NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

EAST AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE: SHAPING ETHIOPIAN PEACE FORCE FOR BETTER PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

by

Haile Araya Amdemichael

December 2006

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons
Second Reader: Nancy C. Roberts

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY ***(Leave blank)***	**2. REPORT DATE** December 2006	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace Force for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations			**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**
6. AUTHOR Haile Araya Amdemichael			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			**10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE** A

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Ethiopia, being one of the force-contributing countries to the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and given its, resources, strategic location, and its military's long history, will have a significant role to play in creating a stable environment in the sub-region. This thesis analyzes the Organization of African Union/African Union (OAU/AU) efforts after the Cold War to restore security and ensure stability in the region and outlines the process of creating African Standby Forces (ASF) as sub-regional arrangements to bring stability and peace by preventing crises or responding to crises whenever they arise in the region. To fulfill such missions East African states have agreed to form the EASBRIG with each state contributing forces.

This thesis also analyzes Ethiopia's past and current participation in peace operations (from 1951 in Korea to ongoing missions in Liberia and Burundi) and argues that though Ethiopia's participation in peace operations is commendable, many things could yet be improved and corrective measures need to be taken to better prepare for mission execution in regional and sub-regional crisis response efforts. There is work yet to be done on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in particular. How to better organize Ethiopia's Peace Force and increase their efficiency and effectiveness for future peace operations is a main goal of this thesis.

14. SUBJECT TERMS OAU/AU, African Standby Forces, EASBRIG, Ethiopian peacekeeping practice, peacekeeping training, peace support operations, sub-regional peace forces			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 117
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

EAST AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE: SHAPING ETHIOPIAN PEACE FORCE FOR BETTER PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

Haile Araya Amdemichael
Colonel, Ethiopian Army
Master of Military Science (With Honors), Military Artillery Academy
named after M .I. Kalinin, Leningrad, (Former USSR), 1987

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2006

Author: Haile Araya Amdemichael

Approved by: Anna J. Simons
Thesis Advisor

Nancy C. Roberts
Second Reader

Dr. Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Ethiopia, being one of the force-contributing countries to the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and given its, resources, strategic location, and its military's long history, will have a significant role to play in creating a stable environment in the sub-region. This thesis analyzes the Organization of African Union/African Union (OAU/AU) efforts after the Cold War to restore security and ensure stability in the region and outlines the process of creating African Standby Forces (ASF) as sub-regional arrangements to bring stability and peace by preventing crises or responding to crises whenever they arise in the region. To fulfill such missions East African states have agreed to form the EASBRIG with each state contributing forces.

This thesis also analyzes Ethiopia's past and current participation in peace operations (from 1951 in Korea to ongoing missions in Liberia and Burundi) and argues that though Ethiopia's participation in peace operations is commendable, many things could yet be improved and corrective measures need to be taken to better prepare for mission execution in regional and sub-regional crisis response efforts. There is work yet to be done on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in particular. How to better organize Ethiopia's Peace Force and increase their efficiency and effectiveness for future peace operations is a main goal of this thesis.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ALF	Africa Leadership Forum
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
ASF	African Standby Forces
AU	African Unity
CSSDCA	South African Development Cooperation Conference
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EACDS	East African Chiefs of Defense Staffs
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
EDF	Ethiopian Defense Forces
EPLF	Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
HQ	Head Quarters
IDADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JMC	Joint Military Commission (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
Lt. Col	Lieutenant Colonel
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
MIL OBs	Military Observers
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group (Rwanda)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLMEE	OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMIB	International Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC	OAU Missions in Comoros
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OP	Observation Post
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PLANELM	Planning Element
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSTS	Peace Support Training Center
ROK	The Republic of Korea
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	South African Development Cooperation Conference
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade
SOP	Standard Operational Procedures
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TOEs	Tables of Organization and Equipment
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America
UNAMIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Liberia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNCK	United Nations Command Korea
UNISOM II	United Nations Mission in Somalia
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the process of formulating, researching, and writing this thesis there are several people who need special thanks.

First is of course my thesis advisor, Professor Anna Simons for her guidance, encouragement, and most of all patience during this research effort. Next is my second reader, Professor Nancy Roberts, for giving me comments and constructive advice in finalizing the thesis.

Special thanks go to Mr. Kert Hultgren who dedicated his time and provided me with continuous support in editing the first draft of this thesis.

In addition, I would also to express my appreciation to the individuals who provided the needed information and support throughout the research and writing process.

Finally I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. government, especially the Naval Postgraduate School, for giving me this fabulous opportunity to realize my dreams in continuing and developing my military education.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on Africa, which led the Organization of African Union (OAU) to increase its efforts to prevent conflict and respond to crises on the continent. Violence and instability have dominated the political and security scene on the continent of Africa for many years.

After the crises in Rwanda and in Somalia in 1993–1994, crisis response by African nations became a burning issue. The rise of conflict in the region raised the question of how the sub-region could better keep the peace. In an effort to restore security and ensure stability in the region, the African Union (AU) member states moved aggressively to find ways to prevent crises before they happened and to manage and respond once they arose. African countries have come to an agreement that the sub-regional crisis response mechanism should be reinforced by the creation of African Standby Forces (ASF). Accordingly, African countries came to a common understanding that if the ASF was up and running it could possibly strengthen or replace existing United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in various trouble spots in Africa. The AU authorized the creation of the ASF in 2002. The aim of the creation of this force was not only to support peace missions, but also to intervene militarily to prevent conflicts from escalating. Any decision to intervene has to be approved by the AU's General Assembly. All African nations that comprise the AU are expected to take steps to establish their own standby military contingents for participation in peacekeeping missions to be authorized by the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

Following this decision of the AU, eleven East African states came to an agreement to form the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) with each state contributing forces. The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) took the lead in organizing this effort. However, IGAD lacked the command and control structures necessary to provide technical and political coordination. While IGAD successfully organized the formation and operationalization of the Brigade, it recently decided that an independent EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism should replace it. Now

it is up to the troop-contributing countries to do their parts by preparing their contingents for the fulfillment of the Brigade's mission, which is to bring stability and peace by preventing crises or responding to crises whenever they arise in the sub-region. Ethiopia, being one of the force contributing countries, has been elected to host the Headquarters (HQ) of the Brigade with responsibility for assigning the Brigade Commander from the Ethiopian Defense Forces. This means that Ethiopia will have a significant role to play in creating a stable environment in the sub-region by contributing troops and the commander to the EASBRIG.

Ethiopia has always been at the forefront of the countries that positively and immediately respond to calls by the UN for troop contributions ever since the UN's formation. Since 1951, Ethiopia has participated in five UN peace missions. Ethiopia's contribution to the crisis response effort of the region and the sub-region is thus historically secure. The question is how Ethiopia's Peace Force should be organized in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness for future peace operations. Finding relevant answers is the goal of this thesis.

B. RELEVANCE

Ethiopia is the only country in Africa that has never been colonized. Ethiopia was among the very few African states to be a founding member of the League of Nations. Ethiopia's contribution to the liberation of African states and the foundation of the OAU clearly indicates its devotion to the development of Africa. Beyond this, Ethiopia has a long history in peace operations since the creation of the UN. Ethiopia, being one of the founding states of the UN, rendered its support to repel invaders in Korea (1951–1953) and in Congo from 1961 to 1964 under the concept of collective security. In addition, Ethiopia participated in Rwanda peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and is still participating in efforts in Burundi and Liberia.

However, given Ethiopia's resources, strategic location, and its military's long history, one could say that Ethiopia has much more yet to contribute. The author believes that for these reasons, among others, Ethiopia's participation in peace operations in the sub-region, region, and under UN auspices elsewhere should be intensified. However, in order to make a noticeable contribution to multinational peace operations, Ethiopia must also restructure and reorganize its Peace Force.

Ethiopia, being one of the force-contributing countries to the EASBRIG, is expected to play a significant role in the realization of the Brigade's mission. In order to play a meaningful role in sub-regional crisis responses, Ethiopian peace troops should be well organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to participate in missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. Thus, preparing a competent Peace Force in Ethiopia is crucial.

Though Ethiopia's past and current participation in peace operations is commendable, many things could be improved and corrective measures need to be taken for still better mission execution. Because it is likely Ethiopian participation in future regional and sub-regional peacekeeping operations (PKO) will significantly increase, this thesis argues for preparation that is more intensive. The author also argues that there should be an independent and responsible office in place to ensure a planned system for training, deployment, and command and control.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Questions addressed in this thesis are:

a. What were the driving factors for the OAU/AU to create ASF?

b. What are the measures being taken to form and use the sub-regional Peace Force?

c. How have sub-regional peacekeeping forces been used in the region?

d. What are some of the lessons learned by African peacekeeping missions for EASBRIG?

e. How might one expect EASBRIG to be deployed in the future?

   1. What kind of force structure will or should it have?
   2. What kind of training and preparation does this demand?
   3. What kind of command and control is needed?
   4. What may be the future major challenges for EASBRIG?

f. What are the past and present practices of the Ethiopian Peace Force?

g. What are the current strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis peacekeeping of the Ethiopian Peace Force?

h. How might the strengths of the Ethiopian Peace Force be maximized and weaknesses overcome?

i. What is to be done to intensify Ethiopia's future participation in peace operations?

D. METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, the author combines historical and background analysis of regional and sub-regional crisis management and response, and explore Ethiopia's historic role in bringing peace and stability to the African continent and beyond. To gain first hand information, The author conducted interviews with Ethiopian soldiers and officers who participated in previous peace operations. He also reviewed primary and secondary materials in regards to Ethiopian peacekeeping practices, both past and present.

E. ORGANIZATION

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the background of OAU/AU efforts to find a solution to the recurrence of major crises in the region. This chapter also examines the fundamental factors that led the organization to establish sub-regional standby forces, as well as their achievements to date.

Chapter III analyzes the implementation of the AU's new sub-regional standby approach to crisis management and response, and IGAD's current role and activities in the creation of the East African Standby Brigade.

Chapter IV discusses Ethiopia's experiences in past and present peacekeeping missions. This chapter identifies Ethiopia's peacekeeping troops' strengths and major practices that should be kept and developed, and weaknesses that should be improved upon.

Chapter V reviews the past and present performance of Ethiopian peace missions. By discussing how strengths might be maximized and weaknesses overcome, the author offers suggestions about how one might better organize and prepare efficient Peace Forces that can be deployed for any peace operations, not only in the sub-region but throughout the region more generally and, when necessary, globally.

Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for the further improvement of Ethiopian Peace Force, with the aim of maximizing Ethiopia's contribution to sub-regional, regional, and global peace operations.

II. END OF COLD WAR: NEW APPROACH TO AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. BACKGROUND: THE OAU PRE–COLD WAR APPROACH TO CONFLICT IN AFRICA

> The OAU was caught in its perennial dilemma to promote peace in cases of civil war while at the same time condemning all secessionist movements and always supporting the government in power. These positions, although understandable, severely limited the peacemaking effectiveness of the OAU since its founding (Smock, 1993, pp. 8-9).

Since the early 1960s, in the beginning of the post-independence era, many wars have erupted in Africa. Some of them were interstate, but most were intrastate conflicts. The increase in ethnic and nationalist feelings was the major reason for many of these wars, especially those fought in the name of self-determination. Secessionist wars waged by one ethnic or national group for creation of a new state, in the interests of that group, represented the prevailing phenomenon in Africa. Though ethnicity has been one source of war, however, the other factor that intensifies the ethnic grievances has been bad governance. Bad governance typically restricts the participation of different ethnicities in the decision-making and power-sharing processes of the state. In Ethiopia, as well in the previous regimes, inadequate and unfair forms of resource allocation along ethnic lines proved to be major factors that led to protracted intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflict in Africa usually occurs because a party, group, tribe, or faction seeks to seize power through either a military coup or an insurgent movement. Most of the intrastate conflicts have been made possible thanks to the training, equipment, and sanctuary offered by other states, whether African or extra-African (Diouf, 1998).

The other cause of conflict in Africa has been the effect of the creation of colonial borders. This resulted in a division of many ethnicities being located in different countries. After liberation, some countries engaged in war with the desire to unite members of the same ethnic groups found in neighboring countries. “Africa has 103 examples of borders that divided ethnic groups, are the subject of dispute between neighboring states, or produce secessionist or irredentist conflict” (James Busumtwi-Sam,

1999, p. 260). One of these examples could be Somalia, which waged war against Ethiopia, claiming that the Ogaden Somalis were a part of Great Somalia.

The OAU, since its creation in 1964 to the early 1990s, had no definite mechanism by which to enable the organization to resolve conflicts within or between states.

> Since 1970, Africa has suffered more than thirty wars; most of these have had intrastate origins. A recent study has documented that from 1990 to 1997 sixteen wars took place in Africa. Fourteen were intrastate conflicts (Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara, and Zaire); only two were interstate (Chad/Libya and Rwanda/Uganda) (Rene, 2002, p. 1).

The organization's charter did not allow it to intervene before conflicts actually erupted and therefore no conflict prevention role was foreseen for the organization. Intervening or playing any role in intrastate conflicts was absolutely out of the question (Faria, 2004). The focus of the OAU was on respecting sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in their internal affairs, and respect for their territorial integrity. That was the reason the OAU, since its creation, showed reluctance to involve itself in civil wars. The principle of non-interference restricted the organization's involvement to situations where there was clear involvement of external military intervention. For example, the OAU remained silent for 30 years in regards to the internal conflict in Ethiopia between the central government and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) which started in 1961 and ended in 1991. This resulted in Eritrea gaining its independence and 17 years of guerrilla war for the overthrow of the Mengistu Government. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) accomplished this overthrow.

Many believed the OAU would be the ideal body to resolve Africa's conflicts. When the end of the Cold War caused the withdrawal of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and United States (U.S.), it became clearer to many African leaders that they should strengthen their concerted efforts in order to resolve continuous African problems. Pressure by the Western countries to do so also intensified this desire. Western countries exerted pressure, on the one hand, by promising and giving some incentives to

African states and, on the other hand, by warning the African states that there would not be substantive help unless they moved towards solving their problems themselves. This situation forced the African Heads of State to work together toward the peaceful and rapid resolution of conflicts.

A 1990 Declaration of the OAU Heads of State and Government recognized that the prevalence of conflicts in Africa was seriously obstructing their collective efforts to tackle the continent's economic problems.

B. AFRICA'S NEW POST–COLD WAR APPROACH TO CONFLICT PREVENTION MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

1. The Kampala Conference

The end of the Cold War had numerous effects on the political climate in Africa. The situation in the world in the 1990s renewed the hope for realizing peace and development in Africa. "It was in anticipation of these post–[Cold War] developments that the normative framework of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) was conceived by the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF)" (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. xiv), under the then retired President of the Republic of Nigeria, Olusengun Obasanjo, the founding chairman of the forum. This forum was held in Kampala, Uganda in May 1991. Noted at the time were the withdrawal of the superpowers from the continent, the efforts of countries towards democracy, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the wave of competitive elections that had been held in nearly thirty countries (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. 1). These events created strong optimism about the opportunity of Africans to solve their own problems. On the other hand, according to Deng and Zartman (2002) "the emergence of a new international system made Africans fears the consequences of the super–powers' abandonment and their increasing marginalization" (p. 109).

The Kampala Document specified the creation of CSSDCA proposals for principles and standards and for specific mechanisms. Though the Kampala Document was praised by many as a framework for a new beginning that would foster the security, stability, development and cooperation for the continent (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. xv), it raised several contentious issues in its efforts to institute a new normative

consensus. It threatened the power positions of a few governments that felt insecure due to domestic issues. One of the Kampala principles that focused on the security issue of Africa was Article 4 that stated:

> The interdependence of Africa states and the link between their security, stability, and development demand a common African agenda based on a unity of purpose and a collective political consensus derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other front without creating collectively a lasting solution to its problems of security and stability (Deng, and Zartman, 2002, p. 7).

After a year of study of the Kampala Document, the OAU Secretariat proposed an initiative on conflict management in 1992 at a summit in Dakar. The content of the document mainly focused on the anticipation of potential conflicts and their prevention. Proposals regarding mechanisms were essentially adopted by the OAU after a year of study at the Cairo Summit in 1993.

2. The Cairo Decision — Conflict Management, Prevention, and Response

Following the end of the Cold War in Africa, many conflicts came to an end. According to Ali and Matthews (1999), some of the highlights were the "peace accord of 1988 in Southwestern Africa [which] led to the independence of Namibia in 1990; agreement of 1991 [which] appeared to bring peace to Angola; another, signed in 1992, ended the war in Mozambique" (p. 257). The EPLF and the EPRDF likewise achieved success and brought the emergence of Africa's newest independent state (Eritrea) and the creation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, respectively.

However even as these peaceful developments appeared in Africa, "new conflicts were erupting, and older conflicts intensifying. In Liberia, in 1989, a civil war broke out that threatened to spill over into neighboring countries; in Rwanda, civil war began in 1990; and in 1992, a conflict that had been raging since 1982 in Somalia degenerated into a human disaster of unprecedented magnitude" (Ali and Matthews, 1999, p. 257).

In the 1990s, intrastate conflicts like these had a disastrous impact on stability and development in their sub-regions, coupled with the decreasing involvement of the international community. This continued to put pressure on African states to address these problems. "Moreover, there were more pressures from the international community

and African public opinion, [which] have pushed the OAU to engage more actively in conflict prevention and management in the region" (Faria, 2004).

During the OAU Summit held in Cairo in 1993, African Heads of States recognized that the presence of peace and stability was a necessary precondition for social and economic development. The assembly thus voted for the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). This resolution was not the result of immediate actions, however, since it was an issue that had been analyzed for three years. According to Juma and Aida (2002), a report submitted by the Africa program of the international peace academy to the Ford Foundation indicated that the mechanism of the resolution identified three aims: "first, to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars; second, to undertake peacemaking and peace building efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise; and third, to carry out peacemaking and peace building activities in post conflict situations." However, since the formation of this mechanism many obstacles, such as the limited resources of the OAU Peace Fund to control conflict management issues and the failure of member states to meet their financial obligations, hindered the effectiveness of the Mechanism from realizing its objective.

Despite these problems, the OAU Mechanism enabled intervention in matters that previously would have been considered to be purely "internal." "In its work, the OAU Conflict Management Center has used a range of preventive tools including applying political pressure, issuing regular statements, endorsing sanctions against military regimes and undertaking direct mediation between parties" (Juma and Aida, 2002, p. 23).

Consequently, foreign powers were also putting pressure on African leaders to speed up the realization of their conflict resolution mechanism. For example, during the November 1994 French-African Summit, President Mitterrand declared, "The time has come for Africans themselves to resolve their conflicts and organize their own security."[1]

[1] President Mitterrand, 1994. Speech in the French-African Summit.

