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Containing ethnic conflicts through ethical voting? Evidence from Ethiopia

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HiCN Working Paper 35

November 2007

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Keywords: Africa, Ethiopia, ethnic conflict, voting behavior, aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity.

JEL Codes: D02, D63, D64, D72, H77, N47

Acknowledgements: I thank Ignace Adant, Maurice Baslé, Jean-Claude Berthélemy, Pierre Cahuc, Jon Elster, Jean-Michel Grandmont, Guy Laroque, Jean-François Laslier, Etienne Lehmann, Gérard Prunier, Eric Strobl, Michael Visser, Léonard Wantchekon and seminar/conference participants at New-York University (2006), USAID (Washington, 2006), Ecole Polytechnique (Palaiseau, 2006), CREST (Malakoff, 2006), AFSE (Paris, 2006), Public Economic Theory (Hanoi, 2006), Social Choice and Welfare (Istanbul, 2006), University Paris I (2006), Applied Microeconomics Days (Nantes, 2006), Centre for the Study of African Economies (Oxford, 2006), and ADRES Doctoral Days (Marseille, 2006) for helpful comments. I am also grateful to the 'Chaire de Développement Durable de l'Ecole Polytechnique' for the funding of my stay in Ethiopia.

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1 Motivation

The impact of ethnic heterogeneity on economic development has triggered off a large interest among economists and political scientists over the last decade (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey). Research on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic development is based on a definition of ethnicity which goes back to the seminal works of Schermerhorn (1970), Banton (1983) and Horowitz (1985). These authors define ethnicity as a sense of common belonging derived from a 'real or putative common ancestry' (Schermerhorn (1970)). In reality, ethnic cleavages are often characterized by both objective and subjective foundations so that ethnic belonging is neither a pure falsification nor a scientifically determinable social phenomenon. The intermediate status of ethnicity between objectivity and subjectivity is widely considered by social scientists as the fundamental reason why the traditional obstacles to collective action presented by Olson (1971) tend to disappear when it get organized along ethnic lines. Objective and subjective feelings of ethnic belonging are indeed likely to create the necessary level of affect, emotions and other non rational factors to trigger off the unconditional participation of an individual in the defense of his ethnic group's interest (see Smith (1986) and Carment (1993) for a discussion). Yet, the impact of ethnic mobilisation and competition on economic development may fluctuate, depending on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity shown by the context in which the mobilisation and the competition occur. Research has initially focussed on the economic impact of ethnic fractionalization. More recently however, a greater attention has been paid to the economic consequences of ethnic polarization.

Ethnic fractionalization is captured through an index called the 'ethnolinguistic fractionalization index' ('ELF index' henceforth). The ELF index was originally calculated by Taylor and Hudson (1972). It has a simple interpretation as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group.

Several studies have found a negative direct impact of ethnic fractionalization on growth (see Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003)). There also exists strong empirical evidence of the negative indirect impact of ethnic fractionalization on growth. Mauro (1995) finds out that ethnic fractionalization enhances corruption which itself lowers investment in productive activities and thereby reduces economic growth. La Porta et al. (1999) emphasize the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on various indicators of 'government performance' like the protection of property rights or the limitation of government expenditures which significantly increase economic growth (see Knack and Keefer (1995) for the economic impact of the protection of property rights; see Barro (1991) and Tavarez and Wacziarg (2001) for the economic impact of the ratio of government consumption to GDP). Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) provide evidence that ethnic fractionalization significantly lowers inter-individual trust which is a determining factor of economic growth (see Algan and Cahuc (2007)). However, while the devastating character of civil

wars on both the host country's and its neighbours' growth has been confirmed (see Alesina et al. (1996) and Murdock and Sandler (2002, 2004)), none of the studies which investigated the impact of ethnic fractionalization on the emergence of civil wars[1] concluded that this impact was positive and significant (see Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002, 2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a)).

Alesina et al. (1999) develop a theoretical argument explaining the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on growth. They assume that citizens' demand for growth-enhancing public goods (education, roads, health care) decreases as ethnic fractionalization increases because of ethnic prejudice. More specifically, the support for public good policies of an individual belonging to a specific ethnic group decreases when the proportion of people belonging to other ethnic groups among the potential beneficiaries increases. This theoretical assumption has been empirically backed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) and by Luttmer (2001). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) show that American citizens living in racially fragmented communities are significantly less likely to participate in collective activities than American citizens living in more racially homogenous communities. Luttmer (2001) provides strong empirical evidence that 'racial group loyalty' in the US significantly induces nonblack (black) citizens to reduce their support for welfare spending when an additional black (nonblack) welfare recipient emerges in his tract. The non significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the emergence of civil wars is somewhat easier to interpret. Horowitz (1985), the seminal reference on the issue of ethnic groups in conflict, had already emphasized that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and civil wars is not monotonic. One indeed expects more violence in societies where a large ethnic minority faces ethnic majority and less violence in highly heterogenous societies. The main reason behind this intuition has been developed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). They claim that the coordination costs for the implementation of collective action in ethnically polarized societies are substantially lower than in ethnically fractionalized societies. Research on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic development has therefore shown an increasing interest in completing the analysis of the economic impact of ethnic fractionalization by the analysis of the economic impact of ethnic polarization.

Ethnic polarization is captured through an index called the 'ethnic polarization index' ('EP index' henceforth). The EP index was originally proposed by Reynal-Queyrol (2002)[2]. It ranges from 0 to 1 and increases the closer the ethnic composition of a country gets to a benchmark (coinciding with the highest level of polarization) where the population is composed of two ethnic groups standing for exactly one half of the population. When confronting the defini-

[1] The definition of 'civil war' in these studies generally coincide with the definition provided by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Notably, the first requirement for an armed conflict to be referred to as a 'civil war' is that it caused more than one thousand deaths.

[2] In the context of income, the polarization index was initiated by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994).

tion of the ELF index with the definition of the EP index, one would expect that the correlation between both indexes is positive and high for low levels of ethnic fractionalization. For high levels of ethnic fractionalization however, one would anticipate a negative correlation between both indexes. These intuitions are empirically confirmed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b).

Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) investigate the impact of ethnic polarization on economic development. They find out that, contrary to ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization has no direct effect on growth. However, they tease out the significant enhancing effect of ethnic polarization on the emergence of civil wars, thereby confirming that the effect of ethnic polarization on growth is indirect.

The channel through which ethnic polarization increases the probability of civil war onset mostly consists in the division of political parties along ethnic lines in ethnically polarized societies[3]. Banerjee and Pande (2007) define 'ethnic political parties' as 'political parties which derive their support from, and claim to serve the interests of, an identifiable ethnic group'[4]. The reasons why political parties tend to divide along ethnic lines in ethnically polarized countries are essentially functional. First, as already emphasized, feelings of ethnic belonging facilitate collective action and therefore strengthens the support of grassroots to the ethnic party which represents their interest. Second, ethnic patronage is one of the easiest way for politicians to reward grassroots for their support (see Chandra (2004)). Third, ethnic identities are relatively fixed. From a strategic differentiation point of view, the incentive for a political party to defend the interests of its ethnic group is strong since there is less risk that others will adopt the same identity in order to get power (see Fearon (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2006)). The division of political parties along ethnic lines in ethnically polarized societies is expected to enhance ethnic competition for the control of national resources and to consequently stir up ethnic grievance as soon as the ethnic majority deprives minority ethnic groups from part of what they consider as their 'fair share' of national resources. In other words, in ethnically polarized countries where political parties tend to divide along ethnic lines, the potentiality of conflict is particularly high.

