



Topic
History

Subtopic
Modern History

A History of British India

Course Guidebook

Professor Hayden J. Bellenoit
U.S. Naval Academy



PUBLISHED BY:

THE GREAT COURSES
Corporate Headquarters
4840 Westfields Boulevard, Suite 500
Chantilly, Virginia 20151-2299
Phone: 1-800-832-2412
Fax: 703-378-3819
www.thegreatcourses.com

Copyright © The Teaching Company, 2017

Printed in the United States of America

This book is in copyright. All rights reserved.

Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,
no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form, or by any means
(electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise),
without the prior written permission of
The Teaching Company.



Hayden J. Bellenoit, D.Phil.

Associate Professor of History
U.S. Naval Academy

Hayden J. Bellenoit is an Associate Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he has taught since 2007. After graduating summa cum laude in History and Economics from Wheaton College in Massachusetts, he attended Oxford University, where he completed his master of studies

in Historical Research and his doctor of philosophy in Modern History, focusing on the comparative religious scholarship between Hindu reformists and Christian missionary scholars in late colonial India. While studying at Oxford, Dr. Bellenoit spent a year in India conducting research in Delhi, Lucknow, and Allahabad.

Dr. Bellenoit has researched and published extensively on modern Indian religious, social, and cultural history. He is particularly interested in the interaction between forces of Western and Indian tradition, specifically in the realms of religion and religious thought in Indian Islam and Hinduism.

At the Naval Academy, Dr. Bellenoit teaches courses on South Asian history, ranging from the Mughals to contemporary Pakistan. He helped develop the Naval Academy's first premodern Asian history course and offered the academy's first courses on the history of India from 1700 to the present, the history of Islam and the origins

of jihad in South Asia, the history of Pakistan, the premodern history of Asia, and the history of the Mughal Empire. Dr. Bellenoit is also a life member of Cambridge University's Clare Hall.

Dr. Bellenoit published his first book, *Missionary Education and Empire in Late Colonial India, 1860-1920*, on the religious and cultural interactions between Christian missionaries and Hindu reformers. He also has had peer-reviewed articles published in journals and edited volumes, including "Education, Missionaries and the Indian Nation, c. 1880-1920" and "Missionary Education, Religion and Knowledge in India, c. 1880-1915." He has recently shifted to studying 18th-century India and the transition between the late Mughal and the early British Empires, publishing the articles "Between *Qanungos* and Clerks: The Cultural and Service Worlds of Hindustan's Pensmen, c. 1750-1850" and "Paper, Pens and Power between Empires in North India, 1750-1850." Dr. Bellenoit's second book, *The Formation of the Colonial State in India: Scribes, Paper and Taxes, 1760-1860*, examines the role that Hindu scribes played in establishing the fiscal pillars of the colonial state and the ability of the British to tax India's agrarian economy. For his third book, he plans to examine the exportation of Hinduism and Indian religious traditions into America over the past two centuries, tracing the origins of American society's fascination with yoga and Indian spirituality. ■

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

Professor Biography.....	i
Course Scope.....	1

LECTURE GUIDES

Lecture 1	
Introduction to India.....	3
Lecture 2	
The Mughal Empire in 18 th -Century India.....	14
Lecture 3	
Indian and British Economic Interests.....	22
Lecture 4	
British Expansion in India (1757-1820).....	30
Lecture 5	
Knowing the Country: British Orientalism.....	39
Lecture 6	
Race, Gender, and Culture (1750-1850).....	47
Lecture 7	
The Age of Reform (1830-1850).....	54
Lecture 8	
The Great Uprising (1857-1858).....	61
Lecture 9	
Economics and Society under the Raj.....	69

Lecture 10	
Caste and Tribal Identity under Colonialism.....	76
Lecture 11	
The Nationalization of Hinduism (1870–1900).....	85
Lecture 12	
Indian Muslim Identity and Colonial Rule	93
Lecture 13	
The Late-19 th -Century British Raj.....	104
Lecture 14	
Princely States and Royalist Relationships	111
Lecture 15	
Indian Nationalism and the Freedom Struggle	118
Lecture 16	
The Great War and Its Impact on India	127
Lecture 17	
Gandhi's Moral-Political Philosophy	136
Lecture 18	
The Noncooperation Movement	146
Lecture 19	
Indian Muslim Politics between the Wars	153
Lecture 20	
The Civil Disobedience Campaign	160
Lecture 21	
Britain and Its Empire in the 1940s.....	169
Lecture 22	
The Raj on Its Knees (1945–1947)	176

Lecture 23
A Split India: Negotiating Independence 182

Lecture 24
Reflections on Postcolonial India 189

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Bibliography 195
Image Credits 224

A History of British India

Scope

India has been viewed by Western eyes as a land of riches, intrigue, and spirituality. It was this mystique that characterized South Asia for centuries and fascinated Europeans. In its more recent history, India became the single most valuable colonial holding for any empire in history. British rule had the effect of opening up India to the Western world and opening up the Western world to India. This binary process had a profound impact not only upon India, but also the British Empire and broader world history.

This course is a modern history of India and the colonial experience of British rule. It is a careful examination of the broader impact of British colonial rule upon India's cultural, religious, political, and social traditions, and its economic relationship with the world. At the beginning of the course, you will receive an overview of Hinduism and India's social, cultural, and regional traditions to set the context for an investigation of the late Mughal Empire in India. The course will carefully examine the transition from the late Mughal system to the beginnings of rule by the East India Company in the 1700s and to the rise of British power in Bengal and the rest of the Indian subcontinent, examining how a small, private commercial enterprise was able to become masters of India within two generations.

The course will also give you a look at bigger changes in India under colonial rule. As you proceed through the lectures, you will analyze the impact of colonial structures, attitudes, and policies upon Hinduism, Indian Islam, caste, and the Indian economy by examining economic policies, colonial law, cultural encounters, and religious exchange and interaction. You will see how Indians

responded to the humiliations and changes under colonialism with resilience, vigor, and dynamism, shaping their own modernity and sources of pride. Then you will examine the rise of Indian nationalism, how Indians fashioned an anticolonial nationhood, and the rise of Gandhi and his mobilizations against the British Raj. Along the way, you will meet some of the more well-known personalities in modern India's history: Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Viceroy Curzon, Jawaharlal Nehru, and of course, Mohandas Gandhi. The course will provide you with a careful assessment of the impact of two World Wars on India and Britain's power in India, and of the eventual decolonization of India and the partitioning of British India into independent India and Pakistan.

The course will conclude with a close look at the partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, the events that led up to it, and the broader impact and meanings for the British and the new independent states of India and Pakistan. There will also be a final assessment of the broader impact of colonial rule upon India, its culture, Hinduism and Islam, and caste and society, and how these set India on the path to economic growth and eventual global power status in the 21st century. ■




Lecture 1

Introduction to India

One of the world's oldest civilizations, India has given humanity fractions, decimals, the process of weaving cloth for clothing, and one of its best-known figures, Gandhi. Between the mid 1700s and 1947, however, this great civilization fell to the rule of a seemingly insignificant foggy island of the northwestern Eurasian landmass. In this lecture, you will learn about Indian society, Hinduism, castes, and the impact of Islamic rule before the arrival of the British.

The Lay of the Land

- The Gangetic Plain, located in northern India, is one of the most fertile regions of India in terms of harvest and crops. It takes its name from the Ganges River, also known as the *Ganga*, which descends from the Himalayan mountains.
- Eastward are the Bay of Bengal and the Bengal regions. With its vast network of marsh waterways, the Bay of Bengal has long been a center of maritime commerce and exchange, with strong links to Southeast Asia and the commercial maritime world. Unsurprisingly, it was the first region of India to fall to British rule.
- Farther south is the Deccan Plateau, which covers the southern portion of the Indian subcontinent. Though verdant in some regions, it is mostly dry and harsh. Its mountains and



rivers have historically prevented outsiders from fully militarily conquering it from the north.

- Up the western coast of India is the Thar Desert, near the current India-Pakistan border. This area looks more like Arabia, with its camels, but the people and customs are decidedly Indian.
- Farther along the western portion of India is the Indus River region, which consists of two subregions. The first is Sindh, at the southern mouth of the Indus River. Second and farther north is Punjab, which comes from the Persian for “five waters.” The name refers to the five tributaries from the Himalayas that enter the Indus River, which then empties into the Arabian Sea.

- To the northwest is the famed Khyber Pass. A narrow pass through mountains that straddle the border between modern Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Khyber Pass traditionally has been the transit route for invaders, Muslim sultans, and Akbar and the Mughals. It was the key link between India and the Islamic Middle East.

Hinduism

- Hinduism is one of the world's great religious traditions, with nearly 800 million followers today. It is a religion, philosophy, and cosmology all rolled into one.
- Unlike the three Abrahamic religions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, Hinduism has no single founder. It is the accumulation of various practices, adaptations, and local customs into a broader tradition that was largely located in the Indian subcontinent.
- We like to think of religions as either monotheistic or polytheistic. But Hinduism defies either categorization. While it has over 3,000 greater and lesser deities, it does believe in a supreme creator. The best descriptor would be henotheistic, meaning that there is one Supreme Being or central divinity but also other, lesser gods.
- The understanding is that humans are limited in their perception of the cosmos and the divine, which means that different people—with different ethnicities, cultures, and views—will see God in different ways. Hindus generally accept that all paths go to the same end—that is, God. This logically explains the diversity of the world's religions. As an old Indian saying goes: "God is one, but wise people know it by many names."
- Hinduism is as much a religion as it is a philosophy. Unlike in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, which have traditionally separated religion and faith from philosophy and metaphysics,

in Hinduism religion and philosophy are not separated. They are one and the same.

- As a result, Hinduism has no set of rules or doctrines. It is not about faith or confession. It has no central textual source of adjudication. It usually doesn't say, "You can't do that." If anything, it is vague on moral guidelines and specificities. Its focus is more on wider, holistic understandings of existence and life.
- Hinduism tolerates evil as part of life and natural existence. This doesn't mean that Hindus condone evil behavior. But it does mean that there is less of a tendency to confront a perceived evil compared to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. In those three traditions, one is generally compelled to combat evil when faced with it.
- Hinduism has no real concept of blasphemy. It has no dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. This doesn't mean that Hindus don't respect religious rite and ritual; there is just no doctrinal altar of punishment.
- Hinduism does have ancient traditions and texts. The main one is called the Rig Veda. Composed between 2000 and 1500 B.C., it is a collection of hymns in Sanskrit, the oldest of the Indo-European languages. It contains approximately 1,023 hymns devoted to creation, the gods, and the cosmos.
- The origins of the Rig Veda and Sanskrit lie in the so-called Aryan peoples of central Asia and southern Russia. These seminomadic peoples started coming into India from the northwest after 2000 B.C. They brought with them the Sanskrit language and a pantheon of nature gods, whom they called *devas*, or shining ones.
- The Vedic pantheon is associated largely with forces in nature. Some examples include Dyaus Pitar, the sky god; Agni, the fire



Setup of Hindu worship

god; and Indra, the warrior god. The Vedic pantheon is thus very similar to those of the Greeks, the Romans, and the Norse.

- Like all ancient pantheons, the gods demanded sacrifice. Hinduism acquired a “sacrificial cult” that was crucial. Sacrifices had to be made to please the gods, usually of animals, fruits, cereals, ghee and milk. The gods in turn would maintain order and balance in the universe. These sacrifices developed into elaborate rituals, sometimes with dozens of priests, set rituals, timings, and offerings.
- There were other reasons why sacrifices were made, however. One was otherworldly. It was to keep and look after the souls of the departed family lineage in the afterlife. The other was very worldly. Pleasing the gods and praying for the departed, it was hoped, would gain one’s family wealth, health, glory, and power over enemies.

- There are three cosmological and philosophical concepts that are crucial to Hinduism, informing both the cosmic worldview and the caste system. The first of these is dharma. Translating roughly as “duty” or “what one needs to do,” dharma is a loose term to convey the idea that doing what is required of you maintains not only domestic order, but also the natural order of the universe. Dharma can apply to many things, but in India it mostly relates to family, caste, and occupation.
- The second cosmological and philosophical concept is karma, or the ethical law of causality. It is the belief that every action has a consequence: If you do something good, you will be rewarded. If you do something bad, something bad will happen to you. These rewards and punishments may occur in this world or the next.
- The third concept is samsara, which is the migration of the soul. The Abrahamic religions all hold that you get only one life. But Hindus believe in reincarnation, that the soul goes through endless lives until it attains perfection—also known as nirvana.

There are three cosmological and philosophical concepts that are crucial to Hinduism—dharma, karma, and samsara—informing both the cosmic worldview and the caste system.

The Caste System

- The word “caste” comes from a Portuguese word, *casta*. There is no word for its equivalent in any Indian language, but the term which best captures what Westerners think of as caste is the Sanskrit word *varna*. *Varna* is the fourfold division of Indian society based upon the Rig Veda. This hierarchy is based upon the notion of ritual purity and pollution. The higher the caste, the purer one is.
 - First are the Brahmins. Associated with the head and with speech, they are the priestly caste. Brahmins are literate, and it is their duty is to keep the sacred knowledge of the

Vedas in Sanskrit. They are considered the most ritually and physically pure.

- Second are the Kshatriyas, associated with the arms. They are warriors and rulers. It is their duty to fight, protect, and administer the orders of humankind.
 - Third are the Vaishyas, associated with the thighs. They are the traders and merchants of society, and it is their duty to keep the material aspects of life flowing and in order.
 - Fourth are the Sudras, associated with the feet. They are the servant class. It is their duty to clean, prune, remove waste, and perform menial, unskilled labor.
 - Below these four *varnas* are the Untouchables, or Dalits. They are considered *avarna*, or outside the caste system. The Untouchables are regarded as filthy and ritually polluted. They are considered, for all intents and purposes, beyond the pale. The same would apply for tribal groups known as *adivasis*, those who are not part of the caste system and therefore also beyond it.
- Another component to the caste hierarchy is *jati*, which means “birth.” *Jati* is a subdivision within each *varna* that can refer to family, region, and occupation, and it is the most referenced marker of caste identity in India traditionally. For example, there are Saraswat Brahmins who trace their heritage from the Saraswati River, and there are Chitpavan Brahmins whose *jati* name means “pure of mind.” Some are more respected than others and see themselves as better than their *varna* peers.
 - Both karma and dharma provide cosmological incentives for caste as a hierarchy. Bad behavior means demotion in the system. If you perform poorly, you may be reborn as a lower caste, or worse still, as a slug. But proper dharma can lead to a life as a Brahmin or a king.

Marriage and Family

- Much of the caste system is about family honor and the honor of one's ancestors. With respect to ownership of property, the Indian family was traditionally organized like a corporation. Most families are extended, with three generations or more. The eldest male was the CEO.
- There were major gender differences within families. Traditionally, males were the shareholders. Women were not. Males inherited property in equal shares, but women did not. This was a gendered partition of inheritance.
- The Indian family was patriarchal, but the eldest male's authority was not unlimited. Unlike in Western Europe, where the eldest male was usually the sole inheritor of the land, in India, the property was divided. This meant that internal family disputes regarding inheritance rarely happened and the seeming dominance of the eldest male was, in fact, much more tempered than in Western Europe.
- The dominance of males in the family was really seen in marriage. Females were given as "gifts" to a groom's family, but males remain members of their original family. This distinction might seem symbolic, but it carries a lot of substance. Because women did not have rights to land, they had other forms of wealth that were exchanged at marriage: saris, clothing, gold, jewelry, utensils. Even cattle could be part of the marriage dowry.
- The purpose of marriage was to continue the male's family lineage. It is meant to amplify family honor. And it must meet certain criteria. For example, the bride and groom need to be from the same *varna*: Brahmins marry Brahmins, Vaishyas marry Vaishyas, and so on. But they need to be from a different family, or *jati*, within that broader caste. They must also have compatible horoscopes, which would be calculated by Brahmins.

- Marriages were usually arranged early, often before puberty, although they wouldn't be consummated until after they became adults. Marriage was not about love. It was much more practical. It was a sacrament of religious obligation. As a result, it was indissoluble.

Unlike in Western Europe, where the eldest male was usually the sole inheritor of the land, in India, the property was divided.
- Hinduism does contain deviations from this Vedic-Aryan norm. One example would be low-caste families. They always had less property, so their families tended to lean toward the nuclear model, with perhaps two generations at most living together.
- In the southern parts of India, families tended to be more matrilineal. Here, mothers and daughters were the shareholders. Men were not betrothed; they lived with their own families, visiting their wives rather than residing with them. Royal southern Indian wives had multiple husbands.
- With the arrival of Islam after the 11th century, Islamic and Middle Eastern marriage patterns were injected into Indian tradition. This meant a preference for patrilineal first cousins when arranging marriage. This was similar to southern Indian traditions, but unlike those of the Vedic Aryan north.
- Indian Muslims adopted a modified version of caste rooted not in the concepts of dharma and karma, but upon the claimed descent of any given Muslim family. The more foreign lineage one could claim, the higher he was seen. Sayyids, for example, claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad. Sheikhs claimed Arab lineage, usually from foreign conquerors of India over the centuries. Ansaris were those who came from outside India, and they were usually considered to be purer and nobler than indigenous Indian converts to Islam.

- Low-caste and Untouchable Hindus were more likely to convert to Islam than those of higher castes. Most Indian Muslims—approximately 80 percent of them in South Asia today—can trace their lineage to Untouchable and low-caste Hindu families. Islam offered these families theoretical egalitarianism and a way to escape caste discrimination.

Politics and Society

- Indian empires were historically based upon intercepting surplus grains as revenue. The agrarian wealth of India paid for administrations and armies. This made rulers sensitive to the well-being of Indian farmers and peasants. The largely corporate, self-governing villages of India are what allowed great Indian Empires over the centuries to flourish and rule.
- Traditionally, there have been two types of rule in India. The first was *rajya*, or royal kingship. Brahmins have traditionally preferred kingship, because it allowed them to be advisors, undertake rites to elevate the raja over his enemies, and to read the horoscopes to promote peace and prosperity.
- The second type of rule was called *sangha*, meaning assembly or society. This was a more republican or confederated form of government. Similar to the Roman Senate, it was for elites who deliberated. This form of rule emerged from challenges to the priestly power of Brahmins, which occurred most often in eastern India. It was no coincidence that Buddhism emerged in this region of India, where *sangha* forms of rule were most pronounced.
- There has always been a tussle and pull between *rajya* and *sangha* in Indian history. But kingship, or *rajya*, largely won. Over the centuries, it emerged as the dominant form of political rule in India.
- Indian kingship traditionally was benign, much more so than in medieval Europe. In India, it never approached the levels

of absolutism in 17th- and 18th-century Western Europe. It was tempered by Brahmins and the realities of the monsoon weather. Remember, caste and family units were like small corporations. Indian society would carry on whether the king was there or not. As a result, rajas styled themselves as paternal “protectors” of their people.

- When Muslim rulers came to power in India, they obviously didn’t need Brahmanical affirmation of their sovereignty. Their sovereignty came through conquest, and the sultan was answerable, in theory, only to Allah. Nevertheless, Muslim rulers largely followed the patterns and tradition of Indian kingship.

Suggested Reading

Flood, *An Introduction to Hinduism*.

Johnson, *A Cultural Atlas of India*.

Trautmann, *India*.

Questions to Consider

1. Why is caste so significant in how it shapes and regulates Indian society?
2. How do geography and the monsoon unit shape the priorities of traditional rule in India?



Lecture 2

The Mughal Empire in 18th-Century India

The Mughal Empire, which existed from 1526–1858, was known for its grandeur, wealth, and high cultural achievements. This lecture considers the multiple and interconnected dynamics of the late Mughal Empire in the 1700s and examines how broader changes in Indian politics, society, and economics—which themselves were by-products of Mughal expansion—laid the foundation for foreign conquest after the 1750s.

The Mughal Empire

- The Mughal Empire was founded in 1526. At the Battle of Panipat, the warrior Babur—a descendant of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan—smashed the ruler of Delhi, Ibrahim Lodhi. Babur's grandson, the famed emperor Akbar, did much to put the empire on a firm footing, so that by the 1600s, the Mughals had effectively become a truly Indian-based empire.
- The Mughals were contemporaries of the other great landed Muslims empires, the Safavids and the Ottomans. These empires dwarfed their European counterparts in terms of prestige, wealth, and cultural achievements. Between them, they ruled from Belgrade to Bangladesh—a large part of the Eurasian landmass. But the Mughal Empire was the largest all-

India empire thus far, and it was the wealthiest empire in the world by 1700.

- The Mughals established and maintained their empire in India in three ways:
 - › First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the Mughal Empire was one large armed military camp. Officers and soldiers were the most numerous and important class of people in the Empire.
 - › Second, the Mughals established a sophisticated administrative and bureaucratic system. It was the single most developed, layered, and complex agrarian taxation system in the world.
 - › Third, the Mughals' official and unofficial policies of religious tolerance gave their empire symbolic legitimacy that lasted until the mid-19th century. In a land as diverse as India, this was perhaps the single greatest contributor to Mughal legitimacy and endurance.
- The Mughals were good at raising armies, feeding them, and using them to quash dissent. They were a gunpowder empire, but their mainstay was swift, mobile cavalries. And because horses are not native to India, the Mughals after the 1500s imported a steady stream of horses from central Asia and Arabia. With all of this combined, the Mughals were a military force in par with the Chinese, Persians, Europeans, and Ottomans.
- The Mughal Empire was an Indo-Islamic empire, and it ruled India with a sophisticated administrative and governing system. Before the Mughals, Muslim sultanates had never fully developed administrative roots. The Mughals recognized this shortcoming and set out to address it in ways that would set the standard for later emperors and for the British for the next 400 years.
- The Mughals, as Muslims, were a minority. They conquered India. But they could never had ruled India effectively in the



long term without employing a portion of native Hindus and others into the administrative machinery.

- The empire had imperial officers known as *mansabdars*. They were the equivalent of European military aristocracies, who held land grants from which they raised soldiers, maintained family honor, and served the emperor. There were also appointed regional governors known as subahdars.
- *Zamindars* were the equivalent of large landowners, and they served as intermediaries between the empire and the cultivators of India's agrarian wealth. The Mughals adopted a practical

approach, working through large local elites and power brokers, rather than replacing them or forcing them to convert to Islam.

- The Mughals adopted Persian as the language of the court. In the lands east of Baghdad, Arabic was the language of God; Persian, or Farsi, became the language of sophistication and kingship, and it was adopted even by Hindu and Sikh regional rulers. Persian would remain the language of government, authority, and legitimacy in India for three generations into British colonial rule.

Taxation and Revenue

- The primary aim of the Mughal's administrative machinery, aside from ruling, was to collect the vast wealth of India's agrarian tracts, or what Sir William Wilson Hunter called "the one great customary source of fiscal wealth in India." The Mughals extracted this wealth and used it to build an empire that lasted centuries.
- One of the reasons the agrarian wealth of India was so great had to do with geography and weather. South Asia has more often been blessed with the vagaries of the monsoon season. In some parts of India, two to three annual harvests are possible. Distribution aside, India has historically produced more than enough food to feed its people.
- The Mughals created a more regularized system of taxation and, by extension, general administration and governance. Matters of land ownership, law, and policy revolved around the fiscal appetite of the empire. After all, the Mughals needed to pay soldiers, officers, governors, tax collectors, clerics, and monument builders.
- By 1700, the middle and lower rungs of Mughal administration were largely made up of Hindus. Hindu penmen and clerical castes called Kayasthas learned Persian and established traditions of literacy and service that lasted deep into the

British period. These scribes were outwardly Hindu, but they spoke Persian, recited Koranic injunctions at official meetings, and conformed to Islamic etiquette. Some even became major officials in places such as Bengal, Awadh, and the Mughal court in Delhi.

- To the average Indian, Mughal authority was noticeable only at the upper levels of political and regional life, or when a regiment of troops passed through. The average village, with its traditional Hinduism, Brahmin officiators, and customs and rituals, would have seen little change.
- Cultivators, of course, felt the impact of Mughal taxation demands. As rulers, however, the Mughals were tempered by moderation and a general regard for the well-being of India's cultivators. The British, later on, had much less concern for these groups. The Mughal Empire did not penetrate as deep into the Indian countryside as the later British Raj would. Large swathes of rural, village society remained untouched.



A Mughal painting showing Jesuits at Akbar's court

Mughal Religious Policies

- Most of the Mughals' subjects were non-Muslims, mainly Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists. Nevertheless, the Mughals were largely accommodative and managing of India's religious traditions. As in most premodern empires, religious identity was rarely displayed in communal and doctrinal terms.
- The Mughal emperors set a standard of religious mysticism and accommodation that allowed Hindus, Jains, and Sikhs to participate. Most Mughal emperors were devotees of the mystical tradition of Islam known as Sufism, which also had a strong following among Indian Muslims and Hindus.
- Combined with an armed camp and a sophisticated administrative system, the Mughals' syncretic and accommodative religious pattern of governance enabled them to rule, govern, and tax effectively.
- The Mughals created a truly Indo-Islamic empire and culture. It was an empire that was certainly Muslim, in the sense that it was ruled by Muslims. The culture of Islam was inescapable at court and in politics, and Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains had to defer to many of these prerogatives. But it was also profoundly Indian. Hindus became major stakeholders in the Court, and Hindu penmen were bound to the cultural and administrative machinery of the empire.

Society and Religion in 18th-Century India

- Indian society in the 1700s inherited a great and awe-inspiring Indo-Islamic culture. It was vibrant, sophisticated and syncretic. In terms of religion, the spiritual traditions of Islam, Hinduism, and Jainism received newfound patronage from various regional and local rulers. Marvelous tombs and temples were built in places such as Jaipur, Lucknow, and Hyderabad.
- There was very little Hindu-Muslim religious rivalry in 18th-century India. On the whole syncretism and accommodation

prevailed over conflict and rivalry. When religious violence did break out, it was usually shaped by economic, military, and political motives.

- The flourishing and vibrant state of society in 18th-century India was made possible in part by what historians have called the regionalization of the Mughal Empire. In order to pay off debts, fund military campaigns, and reward military generals for their service, the Mughals had to tax the territories they had conquered. This meant that they had to rely upon local leaders, headmen, village chieftains, and landlords. The Mughals gave these local leaders titles and largely let them run their own affairs, as long as they continued to remit taxes.
- This regionalization was dangerous to central authority. It gave greater power to the provinces, and upstart regional governors with titles began to subvert imperial authority in Delhi. This was not, however, the breakup or decline of the Mughal Empire. Rather, it was the regionalization of the empire's spirit, culture, and methods of administration. The regional kingdoms that emerged during this period governed in Mughal fashion, from taxation and court culture to patronage and raising armies.
- The regional kingdoms of India became more aggressive in the 18th century, in part because warfare opened up new sources of opportunity for revenue-hungry regional states. Local chiefs and governors saw opportunities for advancing their own influence and legitimacy, and the kingdoms fought each other. This created a trend of what historians have called military fiscalism, with regional states such as Awadh, Bengal, Punjab, and Mysore all devoting increasing shares of their expenditure to their armies.

The flourishing and vibrant state of society in 18th-century India was made possible in part by what historians have called the regionalization of the Mughal Empire.

- The warfare and regionalization of the Mughal Empire led regional states to extend cultivation. They cleared jungle tracts, which not only created new farming lands to tax, but also denied cover for enemy forces. It also led to an explosion of paper and bureaucratic management of agrarian taxes. Land was valuable, and everyone—from kings to cultivators—wanted to document what was their rightful share.
- Scribes and scribal abilities were at a premium in 18th-century India. When territories were conquered and needed to be administered—and, most importantly, taxed—it was often Hindu penmen and Kayasthas who were vaulted into new positions of power. They became indispensable for regional kings.
- Topping this all off was the decline of the Mughal Court's authority. The process of regionalization was exacerbated by a succession of poor, inattentive Mughal emperors who rarely left court and lacked the qualities of their predecessors. In a sense, Mughal expansion created the preconditions for its own eclipse.

Suggested Reading

Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India*.

Ali, "The Passing of an Empire."

Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*.

Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India*.

Questions to Consider

1. Was the Mughal Empire in decline or merely regionalizing itself in the 18th century?
2. Was the 18th century a period of decline or a vibrant economic and political era of India's history?



Lecture 3

Indian and British Economic Interests

In this lecture, you will learn how one of the most vibrant commercial centers in the global economy drifted toward colonialism, and how this set the stage for an eventual conquest of India, by both regional Indian and foreign powers. You will see how the regionalization of the Mughal Empire, global economic trends, and the interests of India's great commercial families all converged to provide a recipe for colonialism, and how the British later took advantage of these dynamics to conquer India within two generations.

The Regionalization of the Mughal Empire

- In 1707, the last great Mughal emperor died. His successors were weaker than he had been, and they were far less effective at governing. They were also seemingly blind to changing political realities in India. The emergence of competing regional kingdoms in 18th-century India had had a dynamic effect, opening up new sources of opportunity for revenue-hungry states and numerous social, military, and economic actors.
- In many regional states, both Hindu and Muslim rulers needed to seek out the favor of Brahmins. For these rulers, Brahmins were often the source of power and legitimacy in the countryside, providing ritual affirmation for Hindu rulers and giving legitimacy to Muslim rulers. Regional states that

wanted their cultivators to pay taxes often had to have the approval of the Brahmins.