When it came to implementing the OAU's mechanism and responding to the international community, it was expected that the OAU would deploy forces either to manage an existing conflict or would prevent tense situations from deteriorating into open warfare. With its limited capacity to mount full-scale peacekeeping operations in the first place, the OAU had to seriously consider organizing its peacekeeping forces. Such responsibility demanded creating and maintaining African troops available for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The solution seemed to be to lobby African countries to set aside peacekeeping forces for use in case of emergency. However, it was obvious that to enhance its capacity to prevent conflicts from arising and prevent them from escalating, as well as to resolve conflicts, the OAU needed to explore ways of working with other conflict management institutions within and beyond Africa.

C. ACRI — THE U.S. CAPACITY-BUILDING INITIATIVE FOR THE REALIZATION OF MCPMR

Given the awful situation in Rwanda and the withdrawal of UNISOM II (United Nations Mission in Somalia) in March 1995, which left Somalia to the warlords, the U.S. sought a new peacekeeping solution that made Africans responsible in resolving their problems. Following the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, the United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, expressed concern for African security in his November 1995 report entitled "Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa." In it, he suggested Africa "should seriously endeavor to develop and enhance its capacity to participate in the field of peacekeeping." In addition, African governments and armies were besieged with challenges due to a lack of experienced personnel, insufficient material resources, and slow deployment of troops. Consequently, Kofi Annan (1995) appealed to the international community "to help enhance the capacity of African peacekeepers." Consequently,

> mainly the U.S., Great Britain and France, unwilling to intervene in conflicts in Africa but aware of the problems there, have created program aims to support and develop African capabilities to deal with conflict situation. Although these programmes vary considerably, they all focus in one way or another on providing training, equipment, or financial assistance to African countries directly or through regional organizations (Faria, 2004).

In early 1997, the U.S. endorsed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). This was mainly a proposal to provide training for several African countries to create the capacity for peacekeeping that might be used in the future whenever a crisis would arise. The idea was to prepare a rapid deployment force in countries to enable them to respond to military crises in African countries before they reached catastrophic levels. The ACRI proposal revealed, on the one hand, that the U.S. tried to avoid contribution of forces directly to peacekeeping in Africa and, on the other hand, still wanted to maintain political influence and military linkages to African states.

The U.S. believed that "the most important element of any peacekeeping operation on the ground is trained and adequately equipped personnel" ("Conflict Trends," 2002). "Accordingly, the U.S. planned to prepare "eight to ten commonly trained equipped and interoperable African battalions (six hundred to eight hundred soldiers each) with four to six specialized companies for combat support/combat service support" (Kwiatkowski, 2000, p. 5). By mid-1997, seven countries had already committed themselves to be trained. Ethiopia also expressed its commitment to participate in the ACRI.

In the summer of 1998, an advanced group from the ACRI pilot team had come and conducted preliminary discussions with the Ethiopian Training Department in which the author participated. During this visit, they first observed the condition of Ethiopia's battalions to ensure that they met the minimum requirements. Then, since the author was the Head of the Military Training Main Section in the MOD Training Department, he participated in the planning and organizational meetings of the Ethiopian ACRI program. The ACRI advance team and the author, representing the Training Department, went to see the selected training center, namely the Hurso Military Training Center. After reconnaissance, the U.S. team found it an appropriate and adequate place for the training. Despite Ethiopia's willingness, however, the training for Ethiopia was delayed because of the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute, which erupted in May 1998.

"ACRI training emphasizes commonality of communications, basic soldiering skills, and specific military activities required in peacekeeping with the ultimate objective of helping African military units meet UN standards in peacekeeping and humanitarian

relief practices" (Rotberg, 2000, pp. 72–73). Although ACRI's plan was to train 12,000 African troops for peacekeeping over a five-year period when the program ended in 2002, 9,000 troops had been trained and three multinational exercises conducted in eight countries (Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda) (Faria, 2004).

ACRI was the first attempt to create African peacekeeping forces that could be readily available and deployed in case of a crisis. It should be noted that the U.S. initiative laid the groundwork for further analyzing the reorganizing and preparing of sub-regional peacekeeping forces to deploy under one command for the purpose of preventing and resolving conflicts. The ACRI program has made its own contribution and evolved into creation of a new African Standby Force.

When ACRI ended in 2002, the United States adopted a new program called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), which is still active. Its aim is to:

- Train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support and complex humanitarian requirements
- Build and enhance sustainable African peace support training capacity
- Build effective command and control
- Provide commonality and interoperability
- Enhance international, regional, and sub-regional peace support capacity in Africa (Faria, 2004).

D. AFRICAN UNION AND ITS VISION

1. The Birth of a New Vision on Conflict Resolutions in Africa

> The launching of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) at the OAU summit of July 2001 and the transformation of the OAU [into] the African Unity (AU) in July 2002 have further reinforced trends towards greater pan-African cooperation and commitment to address conflict-related issues on the continent and developing African capabilities to deal with them (Faria, 2004).

With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, conflict resolution and security have taken on an even higher priority. With these developments, external partners have become increasingly enthusiastic about readdressing Africa's problems. As William Nhara, coordinator of conflict prevention and research in the OAU's Division of Conflict

Management, noted, “Regional organizations should realize that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems, especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability” (Rotberg, 2000, p. 23). Many regard the emergence of an activist African Union with a modern, forward-looking agenda as one of the most important developments on the continent in decades. The need for a common African defense and security policy and the need for establishment of a single continental army were stressed during the Inaugural Summit of the AU held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. “Africa therefore continues to demonstrate eagerness in taking responsibility for its destiny, based on initiatives aimed at enabling its people to tackle their own problems following an African agenda, managed by Africans and designed to promote and foster the continent’s interest, with the active involvement of the international community” (Alusala, 2004).

At the same time, African leaders themselves emphasized the need to build up the continent's own peace capacities. These include not only the ability to organize standby forces to mount peacekeeping missions, but also to mediate political disputes before they erupt into war, broker peace talks in ongoing conflicts, and better coordinate support for countries just emerging from war (Harsch, 2003, p. 1). African states and organizations quite reasonably prefer that African forces, rather than non-African troops, be the first approach to conflict on the continent. The Constitutive Act of the AU in Article 4(d) points to the need for the establishment of a common defense policy for the African continent (Constitutive Act of AU, 2002). This reflects African leaders’ conviction that “in cases where political agreement and preparations for a UN Mission oftentimes involve months of delay, a deployment by peacekeeping forces from the African Union or other sub-regional organization is often the only response tool available” (Frazer, 2005).

2. African Standby Forces, Purpose, Structure, Mission Command and Control

Pursuant to the AU 2002 Inaugural Summit at which African Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Forces (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) were established. During the implementation phase of the AU decision, the AU defense chief

of staff held a meeting in May 2003 and developed plans for the creation of a permanent force under the Peace and Security Council by 2010. The establishment of an African Standby Force would have the capability of rapid deployment and be ready to intervene in situations of armed conflict or genocide to keep or enforce the peace. The ASF is to be organized in a two-phased implementation process: the first phase is aimed at developing the capacity to manage scenarios one to three by mid-2005, while the second phase is aimed at developing the capability to manage the remaining scenarios by 2010.[2] The model for the formation of standby forces was taken from the formation of the Multinational Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).[3] The ASF would be comprised of standby brigades in each of the five regions and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity (Kent and Malan, 2003).

ASF peace and security responsibilities are broad, with the force expected to serve multiple, diverse purposes. The Peace and Security Council Protocol provides that the ASF shall:

- Observe and monitor missions
- Conduct other types of peacekeeping missions
- Intervene in the affairs of a member state during grave circumstances or at its request to restore peace and security
- Conduct preventive deployment

---

[2] The proposed structure of the African Standby Force (ASF) is based on six conflict mission scenarios requiring a rapid response: Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, for example in Côte d'Ivoire. Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission, for example OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 3: Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission, for example AU mission in the Comoros (AMIC). Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment mission (and peace-building), for example AU mission in Burundi (AMIB). Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 5: AU PKF for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including those involving low-level spoilers. Deployment timeline for complete ASF deployment within 90 days with military component deployed within 30 days; Scenario 6: AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Deployment timeline of 14 days.

[3] Rotberg, Robert. I. 2000 *Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: method of conflict prevention.* Brookings Institution Press, p 87. The UN realized the importance of having the capability for rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces to avoid the time lapse between the decision of the Secretary Council to mandate an operation and the actual deployment of troops in the mission area. The inception of the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) was a result of recommendations by a study group in 1993. The system establishes standby forces able to be deployed, in whole or in part, anywhere in the world, at the Secretary General's request for UN duties as mandated by the Security Council. In December 1996, on Danish initiative, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden signed a letter of intent to establish such a brigade (Multinational Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)).

- Conduct peace-building operations, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization
- Provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of people in conflict and disaster areas
- Perform other functions the Peace and Security Council or the AU mandates (Neethling, 2005)

Only when a crisis has gone beyond the capacity of African institutions to respond should military intervention by the international community be considered.

With the development of this new capabilities, many say that "Africa will no longer simply be the source of troops but will be at the centre of determining the degree of success operationally, nurturing a culture of common approach to military professionalism in the long term" (Mtimkulu, 2005). Since it consists of multidisciplinary contingents, the ASF is envisioned to have civilian and military components stationed in their home countries and be ready for call-up and deployment, but they are organized, trained and exercised according to UN doctrine, guidelines, and standards in a synchronized and coherent fashion so that they will be ready to be deployed together when the appropriate authorization has been received (De Coning, 2005). However, the establishment of ASF represents but a step in the process. To deploy, manage, equip, and supply the sub-regional standby forces to achieve the desired result will demand intensive efforts from African leaders.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL PEACE FORCES

A. THE EAST AFRICAN MOVE IN CREATING AN EAST AFRICAN STANDBY BRIGADE (EASBRIG)

1. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its Role in the Creation of EASBRIG

The ASF would be comprised of standby brigades in each of the five African regions. The sub-regions are emerging as the principal actors in recent peace initiatives and operations on the continent. In this regard, the countries that belong to IGAD comprise one of the sub-regions of Africa, which represents the Eastern part of Africa. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986 with the objective to act as an early warning mechanism for alerting the international community of impending humanitarian emergencies and to coordinate resources in response to crises on the Horn of Africa (Profile IGAD, 2005). The main purpose of this cooperation was restricted to issues of drought, desertification, and food security.

However, the absence of a military or security component endangered the security of economic, social, and political developments, and member states started to confront these problems collectively. In March 1996, in an effort to tackle the security problem of the sub-region, leaders of the IGADD signed an agreement that transformed the organization into the IGAD (Profile IGAD, 2005). The issue of conflict management, prevention, and resolution became the mandate of this newly transformed organization. Article 18 of the IGAD Establishing Agreement asserts that member states shall act collectively to preserve peace, security, and stability in order to facilitate economic development in their countries and in the sub-region. The organization's primary focus was to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. Along these lines, since its inception, IGAD has been extensively involved in peace efforts in southern Sudan via the Sudan Peace Process, and in the Somalia via the process that led to the restoration of a transitional government there in 1999.

Eastern African countries are strongly committed to establishing an East African Standby Brigade, in line with the requirements of the AU PSC. It has been decided by the East African states that IGAD shall play an interim coordination role ("Policy Framework," 2005). Accordingly, in implementing the AU Commission's requirements, IGAD convened the Jinja Meeting of Experts in February 2004 to establish the East African Standby Brigade. It was noted that, once established, EASBRIG would encompass thirteen East African countries. These thirteen countries are the seven member countries of IGAD: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda and Comoros plus Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Tanzania, which are not yet members of IGAD, but are countries located in the sub-region. However, in April 2005, at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mauritius were officially removed from the membership of EASBRIG (Report of the meeting of Eastern African CDS, 2005). Therefore, EASBRIG is going to be formed by the contributions of 11 countries of the region.

IGAD in having fulfilled its role of organizing EASBRIG successfully then transferred its organizing responsibility to another body. The 3rd Meeting of the East African States' Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, which was held on September 15, 2005, in Kigali, Rwanda, was held on the recommendation of the 4th Meeting of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff and approved the establishment of an independent Coordinating Mechanism for EASBRIG to take over from IGAD (Rotberg, 2000, p. 11).

2. EASBRIG Overview

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told the conference held in the Ethiopian capital in April 11, 2005 to sign an agreement to contribute to the East African Standby Brigade.

> This [EASBRIG] is critical for peace and stability in our region. We are still not out of the woods as far as conflict is concerned. The memory of Rwanda's genocide figured greatly in the mission envisioned for the ASF, Africa and the whole international community were unable to do anything to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. This underscores the need for us to move with resolve and speed to establish the mechanisms

> necessary to prevent such occurrences… the broader African Standby Force should intervene at short notice to save lives and property in conflict situations (Geeska Africa online & Han, 2005).

The aim of EASBRIG is to have contributing countries within the sub-regional framework designate military units to join the crisis response force. So far, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, and Madagascar have pledged to contribute different types of forces to EASBRIG. Ethiopia pledged one light infantry battalion with organic transport, one company of engineers, one de-mining company, one signal platoon, and one Level II medical unit.[4] These forces will be trained in their countries and according to common doctrines, and will also be trained together with established communications, intelligence, and command and control prescriptions.

EASBRIG's mission will be based on six possible mission scenarios developed for ASF by the AU:

a. Military advice to a political mission
b. An AU observer mission co-deployed with a UN peacekeeping mission
c. A stand-alone AU observer mission
d. A traditional peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission
e. Complex multi-dimensional peace operations
f. Peace enforcement (what the ASF Framework document refers to as intervention missions) (De Coning, 2005).

3. EASBRIG: Force Structure

As described above, creation of a force would not mean the creation of a standing brigade. It has been decided that the EASBRIG headquarters and the Planning Element (PLANELM) would be permanent to allow for planning and training. The components of the brigade would be resident in their own countries and would be part of the UN Standby Arrangement System.

The EACDS recognized that the quantities they relied on were derivatives of the UN specifications that entail the following Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs):

[4] Level II medical support includes evacuation from level I, triage resuscitation and stabilization, sustaining treatment for those requiring further evacuation, reinforcement to level I organizations, and centralization of medical supplies; retrieved on Aug 16, 2006 from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/l.htm

- Brigade (mission level); headquarters support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles
- Headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel
- 4 x light infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles
- Engineer unit of up to 505 personnel
- Light signals unit of up to 135 personnel
- Reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel
- Helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 vehicles and 4 helicopters
- Military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles
- Light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles
- Level 2 medical unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles
- Military observer group of up to 120 officers
- Civilian support group consisting of logistical, administration and budget components ("Policy Framework," 2005).

4. Training and Doctrine

As Maurer's research on coalition command shows (1994),

> Effective execution requires that all functional elements such as operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other support activities, do their part and support the operational requirements. Each is important to the whole operations (pp. 84–85).

EASBRIG is expected to act as one unit comprised of units from different militaries, with different values, technologies, languages and practices. These are expected to work together to accomplish the same mission. For this, there should be a common policy, doctrine, procedure, and training in order for there to be one command structure and as one contingent.

"A multifunctional peace operations capability for the ASF would require standardized doctrine and a clear concept of operations that are consistent with UN missions" (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). Therefore, for the future performance of the EASBRIG there should be a common standard for training, policies, doctrine, SOPs, command and control, information, evaluation, and logistics.

Consistent with this, EASBRIG needs to develop and disseminate

- The EASBRIG Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs)
- Lesson learned
- Sharing training experiences
- Planning Element (PLANELM) instructions
- Training Policies
- Regional coordination enhanced through regional peacekeeping centers of excellence (Kenya)

5. Readiness and Deployment

Each country would undertake to keep its contribution at an agreed state of readiness. When fully established, the EASBRIG will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment in the sub-region and anywhere in Africa (or beyond) at appropriate notice.

> The ASF policy framework provides that missions deployed for Scenarios 1–3 should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4–6 missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-sustainability. Thereafter the AU or UN must take responsibility for the sustainment of the missions or, if lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability of the AU to start reimbursing troop-contributing countries (TCCs) so that these countries can continue to sustain their contingents.
>
> Readiness to deploy within 14 days will require regular joint field exercises with all units, a standing fully staffed brigade headquarters, and support. It will also require an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade.
>
> At 30 days readiness, collective training will at least have to involve regular command post exercises. At this level of readiness, there is a clear requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade headquarters with its attendant support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade.
>
> At 90 days readiness, there may be time to conduct preparatory training to develop a level of coherence before deployment (Cilliers and Malan, 2005).

For timely deployment of peace forces within the timelines for the various conflict scenarios, EASBRIG should have mission-ready units and headquarters. This readiness is to be confirmed via readiness of equipment, to include vehicles and communications. If the idea of inter-operability is to become a reality, there must also be a way to harmonize and standardize operational procedures, logistical systems and, for that matter, the whole concept of logistics. To ensure the readiness of EASBRIG, training should also become a major focus of peacekeeping training efforts.

6. Command and Control

In the "Memorandum of Understanding," (2005) in article 5 it is stated that the organs of the EASBRIG are:

a. The Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government;
b. The Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defense and Security;
c. The Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff';
d. PLANELM (in Nairobi, Kenya);
e. EASBRIG Headquarters; and (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)
f. The Logistics Base (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).

"All the EASBRIG missions shall be mandated by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union" ("Policy Framework," 2005). The Council of Ministers of IGAD with ministers from the other four non-IGAD states forms the organ that would take charge of operations at the political level. This organ assumes the responsibilities of a strategic headquarters that provides the strategic direction for peace support operations in the sub-region. "The functions of the Committee of East African Chiefs of Defense Staff are to serve as an advisory military committee for the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security and the assembly; and to oversee, direct and manage the PLANELM, EASBRIG headquarters and the logistics base" (Policy framework for the establishment of the EASBRIG).

A Director, assisted by four Principal Officers, will head the Coordinating Mechanism for EASBRIG. The Mechanism will be co-located with the PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya. The council also "requested the AU to accept and adopt the new EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism as a permanent structure" ("EASBRIG Communiqué," 2005).

EASBRIG has decided to have separate locations for the PLANELM and the brigade headquarters, with the brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and the PLANELM in Nairobi. The decision to locate the logistics base in Ethiopia has the benefit of potentially co-locating with the AU logistics depot. The EASBRIG Headquarters in Addis Ababa will serve as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command.

There would be a standing headquarters, but no permanent standing force in place. With the designation of a crisis, the force commander would summon his troops from the contributing countries and go into action (Rotberg, 2000, p. 11).



