant.

In Bhutan, the 336-megawatt Chukha hydroelectric project was set up with technical and financial assistance from India, and India also constructed a number of micro-hydropower projects in Bhutan. This is a classic case of gains from cross-border trade, built on the basis of common interest and sovereign equality. Bhutan has earned considerable profits from export of this surplus power to India, which is primarily distributed to the Indian power-deficit states of West Bengal, Orissa, and the North-East region.

Conservative estimates made by the government of Pakistan indicate that Pakistan is likely to have surplus power over the next few years. If Pakistan were to export its surplus 200 megawatts of power to India, it could earn U.S.\$1.2 billion annually over a period of twenty years. This would be a major nontraditional export item in Pakistan's export basket, and would optimize the use of power plants in Pakistan at 80 percent of their capacity, rather than the current 60 percent levels.

The case for natural gas pipelines. The prospect for the emergence of natural gas pipelines as a key area for South Asian economic cooperation is based on the increasing demand in Indian markets for energy, India becoming one of the fastest-growing energy markets in the world. The prospect for supplying natural gas from neighboring countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan—either through their own resource endowments or as transit points for supply to India—has come up for discussion in recent years. Interest by "third" countries like Iran, Oman, Myanmar, and Turkmenistan to supply their

surplus natural gas to India and the region, and the willingness of multilateral funding institutions and foreign multinational corporations to provide insurance guarantees, has generated further expectations for earning revenues from natural gas.

The initiative for an Iran-India gas pipeline began as early as July 1993. Both nations have decided to undertake an offshore feasibility study for laying a pipeline from Iran to India “outside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Pakistan.”

Pakistan, on the other hand, has confirmed its willingness for the construction of an onshore gas pipeline from Iran to India, which has the potential for raising a huge revenue from “transit fees,” estimated in the range of \$500 million annually for Pakistan. However, no decision for an onshore pipeline has yet been made, given the institutional, political, and long-term supply security risks involved in this option for India. A large number of Indian corporates (such as Reliance Industries), foreign multinational companies (such as British Gas, Royal Dutch Shell Group, BHP Australia, and UNOCAL), and multilateral lending institutions (such as the Asian Development Bank), would be key players in supporting active discussions for the construction of a natural gas pipeline in South Asia.

In recent years, major gas reserves have been found in Bangladesh at the Bibiyana Natural Gas Fields. Market studies by UNOCAL and others have confirmed that the Bangladesh market will not be able to utilize such volumes for over fifteen years. An opportunity thus exists for exporting more gas to serve customers along the Hazira-Bijaipur-Jagdishpur (HBJ) pipeline, on the proposed route between Bangladesh and India. The estimated benefits to Bangladesh are in the range of U.S.\$3.5 billion in revenues and tax receipts over a twenty-year period. It would also develop approximately 1,900 jobs for Bangladeshi citizens, and could generate \$55 million to \$75 million for local procurement during the construction phase. Despite these major benefits, however, Bangladesh has not shown any inclination to export natural gas to the Indian market.

It is clear that the emerging global economy—based on communications, technologies, innovation, and new formats for doing business—will open up several new sectors for economic cooperation in South Asia. It is the responsibility of all the nations of South Asia to find the political will to place high priority on regional economic cooperation, development, and poverty reduction.

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See also South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

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SOUTHEAST ASIA, RELATIONS WITH India’s relations with the countries of what is today known as “Southeast Asia” date back to antiquity. Early Indian texts referred to Southeast Asia as *Suvarnabhumi* (land of gold). Trade and the transmission of the Hindu and Buddhist religions were key elements of India’s early interaction with Southeast Asian lands, including Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, the Indochina peninsula, Malaya, and Indonesia. This was not a one-way traffic; Southeast Asians, particularly traders of the Malay world, also sailed west across the Bay of Bengal. The flow of Indian priests, traders, and adventurers, along with intermarriages and cultural assimilation, left a deep and lasting impact on the cultural landscape of Southeast Asia, one of the most impressive examples of acculturation in history. By the eleventh century, a number of strongly “Indianized” kingdoms, such as Funan and Champa, emerged in the Indochina peninsula, as did Nakhon Sri Thammarat in the Malayan peninsula.

Indianization

What historians describe as the “Indianization” of Southeast Asia was “the expansion of an organized culture, founded on the Indian conception of royalty, Hindu or Buddhist beliefs, the mythology of ancient Hindu

Purāṇas, and the observance of the Hindu law codes, expressed in the Sanskrit language.” Other features of Indianization included the use of alphabets of Indian origin, the pattern of Indian law and administration and monuments, and architecture and sculpture influenced by the arts of India. But the subject of “Indianization” or “Hinduization” of Southeast Asia has been controversial. The thesis of Indian colonization of Southeast Asia, or Indian views of Southeast Asia as “greater India” or “further India,” popularized by nationalist groups, like the Greater India Society of Calcutta, and historians of ancient India, such as R. C. Majumdar, has found less favor among contemporary historians of Southeast Asia.

Archaeological and literary evidence suggests that India’s impact on Southeast Asia was achieved largely through peaceful means, by commerce rather than conquest, and by cultural assimilation rather than outright colonization. Nor were Southeast Asians mere passive recipients of Indian ideas, but actively engaged borrowers.

Ideas that suited indigenous traditions, or that could easily be adapted to local interests and practices, were more readily received than those that did not have such potential. The Indian caste system and the practice of according lower status to women were not popular in the Southeast Asia. The temple arts of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Pagan, Angkor, and Java differ from those of India. The influence of Indian ideas was heavily mediated by indigenous Southeast Asian beliefs and practices; Southeast Asians adapted or localized them to suit their own interests, needs, and values.

The decline of Buddhism in India by the end of the twelfth century and the erosion of Hindu political power with the advent of Muslim rule in India contributed to the decline of Indian influence in Southeast Asia. The conversion of Malacca to Islam in the early fifteenth century saw Islam supplant Hinduism and Buddhism there, although it was Indian Muslim merchants who, ironically, played a key role in the spread of Islam by bringing with them mullahs, Sufi mystics, and Arab preachers. Indians, especially Muslim traders from the Tamil and Gujurati areas of India, played a major role in the rise of Malacca as the premier port city of Southeast Asia. Through intermarriage and commercial power, they became a major force at Malacca’s royal court.

The advent of European rule in Asia and the restrictive trade policies of the Dutch and the British severely undermined India’s commercial links with Southeast Asia. The Europeans took control of the trade in spices and textiles, the staples of India-Southeast Asia trade. Under the British Raj, the Indian economy was transformed from being an exporter of manufactured goods to

a supplier of raw materials for Britain. The British also actively curbed Indian shipbuilding and shipping. But British rule started a new type of migration from India to Southeast Asia, especially to Malaya, dating from the foundation of Penang in 1786. In contrast to earlier Indian migrants, who tended to be traders and financiers or priests and pandits, the new migration was more regulated and of a larger scale, consisting chiefly of indentured, illiterate laborers. Annual levels of migration from India to Malaya jumped from less than 7,000 in 1880 to over 18,000 in 1889, while migrations to Burma increased from less than 7,000 to over 38,000. In 1910 an estimated 331,100 Indians migrated to Burma, while the figure for Malaya was 91,723. In 1935 the respective figures were 296,600 for Burma and 81,350 for Malaya.

The Post-colonial Period

The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and the advance of the Japanese army to the border region between Burma and British India underscored the strategic vulnerability of India to attacks through Southeast Asia. During the Japanese occupation of the region from 1942 to 1945, Southeast Asia also became the launching point of the military campaign led by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and his Indian National army, drawn mainly from Indians in Southeast Asia, to oust the British from India.

In the early postwar period, Indian interests in Southeast Asia comprised political, economic, and strategic dimensions. Politically, Indian nationalist leaders viewed the anticolonial struggles in Southeast Asia as being indivisible from their own struggle. India’s struggle for independence from British rule was viewed in Southeast Asia with great interest. The second Asian country, after the Philippines, to achieve independence, India after 1947 played an important role in the campaign for self-determination in Southeast Asia. Economically, Southeast Asia was a market for Indian textiles (Burma was an almost exclusive Indian market); and India was heavily dependent on Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and Indochina for oil, rubber, tin, rice, and timber. An estimated 1.3 million to 1.8 million Indian immigrants in Southeast Asia during the immediate postwar period provided another crucial link between India and Southeast Asia; the treatment of Indian migrants in Burma would become an issue in Indian relations with that country. Strategically, Indian diplomat K. M. Panikkar (who is credited with being among the first to use the term “Southeast Asia”) suggested the creation of an “Indian security sphere” extending from the Persian Gulf to Burma, Siam (Thailand), the Indochina peninsula, Malaya, and Singapore. Indian leaders like Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel expressed concern

about instability and Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia as potential threats to Indian security. This concern was fueled by the meetings of Asian Communist leaders under the banner of the South Asian Youth Congress in Calcutta (the so-called Calcutta Conference) in February 1948, which was followed by the outbreak of Communist rebellions in both India and Southeast Asia. At the same time, the emergence of China as a major Asian power introduced an important new dimension to India's interest in Southeast Asia.

Despite professing a strong commitment to decolonization in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was prepared only to extend diplomatic support to Southeast Asian struggles. Nehru refused Ho Chi Minh's request for material support against the French, though he took a more active role in supporting Indonesia's struggle against the Dutch. India took the lead in convening the 1949 conference on Indonesia to show support for Indonesian nationalists, though again Indian support was mainly moral rather than material. This affected Nehru's bid to organize a regional grouping of newly independent Asian nations. The unofficial Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947 under Nehru's chairmanship attracted delegations from all Southeast Asian countries, but the resulting Asian Relations Organization was moribund and short-lived.

Nehru joined Indonesia's efforts to convene a conference of African and Asian countries, which led to the famous Bandung Conference of 1955. At this time, the regional identity of Southeast Asia remained closely tied to that of India. The Bandung Conference was convened by the Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers (also known as the Colombo Powers), a regional grouping that included the leaders of Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka, as well as Indonesia and Burma. That conference, though successful in articulating a sense of solidarity among the newly independent countries, revealed serious differences, however, between India and the pro-United States Southeast Asian nations, Thailand and the Philippines. Nehru bitterly condemned military alliances between Asian nations and the superpowers, targeting specifically the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, antagonizing the leaders of Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

A highlight of India's involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1950s was its efforts to mediate in the conflict between the French and the North Vietnamese following the Geneva Accords in 1954. Indian diplomacy in the Indochina conflict included Nehru's call for an immediate cease-fire in February 1954. Nehru sought to prevent both Chinese military intervention in support of Ho Chi Minh and large-scale U.S. intervention that might have included nuclear weapons. India's role led to its appointment as chairman of the International Control Commission

(ICC) on Indochina, whose role was to control the flow of armaments into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. But the ICC suffered from a weak mandate and shortage of manpower, and was consumed by the escalation of great power rivalry. China made diplomatic and commercial gains in Southeast Asia at India's expense, while Nehru seemed more preoccupied with domestic issues.

The 1962 war between India and China dashed any remaining hopes of Indian interaction with Southeast Asia within a pan-Asian framework. This was accompanied by a growing divergence of their national economic policies and development strategies: India remained preoccupied with its domestic problems and the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, while the Southeast Asian nations remained concerned with the threat of Communist insurgency and potential Chinese and Vietnamese expansionism. Economically, while Southeast Asian countries were experiencing robust economic growth through openness to foreign investment and multinational enterprise, India could muster only what was derisively called the "Hindu" rate of growth of around 5 percent, which was seen in Southeast Asia as the result of its socialist, centrally planned economy. Later, in the 1990s, India's democratic system invited unflattering comments from the likes of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, who favored "discipline over democracy." The divergence in strategic outlook was equally pronounced, especially after the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. While India remained somewhat uninterested in joining ASEAN, its leaders also ruled out Indian membership on the ground that it was not "geographically included in Southeast Asia." More importantly, India's nonaligned outlook, albeit with a tilt to Moscow over cold war issues, conflicted with ASEAN's pro-U.S. stance, camouflaged in its doctrine of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia. The signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August 1971, intended to deter any Chinese or American intervention in support of Pakistan, was seen in Southeast Asia as compromising India's nonalignment. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 led India to recognize the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samarin regime in Cambodia. This was at serious odds with ASEAN's effort to condemn and isolate Hanoi. Moreover, in the 1980s, India's naval modernization program caused some apprehension in Southeast Asia.

India "Looks East"

The coolness and mutual neglect in India-ASEAN relations persisted until the early 1990s. But a major shift occurred in 1994, when Indian prime minister Narashimha Rao outlined India's "look east" policy,

whose main thrust was “to draw, as much as possible, investment and cooperation from the Asia-Pacific countries, in consonance with our common concept and solidarity and . . . our common destiny.” The “look east” policy was a logical and necessary extension of India’s domestic economic liberalization drive, which was dictated by harsh domestic economic and political realities. ASEAN is a key part of the look east policy.

The focus of India’s look east policy and India-ASEAN ties has been in the economic arena. According to official Indian figures, India’s exports to ASEAN jumped from U.S.\$2.9 billion in 1996–1997 to U.S.\$4.6 billion in 2002–2003, while imports from ASEAN during the same period rose from U.S.\$2.9 billion to U.S.\$5.2 billion. Although Southeast Asia accounts for only 8.77 percent of India’s total exports and 8.44 percent of India’s total imports, and foreign direct investment (FDI) by ASEAN states in India accounted for only 3.4 percent of total FDI flows to India (January 1991–May 2002), India’s impressive economic growth portends rising trade with ASEAN. India’s leadership position in information technology provides ASEAN with an opportunity to forge stronger economic links with India through greater economic integration.

India’s relations with ASEAN have been facilitated by New Delhi’s participation in a number of common regional forums. In 1992 India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. Although restricted to areas concerning trade, investment, tourism, science, and technology, this represented India’s first formal involvement with ASEAN. In 1995 India was made a full dialogue partner by ASEAN, becoming eligible to participate in a much wider range of sectors, including infrastructure, civil aviation, and computer software, as well as in ASEAN Post Ministerial Meetings. India was invited for the first time to summit level talks with ASEAN in Cambodia in November 2002, and at the second ASEAN-India Summit in Bali in October 2003, India signed a Framework Agreement for creating an ASEAN-India free trade agreement (FTA) in a decade. The same year, India also signed a Framework Agreement for creating an FTA with Thailand, and started negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with Singapore.

In 1996, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first multilateral security organization in the Asia-Pacific region under ASEAN leadership. Until then, ASEAN members had opposed Indian membership. India, as with the rest of the South Asian countries, was considered to be outside the geographic scope of the Asia-Pacific region. A more important, if not publicly stated, factor was ASEAN’s fear that South Asian membership

would saddle the ARF with the seemingly intractable India-Pakistan rivalry, including the Kashmir problem. ASEAN’s motives in inviting India into the ARF was partly determined by ASEAN’s perception of the importance of India as a counterweight to China. India’s growing links with ASEAN and sub-ASEAN groupings is indicated in its participation in the launching of a new subregional group involving Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand for Economic Cooperation, whose objectives include regional cooperation in transport and infrastructure. India also engages the newer ASEAN members through the Mekong Ganga Cooperation initiative, which involves building transportation links between India and the newer ASEAN members.

India has no border or land disputes in Southeast Asia and has already marked out its maritime boundary with Indonesia and Thailand. Currently, no Southeast Asian nation considers India to be a threat; nor does India expect any threats to security from any Southeast Asian country. While the situation in Myanmar, especially the growing military ties between Myanmar and China, has been a source of concern to Indian strategists, successive Indian governments have favored a policy of “engaging” China. Like ASEAN, India opposes the isolation of Myanmar. While Indian strategic planners recognize the importance of global trade routes through Southeast Asia, and share a concern over the rise of Chinese military power, India does not appear to have any grand plans for assuming a major security role in the Asia Pacific region, despite its powerful navy.

Nonetheless, the changing strategic climate in Asia appears to favor the development of closer political and security ties between India and the Southeast Asian countries. The 1990s saw increased defense contacts between India and ASEAN countries. The Indian navy has conducted a number of “friendship exercises” with ASEAN navies, including the navies of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. India and Malaysia have cooperated in a program to provide familiarization and maintenance training for Russian-supplied MiG aircraft to Malaysian air force personnel. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, India has joined the U.S. Navy in providing escort vessels in the Straits of Malacca.

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See also **Burma**

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SPACE PROGRAM India’s space program undertakes two major activities: it builds satellites used for remote sensing, meteorology, and communications; and it constructs the rockets to launch its satellites. India’s space program has passed through two stages. The first stage began in the 1960s, and involved setting up an administrative framework and gaining experience with rocket operations. Initial low-tech space operations commenced in the early 1960s. In 1969 the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was formed to coordinate these activities, and the Indian Department of Space was established in 1972.

ISRO’s first chairman, Vikram Sarabhai, planned the gradual evolution and development of the Indian space program. In 1970 Sarabhai noted that in ten years India would have to acquire the capability not only of building telecommunication satellites, such as INSAT-1, but also

of launching them into synchronous orbits. His initial goal was the development of a small satellite launcher, such as a Scout rocket, within five years. He noted that once the basic systems were developed, and enough experience acquired in operating them, a further five-year period (from 1975 to 1980) should be adequate for the second stage, the development of larger boosters. India’s space program, however, has lagged more than a decade behind Sarabhai’s ambitious schedule.

The latter phase of the first stage of India’s space program focused mainly on experimental, low capability projects that allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in the construction and operation of satellites and launchers. In this phase, ISRO built (with foreign assistance) the Bhaskara earth observation satellites and the APPLE (Ariane Payload Experiment) communications satellite. From 1979 to 1983, it also conducted four tests of its indigenously built SLV-3 rocket (similar in design to the U.S. Scout rocket). Subsequently, ISRO built an augmented satellite launch vehicle (ASLV).

The second stage of India’s space program commenced in the mid-1980s and focused on larger, more powerful, and mission-specific systems. This stage involved building the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) to launch the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite, and the PSLV’s successor, the geostationary satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), to launch a meteorology and telecommunications “Indian National Satellite” (INSAT). With the PSLV commencing operational launches in 1997 after three prior demonstration flights, and the GSLV making its first flight in 2001, India’s space program emerged from its developing stages to join the ranks of the world’s five advanced space agencies, all of which have geostationary earth orbit (GEO) capability.

The SLV-3 had a single 9-ton solid fuel engine and was only powerful enough to launch a 77–88 pound (35–40 kg) payload to an approximately 186 mile-altitude (300 km) low earth orbit (LEO). Three such engines power the ASLV, enabling it to place a 220–330 pound (100–150 kg) payload in an approximately 280 mile-altitude (450 km) LEO. Such lightweight low-orbit satellites did not have significant military or commercial capabilities. However, the SLV-3 could still be used as an intermediate range ballistic missile, and its first stage was used in the Agni intermediate range missile. The more powerful PSLV and GSLV can launch more capable, heavier satellites into optimal higher altitude orbits.

The PSLV and GSLV utilize two Indian-built propulsion systems: an approximately 130-ton solid fuel engine, and a 37–40 ton liquid fuel engine (whose design is based on the European Space Agency’s Viking engine used in the Ariane launch vehicle). They allow the PSLV to

launch a 2,645 pound (1,200 kg) payload (the IRS satellite) to an approximately 497 mile-altitude (800 km) polar orbit. The same systems are used on the GSLV, and are supplemented with a 12-ton cryogenic engine, which enables the GSLV to carry a heavier payload to a higher, 22,369 mile (36,000 km) GEO. The 400–414 ton GSLV was designed to launch 2,500 kg INSAT-2 class satellites, but its first three flights carried somewhat lighter satellites weighing 3373 pounds (1,530 kg; 2001), 4023 pounds (1,825 kg; 2003), and 4300 pounds (1,950 kg; 2004). The first three GSLVs also used Russian-supplied cryogenic engines. Later GSLVs will use more powerful, Indian-built, cryogenic engines. ISRO then plans to build a much heavier 630-ton GSLV-Mark 3 that can launch 8,818 pound (4,000 kg) satellites to GEO or 22,000 pound (10,000 kg) satellites to LEO. The rocket will have a 110-ton liquid fuel booster, additional 200-ton solid fuel engines, and a 25-ton cryogenic upper stage.

The IRS satellites have found applications with the Indian Natural Resource Management program, with regional Remote Sensing Service Centers in five Indian cities, and with Remote Sensing Application Centers in twenty Indian states that use IRS images for economic development applications. These include environmental monitoring, analyzing soil erosion and the impact of soil conservation measures, forestry management, determining land cover for wildlife sanctuaries, delineating groundwater potential zones, flood inundation mapping, drought monitoring, estimating crop acreage and deriving agricultural production estimates, fisheries monitoring, mining and geological applications such as surveying metal and mineral deposits, and urban planning. ISRO has also sold its IRS images to international clients; in 2003–2004, it had about 15 percent of the global market share for remote-sensing images. India's early IRS satellites—IRS-1A in March 1988, IRS-1B in August 1991, and IRS-1C in December 1995—were launched aboard Russian rockets. Subsequently, IRS-1D and the IRS-P series were launched on India's PSLV. ISRO thus launched PSLV-C1 with IRS-1D (1997); PSLV-C2 with three satellites—IRS-P4 (an oceanographic satellite), a German Tubsat, and a Korean Kitsat (1999); PSLV-C3 with three satellites—the Indian Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), German Bird, and Belgian Proba (2001); PSLV-C4 carrying a 1-ton meteorology satellite (Kalpana 1) to geosynchronous orbit (2002); and PSLV-C5 with IRS-P6 (2003).

The INSAT-2 and INSAT-3 satellites were launched aboard European Space Agency rockets. INSATs-2A to -2E were launched from 1992 to 1999, and INSAT-3A, -3B, -3C, and -3E were launched between 2000 and 2003. These INSAT satellites have been used to set up a national telecommunications infrastructure. INSAT-1B

extended television coverage to over 75 percent of India's population, and subsequent INSATs have brought television to most of India. The INSAT-2 satellites also provide telephone links to remote areas; data transmission for organizations such as the National Stock Exchange; mobile satellite service communications for private operators, railways, and road transport; and broadcast satellite services, used by India's state-owned television agency as well as commercial television channels. India's Edusat (Educational Satellite), launched aboard the GSLV in 2004, was intended for adult literacy and distance learning applications in rural areas. It augmented and would eventually replace such capabilities already provided by INSAT-3B.

Over time, India's INSAT and IRS satellites have become more sophisticated. For example, the Indian-built 2–2.5-ton INSAT-2 satellite had a greater number of more powerful transponders than the early U.S.-built 1-ton INSAT-1. Further, IRS-1A and -1B sensors had a resolution of 236 feet (72 m) multispectral (in the visible and near-infrared band) and 118 feet (36 m) panchromatic, while IRS-1C and -1D cameras have a better resolution of 75 feet (23 m) multispectral and 20 feet (6 m) panchromatic. ISRO had also planned to launch a mapping and cartography satellite, IRS-P5 (Cartosat-1), with 8.2 feet (2.5 m) panchromatic resolution, but instead launched TES aboard PSLV-C3 in 2001. TES had a panchromatic 3.3–3.6 foot (1–2 m) resolution camera. Subsequently, PSLV-C5 carried IRS-P6 (Resourcesat-1), with sensors of resolution similar to IRS-1D. In 2005, ISRO planned to launch PSLV-C6 with Cartosat-1, after which it will launch Cartosat-2 with a 3.3 foot (1 m) resolution camera, and a radar imaging satellite (Risat) that enables observation at night and under cloudy conditions.

India's satellites and satellite launch vehicles have had military spin-offs. While India's 93–124 mile (150–250 km) range Prithvi missile is not derived from the Indian space program, the intermediate range Agni missile is drawn from the Indian space program's SLV-3. In its early years, when headed by Vikram Sarabhai and Satish Dhawan, ISRO opposed military applications for its dual-use projects such as the SLV-3. Eventually, however, the Defence Research and Development (DRDO)-based missile program borrowed human resources and technology from ISRO. Missile scientist A. P. J. Abdul Kalam (elected president of India in 2002), who had headed the SLV-3 project at ISRO, moved to DRDO to direct India's missile program. About a dozen scientists accompanied Abdul Kalam from ISRO to DRDO, where Abdul Kalam designed the Agni missile using the SLV-3's solid-fuel first stage and a liquid-fuel (Prithvi-missile-derived) second stage. The Agni technology demonstrator flew

three times—in 1989, 1992, and 1994—to an estimated range of 621–870 miles (1,000 to 1,400 km). ISRO also built a solid-fuel second stage for the 1,243 miles (2,000 km) range Agni-2, which first flew in 1999.

IRS and INSAT satellites were primarily intended and used for civilian-economic applications, but they also offered military spin-offs. In 1996 New Delhi's Ministry of Defence temporarily blocked the use of IRS-1C by India's environmental and agricultural ministries in order to monitor ballistic missiles near India's borders. In 1997 the Indian air force's "Airpower Doctrine" aspired to use space assets for surveillance and battle management. In 2000 the air force was conceptualizing various programs for an aerospace command and for the military use of space, and a parliamentary committee endorsed the idea. India's space assets provide modest reconnaissance and communications capabilities.

India's IRS and TES satellites have only a moderate military reconnaissance capability, with the drawbacks of poor resolution and limited frequency of coverage. The LISS cameras on IRS-1C, -1D, and -P6 have a 75 foot (23 m) resolution in the visible and near-infrared band, permitting the detection of large military installations. The PAN cameras on these satellites have a resolution of 20 feet (6 m) panchromatic, which can broadly detect surface ships, aircraft, tank formations, and ballistic missile units, but may not precisely identify these objects. India's INSATs can be used for multiple access digital data transmission, teleconferencing, and remote area emergency communications, features useful for a military command and control network and for search and rescue. However, the INSATs are not optimal for military operation due to their inappropriate frequency range.

India's space assets enhance India's military capabilities against Pakistan and China. If New Delhi acquires dedicated reconnaissance satellites that provide better coverage of Pakistan's military installations, it could obtain counterforce capability against Pakistan, since Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is small, and its delivery systems are concentrated at a few airfields and missile bases. If India's satellites can locate these missiles at their bases in real time, they would become vulnerable to an Indian strike. India's satellites also augment its capabilities against China. Once India develops 1,864–3,107 mile (3,000–5,000 km) range Agni-3 missiles, it would have countervalue capabilities against major Chinese cities. Further, India's reconnaissance satellites will enable New Delhi to counter Chinese conventional threats. They can detect and track Chinese military forces in Tibet. They also give India's armed forces sufficient early warning about the movement of Chinese military forces from central China toward Tibet and India,

thus facilitating the timely deployment of Indian conventional forces to counter any such Chinese military deployments.

ISRO's annual space budget was approximately \$400–500 million in the period 2000–2004 (compared against India's defense budget of approximately \$12 billion–15 billion in this period). In the future, as ISRO launches satellites more frequently (two or more times each year) and undertakes new missions, its budgets could increase. ISRO's future plans are to activate its second launch pad, and use it to launch both the PSLV and the GSLV, in 2005. Further, it seeks to send recoverable capsules into space to perform experiments, after which the capsules will land at sea and be reused. ISRO conducted airdrop tests of such a capsule in 2004 and planned a space flight in 2005. In addition, it intends to develop the GSLV Mark-3 to launch 4-ton satellites. Finally, ISRO intends to launch a lunar probe aboard the PSLV in 2007–2008; the probe would orbit and send back high-resolution pictures of the moon.

Dinshaw Mistry

See also Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Weapons Production and Procurement

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SRI LANKA A tiny island state, Sri Lanka is separated from South India by a narrow stretch of waters in the Palk Strait. It has a total land area of 25,330 square miles (65,610 sq. km.) and a population of about 19 million, including many ethnic communities with diverse histories, languages, and religions. Sinhalese constitute about two-thirds of the total population of Sri Lanka, while Tamils are the largest minority. Around 90 percent of Sri Lanka's people have Indian ancestors, as their forefathers

began migrating from India over a thousand years ago. About 70 percent of Sri Lankans practice Buddhism, which now enjoys special privileges and state patronage. Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam are minority religions. Sinhalese form the majority in seven of Sri Lanka's nine provinces; Sri Lankan Tamils are dominant in the other two northern and eastern provinces, Jaffna and Trincomalli, which they consider their traditional homeland, temporarily merged under the 1987 India–Sri Lanka accord. Muslims and Indian-origin Tamils live throughout the island, mostly in the eastern and central provinces, respectively.

Sri Lanka's independence from British colonial rule came peacefully in 1948. Given its long colonial experience, the country remained a parliamentary democracy for three decades until the second republican constitution of 1978 introduced its presidential system. A vibrant democracy, it has a multiparty system in which two parties dominate. Elections are held regularly, and participation in the electoral process has been always high. Universal adult franchise was introduced in 1931. Many governments have been coalitions headed by the United National Party or the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Plantation agriculture is the mainstay of the Sri Lankan economy. Tea is a major foreign exchange earner. Sri Lanka liberalized its economy in 1977. Over 90 percent of its people are literate, and the average life expectancy of 72.5 years is high.

Despite such impressive social indicators, Sri Lanka has witnessed large-scale death and destruction, especially since 1983, when ethnic riots began in Colombo and a civil war broke out in the Tamil-dominated provinces of the north and east. The root cause of ethnic antagonism lies in the conflicting visions of Sinhalese Buddhist and Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu nationalism, and the Tamil demand for its own nation-state (*eelam*) in the northeastern portion of the island. Successive Sinhalese governments in Colombo, through discriminatory policies regarding language, education, and employment, have alienated Sri Lanka's Tamil minority. The demand for equal linguistic rights and federal autonomy gained momentum in the 1950s, with the Federal Party providing early leadership. Since the mid-1970s, when the Sinhalese leadership failed to redress the Tamils' legitimate grievances, the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front launched a movement for a separate *eelam*. The movement soon took on a violent dimension, as militant organizations were formed to carry on the fight for independence.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, has remained the most powerful militant organization. Formed in 1972 as the Tamil

New Tigers (and renamed in 1976), the LTTE has grown strong enough to sustain prolonged insurgency since 1983 in the face of the tremendous military pressure brought upon it by the Sri Lankan state. Ruthlessness is a notable characteristic of the LTTE. By carrying out a systematic campaign of terror, it has created political disorder in the island. Many Sri Lankan leaders, as well as former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, fell prey to the LTTE's bullets and bombs. Unable to defeat the group militarily, the Sri Lankan government has intermittently offered to negotiate a peace settlement. Peace processes have not been successful, however, due to the LTTE's intransigence regarding their *eelam* goal and the Sinhalese leaders' failure to evolve a bipartisan approach to conflict resolution.

Ponmoni Sabadevan

See also **Sri Lanka, Relations with**

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SRI LANKA, RELATIONS WITH Relations between India and Sri Lanka have been shaped by a variety of factors. The close proximity of the two states has encouraged the exchange of people, culture, trade, and hostilities over several millennia. Sri Lanka has also long served as an entrepôt for Indian Ocean commerce extending to West Asia, Africa, and Europe to its west, and Southeast Asia and China to its east. The mixture of diverse cultural influences in Sri Lanka, the relatively greater significance of maritime trade, its small size, and its geographically insular existence gave the island society a distinctive character and complex identity. This situation was reinforced by Sri Lanka's separate experience under British colonialism from the early nineteenth century. The British system of indirect rule through local notables created a commonality, which from the late nineteenth century gave way to nationalist demands by the Westernized elite in both India and Sri Lanka for increased access to representation and power. In Sri Lanka, the establishment and dominance of a colonial plantation export economy contributed to the emergence of a propertied elite with a conservative and accommodating attitude to British colonial power. The Sri Lankan nationalist movement and transfer of power, led by D. S. Senanayake, who was to become the first prime minister of Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was called until 1972), were carried

out with little involvement by the masses. The more radical mass movement of India, led by the Indian National Congress under Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, backed by the relatively more developed and independent Indian business class, aroused admiration among the more liberal and progressive segments of Ceylonese society while creating great anxiety among the latter's elite. This situation was expressed in the post-independence period in Ceylon by the foreign policy orientations of the two major political blocs that came to dominate Sri Lankan politics. The center-right political party, the United National Party (UNP), remained wary of India, preferring a closer relationship with the capitalist West. In contrast, the center-left party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) founded by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in 1952, favored a more independent, nonaligned stance that was pro-India and the Third World.

Citizenship and Voting Rights of Indian Tamils

A major subject of dispute between the two states in the early post-independence years revolved around the formal status and rights of Indian immigrants to Sri Lanka. The large majority of these immigrants were poor Tamil workers who had come as indentured labor starting from the early nineteenth century to work on Sri Lanka's famous tea plantations in the island's central upcountry. The South Indian Tamils had become the largest ethnic minority on Ceylon by 1911, when they were categorized separately for the first time. Their numbers peaked by 1939, declining thereafter due to discriminatory measures taken against them; by 1946 the census reported there were 857,329 persons of recent Indian origin (PRIOs/ PIOs, officially referred to as "Indian Tamils"). They began to participate in the island's politics in the 1920s by supporting the growing trade union movement and leftist political parties. Though Sri Lanka was bound by agreements with India from the early 1920s to treat the immigrants in a "nondiscriminatory" manner, the competition for votes and power induced Sinhalese political leaders to target immigrant Tamil labor in an exclusionary fashion after 1930, barring them from eligibility to vote and from economic programs. This culminated in the passage in 1948 of the citizenship and franchise acts that stripped the Indian Tamils of their citizenship and voting rights. The Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 created two types of citizenship: citizenship by descent and by registration. Citizenship by descent was restricted to persons who could prove that at least two generations (primarily on the male side) had been born on the island. Citizenship by registration would be available to those residents who could prove that either parent had been a citizen by descent, and that the individual had been a resident of Ceylon for seven years, if married, or ten years,

if unmarried. The minister in charge could also register twenty-five persons a year for "distinguished public service." Opposition members of Ceylon's parliament belonging to the left and to the Tamil parties denounced the legislation as having a clear racial and class bias, since it required documentary proof that simply did not exist for the overwhelming majority of poor Tamil workers. In contrast, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had suggested a far simpler set of provisions, requiring residence of seven years prior to January 1948, along with a voluntary declaration of the intention and desire to settle in Ceylon. The Indian and Pakistani Residents' (Citizenship) Act of 1949 allowed for citizenship through satisfaction of a more complicated set of conditions: residence of seven years for married persons and ten years for unmarried persons to have been completed by January 1948, applications to be made within two years of the legislation, with proof of adequate means of livelihood and conformance with Ceylonese marriage laws. As events demonstrated, these requirements provided ample scope for the rejection of most applications on technical grounds. The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment of 1949 made the status of citizenship mandatory for franchise rights, stripping most Indian Tamils of the franchise that a number of them had enjoyed in the late colonial period. With India taking the position that all Indian emigrants to other parts of the British Empire were equal "subjects" in, and hence citizens of, their host countries, unless they voluntarily chose Indian citizenship, the Indian-origin population of Sri Lanka were rendered stateless. Not surprisingly, as a vulnerable population, their economic and political situation declined in the following period.

With several rounds of talks failing, and pressed repeatedly by Sri Lanka to help resolve the dispute, India reluctantly stepped away from its earlier position. Under the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964, signed by Sri Lankan prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Sri Lanka agreed to accept 300,000 persons and their natural increase, and India 525,000 persons with their increase. The status of the 150,000 who remained would be decided later. These numbers were arrived at by the Sri Lankan government without any consultation with its sole appointed Indian Tamil representative and trade union leader in Parliament, S. Thondaman. Nor did the Indian central government seek input from any of its Tamil representatives, arousing strong resentment in the state of Tamil Nadu.

In direct contradiction to the agreed-upon numbers, over 630,000 Indian Tamils applied for Ceylonese citizenship by the end of 1974. Fewer than 439,000 applied for Indian citizenship, many of them reluctantly, after having been rejected for Ceylonese citizenship. A follow-up

agreement in 1974, recognizing the nonviability of the proportions in the earlier agreement, decided that each country would accept half of the remaining 150,000, but this agreement was never implemented. By the end of the period of the 1964 pact in October 1981, only 162,000 Indian Tamils had been registered as citizens of Ceylon, while 373,900 had been given Indian citizenship (of whom 284,300 had been repatriated to India). The rest remained stateless and voteless, with few individual and political rights.

In the following period, the Sri Lankan government gradually reversed its previous positions and belatedly granted citizenship to the remaining persons—a process largely undertaken by the UNP as a reward for the political support given by the Tamils in elections in the post-1977 period. The Citizenship (Special Provisions) Act of 1988 granted citizenship to the remaining persons of Indian origin who had not previously applied for Indian citizenship. This benefited 231,849 stateless persons. Further legislation, enacted in March 2003, gave citizenship to a further 200,000 Tamils.

Kachchativu Island

Another subject of dispute between India and Sri Lanka after independence related to the maritime waters and boundaries between them. For the most part, the demarcation of boundaries and areas of control over adjacent waters were settled amicably through negotiations in keeping with international law. Kachchativu, a barren island in the Palk Strait, which had traditionally been used by fishermen of both countries to rest and dry their nets while on fishing expeditions and annually for festival observances, acquired importance due to the extended maritime boundary and access to fish, prawns, and other marine resources they would give the possessing country. In the interest of improving relations, India agreed to concede the issue in favor of Sri Lanka's ownership of the island, on the condition that Indian fishermen and pilgrims would be allowed to continue to visit the island as they had in the past.

The Sri Lankan Tamil Separatist Movement

The major issue that has dominated relations between India and Sri Lanka from the early 1980s is the Sri Lankan Tamil movement for the creation of a separate Tamil *eelam* (homeland) in the northeast quarter of Sri Lanka. Differences between the Sinhalese-dominated central government and the Sri Lankan Tamil leadership were rooted in the colonial period. Sri Lankan Tamil fears of marginalization and subordination in the post-independence period grew in reaction to successive discriminatory state policies, including the deprivation of the Indian Tamils of citizenship and representation, the

consequent disproportionate representation of Sinhalese, and the declaration of Sinhala (the language of the Sinhalese) as Sri Lanka's only official language in 1956. The allocation of development funds and projects by Colombo's Sinhalese-led government to majority regions in the southwest, as well as official support of a pro-Sinhalese university admissions policy in the early 1970s, further frustrated and alienated the Sri Lankan Tamils. Militant Tamil youth groups ("The Boys") were soon ready to fight for a separate Tamil state by any means. Efforts by the state to repress these groups through coercion further polarized the situation, culminating in major bouts of ethnic violence in 1977, 1981, and 1983, and ultimately led to civil war.

This trend of events led to an internationalization of the Sri Lankan Tamil issue and drew India into a more active role. India had expressed diplomatic concern in 1977 and 1981 at the impact of the ethnic violence on Indian Tamils, many of whom were Indian citizens. The operations of the Sri Lankan army against the militant Tamil youth groups and the ethnic violence in 1983 sent some 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamils fleeing to seek asylum in Tamil Nadu, the South Indian state in closest proximity, and with which they had the closest historical and cultural ties. The press, people, and political parties in Tamil Nadu, which had its own history of secessionist movements, provided sympathy, support, and funds to the refugees and militants, and demanded action by India's government in New Delhi, led by Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party. This sequence of events coincided with larger concerns in Delhi that had been raised by the growing closeness of the UNP government in Colombo with Western powers, as evidenced by its growing economic dependence and indebtedness, military aid and training to put down the Tamil insurgency, and other concessions having strategic implications. Given the U.S. funds and arms flowing into the region, through the military dictatorship in Pakistan, to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan, India's sensitivities to the presence of an external superpower were exacerbated by the deteriorating situation in neighboring Sri Lanka, a country from which India had traditionally never felt any anxiety and with which it had generally had cordial relations.

India adopted a two-track policy toward Sri Lanka in the subsequent period, under Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi. On the one hand, it provided support, training, and funding to Tamil militant groups to help them create pressure on the government in Colombo to desist from its increasing identification with Western interests. On the other hand, India actively sponsored repeated rounds of negotiations between the government in Colombo and the Sri Lankan Tamil parties to further reconciliation, compromise, and the recognition of

minority ethnic rights to establish a system of regional Tamil autonomy for Sri Lanka's northeast. The bilateral talks that ensued from 1983 to 1986 compelled a growing recognition and delineation of Tamil rights and demands, providing the basis for the provisions supporting provincial autonomy incorporated into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. Those efforts to effect a reconciliation did not, however, materialize. The many militant youth groups seeking to represent Sri Lankan Tamils suffered from serious individual and political differences among themselves, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) maintaining the most militant and intractable separatist position.

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, signed by Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan president J. R. Jayewardene on 29 July 1987, sought to solve the exploding ethnic conflict by declaring Sri Lanka "a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society" consisting primarily of four main ethnic groups. It recognized that the northern and eastern provinces had been areas of "historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking population." Tamil and English were also proclaimed to be official languages of Sri Lanka, along with Sinhala. The Sri Lankan government promised to devolve power to provincial councils and to allow the adjoining northern and eastern provinces to form one administrative unit, or to remain separate, their preference to be determined by referendum in the Eastern province. As a temporary measure, the two provinces would be merged into a single unit, the North-Eastern Provincial Council, until the referendum could be held. India promised to send a contingent of troops as a peace-keeping force (IPKF), at the invitation of Sri Lanka's president, to be deployed in the northeast of the island to oversee the cease-fire, receive arms to be surrendered by the Tamil militants, and serve as a guarantor of the agreement. In an exchange of letters following the accord, Jayewardene assured Gandhi that specific aspects of Sri Lanka's foreign policy would be modified to accommodate Indian regional security concerns.

The accord set out a tight schedule for the completion of commitments by the various sides but ran into trouble almost immediately, and soon became derailed. Its opponents included a rival faction of Colombo's ruling party, led by Prime Minister Premadasa; the other major Sri Lankan party, the SLFP, and its leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike; the influential Buddhist clergy; and the radical militant Sinhalese youth group, the People's United Liberation Front (JVP). Nor did the accord have the open support of either the leading moderate Tamil party (TULF) or the most militant Tamil Tigers (LTTE). Only several small parties on the left, members of the progressive intelligentsia, and several of the Tamil militant

groups supported the agreement. The surrender of arms was rejected by the LTTE. This and other deliberate actions by the LTTE compelled the IPKF to engage in open armed conflict with them, while the Sri Lankan government withdrew its own armed forces from the northeast.

After Premadasa came to power as president in 1988, he called for a cease-fire with the Tigers, began talks with them, summarily asked the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka (before the accord had been fully implemented), and even clandestinely supplied the LTTE with arms to fight the IPKF, which had already lost 1,500 soldiers. New Delhi began to withdraw all its troops in December 1989. Eight months later the LTTE resumed hostilities against the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu in 1991, then Premadasa in Colombo in 1993.

While political opinion in India was divided about the wisdom of sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka, it had remained sympathetic to the Tamil cause. This changed sharply after the LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber in the midst of his campaign to come back to power in India's midterm elections in mid-1991, as demonstrated by popular opinion in Tamil Nadu. India proceeded to try those charged with conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi. It indicted Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tigers, and three of his closest associates to stand trial for the murder. Request for Prabhakaran's extradition continued to be pending over a decade after conclusion of the trial, given the inability of the Sri Lankan government to catch him in his jungle strongholds in the island's northeast. The LTTE was banned as a terrorist organization by India in 1993, a course later adopted by other states, including Sri Lanka, the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

Post-accord relations. After withdrawing the IPKF, India continued to stand by the accord, asserting the need for all parties in Sri Lanka to work out a solution among themselves, within the parameters of a united sovereign democratic and pluralistic Sri Lanka. Another round of cease-fire occurred after the changeover of power to the SLFP-led People's Alliance government of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge in late 1994. In an effort to compel the LTTE to negotiate a compromise, President Kumaratunge escalated the fighting against the Tigers on the one hand. On the other, she sought to restore trust by working to improve Sri Lanka's record of human rights, offering a package of constitutional reforms instituting a generous degree of regional autonomy to resolve the ethnic conflict. The opposing UNP refused to support the reforms and thereby strengthen Kumaratunge's political position. Rejecting Kumaratunge's peace overtures, the LTTE fought the

government forces to a stalemate by 2000, drawing on the globalized network of support, arms, and funds it had built up in its diaspora communities, as well as through overt and covert economic operations.

By December 2000, Sri Lanka's civil war had taken over 65,000 lives and had displaced over a million and a half people. An international coalition, including Norway and other Western powers, Japan, and India, supported a cease-fire and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and were willing to back the effort with funding for reconstruction and development. Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, accepted the offer and the cease-fire was maintained for the next two years, while six rounds of talks were held by representatives of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in various capitals in Asia and Europe. The government made numerous concessions to the LTTE in an effort to engage it in the peace process. Over time, these served to enhance the control of the LTTE in the northeast, but the Tigers remained largely unresponsive, raising fears in the south that the unity and security of Sri Lanka was being dangerously compromised. This exacerbated serious political divisions on the issue between President Kumaratunge and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe, a development which only strengthened the separatist leverage of the LTTE.

The deepening political divisions caused opinion on the island about India's role to come full circle in favor of it adopting a more active, and even outright interventionist, role to resolve Sri Lanka's political impasse. India had resisted demands by members of the Sinhalese community and clergy to return in mid-2000, when the Tigers launched a particularly threatening attack on Jaffna. However, by the beginning of 2003, the coalition government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Bharatiya Janata Party exhibited a greater willingness to take a more active role in fashioning a compromise between Sri Lanka's two major parties in the south, while asserting that only a "homegrown" solution with the Tigers themselves could prove durable.

Amita Shastri

See also **Ethnic Conflict; Sri Lanka**

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SRINAGAR. See **Jammu and Kashmir**.

STATE FINANCES SINCE 1952 In order to analyze the trends in state finances in India since the mid-twentieth century, and to identify reform issues that need to be addressed for better macroeconomic management, it is necessary to examine the fiscal role of state governments in India's federal polity and their effectiveness in fulfilling their fiscal roles. As in other important federal fiscal systems, the states play an important role in providing public services in India. The country's 1.2 billion people live in twenty-eight states and seven centrally administered territories (two with their own elected governments). The seventh schedule of India's Constitution demarcates the legislative and fiscal domains of the union and state governments in terms of union, state, and concurrent lists. The states have exclusive authority over the items specified in the state list and coequal powers in regard to those in the concurrent list. While on the one hand the states are required to make substantial investments in providing efficient physical and social infrastructure, they face binding constraints on resources. Restructuring the finances and expenditure priorities to release resources to the desired activities has not been easy. The declining revenues and transfers from the central government have only added to India's woes. The states are faced with challenging times in creating a business-friendly environment.

The Assignment System

The tax and expenditure powers of the central and the state governments are specified in the seventh schedule of the Constitution. The functions required for maintaining macroeconomic stability, international relations, and activities having significant scale economies have been assigned exclusively to the central government, or have to be carried out concurrently with the states. Functions that have a statewide jurisdiction are assigned to the states. Most broad-based and progressive taxes have been

assigned to the central government, which also has residual tax powers. A number of tax vehicles have been assigned to the states, but from the viewpoint of revenue productivity, only the sales tax is important. The states can borrow from the central government. They have the powers to borrow from the market, but if a state is indebted to the central government, such borrowing must be approved by the center. The important taxes assigned to the states include the sales tax, excise duties on alcoholic products, stamp duties and registration fees, taxes on motor vehicles and passengers and goods. They can also levy taxes on incomes from agriculture, but none of the states has found this feasible for political reasons. Even land revenue, which contributed significant revenue thirty years ago, has ceased to contribute any worthwhile resources in recent years.

The states play a very important role in the development of agriculture and have a significant role in the provision of infrastructure for industrial development. Even more significant is their role in human development, as they have responsibility for the provision of basic education and health care. The states raise 35 percent of the total revenues and incur 57 percent of total expenditures. Their role in providing social services is particularly significant. In fact, their expenditure share in education, public health, and family welfare is close to 90 percent of public expenditures.

Trends in State Finances: Macroeconomic Implications

The trends in state finances in India since the mid-twentieth century can be examined in two distinct phases. In the first phase, from 1950–1951 to 1986–1987, increased revenue receipts kept pace with revenue (current) expenditures. The emphasis on resource mobilization, particularly to finance large development plans, resulted in the steady increase in both revenues and expenditures, with states' own revenues as well as central transfers steadily increasing. In fact, from 1975–1976 to 1983–1984, revenue receipts exceeded revenue expenditures by a significant margin, enabling the states to finance an appreciable portion of their capital expenditure from savings in the current account.

The second phase in state finances began with the pay revision, following the implementation of the recommendations of the pay commission by the central government. The central government itself had such a significant revenue deficit that it could not increase transfers to meet the additional requirements to finance the pay revision. The states, on their part, did not undertake serious fiscal restructuring, and as the buoyancy of both the states' own revenues and central transfers declined (the latter more than the former), public dissaving at the

state level increased steadily. In fact, in the 1990s the states' revenue-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio remained steady at about 5.5 percent, whereas the central tax-GDP ratio declined by two percentage points. The consequence of this has been to reduce transfers to the states by one percentage point. Thus, with stagnant revenues, declining transfers from the center, and ever-increasing pressure on expenditures, revenue deficits in the states widened significantly in the 1990s. Although the states tried to contain their expenditures to adjust for stagnant revenues, the revision of pay scales of state government employees, following the implementation of the fifth central pay commission, did not help matters. Thus, since 1998–1999, the revenue deficits of the states increased sharply, and borrowed resources of over 2.5 percent of GDP were being used to meet states' current expenditures. Correspondingly, fiscal deficit on states' accounts increased from 1.3 percent in 1975–1976 to 2.8 percent in 1985–1986 and accelerated to 4.7 percent in 2001–2002.

The deterioration in state finances since 1987–1988 also marked a sharp deterioration in the quality of deficits as well. Infrastructure spending declined from 3.7 percent of GDP in 1980–1981 and about 3 percent in 1985–1986 to 1.7 percent in 2000–2001. As a ratio of total expenditures, capital expenditure declined from about 27 percent in 1980–1981 to a mere 13 percent in 2001–2002. Sharp increases in expenditures crowded out maintenance expenditures, thereby reducing the productivity of the infrastructure sector as well. Even in labor-intensive social services such as education and health, increases in the pay scales have significantly escalated the input cost of providing these services, and increasing expenditures have not been reflected in the improvement in the standard of these services.

The persistence of large and growing fiscal deficits in India's states over the years has led to a steady accumulation of debt. The states' outstanding debt as a ratio of GDP was steady from 1965–1966 to 1997–1998, but thereafter increased sharply. This deterioration in fiscal imbalances is not just an aggregate phenomenon. It is seen in the case of each of the individual states, particularly after the pay revision in 1998–1999. Even in 1995–1996, some of the states had surpluses in the revenue account, but after the pay revisions in 1998–1999, every state has had revenue deficits of varying magnitude, and capital and maintenance expenditures have been lower than in 1995–1996.

There are a number of reasons for fiscal imbalances at the state level. Since the 1980s, the growth of the states' revenue expenditures has outpaced the growth of revenue receipts mainly because of the two pay revisions, one in the late 1980s and another in the late 1990s. The

last one in particular had disastrous effects on state finances. Pay revision was not accompanied with any restructuring plan in public employment, and expenditures on salaries and pensions increased sharply after 1998–1999. The second important reason for the states' imbalances is the decline in transfers from the central government as a ratio of GDP. The central government's own revenues as a ratio of GDP declined by about two percentage points in the 1990s, and this led to the compression of transfers to states by one percentage point. Third, there has also been a significant deceleration in the growth of states' own tax revenue. Fourth, the artificial distinction between plan and nonplan expenditures and an emphasis on increasing the plan size year after year have led to unbridled growth of expenditures. Fifth, increased borrowing, particularly from uncontrolled sources at high interest rates, has caused a sharp increase in the debt service burden. Finally, public enterprises, particularly the power utilities, have continued to be a drain on the states' funds.

The states' fiscal operations have important implications on microeconomic efficiency as well. On the tax side, the structure and operation of sales tax systems has been a major source of distortion. The relative price distortions caused by complicated, cascading type, preretail and partly origin-based sales tax and the impediments to internal trade and distortions and inequity arising from multiple tariff zones (created by interstate sales tax and the tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption) are well known. These are only some of the problems in the tax side. On the expenditure side, steady decline in the allocation to the creation and maintenance of infrastructure has adversely affected its quality. Similarly, a significant increase in the input cost due to pay revision has adversely impacted the standards of social services.

Reforming State Finances: Challenges Ahead

Concerned over the perilous condition of their finances, some of the states have taken reform initiatives. A number of states have published white papers on their finances. Some of the states have initiated reforms in their tax and expenditure systems, have tried to quantify contingent liabilities, and have passed fiscal responsibility legislation to cap deficits and impose fiscal discipline. In some cases, reform initiatives have been taken at the instance of multilateral lending agencies as a condition for their lending. The central government also has initiated a fiscal reform program for the states and has linked a portion of its transfers to fiscal performance. However, the design of the program and its implementation leave much to be desired.

In a more open market economy, the state governments will have to provide a higher quality infrastructure.

In particular, their role in human development is critical. This change would require a number of reform initiatives. These initiatives include: restructuring the administrative machinery, improving the buoyancy of the tax system, better cost recovery on the services provided, downsizing of bureaucracy, and prioritizing expenditure allocation to provide quality infrastructure and the creation of a business-friendly environment.

One of the most important areas requiring urgent reform is the power sector. Reform is necessary not only to achieve fiscal consolidation but also to ensure the quality of the infrastructure. Restructuring other public enterprises will also prevent a drain on resources. Reforms in the tax systems are important to ensure that the resources for investment in infrastructure are generated in the least distortionary manner. The states took initiatives to substitute the prevailing cascading sales tax with the value-added tax (VAT) in April 2002. Transition to VAT was necessary not only to impart efficiency to the tax system but also to enhance revenue productivity. The reform journey for the achievement of fiscal consolidation, the improvement of efficiency and productivity, and the creation of a competitive environment will be long and arduous. Political will and administrative competence, along with an awareness of the need for reform among the general public, are the most important ingredients that will be needed in abundance to achieve the desired goals.

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See also **Economic Reforms and Center-State Relations; Public Expenditures**

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STATE FORMATION From the dawn of its recorded history, an enduring feature of India's state formation has been the struggle for power between its settled cultures and invading forces. The geographical configuration of the Indian subcontinent also played its part in determining the patterns of invasion and settlement, whether by the "land nomads" from Central Asia,

who entered northern India through the invasion corridor of the northwest, or by the “sea nomads” of Europe, who crossed the oceans and penetrated the Indian subcontinent from the coastal areas.

The earliest known population movement was by the Indo-Europeans (Aryans) from the steppe lands of Central Asia, who settled in the Indo-Gangetic Plain and established the North Indian linguistic and cultural tradition. However, the unique configuration of the Indian subcontinent also dictated that most invading forces from Central Asia encountered the barrier of the Hindu Kush Mountains before reaching the plains of northern India. The new waves of invasion that followed—by the Greeks, Kushans, Huns, Turkic and Mongol tribes—were launched as military expeditions that crossed the Indus to conquer the Punjab. Most of them lost their momentum by the time they reached the Gangetic Plain. Thus, while a few established ephemeral dynasties of considerable power, they were not able to change the mass of population or cultural core of the Gangetic region.

The other aspect of the territorial history of the Indian subcontinent is that of the geographical divide between continental and peninsular India. The political concept of India as an “empire state” was first developed during the time of the Mauryas (321–184 B.C.) and defined Bharat (India) as stretching from the northern Himalayas to Kanya Kumari (Cape Comorin) in the south. The ambition of all subsequent Indian rulers has been to achieve the territorial and political unification of the Indian subcontinent. Here again, geography has played a part; the Vindhya Mountains of the Deccan plateau have provided a formidable barrier to the imperial ambitions of the land-based powers of the north.

In the post-Mauryan period, the Indo-Gangetic Plain was subjected to extensive invasions, and periodic attempts at unification were interspersed with long periods of turmoil and conflict. The Gupta dynasty (4th century) was the last North Indian empire to rule from the Gangetic heartland. Their political collapse came in the wake of fresh invasions by Hun nomads in the fifth century.

Muslim rule followed much the same pattern of invasion and conquest, but the introduction of Islam as a new religion and culture proved a critical break in terms of its impact on state and society. The establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in A.D. 1206 changed the political landscape of northern India, the strategically placed capital of Delhi becoming the new seat of central power.

India’s next imperial unification, under the Great Mughals, from Babur to Akbar (A.D. 1526–1605). Akbar’s rule was renowned for its tolerance, and for his fostering of pluralism and a syncretism of Hindu-Muslim culture and civilization. The Mughal empire was also a warrior

state, administered by a new class of military bureaucratic elites (*mansabdars*). The Northwest and the Northeast of the Indo-Gangetic belt became Muslim majority areas, the former by invaders who settled there, the latter mostly by Sufi conversions, while the Gangetic Plain retained its Hindu majority. Southern India developed a maritime tradition and a seafaring economy, in contrast to the landlocked economy of the North. The Dravidian culture consolidated its position as the region’s major strand of South Indian civilization, and the post-Mughal repository of the Hindu cultural traditions of the North.

The “European epoch” of Indian history dawned as an age of maritime power, of western European authority based on the control of the seas. European expansion to South Asia by sea fundamentally altered the course of Indian history, presenting an entirely new set of challenges to the land-based powers of the North, the Mughals, Rajputs, Marathas, and Sikhs. Not only were the routes, methods of conquest, and patterns of settlement different, but the pressure from the sea had a relentlessness that invasions from land did not possess.

The British, who eventually marginalized all other European contenders (the French, the Dutch, and the Portuguese), penetrated inland from the sea through the two great river valleys: the South’s Cauvery valley, and the Ganges valley of the North. Surmounting the Deccan barrier, and in the nineteenth century finally bringing together both continental and peninsular India, the British imperial Raj transformed itself from a sea-based maritime power to a continental empire.

The British Raj emulated and incorporated many of the features of the previous rulers, especially the Mughals, retaining elements of their military and bureaucratic administration. The role of intermediaries (merchants, traders, and moneylenders) and scribal elites, land revenue systems, and mercantile imperatives were common to both empires. Both were warrior states, and the role of the army drawn from the so-called martial races, was crucial for both. The British, however, had to propagate a new theory of martial races after the Great Mutiny of 1857, when Punjab and the tribal Northwest, instead of Bengal, became the new recruiting ground. The induction of Jat Sikhs, Rajputs, Punjabis, and Pathans into the British army changed the sociopolitical history of the Northwest. It has had immense consequences for the successor state of Pakistan, which inherited the strategic “real estate” of the Northwest and the so-called martial races tradition associated with it.

The Unification of British India

The most significant achievement of British colonial rule was the strategic unification of the Indian subcontinent.

It constituted a significant break from the past, as the concept of strategic frontiers and boundaries was introduced to demarcate the sovereign limits of the British Empire. However, the demands of the greater British Empire added an extra dimension to imperial frontier making. The strategic and economic interests of imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia led to the “Great Game” in Central Asia between the two powers. The northwestern frontier became militarized, and Afghanistan emerged as a classic “buffer state.”

The colonial enterprise was by no means a unilateral exercise. Interaction as well as synthesis were integral to the encounter between India and Britain, whose ideologies and institutions had a profound impact on India. Ideas of nationalism and self-determination were crucial, giving an impetus to India’s nationalist movement. Britain’s industrial capitalism had its effect as well on the modernization and industrialization of the state. Railways were the great unifiers, both in the strategic and economic sense, helping to extend and consolidate British rule.

Decolonization was a critical juncture in the contemporary history of the Indian subcontinent. In the case of British India, the distinctiveness of the decolonization process lay in the dichotomy that developed between the secular Indian Nationalist Congress’s demand for independence and the Indian Muslim League’s demand for a Muslim homeland—Pakistan. In the stalemate that followed, the religious separatism of the minority Muslim community became the determinant factor in granting freedom from colonial rule.

In 1947 British power was “transferred” to the two dominions, India and Pakistan, the former as the primary successor state of British India, with Pakistan a secondary successor state. The price of independence was the partitioning of continental India on the basis of the communal majority principle of the “two nation” theory of the Muslim League, which asserted that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations.

Independence and Partition

British India’s partition was both a turning point and a traumatic event in the history of South Asia, as it left many conflicts unresolved and many questions unanswered. One question that has intrigued historians is why independence became conditional on partition. The British policy of creating separate electoral rolls for Hindus and Muslims, which inaugurated modern Indian political communalism in 1909, provides part of the answer. Another part of the answer lies in the genesis of the Pakistan movement and the communal cleavages that developed between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League over the issue of power sharing and

the principle of democratic rule. The notion of parity was an important consideration for the Muslim elite, as was also their concern that the electoral politics of “majoritarian” rule would translate in practice to a “Hindu Raj” in the guise of a “Congress Raj.”

One of the paradoxes of the Pakistan demand was that the impetus came not from the Muslim-majority provinces but from a small section of the Muslim elite from the Muslim-minority provinces of North India. North India’s Muslim elite were motivated by a complex mix of religious and economic reasons—not the least of which was their apprehension about loss of privilege, status, and economic power under a secular and democratic India. Partition triggered the exodus of these elite Muslims to the promised new state of Pakistan. The decline in status of this Indian Muslim diaspora, from the “creators” of Pakistan to that of refugees (*muhajirs*) in their chosen homeland, is one of the ironies of the Pakistan movement.

The answer to another question has also remained elusive: why did independence and partition give birth to only two nation states in the Indo-Gangetic region, not to many more? Fears of balkanization and the desire for strong centralized state(s) by India’s and Pakistan’s elites are said to have eliminated those options. The legal and political status of some six hundred autonomous princely states was for the most part resolved by integrating them into the two larger states, India and Pakistan—with the notable exception of the largest state, Jammu and Kashmir.

The application of the communal majority formula as the basis for creating a viable state produced the anomaly of a bifurcated Pakistan, separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Geographically, the communal majority formula could be applied only to those regions where Muslims were in a majority, but the provinces of the Northwest, where the Muslims were an absolute majority (North-West Frontier province, Baluchistan, and Sind), constituted only 10 percent of the total Indian Muslim population. Therefore, the two large provinces in which Muslims constituted a bare majority—Punjab (54 percent) and Bengal (57 percent)—were carved up to create the new state of Pakistan.

The legacy of partition. At the time of partition, very little attention was paid to the geopolitical consequences and human dimensions of physically dividing the Indo-Gangetic belt. Once the partition became a reality, however, these traumatic and tragic factors began to impinge on the process of nation building of both fragmented states. The human costs of the partition, the killings and population exchanges that accompanied it, and the refugees and diasporas it created, left a bitter legacy. In

effect, the partition produced a divided polity, a divided elite, a divided economy, and divided security.

The geographical aberration of the two wings of Pakistan being separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory created a logistical nightmare for the new state of Pakistan, which ultimately became untenable, both politically and economically, leading to the independence of East Pakistan in 1971, with the creation of Bangladesh, following the third Indo-Pak War. For the Indian state, the near detachment of its Northeast region, which is joined to the Indian mainland by a slender land corridor (the so-called chicken's neck), posed similar problems of marginalization for its inhabitants, which the state has not been able to overcome. The distancing of the northeastern region from the Indian heartland has added to the sense of alienation of the tribal Northeast states and to their depiction as India's "Far East."

The Making of India and Pakistan

In the immediate aftermath of partition, the imperatives of nation building focused on consolidating the state and constructing a central government. The task was relatively easier for the Indian state, which had inherited the mantle of the primary successor state to British India. Post-independent India had a political system and a bureaucratic structure that emphasized continuities with the past, and a national identity imparted to it by the long history of its nationalist movement. The Indian Congress central government in New Delhi stressed the civil base of its rule, underpinned by the ideology of secularism and parliamentary democracy. It soon federated along linguistic lines, seeking to safeguard the multiethnic character of its polity and to accommodate the wishes of the strongly vocal regional units that make up the Indian union. The fear of balkanization, however, made centralization a key requisite, and the Indian model of state making evolved as a federal union with centralized tendencies. In India, it was the political-bureaucratic elite that came to dominate the state structure, with the military kept out of the power equation. That situation has remained a constant in the Indian political system.

In the case of Pakistan, it was the military-bureaucratic nexus that became dominant, with Pakistan's political elite playing the subordinate role. Pakistan not only had to sustain the image of an "equal power" within the regional system, the external thrust of its foreign policy also pushed its elite toward building a military-bureaucratic state. That equation has also remained a constant in Pakistan's domestic and external politics, with its military entrenching itself within the body politic of the Pakistani state.

Regional rivals. The ideological divide created by the particular circumstances of their birth ensured that India

and Pakistan emerged as regional rivals with very different domestic, security, and foreign policy objectives. India's preeminence within the subcontinent was offset by the effort of the smaller Pakistani state to achieve military parity, if necessary, by "borrowing power" from "great and powerful" allies abroad (the United States, China, and several Middle Eastern states). The role of external actors has been vital in maintaining, and reinforcing, the so-called bipolar structure of the South Asian system. The early outbreak of conflict over partition's "unfinished business" of Kashmir soon became internationalized as a symbol of the India-Pakistan adversarial relationship. On this was superimposed the cold war dynamics of the superpower competition, with India developing a "special relationship" with the Soviet Union to counterbalance Pakistan's military alliances with Western powers.

Bangladesh. The dictates of geography, the unequal development of Pakistan's two wings, and elite conflict between the ruling West Pakistani elite and the East Bengali counterelite, all played their roles in sharpening the cleavage between the two wings of Pakistan, leading ultimately to the majority Bengali-state breaking free of Punjabi-Pathan-led Pakistan in 1971. From an international perspective, the birth of Bangladesh was the first instance of the successful culmination of a secessionist movement in the post-World War II period. The liberation of Bangladesh was the result of a conjunction of geography and Bengali linguistic and economic nationalism, supported by India's military intervention.

For South Asia, that second partitioning changed its geopolitical map, though not its political boundaries, since no territorial dispute was involved. The breaking up of Pakistan, however, did challenge the ideological basis of its two-nation theory, since Bengali linguistic nationalism took precedence over its Islamic identity.

Contemporary South Asia

The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 firmly established the centrality and dominance of India in South Asia. Not only is the Indian union now the largest state in South Asia, it is territorially and demographically larger than all the other six states combined. South Asia's geopolitical reality, moreover, is truly bilateral, since all its other states are contiguous to India, but none adjoin each other. The smaller states of South Asia are, therefore, sensitive to being overwhelmed by the enormous power of India.

On the other hand, the new geopolitical configuration has also exposed the vulnerability of the Indian state to its long, porous boundaries. The proliferation of armed secessionist conflicts in its border regions, and the ongoing "proxy war" between India and Pakistan over the

disputed state of Kashmir, is an indication that an Indian hegemony is far from an undisputed fact in South Asia. Equally telling is the policy of nuclearization followed by India and Pakistan since 1998. This policy may have enhanced India's great power status, but it has also enabled the weaker Pakistani state to achieve semiparity with the stronger Indian state. But it has certainly not resolved the security dilemma of a fractured subcontinent.

The strongest challenge to the secular identity and pluralist ethos of the Indian state has come from a plethora of ethno-nationalist and subnationalist demands, many with secessionist tendencies. The Sikhs of Punjab, the Nagas and Assamese in the Northeast region, and the Kashmiri Muslims in the state of Jammu and Kashmir have all tested the federal structure of the Indian union. The most serious threat yet to the secular fabric of the Indian state is the rise of transnational religious fundamentalism as a force in the region. The communal passions it has aroused has revived the "Muslim question" in India, and by extension, rekindled a wider debate about minority rights in South Asia.

Post-1971 Pakistan, although more viable as a territorial entity and more cohesive as a political unit, is still beset by internal contradictions, not least of which is the problem of identity among a composite people. The centralization policies of the ruling elite have come into conflict with the demands for provincial autonomy by ethnic Pashtuns, Sindis, and Baluchis. The most striking predicament is that of the *muhajirs*, who are yet to gain their own ethnic and regional identity in the "new" Pakistan. The subordination of Pakistan's domestic politics to its external relations has continued, and the periodic resort to military rule has become the most persistent feature of the Pakistani state.

Pakistan's strategic location in the Northwest and the state's policies of Islamization and an external orientation toward the wider Muslim world have also raised questions about its post-1971 identity: whether it sees itself as part of South Asia, Southwest Asia, or Central Asia. The marrying of Pakistan's Kashmir and Afghanistan policies in the 1990s, and Pakistan's continuing involvement in post-Soviet Afghanistan have kept that question alive.

Bangladesh has charted a zigzag course, reflecting two competing influences on its elites: secular parliamentary democracy and Islamic ideology. The most compelling factor of Bangladesh's security is its geography, as it is surrounded on three sides by India. Conversely, Bangladesh's location at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal and the strategic position it occupies between the Indian mainland and India's Northeast have released new dynamics in Indo-Bangladesh relations. The use of Bangladesh as a sanctuary by separatist movements in India's Northeast

has been an ongoing concern to New Delhi, as have boundary disputes arising from the indeterminate nature of their borders.

Boundary Conflicts

In contrast to the traditional natural frontiers that had developed through custom and usage, British India's colonial boundary making was the product of strategic and economic concerns, which led to the creation of an "outer frontier" that crystallized into the linear boundaries, the Durand Line in the Northwest and the McMahon Line in the Northeast. The partitioning of the subcontinent broke the strategic unity of that frontier, with Pakistan inheriting the northwestern frontier as its outer frontier, and India the northeastern Himalayan frontier. Partition also created a new set of boundaries, or "inner frontiers." Thus, apart from the logistics of maintaining their strategic frontiers, India and Pakistan have had to contend with the irredentist demands of tribal communities that were divided by the linear boundaries. The demand for Pakhtoonistan in the Northwest and the Naga demand for a homeland in the Northeast are but two examples of such transnational claims.

The outer frontier. Recent events have again reinforced the intrinsic importance of the outer frontier to the politics of the Indian subcontinent, with the reemergence of Afghanistan as a "gateway" state between South Asia, Southwest Asia, and Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. The "centrality" of Central Asia has started a new "Great Game" in the region, with its Northwest again being drawn into the calculations of great powers. For India, the destabilization of Afghanistan and Central Asia and the breaching of the Durand Line bring back memories of the Northwest as a corridor of invasion into the Indian heartland. For Pakistan, it represents opportunities to influence events in the wider Muslim world as the inheritor of the strategic "real estate" of the Northwest. The fault lines of religious fundamentalism and the nuclearization of India and Pakistan have further polarized the politics of the region. In that sense, the geopolitical patterns on the Indian subcontinent seem to have turned full circle, with the pressures again coming from the Northwest.

The inner frontier. As for the political borders that separate the modern South Asian system, what stands out most are the "unstable nation state boundaries" that are the legacies of the partition process. In recent years the changing nature of transborder conflicts has added a new dimension to the issue of boundary protection. The porous nature of the boundaries has produced the paradoxical situation of the larger Indian state fencing off its borders to stop armed incursions across the India-Pakistan border (which the Indian state characterizes as

cross-border terrorism), and illegal immigrations across the Indo-Bangladesh border (which is threatening to alter the demographic composition of the Northeast region).

Border fencing as the latest phase in boundary making has posed a different set of questions about the security dynamics of the South Asian system. The scourge of cross-border terrorism—including narco-terrorism, arms running, and trafficking in humans—is a manifestation of this phenomenon. The construction of artificial barriers by the Indian state, at enormous cost, has been likened to the modern equivalent of a “Roman Wall” or the Great Wall of China. It is also reminiscent of the ideological divide of the Berlin Wall. The South Asian system has yet to make the transition to a secure regional system, as state formation on the subcontinent still seems hostage to partition’s traumatic legacies.

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See also **Federalism and Center-State Relations; Pakistan and India**

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STATE-LEVEL PERFORMANCE SINCE REFORMS OF 1991

India is a federal country consisting of twenty-eight states, and the division of responsibilities between the central government and the state governments is set forth in the Constitution. The states vary greatly in the level of per capita income, incidence of poverty, population size, resource endowments, and fiscal capacity, and the promotion of regional balance and equity among states is an acknowledged objective of national development policy. The regionalization of politics in India since the 1980s has focused attention on the performance of Indian states to a much greater extent

than before, and the impact of the economic reforms since 1991 on their performance has also been a focus of attention.

Interstate Variations in Growth

While per capita growth in the economy as a whole accelerated in the period after the 1991 reforms, there is considerable variation in the experience of the individual states. Critics of the reforms sometimes present an exaggerated picture of the distributional impact of the reforms, arguing that only the richer states have benefited and that the poorer states have actually become poorer. In fact, none of the states has become poorer in the sense of experiencing negative growth in per capita income. On the contrary, all states have experienced a rise in per capita income, albeit at different rates. Nor is it the case that the richer states have benefited the most from the reforms. The two richest states at the start of the reforms were Punjab and Haryana, and both states actually decelerated in growth in the postreform period. The greatest acceleration in growth was experienced by two of the middle-income states, Maharashtra and Gujarat, while other middle-income states such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala also accelerated. Two of the poorer states, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, also did better than in the prereform period. However, several of the lower-income states that are also very populous (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, and Rajasthan) saw a deceleration in growth compared with the prereform period. This deceleration occurred at a time when the expectation was one of acceleration, and the fact that there was acceleration in many other states produced an understandable sense of not being helped by the reforms.

Various measures of inequality suggest that interstate inequality, that is, inequality due solely to differences in per capita incomes across states, ignoring intrastate inequality, increased in the postreform period. This is an interesting finding, since available measures of inequality for the country as a whole (which are based on the distribution of consumption) do not show a significant increase in inequality in the postreform period.

Explanations for Growth Variation

Growth outcomes are obviously the result of initial endowments, investment rates, and economic policies, which determine the productivity of investment. Since the economic reforms were designed to promote economic efficiency, and were also applied to the entire country rather than to selected regions as in China, one might expect that they would improve growth performance in every state, which should lead to an acceleration in all states. The fact that some states actually decelerated calls for an explanation.

One possible explanation lies in the weakening of one of the two mechanisms traditionally used for promoting regional balance in India. One of these mechanisms, which was not affected by the reforms, was transfers from the central government to the state governments. These transfers took the form of distribution of a share of central government tax revenues to the states, with the proportion to be transferred and its distribution among the states being determined every five years by the Finance Commission; and distribution of central assistance to state finance plans, with the amount of the transfer and the distribution among states being determined by the Planning Commission. In each case, the formula used for interstate distribution explicitly favored states with lower per capita incomes. The second mechanism used to promote regional balance in the prereform period, which was affected by the reforms, was the direction of investments toward the poorer states. This was achieved either by deliberately locating public sector projects in these states, or by using the industrial licensing mechanism to push private investments toward these states.

The scale of public sector investment relative to private sector investments declined as a consequence of the economic reforms, making this option less effective. It also became impossible to direct private investment to particular regions following the abolition of industrial licensing in 1991. Thereafter, the location of private investment was driven by competitive considerations, and these were bound to redistribute investment toward better endowed states with favorable infrastructure—states that already had a faster rate of growth.

More generally, liberalization has meant an increase in the role of the state government in determining the investment climate in each state, and the individual states have varied greatly in the way they have responded. To the extent that the low-income states have responded less or more slowly than other states to the new challenges, it is likely that investment resources have moved away from these states to those that are seen as more investor-friendly. Such a process of reallocation of investment across states could lead to an actual deceleration in growth in some states even if the “investment climate” and “productivity” indicators in these states are no worse in absolute terms than before. This is simply because the relative position of other states has improved, attracting investment toward them. It is not possible to test whether this has happened in a rigorous fashion because investment data are not available at the state level, but anecdotal evidence suggests that some such factor has been at work.

Human Development

The picture of state performance presented by the gross domestic product (GDP) growth numbers needs to be supplemented by considering performance in other

dimensions, especially human development indicators, and particularly the adult literacy rate and the infant mortality rate.

The performance regarding literacy suggests broad-based improvement in the postreform period. The nationwide adult literacy figure increased from around 52 percent in 1991 to about 65 percent in 2001, an increase of 13 percent in that decade, compared with an increase of only 9 percent in the decade from 1981 to 1991. The literacy rate has also risen substantially in most of the poorer states though the comparison with the 1980s presents a mixed picture. In Rajasthan there was an increase of 22 percent in the 1990s, compared with only about 14 percent in the 1980s. In Uttar Pradesh, the increase in the 1990s was just under 15 percent, marginally higher than in the 1980s. In Orissa, it was about 1 percent lower than the almost 15 percent increase in the 1980s. The least encouraging performance was in Bihar, which had an increase in the literacy rate of only 8.5 percent in the 1990s, which was actually lower than the increase of over 12 percent in the 1980s.

The infant mortality rate (IMR) is generally regarded as a robust indicator of the well-being and health status of the population, especially of the poorer sections. There were large differences in the IMR across states at the start of the reforms, with Kerala being the best performer with an IMR of 16, while Orissa was the worst with an IMR as high as 124. There is evidence of progress in almost all states in the postreform period, but in this dimension the rate of progress in the 1990s is much less than in the 1980s. The IMR for India as a whole declined from 110 in 1981 to 80 in 1991, but in the subsequent decade, the decline was much slower, reaching 66 in 2001. The picture for individual states shows considerable variation. Kerala was able to reduce the IMR from 16 to 11 over the decade, and many states (Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, Orissa) also showed a significant improvement. However, there was relatively little improvement or even a small deterioration in Bihar, Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan.

The Role of the States in the Postreform Period

One consequence of the economic reforms has been an increase in the role of the private sector, which in turn implies that the role of government must shift to delivering essential public services, such as health and education, as well as the creation of infrastructure and an environment of good governance, which would improve the investment climate and increase productivity. In all these areas, it is the state governments that have a major role. Health, education, the creation of rural infrastruc-

ture related to irrigation, watershed development, all roads except the national highways, and the supply of electric power are all within the domain of the states, and the administrative instruments for delivering these services are controlled by the state governments. The central government can only help fund programs in the areas that are implemented by state administrative structures.

Although substantial financial resources are being devoted to various types of development programs in these areas, especially education, health, and rural development, their effectiveness in achieving expected objectives is low. In education, for example, enrollment rates indicate that 93 percent of children in the relevant age groups are enrolled in primary schools, but a very large proportion drop out before completing primary school, and the quality of education provided is often inadequate. Similar problems exist in health and other sectors.

There is a growing consensus that public service delivery in India could be greatly improved by shifting from top-down systems of planning and managing programs toward greater involvement of local communities in the design of programs, with prioritization among different programs delegated to lower levels of government to reflect the priorities of the local communities, and also to ensure more active involvement of the local community in monitoring and accountability. One way of achieving this objective is to empower the elected local government institutions, the so-called *panchayati raj* institutions, which consist of an elected village council (*gram panchayat*) at the village level, the block *panchayat* at the next higher level, and the *zilla parishad* at the district level (the last two being composed largely of representatives from the lower-level bodies). In 1994 the Constitution was amended to establish a regular system of election to these institutions and to identify subjects that would be their responsibility. The system of electing representatives to these local bodies has been put in place, and their areas of responsibility have also been determined. However, some of the other steps needed, notably financial devolution of resources from the state to *panchayat* level, and the transfer of control over functionaries to the local level, has yet to be achieved. Some states—notably the southern states—have made greater progress than others, but a great deal more remains to be done in all parts of the country. Genuine empowerment of the *panchayati raj* institutions will make a major contribution to the effectiveness of service delivery programs in the states, and differences in this dimension of performance are likely to contribute to interstate variations in the future.

One of the most important determinants of economic growth in individual states will be the quality of the electric power supply, as this will affect not only industrial and commercial growth but also agricultural development, especially the diversification of agriculture. Reform of

the power sector is perhaps the most important unfinished reform in India, and the key to success lies in improvements in electricity distribution. At present, the state-run electricity distribution systems suffer from losses ranging from 35 to 40 percent in most states. This partly reflects technical losses in transmission, but mainly represents theft of electricity through underbilling, usually in connivance with the utility staff. Tariff structures are also uneconomical, with some categories of consumers (farmers and households) obtaining power at unrealistically low rates. The result is that the state utilities are financially unviable and unable to undertake the large investments needed to ensure an adequate supply of good-quality power. Reform of the power sector requires a gradual move toward rational user charges in which cross-subsidies are kept to a reasonable level and improvements are achieved in collection efficiency, either through improved management of the public sector system or through privatization. Thus far, only Orissa and Delhi have opted for privatization, and it is too early to pronounce whether the initiative is successful.

Progress in all these areas will depend upon how energetically state governments address these problems. As in other areas, performance will vary, but hopefully the diversity of experience will generate lessons on what works and what does not. A very hopeful development in the postreform period is the growth of awareness in the states that the state governments must work to create a favorable investment climate. Several nongovernmental bodies routinely engage in rating states regarding this issue, and the publicity given these ratings is generating healthy competition.

Montek S. Ahluwalia

See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; State Finances since 1952**

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STEP-WELLS OF INDIA Step-wells are wells with underground flights of stairs leading down to the level of the water. They were built in all parts of South Asia, but

in especially great numbers in the states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, in western India, which have a dry climate and sandy soil. Since it was also considered an act of religious merit to dedicate watering places in memory of the dead, thousands of step-wells, ponds, and tanks came to be built. In its fully developed form, a step-well consists of an ornate entrance gateway at ground level, an underground stepped passage punctuated by a series of pillared pavilions, and a well at the far end. There may even be a small reservoir to collect any surplus water flowing out of the well.

Forms

There are step-wells proper (those with a stepped corridor and a well at the far end), and there are others that should be more correctly described as stepped tanks, though sometimes such tanks were also combined with wells. The step-wells proper are laid along one long axis; the staircase usually starts at one end, and there is in most instances only a single entrance. A step-well may have more entrances, but this is the exception rather than the rule; also, the well at the far end may be rectangular or circular. The more evolved examples, however, are always circular.

In addition to the Hindu step-wells, there are others built by Muslim rulers after the thirteenth century. Their character and purpose, however, were altogether different; while the Hindu step-wells were religious undertakings as well as useful watering places for men and for agriculture, those built under Muslim rule were essentially for pleasure, as a retreat from the hot weather.

Many inscriptions record how step-wells were built as pious acts in memory of the dead. A stone slab from Mandasor of A.D. 532 commemorates the deceased relative of a nobleman, Daksha, employing the imagery of the myth of the descent of Gaṅgā (Ganges) from heaven to liberate the spirits of an ancient king's ancestors. Another, of A.D. 1042, from Vasantgarh in Rajasthan, records that a queen, Lahini, repaired the stairs of a step-well which were to provide a stepped ascent to heaven for her husband. The reference to the world of the departed is explicit in the imagery in the records of both Mandasor and Vasantgarh.

Structure

Step-wells involve both excavation and construction in the sandy soil. It took their builders a long time to overcome all the engineering problems, but in due course they created a remarkably efficient structural form. The earliest step-wells consisted of a short flight of steps down a pit whose sides were protected only by dressed stone, and the well at the end of the corridor was at right

angles to it, that is, the two parts of the step-well formed an L shape. This was decidedly unsatisfactory, since it lacked an impressive facade, and it also involved an awkward sharp turn for someone bearing pitchers of water on the head. By the end of the tenth century, however, the structural constraints had been understood and resolved. Then followed a long series of step-wells in which the architectural potential of their basic form was perfectly realized.

In a "complete" example, a *torana* (arch) built at the ground level stands at the head of the stepped corridor. At the first landing of the steps there is an open structure or pavilion whose top reaches the ground level. At the second landing, deeper down, another pillared pavilion is introduced, of two, or even three stories, its top again reaching the ground level, and likewise at every stage of the descent. As the depth of the trench increased with the increasing length of the corridor, it became necessary to stabilize the deep walls, which might have collapsed if kept vertical; therefore, terraces were introduced, corresponding to the height of the stories of the pavilions. Finally, in order to further strengthen the walls, a retaining structure of bricks came to be constructed behind the stone facade of the walls.

By far the largest number of step-wells is concentrated in the two western Indian states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, but such watering places were built all over the country. Step-wells dug by Hindu donors, and those by Muslims as well, are in Delhi (Gandhak ki Baoli, Rani ki Bain), in central India (Vidisha), and even in the southern states (Bagali in Karnataka).

The Ranki Vav Step-Well at Patan

By far the most ornate step-well is the seven-storied Ranki Vav, "the Queen's Step-well," at Patan, the capital of the Solankis from the tenth century. It was built by the widowed queen Udayamati in memory of her husband, Bhima I, in the second half of the eleventh century. Two hundred twenty feet (67 m) long, it is 60 feet (18 m) wide, and the well is 100 feet (30 m) deep.