- Other groups that became sought after in 18th-century India were penmen and scribes. Penmen and scribes were both Muslim and Hindu, came from less elite and landed backgrounds, and were usually literate in Persian, accountancy, and managing paper. The largest group of Hindu scribes—Kayasthas—became known as an almost Islamized group, documenting taxes and military finance and writing imperial edicts.
- As regional states began to make war on one another, everyone from common soldiers, or sepoys, to advisors and strategists saw a boom in employment across India. Regional states such as Mysore, Awadh, and the Maratha confederacy built large armies. In fact, historians have estimated that 2 percent of India's population was in uniform full-time in the 1700s.
- There were also substantial numbers of part-time soldiers. Given the vagaries of the monsoons, cultivators and farmers, when faced with bad harvests, would often join armies part-time to supplement their incomes. Coupled with full-time soldiers, it would be fair to say that around 5 percent of India's population was engaged in direct warfare.
- The emergence of regional warfare also affected India's environment. Beginning in the 1700s, regional kingdoms began clearing forests to increase the amount of taxable, arable land. This meant more revenue for the army, court, scribes, and administration. For some, it could be the difference between victory and defeat. Deforestation also offered a tactical advantage: Fewer trees meant less cover for the enemy.
- All regional states practiced something called military fiscalism. The kingdoms were increasingly shifting their spending and prerogatives toward armies, and this affected how agriculture was expanded, taxed, and administered. It also

greatly affected the rhythms of India's regional economies and centers of production.

- For example, kingdoms that wanted to raise more revenue extended agricultural cultivation into wastelands. They cleared forests, displacing forest dwellers and tribal *adivasi* communities. Settling the lands required capital and credit, which brought Hindu merchants and moneylenders into the picture. Newly settled lands also required administrators and scribes, around whom shops and canteens began to sprout.

India's Place in the Global Economy

- Beginning in the 1500s, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to try to get their hands on India's wealth. They operated out of Goa, their colony on the west coast. In the 1600s, the English, Dutch, and French got involved, working primarily out of coastal settlements. These European powers competed with each other and sought to intercept the flow of trade between Southeast Asia, India, and the Middle East.
- Like India's Muslim conquerors and rulers before them, Europeans desired India's wealth. And the potential spoils were massive: By 1700, roughly one-quarter of the world's total commerce passed through the Indian subcontinent. The Indian economy was buoyant, and it hummed along with commercial vibrancy.
- India in the 1700s was an exciting place for business and opportunity. Its economy linked villages with larger all-Indian networks of commercial exchange and mobility. Letters of credit could originate in Bengal and be cashed across the subcontinent in western India. Merchant families had branches across India and into central Asia.
- The most sought-after items in the Indian economy in this period were textiles made from cotton and jute. The India artisanal economy was designed primarily for export, and

Europeans increasingly demanded Indian-made cloth for shirts, trousers, tablecloths, napkins, and tapestries. In some part of Southeast Asia, Indian textiles were accepted as a form of currency. Similarly, the English used Indian textiles to pay for slaves off the coast of West Africa.

Beginning in the 1500s, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to try to get their hands on India's wealth.

- One entity represented English—and after 1707, British—commercial interests in India: the East India Company. Founded in 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I at the behest of leading London merchants and traders, the East India Company was one of the world's first publicly traded joint-stock companies. The company was granted a monopoly on trade between India and England. If you were an English subject (or a British subject, after 1707), and you wanted to trade legitimately in India, you had to go through the East India Company.
- Initially, the East India Company did not have any political aims. In fact, the company wanted to avoid politics and power because such pursuits could eat away at profit. The company had shareholders, so returns and dividends were paramount. As a result, the British avoided getting involved in political affairs until the 1750s.
- Unlike the Arabs, Persians, and Chinese, the British had certain advantages when it came to trading with India. One of these was silver. Silver was the standard backing India's various rupee currencies, and massive volume of silver were available to Europeans from South America. Another advantage was the powerful British navy, which ensured that Britain could command the long-term maritime trade between India and the outside world.
- The East India Company also had its own private mercenary force, which was made up primarily of Indian soldiers. These



Elizabeth I (1533-1603)

mercenaries protect the company's interests against various nawabs' armies and the border incursions that came to define 18th-century India. And because the company had no political responsibilities, it did not have to abide by formal treaties or the rules of warfare.

- The British had several disadvantages in terms of Indian trade, however. To begin with, British trade and presence was limited to the coasts. By the 1750s, the British had not yet penetrated India's internal economy and trade in wheat, rice, minerals and textiles. The British knew nothing of upcountry interior trade, which had been the source of wealth for kings and sultans for thousands of years.
- Being from far away, the British (and Europeans more generally) were not taken seriously by Indians and the Mughals. Europeans were not feared by Indian rulers and traders, who saw them as crude, violent barbarians who loved drink.
- Another disadvantage was that the British at first knew little about Indian customs, rituals, and religions. It wasn't until after the conquests of the late 1700s that India's great civilization and traditions were opened up to scholars and, eventually, the wider world.

India's Great Commercial Families

- India was not an innocent victim of colonial conquest. There was a wider collection of indigenous capitalists, merchant banker castes, and moneylenders who were later crucial in securing British domination by 1800. These merchant and banking families had started to become very influential at court and for regional Indian kingdoms in the 1700s.
- In the 1700s, the regional kingdoms of Bengal, Awadh, Mysore, and the Maratha confederacy all needed more money and revenue to build up their administrations and bolster their rule. They needed bureaucrats, scribes, accountants, artillery,

stores, provisions, and more. Fiscal might and access to credit were crucial, lest newly won territory and influence fall to regional rivals.

- Because Muslims largely abstained from charging interest (considering it usury), Hindus and Jains served as India's primary moneylenders. Hindu and Jain banking families had crucial advantages in the Indian economy, particularly in the Indian interior where all of India's fiscal and material wealth lay. They moved grains, goods, and—crucially—long-distance credit bills called hundis, which were honored across India. By the mid-1700s, some of these families had become extremely wealthy and influential.
- India's powerful commercial families began to bankroll regional kingdoms. Nawabs, kings, and princes were extended lines of credit to finance wars and build up administrations. Coupled with overall Indian economic growth and European silver, these banking families were projected into new positions of influence.
- Under the Mughals, if a landowner was not able pay the taxes and revenue due on his land, extensive negotiations would take place to arrange payment over time or through other means. Landowners rarely had their lands seized. However, in the heightened regional and fiscal climate of 18th-century India, an auctioneering system of tax collection and land ownership began to emerge. Under this system, wealthy banking families could bid for these lands and for the right to collect revenue.
- The pressure on land taxation was exacerbated by European demand for Indian textiles. Because indigo, cotton, silk, and jute were required for exportable textiles, heightened European demand for these goods led regional kingdoms

Even though India's great commercial families were becoming more important and influential, they tended to bump up against the prerogatives of royal courts.

to tax commerce less and the landed economy more. When demand and profitability increased, so did the severity and intensity of tax collections.

- Even though India's great commercial families were becoming more important and influential, they tended to bump up against the prerogatives of royal courts. Regional kings in Awadh, Mysore, and Bengal, for example, required generous lines of credit to maintain their armies and administrations between harvests. They tended to squeeze Hindu and Jain banking families with their demands and terms.
- As a result of these dynamics, India's commercial families slowly withdrew their support for regional kingdoms throughout the 1700s. And there was always the possibility that they might throw their lot in with an external power who offered better agreements in terms of security and profitability—which is, of course, where the British came in.

Suggested Reading

Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*.

Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia*.

Jalal and Bose, *Modern South Asia*.

Roy, *Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India*.

Questions to Consider

1. How significant was India within the global economy, and why did it attract so much foreign interest?
2. What were the precolonial foundations for the British Empire in India?



Lecture 4

British Expansion in India (1757–1820)

T*his lecture addresses several major developments in 18th- and early 19th-century India. First, you will examine how the East India Company acquired political power in Bengal and other regional kingdoms. You will then consider how the transformation of a merchant venture into a political entity thrust the British into the role of political sovereign. Finally, you will learn how the East India Company employed incumbent tax officials and penmen to govern and administer its new territories.*

The British in Bengal

- The overall state of affairs in 18th-century India—its regionalized politics, warfare, and merchant banking families—was exemplified by India's eastern regions. In Bengal, which would become the bridgehead for the British in India, the East India Company was vaulted into power by the nexus of money and political intrigue.
- The ruler of Bengal at the time was a man named Siraj ud-Daula. The grandson of the first nawab of Bengal, Siraj became nawab himself in April of 1757. No one expected that Siraj would be the first Indian ruler to fall to the British. To the contrary, Siraj was determined to extend his rule deeper into

Bengal's hinterlands and confront the Marathas coming in from central India.

- Siraj was determined to consolidate his state's power. He wanted to centralize control and raise a larger army. To finance these efforts, he made the mistake of demanding extended lines of credit from the Jagat Seth banking family. He also demanded greater taxes from the rural elite, who started to resent such demands. Over a few years, Siraj greatly alienated the very zamindars and creditors needed to grease the fiscal wheels of his kingdom.
- Siraj also wanted to assert more control over European trade. He demanded that the East India Company halt construction of fortifications at their trading station in Calcutta, which were originally built to repel the French. The company refused. Siraj resented this "interference" in Bengal's political affairs. He was especially angry when he learned that the British were supporting factions against him in his court.
- Siraj routed company forces in Calcutta in early 1756. His soldiers took approximately 60 British prisoners hostage and detained them in a holding cell. While later British observers exaggerated claims of torture and abuse, what was more important was the emotional reaction to this assault on British honor.
- Sensing an opportunity, an ambitious company employee named Robert Clive sailed from the company's post in southern India, at Madras, to avenge this humiliation. Clive became the spearhead of British revenge and, unintentionally, the founder of the British Empire in India.
- Because the British were not militarily superior to the Indian states, Clive sought to exploit disillusioned actors in Bengal. He entered into secret negotiations with the Jagat Seths, offering them better prospects and business than their local

clients. Clive and these bankers, in turn, then conspired with Mir Jafar, a disaffected general in Siraj's army.

- In 1757, in a large mango grove in the Bengal countryside, Siraj's army confronted the company's forces in what became known as the Battle of Plassey. As battle commenced, Mir Jafar—per his secret negotiations with Clive—looked the other way. The company won in a rout.
- The aftermath of the Battle of Plassey was more significant than the battle itself. The company won 28 million rupees, equivalent to more than £3 million in 18th-century sterling. The company installed Mir Jafar as the nawab of Bengal, replacing the deposed and defeated Siraj. Mir Jafar ceded to the company 24 parganas, India's lowest administrative

Robert Clive and Mir Jafar after the Battle of Plassey



subdivisions, which came with the power to collect taxes in the parganas.

- The company could now use this new tax revenue not only to fund their army but also to expand trade. This drastically altered Britain's economic relationship with India. Now, instead of importing silver into Bengal to pay for Indian goods, the company could use Indian money to pay for Indian goods.
- Bengal's neighboring states were concerned. In Bihar, to the northwest, a nawab named Mir Kasim tried to hold the company at bay by centralizing his state and extracting more fiscal revenue. Kasim had the Jagat Seths jailed, which turned out to be a crucial mistake. He went on to form an informal alliance with nawab of Awadh and the Mughal emperor to confront the company.
- This alliance worried the British. How could they take on such a formidable group? The British viewed Kasim as a threat to their holdings in Calcutta and the 24 parganas. This led to the Battle of Buxar in 1764 between the company and Kasim. Surprisingly, the company smashed the last strand of armed resistance in eastern India. They proved that they were, militarily, the masters of Bengal.
- As with the Battle of Plassey, the aftermath of the Battle of Buxar was more significant than the conflict itself. In 1765, the Mughal emperor granted the company Bengal's diwan, or revenue administration, to be administered on his behalf. The emperor reckoned that if he couldn't subdue the British, he might as well allow them to work from within the looser imperial system.

Replicating Success

- In Bengal, the East India Company had taken advantage of preexisting dynamics to gain control. The British followed the same formula in other parts of India, practicing military

fiscalism and working with merchant and banking groups. Bengal's revenues, which were considerable, helped the company finance wars against other regional kingdoms, including Mysore and the Maratha confederacy.

- Mysore was one of the most formidable kingdoms of India. It had an impressive military. It was efficiently taxed. And its rulers—Haidar Ali and his son, Tipu Sultan—wanted to raise a large army and drive the British into the sea. Ali established state-owned industries and even built a navy to counter the British. Mysore was unable to counter British naval dominance, however, and Ali was limited by his dependence on British arms.
- Between 1780 and 1799, the East India Company fought three major wars against Mysore. Despite the fact that Mysore's troops outnumbered the company's two-to-one, the company managed to win a final battle in 1799. Afterward, the company was granted the diwan of half of Mysore territory, making it easier to finance further wars.
- The East India Company's victory over Mysore was not due to superior military technology; it was a matter of logistics. Merchants and bankers, seeing a large moving market in their midst, supplied grain to British troops. In addition, the company poached disaffected Indian mercenaries with prospects of better, more regular pay.
- The Maratha confederacy, a central and western Indian kingdom, was the last major power able to challenge the British in central India. The Marathas had significant territorial holdings, and they treated bankers and lending families better than other regional rulers. And because the Maratha confederacy was largely a warrior-peasant kingdom, the Marathas could mobilize masses.
- Between 1774 and 1818, the East India Company fought three wars against the Maratha confederacy. As with Mysore, the company exploited the questionable loyalties of relatives



Tipu Sultan (1750-1799)

within the Maratha bureaucracy, promising them enhanced landed and commercial privileges. Human intelligence was also crucial, and the British quickly co-opted Indian networks of runners, spies, and informants.

- In 1803, the British captured the ancient city of Delhi, ostensibly to “protect” the Mughal emperor from the Marathas. This move demonstrated that while it was technically part of the Mughal system, the company was the real *sarkar*, or authority, in India.
- From 1817–1818, the company fought a final war to defeat the Marathas in central India. By 1820, large swathes of southern, northern, and western India were now company land, and the East India Company had become the dominant power in South Asia.
- When it came to kingdoms that the company either could not or chose not to engage militarily, the company used its fiscal and financial tools to keep them in a subservient position. Awadh, for example, was in “alliance” with the company following the British victory at Buxar in 1764. In return for a massive subsidy, the company maintained its troops in the kingdom. To ease the financial burden, Awadh ceded lush territories—more than half the kingdom—to the company in 1801, adding untold revenues to the company’s tax ledger.

British Governance

- The Mughal system of revenue and taxation was sophisticated, involving collectors, assessors, and paper managers. This is what made the Mughals wealthy and powerful. The successor kingdoms of the 18th century inherited these traditions and modified them, in places such as Bengal, Awadh, and the Maratha territories.
- The British quickly moved to employ former Hindu scribes and paper managers who had served the Mughals and their successor states. These penmen came primarily from a Hindu caste called Kayasthas, and they provided the company with valuable rent rolls, records of past assessments, and the

paper, factual sanction to enact revenue demands.

In 1803, the British captured the ancient city of Delhi, ostensibly to “protect” the Mughal emperor from the Marathas.

- In the Gangetic regions of northern India, the company quickly utilized the skills and paperwork of Hindu penmen to give them an idea of what the tax rates were and what the company could get away with charging. In fact, most revenue archives from Awadh after 1803 have constant references by the British to “what the Nawab’s domains yielded previously.”
- Indians were not suspicious of the company’s ulterior motives because the company concealed its ambitions. It never used the symbols and vestiges of Mughal sovereignty. Indian rulers did not believe the company had political ambitions; they thought it was merely offering its services for hire. Of course, the company’s “trading interests” were stretched to absurd degrees. When the company felt that its trading position was threatened, it resorted to force.
- There were complications for the company in India, however. To begin with, the company was not an Indian power. Unlike previous Indian rulers, it had no sentimental or moral attachment to the well-being of Indian peasants and cultivators.
- Another complication was the company’s fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders. The inherent tension between the company’s obligations as a merchant organization and its obligations as political sovereign shaped its rule of India until the 1850s.

Suggested Reading

Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*.

Bellenoit, "Between *Qanungos* and Clerks."

Jalal and Bose, *Modern South Asia*.

Questions to Consider

1. Did the British come in and conquer, or did their rise to power build upon Indian dynamics?
2. How had the East India Company been transformed after 1765, and what did this mean for India's history?



Lecture 5

Knowing the Country: British Orientalism

For centuries, Europeans saw India as a distant and mysterious place. In the 18th century, however, commonalities between Indians and Europeans became increasingly apparent. This lecture examines how India's social, cultural, and religious traditions were co-opted by the East India Company to help them govern. It also considers the impact of British attempts to understand India on colonial policy, landholding, and the well-being of Indians themselves.

The Importance of Indian Civilization

- As the British came to rule much of the Indian subcontinent, the broader heritage of India's religions, cultures, and history were revealed. The British could study these traditions, analyze them, and seek to make sense of a foreign yet fascinating civilization.
- The British generally understood that India represented one of the world's great civilizations. And knowledge of India was crucial, because the East India Company needed to understand the territory in order to govern it, administer it, and make a profit.
- Early on, the company tended to work within the cultural, legal, and administrative fabric of the territories they conquered. The

British were impressed with the administrative structures they discovered, such as the paper-driven nature of the Mughal administration, the role that Brahmins played in sanctifying Hindu kings, and the traditions of local village self-governance.

- The company was pragmatic between the 1780s and the 1830s. The British wanted to show their legitimacy. They knew that even though they were conquerors, disparaging Indian religious, cultural, and social traditions would eat away at the company's stability and, hence, its profitability.
- The British needed to convince Indians that they could provide justice and good governance. But law and governance are shaped by a society's culture, values, languages, and religions, and the British knew little about these. They needed to learn much more.

Scholarly Engagement and Social Interaction

- Scholarly engagement with Indian traditions during the late 18th and early 19th centuries generally stressed commonalities between Europe and India.
- Sir William Jones, an autodidact who studied Persian and Sanskrit while working for the East India Company, observed that the languages of Persia and India bore striking similarities to the languages of ancient Europe, namely Latin and ancient Greek. This suggested that these languages had once emerged from a common ancestral root, and thus that Indians and Europeans came from the same linguistic—and possibly ethnic—stock.
- Jones quickly realized that Hindus could not be dismissed as pagans, for they possessed sophisticated religious, philosophical, and intellectual traditions. He was highly appreciative of great Indian works such as the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, comparing them favorably with the great works of English literature.

- Many British people were fascinated with India. It was one big bazaar of social, religious, customary, and spiritual curiosity. At this time, the British had little of the racist and cultural prejudices toward Indians that they would exhibit after the 1830s. This was also the period in which some British went native, adopting Indian dress, mannerisms, and languages. A few even converted to Islam or adopted Hindu traditions.




British people dressed as Indians

- There was an immense interaction between Indians and Europeans from the earliest generations of colonial rule. Some of the more telling examples of this interaction can be seen in the more intimate relations between Britons and Indians.
- Robert Clive and other officials had Indian servants and numerous Indian concubines. Despite the image of the incorruptible Englishman, company officials and employees slept with Indian women with a regularity that would have shocked the more restrained British society.
- This period was also an era of free-wheeling commerce in which British officials and traders amassed large fortunes in relatively short times. They were often called nabobs, a corruption of the Indian title “nawab.” In Britain, “nabob” became a condescending term used to describe company traders and officials who amassed large fortunes in India and returned home to live fat and rich.

Reinforcing Tradition

- Early on, the British looked for stability and legitimacy. They tended to seek out traditional sources of authority, including Brahmins, mullahs, and zamindars. As a result, instead of modernizing India, the early colonial state tended to perpetuate the past. In no area was this more apparent than in the landholding settlements and tax policies that emerged in Bengal.
- From 1769–1773, a major famine struck Bengal, Bihar, and parts of central India. Historians have estimated that more than 10 million people died from starvation during this period. The British were obsessed with redressing this state of affairs and ensuring agricultural stability and certainty, which would also guarantee profits for the East India Company.
- In 1793, Lord Cornwallis, the company's governor-general, issued what was called the Permanent Settlement of Bengal. This agreement reformed the zamindari system of land ownership and tax collection by creating a permanent class of landlords who would collect a fixed tax amount in perpetuity. This was meant to increase financial certainty and incentivize the improvement of the lands.
- There were a few major drawbacks to the Permanent Settlement. For example, the agreement made landlords more powerful than they were under the Mughals. The British had a conservative, aristocratic, almost naively utopian vision of what an ordered society should be like. They thought that Indian landowners could (and should) be like English landowners, improving cultivation and agricultural yields and treating their tenants with kindness.
- Indian zamindars, however, were different. Traditionally, they might own the land and have the responsibility to remit revenue. They could lose this right but still own the land, or have tax collection contracted out to a third party. This complexity was lost on company officials.



Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805)

- In order to ensure a stable revenue stream for the company, the Permanent Settlement altered the rights of landowners and created an auctioneering system: If a zamindar could

not pay the tax revenue, his lands would be auctioned to the highest bidder. This policy, more than those enacted by previous rulers, cemented the relationship between owning property and tax collection and made tax policy less flexible than it had been under the Mughals.

Scholarly engagement with Indian traditions during the late 18th and early 19th centuries generally stressed commonalities between Europe and India.

- The company instituted a different revenue system in southern India. Under this approach, called the ryotwari system, there were no large zamindari landholders. Instead, cultivators paid taxes directly to the government through a complex system of officials and administrators. While this system did not create as powerful a zamindar class as in Bengal, it similarly romanticized the Indian peasant and cultivator.
- The ryotwari system was far more archaic than the supposedly more “modernizing” Permanent Settlement of Bengal. It tended to preserve the late Mughal institutional and administrative fabric, and the net effect was that to fossilize the agrarian and peasant economy in a past that was out of sync with the company’s extractive revenue demands.
- The romanticizing of Indian groups and castes was also seen in the writing of one Colonel James Tod. A military man, Tod spent years living with the Rajput warrior clans of western India, studying them and observing their rituals, ethos, and practices. Fascinated by their sense of honor and warrior prowess, Tod wrote a three-volume work called *The Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* in which he lauded Rajput society for its nobility, hierarchy, and moral uprightness.

- By romanticizing the Rajputs, Tod equated their attitudes toward rank and hierarchy with those of Indian society as a whole. In his mind, and in the minds of many scholars of his day, India was defined by rank, order, and village. Later on, these ideas would permeate the color of colonial administration, and the books written about them would be referenced by various castes and ethnic groups attempting to stake their claim to favoritism and special status.
- Colonial law was another example of the traditionalizing of Indian society. For the East India Company, whose lifeline was tax revenue, law was indispensable. The British entered India with little knowledge of Hindu and Muslim law, so they sought out informants and scholars to tell them what laws existed. They consulted Brahmins and Muslim clerics, which unsurprisingly resulted in a more scriptural, book-based legal system.
- The British undertook a codification of what they believed were separate Hindu and Muslim legal traditions—which, they presumed, all Hindus and Muslims followed. This assumption flew in face of practice. In fact, most Hindus and Muslims settled disputes and arbitration according to custom, which was unwritten, oral, and traditional, and which varied from region to region.
- So while the British constantly reminded themselves—and Indians—that they were bringing justice to India, the reality was far more complex. The British made the law more inflexible, even though they dispensed with the sort of legal favoritism that was afforded to Muslims and Brahmins. This helped to create what historian Radhika Singha has called “a despotism of law” that flew in the face of more flexible and accommodative Indian traditions.

Suggested Reading

Bayly, *Empire and Information*.

Edney, *Mapping an Empire*.

Inden, *Imagining India*.

Washbrook, "Law, State, and Society in Colonial India."

Questions to Consider

1. Was colonial knowledge a by-product or a precondition of British rule in India?
2. What was significant about the way the British understood Indian tradition and how they anchored it to colonial law and policy?



Lecture 6

Race, Gender, and Culture (1750–1850)

The dynamics of race and gender were central to the Indo-British colonial relationship. In this lecture, you will examine how the opening up of India to Orientalist scholarship engendered racial paradigms that began to emphasize the differences between India and Britain. You will also consider how Indians and Britons related to each other through gender, and what role British perceptions regarding gender played in justifying colonial rule.

Race in Colonial India

- The story of the British Raj cannot be told without investigating racial dynamics. In colonial India, concepts and theories of race reflected changing dynamics in British imperial ideology, the economic penetration of India's economy, and anxieties about colonial rule.
- This is not to suggest that Indians had no concept of racial difference and preference. But the ideas about race that the British brought to India were novel in scope, and they were accompanied by massive amounts of intellectual investigation, scientific justification, and colonial stereotyping.
- In the 19th century, many scholars and intellectuals in Europe came to embrace what was known as racial science. When we

hear this term today, we tend to think of eugenics and Nazi racial theories. But for 19th-century European scholars, racial science was the idea that one could scientifically prove that some races were better or more developed than others.

- Between 1700 and 1900, European powers came to rule much of the world through empires. It was in this context that Europeans sought to understand how and why they had come to rule the world. By the mid-19th century, European racial superiority had become the most powerful, enticing explanation for many Europeans.
- British understandings of Indian races went through two phases: First was the period of philology and comparative linguistics. This was the high point of largely sympathetic understanding of India compared to Europe, pioneered by Sir William Jones and his discovery of the Indo-European language family tree. The idea was that one could understand different peoples not by their genetic code and racial features, but by their great literatures and classical languages.
- By the 1840s, however, a second, more disturbing phase had begun to emerge. Appreciation for Indian culture shifted away from the humanistic tools of philology and language. Scientific categories—primarily race and genetics—began to dominate as ways of “understanding” India.

Widening the Racial Divide

- The shift from humanistic to scientific consideration of the Indian people orbited around a particular name and category that had been known in India for thousands of years, and which European scholars picked up on in their translations of India’s texts: Aryan.
- The term “Aryan” appears to have been used by Indo-European speakers entering Persia and northern India. Indeed, “Iran” means “the land of the Aryans.” But Aryan was not a racial category.

It was only in the mid- to late 19th century that European scholars turned it into one by arguing that it could help explain linguistic differences between northern and southern India, and—crucially—why Britain had come to rule India.

Between 1700 and 1900,
European powers came to
rule much of the world
through empires.

- The Indo-European language theory suggested that Englishmen and Indians came from a common heritage at some point long ago. Max Müller, a German-born scholar at Oxford University, began to question why Englishmen and Indians were so different if they had indeed come from common stock. The answer that Müller and others came up with was that Indians had “degenerated,” an understanding based on the barometer of racial purity.
- Müller greatly influenced a generation of British administrators and scholars. The idea in currency was that Indians, as Aryans, had become racially corrupted by intermarrying with original, darker-skinned inhabitants of India. Indians had also adopted polytheism, which many European scholars felt encouraged wooly thinking, speculation, and intellectual degeneration. As a result, their racial purity had tanked.
- The corollary to this theory was that Englishmen must be racially purer than Indians, which would explain why Britain had become so powerful. The political implication was that if Indians and Englishmen came from a common stock, and Indians had declined, then the British were justified in ruling their long-lost Aryan brothers.
- This racial template was applied by Europeans to the linguistic map of India. Northern Indian languages such as Punjabi, Bengali, Hindi, Marathi, and Gujarati are all descendants of Sanskrit, the language of classical India, Hinduism, and the purported Aryan peoples. The languages of southern India, however—Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada—are

descendants of the native languages of India prior to the arrival of the purported Aryan peoples.

- Some European scholars and comparative linguists postulated that the presence of two main language groups in India—Indo-European in the north and so-called Dravidian languages of the south—could be explained in part by ethnology and race.
- These scholars argued that those who spoke Sanskrit-based tongues such as Hindi, Marathi, and Punjabi were usually fairer in skin tone than Tamil, Malayalam, and Telugu speakers. They suggested that the subcontinent's population could be divided into the original, darker-skinned inhabitants of India who remained in the south, and the fairer, vigorous Aryans of the north.
- Modern scholarship has demonstrated how absurd and false so many of these racial theories were. Nevertheless, they were among the items used by the British to justify colonial rule of India.

Gender and Sexuality

- Ideas about gender and sexuality helped the British further distinguish themselves from Indians, providing another theoretical underpinning for colonial rule. The British fashioned an idea of masculinity that was crucial to their perception of themselves as colonial masters of over 300 million people.
- The typical British officer was supposed to be stern, convinced of his actions and ideas, and firm in dealing with Indians. Much of this attitude was the result of education, as most prominent British administrators went to Britain's

In the elite educational institutions of Britain, sport and physical prowess was emphasized to a greater degree than intelligence.

elite schools, such as Rugby, Harrow, and Eton, and elite universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge.

- In the elite educational institutions of Britain, sport and physical prowess was emphasized to a greater degree than intelligence. Overly intellectualizing matters was seen as a recipe for indecisiveness and wavering. The British official needed to know what he wanted, know that it was right, and know it all right away.
- An extension of this idea of British manliness was that effeminate traits were suppressed and seen as a sign of weakness. Homosexuality and effeminate behavior weren't tolerated in public. This was the Victorian era, which was homophobic, paternalistic, masculine in public, and averse to discussing sensual and sexual matters.
- In India, these ideas were all the more important. For the British, they were necessary to perpetuate the illusion of the invincible Englishman. One British official, Sir Walter Roper Lawrence, noted that he "had the illusion, wherever I was, that I was infallible and invulnerable in my dealings with Indians... the illusion which is the very air of India.... They, the millions, made us believe that we had a divine mission. We made them believe that they were right."
- This hypertensive British masculinity was due in part to changes in policies enacted by the British themselves. Especially in Bengal, the British became increasingly weary of Indians who learned English and the smaller sliver who entered colonial administration. Some of them started to question British policies and discriminations. To compensate, the British exacerbated stereotypes as a way of rebutting these mild criticisms of the Raj. This spilled over into gender.
- The Bengali man was regularly derided as effeminate. The Bengali babu, or educated clerk, was subject to particular criticism. His purported feminine qualities were another reason

why India had been conquered over the centuries by outsiders who were more manly and monotheistic.