Figure 1. Schematic Representation of EASBRIG Command and Control Structure (From Cilliers and Malan, 2005)

B. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL PEACE FORCES

Although it might be valuable to review peacekeeping practices throughout the world, the intention of this thesis is to focus only on African examples.

1. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

Sub-regional organizations started to emerge in the decade after independence to provide for closer cooperation between African countries. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), which is comprised of 16 independent

states, was formed in 1975 and was intended as the principal institutional mechanism and focus of West African diplomacy to foster cooperation and economic integration among member states (Benneh, et al, 1996, p. 1).

Following the Liberian conflict at the beginning of 1990,

> ECOWAS states, concerned with the threat to regional stability posed by the conflict, and well aware of Western countries' unwillingness to intervene, decided to set up an armed [Economic Community of West Africa States] Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore law and order in Liberia, create the conditions for humanitarian aid to be delivered and allow for cease-fire negotiations (Faria, 2004).

Apart from the Liberian conflict, ECOMOG has also intervened in Sierra Leone between 1995 and 2005 and in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999 with the intent to accept responsibility for stabilizing the situation in neighboring countries before it escalates and causes a crisis in their sub-region.

Given that the lead state is likely to be the major state in a sub-region, Nigeria took the initiative, committed the necessary resources, accepted the inevitable costs, and put together the coalition (Rotberg, 2000). Even so, there were problems among the member states of ECOMOS during the initial stages, especially over fears about divisions between Anglophone and Francophone African, with concern over the rise of Nigeria as a political, economic, and military regional hegemon. However, over time Nigeria has shown the strongest determination to address and resolve conflict situations in the region.

According to Rene (2002), "ECOMOG's lack of experience, along with disarray in Lagos, intensified in many disastrous false starts in peacekeeping in Liberia" (p. xiv). Many shortcomings and political rivalries among its member states have created problems in the organizations. However, the organization was able to take action and demonstrate improvement over time, and thus enabled it to thereby reach its goals. In the end, ECOMOG's mission was relatively successful in ending the civil war and leading Liberia towards a relatively peaceful election in July 1997.

In light of ECOMOG's success and because it had no regular rapid reaction force ready for deployment as one unit, in May 2003 ECOWAS member states decided to create a rapid reaction military force that consisted of 6,500 soldiers to respond to

conflicts in the region (Faria, 2004), which effectively replaced ECOMOG with what is known as the ECOWAS Task Force (Panafrican News Agency, 2004).

2. South Africa Development Cooperation (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was created in 1992. The organization was created because of the conversion of the South African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) established in 1980, which was initially formed to reduce dependence on the apartheid regime in South Africa and support Namibia's struggle for independence. After the peaceful resolution of South Africa's apartheid problem, SADCC was refocused to create a regional common market and became the SADC in 1992. After 1994 when South Africa joined the organization and pointed to unresolved conflicts in Africa, member states decided to create the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. "However, the existence of defense and security structures within SADC has not proven to be very effective in boosting the SADC role in conflict management and resolution in the region" (Faria, 2004). Recently, a Mutual Defense Pact was signed at the SADC summit in 2003. At a meeting of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation in Pretoria in December 2004, SADC committed to creating a SADC standby brigade and gave the green light to its military chiefs to appoint a planning team to do so (Neethling, 2005).

> Some SADC members have been particularly engaged in peacekeeping and conflict mediation and resolution in the region and are among the most active in deploying multinational forces for peace initiatives in Africa. . . SADC has also regularly organized peacekeeping instructions and peacekeeping training exercises, which are playing an important role in developing standing operating procedures, involving both civilian and military components (Faria, 2004, p. 18).

C. SOME LESSONS LEARNED BY AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: LESSONS FOR EASBRIG

Given lessons learned by ECOMOG and SADC, as well as its own sub-regional distinctions the author will now try to indicate some issues which need attention as EASBRIG is stood up.

1. Neighboring States as a Source of Challenge

Regional organizations are made up of countries both involved in a conflict and those that are not. Neighboring states could be a contributing factor to conflicts in

countries, and thereby complicate issues for a regional organization. Also, regional organizations are made up of individual countries, some of which are large and influential within the sub-region. Each region in Africa has countries that are strong economically or militarily, which allow their governments to influence the initiatives that the regional organization promotes. In many cases, the leader of an influential state takes the initiative and secures the support of other member states of the region in order to launch a peace effort in the name of a given regional organization.

> Such a situation has its pros and cons. Influential states have the benefit of being relatively more able to make things happen. On the one hand, they can be perceived as pushing others around, [as] one can not speak ECOWAS without Nigeria or SADC without South Africa (Conflict Resolution in Africa, 2004).

Initiatives brought by neighboring states, can be problematic in other ways. As they are geographically and therefore politically, economically and socially close to the conflict, one or the other party in a conflict may not see neighbors as fair arbiters. One sees this, for example, in the response to a decision made in 2005 by the brokers of the Somali peace process and approved on June 14, 2006 by the Somalia's parliament that peacekeepers from Uganda and Sudan would enter Somalia first, followed by Kenya and Ethiopia. The reaction from the public and rival groups in the transitional government was negative. Many Somalis became suspicious of Ethiopia's intentions and assumed that the Ethiopian Government supported the Somalia Transitional Government. They held a demonstration to make the point that, "Somalis want to govern themselves ... we will never accept military intervention from Ethiopia" (Cawthorne, 2006).

Yet in the case of Somalia, neighboring states could also play a significant role because when neighboring states play constructive roles they are indispensable to the resolution of conflicts.

> They represent a factor of stability and serve as the 'example - next- door' of the benefits of peace. As knowledgeable partners who are familiar with the personalities involved, language, with local cultures, and ethnicities neighbouring states can play a vital role in efforts to end conflicts (Conflict Resolution in Africa, 2004).

Of course, one would be naïve not to recognize that states may follow their political interests when they participate in the creation of regional peacekeeping or peacemaking forces and they may use 'peacekeeping' forces to further their more narrow geo-political objectives rather than the broader humanitarian objective (Rene, 2002, p. 9).

2. Dependent on the International Community

Financial constraints are becoming a big burden for the AU when it comes to tackling its security problems on the continent. AU experience is that even the relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions the OAU undertook were so costly that it was not able to finance them from its own budget.

> The OAU had to rely on donor funding to finance the relatively small missions it deployed to Rwanda (NMOG), Burundi (OMIB), the Comoros (OMIC), Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (JMC) over the past decade. South Africa as the AMBI lead nation has spent approximately US $140 million, to sustain its troops and to supply most of the logistical needs (e.g. fuel, flights and medical requirements) of the mission (De Coning, 2005).

Where budget and logistical issues are concerned, Africa recognizes its limited resource capacity and has always required outside assistance. The international community's support thus remains crucial. The AU did a good job in its first operation, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), but could not have succeeded in this very important endeavor without donor support. The UN is encouraging and empowering regional or sub-regional organizations to intervene militarily for peace in their own areas. Training and funding from wealthier countries ought to be made available to prepare for and sustain such regional or sub-regional intervention capability (Rotberg, 2000, p. 10). The U.S. contributed some $11 million to the AU's Burundi effort (Frazer, 2005). This support enabled Burundi's operation to transition into a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which successfully paved the way for elections that have installed a new government and parliament.

In Darfur, Sudan, the AU has taken the next big step by assuming the task of managing the deployment needed to seek peace in Darfur. The international community's financial and logistics support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is key to

its success. The United States has shown that it is such a partner by putting forward a major share of the funding needed to bring peace to Darfur, including providing over $160 million in funding to support the AU deployment in Darfur (Frazer, 2005).

Moreover, cooperation between the United Nations and the AU in African peacekeeping should focus on enhancing and strengthening the institutional capability of the AU through mobilization and provision of financial, logistical, and technical support. To this end, it is strongly recommended that the UN member states, in particular those with the ability and resources to do so, contribute to the African capacity-building efforts in peacekeeping missions.

When it comes to financing and logistical support, the fact of the matter is the AU and sub-regional organizations will likely continue to depend on the goodwill of leading nations and the international community.

3. Lack of Creation of Rapid Response Capacity

EASBRIG is expected to be a reliable part of the ASF system in which trained and equipped troops are available immediately after the AU Peace and Security Council's decision to mandate an operation to use this force.

> However, Member States can still decline to participate, which means that standby arrangements are somewhat like traveler's checks with only one signature: until the owner countersigns, the currency cannot be used. In practice, standby arrangements have not proven themselves to be enough to meet the challenge of rapid deployment (“UN vital peacekeeping data”).

Therefore, EASBRIG could face the lack of response, which will cause delay in deployment. To overcome such a problem, ideally more forces than those required for a single brigade should be identified and prepared.

In order to guarantee the EASBRIG’s deployment in any condition, even when some countries choose not to deploy as part of a particular operation, countries should prepare two- to three-fold of the forces needed for EASBRIG. This would demand a considerable commitment of troops from countries in the sub-region. One way to prepare reserve peace troops would be for every country to prepare more forces than it pledged to

contribute. The other option could be that there should be a prior agreement among the troop-contributing countries to prepare reserve forces within each country to overcome the problem when one or many countries refuse to participate in a particular mission.

4. Problems of the Coalition Forces Training, Creation of Integrated Command

Training of forces presents certain challenges. “It has been said that the EASBRIG is not to deploy as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another’s doctrine, leadership, and operational practices, even though the brigade would have to come from a group of countries” (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). For this purpose, the EASBRIG mechanism is developing common training principles, doctrine, equipment standards, and command and control arrangements for operational control of the forces. Differences in tactical doctrine among the West African troop-contributing countries (between Francophone and Anglophone countries) created an earlier crisis for ECOMOG. This example alone illustrates why there is a clear need for sub-regional and even regional harmonization and standardization of peacekeeping training.

The second issue/challenge is the creation of an integrated command. In order to organize EASBRIG and engage in operations a good staffing system and integrated command structures are needed (Rene, 1993). Staff arrangement is minimal for military coordination measures adopted within an alliance. However, in some instances there may be a temptation for countries that have more military or expertise and economic power in the sub-region to monopolize the key posts and to contribute more. Such an approach should be avoided (Rotberg, 2000, p. 92).

Since the command and control of the East African peacekeeping forces, in this case, is going to be rendered by the commander of EASBRIG and its staff, which will have the technical and formal capability of commanding and controlling, selecting the commander from which ever country is the most powerful is not a concern. It is clear that the assignment of the brigade’s commander is on a rotational basis. The brigade commander is expected to be trained and technically qualified. The other thing that should be clear in the command and control process is having a clear statement of intervention. When the brigade commander receives an order, how and through which channel is he going to disseminate the order to summon forces? Who gives him the order

and to whom does he report? What are the channels of passing and receiving information and advice? Clarity regarding the rules of engagement will depend on the mandate of the operation, especially at the time of intervention when there may be the need to use military force. Meanwhile no matter how clearly one can state all of this on paper, application in practice can be most problematic. The execution of guidance and orders in the case of multinational forces is critical for the actual ability of the Brigade Commander to command and control his assigned forces for the accomplishment of the mission.

Therefore, for EASBRIG to succeed in having an integrated command structure, it will require the Eastern African countries' mutual commitment to the region's peace and security. When the author says integration of command structure, this depends on the power of the commander in the execution of his orders and how effective and efficient his organization is. In the case of coalition forces, it is obvious that there may be limitations in the execution of the commander's authority. In this case, however, problems can be anticipated and questions addressed ahead of time, as Rotberg, (2000) indicates:

> Do component unit commanders themselves have authority to respond immediately on an order from the force commander, or do they need to consult with their own national political leaders? Within their assigned areas of responsibility, do the component units follow similar patterns of operation, or will they routinely operate in different ways? The ideal is clear authority by the force commander and common doctrine, tactics, and procedure (pp.159-160).

Of course when a situation is complicated and unpredictable, situations arise the unit commander may not be able to apply all of these procedures. As has happened in many previous peacekeeping missions when the commander gives an order, some units may respond with, "Well, that sounds like a reasonable instruction; we'll think about it and get back to you;" others with, "We'll check with the president;" and others with, "That sounds interesting, but we see things differently" (Rotberg, 2000, p. 160). In such a situation, the commander may be relegated to the role of coordinator instead of being the actual commander.

Also critical is the development and introduction of common standards of operations to facilitate the joint training among force-contributing states' armies. With this is a need to develop a common pool of logistical, communication and transportation equipment to be used in peacekeeping operations in the sub-region. This too, needs to be coordinated and monitored by the command element.

5. Combined Training: Solution to Improve EASBRIG Interoperability

The ability of combined forces to operate together effectively has been increasingly valued in peace operations during the author's era, and yet there are also increasing challenges. According to Fitz-Gerald, (2003), "Multinational military interventions that promote sustainable and enduring peace building measures have become increasingly challenged due to the complex environments and the many different players that are brought into these theaters."

EASBRIG in its future deployment is expected to operate as a single unit and have effective interoperability. Troops coming from different countries, to realize this interoperability, should pass through joint exercises, which should enable them to maneuver and operate as one unit in future peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. In this regard, EASBRIG has many things to learn from the experience of ECOWAS:

> From a military standpoint, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia started off inauspiciously, beset by problems with military equipment, logistics, training and interoperability, and aggravated by language differences……..Some of these problems persisted: eight years into the operation, ECOMOG commander General Shelpidi identified *"... differences in language, training, equipment and orientation"* as key issues in interoperability within ECOMOG, stressing the need for bilingual language training in the region, as well as joint training and standardisation of equipment (Hutchful, 1999).

Learning from ECOMOG's experiences, and in order to carry out future peace operations in a successful manner, EASBRIG must anticipate certain problems that may preclude the effectiveness of the brigade. These problems can be eliminated by conducting planned and organized combined training of the commanders and staffs, and via whole unit exercises prior to deployment whenever the situation permits. This may

include pre-mission preparation of commanders at all levels, familiarizing them with the doctrine and procedures to be used in the mission.

To create the interoperability capability of different units coming from different countries, forces should be trained in their respective countries based on the common training materials prepared for EASBRIG troop preparation. Although individual contingents assume that they maintain decisive unilateral efficiency and strength, these individual units are expected to work in concert with other contingents to act as one unit for one mission objective. Thus, the quest for the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability of different contingents through joint training should be a major focus of EASBRIG. Moreover, this joint training could also enable integration of support methods, which could eliminate duplication of effort and conserve scarce resources.

IV. ETHIOPIAN PEACE FORCES' PAST AND PRESENT PRACTICES

A. COUNTRY PROFILE

Ethiopia is the third most populated African country after Nigeria and Egypt, with an estimated 72 million inhabitants. Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in the world and the oldest independent country in Africa, credited with being the birthplace of human beings[5], as well as the original home of coffee. Ethiopia maintained its independence not because colonialists did not want the country, but only through the heroic acts of its population who defeated foreign invaders throughout its history, such as Egypt, the Mahadi[6], Ottoman Turks, and Italy (1896 and 1935–1941). History verifies that the Ethiopian ancestors for many centuries struggled to stabilize the country's boundaries and to maintain the nation's freedom. For these reasons Ethiopia is well known as "the Land of Free Men" (Skordiles, 1954, p. 10).

Ethiopia was admitted into the League of Nations in 1923. Ethiopia was a charter member of the United Nations. Since World War II, it has played an active role in world and African affairs. "The emergence meanwhile of a succession of independent African states, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, enabled the Ethiopian Government, speaking with an authority based on the country's unique history of independence, to involve itself increasingly in the continent's affairs" (Pankhurst, 1997). As one of only two African states that never permanently colonized (the other is Liberia), Ethiopia used its long diplomatic tradition to support the independence of African countries and of unity. On top of this, "Ethiopia's military and diplomatic relationship with the United States provided it with a superpower ally. . . Haile Selassie took the lead in pressing for a

---

[5] According to working paper sites of political science Country Biography Index. Retrieved on Aug 14, 2006 from, http://workingpapers.org/country/ethiopia.htm.

[6] The Mahdiyah has become known as the first genuine Sudanese nationalist government. The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic laws. Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's commitment to using the jihad to extend his version of Islam throughout the world. For example, the Khalifa rejected an offer of an alliance against the Europeans by Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia. In 1887, a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrated as far as Gondar, and captured prisoners and booty. The Khalifa then refused to conclude peace with Ethiopia. In March 1889, an Ethiopian force, commanded by the king, marched on Metemma; http://www.answers.com/topic/history-of-sudan-1884-1898, encyclodictionalmanacapedia.

resolution establishing the territorial integrity of the independent states of Africa" (Pankhurst, 1997). The emperor, Haile Selassie, with other famous leaders of newly independent African countries succeeded in forming the OAU. Because of Ethiopia's contribution in forming the OAU and its significance as symbol of independence in Africa, the leaders of the OAU member states agreed that the HQ of the organization should be in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Subsequently, the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was also located in Ethiopia.

B. ETHIOPIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY MISSIONS

Ethiopia was the only African nation to single-handedly fight for the promotion of the principle of collective peace and security by challenging the European powers in the days of the League of Nations. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt confirmed this in an address[7] on December 1, 1951, at the ceremony honoring representatives of UN Forces in Korea:

> Years ago, a man speaking for a very small country, stood before the League of Nations pleading for collective action against aggression. Representatives of his country stand among the men and forces we are honoring today. And I should like to repeat to you the words he spoke when he bade farewell to his forces when they sailed to Korea last April. I repeat them because I believe this new declaration is as prophetic as the earlier plea that went unheeded. These are words of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia:
>
> You are departing on a long crusade in defense of that very principle for which we have fought - freedom, and respect for the freedom of others. With such traditions and after such sacrifices, Ethiopia would be the first nation to recognize the imperative urgency of that call of duty toward a sister nation.
>
> It is in yet a large sense, Soldier that you are today leaving the Homeland to fight on distant shores. [You are fighting not only for freedom, as we know it in Ethiopia, and the right of each people to its freedom.] You are also representing and defending in far corners of the earth, the most sacred principle of modern international policy - that principle of collective security with which the name of Ethiopia is imperishably associated (Skordiles, 1954, p. 243).

---

[7] After the President's death in 1945 she returned to a cottage at his Hyde Park estate; she told reporters: "the story is over." Within a year, however, she began her service as American spokesman in the United Nations. She continued a vigorous career until her strength began to wane in 1962. She died in New York City that November, and was buried at Hyde Park beside her husband.