The long stepped corridor commences at ground level and, interrupted at four increasingly deeper levels, leads down to where the well water stayed in the driest period of the year. There are multistoried pillared pavilions on the landings, the number of the stories progressively increasing as the depth increases, to reach the ground level above. In addition to the main steps, supplementary staircases are introduced for quick access to different parts of the step-well. Deep niches and projecting panels, with hundreds of nearly life-size sculptures of gods, goddesses, and *apsarās* (semidivine female beings, nymphs) decorate the walls. The inner surface of the well is also

lined with the same kind of images. The Hindu pantheon is present in force, with Shiva, Vishnu and his incarnations, the Seven Mothers, and other divinities. But images of Pārvatī performing the harsh penance by standing “surrounded by five fires” predominate. For just as the goddess performed austerities in order to win Shiva as a husband, Udayamati by building her well was performing a religious act in order to be reunited with her departed husband in her next life.

Other Important Step-Wells

There is an early seventh-century rock-cut step-well at Mandor, in Rajasthan, that has an L shape. Though quite bare, it is important for its “architecture” because it reproduces the form of the earliest structural step-wells in living rock, before the builders had discovered how to build a corridor and a well on one axis. A more ornate example, at Chhoti Khatu, also in Rajasthan, of the ninth century, also has an L shape, and its statuary of river goddesses and *nāgas*, or anthropomorphized snakes, clearly evoke its aquatic character.

The tradition that culminated in the Ranki Vav in the eleventh century continued in the later centuries as well, but by then Muslim power had been established in Gujarat, with far-reaching changes. First, hardly any human figures were used in their decorative elements. And, more importantly, the step-wells built by the sultans functioned not as religious structures but as pleasure retreats to escape the heat of summer.

The two step-wells at Ahmedabad and Adalaj, only a few miles apart, were both built at the end of the fifteenth century. Bai Harir, a rich eunuch at the court of Sultan Mahmud Begda, built the first in a suburb of Ahmedabad. It is over 240 feet (73 m) long. A raised pavilion, supported on twelve columns, stands at the head of the long corridor in the east, and by means of graded stairs reaches first an octagonal well, then a circular well at the western end. Balconies with low parapets look down into the octagonal well. In addition to the main stairs, there are two spiral staircases on the sides that provide access to the four stories.

The consort of a local chief built the step-well at Adalaj, called Ruda Bai’s Step-Well after her name, about 12 miles (19 km) north of Ahmedabad. It is planned on a south-north axis. In addition to the main approach at the southern end, there are two more stairs at right angles to it, on the two sides, all three meeting at the first landing, in a sort of foyer with elegant balconies and richly crafted columns.

Sacred Tanks

The reservoirs described above are proper step-wells, but the sacred tank, or *kunḍa*, is a monument of

comparable character. These are deep pools of water, mostly square or rectangular, which are reached through steps built on three or all four sides, sometimes with a shrine in the middle. Their perfect geometry, the miniature shrines built at intervals along the stairs, and the well-proportioned supplementary stairs create a pleasing appearance.

Such sacred tanks may be of modest size, as is the seventh-century *pushkarin* (lotus pool) at Mahakuta in Karnataka. Or they may be planned on a more impressive scale, such as those at Osian (eighth century), Abhaneri (ninth century), and Baroli (tenth century), all in Rajasthan; and at Modhera in Gujarat (early eleventh century). The Osian and Abhaneri examples have steps on three sides, while a well placed on the fourth side feeds the tank; that at Modhera has long flights of steps on all four sides. The tank at Baroli is built over a natural spring that flows on a rocky bed; on an elevated natural rock in the center, a holy man in the tenth century built a shrine to Shiva, characterizing the god as Jhareshvara, “lord of the Stream.”

Kirit Mankodi

See also **Hinduism (Dharma)**

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STOCK EXCHANGE MARKETS India established the first stock exchange in Asia in Bombay in 1875. Given the large geographical size of the country and the typical floor-based trading system prevalent until 1994, a total of twenty-two stock exchanges were eventually created to cater to the needs of investors in every part of India. Three basic models were adopted: associations of individuals, limited liability companies (without profit sharing), and companies limited by guarantees. Regardless of the form of organization, all were recognized by the tax authorities as nonprofit entities, or entities in which their members had no claim to operating surpluses. Although the generated surpluses were not explicitly distributed, exchanges provided various services to their members invariably below cost, with the subsidy element varying from exchange to exchange.

Exchanges enjoyed subsidies in many forms. The respective state governments allotted land for constructing the buildings for exchange operations and brokers’ offices on nominal terms. Until recently, the government of India had adopted the concept of regional stock



Bombay Stock Exchange. Site of today's Bombay Stock Exchange, which was the first stock exchange in Asia. In the era of reform after the financial reverses of the early 1990s, the BSE has followed the lead of India's NSE in providing fully modernized systems and services. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM.

exchanges (RSEs) defining the operating area of each exchange. A public company was required to list its stock on the RSE nearest its registered office.

A listed company has to pay listing fees, both initial and annual and such fees were linked to the size of its issued capital. For most RSEs listing fees were the main source of income. Each exchange enjoyed monopoly rights in securities trading in the city of its location. Investors had no mechanism to protect themselves from collusive behavior by the stock brokers. This monopoly also led to the creation of fragmented markets that were shallow, inefficient, and cost ineffective. Brokers generally dealt with investors through a multilayered chain of intermediaries increasing cost of transaction.

Since exchanges prohibited corporate membership, all brokerage entities were either proprietary or partnership concerns. Although the liability of a brokerage firm was

unlimited, this did not mean much to investors, as almost all the brokerage firms were poorly capitalized. Brokerage firms distributed most of the profits at the end of each accounting year, transferring them to their family members. Thus, in the event of a firm's insolvency, investors were the main losers.

Reforms since 1991

Capital market reforms process launched in 1992 was in response to a major financial scam that shook the banking system and the capital markets. Some prominent stock brokers defrauded several Indian banks (both government-owned and private) as well as prominent foreign banks. They diverted bank funds to their personal accounts for artificially increasing the prices of their favorite stocks. This became possible due to severe deficiencies in trading and settlement systems for sovereign bonds and bonds issued by public sector units. The resultant boom in equity markets attracted thousands of gullible investors who hoped to make quick gains. The bubble burst after some investigative journalists exposed the frauds perpetrated by unscrupulous stockbrokers. When the banks demanded funds back from the brokers, the market collapsed. The banks lost an estimated U.S.\$2 billion in this scam. For the Indian government, which had just launched a series of reforms in the securities markets, the crisis was a major embarrassment.

The government promptly introduced a number of measures with far reaching consequences in the securities markets. A significant component of this reform package was the need for setting up a new Indian stock exchange, which would be operated in accord with globally accepted best practices, both in trading and settlement systems. The National Stock Exchange (NSE) was thus born. It was initially conceived to be a model exchange to exert pressure on the other twenty-two stock exchanges, inducing them to improve their functioning styles. Within six years, its impact on Indian capital markets was so overwhelming that all the other exchanges, except for Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), became virtually defunct. As a survival strategy, ten regional exchanges set up subsidiary companies that became members of NSE and BSE. The systems and procedures introduced by the NSE have been accepted by the market regulator, the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and were made applicable to the other exchanges, all of which look to the NSE for further initiatives in market reforms.

The Design of the National Stock Exchange

The NSE was set up as a limited liability pro-profit company by twenty-one leading financial institutions in 1993. Its executive board includes senior bankers, lawyers, and financial executives. To avoid any possible

conflict of interests, the day-to-day management of the exchange is handled by professionals, who do not have proprietary trading positions in the stock market.

India's NSE is patterned on the U.S. Nasdaq model, extending its trading facilities to all parts of the country, and providing trading facilities only in large stocks, like the New York Stock Exchange. It has adopted an anonymous order-driven trading system, with orders originating from all its members being matched automatically by the computer as per the price time priority trading algorithm. Thus there is no human intervention in the deal-matching process. India's NSE is the first exchange in the world to set up a captive satellite communications network, connecting its members spread across a vast geographical area in the country to its centralized trading and settlement hub. All members enjoy a response time of less than 1.5 seconds; orders originating from any part of the country are matched, and trade confirmed on the respective trading terminals, in this short time span. This highly transparent system gives investors instant information about traded prices and quantities as well as unmatched bids and offers in all stocks on a real time basis. To start with, NSE enforced on its trading members (stock brokers) certain minimum stringent disclosure norms that provided a clean audit trail of a trade at the investor level. The trading members were forced to provide automatically generated trade and order confirmation notes to all investors. This unique system of disclosure became the standard regulatory requirement subsequently.

India's NSE also started guaranteeing the settlement of members' net obligations, at a time when guaranteed settlement was unheard of in India, by establishing a subsidiary National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited, which developed unique software to monitor each member's net exposure in each stock as well as members' aggregate exposure in all stocks. Each member was required to trade within the overall exposure limits, based on the concept of initial margin adopted globally by the futures exchanges. The moment a member exceeds the exposure level, all its trading terminals are automatically disconnected from the trading system. The trading terminals are reactivated only when additional funds are brought in. If a member fails to honor its settlement obligations, member margins are usually adequate to close out positions. The BSE took more than a year to adopt its own settlement guarantee program, but later developed its own exposure monitoring mechanism based on the national model.

Impact on Other Exchanges

The impact of the major investor-friendly trading and settlement systems was so decisive that the NSE emerged as India's largest exchange before it completed its first

year in November 1995. Business losses then forced the BSE to launch computerized trading as well. Later, all RSEs computerized their operations. But since their response was slow and halting, they lost much of their business to the large exchanges.

Options and Futures

In June 2000, India's two major exchanges, the NSE and the BSE, offered futures and options products on their main indexes, with one-, two-, and three-month expiration contracts. Options on indexes on these exchanges began in June 2001, options on select stocks in July 2001, and futures on select stocks in November 2001. As of December 2004, stock options and futures were available on fifty-three highly liquid stocks. Based on certain objective criteria, the regulator approves inclusion of stocks in the list of equities eligible for futures and options trading. Stock futures and options have proved to be very popular among investors.

As of December 2004, average trading turnover in futures and options (both in stocks and the indices) was twice the turnover in the cash market for equities. The Indian futures and options market has become vibrant; from April to December 2004, the daily average of contracts traded on the NSE was 288,616. The average contract size was, however, small. India is among the few countries to have introduced stock futures, as they are feared to be highly risky. Unless stringent regulations and tight surveillance are in place, stock futures may be misused to manipulate individual stock prices. In India, stock futures account for over 60 percent of trading in the entire futures segment. The daily turnover in stock futures in December 2004 was about 155 percent of the NSE's turnover in the cash market for all traded equities. The Indian experience proves that even relatively backward capital markets can quickly and successfully absorb globally accepted trading and settlement systems.

India's new trading system has encouraged price competition and has helped in the significant decline in bid/offer spreads. As a result, transaction costs are estimated to have declined by a factor of eight to ten after the NSE came to dominate the Indian market.

R. H. Patil

See also **Capital Market; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI)**

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There are three web sites that provide useful information on the Indian securities markets, including the functioning of the Indian stock exchanges: the Securities Exchange Board of India at <<http://www.sebi.gov.in/>>; the National Stock Exchange at <<http://www.nseindia.com/>>; and the

Bombay Stock Exchange at <<http://www.bseindia.com>>. The following reports and publications are particularly useful: Securities Exchange Board of India, *Annual Report*, 1996–1997 to 2002–2003; National Stock Exchange of India’s annual publication *Indian Securities Market: A Review*, 1999 to 2004; National Stock Exchange of India’s annual publication *Fact Book*, 1998 to 2004; Reserve Bank of India, *Report on Currency and Finance*, 1999–2000.

STRATEGIC THOUGHT Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), modern Europe’s great strategist, considered the purpose of war to be the imposition of the victor’s will over the enemy (strategy), and the destruction of the adversary’s main force in decisive battle (tactics). Clausewitz also postulated that strategy was neither an art nor a science but an act of human intercourse. Furthermore, he emphasized that successful war was waged by the trinitarian structure of the state: its government, its people, and its armed forces. India, as a dependency of the rising British Empire, had a government that was alien and an army that was selectively recruited. Accordingly, neither was representative of the people of India. Earlier, the Mughals had understood the strategic significance of India’s mountain passes in the northwest, but were oblivious to sea power. Even the great Mughal emperor Akbar remained unmindful of the Portuguese embargo of his main seaport, Surat. Though the fatal weakening of the Mughals followed the invasion by the Turcoman adventurer, Nadir Shah (1739), the coup de grâce was rendered by a British mercantile company that took control of the Indian sea trade. By its conquest of India, Britain became a great power, and London used India’s central position and resources to control “any point either of Asia or Africa,” as asserted by the Viceroy Lord Curzon.

The *Artha Shāstra*

Ancient India’s greatest strategist, Kautilya (also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta, c. 320 B.C.), prime minister to Emperor Chandragupta Maurya, wrote his great work on statecraft, the *Artha Shāstra*, which focused on the duties of a king and military affairs. Kautilya considered the *dharma* (sacred duty) of a king to expand the resources of his state by employing varying combinations of *sam* (amity or treaty), *dam* (rewards), *dand* (retribution), and *bhed* (discord). However, if war became necessary, Kautilya considered employing the following seven principles and three “controls” before hostilities were undertaken: an efficient system of governance; capable royal councilors and other officials (*amatyas*); firm control over one’s own territory (*janapada*); a fortified city (*durg*) within the king’s domain; a full war-chest (*kosba*); an adequate army (*danda*); and allies, either equals (*mitra* or *sandhi*) or stronger ones (*samasraj*). The three “controls” were equally timeless: to examine the morale and motivation of the opposing

leaders; to calculate the material resources, numerical strength, and level of training of the two states; and to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the two kings’ advisers, generals, ministers, and diplomats.

As his overall strategy, Kautilya based *vijigishu* (victory) on the concept of the *mandala* (circle), whereby one’s neighboring state was always a real or potential enemy, and the state next to one’s immediate neighbor was a natural ally. Among other related topics, the *Artha Shāstra* covered battlefield dispositions, tactics, peace treaties (a weak enemy should be crushed, whereas the stronger one should be negotiated with), and methods of combat, ranging from coercive diplomacy to clandestine warfare.

Kautilya used legends and mythology to buttress his analysis. For instance, he quoted Brihaspati, the legendary sage of sages, as saying that “three to one” superiority over the enemy was necessary for victory. This still widely quoted maxim (without attribution to either Brihaspati or Kautilya) was to make caution the strategic imperative in India, since such overwhelming military superiority was rarely achieved. Kautilya also prescribed responsibilities of the *navadhyaksha* (superintendent of ships) and analyzed sea trade but paid little attention to maritime strategy. Perhaps it was his North Indian outlook and the influence of another Indian epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which Lord Ram invades the island of Sri Lanka by building a bridge, not ships, to cross the sea. Kautilya also limited his wars of conquest to the Indian subcontinent. Hence, over the next millennium, his towering but flawed work created a defensive and introspective Indian military mindset. Muslim invasions and conquests from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries consigned Kautilya to obscurity, only to be resurrected after 1907, when his *Artha Shāstra* was first published in English.

Independent India

Forty years after the rediscovery of Kautilya’s *Artha Shāstra*, India became independent. However, freedom was accompanied by South Asia’s partition and the destruction of the geographical unity visualized by Kautilya. The leadership of newly independent India had little experience in governance, foreign policy, or strategic planning, and was wary of the military, as postcolonial armies seized power in most newly independent states. Moreover, India’s new leaders considered British India’s military, which had remained aloof during the struggle for freedom, as little more than mercenaries. The organization and mindset of the army (by far the largest of the defense services) was based on static, not operational, considerations. Hence, a few high-ranking Indian officers had some administrative experience, but little knowledge of strategy. Furthermore, India’s first prime

minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was determined to avoid entangling foreign alliances and believed that Indian security was enhanced by reduced militarization of the planet. These perspectives were in consonance with the Gandhian strategies of nonviolence and economic self-sufficiency. The latter stifled modernization of the military, as the country's industrial base was small and imports were restricted. Consequently, senior officers, busy husbanding scarce resources, had little time for prospective planning or post-colonial strategy. The Gandhian precept of nonviolence had its own ramifications on the military. For instance, the navy was discouraged from acquiring submarines, since they were perceived as offensive warships and therefore unsuitable for a country advocating disarmament and nonviolence. The electorate, too, was little concerned about defense issues. Accordingly, few members of Parliament wished to serve on the forty-four-member Standing Committee on Defence. Even forty years after independence, fewer than half of the committee's members attended its meetings; apart from the chairman, only seven others were present at all its sessions. Not unexpectedly, strategic thought evolved fitfully, yet incrementally under the influence of the following major factors.

History. The assimilation of non-Hindu cultures and religions is integral to the modern Indian identity. Hence, symbols of the Indian Republic are of Ashokan Buddhist origin, the link-language of the country remained English, and the Muslim Mughals epitomized Indian cuisine and many forms of the arts and architecture. History also reminded India that the country's lag in military science had led to repeated defeats in the past. Therefore, independent India made a conscious effort to keep abreast of modern technology. The sudden emergence of India as a powerhouse in the software industry may be an unintended but fortunate consequence of this commitment.

Geography. India's continental geographical contours were drawn 2,400 years ago by Kautilya. Indians were largely isolationist, for they considered their land secure behind the mountain chains stretching along their eastern, northern, and western borders. The ocean toward the south was not understood in military terms but only as a means of trade, travel, and proselytization. Neither the limited Chinese foray through the Himalayas in the seventh century nor the successive raids from the northwest altered the Indian perception of living in a safe, insular, and prosperous continental nation, though given to fissiparous tendencies that led to piecemeal conquests of the country. Hence, national consolidation of the country was a major security issue for New Delhi, whereas the legacy of insularity contributed to India's attempts to minimize the presence of outside powers in the six-country subcontinent of South Asia.

Culture. Though concerned about divisive tendencies, New Delhi considered the distinctive Indian culture compelling enough to keep the country united, despite the centrifugal effects of well-defined regional subcultures. Furthermore, the Hindu concepts of *dharmā*, karma, and reincarnation were integral to this belief. *Dharma*, as Kautilya instructed, was sacred law, requiring all members of society to perform their various duties. Karma enjoined that individual action and performance was the basis for future incarnations. The concept of reincarnation gave Indians a cyclical rather than a linear perspective on time. Hence, as the universe itself goes through the phases of birth, growth, decay, and rebirth, so must individual countries and living beings. Therefore, in a sense, Kautilya's India was basically eternal, going through cycles from birth to rebirth. Accordingly, Indians appear to possess a capacity for timeless endurance and tolerance.

Colonialism. During the colonial period, strategic responsibility for the defense of India shifted to London. Hence, Indians had little say or understanding of those issues. The net result was material poverty and numerous other losses, including confidence and management skills.

Partition. To Indians, the geographical unity of the country was torn by the creation of Pakistan, a hostile neighbor, across a newly created border that was devoid of natural barriers. Consequently, India was preoccupied by the defense of this new frontier and paid scant attention to its ill-defined border with China. In addition, New Delhi was concerned about the further instigation of Indian Muslims by fundamentalists. Accordingly, internal security became another issue. The conflict over Kashmir became India's major security and diplomatic challenge. Three Indo-Pakistan Wars were fought over Kashmir. Furthermore, the Pakistani-supported, though indigenous, insurgency (since 1987) in Indian Kashmir remains an ongoing conundrum for New Delhi.

Nuclear weapons. Despite the abhorrent nature of nuclear weapons, there was clear recognition in New Delhi of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression or coercion by other countries, especially Pakistan and China. In addition, nuclear weapons came to symbolize political maturity, ultimate sovereignty, and technological prowess. Foreign military interventions in Yugoslavia and in the Gulf have added further relevance to the importance of nuclear deterrence.

Strategically, some of these factors led India to focus on the subcontinent and on its immediate neighbors. The neighbors were dealt with as minor "enemies," whereas the transneighbors, especially the Kingdom of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, were treated as natural allies. The United States became an incipient opponent, an outsider intruding into the subcontinent as

Pakistan's partner in collective security arrangements and with its own military base on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

India had, perhaps intuitively, followed the *mandala* theory as visualized by Kautilya, antagonizing its neighbors, accommodating the strong (China on Tibet), and overwhelming the weak (Nepal and Bhutan). Buffer states, a European concept, were overlooked. Ironically, it was the loss of the largest buffer state, Tibet, that compelled India to move from vague strategic concepts to threat assessment and defense planning, especially after the reverses suffered in the border war with China in 1962. However, it took another thirty years before the factors mentioned above led India to form a cohesive national security perspective. The stimuli were many: the collapse of the Soviet Union with the attendant rise of the United States as an interventionist sole superpower; the global rise in Islamic fundamentalism; the ongoing Sino-Pakistani collaboration, especially in nuclear weapons and missile technology; cross-border terrorism as part of an insurgency in Indian Kashmir; and a compelling study by an American think-tank, the Rand Corporation. Rand's main inference was that India had no long-range strategic perspectives, as evidenced by the country's reactive approach to international affairs and the absence of the military's participation in policy making. The study had its shortcomings, the most obvious being its failure to recognize the sense of mission and commitment of the scientific community to the successful development of nuclear devices, chemical weapons, and missile systems. The unusual group of scientist-strategists received such high public acclaim that one of them, Dr. K. Santhanam, was appointed director of the Ministry of Defence's leading think tank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis in New Delhi. Another eminent scientist, Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, was elected president of India in 2002.

Consensus on the country's strategic imperatives was reached by the new millennium during the several years of the rightist coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The process was invigorated by nuclear tests, accelerated missile development, and military ties with the United States and Israel. Under these circumstances, bureaucrats, scientists, politicians, and perhaps military officers set the strategic vision for the country. Hence, the contours of New Delhi's nuclear policy were already in the public domain before a draft nuclear doctrine, framed by eminent strategic thinkers, declared that India would maintain a minimal credible and survivable deterrence, based on a triad of delivery systems (missiles, aircraft, and submarines) with adequate command and control facilities. The draft also affirmed a no-first-use policy and a commitment not to threaten or use atomic weapons against a nonnuclear country.

The army, bearing nuclear weapons in mind, posited the operational strategy of a limited "hyperwar." The limits were defined as time, geographical area, force levels, and war objectives. Hyperwar meant the use of intense firepower, long-range sensors, precision-guided munitions, and the elimination of the front and the rear of battle. Such a battle could be fought continuously, regardless of day and night, and through all weather. The air force preempted the others by publishing its Air Power Doctrine in 1997. The doctrine gave equal priority to both offensive and defensive operations, and accepted the possibility of reduction in force levels if compensated by induction of high technology equipment and acquisition of force-multipliers like airborne warning and control systems, multirole war planes, and midair refueling capabilities. By implication, it distanced itself from the subsidiary role as the tactical air arm of the army. Its doctrine acquired greater relevance, as it was the only service with the means to deliver nuclear weapons. Hence, it automatically became the preeminent strategic force in the country. The smallest service, the navy, potentially has the largest strategic role through sea-denial, sea-control, power projection, management of the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone of 1.08 million square miles (2.8 million sq. km.), and as a part of the triad of nuclear deterrence. Like other navies, it acquired land-attack missile capabilities. However, its sea control and blue-water potential remains limited. The pursuit of a nuclear submarine arm as a part of the triad of nuclear deterrence, raises concerns among some admirals, as they fear that nuclear submarines would divert funds from the surface ships necessary to fulfill the navy's other tactical and strategic ambitions. Like the rest of India, the armed forces are engaging with the world. Indo-U.S. cooperation ranges from joint exercises to Indian political support for various U.S. ballistic missile defense programs.

In general, India's wider strategic goals remain constrained by an inadequate indigenous military-industrial complex, the constricted strategy of managing domestic conflicts and insurgencies by attrition and co-option, and sudden outbursts of ethnic and communal violence in the country. Furthermore, for forty years, Indians were Pakistan-centric and reactive in the acquisition of weapons and military systems. Submarines, supersonic fighters, and reconnaissance and support battalions were Pakistani initiatives with India following suit. In addition, American strategists continue to find that serving senior Indian military officers still had little exposure to the outside world and insufficient training in such strategic subjects as geopolitics, military history, and patterns of organization.

Nevertheless, the 1990s brought economic liberalization and an unfolding of talents, self-confidence, and

more pragmatic international relationships. India was no longer the hungry country of the 1943 Bengal famine trying to keep Nehru's "tryst with destiny," by espousing global peace, prosperity, freedom, and social justice. Instead, newly confident of its ancient civilization, and a vibrant, stable democracy, India sought new paradigms: self-reliance rather than self-sufficiency, and participative growth instead of a command economy. As India has no territorial ambitions, the pattern of past politico-military engagements is likely to persist. Hence, India will militarily intervene only at the request of a friendly government and withdraw its forces as soon as possible, as in Sri Lanka (1971, 1987), Bangladesh (1971), and Maldives (1988). At present, for the uniformed services and security-related establishments, the new imperatives are greater integration of command, control, modernization with triservice compatibility of acquisitions, and intelligence sharing. Still, fourteen different ministries and departments in New Delhi exercise overlapping authority over the country's maritime affairs. Howsoever slowly, a holistic approach toward strategic affairs appears to be evolving in New Delhi as India develops tangible political, economic, and military ties with countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East (including Israel), Africa, and the United States. Hence, India's strategic perspective appears to have completed yet another cycle of reincarnation, from Kautilyan back to Curzonian concerns.

Rajesh Kadian

See also **Armed Forces; Artha Shāstra; Civil-Military Relations; Pakistan and India; Wars, Modern**

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STUPAS. *See* **Buddhism in Ancient India.**

SUBBALAKSHMI AMMAL, R. S. (1886–1969), educator and activist for women's education. R. S. Subbalakshmi Ammal, a pioneer in the education of upper-caste widows in colonial Madras presidency, was born in July 1886 into a Brahman family. Her students affectionately called her Sahōodarii, or Sister Subbalakshmi. In an era when upper caste girls' schooling was haphazard, her father, a college professor, supervised her education, supported by her mother and a widowed aunt. In accordance with upper caste custom in that era, Subbalakshmi was married before puberty, but the early death of her bridegroom left her a virgin widow at the age of eleven. Widows were often shunned as inauspicious blights, languishing in perpetual celibacy, clothed in drab mourning, their heads tonsured. In most cases, they remained illiterate and were dependent on family charity. However, Subbalakshmi's family defied tradition by educating her, moving to Madras (Chennai) to facilitate her attendance at the Presidency Convent Higher Secondary School. She won gold medals for academic achievement, then joined Madras Presidency College, where she majored in mathematics and botany. She graduated in 1912, the first Hindu widow in Madras to receive a bachelor's degree.

In 1910 Subbalakshmi had started an informal home to educate young widows whose grieving parents had approached her for this purpose. She also simultaneously taught at her former high school for a minimum wage, respecting the nuns who had been her own teachers, but disliking their attempts to convert her. She remained a devout Hindu, committed to the ideals of Upanishadic humanism. Though critical of misogynist traditions, she avoided alienating Hindu traditionalists whose widowed daughters she wished to educate. This pragmatism enabled her to succeed in promoting the education of widows. Her success attracted the attention of Christina Lynch, the progressive inspector of Government Girls' Schools. The two women soon planned to start a government teachers' training institute for widows. On 1 July 1912, their Sārādā Widows' Ashram opened, named for the Hindu goddess of learning.

In an age when prepuberty marriages were the norm, Subbalakshmi became a beacon for women whose education had been curtailed by early marriage. In January 1912 she started her Sārādā Ladies Union to promote intellectual inquiry among women. As a colonial government employee, Subbalakshmi could not openly join the nationalist Women's Indian Association (WIA), although she worked with feminist members like Muthulakshmi Reddi in an unofficial capacity.

In 1919 Subbalakshmi opened the Sārādā Vidyālaya Higher Secondary School for destitute unmarried girls. In 1921 she addressed the Indian Women's Conference

delegates on the need for establishing more teachers' training institutes for women, and on the inclusion of occupational programs in the curriculum. She was respected by conservatives and reformers, colonials and nationalists, men and women. In 1947 Sārādā Ladies' Union was finally affiliated with the WIA. After independence, Subbalakshmi served as a member of the Madras Legislative Council. Denied children of her own, she lavished her maternal love and wisdom upon countless students, nieces, and nephews to whom she became an icon.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Women's Education; Women's Indian Association**

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SUBBULAKSHMI, M. S. (1916–2004), Indian vocalist. Madurai Shanmugavadivu Subbulakshmi, a charismatic singer from South India, was venerated as an outstanding exponent of Karnātak vocal music. "M. S.," as she was popularly known to her millions of fans around the world, was considered the "embodiment of music." Her music appealed to both the uninitiated and the learned with its sophistication and profundity.

Born into a family of professional musicians on 16 September 1916, Subbulakshmi was a child prodigy. Her mother, Shanmugavadivu, was a competent vina player, and Subbulakshmi took her initial lessons on the vina from her mother. Shrinivas Iyengar and M. Subraminiya Iyer taught her vocal music, as did Dakshinamurthy Pillai and veteran Karnātak singer Semangudi Srinivas Iyer.

Total concentration on the alignment of microtones, caressing diction, and purity of *swarasthanams*, or note

positions, are some of the hallmarks of Subbulakshmi's music. Her dignified stage presence, enchanting voice, versatility, and humility enhanced her career, as did her linguistic ability. She did not indulge in showmanship. Devotion was her main driving force, and her vocal communication tended to transcend words. She could simultaneously cater to the most exacting demands of an orthodox Mylapur Madras audience and also touch the heartstrings of a mammoth gathering at the Harvallbh Mela (a musical soiree held annually in the precincts of a temple in Julunder).

Subbulakshmi also acted in films in the 1940s; her portrayal of the poet-saint Mīrabai catapulted her to fame throughout India, and even Mahatma Gandhi became her fan. Thanks to her husband Sadashivam, who was a close associate of Chakravarty Rajagopalachari, Subbulakshmi was exposed to the ideals of the national movement. She enjoyed a rapport with leaders like Sarojini Naidu, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Indira Gandhi. Nehru called her "Queen of Song" and Naidu surrendered her poetic title, "The Nightingale," to her. Since Karnātak music has its origins in the ancient temples, in whose precincts the ecstatic Hindu saints sang their songs to the gods, a devout singer like Subbulakshmi built her musical interpretation on devotion to God.

The peak of her long career was her performance before the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, at the invitation of Secretary General U Thant. On this occasion she urged all nations to give up aggression and cultivate friendship. The government of India decorated her with Bharat Ratna, its highest civilian honor. Subbulakshmi died on 11 December 2004.

Amarendra Dhaneshwar

See also **Music: Karnātak**

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SUBSIDIES IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET Subsidies, like taxes, have been considered legitimate tools of government intervention. Before the 1990s, Indian government intervention over a wide spectrum of private decisions about production and consumption brought extensive use of tax subsidies, designed to achieve given objectives of its socialist approach to economic development. These subsidies took various forms, including:

standard consumer subsidies, for example food subsidies; interest or credit subsidies on priority sector lending by public sector banks; tax subsidies or tax “expenditures”; free public supply of certain services, like primary education and some health services; procurement subsidies for food grains and some other agricultural products; and regulatory subsidies arising from administered prices pegged below market prices, as for iron and steel.

Rationale

All subsidies add to public expenditure and must be financed from general revenues. In a balanced budget framework, this requires an equivalent rise in taxes or other sources of income whenever subsidies are given. Under normal circumstances, subsidies must be justified in specific benefits, and comparison of these benefits with the costs, both private and social, associated with such revenues is implied.

The basic economic rationale for subsidies is to bridge the gap between private returns and social returns of goods and services that have large externalities. Examples would include inoculation against communicable diseases, elementary education, social forestry and water conservation. In India, however, government subsidization has gone well beyond this primary reason, and widespread subsidies have been justified on several grounds, including self-sufficiency in production, supporting infant industries, poverty alleviation, or sometimes for distributional reasons (e.g., food subsidies).

The main problem with the subsidy regime in India is that much of it is nontransparent because subsidies are given in the form of unrecovered costs. As such, they are not really mandated by the empowered legislature, nor are their costs fully appreciated in general. The explicit subsidies are large but form only a fraction of the total amount of subsidies. Large implicit and explicit subsidies have been responsible to a considerable extent for the high fiscal deficits now observed at all levels of government in India. This has resulted in absorption of non-government savings to finance the deficits, leading to high interest rates, lower private investment, and consequent adverse effects on growth. Subsidies also change relative prices, and the resultant price distortions have led to resource misallocation.

Estimates

In India, official figures of subsidies either relate to only explicit subsidies or those including a small part of the implicit ones. After more comprehensive estimates of subsidies were unofficially made and widely accepted, official acceptance also followed. An official white paper on the subject that used the wider concept and its methodology for estimation of subsidies has tried to take

TABLE 1

| Goods and services | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Merit goods and services | Nonmerit goods and services |
| Elementary education | Education, sports, arts and culture (other than elementary education) |
| Public health | Medical and family welfare |
| Sewerage and sanitation | Water supply and sanitation |
| Welfare of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other “Backward” castes | Housing |
| Labor | Urban development |
| Social welfare | Social security and welfare |
| Nutrition | Other social services |
| Soil and water conservation | Agricultural and allied activities |
| Environmental forestry and wildlife | Cooperation |
| Agricultural research and education | Rural development |
| Flood control and drainage | Special area programs |
| Roads and bridges | Irrigation |
| Space research | Power |
| Oceanographic research | Industries |
| Other scientific research | Transport |
| Ecology and environment | Civil supplies |
| Meteorology | Other economic services |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

into account the justification for various kinds of subsidies by classifying subsidized services into merit and non-merit goods based on subjective judgments regarding the degree of externalities involved (see Table 1). There are several difficult problems encountered in measuring this concept on the basis of available information. The stock of accumulated capital is given in nominal terms at heterogeneous prices that vitiate the computation of depreciation. The life of the assets concerned is also not uniform, and therefore the rates of economic depreciation. There is also the problem of change in value of some of the assets, particularly land, which cannot be taken into account, but which are extremely important for understanding the opportunity costs involved.

Another important problem relates to the issue of efficiency costs as opposed to actual costs, and the conceptual need to eliminate the excess of actual over efficiency costs from the estimate of subsidies. This is an intractable problem that has not yet been tackled. There is also the problem of lags between investment and the generation of service flow, and hence the need to abstract from the associated capital costs during this lag, but the informational requirements for this are not readily available.

Table 2 presents the four discrete estimates of aggregate budgetary subsidies, all of which put the total at around 12 percent of the gross domestic produce (GDP) or more. About one-third of these constitute the share of the central government, the rest being provided at the state level. The state governments provide the bulk of the subsidies, mostly in the areas of education, medical and public health, agriculture and allied services, energy,

TABLE 2

Comprehensive estimates of all India budget subsidies: Estimates for selected years

(Rs. Crore)

| Study | Year | Estimated subsidies | GDP at market prices | Combined revenue receipts | Combined fiscal deficit | Subsidy as percentage of | | |
|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | GDP | Revenue receipts | Fiscal deficit |
| Mundle-Rao (1991) | 1987–1988 | 42,324 | 355,417 | 66,838 | 32,182 | 11.91 | 63.32 | 131.51 |
| Tiwari (1996) | 1992–1993 | 95,373 | 747,387 | 135,422 | 50,726 | 12.76 | 70.43 | 188.02 |
| NIPFP (1997) | 1994–1995 | 136,843 | 1,009,906 | 178,012 | 70,062 | 13.55 | 76.87 | 195.32 |
| NIPFP (2003) | 1998–1999 | 235,752 | 1,740,935 | 274,769 | 155,760 | 13.54 | 85.80 | 151.36 |

Note: One crore = ten million rupees

SOURCE: Compiled from Mundle, Sudipto, and M. Govinda Rao, "The Volume and Composition of Government Subsidies in India," *Economic and Political Weekly* (4 May 1991), pp. 1157–1172; Tiwari, A.C., *Volume and Composition of Subsidies in the Government: 1992–1993*, New Delhi: ICRIER, 1996; Srivastava, D. K., et al., *Government Subsidies in India*, New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), 1997; Srivastava, D. K., C. Bhujanga Rao, Pinaki Chakraborty, and T. S. Rangamannar, *Budgetary Subsidies in India*, New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), 2003; *Indian Public Finance Statistics* (various issues), and *National Accounts Statistics* (various issues).

TABLE 3

Explicit subsidies at the central level

| Year | Amount (in Rs. Crore) | As percentage of GDP |
|-----------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1971–1972 | 140 | 0.286 |
| 1980–1981 | 2,028 | 1.411 |
| 1985–1986 | 4,796 | 1.725 |
| 1990–1991 | 12,158 | 2.138 |
| 1995–1996 | 12,666 | 1.066 |
| 2000–2001 | 26,838 | 1.275 |
| 2001–2002 | 31,207 | 1.359 |

SOURCE: Compiled from Srivastava, D. K., C. Bhujanga Rao, Pinaki Chakraborty, and T. S. Rangamannar, *Budgetary Subsidies in India*, New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 2003.

irrigation, and transport. At the central level, about a third of the total subsidies are explicit, the rest given through low or nonrecovery costs of public services. In fact, the overwhelming bulk of explicit subsidies are at the central level. Aggregate estimates of subsidies rose as a ratio of revenue receipts, but fell as a ratio of fiscal deficits. The implication is that subsidies are being financed less by current income of the government, and more by borrowed resources that push up the fiscal deficit, which creates problems of sustainability.

Table 3 shows the growth of explicit subsidies given by the central government, and the clear deceleration in growth during the 1990s. The deceleration would have been much larger had the trends suddenly not reversed direction in the second half of the 1990s, possibly caused by the increase in current costs of service provision due to upward wage revisions.

Assessment

The targeting of subsidies leaves much to be desired, due to design faults as well as implementation problems. Food subsidies, through the public distribution system, are good examples. Most input-based subsidies (like fertilizer or power subsidies) are ill-designed, so that they are not properly targeted and are often regressive. Subsidies at the intermediate stage of production always carry the risk of getting dispersed to all consumers simply in proportion to their consumption.

In the long-term perspective, unnecessary subsidies, coupled with persistent deficits in the public sectors, can actually have the opposite effect of that intended. Provision of many basic services by the government is now facing this paradox, since large subsidies divorce price and output decisions and breed indifference to cost recovery. With growing pressure of population increase and no built-in controls on costs, implicit subsidies keep rising until they hit a budget constraint, and the subsequent adjustments affect both quality and quantity. Poor quality confers an inferior status on such services.

Reforms

A reform that is gradually gaining ground is that of re-establishing the link between price and supply of services, by allowing some autonomy to service units in user charges and allowing use of the proceeds at the same unit for improving the quality of the services concerned. Another reform that is becoming popular concerns collection of charges for irrigation. Water user associations are being set up in some states to take care of distribution of water and collection of appropriate user charges. But proper pricing for piped water supply, particularly in

urban areas, still awaits effective reform. Similarly, problems of major power theft raise the issue of who exactly benefits from the huge subsidies in this area.

Several products actually receive unmerited subsidies, as does jute, long subsidized despite a clear worldwide trend of lower demand. This distorts cropping patterns and prevents market orientation of agriculture.

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SULTANATE OF DELHI. See **History and Historiography.**

SULTANATE PAINTING The term "Sultanate painting" should refer to manuscript illustrations or murals commissioned by Muslim patrons in the regions of India ruled by sultans before the founding of the imperial Mughal atelier in 1556. Though the so-called Sultanate period began in 1206, manuscript painting cannot be traced back much earlier than about 1450. Thus, most Sultanate painting dates between about 1450 and 1550, and the centers of production seem to be primarily Mandu in central India and Jaunpur in eastern India, with some work being done in the Delhi region and in Gujarat in western India. The succession of Muslim sultans ruling from Delhi in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were more concerned with public building projects, and many of them were opposed to figural painting for religious reasons. Several examples of the Qur'an with calligraphy and ornamentation distinctive to India have survived from this period, but they include no figural illumination. Several passages in literature refer to the existence of wall paintings during the time of the early Delhi sultanates, but little survives.

In 1398 Timur, the Turkic warrior from Central Asia (known in the West as Tamerlane), sacked Delhi and defeated the ruling sultan, Firuz Shah Tughluq. The ensuing decentralization of political power led to changes in the history of Indian art. Provincial governors in outlying regions gained greater independence and became self-proclaimed sultans. Over the course of the fifteenth century, these provincial sultans strove to take on the trappings of kingship, following the Persian model. These trappings included the building of fortifications, palaces, mosques, schools for the study of the Qur'an (*madrasa*), and libraries. The libraries were for the use of scholars of the court and for the personal enjoyment of the patrons. They required books, and the rulers and wealthy Muslims on the eastern fringes of the Islamic world began to commission illustrated versions of the classics of Persian literature.

As a rule the works commissioned during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were epics and lyric romances. Most popular were the *Shah Nāma*, a history of the kings of the Islamic world; the *Hamza Nāma*, which relates the fantastic adventures of Hamza, uncle of the prophet Muhammad; and the *Khamsa* of Nizāmī, or its retelling by the Indian author Amir Khusrau Dihlavī, which contains five distinct books of poetry, including the *Sikandar Nāma*, which recounts the exploits of Alexander the Great. The *Chandāyana* (also called the *Laur Chandā*) was evidently the most popular among the lyric romances; five fully illustrated editions survive in more or less fragmentary condition, painted in different styles.

Styles of Sultanate Painting

The illustrated manuscripts made for Muslim patrons between 1450 and 1550 vary considerably in style, as there was no unifying force in the production of these works. Some of the early works were heavily reliant on Turkman prototypes, namely paintings made in Shiraz in eastern Iran, or in Herat in Central Asia. It appears that the painters themselves were typically Indian, trained in the stylized and highly conservative indigenous styles exemplified by illuminations of devotional manuscripts commissioned especially by Jains in western India, but also by Buddhists in eastern India, and by Hindus. These Indian artists were apparently charged with adopting the Turkman style, and different artists produced works with greater or lesser fidelity to their foreign sources. Most of the surviving examples of fifteenth-century Sultanate painting are significant more for historical than aesthetic reasons. Among the more visually engaging works is a *Shah Nāma* of about 1450, now dispersed primarily among museum and private collections in Europe. The manuscript is arranged in a vertical format with horizontal

illustrations and four columns of Persian text. The paintings are closely related to the indigenous western or central Indian styles of paintings in non-Muslim sacred texts of the time.

A remarkable manuscript called the *Ni'mat Nāma*, painted in Mandu in central India around 1500, is a book of recipes, which shows the sultan surrounded by attendants preparing foods, medicines, and aphrodisiacs. The painters of the pictures were Indian, but they drew heavily from Shirazi models, with much use of thick green swards, pastel background colors, and provincial Persian figural types. Indian elements are especially noticeable in the renditions of the Indian ladies, who were part of his extensive, multicultural harem.

By the mid-sixteenth century a harmonious fusion of Persian and Indian styles was achieved, seen especially in the paintings illustrating the adventures of the lovers Chandā and Laurak in the *Chandāyana* of about 1540. The text was composed by a Muslim poet in India, written in the northeastern dialect of Hindi known as Avadhi, in Persian script, and the paintings were painted by a Hindu artist. Artists working in this unique hybrid style, characterized by bright pastel colors, repeated ground patterns, delicate line drawing, and exquisite arabesques, were particularly influential in the early decades of the imperial Mughal atelier.

Sonya Quintanilla

See also **Miniatures**

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
SULTANATE-PERIOD ARCHITECTURE OF SOUTH ASIA Scholars frequently refer to the years 1192–1526 as the Delhi Sultanate period, defined by the establishment and proliferation of a series of Islamic states in South Asia. After the numerous Afghan Ghaznavid raids into the Indus Valley in the late tenth to twelfth centuries, the Afghan Ghurids and their Mamluk deputies, also from Afghanistan, founded the first enduring

Islamic dynasty in northern India, spanning 1192–1290. Thereafter, several other Islamic dynasties with varying territorial holdings appeared in Delhi and in other regions of India. Finally, in 1526, the Timurid prince Babur was victorious at the first Battle of Panipat, launching the great Mughal dynasty with pan-Indic ambitions. During the Sultanate period, the Islamic dynastic patronage of the many building styles of South Asia—firmly rooted in regionally based traditions—produced a plethora of Islamic architecture.

Muslim communities had settled in Sind before the late twelfth-century rise of a lasting Islamic power. Architectural remains from Banbhore in Sind (c. 711), Gwalior in central India (8th century), and Bhadresvar in Kachh, Gujarat (c. 1160) indicate that Muslim groups settled at these sites probably for mercantile purposes. The Gwalior mihrab and Bhadresvar mosques particularly demonstrate that these communities employed local craftsmen for their religious buildings. Indeed, the high quality of those remains indicate that the craftsmen had worked on Islamic architecture before, thereby pushing the presence of Muslims in central India and Kachh to earlier than the eighth and mid-twelfth centuries, respectively.

The Ghurid annexation of northern India underpinned innovations in the building tradition indigenous to the plains by introducing new architectural practices and forms from the Iranian ambit, the latter of which were executed according to local methods. Delhi's well-known Qutb Mosque (Quwwat al-Islam, 1192–1193) exhibits extensive recycling of materials from earlier buildings, a practice comparatively little documented in Hindu and Buddhist foundations of the first millennium A.D. These older fragments were integrated with others contemporaneous with the complex's foundation, meaning that Ghurid deputies also patronized local building traditions. Continuity in style and method is underscored by the arched facades, elements imported from eastern Iran-Afghanistan but constructed using corbelled arches, and iconography from the pan-Indic water cosmology. Ghurid foundations west of the Indus, such as the Ribat of Al-ibn Karmakh, also evince continuity and innovation: While the fortified grave is a conflation of forms imported from Islamized lands, the iconography shows a direct relationship to the region's earlier temples.

The architecture of the Delhi-based powers succeeding the Ghurids and Mamluks emphasized a military aesthetic of heavy proportions, battered walls, and overall austerity. Dynastic Khalji (1290–1320) and Tughluq (1320–1401) architectural patronage, seen in the Ala-i Darwaza (1311) and the Hauz Khass Complex (1388), show that brick was the preferred building material and arcuation the favored articulation of interiors. This architectural style originated in these dynasties' homeland of



Qutb Minar Complex, Delhi. With its first stones laid in 1199, the red sandstone tower of Qutb Minar. Built by Qutb-ud-din Aibak, the founder and first sultan of the Islamic city of Delhi, who applied his own name (*qutb* meaning “axis”) to the tower to mark it as a new symbol of Islamic sovereignty. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Multan, where Sufi mausoleums like the Tomb of Shah Rukn-i Din Rukn-i ‘Alam (c. 1300) were abundant. The Lodi sultans (1451–1526) of Delhi continued in a similar aesthetic vein (Tomb of Sikandar Lodi), though these buildings were more decorative, with niches puncturing their surfaces.

Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, two sultanates neighbored Delhi, the Sharqis (1394–1483) holding sway at Jaunpur to the east, and the Ghuris (1391–1436) and eventually the Khaljis (1436–1531) at Mandu to the west. Both sultanates dedicated much of their financial and labor resources to architectural patronage, studding their urban centers with several large mosque, tomb, and *madrassa* complexes. The influence of the Delhi-based architectural style seemed to radiate east and west: Jaunpur’s Atala Mosque (1408) raised what had originally been a military aesthetic to a monumental scale. Mandu’s Congregational Mosque (1454), with its heavy proportions, evokes the earlier Delhi buildings, though their characteristic austerity was relieved here by means of blue-glazed tile decoration applied on selected surfaces.

The architecture of the Delhi-based dynasties, derived from traditions originating west of the Indus, was adopted and further developed by the nearby sultanates. However, the architectures of many other Muslim states in South Asia, which were more removed from Delhi than Jaunpur and Mandu, stylistically and technically ensued from, and even rejuvenated, their respective indigenous building practices.

Various sultanates appropriated pockets of territories in the Deccan, and some of them maintained control of their holdings for over three centuries (1347–1686) until Mughal conquest. Indeed, the flourishing of South India’s Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar until 1565 reminds us that the “Sultanate period” is something of a misnomer, since the dynasties of this powerful state were not Muslims but Brahmanical Hindus. Architectural patronage throughout the Deccan can be characterized by the application of old building principles to new purposes, often resulting in unprecedented spatial solutions. The Bahmanids’ Mosque at Gulbarga (latter half of the 14th century) presents a case in point: The covered prayer area and open courtyard of the archetypal mosque was

covered with corbelled domes. The arched facade, known since the late twelfth century, was here transferred to the exterior to create monumental entrances. Ibrahim Adil-shahi's Tomb at Bijapur (c. 1626) relied heavily on indigenous architectural and iconographic traditions, including South Indian column orders and ornament.

Architectural patronage in the Bengal (1339–1576) and Gujarat (1411–1573) sultanates emerged from and rejuvenated those regions' local building practices. Bengal had within its borders a well-entrenched tradition of brick construction, including the use of vousoir arches to span short distances. Moreover, the local craftsmen excelled at terra-cotta and molded brick surface decoration. Thus, Gaur's Qadm-i Rasul Mosque of about 1525 is decorated with terra-cotta plaques as well as tilework, and the arch here rose to the challenge of spanning considerably larger interior spaces than before.

The religious architecture of Gujarat was primarily of trabeate construction in stone, with exteriors profusely decorated with stone sculpture. Both of these practices were productively adapted to Islamic buildings, as seen at Ahmedabad's Congregational Mosque of 1424. The monumental entrance facade shows that, rather than the teeming exteriors of the region's medieval temples, local stone-carving methods were applied toward the creation of a surface well balanced in its proportions of ornament and austerity. The interior demonstrates that trabeation did not produce only low, dark interiors, but could also be successfully employed to create lofty spaces with natural light. The introduction of Islamic ritual and social demands, then, were beneficial for the local styles of building.

Alka Patel

See also **Babur; Islam**

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SURYA. *See* **Vedic Aryan India.**

SWADESHI. *See* **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

SWARAJ. *See* **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**




TABLA Tabla (Arabic), a pair of kettle drums with “loaded” drumheads played with the fingers, are the most important rhythmic accompaniment for North Indian classical, religious, popular, and folk music. They are probably a combination of a Central or Western Asian

kettledrum tradition (played in pairs with sticks) and South Asian drums such as the *mrdangam* (played with the fingers, tuned, and with rice paste applied to the head), although the *dbolak* tradition (a barrel-shaped drum) may also have contributed. Documentation of the



Zakir Hussain Playing the Tabla. World-renowned tabla virtuoso Zakir Hussain (left) performing in New Delhi, 1988. After the eighteenth century, the instrument slowly became the primary drum for both the classical and popular music of northern India. NEAL PRESTON.

origins of the tabla (or at least drums appearing to be tabla) does not appear until the eighteenth century in North India.

The higher-pitched right-hand drum (*dāyan* or, more simply, *tablā*) has a hollowed wooden shell. The most important feature of the goatskin heads is the weighted center, a circular patch of a specially applied and modified rice paste. The drummer usually tunes an overtone of this drumhead to the tonic pitch of the music. The drummer obtains this overtone (a result of the weighted center) by damping the head's fundamental with the ring finger of the right hand while striking the edges of the head with his or her index finger.

The lower-pitched left-hand drum (*bāyan* or *duggī*) is usually a metal vessel, although some musicians still play clay drums. This drum too has a weighted head, although the pitching of this drum is often less specific than the *dāyan*, and the drummer does not manipulate the overtones. The patch on this head has the function of helping to focus the sound and pitch so that the drummer has more control over the relative pitch of the drumhead. By pressing the heel of the left hand into the drumhead while striking the drum, the drummer can raise (or alternatively lower) the pitch of the drum.

Drummers learn and remember drum patterns through a system of mnemonic syllables (*bols*) representing drum strokes: dental sounds represent right-hand strokes, guttural sounds represent left-hand strokes, and aspirated sounds represent simultaneous strokes on both the left and right drumheads.

When the drummer solos, he or she uses a number of different forms. For example, a *kāyā* (Persian-Hindustani, “rule”; Urdu, *qā'idā*) is a composition that shows the shape of the *tal* and *theka* and serves as the basis for a number of other subcompositions and extemporizations. These include both the *dobrā* (Persian-Hindustani, “two-fold,” “compound,” or “couplet”), a variation of a rhythmic musical idea (such as a *kāyā*) in which sections of the original theme repeat, and the *paltā* (Hindustani, “turn” or “exchange”), a variation (often a *dobrā*) of a rhythmic musical idea manipulating individual strokes or groups of strokes.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music; Tāla**

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TAGORE, RABINDRANATH (1861–1941), renowned Bengali poet. Author, activist, artist, choreographer, dramatist, educator, musician, and philosopher, Rabindranath Tagore was primarily a poet. He was called a “universal man,” which he certainly was. His roots, both cultural and creative, were set deeply in his beloved Bengal. His talents blossomed from the dusty and wet plains of Bengal in over a thousand poems, two and a half thousand songs, a sizable number of short stories, novels, and discursive essays on education, history, literature, rural reconstruction, politics, philosophy, and science. He became a painter rather late in his life, when he turned seventy. In ten years, he produced some three thousand paintings.

Tagore was born in the Jorasanko district of Kolkata (Calcutta) on 7 May 1861. He was the youngest child of Debendranath Tagore (1817–1905) and Sarada Devi (1826–1875). Originally from Jessore, now in Bangladesh, the Tagore (Thakur in Bengali) family belonged to a Brahman subcaste known as Pirali. Orthodox Brahmans refused to have any social contact with the Tagores and other Piralis due to their closeness to Muslim rulers. The family moved to Kolkata around the time the city was founded, in the 1690s. The Tagores prospered working for the East India Company. Rabindranath's grandfather, Dwarkanath Tagore (1794–1846), known as “the Prince,” built the family fortune with his great industrial enterprises, which included banking, insurance, agency houses, mining, shipping, and real estate. A contemporary of Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) and a close associate in the reform movement, Dwarkanath was arguably India's first modern and global entrepreneur. His industrial enterprises collapsed soon after he passed away, but the extensive landed estates he had built up in East Bengal continued to comfortably support the extended family in the next generation.

Debendranath Tagore's large family lived in a commodious mansion in Jorasanko. All of his children distinguished themselves in some way or another. Dwijendranath Tagore (1840–1926) was a poet and philosopher, Satyendranath Tagore (1842–1923) was the first Indian to join the Indian Civil Service, Jyotirindranath Tagore (1849–1925) was a playwright and translator, and Swarnakumari Devi (1855–1925) was India's first woman novelist.

As a child, Rabindranath had trouble studying in school. He disliked the set curriculum, the strict discipline, and the restrictive atmosphere of the four schools he attended until he was thirteen. He was withdrawn from the St. Xavier's School in 1874. Thereafter he received home schooling from his brother Jyotirindranath and his wife Kadambari Devi. Both of them exercised


great influence on Rabindranath's literary pursuits in his adolescence and early adult life.

Tagore started to publish verse, narrative poetry, short fiction, and translations from 1876 onward in the family's literary journal *Bharati*. He also started to act on the family stage. He appeared, for example, in the title role of Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, adapted to a Bengali farce by his brother Jyotirindranath. The following year, he traveled to London with his brother Satyendranath. He enrolled at the University College, London, to read English literature. His frankly explicit "letters" sent from London alarmed his elders, concerned about his youthful waywardness. He received urgent summons to return home. Upon reaching Kolkata, he began to publish in earnest. His opera *Valmiki Pratibha* (The genius of Valmiki), modeled after the European operas he saw in London, impressed Kolkata's literary elites, especially those engaged in experimenting with Western literary genres and music. Tagore scored the music for the opera and cast himself in the title role. He recorded his first major poetic inspiration in a passionate work that he titled "The Awakening of the Waterfall." A plethora of new works followed, including a series of devotional songs in the tradition of the medieval Mithila Vaishnava poet Vidyapati. He composed these songs in the company of Kadambari Devi, his talented sister-in-law.

Tagore had an arranged marriage in 1883 with Mrinalini Devi. The next year, Kadambari Devi committed suicide, apparently due to her unrequited love for Rabindranath. The tragedy shattered Tagore and arguably created the emotional impetus for his novella *Nashtanir* (The broken nest), which Satyajit Ray adapted for his film *Charulata* (1964). By 1890, when Tagore revisited England, he was considered a top literary talent in Bengal by no less than Bankim Chandra Chatterji.

Tagore spent the next decade (1890–1900) supervising the family's extensive landed estates in what is now Bangladesh. The experience brought him in close and intimate contact with Bengal's countryside and its people. He wrote scores of short stories showing the dark side of Bengal's village life while celebrating in exquisite verse the beauty and bounty of the land. The first decade of the twentieth century saw the emergence of two diametrically opposed profiles of Tagore: the first was that of a dedicated patriot and political activist, and the second that of a deeply mystical poet searching for unity and oneness in the complexity and diversity of the universe.

Tagore's political involvement began in 1886, when he composed and sang at the inauguration of the Indian



Portrait of Rabindranath Tagore. The master of countless intellectual and artistic pursuits, Tagore lifted Indian culture—and even more significant, the Indian psyche—to a new sphere of revitalization. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

National Congress. The next year, he participated in the public protest against the blatantly discriminatory policies of Lord Cross, the secretary of state for India. One sees Tagore's fully formed political personality and activism in the wake of Lord Curzon's decision in 1905 to partition the province of Bengal in two halves, roughly corresponding to the Hindu and Muslim populations. The *swadeshi* (self-rule) movement (1905–1911) was the first major "militant" agitation against colonial rule. During the first phase, Tagore led the protestors in the streets of Kolkata, singing patriotic songs he had composed for the movement. He gave music to Bankim Chatterji's famous hymn to the motherland, *Bande Mataram*. The hymn soon became the battle cry of the antipartition patriots as well as the name of a fiery journal edited by Aurobindo Ghose (later Sri Aurobindo). Terror and violence marked the extremist challenge against the Raj in Bengal. Unable to accept the narrow nationalism and its destructive divisiveness, Tagore withdrew himself from the movement. He was quickly condemned and criticized; some called him a "lackey" of the British. A decade

later, in 1915, Tagore published *Ghare Baire* (The home and the world), a major novel (also later adapted to film by Satyajit Ray) in which he articulated his theses on nationalism.

This period of intense public activism was followed by private withdrawal, which coincided with great personal tragedies in Tagore's life. His wife Mrinalini passed away in 1902, his daughter Renuka died in 1903, his father Debendranath died in 1905, and in 1907 his youngest son Samindranath died of cholera. It appears that Tagore attempted to negotiate the crises in a series of profoundly moving poems, also songs, uniting humanity to nature and nature to humanity. His own elegant yet simple prose translation of *Gitanjali* took the English literary circles by storm in 1912. Among Tagore's admirers in England were Mez Sinclair, Evelyn Underhill, Ezra Pound, Bertrand Russell, and most importantly, W. B. Yeats, the Irish poet. "These prose translations from Rabindranath Tagore have stirred my blood as nothing has for years," Yeats wrote in his introduction to *Gitanjali* (p. ix). In 1912 and 1913 Tagore was in the United States, lecturing at the University of Chicago, University of Illinois at Urbana, and Harvard University. Soon after his return to India, Tagore received the news that he had been awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.

Yeats lamented that even though the poetry of Tagore stirred sublime emotions in him, he knew nothing about "his life, and of the movements of thought that have made them possible." At once unique to Bengal and universal, Tagore's work was the product of the Anglo-Bengali, East-West encounters of the nineteenth century. The colonial world that Tagore inhabited, and the asymmetrical power relations among the colonizers and the colonized, prompted him to seek new and novel pathways to express his autonomy and creativity.

From 1913 to 1941, one can locate this dialectical process in three areas of Tagore's life. The first was the project of building a utopian community in Santiniketan, 100 miles (160 km) outside Kolkata in the saffron-colored soil of southern Bengal. In 1863 his father Debendranath had bought the land, built a guest house, and named it Santiniketan (Abode of Peace). A prayer hall was built in 1891. In 1901 Rabindranath established an academic institution to provide an "overall development of the students amidst close contact with nature . . . classes were to be held in open air under the shades of the trees." In 1918 Tagore transformed the institution into Visva Bharati (World University). Although the atmosphere and environment reminded one of the intentional communities of the Upanishadic age of the pre-Christian

era, Visva Bharati was purportedly a twentieth-century academy. Tagore invited scholars and students from the East and the West to occupy an academic and creative space that was, by design and intent, outside the baneful influences of colonialism, industrialism, and nationalism. To raise funds for Visva Bharati and to speak about its mission, he traveled the globe: to China and Japan (1924), South America (1925), Europe and Egypt (1926), Southeast Asia (1927), and Canada (1929). He delivered the Hibbert Lectures at Oxford in 1930, which were published as *Religion of Man*.

Tagore attempted to provide a practical and material foundation to his vision of the World University. At the adjacent Sriniketan, he established the Center for Rural Reconstruction in 1922. Its first director was Leonard K. Elmhirt, an English agricultural expert. Experimental research activities accompanied agronomy and rural development. Chemical fertilizers and modern medical facilities were introduced. The focus at Sriniketan was, and still is, on vocational education: leather craft, wood craft, clay craft, lacquer work, embroidery, bookbinding, carpet weaving, and block carving and printing. Along with the Art School (Kala Bhavan) and the Music School (Sangit Bhavana), the Santiniketan-Sriniketan complex combined the practice of the traditional arts with contemporary and modern elements.

The second project that preoccupied Tagore during this period concerned his scrupulous spurning of forms of colonial knowledge, and his staunch anti-imperialist and antinationalist positions. He rejected, for example, "academic histories" that are narrowly focused on political and public policies of the state. In numerous poems, plays, and novels, he attempted to capture what Ranajit Guha has called the "historicality" of everyday life.

Tagore surrendered his knighthood in an angry protest against the Amritsar Massacre of 1919. Although he disagreed with Mahatma Gandhi about some aspects of the nationalist movement, his harshest critique was directed to the West, sundered as it was by the Holocaust and World War II. In his last address and testament to the world before he passed on in 1941, he stated, "Perhaps the new dawn will come from this horizon, from the East where the sun rises."

The third area of Tagore's involvement was his continued creative effort. He remained magnificently innovative and profusely productive to his last day. He started experimenting with *verse libre* in 1933; he invented a new play form combining music, mime, and dance. He took up painting at seventy, and the three thousand paintings he completed are considered among the best of modern Indian art.

William Radice, arguably the best translator of Tagore in English, divides Tagore's life and work in a series of paired oppositions borrowed from *Isba Upanishad*: he moves, he moves not; he is far, he is near; he is within all, and he is outside all. Tagore moved away from the orthodox Brahmo church founded by his father; he also moved away from the Hindu revivalism and nationalism. Tagore was quite a radical in more ways than one, but he remained tradition-bound in some key areas. For example, he married a ten-year-old semiliterate from his own caste; he followed the family custom by giving his two daughters in marriage when they were only twelve and fourteen. He can seem utterly foreign to non-Bengali readers. Although there are some good translations, most of Tagore's poetry is inadequate if not inaccessible in translation. Tagore's songs are equally inaccessible to non-Bengalis. There are over two and a half thousand of them, sung and listened to every day by Bengalis everywhere. As a composer of songs, Satyajit Ray says, Tagore has no equal, even in the West (quoted in Dutta and Robinson, p. 385). Most non-Bengalis, however, are denied the pleasure of enjoying Tagore's songs. Yet Tagore proves—in his fervent idealism, in his spiritual reality, in his romanticism—close to all of humankind. Tagore's modernity as a poet, thinker, and activist is accessible to most, as are his antimaterialist, feminist, and educational ideals. Most important is the agency or autonomy of Tagore the artist and poet, and its expression in his creative work. His personality and life are present in his poetry, plays, stories, and novels. He is within all. Yet he is outside all—human creativity is, in his own words, “amoral, arbitrary, fanciful, whimsical, unreal,” and the natural artist in him “is naughty, good for nothing, separate from the man of a hundred good intentions” (quoted in Radice, pp. 36–37).

Is it possible to overcome the translational problems to appreciate Tagore, the poet? Anna Akhmatova, who translated Tagore into Russian, offers an insight: “He is a great poet, I can see that now. It's not only a matter of individual lines which have real genius, or individual poems . . . but that mighty flow of poetry which takes its strength from Hinduism as from the Ganges, and is called Rabindranath Tagore” (quoted in Dutta and Robinson, p. 1).

Dilip K. Basu

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TAJ MAHAL. See **Shah Jahan**.

TĀLA In the classical music traditions of India, *tāla* (Sanskrit, “palm of the hand,” or “clap”) is the combined concept of rhythm and meter. Analytically, a *tāla* is a cyclic and additive measure of musical time. That is, unlike the approach to musical time that has prevailed in Euro-American culture (which has parsed pulses into linear duple and triple patterns and then has subdivided the pulses), South Asian musicians have constructed time by cyclically patterning added subsections of pulses and subdividing the beats. The conceptual categories for *tāla* stem from South Asia's language and poetics, in which verses consist of patterned long and short syllable combinations. Cyclical musical time parallels other Indian conceptualizations of time, such as the agricultural rhythm of the seasons, the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, and notions of cosmic time.

As with *rāga*, musicians in North and South India understand *tāla* similarly, while differing on the specifics. The common concepts are those of cycle (*āvartā/āvartanam* in the South and *āvartā/āvart* in the North), structural subsection (*anga* in the South and *vibhāṅ* in the North), and beat (*mātra* in both cultures), as well as the notion that these beats can have subdivisions. Similarly, the North and the South generally pattern performances from open, pulseless, and meterless beginnings (*ālāpanā/ālāp*) to the microsubdivision of the mensural musical moment. Finally, both systems think of tempo in three

TABLE 1

| Common tālas | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| Laghu/Jāti Tāla | Caturashra 4 | Tishra 3 | Mishra 7 | Khanda 5 | Sankīrna 9 |
| Dhruva _n 0 _n _n | ₄ 0 ₄ ₄ | | | | |
| Mathya _n 0 _n | ₄ 0 ₄ | | | | |
| Rūpaka 0 _n | 0 ₄ | | | | |
| Jhampa _n U0 | | | ₇ U0 | | |
| Tripata _n 00 | ₄ 00 | ₃ 00 | | | |
| Āta _n _n 00 | | | | ₅ ₅ 00 | |
| Eka _n | ₄ | ₃ | ₇ | ₅ | |

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

broad (but modifiable) tempi: *vilambita-laya* (slow tempo), *madhyama* or *madhya-laya* (medium tempo), and *druta-laya* (fast tempo). The differences derive in large part from the historical and cultural contexts of music performance, but also from the cultural disposition of the cultures.

As with scale types, southern traditions have systematic structures for generating and categorizing musical time that inform and have been informed by performance practice. Northern traditions, on the other hand, derive heavily from performance practice, so that *tāla* structure emerges from an ecological evolution of practical forms.

South India

Musical time plays a prominent role in Karnātak music practice and is an integral part of South Indian musical instruction, while functioning as an underlying, albeit often unstated, principle. That is, in South Indian musical practice, performance reflects the underlying structures of *tāla* (the patterning of sections and relative points of importance), but no specific musical part has the charge of keeping and showing the *tāla*. Musicians will often reveal the *tāla* in which they are performing through standardized gestures (and the audience may also “keep time” in this fashion), but no musical part has the specific charge of keeping or showing the time for the other musicians.

South Indian musicians and music scholars have developed systematic formulas for generating time patterns. The overarching idea is that of cycle. An *āvarta/āvartanam* (Sanskrit/Telegu, “cycle” or “a return to the beginning”) is the span of one cycle of a *tāla*. Once established, the pattern of an *āvarta*—the *tāla*—remains consistent until the end of the composition.

This pattern derives principally from the arrangement of the subsections. Each subsection, or *anga* (Sanskrit, “member” or “part”), can consist of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 9 beats or *mātras* (Sanskrit, “syllable”). Karnātak musicians and scholars have developed ways to symbolically represent *angas* both by a physical gesture and/or a written symbol. The two most common physical gestures employed today are the *tattu* (Telegu, “beat” or “clap”) and *vīccu* (Telegu, “wave”) with smaller articulations of the fingers to help in the counting of longer *angas*.

Karnātak practice recognizes three different kinds of *anga* and represents them with written symbols. The *drutam* is a two-*mātra anga* marked by a clap (*tattu*) and a wave (*vīccu*) and symbolically indicated as a circle (O). The *anudrutam* is a one-*mātra anga* marked by a clap (*tattu*) and indicated as an upwardly opening circle (U).

The *laghu* is a multiple-*mātra anga* marked by a clap (*tattu*) and a number of additional silent beats to complete an *anga*. Musicians represent the *laghu* with a vertical bar and a number indicating its duration (1_n). A *laghu* can be *tishbra* (triple) with 3 *mātras* (1₃); *caturashbra* (quadratic) with 4 *mātras* (1₄); *khanda* (broken) with 5 *mātras* (1₅); *mishbra* (mixed) with 7 *mātras* (1₇); or *sankīrna* (composite) with 9 *mātras* (1₉).

Practice also allows the subdivision or *laya* (Sanskrit, *layate*, “to go”; *laya*, “the act of sticking or clinging to”) of each *mātra* in several ways. The single count pulse division is *gati* or *natai* (Sanskrit and Tamil, “pace”), *tishbra natai* is a triple submetric division of the beat, *caturashbra gati/natai* is quadruple (also known as *sarva-laghu*), *khanda natai* is quintuple, and *mishbra natai* is septuple. That is, each *mātra* at *tishbra natai* can have triplets at *tishbra natai*, quadruplets at *caturashbra natai*, and so on.

Sūlādī Tālas. The devotional singer Purandara Dasa (1480–1564) established a musical time system based on seven *sūlādī tālas* for use in formal compositions by combining the *laghu* (l), *drutam* (O), and *anudrutam* (U) in ways that reflect the performance practice of his time. The most commonly used of these *tālas* appear in Table 1.

When naming the different versions of these *tālas*, one first names the quality of the *laghu* followed by the name of the *tāla*; however, particular versions of these *tālas* have special recognition. For example, *caturashbra Triputa tāla* (that is, the eight-*mātra* version of Triputa *tāla* with a *laghu* of four *mātras* followed by two *drutams*) more commonly carries the name *Ādi tāla* (first), as this is one of the most common *tālas* in South Indian music. However, some *tālas* are common in particular contexts and yet have no special name. For example, *khanda Āta tāla* (the 14-*mātra* version of *Āta tāla* with two five-*mātra laghus* and two *drutams*) is particularly important in *tana varnam* compositions, but has no separate appellation.

Capu Tālas. While the *sūlādī tālas* have been the choice of composers for the most complex compositions of the repertoire, the *cāpu tālas* are common in lighter works and occur most often in fast *laya*. A characteristic of the *cāpu tālas* is that each *tāla* has two parts, with the second part one beat longer than the first. The most important of these are (a) *mishbra cāpu* (3 + 4; sometimes known only as *cāpu*) which often acts as an up-tempo version of *tishbra triputa* (3 + 2 + 2); (b) *khanda cāpu* (2 + 3; often called *ara Jhampa* [half Jhampa]) which similarly functions as an up-tempo version of *mishbra jhampa* (7 + 1 + 2); (c) *tishbra cāpu* (1 + 2 and a slightly different emphasis than *tishbra Eka tāla*); and (d) *sankīrna cāpu* (4 + 5).

FIGURES 1-3

(1) Tīntāl (Madhya Laya)

Mātra-level

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| X | | | | 2 | | | | 0 | | | | 3 | | | |

Vibhāg-level

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

(2) Tīntāl Thekā (Madhya Lay Thekā)

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

(3) Tīntāl (Vilambit Lay Thekā)

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

North India

Again, North and South India share conceptions of *tal*. Each cycle or *āvarta* (or sometimes *āvard*) consists of one or several *vibhāgs* (Sanskrit/Hindi, “partition” or “break-down”), which in turn usually consist of two, three, or four *mātras*. A clap (*tālī* [Sanskrit-Hindustani diminutive of *tal*, “beat” or “clap”]) or wave (*kbālī* [Hindustani “empty”])

marks the beginning of each *vibhāg*. The most important *vibhāg* marker is the *sam* (Hindustani, “together”), the first beat of an *āvarta* and the point at which the end of the time cycle comes back and joins the beginning.

North Indian musicians and scholars use a schematic system to describe the structure of *tāla*. An “X”

FIGURES 4-6

(4) Jhaptāl (Madhya Lay Thekā)

1 dhin X
2 na
3 dhin 2
4 dhin
5 na
6 tin 0
7 na
8 dhin 3
9 dhin
10 na

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

(5) Ektāl (Madhya Lay Thekā)

1 dhin X
2 dhin 0
3 dhā 0 ge
4 ti ra ki ta
5 tun 2
6 na

7 ka 0
8 ta 3
9 dhā 0 ge
10 ti ra ki ta
11 dhin 4
12 na

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

(6) Rūpak Tāl (Madhya Lay Thekā)

1 tin 0
2 tin
3 na
4 dhin 1
5 na
6 dhin 2
7 na

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

marks the *sam*. *Tālis* are numbered (with the exception of when the *sam* is a *tāli*—which is true of most *tals*). An “O” marks the *kbālī* or beginning of an “empty” *vibhāg*. Figure 1 illustrates these parts in the context of one *āvarta* (cycle) of the most common *tal* in the Hindustani *sangīt paddhati* (North Indian classical music tradition): *Tīntāl*.

In Figure 1 the *āvarta* consists of 16 *mātras* divided into four *vibhāgs* of four *mātras* each, with the first, second, and fourth *vibhāgs* marked by *tālis* and the third *vibhāg* marked by a *kbālī*. (Note that an X marks the first *tāli*, the *sam*. The number “1” appears only when the *sam* is *kbālī*.)

The Hindustani *sangīt paddhati* sense of *lay* (subdivision, tempo) parallels that of the Karnātak *sangīt paddhati* in that the metric subdivision of *mātras* can be *caturasra* (quadratic, 4 subbeats), *tisra* (triple, 3 subbeats), *misra* (mixed, 7 subbeats), *kbanda* (broken, 5 subbeats), and *sankīrna* (composite, 9 subbeats). Thus, the above schematic of *Tīntāl* could have *mātras* further divided into triplets, quadruplets, quintuplets, or groups of nine. And, as in South India, the terms *vilambit* (slow), *madhya* (medium), and *drut* (fast) describe tempo, with the prefix *ati* (very) modifying the slow and fast extremes.

North Indian time, like that of South India, is conceptually additive. However, rather than a standard set of

formulas modified through a grid of metrical options (like the *sūlādī tālas*) or meters, which follow a standard mathematical function (like the *cāpu tālas*), North Indian *tāls* derive almost entirely from performance practice. Hindustani musicians generally describe *tāls* not as a series of *lagbus*, *drutams*, and *anudrutams*, but rather as a stylized series of drum strokes. These drum strokes most often come from the performance practice of *tabla* and sometimes, the *pakhāwaj*.

Figures 2 through 6 illustrate the most common *tālas*, beginning with the aforementioned *Tīntāl*. In general, syllables beginning with a “dh” sound indicate “open” strokes played by both drums in a pair of *tabla* (or drumheads, in the case of the *pakhāwaj*), with the lower-pitched drum resonating or ringing. A syllable beginning with a “t” represents a stroke played only on the higher-pitched head. A syllable beginning with a “k” or “g” represents a stroke played only on the lower-pitched drum. (Note: the use of Western notation to represent these drum strokes is for the convenience of those familiar with this mode of musical representation.)

In Figure 2, note how “open” strokes (*dbā*, *dbin*) predominate in the first, second, and fourth *vibhāgs*—marked by *tālīs* (claps)—and how “closed” strokes (*tā*, *tin*) predominate in the third *vibhāg*—which begins with a *khālī* (wave). This example is in medium tempo (*madhya lay*). Figure 3 is an example of the same *tāl* in slow tempo (*vilambit lay*). The structure remains on the principle of *mātras*, but each *mātra* has an underlying quadratic (*catu-rashbra*) subdivision (represented by the sixteenth notes).

In Figure 4, the same pattern of *tālīs* and *khālī* is manifested in the ten-*mātra tāla*, Jhaptāl; however, this time the *vibhāgs* consist of alternating patterns of two and three *mātras*.

Not all *tālas* follow this pattern, however. Some treatises list tens if not hundreds of possible *tālas*; but in performance practice, one commonly hears only around a dozen *tālas*, some of which occur only in special circumstances. Figure 5 represents a realization of Ektāl, a *tāla* that is commonly associated with both vocal and instrumental music. The twelve beats divide into six *vibhāgs* of two *mātras* each. In contrast to the other examples (but imitating them), not all “open” *vibhāgs* have claps, nor are “closed” *vibhāgs* dominated by “closed” strokes. The resulting pattern has the curious complementary and overlapping arrangements of *mātras* into three groups of four (clap-wave + clap-wave + clap-clap) and two groups of six (as defined by the rhythm: clap-wave-clap + wave-clap-clap).

Finally, not all *tāls* begin with a clapped *sam*. The popular Rūpak *tāl* (Figure 6)—a seven-beat *tāl*—begins with

a *khālī* and a *vibhāg* of three *mātras*, followed by two *tālī*-marked *vibhāgs* of two *mātras*.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Music; Rāga; Tabla**

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TAMIL LITERATURE. See **Literature: Tamil**.

TAMIL TIGERS. See **Sri Lanka**.

TANCHOI A distinct style of textile developed in the nineteenth century, *tanchoi* was favored among the Parsi women of India. The Chinese opium trade had brought affluence to the Parsis, and a display of this Chinese connection became a status symbol. Two distinctly Indo-Chinese, or “Parsi,” textiles resulted from these interactions: the *tanchoi* and the *garo*, which was a plain fabric with embroidery. These have as much ethnic association with the Parsis, as the *bandhani* with the Gujaratis and the Paithani with the Maharashtrians. *Tanchoi* saris were so popular among the Parsis that practically every home possessed at least one, and they were an essential part of the marriage trousseau of the Parsi bride.

The *tanchoi* is woven with both the twill, and the sateen weave, which can produce an unbroken surface of color while retaining structural strength. The twill weaving produces a much more tightly woven fabric than the plain weave, and was used for the *pallu* (decorative end-piece of the sari) of the *tanchoi*. The rest of the sari was woven using a sateen weave. The most important quality of the *tanchoi* is the complete absence of loose long floats (loose threads of the weft on the reverse of the fabric, not interwoven with the warp) on the back of the fabric, even if they are required at long intervals in the pattern. In the most intricate designs too these kinds of floats are not permissible in *tanchoi* weaving.

The earliest *tanchois* seem to be only two colors, generally the color of the warp for the ground, with that of the weft creating the design on the right side of the cloth. The other side of the material appeared exactly opposite: the weft color became the ground, and the design appeared in

the color of the warp. In a multicolored sari the warp as well as the weft formed the design. *Tanchois* of the nineteenth century generally had a large *pallu* with a combination of large and small paisley motifs at both ends, while the ground designs vary from *butis* (small decorative motifs) to lozenges in an all-over pattern. *Jari* (gold or silver) was also used at times to highlight part of the motif, which required cutting off the extra weft float of *jari*. In addition to its use for saris, the *tanchoi* was also available as a fabric by the yard and was used for various decorative purposes. Parsi women preferred blouses of this material.

With the introduction of the power loom and changes in fashion, *tanchoi* weaving went out of vogue soon after the first quarter of the twentieth century. The way of life of the Parsis, who had been the chief patrons of *tanchoi*, had changed, and Chinese styles were replaced by British and European fashions. Clothing changed, and georgettes and lacy materials replaced materials like *tanchoi*. Surat has long ceased to manufacture *tanchois*, but Benaras (Varanasi) weavers have now revived the art.

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TANSEN (1506–1589), Indian musician. Tansen, also known as Miyan Tansen, was a legendary Indian musician. His father, Markand Pandey, was a poet who lived in a village near Gwalior. Tansen displayed an intense interest in music from an early age, and he was sent to Vrindavan, near Mathura, to study under a famous musician saint, Swami Haridas. After completing his training, Tansen was appointed court musician at Gwalior; he later went to Rewa (in Central India) as court musician of Raja Ramsingh, a musician himself. When Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) heard of Tansen, he invited him to his court and honored him as one of the Navaratna, or "Nine Gems" of the Mughal empire. Abul Fazl, the chronicler of Akbar's reign, wrote of Tansen, "A singer like him has not been in India for the last thousand years." Tansen enjoyed considerable influence in the imperial court and was an exponent of *gaurbar bani*, one of the four known styles of *dbruva-pada* music, prevalent in North India during that era.

Tansen is credited with reshaping *dbruva-pada* music by introducing such Persian nuances as *meend* and *gamaka*. Tansen created new *rāgas*, some of which are still regarded as the foremost *rāgas* in North Indian music, such as "Darbari Kanada," "Darbari Todi," "Miyan ki Malhar," and "Miyan ki Sarang." Tansen was also known to be a musical codifier, studying the structure of *rāgas*, listing about four hundred. His *Sangeeta Sara* and *Rāgāmālā* are important documents on music. He is, moreover, credited with introducing certain developments in the *rabab* and *rudra-veena*. The Dhrupad singers of the *seniya gharana* attribute their lineage to Tansen.

There are many legends about the miraculous powers of Tansen's music. The most famous legend recounts how Tansen sang "Rāga Dipaka" at a royal request, even though that *rāga* was known to generate "unbearable heat" in its singer's body. His victorious competition with the great Baiju Bawra is another legend often narrated by music lovers. The achievements of Tansen are referred to in detail in the work *Virabhanudaya Kavya* by Madhava, written in A.D. 1555, in which his music is described as "immortal."

Tansen and his wife Hussaini had four sons and a daughter, Sarasvati, a vina player. His sons—Suratsen, Saratsen, Tarang sen, and Bilas Khan—all played *rabab*. His son-in-law, Misri Khan, was also a vina player. Tansen died at the age of eighty-three, around 1589, and was buried at Gwalior next to the tomb of Mohammad Ghaus. Many musicians make pilgrimages to his tomb to seek his blessings.

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TANTRIC BUDDHIST IMAGES With the introduction of the Bodhisatvayana (commonly known as Mahayana, the "Greater Vehicle"), the monastic form of early Buddhism, Shravakayana (popularly called Hinayana, the "Lesser Vehicle") underwent a radical change in the theological concept of Buddhist doctrine. In place of the wise teacher, Shakyamuni Buddha, who had already attained *bodhi* (enlightenment) and Nirvāna (literally, "extinction" or "salvation"), emerged various groups of *bodhisattvas*, both male and female, who had

attained *bodhi* but had postponed Nirvāna to help others reach enlightenment. Five transcendent, or cosmic Buddhas appeared, dominating the heavenly quarters and the whole Buddhist pantheon. These are: Akshobya, Buddha of the eastern direction; Amitabha, Buddha of the western direction; Amoghasiddhi, Buddha of the northern direction; Ratnasambhava, Buddha of the southern direction; and Vairocana, Buddha of the central direction. Of these five, Amitabha played an important role at an early date, while Akshobya was very significant in eastern India, and Vairocana, mostly as the Buddha at the center of a *mandala* in Nepal. Multiple *bodhisattvas* were ascribed to each of the cosmic Buddhas, as each of them represented a different *kula*, or family, and hence were called *kulesha*, or lord of the family. Each cosmic Buddha shows a different hand gesture (*mudrā*), each has a different complexion, a different vehicle (*vahana*) and a different female companion, Prajna or Shakti. They complete the Tantric form of Buddhism.

The noted Buddhist iconographic text, *Sadhanamala* (Garland of Meditation) describes the Buddhist divinities, most of them with Tantric affinities. The worship of the Tantric divinities in a diagram in the shape of a circle (*mandala*) originated a later phase; an important addition, it was very popular with the Tantric Buddhist priests. The Buddhist text *Nishpannyogavali* of the “great scholar” (*mahapandita*) Abhayakaragupta (12th century) gives elaborate descriptions of such *mandalas* dedicated to several Buddhist divinities, the last being Kalacakra. The *Nishpannyogavali* is basically a Tantric text describing the Tantric divinities Heruka, Sambara, and Yogambara. The *dharanis*, or esoteric descriptive formulas of each Buddhist divinity, were muttered in a mechanical way. At the time of Bengal’s Pala ruler Devapala (9th century) the *dharani* of the popular Buddhist goddess Tara was well-known in eastern India. Abhayakaragupta selected twelve principal *dharanis* and deified them with human shapes, colors, and weapons. Of these goddesses, Ushnishavijaya, Parnashabari, Janguli, and Cunda were especially well-known.