From what has been written, the overall effect of ethnic heterogeneity on economic development, should one consider ethnically fractionalized or ethnically polarized countries, seems negative[5]. In ethnically fractionalized countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to favor the public delivery of private goods

[3]In ethnically fractionalized societies, the division of political parties along ethnic lines would make little sense since none of the ethnic parties would benefit from a sufficiently large support to get power.

[4]Note that the emergence of ethnic political parties in societies which are ethnically polarized is rather a particularity of developing countries. Western democracies are characterized by a long history of economic development and modernization which favors the supremacy of cleavages based on income classes over ethnic cleavages, even when the degree of ethnic polarization is high. Lipset (1960) emphasizes: 'the principal generalization which can be made [concerning Western democracies] is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes'.

[5]Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) compute that the reduction in economic growth

to local ethnically homogenous communities over nationwide provision of productive public goods. This has a clear negative effect on national economic growth since national resources are wasted into non productive vote-catching activities. Note that low economic growth and subsequent low per capita income are in turn likely to trigger off outbreaks of violence, as it has been shown by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b)[6]. In ethnically polarized countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote for their ethnic party which increases ethnic grievance and the probability of civil war. This conflicting context in turn affects economic growth negatively. Whatever the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, it therefore appears that ethnic group loyalty increases the probability for a country to be locked in a conflict-poverty trap. Finding ways of mitigating the effect of ethnic group loyalty on individuals' vote, specially in low-income ethnically heterogenous countries, could therefore be a promising strategy to enhance economic development. In both cases, this strategy boils down to favoring 'ethical voting'. In the case of ethnically fractionalized countries, 'ethical voting' would amount to renouncing of the material benefit of publicly provided private goods at a local level to promote instead a nationwide provision of productive public goods likely to maximize the country's global surplus. In the case of ethnically polarized countries, 'ethical voting' would rather amount to renouncing of voting for one's ethnic party (which is likely to deprive other ethnic groups from part of their 'fair share') to promote instead a non ethnic party favoring an equitable allocation of national resources among ethnic groups. Broadly speaking, ethical voting in an ethnically polarized country boils down to expressing aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity through one's vote.

Wantchekon (2003) and Atchade and Wantchekon (2006) provide first clues about how to enhance ethical voting in an ethnically fractionalized context. They concentrate on Benin which shows a high ELF index of 0.868 (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b)). Note that over the 138 countries worldwide, only 7 have a larger ELF index than Benin. Wantchekon (2003) presents the results from a field experiment that he conducted during the first round of the 2001 presidential elections in Benin, with the cooperation of political candidates. More specifically, in a first group of treatment villages, political candidates were competing along platforms which were exclusively promoting a nationwide provision of productive public goods (education, roads, health care). In a second group of treatment villages, political candidates were competing along platforms which were exclusively promoting publicly provided private goods at a local level (among which the hiring of local people in public administration). The con-

triggered off by the indirect influence of ethnic polarization is as large as the reduction in economic growth resulting from the direct effect of ethnic fractionalization.

[6]According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), a higher per capita income is associated with a lower risk of civil war onset because (i) it is a proxy for a state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities, and (ii) it characterizes more developed countries with terrain more 'disciplined' by roads and rural society more penetrated by central administration. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), a low economic growth and a low per capita income are associated with a greater risk of civil war onset because it facilitates the enrollment of people by rebels at low cost.

trol villages were exposed to the regular platforms consisting in a mix between promises of a nationwide provision of productive public goods and promises of publicly provided private goods at a local level. Wantchekon (2003) finds out that the support to political candidates in the 'public good' treatment villages was significantly lower than in the control villages. Conversely, the support to political candidates in the 'private good' treatment villages was significantly higher than in the control villages. This empirical evidence is consistent with the fact that vote-catching political platforms are more successful than political platforms enhancing the nationwide provision of productive public goods in ethnically fractionalized countries because of ethnic prejudice. Atchade and Wantchekon (2006) analyze the sociodemographic determinants reducing the impact of ethnic group loyalty on individuals' vote and enhancing instead 'ethical voting' (i.e: the support to nationwide public good policies). They find out that travelling frequently across the country, speaking more than one language, watching TV regularly, and having a child living outside the village significantly lowers individuals' temptation to support vote-catching political platforms. In other words, individuals which do not perceive Benin as completely fractionalized are significantly more likely to promote 'public good' policies. This result suggests that campaigns of civic education aiming at reducing the psychological distance between ethnic groups could have a significant positive effect on economic development in highly ethnically fractionalized countries.

To our knowledge, no research has been dedicated so far to determining whether 'ethical voting' would help reduce risks of conflicts in highly ethnically polarized countries. The published research on conflict-reducing strategies in this context has essentially focussed on institutional design, and notably on the institutional arrangements favoring an efficient power-sharing among ethnic parties (see Rothchild (1996) and Bardhan (1997) for an overview). However, if such institutional arrangements are necessary, they are clearly not sufficient conditions for the settlement of conflicts in ethnically polarized countries. As shown by Schneckener (2002), the best power-sharing constitution will fail if favourable conditions are missing, among which the support for power-sharing arrangements by citizens. This condition was already emphasized by Przeworski (1991) who writes: 'if sovereignty resides with the people, the people can decide to undermine all the guarantees reached by politicians around a negotiation table. Even the most institutionalized guarantees give at best a high degree of assurance, never certainty'. Our paper therefore aims to conclude whether, in an ethnically polarized country, aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity lowers citizens' temptation to support their ethnic party and induces them to vote instead for a non ethnic party promoting an equitable allocation of national resources among ethnic groups. We also intend to give some preliminary insights into the sociodemographic determinants of both ethnic group loyalty and aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity. We concentrate on Ethiopia which shows a high EP index of 0.778 (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b)). Note that over the 138 countries worldwide, only 15 have a larger EP index than Ethiopia. This highly polarized context has favored the breakdown of political

parties along ethnic cleavages since the instauration of democracy in the early 90s, what is referred to as the 'ethnicization' of Ethiopian politics by Vaughan (2003). The ethnicization of Ethiopian politics has been generating an increasing grievance among ethnic groups which makes the tension between ethnic group loyalty and aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity behind Ethiopian citizens' vote particularly vivid. Note that in their 2005 Peace and Conflict Report, Gurr and Marshall point out that Ethiopia is among the five countries[7] having five or more of the seven risk factors that have preceded mass killings of the past half-century (see Harff (2003) for a presentation of these risk factors).

More specifically, we base our analysis on a survey that we conducted in May 2004 among 331 students from Addis Ababa University, one year before May 2005 national elections. One may consider the nature of our subject pool as a serious drawback. However, although university students do not constitute a representative sample of the Ethiopian general population, we expect to derive from this very specific subject pool some rough insights into the voting behavior of the average Ethiopian citizen. We back this expectation by the claim that the intensity of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity in students' voting behavior constitutes an 'upper bound' of the intensity of this concern for fairness in the voting behavior of the average citizen. Three main reasons motivate this claim. First, the university context is known to be a cosmopolitan one. The campus community favors greater interactions between people from different social, cultural and religious backgrounds than its surrounding society. This cosmopolitan context is therefore expected to reduce the 'psychological' distance between individuals from different ethnic groups. Second, promotion in the academic studies is based on merit which is often in contrast to the advancement traditions of developing societies where pre-modern ties, like ethnic ones, keep playing an important role. This meritocratic context may reduce students' reliance on ethnic patronage in their everyday life and notably in their voting behavior. Third, and most importantly, Altbach (1984) recalls that the prominence of anti-establishment ideologies is the main particularity of university student politics. More specifically, the university context induces students to develop an 'oppositional' political subculture running counter the political dominant ideology by looking critically at the functioning of the society in which they live, and searching for solutions to the problems potentially endangering its stability. In an ethnically polarized country threatened by inter-ethnic conflict like today's Ethiopia, it is therefore likely that students struggle for the introduction of non ethnic politics[8]. Consequently, if we find out that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity does not exert any significant influence on university students' vote, we will conclude that there is little hope for this ethical concern to impact the voting behavior of a more representative cross section of the Ethiopian population.