1. Background for Ethiopian Participation in Peace Operations

Why has Ethiopia always positively responded to the calls of the UN for troop contributions? Legally, due to the 1936 failure of the League of Nations to react to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Government has been inspired to participate in the collective security efforts of the UN. Because Ethiopia was the victim of the collective security concept of the League of Nations, it did not want the same thing to happen to any other country of the world under the UN. Skordiles, in his book *Kagnew*, writes,

> No other nation understood the true meaning of the war in Korea as did the Ethiopians. . . . The idea of collective security is very closely connected with Ethiopia. This nation lost her independence for five years, because of the lack of collective security. This lack indirectly caused the Second World War (Skordiles, 1954).

Initially, the League made some positive moves. However, in regards to the 1931 Japanese aggression in China and the 1935 Italian aggression in Ethiopia, the League was unable to translate its principles of collective security into action. The principle demanded that member states participate in collective actions to prevent acts of aggression. In 1936, when Italy invaded Ethiopia with the determination to avenge the defeat at Adwa (1896) and to establish an Italian empire, the Emperor appealed to the League of Nations to act appropriately against Italy. In his appeal the Emperor said,

> I had placed all my hopes in the execution of these undertakings. My confidence had been confirmed by the repeated declarations made in the Council to the effect that aggression must not be rewarded, and that force would end by being compelled to bow before right…. On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I request the Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means in their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. … The great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia , I ask what measures do you intend to take? (Haile Selassie I, 1936).

However, the international community's reply was silence.

After the defeat of the Italian invader in 1941, Haile Selassie started to transform Ethiopia into a centralized monarchical state. The creation of a strong national army was an important part of that transformation and required abandonment of the traditional method of raising armies by provincial levies. In 1942, the emperor signed a military convention with the British Government, whereby Britain agreed to provide a military mission to assist in organizing and training the Ethiopian army. The Ethiopian Government expended about 40% of its annual budget on defense and internal security for the creation of a regular army ("Military Traditions").

Haile Selassie also diversified his sources of foreign military assistance. Over several years, he appointed Swedish officers to train Ethiopia's Air Force, asked Norwegian naval personnel to organize and develop a small coastal navy, signed a military assistance agreement with the United States, invited Israeli advisers to train paratroopers and counterinsurgency units, and arranged for an Indian Military Mission to staff the faculty of the Harar Military Academy. During this period, a number of Ethiopian officers attended military schools in the United States, Britain, and Yugoslavia ("Military Traditions").

After their modernization, Ethiopia's security forces saw action in several foreign conflicts. The commitment was made to fulfill Ethiopia's commitment to the UN.

> In spite of its harsh experience with the League of Nations, Ethiopia once again proved its commitment to global peace and security by being one of three founding African nations of the UN The positive responses it gave on a number of occasions when requested to contribute troops to be deployed in peacekeeping missions in troubled spots of the world are rooted in the country's respect to international law and firm stand to the principle of collective peace and security ("Military Traditions").

The Ethiopian troop contribution to the UN upon the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and consecutively for the Congo in 1960 and in Rwanda, Burundi, and Liberia (see Appendix A) depicted its commitment to UN peace and collective security. According to the United Nations' monthly summary dated January 30, 2006, Ethiopia is the sixth largest contributor of military troops to the UN, as it deploys 3,412 peacekeepers in only Burundi and Liberia (UN DPKO, 2006).



Figure 2. Ethiopian Past and Present UN Missions
(After: World Map)

2. Ethiopia's First International Mission in Korea, United Nations Command Korea (UNCK) (1951–1956)

Ethiopia has a long and proud history in United Nations peace support operations, and has participated and is participating in five UN missions since 1950. The United Nations mission in Korea (1951–1956) was the first international collective security mission by Ethiopia. This mission was established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950.

> Ethiopia responded to the mission for two reasons: The first was, while Ethiopia was speaking against invasion in the League of Nations, no country was supporting and the Ethiopian government knew exactly what it feels to be helpless and it did not want that to happen to other countries again. The other reason was the Ethiopian government was showing its loyalty and commitment to the United Nations (Ethiopian MOD, 2006).

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces attacked South Korea without warning. The Republic of Korea Army forces were forced to retreat toward their capital of Seoul. Two days later, the United Nations Security Council called on the countries of the world and passed a resolution to drive the invader from the Republic of Korea (ROK). In its

resolution, the UN Security Council assigned the United States as executive agent to implement the resolution and direct UN military operations in Korea. Following that, on July 24, in Tokyo, General MacArthur of the U.S. established General Headquarters, United Nations Command. “First, the U.S. troops started to deploy on June 25 then on August 29, 1950, the British Commonwealth's troops arrived” (Korean War). Troop units from other countries of the UN followed in rapid succession.

On April 13, 1951, the Ethiopian expeditionary force to Korea departed from Addis Ababa and arrived in Korea in May 1951 and was attached to the 32nd Regiment of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division in June 1951 (Varhola, 2000). It held the crest line of a great ridge on the right flank of the 7th Infantry Division of the United States along the Eighth Army's main resistance line and fought with distinction (“Military Traditions”). Colonel Kebede Gebre was the Commanding officer of the Ethiopian Expeditionary force and later became Lt. Gen and the Minister of Ethiopian National Defense. Thereafter, Ethiopia sent a fresh ‘Kagnew’ Battalion every twelve months for a continuous period of five years, up to August 7, 1956. Ethiopia deployed 341 officers and 5,696 NCOs, which totaled 6,037 troops in those five successive assignments (see Appendix A). Each battalion had 1,200 troops under UN Command. The first three battalions were engaged in 253 major and minor battles during the first three years (1951-1953) (Ethiopia MOD, 1962). The other two battalions were sent after the cease-fire agreement was signed. As one veteran recently remarked, “We observe that through the past 55 years the history made by the Kagnew Battalion is getting wider recognition from time to time” (Emlaelu Worede, 2006).

Many writers witnessed the Ethiopian contingent’s heroic participation in the Korean War. Excerpts from the book, *Pork Chop Hill*, written by S.L. A. Marshall in 1953 right after the cease-fire agreement between the UN forces and North Korea, describe the quality of the Ethiopian fighters of that time.

> Of all troops which fought in Korea, the Ethiopians stood highest in the quality of their officer-man relationships, the evenness of their performance under fire and the mastery of techniques by which they achieved near perfect unity of action in adapting themselves to new weapons during training and in using them to kill efficiently in battle.

They could not read maps but they never missed a trail.

Out of dark Africa came these men, thin, keen eyed, agile of mind and 95 per cent illiterate. They could take over U. S. Signal Corps equipment and in combat make it work twice as well as the best-trained American troops. When they engaged, higher headquarters invariably knew exactly what they were doing. The information, which they fed back, by wire and radio was far greater in volume and much more accurate than anything coming from American actions…

If to our side, at the end as in the beginning, they were the Unknown Battalion, to the Communists they were a still greater mystery. When the final shot was fired, one significant mark stood to their eternal credit. Of all national groups fighting in Korea, the Ethiopians alone could boast that they had never lost a prisoner or left a dead comrade on the battlefield. Every wounded man, every shattered body, had been returned to the friendly fold.

That uniquely clean sheet was not an accident of numbers only. Knowing how to gamble with death, they treated it lightly as a flower. On night patrol, as he crossed the valley and prowled toward the enemy works, the Ethiopian soldier knew that his chance of death was compounded. It was standing procedure in the battalion that if a patrol became surrounded beyond possibility of extrication, the supporting artillery would be ordered to destroy the patrol to the last man.

That terrible alternative was never realized. Many times enveloped, the Ethiopian patrols always succeeded in breaking the fire ring and returning to home base. If there were dead or wounded to be carried, the officer or NCO leader was the first to volunteer. When fog threatened to diffuse a patrol, [they] moved hand in hand, like children. Even so, though they deny it, these Africans are cat-eyed men with an especial affinity for moving and fighting in the dark. In most of the races of man, superstition unfolds with the night, tricking the imagination and stifling courage. It is not so with the Ethiopians. The dark holds no extra terror. It is their element.

Of this in part came the marked superiority in night operations which transfixed the Chinese. It hexed them as if they were fighting the superhuman. The Ethiopian left no tracks shed no blood and spoke always

in an unknown tongue. Lack of bodily proof that he was mortal made him seem phantom- like and forbiddingly unreal (Marshall, 1953, pp. 233-249).

Of the many heroic acts of the Ethiopian troops described in *Pork Chop Hill*, the one that most attracted the author's attention was known as "The Alligator Jaw:"

> In the Alligator Jaw's mission, Wongele Costa and his twenty men were having their first experience under fire. At the end of the mission, Wongele Costa reported the number of twenty-two, they had counted enemy dead in their foreground. Two badly shot-up prisoners had been taken. For Wengele Costa and his men this was the first patrol sent from the newly arrived Ethiopian battalion which had come to Korea boasting that it would outshine the old Kagnew Battalion, which was a shining outfit (Marshall, 1953, pp. 201–211).

Reading about Wongele Costa's heroism and leadership in Pork *Chop Hill* inspired the author to interview him on a research trip to Ethiopia. The author has known Wongele Costa since his cadet training in 1977 when the training was transferred from Harar Military Academy to Holeta Military School because of the Ethio-Somalia War in the eastern part of Ethiopia. Wongele Costa was the training head of the Holeta Military School while the author was there as a cadet. Currently Wongele Costa has retired from the Ethiopian Army, which he did with the rank of Lt. Col in 1991. The author interviewed him and held discussions about the Kagnew Battalions' military activities in Korea, and particularly about the Alligator Jaw's patrol which was led by him as a platoon leader. Wongele said that he is very proud of his participation in the Korean War to uphold the principle of UN collective security. He remembered that he was nominated to be deployed with the 2nd Kagnew Battalion. However, after he prepared his platoon for the deployment, he was ordered to hand over his platoon to another officer. He was then deployed with the 3rd Kagnew Battalion, almost at the final moment of the battalion's deployment, and with a platoon that another officer had prepared. At that time, Wongele was 19 years old and a fresh lieutenant who graduated in the 2nd course from the Military Academy of the Imperial Bodyguard. Concerning the patrol named the Alligator Jaw, as reported in *Pork Chop Hill*, it was his first mission. All efforts were made to prove that his 3rd Kagnew Battalion was no less effective than the previous Kagnew battalions were. He remembered that he felt very proud that he was the leader of the patrol, in which his men and he did such a good job. Because of his remarkable leadership, he was recognized as an excellent fighting officer and decorated with the Distinguished Military Medal of Haile Selassie I by Maj Gen Mulugeta Buli, Commander of the Division of the

Imperial Bodyguard, during his visit to Korea in May 1953. He was also awarded The Order of Military Merit, Wharang with Gold Star, from the Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea.

"The Incredible Patrol" is another patrol in which Ethiopians exhibited considerable heroism. Here it is not the author's intention to present all the heroic acts engaged in by Ethiopians in the Korean War, but to just mention two of the best known among the 235 engagements of Ethiopian troops during the three years of war.

> There were fifteen men in the Incredible Patrol under the command of 27-year-old 2nd Lieut. Zeneke Asfaw. Lieutenant Asfaw's mission on the night of 19 May [1953 was to] ambush a Chinese patrol and return with prisoners. On the ground within 150 yards of the ditch he had counted 73 dead Chinese. On the slopes of Yoke and within the trenches were 37 more enemy bodies. There were other bodies among the paddies forward of Uncle, still not counted. But assuming the usual battle ratio of four men wounded for every one mortally hit, the score said that he had effectively eliminated one Chinese battalion (Marshall, 1993, pp. 233–249).

During the three years of the Korean War, Ethiopian troops fought and died together as members of the UNC. Casualties numbered 120 killed and 536 wounded. No one was captured (Skordiles, 1954, p. viii).

Various government leaders and military commanders commended Ethiopia's participation and heroic performance in the Korean War, undertaken on behalf of the principle of collective security at the time.

> It was gratifying to note that all the three battalions and their commanders enjoyed [a] high degree of respect and appreciate [ion] from the Force Commander for their efficiency and discipline. Moreover, the successful contingents received a number of decorations and awards from the South Korean government and several other countries. A memorial statue was also erected in honor of those who lost their dear lives in the line of duty (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004).

One reason Ethiopia's participation in the Korean War deserves attention is that it is important for current and future members of the Armed Forces to recognize Ethiopia's legacy in peacekeeping missions since it was there at the outset. Recognition of its

participation is also important in the sub-region, in the continent and in the world, particularly as Ethiopia strives to be a force for stabilization.

3. Ethiopian Participation in United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (July 1960–June 1964)

The Republic of Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent on June 30, 1960. In the days that followed, disorder broke out, and Belgium sent its troops to the Congo without the agreement of the Congolese Government, declaring that they were there to restore law and order and protect Belgian nationals (Republic of Congo- ONUC Background, 1960). On July 12, 1960, the Congolese Government called for the United Nations to intervene to repel the aggression. Accordingly, the UN Security Counsel passed Resolution Number 143 on July 14, 1960 (Republic of Congo- ONUC Mandate, 1960), by which it decided to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps.

The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the government in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance.

> The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary, and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries (Republic of Congo—ONUC Mandate, 1960).

Under this mandate, thirty countries, which included Ethiopia, gave their positive reply to defend the principle of collective security and contributed about 19,820 soldiers in total (Republic of Congo- ONUC Mandate, 1960).

The UN Security Council asked for troops from Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco. Ethiopia, being a strong supporter of the UN principle of Collective Security, gave its positive reply immediately. The Ethiopian Government, who understood the urgency of deploying peace troops to Congo, deployed its first battalion on July 17, 1960 within 48 hours of giving its consent to the UN. The Ethiopian Government did not wait until the UN arranged transportation for the Ethiopian Battalion. The Ethiopian Air Force and

Ethiopian Air Lines transported the first battalion, led by Lt. Col Seyoum Gedlegiorgis.[8] This fast preparation and transportation of troops by the Ethiopian Government allowed deploying troops to reach their mission area just 48 hours after the UN decision of the Security Council to send peacekeeping troops to Congo.[9]

Ethiopia participated in ONUC and deployed four Tekil Brigades from 1960–1963 (see Appendix 1) with the aim of maintaining law and order in Congo. Over the length of the mission, Ethiopia sent some 3,000 military personnel in four Brigades and six F-86 Sabre Fighters from the Ethiopian Air Force ("Cambberas in the Congo"). On a different mission "In 1967 four Ethiopian Air Force F-86 fighter-bombers were deployed to Zaire to help dislodge a concentration of European mercenaries fighting there on behalf of secessionists in Katanga Province (present-day Shaba Region)" ("Military Traditions").

Moreover, Ethiopia is proud that the third among five force commanders of the UNOC was an Ethiopian, namely Lt. Gen Kebede Gebre who served from April 1962 to July 1963 (Republic of Congo—ONUC Mandate, 1960). He had personally commanded the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in Korea when he was a Colonel from 1951-1953.

C. THE DISRUPTION BETWEEN THE CONGO MISSION AND THE POST-DERG RETURN TO PEACEKEEPING

Since the founding of the UN, Ethiopia's commitment was highly professional and promising. This had been proved by Ethiopia's participation in the Korean War, 1951-1953 and the Congo Peace Mission, 1961–1964. However, this commitment seems to have been interrupted for about 30 years, from 1964 to 1993. What led to such a long hiatus?

During the Haile Selassie regime prior to 1964, Ethiopia's internal situation was relatively calm and peaceful. However, once the decision was made to incorporate Eritrea as a province of Ethiopia, a separatist movement in Eritrea arose. Beginning in 1961, the Eritrean separatists turned to armed struggle and, by 1966, started challenging government forces throughout Eritrea. Also in 1960, following the independence of

[8] This is based on the author's translation from the Amharic report on the performance of the first Tekil battalion in Congo, 1960.

[9] Ibid.

Somalia, the demand for the creation of a greater Somalia began to gather support. Confrontations escalated in 1964 following incidents that occurred between Ethiopian and Somalia forces along the border. From the late 1960s to 1974, Haile Selassie also faced demands for land reform, and for economic and political reforms.

After 1974, in the years following Haile Selassie's downfall and the establishment of the Derg Regime, several internal and external threats prevented the Derg from actively participating in regional and sub-regional political activities. In February 1977, as Mengistu's regime attempted to consolidate its rule, the Somalia Government took advantage of the Derg's political problems, as well as its troubles in Eritrea, and attacked government positions throughout the Ogaden, initially by providing supplies and logistical support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). After 1974 and until its demise, the Derg regime was mainly engaged in fighting insurgencies that appeared in various parts of the country, namely in Eritrea, Tigray, and Oromo areas (with Oromo Liberation Front, (OLF)).

In general, starting from the late 1960s until the demise of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopia's leaders were mostly engaged in solving their internal problems using military forces. What becomes clear from this perspective is that Ethiopia's participation in UN peace operations was interrupted from 1967–1991 because its military was being used to deal with internal problems. On the other hand, based on UN peacekeeping statistics, one can argue that since 1948 there have been a total of 60 UN peacekeeping operations, 47 since 1988. Indeed there were no new UN peace missions anywhere in the world from 1967–1974. This period was known as the 'dormant period', and coincided with the last years of Haile Selassie's reign.

Sq No.	UN Peacekeeping Missions	Duration
1	India/Pakistan	Sept. 1965-March 1967
2	Angola	Dec. 1988-May 1991
3	Iran/Iraq	Aug. 1988-Feb. 1991
4	Afghan/Pakistan	May 1988-March 1990
5	Namibia	April 1989-March 1990

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Missions Stated Within 1964-1990
(From: Infoplease, Retrieved 0n September, 23 2006 from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0862135.html)

One can argue then, that despite its internal problems, had there been a need for sending Ethiopian troops, Haile Selassie's regime could have contributed troops to the UN.

Even during the Derg Regime, according to UN data, there were no peacekeeping missions from 1974 to 1988. There were only four UN peace missions, with two of them in Africa which started in 1988–1989. Based on this, it is possible to conclude that the 30-year interval from 1964 to 1993 in which Ethiopia did not participate in peace operations is largely the consequence of there being no peacekeeping missions and/or there were only a few peace operations that took place under UN auspices. Ethiopia's engagement in its internal matters did not necessarily preclude the country from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The main reason for the interval instead seems that there was no extreme demand that required Ethiopia to offer its forces.

D. ETHIOPIA'S COMMITMENT TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which led the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in overthrowing the Derg regime in 1991, after 17 years of war was strongly convinced that for a state's economic and social development, there should be constant peace and security inside and around the country. Peace in Ethiopia alone was not considered to be enough for the development of the country. Over time it has become increasingly obvious that it's not only the stability of

neighboring states, but also regional security disturbances, directly or indirectly, that affect the process of development in Ethiopia. In line with this commitment, the Ethiopian Government sent its peacekeepers to Rwanda when genocide occurred there in 1994. This represented a strong reaffirmation after a 30-year interruption of the significantly accorded UN peace operations. It should be noted that this decision was made shortly after the overthrow of the Mengistu regime, when the Ethiopian Transitional Government was still in power and even before the creation of the formal Ethiopian Defense Force. This was noticed by the then-UNAMIR commander, Canadian Gen. Romeo Dallaire. "The Ethiopians were at the other extreme of preparedness. They had just finished a protracted civil war, and the reconnaissance party, which included the chief of staff of the Ethiopian army, was clearly ill at ease in brand new uniforms" (Dallaire, 2004, p. 444).