In a later development, Vajrasatva holding a *vajra* (masculine principle) and *ghanta* (female principle) was considered the Adi-Buddha, along with the other five cosmic Buddhas. Another Buddha, Vajradhara, holds two *vajras* or *vajra* and *ghanta*, embracing his Prajna, is sometimes considered the Adi-Buddha, and is confused with Vajrasatva. Together with parts of eastern India, Kashmir and the adjoining areas were important sources for Tantric Buddhism, and many manuscripts of important Tantric texts have been recovered from Kashmir. Among the specifically Buddhist Tantric deities represented in Kashmir bronzes are Vajrasatva, Vajrapani, Manjushri, Yamantaka, Sambara, and Kalacakra.



Stone Sculpture of Aparajita. Aparajita, defiant Tantric Buddhist deity. Stone, perhaps from Ganga, c. eleventh century. PHOTO COURTESY OF GOURISWAR BHATTACHARYA.

In Tantric Buddhism, the union of *upaya* (means) and *prajna* (knowledge), represented by the masculine and feminine personages, leads to *bodhicitta* (mind of awakening). Many Buddhist deities in Tantric Buddhism are therefore shown in the *yab-yum* (intercourse) position. The Hevajra-tantra, Kriyasamgraha, Advayavajrasamgraha, and Guhyasamaja-tantra are the special texts for this concept. Another Tantric manuscript of importance, especially in Nepal, is the manuscript describing the five “protectresses,” or Pancarakshas: Mahapratishara, Mahasahasrapramardini, Mahamantranusarini, Mahashitavati, and Mahamayuri. The female deities are of different complexions, many-headed and many-armed, and all seated in various sitting positions. Both the *Sadhanamala* and *Nishpannyogavali* texts describe the Pancaraksha *mandala*, in which Mahamantranusarini is in the south, Mahashitavati in the west, and Mahamayuri in the north. These Pancaraksha deities are mostly shown in the manuscripts. Tara, two-armed and of green or dark (*shyama*) complexion, is



Marici. Carved image of Marici (or Marichi), revered Buddhist goddess. Her name is still invoked by the lamas of Tibet at sunrise. From Bhimpur, c. eleventh century. Collection of Varendra Research Museum. PHOTO COURTESY OF GOURISWAR BHATTACHARYA.

the most popular goddess of the Buddhist pantheon, but her four-faced and eight-armed form, called Vajratara, is a Tantric form shown in the *mandala*. Two other Tantric female deities are Kurukulla (a form of Tara) and the popular deity Cunda. Kurukulla is one-faced but may have two, four, six, or eight arms. Kurukulla is associated with

the Tantric rite of *vasbikarana*, which brings success by enchanting men, women, ministers, and even kings. In the Uddiyana form, the goddess is four-armed, red in color, and fierce in appearance, and she sits in *ardharparyanka* position (one leg hanging down) on a human corpse.

Goddess Cunda is the embodiment of the Cunda *dharani*. She has one face but two, four, sixteen, eighteen, or twenty-six arms. As Cunda-vajri she is mentioned in one of the earliest Tantric works, the Gukyasamaja-tantra. That the worship of Cunda was popular in southwest Bengal (Bangladesh) is mentioned in a Prajnaparamita manuscript of the Cambridge University Library of A.D. 1015 as “Cunda in the excellent temple of Cunda at Pattikera” (present-day Mainamati in Comilla).

Mention should be made here of two other Tantric female deities, Ekajata and Bhrkuti, who are often illustrated in sculptures from Bihar-Bengal. Ekajata, four-armed, wearing a tiger skin and holding an elephant skin above her head, accompanies Tara, a description of whom is not to be found in the Sadhanamala.

There are some Tantric Buddhist deities who are antagonistic to some Hindu gods and goddesses. Aparajita, one such deity, tramples upon Ganesha and slaps him. Similarly, the four-faced, eight-armed male deity Trailokyavijaya, displaying anger, tramples upon the head of Shiva with his left leg and with his right leg presses upon the bosom of Gauri. Heruka, the well-known Buddhist Tantric deity of the Heruka-tantra, is known as Hevajra when two-armed and embracing his Prajna, Nairatma, but when four-armed he embraces Vajravarahi. The union of Vajravarahi with Heruka is the cult of the celebrated Cakrasambhara-tantra. Vajravarahi is a *dakini*. Vajravarahi resembles Marici, who has a sow-like face, but she has a natural sowlike excrescence just near the right ear and she dances in the *ardharparyanka* pose. Marici is more well-known as a Buddhist goddess. Marici is invoked by the lamas of Tibet at sunrise. Like the Hindu Sun god, she rides on a chariot (drawn by seven pigs, not seven horses). Recent scholars have identified her with the *bodhi* of Shakyamuni. Marici is the principal deity in the Marici *mandala* of the Nishpannayanogavali. She has different forms, but her main symbols are needle and string. As three-faced and eight-armed Maricipicuva, she is attended by four sow-faced goddesses called Varttali, Vadali, Varali, and Varihamukhi. The cosmic Buddha, Vairocana, is her mate. With six faces and twelve arms she is called Vajradhatvishvari marici. The three-faced goddess, of which two are sow faces, is called Ubhayavaranana. In this form she tramples under her feet the Hindu gods Hari, Hara,

Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā), and others. With six faces and twelve arms she is called Vajradhatvishvarimarici and is the Prajna of Vairocana.

Vajrayogini, in eastern Bengal (now Bangladesh), near Vikrampur, was a seat of Vajrayana (Tantrayana) Buddhism, and many images of Tantric deities were found there, including that of the strange goddess Parnashabari. The worship of this deity was believed to prevent outbreaks of epidemics. The pot-bellied, three-faced, six-armed deity wearing leaves (hence Parna-shabari) tramples in *pratyalidha* attitude upon a couple, the elephant-headed ram below, accompanied by an animal-headed male figure and the smallpox goddess Shitala riding on a donkey. In her six hands she holds, clockwise, an elephant goad, an arrow, a *vajra*, a branch, *tarjani-mudrā* (warning gesture), and a bow.

The prominent Buddhist male deity Kalacakra is the principal deity of the Kalacakra *mandala* and of the famous Kalacakra-tantra. With four faces and twelve eyes and twenty-four arms, he dances on the bodies of the Hindu god of love Amanga (Kama) and Rudra, who are lying on their backs. In one of his hands he holds the severed head of Brahmā. He holds various weapons, including a *vajra*, in other hands of different colors.

Avalokiteshvara was a sublime *bodhisattva* in the early Buddhist pantheon, but with the influence of the Hindu god Shiva he assumed a form called Simhanada-Lokeshvara, seated on a lion, wearing a crown of matted hair, a tiger skin, and having three eyes. In his right hand he has a white trident, entwined by a white snake, and in the left hand a sword burning like fire.

Another important (especially in Tibet) manifestation of Avalokiteshvara is his Shadakshari, or six-syllabic form. In this form he is four-armed and is attended upon by the male deity Manidhara and the female deity Shadakshari-Mahavidya. In this four-armed form Avalokiteshvara is seated, showing *sarvarajendra-mudrā* (actually *namaskara-mudrā*) with the main two hands, while the back right hand holds the rosary (*akshamala*) and the back left hand a full-blown lotus (*padma*). The six syllables are the famous mantra, *om manipadme hum*, which is uttered daily by the Nepalese and Tibetan Buddhists and which is engraved on the votive stones, popularly called Manistones. Unfortunately the mantra is often incorrectly translated and is therefore commonly misunderstood. This mantra invokes the female form of Avalokiteshvara as Manipadma.

The other well-known *bodhisattva* is Manjushri, the god of learning. He is shown brandishing a sword, which removes ignorance, and holding a blue water lily (*nilotpala*)



Painting of Vaishravana. Also known as the “Guardian King of the North,” the Buddhist god of wealth, date unknown. With the development of Tantric Buddhism in the seventh century came the images of magnificent gods and goddesses, all portrayed in paradise-like settings. In time the archetypal imagery delved more deeply into the unconscious. LINDSAY HEBBERD / CORBIS.

or a manuscript (*Prajnaparamita* text) on it. In an esoteric form he is shown riding a tiger and showing with two hands the *vyakhyana-mudrā* (gesture of explanation). An extremely important Tantric form of Manjushri is Manjuvajra, with three faces and six arms. With the principal arms he makes the gesture of embracing his Prajna, and he holds a sword (*kbadga*) and an arrow in the right hands and the stalk of a blue water lily (*nilotpala*) and a bow (*capa*) in the left hands. The deity is sometimes shown with other similar images in a *mandala*.

Southeast Bengal (*vanga-samatata*), now Bangladesh, was the home of learned Tantric Buddhist pandits, one of whom, the famous Atisha Shrijnana Dipankara (11th century), went to Tibet to preach Tantric Buddhism there.

Gourishwar Bhattacharya

See also **Buddhism in Ancient India; Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century; Sculpture: Buddhist**

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TAPAS Although the root meaning of *tapas* is "heat," this versatile term can indicate creative cosmic energy, sexual fervor and chastity, ecstasy and pain, contemplative ardor and austerity, self-promotion and self-mortification. It held diverse meanings already in the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda before becoming the key feature of asceticism in Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, yoga, other philosophical systems, and in regional epics beyond the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa. Ecstatic and shamanic experiences associated with fire and heat in West and South Asia may be far older than the Vedas, as are Proto-Indo-European mythic and epic motifs of heated battle fury that rises in warrior gods and heroes. In the Rig Veda, Indra defeats Vritra with the weapon of *tapas*; ritual soma is empowered by *tapas*; ancient Rishis first envisioned the Vedas by cultivating *tapas*; ancestor-fathers (*pitris*) gained heaven by *tapas*; and the great gods of fire and sun, Agni and Sūrya, are natural reservoirs of *tapas*. In the tenth and latest book of the Rig Veda, hymns 129 and 190 separately diagram cosmogony: precosmic *tapas* is succeeded by desire (*kāma*), mind (*manas*), order (*rita*), and truth (*satya*). A famous passage in Atharva Veda 11.5 proclaims that a student learning the Vedas generates *tapas* that infuses the universe, including all its gods. Like the sun, he is a reservoir of productive *tapas*.

Brāhmaṇas that follow the earliest Vedas feature Prajāpati, famous as source of creation, Lord of Creatures, and successor to self-sacrificing Purusha, conceiving by desire born of heat. Giving up his body, as did Purusha, Prajāpati exhausts himself through self-heating in order to create by repeated emission. His *tapas* may last for a millennium. The human sacrificer identifies with both Prajāpati and his sacrificial fire (*Agni*) in a similar ritualized striving that simultaneously maintains the world and transcends it. The Upanishads provide further nuances to these homologies between inner and cosmic

heat. With the emergence of the Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas, and developing traditions of yoga and tantra, a wide-ranging pattern of ascetic practices is apparent. A *tapasvin*, one who cultivates *tapas*, usually through a solitary forest or mountain vigil, may be a celibate yogin or *yoginī*, god or goddess, *rishi* or his wife, king, demon, child, or even an animal. *Tapas* can be positive, yielding drought-ending rains, for example, or negative, producing heat that melts mountains and dries up oceans. Countless myths begin with a world threatened by an uncontrollable ascetic, demon, or deity whose silent *tapas* has the destructive power of a raging forest fire.

Tapas has a considerable role to play in Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras, its commentaries, and succeeding traditions. Three practices in *kriyā-yoga* are necessary to gain *samādhi*: self-study, devotion, and *tapas* that yields perfection (*siddhi*) of the body and senses. Perhaps it is in Jainism that *tapas* has its most vigorous adepts today. Both lay and monastic disciplines declare an increasingly rigorous program of austerities—fasting, meditation, chastity—necessary to burn off the impurities of existing karma, as in the burning of sin (*pāpman*) by *tapas* recommended in the Upanishads more than twenty-five centuries ago.

David M. Knipe

See also **Agni; Hinduism (Dharma); Indra; Jainism; Soma; Yoga**

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TATA, JAMSETJI N. (1839–1904), Indian industrialist. A Parsi pioneer of Indian trade and commerce, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata emerged as a beacon of hope

in the early phase of industrialization in India. He was born on 3 March 1839 in the town of Navsari in Gujarat, the son of Nusserwanji Tata, whose father was a Parsi (Zoroastrian) priest. Jamsetji is also known for his nationalist ideals and his humanitarian efforts to alleviate poverty in Indian society, pursuing what could be called “strategic philanthropy.”

Tata’s early education was in form of verbal instruction in the Zoroastrian prayers and scriptures. Later he attended Elphinstone College in Bombay (Mumbai), graduating in 1858. He acquired his business acumen from his father, starting a trading company with a capital of 21,000 rupees in 1868. Jamsetji went on to establish a cotton mill, the Central India Spinning, Wearing and Manufacturing Company, in Nagpur, Maharashtra, in 1874. This was followed by his establishment of the Empress Mills in Bombay on 1 January 1877, coinciding with the proclamation of Queen Victoria as the empress of India.

The last two decades of his life helped shape the course of industrialization and modernization in India, in terms of the iron and steel industries, hydroelectric power generation, and the establishment of educational institutions to promote science and technology. Though steel production started in 1912 and hydroelectric power generation in 1915, almost a decade after his death, they were visualized during his lifetime; in 1901 he had begun organizing the first large-scale ironworks in India. His son Dorabji J. Tata expanded the business under the name Tata and Sons.

Jamsetji Tata is also considered a forerunner in ushering in a professional code of conduct in the management of industries, including a provident fund for employees, decent working conditions, and management by a managing director and a board in an age of family oligarchs. Tata’s city of Jamshedpur remains a classic example of the realization of his concept of capital-intensive heavy industries, blended with a modern industrial township.

Tata’s Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore (Karnataka), which was established with his endowment, remains an outstanding symbol of corporate philosophy and citizenship. It was set up after an ideological battle with the colonial regime under Viceroy Lord Curzon, who questioned the academic credentials of Indian students. Jamsetji Tata was deeply concerned about British colonial rule and its impact on India’s economy, and he supported self-rule under British paramountcy. He attended the first session of the Indian National Congress Party in Bombay and remained committed to its cause until his death in May 1904.

R. Radhakrishnan

See also **Jamshedpur**

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TAXATION POLICY SINCE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS

A comparison of the current structures of India’s main central government taxes with those prevailing before 1991 indicates that, following international trends, there has been a sizable scaling back of rates in income, excise, and trade taxes. During this period, states also attempted to harmonize their sales tax rates and, most importantly, introduced a value-added tax (VAT) on 1 April 2005, comprising perhaps the most important subnational tax reform since the formation of the Indian Republic in 1950. The base of the central government’s service tax has been expanded steadily, though its full coordination into a national VAT remains to be accomplished. At the subnational level, an agreement among states to cut back incentives and exemptions met with partial success. The VAT should improve its adherence.

Before 1991 India’s overall tax structure had been broadly inefficient and quite inequitable. By international standards, the income tax rates had been high, and there was no VAT at the central level, except on a selective basis from the mid-1980s. The consumption tax base was narrow, with services excluded from the tax base, and customs duties were very high yet riddled with complex exemptions. Selected export duties reduced the international competitiveness of traditional exports. At the subnational level, state sales taxes caused heavy excess burdens due to input taxes getting built into the prices of final commodities, resulting in tax-on-tax, or cascading. The changes in India’s tax structure are generally agreed to have led to improvements in its efficiency and equity.

Nevertheless, one cost of the improvements has been the government’s inability to make up for revenue loss from rate decreases because of insufficient base expansion. The central government’s tax revenue collected since 1994 declined by 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) from what had been collected previously. Declines in customs and excise revenues were not compensated by the increase in income tax revenues. Some sunset tax exemption clauses were extended and new incentives crept in, despite the scaling back of central tax

TABLE 1

| Corporate tax rates in India for selected years | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------------------|
| (in percent) | | | | | | |
| | 1990–1991 | 1992–1993 | 1995–1996 | 1997–1998 | 2001–2002 | 2004–2005 ⁽¹⁾ |
| Domestic company | 50 | 45 | 40 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| Foreign company | 65 | 65 | 55 | 48 | 45 | 40 |

(1) Subject to a surcharge of 2.5 percent. Capital gains are taxed at 20 percent plus a surcharge of 2.5 percent (which is exempted if reinvested in primary securities).

SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

incentives in the newly emerging economy. Attempts by the tax administration to expand the taxpayer net through registration drives and a new set of requirements for filing tax returns were initially successful. But further improvements would depend on the efficiency with which newly legislated information returns from third-parties is utilized and associated computer techniques implemented.

Though the states' tax collections improved somewhat, they could not fully compensate for the central government's tax revenue decline, so that the combined central and states tax/GDP ratio fell during the decade. Overall, the ramifications for the consolidated fiscal deficit and, in turn, for public debt could be significant. There are expectations that the VAT will be revenue enhancing. However, there may be an initial period of revenue loss since the VAT rates for all states are the same and, for some high-revenue states, the VAT rates are not revenue-neutral when compared to their earlier sales tax rates. As a result, the central government has agreed to compensate states for revenue loss in the initial three years.

Major Changes in Central Tax Structure

Income tax. By the mid-1990s, many developing countries had emerged from the reform process with much lower and fewer individual income tax rates, typically 15, 25, and 35 percent. Even India legislated comparable rates of 10, 20, and 30 percent in 1997–1998. Both the rates, and their number and dispersion, were reduced on efficiency grounds. Across the developing world, for example in East Asia and Latin America, corporate income tax rates were slashed. The scaling back of corporate income tax rates reflected, to some extent, the twin objectives of administrative feasibility and better tax compliance, but was motivated in particular by the forces of globalization and the increased international movement of capital. In India, corporate income tax rates for both domestic and foreign companies have been

reduced to 35 percent and 40 percent respectively (see Table 1).

Insufficiency in streamlining exemptions and incentives has adversely affected the full potential of revenue productivity in both the individual and corporate income tax. The coverage of tax incentives includes savings generation, regional development, capital investment, labor employment, research and technology, infrastructure development, exports, and charities, among others. The outcome has been a thinning out of the overall income tax base. However, income tax revenue in terms of GDP has steadily improved, reflecting administrative improvements, an expansion in the taxpayer net, and, possibly, favorable supply-side effects.

While industry tends to favor income tax incentives, these incentives have tended to benefit large entities, resulting in inequity within the corporate sector. The effective corporate tax rate is, therefore, skewed among companies. Highly generous depreciation rates were scaled back in 2005–2006 and that should correct for some of this problem. There is little doubt that without base broadening, income tax revenue is unlikely to be able to make up fully for the revenue losses emanating from structural reforms of production and trade taxes.

Central excises and customs. Central excises essentially operate as a VAT that has evolved over almost two decades, with a small beginning in 1986–1987, when a VAT-type credit mechanism for selected raw materials was introduced for the production of specified goods. In 1994–1995, capital goods were made creditable. The emerging quasi-VAT structure was termed Modified VAT or MODVAT. With a further effort to reduce the main rates to only two—8 and 16 percent—it was renamed the Central VAT, or CENVAT, in 2001.

Thus, the excises have been transformed to a VAT structure that is comparable to the successes and foibles of the VATs of most countries, with its administration carried out by the Customs and Excises Department of

the Ministry of Finance. The main, and quite important, difference is that while most countries that have introduced the VAT have tended to do so as a one-shot preparation and implementation package, India has done so in a seemingly deliberate, learning-by-doing approach. This provides an interesting alternative to the usual rapid approach to VAT introduction that has sometimes entailed strong opposition from the representative taxpayer in many parts of the world. Another crucial difference from other countries is that the base of CENVAT is truncated to manufacturing, given the taxation assignment of manufacturing only (and not sales) to the central government by the Constitution of India. This has led to much litigation by businesses on the definition of manufacturing to truncate its definition to avoid tax. The CENVAT base also gets eroded by various exemptions. More than 200 pages of the standard excise tariff, of some 700 pages, comprise exemptions. Each exemption has many entries, conditions, and lists, in turn containing hundreds of items in each list.

The rate structure of customs duties is widely recognized to have been rapidly scaled back over the last decade, the peak rate declining from 150 percent in 1991–1992 to 15 percent in 2005–2006. Nevertheless, the tendency to tinker with incentives and exemptions remains alive. This inherently leads to much complexity in interpretation and administration, let alone economic distortions.

State-Level Taxes

Multiple taxes and low buoyancy. The taxing powers of Indian states include a plethora of minor taxes and one major source of tax revenue, the sales tax, recently replaced by the VAT. In the major states (14 out of a total of 25), tax revenue has represented approximately 7 percent of the state domestic product in recent years. Indirect taxes include state excise duties, taxes on vehicles, purchase tax, entertainment tax, and some surcharges. The sales tax represents approximately 60 percent of total tax revenue, while excises are the second most important revenue source, in particular, on potable alcohol. Thus, Indian states have been assigned mainly indirect taxes by the Constitution. Direct tax powers include stamp duty and registration fee, profession tax, and an income tax on agriculture. The last is usually viewed as insufficiently exploited, while the profession tax is basically a fee with a low nominal ceiling imposed by the central government. Only the stamp duty and registration fee could be said to have been revenue productive among the direct taxes.

A disturbing factor has been the low buoyancy of revenue (i.e., the percentage response of tax revenue, including discretionary changes, to a percentage change in

GDP) from these various taxes. A tax-reform commission of the Government of Karnataka (2001) estimated that the buoyancies of various taxes fell sharply during the 1990s. Recommendations made in selected state-level tax reform studies—including Government of Karnataka (2000), Government of Madhya Pradesh (2001), Government of Maharashtra (2000), and Government of West Bengal (2001)—offer many ideas and directions in which structural reform could be undertaken, with a focus on extending the tax base.

Replacing sales tax with a VAT. Given the primary importance of the sales tax in revenue generation and its recent conversion to a state-level VAT, the main concerns and prospects are examined here. The general dilemma for a subnational VAT is that introducing a VAT at the central level is far easier than at the state level. Countries with the intention of introducing a subnational VAT have grappled with one main problem, that of structuring the VAT as a consumption tax, generally without an appropriate solution. Either they have introduced a VAT that is not a fully consumption-type (Brazil), or one that is administratively complex (Canada); or they have desisted from introducing it at all (United States), or have been debating its appropriate form for a considerable time (Argentina).

In India, all states—through an empowered committee of state finance ministers—have agreed to have the same rate structure—4 and 12.5 percent—for the VAT and the same exemptions. However, each state is allowed to have ten additional exempted items of local importance from a list of about forty items. Some goods such as petroleum products are outside the VAT base with a floor rate of 20 percent. Immediately after the VAT's introduction, however, the states felt compelled to add to the exemption list reflecting popular demand. This was especially to counterbalance the opposition-ruled states that decided not to introduce the VAT at the last moment. Out of a total of thirty-five, twenty-three states (and centrally administered Union Territories [UTs]) have introduced the VAT. Two UTs should introduce them soon, while two did not even have a sales tax. The remaining eight states that did not introduce the VAT are states with opposition governments.

The states have gone halfway in their attempt to move to a destination based VAT, though interstate trade continues to be taxed at 4 percent as before. Under the VAT, states will not give input tax credit in their own states for inputs bought in another state. However, when a good is exported to another state, input tax credit will be given against such export. It is anticipated that input tax credit for inputs imported from another state should be in place in 2006 or 2007. However, a solution would need to be found regarding how to capture the lost revenue currently

collected from this source. A computerized system for exchange of information among states, under development, would also need to be operational prior to implementation.

In sum, the states have made an impressive beginning in the introduction of their VAT, and as in the case of the central government's CENVAT, future evolution in its structure should result in its sophistication. The central government, in its catalytic role, has demonstrated its willingness to participate in the states' tax reform process. The combination demonstrates exemplary fiscal federal cooperation.

Tax Administration

Three issues in tax administration are closely connected to the success of any tax policy reform: expanding the taxpayer register; computerization; and implementation of the state-level VAT. Arguably the most successful action that has been undertaken in the area of central tax administration has been an impressive expansion of the taxpayer net for the income tax. In the mid-1990s, the taxpayer roll included some 14 million taxpayers, of which 10 million to 11 million were current. However, a rudimentary calculation of the potential number of taxpayers would be as follows. Of the total population of 1 billion, the taxable population is approximately 300 million. With an average household size of 5, that would imply 60 million potential taxpayers. Discounting 10 million for taxable agricultural households would result finally in a net 50 million taxable households. Thus only about 20 percent of potential taxpayers were within the taxpayer net.

In the second half of the 1990s, a voluntary disclosure program required individual income earners who possessed certain characteristics, such as ownership of property and telephones, and trips undertaken abroad, to register even if their taxable income was nil. The characteristics were further expanded with time so that more individuals would be required to register. By 2000 the taxpayer register had increased to over 20 million. Thus, within a relatively short period, the number of potential taxpayers doubled, an objective that had been unattainable for decades. In 2005 the register contained approximately 30 million, of which about 25 million are understood to be current.

While it has been found that the number of assesseees has not constrained tax collection, nevertheless there is a need to allocate adequate administrative resources to bring the medium to small taxpayer into the tax net. The strategy must include a credible threat of audits for all taxpayers. This draws attention to the second issue of the extent of resources the tax administration can devote to administering the returns of relatively small taxpayers. If the taxpayers that were rapidly brought into the tax net

realized that their chances of being assessed or audited were very small, then having a larger taxpayer register may not result in any significant increase in revenue collection in the long run. Needless to say, having a large taxpayer unit (LTU), which facilitates payment of all taxes by large taxpayers through a single window, is also important. India does not yet have an LTU but the intention to set one up has been announced.

In order to more effectively tackle the problem of tax evasion in a modern tax administration, a computerized information system needs to be quickly developed. For example, the income tax department collects a wide array of evidence during the course of any investigation. In addition to information from taxpayers' returns and other information returns, a large volume of information is collected during assessment, searches and seizures, and survey operations. Third-party information has been legislated from various sources, but this could lead to revenue enhancement only if such information is successfully collated, disseminated, and verified. Currently the income tax department has initiated massive information-technology transformation that is experiencing teething problems. Complete implementation will take a year or two. Customs operations, on the other hand, are focused specifically at import-export points, catering mainly to businesses, so computerization of customs procedures has moved further on. Excise or CENVAT entails cross-checks of invoices among buyer and seller. It poses more difficult challenges, and systems development is in a nascent, discussion stage regarding alternative models of computerization.

The success of implementation of the state VAT is dependent on the computerization of VAT procedures of various states. States have progressed at differing speeds in this area. The central government is lending a helping hand to some of the smaller states in the form of turnkey projects through computer training, installation, and implementation. A further challenge remains in the development of a comprehensive information exchange system among states that should enable the states to cross-check tax data across state borders, once the VAT evolves to the destination principle. The cost of developing such a system is being shared between the center and the states.

The loss in the tax/GDP ratio could be made up and further resource mobilization successfully achieved only through an expansion of the tax base. Thus exemptions and incentives for both direct and indirect taxes at the central level need to be scaled back significantly. On the administration side, computerization is imperative. At the state level, there is generally a high expectation that, through a broad tax base, and by its extension to the retail arena, the VAT would be revenue productive in the medium term.

In the long term, the goal for the reform of consumption taxation must be a national VAT. Many strides have been made, though much remains to be done. The process should not stop with the introduction of the state level VAT operating side by side with the central CENVAT. A national two-tier VAT, based on the destination principle, would comprise both the central and state levels. The center and states would appropriately share services as a tax base, reflecting cross-border or intraborder consumption, respectively. The challenge would be to achieve cooperation in information sharing between the central government and the states, and among the states themselves, for the concurrent VAT to operate successfully. Only then could the national VAT comprise a comprehensive consumption tax that would cover both goods and services at all subnational levels.

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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Fiscal System and Policy since 1952**

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TECHNICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE, 1952–2000 The fragility of the Indian food production and distribution system was exposed after the disastrous Bengal famine in 1943. Then, following partition, about 32 percent of total irrigated land went to Pakistan. Consequently, food production in India had fallen short of demand and the prices of food grains surged significantly. In order to increase the food grain production levels, the cultivated area under food crops was expanded through special programs, even in the early 1940s, with such initiatives as the Grow More Food Campaign. Further, on the basis of the recommendations of the Food Grain Policy Committee in 1947, the reclamation of 25 million acres (10 million hectares) of land was undertaken to expand the cultivated area under food crops. But this singular focus on food grain production led to an acute shortage in cotton and other fiber production in the late 1940s, and this problem was addressed through an Integrated Production Programme initiated in 1950. The consequent increase in food production was largely achieved through expansion of cultivated area during the 1950s (see Table 1). However, due to the limited scope for further expansion in cultivated area, agricultural production soon became stagnant and even declined during the subsequent drought years. At this stage, the vital role of technology was realized, particularly the land-augmenting technology that enhances the yield per unit of land. The introduction of technical changes through improved seed, fertilizer, irrigation, mechanization, and plant protection have brought dramatic changes in agricultural production since the 1950s. These technical changes in agriculture have proceeded in a step-by-step manner; initially, the focus was on the development of land, irrigation, and other inputs; subsequently, the emphasis was on high-yielding varieties (HYVs) and improved "package of practices"; and finally, postharvest and marketing aspects were explored. Following this progression, technical developments in agriculture from 1952 to 2000 can be spread across three distinct phases, based on the nature and progress of technical changes: the pre-"revolution" period, the period of production revolution, and the period of market reforms.

Pre-Revolution Period (1952–1966)

Though the major breakthrough in agricultural production had come through the "Green Revolution," which introduced HYVs, steps toward land-augmenting technical changes were actually initiated in the 1950s. In order to address the problems of food shortage and the resultant rise in food prices, the agriculture sector was given the highest priority in India's first Five-Year Plan. Focus was placed on expansion of irrigation, land reclamation, and the domestic production of inorganic fertilizers.



Rose Cultivation for Export. In recent years, rose cultivation—which once seemed a secure industry in states like Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra—has faced stiff competition in the form of cheaper imports from Africa. With many small growers being driven out of business, others are trying to survive by exploring new overseas markets. DINESH KHANNA.

Land reclamation and development. As a part of the Grow More Food Campaign, the reclamation of nearly 25 million acres (10 million hectares) of land was set as a target, and land reclamation was undertaken on a large scale across India. Nearly 188,000 acres (76,000 hectares) of land was reclaimed in the Tarai region itself, through a process of mechanized jungle clearing and provision of drainage, between 1948 and 1960. Consequently, the net area sown had gone up from about 297 million acres (120 million hectares) in 1952–1953 to about 341 million acres (138 million hectares) in 1966–1967, and the respective annual average growth rates (net as well as gross area sown) were the maximum during the 1950s, compared to any other period (see Table 1).

Irrigation. A number of major irrigation projects were completed during the first Five-Year Plan, including the

Tungabhadra Project (1956), Maithon (1957), Konar (1955), Kakarpara (1957), Gandhi Sagar (1960), Lower Bhawani (1955), Ghataprabha Left Bank (1956), and Hirakud Dam (1956). In addition to surface irrigation, groundwater irrigation through tube wells gained popularity in the 1950s. Further, mechanization of irrigation operations, as reflected by the steep increase in number of diesel engines and electric pumps, picked up momentum in the late 1950s. As a result, the extent of irrigated area in the total cultivated area had gone up from about 17 percent in the 1950s to about 20 percent in the 1960s (see Table 1).

Mechanization and rural electrification. The mechanization of agriculture was also initiated in the early 1950s but was largely restricted to irrigation operation (diesel engines and electric motors) and included to a

TABLE 1

| Growth trends in land utilization from 1950 to 2000 | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (percent per year) | | | | | |
| | Net area sown | Gross area sown | Net irrigated area | Gross irrigated area | Percent area irrigated |
| 1950s | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 17.4 |
| 1960s | 0.4 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 20.0 |
| 1970s | 0.1 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 25.4 |
| 1980s | −0.1 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 31.1 |
| 1990s | −0.1 | 0.5 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 37.6 |

SOURCE: Compiled from *Agricultural Statistics at a Glance*, Department of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi, August 2004.

limited extent the use of tractors. The number of electric pumps for irrigation purposes increased steeply, from about 56,000 at the end of first plan period to more than 500,000 by the end of third plan period, as a result of the expansion in rural electrification launched during the first plan period.

Fertilizer use. Though the role of fertilizers as an important source of nutrients and a substitute for organic manures was recognized, their use was not widespread and was restricted to commercial crops in southern regions of the country until 1950. In order to create awareness among farmers about the importance and methods of fertilizer application, a number of programs were created, such as the Agricultural Technical Assistance Programme (1951) and the Fertilizer Demonstration Programme (1954–1956). Soil-testing laboratories were also established to collect and analyze soil samples and to prepare a nutrient status map of the villages. As a result, the application of fertilizers increased, with an average annual growth rate of about 20 percent in the 1950s and 25 percent in the 1960s. The consumption of phosphatic and potashic fertilizers was almost negligible until the 1950s but started rising in the subsequent period; the growth in phosphatic and potashic fertilizer application outpaced that of nitrogenous fertilizers during the 1950s and 1960s, although the use was judicious in absolute quantities.

Package of practices. Following an increase in the first plan period, the food grain output actually declined in the second plan period as the result of successive drought years. As a result, the gap between the targeted and actual production became more pronounced. In view of the serious food deficit situation, the government of India invited the Ford Foundation Team to study India's food production problems and to help in shaping proposals for a coordinated effort to increase food production on an emergency basis. Based on the recommendations of the

team, the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme (IADP) was initiated, which featured a “package of practices” for each crop, based on recent research findings. According to the team, the package of practices, which included irrigation, improved seed, mechanization, fertilizers, and pesticides, could lead to a remarkable increase in crop production only if all practices were adopted in particular combination with one another. Though the program was successful in increasing yields to some extent during the early 1960s, the success was restricted to resource-endowed areas that accounted for only 5 percent of the total cultivated area in the country. Further, severe drought in 1965–1966 and 1966–1967 led to a sharp fall in food grains, to 71 million tons (72 million tonnes) from 87 million tons (89 million tonnes) in 1964–1965. Consequently, food grain imports reached more than 9.8 million tons (10 million tonnes) in 1966–1967.

Period of Production Revolution (1966–1990)

The IADP program, or package of practices, could not, however, solve the problem of shortage in food grain production completely, despite the hope for increasing yield levels through better practices. The reason for the program's limited success was recognized to be an inherent problem associated with the traditional improved varieties of wheat and rice. After the application of high doses of fertilizers, those varieties grew taller, with slim stems, and had a tendency to fall over at the time of maturity, notwithstanding the grain weight. Hence, the immediate focus was to find a technology through which vertical growth of improved varieties could be restricted.

Green Revolution (1966–1980). During the same period, U.S. agronomist Norman E. Borlaug (often called the “father of the Green Revolution”), director of the Cooperative Wheat Research and Production Program in Mexico, was successfully incorporating dwarfing

TABLE 2

| Area under High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (million hectares) | | | | | |
| | Paddy | Wheat | Jowar | Bajra | Maize |
| 1966–1967 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 4.1 |
| 1969–1970 | 11.5 | 29.5 | 3.0 | 9.2 | 7.7 |
| 1979–1980 | 40.6 | 67.8 | 18.3 | 28.0 | 23.6 |
| 1990–1991 | 64.2 | 86.8 | 49.1 | 54.4 | 44.2 |
| 1998–1999 | 73.7 | 87.2 | 95.0 | 76.9 | 58.1 |

SOURCE: Compiled from *Fertilizer Statistics of India*, Fertilizers Association of India, New Delhi, 2004.

genes in high-yielding wheat varieties by crossing the short-stemmed germ plasm from Norin 10 with high-yielding Mexican wheat varieties capable of responding to high doses of fertilizers and irrigation. The Mexican dwarf wheat varieties recorded increases as high as 400 percent in their yields in 1965 over that in 1950. Soon, India had imported the dwarf germ plasm (Lerma Rojo 64 and Sonara 64) from Mexico, and Indian scientists developed high-yielding, pest-resistant, and input-responsive dwarf wheat varieties by crossing these lines with local high-yielding varieties.

Similarly, the first semidwarf *indica* rice variety, Taichung Native 1, was developed by crossing a semi-dwarf *indica* variety, Dee-gee-woo-gen, with a drought-resistant variety, 'sai-Yuan-Chung, at the Taichung District Agricultural Improvement Station in Taiwan in 1956. Subsequently, the rice breeders at the International Rice Research Institute made several crosses of Dee-gee-woo-gen and ultimately developed new semi-dwarf rice varieties (IR 8, IR 5, IR 20, IR 22, and IR 24) with heavy stalks, responsive to high fertilizer doses and capable of maturing in 100 days instead of 160 days. India, being the world's largest source of rice germ plasm, had actively participated and cooperated in developing the new rice varieties. The high-yielding semidwarf rice breeding lines were introduced, and numerous improved varieties were developed with the active participation of the Central Rice Research Institute, the All-India Coordinated Rice Improvement Programme, and various state agricultural universities. Finally, high-yielding rice varieties were released for large-scale commercial cultivation all over India in 1966. In addition, high-yielding varieties of coarse cereals, including sorghum, *bajra*, and maize, were also developed through hybridization and were released for large-scale commercial cultivation during the late 1960s.

With an established network through IADP, the cultivation of high-yielding varieties spread rapidly across the

country. Technological changes in the form of high-yielding dwarf wheat varieties became an instant success in India. Thus began the golden period in Indian agriculture called the "Green Revolution." The spread of HYVs of rice was relatively slow compared to that of wheat. The area under HYVs of wheat reached more than 60 percent of total wheat cultivated by the mid-1970s, while it took fifteen more years (until 1990–1991) to reach the same level (64 percent) for rice (see Table 2). The expansion in cultivated area under HYVs led to a steep increase in rice production in the subsequent years, from about 31.5 million tons (32 million tonnes) in the triennium ending in 1968 to about 49 million tons (50 million tonnes) in the triennium ending in 1980. However, the increase in production was much steeper in the 1980s, rising to 71.8 million tons (73 million tonnes) in the triennium ending in 1991 (see Table 3). Adoption of HYVs of *jowar*, *bajra*, and maize was slow, and most of the expansion took place after the mid-1980s. Consequently, the growth of food grain production was the highest during the 1980s, compared to any other period.

Considering the frequency of drought, a characteristic of Indian agriculture, assured irrigation has become a prerequisite for intensifying agricultural production in India, particularly following the introduction of HYVs. A number of major irrigation projects were completed, and the area under irrigation expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 1). Apart from major irrigation projects, emphasis was also placed on increasing minor irrigation projects through groundwater exploitation. Consequently, the total area under irrigation grew from about 55.8 million acres (22.6 million hectares) in 1950–1951 to about 123 million acres (50 million hectares) in 1979–1980. Most of this increase was brought about through minor irrigation projects that tapped groundwater to provide assured irrigation.

Considering the limitations to expanding irrigation through canals as well as groundwater, agricultural scientists and planners started promoting rain-fed agriculture through a promising "watershed" technology during the 1980s. A number of watershed projects emerged in the subsequent period, sponsored by domestic as well as external sources. The amount invested in watershed development reached U.S.\$500 million by the late 1990s. Further, in order to conserve soil and water, particularly in rain-fed areas, technical changes in the form of sprinklers and drip irrigation methods were also promoted through the provision of subsidies in the 1980s and 1990s.

Plant protection, though practiced in Indian agriculture since ancient times, became more vital with the introduction of HYVs. The HYVs, due to their responsiveness to fertilizers, particularly to nitrogenous fertilizers, have a tendency to grow succulent and become

susceptible to pests and diseases. With increasing irrigation and fertilizer application, the growth of weeds also increased. As a measure of plant protection, the first Pest and Disease Surveillance Service was organized in 1969 in selected districts of the IADP. The service was extended to other parts of the country in the subsequent period. With the growing awareness of pests and their control, the application of chemicals for plant protection increased sharply, from about 13,800 tons (14,000 tonnes) in 1960–1961 to about 59,000 tons (60,000 tonnes) in 1978–1979. Application of pesticides became an important component of crop production, particularly in the case of commercial crops like cotton, tobacco, and sugarcane.

Similar to the other inputs, a steep increase in farm mechanization was observed in the production revolution period. Mechanization of irrigation operation expanded rapidly and resulted in a multiplier effect on crop production through crop intensification. This led to the mechanization of other farm operations to ensure timeliness. A steep growth in the number of tractors and other major farm machinery was evident during late 1960s and 1970s.

Yellow (Oilseed) Revolution (1986–1990). The Green Revolution could be called a “cereal revolution,” as the thrust was to increase food production to meet the domestic consumption demand. As a result, other crops (oilseeds and pulses [legumes]) were left untouched, and their output levels remained stagnant in the 1970s. In view of the dismal performance of oilseeds during the 1960s and 1970s, the government of India created the Technology Mission on Oilseeds (TMO) in May 1986. The objective of the TMO was to achieve self-sufficiency in edible oils; to achieve this, the TMO implemented the introduction of HYVs of oilseeds, together with the adoption of improved production technology, a better supply of inputs, and extension services and postharvest technologies. Consequently, a major increase in oilseed production was achieved; the production of oilseeds increased from 10.7 million tons (10.83 million tonnes) in 1985–1986 to 24.6 million tons (25 million tonnes) in the late 1990s. Following the success in oilseed production, other crops, including pulses, oil palm, and maize, were brought under the TMO in 1990, 1992–1993, and 1995–1996, respectively.

White Revolution (1970–1996). Technical changes in the livestock sector, including cross-breeding, frozen semen technology, and artificial insemination, were initiated in the 1950s. But the performance of livestock as a whole, and the dairy subsector in particular, was disappointing, with near zero growth during the 1960s. In light of this, the government initiated a massive dairy development program, popularly known as Operation

TABLE 3

| Trends in output of various crops | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (millions of metric tons) | | | | | |
| | Paddy | Wheat | Jowar | Bajra | Maize |
| 1966–1967 | 30.4 | 11.4 | 9.2 | 4.5 | 4.9 |
| 1969–1970 | 40.4 | 20.1 | 9.7 | 5.3 | 5.7 |
| 1979–1980 | 42.3 | 31.8 | 11.7 | 4.0 | 5.6 |
| 1989–1990 | 73.6 | 49.9 | 12.9 | 6.7 | 9.7 |
| 1999–2000 | 89.7 | 76.4 | 8.7 | 5.8 | 11.5 |

SOURCE: Compiled from *Agricultural Statistics at a Glance*, Department of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi, August 2004.

Flood, in 1970. Veghese Kurien was the principal architect of the program, which was implemented in three phases from 1971 to 1996, with support from the European Economic Community, the World Food Programme, and a soft loan from the World Bank.

The aim of the program was to expand milk production through processing and marketing facilities. Toward this objective, milk producers’ cooperatives were organized to collect, process, and sell milk to achieve a secured market and remunerative prices. Further, in order to enhance milk production, inputs such as better feed and fodder, breed improvement through artificial insemination, and disease control measures were also arranged through cooperatives. This coordinated effort led to an increase in milk production and ushered in an era of “White Revolution.” During this period, milk production increased at an annual average growth of about 5 percent. Consequently, milk production in India increased from 21.6 million tons (22 million tonnes) in 1970 to 29.6 million tons (30.1 million tonnes) in 1980–1981 (first phase) and to 78.7 million tons (80 million tonnes) in 2000–2001 (following the second and third phases).

Blue Revolution. Fishing has been practiced traditionally in the coastal states of India since ancient times. The importance of introducing scientific fishing to increase productivity was recognized, and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) implemented an All India Coordinated Research Project on Brackishwater Fish Farming (1973–1984). The objective of the program was to develop and test various farming technologies under different agro-climatic conditions of the country. The main center of the project was located in West Bengal; other centers were located in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Goa for demonstrating the technologies to small-scale farmers. In addition, shrimp hatchery technology was also introduced into the country, and two commercial hatcheries were established in

the late 1980s with an initiative from the Marine Products Export Development Authority. As a result, the production of fisheries, particularly of inland fisheries, increased significantly, at an average annual growth rate of 7.1 percent and 6.2 percent during the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. By 2002 India had become the third largest producer of fish. The growth of inland fisheries outpaced the growth in marine fisheries, primarily due to a rapid expansion of shrimp farming in the coastal states of the country.

Period of Market Reforms (1991–2000)

There were no significant economic reforms directed toward agriculture, except the removal of the quota system with the inception of the World Trade Organization. However, the devaluation of the rupee in 1991, as part of the financial reforms, triggered the growth of agricultural exports. Among agricultural products, exports of fruits and vegetables, meat, and marine products recorded a significant increase throughout the 1990s as a result of growing international trade in these products, underscoring the significance of postharvest and agro-processing technology in promoting exports.

Agro-processing. The growing market reforms and commercialization of agriculture has created a need for processing and postharvest handling of agricultural produce. Processing adds value, enhances shelf life, and minimizes losses. As the productivity levels of almost all crops reached near stagnation in the 1990s, processing technology emerged as an alternative for increasing the availability of food products through minimizing losses and enhancing shelf life. In addition, growing urbanization has also led to a significant increase in domestic demand for processed and packaged agricultural products. In order to encourage food processing, the government of India has taken a number of steps, first creating the Ministry for Food Processing Industries in 1988. The ministry has taken many initiatives, such as integrated food law, the creation of cold storage facilities, and the establishment of food parks (centers for distribution of all the processed grains and horticultural products across the country). As a result, the food processing industry expanded significantly in 1990s. Recognizing the potential and comparative advantage that India has in the agro-processing industry, a number of agro-export zones were established across the country. Thus, it is the changes in postharvest technology that have dominated Indian agriculture since the 1990s.

Genetically engineered crop varieties. Near stagnation in yields of all field crops in the 1990s created the need to look for alternative technology that can further boost crop yields. In this context, genetic engineering appeared to be a promising choice. Genetically engineering has been

widely used in the pharmaceutical industry, but its entry into the agriculture sector has been surrounded by apprehensions. In India, the efforts initiated in the late 1990s to release the first genetically engineered crop, “Bt cotton,” were not successful until 2002, due to strong protests from environmentalists. On the other hand, several research units under ICAR and state agricultural universities have been working to develop genetically modified crops suitable for Indian conditions. However, the dilemmas concerning the commercial cultivation of genetically engineered crop varieties still persist, owing to the serious concerns of biosafety and biodiversity.

See also **Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950; Economic Reforms of 1991**

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
TEMPLE TYPES (STYLES) OF INDIA The forms of the Hindu temple are based on a rich blending of imageries, including most significantly those drawn from the ritual requirements of Vedic sacrifice and the hierarchical arrangements and towered forms of the royal palace. The geographic spread of the styles through which this imagery is expressed roughly parallels that of India’s numerous languages, in a wide range of local vernaculars that fit generally into northern, Nāgara, and southern, Dravida, regional traditions. Their chronological development is framed by the regnal eras of the dynastic powers governing their patronage.

Though we may consider any Indian shrine for icon worship a Hindu temple, the elite, refined (*samskrita*)

temples constructed in brick and stone, or excavated from the living rock of a promontory, have received the most prestigious patronage over the centuries and—because they have survived—the greatest recognition by modern cultural historians. The vast majority of these *devasthāna* or *prāsāda* (places or palaces of the gods) are Brahmanical, but Jains, Buddhists, and other sects have had closely comparable temples constructed or excavated by the same communities of artisans and more or less according to the same quasi-textual principles. Their remains in the ancient period extend beyond the borders of modern India to the historical limits of Indic culture, reaching as far north and west as Afghanistan, as far east as Bangladesh, south to the island of Sri Lanka.

The oldest evidence of these temples can be traced to the emergence of monumental arts in stone of the Maurya period of the third century B.C. The rock-cut Lomas Rishi and Sudhama excavations of the Barabar Hills in Bihar preserve in their outlines the essential form that has lasted to this day, of inner and outer chambers, constructed on carefully proportioned, symmetrical, geometric layouts, oriented to the celestial axes, and crowned with domed or vaulted ceilings. The Barabar Hills excavations were created for the Ajivika sect. Among the earliest representations we have of a Brahmanical temple is the stone relief depiction of the domed Sudhamā Deva Sabhā (the Holy Assembly Hall of the Gods) enshrining the Buddha's turban as an object of veneration, attached to the multistoried Vijayanta Paśāde (Victorious Palace) of Indra, on a railing pillar from the Buddhist stupa at Bharhut, from about 100 B.C. It shows a design quite similar to the Barabar Hills pair, of a rectilinear hall connecting to a domed chamber. As the palace of a Brahmanical deity enshrining an object of worship, it is quite literally a Hindu temple. Both designs represent wood-framed structures, carefully articulated to display refined carpentry and joinery, as contrasted with the less refined wattle and daub constructions represented for common, vernacular dwellings in early Buddhist reliefs.


The oldest texts referring to the construction of Hindu temples, such as the sixth-century A.D. Brihat Saṃhitā, and the later Vāstu Shāstras, like the Mayamata, explain the devotional temple for the worship of Purāṇic deities as the equivalent of a Vedic sacrifice, both in the process by which the metaphysical (*sūkṣma*) significance is implanted in its physical (*sthūla*) structure and in the benefits its construction achieves for its *yajamana* (sacrificer) patron. Prior to the construction of the temple, the metaphysical design was inscribed upon the chosen site as a *vāstu mandala* (sacred grid) with its various *pada* (squares) assigned to different deities. The main deity occupies the central squares of the grid, with subordinate



Mahabodhi temple complex in Bodh Gayā. Dating from the late Gupta period (fifth or sixth century), it is one of the earliest Buddhist temples built entirely in brick still standing in India. LINDSAY HEBBERD / CORBIS.

deities occupying the separate *pada*, cells of the inner and outer surrounding bands of the grid. These geometric forms are not a ground plan for the temple, but a conceptual model for the *parivārālaya-prākāra*, the concentric cloisters of chambers surrounding the *deva* (king or deity), which is the ideal form of both the royal palace and the refined Hindu temple.

Unlike the architectural systems of Europe or East Asia, where structures are conceptualized as being assembled from bays, measuring the space from one support column to the next, Hindu temples are conceived as assemblages of compartments. Even more distinctively, the Brahmanical temple is conceived as a transcendental entity. Once consecrated, it is as much the body of the gods it enshrines as the sanctum icons that represent them in figurative and symbolic form. As the worshipers pass through the temple's halls on their way to the witness the deity in its sanctum, they pass within the cloister



Gangotri Temple. In the hinterlands of the Himalayas, in Uttar Pradesh, the River Ganges, the “stream of life,” begins its flow. Built in the eighteenth century, the Gangotri temple marks this spot and is the destination of many Hindu pilgrims who often perform ritual in the surrounding cascading waters. CHRIS LISLE / CORBIS.

of compartments inhabited by the main god’s surrounding divinities.

The forms of the Vedic altars, ritual *mandalas*, cosmic mountains, and gods’ chariots are all models for the stone temple, but it is the imagery of the royal palace that dominates the temple’s visible forms and ritual operation. The temple is the god’s palace, constructed as a handsome, domed and turreted mansion of inner and outer quarters, where the deity is represented in human (as well as symbolic) form, surrounded by its court of subordinate beings and served by its human priests and worshipers. Though they are mural structures of brick or stone masonry, these celestial mansions are articulated to represent the wood frame construction, with plaster walls and thatched roofs, of contemporaneous palaces. The hierarchy of the central deity surrounded by ranges of demigods and lesser beings, protected by walls excluding

those of the lowest castes, proclaims the social hierarchy of the *varṇa* system.

The simplest temples are (usually though not necessarily) square sanctums (*garbha griha*) covered by vaulted towers, oriented toward one of the cardinal directions. Normally the sanctum is preceded by a porch or a hall where worshipers can go to approach the god, and the temple sanctum carries a tower representing multiple stories, to signify the enclosing rings of encircling deities, the *parivāra-devatā*, of the god’s retinue, described in the Shāstras.

Textual references to these temples go back to Pāṇini, in the fourth century B.C. The earliest structural temple remains are archaeological fragments, and inscriptions on structures that have long since disintegrated. The earliest preserved of these sites, like Nagari and Nagarjunakonda, show elongated halls on rectilinear and apsidal plans, located within walled compounds more or less in the forms seen more fully in the interiors of the Buddhist *caitya griha* at the contemporaneous rock-hewn sites of Bhaja, Nasik, and Ajanta.

Historic Remains

The most striking element of temple form, from the earliest examples to the present, have been the towers—called *vimāna* in the south, *shikhara* in the north—that reach over their sanctums, indicating the location of the deity, and symbolically depicting the deity as surrounded by its numerous subordinate deities. The ornate forms of these towers are the most prominent displays of their distinctive styles.

The Shilpa Shāstra texts divide the myriad temple types into Nāgara (northern), Dravida (southern), and Vesera (mixed), according to the shapes of their towers. The full scope of these traditions extends beyond the tower forms to their entire structural and ornamental vocabularies, including pillar, doorway, wall niche, architrave, and molding orders. The great majority of fine stone temples can be classed into local varieties of northern or southern regional traditions, or a combination of the two.

The locations of the Nāgara and Dravida traditions coincide roughly with the regions associated with Indo-European and Dravidian language use, upon which much Indic culture is organized, expressing a conscious alignment with that pattern. The Dravida traditions, with their additive combination of fully formed miniature *kūta* (sanctum depictions) are in accord with the agglutinative nature of Dravidian languages, much as the highly elided, nonagglutinative form of the Nāgara traditions suit Indo-European languages. Geographically the Nāgara style extends farther south than the concentration of Indo-

European language use, beyond the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers, which are more or less the northern limit of the Dravida style. Many sorts of Vesera (mixed) style temples can be found in the upper Krishna and Tungabhadra basins, where the two macroregions overlap.

The earliest surviving Brahmanical temple remains, such as the brick temple at Bhitargaon and the rock-cut shrines of Udayagiri Vidisa, come from the fifth century A.D. and display the gradual emergence of the two style traditions. By the sixth century, temples in a number of places show them in their distinctive forms.

The Dravida Style

The mid-sixth century A.D. South Temple of the Rāvaṇa Phadi complex at Aihole offers us what is likely the simplest and possibly the earliest surviving example of the Dravida style. It is a cubical sanctum, raised on a molded basement, crowned by a four-sided cupola, and preceded by a porch. It is a simple *ekatala vimāna* (single-story sanctum). The Dravida style is characterized by the crowning of every significant element with a domed superstructure, if not such a square vault then a round, apsidal, eight-sided, or oblong (barrel) vault.

A glance toward the contemporaneous rock-cut shrine beside the South Temple shows a facade representing a pair of comparable domed pavilions flanking its entrance. As with other rock-cut temples of South Asia, the promontory into which the temple is excavated expresses its tower. A difference between the Nidhi (wealth deity) shrines, represented in relief on the cave facade, and the freestanding South Temple is the presence of a dormer window, *gavāksha*, in the center of these domes.

The addition and multiplication of such architectural details as this *gavāksha* dormer is one of the key means of developing temple design from the earliest period to this one. The other is the more subtle contouring, proportion, and ornamentation of these forms. The two-story Banantigudi, at nearby Mahakuta, adds a *gavāksha* to the dome and raises it over a pilaster-articulated second story. The subsequent Chalukya Dravida temple on the north fort at Badami raises this simple four-sided dome to a third story, articulates its supporting stories as a *hāra* (cloister) of *kūta* (cells), and sets the entire multistoried tower within a hall articulated to represent a *parivārālaya-prākāra* ring of miniature chambers set in a connecting gallery. By the early eighth century, Dravida temples, like the Malegitti at Badami and the Kailasanatha at Kanchipuram, display eight-sided domes, buttressed by miniature *kūta* and raised over multiple *parivārālaya* stories and surrounding halls.

In the Kailasanatha we can see this essential Dravida prototype articulated spatially in a towered sanctum

buttressed by surrounding chambers, set within a courtyard ringed by a free-standing *parivārālaya-prākāra* (courtyard wall of subdeity sanctums). The Virupaksha and Mallikarjuna temples at Pattadakal both display *parivārālaya-prākāra*. This is not because, as was once believed, they were copied from the Kailasanatha, but because this multiplication and elaboration of vaulted pavilions in concentric hierarchies is the essential pattern of the Dravida temple, recognizable in the decorative imagery of its towers, wall entablatures, and door and window pediments.

As the northern and southern style regions coincide roughly with the linguistic-cultural macroregions, the individual Dravida traditions in stone were developed within the vernacular-linguistic regions represented roughly by the modern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. Within each region they have been most effectively distinguished by the dynasties that have patronized their creation. The imperial Chalukya developed the earliest Dravida tradition of the Kannada-speaking Deccan, and the imperial Pallava the earliest of the Tamil coastal plain. The subsequent traditions in the Tamil region, associated with the patronage of the earlier and later Chola dynasties (ninth to thirteenth centuries), carry on directly from the Pallava in relatively similar forms, enriching some decorative and structural elements and adding others. In the Chola's royal Brihadesvara temple at Tanjavur, the Dravida temple *vimāna* reaches its greatest height, at 216 feet (66 m), and begins to display the multiplication of concentric *prākāra* enclosures and barrel-vaulted *gōpura* (gateways) that become characteristic of larger second-millennium complexes.

We can see an example of this later, developed Dravida temple complex in the multiple sanctums, halls, and enclosing courtyards, of the Bhaktavatsaleshvara at Tirukkalukkundram. The Bhaktavatsaleshvara, which includes structures from as early as the ninth century at its core, reached its present size in the seventeenth century. Though early temple texts require the tower of the main deity to be the tallest structure at a site, it is interesting to note that with the multiplication of concentric temple walls and gateways, we find *gōpura* towers increasing in height as one moves away from the main temple, in a reversal of previously established hierarchy.

With the Vijayanagara dynasties from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, the Tamil regional formula of vast walled compounds was spread to the Deccan, and there is a multiplication of broad, open, multipillared pavilions with elaborate figurative piers. The Kannada Dravida traditions of the Chalukya of Kalyani in the eleventh and twelfth centuries are mostly, though not always, characterized by increasingly profuse

decorative detail, and a multiplication of sanctums off a common hall. From the twelfth century on, decorative *kūta* of a distinctively Nāgara type are incorporated in these designs. Thus an essentially Dravida tradition becomes subtly Vesera.

In the Telugu-speaking regions of the Deccan are found styles quite comparable to, but distinct from, those in the Kannada regions. The earliest surviving structural temples there were created under an eastern branch of the Chalukya, carrying a similarly simple, early Dravida style into the ninth and tenth centuries with a growing profusion of ornamentation. The Kalyani Chalukya tradition of Karnataka crossed into Andhra with the spread of that dynasty's power. The progressively enriched and elaborated Deccan Dravida temples of the Telugu Choda, Kakatiya, and Reddi, from the eleventh through the mid-fourteenth centuries, are marked by increasingly elaborate architectural articulation and the development of finely stylized, large-scale figurative imagery.

The most striking variations within the Dravida tradition are found in the styles of the western coastal plain of Kerala and Karnataka, where expansive wood frame roofs crown the designs and wood details take over important elements of the internal decoration as well. That these are essentially Dravida style designs can be seen from the domed pavilions depicted in its stone niche pediments and entablatures, though the dramatic visual impact of its wooden roofs leave much of these walls in shadow, obscuring this element at first glance. The temples of coastal Karnataka combine the wooden superstructures and ornamentation of the southwest coast with Deccan Dravida stone articulation.

While the conservative Dravida traditions of Tamil Nadu have been maintained within a relatively narrow range up to the modern period, changing in proportion, elaboration, and ornamentation but relatively little in their basic forms, the styles of the west coast and the Deccan have continued to create a wide range of local variation.

The Nāgara Style

The Nāgara style articulates the same underlying symbolic forms seen in Dravida temples, in an alternative stylistic tradition. Its distinctive curvilinear *latina* tower presents a more vertical and compactly unified representation of these forms than the layered, horizontal, and segmental display of the Dravida style. It is not as obvious at first glance that the rings of miniature chambers set in concentric hierarchies, raised one story above the other, are depicted on the Nāgara tower, as they are relatively obscured by the abbreviations and fusions of its decorative vocabulary and their subordination to the curvilinear outline and vertical ribs. Where Dravida

forms are composed of separate *kūta* chambers lined up in distinct rows, the *latina shikbara* represents its collection of miniature chambers more subtly, through contractions and combinations, subordinated to the commanding unity of its parabolic silhouette.

The famous Kumrahar plaque of the second century, apparently depicting an early incarnation of the Mahabodhi temple at Bodh Gayā, reveals that this variation existed from an early period. It represents a *shikbara* temple, with four stories rising over its sanctum, the miniature chambers of the upper levels represented not by fully articulated *kūta* but by the abbreviation of *gavāksha* dormers.

At Mahakuta, where eighth-century Nāgara and Dravida temples stand side by side, we can see a clear example of the *latina* tower on the Sangamesvara temple. The wall of the Sangamesvara has a raised central image niche at its center, and subordinated *udgama* (interconnected *gavāksha*) pediments on either side, representing smaller, flanking chambers. The Nāgara tower above continues this imagery with a raised central rib crowning the central niche, flanked by corner ribs over the subordinate bays. Within its curvilinear outline, the Nāgara tower blends its horizontal layers and vertical ribs into a complex unity, capped by the cogged wheel of the crowning *āmalaka*, which is the Nāgara's equivalent of the domical cupola of the Dravida style. (Both traditions add a *kalasha*, a ritual water vessel, above the crown, to signify the temple's ritual consecration.) A continuous *udgama* network blends the central rib into a single unit. The corner ribs, however, are divided into Nāgara *kūta* formed out of two *udgama* layers capped by a corner *āmalaka*. Thus, like the Dravida's *vimāna* tower, the Nāgara's *shikbara* tower represents a palatial, skyscraper crown for the sanctum, composed of story upon story of cloistered chambers.

If we shift our gaze from the Deccan-Nāgara to the Kalinga-Nāgara of Mukhalingam, in coastal Andhra, we can see the *parivārālaya-prākāra* represented on the *mandapa* of the ninth-century Madhukesvara. The Madhukesvara's hall has enlarged replicas of its curvilinear tower at its four corners, linked by a row of miniature towers in reliefs, representing a cloister of Nāgara cells. Comparable *parivārālaya* of cells are represented on most Nāgara sanctums and halls, though this may be obscured by the richness of the ornamentation, depicting the abbreviations and elaborations of the underlying forms.

Nāgara temple designers employed an impressive creativity in devising the bewildering variety of rich decorative schemes to express the uniqueness of each subregional style and each individual temple. The visual emphasis of the tenth-century Lakshmaṇa temple at Khajuraho, in central India, stresses its horizontal layers of molded

basements, and walls with figures stacked one over the other, before taking off vertically in its rippling towers. Here too every element is organized into a distinguishable sequence of linked cells, each crowned with an appropriate tower of its own.

The Lakshmaṇa temple shows an evolutionary variation of the Nāgara's curvilinear tower, where the *latina* core is buttressed by *urabshringa* (half-tower) forms on each side, and smaller quarter and three-quarter *shikhara* representations below. Each of these abbreviated towers represents the chamber of an attendant deity. But, in the nonagglutinative northern fashion, the individual cells are integrated into the compound whole through the abbreviations and elisions of modules ambiguously alluded to, rather than literally enunciated.

Preceding the Lakshmaṇa's compound tower, we can see lower, pyramidal roofs, covering its hall and two porches. These layered roofs complement the dramatic verticality of sanctum towers while distinguishing the spaces they cover as less exalted. There are smaller, subordinate temples standing at the corners of the Lakshmaṇa's subbasement, forming a conventional five-altar (*pañcāyatana*) worship complex.

As North India was divided among a larger number of local dynasties, spread over a wider geographic expanse than in the South, a greater number and variety of local styles were developed. The most widely spread variation of the curvilinear tower is found in the rudimentary-seeming *phāmsanā latina*, seen on the Madukesvara, where the horizontal tiers, visible beneath the *udgama* networks of the usual *latina*, are represented without ornamentation, within the characteristic curvilinear silhouette and crowned by *āmalaka*. We can see one of these towers on the temple beside the Sangamesvara at Mahakuta in the Deccan. Others are found from Gujarat to the Himachal foothills and to coastal Andhra. The Nāgara also makes occasional use of the barrel-vaulted form (called *valabbi* in the North), as seen in the eighth-century Teli-ka-mandir at Gwalior or the Vaital Deul at Bhuvaneshwar. Unlike the usual square sanctum, the oblong sanctum is associated with particular deities, the Seven Mothers (Sapta Matrika), or the reclining Anantasayana Vishnu, or the similarly lateral Trivikrama Vishnu.

The later Jain temples of western India represent a variation in which the cloister of exterior chambers is fully developed into discrete sanctums, as can be seen in the fifteenth-century temple of Adinatha at Ranakpur. The Yogini temple layout presents a variant in which the cloister of goddess cells surrounds a Bhairava temple or altar open to the sky, and so usually without a central tower at all. The Buddhist *vihara* layout presents a

variant in which the cloister of cells, inhabited by monks, stood alone, without a central structure. In the Mahayana phase, central cells of the cloister were enlarged to situate images of the Buddha.

Regional variations of the Nāgara grew progressively distinct over time, even appropriating a few West Asian decorative elements during the course of the second millennium. The incorporation of domes in Western India, as seen on the entrance pavilions at Ranakpur, provide an example of this appropriation.

The Vesera Style

There are a good number of temples that fit the textual reference to Vesera, or mixed traditions, in the region where the northern and southern traditions overlap, between the upper Krishna and Tungabhadra basins, and as far south as the Kaveri in Karnataka. Early Chalukya temples, from the seventh century on, incorporate distinctive elements from the Nāgara tradition into structures that are essentially Dravida, such as the Nāgara tower on the otherwise Dravida-style Durgā temple at Aihole. More rarely, Dravida elements appear on Nāgara structures, as in the wall entablatures of the Papanatha temple at Pattadakal.

Beginning with Kalyani Chalukya of the later eleventh century, there are temples that go beyond mixing, to blend elements of the two traditions together. The Hoysala, Kesava temple at Somnathpur is the most well-known example of this blending. Its crowning cupola is carved into so many wedge-shaped facets that it approaches the form of the *āmalaka*; its towers are difficult to classify into one style or the other; its niche pediments and miniature decorative elements mix northern-looking elements with southern-looking ones.

In a manner that parallels the spread of northern, Indo-European, elements into the essentially Dravidian languages of Kannada, Telugu, and Tamil, this is essentially a Dravida architectural tradition, incorporating Nāgara elements. The same combination is visible in the Deccan style of capping straight-sided *phāmsanā* towers with domical cupolas at Papanasi and Vijayanagar.

Temple Complexes

From their earliest remains, Hindu temples are found in hierarchical complexes, both as planned ensembles and as irregular assemblages, with smaller and peripheral, subordinated structures, surrounding primary shrines. From the earliest remains onward, we have evidence of enclosing *prākāra* walls and gateways. Nearly all temples of any size include a hall for worshipers attached to the sanctum. Many Shaiva temples in the South and some in the North include a Nandi *mandapa*, for the

god's alter-ego, the bull Nandi, who is located facing the sanctum on the longitudinal axis to the east. As time went on, the number of such halls increased. Dancing or offering pavilions are regularly located along the axis leading to the main sanctum in Orissa.

A number of temples were planned in pairs and in ritual or symbolic combinations. Major South Indian temples of the second millennium regularly have *amman* (goddess) shrines beside those of the god. Shiva shrines have separate temples for Chandesa, who is the custodian of Shiva's temple. *Pañcāyatana* arrangements of four subordinate sanctums surrounding a central sanctum are a conventional worship set. Tanks for ritual bathing are a common part of temple complexes. Halls without sanctums normally have flat or relatively lower pyramidal roofs, distinguishing them from the towering *vimāna* or *shikhara* over the deities.

Wherever there are temples of any importance, subordinate temples are likely to be added subsequently, by those wishing to share in the prestige of the original builder or in devotion to the god to whom the temple is dedicated. In many cases these appear to be the temples built by the courtiers or descendants of those who built the primary temples. At prosperous sites, such structures may be added at any time and often in the most irregular of manners, revealing the power of the later patrons rather than any original plan.

The Modern Period

With the Arab, Turkish, and Iranian invasions of the later twelfth century, the patronage of masonry temples declined precipitously in most of northern India. The more cosmopolitan traditions that continued exhibit the impact of new sources and the diminution of earlier continuities. An example of this can be seen in the seventeenth-to nineteenth-century brick temples of Bengal in eastern India, which preserve distinct references to the curvilinear forms of the Nāgara, while evolving a distinctly original new local style. The seventeenth-century temples at Brindaban display a style that blends traditional central Indian Nāgara forms with Mughal and west Indian architectural elements.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century India saw three notable developments in Hindu temple style. The first was a response to the gradual emergence of a subcontinentally expansive Indian state and enhanced communications, which have resulted in the regional styles of one locale appearing in distant sites through the movement of patrons and artisans. Thus Gujarati temple designs have appeared in Varanasi, Pune, and Chennai, and Dravida style *gōpura* have arisen in New Delhi and Brindaban. The second has been a conscious historicism, based on

traditionalist, and in some cases nationalist, political goals. Large temples in this mode have been patronized by the Birla industrial families in important North Indian cities, like the Lakshminarayana temple in New Delhi and the Sri Venkatesvara temple in Hyderabad. There have also been contrasting modernist structures attempting to transcend previous traditions, in structures like the Anandamayi Ma temple at Varanasi.

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See also **Ajanta; Hinduism (Dharma)**

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TEXTILES

This entry consists of the following articles:

BLOCK-PRINTED

EARLY PAINTED AND PRINTED

KARUPPUR

BLOCK-PRINTED

A practical difficulty in tracing the history of technological processes in India is the paucity of archaeological evidence. Ethnological evidence based on an extremely efficient method of transmission, however, helps to bridge this gap. Added to this is the strong element of social continuity engendered through the workings of caste and *jati* (the endogamous group into which a person is born within which marriages can take place) in the Indian social fabric. India has a great tradition in wool and silk, but the fabric that has received the greatest degree of commercial exploitation is cotton. Cotton, being a cellulose fiber, has not only a lesser affinity to dye than silk, but its light reflection capacity is also inferior. Ornamentation can thus be introduced more through variation in color and, to a lesser extent, through diversity in weave. The presence of a fragment of mordanted cotton yarn in Mohenjo-Daro, circa 3500–2500 B.C., attests to the mastery in dye chemistry achieved in South Asia since early times. It is evident that once the dye process had been understood it would be easy to embark



Worker Imprints a Bolt of Cotton, Jaipur, 1987. In India the expanding middle classes and a Westernized lifestyle have widened the market in block-printed textiles, in spite of growing competition from other emergent forms and materials. ZEN ICKNOW / CORBIS.

on the next step, that of selective application of mordant and resist through block or pen to control the range in color and pattern. When the term “block printing” is used in relation to natural dyes, it is important to remember that the block controls the application of resist and mordant on the material. It is on the basis of the application of mordant and resist that the desired color spectrum is developed. Turmeric and saffron, for yellow, and indigo, for blue, do not require the imposition of mordant.

Tradition

Merutunga, who recorded conditions in Gujarat (c. 884–1194), suggests that block printing was by then well established in the area. Hemachandra, born 1089 and hailing from the same region, also supports this. However, the earliest block-printed fragments of western Indian provenance found in Quseir al-Qadim, Egypt, have been dated to the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries.

The practice of block-printed textiles is spread over a large area in northern, western, and central India, inclusive

of the Gangetic belt. The northern belt includes the Jammu region and Punjab. The printing is unrefined and shares the characteristics of the tradition of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. The Gangetic belt is represented in Mathura, Tanda, Lucknow, and Farrukhabad. Jafarganj, near Fatehpur in Uttar Pradesh, was a celebrated center of printing in 1908. Its characteristic feature was color: vibrant red and striking blue. Mathura, being a pilgrim center, catered to an all-India market; a specialty was the *nāmavalī*, a printed shoulder cloth for ritual use. The background color ranged between yellow and ocher, and the names of deities and sacred symbols were printed on this. Tanda reflected the Mathura tradition and had markets in Nepal and Bhutan. Lucknow and Farrukhabad specialized in the “tree of life” motif and were influenced by the Persian style in ornamentation. West Bengal, having a superlative tradition in weaving, diversified into printing only in the nineteenth century. A description of cotton manufacture in Dhaka, dated to 1851, refers to the community of *chipigur*, who printed lines or passages from the Vedas on cloth for the Hindu community. The Muslim community utilized their services

for the printing of appropriate Qur'anic texts on their winding sheets, or *kuffan*.

The western Indian belt, characterized by the use of mud resist, comprises printing centers in Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh. Individual centers, each having variations in technique, comprise the Ajrakh (a type of mud resist printing practiced on the western part of the subcontinent) printing centers of Kutch (Gujarat) and Barmer (Rajasthan); ritual cloth (dedicated to the Mother Goddess, the *Māthāji ne Pachēi*) is printed in Ahmedabad; Bagru, Sanganer (Rajasthan), and Rajapur-Deesa (Gujarat) share a common technique, while Bagh and Bhairongarh represent two variants in Madhya Pradesh. Mud and lime resist are well suited to somewhat coarsely woven cotton. However, if more delicate work is required, wax resist is preferred. Georges Roques, of the French East Indian Company, noted the printing of wax resist in Ahmedabad in 1678. Wax resist was the dominant mode in South India, but it was *kalam* (brush) painted rather than block printed. The practice of *kalamkari* block printing in Masulipatam is a nineteenth-century innovation.

There is also evidence of clamp-resist printing on silk in Gujarat. This technique is also practiced in Nepal and Tibet for decorating the mounting of Buddhist ritual paintings, or *thankba*. A characteristic feature of this form is the outlining of motifs in a white aura, rather than defining the outline in black. The sumptuous textiles depicted in Jain Kalpa Sūtra manuscripts share the former characteristic and could be taken as depictions of silk ornamentation through the procedure of clamp resist.

Technique

There are several stages in cloth printing. These include initial preparation of cloth by removal of impurities, smoothening the texture, bleaching by dunging, a natural agent, and preparation of the fiber for enhanced penetration of the mordant. There is no application of the block at this stage. The cloth is then thoroughly washed, preferably in the flowing waters of a river or stream.

The next stage is that of mordanting. Mordant is a chemical substance that enables cotton to absorb and retain certain dyes. Mordants can either be acid or basic (alkaline). Acid mordants are tannin based. The most common source in India is either myrobalam (*Terminalia chebula*) or catechu (Hindi, *katha*; *Acacia catechu*). Basic mordants are derived from salts of various metals, particularly aluminum, chromium, iron, copper, zinc, or tin. Alum is the one most commonly used in India. Alkali from *surti kar* (saltpeter) or *sapan kar* (carbonate of soda)

has been used for *al* (*Morinda citrifolia*) dyeing in Berar. After mordanting, the fabric is boiled in a cauldron along with the dyestuff. The vessel can be of earthenware, copper, or iron. In the latter two cases, the metal containers themselves contribute an element to the mordanting process, thereby introducing variations in shade and hue.

Other aspects of the dyeing procedure include the use of items such as *jajakku* (*Memecylon edule*) in Tamil Nadu, or *padvas* (*Narigama alta*) in Gujarat, which act as carriers during the dyeing operation. In the case of *al*, on termination of the dyeing process alum or *dbā* (*Woodfordia floribunda*), is used as a fixing agent.

The application of resist is associated with indigo dyeing. The resist is derived from wax, mud, or lime. The dye is reconstituted in the vat through a process of fermentation. A cold vat is used. Although indigo blue is a stable color, it tends to rub off. Rubbing fastness can be improved by a final soaking in catechu. The technology of indigo printing had also been developed and practiced in India. Jean Ryhiner in 1766 referred to the Indian method of indigo printing with the use of orpiment, sulfur of arsenic, the liquid being further thickened with gum.

Design and Use

Although there is some congruity between woven and printed design, the latter offers a much greater degree of freedom in terms of layout and pattern. The costume of traditional India has been the multifunctional unstitched garment. It remains so in many sections of rural India. The patterning, whether woven or printed, is composed of two borders along the horizontal edges and cross-borders defining the two vertical end alignments. In the female costume, the sari, the cross-border at the exposed terminal end can be elaborately designed to set it off from the inner field.

The *Mānasollāsa*, authored by the Chalukyan king Sōmeshvara III (r. 1127–1139), provides comprehensive coverage of textile design in the section titled *Vastrōpabhōga* (using or enjoying of clothes by the king). In addition to geometrical motifs, floral, vegetal, animal, bird, and fish motifs could be used. *Ikat* and *plangi* motifs (which indicate the method by which the yarn to be used in weaving is tied according to pattern and dyed) could also be duplicated in block print. With the introduction of Islam, stitched garments became popular, leading to more elaborate all-over patterning. The *buteh* and the *badam* (popularly known as paisley) now emerged in a more distinctive manner. Tinsel printing, in which gum was applied with the block, was another innovation. Draperies began to emerge as a separate category. The forest was a place of retreat and contemplation in Hindu imagery, while the hunt had symbolic overtones in Islamic

culture. The palace was no longer fixed in location, and the roving camp of the king became the shifting imperial capital, with tent hangings providing much play to the imagination in the area of block printing. It was against this background that block-printed chintz design materialized with the advent of the Europeans, heralded by the arrival of Vasco da Gama on the Malabar coast.

Today the impact of the export market, accompanied by the onset of globalization, has led to many changes. Masulipatam has managed to sustain an export market without a total loss of identity. Screen printing has begun to make considerable inroads. The expanding middle classes and a Westernized lifestyle have widened the market in block-printed textiles, despite severe competition from other emergent forms and materials.

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EARLY PAINTED AND PRINTED


India's mastery over permanent dyes can be traced back to Harappan civilization (3000 B.C.) with the discovery of a fine cotton fragment dyed with mordants, attached to a silver vase. The export of dyed cotton must have been carried out during this period, as dye vats were found at Lothal, a Harappan port in Gujarat. There are hardly any fragments of printed and dyed cloth except for tie-dyed fabric (c. 1000 B.C.) found in Central Asia by Sir Auriel



Antique ghagra Skirt. In the state of Rajasthan, an often barren and colorless landscape, villagers and royalty alike commonly wear brightly colored, brilliantly detailed clothing. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Stien. Fragments were later found in Fostat and at Red Sea ports, dating to the thirteenth century A.D. The latest carbon dating has dated some fragments to the tenth century A.D.

Early literary sources mention the importance of the printing and dyeing industry. The Greek physician Ktesias (fl. 500 B.C.), while visiting Persia, mentioned "flowered cottons with glowing colors," greatly coveted by Persian women and imported from India. *The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, a first-century Roman record, gives a list of printing centers of western India, and Pliny commented that Roman coffers of gold were being depleted by the import of Indian cottons to satisfy the vanity of Roman women. It was the durability and brilliance of Indian cottons that made them renowned throughout the world.



Traditional Block-Printed Fabric from Sanganer, Rajasthan. Sanganer remains a center for textile dyeing and printing that utilize centuries-old techniques. In the printing process, cloth is spread on wax-coated tables and color in the form of a paste is applied through screens. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

The eastern coast had ancient links with Southeast Asia. Kalinga (present-day Orissa) had been greatly enriched by Southeast Asian trade during the pre-Buddhist era. Southeast Asia must also have had contacts with the west coast, as early examples of semiprecious agate stone beads excavated at Lothal were found in Indonesian grave sites dating to 500 B.C. Indian as well as Arab traders used printed Indian cottons as currency, exchanging them for spices, as Indonesian islanders were not interested in bullion. Carbon dating of recent discoveries of fine Indian printed and painted cottons from Indonesia, especially from Toraja in Sulawesi, has given an accurate early date not only to these textiles, but also to printed cottons found in Fostat and Red Sea ports.

Europeans entered the trade in printed textiles much later, while Indians, Chinese, and Arabs had been trading from prehistoric times. The Portuguese were the earliest Europeans, followed by the Dutch, the French, and the English. They traded with the Spice Islands, as well as carrying printed cloth (which came to be known as chintz) to Europe.

The finest centers for Indian printing were in Sind, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bengal, Delhi, Farrukhabad, Golconda, Masalipatnam, Madras (Chennai), Pulicat, and Tanjore. The printers, *chipa*, were of a separate community from the dyers, *rangrez*. In Kalamkari, also known as *vartapani*, all three techniques—painting, printing and dyeing—were done by one community.

The block makers came from the carpenters' community, but many were dedicated solely to the creation of printing blocks, requiring great skill. An old family of block makers survives in Pethapur, Gujarat. For generations they prepared the fine blocks for printed cloth exported to Thailand, known as Sodagiri, trade cloth. Farrukhabad, an important center for printing the large Tree of Life known as *palampore* during the nineteenth century, also had specialized block carvers.

Printing Technique

The hand printing of traditional textiles prepared with the use of wooden blocks was of three kinds: direct

printing, resist printing, and outline block printing augmented by hand painting. Direct printing was done on bleached cloth prepared with mordants for dye absorption; on this surface the outline block was printed, followed by a fill-in block for coloring both the outlined motif and the background. In resist printing, blocks were used to create the outline; the motif was then printed with another color, then covered with a resist material, either mud or wax, and dyed. Indigo dyed cloths were prepared using this technique, as indigo could not be used for printing with blocks. Fragments found at Fostat and Red Sea sites followed these techniques and were made in Western India. Recent finds in Indonesia have the same patterns and have been carbon dated to the tenth century. Printing carried out in large quantities in Southeast Asia especially for the Spice Islands was done at Masalipatnam using a combination of printing and painting while very fine cloths were hand painted.

Hangings from South India, known as *kalamkari* or *varatapani*, were entirely hand painted. The finest were prepared at the court ateliers of Golconda and appear to be the work of master painters working with dyes. They were like large-scale murals, similar in style to the Persian murals of the Saffavid period in Isfahan, but using Indian imagery. The large hangings created for temples were of a different style, generally using themes taken from the Rāmāyaṇa. Episodes were painted and enclosed within a frame in narrative form, with verses describing the scene painted below. These were of ritual importance in Hindu temples. Special cloths of *kalamkari* with the battle scene from the Rāmāyaṇa, showing the victory of good over evil, were made for export to Indonesia.

Gujarat produced elaborate hangings with large female figures created in western Indian style with a three-quarter face and a protruding eye. Some of these were created with blocks and then colored by hand, while others were entirely hand painted, with each figure appearing to be a portrait. These examples have all been discovered in the family “treasure chests” in Toraja. Some have been dated to the fourteenth century A.D. The tradition of figurative hangings existed from ancient times. The older Pechwais of Shri Nath cult were printed and painted.

Consumption and Export

The printing centers produced a range of textiles for local consumption and a different style for export. Local production carried the distinctive designs and colors of each caste. There were also different designs for rites of passage, as well as for different age groups. Ritual cloths with the attributes of different deities accompanied by a printed *sloka*, or litany, such as “victory to Durgā,” were for use by priests as well as householders performing rituals.

During the Sultanate period (13th–15th centuries), royal ateliers produced cloths for the court, particularly printed tents and canopies. Printed and painted tent walls of very fine quality have survived from the Mughal period (late 16th–18th centuries). Ain-e-Akbari gives a detailed description of the tented Mughal court (created while on the move), which used the richest fabrics, among which printed and painted fabrics were prominent. The Jaipur court atelier produced very fine printed cloths for use by the royalty and the courtiers, and examples from the seventeenth century are maintained in the City Palace Museum at Jaipur. The detailed “account books,” *babi kbata*, of the ateliers are preserved in the archives at Bikaner.

The export of textiles from India to Europe had been carried out from a very early period through Fostat, which had become the major port center for the distribution of printed cotton (thus the name given to these cloths, “fustian”). The records of an Anglo-Saxon Synod Calcyth of the eighth century A.D. mentions that priests were discouraged from using Indian dyed cloth. Agnes Geijner (1951) mentions references to fustian cloth as a luxury item, hence forbidden for use by clergy in Scandinavia.

At the end of the fifteenth century, Vasco da Gama landed on the southeastern coast at Calicut, which later gave its name to “calico.” The Portuguese seized power from the local Muslim ruler, the *zamorin*, winning their first base in India. They controlled trade from the area; among the commodities they took back were printed fabrics, which they called *pintadoes*. These later found their way into the European market.

