


THE GERMANS  
AND AFRICA



EVANS LEWIN



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




# **THE GERMANS AND AFRICA**









# **The Germans and Africa**

**Their Aims on the Dark Continent and how they acquired their African Colonies . By**

**EVANS LEWIN, Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute**

**With an Introduction by  
The RIGHT HON. EARL GREY  
G.C.M.G.**

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## PREFACE

**T**HE German Chancellor Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck, on one occasion stated that it would be the greatest misfortune for Germany to secure the whole of Africa. It is the purpose of this book to show how the colonial movement arose in the Fatherland, to point out the causes that led to the colonial activity of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, to describe the founding of the German colonial system in Africa and the diplomatic and sometimes peculiar processes by which it was constantly enlarged, and incidentally to demonstrate how the German colonial appetite grew and grew until there was no reasonable room for doubt that the German people were aiming at a banquet at which the African continent should be the chief dish.

In dealing with the history of German colonial beginnings in Africa, one supreme fact emerges from the review : Great Britain, already firmly established on the Dark Continent, was not prepared to welcome the intrusion of a new rival, and adopted a policy that, from the German point of view, led to bitter and perhaps unreasoning jealousy.

In her dealings with Germany, Great Britain did not at first readily co-operate with her new neighbour. The reason is not far to seek. Long established in many parts

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of the continent, with interests more or less developed at almost every portion of the western, southern and eastern littoral, British statesmen, previous to the year 1884, were inclined to look upon the then position of Africa as one that should on no account be disturbed. It was, indeed, difficult for any Power to obtain a footing in any spot where British interests were not paramount, and the action of Germany in taking possession of certain territories on the western and eastern coasts seemed like the incursion of a wolf into a well-stocked sheepfold. Nevertheless, Germany's attitude was perfectly justifiable. Her methods, on the other hand, were deplorable—but clever.

After a survey of the diplomatic history of the period, the question naturally intrudes itself—Was Great Britain justified in the attitude she first adopted towards her new competitor? From the British point of view, certainly. Great Britain had been first in the field, and in the struggle of the nations the first-comer naturally expects, if his strength fail not, to retain the prizes within his grasp. But the fact must not be overlooked that there is much to be said from the German point of view, and although the game of grab can never be a polite and gentle exercise, no player has really the right to complain if another is first in the field and secures the best stakes.

The extraordinarily clever diplomacy of Bismarck at this period cannot fail to win our admiration, whilst it is with mixed feelings that we must regard the painful vacillation of Lord Granville, upon whom fell the brunt of the British colonial negotiations. A stronger attitude would have enabled Great Britain to keep what she really, though

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unofficially, held; but it may be questioned whether the Empire as a whole would have benefited by the dog-in-the-manger policy which so many people then ardently desired. It is to be doubted, however, whether in dealing with a nation like Germany, any sacrifices could have satisfied the voracious appetite of the colonial party. *L'appétit vient en mangeant*. For whether we throw our garments to the wolves to satisfy any supposed love of finery they may possess, or with the idea of satisfying their hunger and staying their threatened oncoming, sooner or later the pack will again be upon us.

So it was with Germany. Graceful concessions only whetted the territorial appetite, whilst no concessions at all would only have led to an increased land-hunger. It must always be remembered, however, that at this period Great Britain was heavily involved in other quarters of Africa, and that there were territories of much greater importance than South-West Africa, or even Eastern Africa, that were to take their part in our Imperial strategy. A really strong attitude on the part of Lord Granville, however desirable it seemed, might have led to disaster. On the face of it his policy was weak, but the question remains—Was it necessary weakness? There was in reality no alternative open to Lord Granville and his successors but to uphold British interests in the way they thought most desirable; and it is hoped that the reader, after a perusal of this book, may be able to judge whether this was done adequately.

In writing the following pages certain matters have been dealt with—such, for instance, as German emigration

to America, and the excellent system of colonial education in Germany—that do not at first sight seem altogether relevant to the subject of the Germans in Africa. But they are in reality necessary to a thorough understanding of German colonial policy. On the other hand, many interesting topics that are certainly connected with German colonisation in Africa have been left out. Nothing has been said about the commercial policy or the administrative relations between Germany and her colonial possessions, and very little about the native administration, either critical or appreciative. Nor has the subsequent history of the German African possessions been adequately dealt with. The main purpose of the book being to show how Germany acquired her African territories, and the aims she had in Africa, it has been thought desirable, so far as possible, to leave out subjects which, though of great interest, do not really fall within the scope of the volume.

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## INTRODUCTION

BY THE RIGHT HON. EARL GREY, G.C.M.G.

**F**OR two reasons I have much pleasure in introducing Mr. Lewin's book to the public: in the first place, because its author has done an excellent piece of work; in the second, because I have some personal experience of its subject-matter, having all my life been associated with the men who have devoted themselves to promoting the free expansion of British civilisation in Africa, and to protecting its natural development from German interference.

Mr. Lewin is the able and indefatigable librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute. Its enormous library, the largest and best organised library of colonial books in the world, owes much of its usefulness to his painstaking labours. Mr. Lewin is not only a prominent librarian, but also an earnest student of Imperial questions. His book is a valuable contribution to the literature dealing with Africa. It is of particular interest at the present moment, and I sincerely hope that it will be widely read.