[7]The four other countries are Algeria, Burma, Burundi and Rwanda.

[8]Note that, conversely, students struggled for the empowerment of ethnic groups when Ethiopia was submitted to Haile Selassie's and Mengistu's totalitarian regimes which were denying people their ethnic identity and culture.

Our findings yield reasons for both optimism and pessimism. First, we show that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity significantly lowers university students' temptation to vote for their ethnic party, even when controlling for a wide range of motivations influencing the trade-off between voting for one's ethnic party and voting for a non ethnic party. This finding is encouraging since it suggests that ethical concerns could also influence the voting behavior of the average Ethiopian citizen. Enhancing inter-ethnic tolerance through civic education programmes could therefore be a promising conflict-reducing strategy in ethnically polarized countries. Second however, we provide evidence that, though significant, the relative impact of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity is very small in comparison to the impact of ethnic group loyalty which determines ethnic voting. This finding is discouraging since it suggests that the relative impact of ethical concerns will be even lower across a more representative sample of the Ethiopian population. In other words, the 'return' on nationwide civic education programmes in terms of switch from ethnic voting to 'ethical voting' is expected to be low. Finally, we analyse the sociodemographic determinants of university students' aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and ethnic group loyalty. We provide confirmation that some specific sociodemographic characteristics significantly (i) increase the degree of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and (ii) lower ethnic group loyalty. Those characteristics have in common that they reduce the 'psychological' distance between ethnic groups, like living in a cosmopolitan city and having parents belonging to different ethnic groups.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide insights into the 'ethnicization' of Ethiopian politics. In section 3, we present our survey, our econometric approach and the descriptive statistics of the variables entering our econometric specification. Section 4 emphasizes our major statistic and econometric results. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and highlights avenues for future research.

2 The 'ethnicization' of Ethiopian politics

We first present the four main ethnic groups forming the Ethiopian nation. We then show how ethnic grievance has been sharpened by the instauration of ethnic federalism in 1994. We finally highlight the division of political parties along ethnic lines that ensued from this context.

2.1 The four main ethnic groups in Ethiopia

Levine (1974) goes back to the third millennium B. C. to fund a primordial differentiation criterion (that of language) between ancestors of the current four major ethnic groups in Ethiopia: the *Amharas*, the *Oromos*, the *Tigreans* and the *SNNPs* (Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples). At that period, these ancestors were divided into three families of Afro-Asiatic languages: the Semitic languages, the Cushitic languages and the Omotic languages.

By the second millennium B. C., these linguistic groups further differentiated along cultural lines. During this evolution, Cushitic speakers split up into three branches among which eastern Cushites who occupied the southern part of the Great Rift Valley in Ethiopia and who are the ancestors of the *Oromo* ethnic group. Semitic speakers divided into two groups: northern semitic speakers who settled in the northern plateau regions and southern semitic speakers who populated the central part of the country. Northern and Southern semitic speakers are the ancestors of the *Tigray* ethnic group and of the *Amhara* ethnic group respectively. Omotic speakers settled in the southwest and diversified into around fifty communities with distinct languages and cultures. They are the ancestors of a large number of tribes and ethnic groups forming the ethnic patchwork that is nowadays referred to as the *SNNPs*.

Ethiopian history can be interpreted as the history of the ethnic competition essentially between Amharas, Oromos and Tigreans, the SNNPs being too fragmented to get organized efficiently for collective action. Between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, the competition was dominated by Amharas. This domination officially ceased with the overthrow of the Amhara emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by the Derg, the military committee led by Mengistu that established a Stalinist authoritarian regime. However, the Derg's regime preserved the centralized administration inherited from the Amhara empire for further details), which reinforced ethnic grievance among former Amhara-dominated ethnic groups. Tigreans and Oromos therefore engaged in armed struggle to free themselves from what they perceived as the perpetuation of the Amhara rule. The TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) was created in February 1975 (see Young (1997) for more details). The OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) was created in 1976 because of 'a widespread feeling that Oromos were under-represented in the central government [Mengistu's regime] and treated as 'second-class citizens" (Joireman (1997)). TPLF was the main force which drove the Derg's regime out of power in May 1991. It consequently played a leading role in the democratization process that followed.

2.2 The adoption of ethnic federalism in the 1990s

In the early 1990s, TPLF created a political party called the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) which has been ruling the country since Mengistu's withdrawal. It is a coalition of three ethnic parties dominated by TPLF. These three satellite parties officially represent the interests of Amharas through the ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), of Oromos through OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic Organisation) and of SNNPs through SEPDM (Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement).

EPRDF initiated a new way of organizing the state: ethnic federalism. Ethnic federalism was endorsed through the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) that was ratified in December 1994. This constitutional arrangement led to the division of the country into nine federal states 'delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, identity, language and

the consent of the people concerned' (Art. 46-47) and 2 special administrative zones. The nine federal states are[9]: Afar (1.9%), Amhara (25.5%), Benishangul-Gumuz (0.8%), Gambella (0.3%), Harar (0.3%), Oromiya (35.3%), Somalia (5.8%), SNNPR (Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region) (19.8%) and Tigray (5.8%).The two special administrative zones are Addis Ababa (4%) and Dire Dawa (0.5%).

Figure: Map of the Ethiopian federal states and administrative zones

Officially, ethnic federalism aimed to satisfy the demand for recognition coming from former Amhara-dominated ethnic groups through the acknowledgement of the right to self-determination to each federal region[10]. Some observers however (see Ghai (2000) and Gudina (2003)) consider that the strategy followed by TPLF was the one of the 'divide and rule', the only strategy that could allow this party to keep power despite the fact that it stands for only a minority (Tigreans count for less than 6% of the Ethiopian population).

2.3 The division of political parties along ethnic lines

Ethnic federalism indeed turned out to be a conflict-enhancing arrangement. The first reason why ethnic federalism sharpened ethnic competition consists in its premature character. It endorsed the administrative division of the country along ethnic lines without previously ensuring a nationwide political debate on what, after decades of oppression of one group over the others, nevertheless would keep unifying Ethiopian people. This argument is particularly emphasized by Abbink (1997): 'Ethiopian political model shows that a country can be

[9]The percentage of the Ethiopian population living in the region is given into parentheses (Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority (2004)).

[10]The right to self-determination is defined by the Transitional Charter in three steps: 'the right a) to preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history, and use and develop its language; b) to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation; c) to exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged, or abrogated.' (Transitional Conference, 1991: Part One, Article Two).

post-modern without having gone through a successful modern phase (it has no shared idea of the national state 'project', no solid industrial society, no mass consumption, no media culture, and so on)'. As a consequence, 'most elites of the ethno-regional groups now carved out seem to want to grab political power regardless of the consequences' (Abbink (1997)).

Ethnic grievance on the part of non Tigrean ethnic groups has been exacerbated by the TPLF's temptation towards ethnic patronage. Abbink (1995), Aalen (2001) and Mesfin (2006) report a privileged access of Tigrayan elites to key posts in the public administration, what Gudina (2003) describes as a 'Tigrayanization' of Ethiopian political elites. Gurr and Marshall (2005) illustrate their definition of the 'ethnic character' of a ruling elite through the Ethiopian example, referring to 'the Tigrean-dominated regime of Ethiopia'.

Ethnic grievance expresses through the division of opposition parties along ethnic lines, but also through the radicalization of the pro-ethnic character of their political platforms. It is particularly vivid on the part of Oromos who, while they stand for the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, are excluded from the political power.