1. Ethiopian Participation in United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1994–1995

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (October 1993–March 1996) was established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 (1994) with the aim to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda; to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief; and to take action in self-defense against persons or groups threatening protected sites and populations, UN and other humanitarian personnel. Ethiopia participated in UNAMIR from August 1994 to July 1995 and provided a battalion size unit for two rounds (see Appendix A).

Rwanda, as a nation, began to feel relief soon after the Guna Battalion (the first Ethiopian contingent) led by Col. Tdale Gebre Sellassie arrived in the country.[10] However, Rwanda was a very tough assignment and materialized at a time when emotions were still simmering rather that cooling. "In the Rwanda Peace Mission the Ethiopian contingent was able to win the hearts of both the Hutu and Tutsi not through coercion but love and passion" (Best Practices News Letter 9). In witnessing this, Gen. Romeo Dallaire (2004) said,

[10] The name of the first Ethiopian contingent to UNAMIR.

> These soldiers [the Ethiopian troops] were incredibly resourceful. I once watched them use only long wooden switches to restrain a crowd that was trying to surge across the bridge at Cyangugu into Zaire. The switches were the kind that might have been used to herd cattle. The soldiers also had no compunction about getting into the fields to help local farmers harvest the rarely planted fields (p. 444).

The people of Rwanda demonstrated confidence in the Ethiopian peacekeeping force as exemplified by the immediate halting of the exodus to Zaire. The troops participated in the settlement of 50,000 returnees. Not only was the mission for Ethiopians to keep the peace, but also owed to their disciplined impartiality, the troops were also involved in the reconstruction of Rwanda to make it economically viable. Rwanda above was all a successful mission that proved beyond doubt that Africans can effectively help solve their own problems with the financial and logistical support from the West (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004).

Since the creation of the Ethiopian Defense Force, Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping has become one of the defense force's missions. Because of this, Ethiopian soldiers have also been deployed in Liberia and Burundi on UN missions.

2. Ethiopian Participation in the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 2003–to Date

The Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was agreed on in a transitional arrangement, which provided for the establishment of a transitional government in November 2001. Although the transfer of power was a major goal for the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement, continued outbreaks of fighting indicated that the peace process in Burundi remained fragile.

The 2002 (October 7, 2002 and December 2, 2002) ceasefire agreements between the government and rebel forces called for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force and the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to assist the parties in their implementation. On April 2nd, the Central Organ of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution mandated the deployment of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. Ethiopia, without hesitation, accepted the

invitation to contribute troops to the African mission in Burundi. Brigadier General Gebrat Ayele from Ethiopia was assigned as Deputy Commander of Burundi's Peacekeeping Force.

Ethiopia sent a peacekeeping battalion to help realize the peace efforts in that country affected by a lengthy civil war (see Appendix A). Sending off the 1,000 strong force, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said he was convinced that the force would carry out its mission to maintain peace and stability in Burundi. He also affirmed Ethiopia's commitment to pay the sacrifices necessary to discharge the mission as entrusted to it by the AU (Embassy of Ethiopia Washington D.C.). As P.M. Meles Zenawi put it, the commitment and sense of mission of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent in Burundi is a source of pride to the peoples and government of Ethiopia (ENA, 2004).

Prior to their departure, members of the forces had received substantial training, which included the lessons learned from previous Ethiopian missions that might help with the maintenance of peace and security in Burundi. To discharge its mission the Commander of the battalion, Lt. Colonel Meley Amare, said that the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent had been sufficiently informed about the objective situation in Burundi, and had received training necessary for peacekeeping operations (Political Ethiopia News items, 2003, September).

In October, all 3,000 troops (from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa) committed to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) were deployed. The Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent discharged the mission of disarmament and provided protection to military observers. The Ethiopian contingent worked in coordination with the peacekeeping contingents from Mozambique and South Africa. The Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent in Burundi performed its mission efficiently.

> While in the mission, the contingent repeated the Rwanda feat by involving itself in humanitarian and development activities apart from its peacekeeping duties. It has left so indelible an imprint in the hearts of Burundians by sharing its ration with HIV/AIDS – orphaned children and internally displaced people. Besides its great contribution to the restoration of peace and stability in Burundi, the contingent has made Ethiopia proud by participating in the first ever AU peacekeeping mission (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004).

The contingent discharged its mission effectively in Burundi for the three years of its deployment. Prime Minister Meles, on his visit to the peacekeeping contingent in Bujumbura, Burundi in February 2004, said that Ethiopia had dispatched its peacekeeping contingent to Burundi as part of its unwavering commitment to peace in the African continent, and that the people and government of Ethiopia can take pride in the good relationship the Ethiopian Contingent in Burundi has with the people of Burundi (ENA, 2004).

The Burundian president and other senior government officials likewise hailed the commitment, determination, and sense of duty of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent. The United Nations Secretary General's special envoy for Burundi, speaking at the farewell ceremony held in Burundi, said that the efficient accomplishment of the peacekeeping mission passes from generation to generation. One method by which the Ethiopian contingent in Burundi sought to discharge its duties was to build harmonious relations with the people of Burundi. To cite one example of how they did this, "the Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent has donated beds, office furniture, drugs, generator, and other materials, valued [at] over 78,000 USD, for governmental and non governmental [use], as well as [to] humanitarian organizations in Gitega (Burundi) area" (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006).

3. Ethiopian Participation in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL) 2004–to Date

The Liberian mission was mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) on September 19, 2003. According to the information of UN DPKO, the mission's major objectives were to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement to support the Joint Monitoring Committee, carry out disarmament, and support the implementation of the peace process. Ethiopia, accepting the invitation to contribute troops to the UN mission in Liberia, conducted three months of intensive peacekeeping training, and sent the first peacekeeping contingent, which consisted of troops, medical unit Level I, maintenance, and engineering units to Liberia in January

2004.[11] Ethiopian troops were deployed in Zwedru, which is the farthest point of UNMIL and known as Sector 4, to help realize the peace efforts of the mission (See also Appendix C).[12]

The Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in Liberia discharged its duty effectively and efficiently (See Appendix A). The peacekeeping brigades took full control of most of the seven major regions of Zwedru. The brigade disarmed those in possession of illegal arms, stabilized the region, helped create favorable conditions for elections, and looked after the security of workers of international charity organizations, officials of the UN peacekeeping force, and military observers (Indeshaw, 2004, September 28).

Liberians, on several occasions, have expressed joy over the presence of the Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in their midst and have vowed to work in cooperation with the Ethiopian mission to bring about a dependable and sustainable peace in their country. Liberians' recognition of the Ethiopian contingent has been encouraging. According to Brigadier General Seyoum, commander of the 124th Ethiopian Peacekeeping Brigade, "Because of the support and cooperation that we got from our Liberian brothers and sisters we always feel that we are at home with our family, which has helped us a great deal in performing our duties and responsibilities" (Ethiopian MOD, 2006). In the contingent's mission areas in Liberia, this atmosphere enabled dislocated Liberians to reintegrate with their families in order to lead peaceful lives and contribute to rebuilding their nation (Ethiopianembassy.org). The Ethiopian contingents disarmed more that 13,000 rebels, assisted 21,629 refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and facilitated peaceful elections in 273 constituencies in their sector.[13]

The Ethiopian contingents accomplished their duty with competence, high military discipline, and a great sense of responsibility. Government officials, coordinators of non-governmental organizations operating in the country, and the public at large

---

[11] This is usually the first level where a doctor is available. It provides first line primary health care, emergency resuscitation, stabilization and evacuation of casualties to the next level of medical care within a peacekeeping mission.

[12] Sector 4, this Sector covers most of south-eastern Liberia. It consists of the counties of River Cess, Sinoe, Grand Gedeh, River Gee, Grand Kru, Maryland and portion of Nimba, which include volatile areas along the border with Cote d'Ivoire. Retrieved on Sept 29, 2006, from http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military.

[13] Data from Amharic Draft report on the Ethiopian contingents in Liberia from Ethiopian Ministry of Defense media center.

acclaimed the activities of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent, especially its participation in various development activities. The Special Envoy of the UN General and the officer in charge of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Souren Seraydarian, said, “The Ethiopian peacekeeping in Liberia enjoyed the confidence and admiration of the international community” (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004).

Like their predecessors in earlier peacekeeping missions, the Ethiopian peacekeepers in Liberia achieved their goal by employing their trademark tools of winning the hearts and minds of the people through their humanity and bravery (Ethiopian MOD Indoctrination & Public relations Center, 2004). Recognizing that sustainable peace and stability requires development, the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent carried out the repair of roads, sanitation activities, and harnessed a local river that hampered the flow of traffic by digging a 300-meter drainage channel (Ethiopia: Liberians laud, 2006, June). The Ethiopian contingent also repaired the Zwedru Hospital, which had been abandoned following extensive looting (“Liberia – complex emergency” (2004). These are just some of the duties they performed.

E. LEASSONS LEARNED

1. Positive Image

One hundred nations contribute forces to UN peacekeeping, but contributions from developed nations have declined since the 1990s. Today, the top sixteen troop-contributing nations to UN operations are all from developing states, led by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ghana (UN DPKO, 2004).

According to the UN’s January 2006 force contribution report, Ethiopia is the sixth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces in the world, with some 3,421 military and staff deployed.

	Country	Police	Mil OBs	Troop	Total
Number of Ethiopian troops at the end of Jan 2006	Burundi (UNOB)		5	859	864
	Liberia (UNMIL)		17	2531	2548
Total			**22**	**3390**	**3412**

Table 2. Number of Ethiopian Troops at the End of January 2006
(After: UN DPKO, 2006)

There has been strong support within the diplomatic community to use Ethiopian troops as peacekeepers within the UN. "Ethiopian troops ought to be used in regional peacekeeping operations, in peacekeeping operations in western Africa, and indeed in peacekeeping operations around the globe, operating under a UN framework," said Myles Wickstead, the British ambassador ("Ethiopia to send," 2003).

For its part, Ethiopia has continued to reiterate its commitment to peacekeeping in Africa and the world. One can ask why Ethiopia sends its troops on peace missions. One obvious issue is that:

> Ethiopia sees its own experience of the failure by the League as a valuable asset to be inside in the resolution of conflicts. Active participation in peacekeeping demonstrates Ethiopia's historically strong endorsement of the continent's cooperation in matters of security (Ethiopia, Champion of Peace).

Ethiopia believes that its internal security is dependent on the security of its neighbors, the sub-region, the region, and the world at large.

> Ethiopia, by sending her Expeditionary Force to Korea, not only gave an example of her tenacity to the free and democratic institution; not only proved her faith in the United Nations Organization (UNO), but also demonstrated the fighting ability of her people, and the exceptional capability of her officers to administer a modern army, equal to the renowned armies of the world. The test, passed by the Ethiopians together with the other UN troops in Korea, succeeded completely, and the rating deserved by the Ethiopians is excellent. Ethiopia has proved that she is capable of sustaining military strength for the service of international peace and security (Skordiles, 1954, p. xii).

Keeping peace has become an essential part of Ethiopia's view of its international duty for some time now. This both affords the soldiers experience in crisis situations, and rewards them with the UN-level salary that goes with such assignments. In Ethiopia's armed forces, as in many developed countries which contribute to peacekeeping forces, being deployed for peacekeeping duties is increasingly something soldiers want to do.

From the author's interviews with the participants of previous and current Liberia and Burundi peace missions, it is apparent there are major achievements as well as shortfalls in how well Ethiopian contingents discharge their peace missions. The main achievement is overall success. All missions where Ethiopian contingents have been deployed have been successful. The overall commitment of Ethiopian peacekeeping troops is commendable, especially their participation in assisting the local population to rebuild and reconstruct essential facilities. This social interaction with the local population has simplified the regular UN peacekeeping mission. This has been confirmed by Freddie Bategereza, the Tanzanian UNMIL Head of Regional Civil Affairs/Security Coordination:

> Having worked with three contingents of Ethiopian peacekeepers, one can easily conclude that there is simply an exemplary record. They are very dedicated to their work and their civil-military collaboration and cooperation is exceptionally good. Their area of responsibility, which historically happens to be a region of resistance, has not had any security concern due to their strategic system of operation (Ethiopian MOD, 2006).

These positive features of Ethiopia's contingents should be encouraged. At the same time, Ethiopia should be working hard to eliminate identifiable weaknesses and shortfalls for better participation in future peacekeeping missions.

2. Room for Future Improvement

a. Language Proficiency as Obstacle

Since Ethiopia's first Peace Force deployed to Korea, language has been and still is a problem in recent peace missions such as Liberia and Burundi. When Ethiopian troops were deployed to Rwanda, in order to resolve the language barrier, translators were hired and deployed with the contingent. The number of translators was

too small compared to the breadth of the area of responsibility of the contingent. Because there were few translators in the battalion, it was very difficult to communicate with the society and render them the needed assistance.

This problem, even in current missions, is not getting resolved. Officers, who would command from platoon to brigade level, should have the ability to speak and communicate in English. In the author's recent interviews, many officers who participated in the Liberia and Burundi peace missions said that though the mission accomplishment of Ethiopian contingents is considerable and, in some cases, exceeds that of other contingents, because of the commanders' lack of English language skills the troops' performance is not getting due appreciation from the pertinent mission HQs. Moreover, because of the language problem, many commanders were not reporting their troops' performance properly, and there were instances when they were not getting the needed support from the HQ because of the lack of communications.

This language problem should receive greater attention and the Ministry of Defense should draft a plan for improving English language training among Ethiopian officers. This should be done not only for the sake of peacekeeping missions, but also for future training abroad, and for creating an interoperable capacity to work in EASBRIG, since English is becoming the working language of peace operations and of higher education institutions. This should be a major priority in the officers' training program.

Compounding communications difficulties are Ethiopians' natural character, modesty, and even shyness. Others report performances of lesser value than that of the Ethiopian contingents. More confidence in writing and spoken English should assist in overcoming this.

b. Lack of Adequate Staff Officers' Preparation

There is lack of adequate staff officers' preparation for peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, especially when it comes to military observers and contingent commanders at all levels. From platoon commanders to brigade commanders, staff officers who would be assigned in HQs are not getting the proper training for their missions. In most cases, this has happened because the selection and preparation of personnel who would be deployed for peace missions are not conducted ahead of time.

This problem has to be resolved by having a well-developed rotation plan for the training, preparation, and deployment of troops, staff members to the HQs, and military observers.

c. Non-diversified Participation

Ethiopia does not yet take sufficient advantage of all the opportunities given by the UN to deploy more military observers, civilians, and civilian police. Ethiopian participation in the Congo peacekeeping mission in the 1960s demonstrated that what was needed was not only sending troops, but also civilian police and air force personnel with military aircraft. This ability has to be developed. Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping should include sending the civilian police, volunteer civilians, and sufficient air assets whenever they are needed.

d. Lack of Giving Due Attention to Ceremonial Issues

In previous peace missions, from Rwanda to current missions in Liberia and Burundi, though the discipline and sociability of the Ethiopian troops was greatly appreciated, they exhibited certain deficiencies in performing certain military protocols that are considered to be an important part of overall troop performance. In the Rwandan peace mission there were comments from the UNAMIR HQ that Ethiopian troops were not giving due attention to visits by senior commanders, not giving proper salutes, and making it difficult to distinguish officers from soldiers by using the same mess and recreational facilities, etc. Because of these problems, senior officers from UNAMIR considered the Ethiopian contingent to be undisciplined. Since many of these troops were for the author, guerrilla fighters, and peacekeeping in Rwanda was the first mission for the Ethiopians after the overthrow of the Derg regime, there was a lack of formal military training. This issue was subsequently given greater attention by the Wegagen Battalion (the name of the 2nd contingent). A program was created and implemented to improve individual drill and ceremonial skills. The training was organized and conducted in conjunction with peacekeeping missions in their deployment area. Because of this training, during the Wegagen's three-month deployment, the contingent received three generals with due military honors on three occasions (Alemeshet, 1995).

Currently, in preparation of the author's troops and especially for the forces to be deployed to Liberia and Burundi, they are exerting considerable effort, but should probably give even more so as to continue to improve the image of the Ethiopian Defense Forces for future peacekeeping missions.

e. Discipline

In general, the discipline of Ethiopian troops can be evaluated in positive terms. However, compared to the standard of well-organized foreign armies, the author can say from all the information that he has gathered that the military discipline of the Ethiopian soldiers could still be improved upon. The main disciplinary issues, again, tend to be more symbolic than substantive, but according to participants of recent missions in Liberia and Burundi, it is difficult to tell officers apart from soldiers, soldiers are not always properly dressed, and they do not properly salute superior officers, especially officers who are from other contingents. There are also indications that rather than give orders to subordinates, officers do things themselves. For them, this may be connected to with a cultural legacy and guerilla tradition, but in a wider international context it looks like a lack of military discipline and respect. At the same time, there were also some instances when officers were not able to give an order to their subordinates because of the lack of the willingness of soldiers to perform the order. For this reason, it has been observed in many instances that instead of giving orders to subordinates, the officers themselves would prefer to perform the duty rather order someone else to do it.

f. Unmatched Selection with the Qualification Needed for the Work

The problem in recruiting should be given proper attention. In some instances, unqualified officers were sent on peacekeeping missions in positions for which they were not adequately prepared and in which they lacked professional skill and knowledge. Proper criteria and standards should be set and implemented in order to send qualified personnel on peacekeeping missions. If the decision is made to send someone on a peacekeeping mission and he is not the appropriate person for the position, the potential effectiveness and image of the Ethiopian troops is hurt, both abroad and within the Armed Forces.

Even though Ethiopian peacekeepers have registered more than just a solid performance throughout their participation in PKOs, it is still worthwhile to make conceptual changes in how to organize and approach the training, and prepare peacekeeping forces. Ongoing reform of the Ethiopian Defense Force is addressing the need for improvement in this regard. What remains is to strengthen what is done well and work hard to improve on shortcomings, so as to register even better results in future operations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. PROPOSITIONS: SHAPING THE ETHIOPIAN PEACE FORCE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION IN FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

A. COMMITMENT TO INTENSIFY ETHIOPIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PKO

Since 1993, as developed countries have pulled back from multilateral operations, African participation in UN peacekeeping has grown. Participation in peacekeeping operations by the developing world, including five African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) has significantly increased (Earnst, 2003). The UN data shows that Ghana and Nigeria have taken a leading role in peacekeeping throughout Africa. From Ghana alone (with armed forces totaling under 10,000) more than 80,000 men and women have played a critical role in peacekeeping all over the world (from 1960 until January 2004) (Afele, 2000).