In the early sixteenth century, regular trade in printed and painted cloth began to be developed with Europe, after the Dutch, French, and English set up their “factories” along India’s coasts, creating a more organized system of Indian ocean trade. By the early seventeenth century, the resident European representatives began to exert a stronger influence; elaborate detailed patterns began coming from Europe, and Indian printers and dyers began creating textiles for the lucrative European market. The Indian word for a fabric printed with a sprinkling of flowers was *chint* (sprinkled), transformed in the West into “chintz.” English patterns combined Indian motifs with chinoiserie as well as motifs taken from the Balkans. Trailing flowing patterns with subtle color combinations were developed. These created so great a demand that by 1664 the English alone imported 250,000 “calicoes.” The French, who had entered the scene with La Compaigne des Indes Orientales with factors on the western and eastern coast near Kolkota (Calcutta), became competitors of the British East India Company, until their defeat by the English army under Robert Clive.

The craze for Indian printed goods reached its zenith by the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when British and French textile producers exerted influence on their own governments to ban the import of Indian cotton. Indian cotton of all kinds was banned in France in 1686 and in England in 1700. India continued to export cloth to Holland, but the demand for Indian cottons decreased considerably.

The import of printed textiles into Southeast Asia continued until the nineteenth century but decreased considerably because of the growth of the local Indonesian batik and printing industry. By the twentieth century, the import of mill-printed wax prints from Holland captured that market. World War I broke whatever links had existed between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand with India's Masalipatnam and Gujarat, and printed cotton ceased to be exported to Southeast Asia.

The printers continued to supply the local market with printed yardage for skirts, saris, and veils, as well as quilt covers and floor spreads. However, they faced severe competition from mill-made printed fabrics from Manchester, as well as from Bombay's machine-made prints. The loss of major overseas export markets and dwindling local markets created great hardship for the Indian printers, who began producing crude, cheaper prints to compete with the machine-made goods, selling them at very low prices. By the mid-twentieth century, the All-India Handicrafts Board began a special project for research, design, and promotion of hand prints, and a number of centers throughout India were revived. Exhibitions were conducted in India and abroad, and the printing industry soon revived. Today many of the centers, which had previously stagnated, are producing very fine quality printed fabrics, using both synthetic and vegetable dyes.

Jasleen Dhamija

See also **Bandhani**

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KARUPPUR

Relatively unknown among ancient textiles, the exquisite textiles of Karuppur can be understood only from existing masterpieces of saris, dhotis (loincloths), and turbans in museum collections, and from written accounts that appear in travelogues from India and abroad. Skilled craftsmen using special techniques appear to have made these textiles only for the royal courts of Tanjore (now known as Thanjavur), and no distribution elsewhere was recorded beyond this lineage, which does not extend past the nineteenth century.

The rulers of Tanjore, particularly Raja Sarfoji (r. 1799–1833), were strongly influenced by British taste and admired Western art in its contemporary neoclassical phase. Under Sarfoji there was a close integration of ancient tradition and European taste, which continued under his successor, Shivaji. There is no way of knowing with any degree of certainty the date at which the village craftsmen of Karuppur began to supply garments to the royal court of Tanjore. No records are available to indicate whether the fine robes had been provided from ancient times or whether they were introduced during the Maratha dynasty. It is certain, however, that the technique itself persisted from early times. Early cotton paintings of South India depict the dyeing technique, in which fine patterns are drawn with molten wax to appear white on the colored ground. The Karuppur textiles use the same technique, and early examples approach the skill of India's greatest craftsmen of the seventeenth century. The saris were still known to have been made in 1855; after that, the craft declined.

One can observe from museum pieces the fine workmanship of Karuppur textiles, which combine richness of pattern with simplicity and elegance, using a technique of resist dyeing and gold brocading. Each textile contains several shades of red and black and, in some pieces, a touch of blue, with hints of gold and the warm ecru color of the natural cotton outlining the design configurations.

The nuances of color and texture change as the cloth is moved slightly. Though the predominant designs of Karuppur textiles tend to be geometrical forms arranged within framing borders and large central fields, the repertoire was not confined to these forms but included other motifs, such as delicate vines, deer, birds, and sometimes stolid elephants arranged in a grid pattern.

In Karuppur textiles, the patterns of gold yarn were worked in the ground, on the cotton warp, using the tapestry technique. The areas that became the centers of the configurations, as well as the lines of borders and panels, were woven in gold, and the rest were in plain weave. The design forms, freely drawn using a *kalam*, or pen, were created using a wax-resist technique; the mordant for red and black was applied, and the cloth dyed a deep red. For perfecting the shades of red and black, two important mordants, alum and iron, were used in varying concentrations. Alum in association with red dye (*rubia tinctorium*, *oldenlandia umbellata*) created shades of red. Iron, steeped in a sour acidic substance, yielded a mordant that, in conjunction with tannin, produced the black shades. To further enhance the depth of the design forms, selected outlines were enriched with a deeper red, immediately at the edge of the gold. With the exception of the wax-resist areas, the dye was absorbed all over the cloth, including the yarn that formed the core of the loosely wrapped woven gold. This resulted in a graceful blend of texture, with subtle hints of gold embedded in shades of deep red. Some superb samples had the resist applied on both sides, and both faces of the textile have been worked. Certain examples indicate that blocks may also have been used to apply the mordants.

The patterns and the format of the Karuppur textiles resemble features in classic Southeast Asian textiles, indicating that textiles for the Tanjore court were a refinement of existing South Indian traditions of textile design, which had profoundly influenced the East through trade to East Asia as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the patterns of Karuppur textiles seem to have been made in a modest mordant-painted and dyed version, without the wax-resist pattern and gold yarns. The Tanjore book wrappers who used this style of textile without gold, provide additional evidence of hand-painted textiles being made in the area, though the use of carved blocks (to stamp the design) began to displace the hand-painting technique in the early nineteenth century.

During the same period, in the contiguous areas of Kumbakonam and Pudukkottai, artisans appear to have employed the Karuppur technique with slight variations. The Kumbakonam cloth seems to have been prepared first with a red dye mordant, completely covering it and making it gray in color. The design was both hand

painted and stamped, using copper perforated blocks dipped in a solution of oxalic acid and sometimes wax, which produced a pattern of white forms on the gray mordant ground. Then the cloth was dyed red.

The intrinsic beauty of the Karuppur textiles is difficult to reproduce today. The existing photographs of these textiles only raise intriguing questions about the techniques used, and their origin continues to be shrouded in the mists of time. Answers may perhaps be found by further study of ancient records in and around Tanjore.

Jagada Rajappa

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THEATER In traditional India, theater is explicitly associated with one deity or another, and the act of performance is an act of worship for performer and congregation alike. Many forms are still staged inside or next to temple precincts, or during religious festivals and holidays on common village grounds. Folk theater often dramatizes episodes from myth and legend pertaining to divinities or devotion. The aesthetics of Indian theater, originating in Bharata's *Nāṭya Shāstra* (Theater treatise), prioritize performance, inner life, and emotional moods in expressing that life. *Rasa* (literally, "juice" or "flavor") forms the nucleus of this aesthetic. A play must evoke the *rasas*, of which there are nine, in complementary combinations, with one of them predominant. The nine *rasas* comprise the erotic, comic, pathetic, heroic, furious, fearful, odious, wondrous, and peaceful. In order to arouse these *rasas* in the "sympathetic connoisseur," performers must emote appropriate *bhavas* (feelings) throughout. The importance given to emotions causes many non-Indians, preconditioned by their own artistic heritage, to react adversely to Indian drama as being too sentimental and devoid of action.

History

Indian theater history can be classified under three rubrics: classical, traditional, and modern, by no means mutually exclusive or chronologically sequential. Indeed, all three coexist at present. Folk and traditional theater takes place in villages and religious contexts, while



Man Performing in a Hindu Dance Play. Contemporary performance (c. 1972) of *Kathakali*, literally “dance story,” in Kerala. CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS / CORBIS.

modern theater is the preferred urban idiom. Classical theater, strictly speaking, refers to the courtly Sanskrit drama that flowered in the first millennium A.D. It is extinct, like the classical language in which it was written. But some scholars correctly argue that a couple of genres (Kutiyattam and Krishnattam) still use Sanskrit as a living medium, and directly link Kutiyattam to classical Sanskrit theater, pushing back Kutiyattam’s conjectural origins because it seems to have preserved the texts and accompanying production manuals of plays by the earliest known Sanskrit dramatist, Bhasa, in apparently unbroken continuity.

Classical. The sources of Indian theater are shrouded in obscurity, though Vedic rituals and recited duologue may have given birth to it in the first millennium B.C. A small cave amphitheater at Sitabenga, in Chhattisgarh state, possibly dates to the third century B.C., while an outdoor arena, perhaps used by Buddhist monks in the second or third century A.D., exists in Nagarjunakonda, in Andhra Pradesh. Bhasa may have composed his works around the turn of the common era, but we have no documents to

prove it. Later writers mentioned his name, but it was only in 1911–1912 that his plays came to light, discovered among manuscripts in a library in Kerala, and identified with texts performed for centuries by Kutiyattam troupes in Kerala temples. Thirteen such scripts were attributed to him, the largest number to have survived by a Sanskrit author. They reveal a wide range, from full-length seven-act plays to one-act miniatures, covering tales from the epics, and always theatrical, rather than simply literary.

Judged by the *Nāṭya Shāstra* (c. 2nd century B.C. to 4th century A.D.), Bhasa would have either failed its prescriptions or deliberately flouted them. For instance, he shows a hero dying on stage, though the *Nāṭya Shāstra* forbids such scenes. Other possibilities are that he preceded the *Nāṭya Shāstra*, or wrote when its principles had not fully crystallized—many authorities consider it to be a compendium accumulated over time. Besides expounding on *rasa*, its thirty-odd chapters offer methodological categorizations of the types of drama; guidelines on music, dance, and architecture; and details of a highly semiotic

system of gestures and expression, dividing acting into four components—verbal, physical, internal (emotional), and external (costumes and makeup). We can thus safely deduce that Sanskrit theater, composed by court poets and staged in royal durbars for aristocratic audiences, was uncommonly refined and artistic, with grace, beauty, suggestion, and idealism given primary importance.

Kālidāsa (fifth century) is unanimously acknowledged as the pinnacle among Indian authors in any language, for his masterpiece *Abhijñāna-Sakuntala* (Recognition of Sakuntala). Two of his other plays have survived, but the lyrical romanticism and spiritual intensity of *Sakuntala* gave it an uncontested primacy in Indian drama. The four verses in act 4 when the pregnant Sakuntala bids farewell to her ashram home and her foster father, to leave for her husband who seems to have forgotten her, are regarded as the zenith of *rasa* in Sanskrit poetry. Rediscovered by European Indologists in the late eighteenth century, *Sakuntala* persuaded them to reassess Indian literature and to elevate Sanskrit to levels previously reserved for the Greek and Latin classics.

Sudraka's *Mricchakatika* (Little clay cart, c. 2nd century A.D.) is probably the most revived play in the canon because of its social consciousness; it depicts a successful revolution that overthrows an unpopular ruler. Among later Sanskrit works, Visakhadatta's *Mudrā-Rākshasa* (Rakshasa's ring, 5th century) is an unusual historical drama of realpolitik, with the astute Chanakya, Chandragupta Maurya's minister, as protagonist. The famous king Harsha (r. 606–648) has three romantic plays ascribed to him, of which *Ratnāvali* is the finest. Bhavabhūti (7th–8th centuries), considered by some to be Kalidasa's equal, is best known for *Uttara-Rāmacarita* (Later story of Rāma), a moving and powerful narrative of the epic hero Rāma. A slow degeneration of standards characterized subsequent Sanskrit theater, and for all practical purposes it had ceased to be a creative force by the tenth century. Theater in the colloquial idiom of Prakrit briefly occupied a transitional phase, notably in the output of Rajasekhara (9th–10th centuries).

Traditional. As Sanskrit theater declined, the first indications of performance in the regional languages appeared, coinciding with the formalization of those tongues, descended from the various Prakrits and Apabhramsa. Popular forms unknown to us must have previously entertained the lower castes, parallel to the Sanskrit theater meant for the upper castes. Ancient texts in Tamil make cryptic reference to dance-drama genres and stage preparations, from the beginning of the common era. Certainly, several varieties of Indian puppetry (particularly shadow puppetry) have a long history; the striking similarities between leather puppets in Orissa

and Andhra Pradesh and those in Indonesia point to acculturation via mariners from the eastern seaboard who settled in Southeast Asia.

The major influence in the invention of many traditional (formerly known as “folk”) forms was the *bhakti* (devotional) movement that spread throughout the subcontinent. Advocating faith in a personal god rather than the institutionalized, priesthood-dominated ceremonies that had accumulated around Brahmanism, reformers needed to propagate their message, and opted for theater as the most effective medium of communication. Between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, these Vaishnava forms proliferated, telling stories of Vishnu's avatars, mainly Rāma and Krishna. One of the first, Kirtaniya, was created in the rich literary language of Maithili in northern Bihar by the poets Jyotiriswara (1280–1360) and Vidyapati (1360–1440). By the end of the fifteenth century, Raslila (based on Krishna's *rās* dance) arose in Braj, in western Uttar Pradesh, in a local dialect of Hindi. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the elaborately accoutred Terukkuttu and Yakshagana developed in Tamil and Kannada, the languages of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, respectively, followed by Kuchipudi dance-drama in Telugu (Andhra Pradesh), credited to Siddhendra Yogi. The sixteenth century saw *bhakti* theater take shape in eastern India with the active participation of two saints: Jatra (originally called Krishna-jatra) in Bengali received the enthusiastic support of Chaitanya (1486–1533), and Sankaradeva (1449–1568) invented Ankiya Nat in Assamese. Ramlila emerged in Hindi in North India by the seventeenth century, while the Konkani Dasavata (literally, “ten avatars”) in Goa and coastal Maharashtra imitated Yakshagana from neighboring Karnataka. In Kerala, two forms were created: the delicate Krishnattam in Sanskrit by the Zamorin (ruler) of Kozhikode in 1653, and the vigorous Kathakali (initially Ramanattam) in Malayalam by the raja of Kottarakkara in 1661. The former, because of its elite language, remains cloistered in the Guruvayur temple, whereas Kathakali's choice of the mother tongue saw it flourish, into currently the most recognizable face of Indian theater worldwide. After Vaishnavism reached the far eastern state of Manipur, Maharaja Chingthangkomba sponsored the lyrical Manipuri Ras Lila in 1779. The tribal-cum-martial arts form of Chhau, in Orissa, Jharkhand, and Bengal, also adopted mythical tales for presentation.

It seems useful to distinguish two strains of traditional theater, the temple styles (of worship) from the worldly ones (of comedy and social satire), but considerable overlap occurs. Notwithstanding the intensely spiritual aim, horseplay and frightening scenes are integral to the religious forms, keeping the entire family, especially children, entertained. A few of the originally devotional forms, like

Jatra, gradually metamorphosed into secular ones, though others like Ankiya Nat or Manipuri Ras Lila retained their pristine purity. Some nominally associated with worship appear to have crossed over into subversive comic modes fairly early in their history, and became even more boisterous down the centuries. These include the Bhavai in Gujarati (ascribed to Asaita Thakar, 14th century) and Tamasha in Marathi (probably intended as a diversion for soldiers, from the 18th century). Another major form, the Nautanki in Hindi/Urdu, which evolved in the nineteenth century out of and alongside the Swang in Hindi and Punjabi, may have had tenuous sacred links to begin with, but achieved renown for exquisitely musical renderings of heroic romances. The Bandi Pethir in Kashmiri, whose records go back to the tenth century, is exclusively farcical, its clowns' routines recalling the slapstick of Italian commedia dell'arte.

With the exception of Kirtaniya, all these genres remain alive. Besides, dozens of less popular, but not inferior, forms inhabit the Indian landscape, all increasingly threatened by the incursion of film and television into rural lifestyle in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. They range from ritualistic possession, such as Teyyam and Bhuta on the southwestern coast, to diverse storytelling modes (many of them orally keeping alive the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa) that incorporate substantial elements of dance and music. This multiplicity of theater is endangered, ironically, by the homogeneity of performance manufactured in the electronic media, whatever the language, which attract mass viewership by their glamour and pretensions to modernity. Villagers prefer to watch the dream-factory-generated pictures of supposedly greener urban pastures, instead of their local entertainers, whom they consider rustic and backward. Their livelihood thereby imperiled, these performers turn to other careers. Also ironically, interculturalists come to India to study these very genres, seeking the secrets of exotic techniques; renowned directors such as Jerzy Grotowski and Peter Brook have borrowed methods from Kathakali or Chhau for their own work.

Modern. The British introduced the proscenium arch auditorium to India, and with it modern (Western) theatrical concepts. Initially, the expatriate communities in the port cities of Calcutta (Kolkata), Bombay (Mumbai), and Madras (Chennai) built playhouses for their own recreation in English, in the eighteenth century. The Bengally Theater (Calcutta, 1795) established by a Russian bandmaster and adventurer, Herasim Lebedeff, pioneered the use of an Indian language on a European-style stage for Indian audiences. The next century witnessed further inroads: the formal reading of English literature by Indian students under Thomas B. Macaulay's education policy; their first amateur attempts at representation

of English drama; their translations of this canon into Indian languages; their emulation of Western models in writing and staging original plays; and, finally, the arrival of full-blown professional theater in every major language. Some regions started earlier—Bengali, Marathi, and Hindi have particularly long lineages of modern theater—whereas in others (Dogri, Konkani, Maithili, Nepali, Rajasthani) modernism began only around the time of India's independence.

The first modern Indian play was composed in English by Krishna Mohan Banerjea in 1831, but was never performed. Titled *The Persecuted, or Dramatic Scenes Illustrative of the Present State of Hindoo Society in Calcutta*, it had a modern topic: for the first time, an Indian dramatist censured living conditions. In 1853, at the Grant Road Theater in Bombay, Vishnudas Bhave produced the first ticketed shows in Marathi, soon followed by Gujarati theater from companies owned by the Parsi (Zoroastrian) community. The same year, Urdu theater commenced in Lucknow with Amanat's *Indarsabhā* (Indra's court) at Wajid Ali Shah's durbar. While these primarily comprised mythological stories, within the next ten years, eastern India contributed much original social drama. In Bengali, Ramnarayan Tarkaratna castigated Brahman polygamy, and Michael Madhusudan Dutt lampooned upper-class affectations. In Assamese, Gunabhiram Barua criticized child marriages, and Hemchandra Barua, opium addiction.

In 1872 Bengali theater turned professional as well as political. Dinabandhu Mitra's *Nildarpan* (Indigo mirror) condemned British indigo planters' ruthless oppression of peasants. Anti-British productions increased to the extent that the government clamped down with the Dramatic Performances Act (1876), banning seditious material. However, playwrights like Girish Ghosh (1844–1912) in Bengali and Bharatendu Harishchandra (1850–1885) in Hindi circumvented that law, allegorizing familiar tales of repression and rebellion under the guise of seemingly innocuous mythical or historical inspiration. Meanwhile, the spectacular commercial fare of Parsi troupes and Marathi Sangitnatak succeeded in making theater a favorite of the public. Parsi companies toured across India and even abroad, performing in easily understood Hindustani with attractive sets and special effects, the first pan-Indian theater since Sanskrit times. Sangitnatak (musical drama), created by B. P. Kirloskar in 1880, became so much the rage in Maharashtra that spectators went mainly to hear star actors deliver the songs, sometimes as many as a hundred in a show, in exquisite compositions derived from classical, devotional, and folk melodies. Bal Gandharva (1886–1967), singer and female impersonator, commanded a huge following, and women devotedly copied his fashions.

The major innovator in modern Indian theater, Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), authored, directed, scored, choreographed, and acted in over sixty Bengali plays, which were stylistically lyrical and symbolic. They critiqued orthodox Hinduism and dramatized spiritual quest, celebrated nature, pleaded for ecological consciousness, and foresaw the dangers of exploiting mineral resources and damming rivers indiscriminately. Tagore gave importance to women's issues and encouraged girls from respectable families to act (taboo at the time); he initiated open-air children's theater at the school he established in Santiniketan (Abode of Peace), Bengal. He experimented with the musical and dance-drama as forms, and traveled with these productions to large Indian cities. His other plays, translated internationally after he became the first non-European to win the Nobel Prize for literature (1913), were staged all over the world, bringing modern Indian drama to the attention of a global audience.

Theater's halcyon days at the box office began to fade with the arrival in 1931 of the "talkies," which cleverly appropriated the escapist formulas that had enticed viewers to the professional companies, which never recovered. In their place, new theater arose, avowedly amateur to protect itself from the demands of popular taste, overtly socialistic in its politics, and realistic in its technique. The founding of the Indian People's Theater Association (1943) signaled this change, with Bijon Bhattacharya's Bengali *Nabanna* (New harvest, 1944) revolutionizing theater by its stark radicalism (using no scenery or makeup) on the subject of the horrendous Bengal famine of 1943. The movement grew rapidly. In 1944 Prithvi Theaters' Hindustani plays took social awareness across India, and the Dravida Kazhagam Party's Tamil productions opposed Brahmanical dominance in the south. The Praja Natya Mandali (1946) and the Jammu and Kashmir Cultural Front (1953) employed folk forms to advocate their messages in Telugu and Kashmiri, respectively; the Kerala People's Arts Club (1952) espoused the Communist cause in Malayalam. Most serious groups since independence have owed allegiance to leftist ideologies, covering a wide gamut from strident Marxist activism to simple social awareness. Technically amateur, their members hold full-time jobs in other professions.

Contemporary urban theater shows great variety, though three broad currents have emerged: the above-mentioned political, the poetic-symbolical, and the folk nativistic. In Bengali, actor-director Sombhu Mitra (1915–1997) earned respect for his poetic grandeur; Utpal Dutt (1929–1993) regaled with witty plays that expressed an agitprop Communist line; and Badal Sircar (1925–) abandoned the proscenium for free street theater and informal spaces, literally a poor theater with a

conscience. Hindi theater was galvanized by the directorial visions of Ebrahim Alkazi (1925–) at the government-funded National School of Drama, the works of Habib Tanvir (1923–), who heads a troupe of Chhattisgarhi village artists, and the unusual psychological dramas of Mohan Rakesh (1925–1972). Marathi drama introduced three noted playwrights: Vijay Tendulkar (1928–), drawn to controversial topics; Mahesh Elkunchwar (1939–), sensitive to domestic relationships; and Satish Alekar (1949–), often absurdist or meta-theatrical in his themes. Tamil theater ranged from the outrageous political satires of Cho Ramaswamy (1934–) to the symbolism and folk-based work of Na Muthuswamy (1936–). Kannada brought the dramatists Chandrasekhar Kambar (1938–) and Girish Karnad (1938–), and the director B. V. Karanth (1929–2002), to the national limelight, reinterpreting folkloric material. In Malayalam (and Sanskrit), Kavalam Narayana Panikkar (1928–) revived traditional genres in modern contexts. Acharya Atreya (1921–1989), Manoranjan Das (1921–), and Arun Sarma (1931–) were the leading playwrights in Telugu, Oriya, and Assamese, respectively. Heisnam Kanhailal (1941–) gave to Manipur a theater of protest and resistance against mainstream culture from India. Gursharan Singh (1929–) bravely preached nonviolence in the Punjabi countryside during the peak of separatist extremism there. A minority English-language theater also exists in the metropolises, its most arresting authors including Asif Currimbhoy (1928–1994) and Mahesh Dattani (1958–).

Ananda Lal

See also Literature

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THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY The Theosophical Society was founded on 7 September 1875 in New York following a talk on ancient Egyptian spiritualism, by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), a Russian occult medium, and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), a U.S. Civil War veteran and abolitionist, who became the society's first president. Their goals were to study the spiritual truth underlying all religions, to reject materialism, and to do public service. The last aim enabled the society to establish schools, influence the Indian national movement, and act as the seedbed for India's first feminist association in Madras (Chennai) in 1917. Blavatsky claimed that a Rajput spirit "master" or "mahatma" had inspired her during her trip to Tibet and India in 1851. She met Olcott after writing a defense of his investigations into occult phenomena in an essay, "Rosicrucianism." In 1874 they claimed they had witnessed an apparition named Kitty King at a seance in Philadelphia. Their fascination with the occult led Blavatsky to start an Esoteric Section of the society in 1888 and to claim that her books were mystical revelations by "masters." Her first book, *Isis Unveiled* (1877) increased the society's membership worldwide.

In India

In 1879 Blavatsky and Olcott, who had corresponded with Dayananda Saraswati, the Vedic Hindu revivalist and founder of the Āryā Samāj, established their headquarters in his city, Bombay (Mumbai), calling it the Theosophical Society of the Āryā Samāj. However, theological disagreements separated them in 1882, the Theosophists moving south to Adyār, Madras. Blavatsky and Olcott's lectures across North India and Sri Lanka were reported extensively in the Allahabad *Pioneer* by A. P. Sinnett. The British kept them under surveillance as possible Russian spies.

In 1881 Blavatsky began publishing the journal the *Theosophist*, which C. W. Leadbetter edited when she moved to London due to ill health. There, in 1889, Annie Besant (1847–1933), who was to become her greatest disciple, visited her after reading *The Secret Doctrine* (1887) on the doctrine of karma (reincarnation).



Theosophist Annie Besant. Though a fervent advocate of Indian nationalism, she beseeched Hindu women not to emulate their materialistic Western counterparts, but to aspire to selflessness and the wisdom of the Upanishads. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Blavatsky also soon published *The Key to Philosophy* (1889) and *The Voice of Silence* (1890). Besant joined the Theosophical Society in 1891, mesmerized by Hinduism and by Blavatsky's fervent appeal to "come among us!" (Besant, *Autobiography*, p. 311).

Olcott recorded the society's history in his *Old Diary Leaves* (1892). His interest in Buddhism led him to Sri Lanka and Japan in the 1880s. In *The Poor Pariah* (1902), Olcott urged the educational uplift of the Dalits, or the *panchamas*, "downtrodden, wretched human beings" who were shunned by the high castes as untouchables, and seduced by Christian zeal. In 1894 Olcott started a free school for "untouchables" in Urūr, near Adyār. He established the Panchama Education Society, starting five primary vocational schools in Madras and several others in Sri Lanka between 1898 and his death in 1907. The Olcott Schools remain in operation with the aid of government grants.

Annie Besant's Early Years

Annie Wood was born in 1847 in London to a middle-class Irish-English family that became impoverished by

her father's death. She was educated by a wealthy Calvinist widow and was married at nineteen to Frank Besant, an Anglican vicar. Annie railed against her husband's rigid Christian Victorian values, eventually leaving the marriage. In 1879 she wrote the tract "Marriage as It Was, and as It Should Be," while fighting a legal battle for custody of her children. Thwarted from attaining a degree in science by misogynistic university rules, she became a vocal advocate of women's education. Her spiritual quest led her first to Unitarianism, then to atheism and Fabian Socialism, before she finally became a Theosophist and Hindu.

Besant became a labor activist due to the trade unionist William Roberts. Her affair with the atheist Charles Bradlaugh led to her joining his National Secular Society. In 1877 she and Bradlaugh were tried for "obscenity" for having published Dr. Charles Knowlton's tract on contraception. Their victory prompted Besant to write *Law of Population*, although later, as a Theosophist, she repudiated this work. As a Fabian Socialist, she supported democratic representation on municipal boards; fought successfully in 1888 for women who were on strike in match factories; wrote and published *The Unemployed, Why I Am a Socialist, and How Poverty May Be Destroyed*. Radical socialists criticized her "Modern Socialism," and her socialist convictions declined. She became estranged both from Bradlaugh and Bernard Shaw when she espoused Theosophy. In 1908 she declared that democratic socialism would not succeed in India.

Annie Besant in India

In 1893 she and her Theosophist "guru" Gyanandra Nath Chakravarti attended the Parliament of World Religions in Chicago, where Swami Vivekananda made his inspiring speech on Hinduism, predicting that it was destined to "conquer the world" with its philosophic wisdom. On 16 November 1893, at the age of forty-six, Besant reached India. Her appearance in a sari, and her passionate lectures, praising Hinduism and Indian nationalism, sparked interest in journals like *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, winning avid followers. She resided first in Benares (Varanasi), learning Sanskrit from Bhagwan Das, with whom she founded the Central Hindu College.

In 1896 at Maharani Girls' School, Mysore, Besant addressed the students as Hindu girls who would "grow up to be Hindu wives and mothers." Noting that there was "nothing nobler than loving, unselfish, spiritual Indian women," Besant beseeched them not to emulate materialistic Western women, but to aspire to the wisdom of female Upanishadic sages like Gargi and Maitreyi, and to the selflessness of the Rāma's heroic wife, Sītā. Her 1904 pamphlet, *The Education of Indian Girls*, became the educational blueprint for Indian girls for decades. Olcott's death in 1907 brought Besant to

Adyār as the society's new president and head of the Theosophical Educational Trust's network of National Schools.

Besant joined the Indian National Congress in 1914, when she started the journal *Commonweal*. She and Lokamanya ("Friend of the People") Tilak each started Home Rule Leagues in 1916, also helping M. A. Jinnah to forge the Congress-League Lucknow Pact that year. Arrested in June 1917 under the Defence of India Act, Besant was released after intercession by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. As the first European-born president of the Indian National Congress in 1917, Besant spoke about women activists in her inaugural address. In May 1917 at Adyār, she became president of the Women's Indian Association. On 18 December 1918, she led a delegation to Secretary of State Edwin Montagu, pleading for female suffrage in India.

In 1919 Besant was replaced as president of the National Home Rule League by Mahatma Gandhi, whom she had tried, without success, to convert to Theosophy when he first came to London. Her last years were clouded by scandals around Leadbetter's alleged homosexuality; and around her proclamation of Jiddu Krishnamurti, a brilliant student, as "the messiah" or "world teacher" through the Order of the Star with twelve apostles. Krishnamurti himself denied that he was a "savior" and dismantled the order, breaking free of Besant's ambitions for him. Annie Besant died in Adyār in 1933, but the Theosophical Society continues to flourish there.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Women's Education; Women's Indian Association**

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THUMRĪ A vocal (or sometimes instrumental) genre, *thumrī* (Hindustani, *thumaknā* “to walk with a jerky, mincing, or wanton gait”; possibly an onomatopoeic imitation of the sound of a dancer’s foot against the floor [*thumuk*]) features so-called light-classical *rāgs* and (in the case of vocal music) romantic texts. Most musicians associate the origins of the *thumrī* with the court of Wajid Ali Shah, the mid-nineteenth century ruler of Oudh, although the genre has numerous stylistic predecessors. Roughly parallel to the romantic storytelling genre *padam* of *bharata natyam* (dance idiom), *thumrī* has associations with the classical dance of northern India—*kathak*—and in a *kathak* program, dancers often mime their movements to *thumrī*.

Poets of *thumrī* texts have often drawn upon the legends of Krishna, particularly his amorous relationships with the milkmaids of Vraj. The gender of the voice of the text is usually feminine, although both men and women perform. Praise of the beloved, lament of the beloved’s absence, and anticipation of the arrival of the beloved are among the favorite topics of *thumrī*, although explicitly erotic and obscene themes occasionally occur in special contexts. The dominant *rasas* (emotions) of *thumrī* are *shringāra* (the erotic) and *karuna* (the pathetic).

Musical Characteristics

Musicians apply a select repertoire of *rāgas* and *tālas* in *thumrī*. One characteristic of *thumrī rāgas* is the affective use of alternative notes to emphasize the *rasa* of the *rāga*. *Thumrī* singers also often temporarily introduce other *rāgas* in their renditions. As with most North Indian musical genres, the melody has two musical parts—*sthāyī* and *antarā*—in contrasting registers, each having two lines of poetry.

Musical ornaments in *thumrī* are generally quicker and lighter than in *khayal*. The principal type of elaboration

in *thumrī* is the *boltān*, an improvised melodic rendering of the words of the song. These melismatic improvisations commonly function as “word-painting.” Singers repeat text lines often, each time with new elaborations. At the conclusion, the singer returns to the first line and repeats it, while the drummer briefly solos in a sped-up section described as *laggi*. A *laggi* is often in a fast binary meter such as *kabaravā* (8 *mātras*) or *tintāl*, even though the *thumrī* itself is in another *tāla* (such as the 14-*matra* *Dīpcandī* or the 6-*mātra* *Dādra*). At the end of the solo, the drummer returns to the original *tāla*. Instrumentalists often perform *thumrīs* toward the end of their programs, in which context performers choose *rāgas* and *tālas* typical of the genre. The mood of such performances is decidedly lighter than the more elaborate approach taken in *ālāp* and *gat-torā*, although devices such as *sawāl-jawāb* may still be part of the performance.

Gordon Thompson

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TIBETAN BUDDHISTS OF INDIA Since 1950, Tibetans escaping Chinese-occupied Tibet have resettled in numerous enclaves in India, including the community of Dharamsala in the foothills of the Himalayas, the headquarters of the Tibetan government-in-exile. In India, Tibetans have established new and stable communities, forged a united Tibetan identity, and created a democratic system of government under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibetan people worldwide. The Tibetan population continues to establish a new, perhaps permanent home in India, the motherland of the Buddhist teachings through which Tibetan culture came to be uniquely defined.

History of Tibetan Buddhism

Tibetan Buddhism, or Tantric Buddhism, finds its roots in northern India, particularly in Nagarjuna’s Mādhyamika (Middle Way) system. The Tibetan Buddhist tradition arose from a syncretism of the Indian Vajrayāna (Diamond Vehicle) and the indigenous, animistic Bön religion of Tibet, a religion of deities and spirits that some scholars link to the hierarchy of *bodhisattvas*, demons, and other figures of Tibetan Buddhism. Beginning under King Songsten Gampo’s royal patronage in the seventh century A.D., Buddhism flourished, and it developed its unique Tibetan character in the centuries that followed. From the tenth



Worshiper Lights Candles at Monastery. Since 1980, Tibetans with the help of the Indian government have established almost 200 Buddhist monasteries and nunneries in India, housing nearly 20,000 monastics. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

century onward, Buddhist masters in western Tibet held leadership positions alongside lay authorities, a governmental structure that soon spread throughout Tibet and became the norm. By the fifteenth century, the distinctive Tibetan Buddhist canon, consisting of the Kanjur (the teachings of the Buddha) and the Tanjur (commentaries on the teachings), and the complex monastic system, with its reincarnations of *bodhisattvas*, were established. The monastic system comprised four main orders, powerful in both political and religious spheres: the Nyingmapa, the Kargyupa, the Sakyapa, and the Gelugpa. It is from the Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) order that the Dalai Lamas of Tibet, the spiritual and political leaders of the Tibetan people, originated in 1391. The Dalai Lama (“ocean of wisdom,” or “superior one”) is understood to be the continual reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara, *bodhisattva* of compassion. He is a key figure in Tibetan Buddhism, the Tibetan government, and Tibetan identity in general.

The Community in Exile

Since the invasion of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China on 7 October 1950, and the Tibetan revolt


against the Chinese occupation on 10 March 1959, India has provided a haven for Tibetan refugees and their families. By 1960, over 17,000 Tibetans resided in settlements established by the Indian government. The village of Mussoorie served as the headquarters of the Central Tibetan Administration until Jawaharlal Nehru offered Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh to the Tibetan government-in-exile, headed by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, in 1960. Dharamsala and numerous other bases in India are no longer simple refugee resettlement sites but developed, stable Tibetan communities. Over 8,000 Tibetans call Dharamsala, McLeod Gunj, and the surrounding Kangra Valley their home, while approximately 88,000 more reside in other communities in India. The majority of this population lives in Tibetan agricultural, agro-industrial, or handicraft-based settlements established with the assistance of the Indian government. Tibetan refugees continue to enter India at a steady rate of between 2,000 and 2,500 per year.

The Tibetan government-in-exile was restructured according to democratic principles in 1963 with the draft of a new constitution for an anticipated free Tibet in the

future, as well as for the existing exiled government. While many leadership positions remain intact from the previous system, including the position of the Dalai Lama and his cabinet of ministers, the new democracy includes three branches of government, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, with clear separations of powers. The Kashag, the cabinet of ministers, incorporates departments of home, education, finance, and health, and consists of officials elected by the legislative branch of the government, the assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies. The assembly is diverse and represents Tibetans all over the world: two members currently represent Tibetans in Europe, and one represents Tibetans in the United States. The assembly, including the chief *kalon*, or chief executive officer, is elected by the Tibetan people living in India and in other countries outside Tibet. The Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission is the judicial branch of the government. Tibetans in India are subject to Indian law, but through India's arbitration law, the Justice Commission has some jurisdiction and can serve as an arbitrator in disputes. In this manner, Tibetans

enjoy a modicum of self-power within the Indian judicial system.

According to the Government of Tibet in Exile, 44 percent of refugees from 1997 to 2002 were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five. There are an estimated 30,000 Tibetan children in India. Education of Tibetan youth is thus a vital service provided by the government-in-exile, with efforts made toward accommodating the special needs of children orphaned during the arduous journey from Tibet. The Department of Education administers over eighty schools, not only in India but in Nepal and Bhutan as well. The Indian-run Central Tibetan Schools Administration funds and oversees approximately thirty of these schools in India. This has resulted in some tension between the Tibetan population and the Indian host culture: support is necessary and appreciated, but there is concern that the Tibetan schools, if run by non-Tibetans, will teach fewer Tibetan cultural values. Imbuing children with a Tibetan sense of respect and compassion, maintaining the Tibetan



The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. To Tibetans in exile in India and other parts of the world, with no geographic link, the Dalai Lama remains an all-important symbol of continuity through generations. INDIA TODAY.



Buddhist Monks Gather at Ceremony. Saffron-robed Buddhist monks gathered at McLeod Gunj, home to the Dalai Lama, nestled high among the Himalyan forests. Maintaining the Tibetan language and culture, and especially its spiritual beliefs and rituals, are all vital aims for a people living in exile. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

language, and teaching Tibetan cultural arts are all vital aims for a people living in exile.

Within the Kashag, the Department of Religion and Culture seeks to provide aid to Tibetan religious institutions and other cultural institutions. Monasteries and nunneries of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions are central to Tibetan Buddhist life. Since 1980 the population in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries in India has more than doubled, resulting in overcrowded facilities. Thus, support for these institutions, as well as the construction of new monastic centers, is a priority for Tibetans in exile. Almost 200 monasteries and nunneries, with a population of nearly 20,000 monks and nuns, have been established in exile. Projects of the Department of Religion and Culture also include Tibet House in New Delhi, the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives and the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts in Dharamsala, the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies in Varanasi, and the Norbulinkha Institute for Tibetan Culture at Sidhpur. Numerous charitable organizations worldwide and the Indian government provide additional support.

Unity and Tibetan Identity

The occasionally divisive factors of Tibetan life, including regional or tribal loyalties, political rivalries, religious competition, and varying dialects of the Tibetan language, have been set aside since 1959 in favor of promoting unity in the face of the threat to Tibetan culture in general. The new identity forged by the Tibetans in their stateless condition emphasizes the Tibetan Buddhist values of compassion, patriotism, ethnic and linguistic unity, and a focus on what anthropologist Margaret Nowak identifies as the two main Tibetan rallying symbols, the Dalai Lama and *rangzen* (self-power). The Dalai Lama is a symbol of continuity through generations, representing stability for Tibetans in exile. The status as *bodhisattva* also makes him a living symbol of Buddhist reality. *Rangzen*, often defined as independence from China, is a hopeful concept for the possible Tibetan future. The Dalai Lama and *rangzen* both serve as symbols of Tibetan identity, ontological security, and empowerment. In them, religion, culture, political activism for the Tibetan cause, and even Tibet's history and future are encapsulated and advanced.

With no geographical union, Tibetans in India and in exile worldwide innovate a cultural, ethnic, and linguistic union, and the prominent symbols of Tibetan religion and culture emerge as rallying signs for the global Tibetan community. At the heart of the Tibetan project of identity and unity in exile is the conviction that being Tibetan means upholding a compassionate, active, and hopeful Tibetan Buddhist tradition and character.

Eve Mullen

See also **Buddhism in Ancient India**

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TILAK, BAL GANGADHAR (1856–1920), *revolutionary Hindu nationalist leader, called Lokamanya ("Revered by the People")*. Born to a venerable Chitpavan Brahman family in Maharashtra's Konkani village of Chikalgaon on 23 July 1856, Bal Gangadhar Tilak was married at fifteen to Tapi Bai, a Chitpavan girl of ten. A year later, he graduated from high school and immediately enrolled in Pune's Deccan College, where he focused on Sanskrit Vedic studies. Tilak later wrote books on the religious philosophy of the Bhagavad Gītā as well as Vedic astronomy and astrology. Unlike most modern Indian and Western scholars, Tilak believed that the Vedas were composed by ancient tribes, whose "Arctic home" was at the "North Pole" prior to the "Glacial Ice Age." He also studied law in Bombay (Mumbai), which he later found useful in his litigation-plagued career.

Cultural Nationalist

Tilak was one of Maharashtra's most popular cultural nationalists, publishing several important newspapers in



Portrait of Bal Gangadhar Tilak. In their extended discussions of self-rule for India, Tilak (widely regarded as a powerful figure as his penetrating gaze in this drawing and popular name, Lokamanya, attest) is purported to have told Gandhi, "There's no place in politics for saints or religious scruples." K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Pune, the *Mabratta* in English and *Kesari* (Lion) in Marathi, the latter read aloud in village centers to tens of thousands of illiterate peasants, as well as being subscribed to by urban intellectuals. Tilak thus became the cultural leader and political hero of Maharashtra's masses. Tilak denounced Sir Andrew Scoble's "Age of Consent" Bill, which tried to raise the "statutory rape" age for intercourse (with or without a child bride's consent) from ten to twelve years. He called it a "foreign Christian intrusion" in the private household affairs of Hindu Indians. Two years later he publicized the popular revival of annual religious festivals throughout Maharashtra to celebrate the "birthday" of the Hindu divinity Gaṇeśha, whose elephant-headed statues were carried around every town and village for days before being raucously immersed in rivers or coastal waters. Ganpati festivities, which included paramilitary gymnastics

by “Ganesh guards” dressed in khaki uniforms, are considered the birth of modern militant cultural Hindu nationalism. In 1895 Tilak inaugurated a second annual festival in Pune, to honor the birth of Maharashtra’s greatest Hindu national hero, Shivaji Maharaj. The Shivaji festivals drew even larger crowds than those for Ganesha. Speeches in Marathi extolling Shivaji’s heroic deeds in waging guerrilla warfare against, and defeating, the foreign Muslim Mughals, excited the most interest among young men, many of whom used their energies and time to make crude bombs in their basements, before long throwing them at British officers driving by in their carriages.

Tried and Transported for Sedition

Tilak’s most popular mantra was “*Sva-raj* (‘self-rule’ or ‘freedom’) is my birthright, and I will have it!” At times, his Kesari editorials and powerful Shivaji festival speeches incited those who read or heard his words to violent actions against British officials or other foreigners. One of Tilak’s Pune Brahman disciples assassinated an Englishman as he left the governor’s Jubilee Ball honoring Empress Victoria in 1897, just half a century before another Maharashtrian Brahman was to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. Tilak was tried for sedition for several editorials he wrote in his newspaper. He eloquently defended himself and pleaded innocent, but was found guilty in 1908 and was transported to Mandalay Prison in Burma (Myanmar) for six years. He was released at the start of World War I and cabled his “support” for the Allied cause to the king-emperor. He outlived Gopal Krishna Gokhale, his moderate Maharashtrian Brahman rival for leadership of the Indian National Congress, by five years.

Impact on Mahatma Gandhi

Gandhi first met Tilak when Gandhi returned to India from South Africa, while visiting Pune at his guru Gokhale’s invitation. To Gandhi’s mind, gentle Gokhale was like Mother India’s greatest river, “the Ganges,” which “invited one to its bosom.” Tilak, on the other hand, was “the ocean” itself, forbidden to Hindus, who never knew what dreadful dangers lurked beneath its “dark waters.” But Tilak’s fearless insistence upon “freedom,” his successful use of popular religious and cultural Hindu symbols, and his boycott of all things “foreign”—all of which lured India’s illiterate peasant population into the nationalist movement—appealed powerfully to Mahatma Gandhi. But ever-scrupulous Gandhi insisted on nonviolence in all his *satyagraha* struggles. Tilak never feared or worried about violence. “There’s no place in politics for saints or religious scruples,” Lokamanya Tilak once told Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi “begged to

differ,” insisting that “religion (Hindu *dharmā*) could no more be removed from ‘politics’ than from life itself.” On 1 August 1920, the day Tilak died, Mahatma Gandhi launched his first nationwide *satyagraha* in Bombay.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna; Maharashtra**

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TRADE LIBERALIZATION SINCE 1991 Import controls in India were originally imposed in May 1940 to conserve foreign exchange and shipping for World War II. But starting in 1947, regulation of the balance of payments became the central concern of the Indian government, which introduced restrictions on the rate at which foreign exchange could be depleted. From then on, India alternated between liberalization and tighter controls, until the beginning of the launch of the first Five-Year Plan. The period during that first plan, covering 1951–1952 to 1955–1956, was one of progressive liberalization.

A balance-of-payments crisis in 1956–1957 led to a major policy reversal. India restored its comprehensive import controls, which remained in place until 1966. In June 1966, under pressure from the World Bank, it devalued the rupee from 4.7 rupees to 7.5 rupees per dollar, and took steps toward liberalizing import licensing and lowering import duties and export subsidies. But intense domestic reaction to the devaluation led to reversal of the policy within a year, and import controls were again tightened. By the mid-1970s, India’s trade regime had become so repressive that the share of nonoil and noncereal imports in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from the already low 7 percent in 1957–1958 to an even lower level of 3 percent in 1975–1976.

In the late 1970s, two factors paved the way for yet another phase of liberalization. First, industrialists came to feel the adverse effect of the tight import restrictions



Finance Minister P. Chidambaram. One of the principal architects of economic liberalization and reforms. In early May 2005, the decidedly pro-business Chidambaram declared that India must open its doors to foreign investment in order to achieve faster economic growth, a position not supported by leftist leaders within and outside the government. INDIA TODAY.

on their profitability and lobbied for liberalization of imports of raw materials and machinery that did not have domestically produced substitutes. Second, improved export performance and remittances from overseas workers in the Middle East in the post-oil-crisis era led to the accumulation of a healthy foreign-exchange reserve, raising the comfort level of policy makers with respect to the effect of liberalization on the balance of payments.

Liberalization and Growth in the 1980s

The liberalization process was initiated in 1976 through the reintroduction of the so-called Open General Licensing (OGL) list that had been part of the original wartime regime but had become defunct as controls were tightened in the wake of the 1966 devaluation. The OGL operated on a positive-list approach, whereby the item placed on the list no longer required a license from the Ministry of Commerce. This did not necessarily mean that imports of the item on the list were free; the importer usually had to be the actual user of the imports, and could be subject to clearance from the industrial-licensing authority in the case of machinery imports.

Upon its introduction in 1976, the OGL list contained only 79 items. But by April 1990, the list covered 1,339 items, approximately one-quarter of all tariff lines and more than 30 percent of all imports. Though tariff rates were raised substantially during this period, with items on OGL given large concessions on those rates through “exemptions,” they did not significantly add to the restrictive effect of licensing. The government also introduced several export incentives, especially after 1985, which partially neutralized the anti-trade bias of import controls. Above all, from 1985 to 1990, the effective nominal exchange rate was depreciated by a hefty 45 percent, leading to a real depreciation of 30 percent.

These and other liberalization measures relating especially to industrial licensing, improved agricultural performance, discovery of oil and expansionary fiscal policy combined to raise the growth rate in India from its traditional, so-called Hindu rate of approximately 3.5 percent during the years 1950 to 1980 to 5.6 percent during the period from 1981 to 1991. The jump in the average annual growth rate was particularly significant from 1988 to 1991, when it reached 7.6 percent.

Nevertheless, the external and internal borrowing that supported fiscal expansion was unsustainable and culminated in a balance-of-payments crisis in June 1991. This time, however, the government turned the crisis into an opportunity, and instead of reversing the course of liberalization, launched a truly comprehensive, systematic, and systemic reform program that continues to be implemented. The Soviet collapse, China's phenomenal economic rise following its adoption of outward-oriented policies, and India's own experience—first with protectionist policies for three decades and then liberalization in the second half of 1980s—convinced policy makers of the merits of the new policy approach that had been advocated for years by pro-market and pro-free-trade economists, most prominently Jagdish Bhagwati.

Systemic Reforms Beginning in 1991

The trade liberalization program, initiated in July 1991, was comprehensive but gradual and remains under implementation. It is useful first to consider the measures taken in the areas of trade in goods and services and then to discuss their impact.

Merchandise trade liberalization. The 1991 reforms did away with import licensing on virtually all intermediate inputs and capital goods. But consumer goods, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the tariff lines, remained under licensing. It was only after a successful challenge by India's trading partners in the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that these goods were freed of licensing a decade later, starting 1 April 2001. Since that time—except for a handful of goods disallowed on environmental, health, and safety grounds, and a few others that are canalized (meaning they can be imported only by the government), including fertilizer, cereals, edible oils, and petroleum products—all goods can be imported without a license or other restrictions.

Tariff rates in India had been raised substantially during the 1980s to turn quota rents into revenue. For example, according to the Government of India (1993), tariff revenue as a proportion of imports went up from 20 percent in 1980–1981 to 44 percent in 1989–1990. According to the WTO (1998), in 1990–1991, the highest tariff rate stood at 355 percent, the simple average of all tariff rates standing at 113 percent and the import-weighted average of tariff rates at 87 percent. With the removal of licensing, these tariff rates became effective restrictions on imports. Therefore, a major task of the reforms in the 1990s and beyond has been to lower tariffs. This has been done in a gradual fashion by compressing the top tariff rate while rationalizing the tariff structure through a reduction in the number of tariff bands. The top rate fell to 85 percent in 1993–1994 and 50 percent in 1995–1996.

There were some reversals along the way in the form of new, special duties and the unification of a low and a high tariff rate to the latter, but the general direction has been toward liberalization, the top rate coming down to 20 percent in 2004–2005.

The 1990s reforms were accompanied by the lifting of exchange controls that had served as an extra layer of restrictions on imports. As a part of the 1991 reform, the government devalued the rupee by 22 percent against the U.S. dollar, from 21.2 rupees to 25.8 rupees per dollar. In February 1992 a dual exchange rate system was introduced, which allowed exporters to sell 60 percent of their foreign exchange in the free market and 40 percent to the government at the lower official price. Importers were authorized to purchase foreign exchange in the open market at the higher price, effectively ending exchange control. Within a year of establishing this market exchange rate, the official exchange rate was unified with it. Starting in February 1994, many current account transactions, including all current business transactions, education, medical expenses, and foreign travel, were also permitted at the market exchange rate. These steps culminated in India accepting the International Monetary Fund Article VIII obligations, which made the rupee officially convertible on the current account.

Liberalization of trade in services. Since 1991 India has also carried out a substantial liberalization of trade in services. Traditionally, services sectors have been subject to heavy government intervention. Public sector presence has been conspicuous in the key sectors of insurance, banking, and telecommunications. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made toward opening the door wider to private-sector participation, including foreign investors.

Until recently, insurance was a state monopoly. On 7 December 1999, the Indian Parliament passed the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, which established an Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority and opened the door to private entry, including foreign investors. Up to 26 percent foreign investment, subject to obtaining a license from the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, is permitted.

Though the public sector dominates in banking, private banks are permitted to operate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 74 percent in private banks is permitted under the automatic route. In addition, foreign banks are allowed to open a specified number of new branches every year. More than 25 foreign banks, with full banking licenses, and approximately 150 foreign bank branches are currently in operation. Under the 1997 WTO Financial Services Agreement, India committed to permitting 12 new foreign bank branches annually.

The telecommunications sector has experienced much greater opening to the private sector, including foreign investors. Until the early 1990s, the sector was a state monopoly. The 1994 National Telecommunications Policy provided for opening cellular as well as basic and value-added telephone services to the private sector, with foreign investors granted entry. Rapid changes in technology led to the adoption of the New Telecom Policy in 1999, which provides the current policy framework. Accordingly, in basic, cellular mobile, paging and value-added service, and global mobile personnel communications by satellite, FDI is limited to 49 percent subject to the granting of a license from the Department of Telecommunications. FDI up to 100 percent is allowed, with some conditions for Internet service providers not providing gateways (for both satellite and submarine cables) and infrastructure providers furnishing dark fiber, electronic mail, and voice mail. Additionally, subject to licensing and security requirements and the restriction that proposals with FDI beyond 49 percent must be approved by the government, up to 74 percent foreign investment is permitted for Internet service providers with gateways, radio paging, and end-to-end bandwidth.

FDI up to 100 percent is permitted in e-commerce. Automatic approval is available for foreign equity in software and almost all areas of electronics. One hundred percent foreign investment is permitted in information technology units set up exclusively for exports. These units can be set up under several programs, including Export Oriented Units, Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones, Software Technology Parks, and Electronics Hardware Technology Parks.

The infrastructure sector has also been opened to foreign investment. FDI up to 100 percent under automatic route is permitted in projects for the construction and maintenance of roads, highways, vehicular bridges, toll roads, vehicular tunnels, ports, and harbors. In construction and maintenance of ports and harbors, automatic approval for foreign equity up to 100 percent is available. In projects providing supporting services to water transport, such as operation and maintenance of piers, and loading and discharging of vehicles, no approval is required for foreign equity up to 51 percent. FDI up to 100 percent is permitted in airports, though FDI above 74 percent requires prior governmental approval. Foreign equity up to 40 percent, and investment by nonresident Indians up to 100 percent, is permitted in domestic air-transport services. Only railways remain off limits to private entry.

Since 1991 several attempts have been made to bring the private sector, including FDI, into the power sector but without perceptible success. The most recent attempt is the Electricity Bill 2003, which replaces three existing

power legislations dated 1910, 1948, and 1998. The new bill offers a comprehensive framework for restructuring the power sector and builds on experience in the telecommunications sector. It attempts to introduce competition through private-sector entry side by side with public-sector entities in generation, transmission, and distribution.

The bill fully de-licenses generation and freely permits captive generation. Only hydropower projects would henceforth require clearance from the Central Electricity Authority. Distribution licensees would be free to undertake generation, and generating companies would be free to take up distribution businesses. Trading has been recognized as a distinct activity, with the Regulatory Commissions authorized to fix ceilings on trading margins, if necessary. FDI is permitted in all three activities.

Impact of liberalization. The ratio of total exports of goods and services to GDP in India doubled from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 2000. The rise was less dramatic on imports because increased external borrowing was still financing a large proportion of imports in 1990, which was no longer true in 2000. But the rise was still significant, from 9.9 percent in 1990 to 16.6 percent in 2000. Within ten years, the ratio of total goods and services trade to GDP rose from 17.2 percent to 30.6 percent. Nevertheless, this is substantially lower than the corresponding ratio of 49.3 percent achieved by China in 2000.

The Road Ahead

Despite substantial progress, tariffs remain high and must be compressed further. At this stage, the best course will be to first unify all tariff rates applicable to industrial goods at 15 percent, and then to bring them down to 10 percent by 2006–2007. Tariff uniformity has the advantage of minimizing incentives to lobby and therefore makes future liberalization easier. It is also likely to create less distortion than a more variegated tariff structure.

In the Doha negotiations, India should press for complete elimination of industrial tariffs by 2015 in all developed countries and by 2025 in all developing countries. Such a stance may enable India to achieve its long-sought objective of eliminating tariff peaks in developed countries that apply to labor-intensive products such as clothing and footwear. At the same time, the elimination of tariffs at home is fully consistent with India's liberalization program.

Agricultural tariffs in India have risen in recent years, and there is considerable room for lowering them, but political constraints are daunting despite the potential benefit, so that change is unlikely. This makes it essential

for India to adopt a more flexible approach in Doha negotiations.

A particularly disturbing development on the trade policy front in India has been the rise of antidumping duties, which started in January 1993. By 1998, 45 antidumping cases had been initiated, covering 18 products. Definitive duties had been imposed in 11 cases, and a ruling of no injury reached in 2. India has now replaced the United States as the premier user of this instrument. Between July and December 2001, it carried out 51 antidumping investigations, which only reverses the economic liberalization policies introduced since 1991.

India has also embarked upon preferential trade arrangements that liberalize trade with one or more trading partners on a discriminatory basis. On balance, this is an inferior strategy toward trade liberalization, but perhaps for political and strategic reasons India's government has essentially committed itself to it. To minimize the damage to itself from possible trade diversion, it is more important for India to lower its external barriers as well. From a strategic point of view, India's recent decision to forge free trade areas with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations makes eminently good sense. Focusing on creating a South Asian Free Trade Area, on the other hand, offers no such benefits and is almost certain to impose economic costs associated with the diversion of trade from more efficient outside sources.

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See also **Economic Reforms of 1991; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

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TRADE POLICY, 1800–1947 Defined either narrowly or broadly, the trade policy of the British government of India did not promote the interests of most Indian producers or consumers. Narrowly defined, trade policy refers to government rates of tariffs, duties, quotas, trade agreements, and other policy instruments that affect the price and quantities of goods exported and imported. Broadly defined, trade policy incorporates all

government policies that influence a country's terms of trade, defined as the price of its exports relative to its imports. Such policies would include those targeting changes in exchange and interest rates, investment incentives, taxation and expenditure policies on tradable commodities, and nontariff barriers to trade, such as preferential treatment in government purchases. British imperial rule had many adverse consequences for India's international economic relations.

The British Raj had no consistent trade "policy" until the mid-nineteenth century. The three British East India Company presidencies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras had operated largely independently and had adapted to a varying range of pre-colonial trade systems. For example, Mughal tariff rates often varied from 2.5 to 5 percent, depending on the region and the traders' community affiliation. Over time, the British consolidated the indigenous systems of inland and external customs rates of the eighteenth century.

By the time the East India Company's administration had solidified its hold over Indian territory, an all-India trade policy emerged. From 1846 the British Raj instituted a uniform tariff rate schedule: 3.5 percent on cotton twist and yarn, and 5 percent on all other goods imported from Britain. For imports from all other countries, the rates were double. The policy clearly favored Britain among India's numerous trading partners; yet it did not impose unique advantages to British industrial sectors over their Indian counterparts. However, what began as a simple, nonprotective tariff regime evolved during the late nineteenth century into a rigid reflection of the interests of British manufacturing and political interests.

Unlike many governments of the time, the British government of India did not rely upon import and export duties for the bulk of its revenues. In colonial India, the lion's share of revenues came from land taxes, a regressive tax regime retained from Mughal administrations. As fiscal expenditures outpaced revenues, the Raj looked to import duties as an expedient way of raising public revenues. In 1860 the rates on twists and yarn rose to 5 percent. For all other goods, the rates doubled. While this did provide additional income for the government, raising import tariffs also had the effect of raising the price Indian consumers paid for imported goods relative to those produced domestically. British cotton manufacturers cried foul. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce put enormous pressure on the Raj to lower rates, claiming that the government had unfairly favored Indian cotton goods producers to the disadvantage of British firms. Manchester's lobby found a sympathetic audience with Lord Salisbury, secretary of state for India in 1875. By 1882 all cotton import duties were abolished. When fiscal

necessity prompted the reimposition of an import duty of 3.5 percent in 1894, the government again appeased British industrialists with an equivalent excise tax on Indian cotton textile production. These excise duties, which remained in place until 1925, galvanized political opposition to the notion that the imperial government could serve as a loyal steward of India's domestic economy.

For good reason, cotton textiles are symbolic of India's international trading relationships in the period. Between 1840 and 1865, the principal commodities of import included cotton twist and yarn, cotton goods, machinery, raw metals (particularly copper and iron), metal manufactures, and railway materials. Between 1870 and 1895, India was the biggest customer of Britain's Lancashire cotton industry. By 1920, imports included cotton manufactures, sugar, iron and steel, machinery and millwork, and mineral oils. Indian imports were more technologically advanced and had greater value-added than Indian exports. For basic industrial inputs—machinery, metals, and chemicals—India depended upon overseas production. Moreover, 90 percent of all India's imports in 1919–1920 originated from the United Kingdom. During the Great Depression, the British abandoned free trade orthodoxy and built huge tariff barriers to trade. In 1930 the British government of India passed the Cotton Textile Protection Act instituting duties of 15 percent for all British goods and 20 percent for all non-British imports. By 1931 both of these rates rose by 5 percent. The justification again was fiscal necessity, not protection of Indian industry. Most commentators, however, have concluded that the intent was simply to redirect India's foreign trade toward England. In the depressed economic environment of the 1930s, the Raj discouraged trade with other major textile producers such as Japan. The case of cotton textiles thus illustrates how the concerns of Indian consumers and producers were overridden by the special interest groups within the British Empire. British India's primary economic interests were abandoned in favor of overt “imperial preference” and bilateral agreements.

India's other major import was silver. Reportedly, Indian imports of silver accounted for a third of world silver production in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. According to the *Statistical Abstract relating to British India* (various years), precious metals accounted for approximately one-fifth of the value of India's total imports. Part of India's seemingly insatiable demand for silver was for private consumption purposes, sometimes called hoarding. Another part was converted into currency. In either case, the vast majority of the population preferred to accumulate their savings in the form of precious metals, which in times of distress could be easily converted into the official silver-based rupee. Government

mints were open to the public until 1893 and charged modest commissions. Thus if the intrinsic value of the silver in the Indian rupee exceeded the exchange value of the coinage, then the government could anticipate a rise in the public's willingness to liquidate private stores. With a glut of silver on world markets, India's silver currency rapidly depreciated from 1876 to 1893. This illustrated the vulnerability of India's exchange rate, unmanaged by a central bank until 1935.

While the government of British India did have some policy instruments (in the form of counsel bills and reverse counsel bills) to affect the value of the rupee, the government developed no independent, central institution to integrate India's money markets and govern monetary policy. For most of the colonial period, the value of the rupee and its consequent impact on trade relations was left to world market forces. When the value of the rupee plummeted, Indian exports were given a huge boost.

Opium, indigo, sugar, and raw cotton were the major commodities exported by India in 1849. By 1920 exports remained overwhelmingly basic, unfinished commodities: raw cotton, jute manufactures (mainly gunny sacks), raw jute, raw skins and hides, and tea. Although from 1865 to 1920 Britain's share of Indian exports fell from 67 percent to 22 percent, on the eve of its independence India's economy resembled a classic third world economy, producing inelastic agricultural goods for a competitive world market and importing more expensive manufactured goods. Commodity imports exceeded exports by nearly 12 to 1.

Economic wisdom about protection and regulation of trade has changed considerably since the colonial period. While free trade has become the mantra for economic growth since around 1980, in the late nineteenth century many nations, including the United States, actively protected their industries. Protective duties on imports were considered essential for the nurturing of infant industries and at the same time provided a means for governments to reward important constituencies. Few economic historians would deny that India's nascent steel and paper industry got a healthy start thanks to interwar trade barriers. However, it remains an open question whether the absence of tariff protection before 1914 actually hurt the mature Indian textile sector. New research suggests that Indian craft industries, including hand-loom textile production, continued to thrive in the colonial period. Modern machine production was not always a substitute for traditionally processed textiles due to the breadth and segmentation of the textile market. It is possible that free trade may not have hurt Indian producers before 1914, but it certainly did help British producers compete on world markets. For the rulers of British India, free trade

held ideological charm, but it often proved contradictory to the necessities of colonial administration.

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See also *Balance of Payments: Foreign Investment and the Exchange Rate; Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947*

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TRIBAL PEOPLES OF EASTERN INDIA

India's tribal population, about 83.6 million, constitutes 8 percent of the total population of the country. This population comprises about 461 distinct tribal communities. More than 90 percent of the tribals live in tribal minority states. The tribal minority states spread over a broad girdle in middle India from Gujarat to West Bengal. The tribal majority states like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland are all located in the northeast region of the country. But less than 10 percent of the total tribal population resides there.

Ethnically, the tribes in eastern India belong to two racial stocks, Proto-Austroloid and Mongoloid. The Proto-Austroloid group is found in Jharkhand, Orissa, and the southern districts of West Bengal, while the Mongoloid group covers the other tribes in Bengal and the Northeast.

The most important tribal communities are: Santhal, Munda, Oraon, and Ho in Jharkhand; the Bhumij, Bhuiya, Gond, Kandha, and Saora in Orissa; the Bhumij, Santhal, Kora, Lepcha, Bhutia, Munda, and Oraon in West Bengal; Kachari, Miri, and Rabha in Assam; the Adi, Nyishi, Apatani, Monpa, and Wancho in Arunachal Pradesh; the Naga in Nagaland; Garo and Khasi in Meghalaya; the Mizo in Mizoram; some Naga tribes, Mac, and Paite in Manipur; and Tripuri, Riang, and Chakma in Tripura.

All these tribes differ in population, levels of sociocultural and economic development, means of subsistence, religion, and language. However, 90 percent of tribal populations reside in villages. There are many tribes spread over more than one state, such as the Santal, Munda, Oraon, the Naga, and the Gond. All these tribes



Young Members of Naga Tribe Armed with Swords and Shields. In this c. 1930 photo, young Naga warriors from the northeast Assam region pose for the camera. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION / CORBIS.

are known as scheduled tribes (STs). This status gives them certain safeguards, as well as certain rights and privileges, and entitles them to additional development funds from the central government. It also provides for reservation in legislatures, services, and educational institutions. Some of these tribal communities have been identified as “primitive tribal groups,” characterized as inhabiting preagricultural land and having extremely low levels of literacy. Some of them are found in Jharkhand and Orissa. India's government pays special attention to speeding up their development and saving them from extinction.

The literacy percentage among the STs in eastern India varies between 82 percent in Mizoram and 23 percent in Orissa. The literacy percentage in the middle Indian states is much lower than in the Northeast. Among women, the rates of literacy of the scheduled caste (SC) population are lowest in Jharkhand and Orissa.



PERCENTAGE OF TRIBAL POPULATION IN EASTERN INDIA STATES

| | |
|-------------------|-------|
| Arunachal Pradesh | 63.7 |
| Assam | 12.8 |
| Jharkhand | 26.9 |
| Manipur | 34.4 |
| Meghalaya | 85.5 |
| Mizoram | 94.8 |
| Nagaland | 87.7 |
| Orissa | 22.2 |
| West Bengal | 5.6 |
| Tripura | 30.95 |

The work participation rate of the tribal population is about 50 percent, which is much higher than that of the general population, primarily due to very high rate of work participation among tribal women. The tribal population is largely concentrated in rural areas, which have higher female participation rates than the urban areas. In addition, women are employed in forestry operations, which are largely female-oriented. Since very few tribal girls go to school, they are available for taking up gainful economic activity. Ninety percent of the workers are engaged in the primary sector, about 4 percent in the secondary sector, and 6 percent in the tertiary sector.

Social Structure

Each tribal group is known by a distinct name. Some of these are divided into subtribes. Dual organization is also found among some tribes in Orissa. Almost all the tribes are made up of clans, which are exogamous. Of course, there are some exceptions, such as Maler and Parahiya in Jharkhand and Saora in Orissa. In northeast India, social stratification is found among some tribes, such as Monpa and Apatani in Arunachal Pradesh.

By and large, most of the tribes are patriarchal and patrilocal. Succession is from father to son. There are only two tribes that are matriarchal and matrilineal: the Khasi and Garo of Meghalaya. There is no polyandry among eastern Indian tribes, but polygyny is permitted and practiced among many tribes.

The basic unit of the tribal society is the family. Joint or extended families are very rare; in most places the family is nuclear. After marriage, both son and daughter leave the parental home. The son sets up a new household, while married girls go to live with their husbands. In most marriages, there is the practice of paying a bride price, either in cash or in kind, or in both. In some communities in the Northeast, the bride price consists of cattle.

Most of the marriages are negotiated by parents, but there are also other methods of mate selection. Most marriages are adult marriages, and in some cases there are love marriages that are later approved by the parents. In these tribal communities, marriages are a long process, punctuated by various rituals. However, unlike Hindu marriage, tribal marriage is not a religious sacrament, and no priests are involved at any stage in the entire process. Marriage rules prohibit marriage inside the clan and outside the tribe. Anyone breaking these rules invites social ostracism in addition to incurring divine displeasure. Divorce is allowed under certain conditions but must be approved by the village council, which provides for compensation to the aggrieved party. Widow remarriage is allowed. Polygyny is largely confined to affluent sections of the tribal society. It is also a status symbol. The eldest wife enjoys a privileged position in a polygynous family.

In matriarchal societies, among the Khasi and Garo, the family is headed by a woman who has full command over family resources and makes all important decisions regarding family matters. On her death, her position is inherited by her daughter. After marriage, a man must shift to his wife's family. A person inherits the clan title of his mother. In such a society, men play a secondary role.

In many tribal societies in eastern India, youth dormitories used to play an important role in the socialization of children. It was an effective economic organization for guests, a useful seminary of training for young men in the social and cultural duties, and was an institution for magico-religious observances calculated to secure success in hunting. It was also a place for training in music and dance. The organization was entirely managed by the youths, helping them to acquire organizational and leadership skills. It was indeed a "kingdom of the young." In Jharkhand, among the Oraon, it was known as *dbumkuria*. Although *dbumkuria* buildings are found in some villages, they have lost their functions. A similar organization known as the *ghotul* is functioning on traditional lines among the Muria Gond in the Bastar District of Chhatisgarh.

Among the northeastern tribes like the Naga, an organization of this nature, called *morung*, exists. It also functions as a community house where all the weapons of war and head-hunting trophies are placed, reminiscent of days when village raids were common. The Naga *morung* strengthens the sense of social unity, develops in boys a strong esprit de corps, and at the same time encourages competition between the *morung*, thus stimulating the activities of the whole village.

The position of women in tribal societies in eastern India is much better than in other societies, for they are

independent and do not suffer any seclusion. They move about freely in the forest, farms, and agricultural fields. They work shoulder to shoulder with men. In the Northeast they also engage in small business and manage sales in small shops.

However, tribal custom prohibits giving a share to daughters in their fathers' property on the plea that after marriage they become members of another clan. She is entitled to a share in her husband's property after his death. In other matters, women do not suffer from any inequality. In matriarchal society, the status of women is higher than in patriarchal society, since all authority is vested in the head of the family, who is a woman.

Tribal Economy

Tribals in eastern India make a living by different means. There are some communities that are still in the hunting and gathering stage. The Birhor in Jharkhand are a classic example of such subsistence. Now a section of this tribe is engaged in settled cultivation. Some communities are pastoralists, engaged in sheep or cattle rearing, such as the Sulung of Arunachal Pradesh. The number of people engaged in hunting, food gathering, and pastoralism is very small. More than 90 percent of tribals subsist on agriculture, either shifting or settled. Shifting cultivation is generally carried out in areas where flat land is not available for plow cultivation. In Jharkhand, the Maler of Santal Pargana are still engaged in shifting cultivation. Many tribal communities in Orissa, particularly in the hilly regions, are engaged in shifting cultivation. In this process, a plot where vegetation has grown is set on fire, and then the ashes are spread all over. Seeds are sown with help of digging sticks. No plow is used. One plot is cultivated for a year or two. It is then left fallow for a number of years to allow vegetation to grow again. Shifting cultivation is regarded as wasteful by agronomists and foresters. Efforts are being made to introduce scientific horticulture. In many areas of Arunachal Pradesh, apples, oranges, pineapples, and potatoes are being grown on shifting cultivation sites.

The bulk of the tribals in other areas are engaged in settled cultivation and grow a large number of food crops, but the agricultural technology continues to be traditional. Efforts are being made to improve the situation by providing irrigation, improved seeds, and fertilizers and insecticides. This is extremely important, as the fertility of the soil is quite low in plateau and hill areas in comparison to river valleys, villages, and plains.

With the growth of education and the opening up of communication in tribal areas, both in middle India and the Northeast, some tribals have shifted to secondary and tertiary sectors of employment. In Jharkhand and Orissa,

the growth of industry has attracted tribal people, who have joined largely as unskilled laborers in Jharkhand and Orissa and as contractors and small businessmen in the Northeast.

Religious Beliefs and Practices

Most tribal religions are animistic. Their deities are associated or named after natural objects like sun, moon, hills, forest, rivers, and so on. Most of them have a pantheon headed by a high god (God of Gods), such as Singbonga among the Munda of Chotanagpur. He is benevolent, omniscient, and omnipresent. Below the high god are clan and village gods. There are a number of deities associated with hill, forest, and rivers. In Chotanagpur they are known as Bonga. There are also ancestral spirits at home to whom worship is offered on certain occasions. In Jharkhand most villages have a common place of worship—known as *sarna*—where a number of village gods are propitiated by the village priest, known differently among different tribes. In recent times, *sarnaism* is a term that has been used for tribal religion in Jharkhand. However, in census reports, most tribals have been classified as Hindu.

In Arunachal Pradesh most of the tribals, except the Christians and Buddhists, are followers of the popular tribal deity Donyi Polo. In many tribal religions, there are both benevolent and malevolent spirits. The latter must be propitiated so that they do not cause any harm to man or cattle. Tribal society is also characterized by firm belief in totem and taboo. In fact, each clan has a totem fashioned after a natural object, animate or inanimate. This object is given all respect and is regarded as the protector of that totemic group. Taboo is observed in regard to certain items of behavior and ritual practices. Any breach of taboo attracts divine punishment.

All tribal societies in India observe many fairs and festivals. These are largely connected with agriculture, such as the sowing of seeds, first fruit rituals, and harvest. These festivals are spread throughout the year and are celebrated for several days. All the festivals are marked by dances, music, and community worship of deities. The fervor with which these festivals are celebrated is an assertion of tribal identity.

In Jharkhand, Orissa, and West Bengal, a large number of tribals observe Hindu festivals and worship Hindu gods and goddesses during festivals. Such practices do not clash with belief in tribal gods and goddesses. This spirit of accommodation is not evident when they come into contact with Christian missionaries.

Christian missionaries entered tribal areas in Chotanagpur and the Northeast at different times, under the patronage of British rulers. Christian missionaries

belonging to various denominations entered interior tribal areas and started to convert people there. They met with greater success in the Northeast, particularly in Nagaland, Meghalaya, and Mizoram, where they converted large numbers of tribals to Christianity. These converts shed their old religious beliefs and practices and slowly adopted the norms and behavior patterns of the missionaries. This process was accelerated by the spread of education through the medium of the church, which came to play a guiding role in their sociocultural life.

Some tribes in Arunachal are Buddhist. The Monpa follow Mahayana Buddhism, while the Singpho belong to the Hinayana sect. Tawang, which is located close to the Chinese border in Arunachal Pradesh, has a very large monastery with three hundred monks. Some tribes follow the Bon religion, which is a mixture of Buddhism and tribal beliefs and practices.

Colonial Encounters with Tribal Communities

Studies in ancient and medieval Indian history have revealed several instances of continued interaction between the local population and indigenous (tribal) groups in different parts of India. The names of such groups (Bhil, Kol, Kirat, Kinar, Nishad, Asur, etc.) are found in historical literature. Indian rulers were satisfied if tribal chiefs acknowledged their sovereignty and never interfered with tribal customs or imposed tribute. During Mughal rule some revenue was realized, but tribal rights in forest and forest produce were not disturbed. With the establishment of British colonial rule in eastern India, things changed a great deal. The government acquired tribal lands, and different kinds of taxes were imposed on them. Tribal lands were acquired to lay down railways and roads, setting up townships with administrative offices, police stations, educational institutions, and hospitals. In areas where the *zamindari* system prevailed, they were placed under control of the *zamindar*. The exploitative and oppressive behavior of administrative officials and of the *zamindars* forced the tribals to launch agitation for the removal of their grievances. Such unrest in tribal areas sometimes became violent revolts.

In the wake of famine of 1770, the Pahariya of Rajmahal hills in Santal Pargana rose in revolt against the government. Forced by starvation to come down from the hills, they engaged in theft and murder. The government tried to suppress the revolt but could not. Ultimately, it was an enlightened official, Augustus Cleveland, who solved the problem by introducing certain reforms for providing better administration. This was the first attempt at indirect rule. In 1821 the Ho of Singhbhum rose in a revolt against the incursion of British troops in their area. To solve this problem, Thomas Wilkinson, the agent of the governor-general, introduced a series of

rules by which the second example of indirect rule was put into practice. Again in 1831, the Kol rebellion forced the administration to take steps to curb exploitation and oppression by officials and others from outside the area. The Santal revolt of 1855 was mainly directed against up-country outsiders who came to Santal Praganas as shopkeepers and moneylenders. The exploitation by these elements led to a violent revolt, which continued for more than a year. After the rebellion was quelled, certain reform measures were enacted, the most important of which was the demarcation of Santal-dominated areas known as Damin-e-Koh, which were taken out of the general administration and were placed under special regulations. It is clear that all these movements originated from economic exploitation, encroachment on tribal land, infringement of tribal rights in land and forest, and interference with age-old customs.

Survival and Identity

The tribals are faced with a large number of problems emanating from land alienation, which has continued in spite of government legislation: the chronic deficit budget of the tribal family (leading to indebtedness and bonded labor), low productivity of the soil, traditional agricultural practices, poor marketing facilities due to lack of communication, low literacy, and unemployment. These problems are compounded by severe malnutrition, poor health, and lack of sanitation. In recent times many development projects in tribal areas resulted in large-scale displacement; building large industrial establishments resulted in ousting tribals from their homes. Irrigation projects in tribal-dominated areas have submerged a large number of villages by the construction of reservoirs. Reports of the commissioner for SCs and STs are replete with examples of the ravages of such projects. The tribals were displaced from the traditional sources of their livelihood and their places of habitation. The funds they received as "compensation" for their land were soon dissipated, and they joined the ranks of landless laborers. The establishment of vast industrial enterprises in tribal zones has led to the sacrifice of tribal interest at the altar of India's modernization.

In a cultural contact situation there is a greater likelihood of the smaller group losing its language and adopting the language of the economically stronger, culturally more advanced neighbor. In the past two centuries, tribal cultures have become the targets of assault from two sides. Interaction with Hindu society has led to the adoption of many norms and values that were foreign to tribals. This process has not only created prejudice against occupations such as leather working and butchering, but has introduced the dietary taboos, child marriage, and restrictions on remarriage of widows associated with

Hinduism. This is a part of the Sanskritization process, in which the norms and values of Hindu society became the reference model and principal criteria of social responsibility.

Hinduism is not the only ideological force that constitutes the cultural assault on tribal mores. With the advent of Christianity a large number of tribals in eastern India have been converted. Missionary influence has eroded much of their cultural heritage, including myths, beliefs, and rituals. Conversion of a part of any tribal community tends to destroy its social unity.

It is generally seen that not only physical survival but much of tribal social organization and its culture centers around access to land and control and management of natural resources, which is a basis of their life support system. Steady deprivation of these resources and of the traditional right of management and control of the same is reflected in the process of pauperization. The problems are compounded by the lack of diversification of occupations. Under these circumstances, some tribals in middle and eastern India began to suffer from threats to their identity. This is the result of the spread of education, exposure to urban influences, and entry into government service through job reservations. The resurgence of traditional religious identity, the creation of new literature, and the invention of scripts bear testimony to growing tribal identity assertion.

Christian missionaries, nongovernmental organizations, and tribal associations are all catalysts of social change in this regard. Tribal associations initiate social reforms in customary matters, like the reduction or abolition of bride price. Cultural movements launched by Rangunath Murmu among the Santals, focusing on education with a district script and culturally oriented curriculum, as well as social reform, continued for many decades. The Manki-Munda movement launched by the traditional headman of Singhbhum in Jharkhand emanated from an encroachment on traditional land rights but later assumed political overtones. Threats to traditional systems of control and management of resources and the search for a more satisfactory system of organization of community power leads to the creation of political platforms, launching movements that at times react with violence.

The assertion of tribal identity is more evident in tribal minority states. The tribals felt that changes initiated by the state or through market forces tended to erode their identity. In tribal majority states there is no such problem, since tribals can reshape their own future through a democratic process and legal constitutional means. They have never experienced any exploitation or discrimination at the hands of nontribals. In fact, as a

result of the dispensation of "Inner Line" regulations, tribals are protected from incursions by nontribal elements. This creates a situation of exploitation in reverse, resulting in the exploitation of nontribals who go to the tribal states in search of small business jobs.

Some of the states in the Northeast are in the grip of sustained violent insurgency. The roots of that insurgency may be traced to hopes entertained among some tribal leaders that with the end of British rule in 1947, the tribal areas in the Northeast would revert to independent status. Thus insurgency is a struggle not so much for autonomy but for secession from India. In some parts of the Northeast, like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, and Mizoram, total peace prevails and people are reaping the fruits of peace through steady development and a rise in their standards of living.

In India the tribals do not face any problem of physical survival. There has been a steady rise in tribal population, from 30 million in 1961 to 67.8 million in 1991. The literacy percentage rose from 8.5 percent in 1961 to 30 percent in 1991. Ninety-two percent of tribals in the country live in rural areas, and the percentage of people below the poverty line in the rural areas is slightly over 50 percent, while that of general population is 37 percent. They have adequate representation in government service, in the Indian Parliament, and in *panchayati raj* institutions. In the tribal minority states, where the fifth schedule of the Constitution is in operation, adequate measures have been taken to safeguard their interests in all walks of life. Whenever money has to be allotted for the promotion of "total literacy" or Integrated Child Development Service projects, priority is given to tribal areas. Steps have also been taken to promote tribal culture through songs, dances, marketing of handicrafts, and the promotion of tribal languages.

The tribals in India, both in tribal majority and tribal minority states, have retained their identity and are proud of their cultural heritage. Their leaders' main concern is to see that their rights as citizens in India's democracy are well protected. They are striving, through the help of state and the wider society, to achieve a better quality of life while slowly moving toward social integration with other communities of their region.

Sachchidananda

See also **Scheduled Tribes**

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TRIBAL POLITICS The “tribal” peoples or *adivasis* of India, according to the 2001 census, constitute roughly 8.1 percent of the country’s population, some 83.6 million people, classified under 461 different communities. They occupy a belt stretching from the Bhil regions of western India through the Gond districts of central India, to Jharkhand and Bengal, where the Mundas, Oraons, and Santals predominate. There are also pockets of tribal communities in the south like the Chenchus, Todas, and Kurumbas, and very small endangered communities in the Andamans, like the Jarawas, Onge, and Sentinelese. Northeast India contains another major portion of the tribal population, including the different Naga subtribes, Khasis, Garos, Mizos, Kukis, Bodos, and others. The intellectual, political, and administrative rationale for treating all these communities together under a single “tribal” rubric remains unclear.

One feature common to all these communities, however, whether in central or northeastern India, is their division between different state and administrative boundaries, including national borders (e.g., the Chakmas are divided between Mizoram and Bangladesh, the Nagas and Kukis cross the Indo-Myanmar border). In central India, although communities like the Gonds and the Bhils number some 7.3 million people each (1991 census), none of them has been recognized as peoples, nor have they been given statehood, as have other linguistic communities. Even though the struggle for a tribal but multiethnic state of Jharkhand preceded that of many other linguistic states, it was finally achieved in truncated form in November 2000. In the Northeast, struggles for autonomy range from complete independence to statehood to autonomous district councils. Another common feature is the combination of special legal provisions for tribals on the one hand, and repression by the police and army on the other, when tribal peoples try to assert their own visions of the good life.

The “tribal question” in central India has traditionally been posed in two ways by academics and policy makers: the question of differentiating between tribes and castes on the one hand, and tribes and peasants on the other; and the question of how best to improve what is universally seen as a poverty-stricken condition among tribals. In the Northeast, struggles for autonomy, statehood, and secession have put the question of identity at center stage. For the government, the main issue there is law and order, and solutions are usually conceived in military

terms, such as the draconian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, which gives armed personnel the right to shoot on sight on mere suspicion, arrest without warrant, and enter and search premises at will. To understand contemporary tribal politics, however, it is essential to start with the colonial period.

Colonialism

In the pre-colonial period, while hill and plains people occupied different ecological, social, and often political spaces, there was often considerable trade and even intermarriage between the two. Both in central and northeastern India, hills people would raid the plains, and were in turn looked down upon as savages. Yet categories were often fungible, and the balance of power was never fixed. Colonialism was a significant watershed, both in epistemological and material terms. The production of census records, gazetteers, official or semiofficial ethnographies, grammars, linguistic surveys, and land tenure records all served to create sociological and epistemological categories such as castes and tribes. The characterization of the tribal in India was similar to that in Africa, drawing on evolutionary classifications based on race and anthropology, the denigration of any indigenous kingship or polity in favor of an acephalous, kinship-bound society, and the perceived primitiveness of modes of production. The categories “tribal,” “primitive,” “savage,” or “wild” were also used interchangeably to characterize those peoples who resisted colonial rule, and formed part of the justification for particularly violent campaigns of “pacification,” such as the burning of Kond villages in Orissa in the nineteenth century, ostensibly to suppress human sacrifice, or Naga villages in the twentieth century, to outlaw head-hunting.