The book is stored with valuable information and with little known facts with which the public ought to be acquainted. It shows the great difference between British and German methods of colonisation. While Great Britain

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has acquired colonies either in order to protect ill-treated natives, and to substitute peace, law, order, and prosperity for tyranny, bloodshed, famine, and war, or for legitimate purposes of trade, Germany has in her colonisation been actuated by military considerations. Her colonial policy has been directed, not by her business men, but by her soldiers. She has created military settlements here and there, and has endeavoured to acquire strategical points which might serve as bases for future conquest. That was particularly evident in her Moroccan policy, regarding which Mr. Lewin has furnished some interesting and valuable details.

Germany has striven with the greatest energy to acquire Morocco, and has twice within recent years almost gone to war with France about that country, although she had good reason to fear that an attack upon France would lead to a pan-European War. A glance at the map shows why Germany attached so much value to the possession of Morocco. Apart from the opportunity which the occupation of that country would have given her to raise the natives of Algeria and Tunis in rebellion against the French, the southern harbours of Morocco, and especially Agadir, would have been an invaluable strategical base for attacking some of the most important sea-routes in the world, for fighting the United States, for striking at the Panama Canal, and for conquering Southern Brazil, where several hundred thousand Germans live in compact masses. If we draw a direct line from Berlin to Pernambuco, we find that Agadir lies almost exactly half-way between these two towns. This fact, taken in connection with the ambitious character of

German aims and their bearing on the future of Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine, did not seem to be appreciated by the Americans whom I met in Canada in 1911. They apparently failed to recognise that British policy in opposing the Germanisation of Morocco aimed at the protection of American as well as British interests.

Mr. Lewin also shows that extensive areas in Africa might have been reclaimed from savage barbarism, and won for the higher purposes of British civilisation, if the efforts of patriotic Britons gifted with disinterested imagination, humanitarian sympathies, and unfaltering resolution had been supported by H.M. Government. Unstatesmanlike lack of foresight, apathetic indifference to the requirements of the future, and a timid reluctance to seize the opportunities brought within reach by individual effort appear to have been the distinguishing features of the Government action recorded in these pages.

In this volume there is no reference to the great pioneering achievement of Sir George Taubman Goldie and the Royal Niger Company, who together laid securely the foundations of developments which are bringing year by year greater advantage to the Empire and to humanity. This omission is due to the fact that Nigeria had not yet come within the immediate scope of German territorial ambitions.

Mr. Lewin, however, describes in full detail the successive steps taken by Germany in her attempt to create a German African Empire both in Central and Southern Africa, and the counter steps which were taken in British interests by Sir W. Mackinnon and Mr. Cecil Rhodes. I

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had the honour of Sir W. Mackinnon's friendship. I enjoyed the privilege of sharing his hopes that he might be instrumental in civilising a vast area of Central Africa, and I also shared his mortification at the way in which his splendid efforts were frustrated by H.M. Government.

It is painful to reflect that if the concession obtained by Sir W. Mackinnon from the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1877 had not been vetoed by the Ministers of the Crown, the rich district of nearly 600,000 square miles between the coast and the Congo State and between Lakes Nyassa and Victoria Nyanza would have been a British possession of nearly forty years' standing, and that we should not be engaged at this moment in a difficult and costly struggle with Germany for its possession.

With regard to the efforts of Germany to establish a South African Empire stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, I happen to have been brought into personal contact with men to whom this German ambition appeared to be a real and dangerous menace to British interests. Forty years ago I had the honour to act for a short time as private secretary to Sir Bartle Frere, who used to impress upon me the importance of securing for Great Britain the route from Cape Colony to the north. He was fond of quoting the well known saying of Livingstone: "The Boers are resolved to shut up the interior, and I to open it. We shall see who succeeds, they or I." He was aware that Professor Treitschke and other German writers had pointed out that circumstances in South Africa were very favourable to a German settlement in that country, and that if Germany made the necessary preparations she might

conquer all South Africa with the help of the Boers, who were racially related to the German stock. Sir Bartle Frere warned the British Government of Germany's intention. He told them that it was Germany's aim to establish a free self-governing Dutch-African Confederation protected by Germany, and that it was their intention to cut off Cape Colony from its hinterland by acquiring the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It is owing to the resolute action of Rhodes that German aims were frustrated. On three separate occasions did he intervene, each time with signal and complete success, to keep open the road from Cape Colony to the interior and to prevent the realisation of German hopes. The first occasion was when the Transvaal was, as Mr. Merriman described, "pushing out bands of freebooters westwards with the view of realising the dream of President Pretorius that the Transvaal should stretch from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic." Against this policy Rhodes protested with all his force in the House of Assembly at Cape Town: "Was this House prepared to allow the Transvaal and its allies to acquire the whole of the interior? Bechuanaland was the neck of the bottle and commanded the route to the Zambesi. We must secure it, unless we were prepared to see the whole north pass out of our hands." The House concurred with Rhodes in desiring to retain the hinterland for Cape Colony. Within a fortnight of this speech he was sent by Sir Hercules Robinson to the border as Deputy Commissioner. It is well known how President Kruger issued a proclamation annexing "in the interests of humanity" territory which, had annexation taken place, would have barred Cape Colony for all time

from access to the north; and how H.M. Government, acting on the advice of Rhodes, through Sir Hercules Robinson, protested against the proclamation, and sent the Warren Expedition to Bechuanaland to make good their protest.