- The British noted that Bengali men practiced purdah, the seclusion of their women from public view. The women wouldn't go out and would only reside in a particular area of the home. To British eyes, this proved that Bengali men weren't real men, because they treated their women in a cowardly fashion.
- This construction of an effeminate Bengali man was also bound up in questions of sexuality. Englishmen were manly in how they controlled their sexuality, the British believed. But Bengali men, because they were effeminate, were sex-prone and wild.
- The British thought that the heat and humidity of the Bengali marshes led Bengali men to live languid lives of idleness, thus encouraging them to fulfill pleasures of the flesh. The British also believed that because Indians generally married early, they had sex early as well. Some British commentators even claimed that practices such as masturbation were encouraged in the homes of Bengali men.
- British men were also concerned with the sanctity and purity of British women, virtues that they claimed needed to be guarded against lusty, corrupting Indians (especially Bengali men). The British argued that because Indian men were effeminate and sensual, they would target European women.
- Of course, all of this labeling and gender-stereotyping was simply fantasy. For example, the British never really understood that the fact that Indians married early didn't mean that their marriages were consummated early.
- Nevertheless, British ideas about gender and sexuality heavily influenced the Indo-British colonial relationship. Indian

historiography has been immensely enriched by the infusion of gender studies into the historical discipline.

Suggested Reading

Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj*.

Deol, "Sex, Social Critique and the Female Figure."

Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in the Making of Empire*.

Kapila, "Race Matters."

Questions to Consider

1. How did concepts of race inform the way the British viewed India?
2. How did gender figure into the colonial relationship and what did it do to support colonial rule?



Lecture 7

The Age of Reform (1830–1850)

British attitudes toward Indians started to become more condescending after the 1840s. Rather than emphasizing the commonalities between India and Britain, administrators and scholars started to emphasize the differences. In this lecture, you will explore how these changing attitudes were influenced by utilitarian and evangelical currents of thought in Britain and reflected in the Indo-British economic relationship.

Changing Attitudes

- When it first came to power, the East India Company largely governed India along precedents established by the Mughals and their successor kingdoms. The company rarely interfered in Indian religions, customs, and sentiments. In the 1820s, however, this all started to change.
- A newer generation of officers and company servants wanted to remake India to be more modern—which meant more European. The goal was to make India easier and more cost-effective to govern, and more amenable to the British Empire. It was believed that law, education, and free trade could transform Indians.

- Implicit in this belief, of course, was the view that India's existing economy, literature, religions, and educational traditions were inferior and getting in the way.
- Because of the colonial connection, the intellectual currents of British thought generated debates that ended up playing out in India. One such current that impacted India after the 1820s was utilitarianism, the philosophy pioneered by Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarians argued that the goal of any society or government should be the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
- To British reformers in India, the utilitarian philosophy was greatly needed. Caste discrimination prevented everyone from achieving happiness, they said. Religious "superstition," such as the practice of sati—Hindu widows' self-immolation upon the funeral pyre of their husbands—obviously prevented the greatest happiness for the greatest number.



The practice of sati—Hindu widows' self-immolation on the funeral pyre of their husbands

Evangelism and Education

- The East India Company did not want aggressive Christian missionaries in India, fearing that they would threaten stability and profits. British missionaries, however, saw India as an enormous opportunity for conversion. Because they were largely forbidden from coming to India, missionaries began to lobby Parliament to let them in. In 1813, Parliament amended the company's charter to allow missionaries into company territory.
- Missionaries criticized Indian customs, religions, and superstition to a degree never before seen in the country's history. Some missionaries aimed to convert entire cities to Christianity. They whipped up a chorus of contempt for Hinduism and Islam, and they criticized the East India Company for serving as a traditional Indian patron of temples, mosques, and religious endowments.
- These attitudes and actions contributed to an accumulation of Indian resentment toward things loosely conceived as Christian. And to make it worse, missionaries were disappointed in their results. Caste prevented many Hindus from converting, and Brahmins pointed out the very unchristian behavior of the company.
- Another liberal movement of the 1830s was in education. Thomas Babington Macaulay's "Minute on Education," published in 1835, became a seminal document in colonial India. Macaulay, who believed that learning Indian languages was useless, wrote that "a single good shelf of a European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia."
- There was also a darker side to Macaulay's "Minute on Education." In it, he claimed that "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern: a class of persons Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect." This was Anglicizing at its worst.

- Macaulay convinced Governor-General Lord Bentinck to replace Persian with English as the official language of government in the English Education Act of 1835. This ensured that Indians would begin learning English and would be exposed to a broader English and Western curriculum. Thus many of India's educated English speakers came to inhabit two worlds: the Western and the Indian.

Missionaries criticized Indian customs, religions, and superstition to a degree never before seen in the country's history.

Economic Developments

- In 1700, India accounted for roughly one-quarter of the world's commercial activity. Within three generations of British rule, however, this figure plummeted, and India was relegated to a subordinate and dependent economic position, primarily to serve British military and economic interests.
- The specter of debt—due to constant fringe warfare, ballooning costs, and obligations to shareholders—loomed heavily over the East India Company's directors and policymakers. In the 1830s, the British began to inject new life into Indian society and policies, hoping that administrative reform could cut costs and debt.
- At this time, India was subjected to the competition of the world economy like never before. The company straitjacketed the Indian economy into a global economic system, turning India into a traditional peasant-landlord economy for British economic benefit.
- Britain's stunting of the Indian economy took place in two phases. The first phase, which had to do with revenue, ran until the 1820s. During this period, the company perfected the revenue extraction practiced in the 18th century. They penetrated rural India better than any previous Indian power in order to

assess, tax, and collect wealth, narrowing the gaps between assessment and actual taxes collected with ruthless efficiency.

- The second phase concerned trade and British industry. The Indian connection enabled the British economy to industrialize as quickly as it did, helping to make Britain a global economic power. The East India Company had a monopoly on the Indian market, however, and British manufacturers wanted in.
- The free trade lobby successfully petitioned the British Parliament to revoke the company's monopoly when its charter was renewed in 1813. This meant that British firms would finally be able to compete in India.
- After the 1830s, British industry began to penetrate the Indian market. Factories in Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham produced cheaper textiles and cloth than Indian artisans and weavers. Indian textiles, long the prize of international commerce, were displaced by British cloth.
- British competition decimated India's artisan economy. Large communities of weavers, dyers and planters lost their jobs, and Indian unemployment skyrocketed. Many out-of-work artisans joined the peasant class to cultivate jute, cotton, and indigo, as these cash crops were in high demand by British factories.
- Liberal reformers facilitated Britain's economic parasitism. When Governor-General Lord Bentinck wanted to "improve" Indian society, he improved transport through steam shipping. This enabled cheaper, industrially-produced British textile manufacturers to outsell Indian textile manufacturers, further damaging India's artisan economy.
- Under company rule, more Indians became peasants than ever before. Large parts of India were effectively ruralized as former artisans moved away from cities and toward better opportunities in agricultural regions. The British, of course, were

happy to have more Indians work as peasants; it fit their romanticized vision of India as a land of country peasants and landlords.



Shipping of textile goods

- The moneylenders who had propelled the British to power also came into play. Company laws encouraged moneylenders to swarm into rural districts to lend money for seeds and ploughs, allowing the moneylenders to reap the benefits of the Indo-British colonial relationship.
- The linking up of Indian cultivators with the global economy exposed them to the shocks of world prices. After the 1830s, many prices dropped, which hit the peasantry hard. Cultivators had taken out loans, and those debts became harder to pay back.
- Deflation was the nail in the coffin of Indian artisans. Because falling prices usually hit producers hardest, British manufacturers were easily able to replace their Indian counterparts by underselling them. In addition, British textile manufacturers learned new, sophisticated dyeing techniques and weaving processes from Indian artisans, then applied the techniques on an industrial scale using steam power.
- The East India Company, symbolic of free trade and an economically prosperous Britain, had ironically lodged itself like a parasite into the Indian economy. It depended upon Indian revenues to finance its trade and its administration. In this sense, the British simply collected tribute like their predecessors.

- The company was technically a private trading company. Its aim was to bring profits to its shareholders, and it did so by operating the expense of Indian peasants, cultivators, and weavers. Yet the company was also a political ruler. Until 1858, it remained what Henry Bolts called “the sovereign merchant, and the merchant sovereign.”
- The company’s economic and political responsibilities were inherently in conflict with each other. Holding on to the iron laws of classical economics, British officials were ambivalent about government management of the Indian economy—even though, according to Indian tradition, rulers were expected to intervene when necessary.

Suggested Reading

Majeed, *Ungoverned Imaginings*.

Roy, *India in the World Economy*.

Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*.

Zastoupil, *J.S. Mill’s Encounter with India*.

Questions to Consider

1. Were the two decades prior to 1857 an age of reform or an age of arrogance?
2. How did changing attitudes reflect the economic relationship between India and Britain by the 1850s?



Lecture 8

The Great Uprising (1857–1858)

The Great Uprising of 1857–1858 was the single greatest threat to British India since the Battle of Plassey in 1757. The events surrounding this rebellion were complex, layered, and colored by class, caste, and region. In this lecture, you will consider the accumulation of Indian grievances against company rule. You will also examine the outbreak, scope, and progress of the Great Uprising and discover it changed the way Britain governed India as a colony.

Growing Resentment

- During the period of liberal reform, British officials, missionaries, and observers had critiqued India like never before. Indians of many stripes began to resent British meddling in their religious, cultural, and social matters.
- Religious grievances were the most pronounced. The steady stream of missionaries after the 1810s theologically assaulted Hinduism and Islam to an unprecedented degree. Many Indians, including the *sipahis* who served the company, felt that their religions were under attack.
- Because this was happening at a highpoint of British imperial and global might, the British were slow to understand Indians' reactions and were often blinded by their own arrogance.

- There were also economic grievances. The continual shoring up of debts affected Indian soldiers. To cut costs, high-caste *sipahis* saw their pay bonuses, or *battas*, cut. The company's military and political ambitions were always greater than their fiscal resources, and loyal Indian soldiers were now being asked to foot the bill. Add this to the wretched situation of the agrarian economy, of peasants and cultivators, and it becomes apparent in hindsight that economic discontent was real and felt by many.
- There were also political grievances that had been building up. To begin with, there was the symbolism of alien rule. Company rule and reform after the 1820s brought visibly "modernizing" effects: law courts, government offices, the telegraph, railways, and British commerce.
- There was also a spat of rapid annexations from the late 1830s that began to unsettle many regions the British had not yet touched. Due to the fiscal debts the company was constantly trying to recover, the period between the East India Company's 1833 loss of its trading monopoly and the 1856 annexation of Awadh was a two-faced one: The liberal "improvement" of India came at the height of the company's most militant expansionism, and it was no irony that the company was most aggressive when it was deepest in debt.
- Deeply in debt, the company sought new sources of revenue, sometimes by rewriting Indian traditions and customs. One notable example is the doctrine of lapse, which was a flagrant manipulation of Indian kingly tradition. Previously, Indian kings could adopt a suitable male if they lacked a biological heir. The company ruled that this was invalid, however, and that any kingdom that lacked a male heir would be annexed by the company.
- In the 15 years leading up to the Great Uprising, more than 20 smaller and larger kingdoms were parceled off through the doctrine of lapse and their revenues appropriated by the



Indian Mutiny

company. Its contradictions aside, the company was now known as the *angrezi sarkar*, or English authority.

The Great Uprising

- The Great Uprising began in Barrackpore in March of 1857. Mangal Pandey of the 34th Native Infantry, high off bhang (marijuana mixed with milk), tried to raise a religious revolt against the British and attacked his British officers. He was arrested and hanged.
- Events really took off in Meerut two months later. The company had introduced new Enfield rifles for soldiers, and there were rumors that the rifles' cartridges were greased with swine and cow fat. Moreover, the ends of the cartridges needed to be bitten off to fire properly, which of course would necessitate oral contact. This offended Hindu and Muslim soldiers. Many

sipahis refused to load the new cartridges, and many were court-martialed.

- On May 10–11, the 11th Native Cavalry Regiment mutinied throughout the evening and early morning. They quickly overran their British officers and looted the armory. Tapping into existing resentment, the *sipahis* soon overran most of northern India. The *sipahis* and others marched to Delhi and proclaimed the aged Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, “Emperor of Hindustan.”
- The *sipahis* and those who joined them absorbed many tracts of rural countryside west of Delhi. They found support among peasants, cultivators, and displaced weavers, all of whom felt the economic pains associated with British rule.
- Recently-annexed Awadh was in outright revolt. Famous rebels such as Nana Sahib and Tatia Tope proved to be a genuine menace in the field for British troops and their counterinsurgency campaign. Parts of central India also revolted, led by the Rani of Jhansi, whose kingdom had been annexed by the company through the doctrine of lapse.
- The *sipahis* and those who joined them didn’t move their power base beyond Delhi. By late 1857, this proved fatal to the Great Uprising. The British were able to move troops up the rivers with steamboats, and they motivated Punjabi soldiers to take revenge on the very troops who had helped the British conquer Punjab in 1849.
- There is no consistent picture of who participated in the Great Uprising. But it is clear that many groups joined, particularly in the countryside. The eastern Gangetic regions of Bihar and Awadh saw the most significant cooperation between rural laborers and urban elites in rising against the British. Bengal, Bombay, Madras, and Punjab, by contrast, were relatively quiet.

- By late 1857, the British had recaptured Delhi and major tracts of the Gangetic Plain, and they delivered an object lesson in retribution. Delhi, long a center of Indian Islamic culture, was defaced. Mosques and buildings were leveled. In the city's old Muslim section, the British arrested or shot anyone who was even remotely suspected of being involved. Even Muslim clerics were not spared.
- When the city of Lucknow was recaptured, the British cleared major neighborhoods and shot at will. Indians were forced to live on the outskirts of the city, with the inner city reserved for Europeans. As further punishment, the British made Lucknow the highest-taxed city in all of India.
- The British made an example of those who rebelled. They sometimes wrapped Muslim rebels in pigskins, forced alcohol down their throats, and hanged them. Other suspected rebels were tied to cannons and blown to smithereens. Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Mughal emperor, was arrested and exiled.

The Impact of the Great Uprising

- One effect of the Great Uprising was that the British began to question and reverse the liberal reformist impulse that had dominated since the 1820s. Meddling in Indian religious and cultural sensitivities for the sake of "improving" India had caused the British too much trouble.
- This ushered in new attitude of caution and conservatism. This did not mean the British suddenly became nice, sympathetic rulers. They remained convinced of their right to be in India. But the racial edge now stood out. Tales of alleged Indian barbarity, such as the

The British made an example of those who rebelled. They sometimes wrapped Muslim rebels in pigskins, forced alcohol down their throats, and hanged them.



The last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775-1862)

slaughter of women and children, fed the expanding balloon of British imperial hubris for the next 100 years.

- The Great Uprising also spurred crucial military changes. High-caste recruits from the Gangetic Plain were no longer deemed trustworthy. Punjabis and Nepalese Gurkhas became a larger part of the Army, as the British increasingly saw the simple soldiers of Punjab and Nepal as more trustworthy and manly and less likely to rebel.
- The British also infused India with more European troops. Where there had been a three-to-one ratio of Indians to Europeans, there was now a two-to-one ratio. More than 30,000 additional British troops surged into India. Indian soldiers were now barred from handling artillery.
- The entire Indian countryside was disarmed. The British made arms possession a crime. By 1858, they had confiscated 3.5 million guns. Indians found in possession of arms were punished with either a 500-rupee fine, 100 lashes, or seven years' imprisonment.
- In 1858, the East India Company was abolished by the Government of India Act, ending the period of company rule and the contradiction of the sovereign merchant/merchant sovereign. Company rule was replaced by Crown rule, turning India into a proper British colony. This began the period known as the British Raj, which would last until 1947.
- Following the events of the Great Uprising, the British abstained from further expansion in India. They forswore further territorial annexations and, surprisingly, kept their word until they left nearly 90 years later.

Suggested Reading

Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*.

Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt*.

Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj*.

Stokes, *The Peasant Armed*.

Questions to Consider

1. Were the events of 1857-1858 a national uprising or an isolated military mutiny?
2. How did the events of the 1850s change British attitudes and the way India was ruled?



Lecture 9

Economics and Society under the Raj


The story of British colonialism cannot be told without discussing the massive changes in India's agricultural economy under British rule. In this lecture, you will learn about the nature of the colonial Indian economy, the effect of British interests on the well-being of peasants and cultivators, and the impact of British fiscal policy on the Indian economy. As you proceed, you will see that the Indo-British economic relationship tended to benefit the interests of Indian landlords and the British over those of the toiling peasants and laborers who constituted the bulk of India.

The Colonial Economy

- Before British colonialism, the Indian economy was integrated with global patterns of trade that stretched from East Africa to Southeast Asia. What the British did was more forcefully integrate it on British terms. The Indian economy was subjected to the vicissitudes of the world economy like never before.
- India played a crucial role in Britain's balance of payments. By 1900, Britain had developed a favorable balance of trade with India, with a surplus of almost £25 million. This was used to counterbalance Britain's trade deficits with Western Europe and the United States. Europe and America erected protective tariffs, which made British manufactured goods more expensive

to Americans and Europeans. India was an almost guaranteed market for these manufactures—an economic safety valve.

- In the 1830s, the crucial Indian artisan economy was marginalized and outcompeted by cheaper British manufacturers. By the 1850s, British industry had completed its domination of the Indian economy, and the great weavers, dyers, and manufacturers of famed Indian cloth had no hope of competing. By the 1870s, India was dependent upon the United Kingdom for textiles and finished goods.
- With Indian industry effectively stunted, agriculture was the prime source of revenue for the Raj. One British administrator, Sir William Hunter, called the taxes that came from grains “the one great customary source of fiscal wealth in India.”
- There was, however, one exception to this trend: cotton. Grown mainly in western India around Bombay, cotton tended to benefit Indian farmers. They were not swimming in cash, but they were slightly better off than their counterparts in the rest of India. Western India underwent an economic boom during the 1860s, allowing Indian cotton farmers to supplant the British market into which Southern U.S. farmers, affected by the U.S. Civil War, had made headway.
- The rest of India’s agrarian economy didn’t fare so well. The general picture is of an agricultural economy that changed from an exporter of finished goods to exporting raw materials and becoming a net importer of finished manufactured goods. And now that India was ruled by Britain, it meant that Indian farmers, cultivators, and weavers were all subject to the global economic forces that Britain unleashed after the 18th century.
- By necessity, millions of out-of-work artisans migrated to the countryside and began farming cash crops such as indigo, jute, and cotton as part of the peasant class. This contributed to a process historians have called the peasantization of India. This state of affairs suited the British just fine, having been



British troops marching through Calcutta

encouraged by British economic priorities and sanctioned by British visions of India as a land of peasants and landlords.

- The British did some things to unify the internal Indian market and facilitate commerce. They abolished interregional duties and standardized weights and measures. This created a freer movement of internal trade and commerce. Supported by new railways, commerce moved within India like never before.
- On the surface, it looked as if Britain was contributing to Indian economic growth, especially in infrastructure. However, most of the hard capital and material that went into Indian railways was imported from Britain, contributing much less to Indian economic growth than it would have had the British had used Indian materials.
- Most of the capital in India was in British hands. British firms also had special protection through legislation such as the Indian Factory Act of 1881, which protected British companies from Indian competition. This was done by placing so many

rules and regulations upon Indian companies that they would cease to compete.

The Raj's Fiscal Policy

- The overall trend in the Indian government during this period was one of increasing revenues, but painfully slow changes in how the Raj spent its money. Public works and programs of public utility, such as irrigation, education, and public health, were severely underfunded. In keeping with the laissez-faire attitude of self-correcting and self-regulating markets, the Raj rarely intervened in the economy. Instead, the Raj encouraged private initiatives to staff schools, set up medical dispensaries, and feed those affected by famine.

- Even after the British had become the masters of India, they still practiced military fiscalism. The army was usually the single largest item of expenditure, making up approximately one-third of the annual budget and peaking dangerously higher during colonial campaigns in the Afghan northwest and in Burma. This is why the fiscal aspects of British rule were so significant: British military and administrative needs were paid for by the Indian peasant, farmer, and weaver.

Public works and programs of public utility, such as irrigation, education, and public health, were severely underfunded.

- The colonial government itself needed to be paid for. This led to the home charge, which included the salaries of Europeans in India who ran the Raj, ranging from the Indian Civil Service to the Commissioner of Police for Kanpur. In all, the home charge constituted approximately 20–25 percent of the Raj's overall budget.

- The Raj also had to finance its debts to London bankers and the British government. Left over from the days of the East India Company, these debts had financed the company's military fiscalism and the costs of suppressing the Great

Uprising. Payment on these debts took the form of dividends distributed to former company stockholders, making up around 15 percent of the Raj's annual spending.

- The other functions of government, such as public investments and works, education, and public health received much less. Things like irrigation—so crucial in a country like India—and public transport never made up more than 4 percent of total spending. Education and services such as public health and sanitation never amounted to more than 3 percent of the Raj's budget.
- Education and public schooling would have been an embarrassment to liberal reformers and those who wanted to “improve” Indians through English education. Because of the Raj's inflexible military fiscalism, there simply wasn't enough money for the schools, and they had to contract out education to missionaries and various religious actors.
- This fiscal penury was compounded by the fact that so much of what would be considered crucial spending for people was devolved to provincial governments, which meant that the revenue for such endeavors was dependent upon agrarian revenue and taxation. As a result, some regions of India had more money to spend than others. In rural and farming regions, colonial officials saw less of a need to provide schools, transport, and health facilities.
- The taxation system of the Raj was also problematic. Two of its most profitable taxes—on opium and salt—were regressive. By the 1870s, in fact, 15 percent of the Raj's revenue was from salt. But these taxes were not fixed to consumption levels, meaning that both rich and poor paid the same percentage. India's peasants and farmers were hit the hardest.
- The British received most of their revenue from land taxes—the old pillar of Indian sovereignty and courts, both Hindu and

Muslim. The other half came from taxes on opium (sold in India and abroad), salt, income, stamps, and other items.

- During the South African War from 1899–1902, the United Kingdom’s finances were hit hard. This meant that the Indian fiscal state was expected to—and did—contribute more to offset British losses, and London began to demand quicker repayment than usual.
- When it came to monetary policy, there were significant limitations in Indian economic growth that were a result of the colonial connection. For the longest time, gold had been the universal backer of most currencies. But India, like China, was backed by silver. The world economic depression of the 1870s put enormous strain on the Raj’s ability to pay its debts to London.
- Because its bills were harder to pay, the Raj cut expenses it deemed to be less essential, most of which were things that would have helped the Indian people: education, agrarian subsidies and support, and lower taxes.

Poverty under the Raj

- Famines occurred frequently in late 19th-century India, largely as a result of the commercialization of the country’s agrarian economy. Patterns of grain distribution were changed by improved transport networks, which meant that if grain could catch a higher price outside of where it was produced, it might be sold. When this happened, India’s poor were the hardest hit.
- The British didn’t adjust taxes when famine and death struck. They departed from the traditional practice of Indian sovereigns, both Hindu and Muslim. British officials tenaciously adhered to principles of laissez-faire economics, despite the fact that the larger famines of the 1860s were precipitated by the commercialization of Indian agriculture.

- By 1900, some 15–20 million people had perished. More than 200 million were affected by undernourishment and scarcity. There was little movement to address this state of affairs until the 1880 Famine Commission and the Famine Code, completed three years later. The Code was well-intentioned, but it didn't do much to alleviate overall suffering.
- This is not to say that India hadn't had famines before; they had. But the reasons had more to do with natural vagaries in the monsoon rains than the commercialization of Indian agriculture. Now, however, it was the Raj's spending priorities, coupled with the opening up of the Indian agrarian economy to world markets, that endangered the well-being of Indians' stomachs.
- There was, though, one exception to this dismal picture: Punjab. Because of the region's military and political importance, the British ensured that Punjab's agrarian economy was stable and that global economic discontent did not infect the ranks of the army, of which Punjabis were the largest component. In addition to undertaking major irrigation works in the region, the British passed legislation that protected Punjabi peasants from expulsion by their landlords and gave them more tenancy rights than in other parts of India.

Suggested Reading

Arnold, *Famine*.

Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*.

Hardiman, *Feeding the Baniya*.

Mann, *British Rule on Indian Soil*.

Questions to Consider

1. What economic advantages was Britain able to gain from India by 1900?
2. How were the Indian peasantry and poor exposed to the global economy under British rule?



Lecture 10

Caste and Tribal Identity under Colonialism

Many British observers, administrators, and scholars in the 19th century saw caste as the essence of India. In this lecture, you will consider the ways in which caste was affected by the colonial relationship. Specifically, you will examine initial British encounters with the caste system, the connection between caste and colonial administration, and the interpretation of caste by scholars and researchers whose publications and views gave the institution greater currency and legitimacy.


Caste in the 18th Century

- Caste has been one of India's most enduring traditions, fascinating visitors since the time of early Persian observers during the 10th century. Under the Mughals, caste was largely unaffected by the court and its policies.
- In the 18th century, however, caste became more prominent. Regional kingdoms vaulted Brahmins into newly important positions as scribes and ritual affirmers of sovereignty. In the Maratha territories, Brahmins were actually in charge, administering an impressive bureaucratic state that stretched into central India.

- The ascendancy of India's moneylenders and bankers also affected caste. As scholars such as the late professor Sir Christopher Bayly have demonstrated, many of the merchant castes began to adopt Brahmanical notions of purity and piety. They adopted vegetarianism, used their money to patronize major shrines and temples, and were integral to the economic life of pilgrimage cities such as Benares and Mathura.

Caste and Colonial Administration

- British rule brought government into the lives of Brahmins like never before. Like the 10th-century Persian observers, the British saw an almost impervious social and religious class of priests. The British were suspicious of Brahmins, at least in the first few generations.
- Most of the early kingdoms the British conquered were Muslim-ruled, which meant that they had little need for Brahmins at their courts. The early British were therefore very familiar with the Muslim precepts of governance in India, but Brahmins remained somewhat mysterious.
- The Protestant British initially equated Brahmins with Catholics and “papal tyranny.” Like Catholic priests, Brahmins used a sacred language—Sanskrit—which very few people understood.
- The British also thought that the privileges Brahmins gained from Hindu and Muslim rulers—such as tax free lands, expected alms, and immunity from capital punishment—were outdated and tyrannical. For the early British, Brahmanism was just another reason why India was subject to the rule of oriental despots.
- The British quickly realized, however, that Brahmins possessed two things that were crucial in Indian society: legitimacy and influence. This was even more the case after the Great Uprising. Brahmins were the natural leaders of Indian society,



and the British during that period were wary of upsetting the religious and cultural sensitivities of Indians. They meddled less with Brahmanical rituals, customs, and rites.

- The British entered India and their newly-acquired territories with little experience or knowledge of revenue law taxes in non-European cultures. Inheritance, land transfers, and property ownership all needed to be understood by the British if they were to tax effectively.
- From the mid- to late 1700s, the company aimed to rule and administer justice according to the laws of India—namely, Hindu law for Hindus and Islamic law for Muslims. The British therefore had to find out what Hindu law was and who knew

about it. This brought them into contact with Brahmins, who had knowledge of Sanskrit, the shastras, and legal traditions.

- Brahmins were the ones who informed the British what exactly Hindu law was. This was the first time any ruler had approached Brahmins with the stated intent of systematizing a broader legal tradition of India into one code.
- Naturally, the Brahmins were inclined to tell the British a story that reflected their own views. The cumulative effect of this was that Hindu law, when it was finally codified in the 1860s, had a more scriptural, orthodox flavor. Caste and its hierarchies were given greater importance than what was actually practiced. Brahmins also received special legal privileges regarding witnessing, procedure, and testimony.
- The problem with this approach was that it flew in face of practice. Historians and legal scholars have demonstrated that most Hindus followed vibrant, uncodified practices that were shaped more by region and custom than by written law. The shastras and Brahmins' interpretations of them were known, but they had never before been the sole reference point for settling legal and social disputes.
- It was not the intent of the British to make caste more rigid through law. The British were anxious to settle things quickly and ensure expediency in the legal system. They assumed that there was a single Hindu law for all Hindus which was timeless and found in texts. British jurists and scholars insisted on certainty, finality, and clarity in terms alien to Brahmins. Indian law was too erratic for them.
- After the company defeated Mysore in 1799, the colonial state became increasingly paper-driven. This led to a major change in southern India. In many southern Indian regions, rulers, kings, and chieftains obtained their revenue through tribute. There was paperwork, but it was rudimentary and patchy. It

was only in the Mughal heartland of northern India that a more paper-driven revenue administration had emerged.