Ethiopia's commitment to contribute its part to the effort to assure peace and stability in the region and beyond has increased over time. Recently, Ethiopia has joined this movement by resuming its normal leading role and increasing its participation in the belief that peacekeeping is now becoming a new and effective way to mitigate conflict. Ethiopians are proud that their military is used for peacekeeping so that people in war-torn areas can still lead normal lives. The Ethiopian Government's commitment demands greater efforts to foster peace and plays a key role both at regional and continental levels. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has confirmed this:

> The 'iron discipline' of the Ethiopian forces had won the admiration of the two countries [Burundi and Liberia], and that it was for that reason that the country was being asked to become involved in such similar peacekeeping missions. In view of the firm support of the Ethiopian people and government to African peace, I would like to assure our readiness to become involved in the peacekeeping mission in an intensified manner ("Meles reaffirms," 2004).

In this chapter, based on the analysis and findings of previous chapters, the author will mainly deal with the issue of how the Ethiopian Defense Forces should prepare its Peace Force in order to fulfill Ethiopia's commitment for intensified participation in future EASBRIG and/or AU and UN peace operations.



Figure 3. Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of January 31, 2006. Retrieved 24 September 2006, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/jan06_1.pdf)

Sq. No.	Country	Police	Mil OBs	Troop	Size of Contingent
1	Bangladesh	476	102	9,576	**10,154**
2	Pakistan	388	109	9,019	**9,516**
3	India	393	97	6,849	**7,339**
4	Jordan		77	2,904	**3,731**
5	Nepal	448	46	3,023	**3,517**
6	Ethiopia		22	3,390	**3,412**
7	Uruguay	1	68	2,527	**2,611**
8	Ghana	85	64	2,373	**2,522**
9	Nigeria	390	91	1,956	**2,437**
10	South Africa		27	1,968	**1,995**
11	Senegal	464	37	1,387	**1,888**
12	China	197	72	791	**1,060**
13	Morocco		5	1,701	**1,706**
14	Kenya	66	79	1,468	**1,613**

Table 3. Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of January 31, 2006 (From: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/jan06_1.pdf)

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF STRONG PEACE OPERATIONS OFFICE: AN ESSENTIAL MOVE TO REALIZE ETHIOPIA'S COMMITMENT

From past UN and AU experiences, it is clear that when a crisis arises and there is a need to deploy peacekeepers, the most difficult challenge is that countries do not provide troops in time. This is, in most cases, because there is no prior preparation of troops, there is a lack of equipment, or there is a lack of organizational structure and coordination to sufficiently prepare troops. With no ongoing effort to train and maintain peace troops prior to the demand to contribute forces, it is obvious countries will be forced to prepare their troops in a hasty manner. Consequently, too, countries will deploy troops without them having the necessary equipment. To ensure the readiness of Ethiopian peace troops and their availability in a timely manner, the Ethiopian Defence Forces should establish an adequate and effective system that can provide the necessary training and preparation before the need for deployment arises. For this commitment to be effective it is essential to have a responsible office which is able to handle the functions of troop recruitment, training, equipment, deployment, command, and control.

The Ethiopian MOD, considering its past experience in preparation, deployment, and follow-up with Ethiopian peace troops in their mission areas, has recently established an office which should be well-suited to handle peacekeeping issues in a better fashion. This has been done with the intent to improve the MOD's organizational capability in regards to peacekeeping issues. Currently this office is incorporated with the Foreign Relations Department. Though this is commendable, the existing structure of that office may not be sufficient to enable it to render everything necessary, such as organization, deployment and follow-up with the peace troops. Professional assessments must be continuously made in regards to the weaknesses and strengths of the deployed peace troops. Only with this it is possible to readjust and learn how to better use them in future deployments, as well as how to better prepare prior to deployments.

Also, to be effective, it would be better if the office discharged its duties and responsibilities under direct supervision of the General Chief of Defence Staff. Moreover, since Ethiopia is contributing troops and the UN or the AU is going to cover all the expenses for the deployment of these troops, frequent follow-up with the UN and AU offices will be required regarding equipment, supply, reimbursement and other inputs.

Administrative, logistical, and financial operations should be handled by one office under the close supervision of the Chief of Staff's office. Such missions are very serious on a number of levels. For instance, if they are not treated with military professionalism, many advantages that could be gained via the UN and AU may be lost, such as foreign training assistance, supply and equipment for the troops, and reimbursement for the troops, along with their equipment.

C. STRIVE FOR ATTAINING AND BETTER UTILIZING OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

It is the author's belief that if it is found that it is hard to train and prepare troops before a deployment when there is sufficient time, an even greater challenge is faced in amassing the resources needed for the deployment of troops in an organized fashion. In this regard, foreign support is crucial for better and timelier preparation of Ethiopian troops for peace operations. Currently, the international community and the developed countries in particular are not willing to contribute forces for peacekeeping missions in Africa. However, they are willing to assist African states in preparing African peacekeeping troops, and Ghana and Kenya are taking particular advantage of this by using the support from these countries effectively.

Ethiopia has a large and professional military that has provided support for UN and AU peacekeeping operations in the past. Ethiopia is the fifth largest overall contributor and the greatest contributor from Africa to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Therefore, one should know how to argue for and effectively use assistance from these developed countries. For example, as a U.S. State Department website about assistance to Africa indicates for Ethiopia, "the United States will use the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, along with other military assistance funding to increase Ethiopia's capacity and willingness to participate in future peacekeeping missions" (U.S. Assistance to Africa, Ethiopia). This willingness by the U.S. points to the need for having a strong peace operations office for getting and using foreign support for the preparation of Ethiopia's Peace Force.

In the troop preparation process, using local resources by way of Ethiopia's own instructors is one thing; however, one should also continue searching for foreign offers of assistance with the goal of improving the quality of training of the peacekeeping forces.

Despite the fact that currently the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) is trying to get and use foreign assistance for its training purposes, it would do even better if there were one consolidated office responsible for the overall preparation of peace troops.

D. INTEGRATING PEACE OPERATION PACKAGES INTO ALL LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING

> Peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations… Many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must be a good soldier. "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it." States the Army Field Manual on peace missions, FM 100-38….In part, this argument is based on the recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to those "spoilers" who would disrupt the peace [are] a soldier well-trained for combat (Serafino, 2004).

The Ethiopian MOD is continuing to effectively prepare, deploy, and maintain its defense forces to overcome the threats and challenges to the country's national interests, sovereignty, and internal stability. However, since Ethiopian troops are intensively engaging in PSO, simply preparing for the traditional role of external defense of the armed forces is no longer sufficient for addressing today's needs. Additional roles have to be incorporated into the doctrine, organization, and training of the armed forces (Ehrhart, Schnabel, and Blagescu, 2002).

It should be realized that while basic military training lays a firm and essential foundation for the conduct of peace operations, the increasing complexity of contemporary peacekeeping demands the development of specific skills and attitudes. This need has to be addressed at the level of unit command and staff training at different levels of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, from squad leader training to the training of officers at the highest levels.

Currently, the general purpose of Ethiopian military training is fully focused on combat and occupational skills. This provides the core training for units and individuals deploying on peace support operations. However, since Ethiopia is committed to contribute troops to EASBRIG and the UN, general military knowledge and skills should be augmented with 'non-traditional' PSO–specific knowledge and skills. This process requires integration of PSO knowledge and skills into all military training curriculums.

The incorporation of peacekeeping training packages at all levels of leadership training will allow soldiers at every rank in the Ethiopian Armed Forces to have a basic knowledge of the principal aspects of peace operations. This approach to peacekeeping training, coupled with Ethiopia's past peacekeeping experiences, will assure that every member of the Ethiopian Armed Forces will be exposed to basic knowledge of peacekeeping operations, which will then ensure a common foundation for troop pre-deployment training for PSO.

E. TRAINING THE TROOPS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

> Troop contributing countries [States] shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly, release the standby contingents with the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged. . . (AU Protocol, 2002).

Ethiopia has a large military and it has been working to improve its capacity to participate in peace operations. Its next effort should focus not only on maximizing its participation, but also on improving the quality of its participation. The Ethiopian military must train for developing skills both to defend its country from aggressors and to engage in peace operations. Currently Ethiopia, being a member of the East African sub-region, has committed itself to contribute troops to EASBRIG. Moreover, since Ethiopia is committed to contribute troops to the UN and AU, it may be asked to respond immediately should a conflict in the sub-region arise. This highlights the need to organize peacekeeping contingents and be ready for any emergency requests made by EASBRIG, the AU, or the UN.

For what missions exactly is Ethiopia going to prepare the force? This question now has a clear answer. The AU is planning to deploy its standby forces for peacekeeping, and also, when necessary, for peace enforcement missions. Ethiopia, as a country contributing forces to EASBRIG, is also expected to deploy its troops for all the AU mission scenarios. Therefore, it is essential that in the preparation of Ethiopian peace troops they be able to conduct all types of peace operations successfully, from the traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping to more demanding Chapter VII peace enforcement.

1. Training for Peacekeeping Missions

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are to be accomplished in different conditions and typically require different means. Peacekeeping implies that parties in a conflict agree to a cease-fire, and accept the presence of specific and neutral forces to guarantee its observance. Although the peacekeepers' involvement is aimed at conflict reduction, they should not use their weapons except in self-defense. There might be situations which demand peacekeepers' actions but these are worst-case scenarios. For example, during the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia there were many clashes involving ECOMOG troops. Soldiers were held hostage and killed for unknown reasons by fighting parties. In some instances, rebels also attacked ECOMOG units. During these incidents, ECOMOG's ability to defend or to release the hostages was very limited. As the Liberian example suggests, peacekeepers are always liable to be exposed to attacks by fighting parties who breach the cease-fire with the aim of gaining some advantage in whatever negotiations that may be ongoing.

Because Ethiopians may find themselves in a situation similar to that of ECOMOG soldiers, it is essential that all members of the contingent complete an extensive pre-deployment training course. The responsibility for this training obviously is going to lie with the peace operations office in collaboration with the Training Main Department and other relevant departments. The leading role should rest with the peace operations office. This pre-deployment training should prepare troops based on the flow of information about all known aspects of the mission. Officers, especially, may be trained in the Peacekeeping Training Center, utilizing an information package that is provided beforehand. The content of this will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.

In general, the pre-deployment training can be divided into five sections: operational training, health briefing, administrative briefing, cultural awareness program, and human rights issues.

Specifics on training may include:

- Operational training sessions can be implemented if the mission mandate requires the peacekeepers to exercise executive powers (i.e., full police authority/powers) during their mission. Firearms training, self-defense training, criminal intelligence briefing and the Incident Management Intervention Model briefing are examples of Operational training.
- The health briefing is designed to prepare the peacekeepers mentally and physically. This is aimed at giving mission-specific information concerning the hazards to peacekeepers' health. (e.g., prevalence of disease, prophylactic measures, etc.).
- Administrative briefings would describe the administrative duties of troops in mission.
- The cultural awareness program provides information about the new cultural surroundings of the troops. This should not be limited to the country to which peacekeepers will be deployed, but may also include the cultures of the many partners who will be working with Ethiopian peacekeepers during their mission abroad.
- **"**Training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel" (AU Protocol. 2002, July 9-10).

2. Training for Peace Enforcement Missions

Peace enforcement is one of the missions that the EASBRIG could have to perform in the future to stop conflicts from escalating. Troops may be deployed for the purpose of peace enforcement against one party, especially when someone violates the peace in a certain region or situation. This mission may be mandated from the beginning, before deployment of the troops to the mission area, or the peacekeeping mission may shift to a peace enforcement mission, as it occurred in Somalia (UNOSOM Mandate, 1992). This type of mission is risky and requires military and peace support fighting capabilities. In order to be effective in such a mission, intense military training is required.

Since this type of operation means being engaged in fighting, casualties can be expected and losses are likely. As was seen even in traditional peacekeeping missions, self-defense capabilities of soldiers are essential and must be maintained. This was seen when seven Kenyan peacekeepers were killed in the line of duty even though they were among 130 of Kenya's best-trained soldiers sent to keep the peace in Sierra Leone, when

that country was at war with itself (Somalia Watch news, 2000, May). It needs to be recognized that since Ethiopia will be sending its soldiers on dangerous assignments, they should be equipped with the necessary weapons and have sufficient training to enable them to avoid the fate of the Kenyan peacekeepers.

The commanders and staff officers should be especially well-prepared and have the capability to assess the danger posed by the parties to the local conflict, analyze the complex situation on the ground, anticipate the development of new situations, and design possible courses of action to either use Ethiopian peacekeepers effectively or avert danger and future danger to them. However, as important as training is, priority should actually be given to the matter of selecting officers who are qualified for these types of missions in the first place. This is vital.

Attaining operational readiness of EASBRIG is key to the ASF's effectiveness as a whole. As Mitmkulu (2005) states, "The depth of each country's commitment to AU programs can be measured by the level of readiness of the pledged military regional ASF units." For the realization of this concept, one needs to get away from the idea of training or preparing only two or three battalions for peace operations. There is a need to train many of the forces so that they can be deployed or employed in any situation. To be ready for all eventualities requires having adequate supplies and training.

F. ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER

1. The Establishment of EPSTC

The Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center (EPSTC) is the center of excellence for peace support training. The Peace Support Training Center initially started at the beginning of 2005, at the Hurso Training Center in the eastern part of Ethiopia, 525 kilometers from Addis Ababa. Its aim was to keep pace with the ever-changing training requirements of the PSO of the Ethiopian Peace Force. Currently the Center has relocated to Debre Zeit, 45 km east of Addis Ababa. Now the EPSTC is responsible for the training of individuals designated for PSOs and is responsible for providing assistance to peacekeeping units in the designing and conducting of PSO training.

The school is run by the Training Main Department. The school currently prepares Ethiopian Forces personnel for deployment anywhere in the world for any peace support operation. The school's main mission, which is very similar to the Canadian PSTC Mission and Task (Canadian PSTC Mission and Task, 2003), is to provide a nucleus of expertise within the Ethiopian Defense Forces (EDF). This nucleus is in turn responsible for the development of peace support techniques (based on lessons learned), training methodology, training standards, and the provision of training and training support. The school is newly organized and needs more assistance from developed countries to conduct effective courses in the future. With this intent, the school is trying to maintain close links with other centers of excellence across the continent, especially with the peacekeeping schools in East Africa (e.g. Kenya). This co-operation has resulted in instructor exchanges, sharing of courseware, and better global training standards.

The training center, since its creation, has managed to handle the preparation of peacekeeping commanders, military observers and contingents prior to their deployments. Its contribution to preparing contingents and MIL OBs has been considerable (Tefera, 2006, July). What is needed now is to strengthen its efforts through enhancing instructors' capacity and lessons learned from previous missions.

The training center's guidelines for preparing Ethiopian troops for PSO should mainly focus on eliminating shortfalls and enhancing the positive experiences of the troops, based on lessons learned from previous missions. This can be handled through analysis of the performance of peacekeepers upon their return from PSO.

In general, the Peacekeeping Training Center's main tasks could be the following:

- Develop and standardize peacekeeping tactics and techniques for instruction at the center
- Conduct peacekeeping training for selected levels of command courses (company, battalion) and military observers who would deploy for peace missions
- Disseminate the experience gained by units and personnel which have participated in peace operations using the medium of training
- Produce and constantly update a handbook on peace operations, to be used as pocket references by individual officers and NCOs during both training and operations

- Participate in the curriculum development of all command levels of training to incorporate the peace support training packages

2. Training of Individuals

Ethiopian Forces members selected for deployment on a peace support operation that would be part of a contingent or unit in the future should be trained at PSTC. In regards to individual training, the school can render two types of courses: a basic course in PSO and a military observer course for how the PSO could be conducted. These courses could be scheduled throughout the year.

a. Peace Support Operations Basic Course

The Peace Support Operations Basic Course should be designed to prepare individual commanders and soldiers for future peacekeeping missions. All Ethiopian Forces members who are selected and assigned as individuals to a PSO should attend the course, regardless of military occupation, element, or rank. The course should focus on general military skills and knowledge with preparation for deployment to a PSO environment. The duration of the course should depend on the objective and the breadth of the course content.

The course content could be loosely grouped into three main parts:

- **Mission specific information**, such as the current operation structure and mandate, cultural awareness training, and the rules of engagement for the mission area
- **Personal effectiveness knowledge**, such as preventive medicine techniques, stress management techniques, and an awareness of threats and risks in a PSO such as operating in a mined environment
- **Pre-deployment preparations** that include legal preparations, family support, and allowances and benefits (Canadian PSTC Mission and Task, 2003).

b. Peace Support Operations Military Observer Course

The Peace Support Operations Military Observer (PSO MIL OBs) course may last one month. Officers selected as United Nations Military Observers should attend the qualification course. This should not include the language preparation phase. According to Col Tefera Haile (July 2006), the Center's commander, this task has been granted to the EPSTC for two years and it has trained three groups, each consisting of 26 MIL OBs.

For better future preparation of MIL OBs, the course should be built on the knowledge contained in the PSO Basic Course with the addition of topics specific to Military Observer duties and tasks. The course should also contain several practical exercises to simulate the unique and challenging environment in which a Military Observer will operate. The PSO Military Observer course may run two to four times a year. The officers' course and military observers' course programs should cover essential peace-operations issues, from human rights cooperation and coordination to negotiation and peace building initiatives. This course, coupled with the prior English language preparation, will enable the officer corps to acquire the knowledge and skills it needs to be effective in complex peace-operations environments.

The MIL OBs training should focus on creating qualified and competent personnel and the training should meet all the requirements and prerequisites of the UN for the training of MIL OBs. The MIL OBs training of the Canadian Force may be a model for Ethiopian MIL OBS training, which focuses mainly on:

- Being employed in a variety of missions that differ in their terrain, climate, level of intensity and degree of isolation, in urban and rural areas away from immediate support
- The MIL OB is employed as a member of a small multinational team, and may be required to lead that team. This will require command and leadership capability, for patrols, Ops and Ops centers, and negotiation/mediation ("Canadian Forces," 2003).

The overall final goal of the Military Observers training should be to enable the officers to perform the following activities:

- Monitor the disarmament, demobilization, regrouping and cantonment processes of military forces
- Assist in the location and confiscation of weapons caches
- Maintain liaison with and between belligerent factions, other (civilian) UN agencies, NGOs, and neighboring countries
- Provide assistance to humanitarian agencies in the supervision and conduct of prisoners of war exchanges, food distribution, the provision of medical care, etc.