But the Indian “tribe” was further understood to be differentiated by religion and culture from the Indian “caste.” The census reports, with their agonizing over the distinction between animists and Hindus, in particular contributed to this objectification, which continues to fuel social science debates. There were of course dissenters from the conventional view, for example, sociologist André Beteille (1974), who pointed out that in terms of size, isolation, religion, and means of livelihood, it was often not possible to distinguish between castes and tribes.

In material terms, the colonial view of tribal communities as isolated, poor, and backward created conditions for their exploitation. Shifting cultivation, which was a widely practiced form of agriculture, was dismissed as wasteful and destructive of the forests. Reservation of the forests to make space for monocultures, which would contribute to the British shipbuilding, railway, and war efforts, was introduced in the guise of “scientific forestry.” Restrictions were introduced on the collection

and sale of nontimber forest produce, which was a major source of income for most tribal communities. These changes set off more than a century of conflict over access to the forests. Some of the major rebellions in tribal India, such as the Bastar Bhumkal of 1910 and the Jharkhand Sal Andolan of the late 1970s, have been over forest rights. In many places, the forest department claimed land that *adivasis* had been cultivating for generations but on which their rights had never been recorded. Forced evictions from such lands, and the precarious situation of forest villages, remains a central and burning issue for large numbers of forest communities. Similarly, colonial settlement policies that transformed community lands into individually owned plots, higher rents, and unfamiliar legal systems led to significant land alienation. Moneylenders, traders, and others found a foothold in tribal areas, which they progressively expanded into complete dominance. Industrialization has further transformed the demographics of several tribal regions. In Jharkhand for example, tribals were down to approximately 26 percent in 2001 from roughly 50 percent in 1901.

Despite this clear history of underdevelopment, official policy attributes *adivasi* poverty to the backwardness and primitiveness of *adivasis* themselves, or in other words, regards it as an internal condition of their society. In the 1930s and 1940s, there was considerable debate among “isolationists,” “integrationists,” and “assimilationists” about whether to leave tribals alone, integrate them with some perceived “mainstream,” or attempt assimilation as a path toward progress. In neither case was it acknowledged that they had already been integrated, but on disadvantageous economic terms, as labor and supplier of raw materials. While the official policy of the government of India, as reflected in Jawaharlal Nehru’s five principles for tribal policy, or Panchsheel, is culturally “integrationist” and leaves space for *adivasis*’ own distinctive customs, in practice, assimilationist pressures predominate, especially in the sphere of schooling, language, and religion. For instance, the census automatically records *adivasis* as Hindus. The struggle to be recorded as followers of *sarna dharm* has been an important part of *adivasi* politics in Jharkhand in recent years.

Constitutional and Policy Provisions for Tribes

Like the scheduled castes, tribal communities are officially characterized as among the most vulnerable populations in the country, in need of special protective laws. In addition, however, tribal resistance to colonialism ensured that they were governed under distinctive administrative arrangements, some of which are now being rapidly eroded. Maintaining special tenure laws like the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is now an important part of tribal politics in the state of Jharkhand. The constitutional

provisions for scheduled tribes are inevitably a mixture of colonial legacy and fresh thinking at the time of the framing of the Constitution.

Following the various rebellions in *adivasi* areas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the Santal Hul of 1855–1856, the Birsa Ulgulan of 1895–1900, the Tana Bhagat Movement of 1914–1920, and the Bastar Bhumkal of 1910, the colonial government responded either by maintaining indirect rule (as in Bastar or the Dangs) or by setting up specific areas, under the direct rule of an agent to the governor-general, where the land, forest, and other laws applicable to the rest of the British province did not apply and where special administrative arrangements could be made that recognized, at least to some extent, community rather than private property (see, for example, the Bengal Regulation XIII of 1833 which followed the Kol rebellion of 1831–1832). This state of exceptionalism was continued in the Scheduled Districts Act (Act XIV) of 1874, which listed scheduled districts across British India. Special provisions for tribal areas were continued in the Government of India Act of 1919, which allowed for certain areas to be declared “backward tracts,” followed by the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Government of India (excluded and partially excluded areas) Order of 1936. These excluded and partially excluded areas later became the scheduled areas of independent India.

There are two broad types of scheduling in the Indian Constitution: area-based and community-based. Under Article 244 of the Constitution (Part X), which deals with the “Administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas,” there are two types of arrangements. The Sixth Schedule applies to tribal areas in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram, while nine states have scheduled areas under the Fifth Schedule: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan. While there is a strong overlap between the category of scheduled tribes and scheduled areas, the fit is imperfect. Some states that have the most vulnerable *adivasi* populations, like West Bengal, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala, have no scheduled areas at all, and even in the states where the Fifth Schedule is in operation, not all areas where *adivasis* constitute a majority are covered under the schedule.

Article 342 of the Constitution gives the president the power to schedule or list particular communities in order to render them special protection. These lists are state specific; for instance, the Santals and Mundas are a scheduled tribe in Jharkhand, but not so in Assam or the Andamans, where some of them migrated. Even in their states of origin and despite clear poverty, not all tribal communities are scheduled as tribes, for example the Kols of Sonbhadra and Mirzapur in Uttar Pradesh.

While the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution have colonial antecedents, the detailed provisions were framed by three subcommittees of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities. The committee, which was to look at the tribal areas “other than Assam” and whose work resulted in the Fifth Schedule, was chaired by the Gandhian A. V. Thakkar, who believed in a policy of “uplift” rather than “rights.” The basic assumption underlying the 1833 Bengal Regulation, the 1874 act, and the 1919 and 1935 acts, which has continued in the Fifth Schedule as well, is that tribal areas are best governed by a paternalistic and personalized administration with special and fewer rules than those that apply to nontribal areas. The Fifth Schedule makes provision for Tribes Advisory Councils and for certain laws to prevent alienation of land to nontribals and exploitation by moneylenders. The governor of the state has wide-ranging powers to modify or forbid existing laws or to propose special laws for these areas. In practice, experience with the Fifth Schedule has been very disappointing. The Tribes Advisory Councils have hardly any teeth, laws applicable to the rest of the state are routinely extended to scheduled areas, the governor rarely exercises the powers vested in him or her, and the net result is demonstrated by the miserable human development indicators for *adivasis*.

The Sixth Schedule, pertaining to former Assam, gives greater recognition to the right to self-governance, through the formation of autonomous district and regional councils with legislative powers in a variety of important matters, including the management of forests, the regulation of shifting cultivation, the appointment of chiefs or headmen, property inheritance, and social customs. The District Councils also have the power to levy taxes, regulate money lending, establish and manage primary schools, dispensaries, and markets. However, it still falls short of the autonomy that many groups in the Northeast region were demanding at the time.

In a parallel stream, the 73rd Amendment Act of the Constitution (1993) made it mandatory for every state to constitute *panchayats*, or councils, at the village, intermediate, and district levels. Past experience with elected *panchayats* that supplanted traditional tribal systems, however, led to a legal challenge by *adivasi* groups, and in 1995 the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that a separate act was needed for scheduled areas. Accordingly, in December 1996, Parliament passed the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA). This act is applicable to Fifth Schedule areas, since the Sixth Schedule already contains many of its provisions regarding customary law. In fact, PESA explicitly aspires to implement Sixth Schedule-like arrangements in Fifth Schedule areas. PESA mandates that any “State

legislation on the Panchayats . . . shall be in consonance with the customary law, social and religious practices and traditional management practices of community resources” and that “every Gram sabha [village assembly] shall be competent to safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary mode of dispute resolution.” However, most states have not passed appropriate legislation to implement the act, and there is widespread and often purposeful ignorance of its provisions on the part of officials.

In addition to the Fifth and Sixth Schedules and PESA, a number of constitutional provisions are addressed to *adivasis* as individual citizens. These include: Article 15 (4), which enables special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes; Article 16 (4a), which enables reservations in government services; Article 275 (1), which relates to central grants-in-aid to states for the specific purpose of scheduled tribe welfare; Articles 330, 332, and 335, which stipulate seats for scheduled tribes in the Parliament, state assemblies, and services; and Article 339, which mandates the setting up of a commission to report on the administration and welfare of scheduled areas and scheduled tribes. Successive five-year plans have also created special plans for tribal development, in the shape of multipurpose tribal blocks (second plan), tribal development agencies (fourth plan), and tribal subplans (fifth plan).

Tribal Politics in Central India

However, even as the state created paternalist schemes and legal provisions for tribal “development,” it contributed to their poverty and landlessness through land acquisition for mining, hydroelectric projects, defense projects, and other “development” activities, leading to massive displacement. The Bailadilla iron ore mine in Bastar, the Hirakud and Upper Indravati hydroelectric projects in Orissa, and the Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat are all examples. Apart from displacement, the two other axes of tribal politics are struggles over the forest and everyday encounters with the police.

Adivasi communities have responded to their situation in several ways: many of them have succumbed to the forces of industrialization and displacement, losing their lands and migrating to urban centers or other states in search of employment. A significant number, however, have joined communist struggles, like the Telengana movement and become members of the various “Naxalite” parties, such as the Communist Party of India (Maoist), to demand land reform and access to resources. They have also been active in various struggles against displacement by large dams led by organizations like the Narmada Bachao Andolan or the Koel Karo Andolan, as

well as in the struggle against insensitive and overly exploitative mining as in Kashipur, Orissa. In each of these struggles, people have been arrested and killed by the police, their houses have been razed, and their crops destroyed.

Since the late 1990s several tribal groups have mobilized to retain rights to forest land, which are in danger of being usurped by the Supreme Court decision of 1996, in the Godavarman forest case, which gives the forest department the right to manage all “forests,” as defined in the dictionary, regardless of their actual ownership. With one stroke, this judgment negates decades of struggle for more participatory forest management, as well as the specific rights provided by local tenurial acts like the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.

Another major plank of *adivasi* politics today is to claim the rights promised by PESA. Many nongovernmental organizations and social movements have promoted the setting up of village assemblies (*gram sabhas*), on the grounds that they have a constitutionally recognized “competence” to manage their own resources. The government, however, does not recognize these assemblies. In Meghalaya, there has been a parallel move to revive Khasi *syiems*, or chiefs. Several *adivasi* groups have also begun to make alliances with international networks of tribal and indigenous peoples.

Given the desperate situation in which many of the central Indian *adivasis* live, survival issues have usually dominated over identity questions. Competitive proselytization by Christian and Hindu groups has also served to reduce the space for the expression of an autonomous *adivasi* culture, language, and religion. In recent years, while some *adivasi* communities have been mobilized by Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) political forces, primarily through the work of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh fronts like the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, the Bajrang Dal, and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, others have attempted to revive traditional *adivasi* religions like the *sarna dharm* (sacred grove religion).

Tribal Politics in the Northeast Region

Many of the movements in the Northeast date back to the colonial policy of excluded areas and inner line permits, which cut off existing links between the hills and plains peoples, creating isolated tribal areas and communities. Christian missionary activities in these areas, particularly what is now Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya initially resulted in a loss of indigenous identity, culture, and religion, but eventually led to the formation of new identities, like that of the Naga and the Mizo peoples out of different subtribes, and the emergence of an educated middle class, which could articulate nationalist aspirations.

The failure of the Indian state to recognize people’s aspirations, forced accessions at the time of independence, as well as subsequent military action and repression further fueled secessionist politics.

The Northeast is marked by a multiplicity of insurgent outfits representing different ethnic groups, some of whom are engaged in interethnic warfare (e.g., the Naga-Kuki tensions) as well as conflict with the Indian state. Within the space demanded by larger nationalities like the Assamese or the Mizos, there are several minority groups that are also engaged in autonomy struggles, including the Bodos, Karbis, Dimasas, and Koch Rajbanshis in Assam, and the Hmars and Reangs in Mizoram. Some of them, like the Bodos, have been successful in negotiating accords with the Indian government, resulting in the Bodoland Territorial Council within Assam. Immigration by nontribals into tribal areas, especially Bangladeshis, is a major political issue in the area. Since it would be impossible to go into the histories of each movement, what follows here is simply a representative glimpse of two major nationality struggles, those of the Nagas and the Mizos.

Until the 1960s, Arunachal Pradesh (earlier known as North East Frontier Area or NEFA), Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Mizoram were part of the province of Assam. Manipur and Tripura, which were princely states, were absorbed into the Indian union as Part C states and then union territories, and were given separate statehood much later.

The Naga movement, which is the oldest and most powerful autonomy movement in the area, goes back to 1918, with the formation of the Naga club, in which ex-members of the World War I labor corps played a major role. In 1946 leadership of the Nagas was taken over by the Naga National Council (NNC), with representation from different subtribes. Apprehending that Indian independence and the absorption of Naga areas into India would mean a loss of autonomy, and yet with no clear alternative, the NNC wanted a ten-year interim agreement with India, during which it could decide whether it wanted complete independence. A nine-point agreement to this effect was signed between the NNC and the governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, in 1947. However, there was a dispute over the interpretation of the ninth clause, which stated that “at the end of this period (10 years) the Naga council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.” While the Nagas interpreted it to mean that they would be given the choice of independence, the Indian government interpreted it to mean that the Naga hills were now an integral part of India. The Naga hills became a district of Assam, to be

administered under the Sixth Schedule. This led to a split within the NNC, with A. Z. Phizo demanding complete independence. From about 1953, the NNC was forced into underground resistance by the presence of the Indian army. Since then, the Naga peoples have seen continued insurgency, as well as severe army repression involving rapes, killings, and the occupation of churches and schools, all of which is “legally” sanctioned under the Naga Hills Disturbed Areas Ordinance, the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act, and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1858 (amended in 1972). Pressure by Naga moderates on both the insurgents and the Indian government bought some peace in the form of statehood for Nagaland in 1963. Like the Hydari Agreement, the 1974 Shillong Accord between the central government and the insurgents died a quick death, and in 1980 the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) was formed. This in turn split into two factions, named after their leaders, the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang). From 1997 onward, again due to pressure by civil society groups like the Naga Hoho, the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights, and the Naga Mothers Association, there have been talks between the NSCN (I-M) and the Indian government. However, the Indian government’s proposal to extend a cease-fire to all Naga areas in 2001 created huge unrest in Manipur. The cease-fire was read as an initial step toward accepting the NSCN demand for a greater Nagaland, or Nagalim, which would incorporate the three northern districts of Manipur. Naga unification would also affect Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, creating resistance within those states.

Among the Mizos, the earliest social and political associations were the Young Lushai Association and the Mizo Union. The early struggles of the Mizos were against their own feudal chiefs, and around the time of independence, the left faction of the Mizo Union was in favor of merging with India as a way of abolishing the chiefship. Another faction, however, wanted independence or union with Burma (Myanmar). Eventually, in 1947, the Mizos became a part of India, but were split between Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts), and the Indian states of Tripura and Manipur. Unlike in Tripura, however, where there was a long struggle for the tribal areas to be brought under the Sixth Schedule in an Autonomous District Council, in Mizoram the Sixth Schedule was applied from the start. In 1958 the cyclic flowering of the bamboo led to a huge multiplication of rats and famine. Inadequate relief, the Assam government’s imposition of the Assamese language, and the construction of a separate Christian and Mizo identity led to the formation of the Mizo National Front (MNF), led by Laldenga. The MNF carried out attacks on government offices and communication lines and on 1 March 1966 declared independence. The Indian government’s

response was to declare the Mizo hills a disturbed area, aerially strafing villages and forcibly regrouping several villages into concentrations along the highway. This effectively destroyed the Mizos’ own subsistence economy, based on shifting cultivation and made them dependent on government rations. After episodic peace talks, an accord was signed in 1986 between Laldenga, the Mizoram government, and the government of India, whereby the MNF became part of the government in Mizoram.

Nandini Sundar

See also Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Peace Accords; Insurgency and Terrorism; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Northeast States, The; Tribal Peoples of Eastern India

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TRIPURA Located in India's Northeast region, Tripura is the smallest of the seven hill states, the "Seven Sisters." The climate is generally hot and humid. Tripura is bordered by Bangladesh on the north, the south, and the west, Assam on the northeast, and Mizoram on the east. The monsoon usually begins in April and lasts until September. The population of nineteen tribes, led by Tripuris (over 50% of tribals), Reangs, and Chakma, who speak a variety of languages and dialects, and immigrant Bengalis, was about 3 million in 2004. The main languages spoken are Bengali, Kakbarak, and Manipuri, although Bengali is the official language. Animism plays a large part in the life of the tribals, but the largest number of people follow Buddhism, followed by Christianity and Hinduism.

The state is divided into the four districts of North, South, and West Tripura, where the capital Agartala is located, and Dhalai. Just over 50 percent of the state is covered by forest, and the landscape is composed of picturesque hills and dales and green, deep valleys. Less than 25 percent of the land is suitable for agriculture, with rice being the main crop. The main rivers are the Gomati, the largest and the one considered to be the most sacred, the Khowati, Manu, Haorah, and Muhari. Dunbar Falls is one of the most sacred places in the state.

The early history of the state is told in legend and is said to have played a role in the Battle of Kurukshetra. Some seventy-four Tripuri rajas ruled Tripura and were called "Manikya." In about 1280, Muslims invaded the state, and this was followed by settlers from Bengal and Burma. The Bengali sultan ruled until 1515, but in 1586, the Mughals defeated Jasodhara Manikya, and he ceded a part of the state to them. The state was ceded to the British in 1761.

The tribals followed *jhuming*, or slash-and-burn agriculture, or shifting irrigation, which has led to soil erosion and ecological degradation and depletion. Large-scale *jhuming* was banned by the government in 1952. The per capita income is well below the national average, and more than 80 percent of the people live below the poverty line. In addition, the state bore the brunt of massive immigration from East Pakistan and Bengal. The Bengalis brought with them plow cultivation and forced the tribals from the plains to the hills, where they fell into the clutches of Bengali moneylenders and traders.

On 15 October 1949 Tripura entered the Indian Union as a state. It became a Union Territory on 21 January 1972, and Ujjayanta Palace became the Legislative Assembly. Though the Communists had championed the cause of the Tripuris, they created the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti, a separatist party, on 10 June 1967; their

demands included more autonomy and the recognition of the Kakbarak language as an official language. In 1978 a secret military organization, the Tripura National Volunteers, was formed, aimed at achieving complete independence for the state, and they committed hit-and-run attacks and assassinations of Bengalis, who responded through their Amra Bengali. Communal tension has never dissipated.

Roger D. Long

See also **Assam; Ethnic Conflict; Mizoram**

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TYĀGARĀJA (1767–1847), poet-composer. The most influential poet-composer (*vāggēyakāra*) of South India, Tyāgarāja was born on 4 May 1767 in Tiruvārūr near Tanjāvūr, then a center of learning and culture. Between seven hundred and one thousand of his songs, mainly belonging to the genres known as *kīrtana* and *kṛiti*, have been preserved by several teacher-disciple lineages (*guru shishya parampara*). His Telugu lyrics are infused with Sanskrit and reveal a variety of literary and philosophical influences as well as a profound knowledge of music theory. Unlike his contemporaries, Muttusvāmi Dīkshitar and Shyāma Shāstri, with whom he forms the "Trinity" of South Indian music, Tyāgarāja often shares the joys and struggles of his personal life and worship with his public. Like Dīkshitar, he was an accomplished vina player (*vainika*) who succeeded in amalgamating the expressiveness (*bhāva*) of the voice and the aesthetic appeal (*rasa*) of instrumental music.

The fact that Tyāgarāja's father was an exponent of *barikathā* (musical discourse) explains the composer's aptitude for bringing the divine and heroic characters of the Rāmāyaṇa, the Purāṇas, and the Bhāgavatam to life. This art form has devotion (*bhakti*) for its subject, provides ample scope for variations on a given theme, and is based on India's ancient Hindu texts.

Tyāgarāja also composed two musical plays, titled *Naukacāritramu* (Boat story) and *Prablāda bhakti vijayamu* (Victory of Prahlāda's devotion). These original versions of popular stories were told through the characters' singing as well as in narrative passages provided by a *sūtradhāra*, the conventional director of Indian drama. Both works have been adapted for Bhāgavatamēlam drama as well as for Kuchipudi and

Bharata Nāṭya dance-drama, although they were probably not written for the purpose of being so enacted. Similarly, some portions have long been included in musical concerts.

Tyāgarāja's fame spread during his lifetime and has steadily grown since his death in 1847, initially by way of *barikathā* performances. Since 1925, homage is annually paid to him at festivals known as *Tyāgarāja ārādhana*, primarily in Tiruvaiyāru, where he lived and where his *samādhi* (resting place) was erected, as well as in other locations. Some music societies (*sabhā*) maintain the tradition of reenacting Tyāgarāja's performance of *unchavritti*, the custom of collecting food alms while singing religious songs with his disciples, as he shunned the demands of worldly patrons. With the boldness of a creative genius and the authority of a sage advancing the

art and science of music, he celebrates the very experience of music time and again in his songs.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Music: South India**

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UNDERGROUND ECONOMY, DIMENSIONS

OF India's underground economy, or the "black" economy, as it is commonly referred to in India, has serious implications for India's social, political, and economic development. The underground economy is synonymous with illegality; incomes generated in the illegal sectors, on which direct taxes are evaded, constitute India's black economy. The underlying motives for generation of black income and its disposal in terms of consumption and investment usually differ from those of white incomes, but in some activities and in their convertibility, there are links between the two. The black economy, therefore, is not a parallel economy but one that is deeply intertwined with the white economy.

The level of tax compliance in India declined during the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting perhaps the growth of the black economy. Scams have become larger in magnitude and have increased in numbers. Despite being estimated at 40 percent of India's gross domestic product (GDP), the black economy has remained immune to precise mainstream analysis.

Black incomes are also identified as property incomes, profits, interest, rent, and dividends, rather than wage incomes as black incomes are generated through artificial escalation of costs or underreporting of production or sales or some combination of these; in other words, black incomes are generally generated by the propertied class. Illegal transfer payments such as bribes and tax-evaded incomes from capital gains are not to be included in the definition of black incomes, since that would lead to double counting.

The true economy of any country consists of a white and a black component. The importance of the black economy for a country can be gauged from its size relative to the size of the reported GDP. By its very nature,

assessing the size of the black economy is a difficult task. Noteworthy studies giving estimates of the size of the black economy in India are not strictly comparable, owing to the differences in the underlying methodologies and the corresponding differences in its coverage. However, the size of the black economy relative to the size of the white economy has been growing since the 1950s.

Consequences

The impact of the black economy on India's economy, society, and polity is too significant to be ignored. It vitiates data, thereby making it difficult to get a true picture of the economy. It has resulted in higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of human development, more skewed distribution of income, poorer quality of infrastructure, subversion of the political system, weakening of the institutions of democracy, and increasing problems of law and order, which result in poor governance.

Macroeconomic linkages. The black economy has strong macroeconomic linkages affecting all the major macrovariables. The black economy has rendered the information base of India's economy unreliable, which is crucial for policy making, as the data collected for national income accounting from the producing units are fudged in the presence of tax evasion. Incomes are often shown to be originating in agriculture to avoid taxation; therefore the GDP is underestimated.

The propensity for black income generation is greater in the tertiary sector than in the secondary sector, and virtually negligible in the agricultural sector. Thus sectoral composition of income as revealed by the official statistics is distorted. Income distribution and employment figures are substantially biased by the black economy. Furthermore, the growth of black incomes,

property incomes, and the size of India's service sector tend to boost each other and constitute a growing trinity.

At the macroeconomic level, the efficacy of fiscal policy has been severely dented. Government expenditure gets inflated due to leakages while the actual delivery of services suffers. The poor quality of education and health services provided by the government in the majority of cases is forcing people to move toward privately provided services. Revenues turn out to be lower so that the deficit becomes higher, resulting in inadequate allocations of infrastructure, both social and physical. Several studies indicate that revenues from tax and nontax sources are far below their potential at all tiers of the government, which results in rising borrowing and interest payments, fostering budgetary crises.

The rate of growth. In sharp contrast to the channels of white investment, many black channels of investment are generally unproductive and are in the nature of transfers. Speculation, hoarding of cash, smuggling, and capital flight abroad through fake invoicing of exports and imports are some such channels. These channels of black investments opened up the Indian economy even before the liberalization process began during the early 1990s, and the economy traversed along a lower trajectory of growth. The black economy can be shown to result in deficiency of demand, thereby slowing down the rate of growth. The high costs of conducting business because of poor infrastructure, bribery and kickbacks, and uncertainty have contributed to India becoming a high cost economy. The black economy has led to criminalization of India's society due to a nexus among politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople. It is often argued that funding of elections by big businesses helps entrench such an unholy relationship. Societal unrest mounts as disparities between groups widen, while growth and employment remain below that which should be achievable, and thus sound policies fail.

Remedies

There is no consensus concerning diagnosis or remedies for the menace of the black economy. The black economy continues to thrive, despite policy initiatives, because it is systemic, and there exists a nexus among the three groups: the corrupt politicians, the corrupt public functionaries, and the corrupt businesspeople.

The last of the Tax Reform Committees (Government of India, 2002) has suggested that the economics of tax evasion must be changed by reducing costs of complying with tax obligations, moderating tax rates, phasing out concessions, and increasing the use of technology in compiling information related to taxpayers,

reducing the scope for interface between taxpayers and tax administrators. The general perception has been to reduce government intervention in the economy and to rely more on market forces so as to reduce the incentives behind tax evasion.

In the wake of India's integration with the global economy, there is an urgent need for restoration of fiscal balance and improvement in the efficacy of economic policies to accelerate growth and reduce poverty. The government stands discredited regarding its ability to rein in corruption. The black economy is a serious issue that must be remedied, as it darkens India's image abroad and undermines the quality of public life at home.

Saumen Chattopadhyay

See also **Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Economic Reforms of 1991**

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
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UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH India's relations with the United States since independence in 1947 have varied between diplomatic hostility and cordiality, though never bordering on armed conflict. Their foreign policy perspectives and priorities during the cold war did not always coincide, leading to periodic tensions despite their common democratic value systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war in 1991, marked by the end of socialism and the commencement of dramatic economic reforms in India, generated a new era in Indo-U.S. relations. This has been especially spectacular in the areas of U.S. investment in India, economic collaboration, and defense technology cooperation. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relationship is cordial and cooperative between the countries that are now widely referred to as the world's largest and most powerful democracies.

Non-alignment and the Cold War

Indo-U.S. relations had a promising beginning under Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, when the United States supported India's struggle for independence from the British. During World War II, the Atlantic Charter called for freedom from Japanese and German aggression and occupations throughout Europe and China; Roosevelt would have extended this to the British imperial occupation of India, arguing that there could not be two different standards of freedom for nations. But Winston Churchill adamantly refused to agree. After the tragedy of partition that coincided with Indian independence in 1947, Indo-U.S. relations cooled. In the 1950s, following the commencement of the cold war, relations between India and the United States were weakened by India's refusal to join the U.S. alliance in the East-West cold war struggle. India also rejected the American capitalist system of free markets and unlimited private sector profit. Instead, India embarked on a policy of economic socialism in a series of five-year plans within a democratic political framework, allowing for only a limited, regulated private sector.

Resisting U.S. pressure to join the proposed South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharhal Nehru declared that India would follow a policy of "non-alignment" between the Western bloc and the Soviet Communist bloc. India's most urgent need as a new state, Nehru insisted, was an era of peace unencumbered by military alliances. Nehru stated that it would be "a tragedy of infinite magnitude if we should be checked and balked and our policy should be set at naught because of the troubles and quarrels of others" (cited in Thomas, *The Defence of India*, p. 34). India also refused to join the Baghdad Pact, expanded in 1955 to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), for the same reason.



I. K. Gujral and Madeleine Albright. Former Indian prime minister I. K. Gujral (left) and Madeleine Albright, then U.S. secretary of state, meet in September 1997, New York City, before the session of the UN Council of Foreign Relations. With Gujral's stateside visit (which also included a private meeting with former U.S. president Bill Clinton) came meaningful diplomatic exchange, and the hope of improved relations between the two countries, in recent years complicated by a number of sensitive issues. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.

India's refusal to join the U.S.-sponsored military pacts against the Communist bloc caused an adverse reaction in the United States, which was in the grip of a strong anti-Communist fervor, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, in the mid-1950s. There was an immediate condemnation by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Dulles called India "immoral" and "shortsighted," and claimed that remaining non-aligned in the face of the Communist threat was inconsistent with the United Nations Charter provisions on Collective Security. The United States then proceeded to arm Pakistan, which immediately joined all these pacts.

Despite the tensions raised by Nehru's refusal to join the U.S.-sponsored military alliances, there was no likelihood of the United States going to war against India, or even following an aggressive military policy of encirclement, as some Indians feared. And since the Indian political system was modeled on the pattern of Western political ideas and institutions, there could be no question of parliamentary democracy being subverted from this direction. What had not been foreseen, however, was

the indirect, and perhaps inadvertent, threat that would arise from the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. The military risk to India had escalated, not because of threats from the Soviet Union and China, but as a result of the American decision to arm Pakistan against these Communist giants. Nehru complained that Pakistan had not joined these pacts “because it expected some imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union. The Pakistan newspapers and the statements of responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined this Pact because of India” (cited in Thomas, *The Defence of India*, p. 37).

Through much of the cold war, relations between India and the United States were bedeviled by two sets of conflicting strains: There were common political values of democracy and freedom in both countries, but these were undermined by the tensions that arose from the U.S. arming of Pakistan. India insisted that these arms would only be used by Pakistan against India. The United States provided the most economic aid to India in the 1950s and 1960s, yet India pursued closer ties with China (until the Sino-Indian War of 1962) and with the Soviet Union. A sense of Indian “ingratitude” rankled many members of the U.S. Congress, as well as the State Department and the White House.

The United States and the Wars of India

American arms supplied to Pakistan under SEATO and CENTO included fighters, bombers, tanks, artillery, and other logistical facilities. India responded by purchasing similar weapon systems from Britain and France, escalating a major India-Pakistan arms race. The effect of these developments was that Indian perceptions of threat were almost exclusively riveted on Pakistan. Contingency defense plans were aimed at Pakistan and all defense purchases were undertaken with a view to offsetting the American arming of Pakistan.

The most serious repercussion of this preoccupation with the Pakistani threat was India’s neglect of its northern Himalayan borders, even though India’s relations with China were far from satisfactory because of oppressive Chinese actions in Tibet. Deteriorating Sino-Indian relations over the Tibetan question and disputes over their boundaries in the northeast and the northwest eventually led to a border war between the two countries in October 1962. Although the war occurred concurrently with the Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration was quick to rush mountain guns and other non-lethal aid to India to help it fight at high altitudes. More substantial American military equipment to India was opposed by Pakistan, and consequently the United States called upon India to resolve the Kashmir conflict with

Pakistan before substantial military assistance could be advanced.

Pakistan’s wars with India in September 1965 over Kashmir, and in December 1971 over the demand for an independent Bangladesh out of East Pakistan, caused further tensions between India and the United States. U.S. arms, supplied to Pakistan only for use against potential Communist advances from the north, were used against India during the 1965 war. While this aging equipment was also used in the 1971 war, India had by then obtained substantial heavy Soviet artillery and tanks, and Pakistan was easily defeated in two weeks, leading to an independent Bangladesh. Events leading up to this two-week war in December 1971 caused substantial tension between India and the United States, aggravated by the conflicting personalities of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Nixon. India wanted the United States to take swift action in ending the Pakistani military suppression of East Pakistan’s Bengali revolt that had led to the deaths of an estimated million civilians and the flight of some 10 million refugees to India. However, the United States did not wish to alienate the military regime of General Yahya Khan, because Pakistan had provided a secret channel to pursue rapprochement with Communist China, Pakistan’s ally.

This perceived emerging new triangular alliance among Pakistan, the United States, and China, and the need to take swift military action in East Pakistan, prompted India to sign a “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” with the Soviet Union in August 1971. The treaty carried some military clauses, which required the Soviet Union not to extend assistance to Pakistan in the case of military conflict, and that both sides would enter into consultations when either side was faced with immediate threats or armed conflict. With respect to the general purposes served, in the Indian case the treaty was primarily a response to the United States, an effort to neutralize its involvement in case of hostilities by making the consequences of any such involvement potentially a great power conflict. India then proceeded to resolve the East Pakistan conflict by armed force. In response to India’s use of force, the United States sent its nuclear carrier, the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, into the Bay of Bengal, in a show of gunboat diplomacy—a warning that India should not venture beyond the liberation of Bangladesh to overrun West Pakistan.

The new regional and global alignments that occurred during the 1971 crisis subsided over the next few years. India’s fears of an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing alliance did not materialize. However, the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War generated discordant relations between the two countries during the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi. Her declaration of

a “National Emergency” between June 1975 and March 1977, suspending the fundamental rights in India’s democratic constitution, and her imposition of authoritarian rule in India caused new tensions in relations between the two countries, as these actions were widely condemned in the United States. An initial thaw began with a meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Indira Gandhi in Cancún, Mexico, in 1981, when a technology cooperation agreement was signed. The succession of Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister following the assassination of his mother in 1984 produced a further upswing in Indo-U.S. relations during the rest of the Reagan administration. These cordial ties continued to grow during successive Indian governments, headed first by the Congress Party, then the Janata Party, followed by two United Front coalitions, and then the Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition government from 1998 to 2004.

India and the Wars of the United States

India supported various American diplomatic moves when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. It voted for the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions condemning the invasion and for military actions to drive back North Korean forces, which were about to occupy all of South Korea. The aggression was perceived as a test of United Nations (UN) credibility, but as U.S. forces under General Douglas MacArthur began to roll back the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel that divided South and North Korea, India warned the United States that moving further would provoke China to enter the war. After Chinese forces invaded and began to drive back American forces, India played an important diplomatic role at the UN and served as a mediator between the United States and China in helping to end the Korean War.

India opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam from 1964 to 1974. Frequent public and private criticism by Indian officials and the media became a source of irritation in the United States especially since India was then receiving substantial American economic aid. The United States perceived the Vietnam War as part of its policy of containing the advance of communism. India saw it as a civil war and a struggle against foreign military occupation. The withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam did not end Indo-U.S. differences on policy in the region. There were differences of policy and allegiance between India and the United States when China engaged in two short border wars with Vietnam in 1979 and 1984, and when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot. The Khmer Rouge was responsible for the deaths of about a million Cambodians, who were massacred or worked to death, between 1975 and 1979. India and the Soviet

Union supported the Heng Samrin regime that was installed by the invading Vietnamese forces. The United States and China opposed the regime. These dissensions between India and the United States over Southeast Asian conflicts passed with the end of the cold war in 1991.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was interpreted very differently in the United States and in India. The United States perceived the invasion as part of a wider Soviet strategy to seize the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and to gain warm water ports on the Indian Ocean. India perceived the invasion as an overreaction by Moscow, aimed at preventing the replacement of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Kabul by a pro-American regime. The American-supported insurgency against Soviet forces in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 was of great concern to India because the United States renewed massive arms shipments to Pakistan, which had been cut off after the 1971 war. India had preferred to see the more friendly Soviet-backed Marxist government remain in Afghanistan, fearing the possibility of a Pakistani-sponsored radical Islamic government coming to power. This concern became a reality when the zealous Islamic forces of the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan by armed force, following the Soviet withdrawal of its forces in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, India differed with the United States in its use of force in the former Yugoslavia in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2002, and in Iraq in 2003. India joined Russia and China in opposing a U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air war against Serbian forces in Kosovo. India’s permanent representative to the UN declared to the Security Council on 24 March 1999 that the attacks were in violation of the UN Charter and illegal because they were not authorized by the council. The problem in former Yugoslavia’s Muslim-majority province of Kosovo was not unlike that in India’s Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, where an insurgency had raged for over a decade. The use of force in Kosovo in 1999 by an American-led NATO was invoked as an additional post hoc justification for India’s decision to test nuclear weapons earlier in May 1998. This difference with U.S. policy was short-lived, however, as there appeared to be no further effort to dislodge Kosovo from Serbia, which would have set a precedent for Kashmir. Subsequently, India welcomed the American use of force in Afghanistan, which removed the Islamic extremist Taliban regime. But India opposed the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003. Like much of the rest of the world, India saw this war as counterproductive against the terrorism conducted by nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda. However, India joined the United States in

its worldwide campaign to root out the sources of international and transnational terrorism.

The Aftermath of the Cold War

The intensified momentum for better Indo-U.S. relations was prompted by the end of the cold war. India rushed toward embracing the United States, particularly seeking military cooperation. This drive initially ran into some difficulties over India's failure to protect U.S. pharmaceutical patents, its purchase of cryogenic engines for its space program and nuclear reactors from Russia, both of which were perceived to advance India's nuclear weapons and missile programs, and India's testing of its short-range Prithvi and medium-range Agni missiles despite American opposition.

Such disputes generated lukewarm responses from the United States for establishing closer military ties, and growing suspicions in India that U.S. friendship with Pakistan was closer than that with India. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, Indo-U.S. relations blossomed at all levels. A series of joint air, naval, and army exercises were conducted, and there has been close cooperation in the war against international terrorism by both sides, especially following al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001. India went through a similar experience on 13 December 2001, when the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group, seeking independence for Kashmir, attempted to destroy India's parliament building in a suicide attack while it was in session. This experience strengthened India's commitment to the United States in its campaign against worldwide terrorism.

Meanwhile, Indo-U.S. economic ties continued to grow rapidly. The United States was India's main trading partner for more than two decades, and later became the leading foreign investor in India. Following liberalization and reforms in 1991, an avalanche of American corporations have rushed into India with newer investments. From the other side, India provides much of the software for American corporations and is the source of high-tech personnel for American industries. Further improvement in ties followed in the immediate aftermath of President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 and Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee's trip to the United States in September 2000, and a number of new U.S. business investments in India were inaugurated during both visits. The volume of American trade with and investments in India, however, still remained overshadowed by U.S. economic ties with China.

A significant rift between the two countries followed India's decision to conduct a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. Those tests were swiftly followed in a tit-for-tat

fashion by Pakistan. This led to a series of technology sanctions by Washington in areas that may have direct or indirect benefits to India's nuclear and missile programs. Prime Minister Vajpayee requested that the United States lift sanctions on dual-use technologies; these were partially lifted in 1999, and most of them were removed by 2004.

Overall, four basic policy concerns continue to characterize U.S. policies in South Asia and affect its relations with India. First, it has been a long-standing American policy to attempt to contain regional nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the Middle East, and East and Central Asia. This goal failed when India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998 followed immediately by Pakistan. However, no further tests have been conducted, and further proliferation has been contained. Second, the United States made strenuous efforts to prevent an India-Pakistan nuclear war following their nuclear tests in 1998; since there has been no nuclear war between India and Pakistan, the American policy appears to have succeeded. Third, following the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center in September 2001, the United States has conducted a campaign to root out global transnational terrorism from havens in South Asia, especially Pakistan. India has provided full cooperation on this front. Fourth, the United States has sought to facilitate a resolution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan which continued to plague Indo-U.S. relations. Occasional friction over this issue has been relegated to the margins of the relationship, which is now based primarily on common political and economic values. With a strong democracy and a free market economy, India's relations with the United States are now on very firm ground.

Economic Relations

The most spectacular change in the relationship has been on the economic front. Although India's share of U.S. imports and exports is only about 1 percent of the total volume of American trade, it represents a significant proportion of India's external trade. The United States is India's largest trading partner, the source of 9 percent of Indian imports and the destination of 21 percent of Indian exports. In 2002 total Indian exports to the United States were about \$17 billion, of which about \$6 billion consisted of software exports. Merchandise exports included diamonds and gold jewelry, woven and knit apparel, textiles, fish and seafood, machinery, carpets, iron and steel, and pharmaceuticals. Indian imports from the United States included machinery (computers and components, gas turbines, and telecommunications equipment), electrical machinery (recording/sound media), medical and surgical equipment and instruments,

aircraft, spacecraft (small aircraft), precious stones (diamonds, not mounted or set), metals, jewelry, miscellaneous chemical products, organic chemicals, and plastic.

By 2003 several major American corporations had established subsidiaries and other facilities in India. A majority of General Electric's businesses worldwide have a presence in India, covering aircraft engines, broadcasting, capital services, lighting, medical systems. Some 19,000 General Electric professionals work in India, and the company set up its largest laboratory worldwide—the John Welch Technology Centre—in Bangalore. The multidiscipline laboratory covers research in hot-air gas paths, materials, design, and computer science. Other major U.S. corporations established in India include Whirlpool, Ford Motors, 3M, Microsoft, Intel, Texas Instruments, Sun Microsystems, Procter and Gamble, Oracle, IBM, Adobe Systems, and several others. They produce in India for the Indian and overseas markets. American banking and financial services such as Citicorp, GE Capital, and American Express have also established offices and operations in India. American corporations in the bioinformation and biotechnology fields have subsidiary operations in India.

India is the premier country for U.S. information technology (IT) services, with major corporations “outsourcing” its needs to Indian software engineers, who are able to perform the same tasks more cheaply than American software engineers. This business relationship has been aided by the large English-speaking high-tech workforce in India and the twelve-hour time difference between the two countries; software needs and problems can be sent to India at the end of the American working day to be resolved by highly qualified and less costly Indian technical staff by the end of their working day and the beginning of the next American workday. The arrangement has enabled round-the-clock collaborative operations between India and the United States. U.S. companies that have taken advantage of this unique outsourcing opportunity include American Express, Citicorp, Microsoft, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, AT&T, Reebok, GM, Boeing, Pepsi, and Coca-Cola. Outsourcing to India has caused some resentment within the U.S. labor force because of the loss of American jobs.

Investments by Indian companies in the United States grew rapidly in the 1990s. For example, India's United Breweries bought breweries in the United States, while companies such as Dr. Reddy's Laboratories and Ranbaxy bought pharmaceutical manufacturing units in the United States. Mahindra and Mahindra set up an automotive manufacturing unit. In the IT sector, Tata Infotech, Sathyam, Infosys, and WIPRO set up large operations in the United States.

Defense Cooperation

From strategic hostility and suspicion during the cold war, defense cooperation between India and the United States became the norm at the beginning of the twenty-first century. An India-U.S. Defense Policy Group, composed of senior defense officials and military officers, meets once a year in Washington to provide guidance and direction to potential collaborative efforts. A Joint Technical Group coordinates the transfer of technology and explores areas of scientific interaction between the two countries. An Executive Steering Group composed of the army, navy, and air force from both sides meets annually. Joint military exercises between the military services of the two countries have become commonplace.

While there is caution in the United States on the transfer of common civilian-military technologies in nuclear and space programs to India, defense technology cooperation has expanded in other areas. They include cooperation in three mission areas: aircraft technology, antitank systems, and technical manpower training.

The collaboration between Lockheed Martin Controls Systems of Binghamton, New York, and the Aeronautical Development Establishment of Bangalore, India, is one example of this growing cooperation in technology. Much of this revolves around the development of various systems for India's projected “Light Combat Aircraft.” A Joint Technical Group, composed of members of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defence, meets regularly to coordinate defense research and production and logistical support. Cooperation and technical exchanges now extend to defense research and development organizations in the United States and the Defence Research and Development Organization in India. Scientists from the latter regularly visit U.S. defense industries and military installations to update themselves on the state of art of defense technology.

The Role of Indian Americans

Indian Americans have contributed significantly to the growth of cordial ties between India and the United States. According to the U.S. census of 2000, there are approximately 1.7 million American citizens of Indian origin, representing the various languages, religions, and regions of India. They belong mainly to a highly educated class of academics, doctors, engineers, corporate executives, and businesspeople. Almost 60 percent of all Indian Americans are college educated and earn an average median family income of \$60,000, compared to the national average of about \$39,000. The average median income of Indians working in the Silicon Valley IT sector in the 1990s was about \$125,000, with about 15 percent of the start-up companies there being initiated by Indian Americans.

With a vested interest in promoting close ties between their old and new homelands, Indian Americans have been active in supporting U.S. Congress members who support India in its various endeavors. In 2003 various Indian groups consolidated their political activities into an organization called the U.S. India Public Affairs Committee (USINPAC), modeled after the Jewish American lobbying group, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee. With financial contributions from the wealthy Indian American community, USINPAC has become a major factor in expanding the relationship between India and the United States. USINPAC lobbies to prevent policies that may have an adverse impact on India, and promotes exchange visits between American and Indian political leaders to foster mutual understanding. Indian Americans of various ethnic backgrounds, such as Gujaratis, Tamils, Maharashtrians, and Punjabis, also promote American trade and investments with their Indian states. Chief ministers and economic delegations from various Indian states visit the United States to advance the economies of their states. These lines of communication initiated by the Indian American community have further strengthened the India-U.S. relationship.

Prospects

The cordiality between India and the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century appears irreversible. India is now part of the global economy, and its status has risen as a major diplomatic and economic player in world affairs. India's close relations with the United States have played an important part in the new, positive world image of India.

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See also Jammu and Kashmir; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Pakistan and India; Russia, Relations with

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UNTOUCHABLES. *See Dalits.*

UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY The Upanishads are one of the world's great repositories of spiritual insight and wisdom. Composed orally by Indian sages as early as the ninth century B.C., they have attracted the attention of scholars and spiritual seekers the world over. They signal a personal, experiential, and at times mystical understanding of the cosmos, the divine, and the human self, which over the centuries many have found profound. Much of Hindu thought self-consciously sees itself as a development of Upanishadic teaching, which is regarded as *shruti*, divinely revealed truth carrying supreme authority. And outside Hinduism, thinkers as diverse as Dara Shikoh (the great-grandson of the Mughal emperor Akbar), Roberto de Nobili, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Ralph Waldo Emerson have all sung the praises of these texts. In fact, Max Müller, the German Indologist, referring to the Vedānta philosophy based on the Upanishads, spoke of it as "a system in which human speculation seems to have reached its very acme" (cited in Radhakrishnan and Moore, p. 37).

Etymological and Historical Contexts

The term *upanishad* is composed of the Sanskrit roots *sad* (sit), *upa* (near), and *ni* (a closed group) and represents an esoteric teaching imparted by a teacher to a group of students in search of sacred knowledge. The term also connotes the positing of correlations between entities and powers belonging to different spheres, and, through such equivalences, the drawing out of deeper meanings. Thus, for example, equivalences drawn between the human body and the cosmos point to notions of order, hierarchy, and balance. These connections are more suggestive and speculative than strictly logical, and represent poetic speculation rather than a rigorously applied method. Indeed, the Upanishads are explicit that such spiritual truths are not attainable through logical processes. "Not by reasoning is this apprehension attainable" (Katha Up, 1.2.4), for "words return (from Brahman) along with the mind, not attaining it" (Taittiriya Up, 2.9.1).

Such speculation follows certain intellectual and religious developments. The Upanishads both chronologically and thematically come at the end (*anta*) of the Vedas, and thus the teachings based on them are called

Vedānta in both senses of the word “end”: culmination, on the one hand, and the real meaning or fulfillment of Vedic teaching, on the other. What comes before them are the hymns and chants of the four Vedas: Rig Veda, Samur Veda, Yajur Veda, and Atharva Veda, collectively known as the Saṃhitās (collections). These are followed by the Brāhmaṇas, a set of ritual instructions having principally to do with the sacrifices offered to the gods. These sacrifices were elaborate and often expensive, and those who either could not afford them or were unwilling for various reasons to perform them retreated to the forest in order to meditate on the spiritual meanings of these hymns and rituals. These allegorical renderings came to be known as the Āraṇyakas, or forest books. It is out of this complex development that the Upanishads emerged as a set of philosophical reflections on the preceding Vedic literature. They denote a subjective and contemplative turn away from ritualism and priestcraft to ontological musings about the nature of reality and the place of humans within it. These reflections were often expressed in a set of pithy formulas like the famous “*tat tvam asi*” (that thou art), which by their very nature call out for explication. It was this explication that the gurus would provide to students whom they considered spiritually developed enough to absorb it. Hence the distinctly esoteric tone that the Upanishads bear, at least early in the pedagogical tradition, when they refer, for example, to the “truth of truth” (Bṛhad Up, 2.1.20) or “the supreme secret” (Kath Up, 3.17). It is quite clear from many such passages that the teachings were not meant for the untutored.

Classification

So great was the prestige attached to the genre that over two hundred works call themselves Upanishads, including texts outside the Hindu tradition like the Christopanishad and the Allopanishad (secret teachings about Allah), which were composed in the medieval period. The Muktika Upanishad provides a list of 108 Upanishads, which has come to be regarded as canonical, although recent scholarship has increased that number slightly. These can be divided into two categories: the Vedic Upanishads and the later Upanishads. In the first group are the thirteen that are traditionally considered the principal Upanishads. In rough chronological order, they are: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Īsa, Kena, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Kauṣītakī, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Shvetāshvatara, Prashna, Maitri, and Māṇḍukya. Further classification can be done on the basis of sectarian orientation, textual features, and ritual development, but for our purpose, it is important to mention again that these Upanishads are all, though not exclusively, regarded as *shruti*, or authoritative scripture, and as *apauruṣeya*, or authorless, hence, revealed. They are traditionally attached to specific

*sākhya*s, or schools of Vedic interpretation. The former feature, that is, their revealed status, is not true—at least in terms of wide acceptance—of the later Upanishads, which are not as well known as the Vedic Upanishads, but are nonetheless important in their respective sectarian communities.

Central Teachings

Perhaps the most well-known teaching of the Upanishads is the equation of *brahman* and *ātman*, the ultimate reality with the transcendental self existing at the core of one’s being. *Brahman*, derived from the root *brh* (to grow or burst forth), was first identified with prayer and, given the importance of prayer and sacrifice in maintaining the cosmos, was soon seen as the primary cause of the universe. *Ātman*, which originally meant breath, came to be identified with the essence of man, his self or soul. This divine or real self, however, is sharply distinguished from the *jīva*, the empirical or embodied self, which is finite. The speculative genius of Upanishadic thought is to effect the equivalence of two seemingly different ideas, one referring to the outer material world, the other to the inner psychic one. This in a sense is a continuation of the earlier Vedic habit of seeking homologies or correlations between the individual and the cosmos. Now, however, it pushes further to a “nondual” (*a-dvaitic*) unity. The conception of *brahman*, being objective and referring to the external world, is by its very nature hypothetical and lacking in certainty. The conception of *ātman*, by contrast, is free of these defects, but, as commonly understood, it is finite and hence cannot encompass the whole of reality. When the two conceptions are combined, however, a third conception is born, which is richer in significance and meaning than the two considered individually. Like *brahman*, this new notion of *ātman-brahman* encompasses the whole world, but unlike it, it now acquires the certainty of personal existence. Like *ātman*, it is spiritual, but unlike *ātman* considered by itself, *ātman-brahman* is infinite. “That is the Upanishadic absolute—neither *brahman* or *ātman* in one sense, but both in another. . . . The enunciation of this doctrine marked the most important advance in the whole history of Indian thought,” says M. Hiriyanna (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 1932, p. 58).

Various further accounts and descriptions are provided both of *brahman* and of *ātman*. *Brahman*, for example, may be regarded cosmically (*saguṇa*, with qualities) or acosmically (*nirguṇa*, without qualities). In the first case, *brahman* may be seen as evolving into the world, and the philosophical task becomes one of grasping the unity of the world in *brahman*. In the second, *brahman* is at most the logical ground of both subject and object, and the corresponding philosophical task becomes one of

deconstruction, that is, of negating all qualities that may be ascribed to *brahman*, as in the famous doctrine of “*neti, neti*” (not this, not that), where the sheer indescribability of the Absolute in language is highlighted (Bṛhad Up, 3.8.8ff.).

It is also in this second (*nirgunic*) interpretation that the doctrine of *māyā* makes its appearance—*māyā* being the empirical world of space, time, causation, and substance, which is taken to be real by the ignorant, but is not really real. Opinion is divided about the degree of unreality attached to *māyā*—whether it is absolutely or only relatively unreal compared to *brahman*. Upanishadic thought is, however, firm in its insistence on going beyond the world of *māyā*.

The imagination of the Upanishadic sages moved thus in speculative and transcendental realms, rather than in empirical or natural-scientific ones. Underlying the flux of spatiotemporal reality is an eternal, immutable, and psychic reality, just as there is a deeper, timeless, and infinite self underlying the vicissitudes of the empirical ego. The equation of *ātman* and *brahman* is not a mere philosophical or dialectical move, but rather an intuitive one arising out of direct experience of ultimate reality. At this level, the ultimate is experienced as *sat* (existence as such), *cit* (pure consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss). This experience also brings one *moksha*, or release from the *samsāric* world of phenomenal existence. The ultimate thrust of Upanishadic speculation is thus not so much theoretical as practical and soteriological—deliverance from the empirical world and from the cycle of karma and rebirth.

The path to such deliverance requires great moral and spiritual purification and preparation. To see the Self, one must become “calm, controlled, quiet, patiently enduring, and contented” (Bṛhad Up, 4.4.23). Most of the Upanishads concur that the best way to move toward *moksha* is through the practice of yogic meditation. The Vedic Upanishads often highlight the difference between such meditation and ratiocination, and emphasize the efficacy of the former and the poverty of the later (Katha Up, 6.9–11; Svet Up, 1.3). It is, however, in the later Yoga Upanishads that the details of yogic practice and asceticism are most clearly spelled out (see the Yogatattva and the Sandilya Upanishads).

The Upanishads touch on a great many other topics, from the different states of consciousness through death and rebirth processes to the cultivation of the virtues and attitudes needed for *moksha*. This is as one would expect from a heterogeneous collection of material culled from various sources at different times. Later philosophical systems and particularly the schools of Vedānta attempt to systematize them into more unified philosophies, but

the Upanishads themselves are best regarded as spiritual texts, which, like the Bible in the Jewish and Christian traditions, serve as a wellspring for later developments. Even though in terms of composition they are remote in time, in terms of resonance and inspiration, they will always remain contemporary to spiritual seekers.

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See also **Vedic Aryan India**

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URBANISM Soon after arriving in India in 1950 to build India’s first planned capital city at Chandigarh, the architect Le Corbusier insightfully commented that “India hasn’t yet created . . . architecture for modern civilization” (cited in Kalia, *Chandigarh*, p. 87). Even in the twenty-first century, nearly 70 percent of India’s population still lives in over 500,000 villages, although about 300 million Indians currently live in cities, a number almost equal to the total population of the United States. Because of this urban-rural paradox, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, observed, “However well we may deal with the towns, the problem of the villages of India will remain for a long time” (cited in Kalia, *Chandigarh*, p. 30).

The Ancient Cities

The Indus Valley Civilization (c. 2600–1900 B.C.) had nevertheless achieved a measure of urban sophistication, best reflected in the twin capital cities of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, as well as several other cities. Displaying a remarkable uniformity in urban planning, covering a wide geographical spread that stretched from the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas and from the eastern border of Iran to the Ganges Valley near Delhi, the



Chandni Chowk Bazaar. Not far from the Red Fort (in the background), Chandni Chowk (Moonlight Square), the largest bazaar in Old Delhi. In the Mughal ruler Shah Jahan's time (1592–1666), it was the central commercial thoroughfare of Shahjahanabad, the vast capital city he had built after abandoning his other great capital, Agra. Today, Chandni Chowk is equally alive with activity, hopelessly congested with buyers and sellers. JYOTI M. BANERJEE / FOTOMEDIA.

more than 150 sites of the Indus Valley Civilization attest to the sophistication of building skills, the arts, and, possibly, a written language that has yet to be deciphered. Among the excavated cities, Mohenjo-Daro is the most pristine. Built on the gridiron system on the flat, hot floodplain of the Indus, some 300 miles (483 km) north of present-day Karachi in Pakistan, the city was planned with a broad north-south boulevard 30 feet (9 m) wide that was crossed at right angles every 200 yards (185 m) or so by smaller east-west streets that were studded with shops and food stalls, the blocks between them served by narrow curving lanes 5 to 10 feet (1.5–3 m) wide. Urban Indus houses presented blank walls to the main streets, much like today, the main entrances located behind the main streets on service lanes; interior courtyards provided light, air, and space for socialization; and windows were screened with grills of terra-cotta or alabaster. Many houses had a second story and a flat roof that served as a sleeping space in the hot summer months—a practice that continues today, although that is beginning to change with the emergence of multistoried apartment

buildings in most high-density cities. India's fast-growing economy, which has been stimulated by the information technology revolution and buttressed by the expanding privatization of the public sector, has improved the urban infrastructure, including the supply of electrical power, allowing the use of air-conditioning and other electrical appliances for a modern urban lifestyle.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of the ancient Indus cities, unrivaled until much later in Greek and Roman times, was the use of a sophisticated open sewer system along the sides of the streets, with catch-basins dug below sewer level to trap debris that might otherwise have clogged the drainage. These sewers were connected to the houses by an open gutter, also made of brick, into which emptied the house drains, which were often made of an enclosed system of clay pipes. Several of the houses had sit-down toilets that were connected to the sewers, and practically all houses had bathrooms with waterproof brick floors fitted with drains leading to the sewer pipes. The Indus cities displayed other architectural marvels and



Fatehpur Sikri. Now a UN World Heritage site, Fatehpur Sikri (City of Victory) was built during the second half of the sixteenth century by the emperor Akbar. The capital of the Mughal empire for approximately fourteen years, it is a complex of monuments and temples, all constructed in a uniform, awe-inspiring architectural style. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

feats of civil engineering: a Great Bath with a sunken bathing pool approached by wooden steps set into asphalt (much like the bathing *ghats* at Varanasi), a granary, residences for high officials, and, of course, the citadel.

The next push toward urbanism in India was facilitated by the discovery of iron in modern Bihar around 1000 B.C., which accelerated the expansion of the Aryans by allowing them to clear the Gangetic forests, and facilitated their transition from a nomadic pastoral economy to a hybrid agricultural-pastoral one. A more enduring consequence of the Aryan expansion was that Brahmanical Hinduism was firmly implanted on Indian urban developments, the arts, and literature. Henceforth, all public works and architectural designs would be aimed at reinforcing the imperial authority of kings and celebrating gods and goddesses, invoking their blessings, depending on the royal religious preference. The Buddhist architects that preceded the Hindu architects provided historical continuity to temple architecture, which came to combine the best of traditions from the north and south. The resulting “free mixing” of ideas and cultures produced the miracle of temple architecture, which burst

into a passionate and almost frantic activity, raising temple after temple in classical India. Thirteenth-century India experienced the last of the best expressions of Hindu art before the force of Islam under the mighty Mughals swept across the subcontinent.

Islamic Influence

To celebrate the triumph of monotheistic Islam, the Delhi sultans and later the Mughals created an impressive complex of buildings outside Delhi, including the multistoried Qutb Minar, from whose rooftop the call for prayer was issued every day. Whereas Hindu buildings reflected nature in both their shapes and decorations, iconoclastic Islam prohibited Muslim artists and architects from using natural images, even though floral decoration was sometimes allowed. Instead, Islamic art and architecture produced pure geometric designs, reflecting the abstract definition of Allah. The Mughals, informed in their taste by Persian culture, produced the most impressive buildings, as well as erecting new cities to serve Allah and Islam in predominantly Hindu India. Mughal architecture received a new impetus during the

reign of Akbar (r. 1556–1605), whose tolerant religious spirit, mystical disposition, and artistic sense inspired a synthesis of Persian and Indian styles of architecture—thereby producing the Indo-Saracenic style that would later influence the British in their construction of New Delhi. From the 1500s, the Mughal emperors continued to build, not only in Delhi but also in their other capital of Agra, and in Punjab's Lahore, producing remarkable buildings, including Delhi's Jama Masjid and the two Red Forts at Delhi and Agra. To combat the intense heat of the subcontinent, the Mughals created magnificent gardens with terraces, stairways, running streams carrying cool water from the mountains to nearby lakes, and a complex system of fountains and cascades. At Delhi and Agra, special channels carried cooling water through the interiors of imperial buildings. In the 1600s, Shah Jahan built mosques and other buildings within his Red Forts. These buildings were made of imported Italian white marble, as was the magnificent Taj Mahal, the tomb that Shah Jahan had built for his wife Mumtaz, beside the river Jamuna at Agra.

The British Period

The British began their building efforts in India when Sir Thomas Roe, King James's ambassador, secured permission in 1619 for the East India Company to build its first factory (trading post) at Surat, a bustling city and principal port of the Mughal empire at the mouth of the Tapti River, the western gateway to India. From these humble beginnings, the British would ultimately culminate their imperial construction in the building of the British capital at New Delhi, when King George V declared, on the occasion of his coronation durbar at the Red Fort on 12 December 1911, that British India's capital was being shifted from Calcutta to a new site on Delhi's historic plain.

Among many myths surrounding the British Empire was the myth of imperial unity. Their search for an elusive imperial identity through the medium of architecture occupied the imagination of many a British administrator. Although this imperial impulse never became pervasive, it nevertheless achieved its most eloquent expressions in the building of the first British capital city at Calcutta and, even more so, in their second capital city at New Delhi. At the heart of this impulse was the British illusion that if imperial unity could be achieved in brick and stone in heterogeneous India, then perhaps such unity could be attained globally.

The British East India Company's Francis Day bought land in 1638 from the Hindu Vijayanagar kingdom, near the South Indian village of Mandaraz; in 1642 he built Fort St. George there, which came to be called Madras, British India's premier city and urban port on

the Coromandal coast. The archipelago of Bombay, which had been given to King Charles II as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry in 1661, was handed over to the East India Company in 1668 for a nominal £10 annual rent. This transfer changed Bombay from a cluster of seven sleepy fishing villages into British India's western headquarters, displacing Surat and, in time, becoming a sprawling modern financial metropolis and the capital of Maharashtra. Soon after securing permission from Mughal emperor Alamgir in 1690 to trade in eastern Bengal, the British erected a factory on the Hugli River, a tributary of the Ganges that flowed into the Bay of Bengal. The site, located near a village shrine to the Hindu goddess Kālī, and from which *ghats* (steps) descended to the river, was thus named Kalighat, later corrupted by the British to "Calcutta." The English merchant Job Charnock, a member of the Bengal Council, drew his urban plan for British India's first imperial capital there.

The creation of the British Company presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras marked the beginning of British experiments in urban planning in India. Many imposing structures still stand in these cities, enduring testimony to the power of the British Raj: in Calcutta (present-day Kolkata), the Governor's Mansion, modeled by Viceroy Lord Curzon after his Kedleston Hall; its Gothic High Court; neoclassical Town Hall; and the Renaissance-inspired Victoria Memorial. In Bombay (present-day Mumbai), the Gateway to India, born of Anglo-Indian parenthood, commemorates the visit of King George V in 1911, while the Central Telegraph Office, High Court, General Post Office, and Victoria Terminus (present-day Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Railway Station) show Gothic features. In Madras (present-day Chennai), several civic and public buildings, including a banquet hall, a museum, and the legislative assembly, represent Western classicism. Thereafter, the British built hill stations, civil lines, and cantonments—all in their efforts to sanitize and segregate Europeans in India and to establish British authority in India. However, it is at New Delhi that the architectural experiments of British Raj in India find their resolution in a style of architecture that is neither Indian nor European, but a complete fusion of the two traditions. Architect Edwin Lutyens's New Delhi represents a mutated but monumental style born of European classicism and Indo-Saracenic influences, and the city itself offers a place where colonial life was sanitized in the spacious symphony of Garden City greenery (the influence of Ebenezer Howard) and imperial power was celebrated in the grouping of public buildings in a monumental center with radiating axial vistas, ending in areas of open space and imposing buildings. To Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi was the worst example of British

sensibility and imperial arrogance; to British poet Lord Byron it was the Rome of “Hindoostan.”

Independent India

New Delhi remains the capital of independent India, and also the most ostentatious expression of the British Raj. Shortly after independence, Nehru censored New Delhi as “most un-Indian.” Nehru’s nationalist remark, made at the outset of India’s experiments in European modernist architecture, was to set the terms of the national debate on the character of India’s new cities and its post-colonial architectural style. Nehru felt that the average American or English urban planner could not understand the social background of India. Still, he realized that modern India could not be built without technology, and consequently he supported the creation of the Indian Institutes of Technology and Indian Institutes of Management (modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Business School, respectively). But he insisted that Western technology must be fused with Indian cultural traditions, just as he had fused the political ideologies of communism and democracy to create democratic socialism as a means for leading India on the path of planned economic development.

To a degree, the British who planned New Delhi also were influenced by the ideas of Beaux Arts city planning, American style, which tended to group monumental public buildings in the urban center, leaving the rest of the city to green spaces. What Nehru objected to in New Delhi was not the “leafy capital” per se, for that represented village India, but the monumentality of its official buildings, decorated with classical motifs, attesting to the roots of the British Raj. It therefore followed that in post-colonial India, a new paradigm of planning and architectural style had to be invented. Prime Minister Nehru provided the imaginative shape to the new urban vision at Chandigarh, Punjab’s new capital: “Let this be a new town symbolic of the freedom of India, unfettered by the traditions of the past . . . an expression of the nation’s faith in the future” (cited in Kalia, *Chandigarh*, p. 21)

Arguably, Nehru’s greatest gift was his ability to bring to the surface, through his historical vision, images that fused traditional India with the modern world. He thus introduced a modernist discourse for the making of a nation state—a discourse that was to encourage his countrymen to develop a more encompassing sense of what constituted their world. Nehru said of Chandigarh: “It is the biggest example in India of experimental architecture. It hits you on the head, and makes you think” (cited in Kalia, *Chandigarh*, p. 29). The man who would deliver Nehru his urban dream was Le Corbusier, whose vision brought down old walls that had long imprisoned India, defying ancient prejudices. Le Corbusier opened the

doors of modernism’s golden age, which stretched from the 1920s through the 1960s, promising to make the world a better place through design. This was to be achieved, according to the menu of modernism, by providing plenty of unadorned open space, abundant natural light through large expanses of glass, and an intimate connection with the outdoors. In the 1960s, the experiment in modernism was expanded by American architect Louis Kahn in his seminal work on the Indian Institute of Management (1962–1974) at Ahmedabad. Modernism’s technological innovation and aesthetic self-expression were seen as the twin forces of urban design that could solve housing and other social problems. The ability of modernism to meet a surging housing demand and to revitalize decaying cities in postwar Europe was not lost on India, which itself was burdened with refugees as a result of the 1947 partition of the subcontinent.

From the struggle over rival visions of independent India’s future emerged a new understanding of the confluence of history and memory for India’s intellectuals, architects, urban planners, and political leaders. Partitioned India demonstrated two versions of history and ideology: Mahatma Gandhi’s vexed, sometimes mystical, attachment to villages as the source of ideals for building a new India competed with Nehru’s inclination toward modern cities. Nehru spent much of his career as a public figure trying to confront traditional India, and his Western training placed him in an oppositional—and sometimes advantageous—position to comment on the struggle over memory in Indian society. In his writings and speeches, Nehru presented a historical vision for India in which urbanism flourished and modern industry thrived.

Fifty years after its inception, the Chandigarh plan remains India’s inspiration in urban planning and renewal, repeated with mantralike regularity in its application, always with idiosyncratic variations to legitimize the enterprise as truly Indian. Through this process of repetition, the Chandigarh plan has been absorbed into the assimilative Indian tradition, first in Orissa’s capital of Bhubaneswar, then in Gujarat’s new capital of Gandhinagar, as well in the other new cities and in rebuilding of the old ones. However, after its first impact, the modern movement lost its way in India, resulting in idiosyncratic building designs. Still, the best Indian architecture, which represented the thoughtful synthesis of old and new, the fusing of regional and universal, and the blending of local craft with modern technology, would evolve after the masters of modernism had been consigned to history. Indian architects such as Charles Correa, B. V. Doshi, Raj Rewal, and others in their youth had fervently sought answers from the masters of modernism to build a new India; they now truly belong in a

new nation that is building monuments for the future and rapidly forgetting the burden of colonial rule and the deep religious and communal roots of the partition.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Agra; Bhubaneswar; Bombay; Calcutta; Chandigarh; Gandhinagar; New Delhi**

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URDU. See **Languages and Scripts.**

USHAS. See **Vedic Aryan India.**

UTTAR PRADESH. See **Geography.**



VAISHESHIKA According to Kanāda, the mythical founder of the system, *Vaisheshika* is the enumeration of everything in this world that has the character of being. Since the categories are numerous, the use of formal logic is essential to draw inferences, and in this respect *Nyāya* is its sister system.

Kanāda's *Vaisheshika Sūtra* presents a system of physics and metaphysics. Its physics is an atomic theory of nature, where the atoms are distinct from the soul, of which they are the instruments. Each element has individual characteristics (*viśeṣas*), which distinguish it from the other nonatomic substances (*dravyas*): time, space, soul, and mind. The atoms are considered to be eternal.

There are six fundamental categories (*padārtha*) associated with reality: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). The first three of these have a real objective existence, and the last three are products of intellectual discrimination. There are nine classes of substances (*dravya*), some of which are non-atomic, some atomic, and others all-pervasive. The non-atomic ground is provided by the three substances, ether (*ākāśa*), space (*dīk*), and time (*kāla*), which are unitary and indestructible; a further four, earth (*prithivī*), water (*āpas*), fire (*tejas*), and air (*vāyu*) are atomic, composed of indivisible, and indestructible atoms (*anu*); self (*ātman*), which is the eighth, is omnipresent and eternal; and, finally, the ninth is the mind (*manas*), which is also eternal but of atomic dimensions, that is, infinitely small.

There are seventeen qualities (*guṇa*), listed in no particular order as color or form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), and touch (*sparsa*); number (*sankhyā*), size (*parimāna*), separateness (*prithaktva*), conjunction (*samyoga*), and disjunction (*vibhāga*); remoteness (*paratva*)

and nearness (*aparatva*); judgment (*buddhi*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and effort (*prayatna*). These qualities are either physical or psychological.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (*dvyanuka*). Two, three, four, or more *dvyanukas* combine into grosser molecules of *tryanuka*, *chaturanuka*, and so on. The other view is that atoms form dyads and triads directly to form the molecules for different substances. Atoms possess an incessant vibratory motion. The activity of the atoms and their combinations are not arbitrary but are based on laws that are expressed as the *adrishta*.

Molecules can also break up under the influence of heat. In this doctrine of heating of atoms, the impact of heat particles decomposes a molecule. Heat and light rays are taken to consist of very small particles of high velocity. The particles of heat and light may be endowed with different characteristics, and therefore heat and light can be of different kinds.

Ākāśa (ether), time, and space have no lower constituents. Of *ākāśa* the qualities are sound, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction. Thus, being endowed with qualities, and not being located in anything else, it is regarded as a substance. In as much as it has no cause, either homogeneous or heterogeneous, it is eternal. "Time" is the cause of the relative notions of priority, posteriority, or simultaneity and succession, and of late and soon, in as much as there is no other cause or basis for these notions. The *Vaisheshika Sūtras* clearly present the principle of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*). Time and space are the efficient cause for all phenomena.

It is stated that there are two kinds of universals: higher and lower. The higher universal is Being, which

encompasses everything. Lower universals exclude as well as include, which means that the universals may be defined in a hierarchical fashion. The higher universal is akin to a superposition of all possibilities and it therefore anticipates the essence of the quantum theory.

Subhash Kak

See also **Vedic Aryan India**


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VAJPAYEE, ATAL BIHARI (1924–), prime minister of India (1996–1998 and 1998–2004). A. B. Vajpayee was India's prime minister in the Bharatiya Janata Party–led coalition government of the National Democratic Alliance from March 1998 to April 1999. It fell in a vote of no-confidence in 1999 when the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party refused to vote with its coalition partners. Vajpayee led the alliance to victory again in the general elections that followed in October 1999. He became prime minister when this coalition formed a government from October 1999 to May 2004. Vajpayee's coalition government lost the 2004 general elections to a Congress Party–led coalition government led by Sonia Gandhi, president of the party.

Vajpayee was born on 25 December 1924 in Gwalior, in what was then British India's Central provinces, now Madhya Pradesh. He attended college in Gwalior and Kanpur, and has a master's degree in political science. He first entered politics during the independence struggle as a member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the extremist Hindu nationalist wing of the Hindu Mahasabha. He was a founding member of the Hindu right-wing Jana Sangh Party in 1951, a reconstituted version of the Hindu Mahasabha, which was banned from politics after one of its members, Nathuram Godse, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. Vajpayee was a member of India's lower house of parliament, the Lok Sabha, and briefly of its upper house, the Rajya Sabha, since 1957. He was elected to Parliament at various times from constituencies in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi.

Vajpayee became leader of the revamped Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and a coalition member of the Janata Party government led by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. This newly constituted alliance of parties under the banner of the Janata Party had ousted Indira Gandhi's Congress Party government in a national election following



Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee in a private moment of reflection, the festival of Holi, March 2003. During his two terms as prime minister, his was the moderate face of Hindu nationalism, insisting that India remain a secular state. REUTERS / CORBIS.

her twenty-two-month “National Emergency” rule that suspended the democratic process in India from June 1975 to March 1977. Vajpayee had been jailed by the Indira Gandhi government during the Emergency. After the defeat of the Congress Party, he became external affairs minister in the Janata Party government of Prime Minister Desai.

Following the victory of the BJP-led coalition over the Congress Party in March 1998, newly appointed prime minister Vajpayee immediately gave the go-ahead for a series of nuclear tests in early May 1998. Pakistan countered promptly with nuclear tests of its own. BJP rule also ushered in a wave of Hindu nationalism, pushed by more extreme Hindu parties, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Shiv Sena. There were attempts to redefine India as a Hindu state called “Hindutva,” against the opposition of the more secular parties, groups, and leaders in India. However, Vajpayee

appeared as the moderate face of Hindu nationalism, insisting that India remain a secular state.

Vajpayee's tenure as prime minister is best known for his efforts to bring about reconciliation with Pakistan through what came to be called "bus diplomacy." In February 1999 he took a well-publicized bus trip from Amritsar in Indian Punjab to Lahore in Pakistani Punjab and was greeted warmly by Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif. This gesture of Indian goodwill and reconciliation fell apart two months later, when Pakistan launched an attack on Kargil in Indian Kashmir. The peace initiative by Prime Minister Vajpayee collapsed. Relations appeared to suffer a further setback when the perceived mastermind of the Pakistani attack on Kargil, General Pervez Musharraf, overthrew Sharif's civilian government and imposed military rule. In early 2004, Vajpayee made further conciliatory gestures toward Pakistan, declaring that he would like to see peace between India and Pakistan during his lifetime.

Economic growth at averages of 6 to 8 percent of the gross national product continued under Vajpayee's BJP-led coalition government, drawing further on the reforms introduced in 1991 by Congress Party minister of finance, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Even during the global economic recession of 1998–1999, India's growth continued at 5.8 percent. However, the defeat of Vajpayee's government by the Congress Party is attributed largely to its excessive commitment to high-tech development in India and the welfare of the rising Indian middle class, and the neglect of the masses of India's rural poor.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindutva and Politics**

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VALMIKI. *See* **Rāmāyaṇa.**

VANAPRASTHA. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma); Saṃskāra.**

VARANASI A city in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Varanasi (called Benares by the British) had a population of 1.1 million in 2001. The name Varanasi is derived from the two rivers, Varuna and Asi, that flow into the Ganga (Ganges) there. The city is located on the western bank of the Ganga, which flows from north to south in this area, and the city thus faces the morning sun. Many *ghats* (steps) lead from the high bank down to the river, where pilgrims bathe; the Manikarnika Ghat and the Dasavamedha Ghat are the most famous of these. Being the most sacred place of the Hindus, the city has many temples, including the Hanuman Temple, dedicated to the monkey god Hanuman, and the Durga Temple of the Mother Goddess Durgā. The most important of all is the Vishwanath Temple, dedicated to Lord Shiva, the patron of the city. The original Vishwanath Temple was destroyed by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, who had a mosque built at this site, which still occupies one of the most prominent locations of the city.

Many pious Hindus come to Varanasi when they believe they are near death, in order to be cremated on one of the "burning *ghats*" in the northern part of the city. The ashes of the dead are swept into the river, which is believed to have a self-purifying quality. In recent years the river has been polluted by many industrial effluents.

This sacred city was earlier known as Kashi. Its origins can probably be traced back to the eighth century B.C. The Buddha preached his first sermon in neighboring Sarnath, which is marked by its ancient Dharam Eka stupa. In addition to its ancient religious traditions, Varanasi is also known for its silk saris, which are coveted by Indian women everywhere. The saris are usually decorated with borders containing gilded threads, some with beautifully embroidered patterns.

The city is also home to one of India's most famous universities, Banaras Hindu University. When the Muslim University at Aligarh was started, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a leading Hindu politician, advocated the establishment of a Hindu university in Varanasi and received a great deal of support for it. The university was inaugurated in February 1916. The humanities have played an important role in its curriculum, but it has also gained a reputation as a center of science and technology. It is one of India's national universities, which are under the direct supervision of the president of India.

Dietmar Rothermund

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VARNA. See **Caste System**.

VARUṆA A powerful deity, Varuṇa is known in the Rig Veda as the universal ruler in charge of *rita*, cosmic law and order, and the personification of moral authority. He is an all-seeing, omniscient, celestial controller and exacting punisher of those who transgress his commandments (*vrata*). In hymns he is frequently invoked in the compound Mitravaruṇa along with his brother, Mitra, also one of the Ādityas, the sons of the goddess Aditi, “the Unbounded.” Mitra, a name cognate to ancient Iranian Mithra, meaning “friend,” shares the major features of Varuṇa, including kingship, but appears as a benign, restoring, and contractual side of divine sovereignty. Varuṇa, on the other hand, is the wielder of occult power (*māyā*) and the severe binder of sinners, capturing with nooses (*pāśha*) those who infringe upon *rita*, often inflicting diseases upon them. Hymns to Varuṇa invariably include pleas for forgiveness and release from his wrath, judgment, and bondage for any moral offense (*āga*). Like Mitra, Varuṇa may extend grace to the penitent. Release from one or another of his hundred nooses means not only cessation of disease or physical pain but also removal of the sin that brought on punishment. He is the dominant side of the pair, Mitra being addressed alone in a single Rig Vedic hymn, whereas a dozen are directed solely to Varuṇa.

Satya, or truth and exactitude in sacrifice, are within Varuṇa’s guardianship, and several Vedic sacrifices feature him, including *rājāsūya* (consecration of a king), *ashvamedha* (horse sacrifice), and *varuṇapraghāsa* (second of three seasonal sacrifices, a rite in which the sacrificer’s wife must confess sins). One of the priests essential to the Vedic soma cult is named Maitrāvaruṇa; he takes the pressed juice offered to Mitravaruṇa, the pair, as divine unity.

Sūrya, the sun, serves as eye of the all-observant Varuṇa, who as divine overseer also has spies (*spāśha*); the same word occurs for Mithra’s spies in the Avesta, indicating an Indo-Iranian antiquity for this feature of cosmic control. Since Varuṇa is associated with both the day and night sky, his spies are possibly stars. Cosmic waters above and below the earth, rivers, and rain are all within his domain.

During the Vedic period, Varuṇa as *samvāj* (king by his nature) gradually lost his position as all-powerful sovereign and greatest of deities to Indra, who is king by force,

by self-rule (*svarāj*). In the Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas, Varuṇa appears as a *lokapāla*, assigned to the west as one of the eight guardian deities. Still lord of the waters, now featuring the ocean, he is king of *nāgas*, or serpents. He may be seen in temple sculptures on his mount (*vāhana*), the *makara*, a crocodile-like composite creature. In addition to Varuṇānī, named in the Rig Veda, his legitimate wives in various Purāṇas include Gaurī and Jyeshthā, while Bhadrā, daughter of Soma and wife of Utathya, he captured by force. Among his sons were the *rishi* Vasishthā (fathered jointly with Mitra), Pushkara, and the great poet of the Rāmāyaṇa, Vālmīki, born according to one version when Varuṇa’s semen fell on a termite mound (*valmīka*).

Today, Varuṇa’s aide is sought when digging wells or in times of drought. If monsoon rains are late and crops are endangered, Vaidika Brahmans may be summoned to recite Rig Veda hymns in a Varuṇa *pūjā*. Although Varuṇa is now seldom credited, both *dharma* as cosmic law and *vrata* as human vow to observe *dharma* continue to be the focus of modern Hinduism, as they were for the development of the classical Dharma Sūtras and Dharma Shāstras.

David M. Knipe

See also **Agni; Hinduism (Dharma); Indra; Soma; Vedic Aryan India**

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VEDĀNGA JYOTISHA The earliest astronomical text from India, the *Vedānga Jyotisha* is attributed to Lagadha and has an internal date of approximately 1350 B.C. It is available in two recensions, one belonging to the Rig Veda and the other to the Yajur Veda (which, from the language used, appears to have been edited a

few centuries later). The text is dated from the statement that the winter solstice was at the beginning of the asterism Shra Vishthā (beta Delphini) and the summer solstice at the midpoint of Ashleshā.

According to the *Vedānga Jyotisha*, in a *yuga* there are 5 solar years, 67 lunar sidereal cycles, 1,830 days, 1,835 sidereal days, 62 synodic months, 1,860 *tithis*, 135 solar *nakshatras*, 1,809 lunar *nakshatras*, and 1,768 risings of the moon. It also provides ingenious rules to determine the positions of the *nakshatras*, the sun, and the moon at any time.

A lunar month is divided into 30 *tithis*. The solar day is divided into 124 parts and also into 603 *kalās*. The measurement of time, by the use of a clepsydra, was in the unit of *nādikā*, which was the sixtieth part of a day. The units used were chosen to allow for the use of integers in various calculations.

The *Vedānga Jyotisha* is a lunisolar system in which the movements of the moon across the *nakshatras* in the sky identify the days, and the position of the sun, tracked by its northward and southward course in the two halves of year (*ayana*), identifies the twelve months of the year. In this system, intercalary months need to be added and other corrections made in order to make the sun's northward course begin in the correct month.

Although the *Vedānga Jyotisha* says that the *yuga* of five years has 1,830 civil days and 62 lunar synodic months, actually the correct number of days is 1,826, and an additional day should be added to the 62 synodic months. The length of the year was measured from one winter solstice to another, and this was taken to be 366 days. Since the year was divided into six equal seasons of 61 days, the civil count of 1,830 was a convention. The number of civil days in the *yuga* was corrected in the two extra intercalary months that were employed.

Lagadha gives the ratio of the longest to the shortest day as 3:2. This is true for northwestern India, and one may conclude that he belonged to that region.

Subhash Kak

See also Astronomy; Vedic Aryan India

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VEDĀNTA. *See Upanishadic Philosophy.*

VEDIC ARYAN INDIA The *Samhitās*—"collections" of hymns (*sūkta*) or, more comprehensively, ritual formulas (mantra)—constitute the oldest surviving literature of South Asia. They form the earliest category of texts belonging to the four divisions of the Veda (sacred knowledge), composed in the Sanskrit language. The *Samhitās* are the sources discussed in this article. (See the article "Brāhmaṇas" for a discussion of later Vedic texts, the Brāhmaṇas [in a broader sense comprising the Āraṇyakas and Upanishads], the subsequent category of Sūtras [Shrauta, Grihya, and Dharma Sūtras], and other auxiliary texts.)

The *Samhitās* and Brāhmaṇas came to be considered eternal, transcendental wisdom (*shruti*; literally, "hearing"), supernaturally "heard" or "seen" by ancient sages (*rishi*), the ultimate authority in Hinduism. Though each Veda thus comprises other texts besides (one or more) *Samhitās*, their plain names are often used to designate the respective *Samhitās*: Rig Veda = Rig Veda *Samhitā*. The fourfold division of the Veda results from the engagement of four groups of priests in the elaborate *shrāuta* rites ("based on the *shruti*"), which first took their codified shape in Yajur Veda.

Rig Veda—"knowledge of praise stanzas"—was the domain of the *hotar* priest and his assistants, who praised deities by reciting specific stanzas of the Rig Veda. Its 1,028 hymns total 10,417 stanzas. Most hymns were probably composed in the thirteenth century B.C. and the whole corpus collected by about 1100 B.C. The final redaction took place around 700 B.C., whereafter the text was handed down with extraordinary fidelity. Preserving extant poems by oral repetition replaced a living tradition of composing new poems.