The two main Oromo opposition parties are OLF and ONC (Oromo National Congress). OLF it the more radical of them. It fights for ethnic separatism, arguing that 'Oromia was not part of Ethiopia before its colonisation in the last decades of the nineteenth century' and that 'Oromos ha[d] always been historically, culturally and linguistically different from the Ethiopians' (Asafa (1993)). OLF is still involved in armed struggle. It is consequently not authorized to participate in elections. ONC was created in 1996 and promotes self-determination without secession, claiming that the history of the incorporation of Oromos into Ethiopia, though having operated through their subjection, cannot validate the thesis of a separate historical and geographical identity. OLF and ONC constitute serious challengers to TPLF. First, as already emphasized, Oromos stand for 35.3% of the Ethiopian population. Provided that they massively support their ethnic party and that elections are organized on a competitive, free and fair basis, this numerical superiority would provide them with a strong bargaining power at the House of People's Representatives[11]. Second, Oromiya is the richest federal region in Ethiopia and is often referred to as the 'storehouse' of the country. This makes OLF's threat of secession particularly credible.

AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation) is the most famous Amhara opposition party. It was created in 1992 and crystallizes the resentment of Amharas who have lost 'the dominant position they enjoyed in Ethiopia for a century' (Henze (1998)). AAPO's political priority consists in the preservation of Ethiopia's political and geographical integrity that AAPO believes to be jeopardized by ethnic federalism. Given that this priority is shared by the emerging

[11] Elections in Ethiopia are based on a 'first past the post' rule. This means that each federal region is awarded a given number of seats (proportionally to the demographical size of the region) which are wholly won by the political party having gathered the strongest support in the region.

non ethnic parties (see below), many Amhara opposition parties joined the non ethnic coalition that competed during 2005 national elections to increase their chance of getting elected.

The SNNPs opposition party is SEPDC (Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition). It was created in 1992 and is an umbrella organisation for 15 different SNNPR-based parties. As already mentionned, SNNPs are not among the most vocal ethnic groups in Ethiopia and SEPDC merely struggles for 'a modest self-rule' (Gudina (2003)).

Besides these three ethnic opposition parties, an increasing number of non ethnic parties have been emerging. They started becoming particularly influential after 2000. They are mainly supported by the cosmopolitan urban electorate and most of them joined the non ethnic CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) which competed alongside EPRDF and Oromo opposition parties during the 2005 national elections. In the following, we particularly focus on three non ethnic parties which were among the most popular at the time when the survey was conducted. The first one is CAFPDE (Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy), a coalition of 31 political organisation that was created in 1993 in Addis Ababa to counter the domination of TPLF over the transitional regime. The two others are EDUP (Ethiopian Democratic Union Party) and EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party) which promote the recognition of human rights not so much on an ethnic basis than on an individual basis. They struggle for the abrogation of ethnic federalism and for an equitable treatment of the various Ethiopian ethnic groups (see Pausewang et al. (2003) for more details).

3 Data, econometric method and descriptive statistics

We present our survey, our econometric approach and the descriptive summary of the variables entering our econometric specification.

3.1 Survey

Our questionnaire consisted in roughly hundred questions about the students' perception of democracy, politics, political parties and vote, both as concepts and realities of Ethiopian politics (see Valfort (2005) for a detailed description of the survey).

The survey was filled in on an anonymous basis by 331 students from Addis Ababa University in May 2004, one year before May 2005 national elections. The students were recruited with the help of research assistants. The sample gathers graduate and undergraduate students enrolled both in the 'regular' and in the 'extension' programs. They come from various faculties of the Addis Ababa University. Over the 325 students who answered the 'faculty' question, 40% come from the faculty of Management, 26% from the faculty of Sciences, 14% from the faculty of Economics, and 9% from the faculty of Political Science.

The remainder (11%) gathers students from the faculties of Law, Languages and Philosophy. We ran 6 sessions of 50 to 60 students at a single point in time so as to avoid contamination. Each student was paid 30 Birrs (roughly 3 Euros) for showing up, knowing that, according to the 1997 urban household survey reported by Bigsten et al. (2005), 70% of Addis Ababa households earn less than 600 Birrs per month (roughly less than 20 Birrs per day). This rather large amount was necessary since the survey was lengthy and conducted over a week-end.

A system of student exchange between Ethiopian universities has been implemented by EPRDF. Our sample therefore shows a fair diversity in terms of ethnicity and geographical origin. 326 of the 331 students belong to one of the four main ethnic groups[12]. Among them, 40% are Amharas ($N = 130$), 21% are Oromos ($N = 69$), 12% are SNNPs ($N = 39$), and 27% are Tigreans ($N = 88$). From now on, we consider these 326 students as our reference sample. Among them, only 21% originate from Addis Ababa while almost one third stems from rural areas (note that 80% of the Ethiopian population is rural).

As regarding the income distribution, 40% of the respondents grew up in an household with an average monthly income of less than 300 Birrs (45% among the urban Ethiopian population according to Bigsten et al. (2005)); 38% grew up in an household with an average monthly income of more than 600 Birrs (30% among the urban Ethiopian population).

14.2% of the reference sample are between 18 and 20; 64.1% are between 21 and 24; 16.4% are between 25 and 29; 5.6% are above 30. Besides, the sample encompasses 11% of female.

3.2 Econometric method

We study the determinants of a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the respondent claims to support an ethnic party (AAPO, EPRDF, OLF, ONC, or SEPDC) and the value of 0 if the respondent claims to support a non ethnic party (CAFPDE, EDP or EDUP) or no party at all. We carry out a multivariate binary logit analysis with hierarchical block-wise entry. Given the dichotomous character of our dependent variable a logit analysis has greater statistical efficiency than an ordinary least square regression. Note that a probit analysis yields similar results as the ones presented in section 4.

We assume that the variable measuring the utility derived by respondent i when he decides to support an ethnic party can be modeled as follows:

$$y_i^* = \alpha + \beta E_i + \gamma I_i + \delta N_i + \lambda A_i + \mu X_i + \xi e_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where the random component ϵ_i is distributed according to a logistic distribution. The variable y_i^* is not observable. What we do observe is a dummy

[12]We derive the respondent's ethnicity from his father's ethnicity due to the patriarchal organisation of the Ethiopian society (see Giorgis (2002)). Wright (2000) emphasizes: 'a woman who marries a man from another ethnic group will adopt his identity'.

variable y_i which is the realization of a binomial process defined by $y_i = 1$ if $y_i^* > 0$ and $y_i = 0$ otherwise, where $y_i = 1$ means that the respondent supports an ethnic party.

We categorize our explanatory variables in six 'vectors'.

First, the E vector (where E stands for '**E**thnic group loyalty') encompasses the motivations behind individuals' decision to vote for their ethnic party. Three determinants of ethnic voting have been identified by the literature in political science. The first determinant was emphasized by Horowitz (1985). It captures the idea that, when they are *proud of their ethnic identity*, individuals vote for their ethnic party because they derive a psychological benefit (an enhanced self-esteem) in expressing their ethnic identity through their vote. The second determinant was notably emphasized by Mattes (1995). It captures the idea that, when they consider people from their ethnic group as more *trustworthy* than people from other ethnic groups, individuals also tend to vote for their ethnic party because they hold their ethnic party as the only credible political party. The third determinant derives from the very nature of ethnic parties which implement *ethnic patronage* (see Chandra (2004)). It captures the idea that individuals vote for their ethnic party because they care about the material reward that they will receive if their ethnic party get elected, simply because they belong to the *ethnic group* whose interests are defended by the ethnic party.