In order to achieve the above-mentioned goal the Center may introduce the following lesson topics for MIL OBs:[14]

- The MIL OB's role in the context of the UN and UN PSO
- Understanding the personal conduct and ethics expected from an Ethiopian Mil OBs on PSO
- History and evolution of a PSO and understanding of AU/UN peace mechanisms and content
- Duties of MIL OBs
- Knowledge, discussion and application of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Risks and threats inherent to a PSO
- List the organizations and discuss the role of nonmilitary NGO, IO and UN agencies which may be operating in the PSO environment
- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its relationship to UN operations and individual conduct and responsibility
- Organizational design of the UN office responsible for mission support
- The Law of Armed Conflict
- The use of force for self-defense and ROEs
- Mission -specific information, such as mission statement, intelligence situation, terrain, cultural awareness and operational environment
- Briefing by Ethiopians regarding personal experiences on previous missions
- Personal requirements for deployment of MIL OBs, such as legal issues, allowances and benefits, pre-deployment administrative requirements
- Operational skills development, such as, how to conduct a MIL OBs patrol, escort, direct an OP or an Ops Center, conduct negotiations or mediate a dispute
- Other basic MIL OB skills, such as mine awareness, equipment and weapons recognition, how to observe and report, force protection, investigation techniques, driving skills, land navigation skills, UN communications procedures, staff duty, conduct of liaison and verification, understand the relations with the media, MIL OBs first aid

[14] The basic idea is drawn from the Canadian experience.

Military personnel at different levels of leadership and police personnel, after having received individual peacekeeping skills, need to have the chance to put into practice their skills in the PSTC prior to joining the contingent. Though the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Training Center is in its infancy, its vision should be including a variety of hands-on and field training exercises. In general, this training can be oriented towards developing essential qualities and conveying specific skills for peacekeeping.

3. Training Assistance to Units/Formed Contingents

Since the center's establishment, it has organized teams of instructors and conducted pre-deployment training for three contingents, each consisting of one battalion which deployed to Burundi, and seven battalions which deployed to Liberia under the UN mandate (Tefera, 2006, July). The training teams worked to provide PSO training, advice, assistance and support to peace contingents, which were formed units. The training team offered a full range of services and products that were tailored to meet the specific requirements of these contingents.

4. Evaluation and Validation

For the purposes of improving the quality of its training and producing qualified personnel for PSO, the EPSTC has to conduct reviews of the performance of peacekeepers after their return to Ethiopia through questionnaires, interviews, reports and other means. The PSTC team of instructors also may travel into theatres of operation to convene discussion groups with former students and their supervisors. This can be done with selected personnel who participated in PSO to review what went right and what went wrong in actual mission implementation. Using the feedback and lessons learned, the school should constantly develop and improve PSO-related instructional material.

Likewise, as with any instructional establishment, the PSTC is expected to conduct reviews of all courses. Input to these sessions comes from student questionnaires, student critiques and staff observations. Another method of improvement of skills is the use of after action analysis. With research along these lines, the centre can develop and improve its PSO-related instructional material.

G. PRE-DEPLOYMENT UNIT TRAINING

Designated units should receive six to eight weeks of mission-specific, pre-deployment training on a joint basis that includes the core infantry unit and integrated

specialists, such as engineers and military police. Unit-level peace operations training should focus on the special dimensions of peace operations; this is because soldiers have already mastered basic military skills prior to their selection to a peacekeeping battalion. At the same time, it is critical to give commanders prior training on peace support operation issues, since it is especially important that they be able to focus on adjusting attitudes and approaches from strictly military and combat-oriented tasks to PSO tasks.

The pre-deployment training for peace operations may take six to eight weeks and should include the following aspects:

- General introduction to peacekeeping
- Geography of the host country
- Background history to the conflict
- Culture, habits, religion, and characteristics of the local people
- Language training (useful elementary phrases such as greetings, thanks, halt, etc.)
- Specific task preparation (use of force, etc.)
- Review of SOPs and contingency plans (state of readiness, evacuation plans, disaster plans, etc.)
- Weapons and equipment identification
- Civil/military co-operation
- Force mandate, status of force agreement and other protocols
- The principles and rules of neutrality, reliability, and impartiality
- Updates on the situation in the area of operations

The final goal in training and preparation of Ethiopian peace troops for peace missions should be to enable the contingent to achieve interoperability with other contingents. Committed peacekeeping troops, despite having their origins in different countries, are expected to maneuver and operate as a single unit. In the Liberian experience, the area where the Ethiopian contingent deployed (Sector 4) was under the responsibility of an Ethiopian commander. In this zone were different countries' contingents who were working under the Ethiopian commander and had to cooperate in

order to fulfill the mission's objective. [15] The team of instructors from the EPSTC and other experienced officers who have participated in previous peace operations could make a significant contribution to the preparation of peace troops in this regard.

Indeed, in general, it is not only worthwhile for officers and NCOs who have had experience in peace operations to assist with training and preparation, but it is in keeping with Ethiopia's own peacekeeping legacy. "The officers of first Kagnew Battalion, who had already gained experience in the Korean War, have been ordered to assume the special training of the fighters of the third Kagnew Battalion" (Skordiles, 1954, p. 118). In many regards, the best teaches can be themselves.

[15] Military units attached to this Sector were three Ethiopian Infantry Battalions located at Greenville, Tappita, Zwedru and Cestos City; one Senegalese Infantry Battalion and Senegalese Level II Hospital in Harper; and a Chinese Engineering Company and a Chinese Level II Hospital in Zwedru. Retrieved on Sept 29, 2006, from http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

> Many do not realize that African nations already provide close to 30 percent of United Nations peacekeeping forces worldwide, with four African countries — Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa — among the top 10 UN troop contributors (Frazer, 2005).

Since the overthrow of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the formation of a democratic regime in 1994, domestic and international expectations have been heightened in regards to Ethiopia's role as an important member of the international community. These expectations indicate that Ethiopia has a leading role to play in the continent's peace missions.

The nature of these missions has changed noticeably over the past decade. This has been indicated in a South Africa White Paper on Peacekeeping Participation (1998):

> In less than a decade, United Nations peace operations have evolved rapidly and in an *ad hoc* fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multidimensional interventions where the military component is but one of many participants within an involved peace process.

Peacekeeping missions have become, essentially, multidimensional conflict management operations. Peace operations involve the concerted effort of the military, civilians, and police officers. So far, Ethiopia has only been contributing military contingents and military observers.

Though still only in small numbers, Ethiopia has started to send military observers on recent missions to Liberia and Burundi. Initially, less preparation was given to the military observers after their selection and not even the second group received sufficient background or training, given the rapidity with which they were deployed. Fortunately, Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center has taken over the responsibility to prepare the MIL OBs, which represents a major step forward. This must be further strengthened and the peacekeeping training center should build its capacity to prepare the MIL OBs with an adequate program and with experienced instructors. The selection of these observers should be performed ahead of time, even when there is no immediate

demand for the deployment of military observers. This prior preparation will facilitate the conduct of proper selection, provide sufficient training time, and could enable the school to conduct the full curriculum without any need for short cuts or omissions.

> Beyond the MIL OB's training, according to the country's resource[s], as much as possible, it is advisable to use every opportunity to send officers to attend a wide variety of peacekeeping courses in the region and abroad. This will establish a collection of knowledge and expertise among career officers, which can be utilized to enrich the quality of existing and planned training program for peace operations ("White Paper on SA," 1998).

Altogether, this would ensure a pool of competent personnel who would be available for any peacekeeping assignment.

The preparation and deployment of contingents up to now has generally been positive, though it has been conducted on short notice, mostly after the government accepted the UN request for a troop contribution. For better results, the preparation of contingents should be conducted ahead of time even in a situation when there is no immediate request from the UN or AU. Careful attention should be given to the selection of qualified officers for all command and staff posts. Generally, preparation should focus on enabling troops to achieve:

- The separation of combatants
- The disarmament of irregular forces
- The demobilization and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army
- Assistance with reintegration into civil society
- Assistance with elections for new governments

Ethiopia has pledged to contribute forces to EASBRIG. These forces are comprised of people with different skills who need special training and particular skills and expertise in communications, field engineering (including mine clearing), medical, and command and control functions relevant to peace support operations. In this regard, their preparation and training should also be conducted by their own experts as well as in the field of peacekeeping. They also should pass through the courses of the Peacekeeping Training Center.

A review of Ethiopian's past and present peace missions demonstrates that there have been major achievements as well as shortfalls in the capacity of Ethiopian contingents to discharge their peace missions. Despite the fact that all missions of Ethiopian contingents have been successful and their overall commitment is commendable — especially their participation in assisting the local population to rebuild and reconstruct essential facilities — there have also been weaknesses that should be eliminated and/or improved. They should be working hard to eliminate identifiable weaknesses and shortfalls for even greater rates of success in future peacekeeping missions.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Peacekeeping Allowances as a Potentially Contentious Issue

In many cases, the absence of clear and fair payment of allowances for UN peacekeeping participants could cause disciplinary problems in the army. Individual governments pay troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations according to their own national rank and salary scale. The United Nations reimburses countries volunteering military contingents and police units. The standard rates, approved by the General Assembly, are used to compensate the pay and allowances of all troops, along with supplementary payment for specialists (within infantry, logistics contingents, and formed police units). In addition, troop-contributing countries are reimbursed for the usage of personal clothing, gear, and equipment, including personal weaponry. According to the UN DPKO web site on how are peacekeepers compensated,

> The current rates of reimbursement paid by the UN to troop contributing countries per peacekeeper per month include: $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry.

Many countries issue clear directives about the per diem rates for their soldiers who are deployed on UN peacekeeping missions. On the first mission to Rwanda, when the Ethiopian contingent was deployed, there were no clear instructions about the allowances of the peacekeepers. The Guna Battalion was located next to the Ghanaian contingent. The Ethiopian peacekeepers had the opportunity to meet and discuss many issues regarding the Ghanaians' experience in peacekeeping missions. The Ethiopian peacekeepers were told by the Ghanaian peacekeepers that many of them had participated

in many missions and earned considerable money and had built houses, bought cars, and set aside money for their future needs. This issue, especially at the end of the first mission, was hot and even during the Chief of Staff's tour (in which the author participated), the contingent commander brought up the fact that there should be some arrangement in regards to the UN allowance for peacekeepers when they ended the mission.

Consequently, after the Guna contingent accomplished its mission and returned to Ethiopia it was recognized that something had to be done. There was a two-three days long discussion with the peacekeepers regarding the amount that they were going to be paid by the government. Many who accepted the amount that the government paid them then deserted from the army, taking the money they got, believing that they could lead a good life with that money. Others, though they continued their service, were still seriously affected, as was morale, and as a result a significant number of them were not happy.

In fact, the Ethiopian government, learning from such lessons, has put in place a plan for how peacekeepers are to be paid on their return home. The author believes the sum decided upon should be based on studying the experiences of different countries. Ethiopian peacekeepers find themselves working alongside peacekeepers from many other countries. These peacekeepers have the opportunity to discuss many things, including the allowances that they are being paid by their governments. Given this context and the ability of peacekeepers to compare notes, the standard of allowance, should be reasonable and acceptable to the peacekeepers.

The UN allowance issue is a very sensitive and dangerous issue for any military. When the author was a student in 1974, he remembers that participants in the Congo Peacekeeping Mission demonstrated and demanded that the Haile Selassie government issue them their unpaid allowances after so many years. Alternatively, there is a more recent example involving Nigeria and the issue of delayed payment:

> Non-payment of entitlements due to Nigerian soldiers and officers who took part in international peacekeeping operations is a source of unease inthe nation's armed forces and military authorities were said to be scared stiff that the development could degenerate into discontent among the rank and file of the armed forces (Global Policy Forum, 2002).

A related issue is that the amount of the allowance should be declared to peacekeepers before their departure. Announcing this up front will show transparency, create clarity, and will preclude problems from arising later. The same holds for the amount of money that the government will deduct. This deduction should be proportional. Here, too, it is a good idea to refer to the experiences of other countries and then take into account Ethiopia's economic level and other factors. Everybody needs to be made aware of the rationale behind the calculations. In the Nigerian situation for instance "Each of the affected soldiers is entitled to 900 dollars per month while 1,200 dollars is due to each officer, although the authorities deduct 300 dollars from each participant's pay for the use of the military in maintenance and rehabilitation of equipment" (Global Policy Forum, 2002).

Money always raises problems. For example, as was seen after the Rwandan mission when many soldiers received the accumulated funds from the government and then quit and returned to civilian life, one can lose experienced warriors and peacekeeping personnel if other effects are not made to retain them, maybe to include the promise of future deployments.

2. Expand Ethiopia's Fields of Participation in Peacekeeping Missions

Ethiopia's participation in Peacekeeping Operations up to now has mainly focused on sending military contingents. Ethiopia's participation in peace operations should be multilateral, which means the involvement of the Air Force, civilians with different skills who would participate in different UN activities, and civilian police.

a. Participation of Police Force in Peace Operation

A key component of contemporary peace operations is police officers. Members of the Ethiopian police force were sent to the Congo Peace Mission with the 1st Tekil Brigade with the aim of performing police duties and traffic services in the area where the Ethiopian contingent was deployed. However, since the UN regulation of that time did not permit the presence of police, these police officers and NCOs were assigned

to military duties with the contingent.[16] Now, with the further development of peacekeeping operations, the role of civilian police in peacekeeping missions has grown. Police conduct patrols, provide training, and advise local police services to help ensure compliance with human rights standards and assist in promoting the rule of law.

To the best of the author's knowledge, Ethiopian police officers are not currently participating in peacekeeping operations. However, for future peace operations, participation by police officers should be encouraged. They would need to be properly trained to be capable of assisting in peacekeeping efforts to ensure that law and order is maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. To these ends, the police and military institutions should establish communications, especially about the selection and preparation of their officers and effective use of scarce resources to eliminate unnecessary effort and duplication.

b. Air Force Participation in Peace Operations

The Air Force is the other component that should be incorporated into future peacekeeping operations. Ethiopia sent four Air Force aircraft to Congo, which showcased Ethiopia's overall military capacity in an era when many African states were still colonies. This contribution was much appreciated. Ethiopia's Air Force should continue this legacy and should be encouraged to participate in future peace operations, along with military contingents and civilian police. EASBRIG is mostly expecting to be deployed in the Eastern sub-region, so in this case Air Force helicopters and small transport planes may be deployed, much as the Ethiopian Air Force did in the 1960s in Congo. Nigeria and other countries do this frequently today.

c. Participation of Volunteer Civilians

Sending civilians on peace operations is not a current practice for Ethiopia. However, this is a very common practice in other African countries that participate heavily in peace operations, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya (see Appendix B). In the author's case, civilians are hired only for the purposes of language translation and food preparation for contingents.

---

[16] This is based on the author's translation from the Amharic report written by Col Teshome Irgetu commander of the 2nd Tekil Brigade in Congo to maj. Gen Issayas Gebresilase , commander of the Ethiopian Ground Forces.

In this regard, the approach should be changed since non-governmental organizations have become increasingly important players in the humanitarian and human rights areas. To create favorable conditions for participation by Ethiopian civilians as volunteers will likely become an increasingly important issue. These civilians could be engaged in a variety of activities, such as electoral monitoring and assistance, promoting and monitoring human rights, monitoring disarmament and adherence to sanctions, and providing humanitarian assistance. Specialized contractors could even engage in de-mining activities.

3. Peacekeeping Policy as a Tool to be Well-Organized

The government has reiterated its commitment to participate in peacekeeping operations for the realization of peace and stability in the sub-region, and in Africa as a whole. In this regard, it is strongly recommended that a policy is developed at the political level which would provide conceptual clarity as to the boundaries of peace operations, so that Ethiopia's Peace Force may participate more fully and confidently in future peace operations. There is a particular need for development of a common approach in regards to the situations in which Ethiopia's peace troops should participate and the processes by which they are selected to prepare and participate. This should be clearly articulated, ideally by the political body responsible for peacekeeping policy relating to peace support operations, and military support for relief and humanitarian operations. This in turn would assist the MOD in its development of guiding principles, and would enable it to design detailed directives in regards to the duties and responsibilities of each department for the support of the preparation and deployment of Ethiopia's peace troops.

Moreover, this peacekeeping policy should spell out what the procedures and requirements for recruitment should be and how peace troops are going to be trained and for what kinds of peacekeeping missions. For instance, too, how is one going to prepare, deploy and implement command and control of the peacekeepers? What is the involvement of other departments of the MOD in regards to troop preparation and support for the deployment throughout its duration? In general, the MOD may be responsible for the development of the peacekeeping policy. However, the principal guiding ideas should emanate from and be forwarded to the proper political entities.

The author raises these sample questions so that these and other relevant issues can be evaluated and properly addressed. Most ideal would be for an independent office and staff to be organized, with qualified staff members handling such issues directly under the Chief of Staff's office. There are many good lessons that can be learned from previous deployments, which suggest ways in which improvement can continue, to include improving organizational capacity to engaging in PSO. With acceptance of the need for having a responsible office for peacekeeping issues, one can move even further forward by separating it from the foreign relations office, and making it a critical component within the MOD.

C. SUMMARY

The first Ethiopian peace mission, Ethiopia's participation in Korean War to defend the principle of collective Security of the UN, has significant meaning for current and future member of the Ethiopian Armed Forces to recognize its legacy in peacekeeping missions: they were there at the outset. This tradition, Ethiopia's commitment to contribute its part to the effort to assure peace and stability in the region and beyond, has increased over time in the belief that peacekeeping is now becoming a new and effective way to mitigate conflict. However, this commitment demands greater efforts to foster peace and plays a key role both at regional and continental levels. Its next effort should focus not only on maximizing its participation, but also on improving the quality of its participation.

The Ethiopian military must train for developing skills both to defend its country from aggressors and to engage in peace operations. The Ethiopian MOD is continuing to effectively prepare, deploy, and maintain its defense forces to overcome the threats and challenges to the country's national interests, sovereignty, and internal stability. Besides this, since Ethiopian troops are intensively engaging in PSO, it is also essential to prepare its troop to be effective in future peace missions.

Currently Ethiopia has committed itself to contribute troops to EASBRIG, AU, and UN and it may be asked to respond immediately should a conflict in the sub-region or in the region arise. Therefore all efforts must be exerted to organize peacekeeping contingents and be ready for any emergency requests made by EASBRIG, the AU, or the UN.