It is pleasant, in a history of neglected opportunities, to note this exceptionally vigorous exercise of Imperial strength.

The second occasion on which Rhodes, by his prompt action, saved for Cape Colony and the Empire the route to the north, occurred a few years later, in 1888, when Kruger had sent his agent Grobler to negotiate with Lobengula for a concession which might secure for the Transvaal the plateau north of the Limpopo. To counteract the influence of Grobler, Rhodes procured the mission of Mr. J. S. Moffat to Bulawayo, where he was successful in obtaining what is known as the Moffat Treaty, under which Lobengula undertook not to part with his country without the consent of H.M. High Commissioner. Rhodes also sent up Messrs. Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson to Bulawayo, and they succeeded in arriving at an understanding with Lobengula which enabled Dr. Jameson to lead the pioneer expedition to Mashonaland, in 1890, and to open for all time the road for British expansion to the Zambesi.

When Rhodes invited me to help him to organise this expedition, I told him that I regarded the occupation of Mashonaland as a duty for which H.M. Government should be responsible, and it was only when I was informed by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain that H.M. Govern-

ment would not ask the House of Commons to vote the money required for such a purpose that I consented to become a director of Rhodes's British South Africa Company. But for his action Germany would have been able to connect her South-West African colony with her East African colony, and to provide herself with an excellent base whence the Transvaal, and afterwards the whole of South Africa, might have been conquered. Although Germany was thus checked in her attempt to create an organic connection between her colonies and the Transvaal, German statesmen still hoped to make use of the Boers against the British. Germany's agitation in the Transvaal previous to the outbreak of the South African War is notorious. It alarmed many African statesmen. In 1894 Mr. Merriman warned me that the greatest danger menacing the future peace of South Africa arose from "the steady way in which Kruger was Teutonising the Transvaal."

On the third occasion to which I refer, Rhodes interfered effectually to prevent Germany from closing against Great Britain the road to Lake Tanganyika. In 1891 Lord Salisbury was engaged in negotiations with Germany with regard to the boundaries of her East African colony. Germany had advanced a claim to the whole of the hinterland from the coast of German East Africa up to the boundary of the Congo State. I cabled to Rhodes in South Africa informing him that some conversations with Lord Salisbury caused me to fear that he was contemplating a surrender to Germany on this point. A short time afterwards a cable to the *Times* announced the fact that the British South Africa Company had established two forts, Fort Abercorn

and Fort Fife, at the two ends of the Stevenson Road connecting Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika. When I next saw Rhodes he said to me, smilingly, "I knew Lord Salisbury would not surrender a piece of country on which there was a fort that had been named after the grandson-in-law of the Queen!"

I recommend Mr. Lewin's valuable book very cordially to the British public and hope that it will find many appreciative readers. He has done a valuable piece of work in giving us an account of the Germans in Africa. It will prove enlightening to many, and especially to those who have failed to understand the true character of Germany's colonial policy.



# THE GERMANS AND AFRICA

## CHAPTER I

### EARLY GERMAN COLONIES

**E**VEN before the German Empire was reconstituted in 1871 there was a small, but as yet unimportant, party in favour of the establishment of German colonies overseas. The aspirations of the leaders of this party for the extension of Germanic influence by the establishment of colonies owing a direct allegiance to the Fatherland were not regarded with favour by those in authority and certainly met with little response amongst the mass of the German people. The dream of a German colonial empire appealed solely to a select coterie of professors, economists, and merchants, who with the eye of faith foresaw the growth of their country and believed that the time was rapidly arriving when, as a united nation, Germans would be able to pursue an active commercial and colonising policy. These ideals, which rapidly entered into the realm of practical politics after the consolidation of the Empire, were founded upon three definite premises. The colonial party believed that the large emigration of German subjects to the United States, South America, and other countries might be diverted to German colonies, where they would be a source of strength instead of weakness. Secondly, they believed that the extension of German commercial interests and the

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rapid growth of German industry imperatively demanded the acquisition of new sources for the supply of raw products and new avenues for the introduction of German trade. Lastly, they taught that as Germans had already possessed colonies in Africa, and had attempted to found others in South America, the foundation of a German colonial empire would only be the culmination of an historic movement which was partly dynastic and partly the outcome of the commercial activity of the Hanseatic period. Before discussing the two predominating causes which led to the acquisition of territories in Africa, the South Pacific, and China, it would be well to examine the historic basis of the claims that were so sedulously put forward.