The Rig Veda is divided into ten books. The oldest are the nuclear "family books" (II–VII), each ascribed to a family of poets descended from a particular sage: II, Gritsamada; III, Vishvāmitra; IV, Vāmadeva; V, Atri; VI, Bharadvāja; and VII, Vasishtha. Almost equally old is Book VIII, with hymns of the Kanva (1–66) and Angiras (67–103) families, and its supplement, the Kanva hymns (1–50) of Book I, though the rest of Book I is more recent. Book IX was created by extracting all the hymns addressed to God Soma from Books I through VIII. Book X is the most recent addition.

Sāma Veda—"knowledge of the melodies"—is the domain of the *udgātar* and other chanter priests. The *Samhitā*, preserved in two versions (Kauthuma and Jaiminīya), consists of text books (*ārcika*) with stanzas mostly taken from the Rig Veda, and of extensive song books (*gāna*) with melodies (*sāman*) set to the (variously altered) texts.

Yajur Veda—"knowledge of the muttered formulas," largely in prose—belonged to priests performing practical

operations. The earlier Saṃhitās of “Black Yajur Veda” (Maitrāyaṇīya, Katha, Kapishthala-Katha, and Taittirīya) include prose passages explaining the origin and symbolism of the *śrauta* ritual. In contrast, the younger “White Yajur Veda” separates its (Vājasaneyi) Saṃhitā from the ritual explanations in prose, which are collected in the most extensive of the existing Brāhmana texts, the Shatapatha-Brāhmana.

Atharva Veda—“knowledge of the *atharvan* priest”—contains charms for healing, love affairs, sorcery, and domestic (*grihya*) and royal rites. The next oldest collection after the Rig Veda, the Atharva Veda (and the latest hymns of the Rig Veda, which anticipate it) differs from the Rig Veda in language and content, and probably reflects the traditions of both earlier arrived Aryan immigrants and the indigenous population of India. It was initially excluded from the solemn ritual, but later became the Veda of the Brahman priest, whose main duty was to control that everything was done correctly and to “heal” eventual mistakes.

Background of the Vedic Aryans in South Asia and Beyond

The ancestry of the Vedic Aryans is understood today better than before. At the same time, it has become a heatedly debated and politicized issue. Opinions widely differing from the traditional “immigration hypothesis” are expressed especially by Hindu fundamentalists. These opponents maintain that the birthplace of the Aryan (and even other Indo-European) languages is India, and that Vedic Sanskrit was spoken in the Indus Valley, or Harappan, Civilization (2600–1900 B.C.). The forgotten Indus script is difficult to decipher in the absence of any translations, but its analysis leads to the conclusion that the language was Proto-Dravidian. This is supported by the presence of Dravidian loanwords in the Rig Veda and later Vedic texts and the survival of one Dravidian language (Brahui) in the Indus Valley. Most important, however, is the absence of the horse, both from excavated animal bones antedating 2000 B.C. in South Asia and from the otherwise rich gallery of animals in Harappan art. By contrast, the horse is frequently mentioned in the Rig Veda and was culturally important.

The Vedic language is archaic Sanskrit, or Old Indo-Aryan, the oldest phase of Aryan languages spoken in (ancient) India. *Ārya* (hospitable, noble) is the ethnic self-appellation of the authors of the Rig Veda, shared by the speakers of Avestan and Old Persian, the two varieties of Old Iranian (or “Irano-Aryan”), the oldest phase of Aryan languages spoken in (ancient) Iran. The original location of the Proto-Aryan or Proto-Indo-Iranian parent language is indicated by the many Proto-Aryan loanwords in the Finno-Ugrian protolanguage, which dispersed from

central Russia. The Rig Vedic hymns imply a long poetic tradition with refined style and metrics. They share numerous phrases with Zarathushtra’s Old Iranian poems. Some poetic formulas go back even to Proto-Indo-European. The phrase *śhrávas. . . ákshitam* (imperishable fame) has an exact etymological counterpart in ancient Greek, in the Homeric phrase *kléos áphthiton*.

Several terms related to wheeled vehicles reconstructable to the Indo-European protolanguage indicate that its speakers knew ox-drawn carts and wagons, which were invented around 3500 B.C. This gives a firm starting point for identifying the chain of archaeological cultures through which the various Indo-European languages eventually reached their historical seats. On this basis, Proto-Aryan was spoken in the Sintashta-Arkaim culture (c. 2200–1800 B.C.) in southern Russia between the Volga and Ural rivers. The earliest known horse-drawn chariots are from aristocratic graves of this culture.

The Indo-Aryan branch seems to have broken off with the Andronovo culture (c. 1800–1300 B.C.) that spread to Siberia and Central Asia. In Central Asia, Indo-Aryan speakers apparently took over the rule in the Bactria and Margiana Archaeological Complex (BMAC) in the first quarter of the second millennium. A similar BMAC-related takeover of power happened in Syria, where the Mitanni kingdom, famed for its horse-drawn chariots, had rulers with Indo-Aryan names (c. 1500–1300 B.C.).

Entrance of the Vedic Aryans to South Asia

Ceramics with BMAC origin came to the Swat Valley of north Pakistan around 1600 and again around 1300 B.C. These two waves of immigration most probably brought the poetic tradition of the Rig Veda to South Asia. These dates agree with the fact that the Rig Veda mentions bronze (*ayas*) but not iron. Iron came to South Asia around the eleventh century B.C. and is mentioned in the Atharva Veda.

River names occurring in the Rig Veda connect its oldest parts with the northwest and the Punjab. The “seven streams” are repeatedly mentioned; in X, 75 all the major rivers of the Indus system are enumerated. Eastern rivers (Yamuna and Ganga) are mentioned only a few times. In later Vedic literature the geographical horizon widens eastward and southward. Several river names seem to have had their referents in Afghanistan. Thus Rasā, corresponding to Avestan Ranhā, probably denotes the Amu Darya and may have a Proto-Aryan background in the Volga River, called Rhā in Greek sources. Sarasvati mostly denotes the North Indian Ghaggar-Hakra, but in VI, 61 Sarasvati evidently refers to the Argandāb River in the Afghan province of Kandahar, called Harahvaiti in

Avestan and Harahuvati in Old Persian. This was the birthplace of King Divodāsa.

The Vedic Aryans did not come to an empty country when they entered South Asia. The Harappan population is estimated to have been around 1 million. The walled Indus cities collapsed around 1900 B.C., and the Aryan war god Indra and his protégé, King Divodāsa, have long been blamed for this: according to the Rig Veda, they vanquished “black-skinned” enemies called Dāsa, Dasyu, and Pani, and destroyed their numerous strongholds.

However, chronological reasons alone make it difficult to accept this popular hypothesis, as King Divodāsa probably did not come to the Indus Valley before 1300 B.C. Moreover, the Dāsa forts are described as having circular and often multiple, concentric walls, while the Indus cities had a square layout. In the 1970s, a “temple fort” with three round concentric walls was discovered at the BMAC site Dashly-3 in Afghanistan. The battles against the Dāsas may therefore have taken place west of the Indus Valley.

Later Iranian and Greek sources place a tribe called Dasa or Daha and its subtribe Parna in Afghanistan and southern Turkmenistan, the very area of the BMAC. Two East Iranian languages have preserved the word *daba* (from earlier *dasa*) in the meaning “man, hero, human being,” which is often the basis of ethnic names. A wave of Early Proto-Iranian-speaking immigrants from the northern steppes may have preceded the Vedic Indo-Aryans in Central Asia (taking over the BMAC) and in South Asia. This earliest Aryan wave could be connected with the Late and Post-Harappan cultures in the Indus Valley (“Jhukar” in Sind, “Cemetery H of Harappa” in the Punjab), the Ganges-Yamuna Doab (the “Copper Hoards”), and with the early non-Vedic but Aryan languages of eastern India (Māgadhī). Their religion may have initiated Shākta Tantrism.

The Rig Veda mentions by name some thirty Aryan tribes and clans, major ones being the “five peoples.” Four of these, paired as Yadu and Turvasha, and Anu and Druhyu, seem to represent the first wave of Rig Vedic immigrants (c. 1600 B.C.). The fifth tribe, Pūru, together with its ally or subtribe Bharata—which has given India its later native name, Bhārat(a)—appears to have arrived later (c. 1300 B.C.), overpowering the earlier tribes. This immigration from Afghanistan over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the western side of the Indus was led by the Pūru king Purukutsa and the Bharata king Divodāsa.

Divodāsa’s son or grandson Sudās defeated the Pūru king and his many allies in the celebrated “battle of ten kings” (Rig Veda VII, 18) on the Ravi River in the Punjab. Sudās became the supreme ruler in the easternmost realm of the Rig Vedic period, the area around

Delhi later called Kurukshetra. The Pūrus stayed between the Jhelum and Ravi rivers, where Alexander conquered King Pōros (“descendant of Pūru”).

Vedic History after the Rig Veda

Iron and a new luxury ceramic called painted gray ware appeared in the Punjab and Haryana around 1100 B.C. and remained cultural characteristics of this area until about 400 B.C. Iron probably came with Old Iranian-speaking horse riders from Central Asia. It is possible that the Kuru kings, who now assumed power in Kurukshetra, the center of Vedic civilization immediately after the Rig Veda, belonged to this wave of immigrants: they share the name “Kuru” with the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus.

Economy and Society

Cattle breeding was the basis of Vedic economy. The cow was the most important domestic animal as the provider of meat and milk products; others included the horse, donkey, mule, camel, goat, and sheep, as well as dog and cat, and in the Yajur Veda, also elephant. Agriculture (with plow) was practiced mainly by the indigenous sedentary population. The main crop was barley; rice is mentioned from the Atharva Veda onward.

Early Vedic Aryans were much on the move and continually at strife with each other, cattle rustling being a favorite pastime. Horse-drawn chariots with two spoked wheels served for fighting, hunting (wild boars and antelopes), and racing. Rivers were crossed with boats and floats. The word *grāma*, which later means “village,” denotes in the Rig Veda “a group of wandering pastoralists and their camp,” also “a warring band.” People lived in their ox-drawn wagons, placed in a circle to provide a corral for the cattle at night. Actual buildings—called “house” (*griha*) or “hall” (*shālā*)—were lightly constructed with wooden beams and matted walls and roofs. Brick was not used for residential buildings, only for fire altars and hearths. Towns appear around 800 B.C. with the painted gray ware and start being referred to in Brāhmaṇa texts.

Goods traded by barter included salt, metals and metal objects (weapons, tools and vessels), grain, wool, thread and garments, goatskins and plants (soma, herbs). Cattle was the main means of payment. Kings rewarded poets with gifts of cattle, horses, and golden ornaments.

Some specialized craftsmen are mentioned in the Rig Veda, including carpenters, smiths, merchants, and fishermen. Post-Rig Vedic texts speak of potters (*kulāla*) with potter’s wheels, but they were considered non-Aryan and wheel-thrown dishes “demonic”: ritual vessels were handmade by Aryans.

Vedic society consisted of extended families headed by patriarchal “masters of the house” (*grihapati*), clans (*visb*) headed by chieftains (*visbpati*), and tribes ruled by kings (*rājan* or *kshatriya*), war leaders like the war god Indra, and peacetime rulers like God Varuṇa, who guarded social rules and punished offenders. By the Brāhmaṇa period, the administration was much more developed, with numerous dignitaries.

The Rig Veda distinguishes between the *Ārya varṇa* and the *Dāsa varṇa*, apparently a difference in skin color. In the late hymn X, 90, however, *varṇa* (color) denotes the four social classes—*brāhmaṇa* (priests), *rājanya* (nobility), *vaishya* (commoners), and *śūdra* (serfs)—as originating from the mouth, arms, loins, and feet of the primeval man (*puruṣa*), whom the gods sacrificed in the beginning, creating the world out of his body. This seems to reflect the surfacing of earlier local developments. The priestly claim for superiority and monopolization of the sacrificial ritual probably started from the royal high priests (*purohita*) important in the Atharva Veda.

Religious Ideas and Forms of Worship

Contrasting with the systematic and detailed descriptions of rituals in the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, the Rig Veda repeats over and over a few central myths and cultic acts but leaves many others quite obscure, as poetics favored veiled and indirect references. The hymns mainly praise gods, invite them to a sacrificial meal, and pray to them for long life, sons, cattle, victory in battle, or fame. Verbal art and liturgy was most important in the uniconic worship of gods. The truthfully spoken word had magic power, *brahman*: by means of his poems, God Brihaspati (in later Hinduism, the chaplain of the gods and the planet Jupiter), helping Indra, opened the cave of the demon Vala who had imprisoned the cows of the Dawn.

The Rig Vedic worship or sacrifice (*yajña*), which was modeled on human hospitality, was a very important ceremony for the Aryans, as their ethnic name indicates; it was guarded by God Aryaman, “hospitality” personified. After the sacrificer and the priests (who represented particular deities) had become purified and initiated, the sacrificial fire was kindled. Gods were invited to come and seat themselves on the grass strewn near the fire. Agni, the god of fire, conveyed the offerings to them, or functioned as their mouth and priest. Agni is one of the principal Vedic deities, worshiped in every house as its master. Offerings consisted of cakes and of portions of slaughtered animals put into fire, while other parts were eaten by the priests.

The most important offering substance was soma, the deified sacrificial drink, pressed out of the stems of a plant previously soaked in hot water. The juice was purified

with a woolen filter, and during this act lauded with Samur Vedic songs. The botanical identity of soma is controversial. Most likely, it was ephedra, still used as *haoma* by Zoroastrians, the followers of Zarathushtra. Ephedra contains ephedrine, a drug that enhances physical performance. Soma is the drink of the warrior. Poets, too, are inspired and kept awake by soma.

More than a quarter of the Rig Vedic hymns are addressed to Indra, the god of war and the principal drinker of soma. Indra’s greatest feat is the killing of Dragon Vritra (Obstruction) who had imprisoned the waters. Maruts, the storm winds, assisted Indra. Indra also helps in finding cattle captured by the enemy and in breaking enemy forts. He is said to have created the sun, the heaven, and the dawns.

Indra, however, is not the only king of the gods. (He has this function also in Hinduism and other Indian religions.) Mitra (personified “treaty of friendship”) and Varuṇa (personified “oath” or “true speech,” upholder of cosmic order—*rita*, later *dharmā*—and punisher of sinners) are worshiped as a dual deity of kingship. Mitra is associated with day (in Iran, Mithra was the sun god and the god of victory) and Varuṇa with night (conceived of as a heavenly ocean; in later Hinduism, Varuṇa is the god of ocean and the waters. As a dual divinity they represent the bright and the dark side of the single sun god, Savi-tar. Along with Aryaman, Bhaga (share [of booty], good fortune), and some other gods, they form a class of “abstract” deities called Ādityas, “sons of [Goddess] Aditi,” possibly created by Proto-Indo-Aryans under the inspiration of the Assyrian religion, where similar deities are worshiped as aspects of the chief god Assur. Likewise, the “Holy Immortals” were aspects of Zarathushtra’s Ahura Mazda “Lord Wisdom”—the Old Iranian counterpart of Varuṇa as the principal Asura.

As the title of Varuṇa, *asura* means “Lord,” but in other Vedic contexts and in later Hinduism it means “Demon,” an enemy of the “Gods,” usually called *deva* in the Veda. Zarathushtra rejected most of the earlier Indo-Aryan gods, so *daēva* means “demon” in Avestan. There are traces of some rivalry between the cult of Indra (worshiped with soma) and the cult of the twin gods called Ashvin or Nāsātya (worshiped with *gharma*, an offering of heated milk, or with *surā*, a beer made from milk and honey). The Ashvins drive their flying horse chariot around heaven with their beautiful sister-wife, Ushas, the goddess of Dawn. They function as healers and saviors of gods and men, like their Greek counterparts, the horse-man twins. The Dioskouroi, however, were also guardians of the dual kings of Sparta, so Mitra-and-Varuṇa may be partial doubles of the Ashvins, the original chariot gods. The horse sacrifice (*ashvamedha*) belonged to royal rites (in the Rig Veda as in the later

epics and after). Mitra-and-Varuṇa, Indra, and the Nāsatyas were all invoked as oath deities by the Mitanni king in a treaty with the Hittite king in 1380 B.C.

The main gods of later Hinduism appear with a lower profile as early as the Rig Veda. Rudra (Shiva) is feared for his arrows, while Vishnu assists Indra and crosses the universe with his three strides.

The late books I and X of the Rig Veda differ considerably, in language as well as in content, from the rest of the collection but anticipate the Atharva Veda and Brahmanism. Philosophical speculation starts with the mighty hymn of creation (*sat* and *asat*, X, 129). Sorcery spells contain archaic Indo-European traditions, likewise the hymns associated with domestic rituals, which remain the most enduring part of the Veda in India today. Harappan heritage is preserved in Vedic calendrical astronomy, attested for the first time in the marriage hymn (X, 85). The Rig Veda speaks of both burial and cremation as current modes of disposing of the dead, but cremation became the standard method. The funeral hymns (X, 10–19) are related to Yama, “the twin (with his sister Yamī),” the first man and first mortal, and the king of the dead, who has an Old Iranian counterpart in the Avestan Yima, the first king and first mortal. Yama seems to be an earlier double of Manu (man), the ancestor of the Vedic Aryans; both descend from the solar god Vivasvat. Several cultural and cultic layers can thus be traced in the Veda.

Asko Parpola

See also Ashvamedha; Brāhmaṇas; Harappa; Hinduism (Dharma); Indus Valley Civilization; Zoroastrianism

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VINA The South Indian vina is also called *Sarasvatī vīnā* due to its association with the goddess Sarasvatī, who embodies the respect for learning that characterizes South Indian culture. In song lyrics and paintings, the goddess is depicted as a beautiful lady who delights in playing the vina. The modern vina dates from the early seventeenth century and belongs to the category of long-necked lutes. Its main resonator (*kudam*) and neck (*dandi*) are carved from jackwood. A removable resonator (made from gourd, wood, fiberglass, plastic, or papier-mâché) mainly serves to support the vina on the left knee of its player. The neck holds twenty-four frets and seven tuning pegs, and it is decorated by a dragon head (*yālī*). The characteristic sound of the vina is the result of several factors, including the black wax layer on which the “bell metal” frets are placed, the convex shape of the brass plate covering the wooden bridge, and the optional use of wire plectra.

Of the seven strings, four are fitted on the top of the neck, and three along the side facing the player. The four melody strings are tuned to the tonic (middle and lower *sā*) and its fifth (lower *pā* and one octave below); these notes are arranged in the descending order from the player’s point of view (*sā-pā-sā-pā*).

Three auxiliary strings constitute a kind of drone whenever the basic note (*sā*), its higher octave, and the fifth (*pā*) between them are sounded. In addition, these strings are used to indicate the cyclic pattern (*tāla*) that applies to any particular composition or improvisation. All these features and techniques account for the fact that in Sanskrit, this type of vina is referred to as a complete instrument (*sarva vādya*), one that is self-sufficient, as it expresses the melodic and rhythmic aspects of music even in the absence of an accompanist.

A few traditional vina exponents sing along with their instrument in order to highlight the lyrical aspect of a song. The repertoire of a vina player (*vāinika*) is essentially the same as that of a vocalist, but unlike the human voice, a vina has a range of 3 1/2 octaves. Most performers prefer to tune it to a key note between E and F. Its playing technique involves slides (horizontal pull) and deflection (vertical pull) in order to produce subtle nuances such as microtonal shades (*sbruti*) and a variety of embellishments. A fretless type of vina (*chitravīnā*) was earlier known as *gōttuvādya*, which implies that it is played with a gliding “rod.”

The *tānam* is a speciality of all vina players and involves the elaboration of a *rāga* in a pulsating manner. This musical expression of bliss (*ānantam*) during *tānam* is also achieved by singing the syllables “ā-nan-tam-tā-nam” in various combinations. Embellishments and grace notes (*gamaka*) serve to intertwine melodic phrases in a pleasing

manner. Such continuity is greatly valued by the discerning listener (*rasika*). Although music of such high density requires much skill, a good vina performance conveys the legacy of composer-poets like Muttusvāmi Dīkshitar: his song (*kṛiti*) in praise of Mīnākshi invokes the beautiful goddess who plays music on the vina with ten different types of embellishments (*dashavidha gamaka*).

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Dīkshitar, Muttusvāmi**

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VISHNU AND AVATĀRAS The god Vishnu, a relatively minor figure in the Vedas (which hold many but not all of the primary roots of Hindu tradition), emerges in the Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas to become one of the pair of most powerful male deities. As sectarian Shaivas are those whose primary devotional allegiance is to Shiva, Vaishnavas are worshipers of Vishnu in one or more of his manifestations. In many ways, Vishnu represents an entire pantheon of gods assembled under one name, a supreme being with multiple incarnations popularly known as *avatāras*. Historically, these numerous divine beings had obscure but sometimes colorful origins in regional clan deities and cults of deified heroes. Gradually they were gathered under the umbrella designation of Vishnu and regarded as his appearances with various names, mythologies, and rituals. Alongside Shaivas on one hand and devotees of many forms of Devī, the goddess, on the other, Vaishnavas represent the core of the Hindu devotional tradition. Although many Hindus concentrate faith in one god as supreme deity, Hinduism has always been comfortable with devotees who worship in temples, shrines, and home altars that embrace more than one sacred being.

Vishnu in the Vedas

Of the more than one thousand hymns of the Rig Veda, Vishnu is addressed in only five, and his name appears fewer than a hundred times in all the others. Yet his most celebrated feat, the taking of three great strides, the last extending beyond human comprehension and presumably embracing the three cosmic levels of earth, midspace, and



Narasimha. Massive stone sculpture from Hampi depicting the fourth avatar of Vishnu, the all-powerful Narasiṃha (half-man, half-lion) sent to slay the errant ruler Hiranyakashipu. Regardless of what form his manifestation takes, Vishnu's pervasiveness in Indian culture is never far from mind. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

heaven, endows him with a permanent reputation for all-pervasiveness. He is associated with major Rig Vedic deities, including Indra, whom he assists in the conquest of the powerful demon of obstruction Vritra, and with whom he drinks the sacred soma offering. Detailing *yajña*, sacrifice, Brāhmaṇa texts direct the sacrificer to take three strides to reach heaven and the highest light. In so doing, the sacrificer becomes both Vishnu and the sacrifice (Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1.9.3.9–10). Such a homology of the god, worshiper, and sacrifice assures Vishnu a prominent and lasting role in a religion that focuses on ritual. Communication between gods in heaven and humans on earth is secured by identifying Vishnu with the *yūpa*, at once the sacrificial pole and a cosmic *axis mundi*.

In addition to myths featuring Indra, Soma, and Agni, Vishnu also plays a part in various accounts, from the Rig Veda to the Brāhmaṇas, of a boar and a dwarf, prefiguring two of the famous *avatāras* narrated in greater detail in

subsequent Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas. A central motif in these developing myths is cosmogony, the creation or rescuing of the earth from chaos or the Asuras (enemies of the gods) through sacrifice, often personified in the form of Prajāpati, Lord of creatures. For example, the Asuras, unaware of Vishnu's talent for a three-step across the universe, are fooled when they readily consent to give up as much of the earth as the dwarf can lie upon or cross in three strides. And the boar, called Emūsha in some variants, stars as an "earth-diver" type of creator who raises out of primeval waters the entire earth on his tusk. Two other early myths involve Prajāpati and either a fish or a tortoise, yet another pair of *avatāras* of Vishnu that achieved widespread popularity in post-Vedic texts.

At the close of the Vedic textual period, most Upanishads paid scant attention to Vishnu. The early Brihadāraṇyaka placed Vishnu in a creative role, alongside Prajāpati and other deities, as overseers of ritual impregnation. In the later Kaṭha Upanishad, Vishnu's highest step occurs with the first mention of the term for rebirth, *samsāra*: one with proper knowledge of the self attains that heaven from which he will not be reborn. But more significantly, by the third century B.C., the Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upanishad, book 10 of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, connected Vishnu with cosmic Purusha, Prajāpati, time personified as Kāla, order, truth, the highest light, and in fact the Absolute, *brahman*. Among all these associations with supreme cosmic entities was inserted Nārāyaṇa, a Rishi and son of Dharma who became known as "Purusha Nārāyaṇa" in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa (e.g., 12.3.4.1). The identification of Vishnu with Nārāyaṇa proved to be momentous in post-Vedic theological circles that led to the establishment of sectarian Vaishnavism.

Vishnu in Epics and Purāṇas

In the last half of the first millennium B.C., Vishnu and Shiva came into prominence, each expressing a range of essential myths, rites, and symbols of the past, both Vedic and non-Vedic. Over the succeeding centuries, they were joined by an array of local, regional, and eventually pan-Indian goddesses who also achieved status in popular worship. Aspects of Vedic Vishnu that served best to highlight him in a new age that produced epic roles in the Sanskrit Mahābhārata, Harivaṃsha, and Rāmāyaṇa included his role as the sacrifice, and particularly as the sacrificial victim Purusha-Prajāpati, the primal person whose body became the distributed cosmos. As cosmic pole (*skambha*), Vishnu was everywhere present as essential cosmic energy. To the scattered earlier cosmogonic folklore of the boar, fish, tortoise, and dwarf were added weightier cycles of two great heroic figures, Krishna and Rāma, who became the most famous of all manifestations. In the system of *avatāras* that emerged well into



Vishnu as Boar. Kavi mural of the third avatar, Vishnu's reincarnation as a boar to save the earth from raging flood waters. Hindus believe that whenever injustice or disorder rules the universe, God will assume an earthly form to reestablish *dharmā* (balance). K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

the first millennium A.D., these two, in widely separate ways, were considered to be descents of Vishnu into the human world to restore *dharmā*, sacred order, in a time of lawlessness and chaos. Each appears at the shift of an age, or *yuga*, within the great cycle of time, and each is said to be the ideal king for the new age.

Multiple cults of regional clan leaders and deified heroes, some of them thought to be Rishis, appear to have formed, reformed, and coalesced during the period of composition of the Mahābhārata, about 500 B.C. to A.D. 200. The great epic reveals the names of Vāsudeva, Nārāyaṇa, Krishna, Bala-Rāma, Nara, and Hari, as well as communities known as Bhāgavatas (worshippers of Bhagavan, the



Vishnu Sanskarana. Carving of Vishnu, c. 1147. In Hinduism, the worship of Vishnu (“all preserving one”) is frequently associated with *sanskar* (sacraments or rituals) that mark a new stage of life. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Lord), Pāñcarātras, and others, but gives no transparent view of their developing relationships. The Nārāyaṇīya section in book 12 provides some degree of focus. But the words of Krishna in the Bhagavad Gītā (c. 200 B.C.)—verses often considered the essence of the Mahābhārata in its portion of the sixth book—declare a divine mission and provide a rationale employed later in the concept of *avatāras*: “For the preservation of good and destruction of evil . . . I come into being in age after age” (Gītā 4.8). The relationship of the warrior Arjuna’s charioteer, Krishna, to the god Vishnu is complex and certainly mystifying to Arjuna. In a crucial moment, transcendent Vishnu reveals his bodily form in the terrifying splendor of a thousand suns, and Arjuna beholds all the gods and the fiery dissolution of the universe. Quickly he begs for the mercy of normal human vision and then learns that it is only through steadfast devotion (*bhakti*) that such a theophany occurs and god himself may be entered (Gītā 11.3–55).

In other epic passages, including the Harivaṁsha, and in the Purāṇas, particularly the Vishnu and Bhāgavata, Krishna is portrayed quite differently, as a valiant warrior dispatching monsters and demons, and then again as the cowerd Gowpāla and lover of *gopīs*, milkmaids who represent the adoring souls of humans, more often found languishing in separation from the god than relishing his

embrace. In sculpture, wood carvings, and later medieval paintings, Krishna is seen conquering the serpent Kāliya, hoisting up Mount Govardhana in a rescue mission, or as a lithe, dark blue figure, surrounded by cattle and rolling hills, enchanting all with his flute, but crowned and still royal. The Gītā Govinda, a twelfth-century Sanskrit devotional poem by Jayadeva, provided a name for the *gopī* favored by the dark lord, and a cult of Rādhā and Krishna was born. Krishna’s many heroic deeds are recited with great affection, and in fact his entire life fascinates his devotees, including his childhood antics. Bāla-Krishna stealing butter from the pantry is a favored scene. Another episode echoes the revelation to Arjuna: Krishna’s mother looks into her child’s mouth when she thinks he has been eating dirt and discovers the entire universe, earth, moon, and stars.

Rāma, prince of Ayodhya, is hero of the Rāmāyaṇa, perhaps the earlier of the two epics. His character is more focused and transparent than that of Krishna. Popularly known to Vaishnavas as Rāmacandra, he is portrayed as a handsome blue figure, crowned, an arrow in one hand, bow in the other. Vishnu’s descent in this instance of the *avatāra* series is to restore the rightful kingdom to Rāma, who has been unjustly exiled, and to defeat the usurping demon Rāvaṇa, king of Lanka. The epic centers on Rāma and Sītā as ideal man and wife, each the model of virtue, truth, and beauty. Rāma’s heroic younger brother, Lakshmaṇa, and monkey allies championed by Hanuman are crucial in a war to rescue the abducted Sītā. The Sanskrit Rāmāyaṇa traditionally attributed to Vālmīki was followed by other, substantially different regional versions in several languages, including Tamil, Hindi, and Bengali between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. Before tens of thousands of devotees, the Hindi Rāmāyaṇa of Tulsīdās is dramatized annually as the Rām-Līlā.

Although some Purāṇas maintain longer catalogs, a classical list of ten *avatāras* of Vishnu endures, often beginning with Matsya, the fish. A well-known myth in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa features an unnamed tiny fish, cared for by Manu, that grows into a giant fish strong enough to save Manu from a universal flood by towing him in a boat. In the Mahābhārata, the Matsya, and other Purāṇas, this fish is identified either as Brahmā or Vishnu, and rescue from world annihilation now entails all beings, with Manu in charge of a new creation in which the Vedas must be heard anew. Paintings illustrating Purāṇa manuscripts charmingly show four personified Vedas and seven Rishis alongside Manu and family, all bobbing in a boat on an endless sea that represents an interlude between destruction and a new creation.

Kurma, the tortoise incarnation of Vishnu, also has Vedic cosmogonic origins. In the *agnicayana* sacrifice, a live tortoise, symbol of the three worlds and life-sap, was

buried as foundation for the fire altar. In epics and Purāṇas, Kurma lies at the bottom of the cosmic ocean with Mount Mandara based on his back like an *axis mundi*. In the myth of the churning of the ocean, warring gods and demons employ the great serpent Vāsuki as churning rope to twirl this pole and produce from an ocean of milk fourteen cosmic treasures, including *amrita*, the drink of immortality, and the goddess Lakshmi.

Again the Vedic tradition is one source for the boar *avatāra*, Varāha, widely represented in early iconography. The assimilation of indigenous myths and cults of a sacred boar into Vedic tradition and thence into the Vaishnava pantheon is illustrated in an association of Varāha with every aspect of the sacrifice. He is shown either upright on his hind legs or standing on all fours. Often a naked young girl is suspended from one tusk, a symbol of Prithivī, the goddess Earth, brought up by the boar who dove to the bottom of the sea to rescue her.

Unlike the other great male god, Shiva, who appears in at least as many fearful and demonic guises as gracious and benign ones, the incarnations of Vishnu are almost always benevolent. One exception is his descent as Narasiṃha, the man-lion. This curious mixture came about when a clever demon, Hiraṇyakashipu, extracted a boon from Brahmā that no weapon could harm him, that he could not be killed by man or beast, by day or night, inside or outside his dwelling. The demon's son, Prahlāda, a passionate devotee of Vishnu, enraged his father, who tried every means to kill the boy. Vishnu therefore dispatched this troublesome demon by his own hands, appearing as a man-lion, at twilight, on the threshold. Usually depicted with fierce lion face, Narasiṃha is often shown in a macabre scene, Hiraṇyakashipu stretched across his lap being disemboweled.

The dwarf in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa who tricked the Asuras into giving up the world by recapitulating Rig Vedic Vishnu's three great strides across the cosmos now receives a name, Vāmana. Yet another demon, Bali, is fooled by the innocent-looking but wide-striding dwarf. Vāmana is often pot-bellied as a dwarf but lithe and virile when conquering.

Parashu-Rāma, Rāma-with-battle-ax, presents the anomaly of a Brahman priest who is a fierce warrior wielding a deadly weapon. His myths center on the perpetual struggle for supremacy between the two primary classes, Brahmans and Kshatriyas, priests and warriors. Depicted with his right hand holding an ax given by Shiva, Parashu-Rāma recalls the mythic annihilation of a warrior class that temporarily usurped sovereignty and inverted cosmic order.

Even the Buddha was drawn into the orbit of Vishnu. Just as Buddhists co-opted several Hindu gods (Indra was said to have become a Buddhist convert), so did Vaishnavas submerge the Buddha into one more incarnation of Vishnu. According to one source, Vishnu deliberately deceived and punished those incapable of knowing god. The Mahābhārata and several Purāṇas list Hanṣa, the goose, Brahmā's mount, instead of the Buddha.

These nine *avatāras* are said to have descended in times of distress to rescue or re-create the world. That leaves only the tenth of the classic set, a Vishnu still to come. At the close of our current Kali *yuga*, worst of the four ages, Kalki will arrive to initiate the Krita *yuga*, the golden age restored once again. As an eschatological figure akin to both ancient Iranian Saoshyant and the Buddha Maitreya, he is to appear with flaming sword on a white horse, riding to end chaos, reestablish order, and reward or punish all according to their deeds.

Of the ten, it is Krishna and Rāma who emerged as such powerful magnets of devotion that worshipers often dismiss all others and think of one or the other instead of Vishnu. But regardless of manifestation, Vishnu's pervasiveness is never far from mind. Nammālvār, most famous of the twelve Tamil Vaishnava poet-saints of South India in the seventh to tenth centuries, spoke of Tirumāl (Vishnu) coming to him "happily, all grace, my lord who became fish, tortoise, man-lion, dwarf, wild boar, and who'll soon be Kalki, occupied me, became all of me, my lord dark as raincloud" (trans., A. K. Ramanujan).

The iconography of Vishnu that began with temple sculpture in the late centuries B.C. and flourished between the fourth and sixth centuries A.D. continued with coins and on to medieval paintings. Frequently he is youthful in appearance, dark blue, a *shrīvatsa* in his chest hair marking him as the favorite of Shrī-Lakshmi, his four hands holding a conch and lotus, with discus and mace as weapons. A prize from the churning of the ocean is the *kaustubha* jewel worn by Vishnu. Often he appears on Garuḍa, his eagle or hawk mount, a well-winged (*suparna*) figure in his own right, whose career echoes that of the Vedic eagle who carried a hero to steal soma. Garuḍa is known as the enemy of serpents, *nāgas*. But another theriomorphic mount for Vishnu is the cosmic serpent Shesha, known as Ananta, endless, a coil floating upon the ocean as foundation for the sleeping god. A recurrent scene depicts Vishnu lying asleep on Shesha, Lakshmi tending his feet, while a lotus sprouts from his navel to reveal the creator god Brahmā. In the late and synthetic Purāṇic theology of Trimūrti, a triune godhead, Brahmā creates, Vishnu preserves, and Shiva destroys each temporary world. Another conflation was Hari-Hara, Vishnu, and Shiva as one being performing all functions. The *shālagrāma* stone found in many home

shrines is a fossil ammonite from a sacred river. It is pervaded by the god and therefore is Vishnu.

Lakshmī, at Vishnu's feet or by his side on Gupta coins, is his wife but also the famed goddess of good fortune, wealth, prosperity, and beauty. By the close of the Vedic texts, Lakshmī had merged with Shrī, an older Vedic goddess with similar characteristics. Vishnu's divine consort may also be known as Padmā, the lotus. In South Indian temples the god is often flanked by Shrī-Lakshmī and Bhū or Bhūmi, a variant of Prithivī, the earth. The goddess remained subordinate until such texts as the Lakshmī Tantra of the Pāñcarātra Āgamas promoted her to equality, even identity with Vishnu. Here, Lakshmī-Nārāyaṇa becomes as arresting and complicated a manifestation as Shakti-Shiva among other texts and rituals of Tantra. The Tamil Shrī Vaishnava treatises of the twelfth and later centuries and the emergence of Rādhā in the Gītā Govinda from Bengal, also in twelfth century, assured a permanent place for goddesses and feminine powers within Vaishnava tradition. In the fourteenth and later centuries, the popularity of openly erotic poems of Vidyāpati, Sūrdās, Caṇḍīdās, and the Sahajiyā mysticism of Bengal meant a more intricate demonstration of the Lord's love play (*rāsa līlā*) with the human soul, and a counterpoint to those such as Caitanya, who stressed his experience of Krishna's absence.

Vishnu in Faith and Practice

Vishnu as godhead and his principal *avatāras*, Krishna and Rāma, are most readily discernible in the context of *bhakti*, devotional movements in which the *bhakta*, devotee, fervently seeks the presence of god. To be with god—really to return to him, since the body of Purusha-Nārāyaṇa is the source of all being—is a desire that remains unqualified by time, as evidenced in the widespread belief in Vishnu's heaven, Vaikuṅṭha, on the Ganges River flowing from Mount Meru (or in variants, within the deepest ocean). *Moksha* is the sought-after release from further rebirths, but living for eternity in the presence of Lord Vishnu is a far higher reward for devotion. In funerary rituals Rāma may be invoked in several ways, including a chant “the name of Rāma is *satya*, truth!”

The mythology of manifestation according to the Bhagavad Gītā and several Purāṇas is one statement of Vishnu's pervasive nature. But the attempt to explain the relationship between the one and the many, a supreme being with multiple forms that do not exhaust his totality, was approached by different communities from several perspectives from the fifth century B.C. The highest being could be disclosed as unitary, two-, three-, four-, five-, or even sixfold, each expression supported by

cosmology and mythology, including agricultural and pastoral symbols of sun, rain, earth, plows, pestles, and cattle. Vedic Purusha is again recalled, the primal being in four parts, three of them remaining unmanifest (Rig Veda 10.90.3). The doctrine of *vyūhas* emerged from the Pāñcarātra school, perhaps under the influence of Sāṃkhya philosophy, with its division of consciousness and matter, *purusha* and *prakṛiti*. An early branch envisioned four *vyūhas*, arrangements or emanations, proceeding from the supreme Vishnu as an aggregate of deified heroes: Saṃmkarshaṇa (Bala-Rāma), Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Another perspective noted five by including Sāmba or Shāmba, and still another counted triads in pairs. Krishna devotees centered upon Vāsudeva as Krishna, the other four being his brother, two sons, and a grandson. By the time of the Vishnu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas, many of these cosmological perspectives had melded into a more uniform background for the doctrine of *avatāras* and proliferation of *bhakti*.

As Shankara was the great eighth-century monistic philosopher of Advaita Vedānta and impersonal *brahman*, so were Yāmuna, and in particular, his successor, Rāmānuja, the principal architects of what came to be known as Vishishtādvaita, the qualified nondualism school of Vedānta. Rāmānuja was an eleventh-century student of Vedānta whose personal experience of Vishnu and Shrī-Lakshmī brought realization of *brahman* as a limitless being with whom an individual soul could unite. Passionate devotion to the point of complete self-surrender, *prapatti*, later became the hallmark of many South Indian Shrī Vaishnavas. Eventually this movement split into northern and southern subsets. The former stressed Sanskrit texts and cooperative grace, whereas the latter relied on Tamil hymns and the irresistible grace of god, a conviction that one is rescued by god alone without human effort. As chief priest of the Ranganatha temple in Shrirangam, Rāmānuja systematized Vaishnava *devapūjā*, divine worship, and traveled widely to disseminate theological and liturgical reforms that became fundamental to the overall success of *bhakti* in Hinduism.

A list of 108 sacred sites for Vaishnava pilgrims includes Shrirangam, Tirupati, and even Vaikuṅṭha, heaven. Among celebrated festivals are birthdays for Krishna and Rāma, Holi, and special times to honor regional poet-saints who made manifestations of Vishnu accessible in Tamil, Kannada, Marathi, Braj, Bengali, or a score of other languages.

David M. Knipe

See also **Bhagavad Gītā; Bhāgavata Purāṇa; Devī; Hinduism (Dharma); Krishna in Indian Art; Rāmāyaṇa; Shiva and Shaivism**

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VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD (VHP) Established in 1964 by a Hindu nationalist party, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Hindu Council) was created to campaign for an end to the slaughter of cows, a central demand of Hindu activists, who consider the cow a sacred embodiment of Hinduism. The VHP is also a religious and voluntary social service organization that espouses a broader agenda of reform to eradicate various perceived ills of Hindu Indian society. An important underlying ideological motif of the VHP’s program is to unify Hindus politically throughout the world, in order to establish a powerful global Hindu voice.

The broader agenda of the VHP includes its stated desire to abolish the consequences of caste divisions in Indian society. It wishes to emulate other world religions by instituting greater rigor and homogeneity in religious practices, as well as to defend traditional Indian cultural values. A central dimension of the VHP’s aims and sociopolitical activities is to oppose the conversion of Hindus to other faiths and to encourage the return of converts to the Hindu fold (“homecoming”).

Individual VHP organizational service units (*sevakaryas*) adopt a holistic approach, combining religious and sociocultural activities, such as the study of Sanskrit, the classical language of the ancient Hindu texts. They organize gatherings of religious leaders and perform sacerdotal rites to propagate Hinduism. The VHP considers the participation of religious leaders (Dharmacharyas and Shankaracharyas) under its auspices as a crucial element of its activities, as it allows Hindu leaders to speak with a single voice on subjects like the ban on cow slaughter and the construction of a new Rāma temple. The VHP also provides voluntary social services and has pioneered one-teacher schools for deprived rural communities. It helps in the upkeep of rural Hindu temples and trains priests. The VHP operates in virtually all the 770 districts of India and more than two dozen countries abroad.

The VHP’s opposition to religious conversion has brought it into sharp conflict with various Christian churches. The VHP is evidently willing to intervene

physically to prevent Christian missionaries from undertaking religious or welfare activities that it construes as part of religious conversion. Missionary groups, who have been protesting the disruption of their activities, argue that the right to proselytize is fundamental to their faith and is guaranteed by India's Constitution. A turning point for the VHP was the mass conversion to Islam of India's deprived Dalit community (formerly called "untouchables") in the southern district of Meenaksipuram in 1992. That episode galvanized the VHP into action in a campaign to bring the converts to Islam and other faiths back to the Hindu fold.

During the 1990s the VHP acquired notoriety by spearheading the campaign to build a temple for the Hindu deity, Lord Rāma, at the site in Ayodhya of the Babri Masjid, a mosque constructed in the sixteenth century by the Mughal emperor Babur. The controversy over the site was revived in 1989 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reopened it for worship by Hindus, after decades of quarantine, hoping thereby to head off conflict between Muslims and Hindus. The conflict, however, escalated, and the mosque was demolished by a Hindu mob in December 1992.

The VHP and its allies argue that an ancient Rāma temple must have stood at the site, was destroyed to make way for the mosque, and must therefore be reinstated. Indians remain divided over the issue. Supporters of the previous coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), allied to the VHP, backed the claim, while critics, both secular and Muslim, regarded attempts to destroy any ancient historical monument as a real danger to Indian secularism and tolerance. At least two other mosques, known to have replaced significant temples, are regarded as potential flash points that could provoke religious passions. The VHP insists that few major Hindu temples in northern India survived Islamic rule and that the temples at Ayodhya, Varanasi, and Mathura must be "restored" to allow Hindus to worship there.

In 2001 fifty-nine Hindu pilgrims, including forty women and children, returning from the controversial Rām Janmabhoomi ("Rām birth") temple site in Ayodhya, were attacked and burned to death by a Muslim mob at Godhra station in Gujarat. Retaliatory Hindu mob violence against Muslims followed, and it is believed that various elements of the Sangh Parivar political organization, including the VHP, participated. More than one thousand Muslims were killed. Witnesses allege that members of the VHP, the Bajrang Dal (the youth wing of the RSS), BJP state legislators, and Gujarat state government ministers were involved in the murderous riots that resulted in the killing of innocent Muslims. The events in Gujarat polarized public opinion in India. Nevertheless, anxious Hindus in Gujarat voted overwhelmingly to

ensure a resounding victory for the BJP in the state elections that year.

Critics of the VHP view their militant Hindu politics as responsible for instigating intolerance, as well as encouraging violence against religious minorities. The VHP also stands accused of active involvement in the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992. The VHP dismisses its detractors as prone to "appeasement" of unjust demands from India's religious minorities, and it insists that the rise of Hinduism is irresistible after centuries of repression by monotheistic invaders.

Gautam Sen

See also **Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindu Nationalist Parties; Hindutva and Politics; Shiv Sena**

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VIVEKANANDA, SWAMI (1863–1902), *Hindu religious leader*. Born Narendranath Dutta in Calcutta (Kolkata), Vivekananda studied philosophy at the Scottish Churches College of Kolkata and became a disciple of Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa, the head priest of the Dakshineswar Temple. Ramakrishna was a mystic who taught the unity of all religions, an idea that Vivekananda propagated worldwide. In 1893 Vivekananda was invited to attend the World Parliament of Religions, convened in Chicago, as a representative of Hinduism. In his opening speech on 11 September he expressed the hope that the bell which rang at the welcome ceremony had sounded the death knell of all fanaticism. He addressed the parliament several times. In one of his speeches he praised Buddhism as the fulfillment of Hinduism. He advocated a synthesis of the intellect of Hinduism's Brahman with the heartfelt message of the Buddha. Though a Hindu monk, Vivekananda did not stress the renunciation of this world or the quest for individual salvation. He instead made a plea for active social work, seeing God in the poor (*daridra narayan*). As a philosophical justification for this approach, he emphasized Karmayoga, that is, the path to salvation by active work in this world in selfless devotion, without looking to the fruits of one's actions.

The respect that Vivekananda had earned in the West made a great impact on his contemporaries in India, who had been used to the British denigration of Hinduism as

a ragbag of superstitions. He thus became a national hero who fired the imagination of young India. Some of the Indian nationalists then also used the idea of Karmayoga as justification for terrorist attacks on the British colonial rulers, but Vivekananda had never intended to inspire violent methods. His main source of inspiration was the Vedānta philosophy of the Upanishads. He reinterpreted Indian traditions so as to fit with modern ideas. Praising the Brahman ideal of service and the spurning of the profit motive, he constructed an Indian socialism. In this way he influenced Indian politicians of various schools of thought, including the great Liberal, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and the fervent socialist, Jawaharlal Nehru, who acknowledged his debt to Vivekananda in later years. Vivekananda praised the Hindu spiritual tradition but was an ardent critic of Hindu practices such as untouchability, which he characterized as a social custom not justified by religion.

As an instrument for both the propagation of his ideas and active social work, Vivekananda founded the Ramakrishna Mission, named after his spiritual mentor, in 1887. At that time Vivekananda and other followers of Ramakrishna had taken monastic vows. Although most Hindus do not believe in conversion, the Ramakrishna Mission did accept disciples from all over the world who were not born as Hindus. Vivekananda's trips to several Western countries paved the way for the global spread of the Ramakrishna Mission. The Mission has published the eight volumes of his collected works, which contain his books on Bhakti Yoga, Jnana Yoga, Raja Yoga, and Karma Yoga, as well as his numerous speeches.

Dietmar Rothermund

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WARS, MODERN India has fought four open wars and been involved in several near and minor armed conflicts with its neighbors. India has large standing armed forces and also possesses nuclear weapons. Arguably these are a result of insecurities arising from a history of conflicts that it has been involved in, some whose origins lie in forming a nation comprising scores of ethnic and linguistic groups. The disputes with Pakistan are said to center on Jammu and Kashmir, but as the record shows, the causes of disagreements between the two countries could be more elemental. In the case of China, the dispute is over their border and is yet to be resolved.

Indo-Pakistan War: The First Round

Britain's Independence of India Act of 1947 created the dominions of India and Pakistan, and while the rulers of the over five hundred princely states were asked to work out arrangements with the two new nations, none had the option of remaining independent. Pakistan assumed that the Muslim-majority Kashmir would accede to it, but witnessing the carnage of partition, the maharaja, a Hindu, vacillated. To force his hand, a tribal army attacked the state on 22 October, and the ruler decided to accede to India. India launched a massive airlift on the morning of 27 October, flying in troops to defend the state. Pakistani army regulars, allegedly on leave, led the attack, notwithstanding claims that they were Azad (free) Kashmir forces who had revolted against the maharaja.

The Valley of Kashmir was quickly cleared of the invaders, but through 1948, India and Pakistan were locked in combat across the entire state. In the north, British officers of the Gilgit Scouts handed over the territory to Pakistan. But the battle focused on Indian efforts to secure Ladakh in the northeast, while Pakistan


attempted to prevent the Indians from recapturing a strategic sliver of territory stretching from Muzaffarabad to Mirpur, cushioning its Punjabi heartland. It was only in July 1948, when a United Nations commission reached the subcontinent, that Pakistan conceded that its regulars had been involved, but only since earlier that year.

The British generals and a unified British commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, who still headed the two armies, were able to manipulate and moderate the conflict to some degree. Essentially it was an infantry war of mortars, machine guns, and some artillery. India used light tanks to capture the crucial Zoji La Pass and open the road to Leh and used the Indian air force continuously, but Pakistan could not use its air force because of the issue of its legitimacy as a combatant in Kashmir.

When it became clear that neither side could advance beyond what they held by the autumn of 1948, the two sides accepted a cease-fire that became operational at midnight on 31 December 1948.

The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

The entire 2,520 miles (4,056-km) Sino-Indian border is considered disputed by Beijing, while New Delhi argued that a customary line defined it. Attempts by both sides to militarily establish the border as they perceived it have led to clashes since 1959. The ill-equipped and poorly led Indian army was ordered by the government to undertake a "forward policy" to establish posts behind the Chinese positions. The Chinese bided their time and launched an attack on Indian positions in the North-East Frontier Agency and in Ladakh on 22 October 1962.



Tiger of Mysore Mural. Wall mural depicting a battle between the British and Tipu Sultan (the “Tiger of Mysore”) at the Daria Daulat Bagh, Srirangapattana, 1784. After a series of bloody skirmishes, the British finally killed Tipu Sultan in 1799 and took control of South India. T. S. SATYAN.

An Indian brigade readying to occupy the Thag La ridge across the Namka Chu River was wiped out and the monastery town of Tawang captured. On 16–17 November, after a lull of some three weeks, the Chinese moved against the supposedly strong Indian defenses at Se La and Bomdi La to the east, using infiltration tactics reminiscent of the Korean War. The Indian division was routed, bringing the Chinese within sight of the plains of Assam. Further east, the Indian forces fought with great determination in the Walong area, but were also forced to retreat in some disorder. The Indian army performed better in Ladakh, where they conceded ground to the Chinese only after a tough fight, on some occasions to the last man. Indians used light tanks here, but did not commit the combat strength of the Indian air force during the war for fear of Chinese retaliation.

India sought military help from the United States and the United Kingdom, but the Chinese shrewdly declared a unilateral cease-fire on 20 November and in most cases withdrew to their original positions before any significant assistance arrived. Though fighting was limited, the war, particularly the collapse in the east, was a major

trauma that led India to embark on a major expansion and reequipment of its forces.

Indo-Pakistan War: The Second Round, August–September 1965

The second Indo-Pakistan war began with a clash in the southern extremity of their land border in the Rann of Kutch in February 1965, and through the summer there were heightened tension and clashes across the cease-fire line in Kashmir. But beginning in August, Pakistan initiated Operation Gibraltar, an invasion of the state by thousands of irregulars. Their aim was to converge on Srinagar and stage a “popular” uprising, which failed to take place; those guerrilla forces that did not retreat were captured or killed. The tough Indian reaction, which included the capture of the strategic Haji Pir Pass and several other Pakistani posts in Kashmir, compelled the Pakistanis to up the ante.

On 1 September, a Pakistani armored division moved toward Akhnur, to cut Indian forces in western Kashmir and threaten links with the valley. Pakistan hoped to

localize the conflict within the Jammu and Kashmir state, as had been the case in the 1947–1948 war. But the Indians had other ideas; to relieve pressure in the north, they launched on 6 September a three-pronged attack toward Lahore and also moved against Sialkot. The Indian plans were, however, poorly executed. The Indian air force was not told of the Lahore thrusts, and the Pakistani air force disrupted the central Indian spearhead, striking at Indian air bases and causing considerable damage.

Pakistan had audacious plans of its own, and after blocking the southern thrust against Lahore, they counterattacked with the aim of capturing a vital bridge on the Beas River linking Amritsar with the rest of India. But the badly led Pakistanis floundered at Khem Karan, and the attacking force was trapped and destroyed. By mid-September, Pakistan had expended most of its ammunition, and India's advantage of size would have come into play; strong Chinese pressure and poor advice from army headquarters, however, persuaded India to accept a cease-fire on 22 September. Both sides returned the territory they had captured through an agreement signed at Tashkent in early 1966.

Indo-Pakistan War: The Third Round, The Bangladesh War of 1971

The refusal of Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan to accept the victory of the Awami League, the principal party of East Pakistan, in the first general election of the country in early 1971 led to the latter declaring itself as an independent Bangladesh. Beginning on 25 March 1971, the Pakistani army sought to restore authority through a brutal campaign, killing hundreds of thousands of people. Some 10 million refugees fled across the border to India, along with many Bengali leaders. Led by Bengali officers of the Pakistani army, a Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) launched a guerrilla war against the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan/Bangladesh.

India began to assist this force and to prepare for a general war. As the battle lines were being drawn, India signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971; meanwhile, U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China, via Pakistan in July 1971, cemented the already existing U.S. tilt toward Islamabad. By the end of November, fighting along the border intensified, and Indian forces entered East Pakistan/Bangladesh at several points.

On 3 December, in a bid to ease Indian pressure, the Pakistani air force launched a series of air strikes against Indian airfields in the west, leading to open war. The Pakistani commander in Bangladesh planned to keep screening forces on the border and build up cities as strong points that could hold out for two months or so.

The initial Indian plan was to advance on four fronts across the riverine terrain, occupying positions short of the capital, Dhaka. But as the confused Pakistanis pulled back, Indian generals sensed opportunity, and two of the thrusts reached the gates of the city by 14 December; two days later, the 91,000-strong Pakistani army surrendered. The dispatch of a nuclear-powered carrier group to the region by U.S. president Richard M. Nixon was to little avail.

The Pakistani army had vague plans for an offensive in the west to help the beleaguered forces in the east. The plan to capture Poonch failed, but Pakistani forces captured Chamb again. But the anticipated big offensive, however, did not take place. Indian forces were put off-balance by contradictory orders on whether they should take the offensive or remain on the defensive. The limited offensives that did take place yielded insignificant gains because of poor leadership. Unlike the war of 1965, this conflict saw considerable naval action. The Indian navy conducted two daring raids on Karachi, bombed Chittagong harbor, and sank a Pakistani submarine, though it lost a frigate off Gujarat.

Under the Simla Agreement in 1972, prisoners of war were exchanged and captured territory returned, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where the cease-fire line was replaced by a Line of Control (LOC), through which both sides kept their respective gains: Pakistan in Chamb, and India in Ladakh.

The Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987–1990

India sent in a division-sized force in September 1987 as part of an accord with Sri Lanka. Their job was to enforce a peace with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist group that India had earlier backed. However, the effort soon involved India in combat operations against the LTTE, which expanded to a guerrilla war across the northern and eastern parts of the island and sucked in another three Indian divisions. A change in government led to a Sri Lankan request for an Indian withdrawal in March 1990, which took place after India had lost some 1,100 soldiers.

The Siachen War

The officials who determined the LOC in 1972 did not anticipate one problem when they terminated the line at a point NJ 9842: the agreement did not stipulate the location of the line for the remaining about 60 miles (100 kilometers) of glaciated terrain before it reached the border with China. In the early 1980s, Pakistan began to issue maps with the border running northeast to the Karakoram Pass, incorporating the Saltoro range and Siachen Glacier. India refused to accept this, sending

reconnaissance parties to occupy the Saltoro range on the western side of the glacier in April 1985, thereby preempting a similar Pakistani plan. Since that time, an autonomous conflict has raged there, primarily in the form of artillery duels, though a greater proportion of Indian losses have been caused by avalanches, altitude sickness, and frostbite, since the forces occupy altitudes up to 20,000 feet (over 6,000 m). An agreement between the two sides to withdraw from the area has been pending implementation since 1989.

The Kargil War of May–July 1999

This miniwar, the first face-to-face conflict between two nuclear-armed powers anywhere, began when India discovered a shallow Pakistani incursion on the LOC near Kargil in early May 1999. India's initial efforts to push back the well-entrenched Pakistanis failed. After a buildup, a counteroffensive was launched in June with the help of massed artillery and the Indian air force, but the main thrust consisted of near-suicidal enveloping infantry attacks on Pakistani strong points. India strictly confined the area of fighting to the locale of the incursion. The Pakistanis maintained that the intruders were mujahideen (Muslim guerrilla fighters) and even refused to reclaim the remains of 279 soldiers buried by the Indians, who in turn lost 524 dead. A U.S.-brokered agreement persuaded Pakistan to pull out, and India declared the war to have ended on 26 July.

Minor Wars and Near Wars, 1947–2002

The 100-hour war to liberate Hyderabad in September 1948 was termed a "police action," but it was conducted as an orthodox military operation codenamed "Polo." Surrounded by Indian territory, the state was run by the Muslim nizam, who declared independence in 1947, despite being told by the British that this was not an option. The state had a fairly large army, including armored car regiments and a large levy of paramilitary *razakars*, or Islamic volunteers. India used a roughly division-sized force as well as combat aircraft beginning 13 September 1948, and the state forces surrendered on 17 September.

After independence, remnants of the Portuguese empire—Goa, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli—were a sore point for Indian nationalists, who tried to use Gandhian tactics to liberate them, but failed. In 1961 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, despite pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States, gave the go-ahead for a military operation. Given the imbalance of forces, Operation Vijay was virtually uncontested. It began on 17 December and ended in a day, since the Portuguese put up only token resistance.

In 1986–1987, two major exercises nearly triggered conflicts with Pakistan and China, respectively. Exercise

Brasstacks, an Indian military exercise that concentrated a huge amount of armor in Rajasthan, led to precautionary Pakistani deployments in Punjab, setting off a train of events that nearly led to war, as well as a veiled Pakistani nuclear threat in January–February 1987. Exercise Chequerboard was designed to test Indian abilities to move forces from their bases in the plains to the Sino-Indian border in the east. Unsure of its purpose, the Chinese mobilized, and the two forces came face to face in the Tawang region, the site of the Indian disaster in 1962. Some deft diplomacy defused the crisis by May 1987.

In a show of force linked to a series of demands after the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on its Parliament, India mobilized its army for a punitive strike against Pakistan. By the time the Indian forces were ready, however, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf delivered a speech, on 12 January 2002, outlining steps to break Islamabad's terrorist links. A second alarm came in May 2001, after terrorist killings of relatives of Indian army personnel at Kalu Chak, near Jammu; it was defused by U.S. intervention after Pakistani leaders declared that they would end infiltration across the LOC "permanently."

Manoj Joshi

See also Armed Forces; Bangladesh; China, Relations with; Ethnic Conflict; Kargil Conflict, The; Military Interventions in South Asia; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Pakistan and India; Strategic Thought

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WAVELL, LORD (1883–1950), viceroy of India (June 1943–March 1947). Field Marshal Lord Archibald Wavell was commander-in-chief of British India's forces prior to his appointment as Britain's penultimate viceroy of India. Born at Colchester, the son of an army officer who first brought him to India as a child, Wavell was educated in Winchester College and also graduated from Sandhurst, returning to serve in India at

the age of twenty. At the start of World War I, he worked in the War Office, but was soon shipped over to fight in Ypres, Belgium, where he lost an eye.

Wavell was assigned to Field Marshal Allenby's staff in 1918, and two decades later to the command of British forces in the Middle East, but he failed to anticipate the swift power of General Erwin Rommel's tank corps, and was ordered in June 1941 to switch his command in North Africa with Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck's in India. Since Wavell's India command included the British 18th division, which in the following year surrendered Singapore to the Japanese, he was blamed by many for that loss as well. His battlefield wounds and losses appear to have predisposed Wavell for the rest of his life to long, lugubrious interludes of silence. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi distrusted him; others considered him too "wooden."

Prime Minister Winston Churchill chose Wavell to be India's viceroy in 1943, when Lord Linlithgow finally stepped down after six years at that post, precisely for all the reasons that India's Congress leaders feared, mistrusted, and disliked him. Churchill wanted Wavell to hold the line against any and all political demands from Congress for concessions of any kind as long as the war lasted. He felt certain, of course, that good soldier Wavell agreed. But Wavell, whose intellectual interests included poetry and the classics, wanted, in fact, to try his hand at diplomacy, which as viceroy he thought only appropriate. He had ideas about bringing Mahatma Gandhi and M. A. Jinnah together for a summit meeting at his vice-regal mansion in Simla, hoping to persuade them to work out their differences and agree to a new formula he toyed with for Hindus and Muslims sharing power. Student of Herodotus and Thucydides that he was, and knowing well from his own bitter experience the painful cost of all combat, Wavell hoped to bring peace to sorely troubled and conflicted India. But when Churchill heard of Wavell's idea, he vowed that only "over his dead body" should any approach to Gandhi be made during the war.

By the end of 1943, Bengal's dreadful famine had claimed more than one and a half million lives. Wavell tried his best to secure shipments of grain to relieve that starving province, knowing as he did that 6 million tons of wheat were floating nearby inside a fleet of British storage vessels, their holds full of food for "emergency" British military needs only, as Churchill's tight-fisted minister of war transport, Baron Leathers, coldly informed Wavell.

In the summer of 1945, after Germany surrendered, Wavell released all his Congress prisoners from jail and convened the Simla summit he had dreamed of holding

two years before. Gandhi, Jinnah, and Nehru all went up, as did lesser party leaders, but no agreement could be reached. Then Britain held its first postwar elections and Churchill lost his seat, as did most of his Tory colleagues. Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Labour Party moved into London's halls of power, determined to end Britain's exorbitant imperial expenditures as quickly as possible. Now, however, instead of appearing too eager to launch a plan of peace and political reform, Wavell proved too cautious and outdated for both Attlee and Sir Richard Cripps, Attlee's Chancellor of the Exchequer, who looked for a much younger and more genial viceroy to effect the swift transfer of power they had in mind. Their choice was dashing Dickie Mountbatten, the king's cousin.

Stanley Wolpert

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WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT

All armed forces need to replace their aging weapons systems after they complete their life cycles. For India, the MiG-21 aircraft and T-59 tanks, and its sole aircraft carrier, need replacement. The problem of bloc obsolescence is acute in India because its major weapons systems, mainly ex-Soviet in origin, were procured in the 1960s and now require urgent replacement. Current generation weapons systems, incorporating the latest available technology, are naturally costlier than the equipment being replaced. The paucity of resources had inhibited long-term planning by the Indian defense establishment, leading to a "bunching" of expensive requirements. The MiG-21 variants, for example, were imported from the Soviet Union in the 1960s at around U.S.\$500,000 apiece; the MiG-29 fighters were obtained in the mid-1980s for \$14 million; and the Su-30 fighter bombers currently being inducted cost about \$30 million each.



Missiles on Display at Annual Republic Day Parade. Many accuse recent Indian leaders of an obsession with nuclear weapons and missile technology, at the expense of defense research and the adequate production of aircraft and other weaponry. INDIA TODAY.

Difficult decisions consequently need to be made whether the successor weapons systems should be indigenously developed or procured from abroad, or whether aging equipment should be refurbished, if possible, to extend its service life. Inadequacy of funds inhibits ideal acquisition decisions. The refurbishment option is therefore becoming more viable for India as the costs of state-of-the-art equipment rise astronomically.

Issues Involved

Weapons acquisition decisions in India are not simple. Political factors restrict the choice of external suppliers. The initial unavailability of Western arms, due to political factors, led to India's dependence on the Soviet bloc; currently some 70 percent of the major weapons systems in India's armed forces are of Soviet origin. The end of the cold war, however, has created a buyer's market. Arms supplier nations are vying with each other to sell any type of armaments for purely commercial considerations. But problems remain, as occurred when the United States and other Western nations imposed sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in May 1998. Not only did they withdraw

from negotiations for supplying new equipment, but also from contractual obligations to supply spares and ancillaries and to undertake repairs to equipment already supplied. India had similar experiences in September 1965, during the second Indo-Pak War, when the United States stopped all supplies of military equipment to India.

Therefore, the achievement of a maximum degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency has long been a hallowed goal of India's defense establishment. In furtherance of this objective, a decision was taken by the Government of India in the mid-1990s to launch a ten-year self-reliance plan, designed to raise defense expenditure on acquisitions from indigenous sources. A three-pronged approach, involving indigenization of vital spare parts, upgrading of existing systems by life-extension programs, and indigenous design and development of high-technology weapons systems, was launched.

The Indian Bureaucratic Process

A major problem in the Indian situation is that weapons equipment must perform in very different

terrains over wide temperature variations, ranging from -22° Fahrenheit (-30° C) in the Himalayan heights to 122° Fahrenheit (50° C) in the Rajasthan Desert. A make or buy decision has then to be made after consulting Defence Research and Development to ascertain whether they can develop the weapons system within an acceptable time frame. Extensive debates take place to arrive at a pragmatic solution. If the decision taken is to produce the equipment indigenously, the defense laboratory is identified and tasked to develop a model, freeze the design, develop a prototype, and conduct user trials.

Should it be decided, however, to procure the equipment from abroad, suitable suppliers must be identified by a literature search; the military attachés serving abroad are also tasked to identify suitable suppliers. The actual selection of a particular weapons system involves two stages. A technical evaluation of the various systems is made by Services Headquarters. Later, the short-listed suppliers are requested to send in price quotations. The commercial terms for inducting the equipment are then placed before a Price Negotiation Committee, which enters into negotiations and ultimately signs the contract with the selected supplier. These contracts often incorporate clauses for the transfer of technology and the indigenous manufacture of the equipment.

The Department of Defence Production was set up in 1962, following the Sino-Indian border conflict. In 1965 the Department of Defence Supplies was created to forge closer links with the civil sector, in order to promote the indigenous production of imported defense stores and new stores required by units in the public sector. This department was merged into the Department of Defence Production in 1984 to form the Department of Defence Production and Supplies.

Defense production in the public sector is organized in forty ordnance factories and eight public sector undertakings, incorporated as limited companies under the law. In addition to the armed forces, these units cater to the needs of the paramilitary forces and the police. The ordnance factories are divided into five operating divisions: ammunition and explosives; weapons, vehicles, and equipment; materials and components; armored vehicles; and ordnance equipment. They also produce items for the civil market, like textiles, leather goods, and sporting arms and ammunition. An aggressive effort is being made to export their products. The eight defense public sector undertakings produce a wide variety of goods for the armed forces, including aircraft, electronic goods, heavy vehicles, naval vessels, missiles, and special alloys.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was created in 1958 by amalgamating the existing technical development establishments in the

services. The Department of Defence Research and Development, established in 1980 to enhance self-reliance in defense systems, now has forty-nine laboratories engaged in developing defense technologies and covering disciplines like aeronautics, armaments, electronics, combat vehicles, engineering systems, instrumentation, missiles, advanced computation and simulation, special materials, naval systems, life sciences, training, information systems, and agriculture. It employs over 5,000 scientists and around 25,000 other scientific, technical, and supporting personnel, making it the largest scientific establishment in India. Some of its notable achievements are development of the Lakshya pilotless target aircraft, the Nishant remotely piloted vehicle, airborne electronic warfare systems, the Agni-I land/rail mobile missile, and the PACE parallel processing super-computer. Its major projects under development include the Light Combat Aircraft and its Kaveri engine, the Trishul surface-to-air missile, different warheads for the Prithvi short-range missile, the BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile, electronic warfare systems for the three services, and various types of sonars and battlefield surveillance radars. Several of the technologies developed by DRDO have civil applications, such as agricultural practices in high-altitude areas, malaria control, high-altitude medicine, nuclear medicine, and radio-pharmaceuticals.

A symbiotic linkage exists between the Defence Production and Supply Department and the DRDO; consequently, a weakness in one affects the other. The DRDO is headed by the scientific adviser to the defense minister, and the combination of advisory and line functions offends a basic principle of public administration. Quality control is also carried out in-house by the user services, which again offends a basic administrative principle that external checks are necessary to ensure integrity in any activity. How effective the newly constituted Defence Procurement Organisation will be to address these weaknesses remains to be seen. But the lack of accountability in the processes of indigenous research and development and defense production is worth highlighting, as it incorporates a single developer (DRDO), a single buyer (the armed forces) and a single funder (the government). There is regrettably no credible legislative oversight available over these activities. Parliamentary committees like the Public Accounts Committee, which undertakes examination of past procurement cases, or the Estimates Committee, which examines budget estimates, and the Standing Committee on Defence are unable to exercise any effective checks over defense acquisitions.

Role of Private Industry

A change in official Indian attitudes toward the private sector has occurred with the steady liberalization of the

economy and the impact of globalization. Greater participation by Indian private industry is thus being sought, and such companies are now eligible to apply for licenses to manufacture a wide range of defense items and to seek foreign direct investment, to the extent of 26 percent of their business.

For indigenization of spares, a serious problem regarding all ex-Soviet equipment, the Department of Defence Production and Supplies has set up technical committees to identify the needs of the user services, take up indigenization activities, and ensure timely supply of defense equipment and stores. Sample rooms are also being maintained in metropolitan cities to familiarize the civil industry with the requirements of the armed forces. Civil industry clearly expects to play a larger role in future defense production.

Conclusions

India has been most fortunate, compared to other developing countries, in having internal stability and a democratic system of government that has taken deep roots; one of its manifestations is the firm control of the civilian leadership over the military apparatus. The civilian bureaucracy, however, is largely untutored in dealing with complex military issues, including defense acquisitions, research and development, and domestic production of weapons systems. The discovery of several major cases of corruption in the purchase of foreign weapons has led to great caution in the procurement process, which at times seems to be paralyzed. This has also resulted in the defense research and defense production establishments functioning below par and paying altogether too much attention to nuclear weapons and missile technology. Inadequate attention has been paid to the reform of the defense apparatus, despite a plethora of reports and sensible suggestions having been made to achieve this objective. Consequently the Indian weapons procurement and production processes are as yet performing less efficiently than they should.

P. R. Chari

See also **Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development; Ballistic Missile Defenses; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons, Testing and Development.**

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WELLESLEY, RICHARD COLLEY (1760–1842), governor-general of India (1798–1805). Richard Colley Wellesley, Earl Mornington and Marquess Wellesley, was born into the English "ascendancy" in Ireland. First elected to the British House of Commons in 1784, his introduction to Indian affairs came with his appointment in 1793 to the Board of Control, the link between the government and the East India Company. He became governor-general of the company's possessions in India in 1798. Before leaving for India he had been warned by the directors of the company not to get involved in wars, as they were too expensive and were arousing the Indian rulers against the British traders. Wellesley, an eighteenth-century pleasure-loving aristocrat, was contemptuous of the bourgeois merchants who controlled the company, but he was also the first of the great nineteenth-century imperialists who believed that territorial power in India would give Great Britain an enormous advantage over her European rivals. He was personally ambitious, in search of fame in India that would assure him a place in British politics. He had a degree of freedom from London to pursue his own policies in India that later governors-general did not have, since it took four months for an action in India to become known in England and another four or six months for approval or disapproval to reach Calcutta (Kolkata). Wellesley believed that the British position in India was threatened by an alliance between Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, with the French; by the Maratha chieftains who had established themselves in western and central India; and by the ruler of the state of Awadh, who realized that the British were becoming a threat to his power. Wellesley dealt with these hostile powers by defeating them in battle, then forcing them to give

territory to the British, making them pay for the cost of the wars, forbidding them to have any dealings with foreign powers, and permitting British officials, or “Residents,” to live in their territories to keep watch on what was happening. During these years of decisive action, Wellesley’s brother, Arthur, later the great Duke of Wellington, was in charge of many of the important military campaigns. While bitterly criticized by the directors of the East India Company, Wellesley was supported by the British government, and he later became foreign secretary and lord-lieutenant of Ireland, but in neither post did he enjoy the success he had had in India, where he could correctly claim that he had created an empire for the British.

Ainslie T. Embree

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WOMEN AND POLITICAL POWER Indian women became politically active in 1889 when some elite women started to attend meetings of the Indian National Congress. Inspired by the task of social rejuvenation, they established girls’ schools and raised consciousness against child marriage and *purdah* (the seclusion of women), while expressing solidarity with male nationalists. These social goals were expanded by the Women’s Indian Association (1918) and the All-India Women’s Conference (1927) to include a demand for women’s suffrage and the right to hold elected office. Idealists like Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddi introduced legal measures in the Madras Assembly to promote women’s education and health care. Congress president Sarojini Naidu helped to pass a resolution in 1930 supporting female suffrage and equal rights. When thousands of women joined the *satyagraha* campaigns against colonial rule, they gained the respect of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the entire nation. After India’s independence in 1947, several women held powerful administrative positions. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was appointed union minister for health; Sarojini Naidu was governor of Uttar Pradesh; Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, served as India’s ambassador to the Soviet Union; and Shareefah Hamid Ali was a member of the United Nations commission on women’s status.

Legislators and Administrators

In 1950 the Constitution of the Republic of India granted universal suffrage, allowing millions of women to vote without restrictions of any kind. While there have been many women cabinet ministers since 1947, women legislators have been seriously underrepresented in village councils (*panchayats*), state assemblies, and Parliament. In 1967 women constituted 5.9 percent of the Lok Sabha (Parliament’s lower house); thirty years later, they held only 7 percent of the seats. In 1974 the Committee on the Status of Indian Women declared this underrepresentation to be undemocratic and conducive to further gender inequality. However, no remedial action was taken until 1992–1993, when Constitutional Amendments 73 and 74 reserved one-third of *panchayat* and town council seats for women. In June 1996, Prime Minister Deve Gowda’s United Front government introduced a bill reserving 33 percent of the seats in Parliament to women. However, due to differences amongst his coalition allies, the bill was not passed. Meanwhile, a Women’s Reservation Bill was introduced in Parliament, supported by leftist and regional Dravidian parties. Polls showed that 75 percent of Indian voters supported affirmative action for women. Yet, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allied parties, especially the Shiv Sena, blocked its enactment; their anxiety over the prospect of a contingent of 180 women in Parliament was evident when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called the bill “revolutionary legislation.” Twenty-five women’s organizations staged mass demonstrations in favor of the Reservation Bill in May 2003, but it remained in limbo. In February 2005, the new government led by the Congress Party and its socialist allies announced that a revised bill would be introduced giving women 33 percent of the seats in central and state legislatures. Within this quota, the socialist parties support a further reservation for Dalit, backward caste, and minority women. Women’s associations have also focused on increasing female representation in village *panchayats* and other local bodies.

Despite women’s comparative lack of leverage within India’s state and central legislatures, they have been politically active through various parties, voluntary women’s associations, a broad spectrum of nongovernmental organizations, as well as administrative services. Top-ranking women administrators have effected many reforms at the local level, and the number of mid-level female officials has increased steadily, with women scoring highly in the competitive examinations for the administrative services. As more talented women enter the bureaucratic “steel frame” that still governs India, they may provide fresh solutions to the country’s ancient problems.



Women Supporters of the BJP Protest Rising Prices. Though most political parties in India now actively court the female vote, many feminist organizations accuse them of mere lip service, claiming they include women only in ways that do not fundamentally challenge their traditional roles within the family. INDIA TODAY.

Gender in Politics

In December 1974 the United Nations Committee for the Status of Women published their report *Towards Equality*, revealing that although professional Indian women had made strides, the vast majority of Indian women lagged behind men in nutrition, education, and employment, and that the female-male ratio in the population was alarmingly low. Census records show a continuing decline in the number of Indian women: in 1991 there were 945 females to every 1,000 males; in 2001 the ratio had dropped to 927 females to 1,000 males. This decline can be attributed to regressive manifestations of patriarchy in a modernizing society, and not simply to ancient traditions. New technologies, such as amniocentesis through which the sex of a fetus is revealed, have increased female feticide; and although sex-discriminatory abortion is illegal and expensive, it is practiced often by the educated and affluent in large cities. Unfortunately, *Towards Equality* coincided with Indira Gandhi's "National Emergency" (1975–1977), an era when all civil rights were curtailed in the name of national security. Women activists mobilized against the Emergency's harsh "voluntary" sterilization programs, as well as other

common offenses such as "custodial rape" by police officers, marital rape, and instances of "bride burning" by in-laws angered by insufficient dowries.

Although Indira Gandhi was admired for being a powerful woman leader, she gave scant attention to women's issues. After the 1970s, the new feminists charged politicians with ignoring women's rights in their preoccupation with economic development. They accused all political parties, including left-wing groups with progressive views, of subsuming gender under the umbrella of "minority" rights. While women's issues are often addressed through various bureaucracies, they rarely receive adequate attention from politicians. Especially after 1989, gender has become of secondary interest to a nation focused on religious and caste controversies. Yet, these issues are interrelated, since minority women are more likely to be exploited and sexually abused than women of the Hindu upper castes. In the 2002 Gujarat riots, thousands of Muslim women were raped; and the widespread sexual exploitation of working class and Dalit women has been documented by the All-India Democratic Women's Association. Despite the seriousness of these problems,

Indira Gandhi's model of ungendered politics has become a blueprint for her male and female successors.

Women Politicians

Elite women have been elected to the highest positions, often carving out these spaces as chaste wives, widows, mothers, daughters, and daughters-in-law. Female politicians of many parties embrace these domestic identities in the public arena for electoral advantages. Most offer to "cleanse" the body politic, like Rabri Devi (Rashtriya Janata Dal, wife of Lalu Prasad Yadav) of Bihar, whose speeches were laced with colorful, domestic imagery. Only a few, like chief minister Sheila Dixit of Delhi, have conveyed an active interest in women's issues while participating in India's patriarchal political game.

Thus, Indira Gandhi rose to power as Jawaharlal Nehru's daughter, and Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi achieved popularity as the assassinated prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's widow and the daughter-in-law (*babu*) of the Nehru-Gandhi clan. The BJP's moral arbiter, Sushma Swaraj, is the wife of Swaraj Kaushal, governor of Mizoram; Vasundhara Raje is a dutiful *babu* of former Jaipur rani Gayatri Devi. All-India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam chief minister Jayalalitha advertises herself as "Ammamma," the loyal widow of the charismatic star and political Tamil Nadu idol M. G. Ramachandran. Madhya Pradesh chief minister Uma Bharti is a self-styled ascetic (*sadhvi*) and "daughter" of Hindutva. The same phenomenon is visible in Pakistan, where Benazir Bhutto rose to power after her father's hanging; in Bangladesh where Sheikh Hasina Wajed entered politics after her husband, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was assassinated; and in Sri Lanka, where Chandrika Kumaratunga follows her parents' ministerial footsteps.

Scandals around corruption are common in India, and a few women politicians have been notorious for complicity in nefarious schemes; among these are Tamil Nadu's Jayalalitha and Uttar Pradesh's former chief minister Mayavati. Like their male counterparts, not all women politicians have proven trustworthy, due to the pervasive climate of opportunism in politics. Perhaps the solution to gender equality lies not in the public, corruptible centers of political power, but rather in the idealism of anonymous women administrators who honestly strive to serve India. One such leader is Sheila Rani Chankatt, who in her short stint in 1988 as the collector of Pudukottai, Tamil Nadu, made her district 100 percent literate by working with the National Literacy Mission; retrained sex workers as diamond cutters; and organized unskilled women workers for higher wages. Indian women have learned to play the political game skillfully, but gender

justice will be achieved only through the enduring work of honest women in political office.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Feminism and Indian Nationalists; Gandhi, Indira; Gender and Human Rights; Women's Education**

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WOMEN'S EDUCATION It is ironic that although Indians have deified knowledge as the goddess Sarasvatī, Indian women have been relegated to educational subservience throughout India's long history. Education means power, which in India remains largely in male hands. The earliest British educational surveys in Madras presidency in 1822 brought to official attention the relative absence of girls in formal schools. In 1881 the Hunter Educational Commission noted that a mere .2 percent of the women in British India were literate, although as in all early colonial surveys, investigators focused solely on school enrollment and failed to count the girls taught informally at home. On the eve of independence in 1947, literacy rates for both genders were abysmally low at 6 percent (female) and 22.6 percent (male). Since then, they have plodded forward slowly but surely, and there has been a noticeable improvement since the 1980s. Thus, in 1961 the literacy rates were 15.3 percent (female) and 40.4 percent (male); in 1981 they rose to 28.5 percent (female) and 53.5 percent



Literacy Classes for Rural Women in Rajasthan. A late-twentieth-century study by the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that fewer than 40 percent of women in India were literate. Although the results of the study varied greatly among Indian states, they suggest that there are possibly upwards of 200 million illiterate women in India today. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

(male); and in 2001 they had risen to 54.3 percent (female) and 76 percent (male). However, women's education still shuffles far behind that of men, with the disparities greater in a state like Bihar, where rates are 33.6 percent (female) and 60.3 percent (male), than in Kerala, where they are 87.9 percent (female) and 94.2 percent (male). The last century's goal for women was to educate better mothers and wives for the nation. However, some of the urban literate classes have begun to acknowledge that women are a national resource that India cannot squander away in this competitive era of globalization and computer technology.

Education in Early India

For much of Indian history, education involved the oral and written transmission of sacred texts, and the acquisition of survival and craft skills. Among some

adivasis (aboriginals) like the Birhor of Jharkhand, for example, there was greater gender parity in learning the skill of toolmaking. However, Sanskritization and Westernization as "civilizing" agents have today marginalized women's vestigial rights among many tribal communities, which have been integrated into the mainstream society and economy. Artifacts from the literate Indus Civilization (6000–1650 B.C.) include icons of goddesses and the female genitalia (*yōmi*), while some seals suggest that there may have been priestesses in an arboreal religion. The inhabitants clearly revered the female in nature, a vision of divinity that persists across India today. However, male power was also venerated, and no evidence exists of a matrilineal society. The absence of gendered spaces in the houses and public buildings do indicate that women had freedom of movement, but we have no information yet as to how and where education took place.

The arrival of patriarchal Aryan groups in the early second millennium B.C. profoundly shaped Indian notions of gender equity. Their most revered skill was the oral transmission of the Vedas (Books of knowledge) to propitiate the gods. Known as *śruti* (revelations that are heard), this form of oral learning became central to the acquisition of knowledge, although these Sanskrit hymns were later also written in the Devanāgarī script. At first, some women initiates, who wore the sacred thread of the twice-born upper castes, recited the Vedas. The Rig Veda (1500–100 B.C.) attests to some *brahmvādinis* (women bard-poets) like Lōpamudra and Ghōsha. Even as late as 800 B.C., there were spirited female savants like Gārgi and Maitreyi in the Brahadaranyka Upanishad, and Sāvitrī in the Mahābhārata.

From this point, due to geopolitical reasons leading to patriarchal ascendancy, the Vedas became the exclusive preserve of male Brahman caste priests, and women's learning became subsidiary to that of men. However, women were permitted to know the "remembered" secondary scriptures (*smṛiti*), including the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa epics, and later texts like the Dharma Shāstras (law books) and Purāṇas (Ancient tales), the latter containing myths about Hindu deities. Boys were taught in open air classes around a tree, or on the open verandas (*pyāls*) of buildings. Meanwhile, higher caste girls often sat away from the public eye, in rooms adjacent to the *pyāls*, where they studied the *smṛiti* and nonreligious subjects like arithmetic.

Thus, around 525 B.C., we hear of learned women such as Queen Mahāgotāmi, the Buddha's foster mother, who struggled to establish the first order of nuns. Learned female ascetics like Mitta and Patacāra composed the Thērigātha, a revered hymnal section of the Buddhist Pali canon. Jainism's followers also revere an early female *tirthankara* (ford crosser) or teacher, and Jainism

encouraged women ascetics. However, over time, misogyny crept into texts, which scorned female sexuality and downgraded women's intellect. South Indian Dravidian society appears to have respected accomplished women during the Tamil Sangam era (200 B.C.–A.D. 500). Sangam poetry was composed by some 470 poets, including 154 women sages like Auvaīyār. Moreover, despite male dominance, women's power is seen in three of the five Tamil epics, which revolve around learned women.