- Tribute in southern India was too informal for the British. They wanted paperwork, documented assessment, and regularity. British assessors and surveyors wanted to know about everything: proprietary holdings, land tenures, rates of assessment, grain types, grain prices, regularity of rainfalls.
- The British need for information extended to castes and occupations. There were agricultural groups that the British saw as castes. Brahmins traditionally had rent-free land, and some took informal shares of village agricultural harvests to support temples and religious scholarship. Caste, in a way, punctuated the daily rhythms of agriculture and taxation.
- In southern India, the British were the first to systematize the relationship between taxes and caste. They created categories of agricultural castes, commercial castes, and tribes. Brahmins were a small percentage of the population, but because they held so much influence, all other groups were judged against the Brahmanical standard.
- Another factor that made caste more rigid was the development of the first all-India census in 1871. The census was motivated in part by strategic concerns: For example, if the British knew that a particular town had a large Hindu population, they might stop a Shia Muslim religious procession from traveling through to avoid a potential riot. More generally, statistical knowledge provided by the census could help the Raj in the areas of intelligence and counterinsurgency.
- But the primary purpose of the census was to make taxation more efficient, accurate, and effective. The British needed to know who was where so that they could streamline the revenue-collection process.

- The result of decades of categorization and research, the Indian census was meant to demonstrate the power of the colonial state and the might of the British. They knew more about their empire than the Mughals ever did.
- Individual Indians were asked what their religion, region, and languages were. If the respondent was Hindu, he was asked what his caste was. Caste thus became a crucial component of the Indian census.
- The census became the statistical reference point for anyone researching India's demographics. It would later be used by Indian nationalists to strategize mobilization tactics, by Hindu revivalists to reform caste, and by the British Raj to argue that Hindus were too divided by caste and caste discrimination to deserve self-rule.
- The census also affirmed the British approach to categorizing lower castes. Classifications such as "other backward castes" and "depraved castes" became official, government-sanctioned designations.
- There were also religious dimensions that turned castes into more rigid categories. To the British, the distinguishing feature of Hindus—compared to Indian Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains—was caste. Caste, for example, is what distinguished Punjabi Hindus from Punjabi Muslims.

In southern India, the British were the first to systematize the relationship between taxes and caste.

British Views and Scholarship

- British views and scholarship concerning caste had as much of an effect upon the practice and rigidity of caste as actual concrete changes in law and the colonial state. British views of caste were not monolithic, however. There were differing views among the British in India.

- British perceptions of caste were colored by their experiences in Bengal, the region of India they had conquered first. But there was no real colonial consensus on caste. It varied from province to province, and so did British attitudes. In some regions governors saw caste as more crucial.
- British attitudes were also complicated by the contributions of Christian missionaries, who did their part to categorize castes. Missionaries wanted to know more about caste so that they could find out who the lower castes and Untouchables were; they believed that members of these castes would be more likely to convert to Christianity to escape caste prejudices and discrimination.
- Beginning in the 1820s, missionaries actively sought to convert low-caste Hindus and Untouchables. The lower and more downtrodden they were, the more of a target they were for proselytization and the less they had to lose from conversion. The missionaries were somewhat successful in their efforts.
- The mass, often forced conversions of low-caste Hindus in the late 19th century resulted in Brahmanical and other Hindu reforms that responded in terms of caste. Debates over caste were most intense under British colonial rule, which had the effect of making the caste system more central in people's thinking.
- Caste was also made more important by the expansion of British rule. Unlike previous rulers, the British pushed toward the frontiers of settled India in regions such as northeastern India, Nepal, and Punjab. Here they came into closer contact with semi-settled groups, such as Kathis, Gurkhas, and Jats. Despite the fact that these groups didn't follow Brahmanical rituals and norms of purity and pollution, the British compared them to the main settled areas of India where these practices were followed.

- Caste was subject to intense and steady scholarly study by the mid-19th century. European and American professors, linguists, and scholars wrote voluminously on caste and its origins.
- Racial studies and pseudoscience were common in the late 19th century, and many scholars began to see caste as a racial distinction. These scholars believed that caste was imposed upon the native aboriginals of India by the purported Sanskrit-speaking Aryans when they arrived in northern India.
- Skin color rarely corresponded directly with *varna* rank, however. Brahmins did not always have fairer skin. Likewise, Untouchables and Shudras were not always darker than Brahmins. And Indian Muslims who traced their descent from Persian and Arab conquerors were often the fairest of them all.
- Colonial studies and ethnographies clearly stated that India was defined by caste and hierarchy. Once these studies were in print, they became reference points for British magistrates, legal advocates, and Indian reformers.
- Racial views of caste were also applied to British understandings of India's tribal populations, such as the Bhils and the Kallars. One theorist, Walter Elliot, argued that caste was a precautionary measure adopted by fairer-skinned Aryan invaders to maintain their bloodline's purity, which would explain the isolation of tribal populations.
- As the frontier expanded, Hindu farmers and others who followed the caste system were brought into contact with India's seminomadic tribal groups. Members of these groups

British perceptions of caste were colored by their experiences in Bengal, the region of India they had conquered first.

were often viewed as unclean and without caste by both Europeans and Indians.

- As their lands were settled and cultivated, tribal groups were exposed to Brahmanical notions of social relations and ritual purity. They were encouraged to settle the land, revere Brahmins, and adopt Indian modes of social organization and behavior.

Suggested Reading

Bayly, *Caste, Society and Politics*.

Brimnes, *Constructing the Colonial Encounter*.

Dirks, *Castes of Mind*.

Kaviraj, "Imaginary Institution of Indian Society."

Questions to Consider

1. How and why did understandings of caste change under British rule?
2. Did the British intentionally make caste more rigid under colonial rule?



Lecture 11

The Nationalization of Hinduism (1870–1900)

In this lecture, you will explore how Hinduism came to be seen not only as a “religion” (as that term is traditionally understood) but also as the anchor of Indian nationhood under British colonial rule. Along the way, you will learn about Christian missionaries, Hindu reform movements, and the effect of the colonial experience on Hinduism’s broader traditions.

Christian Missionaries

- The impact of European modernity upon Hinduism, through British colonial rule, was massive. The British Raj enacted major changes that greatly affected Hinduism. Brahmins and high-caste Hindus were forced to reevaluate their traditions in the face of the humiliation of foreign colonial rule.
- Much of this starts with the impact of Christian missionaries. Missionaries were allowed into East India Company territories after 1813, and their impact was immediately felt. Christian evangelical missionaries unleashed a chorus of contempt upon the so-called “idolatry” and “paganism” of Hinduism.
- Missionaries lashed out against caste discrimination, the use of idols, the traditions of sati and child marriage, and other things. Many even said that Brahmins—with their privileged status and monopoly of a sacred language (Sanskrit)—were

not only similar to Catholic clergy but were the incarnation of the Devil himself.

- Caste was another factor that missionaries exploited. Protestant missionaries were particularly eager to go to India to convert people. Some had grand designs to convert all of India for Christendom. But when it became clear that rulers and Brahmins were extremely unlikely to convert, missionaries started to focus on the lower castes and Untouchables. When famine and poverty struck and low-caste children became orphans, missionaries scooped them up, housed them, and had them converted.
- All this missionary activity affected Brahmins and other high-caste Hindus in a number of ways. Never before had Hinduism's traditions been assaulted with such intensity. The Mughals had never criticized Hinduism to this extent. Evangelical Christians, by contrast, unleashed a theological assault upon Brahmins, Hinduism, and many of Indian's religious traditions.

Hindu Reform Movements

- Some high-caste Hindus stood by and simply ignored Christian missionaries. But many others responded, and they did so largely in two ways. The first of these was a more accommodative movement, seen in the works of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda.
- Sri Ramakrishna, who lived from 1836–1886, was one of India's saintliest religious leaders. The son of a Bengali Brahmin priest in a small village, he was not very well educated. He only spoke Bengali and not English. He was not part of the colonial milieu of exchange and debate.
- Ramakrishna clung to a traditionally Hindu and Indian notion of God: that God was manifest in people throughout human history, be they greater prophets such as Muhammad, Jesus, the Buddha, and Krishna, or simple, common people. They

all represented divine light and manifestation, he argued.

- Ramakrishna's reform drew upon the simplicity of Indian tradition and popular Hinduism. But he became very influential amongst the urban Bengali intelligentsia, the ones who benefited from the colonial connection through English education and Western learning.
- Ramakrishna challenged the Western notion of rationalism. He saw missionary claims to exclusive truth and material progress—as seen in industrialization, democracy, and power—as unfounded.
- Like other Indians, Ramakrishna noted that the actions of the British and Europeans were anything but Christian. Specifically, he ridiculed the Christian notions of the fall of man and the need for redemption. To Ramakrishna, humans were inherently good, and this should be celebrated and cultivated.
- One of Ramakrishna's greatest disciples was Swami Vivekananda, who lived from 1863–1902. Vivekananda was a Bengali who continued Ramakrishna's reforming work. Vivekananda had a different approach, however. He became more socially inclusive, taking in low-castes. And unlike Ramakrishna, he received an English education and was fluent in the language of his colonial masters.
- Vivekananda became a famous and renowned spiritual leader, or swami. He viewed selfless social service as essential for all people. For Vivekananda, society's morality determined the strength of the future Indian nation.



Sri Ramkrishna
(1836–1886)

- Vivekananda was also accommodative of all religions, especially Islam. He stood strongly against religious fanaticism, a category in which he included missionary preaching in India.
- Vivekananda believed that India could learn much in the ways of practical knowledge from West. But he believed that the West had more to gain from India's moral and spiritual Hindu traditions. In fact, he argued that Britain had become powerful not because of Christianity but in spite of it.
- Vivekananda went global with his message. He went to America and attended the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, where he made a huge impact and received a two-minute standing ovation. Never before had Americans been so directly exposed to Hinduism and Indian traditions. Vivekananda argued that all faiths were equally valid, and that religious fanaticism and coercion was a curse that plagued the Abrahamic faiths.
- Ramakrishna and Vivekananda both borrowed elements of religious modernity that had come with Protestant missions to India, including organization techniques, publicizing efforts, and general concepts of missionary work and service.
- The second, more conformational reformist movement in Hinduism was called the Arya Samaj. The Arya Samaj, or the Society of Aryans, was founded in 1875 by Swami Dayananda. He argued that the Aryan peoples who brought Sanskrit to northern India and influenced Indian and Hindu tradition throughout the subcontinent had founded a pristine, pure society that had been corrupted over the ages.
- Dayananda preached a purified Hinduism, free from what he considered the corrupting influences of caste restrictions, overblown ritual, idolatry, and polytheism. He believed that the Vedas contained all knowledge, including allusions to electricity and trains.



- Like the missionaries, Dayananda was obsessed with numbers and conversion, and he and the Arya Samaj traveled throughout India seeking to convert Muslims and Indian Christians. The Arya Samaj argued that Indian Christians and Muslims were Hindus by blood, and that their genetics and location in India could never be changed by an outside, Abrahamic creed.
- To Dayananda and the Arya Samaj, soil and territory equaled authenticity. India's land was sacred, which meant that its culture and traditions were equally sacred. This implied that Islam and Christianity, which had made major inroads into India through conversion, were alien to the subcontinent.
- The Arya Samaj wanted to reform caste, the usual critique of Christian missionaries. But Dayananda saw it as a virtue. The fourfold *varna* organization of society was a virtue, he said, but the institution of *jati* had corrupted it over centuries. He argued that the *varna* caste system was natural, for it engendered discipline and cohesion in society.
- Orthodox Brahmins abhorred the idea of readmitting low-caste Hindus. To them, purifying the lower castes would taint the whole edifice of caste hierarchy. The campaigns of the Arya Samaj also upset Punjabi Muslims and led to communal conflict.
- The Arya Samaj was the most influential and enduring Hindu reform movement. It represented a reconstitution of Hinduism to make it more like a Protestant religion. It boiled Hinduism down to a single creed and streamlined practice, with the primacy of the Vedas and a monotheistic, socially inclusive Hinduism that repudiated caste discrimination.

Dayananda preached a purified Hinduism, free from what he considered the corrupting influences of caste restrictions, overblown ritual, idolatry, and polytheism.

Hinduism and National Identity

- There were two types of reactions by high-caste Hindus to this flurry of religious activity: Some orthodox Brahmins argued that India was self-sufficient in its religion and traditions. Unlike the Hindu reformers, this group tended to defend the status quo and rarely offered alternatives. The second type of reaction was one that impacted Hindu nationalism, the vision of an Indian nation defined by Hinduism and nothing else.
- Hindu nationalism began with the Hindu Sabha movement in the 1880s. The movement was led by extreme nationalists who wanted the British out of India right away, at any cost. The Hindu Sabha was founded by Arya Samajists in Punjab, the Hindu Sabha was formed to serve the interests of Hindus and to act as a check against moderate Indian nationalists, who the Hindu Sabha felt were giving too much to Indian Muslims.
- In the minds of the Hindu Sabha, Muslims used to rule India, but demographics were now what mattered. Muslims, how represented at most 15 percent of the Indian population, no longer had a claim to power beyond their numbers.
- An offshoot of the Hindu Sabha was the Hindu Sangathan movement, the aim of which was to protect Hindus and fashion an idea of Indian nationhood. The movement was premised upon two concepts: the demonizing of non-Hindus (Muslims in particular) and the emergence of anti-Brahmin movements in western India led by low-caste and Untouchable Hindu groups.
- The Hindu nationalist movements of this period put Brahmins in reactionary mode as they sought to defend their status and India's honor, of which they were the ordained defenders.

Suggested Reading

Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics*.

Lorenzen, "Who Invented Hinduism?"

Pennington, *Was Hinduism Invented?*

Sarkar, *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation*.

Questions to Consider

1. How did Christian missionaries affect the traditions of Hinduism? Were the effects significant?
2. How did Hinduism become more religious during the 19th century, and what did this mean for Indian nationalism?



Lecture 12

Indian Muslim Identity and Colonial Rule

British rule had a major impact upon Islam in India, initiating profound changes in Indian Muslims' sense of identity. In this lecture, you will consider the impact of colonial rule upon Indian Muslims. In particular, you will examine the effects of colonial law, newly empowered Hindu groups, English education, language debates, the census, taxonomy, and shifts in Indian Muslim identity.

Colonialism and Islamic Law

- Law is closely related to the history of Islam. It is, after all, a religion of law, like the other Abrahamic faiths of Judaism and Christianity. And law is as much about of culture, values, and religion as it is about rules and regulations. The two primary sources of Islamic law are the Quran and the Hadith.
- The Quran is the holy text of Islam, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the archangel Gabriel in the 7th century. The Quran offers specific guidance for Muslims in terms of regulations and prohibitions. The Hadith are a collection of sayings and actions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, assembled by scholars since the 8th century. They are various and wide-ranging, and some are contradictory.



Reading the Holy Quran

- Both the Quran and the Hadith make up Islamic law, or sharia. They offer guidance for Muslims on everything from divorce, alimony, inheritance, social relations, and rules for marriage, to personal hygiene and the consumption of food and drink. They cover numerous of aspects of day-to-day matters.
- The Mughals were never able to apply sharia to all of India. The Mughals, as we know, were too dependent upon Hindus, Jains, and others in administering the empire. In fact, one crucial aspect of sharia, the jizya tax on non-Muslims, was rarely fully enforced upon Hindus.
- In India, most Muslims followed local custom over religious law. This is similar to what non-Muslims did in their regions, be it Bengal or Punjab. Indian Muslim customs and culture had for centuries retained much of the Indian and Hindu colors that

made their daily cultural fabric not entirely different from their Hindu, Sikh, and Jain neighbors.

- Even for elite Muslim leadership, sharia was symbolically important, but never followed completely. Muslim leaders didn't always refer to the Quran or the Hadith for questions of divorce, inheritance, or marriage customs.
- The criminal code for most of Mughal India was largely Islamic. If you committed a crime, even if you were a Hindu, you would be tried according to Islamic takes on evidence, witness, and procedure. Because Mughal rule did not penetrate as deeply as the Raj did, however, this often only happened in large townships and major cities.
- When it came to family and community matters such as inheritance, divorce, and alimony, Hindus were free to follow their own customs and traditions. The Mughals, as Muslims rulers, allowed Hindus, Jains, and Sikhs a significant amount of local autonomy and leeway.
- In 1765, when the East India Company assumed the diwan of Bengal, the British were brought into the realm of law. The British needed a reference of laws which governed property and land, the ultimate source of revenue for the company's shareholders. Property laws covered inheritance, divorce, and the religious status of charitable land. Because India was so big, and because the British saw Hindus and Muslims as communities with their own traditions, the British decided to govern according to Islamic and Hindu law.
- From the 1770s onward, the British made attempts to codify and put into written form the elements of what they called "Hindu and Mohammedan law." For Islamic law, the British went to the clerics and scholars of Islam. The effect of this was to anchor Islamic law more firmly to the state than ever before. Previously, the clerics of Islam were sought for opinions by the Mughals and regional kingdoms. Now the

British took their positions and codified them into written law, which could be accessed again and again by later generations.

- By seeking out the clerics and codifying their opinions and interpretations, the British incidentally gave Islamic law in India a high-legal flavor. The clerics, like all religious scholars, naturally told the British that Islamic law was based more in the Quran and the Hadith, rather than custom and tradition. This largely flew in the face of what was actually practiced.
- The effects of British efforts to codify Islamic law in India took generations, but they were significant. Whereas previously personal matters for inheritance, divorce, and marriage were often decided by region and according to local custom, Islamic law increasingly defined Indian Muslims as having their own separate traditions and communal identity.

Hindu Empowerment

- In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Hindu merchant groups bankrolled regional regimes such as the Marathas and the Bengali nawabs and amassed great fortunes. These merchants, who were all of the Vaishya caste, began to act more Brahmanical. To prove their religious devotion, they started spending money on temples and religious endowments.
- These newly moneyed merchant families served as public patrons of Hinduism's great traditions, festivals, and pilgrimage cities such as Benares, Haridwar, and Ujjain. With no Muslim ruler to keep tabs on them, Hindu traditions were asserted far more publicly than they had been under the Mughals.

The effects of British efforts to codify Islamic law in India took generations, but they were significant.

- This newly assertive Hinduism also appeared in the various Hindu reformist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In particular, cow protection societies, or *gaurakshmisabhas*, emerged with outfits such as the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Sabha in Punjab and on the Gangetic Plain. These societies sought to legally protect cattle as symbols of Hindu tradition and pride. This, in turn, led to anti-slaughter riots from the Afghanistan border to the jungles of Burma.
- In theory, these societies could limit Muslims' religious obligation to offer sacrifice on religious days. On Eid al-Adha, for example, Muslims celebrate with an animal sacrifice in commemoration of Abraham's submissiveness to God. Cow protections societies sought to put a limit on this kind of action, sometimes implicitly, sometimes more explicitly.
- Demographics were also a key component of the newly assertive Hinduism. Most Indian Muslims across India, save for Bengal, tended to live in urban townships. But in the countryside, it was still overwhelmingly Hindu. When it came to mobilizing the masses, the largely Hindu countryside would put its stamp on the nationalist movement and put Muslims at a disadvantage in terms of numbers.
- This rural-urban component was also seen in the decline of India's textile economy. Muslim artisans dominated large sections of the Indian textile market as weavers, particularly in urban cities such as Benares, and they were out-competed not only by British manufactured goods after the 1830s, but also by new mills run by Hindu industrialists after the 1910s. Many Indian Muslims' livelihoods were destroyed by colonialism, and they never recovered once a Hindu-dominated Indian industry got its footing back.

Education and the English Language

- Persian was the language of government, authority, and the learned in India before the British arrived and for three generations of British rule. In the 1830s, this started to change. The British had always been suspicious of Persian. They never fully mastered the language, and the its flowery descriptions and insinuations revealed too much wooly thinking for a newer generation of straight-talking Englishmen.
- In 1835, Thomas Macaulay and the liberal reformers made English the language of Indian government, replacing Persian. This had a profound impact upon Indian Muslims. It also opened up a demand for English-language training. Education institutions started to sprout up across India, some run by the English, but many by Indians.
- This initiated a profound shift in learning in India. Previously learning and education weren't widespread. Institutions for higher learning were traditionally religiously associated. And there wasn't as direct a link between education and government employment.
- Indian Muslims were slow to move to English education. Literate Muslims were strongly attached to their traditional system of learning, in the *maktabs* and madrasas, and the traditional curriculum of Greek philosophy, Arabic rational sciences, and Persian literature. Now, the masters of India valued English, Shakespeare, English history, and Western ideas.
- Some conservative Muslims distanced themselves from this new educational regime. Some Muslims weren't helped by their spiritual leaders: Clerics in Delhi, for instance, issued fatwas, or religious edicts, declaring that learning English was tantamount to apostasy.
- This Muslim insulation from English education resulted in the decline of the gentry service group of scribes, penmen, and officials that had once kept the Mughal and regional

successor states afloat. It was as if one major pillar of government authority had changed religious ownership. A vast majority of all the Raj's clerks and subordinate paper managers were Hindus. This would later put Hindus at

Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859)



political advantage when mass politics emerged under Gandhi in the 1920s.

The Role of the Census

- British colonial policy had the effect of making religion a more demarcated and cohesive category in the minds of Muslims. In 1871, the first all-India census was conducted. It was a massive taxonomic undertaking.
- The census was part of the British desire to know the country, especially following the Great Uprising. For example, if the British knew that a particular town in Bengal had a mostly Muslim population, they might prevent Hindus from marching a large effigy of the goddess Durga close to a mosque on Friday.
- One question asked on the census as respondents what religion they were. Over time, this had the effect of instilling in Indian Muslims and Hindus a heightened sense of religious identity. It forced them to enter a single category that could be divided by region and language. And it let Indian Muslims see for themselves just how much of a minority there were.
- The census was also significant because it attacked the syncretic, hybrid nature of Indo-Islamic culture. The implied differences between Hindus and Muslims—who shared languages, regional cultures, and even spiritual experiences—were now being underscored.

The Deoband School

- The Deoband reform movement was one of the most significant Islamic reform movements in the world. To understand this movement, which took place in India, we must begin with Delhi in 1857 and 1858.

British colonial policy had the effect of making religion a more demarcated and cohesive category in the minds of Muslims.

- Delhi had been a culturally Islamic city and a seat of Muslim power for centuries. But after the Great Uprising, the British retook the city and leveled mosques, shot clerics, and desecrated the shrines and Muslim quarters of many neighborhoods.
- The brutal British repression after the Great Uprising was as much a symbolic assault as it was a physical assault on the Islamic character of Delhi. Many Muslims clerics left the city and fanned out across northern India. A number of them settled in a sleepy little town called Deoband as physical and spiritual refugees.
- In 1867, these clerics founded the Deoband school of thought and seminary. It was called the *Dar al-'Ulum Deoband*—the “abode of the knowledge of Deoband.” The school was founded by Muhammed Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, who had been greatly influenced by Delhi’s life of Muslim thought and its religious circles.
- During this period, Indian Islam reinvented itself in order to survive. The British decision to forgo managing religious endowments and buildings—practiced by all previous rulers of India—meant that Islam was cut off from the state. British rule ended the traditional relationship between sovereignty and religious patronage.
- The Deoband school took a grassroots approach, adopting missionary techniques such as regular preaching, pamphleteering, raising private subscriptions, and forming bureaucratic organizations. The base of support for Islam thus shifted from the state to the community.

- Because Islam no longer had power in India, Deobandi clerics sought to have greater uniformity in order for the Muslim community in India to survive. They knew that a more uniform Indian Islam would better cope with the loss of state support. In addition, religion that was more accessible provided comfort in the face of humiliating foreign rule.
- The Deobandis turned their back on politics and the Raj. They wanted to ensure that Islam and its institutions could survive regardless of who was in charge in India. They believed that Islamic revival could only come about via internal purification and struggle, not struggle against outsiders or rulers.
- Deobandi clerics' primary focus was scriptural guidance for Muslims. This meant the Quran and the Hadith. Deobandis were not fundamentalists, however; they were nuanced and sophisticated in their interpretations and reevaluations of textual guidance as laid down by the Prophet Muhammad and his successors.
- Deobandis also wanted to make Indian Islam more Islamic. They wanted Indian Muslims, who came from various regions of India with their own customs, to stop taking part in more traditional "Indian" customs, such as large marriage dowries, the belief in and warding off of evil spirits, and reverence for Sufis and other holy men. Sufism in general—saintly worship at tombs, gifts to holy men, and music at Sufi gatherings—was discouraged.
- Deobandi clerics wanted to rationalize Islam. They weren't keen on hocus-pocus and mysticism, which had largely characterized Indian Islam to that point. Instead, they wanted to make Allah a rational deity who could be understood by all classes.

Suggested Reading

Bayly, "The Pre-History of 'Communalism'?"

Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty*.

Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India*.

Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*.

Questions to Consider

1. What were the responses of Indian Muslims to the rise of British rule?
2. Were Indian Muslims becoming more "Muslim" as a result of colonial rule and policies?



Lecture 13

The Late-19th-Century British Raj

The stereotype of the quintessential Englishman—stiff upper lip, rarely showing emotion, somewhat arrogant—was to some degree born in the British Raj's administration of the Indian plains. In this lecture, you will examine the attitudes and infrastructure that buttressed the Raj in the late 19th century. In particular, you will learn about the Indian Civil Service, the primary bureaucratic system that allowed a few thousand Englishmen to administer more than 350 million Indians.

Racial Attitudes in the Late 19th Century

- The Great Uprising shook Britain's rule of India to its core and led to fundamental changes in the way Britain governed India. This spilled over into Indo-British relations. It hardened Britain's sense of imperial mission in India, but also distanced friendly interactions between the British as rulers and Indians as subjects.
- The British, now more than ever, saw themselves as the ruling race. In their logic, 1857 was a rejection of the supposedly "benevolent" modernizing rule of Britain. And because Indians had rejected it, they therefore were lower than Europeans, and therefore were unable to rule themselves. Lord John Lawrence, a Viceroy of India in the 1860s, called the Great Uprising a "war of the races."

- By the late 19th century, this had crystallized into a hardened racial attitude, though it only toyed with scientific racial theories. One British official tellingly said that “No one will doubt for a moment that the Indian is far inferior to the Englishman.”
- This was reflected in the way geographical space and interactions were unofficially policed. For example, the local British Club was nearly always off-limits to Indians, unless they were maharajas or eminent elites. In Simla, which became the summer capital of the Raj after 1864, signs were posted outside the main thoroughway: “Indians and dogs not allowed!”
- Underscoring the deterioration of racial relations after 1857 was the British view that the Great Uprising had been a Muslim plot to restore the Mughal Empire. Indian Muslims did have substantial grievances, but their participation in the Great Uprising was patchy and fragmented. Some landed elite Indian Muslims, such as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, denounced the mutineers as rebels. And the mutineers who rallied around the aged Mughal emperor in Delhi included both Hindus and Muslims.
- Using a racial prism, British officialdom started to see Indian Muslims as inherently rebellious and disloyal. This more pointed Islamophobia, combined with hardened racial attitudes, would define British policy for the next three generations. A century earlier, East India Company officials railed against the Oriental and Moorish despotism of Indian rulers. By 1900, however, the British had ironically styled themselves as the very despots they had denounced.
- Modernizing administration was more cautious, and laws were to be simple and uncompromising. This would make it easier for Indians—who the British believed to be unable to govern themselves and have political consciousness—to be ruled. Thus the racial attitudes of the Raj—which were not monolithic, but shared by a good share of officialdom—were reflected in the way India was governed.

British Administrators and Their Backgrounds

- The administrative and governing core of the Raj's personnel came from the more privileged parts of British society. This included lesser lords, such as barons and dukes, as well as well-to-do young British men who joined the Indian Civil Service.
- The British aristocracy were slowly losing out to the democratization of British politics and the emergence of an industrial national economy where the land was losing its centrality. India was certainly a place where the British had no intent of introducing democratic elements, either at a local or national level.
- For many lesser aristocrats, India represented a bygone, nobler era—an era where there was class and hierarchy, and where people “knew their place.” Instead of class, India had caste, which was almost a substitute for the layers these aristocrats missed. Most lesser aristocrats tended to serve in the upper echelons of the Raj's power as viceroys, provincial governors, and chief magistrates.
- The Raj was bureaucratically administered by the Indian Civil Service, known as the ICS. Called the “steel frame of the Raj,” the ICS consisted of around 1,000 civil servants, who until the 1920s came almost exclusively from Oxford and Cambridge. These were young British men in their mid-twenties to forties. After they had passed a competitive examination held only in London, they finished their training at the Indian Institute in Oxford.
- After their training, they filled posts in specialized departments such as forestry, public works, and education. ICS men were guaranteed a career and pension, and they became the face of the Raj in villages, often in khaki shorts and a pith helmet.
- The ruling cadre of the Raj thus came from overwhelmingly privileged, well-to-do elements of British society. They all shared a disdain for popular politics and the working masses. And it was, crucially, this attitude that was transplanted to

India when they had to deal with Indian peasants, cultivators, and holy men.

- Indians made up less than 4 percent of the Indian Civil Service. The examinations were held only in London, and general racial prejudice meant Indians had to surmount considerable hurdles to pass. It was this subtle discrimination that would later be pointed out by loyalist Indian critics of the Raj in the late 19th century.
- The governing mentality of ICS officials was paternalist. They were tough-minded men who thought they were doing good for Indians. They saw Indians as little children who needed a firm hand. ICS men were used to giving orders and being obeyed.