Critics of German colonisation have generally regarded the movement as a modern innovation, without the sanction of antiquity or the support of tradition; whilst exponents of the movement, particularly amongst German historians, have looked upon it as a continuation of a work already commenced but unfortunately ineffective owing to a variety of causes which will be mentioned hereafter.<sup>1</sup> The idea that German colonisation was the fulfilment of an ideal carefully cherished amongst the German people, and only awaiting the favourable breath of circumstance to fan it into a flame, however flattering it may have been to the national sentiment, was, unfortunately, entirely opposed to

<sup>1</sup> In an amusing anonymous pamphlet issued by the Clarendon Press in December, 1914, occurs the following passage: "We Germans were in the Middle Ages a great colonial nation. Centuries before the expansion of England, in the days of Henry the Fowler and Henry the Lion, we Germans began that *Drang nach Osten* which carried German farmers, German merchants, German knights, and German monks over the Elbe to the Vistula, over the Erzgebirge to Bohemia, and over the Carpathians to far Transylvania. The illimitable East beckoned, and the romantic soul of Germans cried, 'I come.' But then, alas, there came the Hussite wars, and next there came the rise of Russia, and later there came still other wars and waves of the back-wash of the Slav. For centuries we slept, until our Kaiser came and blew a trumpet-call, 'Eastward Ho, to far Bagdad.' And we heard, and, thinking of the Teutonic knights and many things, we willingly followed."

the real facts. It was industriously propagated in order that new ideas might be rendered more acceptable to those who believed that the trappings of history could alone lend dignity to the teachings and aspirations of a new party. The fond belief that colonisation had been a work already undertaken by the Hohenzollern dynasty, and had been one of the cherished schemes of the Great Elector, appealed especially to that large class who drew their inspiration from the wells of history; whilst the knowledge that the Hanseatic League had been instrumental in the extension of German commerce throughout mediæval Europe attracted the larger commercial community who desired a recrudescence of German activity in the greater world of the nineteenth century.

So small and unimportant were early German efforts at colonisation, so little influence had they upon the main course of German history, so entirely negligible was their effect upon German commerce and industry, that the memory of these enterprises had almost died out, and, until the activities of the German colonial party first gave them prominence, exercised no influence whatever over the German people. The activities of the Hanseatic League were in the main purely commercial, and, so far from being concerned with any schemes of colonisation, they were directed towards the preservation of the rights of German merchants who had settled in foreign countries, the fostering of their interests by the extension of German trade, and the protection of German commerce wherever it might be threatened by hostile interference. The League was merely an organisation for trade. The small colonies of German merchants in the earliest days of the Middle Ages were entirely outside the laws of the countries in which they had settled, and were neither sharers in the rights nor

subject to the duties of the nation in which they had planted themselves. In order to protect their interests they banded themselves into companies, and the principle of association which afterwards found so great an extension in the Hanseatic League was common to foreign merchants in all countries. The communities of foreign traders claimed and acquired their own peculiar privileges. They possessed their own trade-halls (*hans-hus*) where they met to discuss matters of common interest and to enact regulations for the carrying on of their trade; they built their own warehouses, which were often palatial establishments covering extensive tracts of ground; and they lived in their own private dwelling-houses, or resided in the foreign quarters of the cities in which they were established. But it was not until the fourteenth century that the Hansa acquired its political importance in Germany by becoming a league of free cities banded together for the prosecution of common enterprises, and acting in foreign countries through the intermediary of their citizen-merchants settled in those countries.

The Hansa, as a political as well as a commercial force, acquired its greatest influence in the north of Germany, and possessed at Wisby, a once famous seaport on the west coast of the Swedish island of Gothland, an important centre for the distribution of German goods, which was rendered specially valuable owing to its geographical situation upon the trade route through the Baltic. By slow degrees the Hansa extended its influence throughout Europe, establishing centres at Novgorod in Russia; at Bruges in Flanders; at London, Boston, and Lynn in England; and in many other places, whence was carried on an immense and profitable trade.

The influence exerted by the Free Cities of Germany is

a matter of history. Like the monasteries of the Dark Ages, which stood forth as beacons of learning and refuges for scholarship amidst the darkness of ignorance and barbarity that followed the downfall of the Roman Empire, the Hanseatic towns performed their own appointed work in the history of civilisation. They were bulwarks of freedom against the encroachment of despotic power, and in the period of their prosperity were strong enough to defy the most powerful emperors and princes. But their gradual rise was followed by a rapid decay. In the course of the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century, and above all during the Thirty Years War, the relations between the different Hanseatic cities were profoundly disturbed, and the League practically ceased to exist after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. A few years later, in 1669, attempts were made to reconstitute the League, but the conference that was then held was attended only by the representatives of Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Brunswick, Danzig and Cologne, and although the three former cities retained their liberties as free cities within the German Empire, the League from that date definitely ceased to exist.

The activity of the Hanseatic League, as has been stated, during the period of its prosperity was considerable and was of enormous value to Germany as a nation. It assisted to develop amongst the German people a spirit of commercial and maritime enterprise that, but for political causes, should have resulted in a permanent extension of Germany across the seas. But the times were not propitious. Other nations possessing the true requisites for colonial expansion—political unity and sea-power—were able to reap the harvest, and although commerce and emigration are important factors in colonisation, they are

powerless to effect any permanent result unless aided by the resources of a powerful maritime state.