Second, the I vector (where I stands for '**I**ncumbent') encompasses the motivations behind individuals' decision to vote for EPRDF, not because EPRDF stands for their ethnic group but because EPRDF is the incumbent party. First, individuals may vote for the incumbent EPRDF because they consider that EPRDF *performed* well during its political mandate(s). Second, they may be willing to reelect EPRDF simply because they consider that there is *no credible political alternative*.

Third, the N vector (where N stands for '**N**ationwide') encompasses the reasons other than aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity that could explain individuals' decision to vote for a non ethnic (or nationwide) party. More precisely, these reasons include all the characteristics which could explain why individuals do not experience a strong feeling of ethnic belonging. A first characteristic could consist in their living in a large cosmopolitan city (like *Addis Ababa*). Urbanization is often viewed by scholars as a process weakening 'bonding' linkages with one's ethnic community and strengthening instead 'bridging' linkages with other ethnic communities (see Norris (2003) for an analysis). A second characteristic could consist in the *belonging of their parents to different ethnic groups*.

Fourth, the A vector (where A stands for '**A**bstention') encompasses the motivations behind individuals' decision to vote for no party. First, individuals may decide to abstain because they consider that *politicians do not care* about citizens' well-being. They may also *do no feel interested* by politics.

Fifth, the X vector encompasses various socio-demographic variables that could account for individuals' voting behavior in different ways. The X vector includes the *monthly average income* of the household in which the respondent grew up

in, the *profession* of the respondent's father, and the respondent's *age*, *gender*, and *faculty*.

Sixth, and most importantly given the purpose of our research, the e vector (where e stands for '**e**thical voting') encompasses the crucial ethical concern behind individuals' decision to renounce of voting for their ethnic party. We call this ethical concern '*aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity*'. More specifically, we measure individuals' aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity through their degree of political mobilization to fight the potential unequal treatment of citizens by the Ethiopian government.

3.3 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of the dependent variable and of the explanatory variables entering our econometric specification. In the column entitled 'Variable', we report the total number of respondents, among the 326 of our reference sample, who answered the question(s) from which the variable is derived. We then decompose this total number by indicating the number of Amharas, of Oromos, of SNNPs and of Tigreans who answered the question. For instance, among the 307 individuals of our reference sample who answered the question related to the 'ethnic pride' variable, 125 are Amharas, 65 are Oromos, 36 are SNNPs, and 74 are Tigreans. The same remark holds for the column entitled 'Proportion'. Concerning the 'ethnic pride' variable, it indicates that 7% of the 307 respondents feel most proud when people refer to them as members of their ethnic group. More particularly, 4% of the 125 Amhara respondents, 23% of the 65 Oromo respondents, 3% of the 36 SNNPs respondents and 2% of the 74 Tigrean respondents feel so.

Variable	Question	Coding	Proportion (%)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (N=312=126+63+38+85)	'Which party do you support?'	=1: support AAPO, EPRDF, OLF, ONC, or SEPDC =0: support CAFPDE, EDP, EDUP or no party	=1: 38 (21;41;18;69)
'E' VECTOR			
ETHNIC PRIDE (N=307=125+65+36+81)	'What makes you feel more proud?'	=1: people refer to you as a member of your ethnic group =0: people refer to you as an Ethiopian citizen or as a human being	=1: 7 (4;23;3;2)
ETHNIC TRUST (N=282=112+63+33+74)	'How much do you trust (i) someone in your own ethnic group (ii) Ethiopians from other ethnic groups'	=1: trust more (ii) than (i) =2: trust as much (ii) as (i) =3: trust more (i) than (ii)	=1: 9 (8;8;12;9) =2: 54 (53;46;61;59) =3: 37 (39;46;27;31)
ETHNIC PATRONAGE (N=326=130+69+39+88)	'What is the ethnic group of your father?'	We create a dummy for each of the following ethnic groups: Amharas, Oromos, SNNPs, and Tigreans	40;21;12;27
'I' VECTOR			
INCUMBENT'S PERFORMANCE (N=319=126+68+39+86)	'Overall, would you say that democracy has improved or worsened in Ethiopia over the last 10 years?' & 'Over the last 10 years, how well would you say that government has been improving growth and Ethiopians' access to education, health services… etc?'	=1: democracy has improved, as well as growth and access to education, health services…etc	=1: 47 (35;21;51;85)
NO POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE (N=284=111+62+33+78)	'Do you think that a different government coalition could have done better work at handling these matters than the actual one over the last 10 years?'	=1: rather no or not at all	=1: 37 (32;32;36;47)
'N' VECTOR			
ADDIS ABABA (N=324=10+69+39+86)	'Did you mainly grow up on the countryside/village or in a small, middle-size, or big city?'	=1: a big city (Addis Ababa)	=1: 21 (23;22;31;13)
INTER-ETHNIC MARRIAGE (N=326=130+69+39+88)	'What is the ethnic group of your father?' & 'What is the ethnic group of your mother?'	=1: the parents belong to different ethnic groups	=1: 23 (21;41;36;8)
'A' VECTOR			
CARELESS POLITICIANS (N=325=130+68+39+88)	'In many countries, people say that politicians only care about themselves and not at all about the population. Do you agree with them?'	=1: yes a lot or yes to some extent	=1: 38 (46;43;36;23)
NO INTEREST IN POLITICS (N=317=126+66+39+86)	'Generally speaking, would you say that politics interest you?'	=1: not much or not at all	=1: 40 (45;35;51;33)
'X' VECTOR			
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (N=325=130+69+39+87)	'In which category of monthly average income is the income of the household you grew up in?'	Coded from 1 to 7 (=1 if under 150 Birrs;=7 if above 3,000 Birrs)	=1: 20 (14;20;10;33) =7: 2 (3;1;3;1)
FATHER FARMER (N=324=129+69+39+87)	'What is the profession of your father?'	=1: farmer	=1: 29 (25;29;13;41)
AGE (N=319=127+69+38+85)	'In which year were you born?'	Coded from 1 to 5 (=1 if under 20; =5 if above 30)	Average age: 23 (24;23;22;23)
FEMALE (N=325=130+69+39+87)	'What is your gender?'	=1: female	=1: 11 (11;12;21;8)
'POLITICAL SCIENCE' FACULTY (N=325=130+69+39+87)	'In which faculty are you registered?'	=1: Political Science and International Relations	=1: 9 (9;9;10;9)
'e' VECTOR			
AVERSION TOWARDS INTER-ETHNIC INEQUITY (N=291=116+63+34+78)	'What would you be willing to do if the government distributed the wealth of the country only to those who strongly support him or who belong to the same ethnic group or economic class, to the detriment of other Ethiopian people?'	=1: support the government =2: nothing =3: support an opposition party =4: boycott elections =5: join a protest	=1: 5 (6;5;3;5) =2: 8 (9;3;21;5) =3: 38 (40;41;29;37) =4: 11 (10;13;6;14) =5: 37 (34;38;41;38)

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

4 Results

We first examine the perception of the Ethiopian political landscape by students. We then display the descriptive statistics related to their voting behavior. We finally analyze the determinants of their voting behavior.