By the first century A.D., as society absorbed new immigrants across racial lines, Brahmans reinforced gender and caste hierarchies in texts like the *Mānava Dharmashāstras* (Laws of Manu). This work praised women's domestic duties and denounced their sexual proclivities. Artisan groups transmitted craft skills, and both working and elite castes transmitted their oral traditions across generations. However, the lowest castes were excluded from literacy, while women's education became largely informal and haphazard. After the sixth century, in the medieval climate of invasions, wars, and feudalism, elite women retreated further into the domestic arena, instructed informally at home until the nineteenth century.

Medieval Women's Education

Despite such patriarchal norms and prejudice, there were still scores of women poet-saints and writers in the medieval centuries. Thus, Āndāl, Kāraikkal Ammaiyār, Akkamahādevī, Gangāsati, Lallā, and Mīra have left a legacy of devotional (*bhakti*) compositions in the regional languages. Moreover, one class of educated South Indian women attended schools in public with boys. They were the lower caste temple dancers (*dēvadāsīs*) who were rarely Brahman women. *Dēvadāsīs* were ritually married to the shrine's deity in South India during the first millennium A.D., and they were the repositories of Indian traditions of dance and music. By the seventeenth century, however, many became court dancers and courtesans outside the norms of female domesticity. Governor Munro's survey of schools in South India in 1822 revealed that, except for the *dēvadāsīs*, no other girls studied on the *pyals* in the company of boys.

The prophet Muhammad's wife and daughter were literate and powerful, but despite this and the Islamic belief in salvation through the written Qur'an, Muslim women's educational lot in India was not substantially different. Islam was introduced into the subcontinent by patriarchal groups who kept their women in domestic seclusion within female quarters (*zenānā*). If women ventured outside, they wore a veil (*pardab*). Those women who defied the *pardab* were prevented from rising to power. Thus, Sultana Raziya (thirteenth century A.D.), the sole Muslim queen in India, was deposed quickly by men. Aristocratic women were often instructed by female teachers (*ustād*

bis) in the *zenānā*, and some have left records, like the Mughal princess Gulbadan (sixteenth century), who wrote an elegant royal biography in Persian. Like Hindu *dēvadāsīs*, Muslim courtesans (*tawāif*) were taught to read and write. The *tawāif* Mahlaqa Bai Chanda (eighteenth century) wrote lyrical Urdu songs. Ordinary Muslim boys and girls studied the Qur'an at mosque schools (*madrassas*), but often this consisted of rote chanting of the sacred verses. In this era, conservative Muslim and Hindu patriarchs often feared that a literate girl would write love letters and become promiscuous.

In North India, Muslim and Hindu women wore the restrictive *pardab*. In South India, elite Muslim women wore *pardab*, while Hindu women lived in domestic seclusion but enjoyed greater freedom of movement. As an important deterrent to female attendance in formal schools, *pardab* became the subject of discussion among elite women reformers in the twentieth century. The other major obstacle to girls' education was the custom of early marriage among Hindus and Muslims. Muslim women reformers were divided on *pardab* and the extent to which it should be practiced. Shareefa Hamid Ali and Dr. Rahamatunnissa Begum felt that it injured girls' health and prevented their attendance in schools. Nazar Sajjad Hyder initially argued that parents would more readily send their veiled daughters to school, but she later opposed *pardab*. In 1914 the Begum of Bhopal convened a Muslim Women's Educational Conference in Allahabad, and philanthropists began schools for girls, raising the female literacy rate.

Colonial Era

European conquest led to the political decline of Indian states, and indigenous schools decayed. Catholic missionaries began schools to teach Christianity in Goa and elsewhere from the sixteenth century, while Protestant evangelicals founded schools in southern, eastern, and western India beginning in the eighteenth century, notable for their attempt to bring girls to school without caste distinctions. The early colonial state's interest in education was cursory, but it supported missionary endeavors, and British officials gauged educational competence through literacy and school enrollment. Henceforth, oral and informal learning became less significant. When the British Parliament gave the East India Company a large grant in 1813 to promote education in India, evangelicals arrived in droves to proselytize in schools. Women missionaries assiduously began elementary classes for girls, who learned English through the Bible and converted to Christianity. Indian rulers like the Rānis Lakshmibai and Parvatibai of Travancore gave financial support to missionaries for their educational work. In 1849 the government subsidized a Calcutta (Kolkata)

girls' school, founded by J. E. D. Bethune, Ram Gopal Ghosh, and Jaikissen Mookherjee. In 1854 Charles Wood's Despatch on Education launched a new policy of granting aid to private schools. Promptly, Gopal Kistnah Pillai asked for a grant for his girls' school in Madras (Chennai). However, the first major breakthrough for girls' secular and high school education occurred in 1877. Mary Carpenter, the eminent educator, advised the government to establish secular teacher training centers in the presidency capitals of Calcutta, Bombay (Mumbai), and Madras. She used the guidelines of a similar school started in Madras by the Maharaja of Vijayanagaram.

Child marriages were a major impediment to girls' education. Among the higher Hindu castes, girls were married before puberty, until which time they might attend municipal or mission schools. After their nuptials, at the age of eleven or twelve, girls no longer attended public classes; if lucky, they were taught at home. Until the 1930 Sarda Act raised the age of marriage for girls to fourteen years, female literacy did not substantially improve. Christian converts educated their daughters, however, so their literacy rates were higher. This goaded Hindu reformers, whose daughters had not studied at mission schools, and they sent their daughters to schools with a secular curriculum. In 1904 Annie Besant wrote *The Education of Indian Girls*, which laid the curricular foundation for girls' schools. Reform organizations like the Prārthanā Samāj, Ārya Samāj, Rāmākrishnā Society, and the Theosophical Society started schools that taught Indian culture as well as Western subjects like geography and hygiene.

Indian nationalists worked to legalize compulsory education and to increase government funding for schools. The paucity of women teachers and doctors led to the establishment of teachers' training institutes and colleges such as the Lady Hardinge Medical College for Women in Delhi in 1916 and Queen Mary's College in Madras in 1914. Besant also worked to start a Women's University at Adyar in 1916, while women reformers started occupational training institutions for working-class women.

Independence Era

Since 1947 the Indian government has tried to provide incentives for girls' school attendance through programs for midday meals, free books, and uniforms. This welfare thrust raised primary enrollment between 1951 and 1981. In 1986 the National Policy on Education decided to restructure education in tune with the social framework of each state, and with larger national goals. It emphasized that education was necessary for democracy, and central to the improvement of women's condition. The new policy aimed at social change through revised texts, curricula, increased funding for schools, expansion

in the numbers of schools, and policy improvements. Emphasis was placed on expanding girls' occupational centers and primary education; secondary and higher education; and rural and urban institutions. The report tried to connect problems like low school attendance with poverty, and the dependence on girls for housework and sibling day care. The National Literacy Mission also worked through female tutors in villages. Although the minimum marriage age is now eighteen for girls, many continue to be married much earlier. Therefore, at the secondary level, female dropout rates are high.

Indian women's education has, however, certainly improved since independence. Many urban women are highly educated in the sciences, medicine, computer technology, and the social sciences. India now has missions of female doctors, nurses, teachers, and social workers. Yet, in most important fields, girl students are outnumbered, and women professionals do not often receive equal pay, even though Indian women scientists, for example, are among the world's most talented. Such gender disparities in education will continue until girls are valued as highly as boys; until patriarchy and sexual predation are reduced; and until female feticide and infanticide, reflected in the sex disproportion of India's population, disappear.

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See also **Feminism and Indian Nationalists;**
Subbalakshmi Ammal, R. S.; **Theosophical Society;**
Women's Indian Association

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WOMEN'S INDIAN ASSOCIATION On 8 May 1917 in Adyār, Madras, a multiethnic group of women established the Women's Indian Association (WIA), India's first major feminist organization, which remains in operation today. The WIA's success can be attributed to its secular agenda for women of all sects, classes, and castes, and to its initial effective use of the organizational framework of the Theosophical Society, whose president, Annie Besant, was chosen as the first WIA president. The honorary secretaries were Margaret Cousins, a teacher and Irish suffragist; Dorothy Jinarajadasa, the Irish wife of a Sri Lankan Theosophist; Ammu Swaminathan and Malathi Patwardhan. Borrowing the idea of a cross-cultural association from the Tamil Māthar Sangam (Tamil Women's Organization) formed in 1906 by Indian and European women, Margaret Cousins sounded out her proposal to a gathering of Theosophists at Adyār after her arrival in 1915. The founders included S. Ambujammal, Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddi, Mangalammal Sadasivier, Saralabai Naik, Herabai Tata, Dr. Poonen Lukhose, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya, Begam Hasrat Mohani, and Dhanavanti Rama Rao. Describing themselves as the "daughters of India," its mothers and wives, their objectives were to guide the nation; serve the poor; promote women's education and compulsory universal primary education; abolish child marriage; raise the age of sexual consent to sixteen for women; win female suffrage; and attain the female right to elected office. The WIA was one of the first organizations to boldly connect Indian women's social and sexual subjugation with patriarchy, poverty, and political disenfranchisement.

Reform and Early Women's Groups

A primary goal of most women's *samājs* (associations) in India has been to improve women's educational conditions and to remove customs like early marriage,

enforced widowhood among Hindus, and the Muslim *pardab* (veil), all of which were mental and physical impediments to women's health. One of the earliest groups was the Ārya Mahila Samāj (Ārya Women's Association), founded by Pandita Ramabai (1858–1922) in 1881. Early Hindu reform organizations, like the Brahmo Samaj, Prārthana Samāj, and the Ārya Samāj promoted women's education, while condemning early marriage and enforced widowhood. In 1896 Justice M. G. Ranade (1842–1901) and his wife Ramabai (1862–1924) started the Ladies Social Conference, a secular forum for women's issues, within the Indian National Congress.

Effective changes in the status of women would occur only when educated women began their own associations. Sectarian groups included Stri Zarothoshti Mandal (Parsi Women's Organization) in 1900 in Bombay; the Young Women's Christian Association; and the Anjuman-e-Khawatin-e-Islam (Association for Muslim Women) in 1915, associated with the All-India Muslim Women's Conference. A regional women's group was the Andhra Mahila Sabha (Andhra Women's Club; 1910), founded by Virēsalingam Pantulu (1848–1919), a male reformer who worked to educate girls and to promote widow remarriage.

However, a truly national feminist organization was possible only with the emergence of a sizable number of educated women. Between 1902 and 1912, the girls' school enrollment doubled in Madras presidency, especially after reformers started schools that taught Indian culture. The Tamil Māthar Sangam (Tamil Women's Organization) met intermittently in Madras (Chennai) city (1906) and in Kanchipuram (1907, 1914). In 1908 its Tamil, Malayali, Telegu, Marathi, and English-speaking members attended an all-India Ladies' Congress (*parishad*) in Madras with a strong feminist agenda, according to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, later president of the All-India Women's Conference (1927), India's third feminist organization. The WIA drew its initial membership from the Ladies' Congress, and its founders were doubtless aware of the Bharata Stree Mahāmandal (Great Society of Indian Women), which Sarladevi Chaudrani, a niece of Rabindranath Tagore, founded in Allahabad in 1910. However, the Mahāmandal's goals remained unfulfilled.

Women's Suffrage

On 18 December 1917, the WIA sent a delegation led by Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) to Edwin Montagu, secretary of state for India. Representing themselves as Indian women who had awakened to their civic responsibilities, they requested female suffrage on a par with men in the

expanded provincial legislatures as a part of the forthcoming Government of India Act of 1919. Naidu had earlier appealed for support from the Indian National Congress. She sought to calm male fears that women would try to usurp authority, emphasizing that their maternal instincts would inspire the nation's children. The imperial Southborough Franchise Commission in London did not sanction their request, although they won the support of Sir C. Sankaran Nair. Sarojini Naidu, Annie Besant, and Herabai Tata then appealed their case in London, and the provincial legislatures were later authorized to decide individually. Thus, with the help of some male nationalists on the councils, a few women were enfranchised, first in Madras in 1920, and in Bombay in 1921.

In 1926 the WIA sent five delegates to the Congress of International Women Suffrage Alliance in Paris. It encouraged its members to stand for election as magistrates and supported Muthulakshmi Reddi in 1928. She was elected to the Madras Legislative Council and was chosen as its deputy president. As India's first woman legislator, Reddi introduced legislation to improve women's education, raise the age of marriage to fourteen for girls through the Sarda Act of 1930, aid programs for women's health, and end the controversial system of *dēvadāsi* (slaves to the god) dedication to temples in 1929.

The second struggle to expand female suffrage began in 1930 in preparation for the Government of India Act of 1935. Unlike the new feminist organization, National Organization of Women of India (1925), the WIA followed the National Congress stand against separate electorates for minorities and women. In the next decades, WIA members spoke passionately about their agendas, and although they disagreed with individual Congress members, they joined in the struggle for India's independence led by Mahatma Gandhi.

Social Service

By the end of 1918, the WIA had thirty-three self-governing local branches, dedicated to the service of a sisterhood of women of all creeds, castes, and classes. Although its leaders aspired to attract women of all castes, it remained an elite organization for years; however, it finally became a significant national organization for women. In 1920 Margaret Cousins began to edit a quarterly newsletter, *Stri Dharma* (Women's duty), first in English, but later with Tamil and Hindi sections. The journal developed into a monthly after a few years. *Stri Dharma* publicized the WIA and its agenda against child marriages and the Muslim *pardab*. Its membership increased noticeably; by 1924 there were 51 branches and 2,500 members across India, and by 1926, it was the largest Indian women's organization, with over 4,000 members and 80 branches.

The WIA held free elementary classes, as well as classes on hygiene, child welfare, and vocational skills. Its ideals of service facilitated the establishment of the Avvai Home for girls, which Dr. Reddi started in 1930, and its members also worked with the vocational programs in Madras Seva Sadan. The WIA provided the framework for medical help to the poor by Drs. Reddi, Lukhose, and Rahamatunissa Begam. Since independence, the WIA has continued to serve India's women through numerous regional branches.

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See also **Feminism and Indian Nationalists; Theosophical Society**

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WORLD BANK (WB), RELATIONS WITH

India was one of the forty-four original signatories to the agreements reached at Bretton Woods that established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was also one of the founding members of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1956 and the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960. India later became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in January 1994.

IBRD lending to India commenced in 1949 with a loan to the Indian railways; the first investment by the IFC in India took place in 1959, and by IDA in 1961

(a highway construction project). The World Bank has been India's largest source of external capital and, in turn, India has been the largest borrower from the World Bank, with loans accounting for 11.4 percent of total lending by June 2003. During this period, the World Bank had lent India a total of \$60 billion in 441 projects, almost equally divided between the IBRD and the IDA, which constituted nearly 8 percent of IBRD lending and 20.7 percent of IDA lending. India's share of IFC loans has been somewhat less: \$2.7 billion for 162 enterprises; 4.6 percent of total lending, including syndications.

During the 1950s, the IBRD was India's sole source of World Bank borrowings. By the end of the decade, India's mounting debt problems became an important factor in the launch of the IDA, the soft loan affiliate of the World Bank (WB) group. As India increasingly turned to a state-dominated economic model, the WB was skeptical, but mindful of the hypersensitivity of Indian policy makers, it refrained from overt criticism. These reservations notwithstanding, the imperatives of the cold war and India's pivotal position as a democratic role model for newly independent countries, distinct from Communist China, as well as the high quality of India's interlocutors ensured continuous support by the industrialized countries.

By the mid-1960s, India's economic problems were compounded by back-to-back failures of the monsoons. With the specter of famine looming, the WB mounted an ambitious mission in 1966 (in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development [U.S. AID] and the IMF) to persuade India to undertake sweeping policy reforms. This attempt, popularly known as the "Bell mission," recommended both internal and external liberalization, currency devaluation, and a focus on agriculture. Except for agriculture (which was instigated by U.S. AID and even more by some Indians themselves), this highly visible attempt at policy reform by the WB proved to be a singular failure. The episode left a deep mark on both Indian policy makers and the WB. While the latter became much more deferential to India's sensibilities in the next two decades, Indian policy makers also became much more cautious in undertaking ambitious policy reforms.

By the end of the 1960s, the United States, until then India's largest source of external resources, sharply cut its bilateral aid program. Since then, the WB emerged as the most important source of official long-term finance. During the 1960s and 1970s, the IDA accounted for nearly three-fourths of all WB lending to India and, in turn, India was by far the largest recipient of IDA funds, accounting for more than two-fifths of all its lending. The subsequent decade, with China joining the WB in 1980 and accordingly entering its own claims to limited IDA resources, the worsening economic fortunes of

Africa, and India's better performance, saw a sharp decline in India's share in IDA. Instead, its share of IBRD lending grew sharply in the 1980s, buoyed by its improving creditworthiness and the Indian government's waning inhibitions with regard to nonconcessional borrowing. Prior to the launch of the economic liberalization program in 1991, the WB accounted for nearly a third of India's long-term debt and 60 percent of official debt.

The share of WB debt in India's total external debt has been around a quarter since 1980. Non-concessional IBRD debt peaked at about 37 percent of total WB debt in 1990, in part due to faster repayment schedules of IBRD debt and a postliberalization drop in IBRD lending. The latter was the result of several factors: sanctions imposed after India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, which curbed new IBRD loans; the slow pace of policy reforms that reduced the supply of new loans in certain sectors; and mounting transaction costs of IBRD lending that reduced the demand for new loans in other sectors.

Despite India's salience in the WB's loan portfolio and the WB's importance in India's external borrowings, these financial flows were, in the aggregate, modest for India's economy, comprising less than 1 percent of gross national product and seldom more than a couple of dollars per capita. However, their relative importance has been greater in certain sectors and time periods. In particular, the WB has been one of India's most reliable sources of external financing when the country suffered balance of payments problems, such as in the 1960s, after the first and second oil shocks, and in 1990–1991.

Lending Portfolio

In its early decades, WB lending to India was largely in support of India's five-year plans that concentrated on infrastructure (railways, dams) and development finance companies. The heyday of WB lending to India was during the 1970s and 1980s. More than three-fourths of lending in this period was in energy, agriculture and rural development, and industry. In the 1970s, India's emphasis on agriculture and poverty rhetoric dovetailed well with the WB's own lending priorities. India's large size and its need for external capital also meshed well with the WB's emphasis on expanding lending volumes. With many of the WB's other poor borrowers plagued by political instability and weak administrative capacity, India offered a convenient sponge to absorb WB resources and meet its annual lending targets.

The early 1980s were pivotal years for the WB. Its greater emphasis on liberal economic policies, however, did not lead to any significant changes in its stance

toward India. Even though, as the decade progressed, India's dirigiste economic policies were increasingly at odds with those espoused by the WB, India's standing as a valued customer of the IBRD grew. The outset of the debt crisis meant there were few large creditworthy borrowers in the IBRD's portfolio. Indeed, the WB even increased its overall lending volume for the industrial sector, with some of its largest loans to public sector manufacturing enterprises (e.g., \$545 million in two loans to Indian Petrochemicals Limited), science and technology development, and sectoral and subsectoral industrial restructuring. The WB also continued to pour money into sectors with unsound policies and corrupt institutions, especially irrigation and power.

Near the end of the decade, India's bargaining position weakened as the strains in India's political and economic fabric became more pronounced. The absence of alternative sources to service India's external debt, coupled with the emergence of Eastern Europe as a region deserving of the WB's resources, altered the relationship. The WB pressed India to take more loans in social sectors, especially education and health, as well as to implement policy reforms, but was rebuffed.

The lending portfolio changed sharply after the 1991 macroeconomic crisis. In the immediate aftermath, India became one of the last important WB borrowers to partake of structural adjustment lending, which supported policy reforms in finance, taxation, and the investment and trade regime. With the abatement of the crisis, lending shifted away from public enterprises in electricity and irrigation to a focus on health and education. By the late 1980s, the WB had begun to warn India that its level of IDA lending would depend on its receptivity to loans in the social sectors. In the second half of the 1980s, the social sectors accounted for barely 7 percent of total WB lending. A decade later, between 1996 and 2000, they accounted for nearly a third of all lending. Communicable diseases (particularly HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) emerged as a new focus of lending.

A second shift occurred in sharply reduced lending for "hard" infrastructure projects. In part, this was due to the decidedly lackluster outcomes in infrastructure sectors where the WB long had involvement, such as irrigation, railways, and power. The precipitating factor was the protracted controversy surrounding the WB's support of the massive Narmada irrigation project, which involved the construction of dams and irrigation canals and concomitant large-scale resettlement of displaced people. The project became a cause célèbre for international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), thus forcing the WB to have its first ever external review of an ongoing project. The resulting report was strongly critical of the project's implications for displaced populations and the

environment. The WB ceased disbursements in 1993, and eventually the Indian government simply canceled the loan in 1995. An important consequence was that the WB became much more risk averse with regard to infrastructure projects. Although infrastructure-related lending revived by the end of the 1990s (especially for roads), its attempts to implement innumerable safeguards multiplied transaction costs, dampening demand for such loans.

Another change occurred in the level of lending, with a greater focus on subnational lending through state-level adjustment loans. These loans sought to improve the fiscal health of states, by improving expenditure priorities and taxation. This shift was facilitated in part by the decision of the central government to give the states a greater share in external loans, unlike the past, when the money went into a central pool, and concerned states received only a marginal increase in additional resources. The WB's increasing poverty focus and its recognition that the locus of poverty-related policies and implementation was situated at the state level were additional factors.

The World Bank's Impact on India

As with any borrower, it is not easy to get a simple bottom line on the WB's effects on India. At the most fundamental level, it has contributed to augmenting India's foreign exchange resources and level of investment. Although most attention is placed on the transfer of resources (especially long-term concessional resources), these are just one element of a multifaceted relationship. Much of the WB's lending to India has been for investment projects, and it was through these projects that it played an active technical assistance role, improving the quality of engineering and training, propagating new technical doctrines (such as the Training and Visit system in agricultural extension), developing strategies to reduce the incidence of corruption, setting up organizational competencies, and so on. The WB nurtured and supported organizations that have emerged as some of India's strongest, be it in finance (Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India) or power (National Thermal Power Corporation, or NTPC). In other cases, as with the Indian railways, despite an extensive long-term commitment that spanned over four decades and loans totaling \$1.5 billion (the most made by the WB to a single entity), the WB's influence on policies was limited, and it finally gave up. Similarly, although its lending to NTPC and Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative built excellent organizational capabilities in the power and fertilizer sectors respectively, these were undermined by the inability to change the policy environment. While its protracted involvement in agriculture did produce some good results (such as in agriculture extension and the dairy sector), the

substantial lending for irrigation and agricultural credit through National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development produced few results.

For most of its history, the WB's project performance in India outperformed its global portfolio. However, and somewhat paradoxically, in recent years, even as India's growth rate accelerated, the performance of the WB's India portfolio fell below its global average. The mediocre project performance was particularly apparent in sectors like water supply, power, and environment, while social sectors and industry did better. There has also been a substantial opportunity cost of nonlending (especially in infrastructure), the result of increasing transaction costs in borrowing from the WB as a result of the "Christmas tree"-like profusion of lending criteria over the 1990s.

There are four areas in which the WB made important but less heralded contributions. First, externally it played an important role as an advocate for India and a coordinator of aid flows. It organized, and has since coordinated, the Aid India Consortium since 1958, the sole institutional mechanism coordinating official flows to India. The Aid India Consortium was renamed the India Development Forum in 1993, signaling that official flows had become less important for India, and thus the importance of this institution waned. The WB played a critical diplomatic role in settling a major dispute between India and Pakistan regarding the sharing of the waters of the Indus River, and the resulting Indus Water Treaty of 1960 has stood the test of time despite the fractious relationship between the two countries. In recent years, the WB (along with the Asian Development Bank) has attempted to build epistemic communities of policy makers in South Asia through conferences and workshops, which might also help build bridges across the region.

Second, the WB also frequently played an important coordinating role within India, both among central government agencies as well as between central government agencies and state governments. The lack of strong central coordinating mechanisms in India and the inevitable interagency rivalries of bureaucracies have meant that as an outsider with seemingly deep pockets, the WB has often been a constructive informal peacemaker, while advancing its own interests. Third, the WB has also acted as an "agency of restraint." The covenants and conditionalities in many of its loans—at times at the urging of its Indian counterparts—often helped limit welfare-reducing political discretion in areas such as procurement to tariffs and expenditure priorities. Of course, in some cases, these restraints also served to advance the interests of the institution's major shareholders.

Finally, the WB also provided India with a range of public goods, both directly from its own substantial

research, as well as indirectly for agricultural research through the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research system. Moreover, it played a socialization role as an ideas intermediary, helping push advances in knowledge from the mundane (bidding procedures) to the ideological, reflecting its intrinsic ethos and governance. It has been an important contributor to applied economics research in India, although for many years the government of India did not allow its reports to be publicly circulated. By not investing more in vernacular languages, the WB severely circumscribed the dissemination (and influence) of its intellectual products. On the other hand, an important mechanism that enhanced the diffusion of the WB's ideas was the number of Indian economic reformers who worked in the WB and then returned home. In fact, there have always been steady numbers of Indian civil servants working with or in the WB for short to medium periods, who collectively serve as a mechanism of influence.

Evaluating the Relationship

While many in India (especially on the left) have always been suspicious about the WB and its ideological baggage, the overall relationship between the WB and India has been characterized by symmetry and equality (despite some notable exceptions). The relationship was particularly symbiotic in the first quarter century. As the first history of the WB put it in 1971, "No country has been studied more by the World Bank than India, and it is no exaggeration to say that India has influenced the Bank as much as the Bank has influenced India." The reality has been that the WB has treated India more favorably than most other borrowers. The perceived sophistication of Indian policy makers, their ability to articulate programs (as distinct from their ability or willingness to implement them), and the caution that inevitably comes in dealing with a large country all played a role. India's democracy, the exigencies of the cold war, extreme poverty, and eloquent political and economic interlocutors long made India the best argument for foreign aid for many years. On the flip side, criticisms of India would have weakened the general case for development aid. India's assigned role as an aid showcase added to the constraints the WB felt in pressing India for policy change.

The WB's limited leverage were also due to the reality that its resources were quite modest relative to the size of Indian economy, whether that money was seen in per capita terms or as a percent of both total government expenditures and gross domestic investment. This insignificance was due to both demand and supply. On the demand side, India's economic policies always relied primarily on domestic resources. The rare episodes when this was not the case (such as the mid-1960s and 1990–1991)

simply reaffirmed these policies subsequently. As for the supply side, the IBRD side of WB lending was limited by concerns over India's creditworthiness. At the same time, IDA lending was both constrained by the IDA's own limited resources and by politically imposed limits on India's share of those same resources.

However, even within the confines of these limited resources, there were reasons internal to the WB that may have limited the institution's leverage. In particular, until well into the 1980s, the WB's anxiousness to commit the annual tranches of IDA availabilities by the end of each fiscal year frequently limited its leverage on Indian policy. A view that the foreign exchange gap and aid shortages contributed to India's growth also played into this. When it came to balancing lending against policy insistence the WB acted as if foreign exchange was critical and therefore untouchable. During the 1980s, while the WB shifted its emphasis to stress policy reforms and greater economic liberalization, it continued to lend to poorly governed public sector institutions in India and was muted in its criticism of India's closed economy. The WB itself admitted that throughout the 1980s its management did not address "India's disappointing policy record for fear of jeopardizing a strong lending relationship with a sensitive client." Internally, however, the WB's senior management had been concerned about India's policies and launched a series of collaborative reports with the Indian government on trade and industrial reform. These reports laid the groundwork for India's later policy reform agenda and were an important factor in the relatively smooth implementation of trade and industrial reforms in the early 1990s.

The WB's relationship with India has also been affected by India's federal system. As with other international organizations, its dealings were principally with the central government. Of course many of its projects were at the state level. However, selection of state projects was done largely on project and sector grounds, rather than on the basis of the overall policy stance of the state itself. WB loans were part of overall plan resources; hence a state with a WB project received only a small fraction of additional resources. And the central government's preoccupations—getting more foreign exchange—mattered little to state governments. Cash-strapped states therefore did not put a priority on their contributions of counterpart resources to WB projects, leading to projects delays and poor disbursement rates.

Changes in the 1990s led the WB to focus on state-level adjustment loans. This led to a paradox: even as the WB's overall resources became much less important for India, they became much more important for cash-strapped states, leading to an increase in the WB's

influence. However, by 2004, outcomes in the three states where the WB focused its efforts—Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh—were modest. Indeed, the WB's showcase, the Chandrababu Naidu-led government in Andhra Pradesh, performed poorly on the very fiscal criteria that had been the *raison d'être* of these loans, and its electoral defeat in 2004 dealt a blow to the WB's reform strategies.

Ultimately, the sheer size and complexity of India and its democratic polity means that there are limits to what any outside actor can do—for better or for worse. Both its critics and the WB itself give the institution too much importance. The dilemma faced by the WB is exemplified by its involvement with the notorious Narmada project or its cessation of lending to the Indian railways, or nonlending to states like Bihar. In the first case, although the WB earned the opprobrium of NGOs, much of the problems lay with the borrowers, especially the concerned state governments. The fact that WB financing was barely a fifth of overall cost reduced its leverage. As NGOs, who had been severely critical of the WB, realized after India canceled the loan in 1995, their actual targets were more vulnerable to pressure when there was external funding through the WB than when there was not. In the case of Indian railways or Bihar, the WB has struggled with two competing pressures—lend to sectors and regions where the need is greatest and potential economic and social rates are highest or lend to where implementation outcomes are likely to be most successful. In the past, well-intentioned efforts to stay engaged and try for incremental change have often simply exacerbated the problem. Perhaps the single biggest error the WB has made in India has been its failure to realize that nonlending might serve the country better.

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See also Asian Development Bank (ADB), Relations with; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with

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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), RELATIONS WITH India is one of the twenty-three original contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It thus automatically became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which replaced GATT on 1 January 1995, following the completion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1994.

India has been an active participant in all rounds of GATT negotiations, notwithstanding its declining share in world trade through most of the post-World War II period. In the post-WTO era, India continues to be an important voice in discussions to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. The thrust of India's position has been to ensure a fair distribution of rights and obligations between developed and developing countries and to address the developmental concerns of poor countries. Its negotiating strategy has, however, evolved with its overall trade and development strategy and policy orientation. Its earlier strategy was largely defensive, in line with its import substitution policies. But the initiation of economic reforms following the balance of payments crisis of 1991 altered India's views on the opportunities, benefits, and threats of engaging in the multilateral trading system and has led to the adoption of a more forward-looking negotiating strategy.

GATT and India: The Pre-Uruguay Round Years

India played an important role in international trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT. Time and again it played the role of a leader and spokesperson for developing countries, along with Brazil. For instance, as early as 1963, India initiated an action program to expand exports by less developed countries to the developed countries. This program called for a standstill on all new tariff and nontariff barriers, the elimination of all GATT illegal Quantitative Restrictions (QRs), the removal of all duties on tropical primary products, and a schedule for reducing and eliminating tariffs on semiprocessed and processed products. But often such efforts bore little success.

However, India's overall approach to the multilateral trading system during the pre-Uruguay Round period was ambivalent and protectionist. It was driven by an ideology of import substitution and foreign exchange conservation and was underpinned by its belief in a new international economic order. India was an advocate of

special and differential treatment to developing countries and unilateral concessions by developed countries. This defensive approach was evident in the continued high levels of tariff and nontariff protection in India, despite successive rounds of GATT negotiations. In 1990 India's import weighted average tariff rate stood at 87 percent, its unweighted average tariff at 128 percent, and its highest tariff rate at 355 percent, much higher than rates in other developing countries. In addition, 65 percent of all its imports and 90 percent of its manufacturing imports were subject to nontariff barriers in 1990. Moreover, India repeatedly invoked GATT Article 19(B), which permitted the maintenance of QRs for balance of payments reasons. Agriculture and textiles, which were two major sectors of export interest to India, remained outside GATT agreements. Concessions given under special and differential treatment arrangements like the Generalized System of Preferences were heavily qualified, discriminatory, and often nonsubstantive. Overall, India viewed GATT as an international forum to address asymmetries in the balance of economic power between developed and developing countries rather than a forum to liberalize its trade policies and integrate with global trade.

The Uruguay Round of Negotiations

The Uruguay Round of negotiations introduced textiles and agriculture as well as several new issues like intellectual property rights, services, and trade-related investment measures into the multilateral trading system. India, along with Brazil, led a group of developing countries against the inclusion of these new issues. It feared that industrialized countries would make commitments in textiles and agriculture subject to developing country concessions in such areas. However, India eventually had to agree to negotiate on these new issues as part of the Uruguay Round.

India made far more substantive commitments to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers on merchandise trade under the Uruguay Round than in all earlier rounds. Its relatively more liberal approach in this round was made possible by the far-reaching trade reforms introduced in the country beginning in 1991. In its Uruguay Round commitments, India increased the percentage of bound tariff lines for all products from a mere 6 percent in the pre-Uruguay Round period to 67 percent following the Uruguay Round. It bound its tariffs on 62 percent of all nonagricultural tariff lines, which included a large number of important products like iron and steel, chemicals, and machinery. It further committed to reduce its bound rate on all industrial products by 40 percent, from an import weighted average tariff rate of 71.4 percent to 32.4 percent, and committed to reduce tariffs on 2,701

industrial product lines. In agriculture, India bound 81.4 percent of its agricultural imports from the rest of the world. However, India remained largely defensive in the agricultural sector owing to food security and livelihood concerns. The bindings in agriculture were set at very high levels, at rates of 100 percent for primary products, 150 percent for processed products, and 300 percent for edible oils. Moreover, some tariffs that had been bound at zero before the Uruguay Round were renegotiated and were set at higher levels to afford a greater degree of protection to sensitive products. Inclusive of industrial and nonindustrial products, India offered to reduce its basic duty by roughly 30 percent. The duty reductions were to be made over a period of six years.

India has thus far adhered to its tariff binding and reduction commitments. It brought down its applied import-weighted average tariff rate on industrial products from 54 percent in the pre-Uruguay Round period to 33 percent in 1996–1997, further to 30.3 percent in 1998, and to 29 percent in 2001–2002 and most recently to around 20 percent. It has reduced its applied tariffs for a large number of industrial products and has brought them close to their bound levels. However, in agriculture, tariff reductions have been less substantive, with the difference between bound and applied rates remaining at more than 50 percent for 656 out of 673 tariff lines as late as 2000. The slower pace of trade liberalization in this sector has been due to concerns about potential adverse effects on rural employment, livelihoods, and food security.

India also made substantive commitments to reduce nontariff protection in the Uruguay Round. It agreed to phase out QRs on all goods except for some 600 items or product lines for security reasons. As per the Agreement on Agriculture, it also committed to tariff its nontariff barriers on agricultural imports. But due to concerns about the potential adverse impact on domestic producers and on the balance of payments, India took recourse to GATT Article 18:B to maintain QRs on some products. The latter was, however, ruled inconsistent with India's WTO obligations following a dispute filed against India by the United States in 1996, and India had to agree to phase out all its QRs (on 1,429 product lines) by 31 March 2001, earlier than originally scheduled. In line with the WTO decision, India removed QRs on 714 items by 1 April 2000 and the rest by 1 April 2001, covering both bound and unbound products.

Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), India's approach was highly conservative. It scheduled only a few services for negotiations and did not table important services, such as energy and distribution services, where there is great interest on the part of developed countries to enter the Indian market. Even

within the scheduled sectors, India's market access and national treatment commitments were very limited in scope and more restrictive than prevailing policies. The revised offers made by India in January 2004 as part of the ongoing GATS negotiations are not substantively different and remain subject to numerous restrictions. Today, the wedge between India's GATS commitments and existing policies is even greater, given the considerable autonomous liberalization undertaken in the 1990s in many of India's service sectors. India's main market access interest within services has been the movement of service suppliers; India wants to secure increased and predictable market access for the temporary movement of its service providers and was earlier influential in developing the GATS annex on this mode of supply. More recently, India has been pushing for secure market access for the cross-border supply of services, a mode which covers trade in services through business process outsourcing, which is of growing interest to India. It has formed developing country coalitions and presented bold proposals on both these GATS modes of supply.

The issue of intellectual property rights and the resulting agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) aroused much debate in India. While the agreement had no major implications for India in the area of copyrights, trademarks, and designs, as domestic legislation in the latter areas were already in conformity with the TRIPs agreement, in the area of patents India had several concerns. The foremost concern was about the likely impact of amendments in domestic patent legislation due to the TRIPs agreement (given differences between the two in terms of coverage, duration, working of patents, and compulsory licensing provisions) on the Indian pharmaceutical sector and on public health and equity objectives. It was feared that the introduction of product patents for pharmaceuticals (as opposed to process patents, which was the case in India) would lead to higher drug prices and benefit developed country pharmaceutical firms at the expense of domestic generic drug manufacturers in developing countries. Moreover, in the Indian view, there was no convincing link between stronger intellectual property rights legislation and innovation, investment, technology transfer, and quality. A second concern was that patent protection to plant varieties and microorganisms under the TRIPs agreement would lead to "bio-piracy" and plundering of the ecological wealth of developing countries like India as well as monopoly over seed and fertilizer trade and production by Western multinationals. The fear was that such protection would ultimately raise input prices for developing country agricultural producers, would limit their ability to indigenize to suit local conditions, and could potentially have adverse environmental effects.

Notwithstanding such concerns and much domestic opposition, India has taken steps to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with the TRIPs agreement. India's Patents Act of 1970 has undergone three amendments, the latest being at the end of 2004. The main changes include the extension of patent protection to a period of twenty years for all inventions, the specification of a list of nonpatentable innovations, including seeds, plants, species, traditional knowledge, and other items for which innovations may not classify as inventions, clarification of what constitutes the working of patents, conditions for the grant of compulsory license, including on grounds of national and public health emergencies, and introduction of product patents. India has also introduced the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmer's Right Act as a *sui generis* system for protecting plant and animal life. However, the basic concerns and debates over the TRIPs agreement continue in India, and have also shaped India's position on this agreement in the post-Uruguay Round discussions.

According to various studies, India was expected to be among the main developing-country beneficiaries of the Uruguay Round agreement, mainly due to the elimination of nontariff barriers. The coverage ratio for nontariff barriers on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries' imports from India was estimated to decline from 29.4 percent to 5.1 percent across all products. The bulk of this reduction was due to improved market access in textiles and clothing and agriculture, following the phasing out of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) by 2005 and the elimination of nontariff barriers in agriculture. Quantitative exercises indicated an increase in exports of .3 percent of the value of India's 1992 exports due to liberalization of agricultural trade and of 7.4 percent due to elimination of the MFA. The gains were not as significant in other areas. For instance, committed tariff reductions averaged a mere 2.4 percent and affected only 5 percent of all merchandise exports by India to OECD countries. In the area of services, the gains were limited, given the lack of substantive commitments by all countries in India's main area of export interest, namely, movement of service suppliers. Any gains were, however, finally contingent on the implementation of commitments by the developed countries and on India's ability to capitalize on the improved market access opportunities by introducing domestic structural and policy reforms to remove supply-side constraints and compete more effectively in world trade.

Post-Uruguay Round Developments

In the various Ministerial Conferences that have taken place since the Uruguay Round, India's focus has been on three issues. These are: the implementation of the

Uruguay Round commitments in agriculture and textiles to ensure that the gains promised to developing countries in that round are realized; ensuring greater sensitivity to equity and developmental concerns of developing countries in the context of TRIPs; and preventing further widening of the WTO mandate. In the course of these Ministerials, India has also been very influential in shaping the outcome of discussions and the introduction of new frameworks and proposals.

In agriculture, India has pushed strongly for the implementation of subsidy reduction commitments made in the Uruguay Round by the developed countries. In preparation for the Cancún Ministerial in September 2003, India was instrumental in forming a new alliance of developing countries (G-22), including important developing countries like Brazil, South Africa, China, and Egypt, which rejected the framework on agriculture that was put forward by the European Union and the United States just prior to the Cancún meetings. The collapse of the talks at Cancún was in large part due to the G-22's insistence on implementation issues in agriculture. India was a key player in this coalition, fostering unity among the group despite the divergent interests of its member countries and despite divisive tactics by the developed countries to fragment the coalition. It also helped in framing an alternative proposal by the developing countries on agriculture and garnered the support of the smaller and poorer developing country coalition, the G-90 grouping.

In the July 2004 discussions in Geneva to develop a framework agreement, India again played a leading role within the G-22 alliance. It pushed for provisions such as safeguard measures, the adoption of less than full reciprocity in tariff reductions, exemptions from *de minimis* subsidy reductions for resource-constrained farmers in poor countries, and explicit recognition in the framework on agriculture of the food security, livelihood, and rural and social development concerns of developing countries. India was also one of the members of a new group that emerged during the July 2004 discussions, the Five Interested Parties Group (including Brazil, the United States, the European Union, and Australia), which consisted of countries with both offensive and defensive interests in agriculture. India played an important role within this group in helping forge a last-minute consensus on the July framework agreement, particularly in the context of agriculture, thus keeping the Doha Round alive.

India has also voiced implementation concerns in textiles. It criticized the fact that during the 1995–2005 transition period of this agreement, developed countries had phased out quotas on textile and clothing products which did not face binding quotas and that over 95 percent of

India's textile and clothing trade would remain unintegrated until the final year of transition. Moreover, India also voiced concerns about unilateral changes introduced by certain importing countries on rules of origin, repeated antidumping investigations on India's textile exports, and selective liberalization of quotas under preferential bilateral arrangements, which further eroded any market access gains realized in this sector by India. It pushed successfully for the scheduled elimination of the MFA on 1 January 2005. Its textile and clothing exports are expected to grow significantly in the post-MFA regime.

There has also been some concern in India with regard to the nonagricultural market access negotiations. Although India has not opposed these discussions, it has expressed concerns about the formula that will be adopted for reductions in industrial tariffs from the Uruguay Round levels. It has opposed proposals for larger reductions on industrial products that are subject to higher tariffs, and proposals for zero duties on selected products. This opposition stems from concerns about possible adverse effects on certain emerging manufacturing sectors and on labor-intensive small-scale industries, with implications for employment and poverty. India has also lobbied for credit to be given to developing countries for autonomous liberalization in recognition of the fact that significant reductions in applied tariffs have been undertaken unilaterally by many developing countries since the Uruguay Round in the context of trade reforms.

With the backing of developing countries like South Africa and Brazil, India has argued the need to interpret and implement the TRIPs agreement in a manner that gives member countries the right to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all. India lobbied actively to introduce flexibility provisions under the TRIPs agreement in the area of public health and medicines and was finally successful in realizing the Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health at the Doha talks. This declaration gives members the right to grant compulsory licenses, to determine the grounds on which to grant these licenses, and to determine what constitutes a national health emergency. Before the Cancún Ministerial, India, along with the United States, Brazil, South Africa, and Kenya, also succeeded in introducing a provision under the TRIPs agreement that would allow developing countries to import generics from earmarked countries in case of public health emergencies. This was seen as a major victory for developing countries and their generic manufacturers, although how such a provision will operate in practice and its implications for the Indian pharmaceutical industry are not yet clear.

India has also made two other demands in the post-Uruguay Round discussions on TRIPs. The first is

to extend geographic indicators to products other than wines and spirits in view of India's export interests in products like basmati rice. The second is to introduce restrictions on the misappropriation of biological and genetic resources and traditional knowledge from developing countries. However, its primary focus under TRIPs has been the issue of affordable access to medicines and equity in public health.

India differs from the major developed countries concerning the scope of future WTO negotiations. It has insisted that the scope of WTO negotiations be restricted to the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round and the implementation of commitments made in the previous round. It strongly opposed the inclusion of labor and environmental standards and the four Singapore issues of investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation under the WTO framework. As part of the G-22 alliance, it was instrumental in the dropping of three of the four Singapore issues as part of the July 2004 framework agreement.

Future Strategies and Policy Directions

India's approach to the WTO negotiations has been largely issue- and cause-based and very much driven by coalition dynamics and alliances, often at the expense of its own strategic interests. On several occasions, India's firm public stand on issues has attracted criticism from developed country negotiators and the media. For instance, it was widely blamed for "scuttling" the launch of a new round at Doha, and was termed by one observer as the "fallen hero of a lost third world cause" (Panagariya).

Overall, critics contend that India has often espoused the cause of developing countries at the expense of its own interests in WTO negotiations. In future WTO negotiations, India needs to adopt a more strategic approach. It must dovetail its negotiating strategy into its overall economic liberalization and trade reform program. It needs to use its multilateral engagement in the WTO to facilitate meaningful policy reform, such as by ensuring that domestic opening generates payoffs in terms of increased market access abroad. The latter would also enhance India's credibility as a bargainer. Given the extent of trade liberalization and market opening that has occurred in India since the Uruguay Round, India needs to solidify these policies through multilateral commitments to lock in its reforms and to signal the credibility of its policy orientation.

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See also **Brazil-India Relations; Economic Reforms of 1991; Intellectual Property Rights; Trade Liberalization since 1991**

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WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II, IMPACT ON INDIA. See **History and Historiography**.



XAVIER, FRANCIS (1506–1552), Jesuit missionary to India. Francis Xavier was born in 1506 in the Pyrenees kingdom of Navarre. At eighteen he went to the University of Paris, where nine years later he joined the faculty and came under the influence of Ignatius Loyola, who was planning to start the Society of Jesus. Xavier was one of the first six to join Loyola.

Eventually Xavier was commissioned by King John III of Portugal to Christianize his eastern colonies. Xavier left for India on 7 April 1541. As papal nuncio, he was given supreme authority over all missions and churches already in existence. He landed in Goa on 6 May 1542.

Late in 1542, he went to Madras (Chennai), converting the Parava fisher people in great numbers. though their acquiescence was not necessarily spiritually motivated. Harassed by pirates at sea and powerful vested interests on the land, they readily agreed to become Christians in return for the protection of the king of Portugal. Xavier had no fluency in any of the local vernacular languages, so he memorized the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ave Maria, and the Ten Commandments. His method was to gather the people of a village together on Sundays. "We begin," Xavier wrote, "with a profession of faith." He would then recite the Creed and the Commandments and the people would respond in a "mighty chorus . . . with their arms folded on their breasts in the form of a cross," affirming that they believed (Firth, p. 59). In such a fashion, in one month, he baptized as many as ten thousand. After a year, Xavier turned his attention to the west coast, journeying through Travencore to Cochin. Here he repeated his efforts. Everywhere he went he endeavored, but without much success, to train Indian workers, both ordained and lay, to provide for the spiritual nurture of the young Christian community. In addition, he instructed his fellow Jesuits to "build schools

in every village, that the children may be taught daily." Remarkably, the Parava remain Christian to this day.

Subsequent to his work in India, Xavier attempted, but failed, to enter China, and he died of a fever on 2 December 1552 off the south coast of China. He



St. Francis Xavier. St. Francis Xavier's remains as preserved at the Catholic Basilica of Bom Jesus in Goa. Xavier is regarded as one of the greatest of Christian missionaries; his travels covered many thousands of miles in a dozen years. TIME LIFE PICTURES / GETTY IMAGES.

was eventually buried in Goa and was canonized to sainthood in 1622.

Graham Houghton

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YAJÑA “Sacrifice,” or *yajña*, is the key word in a Vedic worldview that dominated South Asian religion for the entire first millennium B.C. Derived from *yaj* (to sacrifice, worship), *yajña* has an Avestan counterpart *yasna*, indicating an Indo-Iranian pre-Vedic origin. In the highly influential Purusha hymn, Rig Veda 10.90, the self-sacrificing cosmic being Purusha creates not only the world and classes of beings but also the institution of *yajña* and the first cosmic laws. Sacrifice for Vedic poets and ritualists became the crucial link between human and divine worlds. *Karman*, ritual “work” in *yajña*, was declared a human responsibility, and sacrifice evolved into a complex, highly sophisticated instrument by which the cosmos itself was ritually renewed.

Early in the first millennium B.C., Vedic tradition divided ritual activity into *shrauta* sacrifices based on *sbruti*, the revealed Vedas, and *grihya* ceremonies based on *smriti*, or human tradition. The former apparently had priority, and Shrauta Sūtras of numerous Vedic schools systematized sacrifices already described in the Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas of the orally transmitted Vedic texts. Grihya Sūtras of the same schools provided domestic guidelines. These Sūtras listed sacrifices that could be performed on one fire in the home, some with assistance from a *purohita* (domestic priest), or great sacrifices requiring three fires and as many as sixteen or seventeen priests. The latter included soma sacrifices, with the *agnishṭoma*, an initial soma offering, as paradigm. Once a sacrificer (*yajamāna*) and his wife (*patnī*) performed the five-day *agnishṭoma* (known today among Vaidika Brahmans of Andhra simply as *yajña* to declare its priority), the couple may then go on to further soma *yajñas* such as the *agnicayana* and *vājapeya*. When one of the pair dies, all of the dozen or more implements, *yajñapātra* or *yajñāyudha* (literally, “sacrificial weapons”) go to the fire-god Agni in the funeral pyre.

Beginning with Brāhmaṇa texts (e.g., Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.5.6.1) and continuing on to the authoritative law code of Manu (3.67–74), an important reduction of sacrifice to a manageable yet spiritually satisfying scale arrived with stipulation of five daily “great” *yajñas* (*mahāyajña*) to be made by a householder without priestly assistance. *Yajñas* to *devas* (gods), *brahman* (the Veda), *pitris* (ancestors), *manushya* (humans), and *bhūtas* (supernatural beings) could be accomplished simply by adding a stick to the ritual fire, reciting a Vedic verse, offering water, giving alms to a Brahman or beggar, scattering leftover grains for crows or ants.

In the post-Vedic era of classical Hinduism, the solemn *shrauta* schedule of *yajña* gradually gave way to *devapūjā*, the worship of images of deities in households, roadside shrines, and increasingly elaborate public temples with priestly staff. Aside from innumerable goddesses of rural and urban theistic Hinduism, the two principal male deities, Vishnu and Shiva, both demonstrate strong connections with *yajña*. Vishnu is pervader of the universe, like the sacrificial pole (*yūpa*), and Shiva is Sthāṇu, that same *axis mundi*. Both gods also have mythic links to the cult of soma, although it is only Shiva, famously excluded from Daksha’s *yajña*, who succeeds in destroying the sacrifice.

In contemporary India, elaborate sectarian rituals, often labeled “Vedic” *yajñas* or *yāgas* to acquire prestige, have little to do with authentic Vedic ritual.

David M. Knipe

See also **Agni; Devī; Hinduism (Dharma); Shrauta Sūtras; Soma; Vedic Aryan India; Yajur Veda**

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YĀJNAVALKYA, Indian astronomer, perhaps of the second millennium B.C. Yājñavalkya is one of the foremost figures in the earliest period of Indian astronomy. There is no unanimity about his time, which has been estimated in an indirect manner. His time was considered to have been around 800 B.C., based on the dating of the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa—a voluminous prose text from his school, which serves as a commentary on Vedic ritual—by nineteenth-century philologists. These philological theories have been called into question by new archaeological data, and his true period may be the second millennium B.C.

Yājñavalkya's parents were Brahmaratha and Sunandā. He studied first in the hermitage of Vaishampāyana and later with Bāshkala and Uddālaka. He is credited with the authorship of the Shukla (White) Yajurveda. He is also credited with the school that put together the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Many dialogues of Yājñavalkya with his disciples and with rival sages are preserved in the Vedic literature. Legends connect him to the sun; this may be a slanted reference to his discovery of two important facts about the motions of the sun.

In the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Yājñavalkya advances two important theories: first, that a cycle of ninety-five years is required to reconcile the lunar and the solar years (indicating that the length of the year was known to a great degree of accuracy); second, that the circuit of the sun is asymmetric in its four quarters. The proportion for the two halves of the year described by him is 176:189. It is interesting that this proportion is also used in describing the asymmetry of the two halves in the Angkor Wat temple in Cambodia (c. 1150). Yājñavalkya's astronomy is very important in the history of ideas because it pushes the recognition of the ninety-five-year lunisolar cycle and the asymmetry of the year to a much earlier time than has been supposed.

Yājñavalkya's astronomy belongs to a period in which astronomical knowledge was part of ritual. Complicated geometrical altars were built to represent the year, with facts about the year expressed in terms of number or area within the altar design. Yājñavalkya is a major figure in early Vedic thought, renowned for his stress on the correspondence between the outer world and the inner world. Many of his dialogues form a part of the narrative of the

Brihad-Āraṇyaka-Upanishad, in which he mentions a preliminary version of the Purāṇic system of cosmology.

Subhash Kak

See also **Astronomy; Science; Vedic Aryan India**

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YAJUR VEDA The Yajur Veda is one of four primary Saṃhitās (anthologies) of Vedas, India's most ancient textual authority. The oldest, decidedly seminal Veda, the Rig Veda—1,028 hymns composed in the final centuries before 1000 B.C.—became a source of mantras, cited with additional material in three later Vedas: Yajur, Samur, and Atharva Veda, all compiled within two or three centuries. An "inside" perspective of Vedic heritage, including those Vedic Brahmins still tasked today with memorizing and reciting Vedas as oral traditions, understands the four Saṃhitās as unitary ("the Veda"), eternal, without human or divine origin, and therefore without literary chronology as recognized by "outside" historians and linguists.

The great system of sacrifices at the heart of Vedic religion depended upon invocations of deities and ritual prescriptions of the Yajur Veda, literally "knowledge of the *yajus* (sacrificial formulas)," and the melodies of the Samur Veda, literally "knowledge of the *saman* (chant)." Together with the Rig Veda, they form a "triple Veda," following a traditional predilection for triads. A fourth Saṃhitā, the Atharva Veda, was added as an important ancient compendium of hymns regarding popular religious practices not directly related to the sacrificial calendar. Four major priests were assigned to these four Vedas, the *bota*, *adbvāryu*, *udgata*, and *brahman*, for the Rig, Yajur, Samur, and Atharva Vedas, respectively. Each has essential ritual roles, but it is the *adbvāryu*, reciting from the Yajur Veda, who functions as executive priest, assigning sacrificial duties and mantras to the *yajamana* (sacrificer-patron) and other priests. In great *shrauta* sacrifices, including paradigmatic soma and animal offerings, the *adbvāryu* may direct sixteen or seventeen priests in an arena outside the sacrificer's home. Or the *adbvāryu* may direct actions inside the home in new- and full-moon-day sacrifices, with the *yajamana* alone or with one to three other priests in the *grihya* (domestic) schedule patterned after that of

the *śrauta*. In either case, portions of the Yajur Veda are incorporated into ritual handbooks for procedures.

Over the centuries, the four Vedas were orally transmitted and edited by numerous schools known as *śakhas* (branches). The Yajur Veda text generated the largest number of schools in two divisions: the older Krishna (Black) Yajur Veda, with four Saṃhitās (Taittiriya, Maitrayani, Kathaka, and Kapishthala-Katha); and the younger Vajasaneyi Saṃhitā, also known as the Shukla (White) Yajur Veda, with two closely related schools, Madhyamdina and Kanva. Whereas the texts of the latter were composed, and are still recited today, in verse only, those of the various Krishna Yajur Veda schools are mixed, with prose passages among metrical ones. Almost the same rites are provided by each school, although length of coverage, schedule order, and even emphasis in the subcontinent vary considerably.

The major difference between the two Yajur Vedas, Krishna (Black) and Shukla (White), concerns *brāhmaṇas*. Every Veda has a prose genre known as *brāhmaṇa*, a discourse with rules concerning particular mantras or ritual actions, along with explanations of their meanings. For example, in his schedule of memorized texts, a Vedic student born into the Taittiriya *śakha* first learns the Taittiriya Saṃhitā (= Krishna Yajur Veda), which includes numerous *brāhmaṇa* passages throughout (although he then goes on to memorize an equally lengthy text known as the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, followed by the briefer Taittiriya Aranyaka and Taittiriya Upanishad). On the other hand, a student born into the Madhyamdina *śakha* learns the metrical Shukla Yajur Veda (= Vajasaneyi Saṃhitā) without any *brāhmaṇa* explanations, those having been collected in a separate text known as the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the next assignment for memorization.

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See also **Agni; Hinduism (Dharma); Śrauta Sūtra; Soma; Vedic Aryan India; Yajña**

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YOGA The Yoga tradition is extremely old. Yogic postures are depicted on the third millennium B.C. seals of the Harappan period. The Rig Veda speaks of the visions (*dhi*) of harmony stretched on the loom of cosmic existence.



Yoganarayana Stone Sculpture. Narasimha, the fourth avatar of Lord Vishnu, who cast off his fiery nature in deep meditation or yoga mudra. From remains of Hampi, capital of the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar, c. sixteenth century. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

This task was compared to harnessing of the plow (*yuga*). The mind is compared to the flutterings of a bird, indicating its union in the heart with the divine. The Rig Veda asserts that the universe is stationed within the heart, suggesting the yoking of it with the individual's body.

The goal of Yoga is self-transformation and transcendence, achieved by yoking the body and mind with the spirit within. This yoking may be viewed as an interiorization of the ritual that is more commonly done externally.

By the time of the Bhagavad Gītā, the most popular text of Yoga, the teachings are already very ancient. The Mokshadharma section of the Mahābhārata has a longish description of Yoga. Other texts that may belong to the first part of the first millennium B.C. and that also describe Yoga are the Katha, the Shvetāshvatara, and the Maitrayāniya Upanishads. Around 150 B.C., the teachings were codified by Patanjali in his Yoga Sūtra (Aphorisms of Yoga), which is now termed Classical Yoga. An important early commentary on this text is Vyāsa's Yoga Bhāshya.

The Purāṇas (Ancient tales) also teach Yoga. Another encyclopedic work is the Yoga Vāsishtha, which teaches a nondualistic Jñāna Yoga of seven stages. Yoga teachings are a part of the Tantras of Shakti, the Āgamas of Shiva, and the Saṃhitās of Vishnu worship.

Hatha Yoga is a later development within the Yoga tradition, credited to Gorakshanātha of the eleventh century. The major texts of this Yoga, which has become very popular in the West, are the Hatha Yoga Pradīpikā, the Gheranda Saṃhitā, and the Shiva Saṃhitā. An important early Tamil text on Yoga is Tirumandiram.

Patanjali's Yoga Sūtra speaks of a system of eight limbs:

1. Moral restraint (*yama*), comprising nonharming (*ahimsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), nonstealing (*asteya*), chastity (*brahmacharya*), and noncovetousness (*aparigraha*)
2. Discipline (*niyama*), consisting of purity (*shaucha*), contentment (*santosha*), asceticism (*tapas*), self-study (*svādhyāya*), and devotion to the Lord (*īshvara-pranidhāna*)
3. Posture (*āsana*)
4. Breath control (*prāṇāyāma*)
5. Sense withdrawal (*pratyābhāra*)
6. Concentration (*dhāranā*)
7. Meditation (*dhyaṇa*)
8. Absorption (*samādhi*).

Several kinds of Yoga are described in the texts. These include Jñāna-Yoga, or the path of knowledge; Sāṅkhya-Yoga, or the path of union through transformation of the elements within the psychical person; Karma-Yoga, the path of selfless action; Bhakti-Yoga, the path of devotion; Mantra-Yoga, the path of sacred sound; and Hatha-Yoga, the path of self-transformation using the arduous path of physical purification.

Breath control, or *prāṇāyāma*, is fundamental to yogic practice. Vedic books speak of five kinds of breath (*prāṇa*) that mediate the various processes in the body. These may be viewed not only as inhalation and exhalation but also as electric and chemical currents coursing through the body. The five main breaths are: *prāṇa*, associated with inhalation and with the regions of heart and head; *apāna*, associated with exhalation and with the navel and the lower abdomen; *udāna*, located at the throat and associated with speech and other functions; *samāna*, the midcurrent located at the abdomen and chiefly responsible for digestion; and *vyāna*, the diffuse current pervading the entire body.

The Hatha Yoga texts speak of seven (in some texts, as many as thirteen) *chakras* (centers of energy) in the body:

1. *Mūlādhāra chakra*, at the bottom of the spine, is associated with the coiled energy of *kundalini* and is portrayed as a lotus of four petals. This *chakra* is

associated with the earth element, the sense of smell, and the lower limbs.

2. *Svādhiṣṭhāna chakra*, at the genitalia, is associated with the water element, the sense of taste, and the hands. It is shown as having six petals.
3. *Manipūra chakra*, at the navel, is associated with the fire element, the sense of sight, and the digestive tract. It is portrayed as having ten petals.
4. *Anāhata chakra*, at the heart, is associated with the air element, the sense of touch, and the reproductive organs. It is shown with twelve petals.
5. *Vishuddhi chakra*, at the throat, is associated with the ether, the sense of hearing, the skin and the mouth, and is shown as having sixteen petals.
6. *Ājñā chakra*, at the center of the eyebrows, is associated with the mind and the sense of individuality (*ahamkāra*). It has two petals.
7. *Sahasrāra chakra*, at the crown of the head, is viewed as having a thousand spokes or petals. It is associated with pure consciousness.

The exertions of the yogi make it possible for the kundalini (representing the natural energy of the individual) to rise up and ultimately pierce through to the highest *chakra*. This joining of the kundalini at the *sahasrāra chakra* is called the union of Shakti and Shiva, respectively representing body and consciousness. Before reaching the top, the kundalini must pierce through three particularly difficult knots or hurdles (*granthi*) at the first (at the base of the spine), the third (at the navel), and the fifth (at the throat) *chakras*. These points are called Brahmā, Vishnu, and Rudra *granthis*.

The physical body is supposed to be enveloped in an energy sheath, which is the subtle body (*sūkṣma śarīra*). The energy flows around through 72,000 channels (*nādis*) that are described in the Upanishads. The three main pathways down the spine are the *sushumnā* at the center, with the *idā* and the *pingalā* to the left and right of it. The *idā* is associated with cooling (and the moon) and the *pingalā* with heating (and the sun).

In recent decades, the popularity of Yoga has spread around the world. It is practiced for its health benefits as well as its promise of mastery of mind and body through the advanced practice of meditation.

Subhash Kak

See also **Science**

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ZOROASTRIANISM A religion founded on the teachings of the prophet Zoroaster, who lived in ancient Persia (now Iran), Zoroastrianism is practiced by about 100,000 people worldwide. Most of its adherents live in India (and are also called Parsis). A smaller number are in Iran; and many Indian and Iranian Zoroastrians migrated to and now live in Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and other countries. One of the world's oldest monotheistic religions, Zoroastrianism has influenced other monotheistic religions. Its main tenets are rather simple—it espouses three virtues of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, realization of which enables one to win the battle between good and evil.

Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, is believed to have lived around 1500 B.C. in eastern Iran, in what is now the Russian steppes. Like the Buddha after him, Zoroaster sought to understand the reasons for death and suffering and the origin of evil. He had a deep longing for justice and for a moral law that would allow humankind to lead a good life in peace. In search of answers, he meditated in a mountain cave for ten years. When he received enlightenment, he descended from the mountain and sought to promote a new way of life among his tribesmen. He preached monotheism in a land that followed an aboriginal polytheistic religion, and he was therefore attacked for his teaching. Zoroaster eventually gained the royal patronage of King Vishtasp, resulting in a substantial following for his faith. Zoroastrianism was already over a millennium old when the first Persian Empire was established by Cyrus of the Achaemenid dynasty. It was propagated in various Persian empires by the Achaemenids, then the Parthians who ruled from 247 B.C. onward, and the Sassanians who overthrew the Parthians in A.D. 224. When Muslim invaders entered Persia around A.D. 650, a small number of Zoroastrians fled to India. Zoroastrians were

free to practice their religion in India and, though small in number, made important contributions to Indian society.

The sacred text of the Zoroastrians is the Zend-e-Avesta. One part of the Avesta consists of the Gathas, which are songs or hymns composed by Zoroaster. The Gathas are abstract sacred poetry, directed toward the worship of the one God, the understanding of righteousness and cosmic order, the promotion of social justice, and individual choice between good and evil. The Gathas have a general, even universal vision. The remaining parts of the Avestas were written perhaps centuries after the Gathas, and they deal with laws of ritual and practice and with the traditions of the faith.

One central theme in Zoroastrianism is the battle between good and evil in human life. In nature, there exist two opposing forces—*spenta-mainyu* (the good mind) and *angre-mainyu* (the wicked mind)—which are in continuous conflict. A person's soul is caught between them and is pulled by each side. To help the soul balance itself between these two forces, it is given a rudder in the form of a tail. This tail has three layers of feathers, which reminds one of the path of good thoughts, words, and deeds, by which the soul is able to make spiritual progress. Every soul has a free will to choose either to obey divine universal natural laws or to disobey them. If these divine laws are obeyed, the soul will be able to attain union with God. This remote event, toward which all creation moves, is called *frasbo-kereti*.

In short, every individual has the twin spirits of good and evil in his or her mind, forming a dual nature. When individuals exercise the better mind, they create life and draw God and his divine powers toward themselves. When they choose to use the evil mind, they enter a state of spiritual death. Confusion descends upon them

and they rush toward wrath and bloodlust. An individual's duty is to play his or her part in this great cosmic battle between good and evil, with each individual's life serving as the battlefield. Every decision made and every choice of thought, word, and deed, is weighed in the balance.

Upon physical death (which is seen as the temporary triumph of evil), the soul will be judged at the "Bridge of the Separator," where the soul, it is believed, will receive either its reward or punishment, based upon the balance of its thoughts, words, and deeds. If found righteous, the soul will ascend to the abode of joy and light. If wicked, it will descend into the depths of darkness and gloom. The latter state, however, is a temporary one, as there is no eternal damnation in Zoroastrianism. Thereafter, there is a promise of a series of saviors who will appear in the world to complete the triumph of good over evil. Evil will be rendered ineffective. There will then be a general last judgment of all the souls awaiting redemption, followed by the resurrection of the physical body, which will once again meet its spiritual counterpart, the soul. Time, as we know it, will cease to exist, and life, it is believed, will remain in a perfect state of joy.

Individual responsibility is another key theme in Zoroastrianism. Salvation for the individual depends on the sum of his or her thoughts, words, and deeds, and no intervention by any divine being may alter this. No costly material sacrifices or rituals will change the way the individual is judged. Making their own choices, individuals alone must bear responsibility for their souls. A life of active good toward others (people, animals, nature) is critical, giving individuals a simple creed to follow—good thoughts, good words, and good deeds.

Further, adherents are encouraged to lead a good and prosperous life, and monasticism, celibacy, fasting, and the mortification of the body are anathema to the Zoroastrian faith. Such practices are believed to weaken the individual and thereby lessen his or her power to fight evil. Zoroaster saw pessimism and despair as sins, in fact, as a submission to evil. In his teachings, the individual is encouraged to lead an active, industrious, honest, and above all, a happy and charitable life. Since this world created by God (Ahura Mazda) is essentially good, the individual should live well and enjoy its bountiful gifts, though always in moderation (as the states of excess and deficiency are deemed to be the workings of a hostile spirit).

It is perhaps difficult to appreciate the originality and courage of Zoroaster's thought today. Many prophets have appeared in later times with similar proclamations. But Zoroaster's religion was radically different from anything humankind had previously believed. Instead of

a religion based on fear, Zoroaster's religion exalted the free and rational mind. Later religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—all borrowed from Zoroaster's teachings. They all grew to attract millions of believers, while Zoroastrianism declined. Today, the Zoroastrian religion is probably familiar only to scholars of religion and to its adherents in South Asia, Iran, and the West.

In terms of customs, Zoroastrians have been incorrectly called fire worshipers. They do not worship fire, but fire has special significance. It is regarded as giving light, warmth, and energy and is therefore vital to life. Parsi places of worship (temples) have altars that contain fire and are called fire-temples. Eight principal fire-temples in India include four in Mumbai and four in the State of Gujarat (two in Surat, one in Udwada, one in Navsari). There are no caste divisions and no religious restrictions concerning food for Zoroastrians. A Zoroastrian child is formally initiated into the religion at a *navjote* or thread ceremony, which takes place between the ages of seven and nine. Zoroastrians continue to debate whether a child with one non-Zoroastrian parent can be initiated into the religion—orthodox members oppose this, while reformists favor the issue. Conversion is not practiced, and though some reformists suggest allowing children of non-Zoroastrian parents to be initiated into the Zoroastrian religion, this issue has not been seriously considered.

Zoroastrianism is one of the world's oldest religions, and the influence of its core tenets may be detected in all three Abrahamic religions. Though Zoroastrians (Parsis) have been prominent in Indian society, the number of Zoroastrians has been declining at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Dinshaw Mistry

See also **Parsis**

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
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PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT *India*





Women harvest the fiery red kernels of buckwheat. The grain is now almost exclusively cultivated in remote villages of the Himalayas. ASHOK DILWALI/ FOTOMEDIA



TOP: At day's end, still bustling campsite of the annual cattle fair in Pushkar, Rajasthan. Every fall, thousands of dealers, villagers, tourists, and religious pilgrims (drawn to the city's 400 temples and a nearby lake) flock to this destination. SUDHIR KASLIWAL/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Surrounded by the heavenly peaks of the Himalayas, Sonmarg, Kashmir, rests in the valley of the Sindh River. With its almost painterly vistas, Sonmarg has become a popular getaway for adventurers. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Munnar, a small but verdant station set high among the Kannan Devan hills in Kerala. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: To both the men shown here and the largely agriculture-based economy in India, the monsoon season brings relief from the searing heat of summer. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: Elephants from the Bandavgarh National Park in Madhya Pradesh calmly submit to a bath at the hands of their *mabouts* or trainers. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: Rolling dunes of the Thar in northwest India. The largest portion of this desert (which also extends into eastern Pakistan) may be found in Rajasthan. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: The peacock remains the beloved national bird of India and may be observed in large numbers in forested regions and sometimes even in the most unlikely of places: a front lawn of a home. This regal specimen was photographed at Kanha National Park, Madhya Pradesh. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: “Tea pluckers” scour the land on an Assam estate in search of the “two leaves and a bud,” the essential ingredient of fine teas. This plantation industry has its roots in British colonial rule. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: At Kaziranga National Park in Assam, tourists on “elephant back” descend on a one-horned rhinoceros. This is one of the few reserves where the rhino may still be found in abundance. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA




BOTTOM: A wily leopard awaits his prey. These quick-witted cats are quite a common sight in India’s jungles. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: A petite langur atop a tree at the Bandhavgarh National Park, Madhya Pradesh. With many different-sized and different-colored species throughout India, langurs are named for the Hindu monkey-god Hanuman. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Aerial view of terraced fields in the fertile, high-altitude Kulu Valley, Himachal. Rice- and wheat-growing fields such as these are commonly held, in small segments, by numerous families. ASHOK DILWALI/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: A cane suspension bridge over the Siyom River in Arunachal Pradesh, a remote and heavily forested state in the northeast of India. Without such bridges, some villages in the region would be entirely cut off from the rest of civilization as navigation is virtually impossible in the fast-flowing rivers of the hills. IPSHITA BARUA/FOTOMEDIA

MIDDLE: Winter view of Bhimakali, wooden palace and temple of the Rampur Bushahr kings. In Sarahan, Kinnaur, Himachal. ASHOK DILWALI/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: *Ghats* (landing places) along the banks of the Ganges in the holy pilgrim city of Varanasi. They and the many nearby temples and shrines daily reverberate with the sounds of Hindu religious practices. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





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Selected Edicts of King Ashoka

Introduction

King Ashoka (r. 268–231 B.C.), Priyadarśī in the Edicts, the third of the Mauryan kings, left behind on rock and pillar edicts the oldest Indian written documents of any historical significance. In addition to their historical importance, the edicts also contain a number of personal statements believed to have been drafted by Ashoka himself. For this reason, more is known about the personality of Ashoka and his administration and policy than any other ancient Indian ruler. His story was a remarkable one. After a decade as a typical Indian king he had, after the Battle of Kalinga, a change of heart and embarked on a new policy. While not abjuring force entirely, he established a social policy marked by high ethical content. To enforce this policy he created a class of officials called *dharma-mahāmātra*, “Officers of Righteousness.” It is believed that Ashoka became a Buddhist, although he supported other religious sects. The Pāli canon was codified at a great Buddhist council held at Ashoka’s capital, Pataliputra, and he sent missionaries to Ceylon. It was during his reign that Buddhism ceased to be an Indian sect alone and began to be a universal religion. Rock Edict VIII tells of how Ashoka was converted to his new policy and how his life changed. Rock Edict VI explains how he was available to officials day and night, no matter what he was doing, as his highest calling was the welfare of his subjects.

Rock Edict VIII

SOURCE: *The Edicts of Asoka*. Edited and translated by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 37.

In the past, kings used to go on pleasure tours (*vihār-yātrās*). On these tours, they hunted and indulged in other pastimes.

King Priyadarśī, however, became, enlightened in wisdom (*sambuddha*) ten years after his coronation. Since then his tours have been moral-tours (*Dharma-yātrās*).

He visits priests and ascetics and makes gifts to them; he visits the aged and gives them money; he visits the people of rural areas, instructing them in Dharma and discussing it with them.

King Priyadarśī takes great pleasure in these tours, far more than could result from other tours.

Rock Edict VI

SOURCE: *The Edicts of Asoka*. Edited and translated by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 37–38.

King Priyadarśī says:

In the past, state business was not transacted or reports made at all hours of the day. I have therefore made

arrangements that officials may have access to me and may report on the affairs of my people at all times and in all places—when I am eating, when I am in the harem or my inner apartments, when I am tending to the cattle, when I am walking or engaged in religious exercises. I now attend to the affairs of the people in all places. And when a donation or a proclamation that I have ordered verbally, or an urgent matter which I have delegated to my high officials, causes a debate or dispute in the Council, this must be reported to me immediately, at all hours and in all places. These are my orders.

I am never completely satisfied with my work or my vigilance in carrying out public affairs. I consider the promotion of the people’s welfare my highest duty, and its exercise is grounded in work and constant application.

No task is more important to me than promoting the well-being of all the people. Such work as I accomplish contributes to discharging the debt I owe to all living creatures to make them happy in this world and to help them attain heaven in the next.

I have ordered this edict on Dharma inscribed in order that it may endure forever and in order that my sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons may follow it for the welfare of all. This is difficult to do, however, without devoted and sustained work.

Selections from the Autobiography of Mahatma M. K. Gandhi

Introduction

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born on October 2, 1869, at Porbandar in what is now the state of Gujarat, India. He was married to Kasturbai and they had four sons. From 1888 until 1891 he studied law in England and was called to the bar but traveled to South Africa in May 1893 to practice law. Subsequently, he developed his strategy of nonviolent noncooperation, *Satyagraha* (truth force), to fight government policies. He returned to India in January 1915 and in 1917 he started a *Satyagraha* movement against the indigo growers of Champaran in Bihar and then against the mill owners of Ahmedabad. In 1919 he called for a national *hartal* (strike) against the British and supported the Khilafat Movement. By 1920 he had become the most important leader of the Indian National Congress. His *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, written in the 1920s, is one of the enduring records of a political leader. Gandhi was not only a political leader, he was also a social reformer.

One of Gandhi’s concerns was the institution of child marriage, which he opposed. This was courageous as he had been married at the age of thirteen. The passage “Child Marriage” recounts Gandhi’s marriage to

Kasturbai of which, in retrospect, Gandhi felt ashamed. He relished the marriage when it occurred but in the fullness of time came to regard it as a shameful event and he later became highly critical of his father for his childhood marriage. He criticized the extravagant way Hindus were married but, above all, he was tormented by his carnal lust in his early years. This was especially so when Gandhi left his sick father to engage in sex with his pregnant wife. During that time his father died. His newborn child also died and the death of his father and the death of his child became linked in his mind. In "Playing the Husband" he recounts his early relationship with his wife and how he had to establish his authority as a husband. Gandhi believed he was saved from the sin of carnal pleasure by his separation from his wife due to his sojourn to England and the Indian custom of the wife spending time with her family.

For Gandhi the most important aspect of his *Satyagraha* strategy was *ahimsa*, or nonviolence. When he began the *Satyagraha* struggle in Kheda district, Gujarat, on 22 March 1918 he expected the campaign for nonpayment of taxes to be conducted in a disciplined manner on the basis of his credo of love and justice. He was not satisfied with the way the campaign was carried out by the peasants, and accordingly he realized he had made a "Himalayan miscalculation." He decided, therefore, to raise a corps of disciplined *satyagrahi* who would spearhead any future civil disobedience movement strictly on the basis of discipline and nonviolence.

The Indian National Congress, which had been founded in 1885, was led by Western-trained lawyers who took a constitutional path in their fight for independence. It was remarkable that Gandhi became the recognized leader of the Congress in such a short period of time and that he changed the ethos of the organization and the whole independence movement to reflect his own nativist mores. In "Congress Initiation" he relates how he was responsible for the creation of a new constitution for the party and in "The Birth of Khadi" he recounts the way in which he and the members of his ashram learned how to spin *khadi* and how an untouchable, Gangabehn Majumdar, searched for a spinning wheel for him. One was located in Vijapur in Baroda State as recounted in "Found at Last." In "An Instructive Dialogue" Gandhi presents the mill owners' viewpoint about *khadi* through a reported conversation with Umar Sobani, a mill owner. Gandhi explained his rationale for the production of *khadi* and how it would provide work for women.

In "Its Rising Tide" Gandhi reports his success in establishing noncooperation and nonviolence as the official policies of a number of organizations, such as regional Congress parties and the Khilafat movement, where he had to discuss whether Islam forbade its adherents from following nonviolence. At the 1920 special session of the Congress at Calcutta the Congress supported noncooperation but also adopted a controversial

resolution calling for independence, *Swaraj*, a resolution that was adopted "At Nagpur" where Gandhi also discusses Hindu-Muslim unity, untouchability, and *khadi*.

In "Farewell" he recounts his relationship with the Congress and how all his major activities were conducted through the Congress. He reaffirms his belief that there is no other God than Truth and that Truth is *ahimsa*. It reveals how idealistic Gandhi was and how committed he had become to his ideals of purity of heart. For him this entailed his belief in "Ahimsa in mind, word, and deed."

Child Marriage

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 8–11.

Much as I wish that I had not to write this chapter, I know that I shall have to swallow many such bitter draughts in the course of this narrative. And I cannot do otherwise, if I claim to be a worshipper of Truth. It is my painful duty to have to record here my marriage at the age of thirteen. As I see the youngsters of the same age about me who are under my care, and think of my own marriage, I am inclined to pity myself and to congratulate them on having escaped my lot. I can see no moral argument in support of such a preposterously early marriage.

Let the reader make no mistake. I was married, not betrothed. For in Kathiawad there are two distinct rites,—betrothal and marriage. Betrothal is a preliminary promise on the part of the parents of the boy and the girl to join them in marriage, and it is not inviolable. The death of the boy entails no widowhood on the girl. It is an agreement purely between the parents, and the children have no concern with it. Often they are not even informed of it. It appears that I was betrothed thrice, though without my knowledge. I was told that two girls chosen for me had died in turn, and therefore I infer that I was betrothed three times. I have a faint recollection, however, that the third betrothal took place in my seventh year. But I do not recollect having been informed about it. In the present chapter I am talking about my marriage, of which I have the clearest recollection.

It will be remembered that we were three brothers. The first was already married. The elders decided to marry my second brother, who was two or three years my senior, a cousin, possibly a year older, and me, all at the same time. In doing so there was no thought of our welfare, much less our wishes. It was purely a question of their own convenience and economy.

Marriage among Hindus is no simple matter. The parents of the bride and the bridegroom often bring themselves to ruin over it. They waste their substance, they waste their time. Months are taken up over the preparations—in making clothes and ornaments and in preparing budgets for dinners. Each tries to outdo the other in the number and variety of courses to be prepared. Women, whether they have a

voice or no, sing themselves hoarse, even get ill, and disturb the peace of their neighbours. These in their turn quietly put up with all the turmoil and bustle, all the dirt and filth, representing the remains of the feasts, because they know that a time will come when they also will be behaving in the same manner.

It would be better, thought my elders, to have all this bother over at one and the same time. Less expense and greater *eclat*. For money could be freely spent if it had only to be spent once instead of thrice. My father and my uncle were both old, and we were the last children they had to marry. It is likely that they wanted to have the last best time of their lives. In view of all these considerations, a triple wedding was decided upon, and as I have said before, months were taken up in preparation for it.

It was only through these preparations that we got warning of the coming event. I do not think it meant to me anything more than the prospect of good clothes to wear, drum beating, marriage processions, rich dinners and a strange girl to play with. The carnal desire came later. I propose to draw the curtain over my shame, except for a few details worth recording. To these I shall come later. But even they have little to do with the central idea I have kept before me in writing this story.

So my brother and I were both taken to Porbandar from Rajkot. These are some amusing details of the preliminaries to the final drama—*e.g.* smearing our bodies all over with turmeric paste—but I must omit them.

My father was a Diwan, but nevertheless a servant, and all the more so because he was in favour with the Thakore Saheb. The latter would not let him go until the last moment. And when he did so, he ordered for my father special stage coaches, reducing the journey by two days. But the fates had willed otherwise. Porbandar is 120 miles from Rajkot,—a cart journey of five days. My father did the distance in three, but the coach toppled over in the third stage, and he sustained severe injuries. He arrived bandaged all over. Both his and our interest in the coming event was half destroyed, but the ceremony had to be gone through. For how could the marriage dates be changed? However, I forgot my grief over my father's injuries in childish amusement of the wedding.

I was devoted to my parents. But no less was I devoted to the passions that flesh is heir to. I had yet to learn that all happiness and pleasure should be sacrificed in devoted service to my parents. And yet, as though by way of punishment for my desire for pleasures, an incident happened, which has ever since rankled in my mind and which I will relate later. Nishkulanand sings: 'Renunciation of objects, without the renunciations of desire, is short-lived, however hard you may try.' Whenever I sing this song or hear it sung, this bitter untoward incident rushes to my memory and fills me with shame.

My father put on a brave face in spite of his injuries, and took full part in the wedding. As I think of it, I can even today call before my mind's eye the places where he sat as he went through the different details of the ceremony. Little did I dream then that one day I should severely criticize my

father for having married me as a child. Everything on that day seemed to me right and proper and pleasing. There was also my own eagerness to get married. And as everything that my father did then struck me as beyond reproach, the recollection of those things is fresh in my memory. I can picture to myself, even today, how we sat on our wedding dais, how we performed the *Saptapadi*, how we, the newly wedded husband and wife, put the sweet *Kansar* into each other's mouth, and how we began to live together. And oh! that first night. Two innocent children all unwittingly hurled themselves into the ocean of life. My brother's wife had thoroughly coached me about my behaviour on the first night. I do not know who had coached my wife. I have never asked her about it, nor am I inclined to do so now. The reader may be sure that we were too nervous to face each other. We were certainly too shy. How was I to talk to her, and what was I to say? The coaching could not carry me far. But no coaching is really necessary in such matters. The impressions of the former birth are potent enough to make all coaching superfluous. We gradually began to know each other, and to speak freely together. We were the same age. But I took no time in assuming the authority of a husband.

Playing the Husband

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 11–14.

About the time of my marriage, little pamphlets costing a pice, or a pie (I now forget how much), used to be issued, in which conjugal love, thrift, child marriages, and other such subjects were discussed. Whenever I came across any of these, I used to go through them cover to cover, and it was a habit with me to forget what I did not like, and to carry out in practice whatever I liked. Lifelong faithfulness to the wife, inculcated in these booklets as the duty of the husband, remained permanently imprinted on my heart. Furthermore, the passion for truth was innate in me, and to be false to her was therefore out of the question. And then there was very little chance of my being faithless at that tender age.

But the lesson of faithfulness had also an untoward effect. 'If I should be pledged to be faithful to my wife, she also should be pledged to be faithful to me,' I said to myself. The thought made me a jealous husband. Her duty was easily converted into my right to exact faithfulness from her, and if it had to be exacted, I should be watchfully tenacious of the right. I had absolutely no reason to suspect my wife's fidelity, but jealousy does not wait for reasons. I must needs be for ever on the look-out regarding her movements, and therefore she could not go anywhere without my permission. This sowed the seeds of a bitter quarrel between us. The restraint was virtually a sort of imprisonment. And Kasturbai was not the girl to brook any such thing. She made it a point to go out whenever and wherever she liked. More restraint on my part resulted in more liberty being taken by her, and in my getting more and more cross. Refusal to speak to one another thus became the order of the day with us, married children. I think it was quite innocent of Kasturbai to have taken those liberties with my restrictions.