The Indian Civil Service

- The ICS engendered one of the major ideological underpinnings of colonial rule: that only British men could fairly and justly rule India. If Indians were allowed to govern themselves, they would be divisive, corrupt, and dishonest. India would fall into chaos.
- The ways in which ICS men were expected to behave with Indians was a direct reflection of prevailing racial attitudes. These men couldn't get too friendly or close with Indians. Being seen as sympathetic to Indians was frowned upon by expatriate British folk and British officialdom.
- A specific post that was crucial to the Raj and the ICS was the district collector. Known as a "sun roasted and dried bureaucrat," he was known locally as *mabap*, literally "mother-father." The British interpreted this as "my lord." The district collector was

For many lesser aristocrats, India represented a bygone, nobler era—an era where there was class and hierarchy, and where people “knew their place.”



often in charge of districts of between 1-3 million Indians. The collector was the representative of the Raj's authority for Indians in their day-to-day local affairs.

- The collector's main priority was the maintenance of law and order so as to allow Britain to effectively harness India's economic, material, and military benefit. The collector was the person in the district responsible for remitting India's agrarian revenue and taxation all the way up to the coffers in Calcutta.

- The district collector was not a local tyrant. But he did exercise considerable autocratic-bureaucratic authority. He was basically an unchecked county emperor, albeit bound by bureaucratic regulation from Calcutta.
- The district collector had thousands of powers. For example, he could adjust tax and revenue rates, administer famine relief, decide legal disputes between different parties, and dispense political patronage. District collectors also controlled access to government employment and the spending capabilities of local government. These were remarkably influential tools.
- In a society so attuned to honor and social standing, the district collector possessed a crucial tool of governance: the power to raise or relegate Indians' social standing, especially when it came to land. For example, if a zamindar fell afoul of a collector, the collector could slowly chip away at his social standing. The collector could marginalize him from provincial or local politics by offering more protection to peasants on his lands, and he could either not invite or disinvite him from elite British social gatherings.
- If legal proceedings and patronage failed, district collectors always had as a final recourse to sheer overwhelming force—the Indian army. In the daily life of local administration, the army was rarely used to crush internal dissent. Often enough, the mere threat of force could be employed as a local political tool.
- District collectors and ICS men were gods in the eyes of some Indians. Because they were the source of local authority, to some their powers were awesome and powerful.
- By 1900, the Raj had built up one of the most bureaucratic states in the world. The late 19th-century Raj ruled India not by learning the Indian constitution, traditions, customs, and religions, but through paper-based authority. British

knowledge of India became ossified in the census, statistical land surveys, and ethnographies.

- One way the Raj sought to modernize India was through transport and communication. The British made substantial investments in railways, telegraph lines, and a countrywide postal service. They also expanded education among Indians, establishing universities in several major cities.
- The Raj spent money on Indian infrastructure for two reasons: First, the projects benefited the army. With better infrastructure, troops could be moved around quickly. Memories of the Great Uprising were still fresh, and the Indian army could be quickly moved across the countryside to prevent future uprisings.
- The second reason was governance. It was easier to govern a country with transportation networks, and having telegraphs meant that orders from Calcutta—instead of being sent via horsemen—were sent electronically. With all of these technological and bureaucratic changes combined, the British turned India into a colonial nation-state ruled by Britain. This secured the Raj after 1857 and deep into the 20th century.

Suggested Reading

Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes*.

Forster, *A Passage to India*.

Potter, *India's Political Administrators*.

Questions to Consider

1. How was racism anchored into the administration of the Raj by 1900?
2. How did the Indian Civil Service function, and what were its goals?



Lecture 14

Princely States and Royalist Relationships

A frequently overlooked aspect of India's colonial history is the crucial role that princely states played in maintaining British power and influence throughout the subcontinent. In this lecture, you will examine the origins of Indian princely states, and you will find out what separated them from territory controlled directly by the British. You will consider how the British cultivated relationships with the ruling princes, many of whom became staunch loyalists.

Princely India

- India has known kings for thousands of years. The *Arthashastra*, an ancient Indian treatise that dates between the 4th century B.C. and the 3rd century A.D., was effectively a manual for how the king should rule his empire and domains. The caste system had a place for rulers. They were known as rajas and maharajas, or great kings.
- With the coming of the Mughals, most regional kingdoms in 18th-century India were ruled by Indian Muslims. These rulers were usually called nizams or nawabs. The British had dislodged most, but not all, of these Muslim regional kingdoms between the 1700s and 1830s.

- There were two phases in how the British dealt with these Indian-ruled regional kingdoms. Before the 1850s, the East India Company was much more confrontational and bellicose toward them. They bullied the nawabs of Awadh, the amirs of Sindh, and the Sikh kings who ruled Punjab.
- Under the Mughals, vakils, who were agents or intermediaries between rulers, were allowed to be posted in provinces. The company continued this, allowing rulers from Hyderabad, Mysore, and the central Indian kingdom of Gwalior, to post vakils in Calcutta. In the 1820s, however, the company decided to cut the Indian middlemen out, monopolizing diplomatic communication by using British envoys.
- After the Great Uprising, the British, wary of meddling too much in Indian tradition, started to see Indian princes as a source of stability. Because they were fearful of upsetting sensibilities, the British resorted to traditional authority as a means of buttressing their rule.
- The British decided to consolidate what they couldn't conquer. They knew that if they were not going to undertake further territorial expansion, they had to find ways to maintain influence in those regions not under direct British rule. As a result, they began to treat nizams and maharajas with more respect.
- During this period, the British recognized more princes and hereditary titles than ever before. The doctrine of lapse was repudiated, as was further territorial expansion. Princes were now allowed to adopt to continue their male lineage.
- The British were aware of Indian opinion. They hoped that cozying up and supporting traditional Indian authorities would make them look better—more deferential to Indian sensibilities—in the era following the Great Uprising.

Attributes of the Princely States

- Princely states accounted for approximately two-fifths of the Indian subcontinent's territories and approximately two-fifths of India's total population. This covered 500,000 square miles and over 90 million subjects. Some territories, such as Hyderabad, were larger than some states in Europe.
- In 1877, Queen Victoria was made Empress of India. The semantics here are substantial. The specific Indian title she was given was *Kaisar-i-Hind*, meaning "Caesar of India." Suggestive of a more traditional rule, this dovetailed with the post-1857 caution that characterized the Raj.
- The British saw the activities of utilitarians, missionaries, and reformers as having contributed to widespread revolts. Indian society came to be seen as layered and ordered, and the British decided not to mess with tradition.

Queen Victoria (1819–1901)



- A large section of the subcontinent never came under direct British control. The largest concentration of princes that survived were in western and central India, where British influence came later. In eastern and southern India, where British power first arrived, most of the princes were gone.
- Not all Indian kingdoms were the same. Over 600 in number, they varied immensely in size: Some were less than a square kilometer. Others, like Hyderabad, were the size of France. And like all royals, the rulers were often eccentric.
- Princely states also varied in terms of administration and governance. Some kingdoms were known for being moderately progressive, even more so than the territories under direct British rule. Others remained primarily feudal from the outside and dabbled little in modernizing their rule and administration.

A newfound affinity for India's traditional rulers didn't prevent the British from interfering in their kingdoms.

British Influence over the Princely States

- A newfound affinity for India's traditional rulers didn't prevent the British from interfering in their kingdoms. Meddling continued after the Great Uprising, but it was more cautious and clandestine.
- The princely states were subject to indirect rule. Even though they were never formally under British rule, they could be made amenable to British interests. They had a lot in common: The British and Indian rulers were both fearful of rapid and sudden change, and they both identified with traditional sources of authority.
- Indirect rule cost very little because the British didn't have to pay for administration. Indirect rule required collaboration and

compromise with established Indian rulers, but it generally maintained British hegemony without requiring them to annex more territory, administer it, and drain the Raj's coffers.

- The British used what was called the residency system. In the princely states under indirect rule, the British maintained an envoy, known as a resident. Residents would advise princes on matters of state and relay messages to the viceroy. The resident was the primary intermediary between princely states and the Raj.
- India's princes were technically sovereigns, but they were cut off from the world. They weren't allowed to maintain diplomatic relations with one another, let alone outside governments. The Raj monopolized their diplomacy and communication.
- Princes also couldn't possess independent military forces. Their forces either had to be regiments under British command as part of the army or work within the existing armed forces of the British.
- Making the princes dependent upon the British ensured that they were less likely to criticize the Raj and its policies. It often kept princes meddling in peasant grievances against high taxes.

Cultivating Loyalty

- The British couldn't simply tell princes what to do. The British had to manage relationships with over 600 different princes, which meant that they had to be nice to them.
- Loyalty and affection among the princes was cultivated mainly through symbolism and ritual. The British wanted to appeal to the princes and indulge them in royal splendor through personal, loyal relationships. Before modern bureaucracies and state structures, this is how ruling was done, and it was something with which princes could identify.

- The British held huge royal gatherings called *durbars*, coming from the Persian word for “court.” These occurred more frequently after the 1860s. *Durbars* were used to display visual and ceremonial solidarity with India’s princes and to make the British—in spite of their savage tax demands and economic parasitism—look like legitimate rulers in the eyes of Indians.
- The Raj showered Indian princes with honors and titles, many of which had been established specifically for Indian princes. These were meant to engender a sense of affection and loyalty to the Crown. There was competition for these titles. Like royalty the world over, Indian princes competed with each other for honor, status, and importance.
- The princes were a significant source of military strength. After the 1850s, especially due to the Great Uprising, Indian princes became generous donors and supporters of the British imperial cause. Princes had previously supplied the East India company with troops to fight its expansionist wars, and this role expanded after 1857.
- There was a contradiction inherent in the British system of indirect rule over the princely states. The British wanted to maintain what was essentially a feudal order, but they also had to show that their rule had a modernizing effect on India.
- This was a delicate balancing act. The British did not want to push the notion of administrative reform too hard on princes. Some viceroys were more amenable than others, and some treated princes with great respect. Others treated them like rebellious, rambunctious schoolboys.
- There’s no easy answer to the question of whether princes were dominated by the British or willing collaborators. On one hand, the princes were surrounded largely by British territory. Militarily, the Indian army was the dominant force on the subcontinent. Residents could use the threat of force and intimidation to bring princes into line.

- On the other hand, many Indians certainly identified with British support for princes. Some were so loyal that they supplied substantial support and manpower during the two World Wars. Some didn't even want the British to leave in 1947.

The Raj showered Indian princes with honors and titles, many of which had been established specifically for Indian princes.

- In spite of this balancing act, the British and the princes were brought together by common fears of anything that seemed too unsettling, too populist, or that challenged traditional authority. Whether the threat was Hindu reform efforts, peasant agitation, or urban labor movements, the Indian princes knew that anything involving the Indian masses meant that their traditions and ways of ruling would have to change.

Suggested Reading

Bhagavan, *Sovereign Spheres*.

Copland, *The British Raj and the Indian Princes*.

Datla, "A Worldly Vernacular."

Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and Their States*.

Questions to Consider

1. Why were the Indian princely states significant for the post-1857 British Raj?
2. How did the British manage relationships with India's princes?



Lecture 15

Indian Nationalism and the Freedom Struggle

The British regularly insisted that India, while a great civilization, was too divided by caste, religion, and region to be considered a nation. By the late 1800s, however, Indians began to take a different view, formulating a sense of nationhood that was rooted in an anticolonial critique of the Raj. This lecture examines the emergence of Indian nationalist thought and delineates that emergence.

Critiques of British Rule

- The first Indian nationalists were loyalists who critiqued the Raj's economy, not its political aspects. Their demands were moderate. But their critique of Britain's economic relationship with India was poignant and to the point.
- Britain extracted a significant economic advantage from India. Since the late 1700s, Britain had latched onto India in a parasitic and antidevelopmental economic relationship. British rule had essentially reversed India's historic trading position in the world economy.
- India had gone from a net exporter of finished goods to a net importer of finished British goods, and India's agrarian economy was exposed to the forces of globalization and the

swings in prices and demand. This all had devastating effects upon Indian cultivators and farmers.

- The first Indian economic nationalist was Sir Dadabhai Naoroji. He published *The Poverty of India* in 1876 and, in 1901, the more pointedly-titled *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*. Naoroji postulated the drain of wealth theory. He argued that the colonial connection with Britain had been draining wealth out of India without giving anything back.
- Specifically, Naoroji addressed the home charges of the Raj's budget. These were the entire costs of administration—everything from magistrates' courtrooms and wigs to ICS officers and their relocation costs. And Naoroji was on to something. The British were the best-paid imperialists on earth. They were better compensated, in terms of salaries and perks, than anyone else.
- Naoroji sought to inform an educated Indian public about the true net losses of British rule. He thought that home charges were unacceptable. Able-bodied Indians could do the same jobs for much less. Naoroji argued that the cost of the Raj was stunting Indian economic growth. British colonialism created costs for its own maintenance, and this had been depleting India's wealth.
- Naoroji proposed a radical reprioritization of the Raj's budget. He argued that much-heralded public investments in infrastructure in India, such as the railways, were too large compared to what India really needed to help the masses: agricultural relief, education, and public health. He wanted more money spent on public services. He also wanted the Raj to prop up the Indian rupee to alleviate the poverty that had resulted from lower prices after the 1870s.
- Naoroji's critique was tempered, however. He didn't advocate swaraj, or self-rule. Instead, he pressed the British government to open up the echelons of Indian government to qualified,

educated Indians. But the officials of the Raj never considered this.

- Naoroji eventually became frustrated and hinted, in a somewhat challenging passage, that India might “under the persistence of the present evil bleeding fall from the British frying pan into the Russian fire or free itself from a destructive rule.” This was a subtle form of constitutional resistance, but it was still polite, gentlemanly, elite, and—above all—loyalist.

The Indian National Congress

- The early loyalism of Indian nationalism reflected in the institutional forms it took. The Indian National Congress, the party that would eventually lead India to independence, was founded in 1885 by Allan Octavian Hume, an Englishman who was sympathetic to the modest demands of educated Indians. The Congress served as an annual gathering and forum.
- The early Congress was elitist. It was composed mainly of Western-educated Hindus who were the beneficiaries of colonial rule, and there was a substantial Bengali presence within the early party. At first, the Congress was moderate and loyal to British rule. They saw no need to make reform of British rule a popular cause.
- The early Congress achieved some moderate successes before 1905. They had moderate aims, which included greater Indian representation on provincial legislative councils—nothing terribly radical or demanding.
- The leaders and senior members of the Indian National Congress were moderates. These included Motilal Nehru—the father of India’s future prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru—Surendranath Banerjee, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale.

The early loyalism of Indian nationalism reflected in the institutional forms it took.

- By the late 1800s, Indian nationalism was not only polite and loyalist, but moderately tame in its agenda. It was filled with the beneficiaries of British rule. This all changed, however, with the arrival of Viceroy Lord Curzon in 1898.

The Partition of Bengal

- Viceroy Curzon of Kedleston arrived in Calcutta in 1898. From the beginning, it was clear that he brought a more conservative and reactionary attitude to Indian governance. Curzon had an uncompromising attitude toward British rule and particularly toward educated Indians.
- Curzon was hidebound and patronizing, and his attitudes tended to radicalize his opposition, both British and Indian. He was an aggressive imperialist convinced of England's "duty" to rule India. Curzon envisioned British India as the premier Asian power.
- Curzon was very different from a more sympathetic viceroy, Marquess Ripon. Between 1800 and 1884, Ripon took sincere, if limited, interest in getting Indians more involved in governance. He heeded suggestions from his advisors that Indian educated opinion couldn't be repressed or ignored. But Curzon ended up dismissing warnings by his advisors that accommodations needed to be made regarding educated Indian opinion.
- The main group that Curzon rubbed the wrong way were English-educated Indians, whom Curzon hated. Although they were polite, they questioned how the British ruled India too much for Curzon's liking.
- From his arrival, Curzon initiated a number of policy changes that targeted educated Indians—the very people who benefited from the colonial connection. The Universities Act of 1904, for example, greatly restricted the number of entrants every year to universities in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.



Lord Curzon (1859-1925)

- Curzon also pushed through legislation that radicalized the Indian National Congress and became an omen of more aggressive nationalism to come: the 1905 Partition of Bengal. The rationale, from an administrative perspective, was sensible. Bengal was the most populous province in British India, with over 70 million people. Naturally, it would be easier to administer if it were smaller. The rhetoric of administrative efficiency punctuated discussions over the idea.
- Curzon’s true motive was to split up dissenting opinion along the lines of religion. Western Bengal was primarily Hindu, while the rural eastern regions were overwhelmingly Muslim. All were Bengalis, however, with a proud local and cultural identity that often made religion of secondary importance.
- Curzon made a deal with Bengali Muslim leaders, promising them that they would have a Muslim unity unknown since the Mughal era. And in a secret communiqué, Curzon admitted that “Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull in different ways...one of our main objectives is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule.”
- When the Partition was announced, there was a massive fallout. To the Indian National Congress, it smacked of British high-handedness guided by the principle of divide and conquer. The Congress was energized, organizing rallies and demonstrations in Calcutta. These events were tame, and initially they were ineffective. Eventually, however, they became larger and appealed to popular anger and resentment against Curzon.
- What emerged when Congress and Bengali leaders started to engage the masses was known as the Swadeshi movement. “Swadeshi” means “of one’s own country.” It was a form of protest that boycotted British and foreign goods—the very symbols of India’s economic servitude. It reminded Indians that they once produced their own cloth and goods. Swadeshi

sought to demonstrate that Indians could do without British goods—and by extension, the British themselves.

- Congressmen organized the boycott of British goods. They burned foreign cloth in large bonfires. And it was not just cloth: They boycotted government schools and shops, picking up in intensity when the Partition went into effect on October 16, 1905.
- Economically and fiscally, Swadeshi was effective. It surprised the British, and imports of textiles plummeted almost 35 percent. Swadeshi hit British economic interests in Bengal hard and swiftly. Profits plummeted for British industrialists, who had large factories back home, and planters, who had large plantations in India.
- The Swadeshi agitations led to the emergence of political extremism in India. Nationalists such as Aurobindo Ghosh, Lala Lajpat Rai, and Bal Gangadhar Tilak chucked the polite, constitutional route out with the bathwater. They demanded immediate and full independence. Because the goal was noble, they argued, any and all means were justified to get the British out.
- The Swadeshi movement also exposed some religious differences between Hindus and Muslims in Bengal over the Partition and mobilization against the British. Bengali Muslim leaders largely supported the Partition, as they knew that they had fallen behind their Hindu countrymen in education, economic prominence, and Indian governance.
- The boycotting of British goods was also problematic. Urban Bengali Hindus, the core of the Congress in eastern India, were economically better off than the mass of rural poor Bengali Muslim farmers and peasants. Many Bengali Muslim traders and peasants couldn't afford to boycott foreign cloth. As a result, Bengali Muslim participation in the agitations was patchy.

- Never before had the colonial state faced such organized and mass agitation against its rule. European residents in Calcutta were rattled by the throngs of protestors chanting and boycotting and burning cloth.

“Swadeshi” means “of one’s own country.” It was a form of protest that boycotted British and foreign goods—the very symbols of India’s economic servitude.

- The Raj’s reaction was harsh. Police were sent to clear pickets and demonstrations. Hundreds were imprisoned, and the protests turned violent. Bengal saw the repressive hand of the colonial state, with its police, intelligence, and military assets brought to bear.
- The British had had enough of Curzon. A newly-elected Gladstone liberal government replaced him as viceroy with the more moderate Lord Minto. Viceroy Minto made overtures to Congress about reversing the Partition and giving the Congress some political concessions. Toward that end, Gopal Krishna Gokhale was able to persuade Surendranath Banerjee and others to end the boycott and Swadeshi agitations.
- Nevertheless, political extremism had sparked in Bengal, and it continued. Small terrorist outfits emerged, usually among young, radicalized students. They gained access to bomb-making facilities and small arms. Their bombs occasionally targeted British officials. They robbed banks to finance their operations. Radical students donned disguises—sometimes as women, sometimes as elderly holy men.
- To cool Indian anger, the British offered political concessions. This led to the Indian Councils Act, known as the Morely-Minto Reforms in 1909. The Act allowed Indians to be elected to various legislative councils for the first time. The councils had limited powers, however. The legislation did not meet Congress’s demands for more self-governance and home rule.

- The Act made special accommodations for Indian Muslims. They were given reserved seats on the councils and on municipal and district boards, in excess of their proportion of the population. And Muslims would only vote for Muslim candidates. Hindu nationalists resented special treatment for Muslims. In a way, the Act was not terribly dissimilar from Curzon's partition; it was simply more massaged and politically acceptable.
- The aims of the Act were to win over the moderate bloc of Congress and to split extremists from moderates. On the surface, the Act appeared to be liberal and good for India, but it was actually meant to perpetuate British power rather than diminish it.
- By 1914, the Raj was secure and able to marginalize radical nationalists. But it was an arrangement that couldn't last forever, as the events and strains of World War I would soon demonstrate.

Suggested Reading

Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*.

Goswami, *Producing India*.

Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal*.

Tagore, *The Home and the World*.

Questions to Consider

1. What explains the emergence of Indian nationalism in its initially polite, loyalist forms?
2. How did the 1905 Partition of Bengal change the development of Indian nationalism?



Lecture 16

The Great War and Its Impact on India

In this lecture, you will consider the impact of World War I on India. As you proceed, you will see how the events of 1914–1918 set the stage for Gandhi’s mass mobilization against the Raj and accelerated events that had been brewing since the late 19th century. Topics addressed in this lecture include India’s wartime economy, the emboldening of radical Indian nationalists, strategies adopted by more moderate nationalists, and Indian contributions to the war effort.

India during World War I

- World War I, also known as the Great War, was a turning point in Indian history. Not only did it expose India to the pressures and strains of prosecuting a global war, but it laid the groundwork for the emergence of Indian nationalism.
- On August 4, 1914, Germany invaded Belgium. When Britain declared war on Germany because of an interlocking system of alliances, the whole of Europe was engulfed. Soon after, Britain was at war with Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire, collectively referred to as the Central Powers.
- If the British Empire was at war with the Central Powers, India was technically at war as well. Indians had no voice in the matter, however; it was a decision that the British made

unilaterally. The great irony was that British expectations of India's loyalty turned out to be correct. Indians displayed overwhelming loyalty to the Raj and the war effort.

- India's military contributions to the war effort were substantial and unprecedented. India had millions of men, revenue, and supplies that could help prosecute the war. India provided cloth and dyes for uniforms, foodstuffs, armaments from factories, and more.
- Because Indian nationalism had not yet become the confrontational movement that later characterized Gandhi's campaigns, mainstream nationalists in the Indian National Congress largely saw the constitutional route as the best and most effective one to take.
- The loyalty of Indians at the outbreak of the war was seen even among extreme nationalists. They recruited for the war effort and encouraged young men to join the army, convinced that their good faith would be rewarded at war's end.
- The war cemented the unity of the Indian National Congress, creating uniformity and cohesion among various factions within the party. The pressures of war saw their disagreements temporarily fade away.
- A smaller number of radical Indian nationalists wanted to use violence, sabotage, and the standard tools of resistance to gain independence. They assassinated minor officials, planted bombs, and robbed banks to finance their activities. They sought to take advantage of Britain's wartime distraction. These radicals were never significant in number and means, however.
- The only place where radicals were successful was outside of India. Germany offered asylum to Indian radical nationalists and utilized secret agents to conspire with revolutionary young Bengalis to stir up trouble in India, far away from the western

front. But this doomed the cause of radicals in India. It gave Britain an excuse (as if it needed one) to use a heavy hand.

- Recruitment for the Indian army exploded during the war, and the army ballooned to a staggering 2.5 million soldiers. Indians were again permitted to handle artillery, an activity from which they had been barred since the late 1850s. Most new soldiers came from Punjab. In a great fit of irony for a force that would help carve up the last Muslim caliphate—the Ottoman Empire—Punjabi Muslims made up the largest single regiment in the Army, close to 150,000.
- As what historian David Washbrook called the “iron fist in the velvet glove of Victorian expansionism,” the Indian army became Britain’s imperial battering ram during the war. And due to the intensity and geographic scope of their service, the Indian army became one of the most professional in the world.
- India’s sacrifices during the war were substantial. Over 60,000 Indians were killed, and close to 100,000 were wounded. Over 1 million Indian men



The British Victoria Cross



Indian soldiers during World War I

saw active combat, and 16 Victoria Crosses were awarded to Indian soldiers.

Economic Effects

- There were two major developments in the Indian economy during the war. First of all, there was an expansion and boom in Indian domestic industry at the expense of British industrial dominance. And second, there was the stagnation and decline of agriculture's share of the Indian economy, which had disastrous results.
- India's peasants and farmers footed the bill for Britain's war. India supplied manpower and materials for the army, and army

expenditures increased 300 percent. In fact, historians have estimated that Britain raised an extra £100 million in taxes and revenue, most of which came from the countryside.

- The wartime economy led to massive inflation booms and food shortages. The prices of grains, cooking oils, and vegetables all went up. Inflationary policies made it more difficult for rural laborers and the poor to purchase necessary staples, such as rice, wheat, cooking oil, and vegetables.
- There were also major changes in the role of industry in India. British factories and manufacturers had supplanted the Indian artisan economy beginning in the 1830s. India had gone from being a net exporter of finished textiles and goods to being a net importer of British finished goods.
- Yet western India, mainly around the Bombay region, had always done slightly better and was more industrialized than other parts of India. Western India stood to benefit immensely from the needs of wartime production.
- Indian-owned factories began producing all the goods needed for armies and warfare, guaranteeing supplies of uniforms, small arms, ammunition, field guns, and more. Indian factories now had to provide for an expanded army and the ever-expanding scope of wartime government.
- It was during the First World War that India started to break the shackles of British industry. Because British shipping was disrupted by the naval war and the threat of German U-boats, it made sense to use India as a base of production.
- Indian industrialists also began to cultivate links with members of the Indian National Congress. The industrialists were generating significant profits during the war, and they wanted to see that their profits and market shares continued to rise. They knew that supporting a party that could eventually help

them marginalize, if not erase, British industrial dominance in India's economy was in their interest.

Political Agitation

- The British were aware of the potential for mass agitation in India and sought to counter it. If the Indian economy was marshaled to the war effort like never before, then India's political climate was subjected to an equally strong form of British coercion. For the Raj, this was necessary to keep India's contributions to the war effort steady and uninhibited.
- The Russian Revolution of 1917 was celebrated widely in the colonial world as a blow to European imperialism, which colonial subjects viewed—with good reason—as synonymous with Western capitalism. The revolution electrified radical Indian nationalists, who saw the Soviets as a natural ally against a capitalist and imperialist Britain.
- In addition, there was fear of economic unrest in Bombay and western India. Even though western India had witnessed an economic wartime boom, it had also sown the seeds for significant urban labor militancy and agitation—something that would have attracted communists' attention.
- The introduction of electricity by Indian textile companies squeezed more labor out of their workforce. Indian factory owners figured out pretty quickly that electricity enabled them to stay open longer and, by extension, make their workers put in longer hours. As a result, urban labor in Bombay and western India grew agitated.
- The British strategy toward anything they viewed as seditious or extremist was firm but nuanced. Though they were wary of anticolonial agitation, the British wanted to co-opt moderate opinion—that is, mainstream members of the Indian National Congress who wanted to negotiate and take the constitutionalist route.

- Aware of the potential for radical agitation, the British sought to counter by splitting political extremists from moderate nationalists. They often arrested extremists and offered political reforms to moderates.
- Even though they were largely loyal during the early part of the war, the Indian National Congress wanted to prevent the British from splitting them up. One of the actions the party took was to readmit extremists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak.
- Tilak set up a Home Rule League in the city of Pune, just outside of Bombay. Inspired by the Irish Home Rule movement and the Irish Easter Rising of 1916, Tilak and the Indian National Congress founded hundreds of branches and had over 30,000 members. They employed the English press and made extensive use of pamphleteering and distribution through Indian commercial men and traders.
- In 1919, the British passed the Rowlatt Acts. The Acts did a few things: They suspended civil liberties, forbade public demonstrations, and more intrusively censored and monitored the press. Essentially, they enforced a quasi-military state under a form of martial law.
- Another way the British attempted to divide extremist from moderate nationalists was through the constitutional process. In late 1919, the Raj passed the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, establishing what was known as dyarchy, or rule by two. It devolved a degree of local, provincial government into elected Indian hands.

The introduction of electricity by Indian textile companies squeezed more labor out of their workforce.
- The realms of local government the British cared less about, and were thus willing to relinquish to win over moderates, included agriculture, supervision of local government, health, and education. This was called the transferred list. It was made

up of local government components that the British felt did not challenge overall British rule in India.

- In addition, provincial councils were enlarged to include a smaller number of elected Indian officials and advisors. The Imperial Legislative Council was enlarged and reformed, and it became a bicameral legislature for all India, with an upper house and a lower house.
- These efforts were an attempt by the British to distract elected Indians from central government and the larger portions of the government portfolio that were too big for the Raj to part with. Known as the reserved list, these areas included foreign policy, taxes, and monetary and fiscal policy. Under this division, the smaller Indian electorate could decide the Indian portfolio of the transferred list, and the British held onto the reserved list. This kept the reins of power firmly in British hands.
- The reforms would eventually create long-term problems involving religious relations and politics. Voting was done along a communal basis: Muslims voted for Muslim candidates, Hindus for Hindu candidates, Untouchables for Untouchable candidates. The British insisted on separate communal electorates, which allowed them to divide and conquer.
- The system of communal electorates was also used to justify British rule in India. If every person got one vote, they claimed, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs would be at each other throats and law and order would break down. So even in legislative proceedings, the insistence upon the differences in India provided a theoretical justification for the Raj's existence.
- When the war ended in 1918, the British kept the Rowlatt Acts on the books. This infuriated Congress. They were still angry about the suspension of civil liberties during the war, and now the war was over. The British excuse was that the suspension of civil liberties was needed to counter extremists.