A rapid survey of the conditions of mediæval Germany, before the first German experiments in colonisation were attempted, leads to the conclusion that the German people were politically unable to carry out any schemes of colonisation. As has been seen, the main object of the Hansa communities, like that of the Mediterranean republics of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, was to secure trading depots, and they took no part in the great colonising movements which followed the discovery of America and the expansion of Spain and Portugal in the New World. The empire to which the various Germanic States were attached was too loosely organised to enable the powerful protection of a centralised administration to be extended to any colonial schemes. France, England, and Holland, which later acquired enormous colonial territories, were, on the other hand, powerful and centralised states and possessed a great advantage over Germany because their geographical position afforded them free and unimpeded access to the sea, whilst the German States were practically confined to the Baltic littoral and possessed no security for their commerce upon the high seas.

Whilst these nations were struggling for mastery upon the ocean, the divided states of the German Empire were obliged to be contented with the meagre share of commercial enterprise that then fell to their lot. The numerous states and principalities into which the Empire was divided were incapable of concerted action for purposes of colonisation. The political and dynastic jealousies that divided one state from another kept them permanently in a subordinate position, and tended to develop a narrow spirit of provincialism which was totally opposed to the growing nationalism

of Spain, France, and other countries. Small principalities and larger states were alike the victims of the vicious system of government to which they were subjected, and their inhabitants were incapable of taking a wide view of their destinies or of looking beyond the boundaries of their own petty provinces. One State alone—Brandenburg—adopted a vigorous policy of expansion, and became sufficiently strong, during the second half of the seventeenth century, to undertake the uncertain and hazardous experiment of establishing overseas colonies. Although Germany had been devastated during the Thirty Years War, and required a long period of tranquillity in order to recover from the disastrous effects of the constant warfare by which she had been overwhelmed, Frederick William, the Great Elector, believed that the opportunity had arrived for a forward economic policy and for the formation of commercial settlements in Africa. Although his colonial schemes ended in failure, they were not unworthy of the ambitions of a prince who realised that only by the extension of territory through the acquisition of other provinces would his fellow-countrymen be able to secure the political influence which was essential for the future greatness of his kingdom, and who recognised that commercial enterprise was the lever that would lift his country towards prosperity. Brandenburg, which was subsequently to expand into the kingdom of Prussia, was the patrimony of the Hohenzollerns, and was then a comparatively insignificant state situated in the low-lying country drained by the Oder. Its extension into Pomerania and Prussia gave the Elector, who was recognised as Duke of Prussia in 1657, access to the sea and the possession of the important seaport of Königsberg. The Great Elector, in pursuance of his maritime ambitions, took into his service Aernout Gysels van Lier, who had formerly

been Admiral of the Dutch fleet in the East Indies, and, acting upon his advice, established in the year 1647 a Brandenburg East India Company (*Kurbrandenburgisch-ostindische Kompagnie*), which was to do for Prussia what the English, French, and Dutch trading companies were doing for their respective countries. At the same time he issued a charter to the new company, and entered into negotiations with Denmark with the object of securing reductions upon the duties levied upon all ships that passed through the Sound. But for some years no progress was made. The hostility of the Hansa towns and the unwillingness of the Elector's subjects to undertake uncertain maritime adventures militated against the success of his plans, and although Van Lier was indefatigable in the service of the Elector, and travelled the country far and wide to gain adherents for the colonial scheme, it was not until Benjamin Rawle, a citizen of Middleburg, approached the Elector with a proposal to establish a Guinea trading company that his ideas began to take definite shape. In the meantime, however, Frederick William had been busy organising a Brandenburg navy, realising that maritime trading ventures without the support of a navy would be doomed to failure, whilst any trading settlements that might be founded would be certain to fall before the rapacity and hostility of rival nations. Although the Elector's fleet was not fully completed, he felt that the time had arrived for a definite move, and, in the year 1680, Rawle, who had been appointed successively Electoral Councillor, Director of Naval Construction, and Director-General of the Marine, fitted out two ships at his own expense, and sailed for West Africa under the Brandenburg flag. The first ship was captured by the Dutch off Assena, on the Guinea coast, but the second managed to elude



pursuit, and its captain, acting on the royal instructions, concluded a treaty (May 16, 1681) with three native chiefs near Axim, and obtained permission to erect a fort in their territory. For the first time a German State was definitely pledged to colonial enterprise, and the result of the attempt was the founding of the unfortunate Brandenburg-Africa Company (*Handelskompagnie auf den Küsten von Guinea*).

It is not necessary to follow in detail the fortunes of this forlorn undertaking. The Germans, on their arrival, found that the field for their enterprise would be strictly limited; for English, Danes, French, Portuguese, and Dutch had already established forts on the Guinea coast, and had secured a firm hold on the lucrative trade in gold and slaves. They were obliged to restrict their operations to the neighbourhood of the forts they erected, and were unable either to buy off or beat down the hostility of the Dutch. The first of the Brandenburg establishments was built at Grosse-Friedrichsburg, near Axim, in 1682-3, and others were erected in 1684 at Accada and in the following year at Taccarary, whilst in 1687 the small island of Arguin, situated to the south-east of Cape Blanco, was also occupied. In the meantime the seat of the company had been changed from Königsberg to the important seaport of Emden—then occupied by a Brandenburg garrison—which offered greater facilities for trade with the African coast, whilst arrangements were made with Denmark (November 24, 1685) for the establishment of a depot on the West Indian island of St. Thomas for the reception of the slaves whose sale furnished so considerable a source of wealth to all traders on the west coast of Africa.