How could a guileless girl brook any restraint on going to the temple or on going on visits to friends? If I had the right to impose restrictions on her, had not she also a similar right? All this is clear to me today. But at that time I had to make good my authority as a husband!

Let not the reader think, however, that ours was a life of unrelieved bitterness. For my severities were all based on love. I wanted to *make* my wife an ideal wife. My ambition was to *make* her live a pure life, learn what I learnt, and identify her life and thought with mine.

I do not know whether Kasturbai had any such ambition. She was illiterate. By nature she was simple, independent, persevering, and with me least, reticent. She was not impatient of her ignorance and I do not recollect my studies having ever spurred her to go in for a similar adventure. I fancy, therefore, that my ambition was all one-sided. My passion was entirely centred on one woman, and I wanted it to be reciprocated. But even if there were no reciprocity, it could not be all unrelieved misery because there was active love on one side at least.

I must say I was passionately fond of her. Even at school I used to think of her and the thought of nightfall and our subsequent meeting was ever haunting me. Separation was unbearable. I used to keep her awake till late in the night with my idle talk. If with this devouring passion there had not been in me a burning attachment to duty, I should either have fallen a prey to disease and premature death, or have sunk into a burdensome existence. But the appointed tasks had to be gone through every morning, and lying to anyone was out of the question. It was this last thing that saved me from many a pitfall.

I have already said that Kasturbai was illiterate. I was very anxious to teach her, but lustful love left me no time. For one thing the teaching had to be done against her will, and that too at night. I dared not meet her in the presence of the elders, much less talk to her. Kathiawad had then, and to a certain extent has even today, its own peculiar useless and barbarous *Purdah*. Circumstances were thus unfavourable. I must therefore confess that most of my efforts to instruct Kasturbai in our youth were unsuccessful. And when I woke from the sleep of lust, I had already launched forth into public life, which did not leave me much spare time. I failed likewise to instruct her through private tutors. As a result Kasturbai can now with difficulty write simple letters and understand simple Gujarati. I am sure that, had my love for her been absolutely untainted with lust, she would be a learned lady today; for I could then have conquered her dislike for studies. I know that nothing is impossible for pure love.

I have mentioned one circumstance that more or less saved me from the disasters of lustful love. There is another worth noting. Numerous examples have convinced me that God ultimately saves him whose motive is pure. Along with the cruel custom of child marriages, Hindu society has another custom which to a certain extent diminishes the evils of the former. Parents do not allow young couples to stay together long. The child-wife spends more than half her time at her father's place. Such was the case with us. That is to say, during the first five years of our married life (from the

age of 13 to 18), we could not have lived together longer than an aggregate period of three years. We would hardly have spent six months together, when there would be a call to my wife from her parents. Such calls were very unwelcome in those days, but they saved us both. At the age of eighteen I went to England, and this meant a long and healthy spell of separation. Even after my return from England we hardly stayed together longer than six months. For I had to run up and down between Rajkot and Bombay. Then came the call from South Africa, and that found me already fairly free from the carnal appetite.

'A Himalayan Miscalculation'

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 469–471.

Almost immediately after the Ahmedabad meeting I went to Nadiad. It was here that I first used the expression 'Himalayan miscalculation' which obtained such a wide currency afterwards. Even at Ahmedabad I had begun to have a dim perception of my mistake. But when I reached Nadiad and saw the actual state of things there and heard reports about a large number of people from Kheda district having been arrested, it suddenly dawned upon me that I had committed a grave error in calling upon the people in the Kheda district and elsewhere to launch upon civil disobedience prematurely, as it now seemed to me. I was addressing a public meeting. My confession brought down upon me no small amount of ridicule. But I have never regretted having made that confession. For I have always held that it is only when one sees one's own mistakes with a convex lens, and does just the reverse in the case of others, that one is able to arrive at a just relative estimate of the two. I further believe that a scrupulous and conscientious observance of this rule is necessary for one who wants to be a Satyagrahi.

Let us now see what that Himalayan miscalculation was. Before one can be fit for the practice of civil disobedience one must have rendered a willing and respectful obedience to the state laws. For the most part we obey such laws out of fear of the penalty for their breach, and this holds good particularly in respect of such laws as do not involve a moral principle. For instance, an honest, respectable man will not suddenly take to stealing, whether there is a law against stealing or not, but this very man will not feel any remorse for failure to observe the rule about carrying head-lights on bicycles after dark. Indeed it is doubtful whether he would even accept advice kindly about being more careful in this respect. But he would observe any obligatory rule of this kind, if only to escape the inconvenience of facing a prosecution for a breach of the rule. Such compliance is not, however, the willing and spontaneous obedience that is required of a Satyagrahi. A Satyagrahi obeys the laws of society intelligently and of his own free will, because he considers it to be his sacred duty to do so. It is only when a person has thus obeyed the laws of society scrupulously that he is in a position to judge as to which particular rules are good and just and which unjust and iniquitous. Only then does the right accrue to him of the civil disobedience of certain laws in well-defined

circumstances. My error lay in my failure to observe this necessary limitation. I had called on the people to launch upon civil disobedience before they had thus qualified themselves for it, and this mistake seemed to me of Himalayan magnitude. As soon as I entered the Kheda district, all the old recollections of the Kheda Satyagraha struggle came back to me, and I wondered how I could have failed to perceive what was so obvious. I realized that before a people could be fit for offering civil disobedience, they should thoroughly understand its deeper implications. That being so, before restarting civil disobedience on a mass scale, it would be necessary to create a band of well-trying, pure-hearted volunteers who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of Satyagraha. They could explain these to the people, and by sleepless vigilance keep them on the right path.

With these thoughts filling my mind I reached Bombay, raised a corps of Satyagrahi volunteers through the Satyagraha Sabha there, and with their help commenced the work of educating the people with regard to the meaning and inner significance of Satyagraha. This was principally done by issuing leaflets of an educative character bearing on the subject.

But whilst this work was going on, I could see that it was a difficult task to interest the people in the peaceful side of Satyagraha. The volunteers too failed to enlist themselves in large numbers. Nor did all those who actually enlisted take anything like a regular systematic training, and as the days passed by, the number of fresh recruits began gradually to dwindle instead of to grow. I realized that the progress of the training in civil disobedience was not going to be as rapid as I had at first expected.

Congress Initiation

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 486–488.

I must regard my participation in Congress proceedings at Amritsar as my real entrance into the Congress politics. My attendance at the previous Congresses was nothing more perhaps than an annual renewal of allegiance to the Congress. I never felt on these occasions that I had any other work cut out for me except that of a mere private, nor did I desire more.

My experience of Amritsar had shown that there were one or two things for which perhaps I had some aptitude and which could be useful to the Congress. I could already see that the late Lokamanya, the Deshabandhu, Pandit Motilalji and other leaders were pleased with my work in connection with the Punjab inquiry. They used to invite me to their informal gatherings where, as I found, resolutions for the Subjects Committee were conceived. At these gatherings only those persons were invited who enjoyed the special confidence of the leaders and whose services were needed by them. Interlopers also sometimes found their way to these meetings.

There were, for the coming year, two things which interested me, as I had some aptitude for them. One of these was the memorial of the Jalianwala Bagh Massacre. The Con-

gress had passed a resolution for it amid great enthusiasm. A fund of about five lakhs had to be collected for it. I was appointed one of the trustees. Pandit Malaviyaji enjoyed the reputation of being the prince among beggars for the public cause. But I knew that I was not far behind him in that respect. It was whilst I was in South Africa that I discovered my capacity in this direction. I had not the unrivalled magic of Malaviyaji for commanding princely donations from the potentates of India. But I knew that there was no question of approaching the Rajas and Maharajas for donations for the Jalianwala Bagh memorial. The main responsibility for the collection thus fell, as I had expected, on my shoulders. The generous citizens of Bombay subscribed most liberally, and the memorial trust has at present a handsome credit balance in the bank. But the problem that faces the country today is what kind of memorial to erect on the ground, to sanctify which, Hindus, Musalmans and Sikhs mingled their blood. The three communities, instead of being bound in a bond of amity and love, are, to all appearance, at war with one another, and the nation is at a loss as to how to utilize the memorial fund.

My other aptitude which the Congress could utilize was as a draftsman. The Congress leaders had found that I had a faculty for condensed expression, which I had acquired by long practice. The then existing constitution of the Congress was Gokhale's legacy. He had framed a few rules which served as a basis for running the Congress machinery. The interesting history of the framing of these rules I had learnt from Gokhale's own lips. But everybody had now come to feel that these rules were no longer adequate for the ever increasing business of the Congress. The question had been coming up year after year. The Congress at that time had practically no machinery functioning during the interval between session and session, or for dealing with fresh contingencies that might arise in the course of the year. The existing rules provided for three secretaries, but as a matter of fact only one of them was a functioning secretary, and even he was not a whole-timer. How was he, single-handed, to run the Congress office, to think of the future, or to discharge during the current year the obligations contracted by the Congress in the past? During that year, therefore, everybody felt that this question would assume all the more importance. The Congress was too unwieldy a body for the discussion of public affairs. There was no limit set to the number of delegates in the Congress or to the number of delegates that each province could return. Some improvement upon the existing chaotic condition was thus felt by everybody to be an imperative necessity. I undertook the responsibility of framing a constitution on one condition. I saw that there were two leaders, *viz.*, the Lokamanya and the Deshabandhu who had the greatest hold on the public. I requested that they, as the representatives of people, should be associated with me on the Committee for framing the constitution. But since it was obvious that they would not have the time personally to participate in the constitution-making work, I suggested that two persons enjoying their confidence should be appointed along with me on the Constitution Committee, and that the number of its personnel should be limited to three. This suggestion was accepted by the late Lokamanya and the late

Deshabandhu, who suggested the names of Sjts. Kelkar and I. B. Sen respectively as their proxies. The Constitution Committee could not even once come together, but we were able to consult with each other by correspondence, and in the end presented a unanimous report. I regard this constitution with a certain measure of pride. I hold that, if we could fully work out this constitution, the mere fact of working it out would bring us Swaraj. With the assumption of this responsibility I may be said to have made my real entrance into the Congress politics.

The Birth of Khadi

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 489–491.

I do not remember to have seen a handloom or a spinning wheel when in 1908 I described it in *Hind Swaraj* as the panacea for the growing pauperism of India. In that book I took it as understood that anything that helped India to get rid of the grinding poverty of her masses would in the same process also established Swaraj. Even in 1915, when I returned to India from South Africa, I had not actually seen a spinning wheel. When the Satyagraha Ashram was founded at Sabarmati, we introduced a few handlooms there. But no sooner had we done this than we found ourselves up against a difficulty. All of us belonged either to the liberal professions or to business; not one of us was an artisan. We needed a weaving expert to teach us to weave before we could work the looms. One was at last procured from Palanpur, but he did not communicate to us the whole of his art. But Maganlal Gandhi was not to be easily baffled. Possessed of a natural talent for mechanics, he was able fully to master the art before long, and one after another several new weavers were trained up in the Ashram.

The object that we set before ourselves was to be able to clothe ourselves entirely in cloth manufactured by our own hands. We therefore forthwith discarded the use of mill-woven cloth, and all the members of the Ashram resolved to wear hand-woven cloth made from Indian yard only. The adoption of this practice brought us a world of experience. It enabled us to know, from direct contact, the conditions of life among the weavers, the extent of their production, the handicaps in the way of their obtaining their yarn supply, the way in which they were being made victims of fraud, and, lastly, their ever growing indebtedness. We were not in a position immediately to manufacture all the cloth for our needs. The alternative therefore was to get our cloth supply from handloom weavers. But ready-made cloth from Indian mill-yarn was not easily obtainable either from the cloth-dealers or from the weavers themselves. All the fine cloth woven by the weavers was from foreign yarn, since Indian mills did not spin fine counts. Even today the outturn of higher counts by Indian mills is very limited, whilst highest counts they cannot spin at all. It was after the greatest effort that we were at last able to find some weavers who condescended to weave Swadeshi yarn for us, and only on condition that the Ashram would take up all the cloth that they might produce. By thus adopting cloth woven from

mill-yarn as our wear, and propagating it among our friends, we made ourselves voluntary agents of the Indian spinning mills. This in its turn brought us into contact with the mills, and enabled us to know something about their management and their handicaps. We saw that the aim of the mills was more and more to weave the yarn spun by them; their cooperation with the handloom weaver was not willing, but unavoidable and temporary. We became impatient to be able to spin our own yarn. It was clear that, until we could do this ourselves, dependence on the mills would remain. We did not feel that we could render any service to the country by continuing as agents of Indian spinning mills.

No end of difficulties again faced us. We could get neither spinning wheel nor a spinner to teach us how to spin. We were employing some wheels for filling perarns and bobbins for weaving in the Ashram. But we had no idea that these could be used as spinning wheels. Once Kalidas Jhaveri discovered a woman who, he said, would demonstrate to us how spinning was done. We sent to her a member of the Ashram who was known for his great versatility in learning new things. But even he returned without wresting the secret of the art.

So the time passed on and my impatience grew with the time. I plied every chance visitor to the Ashram who was likely to possess some information about handspinning with questions about the art. But the art being confined to women and having been all but exterminated, if there was some stray spinner still surviving in some obscure corner, only a member of that sex was likely to find out her whereabouts.

In the year 1917 I was taken by my Gujarati friends to preside at the Broach Educational Conference. It was here that I discovered that remarkable lady Gangabehn Majmundar. She was a widow, but her enterprising spirit knew no bounds. Her education, in the accepted sense of the term, was not much. But in courage and commonsense she easily surpassed the general run of our educated women. She had already got rid of the curse of untouchability, and fearlessly moved among and served the suppressed classes. She had means of her own, and her needs were few. She had a well seasoned constitution, and went about everywhere without an escort. She felt quite at home on horseback. I came to know her more intimately at the Godhra Conference. To her I poured out my grief about the charkha, and she lightened my burden by a promise to prosecute an earnest and incessant search for the spinning wheel.

Found at Last!

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 491–494.

At last, after no end of wandering in Gujarat, Gangabehn found the spinning wheel in Vijapur in the Baroda State. Quite a number of people there had spinning wheels in their homes, but had long since consigned them to the lofts as useless lumber. They expressed to Gangabehn their readiness to resume spinning, if someone promised to provide them with a regular supply of slivers, and to buy the yarn spun by them. Gangabehn communicated the joyful news to

me. The providing of slivers was found to be a difficult task. On my mentioning the thing to the late Umar Sobani, he solved the difficulty by immediately undertaking to send a sufficient supply of slivers from his mill. I sent to Gangabehn the slivers received from Umar Sobani, and soon yarn began to pour in at such a rate that it became quite a problem how to cope with it.

Mr. Umar Sobani's generosity was great, but still one could not go on taking advantage of it for ever. I felt ill at ease, continuously receiving slivers from him. Moreover, it seemed to me to be fundamentally wrong to use mill-slivers. If one could use mill-slivers, why not use mill-yarn as well? Surely no mills supplied slivers to the ancients? How did they make their slivers then? With these thoughts in my mind I suggested to Gangabehn to find carders who could supply slivers. She confidently undertook the task. She engaged a carder who was prepared to card cotton. He demanded thirty-five rupees, if not much more, per month. I considered no price too high at the time. She trained a few youngsters to make slivers out of the carded cotton. I begged for cotton in Bombay. Sjt. Yashvantprasad Desai at once responded. Gangabehn's enterprise thus prospered beyond expectations. She found out weavers to weave the yarn that was spun in Vijapur, and soon Vijapur Khadi gained a name for itself.

While these developments were taking place in Vijapur, the spinning wheel gained a rapid footing in the Ashram. Maganlal Gandhi, by bringing to bear all his splendid mechanical talent on the wheel, made many improvements in it, and wheels and their accessories began to be manufactured at the Ashram. The first piece of Khadi manufactured in the Ashram cost 17 annas per yard. I did not hesitate to commend this very coarse Khadi at that rate to friends, who willingly paid the price.

I was laid up in bed at Bombay. But I was fit enough to make searches for the wheel there. At last I chanced upon two spinners. They charged one rupee for a seer of yarn, *i.e.*, 28 *tolas* or nearly three quarters of a pound. I was then ignorant of the economics of Khadi. I considered no price too high for securing handspun yarn. On comparing the rates paid by me with those paid in Vijapur I found that I was being cheated. The spinners refused to agree to any reduction in their rates. So I had to dispense with their service. But they served their purpose. They taught spinning to Shrimatis Avantikabai, Ramibai Kamdar, the widowed mother of Sjt. Shankarlal Banker and Shrimati Vasumatibehn. The wheel began merrily to hum in my room, and I may say without exaggeration that its hum had no small share in restoring me to health. I am prepared to admit that its effect was more psychological than physical. But then it only shows how powerfully the physical in man reacts to the psychological. I too set my hand to the wheel, but did not do much with it at the time.

In Bombay, again, the same old problem of obtaining a supply of hand-made slivers presented itself. A carder twanging his bow used to pass daily by Sjt. Revashankar's residence. I sent for him and learnt that he carded cotton for stuffing mattresses. He agreed to card cotton for slivers, but demanded a stiff price for it, which, however, I paid. The yarn

thus prepared I disposed of to some Vaishnava friends for making from it the garlands for the *pavitra ekadasbi*. Sjt. Shivji started a spinning class in Bombay. All these experiments involved considerable expenditure. But it was willingly defrayed by patriotic friends, lovers of the motherland, who had faith in Khadi. The money thus spent, in my humble opinion, was not wasted. It brought us a rich store of experience, and revealed to us the possibilities of the spinning wheel.

I now grew impatient for the exclusive adoption of Khadi for my dress. My *dboti* was still of Indian mill cloth. The coarse Khadi manufactured in the Ashram and at Vijapur was only 30 inches in width. I gave notice to Gangabehn that, unless she provided me with a Khadi *dboti* of 45 inches width within a month, I would do with coarse, short Khadi *dboti*. The ultimatum came upon her as a shock. But she proved equal to the demand made upon her. Well within the month she sent me a pair of Khadi *dbotis* of 45 inches width, and thus relieved me from what would then have been a difficult situation for me.

At about the same time Sjt. Lakshmidas brought Sjt. Ramji, the weaver, with his wife Gangabehn from Lathi to the Ashram and got Khadi *dbotis* woven at the Ashram. The part played by this couple in the spread of Khadi was by no means insignificant. They initiated a host of persons in Gujarat and also outside into the art of weaving handspun yarn. To see Gangabehn at her loom is a stirring sight. When this unlettered but self-possessed sister plies at her loom, she becomes so lost in it that it is difficult to distract her attention, and much more difficult to draw her eyes off her beloved loom.

An Instructive Dialogue

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 494–496.

From its very inception the Khadi movement, Swadeshi movement as it was then called, evoked much criticism from the mill-owners. The late Umar Sobani, a capable mill-owner himself, not only gave me the benefit of his own knowledge and experience, but kept me in touch with the opinion of the other mill-owners as well. The argument advanced by one of these deeply impressed him. He pressed me to meet him. I agreed. Mr. Sobani arranged the interview. The mill-owner opened the conversation.

'You know that there has been Swadeshi agitation before now?'

'Yes, I do,' I replied.

'You are also aware that in the days of the Partition we, the mill-owners, fully exploited the Swadeshi movement. When it was at its height, we raised the prices of cloth, and did even worse things.'

'Yes, I have heard something about it, and it has grieved me.'

'I can understand your grief, but I can see no ground for it. We are not conducting our business out of philanthropy. We do it for profit, we have got to satisfy the shareholders.'

The price of an article is governed by the demand for it. Who can check the law of demand and supply? The Bengalis should have known that their agitation was bound to send up the price of Swadeshi cloth by stimulating the demand for it.'

I interrupted: 'The Bengalis like me were trustful in their nature. They believed, in the fullness of their faith, that the mill-owners would not be so utterly selfish and unpatriotic as to betray their country in the hour of its need, and even to go the length, as they did, of fraudulently passing off foreign cloth as Swadeshi.'

'I knew your believing nature,' he rejoined; 'that is why I put you to the trouble of coming to me, so that I might warn you against falling into the same error as these simple-hearted Bengalis.'

With these words the mill-owner beckoned to his clerk who was standing by to produce samples of the stuff that was being manufactured in his mill. Pointing to it he said 'Look at this stuff. This is the latest variety turned out by our mill. It is meeting with a widespread demand. We manufacture it from the waste. Naturally, therefore, it is cheap. We send it as far North as the valleys of the Himalayas. We have agencies all over the country, even in places where your voice or your agents can never reach. You can thus see that we do not stand in need of more agents. Besides, you ought to know that India's production of cloth falls far short of its requirements. The question of Swadeshi, therefore, largely resolves itself into one of production. The moment we can increase our production sufficiently, and improve its quality to the necessary extent, the import of foreign cloth will automatically cease. My advice to you, therefore, is not to carry on your agitation on its present lines, but to turn your attention to the erection of fresh mills. What we need is not propaganda to inflate demand for our goods, but greater production.'

'Then, surely, you will bless my effort, if I am already engaged in that very thing,' I asked.

'How can that be?' he exclaimed, a bit puzzled, 'but may be, you are thinking of promoting the establishment of new mills, in which case you certainly deserve to be congratulated.'

'I am not doing exactly that,' I explained, 'but I am engaged in the revival of the spinning wheel.'

'What is that?' he asked, feeling still more at sea. I told him all about the spinning wheel, and the story of my long quest after it, and added, 'I am entirely of your opinion; it is no use my becoming virtually an agent for the mills. That would do more harm than good to the country. Our mills will not be in want of custom for a long time to come. My work should be, and therefore is, to organize the production of handspun cloth, and to find means for the disposal of the Khadi thus produced. I am, therefore, concentrating my attention on the production of Khadi. I swear by this form of Swadeshi, because through it I can provide work to the semi-starved, semi-employed women of India. My idea is to get these women to spin yarn, and to clothe the people of India with Khadi woven out of it. I do not know how far this movement is going to succeed, at present it is only in the incipient stage. But I have full faith in it. At any rate it can do no harm. On the contrary to the extent that it can add to

the cloth production of the country, be it ever so small, it will represent so much solid gain. You will thus perceive that my movement is free from the evils mentioned by you.'

He replied, 'If you have additional production in view in organizing your movement, I have nothing to say against it. Whether the spinning wheel can make headway in this age of power machinery is another question. But I for one wish you every success.'

Its Rising Tide

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 497–500.

I must not devote any more chapters here to a description of the further progress of Khadi. It would be outside the scope of these chapters to give a history of my various activities after they came before the public eye, and I must not attempt it, if only because to do so would require a treatise on the subject. My object in writing these chapters is simply to describe how certain things, as it were spontaneously, presented themselves to me in the course of my experiments with truth.

To resume, then, the story of the non-co-operation movement. Whilst the powerful Khilafat agitation set up by the Ali Brothers was in full progress, I had long discussions on the subject with the late Maulana Abdul Bari and the other *Ulema*, especially, with regard to the extent to which a Musalman could observe the rule of non-violence. In the end they all agreed that Islam did not forbid its followers from following non-violence as a policy, and further, that, while they were pledged to that policy, they were bound faithfully to carry it out. At last the non-co-operation resolution was moved in the Khilafat conference, and carried after prolonged deliberations. I have a vivid recollection how once at Allahabad a committee sat all night deliberating upon the subject. In the beginning the late Hakim Saheb was skeptical as to the practicability of non-violent non-co-operation. But after his skepticism was overcome he threw himself into it heart and soul, and his help proved invaluable to the movement.

Next, the non-co-operation resolution was moved by me at the Gujarat political conference that was held shortly afterwards. The preliminary contention raised by the opposition was that it was not competent to a provincial conference to adopt a resolution in advance of the Congress. As against this, I suggested that the restriction could apply only to a backward movement; but as for going forward, the subordinate organizations were not only fully competent, but were in duty bound to do so, if they had in them the necessary grit and confidence. No permission, I argued, was needed to try to enhance the prestige of the parent institution, provided one did it at one's own risk. The proposition was then discussed on its merits, the debate being marked by its keenness no less than the atmosphere of 'sweet reasonableness' in which it was conducted. On the ballot being taken the resolution was declared carried by an overwhelming majority. The successful passage of the resolution was due not a little to the personality of Sjt. Vallabhbhai and

Abbas Tyabji. The latter was the president, and his leanings were all in favour of the non-co-operation resolution.

The All-India Congress Committee resolved to hold a special session of the Congress in September 1920 at Calcutta to deliberate on this question. Preparations were made for it on a large scale. Lala Lajpat Rai was elected President. Congress and Khilafat specials were run to Calcutta from Bombay. At Calcutta there was a mammoth gathering of delegates and visitors.

At the request of Maulana Shaukat Ali I prepared a draft of the non-co-operation resolution in the train. Up to this time I had more or less avoided the use of the word non-violent in my drafts. I invariably made use of this word in my speeches. My vocabulary on the subject was still in process of formation. I found that I could not bring home my meaning to purely Moslem audiences with the help of the Samskrit equivalent for non-violent. I therefore asked Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to give me some other equivalent for it. He suggested the word *ba-aman*; similarly for non-co-operation he suggested the phrase *tark-i-mavalat*.

Thus, while I was still busy devising suitable Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu phraseology for non-co-operation, I was called upon to frame the non-co-operation resolution for that eventful Congress. In the original draft the word 'non-violent' had been left out by me. I had handed over the draft to Maulana Shaukat Ali who was traveling in the same compartment, without noticing the omission. During the night I discovered the error. In the morning I sent Mahadev with the message that the omission should be made good before the draft was sent to the press. But I have an impression that the draft was printed before the insertion could be made. The Subjects Committee was to have met the same evening. I had therefore to make the necessary correction in the printed copies of the draft. I afterwards saw that there would have been great difficulty, had I not been ready with my draft.

None the less my plight was pitiable indeed. I was absolutely at sea as to who would support the resolution and who would oppose it. Nor had I any idea as to the attitude that Lalaji would adopt. I only saw an imposing phalanx of veteran warriors assembled for the fray at Calcutta, Dr. Besant, Pandit Malaviyaji, Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari, Pandit Motilalji and Deshabandhu being some of them.

In my resolution non-co-operation was postulated only with a view to obtaining redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat wrongs. That however, did not appeal to Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari. 'If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be with reference to particular wrongs? The absence of Swaraj was the biggest wrong that the country was labouring under; it should be against that that non-co-operation should be directed,' he argued. Pandit Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj to be included in the resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion and incorporated the demand for Swaraj in my resolution, which was passed after an exhaustive, serious and somewhat stormy discussion.

Motilalji was the first to join the movement. I still remember the sweet discussion that I had with him on the

resolution. He suggested some changes in its phraseology which I adopted. He undertook to win the Deshabandhu for the movement. The Deshabandhu's heart was inclined towards it, but he felt sceptical as to the capacity of the people to carry out the programme. It was only at the Nagpur Congress that he and Lalaji accepted it whole-heartedly.

I felt the loss of the late Lokamanya very deeply at the special session. It has been my firm faith to this day that, had the Lokamanya been then alive, he would have given his benedictions to me on that occasion. But even if it had been otherwise, and he had opposed the movement, I should still have esteemed his opposition as a privilege and an education for myself. We had our differences of opinion always, but they never led to bitterness. He always allowed me to believe that the ties between us were of the closest. Even as I write these lines, the circumstances of his death stand forth vividly before my mind's eye. It was about the hour of midnight, when Patwardhan, who was then working with me, conveyed over the telephone the news of his death. I was at that time surrounded by my companions. Spontaneously the exclamation escaped my lips, 'My strongest bulwark is gone.' The non-co-operation movement was then in full swing, and I was eagerly looking forward to encouragement and inspiration from him. What his attitude would have been with regard to the final phase of non-co-operation will always be a matter of speculation, and an idle one at that. But this much is certain—that the deep void left by his death weighed heavily upon everybody present at Calcutta. Everyone felt the absence of his counsels in that hour of crisis in the nation's history.

At Nagpur

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 500–502.

The resolutions adopted at the Calcutta special session of the Congress were to be confirmed at its annual session at Nagpur. Here again, as at Calcutta there was a great rush of visitors and delegates. The number of delegates in the Congress had not been limited yet. As a result, so far as I can remember, the figure on this occasion reached about fourteen thousand. Lalaji pressed for a slight amendment to the clause about the boycott of schools, which I accepted. Similarly some amendments were made at the instance of the Deshabandhu, after which the non-co-operation resolution was passed unanimously.

The resolution regarding the revision of the Congress constitution too was to be taken up at this session of the Congress. The sub-committee's draft was presented at the Calcutta special session. The matter had therefore been thoroughly ventilated and thrashed out. At the Nagpur session, where it came up for final disposal, Sjt. C. Vijayaraghavachariar was the President. The Subjects Committee passed the draft with only one important change. In my draft the number of delegates had been fixed, I think at 1,500; the Subjects Committee substituted in its place the figure 6,000. In my opinion this increase was the result of hasty judgment, and experience of all these years has only confirmed me in

my view. I hold it to be an utter delusion to believe that a large number of delegates is in any way a help to the better conduct of the business, or that it safeguards the principle of democracy. Fifteen hundred delegates, jealous of the interests of the people, broad-minded and truthful, would any day be a better safeguard for democracy than six thousand irresponsible men chosen anyhow. To safeguard democracy the people must have a keen sense of independence, self-respect and their oneness, and should insist upon choosing as their representatives only such persons as are good and true. But obsessed with the idea of numbers as the Subjects Committee was, it would have liked to go even beyond the figure of six thousand. The limit of six thousand was therefore in the nature of a compromise.

The question of the goal of the Congress formed a subject for keen discussion. In the constitution that I had presented, the goal of the Congress was the attainment of Swaraj within the British Empire if possible and without if necessary. A party in the Congress wanted to limit the goal to Swaraj within the British Empire only. Its viewpoint was put forth by Pandit Malaviyaji and Mr. Jinnah. But they were not able to get many votes. Again the draft constitution provided that the means for the attainment were to be peaceful and legitimate. This condition too came in for opposition, it being contended that there should be no restriction upon the means to be adopted. But the Congress adopted the original draft after an instructive and frank discussion. I am of opinion that, if this constitution had been worked out by the people honestly, intelligently and zealously, it would have become a potent instrument of mass education, and the very process of working it out would have brought us Swaraj. But a discussion of the theme would be irrelevant here.

Resolutions about Hindu-Muslim unity, the removal of untouchability and Khadi too were passed in this Congress, and since then the Hindu members of the Congress have taken upon themselves the responsibility of ridding Hinduism of the curse of untouchability, and the Congress has established a living bond of relationship with the 'skeletons' of India through Khadi. The adoption of non-co-operation for the sake of the Khilafat was itself a great practical attempt made by the Congress to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity.

Farewell

SOURCE: Gandhi, Mohandas K. *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 503–505.

The time has now come to bring these chapters to a close.

My life from this point onward has been so public that there is hardly anything about it that people do not know. Moreover, since 1921 I have worked in such close association with the Congress leaders that I can hardly describe any episode in my life since then without referring to any relations with them. For though Shradhdhanandji, the Deshabandhu, Hakim Saheb and Lalaji are no more with us today, we have the good luck to have a host of other veteran

Congress leaders still living and working in our midst. The history of the Congress, since the great changes in it that I have described above, is still in the making. And my principal experiments during the past seven years have all been made through the Congress. A reference to my relations with the leaders would therefore be unavoidable, if I set about describing my experiments further. And this I may not do, at any rate for the present, if only from a sense of propriety. Lastly, my conclusions from my current experiments can hardly as yet be regarded as decisive. It therefore seems to be my plain duty to close this narrative here. In fact my pen instinctively refuses to proceed further.

It is not without a wrench that I have to take leave of the reader. I set a high value on my experiments. I do not know whether I have been able to do justice to them. I can only say that I have spared no pains to give a faithful narrative. To describe truth, as it has appeared to me and in the exact manner in which I have arrived at it, has been my ceaseless effort. The exercise has given me ineffable mental peace, because, it has been my fond hope that it might bring faith in Truth and Ahimsa to waverers.

My uniform experience has convinced me that there is no other God than Truth. And if every page of these chapters does not proclaim to the reader that the only means for the realization of Truth is Ahimsa, I shall deem all my labour in writing these chapters to have been in vain. And, even though my efforts in this behalf may prove fruitless, let the readers know that the vehicle, not the great principle, is at fault. After all, however sincere my strivings after Ahimsa may have been, they have still been imperfect and inadequate. The little fleeting glimpses, therefore, that I have been able to have of Truth can hardly convey an idea of the indescribable luster of Truth, a million times more intense than that of the sun we daily see with our eyes. In fact what I have caught is only the faintest glimmer of that mighty effulgence. But this much I can say with assurance, as a result of all my experiments, that a perfect vision of Truth can only follow a complete realization of Ahimsa.

To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics; and I can say without the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, that those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means.

Identification with everything that lives is impossible without self-purification; without self-purification the observance of the law of Ahimsa must remain an empty dream; God can never be realized by one who is not pure of heart. Self-purification therefore must mean purification in all the walks of life. And purification being highly infectious, purification of oneself necessarily leads to the purification of ones' surroundings.

But the path of self-purification is hard and steep. To attain to perfect purity one has to become absolutely passion-free in thought, speech and action; to rise above the opposing currents of love and hatred, attachment and

repulsion. I know that I have not in me as yet that triple purity, in spite of constant ceaseless striving for it. That is why the world's praise fails to move me, indeed it very often stings me. To conquer the subtle passions seems to me to be harder far than the physical conquest of the world by the force of arms. Ever since my return to India I have had experiences of the dormant passions lying hidden within me. The knowledge of them has made me feel humiliated though not defeated. The experiences and experiments have sustained me and given me great joy. But I know that I have still before me a difficult path to traverse. I must reduce myself to zero. So long as a man does not of his own free will put himself last among his fellow creatures, there is no salvation for him. Ahimsa is the farthest limit of humility.

In bidding farewell to the reader, for the time being at any rate, I ask him to join with me in prayer to the God of Truth that He may grant me the boon of Ahimsa in mind, word and deed.

Jawaharlal Nehru's Speech on the Assassination of Mahatma M. K. Gandhi

Introduction

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) was one of Mahatma Gandhi's most devoted followers and this speech he gave on Air India Radio on the day that Gandhi was assassinated is one of his most sensitive and one of his finest. Along with his "Tryst with Destiny" speech, given to mark India's independence in August 1947, this talk must rank as one of his most memorable and one of the elevated speeches of history. At this time of tragedy, when Nehru was visibly brokenhearted, he called for the continuation of Gandhi's teachings of love for others, for nonviolence, and for living up to the great principles by which he lived his life. Nehru and Gandhi were so different in many ways, not least of which was their attitude toward modernization. Nehru was a Utopian Marxist who believed in socialistic planning and industrialization while Gandhi had little faith in either. Yet Nehru, like so many people, was devoted to Gandhi from the time that he first followed Gandhi in "National Week" in 1919 to protest the Black Acts. For Nehru as well as for many others, Gandhi was an enigma and his ways and methods were sometimes hard to comprehend. But time and again, as during the Salt March of 1930, Nehru recognized the brilliance of Gandhi's tactics in Indian eyes and followed him devotedly. For some thirty years Nehru would seek Gandhi out or, as he put in his broadcast, he would "run to him and seek solace from him." This devotion of Nehru (himself one of the great figures of history) to Gandhi, and his depiction of the role that Gandhi played for him and for India and the world is sensitively portrayed in this broadcast.

The Light Has Gone Out

SOURCE: Norman, Dorothy, ed. *Nehru: The First Sixty Years*. Vol. 2. London: The Bodley Head, 1965, pp. 364–366.

them, and assures them of her largess. She drives away bad dreams and opens the gates of darkness. In another hymn, Rig Veda VI:6,7 Usha delivers men from the power of curses. She is a young maiden dressed gaily and reveals her bosom to mortals. The sun follows her as a lover and she is known as the wife and beloved of Sūrya, the sun god. The lovely goddess brings wealth, long life, fame, and glory.

Rig Veda I:113 Usha the Dawn

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 16–17.

Selections from Hindu Texts

Introduction

The Rig Veda, consisting of 1,028 hymns, is the oldest of the four collections of the Vedas, from the Sanskrit word *vid* (to know). The other Vedas are the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, and the Arthava Veda. Each of the four Vedas consists of two parts, the Saṃhitā, consisting of hymns and incantations used in rituals and sacrifices, and the Brāhmaṇa, offering exegeses on ritual. The Rig Veda, composed over several centuries by generations of poets, marks the beginning of Hindu religious–philosophical thought. From the worship of many gods such as Usha and Indra, the concept of monism—as represented by the Upanishads—arises. Hinduism offers guidance to every aspect of life and for every stage of life. The special characteristic of Hinduism is the concept of the transmigration of souls. Doing one’s duty is the key to living a virtuous life and this can be expressed in devotion to god. These ideas are expressed in the readings that follow.

The poems dedicated to the Goddess Usha, the Goddess of Dawn, are among the most beautiful in the Vedas. She is the subject of twenty hymns and her name is invoked 300 times in the Saṃhitā. In Rig Veda I:48 she is referred to as “Daughter of the Sky, the Lady of Light.” She was also called the mother of the gods. She tends to everything, rouses man and animals to activity, encourages

Rig Veda I:32 Indra

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 18–20.

Rig Veda X:90 Sacrifice as Creator

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 25–26.

Rig Veda X:129 The One as Creator

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 26–27.

The Four Stages of Life

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 84–93.

Bhagavad Gītā II:11–30, 55–59

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 120–122.

Bhagavad Gītā, The Way of Salvation: Duty

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 122–124.

Gītā Govinda

SOURCE: Embree, Ainslee T., *The Hindu Tradition*. New York: The Modern Library, 1966, pp. 169–170.

Selections from the Upanishads

Introduction

The Upanishads, literally “to sit down in front of,” are philosophical ideas of the Vedic Indo-Europeans created in dialogue form and transmitted by gurus to students. They were memorized by rote learning, hence they are called *smritis* as opposed to the *śrutis*, which were Vedic texts to be recited and heard. Collectively, they are also called Vedānta, “the end of the Vedas.” They are not concerned with rituals or sacrifices but with abstract speculations about truth and reality, the knowledge of which would enable a person to attain release (*moksha*) from the cycle of birth and rebirth. They revolve around the concepts of *Brahman* (the Absolute) and *ātman* (the Self or individual soul). They are mostly written in prose although a few are in verse. They are pre-Buddhist and the earliest were written in archaic Sanskrit but some are later compositions. There are 108 extant dialogues but Shankara (8th century), who expounded the monism of Vedānta through his “Brahman is reality, the world is illusion, and the soul is God,” wrote commentaries on twelve of the thirteen Upanishads considered to be the original treatises. Each Upanishad was attached to a Brāhmaṇa, a supplement of a Veda. Representing different philosophic schools, some of the Upanishads expound monistic ideas, some stress the worship of a personal god, and others focus on the practice of yoga.

Yājñavalkya the sage had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani, and when—in the “Fourth Brāhmaṇa”—he wished to make a settlement on them and depart on another phase of his life as an ascetic, his favorite wife Maitreyi asked him whether she would be immortal if the settlement he made on her would make her wealthy. When he replied that wealth would not bring immortality she asked him, therefore, what was the good of wealth? Instead he should give her knowledge. He was touched by this reply and informed her that she should see, know, perceive, and hear the *ātman*. Once she had understood that there was only consciousness of the Self and that nothing else was real then she would achieve immortality. With that he departed, content that his message—that the only reality was the one when the soul had joined in unity with the Absolute—had been understood.

Throughout the Upanishads the soul of the individual is identified with the soul of the universe and is considered the only reality. There were many ways to achieve understanding of this and renunciation was one of them. A life of asceticism was not absolutely necessary to achieve salvation—even rulers could realize Brahman—but if a mind was filled with material cares then it was very difficult. Thus, the renouncing of all pleasures, including the joy of family, was one of the ways to achieve salvation. This is the message of the “Fifth Brāhmaṇa.”

In the “Sixth Brāhmaṇa,” the delightful conversation between the learned lady Gārgī and Yājñavalkya instructs her not to think too much and not to ask too many questions. This offers the Upanishadic message that salvation comes through an abstract and instinctual understanding of the reality of Brahman and not through sacrifices and good works. This reflects the Upanishadic method of explanation of the path to salvation. The nature of the *ātman* was not expressed in concrete terms but in negative ones as “not this, not that” (*neti, neti*). It was a totally abstract entity that could not be assailed. This is seen in the “Seventh Brāhmaṇa,” which heralded that an understanding of the path of salvation would lead to the freedom from all desires and that, in turn, would lead to unity with Brahman in a state of bliss that existed before creation itself.

Śvetatāku is one of the most familiar interlocutors in the Upanishads and his dialogues in the ninth through fourteenth khandu are some of the most endearing, most celebrated, and most cited. Śvetatāku was a conceited youth who had studied with brahmins for twelve years. In one renowned dialogue he was instructed to fetch a fig, to divide it, to divide the seeds, and to explain what he saw. When he said nothing, he was informed that what he missed was the essence of the fig and that the whole world had it as its soul. That was reality, *ātman*, and that too was Śvetatāku. In the parable of the salt in the water he was asked to place some salt in water and come back the next morning and explain where the salt was. When he said he could not find it he was asked to sip the water from two ends and the middle. He said that it was always the same but was told that it contained the finest essence which was the whole world, which was *ātman*, which was Śvetatāku.

The Fourth Brāhmaṇa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas. 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 98–102.*

The conversation of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī concerning the pantheistic Soul

1. ‘Maitreyī!’ said Yājñavalkya, ‘lo, verily, I am about to go forth from this state. Behold! let me make a final settlement for you and that Kātyāyanī,’

2. Then said Maitreyī: ‘If now, sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be immortal thereby?’

‘No,’ said Yājñavalkya. ‘As the life of the rich, even so would your life be. Of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth.’

3. Then said Maitreyī: ‘What should I do with that through which I may not be immortal? What you know, sir—that, indeed, tell me!’

4. Then said Yājñavalkya: ‘Ah (*bata*)! Lo (*are*), dear (*priyā*) as you are to us, dear is what you say! Come, sit down. I will

explain to you. But while I am expounding, do you seek to ponder thereon.’

5. Then said he: ‘Lo, verily, not for love of the husband is a husband dear, but for love of the Soul (*Ātman*) a husband is dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of the wife is a wife dear, but for love of the Soul a wife is dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of the sons are sons dear, but for love of the Soul sons are dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of the wealth is wealth dear, but for love of the Soul wealth is dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of Brahmanhood (*brabma*) is Brahmanhood dear, but for love of the Soul Brahmanhood is dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of Kshatrahood (*ksatra*) is Brahman dear, but for love of the Soul Kshatrahood is dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of the worlds are the worlds dear, but for love of the Soul the worlds are dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of the gods are the gods dear, but for love of the Soul the gods are dear.

Lo, verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the Soul all is dear.

Lo, verily, it is the Soul (*Ātman*) that should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on, O Maitreyī. Lo, verily, with the seeing of, with the hearkening of the Soul, this world-all is known.

6. Brahmanhood has deserted him who knows Brahmanhood in aught else than the Soul.

Kshatrahood has deserted him who knows Kshatrahood in aught else than the Soul.

The Worlds have deserted him who knows the worlds in aught else than the Soul.

The gods have deserted him who knows the gods in aught else than the Soul.

Beings have deserted him who knows beings in aught else than the Soul.

Everything has deserted him who knows everything in aught else than the Soul.

This Brahmanhood, this Kshatrahood, these worlds, these gods, these beings, everything here is what this Soul is.

7. It is—as, when a drum is being beaten, one would not be able to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the drum or the beater of the drum the sound is grasped.

8. It is—as, when a conch-shell is being blown, one would not be able to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the conch-shell or the blower of the conch-shell the sound is grasped.

9. It is—as, when a lute is being played, one would not be able to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the lute or the player of the lute the sound is grasped.

10. It is—as, from a fire laid with damp fuel, clouds of smoke separately issue forth, so, lo, verily, from this great Being (*bbūta*) has been breathed forth that which is

Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, [Hymns] of the Atharvans and Āngirases, Legend (*itibāsa*), Ancient Lore (*purāna*), Sciences (*vidyā*), Mystic Doctrines (*upanīṣad*), Verses (*śloka*), Aphorisms (*sūtra*), Explanations (*anuvyākhyāna*), and Commentaries (*vyākhyāna*). From it, indeed, are all these breathed forth.

11. It is—as of all waters the uniting-point is the sea, so of all touches the uniting-point is the skin, so of all tastes the uniting-point is the tongue, so of all smells the uniting-point is the nostrils, so of all forms the uniting-point is the eye, so of all sounds the uniting-point is the ear, so of all intentions (*saṅkalpa*) the uniting-point is the mind (*manas*), so of all knowledges the uniting-point is the heart, so of all acts (*karma*) the uniting-point is the hands, so of all pleasures (*ānanda*) the uniting-point is the generative organ, so of all evacuations the uniting-point is the anus, so of all journeys the uniting-point is the feet, so of all Vedas the uniting-point is speech.

12. It is—as a lump of salt cast in water would dissolve right into the water; there would not be [any] of it to seize forth, as it were (*iva*), but wherever one may take, it is salty indeed—so, lo, verily, this great Being (*bbūta*), infinite, limitless, is just a mass of knowledge (*vijñāna-ghana*).

Arising out of these elements (*bbūta*), into them also one vanishes away. After death there is no consciousness (*na pretya samjñā 'sti*). Thus, lo, say I.’ Thus spake Yājñavalkya.

13. Then spake Maitreyī: ‘Herein, indeed, you have bewildered me, sir—in saying (*iti*): “After death there is no consciousness!”’

Then spake Yājñavalkya: ‘Lo, verily, I speak not bewilderment (*moha*). Sufficient, lo, verily, is this for understanding.

14. For where this is a duality (*dvaita*), as it were (*iva*), there one sees another; there one smells another; there one hears another; there one speaks to another; there one thinks another; there one understands another. Where, verily, everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby and whom would one smell? then whereby and whom would one see? then whereby and whom would one hear? then whereby and to whom would one speak? then whereby and on whom would one think? then whereby and whom would one understand? Whereby would one understand him by whom one understands this All? Lo, whereby would one understand the understander?’

The Fifth Brāhmana

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 112–113.

The practical way of knowing Brahma—by renunciation

Now Kahola Kaushītakeya questioned him. ‘Yājñavalkya,’ said he, ‘explain to me him who is just the Brahma present and not beyond our ken, him who is the Soul in all things.’

‘He is your soul, which is in all things.’

‘Which one, O Yājñavalkya, is in all things?’

‘He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond sorrow and delusion, beyond old age and death—Brahmans who know such a Soul overcome desire for sons, desire for wealth, desire for worlds, and live the life of mendicants. For desire for sons is desire for wealth, and desire for wealth is desire for worlds, for both these are merely desires. Therefore let a Brahman become disgusted with learning and desire to live as a child. When he has become disgusted both with the state of childhood and with learning, then he becomes an ascetic (*muni*). When he has become disgusted both with the non-ascetic state and with the ascetic state, then he becomes a Brahman.’

‘By what means would he become a Brahman?’

‘By that means by which he does become such a one. Aught else than this Soul (*Ātman*) is wretched.’

Thereupon Kahola Kaushītakeya held his peace.

The Sixth Brāhmana

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 113–114.

The regressus to Brahma, the ultimate world-ground

Then Gārgī Vācāknvī questioned him. ‘Yājñavalkya,’ said she, ‘since all this world is woven, warp and woof, on water, on what, pray, is the water woven, warp and woof?’

‘On wind, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, is the wind woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the atmosphere-worlds, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the atmosphere-worlds woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the Gandharvas woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of the sun, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the sun woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of the moon, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the moon woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of the stars, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the stars woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of the gods, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the gods woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of Indra, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Indra woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of Prajāpati, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Prajāpati woven, warp and woof?’

‘On the worlds of Brahma, O Gārgī.’

‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Brahma woven, warp and woof?’

Yājñavalkya said: ‘Gārgī, do not question too much, lest your head fall off. In truth, you are questioning too much about a divinity about which further questions cannot be asked. Gārgī, do not over-question.’

Thereupon Gārgī Vācāknvī held her peace.

The Soul of the Unreleased after Death

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 140–141.

3. Now as a caterpillar, when it has come to the end of a blade of grass, in taking the next step draws itself together towards it, just so this soul in taking the next step strikes down this body, dispels its ignorance, and draws itself together [for making the transition].

4. As a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, reduces it to another newer and more beautiful form, just so this soul, striking down this body and dispelling its ignorance, makes for itself another newer and more beautiful form like that either of the fathers, or of the Gandharvas, or of the gods, or of Prajāpati, or of Brahma, or of other beings.

5. Verily, this soul is Brahma, made of knowledge, of mind, of breath, of seeing, of hearing, of earth, of water, of wind, of space, of energy and of non-energy, of desire, of anger and of non-anger, of virtuousness and of non-virtuousness. It is made of everything. This is what is meant by the saying “made of this, made of that.”

According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action.

But people say: “A person is made [not of acts, but] of desires only.” [In reply to this I say:] As is his desire, such is his resolve; as his resolve, such the action he performs; what action (*karma*) he performs, that he procures for himself.

6. On this point there is this verse:—

Where one’s mind is attached—the inner self
Goes thereto with action, being attached to it alone.
Obtaining the end of his action,

Whatever he does in this world,
He comes again from that world
To this world of action.

—So the man who desires.

The Soul of the Released

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by*

George C. O. Haas. 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 141–144.

Now the man who does not desire.—He who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the Soul—his breaths do not depart. Being very Brahma, he goes to Brahma.

7. On this point there is this verse:—

When are liberated all
The desires that lodge in one's heart,
Then a mortal becomes immortal!
Therein he reaches Brahma!

As the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body. But this incorporeal, immortal Life (*prāṇa*) is Brahma indeed, is light indeed.'

'I will give you, noble sir, a thousand [cows],' said Janaka, [king] of Videha.

8. [Yājñavalkya continued:] 'On this point there are these verses:—

The ancient narrow path that stretches far away
Has been touched by me, had been found by me.
By it the wise, the knowers of Brahma, go up
Hence to the heavenly world, released.

9. On it, they say, is white and blue
And yellow and green and red.
That was the path by Brahma found;
By it goes the knower of Brahma, the doer of right
(*punya-kri*),
and every shining one.

10. Into blind darkness enter they
That worship ignorance;
Into darkness greater than that, as it were, they
That delight in knowledge.

11. Joyless are those worlds called,
Covered with blind darkness.
To them after death go those
People that have not knowledge, that are not awakened.

12. If a person knew the Soul (*Ātman*),
With the thought "I am he!"
With what desire, for love of what
Would he cling unto the body?

13. He who has found and has awakened to the Soul
That has entered this conglomerate abode—
He is the maker of everything, for he is the creator of all;
The world is his: indeed, he is the world itself.

14. Verily, while we are here we may know this.
If you have known it not, great is the destruction.
Those who know this become immortal,
But others go only to sorrow.

15. If one perceives Him
As the Soul, as God (*deva*), clearly,
As the Lord of what has been and of what is to be—
One does not shrink away from Him.

16. That before which the year
Revolves with its days—
That the gods reverse as the light of lights,
As life immortal.

17. On whom the five peoples
And space are established—
Him alone I, the knowing, I, the immortal,
Believe to be the Soul, the immortal Brahma.

18. They who know the breathing of the breath,
The seeing of the eye, the hearing of the ear,
(The food of food), the thinking of the mind—
They have recognized the ancient, primeval Brahma.

19. By the mind alone is It to be perceived.
There is on earth no diversity.
He gets death after death,
Who perceives here seeming diversity.

20. As a unity only is It to be looked upon—
This indemonstrable, enduring Being,
Spotless, beyond space,
The unborn Soul, great, enduring.

21. By knowing Him only, a wise
Brahman should get for himself intelligence;
He should not meditate upon many words,
For that is a weariness of speech.

22. Verily, he is the great, unborn Soul, who is this [person] consisting of knowledge among the senses. In the space within the heart lies the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not become greater by good action nor inferior by bad action. He is the lord of all, the overlord of beings, the protector of beings. He is the separating dam for keeping these worlds apart.

Such a one the Brahmans desire to know by repetition of the Vedas, by sacrifices, by offerings, by penance, by fasting. On knowing him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic (*muni*). Desiring him only as their home, mendicants wander forth.

Verily, because they know this, the ancients desired not offspring, saying: "What shall we do with offspring, we whose is this Soul, this world?" They, verily, rising above the desire for sons and the desire for wealth and the desire for worlds, lived the life of a mendicant. For the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds; for both these are desires.

That Soul (*Ātman*) is not this, it is not that (*neti, neti*). It is unseizable, for it cannot be seized. It is indestructible, for it cannot be destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unbound. It does not tremble. It is not injured.

Him [who knows this] these two do not overcome—neither the thought "Hence I did wrong," nor the thought "Hence I did right." Verily, he overcomes them both. What he has done and what he has not done do not affect him.

23. This very [doctrine] has been declared in the verse:—
This eternal greatness of a Brahman
Is not increased by deeds (*karman*), nor diminished.
One should be familiar with it. By knowing it,
One is not stained by evil action.

Therefore, having this knowledge, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring, and collected, one sees the Soul just in the soul. One sees everything as the Soul.

Evil does not overcome him; he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him: he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from impurity, free from doubt, he becomes a Brahman.

This is the Brahma-world, O king,' said Yājñavalkya.

[Janaka said:] 'I will give you, noble sir, the Videhas and myself also to be your slave.'

24. [Yājñavalkya continued:] 'This is that great, unborn Soul, who eats the food [which people eat], the giver of good. He finds good who knows this.

25. Verily, that great, unborn Soul, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is Brahma. Verily, Brahma is fearless. He who knows this becomes the fearless Brahma.'

The Ninth Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 246.

The unitary World-Soul, the immanent reality of all things and of man

1. 'As the bees, my dear, prepare honey by collecting the essences of different trees and reducing the essence to a unity,

[2.] as they are not able to discriminate "I am the essence of this tree," "I am the essence of that tree"—even so, indeed, my dear, all creatures here, though they reach Being, know not "We have reached Being."

3. Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, or worm, or fly, or gnat, or mosquito, that they become.

4. That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.'

'Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.'

'So be it, my dear,' said he.

The Tenth Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 246–247.

1. 'These rivers, my dear, flow, the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west. They go just from the ocean to the ocean. They become the ocean itself. As there they know not "I am this one," "I am that one"—[2] even so, indeed, my dear, all creatures here, though they have come forth Being, know not "We have come forth from Being." Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, or worm, or fly, or gnat, or mosquito, that they become.

3. That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.

'Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.'

'So be it, my dear,' said he.

The Eleventh Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 247.

1. 'Of this great tree, my dear, if some one should strike at the root, it would bleed, but still live. If some one should strike at this middle, it would bleed, but still live. If some one should strike at its top, it would bleed, but still live. Being pervaded by Atman (Soul), it continues to stand, eagerly drinking in moisture and rejoicing.

2. If the life leaves one branch of it, then it dries up. It leaves a second; then that dries up. It leaves a third; then that dries up. It leaves the whole; the whole dries up. Even so, indeed, my dear, understand,' said he.

3. Verily, indeed, when life has left it, this body dies. The life does not die.

That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.'

'Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.'

'So be it, my dear,' said he.

The Twelfth Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 247–248.

1. 'Bring hither a fig from there.'

'Here it is, sir.'

'Divide it.'

'It is divided, sir.'

'What do you see there?'

'These rather (*iva*) fine seeds, sir.'

'Of these, please (*aṅga*), divide one.'

'It is divided, sir.'

'What do you see there?'

'Nothing at all, sir.'

2. Then he said to him: 'Verily, my dear, that finest essence which you do not perceive—verily, my dear, from that finest essence this great Nyagrodha (sacred fig) tree thus arises.

3. Believe me, my dear,' said he, (3) 'that which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.'

'Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.'

'So be it, my dear,' said he.

The Thirteenth Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 248.

1. ‘Place this salt in the water. In the morning come unto me.’

Then he did so.

Then he said to him: ‘That salt you placed in the water last evening—please bring it hither.’

Then he grasped for it, but did not find it, as it was completely dissolved.

2. ‘Please take a sip of it from this end,’ said he. ‘How is it?’
‘Salt.’

‘Take a sip from the middle,’ said he. How is it?’

‘Salt.’

‘Take a sip from that end,’ said he. ‘How is it?’

‘Salt.’

‘Set it aside. Then come unto me.’

He did so, saying. ‘It is always the same.’

Then he said to him: ‘Verily, indeed, my dear, you do not perceive Being here. Verily, indeed, it is here.

3. That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.’

‘Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.’

‘So be it, my dear,’ said he.

The Fourteenth Khaṇḍa

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 249.

1. Just as, my dear, one might lead away from the Gandhāras a person with his eyes bandaged, and then abandon him in an uninhabited place; as there he might be blown forth either to the east, to the north, or to the south, since he had been led off with his eyes bandaged and deserted with his eyes bandaged; [2] as, if one released his bandage and told him, “In that direction are the Gandhāras; go in that direction!” he would, if he were a sensible man, by asking [his way] from village to village, and being informed, arrive home at the Gandhāras—even so here on earth one who has a teacher knows: “I shall remain here only so long as I shall not be released [from the bonds of ignorance]. Then I shall arrive home.”

3. That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu.’

‘Do you, sir, cause me to understand even more.’

‘So be it, my dear,’ said he.

Liberation into the Real Brahma By Relinquishment of All Desires, Mental Activity, and Self-Consciousness

SOURCE: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography by Robert Ernest Hume. With a list of recurrent and parallel passages by George C. O. Haas.* 2d ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 442–443.

30. *Om!* One should be in a pure place, himself pure (*śuci*), abiding in pureness (*sativa*), studying the Real (*sat*), speaking of the Real, meditating upon the Real, sacrificing to the Real. Henceforth, in the real Brahma which longs for the Real, he becomes completely other. So he has the reward (*phala*) of having his fetters cut; becomes void of expectation, freed from fear in regard to others [as fully] as in regard to himself, void of desire. He attains to imperishable, immeasurable happiness, and continues [therein].


Verily, freedom from desire (*niṣkāmatva*) is like the choicest extract from the choicest treasure. For, a person who is made up of all desires, who has the marks of determination, conception, and self-conceit, is bound. Hence, in being the opposite of that, he is liberated.

On this point some say: “It is a quality (*guṇa*) which by force of the developing differentiation of Nature (*prakṛti*) comes to bind the self with determination [and the like], and that liberation results from the destruction of the fault of determination [and the like].”

[But] it is with the mind, truly, that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears. Desire, conception, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear—all this is truly mind.

Borne along and defiled by the stream of Qualities, unsteady, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, one goes on into the state of self-conceit. In thinking “This is I” and “That is mine” one binds himself with himself, as does a bird with a snare! Hence a person who has the marks of determination, conception, and self-conceit is bound. Hence, in being the opposite of that, he is liberated. Therefore one should stand free from determination, free from conception, free from self-conceit. This is the mark of liberation (*mokṣa*). This is the pathway to Brahma here in this world. This is the opening of the door here in this world. By it one will go to the farther shore of this darkness, for therein all desires are contained. On this point they quote:—

When cease the five
[Sense-] knowledges, together with the mind,
And the intellect stirs not—
That, they say, is the highest course.’



Sanskrit and Hindi Pronunciation Guide

Long vowels have lines above them: ā, ī, and ū are pronounced as the “a” in *bar* or *calm*, the “i” in *machine*, and the “u” in *rule* or *soon*.

Diphthongs e, o, ai, and au are also long, pronounced: “e” as the “a” in *take* or the “e” in *prey*; “o” as in *so* or *go*; “ai” as “ai” in *aisle* or “i” in *time*; “au” as in “ow” in *how* or *cow*.

Short vowels are a, i, and u and pronounced: “a” as “u” in *up* or *cut*; “i” as “i” in *sin* or *bit*; and “u” as “u” in *pull* or *bull*.

Consonants

Pronounce “c” as “ch” in *chin* and “g” as “g” in *gun*.

Aspirates “dh,” “gh,” and “bh” pronounce as in *roundhouse*, *doghouse*, and *clubhouse*.

Aspirates “th” and “ph” pronounce as in *pothole* and *shepherd*.

Ś and ṣ are both pronounced as “sh” in *shape*.

abhisheka: Ancient Brahman ritual to consecrate a king.

Ādityas: Early Vedic deities.

adivasis: Tribal peoples.

Agni: Vedic Aryan god of fire.

ahimsa: Nonviolence.

Ajivika: Early monastic sect, similar to Jains.

Akbar: “Great” Mughal emperor.

amir: Muslim prince or commander of troops.

aparigraha: Hindu vow of poverty.

arhat: Buddhist monk who has achieved great wisdom.

Arjuna: Brave Aryan Pandava brother, whose charioteer was Krishna.

Artha Shāstra: “Science of Material Gain,” ancient Brahman textbook on polity.

Aryan: Indo-European linguistic group or early tribal invaders of North India.

Aryavarta: Land of the Aryans; North India’s Punjab to Delhi.

asat: Ancient Rig Vedic “Unreal,” or untrue; nebulous or demonic.

Ashoka: Mauryan emperor.

Ashrama: One of four stages in a good Hindu’s life; also a rural community.

ashvamedha: Vedic royal horse sacrifice.

Ashvins: Vedic Hindu twin gods.

Atharva Veda: Late Vedic Saṃhitā, containing medicinal remedies.

ātman: Ancient Vedic breath, later self; finally Soul, identical to Vedāntic Brahman.

Aurangzeb: Mughal emperor.

avatāra: Earthly emanation of Vishnu, nine of which have appeared, the tenth yet to come.

avidya: Ignorance.

Ayodhya: Ancient North Indian Hindu Temple city, recent center of communal conflict.

azad: Free.

Babur: First great Mughal emperor.

bagh: Garden.

Bande Mataram: “Hail to thee, mother!,” first national anthem of India.

- Bania:** Hindu merchant caste of Gujarat.
- Bhadralok:** Bengali intellectuals, “gentle learned people.”
- Bhagavad Gītā:** “Song of the blessed one,” philosophic dialogue between Arjuna and Krishna from the longer epic Mahābhārata.
- bhakti:** Hindu devotion to a personal god.
- Bharata:** Sanskrit name for India; name of an ancient Aryan tribe and of Rāma’s brother.
- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP):** “Indian People’s Party,” a political party.
- Bhīma:** Ancient Pandava brother hero.
- Bhoodan:** “Gift of land,” original appeal launched by Vinoba Bhave.
- Bimbisara:** Buddha’s royal patron, king of Magadha.
- Bindusara:** Second Mauryan emperor, father of Ashoka.
- bodhi:** Enlightenment.
- bodhisattva:** Mahayana Buddhist heavenly being, whose “essence is True Enlightenment.”
- Brahmā:** Vedic god of creation.
- Brahmacharya:** Celibate studenthood *asbrama*, the first “stage” of a devout Hindu’s life.
- Brahman:** Sacred utterance; hence, Hinduism’s highest class of priests who control religious mantras, reciting Vedic texts from memory; also transcendental Brahman, the Upanishadic divine principle, equated to *ātman* in Vedānta texts.
- Brāhmaṇas:** Ancient commentaries on Vedic Saṃhitās.
- Brahmi:** Ancient alphabet and script in which Sanskrit Vedic and Hindu texts were first written.
- Brihadāranyaka Upanishad:** “Great Forest” Upanishadic text, perhaps the most ancient to survive.
- Buddha:** The Enlightened One.
- caste:** Portuguese term for India’s *jati* (birth) and *varṇa* (class) systems.
- chaitya:** Sacred spot, or shrine, carved into ancient Buddhist and Jain caves.
- chakra:** Wheel, found in the middle white band of India’s flag; Ashoka’s “Wheel”; also Mahatma Gandhi’s cotton hand-spinning “wheel.”
- chakravartin:** Universal Hindu emperor, for whom the “Wheel of Law” turns.
- Chalukya:** Ancient Central and South Indian Hindu dynasty; later period.
- Chandragupta I and II:** First and third emperors of the later Gupta dynasty.
- Chandragupta Mauryan:** First emperor of the ancient Mauryan dynasty.
- Charaka:** Ancient Indian physician, author of an important medical text.
- Chatrapati:** Ancient Hindu monarch of the “Four Quarters” of the universe.
- Cholas:** Ancient South Indian maritime dynasty, greatest Hindu bronze artists.
- Dalits:** Formerly “Untouchables,” or “Outcaste” peoples, named Harijans by Mahatma Gandhi.
- danda:** “Rod” used to punish lazy students or neighboring kingdoms, ancient India’s weapon for retaining and expanding a raja’s power.
- dandaniti:** Art of government.
- Darshana:** “View” or “vision” of an icon of a Hindu god, saintly being, or mahatma; also the term used for each of the classical schools of Hindu philosophy.
- Dasa:** Initially pre-Aryan “dark-skinned” peoples of the Indus Valley, later “slave.”
- Deva:** Vedic Aryan god—“Shining One.”
- dēvadāsi:** “Slave of the God,” temple dancers, orphan girls abandoned, left to be reared by Brahman priests, for whom they danced and performed other services.
- Devanagari:** “City of god”—the script in which most modern Indo-European languages, including India’s national language, Hindi, are written.
- Devī:** Hindu goddess.
- Dharma:** Hindu religion, law, duty, truth, or responsibility; a Sanskrit term of many meanings.
- Dharma Shāstra:** Ancient Hindu legal textbook, among which the Manava Dharma Shāstra (Manu’s law text) is most famous.
- Dhimmis:** “Peoples of the Book,” including Jews and Christians, specially protected by Muslim monarchs as long as they paid the extra *jizya* “head tax.”
- dhruva-pada:** Rhythmic musical form.
- dhyana:** Yogic meditation.
- diwan:** Prime minister to a Muslim sultan or emperor, originally “court.”
- diwani:** Revenue-collection powers granted by Mughal emperors to provincial officers.
- Draupadi:** Epic polyandrous wife of all five Pandava brothers.
- Dravidian:** Family of South Indian languages that include Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kanarese; a South Indian “nationalist” movement which has tried to unite all peoples who speak those tongues.
- dukkha:** Sorrow or suffering, the Buddha’s first noble truth of universal human pain.
- Durgā:** Mother goddess, Hinduism’s fiercest “Mother,” who wears a necklace of skulls.
- Dyaus:** Rig Vedic “Father Sky,” one of the most ancient Hindu gods.

- Elephanta:** Ancient Hindu rock-carved caves on an island off Mumbai (Bombay).
- Epic Age:** Hinduism's great epics, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, were composed in North India between about 1000 B.C. and the dawn of the common era.
- Eucratides:** Early Bactrian Greek king who invaded Northern India.
- Euthydemus:** Bactrian Greek king who invaded India's North-West Frontier.
- Fahsien:** Chinese Buddhist monk who traveled through India during the Gupta era.
- feringi:** "Polluted" foreigner, a term often used by high caste Hindus.
- Gaṇeṣha:** One of the most popular Hindu gods, the elephant-headed son of Shiva and Pārvatī.
- Gaṅgā:** River goddess.
- Gayatri:** Rig Vedic morning sacred verse to the rising Sun god.
- ghats:** "Steps," usually of stone, leading into a river's water from Hindu temples along its bank, where worshipers bathe before praying, or as in Varanasi, the "burning *ghats*" where corpses are consumed by flame; also used for the mountain ridge along Southwest India, the "Western Ghats."
- gopī:** Milkmaid, usually a Hindu cowherd's daughter, devoted to fluting Krishna, the most perfect and beloved of Vishnu's *avatāras*.
- gōpura:** South Indian Hindu temple gate tower, usually high enough to be seen for miles.
- gotra:** Hindu Brahman exogamous sect.
- grama:** Village.
- Gupta dynasty:** Classical "Golden Age" of Hindu unification (c. A.D. 320–550).
- Gurjara-Pratiharas:** One of the last great Hindu dynasties of North India.
- Gurmukhi:** Unique cursive script used by Sikhs.
- guru:** Hindu teacher or preceptor; semidivine leader of the Sikhs, starting with Guru Nanak and ending with Guru Govind Singh.
- Guru Granth Sahib:** Sikh scripture, kept in Amritsar's Golden Temple.
- Hara:** Great Hindu god Shiva; ancient northern "capital" of Indus Valley, Harappa.
- Hari:** Great Hindu god Vishnu, disciples of whom are called Vaishnavites.
- Harihara:** Sculptured syncretism of Vishnu and Shiva, classical Hindu attempt to integrate artistically its two most popular male gods; royal founder of South India's Vijayanagar dynasty (Harihari I, r. A.D. 1336–1357).
- Harijan:** "Child of God," the term used by Mahatma Gandhi for "Untouchables."
- Harsha Vardhana:** Powerful king of Kanauj (r. A.D. 606–647).
- Hastinapura:** Ancient Vedic Aryan city.
- Hinayana:** "Lesser Vehicle" early form of Buddhism.
- Hsieun Tsang:** "Master of the Law," Chinese Buddhist pilgrim.
- Hyder Ali:** Muslim ruler of Mysore.
- Indra:** Great Vedic god of war.
- Isha Upanishad:** One of the most sacred Upanishads, of "the Lord-Isha."
- Islam:** Faith of the prophet Muhammad; Arabic, "surrender" to the will of Allah.
- Jahangir:** Great Mughal emperor (r. A.D. 1605–1627).
- Jain:** A follower of the faith of Mahāvīra, Jainism.
- Jajmani system:** A rural Hindu Indian system of exchange based on patronage and barter.
- Jallianwala Bagh:** A garden in Punjab's Amritsar, where some 400 Indian nationalist Sikhs and Hindus were massacred by British-led troops in April 1919.
- Jana:** Ancient Aryan tribe.
- Jatakas:** Mythical "birth" stories and folktales of previous "lives" of the Buddha.
- Jati:** "Birth" group, misnamed "caste," within which Hindus traditionally marry.
- jina:** "Conqueror," one of the titles given to the founder of Jainism, Mahāvīra.
- jiva:** Soul, very important to the Jain faith.
- jizya:** Head tax imposed by Muslim rulers on Dhimmis ("Peoples of the Book").
- Kailasanatha Temple:** Shiva's celestial palace carved out of the rock mountain at Ellora.
- Kālī:** Mother goddess ("Black") worshiped by millions of Hindus.
- Kālidāsa:** Greatest ancient Indian poet-dramatist, author of *Shakuntala*.
- kalpa:** A period within traditional Hindu-Jain cyclical cosmic aeons of time.
- Kāma:** Hindu god of love.
- karma:** To "do," or "act," actions bearing fruit similar to, or based upon, parent deeds.
- Karma Yoga:** "Discipline of Action," a Hindu path to salvation expounded in the Bhagavad Gītā.
- khadi:** Hand-spun cotton and woven cotton cloth, such as Mahatma Gandhi made.

- khalifa:** Muslim caliph or emperor, whose restoration was demanded by pan-Islamic leaders.
- Khalsa:** Sikh army of the “Pure.”
- Krishna:** Most popular *avatāra* of Vishna, pastoral Hindu god, whose name means “Black.”
- Kshatriya:** Hindu warrior; the second highest Hindu “class” (*varṇa*) among four.
- Lakshmaṇa:** Brother of Rāma.
- Lakshmī:** Mother goddess.
- lok:** People.
- Lok Sabha:** “House [Assembly] of the People”—Lower House of Parliament in New Delhi.
- Madhya Pradesh:** “Middle Province,” a large state of Central India.
- Mahābhārata:** “Great-Bharata,” the longer epic Sanskrit poem of ancient India.
- maharaja:** “Great-King,” the title taken by monarchs who conquered several rajas.
- mahatma:** “Great-Soul,” the only title Mahatma Gandhi ever had.
- Mahāvīra:** “Great Hero,” the title name of the founder of Jainism.
- Mahayana:** “Greater Vehicle” of later Buddhism, post-common era.
- Maheshvara:** “Great God,” the term often used for Shiva.
- mandala:** “Circle” or ring.
- mansabdar:** Mughal official, whose rank was usually associated with a number of horsemen for whom he was responsible, obliged to bring ready for battle, whenever the emperor called.
- mantra:** A sacred utterance, e.g., a syllable, “*Om*,” or god’s name, “*Ram, Ram*,” or phrase, as the Upanishadic equation of *ātman* and Brahman, “*Tat tvam asi*”—“thou art That One.”
- Maurya dynasty:** North Indian Jain–Buddhist imperial unification, (c. 324–184 B.C.).
- maya:** Illusion, used for material things of this world by Vedāntic philosophers.
- moksha:** “Liberation” or “release” from worldly pains of the here and now and reincarnation, a devout Hindu’s ultimate goal; sometimes called “*neti, neti*,” (“not this, not that”).
- mudra:** Hand gesture, hundreds of which are used as one code of classical Indian dance.
- nabob:** British corruption of Mughal *nawāb*.
- Naga:** Snake-spirit or tribe.
- Nanak:** Guru founder of Sikhism.
- Narasimha:** Man-lion *avatāra* of Vishnu.
- Nataraja:** Shiva depicted in bronze sculpture or other art forms as “King of Dance.”
- Nātya Shāstra:** Classic Hindu textbook of music, dance, and drama, attributed to the ancient sage Bharata.
- nawāb:** Mughal provincial governor, or viceroy, or deputy.
- netaji:** “Leader,” the title used by Subhash Chandra Bose.
- nirvāna:** “Blowing out,” the ultimate goal of “extinction” for Buddhist monks.
- Nyāya:** Ancient Hindu school of philosophy focusing on salvation through “logic.”
- om:** Sacred Sanskrit syllable of cosmic unity.
- Ophir:** Ancient West Indian port or region from which ivory, gold, and peacock feathers were shipped to King Solomon.
- Orissa:** Indian state, named Kalinga during the Mauryan era, conquered by Ashoka.
- padishah:** Mughal “emperor.”
- padmāsana:** Classical dance and Yogic lotus position.
- Pallavas:** South Indian “robber” dynasty, from fourth century B.C.
- Panchamas:** “Fifths,” a term used for “Untouchables,” who fall below the four-class Hindu system.
- panchayat:** Village “council of five,” usually Brahman, Kshatriya, or Vaishya elders.
- panchayati raj:** Ideal of rural democracy, an experiment launched in 1959 in India’s Rajasthan state, to help in its economic planning for agricultural development.
- Panch Shila:** “Five principles,” including peaceful coexistence, Prime Minister Nehru’s ideal foreign policy, initially agreed upon in a 1954 treaty with China regarding Tibet.
- Pandavas:** Five virtuous sons of Pandu—Yudhishtira, Bhīma, Arjuna, Nakula, and Sahadeva, the heroes of the epic Mahābhārata, who defeat their Kaurava cousins at Kurukshetra.
- Parsis:** A small, enlightened Zoroastrian community, expelled from Persia in the seventh century A.D., settling mostly in Bombay (Mumbai), leaders in politics, law, and the arts.
- Pārvatī:** Shiva’s consort, popular Hindu mother goddess.
- Pashupati:** Shiva as “Lord of Beasts.”

- Pataliputra:** Ancient capital of the Mauryan empire, modern Patna, capital of Bihar.
- peshwas:** Chitpavin Brahman prime ministers of Poona (Pune).
- pir:** Muslim holy Sufi.
- prakriti:** “Woman”; also primeval “matter,” in the Sāṅkhya school of Hindu philosophy.
- Punjab:** “Land of Five Rivers.”
- Pur:** Ancient fortified city.
- Purāṇas:** Ancient “tales,” mythical stories of many incarnations of popular Hindu gods.
- pardah:** Hiding female Muslim faces and bodies behind usually dark cloth veils and robes.
- purusha:** “Man,” the original Vedic sacrificial Being from which the four Hindu *varṇas* emerged, Brahmans from his mouth, Kshatriyas from his arms, Vaishyas from his thighs, Shudras from his feet; in the Sāṅkhya (“Numbers”) school of classical Hindu philosophy, Purusha (“Man” or “Spirit”) is the first of 25 numbered “matters,” the other 24 emerging from Prakriti (“Woman”).
- Purva Mimamsa:** “Early inquiry” school of ancient Hindu philosophy, focuses on re-creating the ancient Vedic fire altar and performing its annual ritual sacrifice.
- Pushyamitra Shunga:** Martial founder of the Shunga dynasty (184–72 B.C.).
- Quaid-i-Azam:** “Great Leader,” honorific title reserved for M. A. Jinnah, father of Pakistan.
- Qurʿan:** Sacred “book” of Islamic scripture, Arabic message of God heard by the prophet Muhammad.
- Rādhā:** Krishna’s most beloved consort.
- rāga:** Series of five or more musical notes on which a classical Indian melody is based.
- Raj:** “Rule,” hence government, used for the British Empire of India, “The Raj.”
- raja:** Ancient Indian king, later exalted to “Great King,” maharaja, and “King of Kings,” rajaraja.
- Rajaraja Chola:** “King of Kings” of the South Indian dynasty (r. A.D. 985–1016).
- Rāma:** Ideal heroic Hindu king; popular incarnation (*avatāra*) of Vishnu.
- Rāmāyaṇa:** The shorter Sanskrit epic poem, the story of Raja Rāma and his beloved wife Sītā.
- Ram Rajya:** Hinduism’s mythical “Golden Age,” when Raja Rāma ruled over Ayodhya.
- Rashtrakuta:** “Country Lord” dynasty established in eighth century A.D. in Central India.
- Rishi:** Rig Vedic sage.
- rita:** Vedic cosmic order of the true.
- Rudra:** Rig Vedic (“Howler”) god, later associated with Shiva.
- Rukmini:** Krishna’s consort.
- ryot:** Agricultural laborer.
- sabha:** Council chamber or assembly.
- Salt March:** Led by Mahatma Gandhi in opposition to the British tax on salt, March–April 1930.
- Samadhi:** Deep Yoga meditation.
- Sāma Veda:** Vedic prayer hymnal, probably the third Saṃhitā compilation.
- Saṃhitā:** Four ancient compilations of Vedic prayers: Rig, Yajur, Sāma, Atharva.
- Sāṅkhya:** “Numbers” school of classical Hindu philosophy.
- saṃsāra:** Cycle of birth and death; life in this world of pain and sorrow.
- Samudra Gupta:** Second Guptan emperor (r. A.D. 335–375).
- sangha:** Buddhist monastic order.
- Sarasvatī:** Goddess of the Sarasvati River, sister of Gaṅgā.
- sarkar:** District; later expanded to mean the entire British administration.
- Sarvodaya:** “The uplift of all,” Gandhian socialism.
- sat, satya:** Vedic “Real,” and “True” or “Truth.”
- sati:** “True One,” euphemism used for a Hindu widow immolated on her husband’s funeral pyre, abolished by the British in 1829, but recently revived in Rajasthan.
- satyagraha:** “Hold fast to truth,” Mahatma Gandhi’s term for his nonviolent, noncooperation movements, first launched in South Africa, later as nationwide protests in India.
- sepoy:** Indian “police” first hired by Portuguese, later by the British, also used as soldiers.
- Shah Jahan:** Mughal emperor (r. A.D. 1628–1658).
- Shaivism:** Hindu worship of Shiva, the “Great God” (Maheshvara).
- Shakti:** Mother goddess “Power,” whose undying force invigorates all male gods, each of whom thus needs a female consort; Shiva’s first consort.
- Shakuntala:** Kālidāsa’s greatest Sanskrit drama; its heroine’s name.
- Shariʿa:** Islamic law.
- shastri:** Teacher.

- Shī'i:** Heterodox Islamic sects, followers of Ali.
- Shiva:** Hinduism's "Great God," "King of Dance," "Lord of Beasts," master of Yogic power.
- shreni:** Hindu merchant or artisan guild.
- shruti:** "Heard"—sacred Vedic texts, from the Rig Veda through Brāhmaṇa commentaries, and Upanishadic Vedānta.
- Shudra:** One of the lowest *varṇa* (class) of Hinduism's four Ashramas, usually a landless menial laborer.
- Sikh:** "Disciple," of the gurus (great teachers) of Sikhism.
- Sītā:** Rāma's consort, the ideal Hindu wife.
- sitar:** Classic stringed musical instrument, usually made of lacquered gourds.
- Soma:** Vedic god of divine nectar.
- stupa:** "Gathered" mound of earth and brick over some of the Buddha's ashes, worshiped by monks who circumambulate it in a clockwise direction.
- Sufism:** Mystical "third" sect of Islam, most appealing to lower class or outcaste Hindus.
- Sunni:** Orthodox Islamic faith of the majority of Muslims.
- swadeshi:** "Of our own country," goods made by Indian nationalists, rejecting British imports.
- swaraj:** "Of our own rule," the battle cry for independence, demanding "home rule" or "freedom," raised by early revolutionary leaders of India's National Congress.
- tabla:** Classic Indian musical drum set, covered with tightly drawn hide, the fast-moving fingers of skilled drummers tapping out rhythmic tālas to accompany a sitar player's *rāga*.
- tāla:** Rhythmic figure, the second most important element (after *rāga*) of classic Indian music.
- Tamil Nadu:** South India's "Land of the Tamils" state, formerly Madras.
- Tantrism:** Esoteric form of Hinduism, sexually orgiastic in nature, obscure in its ancient origins.
- tapas:** Heat generated during Yogic meditation.
- tapasya:** Self-purification through intense prolonged "suffering."
- Tat:** "That One," the transcendental monistic essence, Brahman, of Upanishadic Vedānta.
- Theravada:** "Teachings of the Elders," the earliest form of Buddhism.
- Thugi:** Ritual murder by strangulation, performed by gangs of Thugs, Hindu worshipers of Mother goddesses Kālī and Durgā, outlawed by the British in 1828.
- Tipu Sultan:** Enlightened Muslim ruler of Mysore, defeated by Lord Wellesley in 1799.
- Tīrthānkara:** "Ford-crosser," worshiped by Jains, the last (24th) of whom was Mahāvīra.
- ulama:** Muslim learned elite, plural of *alim*.
- Umā:** Hindu Mother goddess.
- Umma:** Universal Islamic brotherhood of Muslims.
- untouchables:** Lowest class of Hindus, also called Outcastes, or Harijans, now Dalits.
- Upanishad:** "To sit down in front of," esoteric teachings of Vedānta philosophy.
- vaidya:** Āyurvedic traditional Hindu physician.
- Vaisheshika:** "Atomic" or "individual characteristics" school of traditional Hindu philosophy.
- Vaishnavism:** Hindu worshipers of Vishnu, whose many *avatāras* include Krishna, Rāma, and the Buddha.
- Vaishya:** Merchant or landowning third "class" (*varṇa*) in Hinduism's social hierarchy.
- Varṇa:** Hindu "class," traditionally only four, though an outcaste fifth was later added.
- Varuṇa:** Rig Vedic god of "Universal Law and Order" (initially *rita*, later *dharma*).
- vazir:** Muslim ruler's premier.
- Vedānta:** "End of Vedas," Upanishadic philosophy, last of six classical schools of Hindu philosophy.
- Vedas:** Earliest Sanskrit ritual prayers and sacred books of "knowledge" (*vid*).
- vihara:** Monastic cells for living quarters carved out of mountain escarpments by Buddhist and Jain monks in Northeast India, in the state for which they are named—Bihar.
- vina:** "Lute," classic Hindu musical instrument, with a long fingerboard and gourd body.
- Vishnu:** Shares with Shiva the greatest popularity among a majority of Hindu worshipers of male divinities; devotees often marking their foreheads with a chalk or lime-white V.
- Yajur Veda:** Probably the second compilation (Saṃhitā) of ancient Vedic prayers.
- Yama:** Vedic god of death.
- Yoga:** "Discipline," probably the most ancient Indian school of philosophy, pre-Aryan in its Indus Valley origins, emerging later as the unifying discipline of all six classical schools of traditional Hindu philosophy, always associated with Shiva.

Yogis: Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain practitioners of Yoga, known to have sat in lotus positions from very ancient times, meditating deeply in the forests of North India.

zakat: Islamic tax imposed on all Muslims.

zamindar: Initially temporary Mughal land-revenue collectors, later made more wealthy and powerful as permanent landlords throughout Bengal by the British.

zenānā: Hindu women's secluded quarters in rural as well as urban homes, usually completely hidden from the eyes of strangers passing on lanes or roads outside.

Zoroastrianism: Religion of India's Parsis, most of whom still live in Mumbai.




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Note: **Bold** page numbers indicate main discussions. *Italic* page numbers indicate figures and tables. Colons separate volume numbers from page numbers. Color inserts are abbreviated as “col. ins.” plus the volume number.

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