Suggested Reading

Bayly, *The Origins of Nationality in South Asia*.

Metcalf, *Imperial Connections*.

Mazumdar, *The Indian Army and the Making of the Punjab*.

Roy, *The Economic History of India, 1857–1947*.

Questions to Consider

1. How did the First World War affect India?
2. How did India contribute to the war effort, and why were nationalists largely loyal during the conflict?



Lecture 17

Gandhi's Moral-Political Philosophy

Mohandas Gandhi is known around the world as one of the greatest leaders in history. Gandhi is a complicated figure, and understanding his place in colonial India is necessary a necessary prerequisite to understanding how India achieved independence in 1947. This lecture examines Gandhi's life, his sophisticated (if somewhat contradictory) nationalist philosophy, and his harsh critique of the Raj.

Early Life

- Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born in 1869 into a western Indian family in Porbandar, Gujarat. He came from a trading merchant caste of grocers, but his family had a history of service to the courts of minor Indian princes in western India.
- Gandhi had an arranged marriage at age 13 to Kasturbai Makanji. Five years later, his wife gave birth to his first son, Harilal. That same year, Gandhi left to study law in London.
- Gandhi saw aspects of London society that belied the image of British superiority: pub-fueled nights in the East End, informal networks of prostitution, and, more generally, the English working classes.

- Gandhi's experience in London was both an emotional and social ordeal. He felt estranged from the gentlemanly lifestyle that was associated with pinstripe-wearing lads. Emotionally, he couldn't connect with London society. So he abandoned his attempts to be a dandy Victorian gentleman and started to live a frugal, removed, and quiet lifestyle.
- Over the next two years, Gandhi threw himself into his studies as he prepared for the bar examination. In 1891, he passed the bar of the famous Inner Temple, part of the Inns of Court in London. He had become a well-educated, Anglicized Indian gentleman.
- Gandhi returned to India for a few years, attempting to practice law as a barrister in Bombay. But he was too tongue-tied to speak during his first case, and he had to compete with a glut of other lawyers. Humiliated and depressed, Gandhi decided to try his luck in South Africa and set sail in 1893. He took odd work with an Indian Muslim trading firm, and he also got a year's contract with an Indian law firm. He eventually set up his own law firm.
- It was in South Africa that Gandhi started his experiments with peaceful resistance and nonviolence. These initial forays were crucial in fashioning him into a potential national leader. He founded the Natal Indian Congress and petitioned against anti-Indian racial discrimination laws in South Africa.
- Famously, Gandhi was literally tossed out of a railway carriage outside of Pietermaritzburg when the white train conductor insisted that, even though Gandhi had purchased a first-class ticket, no "colored" people were allowed in first class. After this humiliating episode, Gandhi settled in Johannesburg in 1903 to start work on a newsletter called *Indian Opinion*.
- Gandhi started to utilize the resources available in colonial society—newspapers and associations—in order to publicize

political issues and to voice Indian discontent. He also continued to petition against anti-Indian racial discrimination.

- British South Africa legalized discrimination against non-Europeans peoples. Indians and black Africans needed to carry identity papers with them at all times, but Europeans didn't. To Gandhi, this smacked of racism. In 1906, he called for civil disobedience against this legislation. Two years later, he led a famous mass burning of registration certificates in Johannesburg.
- Gandhi was imprisoned twice, once in January 1908 and again in October 1908. His terms were light, and he was released. During this time, he formally adopted the term "satyagraha" and made it part of his moral and political vocabulary. He also composed his famous treatise, *Hind Swaraj* ("Indian Self-Rule").
- When Gandhi returned to India in 1915, he was an outsider in the Indian National Congress. He didn't wear Western clothes like the other party leaders. Remember, most party members were elites; they were comfortable in their bungalows, with lots of servants and networks of patronage. Gandhi was different.
- Gandhi traveled around the country by train, and he was profoundly influenced by the poverty he saw. He saw villagers scraping by when the monsoon rains never arrived but tax demands remained. He saw farmers forced to grow indigo, which left less food for people to eat. To Gandhi, the free market was violent, even if the players didn't use swords.
- Gandhi was not yet a political extremist. He saw promise in the British Empire, at least initially. He argued that the British Empire could offer equal liberty to all, regardless of color or religion. He sought to reform governance of the empire from within and not to challenge its constitutional foundations.
- During the South African War of 1899–1902, Gandhi organized an ambulance corps for the British army. He did the same

thing during the 1906 Zulu rebellion. As late as 1918, he was actively recruiting Indian men to fight for the British army in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

- Gandhi was greatly influenced by his cosmopolitan background and career. He was the perfect example of the 20th-century globalized individual. He lived on three continents, spoke at least three languages, and was very much a man of the world. He was well read, conversant, and engaging, and he could talk about the Bhagavad Gita, the *Communist Manifesto*, and Voltaire.
- Gandhi was also influenced by missionary Christianity. He read the stories of Jesus as if they were no different from his understanding of Prince Arjuna being counselled by Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita. But Gandhi pointed out the contradictions inherent in the relationship between

Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948)



missionary Christianity and the British Empire. The British and the West were powerful not because of Christianity, he said, but in spite of it.

Moral and Political Philosophy

- Gandhi was the most admirable moralist of the modern era. But he was also one of the shrewdest politicians in history. Unlike the British, Gandhi saw morality and politics as one and the same. While he wasn't a theocrat, his success lay in forcibly showing the British and the world that politics and morals have to be addressed together and not separately.
- The first tool that Gandhi developed was called ahimsa. Originally an ancient Jain concept, it translates not as “nonviolence,” but as “the absence of desire to inflict harm.” It is as much mental as it is physical. By taking the moral high ground and responding without violence, people expose the futility of a government's actions and policies. Laws require the consent of those to whom they apply, and Gandhi knew this better than anyone.
- Gandhi's other tool was called satyagraha, which literally means “the force of truth” or “truth-power.” It is the idea that the truth behind any political debate or disagreement—be it the British rule of India or the poverty of the rural masses—was the ultimate weapon that favored those who were on the right side of that truth.
- In the British case, the truth was that that British were ruling India without the good of the Indian people in mind, even if they claimed to bring justice, order, and modernity to the country. The truth was that Britain was in India for its own selfish reasons. And

Gandhi was the most admirable moralist of the modern era. But he was also one of the shrewdest politicians in history. Unlike the British, Gandhi saw morality and politics as one and the same.

this truth was the most powerful weapon for Gandhi against the British.

- Gandhi saw satyagraha as a weapon, saying that “satyagraha is a sword which spills no blood.” He clearly held to an idea of attacking the British, but not in the way one normally thinks of confronting political authority. He once noted that it isn’t only generals who can lead campaigns.
- Gandhi was not a complete pacifist, however. He claimed that if India had the sword she should use it. But the sheer power and reach of the modern colonial state was too much for Indians to realistically confront on violent terms.
- It was the combination of ahimsa and satyagraha that Gandhi saw as most effective. Responding to the Raj and its policies with nonviolence—ahimsa—would show the power of truth, and satyagraha would reveal that British rule rested on force and the need to humiliate Indians in order to govern them.

Critique of Modernity

- The early Indian National Congress members and loyalist nationalists were Anglicized. They spoke English. But Gandhi didn’t want to see his party replicate the British Raj. He noted that if the party merely supplanted its British rulers and kept British institutions and attitudes, then Indians would have, as he put it, “English rule without the Englishmen.”
- Gandhi abhorred modern, centralized parliamentary systems. India didn’t have a parliament, but it was still modern: bureaucracies, departments, telegraphs, railways—everything the British had built over 200 years. Gandhi was aghast at the colonial state’s powers. But he was not a fan of democratic systems either, likening the British Parliament to a prostitute and the election cycle to a pimp.

- Gandhi thought India's salvation lay in small, self-sustaining village communities that lived off minimalist means. He believed that a centralized nation-state would sap India's civilization and moral character.
- Gandhi also was a major critic of modern industry, markets, and the global economy. This makes sense, given India's brutal exposure to global competition and British industry. He felt that mechanized production took away from the individual worth of labor, and that it opened up the potential for individuals to become dependent upon others for their well-being.
- Gandhi used the symbols of the khadi (homespun cloth) and the charkha (spinning wheel) to underscore his moral and political philosophy. The khadi was a symbol of a time when India used to make its own cloth, and a reminder that British cloth had displaced India's ability to make and export

The charkha (spinning wheel) used by Gandhi



their own. Similarly, the charkha symbolized the simple, self-sufficient means by which to make one's own cloth.

- Gandhi wanted to appeal to the eyes and sentiments of Indian peasants. His use of symbolism—combined with very good timing—enabled him to energize the countryside and turn the Indian National Congress into a mass political movement that spoke for the nation.
- Gandhi's political outlook was tough to measure. In some ways, it was wholly impractical. In other ways, it was admirable. When asked by an American reporter whether nonviolence would work against Hitler, Gandhi didn't really have an answer. What was more significant, however, was that his ideals gave Indian people hope.
- Gandhi was also a contradictory character and personality. Like any great leader in history, he had flaws. For one, he could be terribly patronizing. He ran sessions of the Indian National Congress with an almost authoritarian streak, even though he held no official position.
- Gandhi's attitudes toward women were also less than enlightened. We know this because he wrote so much about their role in society. In one instance, when some village boys taunted a young girl and she complained, Gandhi had her hair cut off for not being shameful enough. He believed that the proper place of women was in the home.
- Gandhi also rejected the usage of contraception because he feared it would drain the nation of its energy. He held an almost puritanical Victorian attitude toward sexual energy, believing that sexual energy should only be used for procreation and service of the nation.
- In a way, Gandhi lived in a utopian fantasy. He perpetuated the Orientalist myth of self-sustaining Indian villages who lived in Spartan simplicity. The problem with this, of course, was that

this vision was also what the British believed India was and should be.

- When it came to caste discrimination, Gandhi's views were equally contradictory. He preached the emancipation of low-caste Indians, but he said this could only be done once they began washing themselves, adopting vegetarianism, and becoming more Brahmanical. And he refused to disturb the status quo of the caste system, arguing that it provided a model of stability that simply needed reform.
- In spite of these complications and contradictions, Gandhi was the most successful Indian nationalist. He prevented alternative and more radical forms of nationalism from leading the movement, and his moral appeal ultimately led India to independence. His simple dress and demeanor made him the most unlikely—but also the most dangerous—anticolonial nationalist the British would ever confront.
- The scales began to tip for Gandhi and the Indian National Congress following the 1919 Massacre of Amritsar, in which the British fired upon a crowd of peaceful Indian demonstrators. Gandhi saw an opportunity to employ in India the techniques of ahimsa and satyagraha that he had experimented with in South Africa. And the outrage across India following the massacre allowed him and Congress to mobilize the masses.
- Gandhi started a movement that widened nationalist participation against the British. The Indian National Congress went from gentlemen talking shop about constitutionalism to a populist movement that engaged the

Gandhi was the most successful Indian nationalist. He prevented alternative and more radical forms of nationalism from leading the movement, and his moral appeal ultimately led India to independence.

masses, which was India's real strength, and call out the British Raj for what it had become: an increasingly autocratic paternalist regime.

Suggested Reading

Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*.

Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*.

Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours*.

Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*.

Questions to Consider

1. What was Gandhi's moral and political philosophy? Were his tools practical?
2. What was Gandhi's critique of British rule and of Western modernity?



Lecture 18

The Noncooperation Movement

Following World War I, the British Empire seemed to be on top of the world. It had won the war against Germany, subdued the Ottoman Empire, and gained new colonies in Palestine, Jordan, and the Arab heartlands. But the Massacre of Amritsar in 1919 damaged Britain's reputation in India and abroad, leading to the emergence of organized Indian nationalism and catapulting Gandhi onto the national stage.

Party Reorganization

- The 1919 Massacre of Amritsar had demonstrated that the tactic of polite, constitutional engagements with the British had not gotten Indians enough concessions. This was clear to Gandhi. He and the Indian National Congress decided to make a significant change: They would take it to the British on the streets.
- Gandhi helped turn the Indian National Congress into a mass political party that had appeal beyond the Western-educated, elite, and cynical membership. Gandhi wanted to engage the masses, and he would provide effective and clear vision and skill that served the party for next 27 years.
- Gandhi enacted two crucial and instrumental changes: First, the Indian National Congress officially adopted a policy of

gaining independence within one year. It became a proper popular party, establishing annual membership dues and a chain of command. The party also established provincial-level organizations based on linguistic boundaries, not the arbitrary administrative provincial borders drawn up by the British. This eased organization and the speed of mobilization.

- Second, the party launched the noncooperation movement. This was the first time the party wanted to engage the masses. There was already an accumulation of urban labor and peasant unrest that had been built up over decades; not only did this make the party's job easier, the timing was perfect.
- Noncooperation meant that Indians would not cooperate with the British Raj. The party led Indians of all stripes in boycotting British goods and shops and peacefully protesting against excessive taxes, duties, and revenue demands. In some villages and districts, daily business ground to a halt. The aim of the movement was to demonstrate that the Raj could not function unless Indians consented to cooperate with it.
- Indian members resigned the council seats they had gained after the 1909 and 1919 reforms. Indian employees of the state—from the translator to the deputy magistrate—refused to show up for work, and the government ceased to function. In some cases, the British army had to take over the railways and telegraph lines.
- The campaign was immensely successful. A wide section of society participated. Peasants and the impoverished joined, as did urban laborers. And the geographic scope was impressive.
- Gandhi's appeal among Indian peasants was profound. Some referred to him as *Gandhi Maharaj* ("King Gandhi"), and it created an aura of almost mythical, divine-like reverence, even for those who never saw him.

- Indian peasants had felt the heel of larger economic forces. They identified with Gandhi's visual message and could easily connect with him. He offered hope and a possible way out of their predicament. Even today, communities in northern India refer to him as their savior and divine leader.
- Participation in the noncooperation movement was ecumenical in terms of religion and community. The Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah joined forces with the Indian National Congress in 1916, and the Congress supported the League in pressuring the British not to dismantle the Ottoman Empire.
- Despite its many successes, the noncooperation movement could not last forever. Chauri Chaura, a small village in northern India, saw the end of the peaceful campaign: The Indian police were provoked in a protest against high food prices and liquor taxes, and violence broke out against noncooperation volunteers. In retaliation, 22 Indian police were killed, which led to the retaliatory arrest and killing of around 170 farmers.
- It was at this point that Gandhi called off the noncooperation movement. He realized that did not yet have full control over the political campaign that he and the Congress had unleashed. Gandhi was aware that Indians would lose the moral high ground if their purportedly nonviolent campaign ended up killing people.

Noncooperation's Aftermath

- The noncooperation movement rattled the British to the core. Not since the Great Uprising in 1857 had the Raj been so defensive or faced such popular mobilization.
- Even though the noncooperation movement failed to achieve independence for India, the campaign laid the foundation for more effective mobilization against the Raj in the 1930s and 1940s.

- Now that the Indian National Congress had become a mass political party, it had to account for and represent the dynamics of its constituency, from the polite barrister to the militant peasant. Gandhi had always tried to maintain a controlled and organized resistance to British rule, and to temper more radical voices. But even he could not keep a complete command over these forces.
- Some in the Congress thought that Gandhi's methods were too nice and idealistic to gain independence, and that more forceful action was needed. It was no coincidence that after the early part of 1922, smaller armed revolutionary groups sprouted up in some Indian cities and engaged in minor assassination campaigns and sabotage of the Raj's wealth and personnel.
- The suspension of the noncooperation movement by Gandhi affected the Congress's relationship with Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. Jinnah realized that the concerns of Indian Muslims couldn't be left in hands of someone as philosophically eccentric as Gandhi.
- Jinnah and the Muslim league were also wary of the populist nature of Indian nationalism. Indian nationalism drew heavily upon Hindu and ancient Indian symbolism. Combined with mass mobilization and a clearly assertive Hindu supermajority, Muslims such as Jinnah were reminded of their minority status in the country.
- The British called the noncooperation movement sedition. They threw thousands of Congress members and other leaders into prison, including Gandhi, Jinnah, and the Congress high command.

Some in the Congress thought that Gandhi's methods were too nice and idealistic to gain independence, and that more forceful action was needed.

- In 1923, provincial elections were held as per the 1909 and 1919 reforms. The Congress did well in the elections, and once they were in legislatures, Indian provincial council members procrastinated. This forced British administrators to make high-handed autocratic decisions. The strategy was used to demonstrate that the constitutional concessions the British offered didn't go far enough.
- The Congress still couldn't ignore the broader agitation of urban laborers and rural peasants. Bombay and western India witnessed urban labor militancy, which had started in the wartime economy between 1914 and 1918. Gandhi's campaigns electrified these agitations, which were also colored by communist ideas of the solidarity of workers.
- Rural and agrarian discontent was particularly problematic. The party exercised caution when peasants rose against their zamindar landlords, because they didn't want zamindars to be driven into the arms of the British, who could easily use them as a counterweight to the party.
- The split among nationalists in the mid-to-late 1920s was largely between the constitutionalist faction, who favored using constitutional mechanisms to gain concessions, and Gandhi and the confrontationalists, who wanted to agitate in the streets against the British.
- Gandhi resisted the constitutionalist approach. Even though he was a barrister, he believed that this approach would not lead to greater freedom, but instead to greater dependence on the Raj.
- By the mid-1920s, constitutionalism was the dominant approach among party leadership. It appeared to be gaining smaller concessions from the Raj, and Gandhi's noncooperation movement, ahimsa, and satyagraha all appeared to be spent political forces. The lawyers and constitutionalists were steering the nationalist boat.

The Simon Commission

- In 1927, the British announced the Simon Commission. Headed by Sir John Simon, the commission was to investigate further extension of constitutional reforms to Indians. But there was not a single Indian member on the commission, which implied that Britain could adequately rule and administer larger decisions for Indians.
- The rifts between constitutionalists and confrontationalists were suddenly healed. They were united by a common hatred of the Commission and what it insinuated. The Indian National Congress mobilized the masses and boycotted the Commission.
- In 1926, the British Parliament issued the Balfour Report. This pledged to give the colonies of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, and Canada self-government and dominion status within the British Empire. The Congress seized upon this reformist spirit. Jawaharlal Nehru's father, Motilal Nehru, completed a report in 1928 that advocated dominion status and home rule for India, similar to what these other colonies were being offered.
- Given the strains on the British economy after World War I, the British dismissed Motilal Nehru's report. If enacted, the proposal would have blunted the strategic needs of Britain and the British Empire in the interwar years. A decentralized, self-governing India's material, manpower, and economic resources would have been much more difficult to marshal if Indians had more say in their government.

The split among nationalists in the mid-to-late 1920s was largely between the constitutionalist faction, who favored using constitutional mechanisms to gain concessions, and Gandhi and the confrontationalists, who wanted to agitate in the streets against the British.

- The British also said that if they were to devolve power significantly, India would simply become an oligarchy. The British claimed that Congress members—all English-educated—would care more for their own pockets and power than the well-being of the people. In a fit of self-congratulating pique, the British argued that they were more neutral toward Indians and better rulers and administrators.
- Nationalist unity melted away when the British rejected Motilal Nehru's report. The division was so large that a smaller group of ardent constitutionalists, led by Motilal Nehru and calling themselves the Swaraj Party, left the Indian National Congress.
- These divisions continued until 1929. Congress was internally divided over whether to aim for complete independence or dominion status within the British Empire. At their annual session in 1929, the Congress voted for complete independence, chucking the constitutionalist approach out the window.
- By adopting a more confrontationalist approach, the Congress aimed to prevent the Raj from exploiting a division within their own party. They would speak more firmly, with one voice, and hence as a nation.

Suggested Reading

Chandavarkar, *Imperial Power and Popular Politics*.

Low, *The Congress and the Raj*.

Sarkar, "The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism."

Siddiqi, *Agrarian Unrest in North India*.

Questions to Consider

1. Was the noncooperation movement a success or failure?
2. How did noncooperation affect the cohesiveness of Indian nationalism?



Lecture 19

Indian Muslim Politics between the Wars

In this lecture, you will examine the effects of World War I on Indian Muslim politics. In the process, you will see how Indian Muslim identity—largely due to the pressures of an Indian nationalism led by Hindus—began to shift. The events of this period are what ultimately generated support for a vaguely identified idea of a country called Pakistan.

Indian Muslim Identity after World War I

- The two components of Indian Muslim identity—being Muslim and being Indian—have historically never been in conflict with each other. While all Muslims loosely hold to the concept of *hakimiyet*, or the ultimate sovereignty of God over the world, the reality of territorial loyalty has always been there. But these two components started to come into some tension with each other under colonial rule. In particular, Indian Muslims' wider worldview started to change in the 20th century.
- The rise of European imperialism had a net effect of increasing many Muslims' global consciousness. The French had conquered most of North Africa. The Dutch had colonized most of Southeast Asia. The Russians had taken most of central Asia. And the British had claimed Egypt and the remnants of the Mughal Empire. The Ottoman Empire also was

losing ground—territorially and in influence—to encroaching European nations.

- Most Muslims had largely made themselves amenable to British rule and saw no conflict between being Muslim and being a subject of the British Empire, even if it was ruled by nominal Christians. But during the First World War, this all changed. Broader trends outside of India in the Middle East and Europe galvanized Indian Muslim opinion, because these events bore directly upon Indian Muslim self-conceptions of their identity.

The Khilafat Movement

- The Khilafat movement, which lasted from 1916–1924, was effectively a lobbying effort on behalf of Indian Muslims to pressure Britain not to dismantle the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Indian Muslims were largely concerned with the safety of the holy cities Mecca and Medina.
- Indian Muslims had lost a lot under colonial rule, and many older elites and landowners felt they simply weren't getting enough out of the British. So when the British forced Indian Muslims—both nominally and with the soldiers in the Indian army—to pit themselves against the spiritual leader of their religion, they decided to mobilize.
- Needing help in their efforts, the Muslim League and others in the Indian Muslim leadership turned to the Indian National Congress. In the 1916 Lucknow Pact, the Congress agreed to support the League in pressuring the British not to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, presenting a united Indian front.
- Conversely, when the Indian National Congress launched the noncooperation movement in 1920, the Muslim League cooperated and coordinated with the party. In fact, Gandhi himself was propelled to leadership in the Congress with the help of pro-Khilafat Muslim politicians.

- The idea was that the British would have to take Muslim and Hindu unity seriously. They would be unable to dismiss Indian agitators as divided by religion, which they had done for generations.
- The Khilafat movement was led by two Indian Muslim brothers, Shaukat and Muhammad Ali. They traveled to Palestine, Turkey, and Arabia to whip up support for their cause. They wanted to remind fellow Muslims that Indian Muslims supported them in their war, as they saw it, against the British and Christian Europe.
- One effect of the Indian National Congress's pact with the Muslim League was to radicalize the more Hindu nationalist segments of support within the party. This in turn bred a reaction from certain Muslim clerics and leaders. Some implored Muslims to distance themselves from Hindus and to refrain from engaging in Hindu customs, celebrations, and goodwill.
- In 1920, with Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire defeated, the Turks signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the major Allied powers: the United States, Britain, and France. This led to an Allied occupation of Istanbul and a general agreement to partition the Ottoman Empire. For the Khilafat supporters, this was seen as evidence of the designs of Europeans and as a threat to the caliphate—and thus to part of Indian Muslim identity.
- The Khilafat movement didn't have everyone on board, however. Crucially, Deobandi clerics believed that so long as British didn't interfere with the religious freedom of Indian Muslims, questions of the caliphate were irrelevant.

The Khilafat movement, which lasted from 1916–1924, was effectively a lobbying effort on behalf of Indian Muslims to pressure Britain not to dismantle the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

- There was also a great deal of irony in in the Khilafat cause: Punjabi Muslim troops had helped the British defeat the Ottoman Empire, and Bedouin Arabs from Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan had been more than happy give the Turks the boot.
- In 1922, the British decided to try to keep the Ottoman Empire intact. Two years later, however, the Turks dissolved the caliphate themselves. At this point, the Khilafat movement rapidly faded away, although some refused to give up the cause, believing that the new states of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were created by Europe to divide the Muslim Middle East.
- One result of the end of the Khilafat movement was the accentuation of religious political rivalry in India politics. As



Indian Muslims paid less attention to Middle Eastern affairs, they had to focus more on real and pressing Hindu-Muslim political rivalries in key provinces such as Bengal, Punjab, and Sindh.

Pakistan

- Hindus were 80–85 percent of the entire Indian population, and Indian Muslim leaders feared the power of the Hindu supermajority. The rise of a more publicly assertive Hinduism—through the patronage of newly moneyed merchant families in temples and in cities such as Haridwar, Allahabad, and Benares—had a real impact.
- This got some Indian Muslims—those who thought in national and not provincial terms—wondering about their own future. Many Indians figured that they would get freedom from the British; the only questions were when and on what terms.
- An Indian Muslim student from Punjab, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, was worried about the possible fate of India’s Muslims if India were to be given independence. With such numbers, Hindus as a majority could easily run roughshod over the concerns of Indian Muslims and possibly exclude them from power.
- One day in the early 1930s, Ali was strolling the foggy court of Trinity College in Cambridge and came up with the idea of a homeland called Pakistan. This was a vague, undefined idea. In January 1933, he wrote a treatise entitled *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish Forever?* It read as follows:

At this solemn hour in the history of India, when British and Indian statesmen are laying the foundations of a Federal Constitution for that land, we address this appeal to you, in the name of our common heritage, on behalf of our thirty million Muslim brethren who live in PAKSTAN—by which we mean the five Northern units of India, Viz: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan

Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. And we ask for your sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and national annihilation.

- Ali went on to tap into the fear among many Indian Muslim nationalists: that Hindu nationalism—which saw India as inherently a Hindu country and nation—was a threat to Islam in India:

Our brave but voiceless nation is being sacrificed on the altar of Hindu Nationalism not only by the non-Muslims, but also, to their lasting shame, by our own so-called leaders with a reckless disregard of our protests and in utter contempt of the warnings of history.

- Ali issued a stark challenge to the Indian National Congress and to Gandhi, who claimed that India was indeed a nation rooted in an ancient, and still solid, civilization:

India, constituted as it is at the present moment, is not the name of one single country; nor the home of one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a State created by the British for the first time in history.

It includes peoples who have never previously formed part of the Indian nation at any period of its history, but who have, on the contrary, from the dawn of history till the advent of the British, possessed and retained distinct nationalities of their own.

- This was the first major, comprehensive political manifesto on the anxieties of Indian Muslim nationalism. It hit all the marks: anxiety about numbers; the fears of Hindu majoritarianism; the

Muslim-held idea that India was not a nation but a collection of nationalities and regional cultures.

- But it was Ali's coining of the term "Pakistan" that was novel. Etymologically, "Pakistan" is a Persian word that means "land of the pure." But it also was a geographical acronym: *P* for Punjab, *A* for the Afghan or Northwestern Frontier Provinces, *K* for Kashmir, *S* for Sind, and *-stan* for the western province of Baluchistan. Notably, there was no mention of Bengal.
- Ali never described Pakistan it as a sovereign nation-state. The closest he came was to call it a "separate Muslim Federation." What many Muslim leaders envisioned was a looser federation with Muslim majority provinces coexisting with Hindu majority provinces.
- The broader significance of this idea was that it represented the culmination of Indian Muslim anxieties, which had been exacerbated by the Khilafat movement and the emergence of mass-populist nationalism led by the Indian National Congress.

Suggested Reading

Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*.

Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty*.

Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*.

Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*.

Questions to Consider

1. How were Indian Muslims affected by colonial rule and the First World War?
2. Why is it that Indian Muslim political leaders feared popular politics after 1920?



Lecture 20

The Civil Disobedience Campaign

The Civil Disobedience Campaign was the second round of nationalist agitation against the British Raj. In this lecture, you will examine the historical context behind the Civil Disobedience Campaign, the campaign's successes and failures, and the countermeasures used by the British to stunt nationalist agitation.

Historical Context

- The ails of the interwar global economy hit India hard and formed the context for the emergence of a different type of agitation against the Raj after 1930.
- The Raj supported Indian industry due to wartime necessities. Now that Indian industry had started to come into its own, the colonial government started to protect it. It set up tariffs and high duties to prevent British goods from replacing Indian goods. Industry in Bombay easily outperformed British industry in India.
- Once Indians had the means of mechanized production, production costs were drastically cheaper. This led to broader economic growth. Indian industry's share of its GDP increased by roughly 3 percent over the 1920s and 1930s, largely at the expense of British industry.

- But there was a flip side to this economic success and growth. Agriculture's share of the Indian economy declined steadily after 1920, and it was the sector of the economy that was hit hardest by the ravenous effects of the worldwide depression.
- Indian peasants had, since the mid-1850s, started to take loans from Indian creditors. This was mainly to grow cash crops that were in demand, such as jute, cotton, and indigo. Working through the structures of the Indo-British economic relationship, Indian merchants effectively put much of the Indian countryside into debt. Peasants' loans were subject to varying interest rates and the vagaries of global demand.
- During the 1920s, Indian credit started to flow into major cities from the Indian hinterland. Cities such as Bombay saw a massive influx of credit and new money. This was compounded by the effects of the First World War. Inflation and poverty and shortage hit the Indian peasantry hard.
- And even though the Raj pursued deflationary policies to offset the gains in wartime prices, prices remained high in India despite a worldwide fall in prices during the 1920s. It was Indian industry's need and protectionism by British policies that kept overall price levels high.
- This was compounded by the trend that agriculture's share of Indian GDP dropped dramatically. In fact, it fell by 68 percent between 1914 and 1947. This was a fundamental shift in the Indian economy.
- And between 1914 and 1947, Indian per-capita income remained stagnant. Its agricultural population increased markedly due to rising fertility rates. But the flipside was that with more mouths to feed, residually high prices, and a shrinking agricultural economy, agrarian poverty often led to agitation and anger, which Gandhi and the Congress would again capitalize on after 1930.