But in spite of the Elector's efforts and the co-operation of the Dutchmen who had entered his service, and prac-

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tically controlled the commercial part of his enterprises, the company soon became involved in serious financial difficulties. Apart from the entire lack of interest on the part of the Brandenburgers in the plans of their sovereign, three causes militated against the success of the scheme. The treacherous climate proved fatal to the few Brandenburgers who ventured to West Africa; the Dutch, who were the mainstay of the German settlements, proved disloyal servants, and gravitated towards their own countrymen; and the hostility of the other trading settlements, particularly those held by the Dutch and the Danes, led to the virtual bankruptcy of the concern.

An interesting account of the Brandenburg settlements was written by William Bosman, and published in his "View and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea," issued in 1705. This is what Bosman says :

" But having already hinted something relating to the Brandenburgers, 'twill not, I hope, be tedious to particularize a little on their present state. Their principal fortress is not above three miles east of our fort of St. Anthony, and is call'd Frederic's-burg; 'tis situate on the hill Namfro near the village Pocquefoe, and is handsome and reasonably large, strengthened with four large batteries furnished with forty-six pieces of ordnance, but too light and small; the gate of this fort is the most beautiful on all the coast, but proportionably much too large for the structure, so that the garrison seems to have an equal right with the burghers of Minde, to the advice that they should keep their gate close shut for fear the fort should run away. On the east side it hath a beautiful out-work, which deprives the fortress of a great part of its strength, wherefore it would be easily gain'd if attack'd on this side; besides which, the greatest fault in this building is, that the breast-works are built no higher than a man's knee, and the men thereby are continually exposed defenceless to the shot from without; which is no small inconvenience in wars with the Blacks . . . for the rest, the building part is not to be

objected against, and is provided with a great many fine dwellings within.

“ The Commander-in-Chief of this fort, and indeed of all the possessions of the Brandenburgers on this coast, consisting of two forts and a lodge, takes the title of Director-General under his Electoral Highness of Brandenburg and his African Company. For some time past their commanders and servants, except common soldiers, have been most part Dutch, who in imitation of our nation have always aimed at an absolute dominion over the Blacks; but never could yet accomplish their end, being hitherto hindered by their intestine dissensions and irregularities, or the villainous nature of their negroes who, having mostly fled from us on occasion of crimes committed by them, hath taken refuge under them.

“ In the time of my residence here I can remember seven of their directors; the first, John Nyman, an Embdener, a man of sound judgment, good sense, and great experience, who discharged his office with the greatest fidelity and good conduct, by which means he quitted this country with a great deal of honour and left a very good name behind him. He was succeeded by John and Jacob Ten-Hoost, the father and son, who both acquired a large share of reputation, and kept their subordinates in due decorum, especially the son who, by good nature and a civil address, gain'd the affection of the Blacks, and had everybody at his devotion; by which means he established the Brandenburgian affairs in a much better condition than any before him . . . so 'tis very much to be doubted, they'll repent the time when they removed him, and appointed Gysbrecht van Hoogveldt in his place, who . . . to reconcile himself to the negroes, granted them several franchises and priviledges, which served not only to lessen the power of the Brandenburgers and lay the first foundation of their ruin, but after a short government the Europeans and Blacks joyntly rose against him, and after trying him, discharged him once more . . . choosing in his place one John van Laar, an Anabaptist, who was found to have a much better talent at drinking of brandy than at business; and took so little care of the publick that all went to ruin; and he himself was timely removed by death to make way for John Visser. . .

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who wanting even common sense was therefore incapable of that trust. Shortly after his elevation . . . the negroes . . . continued their unbridled outrages . . . and lastly seizing his person they carry'd him into the inland country, and after miserably breaking almost all his limbs and fastening abundance of stones about his body, drowned him in the sea. Adrian Grobbe (chosen by the negroes) his successor is generally charged with the greatest share in this crime which hath very perniciously weakened the power of all the Europeans on this coast. . . It hath already so enslaved the Brandenburgers that I very much doubt whether ever they will regain the mastery, for the negroes having once got the upper-hand will sufficiently lord it over them.

“ I could not help imparting to you this event, equally strange and detestable, to which I was indeed the rather induced, because as you are perfectly acquainted with all the European trade of the Embden Company ; so you may take an opportunity of informing them how their affairs have been managed here for some years past. But taking leave of this fort, let us take a step two miles and a half eastwards below Cape Trespuntos, where we find another Brandenburgian fort at Acoda called Dorothea ; which by order of our superiors was amplified and delivered to them about eleven years past ; since which they have very considerably strengthen'd and improved it. It is a house covered with a flat roof, on which are two small batteries and half curtaines, upon which they have planted several light pieces of cannon ; it is indeed furnished with a sufficient number of rooms and conveniences, tho' but slightly built and somewhat crowded.