4.1 The characterization of political parties by university students

To ensure the relevance of our econometric specification, we analyze whether the perception of the Ethiopian political landscape by university students coincides with the picture provided by political analysts (see Section 2). We concentrate on the answers given to the 'party characterization' question of our survey (see Valfort (2005), question QC36 pp. 48). This question asks students to describe each political party by choosing one or more of the six following characteristics: the 'Ethiopia-oriented' characteristic to describe parties which 'defend the interest of ALL Ethiopian people without favoring any group more than the other'; the 'ethnic-oriented' characteristic to describe parties which 'favor people from their ethnic group'; the 'poor-oriented' characteristic to describe parties which 'favor poor people'; the 'power-oriented' characteristic to describe parties which 'only care about getting power and not at all about Ethiopian citizens'; the 'rich-oriented characteristic to describe parties which 'favor rich people'; the 'vote-oriented' characteristic to describe parties which 'favor people who voted for them'. The 'Ethiopia-oriented' characteristic and the 'ethnic-oriented' characteristic are the two most frequently used characteristics by the students to describe the Ethiopian political parties. They were used at least once by 85% and 58% of our reference sample respectively. *A contrario*, the 'poor-oriented' characteristic and the 'rich-oriented' characteristic are the two least frequently used characteristics by the students to describe the Ethiopian political parties (less than 10% of our reference sample used them). This observation shows a major convergence between the perception of the political landscape by university students and the way it is described by external observers. Like external observers, university students consider Ethiopian politics to be mainly divided along ethnic lines, not along income classes.

Table 2 reports the percentage of students characterizing an ethnic party as 'nationwide' (or 'Ethiopia-oriented'), the percentage of students characterizing an ethnic party as 'ethnic-oriented', and the difference between these two percentages. We indicate in footnote the total number of the respondents who were able to characterize each ethnic party. We display the decomposition of this total number along ethnic lines, by highlighting the number of Amhara, Oromo, SNNPs and Tigrean respondents respectively. Table 2 shows that each ethnic group is able to characterize the ethnic parties representing the interests of other ethnic groups as 'ethnic-oriented'. But this assertion also holds for most of the ethnic groups regarding the ethnic parties which represent their own interests. Neither Amharas, not Oromos, nor SNNPs are reluctant to characterize

their ethnic party as 'ethnic oriented'. The only exception comes from Tigrean students who massively characterize their ethnic party EPRDF as 'nationwide'.

	EPRDF[a]			AAPO[b]			SEPDC[c]			ONC[d]			OLF[e]		
	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat
Amharas	20	57	37***	20	63	**43*** **	5	80	75***	1	85	84***	1	88	87***
Oromos	8	52	44***	7	84	77***	12	70	58***	10	71	**61*** **	10	82	**72*** **
SNNPs	11	51	40***	0	82	82***	4	70	**66*** **	0	85	85***	0	94	94***
Tigreans	69	11	**-58*** **	9	67	58***	8	73	65***	2	76	74***	2	85	83***

***significant at 1%

[a]N=297=117+64+35+81;[b]N=237=90+55+28+64;[c]N=204=74+43+27+60;[d]N=231=94+49+26+62;[e]N=268=101+57+32+78

Table 2: Students' perception of ethnic parties

Table 3 reports the percentage of students characterizing a nationwide party as 'nationwide' (or 'Ethiopia-oriented'), the percentage of students characterizing a nationwide party as 'ethnic-oriented', and the difference between these two percentages. We indicate in footnote the total number of the respondents who were able to characterize each nationwide party. We display the decomposition of this total number along ethnic lines, by highlighting the number of Amhara, Oromo, SNNPs and Tigrean respondents respectively. Table 3 shows that the percentage of students who characterize CAFPDE, EDUP and EDP as 'nationwide' is greater than the percentage of students who characterize them as 'ethnic oriented'. This difference is significant among Amharas, Oromos, SNNPs, but not among Tigreans.

	CAFPDE[a]			EDUP[b]			EDP[c]		
	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat	nat	ethn	ethn-nat
Amharas	44	16	-28***	56	15	-41***	65	10	-55***
Oromos	50	9	-41***	45	13	-32***	44	18	-26***
SNNPs	39	4	-35***	57	4	-53***	60	4	-56***
Tigreans	26	21	-5	32	23	-9	37	18	-19**

***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%

[a] N=162=64+32+23+43; [b] N=182=68+38+23+53; [c] N=210=83+45+25+57

Table 3: Students' perception of nationwide parties

From what has been written, it appears that the perception of the Ethiopian political landscape by university students do coincide with the description provided by political analysts, with the striking exception however of a majority of Tigrean respondents.

4.2 Voting results

In Table 4, we report for each ethnic group the percentage of respondents who claimed to support EPRDF, an opposition ethnic party, a nationwide party, or no party at all. We distinguish between those who do not characterize EPRDF

as 'nationwide' and the others. This distinction seems necessary since we have shown that the characterization of EPRDF is the most controversial among students.

Among those who do not characterize EPRDF as nationwide, a strong majority of students renounce of voting for their ethnic party. The proportion of abstainers is however greater than the proportion of those supporting a nationwide party. This betrays either a disinterest in politics and/or a general mistrust towards politicians, or simply the fact that the nationwide character of CAFPDE, EDP and EDUP was not clear enough at the time when the survey was conducted. The relative impact of the A vector compared to the impact of the e vector in our regression results will help us conclude. Note that the temptation towards ethnic voting is high among Oromos, and overwhelming among Tigreans since a majority (58%) support EPRDF.

As expected, among those (mainly Tigreans) who characterize EPRDF as 'nationwide', a majority support EPRDF.

	Incumbent EPRDF %	Ethnic opposition party %	Non-ethnic/multi-ethnic party %	Abstention %
ALL SAMPLE				
Amharas (N=126)	13	7	24	56
Oromos (N=63)	10	32	16	43
SNNPs (N=38)	11	8	21	61
Tigreans (N=85)	68	1	6	25
THOSE WHO DO NOT CHARACTERIZE EPRDF AS NATIONWIDE				
Amharas (N=99)	8	4	27	61
Oromos (N=57)	9	32	12	47
SNNPs (N=33)	9	9	24	58
Tigreans (N=31)	58	3	10	29
THOSE WHO DO CHARACTERIZE EPRDF AS NATIONWIDE				
Amharas (N=23)	39	22	13	26
Oromos (N=4)	25	25	50	0
SNNPs (N=4)	25	0	0	75
Tigreans (N=54)	74	0	4	22

Table 4: Voting results

4.3 Logit regression results

EPRDF is clearly the political party whose characterization collects the lowest consensus (although a majority of respondents are reluctant to characterize it as nationwide). To secure the relevance of our logit specification where EPRDF is treated as an ethnic party, we slightly modify our logit regression model. Instead of estimating the previous model:

$$y_i^* = \alpha + \beta E_i + \gamma I_i + \delta N_i + \lambda A_i + \mu X_i + \xi e_i + \epsilon_i,$$

we estimate the following one:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i^* &= \alpha + eprdfnonethio(\beta_1 E_i + \gamma_1 I_i + \delta_1 N_i + \lambda_1 A_i + \mu_1 X_i + \xi_1 e_i) + \\ & \quad eprdfethio(\beta_2 E_i + \gamma_2 I_i + \delta_2 N_i + \lambda_2 A_i + \mu_2 X_i + \xi_2 e_i) + \epsilon_i, \end{aligned}$$

where 'eprdfnonethio' (resp. 'eprdfethio') is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the respondent did not (resp. did) characterize EPRDF as nationwide.

The logit results are reported in Table 5. We only present the coefficients of the explanatory variables which are interacted with the 'eprdfnonethio' dummy. As expected, almost none of the coefficients of the explanatory variables which are interacted with the 'eprdfethio' dummy is significant.

Three important conclusions can be drawn from Table 5.