- When it came to the Raj's fiscal policy, developments worked both for and against India's interests. Before 1922, London had final say over how the Raj spent its money. But that year London ceded fiscal autonomy to Delhi. In theory, this was good. But there was constant tension between London and Delhi over the Indian budget.
- Naturally, London wanted more money spent on the Army and other "essential" functions. Delhi wanted a bit more for Indian interests, such as famine relief, education, and public health. But when push came to shove, India was ruled by British administrators and often deferred to London's priorities, especially with the specter of war arising again in the 1930s.
- But it was in the realm of monetary policy where the British made substantial economic gains from India. Unable to directly intervene in Indian spending, the British manipulated the rupee-pound-sterling exchange rate to extract wealth from India.
- India's economic condition was further compounded by the Raj's economic policies. In an era when Keynesian economics was in the ascendency, the Raj was decidedly neoclassical in its economic policies. It did not intervene in India's economy very often.
- The British in India were still wedded to liberal, laissez-faire economic policies. Where other countries such as France and the United States were intervening in their economies to save them, the Raj did very little in India.
- So through the 1920s and 1930s, the Indian countryside was defined by abject poverty. This was the period that the stereotypical association of India with poverty was created and impressed, with the aid of cinema news reels, upon the minds of millions of viewers in the West.

Successes and Failures

- The second round of nationalist mobilization against the British was called the Civil Disobedience Campaign, and it lasted from 1930–1935. While it used the same techniques of satyagraha and ahimsa, this time around it was focused more on the economic plight of India.
- Because India had been hit so hard by the interwar economy and global depression, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress shifted tactics. Several of the demands they made to then-Viceroy Lord Irwin were economic. Some of these included the abolition of salt tax, protection for the Indian textile industry, appreciation of the Indian rupee, and reservation of coastal shipping for Indian firms.
- The campaign involved boycotts of British goods and services, government jobs, schools, and institutions. The strategy stayed the same—either get concessions or get independence—but the tactics changed.
- In response to Gandhi's demands, the British neither budged nor blinked an eye. Their interwar economic problems were significant, and they greatly relied upon India to ameliorate them.
- This is when Gandhi decided to launch his famous Salt March. In March 1930, to protest the Raj's salt tax and monopoly, Gandhi marched from his ashram in Gujarat to Dandi on the Arabian Sea.

Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Indian countryside was defined by abject poverty. This was the period that the stereotypical association of India with poverty was created and impressed, with the aid of cinema news reels, upon the minds of millions of viewers in the West.

- The salt tax was the most regressive of taxes, and it was a major source of revenue for the Raj. But there were disagreements amongst members of the Congress; even himself admitted that salt was too eccentric for his fancy. Irwin said that he admired Gandhi's choice of salt, as it proved to have a unifying effect.
- On April 5, 1930, Gandhi and thousands of his followers reached Dandi. Speaking to the Raj and the world, he defiantly picked up handfuls of salt from the seashore, declaring that it was Indian salt from the Indian Ocean, and that it belonged to the people of India, no matter what tax laws the British made up.
- New media technologies helped the Congress amplify their message. Films made by journalists, coupled with old-fashioned reporting, made a spectacle for the world to see. The image of a humble, loincloth-wearing marcher with a walking cane challenging the might of the British Empire was electrifying.
- At first, the British were stunned and aloof. They thought that Gandhi was either mad or a pure genius. And either way, it was shocking. But in the end, they believed, it would amount to nothing.
- But Gandhi extended the boycott to liquor and foreign cloth. It was both a symbolic and fiscal choice: The foreign cloth was



Gandhi picking salt on the beach at the end of the Salt March

a symbol of India's economic subjection, while liquor taxes generated a substantial amount of revenue for the British Raj.

- The more effective episode was the Dharasana saltworks march. This peaceful protest in Gujarat was what really turned opinion against the British. Individual volunteers tried to march peacefully through the gate of the saltworks, only to be wacked over the heads by guards. A steady stream of white, the protesters kept marching, were bandaged up, then marched again.
- The impact of the Civil Disobedience Campaign abroad was marked. Journalists and cinema newsreels projected the Indian struggle into the forefront of global opinion. In the United States, the effect was electrifying.
- There was strong public support for Indian independence and sympathy with Gandhi and the Congress, partially out of a shared experience of being British colonies. And American public sympathy for India was eventually relayed by Franklin Roosevelt to Winston Churchill after 1939.
- The impact of the Civil Disobedience Campaign in India was solid. The campaign's no-tax and no-revenue mobilizations were successful. They gathered attention and proved that the Congress could mobilize the masses against the Raj. They were not perfect, however. The effort didn't achieve independence, and it was hard for the Congress to control the people they had mobilized.

British Countermeasures

- The British responded to the Civil Disobedience Campaign with the usual swarm of arrests. But the demographics of arrests changed: Most people arrested by the British were from the Indo-Gangetic Plain and heartland of northern India. Gandhi's new, economically focused campaign had agitated the peasants and cultivators of this region like never before.

- The success of the Civil Disobedience Campaign led the Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin, to call a truce with Gandhi in 1931. It was the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. If the Congress agreed to stop the campaign, the British would open the constitutional door for a devolution of power.
- When it came to the constitutional nuts and bolts of the pact, however, little was concretely defined. Gandhi set sail for a conference in London in 1931, but the trip turned out to be a failure: He only secured a truce and not a peace.
- Shortly after the conference, a conservative tide swept government. Winston Churchill and the Conservatives came to power in 1940, and they were disillusioned with what they called the “feeble liberalism” of Lord Irwin. Churchill argued that it was an error to enhance Gandhi’s status by treating him as an equal.
- Lord Willingdon succeeded Lord Irwin as Viceroy of India in 1931 and took a much harder attitude toward Gandhi and the Congress. In fact, Willingdon made a point of specifically repudiating Irwin’s promises of economic and political reform. India was a colony, and a colony that behaved seditiously should be treated accordingly.
- After Gandhi’s return to India, the Congress decided to resume the Civil Disobedience Campaign from below. This meant that popular pressure from peasants and the rural countryside moved Congress to act. The impoverished countryside, agitated by revenue demands and falling prices, made many angry and frustrated.
- In northern India, rural militancy became endemic. Now, instead of leading from

Lord Willingdon succeeded Lord Irwin as Viceroy of India in 1931 and took a much harder attitude toward Gandhi and the Congress.

above, the Congress was being led from below by the Indian peasant and rural masses.

- But the Congress was hesitant about openly siding with agitated peasants. Faced with the angry mobilizations of masses of tenant farmers and cultivators, if they thought the Congress was making things difficult, the zamindars might find more security in British protection. This was not what the Congress wanted to achieve.
- The British reacted with ferocity, arresting 150,000 people from 1932-1933. The Civil Disobedience Campaign was largely quashed by 1934. Many top congressmen and provincial leaders were in jail.
- As part of the usual British strategy to divide extremist and moderate nationalists, the British passed the 1935 Government of India Act. It was largely a response to the mass scale and reality of the Civil Disobedience Campaign.
- The drafting of the Act was done primarily by Parliament and British administrators. It was a significant constitutional moment in India's history. It did provide some limited progress and concessions toward Indian self-rule. It effectively extended the 1919 reforms and made them deeper. The overall franchise was expanded to 35 million voters, which made it the second-largest electorate in world.
- The Act set up the theoretical possibility of independence. It contained the possibility of a federated, independent India, if standards of "responsible government" were met and if India's princely states agreed to join. The princes were used as a constitutional counterweight to the Congress, because the British knew that the princes were fearful of nationalism, popular sovereignty, and elections.
- In 1937, provincial elections were held across British India. The Congress swept the polls, forming ministries in every

province but Punjab, Bengal, and Sindh. After the elections, the Congress could, with more legitimacy, call itself the voice of the nation.

Suggested Reading

Brown, *Gandhi and Civil Disobedience*.

Hunt, *The District Officer in India*.

Seal, "Imperialism and Nationalism in India."

Washbrook, "South Asia, the World System and World Capitalism."

Questions to Consider

1. How was India affected by the interwar global economic depression?
2. Did the Civil Disobedience Campaign succeed or fail?



Lecture 21

Britain and Its Empire in the 1940s

By 1939, Indian nationalism had achieved some success, but the British Raj was still firmly in control. Over the next six years, however, this all began to change. In this lecture, you will examine how the outbreak of World War II affected India, the Raj, and the Indian National Congress. You will also consider the impact of the war on the Indian economy and analyze the Quit India Movement, the last bout of popular mobilization against the Raj.

India in 1939

- By the hot monsoon months of 1939, the Indian nationalism that the Indian National Congress led had been internally split. The British, through the 1935 Government of India Act, had successfully split the more radical nationalists from the ones who wanted to use constitutional mechanisms to gain concessions from the British.
- The Indian National Congress learned a lot about governing during this time. This prepared them when they inherited power from the British in 1947, and it set India on a course of fairly stable democratic governance in the decades after independence.

- When Hitler's forces invaded Poland in August of 1939, India—still part of the British Empire—would be drawn into European events yet again.
- The British were as determined as ever to hold on to India and exploit it for its colonial status. When Winston Churchill was appointed Prime Minister in 1940, he famously stated that he had “not become the King's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”
- The Indian National Congress decided to offer support for the war effort on the condition that the British offer major political concession after the war, whether it was won or lost. This offer was rejected by the British. Delhi and London saw the threat of Hitler and war in Europe as too big. And while the Raj was bruised, India in their minds was still a British colony and should be treated as such.
- The Congress was furious. They thought that their sweeping win of the 1937 provincial elections had given them more centrality in the Raj's eyes. They believed that, even though they didn't control the portfolios of foreign policy and the army, the Congress—which ruled 8 out of 11 Indian provinces—should at least be consulted before major decisions.
- As a result, the Indian National Congress decided to protest the very constitutional concessions they'd won, resigning all the seats and ministries gained during the provincial elections. In response, the British took over these provincial ministries directly. The Congress had constitutionally protested, but had lost any real say in governing during the crucial wartime years.
- Once the British learned that Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were coordinating war efforts, the British modified the 1935 Act to permit direct British takeover of provincial administrations and, in shades of 1916, suspend civil liberties throughout India.



Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

- In the army, India saw an infusion of British and European troops at levels never seen in India's history. Even American soldiers were stationed in major cities after the United States entered the war at the end of 1941.

- While Britain was on top and would use India for the war effort, it was perhaps inevitable that the stain of another world war would weaken British rule. In hindsight, it was inevitable that Indian nationalism's successes so far, combined with Britain's wartime commitments, would force Britain come to terms with the tenuousness of its grip on India.

World War II and the Indian Economy

- India between 1939 and 1945 was a wartime command economy. The Raj interfered with the Indian macro and micro economy at an unprecedented level. India's resources were marshaled like never before. This made the cost of World War I to India look small.
- After 1939 the true nature of the colonial relationship became apparent: Britain's war needs were simply incompatible with the subsistence needs of the Indian people. This had tragic effects across India.
- The Raj racked up a massive wartime spending bill of around 4 billion rupees. Public expenditures, mostly on defense-related needs, such as uniforms, weaponry, foodstuffs, boomed. An inflated currency chasing a limited number of goods led to a massive inflation.



The British commander and Indian crew in World War II

- As in the First World War, the Indian peasantry footed the bill for Britain's imperial war efforts. There were shortages of food and basic goods, such as cooking oils, sugar, flour, and beans. The rural economy was hit particularly hard.
- Nowhere was this seen more tragically than in the Bengal famine of 1943, in which 3.5 million people perished from famine and starvation. This not just a matter of crop failure or some vagary in the monsoon, however; it was a completely manmade disaster.
- The 19th-century commercialization of Indian agriculture meant that India was now exporting grains abroad. Bengal had become a net importer of rice from Burma. But by 1943, Japan had conquered half of Burma, which displaced rice supplies to Bengal. The effects were compounded by wartime inflation and British negligence—the British blew up floating storages of grain in the Bay of Bengal, lest they fall into Japanese hands.
- The suffering of the poor during wartime was exacerbated by another factor: price controls. Those deemed essential for the war effort, such as administrators, civil service, Europeans, Indian soldiers, and the military, were all shielded from inflation through set prices and protection from the disruption of credit networks. They felt few of the economic effects of the war.
- Indian industry benefited immensely from the war. Indian industries centered around Bombay started to produce their own range of new industrial goods: aircraft, tanks, automobiles, and electrical goods. And during the war, the leaders of Indian industry started to talk to the Indian National Congress. Many of these industrialists suspected that growth might be better under the Congress than the British.

The Quit India Movement

- Partially in response to American pressure, Winston Churchill sent the Cripps Mission to India in March of 1942. Its aim was to

discuss further constitutional devolution and possible home rule after the war—with no guarantees. The Indian National Congress wanted guarantees, however. As a result, the talks failed.

- Britain refused to relinquish control of Indian defense, the army, foreign policy, and overall taxation. But the Congress insisted on having a share of control over these elements. It quickly became clear that the Cripps Mission was a dodge. Gandhi called it “a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank.”
- As a result of these failed talks and increasing Indian frustration with the British, a campaign called the Quit India Movement was drafted by Gandhi in August 1942. In this campaign, he did some things differently: Where the previous campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s saw the Congress trying to master their control of the masses, this time they gave that up. Gandhi let the masses reign. He encouraged widespread and local satyagraha to denounce war, and he even considered a resumption of mob violence.
- The Quit India Movement was the largest all-India uprising since 1857, and it quickly descended into violence. It turned revolutionary. The British lost control over parts of Bihar, eastern and northern India, Bengal, and areas outside of Bombay. Gandhi’s nuanced ideal of ahimsa had been jettisoned in the hope of getting the British out.
- The movement was quashed by the year’s end, with the British imprisoning hundreds of thousands of people. “Seditionists,” as the British called them, were jailed en masse. The British imprisoned so many people that they ran out of jail space. In some instances, in fact, they took truckloads of prisoners, blindfolded them, and dropped them off in the middle of the jungle.
- The Quit India Movement had mixed results. It was neither a British defeat nor did it gain concessions. And Indian nationalism diverged even more than it had previously.

But the movement did succeed in one way: It made plain the fact that Britain's hold on power rested increasingly on violence. It was here that the Raj's limits and futility were exposed. Even though he was in jail, Gandhi felt vindicated; his philosophical take on the nature of British rule had been proven correct.

Suggested Reading

Jalal and Bose, *Modern South Asia*.

Kamtekar, "A Different War Dance."

Potter, "Manpower Shortages and the End of Colonialism."

Tomlinson, "India and the British Empire, 1937-47."

Questions to Consider

1. How was India affected by the Second World War?
2. Was Britain destined to leave India before mid-1945?



Lecture 22

The Raj on Its Knees (1945–1947)

In this lecture, you will learn how India and Britain came to negotiate on nearly equal terms for Indian independence, even though the nature of that independence had not yet been fully defined. In particular, you will consider the state of the Raj after the World War II, the rise of the Muslim League, and the Hindu-Muslim communal violence that swept entire regions of India and shaped the British decision to leave.

The Raj after World War II


- In the years immediately following World War II, the British suppressed major Indian dissent in the armed forces. But beneath the surface, the question was not if but when the British would let go of India.
- British administrators in India knew that they could not carry on with the brutal repression required to suppress Indian dissent without looking like the enemy they had fought so hard to vanquish in World War II.
- The strains of war, the wartime economy, and simple fatigue had revealed irreparable cracks in the Raj. They exposed the fundamental contradiction between British interests and Indian needs. The 1943 Bengal famine was the most terrible example, but there were many others.

- Once the guns of World War II fell silent, demand for munitions, foodstuffs, and weaponry dropped. In many parts of India, this led to massive jumps in unemployment as a result of the drop in government spending.
- This was exacerbated by poor harvests in Bombay and Bengal, areas usually known for their rich and productive yields. The British Raj may have been powerful, but like so many rulers before them, they were humbled by the sublime power of the monsoon and its rains.
- These events generated agrarian unrest, the likes of which the British had never seen. The limited access to food supplies and staples created so much unrest—and the lot of peasants and sharecroppers was so horrible—that a British commission recommended that sharecroppers in Bengal retain 67 percent of their produce. Given the history of British tax demands, this would have been unthinkable a decade before.
- This uneasy state of affairs was made worse by militant student activism in Bengal, where communist-influenced students undertook campaigns to confront obdurate zamindars and launched violent mini-insurgencies against them. These students were animated by the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany and rise to global superpower status after 1945.
- All in all, the economic context of postwar India made the colony far less profitable to the British than it had ever been.

The Muslim League

- The most astonishing development in Indian politics between 1940 and 1947 was the rise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. It was in this brief period that the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, made a rapid ascent by cobbling other regional Muslim political parties together under Jinnah's command.

- The net result was that by 1946, Jinnah could, with some legitimacy, claim to be the sole spokesmen for India's Muslims. He could counter the Indian National Congress's claim that they spoke for the nation as a whole, including the Muslims of India.
- The rise of Jinnah and the Muslim League was significant not only for Islam in India and the future of independent Pakistan, but also for the endgame of the Raj.
- Until 1945, the Muslim League lacked real experience in governing, campaigning, and mobilizing. The League had stayed out of the Civil Disobedience Campaign and the Quit India Movement, and they had no real experience from the 1937 elections.
- Muhammad Ali Jinnah raised the stakes—not because he really believed that Islam was in danger, but because he was worried that the Indian National Congress was running roughshod over legitimate Indian Muslim concerns. He wondered what Indian Muslims' status would be once the British left the subcontinent.
- Jinnah was a Karachi-born Indian Muslim of Shia Ismaili descent. He was highly educated, elite, and trained as a lawyer. He was a recent arrival to the Indian political scene, however, with far less experience than Gandhi, Nehru, or Patel.
- Even though he was less experienced, Jinnah understood politics at the national level. He knew that the Muslim League needed to bargain for an Indian Muslim share in any future India's central assets, such as defense, foreign policy, and taxation. Otherwise, he reckoned, India's Muslims, being in the minority, would not have any guaranteed rights or protections.
- Jinnah was not a religious man. He rarely prayed, and Islamic norms and traditions meant very little to him. For example, he loved single-malt whiskey. He was a chain smoker. And he



Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) with Gandhi

wore only the finest, most expensive suits from London tailors on Savile Row.

- Jinnah's genius and ruthlessness was in his mobilization of millions of Muslims under the League's banner. He brought the Muslim League back from the brink of irrelevancy and led the formation of the first country in Muslim history formed exclusively on the basis of religion. Jinnah was an adroit, firm, and effective leader.
- But this success came at a major cost. In order to quickly consolidate power between 1940 and 1947, the League marginalized more representative elements in the party's

structure. The League's Working Committee, which made policy, was not elected; its members were appointed by Jinnah. This was different from the Indian National Congress, whose Working Committee members were elected.

- The Indian National Congress in general had more say in choosing its own leadership. In the Muslim League, the cult of leadership and the tendency to defer to strongman rule would hurt Pakistan after its formation in 1947.

Hindu-Muslim Communal Violence

- Relentless campaigning and mobilization by the Muslim League led to the emergence of Hindu-Muslim communal violence.
- One of the downsides of the 1935 Government of India Act, which granted greater self-rule to the Indian provinces in ministries such as health, education, and public works, was that it brought religious communal political blocs into greater contact and competition with each other.
- Violence between Hindus and Muslims began to erupt more frequently and with greater intensity in Bengal and Bihar. The violence started out as an economic conflict, but incidents were increasingly acquiring a communal flavor.
- In Punjab, when the demographically dominant Muslim provincial ministries came to power, they tried to cut away at the economic dominance of Hindus and give more protection to Muslim farmers on Sikh-owned lands. As in Bengal, these were economic contests—but they quickly pitted religious communities against each other.

The most astonishing development in Indian politics between 1940 and 1947 was the rise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.

- Hindu-Muslim communal violence took multiple forms. There were retaliatory campaigns of burnings in villages, firings of employees who happened to be of the opposite religion from their employers, Hindus refusing to lend money to Muslims, and Muslim farmers refusing to pay taxes to Hindu landlords, claiming that the money would go to “idol worshipping” festivals.
- There was little that the Raj could do about this. The simmering communal violence between Hindus and Muslims underscored just how tenuous Britain’s hold was. It said a lot about the eclipse of British power by the forces of popular politics, which were starting to spill into religious communal violence.

Suggested Reading

Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*.

Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*.

Moore, *Escape from Empire*.

Questions to Consider

1. How did Britain go from victor in World War II to being on its knees in India by mid-1946?
2. What is the explanation for the rapid rise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League at the national level?



Lecture 23

A Split India: Negotiating Independence

In the mid-1940s, some Indians' desire for independence turned into animosity toward brothers with whom they had lived for hundreds of years. This lecture examines the British decision to relinquish power in India, the ensuing constitutional negotiations involving the British, the Muslim League, and the Indian National Congress, and the partition of British India into two separate countries.

Relinquishing Power

- Britain gave up power in India due to a number of factors. First were the cumulative strains and challenges that Gandhi and Indian nationalist mobilization had achieved. They made the British look foolish and morally bankrupt. For this, Gandhi's brilliant moral and political philosophy should be given credit.
- Second, Britain's broader imperial resources were stretched and largely depleted after two wars and a global economic depression. To put it bluntly, Britain was almost bankrupt.
- Third was domestic British politics. British voters thanked Churchill and the Conservatives for their war efforts by kicking them out in July 1945, bringing the Labor Party to power. The Labor Party ran on a manifesto of ending imperialism—at

least in India—and cutting down Britain’s expensive overseas commitments.

- In June 1945, the British called the Simla Conference, which was an attempt to build upon the failed 1942 Cripps Mission. At the table were Gandhi, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the leadership of the Indian National Congress. Ironically, most of these participants had only recently been released from prison.
- At the conference, Viceroy Archibald Wavell proposed an executive council at the federal level composed entirely of Indians. It would represent, among others, low-caste Hindus and Muslims, addressing one of the Muslim League’s key demands.
- However, the whole conference was scuttled over the question that defined how the Muslim League and Congress related to each other: Who speaks for India’s Muslims?
- Jinnah stubbornly insisted that the Muslim League alone could appoint Muslim ministers, not the Congress. He famously claimed to be the “sole spokesman” for India’s Muslims—a clear refutation of Congress’s claim to speak for the nation.
- Jinnah pointed to the fact that the Congress had smaller a smaller proportion of Muslims in their party than there was in the general Indian population.
- Because the Muslim League largely sat on the sidelines after 1924 and did not participate in Congress-led agitations in 1930 and 1942, they were seen as slightly more loyal to the British. This allowed the British to exploit the division among Indian nationalists and end the talks.
- In a way, Jinnah cashed in on wartime loyalism. He acquired significant leverage among the British by showing that the League was not going to take to the streets to oppose the Raj.

Perspectives on a Sovereign India

- There were major differences between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress over what an independent Indian state would look like.
- Nehru and the high command of the Congress were students of history. They knew that for India to survive as a nation-state in the 20th century, it needed the strong state apparatus that the British had built up over 200 years. This meant the strong powers of central rule and an executive that could take over in provinces when law and order broke down. Allowing provinces to have too much self-government, Nehru thought, would be repeating the mistakes of 18th-century Mughal India all over again.
- The Muslim League's vision was different. The League wanted a less centralized state, and one which gave far more autonomy to the provinces. This was not about imposing Muslim rule in India, but about safeguarding Muslim political rights in regions where they felt that their majority entitled them to some degree of self-rule.
- The Muslim League's approach at this point did not come from a desire to have a separate nation-state. Rather, it aimed to secure political safeguards and rights for Indian Muslims within a broader Indian union.
- The 1935 Government of India Act had devolved significant political powers to elected Indian officials in provinces. This seemed positive, but it also introduced problems. For one, in places with roughly evenly mixed religious communities—such as Punjab and Bengal—it brought religious community blocs into greater conflict with each other.

The Cabinet Mission

- The 1946 Cabinet Mission was meant to probe the terms and finer points of transferring power to India. By now, it was not a

question of if the British would leave, but when and on what terms.

There were major differences between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress over what an independent Indian state would look like.

- The Cabinet Mission proposed a plan for an independent India involving a three-tiered federated arrangement. Both the Congress and the League agreed to the plan. It was a vague document and thus open to interpretation, and each party thought it meant something different.
- The League believed that the plan implied a separate “Pakistan” region within an Indian Federation, with a weakened central government. The Congress, by contrast, believed that the plan negated the very idea of Pakistan and of devolved regions within an Indian union. They thought that all of India would be inherited and the oneness of the state would remain intact.
- At the Constituent Assembly, which was the equivalent of a central government, talks between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress broke down again. The Congress pointed to their provincial election victories in 1937 and again in 1946, in which they had won 8 out of 11 provinces. To their minds, this was far more representative of India than the Muslim League’s claim to a single community. All of India needed to be considered and represented, they argued.
- When it came to the more specific matters of central government, there were further disagreements between the League and the Congress. For one, the Congress wanted to be able to control Indian defense, fiscal and monetary policy, and foreign relations. The Muslim League insisted that they would have to have a share of an all-Indian central government.
- It was in the context of these negotiations that Jinnah became frustrated. On August 16, 1946, he launched a day of “Direct

Action,” appealing to Muslims all over India to riot in the streets and demonstrate that their voice mattered.

- August 16–18 saw roughly 4,000 Hindus and Muslims killed and scores more injured in Calcutta. The British had virtually no control. When news of these killings got out, the violence spread across India.

Final Negotiations

- Britain understood that it could not possibly contain all this violence and carry out anything resembling effective government. The costs of maintaining British rule were now greater than the benefits of staying in India.
- The British wanted to leave India with the least possible harm done to British economic and strategic interests. Companies such as Dunlop and Lipton had major holdings in India, and there were of course the substantial military and naval assets in India and its coastal cities.
- On March 15, 1946, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that Britain would leave India by June 30, 1948. The British then sent Lord Mountbatten to the subcontinent as the designated last Viceroy of India. Mountbatten was brought in to speed up process with least harm done to British interests, and he was given full authority to negotiate and decide to whom sovereignty would be left.



Lord and Lady Mountbatten with Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah

- In June 1947, Mountbatten presented a partition plan to the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. Ominously dubbed “Plan Balkan” by those who saw it in its draft form, it envisioned an independent India and Muslim Pakistan.
- Neither the Congress nor the League wanted a partition. Gandhi was dead set against it, as was Jinnah. But Mountbatten pressed the plan. It was clear that the British wanted to leave quickly.
- Mountbatten claimed that the future of India awaited the “decision of the Indian people,” which for him meant that it had to be accepted by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. But Mountbatten had all but decreed partition.
- Most legislators and members of the Congress and the Muslim League rejected the plan. In fact, a majority of legislators in both Punjab and Bengal rejected the divvying up of their provinces. But many leaders were swayed by legislators and members in east Punjab and west Bengal, where communal violence was the worst.
- There were some last-minute attempts to salvage what had come to seem all but inevitable. The Muslim League and Bengali nationalist parties agreed to keep Bengal united yet independent. They didn’t want to tear up their province. Jinnah and Gandhi approved and accepted the plan, but Nehru and Patel did not.
- The forces of national politics were too strong for regional holdouts. Nehru and Patel believed that regional states needed to join either an all-India state or a separate India or Pakistan. Regional nationalism, they believed, would encourage other regions to seek independence, complicating the project of unified independent statehood.
- To top it all off, Mountbatten sped up Britain’s departure date from June 1948 to August 1947. All that remained was for the

British Parliament to approve the Indian Independence Act, which they did speedily.

- With events seemingly moving with or without them, the Congress grudgingly voted in favor of the partition plan. Two things became clear: that the British were leaving more quickly than anticipated, and that Jinnah and the Muslim League would not budge in their demands for protections for Indian Muslims. The Congress wanted a different vision for an independent India.
- At midnight on August 15, 1947, the Union Jack was lowered in New Delhi, the tricolor was raised, and India declared its independence to a sleeping world. One day earlier, Jinnah presided over the creation of the new state of Pakistan, where the green flag and crescent moon were raised to proclaim a homeland for India's Muslims.

Suggested Reading

Chatterji, *Bengal Divided*.

Hasan, *India's Partition*.

Jalal and Bose, *Modern South Asia*.

Moon, *Divide and Quit*.

Questions to Consider

1. What were the major differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, and why were these differences so significant in 1945?
2. Who was responsible for the partition of India: the Muslim League, the Indian National Congress, or the British?



Lecture 24

Reflections on Postcolonial India

Two generations have passed since India gained independence, and historians and political scientists are now in a better position to assess the impact of British colonial rule on the subcontinent. This lecture addresses the state of affairs in India since 1947, examining how India's colonial inheritance helped the country develop into a successful democracy and otherwise shaped the India of today.