“ Between Maufro and Acoda, the Brandenburgers in 1674 built another fort-house at the village Tacrama, in the middle of Cape Trespuntos. Their General's design was to build a fort here to preserve and defend the adjacent watering-place in their power. Upon the whole, the keeping of this lodge and the two former forts hath been so very expensive to them, that I am of opinion they will not hastily augment their charge by undertaking any new building.”

For some years the Brandenburg forts maintained a precarious fight for existence, but after the death of

Frederick William, and the subsequent disgrace of Rawle, the two moving spirits had gone, and what little interest there had been in the operations of the African company practically ceased. Whilst the Dutch continually attacked the Brandenburg ships and menaced the forts, capturing both Taccarary and Accada in 1689, the company's servants filled their pockets at the expense of shareholders, and by means of extensive peculation hastened the end. Moreover, the difficulties with which Brandenburg had to contend in Germany were sufficient to demand the entire attention of its sovereign, and although the company languished for some years under the rule of Frederick I., King of Prussia, the new ruler, Frederick William I., who succeeded, had no intention of shouldering the unsuccessful schemes of his predecessors. By an arrangement concluded on December 18, 1717, the King of Prussia sold for a sum of 7,200 ducats to the Dutch East India Company his rights upon the Guinea coast, making, however, a stipulation that upon the repayment of this sum he could at any time re-enter into possession of the abandoned settlements. Such a stipulation seems to suggest that Frederick William I. was unwilling to withdraw definitely from the African littoral, but it is probable that he was under no illusion as to the possibility of re-establishing German settlements on the Guinea coast. Having been educated in Holland he was able to appreciate and understand the commercial and colonising genius of that country, which maintained its position owing to its important navy and immense marine, and he must have realised that conditions in Holland and Prussia were so widely different that it was impossible for Prussia to achieve success in similar colonial undertakings. In the seventeenth century the national unity of the Dutch was firmly established, and consequently they could success-

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fully undertake practical schemes of colonial expansion, relying upon the full resources of a rich and closely populated country, whilst Brandenburg was a poor and thinly peopled province, divided into many separate districts scattered throughout Northern Germany. From such diverse political conditions there resulted equally diverse economic conditions, of which the difference was accentuated by the respective geographical situations of the two countries. Such reflections doubtless convinced the King of Prussia that the time was not ripe even for trading settlements, and that Prussia needed internal consolidation rather than overseas expansion. The small colonies which were abandoned in 1717 were but the premature efforts of a divided nation without sea-power to establish itself where other and stronger countries had already won commercial success, and in reality had little or no influence upon the future course of German expansion.

The failure of the attempt to establish German trading colonies in West Africa was not an unmixed misfortune. Prussia was not in a position to defend, or to afford financial support to, overseas possessions, and had the policy of the Great Elector been persisted in there can be little doubt that the country would have become involved in constant quarrels with the great maritime powers. The energies of her rulers and citizens were rightly directed to the aggrandisement of their state in Europe, and they could not afford to waste the resources of the country upon uncertain overseas schemes at a period when the map of Europe was undergoing constant revision. If sea-power were not then within the grasp of Prussia, no other German State was in a position to establish colonies.

But although the Brandenburg colony was the first and only effort to establish a German settlement under imme-

diate state patronage, it was not the only attempt to found German colonies. The Welser Colony in Venezuela, which was held in feudal tenure under the Crown of Spain, and although a purely private venture was a colony founded under state patronage, was not in the strictest sense a German colony at all. It had been founded by the Ehingers, agents of the wealthy Welser trading and banking firm established at Augsburg, who in 1528 had received a charter from the Emperor Charles V. which placed them in possession of Venezuela from Cape de la Vela to Macarapana, and in the north and south from ocean to ocean. The civil and military command of the colony was granted to Bartholomew Welser, who was authorised to appoint governors and to enjoy the privileges granted to Spanish subjects in South America. Although a considerable number of colonists, of whom some came from Suabia, were settled on the coast, the settlement was a failure, largely owing to the jealousy of the Spaniards, who were unwilling to tolerate the establishment of a German trading firm in South America. Complaints to the Spanish Crown led to a modification of the extensive powers granted to the Welsers, who were finally dispossessed in the year 1566, after the country had gone from bad to worse and had been plundered both by the Spanish and German officials of the firm.

Settlements which were proposed by another of the wealthy banking families of Augsburg, the Fuggers, who entered into an agreement with Charles V. in 1531 for the exploration and occupation of large tracts of territory upon the coast of Chile and for the extraction of the precious minerals, came to nothing, and one hundred years later Johann Joachim Becher, who desired to found a Bavarian colony in Dutch Guiana, was ruined by his projects. These, prior to the colonial movement of the nineteenth

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century, were practically the only attempts to found German colonies. As has been indicated, they exercised no influence upon the history of Germany, and in after years merely served as a convenient historical bait with which to whet the growing colonial appetite of a section of the German people.