APPENDIX A. ETHIOPIA'S PAST AND PRESENT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

No.	Contingents	Duration	Commander	No of Troops	Remarks
ETHIOPIA'S FIRST INTERNATIONAL MISSION IN KOREA, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND KOREA (UNCK) (1951 – 1956) COLONEL KEBEDE GEBRE – COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ETHIOPIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE					
1	1st Kagnew Battalion	June 51-April 52	Lt. Col Aman Andom later on Lt. Col Teshome Irgetu	341 officers and 5696 NCOs, totaling 6,037 troops in those five successive assignments. (Ethiopia MOD, 1962)	In 235 engagements 122 Killed and 566 Wounded; no one was captured (Skordiles, 1954).
2	2nd Kagnew Battalion	April 52-April 53	Lt. Col Asfaw Andarge		
3	3rd Kagnew Battalion	April 53-April 54	Lt. Col Welde Yohannes Shita		
4	4th Kagnew Battalion	April 1954-Aug 1956	Lt. Col Asfaw Habtemariam		
5	5th Kagnew Battalion		Captain Yohannes Misekir		
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) (JULY 1960-JUNE 1964)					
1	1st Tekil Brigade	July 1960- June 1961	Col Weldeyohanis Shita	3,000	
2	2nd Tekil Brigade	June 1961-April 1962	Col Teshome Irgetu		
3	3rd Tekil Brigade	May 1962-April 1963	Col Werku Metaferia		
4	4th Tekil Brigade	April 1963-June1964	Col Gizaw Belayneh		

ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) 1994-1995					
1	Guna Battalion	Aug 1994- April 1995	Col Taddele Gebresilase	830	61 officers, 61 NCO, 684 soldiers, 18 civilians
2	Wegagen Battalion	April 1995- July 1995	Col Alemishet Degife (Currently Maj. Gen.)	830	
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI (ONUB), 2003-TO DATE. Brig. Gen. GEBRAT AYELE, DEPUTY FORCE COMANDER					
1	1st Wegagen Battalion	Aug 2003-Aug 2004	Lt. Col Meley Amare	841	116 officers, 432 NCO, 328 soldiers
2	2nd Wegagen Battalion	Aug 2004-June 2005	Col Gebre Gebre Mariam	843	92 officers, 322 NCO, 429 soldiers
3	3rd Wegagen Battalion	June 2005-March 2006	Col Negash Hiluf	841	62 officers, 476 NCO, 303 soldiers
4	4th Wegagen Battalion	April 2006-Aug. 2006	Col Yirdaw G/ Ananaya	192	18 officers, 18 NCO, 156 soldiers
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNAMIL) 2004-TO DATE					
1	87th PK Brigade	Dec 2003-Sept 2004	Brig. Gen. Kemal Gelchu	1785	205officers, 467 NCO, 1113 soldiers
2	137th PK Brigade	Oct 2004- June 2005	Brig. Gen. Tsegaye Tesema	2,548	275officers, 805 NCO, 1468 soldiers
3	124th PK Brigade	June 2005-May 2006	Brig. Gen. Seyoum Hagos	2,544	348 officers, 1108 NCO, 1088 soldiers
4	27th PK Brigade	March 2006- Oct 2006	Brig. Gen. Berhanu Jula	2,551	311 officers, 1168 NCO, 1072 soldiers

Total number of troops sent for peace operations is more than 22,000 (From 1951-to date)

APPENDIX B. KOREAN WAR CASUALTY STATISTICS17

(From: Korean war casualty statistics Copyright (C) Dongxiao Yue, 1999 Retrieved on Sept 3, 2006, from http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html)

Country	KIA+ (Killed in Action)	Wounded	MIA (Missed in Action)	Captured	Total	Comments
S. Korea	227,800	717,100	43,500	?	984,400	Captured included in MIA?
US	54,229	103,248	8,142	3,746	169,365	KIA included the 20,600 accidental fatality
UK	710	2,278	1,263	766	5,017	
Turkey	717	2,246	167	217	3,349	
Australia	291	1,240	39	21	1,591	
Canada	309	1,055	30	2	1,396	
France	288	818	18	11	1,135	
Tailand	114	794	5	0	913	
Greece	169	543	2	1	715	
Holland	111	589	4	0	913	
Columbia	140	452	65	29	686	
Ethiopia*	120	536			656	
Philippines	92	299	57	40	488	
Belgium/Luxe	97	350	5	1	453	
New Zealand	34	80		1	115	

17 Korean war casualty statistics Copyright (C) Dongxiao Yue, 1999 Retrieved on sept 3, 2006 from http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html.

South Africa	20		16	6	42	
Japan	Several			1		
PRC	132,000	238,400	8,000	21,400	392,600	

* The data shows that no one was missing in action or captured during the war in Korea

APPENDIX C. MAP OF UNMIL SECTOR 4, ETHIOPIAN DEPLOYMENT AS OF FEBRUARY 2005

(From: UNMIL Sector 4, Ethiopian Deployment as of February 2005, http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

Afele, M. (2000), Peacekeepers are Ghana's treasured export. *Dateline: Accra, Ghana.* Retrieved September 23, 2006, from http://www.library.yale.edu/~fboateng/peace.htm database.

Alemeshet Degfe.(Col) (1995). Guna Battalion's report on the mission to Rwanda taken from Amharic version. Unpublished manuscript.

Ali, T. M., & Matthews, R. O. (Eds.). (1999). *Civil wars in Africa: Roots and resolution.* London: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Alusala, N. (2004). African standby force east Africa moves on, *ISS. African Security Review, Vol 13*(No 2) Retrieved August 3, 2006, from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/13No2/EAlusala.htm database.

AU protocol. (2002). Retrieved August 24, 2006, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf

Benneh, G., & Morgan, W. B., et Uitto, J. I. (Eds.). (1996). *Sustaining the future: Economic, social, and environmental change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press.

Benton, B. (Ed.). (1996). *Soldiers for peace: Fifty years of United Nations peacekeeping.* New York: American Historical Publications.

Berman, E., & Sams, K. E. (2000). *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities*. Geneva; Pretoria: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; Institute for Security Studies.

Canbberas in the Congo. Retrieved on July 2, 2006, from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Congo/

Canadian forces training plan for MIL OBs, training establishment: Peace support training center, Kingston. (2003). Retrieved September 25, 2006, from http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/documents/milobs/PSTC_MO_TP_en.pdf

Canadian peace support training Center/Mission and tasks. Retrieved August 3, 2006, from http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/mission.asp

Cawthorne, A. (2006). Mogadishu protesters march against foreign troops. *Reuters,* Retrieved August 4, 2006 from http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=887522006

Cilliers, J., & Malan, M. (2005). Progress with the African standby force. *Occasional Paper, 98*

Conflict resolution in Africa. (2004). Retrieved August 30, 2006 from http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_03_16_papers/conflict_resolution.doc

Conflict trends, introduction no 3. (2002). Retrieved August 4, 2006, from http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/ACCORDpking2002.html

Constitutive act of AU. (2002). Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.pdf

Cooper, T. (2003). Congo, part 1; 1960-1963. *Central, Eastern, & Southern Africa Database*. Retrieved August 23, 2006 from http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/printer_182.shtml

Dallaire, R. (2004). *Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda.* NY: Carroll & Graf Publishers.

De Coning, C. (2005). Refining the African standby forces concept. Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 13, 2006, from http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ctrends204/CT2_2004%20PG%2020-26.pdf

Deng, F. M., and Zartman, I. W., (2002). *A strategic vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement.* . Arlington, Virginia: Brookings Institution Press.

Diouf, B. (1998). *The future of conflict resolution in Africa and the role of the organization of African Union*. (Master of Science, Naval Postgraduate School). (In NPS Library)

EASBRIG communiqué of the council of ministers of defense and security of eastern Africa. Retrieved August 3, 2006, from http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/easbrig/comm13sep05.pdf

Ehrhart, H., Schnabel, A. & Blagescu, M. (2002). Towards more effective assistance in security sector reform. Retrieved August 29, 2006 from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=20181

Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington DC. (2003). Ethiopian military contingent to Burundi accorded farewell two days ahead of departure. Retrieved August 19, 2006 from http://ethiopianembassy.org/news092603_2.shtml

Emlaelu Worede (Engineer Colonel), (2006).Message. *Kagnew Magazine Special Edition on the Occasion of the 55th Commemoration Day and the Inauguration of Kagnew Memorial Statue and the Museum in Ethiopia. Feruary. 26, 2006*

Ethiopia to send peacekeeping troops to Burundi. (2003), Retrieved on July 23, 2006 from, http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2003/01/31-01-03/Send.htm database.

Ethiopia, champion of peace. *Best practices, News Letter 9*. Retrieved August 14, 2006, from http://www.mfa.gov.et/Press_Section/Newsletter9/BestPractices9.htm

Ethiopia: Liberians laud Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent. (2006, June 14, 2006). *The Ethiopian Herald.* Retrieved July 23, 2006, from http://allafrica.com/stories/200606140746.html database.

Ethiopian forces, Retrieved August 23, 2006 from http://www.korean-war.com/ethiopia.htm

Ethiopian MOD media center. (2006). Data from Amharic draft report on the Ethiopian contingents in Liberia. Unpublished manuscript.

Ethiopian MOD, (2006*). A Magazine on Medal Ceremony to the 124th Ethiopian Peacekeeping Brigade.*

Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrination & Public Relations Center, (2004). *"Image of defense". the Ethiopian Army in International Peacekeeping Missions-1951-2004*

Ethiopian MOD. (1962). Summary of the Korean participation report found from archive of the. Unpublished manuscript.

Ethiopian News Agency. (2004). Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent discharging duty effectively. Retrieved September 12, 2006 from http://www.ethiopiaemb.org.cn/bulletin/826/006.html

Ethiopian News Agency. (2004). Meles hails commitment, sense of mission of Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in Burundi. Retrieved September 12, 2006 from http://www.telecom.net.et/~ena/archivenglish/FEBRUARY2004/132413.1602.htm

Faria, F. (2004). Crisis management in Sub-Saharan Africa. the role of the European union. *EU-ISS Occasional Paper, No. 51*, April 2004. Retrieved August 225, 2006, from http://aei.pitt.edu/1615/

Fitz-Gerald, A. M. (2003). Multinational land force interoperability: Meeting the challenge of different cultural backgrounds in chapter VI peace support operations. *Choices, Vol. 8* (No.3). Retrieved September 29, 2006, from http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol8no3.pdf

Frazer, J. E. (2005). Consolidate Africa's progress, promise now, *USINFO.STATE. GOV.* Retrieved August 3, 2006 from http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2005/Nov/18-970005.html

Frazer, J. E. (2005). Testimony before the senate foreign relations subcommittee on African affairs, assistant secretary of state outlines regional challenges for senate panel. Retrieved August 2, 2006 from http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2005/Nov/18-970005.html

Geeska Africa online & Han. (2005, April 13). East African standby brigade will help end wars in Somalia. Retrieved September 3, 2006, form http://www.geeskaafrika.com/somalia_13apr05.htm

Global Policy Forum. (2002, January 28). Nigeria; soldiers worry over pay for UN job ' peacekeeping entitlements unpaid'. Retrieved July 23, 2006, 2002, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/finance/nigeria.htm

Harsch, E. (2003). Africa builds its own peace forces: As big powers hold back, continent works to strengthen its capacities. *Africa Recovery, Vol.17* (#3), Aug 3, 2006. Retrieved August 3, 2006, from http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no3/173peace.htm

Hutchful, E. (1999). The ECOMOG experience with peacekeeping in West Africa. l. *Monograph no 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?* Retrieved September 5, 2006, from http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.htm

Indeshaw, Haile-Gebriel. (2004, September 28). Premier reaffirms commitment to African peacekeeping effort. *Political Ethiopia News Items.* Retrieved September 12, 2006 from http://lists.sn.apc.org/pipermail/pol.ethiopia/2004-September/003105.html

Indian air force. Camberas in the Congo. Retrieved August 18, 2006http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Congo01.html

James Busumtwi-Sam, R. (Ed.). (1999). Redefining "Security" after the cold war: The OAU, the UN, and conflict in Africa. In Ali, T. Mohamed A. & Matthews, R. O. (eds). *Civil wars in Africa: Roots and resolutions. (pp. 257-287).* McGill: Queen University Press.

Juma, M., & Aida M. The infrastructure of peace in Africa assessing the peace building capacity of African institutions. A report submitted by the Africa program of the international peace academy to the ford foundation. */International Peace Academy/.* Retrieved September 2, 2006, 2002, from http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/FORD.pdf

Kent, V., & Malan, M. (2003). The African standby force *progress and prospects. . African Security Review, Vol 12No.3*. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/E2.html

Kofi Annan. 'Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa'. *Conflict Trends, No. 3/2002*. Retrieved September 3, 2006, from http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/ACCORDpking2002.html

Korean War. United Nations command. Retrieved August 14, 2006, from http://www.korean-war.com/unitednations.html

Kwiatkowski, K. U. (2000). *African crisis response initiative (ACRI): Past present and future?* Colorado: Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy.

Laremont, R. R. (Ed.). (2002). *The causes of war and the consequences of peacekeeping in Africa.* Portsmouth: Heinemann.

Liberia – complex emergency. (2004). *USAID Fiscal Year 2004, Situation Report no. 11* Retrieved July 23, 2006, from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/mano_river/fy2004/Liberia_CE_SR11_2-03-2004.pdf

Liberia-UNMIL-mandate. Retrieved July 12, 2006http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/mandate.html

Marshall, S.L. A. (1953). *Pork chop hill: The American fighting man in action in Korea.* Nashville: The Battery Press.

Maurer, M. E. (1994). *Coalition command and control.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Meles reaffirms commitment to peace-keeping missions. (2004). *The Monthly Publication of Ethiopian Embassy in London. Vol 4* (No 2). Retrieved August 24, 2006, from http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/articles/Newsletter%20October%202004.htm

Memorandum of understanding on the establishment of the eastern Africa standby brigade. Addis Ababa, 11 April 2005. Retrieved August 2, 2006 from www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/easbrig/mouapr05.pdf

Military tradition in national life. Retrieved August 14, 2006 from http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/ethiopia

Mitmkulu, B. (2005). The African Union and peace support operations. Retrieved August 3, 2006 from http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2005-4/ct4_2005_pgs34_36.pdf

Neethling, T. Shaping the African standby force: Developments, challenges, and prospects. *Military Review, May-June, 2005*. Retrieved August 2, 2006, from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_85/ai_n13824963

Panafrican News Agency (PANA), 2004. "West African commission endorses standing force," Retrieved August 23, 2006 from http://www.panapress.com/newslatf.asp?code=eng046289&dte=19/06/2004

Pankhurst, R. A history of early twentieth century Ethiopia. Retrieved August 17, 2006 from http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/ethiopia/pankhurst/early_20th_cent_ethiopia_4.htm

Policy framework for the establishment of the eastern Africa standby brigade (EASBRIG). (2005). Retrieved August 17, 2006 from http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/easbrig/polframapr05.pdf

Political Ethiopia News Items, (2003). Retrieved on September 3, 2006 from http://lists.sn.apc.org/pipermail/pol.ethiopia/2003-September/002921.html

Political Ethiopia News Items, (2004, June 7). Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in Liberia receives medals, ribbons. Retrieved September 1, 2006, from http://lists.sn.apc.org/pipermail/pol.ethiopia/2004-June/003056.html

Profile IGAD. (2005). Retrieved July 3, 2006 from http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/igadprof.htm

Rene, L. R. (Ed.). (2002). *The causes of war and the consequences of peacekeeping in Africa.* Portsmouth, NH, Heinemann.

Report of the meeting of Eastern Africa CDS held at Windsor golf club in Nairobi on 13th July 2005. Retrieved June 28, 2006 from http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/defstaffrptjul05.pdf

Rotberg, R. I., et al., . (2000). *Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: Method of conflict prevention* . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Selassie, Haile I. (1936). Appeal to the League of Nations. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selassie.htm

Serafino, N. M. (2004, October 4). Peacekeeping and related stability operations: Issues of US military involvement. *CRS issues brief for congress.* Retrieved August 2, 2006, from http://www.senate.gov/~hutchison/IB94040.pdf

Skordiles, K. (1954). *Kagnew: The story of the Ethiopian fighters in Korea*. Tokyo, Japan: Radiopress.

Smock, D. R. (1993). *Making war and waging peace.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Somalia Watch News. (2000). Deaths signal a rethink of peacekeeping duties. Retrieved August 23, 2006 from http://www.somaliawatch.org/Archivemay/000505103.htm

Tefera Haile (Col), Commander of the EPSTC. In Col Haile Araya (Ed.), *from note on the overview of the EPSTS.* Addis Ababa:

The Ethiopian Herald, (2006, March 18). Retrieved September 3, 2006, from http://www.ethpress.gov.et/Herald/articlefront.asp

UN DPKO. (2004). Contributions to UN PKO. Retrieved July 23, 2006, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2004/August2004_1.pdf

UN DPKO. (2006). Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/jan06_2.pdf

UN DPKO. How are peacekeepers compensated? Retrieved September 4, 2006 from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q10.htm

UN DPKO. Republic of the Congo-ONUC background. Retrieved August 14, 2006, from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucM.htm

UN missions summary of military and police mission description of post members. Retrieved August 13, 2006, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/jan06_4.pdf

UN vital peacekeeping data, peacekeeping from the millennium report. Retrieved September 6, 2006 from http://cyberschoolbus.un.org/briefing/peacekeeping/peacekeeping.pdf

U.S. assistance to Africa, Ethiopia. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60651.pdf

Van Beveren, R. (1993). Military cooperation: What structure for the future? *EU-ISS Chaillot, Paper 6*

Varhola, M. J. (2000). *Fire & ice: The Korean war, 1950-1953.* Mason City, Iowa: Savas Publishing Co.

White paper on South African participation in international peace missions approved by cabinet on 21 October 1998. Retrieved August 22, 2006 from http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white_papers/peacekeeping.html

Working paper sites of political science country biography index. Retrieved August 14, 2006, from http://workingpapers.org/country/ethiopia.htm

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Anna Simons
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

4. Nancy Roberts
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

5. Samora Yenus, Lt. Gen.
   Ethiopian Ministry of Defense
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

6. Taddesse Worede, Maj. Gen.
   Ethiopian Ministry of Defense
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

7. Halefom Alemu, Brig. Gen.
   Ethiopian Ministry of Defense
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

8. Said Djinnit, Amb.
   African Union HQ
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

9. United Nations Peacekeeping Training
   UN DPKO
   New York, New York

10. Professor Kinfe Abreham
    Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD)
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

11. Haile Selassie gebru, Brig. Gen.
    Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations
    New York, New York