First, the explanatory variables entering the '**E**thnic group loyalty' vector (the 'ethnic pride' variable, the 'ethnic trust' variable, and the 'ethnic patronage' variable) have a strong significant influence on students' decision to support an ethnic party. As shown in Table 1, the 'ethnic patronage' variable coincides the respondent's ethnic group. We use SNNPs as the reference ethnic group. The positive and significant coefficients of the 'Tigrean' variable and of the 'Oromo' variable highlight that ethnic patronage is an important determinant of voting behaviors among Tigreans and Oromos. Tigreans have a clear interest in the perpetuation of TPLF's pro-ethnic policies. As for Oromos, we already emphasized that their ethnic parties are among the most credible challengers to TPLF. Note that Oromos' strong temptation towards ethnic voting may also reflect the severity of their grievance. In Section 2, it was mentioned that the preservation of the Ethiopian unity was an objective common to the political platforms of Amhara opposition parties and of non ethnic parties. As an illustration, many Amhara opposition parties joined the non ethnic CUD coalition during 2005 national elections to increase their chance of getting elected. Our regression results are consistent with this reality. Although it is not significant, the negative coefficient of the 'Amhara' variable suggests that Amharas have more interest in voting for a non ethnic party than in voting for their ethnic party. The coefficients of the variables capturing the respondent's ethnic group are strikingly consistent with the results of the 2005 national elections. During these elections, the support to ethnic parties was the highest in the Tigray region and in the Oromiya region. TPLF/EPRDF won 100% of the constituencies in Tigray. UEDF (United Ethiopian Democratic Forces), a coalition encompassing ONC and a party close to OLF, won 29% of the constituencies in Oromiya (against 62% for TPLF/EPRDF and 9% for CUD). In comparison, SEPDC won only 10% of the constituencies in the SNNP region (against 75% for TPLF/EPRDF and 15% for CUD).

SUPPORT FOR AN ETHNIC PARTY					
	E vector	**+ I vector**	**+ N vector**	**+ A vector**	**+ e vector**
ETHNIC PRIDE	**1.829*** (0.621)**	**1.800*** (0.691)**	**1.662** (0.751)**	**1.674** (0.812)**	**2.358*** (0.870)**
ETHNIC TRUST	0.409 (0.296)	**0.563* (0.334)**	**0.531[a] (0.357)**	**0.813** (0.411)**	**1.059** (0.493)**
ETHNIC PATRONAGE					
TIGREAN	**2.281*** (0.668)**	**2.422*** (0.803)**	**2.195** (0.874)**	**2.491*** (0.970)**	**2.745** (1.107)**
OROMO	0.594 (0.591)	**1.260* (0.705)**	**1.626** (0.768)**	**1.595* (0.823)**	**1.793** (0.916)**
AMHARA	-0.789 (0.609)	-0.209 (0.719)	-0.372 (0.760)	-0.380 (0.829)	-0.243 (0.919)
INCUMBENT'S PERFORMANCE		**0.834* (0.481)**	**0.982* (0.518)**	**1.167** (0.568)**	0.891 (0.635)
NO POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE		0.201 (0.449)	0.125 (0.490)	0.032 (0.528)	0.114 (0.591)
ADDIS ABABA			**-1.206* (0.703)**	**-1.231[a] (0.803)**	**-2.404** (1.116)**
INTER-ETHNIC MARRIAGE			**-1.663*** (0.629)**	**-1.699** (0.706)**	**-1.381** (0.721)**
CARELESS POLITICIANS				-0.429 (0.498)	**-1.017* (0.596)**
NO INTEREST IN POLITICS				**-0.983* (0.538)**	**-1.554** (0.633)**
HOUSEHOLD INCOME				-0.284 (0.200)	-0.145 (0.222)
FATHER FARMER				0.299 (0.632)	0.384 (0.700)
AGE				-0.054 (0.259)	-0.064 (0.291)
FEMALE				-0.750 (0.828)	-0.645 (0.987)
'POLITICAL SCIENCE' FACULTY				1.001 (0.907)	1.444 (1.033)
AVERSION TOWARDS INTER-ETHNIC INEQUITY					**-0.711*** (0.250)**
Number of observations	251	222	221	213	196
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	25.4	27.5	31.8	41.6	47.6

Standard errors between parentheses

***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%; [a] significant at 15%

Table 5: The determinants of the support for an ethnic party

Voters in the Amhara region showed the strongest support to the CUD of all fed-

eral regions. The CUD won 36% of the Amhara constituencies, against 64% for EPRDF). Note that the votes gathered by EPRDF in the Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP regions mainly come from the rural electorate. As wondered by Tamru (2005), it is not easy, due to a lack of survey data, to account for this massive support. It can reflect various realities like a genuine political attachment to EPRDF's agrarian policy, a spontaneous support towards the incumbent party, the fact that opposition parties are weakly represented in remote rural areas, or even the threat of retaliations from the ruling party if peasants do not support it[13]. Pausewang and Tronvoll (2000), Pausewang et al. (2003) and Harbeson (2005) record many irregularities in the election process in rural areas, mentioning for instance the 'vote for food' mechanism consisting in providing food aid during dearth times only to those who showed their support to the ruling party. The non significance of the coefficient of the 'father farmer' variable in our logit regression at least suggests that students whose father is farmer are not more tempted than the others to support EPRDF.

Second, there is clear indication that ethical concerns do play a role in students' voting behavior. The strongly significant negative coefficient of the 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity' variable indicates that the reluctance to discriminate against other ethnic groups reduces the impact of ethnic group loyalty. It is important to note that this lowering effect holds for all ethnic groups, should they currently suffer from ethnic discrimination or not. The correlation between the 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity' and each of the four 'ethnic group' variables is close to zero (correlation of -0.062 with the 'Amhara' variable, of 0.04 with the 'Oromo' variable, of -0.02 with the 'SNNPs' variable and of 0.04 with the 'Tigrean' variable) .

Third, the implementation of a logit analysis with hierarchical block-wise entry allows to isolate the contribution of each vector of independent variables to the general explanatory power of our model. Our model explains 47.6% of the variance in students' voting behavior. The '**E**thnic group loyalty' vector accounts for 53.4% of this global explanatory power, against only 12.4% for the 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity' variable. In other words, the impact of ethnic group loyalty on students' decision to support an ethnic party is more than four times as high as the impact of ethical concerns. Note that this assertion holds irrespective of the order in which the various vectors enter our econometric specification (in other words, the correlation between the various explanatory variables is very low).

The variables entering the '**I**ncumbent' vector are not significant at fair statistical levels in the final logit regression. This suggests that students' support for the incumbent cannot be accounted for by their retrospective assessment of the incumbent's performance during its political mandate(s) nor by the belief that there is no credible political alternative. The variables composing the '**N**ationwide' vector exert a significant influence on students' voting behavior.

[13]Diamond (2002) categorizes Ethiopia among the 'authoritarian competitive democracies'. These democracies are characterized by nominally competitive elections but actually seriously flawed elections (with political intimidation, vote buying, questionable ballot counts... etc).

The significant negative coefficients of the 'Addis Ababa' variable and of the 'inter-ethnic marriage' variable confirm that living in a cosmopolitan community or having parents from different ethnic groups lowers students' feelings of ethnic belonging and therefore their temptation to vote for their ethnic party. The coefficient of the 'Addis Ababa' variable is consistent with the results of the 2005 national elections. CUD won 100% of the seats (N=23) dedicated to Addis Ababa at the House of Peoples Representatives. The variables forming the '**A**bstention' vector also show a fair level of significance. Note that the contribution of the '**N**ationwide' vector to the global explanatory power of our model is twice as high as the the contribution of the '**A**bstention' vector. We have underlined in Section 4.2. that those renouncing of supporting an ethnic party were more likely to support no party at all than a non ethnic party. Our regression results suggest that this trend is less due to a lack of interest in politics and/or a global mistrust towards politicians than to the ambiguity of the nationwide character of CAFPDE, EDP and EDUP at the time when the survey was conducted. Finally, none of the sociodemographic variables plays a significant role in individuals' voting behavior.