Transfers of Power

- The transfers of power from Britain to independent India and Pakistan was complicated. Neither the Indian National Congress nor the Muslim League got what they wanted.
- This was very much the case with Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Pakistan. Jinnah was against the partition of India and Pakistan into separate countries in 1944 and in 1946. He only reluctantly accepted it when it was clear that the British were leaving and that the protection of Indian Muslims needed to be salvaged.
- The great irony is that the day after India got its freedom, the aura and exuberance of independence was soon overshadowed by the physical, human, and often violent results of partition.

- The scale of the partition of India was baffling if not surreal. Hundreds of thousands were killed crossing borders that were officially made public only two days after the partition went into effect. Historians have estimated that 2–3 million Indians—Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh—were killed as a result of partition, and another 15–20 million were displaced.
- Women were probably most affected by the violence. There was rape on unfathomable scales. When faced with violence and death, many communities had their women commit mass suicide lest they be “dishonored.”
- In the trains between India and Pakistan, refugees were targeted. Some made it to safety, but many didn’t. In some cases, carriages returned over the border filled with piles of corpses. Some even sent women back with sacks of lopped-off breasts.
- The reasons for Hindu-Muslim violence following the partition are somewhat hard to explain. Hindus and Muslims



A refugee special train during partition of India

didn't see each other as monolithic communities, but they knew that politicians had made decisions that affected them regardless of their consent. They were angry at the "others" political leaders' decisions, and their anger was transferred to the communities their leaders claimed to represent.

- During all of this violence, the British patted themselves on the back for having achieved what Viceroy Lord Mountbatten called the "greatest administrative operation in history." What had really taken place, however, was a willful neglect of duty at a moment when India was at its weakest.
- If there was a time when India might have been amenable to having the British stay on a bit longer—and indeed, if the British really wanted to fulfill any "duty" in ruling India—this would have been it. But Britain fled once the problem seemed out of control.

Views on Independence

- For the British, the events of 1947 were the fulfillment of a mission—even if they had exploited India to the hilt along the way—to provide India with self-government. In their eyes, 1947 vindicated their colonial rule: They had taught Indians enough about government that they were now ready to have their country back. In reality, of course, the British left India at its most vulnerable.
- For the Indian National Congress, 1947 symbolized the attainment of a long struggle for freedom from British rule. As Jawaharlal Nehru said the eve of independence, India and the Congress "had redeemed their pledge" to attain freedom. And India's record of success in democratic government over the next three decades was admirable. They were the legitimate heirs to the strong unitary state the British had built over 200 years.



- The events of 1947 also meant that the techniques used by Gandhi—ahimsa and satyagraha—had been vindicated. India had won freedom from the British without launching a major violent counterinsurgency, as was the case in other European colonies such as Algeria, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
- For Pakistanis, 1947 was an affirmation of the two-nation theory—that Hindus and Muslims, no matter how much Indian National Congress claimed that they were united—were, in fact, two separate nations and could never be in one state together.

- Pakistan itself was pointed to by some as a harbinger of a broader Muslim global revival. At the time, it was the world's largest Muslim country. The new country was also a vindication for Jinnah, at least to outsiders. Even though the term "Pakistan" had been only vaguely defined, it was powerful enough to exert a seductive pull upon Muslim political leaders.
- Pakistan also represented the internal division inherent within Indian Islam. Divided by region and geography, Pakistan's founding represented what looked like a victory of Islam over regional pettiness. Upon closer inspection, however, things were much more complicated.
- Of the over 100 million Indian Muslims in British India, 60 million ended up in Pakistan. But over 40 million remained in India for various reasons, including distance, historical dynamics, disagreements over the Islamic character of the new country, and the realities of regional Muslim identity. Indeed, one could view Pakistan's history since 1947 as one long contest sparked by the contradiction of Jinnah's achievement.

The Impact of Colonial Rule

- British colonial rule—first under the East India Company and then under the Raj—markedly changed Indian culture, religion, and society. Caste became a more hardened category. Religion also became a more cohesive identity. English became the lingua franca of India's elite, and the infrastructure of the railroads, law courts, telegraph, universities, and the state altered India in ways never before seen.
- Indian forces also played an important role in facilitating and deepening colonial rule. The merchant banking families of 18th-century India helped the East India Company establish its rule in regions such as Bengal, Awadh, and Mysore. Penmen from Hindustan helped the British justify their savage tax demands and fund the British Empire.

- Indians didn't passively accept everything that came with the Raj, however. From the very beginning of the 19th century, Indians displayed an admirable ability to counter and contest British policies and to fashion their own version of modernity and nationhood. By the 1930s and 1940s, the Indian people, mobilized by Indian nationalists and leaders, were forcing the Raj to react to events rather than direct them.
- Even though India was greatly affected by the Raj and the colonial relationship—tragically so, in some cases—India retained a solid core of its civilizational values, religious integrity, and cultural vibrancy and heritage. Indians ultimately used the better aspects of British rule and their colonial inheritance to their advantage.

Suggested Reading

Chatterji, *The Spoils of Partition*.

Das, *Mirrors of Violence*.

Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation*.

Jalal and Bose, *Modern South Asia*.

Questions to Consider

1. How much was India affected by the colonial experience of foreign rule?
2. What was the broader significance for South Asia of a divided India and Pakistan?

Bibliography

Ahmed, Rafiuddin. *The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Alam, Muzaffar. *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Alavi, Seema. *The Sepoys and the Company*. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Ali, M. Athar. "The Passing of an Empire: The Mughal Case." *Modern Asian Studies* 9, no. 3 (1975), 385-396.

Ali, Imran. *The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1940*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Aloysius, G. *Nationalism without a Nation in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Amin, Shahid. *Event, Metaphor, and Memory*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Amin, Sonia Nishat. *The World of Muslim Women in Colonial Bengal, 1876-1939*. Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1996.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1983.

Appadurai, Arjun. *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Arnold, David. *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

———. *Famine: Social Crises and Historical Change*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

———. *Science, Technology, and Medicine in Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Arnold, D., and R. Guha, eds. *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Bailey, F. G. *Caste and the Economic Frontier*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1957.

———. *Tribe, Caste and Nation*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1960.

Baker, Christopher J., and David Washbrook. *South India: Political Institutions and Political Change 1880–1940*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Ballhatchet, Kenneth. *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and Their Critics 1793–1905*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Banuri, Tariq. "Modernization and Its Discontents: A Cultural Perspective on Theories of Development." In *Dominating Knowledge*, edited by Frederique Apfel Marglin and Stephen Marglin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Barnett, Richard B. *North India between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British, 1720–1801*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Barrier, N. Gerald. *Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India 1907-1947*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1974.

Barrier, N., ed. *Roots of Communal Politics*. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1976.

———. *The Census in British India*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1981.

Basu, K., ed. *Agrarian Questions*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Baxi, Upendra. "Reflections on the Reservation Crisis in Gujarat." In *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia*, edited by Veena Das, 215-40. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Bayly, C. A. *Empire and Information: Political Intelligence and Social Communication in North India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830*. London: Longman, 1989.

———. *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

———. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

———. *The Origins of Nationality in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.

———. "The Pre-History of 'Communalism'?: Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860." *Modern Asian Studies* 19, no. 2 (1985): 177-203.

Bayly, Susan. *Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

———. *Saints, Goddesses, and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Bellenoit, Hayden. “Between *Qanungos* and Clerks: The Cultural and Service Worlds of Hindustan’s Pensmen, 1750–1900.” *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 4 (2014): 872–910.

———. “Education, Missionaries and the Indian Nation, c. 1880–1920.” In *Perspectives on the History of Education in India*, edited by P. Rao. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2013.

———. *Missionary Education and Empire in Late Colonial India, 1860–1920*. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007.

———. “Missionary Education, Religion and Knowledge in India, c. 1880–1915.” *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2007): 369–94.

———. “Paper, Pens and Power between Empires in North India, 1750–1850.” *South Asian History and Culture* 3, no. 3 (2012): 348–72.

Beteille, Andre. *Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Social Stratification in a Tanjore Village*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

Bhagavan, Manu. *Sovereign Spheres: Princes, Education and Empire in Colonial India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Bhargava, M. *State, Society and Ecology: Gorakhpur in Transition, 1750–1830*. Delhi: Manohar, 1999.

Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi, and Romila Thapar, eds. *Situating Indian History: For Sarvapalli Gopal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Bose, Sugata. *Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal since 1770*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Bose, Sugata, ed. *Credit Markets and the Agrarian Economy of Colonial India*. Delhi, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

———. *South Asia and World Capitalism*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Brass, Paul. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992.

———. *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

———. *The Politics of India since Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Breton, Roland J. L. *Atlas of the Languages and Ethnic Communities of South Asia*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Brimnes, N. *Constructing the Colonial Encounter: Right and Left Hand Castes in Early Colonial South India*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Broomfield, John H. *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi and Civil Disobedience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

———. *Gandhi's Rise to Power, Indian Politics 1915–1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

———. *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Breckenridge, Carol. *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

———. *Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890–1940*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Chandra, Bipan. *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of the Indian National Leadership, 1880–1905*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1966.

Chandavarkar, Raj. *Imperial Power and Popular Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

———. *The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Chatterji, Joya. *Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932–1947*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

———. *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947–1967*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Chatterjee, P., ed. *State and Politics in India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

———. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Chaturvedi, Vinayak, ed. *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial*. London: Verso, 2000.

Chaudhuri, K. N. *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Cohn, Bernard S. *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

———. *Colonialism and Its Form of Knowledge: The British in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Conlon, Frank. *A Caste in a Changing World: The Chitrapur Saraswat Brahmins 1700–1935*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.

Copland, Ian. *The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857–1930*. London: Orient Longman, 1982.

———. *The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917–1947*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Dalmia, Vasudha, ed. *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995.

Das, Veena, ed. *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Datla, Kavita. “A Worldly Vernacular: Urdu at Osmania University.” *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 5 (Sept. 2009): 1117–1148.

Davis, M. *Late Victorian Holocausts*. London: Verso, 2002.

Deol, Jeevan. “Sex, Social Critique and the Female Figure in Premodern Punjabi Poetry: Vāris Shāh’s ‘Hīr.’” *Modern Asian Studies* 36, no. 1 (Feb. 2002): 141–171.

Derrett, J. Duncan M. *Religion, Law and the State in India*. London: Faber & Faber, 1968.

Dewey, Clive. *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003.

———. “The End of the Imperialism of Free Trade: The Eclipse of the Lancashire Lobby and the Concession of Free Trade to India.” In *The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India*, edited by Clive Dewey and A. G. Hopkins, 35–67. London: Athlone Press, 1978.

Desai, A. R. *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*. Bombay: Asia Publishing Company, 1959.

Dirks, Nicholas B. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

———. *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Dirks, Nicholas B., ed. *Colonialism and Culture*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1992.

Dumont, Louis. *Religion, Politics and History in India*. Paris: Mouton, 1970.

Dutt, Romesh Chandra. *The Economic History of India*. 2 vols. London: K. Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1960.

Edney, Matthew. *Mapping an Empire*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Eisenstadt, S. N. *European Expansion and the Civilization of Modernity*. Leiden: University Press, 1978.

Engels, Dagmar. *Beyond Purdah?: Women in Bengal, 1890–1939*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Fisher, M., ed.. *The Politics of the British Annexation of India, 1757–1857*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Fisher, Michael. *Indirect Rule in India*. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Flood, Gavin. *An Introduction to Hinduism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Forbes, Geraldine. *Women in Modern India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Forster, E. M. *A Passage to India*. London: Edward Arnold, 1924.

Fox, Richard. *Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989.

———. *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

Frankel, Francine R. *India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Frankel, Francine, and M. S. A. Rao, eds. *Dominance and State Power in India: Decline of a Social Order*, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Freitag, Sandria B. *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, 1870-1940*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Freitag, Sandria B., ed. *Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance and Environment, 1800-1980*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Frykenberg, Robert Eric. *Guntur District, 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Frykenberg, Robert Eric, ed. *Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Gallagher, John. *Imperialism: The Gallagher and Robinson Controversy*. New York: New Viewpoints, 1986.

Gallagher, John, ed. *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870–1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Gandhi, M. K. *Hind Swaraj*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1938.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Ghosh, Durba. *Sex and the Family in the Making of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Gilmartin, David. *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Gordon, Stewart. *Marathas, Marauders, and State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India*. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994.

———. *The Marathas 1600–1818*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Goswami, Manu. *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Greenough, Paul R. *Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943–1944*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Grewal, J. S. *The Sikhs of the Punjab*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Guha, Ranajit. *A Rule of Property for Bengal*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.

———. *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Guha, Ranajit, ed. *Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982-1989.

Guha, Sumit, ed. *Growth, Stagnation, or Decline?: Agricultural Productivity in British India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Habib, Irfan. *The Agrarian System of Mughal India: 1556-1707*. Bombay and New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963.

———. *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire: Political and Economic Maps with Detailed Notes, Bibliography and Index*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982.

———. "Classifying Pre-Colonial India." In *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, edited by Harbans Mukhia, 44-53. London: Frank Cass, 1985.

———. *Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception*. New Delhi: Tulika, 1995.

Habib, Irfan, ed. *Confronting Colonialism: Resistance and Modernization under Haidar Ali & Tipu Sultan*. New Delhi: Tulika, 1999.

Habib, Irfan, and Tapan Raychaudhuri, eds. *The Cambridge Economic History of India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Hardiman, David. *The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi Assertion in Western India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

———. *Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of His Ideas*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Hardiman, D., ed. *Peasant Resistance in India, 1858-1914*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

———. *Feeding the Baniya: Peasants and Usurers in Western India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

———. *Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District, 1917-1934*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Hardy, Peter. *The Muslims of British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Hasan, Mushirul. *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985.

———. *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims from Independence to Ayodhya*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997.

———. *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1932*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1991.

Hasan, M., ed. *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Haynes, Douglas E. *Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India: The Shaping of a Public Culture in Surat City, 1852-1928*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Haynes, Douglas, ed. *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Hobsbawm, Eric J., and T. O. Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Hunt, Roland. *The District Officer in India*. London: Scolar Press, 1980.

Inden, Ronald. *Imagining India*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1990.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics*. London: Penguin, 1999.

Jalal, Ayesha. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

———. "Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of 'Communalism': Partition Historiography Revisited." *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 33, no. 1 (1996): 93-103.

———. "State-Building in the Post-War World: Britain's Colonial Legacy, American Futures and Pakistan." In *South Asia and World Capitalism*, edited by Sugata Bose. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

———. *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850*. London: Routledge, 2002.

———. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

———. *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Jalal, Ayesha and Sugata Bose. *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, and Political Economy*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Johnson, Gordon. *A Cultural Atlas of India*. New York: Facts on File Publishing, 1996.

Jones, Kenneth W. *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th-Century Punjab*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

———. *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Kamtekar, I. "A Different War Dance: State and Class in India, 1939–1945." *Past and Present* 176, no. 1 (2002): 187–221.

Kapila, Shruti. "Race Matters: Orientalism and Religion, 1770–1880." *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (May 2007): 471–513.

Kaviraj, Supdipta. "Imaginary Institution of Indian Society." In *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 7 (1994).

Kling, Blair B., and M. N. Pearson. *The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Domination*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1979.

Kolff, Dirk H. A. *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Kopf, David. "A Macrohistoriographical Essay on the Idea of East and West from Herodotus to Edward Said." *The Calcutta Historical Journal* 11, nos. 1–2 (1986–1987): 1–24.

———. *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 1773–1835*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

———. *The Brahma Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Kulke, H., ed. *The State in India, 1000–1700*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Kumar, Dharma, ed. *The Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume 2: c. 1750–c. 1970*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

———. *Colonialism, Property, and the State*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

———. *Land and Caste in South India: Agricultural Labour in the Madras Presidency During the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Kumar, Nita. *The Artisans of Banaras: Popular Culture and Identity, 1880–1986*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Lelyveld, David. *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Leonard, Karen. *The Kayasths of Hyderabad: The Social History of an Indian Caste*. Irvine, CA: University of California Press, 1978.

Lorenzen, David. "Who Invented Hinduism?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 4 (Oct. 1999): 630–59.

Low, D. A. *Eclipse of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

———. *Lion Rampart: Essays on the Study of British Imperialism*. London: Routledge, 1973.

Low, D. A., ed. *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

———. *The Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917–1947*. London: Oxford University Press, 1977.

———. *The Indian National Congress: Centenary Hindsight*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Ludden, David. *Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.

———. *Peasant History in South India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.

———. *An Agrarian History of South Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Ludden, D., ed. *Agricultural Production and Indian History*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Majeed, Javed. "James Mill's 'The History of British India' and Utilitarianism as a Rhetoric of Reform." *Modern Asian Studies* 24, no. 2 (1990): 209-24.

———. *Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's 'The History of British India and Orientalism.'* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Mani, Lata. *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Mann, Michael. *British Rule on Indian Soil: North India in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1999.

Mansergh, N. *India, the Transfer of Power, 1942-1947*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970-83.

Markovits, Claude. *Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Marshall, P. J. *Bengal: The British Bridgehead: Eastern India, 1740-1828*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

———. "Early British Imperialism in India." *Past and Present* 106 (1985): 164-68.

———. *East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Marshall, P. J., ed. "The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century." In *The European Understanding of India Series*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Maskiell, Michelle. "Gender, Kinship and Rural Work in Colonial Punjab." *Journal of Women's History* 2, no. 1 (1990).

———. *Women between Cultures: The Lives of Kinnaird College Alumnae in British India*. Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1984.

Mazumdar, R. *The Indian Army and the Making of the Punjab*. Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2011.

McAlpin, Michelle Burge. *Subject to Famine: Food Crisis and Economic Change in Western India, 1860-1920*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

McDonald, Ellen E. "City-Hinterland Relations and the Development of a Regional Elite in Nineteenth Century Bombay." *Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 4 (1974): 581-601.

McLane, John R. *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Menon, V. *The Transfer of Power in India*. Calcutta: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Metcalf, Barbara Daly. *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Metcalf, Barbara Daly, trans. *Perfecting Women: Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi's Bihishti Sewar*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Metcalf, Thomas. *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

———. *Ideologies of the Raj: The New Cambridge History of India*, vol. 3, no. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

———. *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

———. *Land, Landlords and the British Raj: Northern India in the Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

———. *Modern India: An Interpretive Anthology*. London: Macmillan, 1971.

———. *The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857–1870*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1990.

Minault, Gail. *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Minault, Gail, ed. *The Extended Family: Women and Political Participation in India and Pakistan*. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1981.

Mitter, Partha. *Much Maligned Monsters: History of European Reactions to Indian Art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Moon, Penderel. *Divide and Quit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Partition of India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Moore, R. J. *Churchill, Cripps, and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

———. *Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Mukherjee, Rudrangshu. *Awadh in Revolt*. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Nandy, Ashis. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Naoroji, Dadabhai. *Poverty and British Rule in India*. London: S. Sonnenschein, 1901.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. *The Discovery of India*. Calcutta: The Signet Press, 1946.

O'Hanlon, Rosalind. *Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low-Caste Protest in Western India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

———. "Issues of Widowhood: Gender and Resistance in Colonial Western India." In *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia*, edited by Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Oldenburg, Veena. *The Making of Colonial Lucknow 1856-1877*. Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Omissi, David. *The Sepoy and the Raj*. London: Palgrave, 1995.

Omvedt, Gail. *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994.

———. "Migration in Colonial India: The Articulation of Feudalism and Capitalism by the Colonial State." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 7, no. 2 (1980): 185-212.

Pandey, Gyanendra. *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-1934: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

———. *Remembering Partition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

———. *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today*. New Delhi: Viking by Penguin Books India, 1993.

———. *The Indian Nation in 1942*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi and Co., 1988.

Panikkar, K. M. *Asia and Western Dominance*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959–1969.

Parekh, B. *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999.

Pearson, M. N. *The Portuguese in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Pennington, Brian. *Was Hinduism Invented?: Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Philips, Cyril Henry, ed. *Historians of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Philips, Cyril Henry, and M. D. Wainwright. *Indian Society and the Beginnings of Modernization, c. 1830–1850*. London: SOAS, 1976.

Philips, Cyril Henry and Mary Doreen Wainwright, eds. *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935–1947*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970.

Potter, D. C. *India's Political Administrators*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

———. "Manpower Shortages and the End of Colonialism." *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1973): 47–73.

Powell, Avril. *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India*. Abingdon, UK: Psychology Press, 1993.

———. *Politics and Society in India*. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Prakash, Gyan. *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Prakash, Gyan, ed. *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

———. *The World of the Rural Labourer in Colonial India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Prakash, Om. *European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Ramusack, Barbara. *The Indian Princes and Their States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Rai, Mridu. *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004.

Rao, P. *Foundations of Tilak's Nationalism: Discrimination, Education and Hindutva*. Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2010.

Ray, R. *Change in Bengal Agrarian Society 1760-1850*. Delhi: Manohar, 1979.

Ray, R., ed. *Entrepreneurship and Industry in India, 1800-1947*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Richards, John. "Early Modern India and World History." *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (1997): 197-209.

———. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Richman, Paul, ed. *Many Ramayanas: The Diversity of a Narrative Tradition in South Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Robb, Peter. *Ancient Rights and Future Comfort: Bihar, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, and British Rule in India*. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1997.

Robb, Peter, ed. *Dalit Movements and the Meanings of Labour in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

———. *Meanings of Agriculture: Essays in South Asian History and Economics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

———. *Rural India: Land, Power and Society under British Rule*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992.

———. *Rural South Asia: Linkages, Change, and Development*. London: Curzon, 1983.

———. *The Concept of Race in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Robb, Peter, and David Arnold, eds. *Institutions and Ideologies*. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1993.

Robb, Peter, and David Taylor, eds. *Rule, Protest, Identity: Aspects of Modern South Asia*. London: Curzon, 1978.

Robb, Peter, Kaoru Sugihara, and Haruka Yanagisawa, eds. *Local Agrarian Societies in Colonial India: Japanese Perspectives*. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1996.

Robb, Peter, K. N. Chaudhuri, and Avril Powell, eds. *Society and Ideology: Essays in South Asian History*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Robinson, Francis. *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Rocher, Rosane. *Orientalism, Poetry, and the Millennium: The Checkered Life of Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, 1751-1830*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1983.

Rothermund, Dietmar. *An Economic History of India: From Pre-Colonial Times to 1986*. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

———. *India and the Great Depression, 1929-1939*. Delhi: Manohar, 1992.

Roy, T. *India in the World Economy: From Antiquity to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

———. *The Economic History of India, 1857-1947*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

———. *Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Rudolph, Lloyd. *Gandhi: The Traditional Roots of Charisma*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

Sarkar, Sumit. *A Critique of Colonial India*. Calcutta: Papyrus, 1985.

———. *An Exploration of the Ramakrishna Vivekananda Tradition*. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1993.

———. *Bibliographical Survey of Social Reform Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1975.

———. "The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism: Civil Disobedience and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (1930-1931)." *The Indian Historical Review* 3, no. 1 (July 1976).

———. *Modern India, 1885-1947*. Delhi: Macmillan, 1986.

———. *'Popular' Movements and Middle Class Leadership in Late Colonial India: Perspectives and Problems of a 'History from Below.'* Calcutta: Centre for Studies in Social Sciences by K.P. Bagchi, 1983.

———. *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal.* Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2011.

———. *Writing Social History.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Sarkar, Tanika. *Bengal, 1928-1934: The Politics of Protest.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

———. "Hindu Conjuality and Nationalism in Late Nineteenth Century Bengal." In *Indian Women: Myth and Reality*, edited by Jasodhar Bagchi. Calcutta: Sangam Books, 1995.

———. *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation.* London: Hurst & Co., 2001.

———. "The Hindu Wife and the Hindu Nation: Domesticity and Nationalism in Late 19th Century Bengal." *Studies in History* 8, no. 2 (1992): 213-36.

Savarkar, V. D. *Hindu-Pad-Padashahi or A Review of the Hindu Empire of Maharashtra.* New Delhi: Bharti Sahitya Sadan, 1971.

———. *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* Bombay: S.S. Savarkar, 1923.

Schwartzberg, Joseph E. *Historical Atlas of South Asia.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Seal, Anil. "Imperialism and Nationalism in India." *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3 (May 1973): 321-47.

———. *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Seeley, J. R. *The Expansion of England*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Sen, Amartya K. *Poverty and Famine: An Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Sen, Sudipta. *Empire of Free Trade*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

Sen, Surendranath. *Eighteen Fifty-Seven*. New Delhi: Government of India, 1958.

Siddiqi, A., ed. *Trade and Finance in Colonial India, 1750-1860*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Siddiqi, M. *Agrarian Unrest in North India: The United Provinces 1918-1922*. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978.

Singha, Radhika. *A Despotism of Law*. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Sinha, Mrinalini. *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995.

Sontheimer, Gunther-Dietz. *Pastoral Deities in Western India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Sopler, David E., ed. *An Exploration of India: Geographical Perspectives on Society and Culture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980.

Spate, O. H. K., and A. T. A. Learmonth. *India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography*. London: Methuen, 1967.

Spear, Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India, 1740-1975*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

———. *Twilight of the Mughals*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

Stein, Burton. *A History of India*. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

———. *Vijayanagara*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Stein, B., ed. *The Making of Agrarian Policy in British India, 1770–1900*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Stokes, Eric. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959.

———. *The Peasant Armed*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Subrahmanyam, S., ed. *Money and the Market in India, 1100–1700*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

———. *The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India, 1500–1650*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Tagore, Rabindranath. *The Home and the World*. London: Penguin Books, 1985.

Talbot, Ian. "Muslim Political Mobilization in Rural Punjab, 1937–46." In *Rural India: Land, Power and Society under British Rule*, edited by Peter Robb. London: Curzon, 1993.

———. *Pakistan: A Modern History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

———. *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937–1947*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988.

———. *Punjab and the Raj, 1849–1947*. Riverdale, MD: Riverdale, 1988.

Thorner, Daniel. *Investment in Empire: British Railway and Steam Shipping Enterprise in India, 1825-1849*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950.

Timberg, Thomas. *The Marwaris: From Traders to Industrialists*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1978.

Tinker, Hugh. *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830-1920*. London: Institute of Race Relations, 1974.

———. *Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950*. London: Hurst & Co., 1976.

Tomlinson, B. R. "India and the British Empire, 1935-47." *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 13 (1976).

———. *The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. *The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics of Decolonization*. London: MacMillan, 1979.

Trautmann, Thomas. *Aryans and British India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

———. *India: Brief History of a Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Travers, Robert. *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Viswanathan, Gauri. *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

van Schendel, Willem. *Rural Labourers in Bengal, 1880-1980*. Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 1984.

Washbrook, David A. "Law, State, and Society in Colonial India." *Modern Asian Studies* 15 (1981).

———. "Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History, c. 1720–1860." *Modern Asian Studies* 22 (1988): 57–96.

———. "South Asia, the World System, and World Capitalism." *Modern Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (Aug. 1990): 479–508.

———. *The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency, 1870–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Wink, Andre. *Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-Century Maratha Swarajya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Whitcombe, Elizabeth. *Agrarian Conditions in Northern India: The United Provinces under British Rule, 1860–1900*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

Wolpert, Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

———. *Tilak and Gokhale*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Wood, Conrad. *The Moplah Rebellion and Its Genesis*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1987.

Yang, Anand. *Bazaar India: Markets, Society, and the Colonial State in Bihar*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

———. *The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793–1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Zastoupil, L., ed. *J.S. Mill's Encounter with India*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

———. *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy, 1781-1843*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Image Credits

- Page 4: © The Teaching Company Collection.
- Page 7: © dinozaver/iStock/Thinkstock.
- Page 16: © The Teaching Company Collection.
- Page 18: © Jungpionier/Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain.
- Page 26: © PHOTOS.com/Thinkstock.
- Page 32: © National Potrait Gallery/Wikimedia Commons/
Public Domain.
- Page 35: © GeorgiosArt/iStock/Thinkstock.
- Page 41: © The British Library.
- Page 43: © PHOTOS.com/Thinkstock.
- Page 55: © Victoria and Albert Museum, London/
Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain.
- Page 59: © The British Library.
- Page 63: © PHOTOS.com/Thinkstock.
- Page 66: © Victoria and Albert Museum, London/
Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain.
- Page 71: © PHOTOS.com/Thinkstock.
- Page 78: © The Teaching Company Collection.
- Page 87: © Belur Math, Calcutta/Wikimedia Commons/
CC BY-SA 3.0.
- Page 89: © yogesh_more/iStock/Thinkstock.
- Page 94: © Ibrakovic/iStock/Thinkstock.
- Page 99: © National Potrait Gallery/Wikimedia Commons/
Public Domain.
- Page 108: © The Teaching Company Collection.
- Page 113: © Ingram Publishing/Thinkstock.

Page 122: © Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
LC-DIG-ggbain-23521.

Page 129: © GBlakeley/iStock/Thinkstock.

Page 130: © Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
LC-DIG-ggbain-17578.

Page 139: © mcmorabad/iStock/Thinkstock.

Page 142: © Jigar Brahmhatt/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 3.0.

Page 156: © The Teaching Company Collection.

Page 164: © Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain.

Page 171: © Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
LC-USW33-019093-C."

Page 172: © Imperial War Museums/Wikimedia Commons/
Public Domain.

Page 179: © Imperial War Museums/Wikimedia Commons/
Public Domain.

Page 186: © Imperial War Museums/Wikimedia Commons/
Public Domain.

Page 190: © Photo Division, Government of India/Wikimedia
Commons/Public Domain.

Page 192: © The Teaching Company Collection.