The ultimate purpose of this paper consists in identifying ways of reducing citizens' temptation to vote for their ethnic party in ethnically polarized countries. We have already shown that the aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity significantly counters the impact of ethnic group loyalty. However, it is worthwhile to complete our analysis by further investigating the sociodemographic determinants of students' ethnic group loyalty and aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity.

Results of the regression of the 'ethnic pride', 'ethnic trust', and 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity' variables over the various sociodemographic variables are reported in Table 6.

Our results confirm that sociodemographic characteristics favorable to a reduction in the 'psychological' distance between ethnic groups, like living in a cosmopolitan city and having parents belonging to different ethnic groups, significantly reduce ethnic group loyalty and significantly increase the aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity. More precisely, both the 'inter-ethnic marriage' variable and the 'Addis Ababa' variable significantly decrease respondents' degree of ethnic trust. However, only the 'inter-ethnic marriage' variable influences the respondents' degree of ethnic pride and of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity. Regarding the 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity' variable, this result may suggest that ethical concerns are rather acquired in the early life of individuals. We do not discuss further the impact of the 'inter-ethnic marriage' variable on the respondents' degree of ethnic pride since the coefficient of this variable hardly reaches statistical significance. Belonging to the Oromo ethnic group significantly increases ethnic group loyalty. This result is consistent with the severity of grievance among Oromos. Being a female significantly lowers aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity. This result is surprising. Literature in sociology usually emphasize that women are socialized in a way that makes them more concerned about others' well-being (see Waerness (1987) for a discus-

sion). In Western democracies for instance, they are typically more supportive to income redistribution than men.

	Ethnic pride (logit)	Ethnic trust (ordered logit)	Aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity (ordered logit)
Household income	-0.140 (0.206)	-0.024 (0.104)	**0.185*** **(0.098)**
Father farmer	0.373 (0.605)	-0.048 (0.328)	0.012 (0.300)
Age	0.061 (0.059)	0.014 (0.037)	0.016 (0.029)
Female	0.551 (0.753)	0.265 (0.419)	**-0.749*** **(0.389)**
Inter-ethnic marriage	**-0.939**[a] **(0.658)**	**-0.536*** **(0.303)**	**0.521*** **(0.289)**
Addis Ababa	0.066 (0.673)	**-0.532*** **(0.316)**	0.096 (0.296)
Amhara	0.087 (0.133)	0.357 (0.403)	0.099 (0.382)
Oromo	**2.269**** **(1.076)**	**0.760*** **(0.434)**	0.310 (0.410)
Tigrean	-0.478 (0.259)	-0.039 (0.430)	0.465 (0.410)
Number of observations	302	278	285
Prob>chi2	0.0004	0.2351	0.1620
Pseudo R^2	18.7	2.3	1.7

Standard errors between parentheses

**significant at 5%; *significant at 10%; [a] significant at 15%

Table 6: The determinants of ethnic pride, ethnic trust, and aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity

However, one should keep in mind that we measure aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity through the respondent's degree of political mobilisation to fight the potential unequal treatment of citizens by the Ethiopian government. In a country like Ethiopia where peaceful demonstrations can be repressed very violently (as it was the case after May 2005 national elections), 'joining a protest' may constitute a particularly risky activity. In view of the patriarchal organisation

of the Ethiopian society, political mobilisation may therefore be perceived as a 'matter for men'. Finally, our results show that the degree of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity depends positively and significantly on the average monthly income of the household in which the respondent grew up in. We see two preliminary ways of interpreting this finding. First, it may suggest that ethical concerns constitute 'luxury goods' that increase with individuals' income (see Margolis (1984)[14] for further evidence). This suggests that enhancing aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity in poor ethnically polarized states is meaningless in case poverty is not being hunted down by other means at the same time. As stressed by Udogu (1999), 'regardless of these practical and theoretical solutions to the problems of political ethnicity and the future of democracy in Africa, if people are hungry these solutions would be meaningless'. Second, this finding may also reflect that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity increases with the educational background of one's parents, under the assumption (to be validated) that income and educational background are correlated. Overall, further research is needed to provide more definitive interpretation of the various socio-demographic determinants of ethnic group loyalty and aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity.

5 Concluding remarks

Could 'ethical voting' help reduce risks of conflict in ethnically polarized countries? Relying on data collected among students from Addis Ababa University, our answer is threefold.

First, we show that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity significantly lowers university students' temptation to vote for their ethnic party. This finding allows for some enthusiasm, at least to contrast with disillusioned assertions coming from the unconditional believers in the power of institutional arrangement for settling ethnic conflicts: 'Working toward an incentive structure that induces otherwise disaffected people to patch up and cooperate is more useful than mere exhortations of sermons about solidarity and fraternity' (Bardhan (1997)). More precisely, under our initial assumption that the degree of ethical concerns of university students constitute an upper bound of the degree of ethical concerns of the average citizen, this finding suggests that ethical concerns could also influence his voting behavior. In other words, 'exhortations or sermons about solidarity and fraternity' through nationwide civic education programmes could be a promising conflict-reducing strategy in ethnically polarized countries. Finkel (2002, 2003) shows that civic education programs indeed have a significant impact on participants' 'political tolerance', while his concept of 'political tolerance' is close to our notion of 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity'. Finkel defines 'political tolerance' as 'the extent to which citizens are

[14] Margolis (1984) assumes that the likelihood that an individual allocates a marginal dollar to improve his own well-being rather than the well-being of others increases in the 'participation ratio g/s' where g stands for the amount already given to other people and s the amount already given to himself.

willing to extend procedural democratic liberties to individuals and groups with whom they may disagree'.

Second however, we provide evidence that, though significant, the relative impact of ethical concerns is very small in comparison to the impact of ethnic group loyalty, an important determinant of ethnic voting. More precisely, we compute that the contribution of ethnic group loyalty to the explanatory power of our voting model is more than four times as high as the contribution of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity. This finding is discouraging since it suggests that the relative impact of ethical concerns will be even lower across a more representative sample of the Ethiopian population. In other words, the 'return' on nationwide civic education programmes in terms of switch from ethnic voting to 'ethical voting' is expected to be low.

Third, we analyse the sociodemographic determinants of university students' aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and ethnic group loyalty. We provide confirmation that some specific sociodemographic characteristics significantly (i) increase the degree of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and (ii) lower ethnic group loyalty. Those characteristics have in common that they reduce the 'psychological' distance between ethnic groups, like living in a cosmopolitan city and having parents belonging to different ethnic groups. Besides, we find that ethnic group loyalty is particularly strong among ethnic groups experiencing a severe level of grievance. Finally, evidence shows that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity depends positively on the income of the household in which the respondent grew up in.

Obviously, a deeper understanding of the determinants of ethnic group loyalty is needed for the implementation of conflict-reducing and poverty-reducing policies, should one consider ethnically fractionalized or ethnically polarized countries. The last round of Afrobarometer surveys has covered an unprecedented number of 18 sub-Saharan African countries between 2005 and 2006. Moreover, the survey encompasses for the first time a range of questions capturing the three components of ethnic group loyalty that have been identified so far by the literature in political science: ethnic pride, ethnic trust, and ethnic patronage. One future development of our research would consist in constructing subjective indexes of ethnic group loyalty across Africa and study their determinants. For a comprehensive analysis, explanatory variables should not be limited to the standard measures of economic, political, social or institutional performance of a country during its recent past. They should also include historical variables from both the colonization time and the pre-colonization time. As an illustration, Blanton et al. (2001) emphasize that former British colonies are more prone to organized ethnic conflict than former French colonies because the British colonial style did less to corrode the traditional mobilizing structures that facilitate ethnic collective action. We also expect that the pre-colonial degree of centralisation that was computed by Murdock (1967) for a large variety of African ethnic groups exerts a significant influence on today's ethnic group loyalty.

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