## CHAPTER II

### BIRTH OF THE COLONIAL MOVEMENT

**T**HE policy of the Great Elector had been to extend the influence of his state by the acquisition of new territory. The provinces over which he ruled had been lifted from a state of barbarism and anarchy only within comparatively recent times by the genius of the Hohenzollern princes, who had imposed their arbitrary rule upon the scattered population. Brandenburg-Prussia was a state ruled by the sword, and at the time of the Great Elector the country was sparsely peopled—in the year 1650 Berlin was a town of but 10,000 inhabitants—by a hardy and industrious population, who were obliged to exercise the utmost thrift and industry owing to the comparative poverty of their country. Prussia was the parvenu among the German States—a poverty-stricken rather than a wealthy parvenu—and possessed neither the historic past of the other Germanic States nor shared in the dignified antiquity which made the Holy Roman Empire so illustrious and formidable. But nevertheless the seed of German nationalism was sown in the fields of Brandenburg, and was fructified by the blood of Brandenburgers and Prussians who sacrificed their lives to further the territorial ambitions of their rulers. The marvellous rapidity with which Prussia extended her influence throughout Germany by aggrandising herself at the expense of her neighbours was due almost entirely to the military genius of her rulers, who organised and maintained

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a standing army out of all proportion to the population of the country—an army well drilled, absolutely ready for war, and trained to the utmost limits of obedience.

When Frederick the Great succeeded to the throne another era dawned in Prussia. Hitherto the policy of her rulers, although energetic and in the main highly successful, had been crude and artless; but with the accession of Frederick a subtle and successful diplomacy was initiated which, added to the military strength of the state and the military genius of its sovereign, lifted Prussia to the front rank of European monarchies. Prussian nationalism received an immense impetus, and the national spirit then acquired those peculiar characteristics which were subsequently to be impressed upon the whole of the North German peoples, and to exercise so vast an influence upon the peoples of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and other South German States. With a cynical disregard of obligations which has been the main characteristic of Hohenzollern policy, Frederick taught that the alliances formed by Prussia were to be for the aggrandisement of the one state rather than for the mutual benefit of the two contracting parties, or, in other words, that alliances were only to be tolerated so long as they would serve the purposes of the stronger of the contracting powers. “If the ruler,” wrote Frederick in his memoirs, “is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice engagements the continuation of which would be harmful to his country.” The doctrine that might is right was thus clearly the mainspring of Prussian policy, which achieved its enormous success owing to the intelligence and foresight exercised by Frederick in building up the military forces of his country and the genius he displayed upon the battlefields of Europe.

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It is unnecessary to describe the events of Frederick's reign. The impress they made upon the Prussian spirit has been permanent and ineradicable. The extensions of territory, the increase of population, and, above all, the enormous influence exerted by the small but highly organised Prussian kingdom, impressed its inhabitants with a belief in their future and inspired them with an intense nationalism that not even the disasters of the succeeding reigns when Prussia lost half its territory, after the terrible defeat by Napoleon, served to annihilate. On the contrary, the failure of the Prussian army in 1806, due in no small measure to its rigid adherence to obsolete methods, merely served to arouse the genius of the Prussian people. A spirit of reorganisation and reform—in a military, not in a political, sense—animated their leaders, and within a few years Prussia, which Napoleon had believed to be hopelessly defeated, was able to withstand successfully the French armies and to contribute to the downfall of the French Empire.

The democratic nationalism of the French Revolution, which found its ultimate expression in the military spirit that animated the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies, had its counterpart in the military nationalism, essentially autocratic, that animated the Prussian people. The Prussian spirit spread into other German States, and a wider and more Imperial outlook was gradually introduced among the German peoples. The passive provincialism of the petty principalities gave way before the tide of patriotism that was welling across the boundaries of Prussia and gathering fresh adherents within its ever-increasing circle. Germany was becoming less divided. Dynastic and local jealousies were being dispelled, and a spirit of mutual co-operation for the common good of the whole nation took the place

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of the centuries-old particularism for which the German peoples had been noted.

The efforts of Prussian statesmen were directed towards the unification of the country. Under the influence of the memories of 1813, the year of the Battle of Leipsic, and of 1815, the year of the Battle of Waterloo, and owing to the efforts of professors, scholars and poets, the ideal of national unity took definite shape, and found its first public expression in the Congress of Frankfort in the year 1848. Although the congress had no very definite results, it nevertheless marks an important point in the history of modern Germany, and the events of the year 1848-49, when Prussia as a whole definitely refused to enter upon the paths of democratic progress, and adhered to the autocratic principles of her rulers, clearly and decisively severed Germany from the democratic movement. The constitutions that were bestowed upon Prussia and other Germanic States, as a result of the democratic upheavals of the period, were neither democratic nor intended to be anything more than an offering to placate the more moderate of the reformers. But the spirit of German unity was abroad, and found expression in the election of the King of Prussia by the German National Assembly (March 28, 1849) as "Hereditary Emperor of the Germans." The King of Prussia, however, in accordance with the principles of his house, did not desire his Imperial title at the hands of the German people. The sword and not the pen was required to cut the cords of German particularism; and German unity, like Prussian unity, was only to be achieved on the battlefield. Denmark, Hanover, the South German States, Austria, and France had to be crushed and humiliated upon the battlefields of South Germany and Austria, Schleswig-Holstein and France before German

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unity was finally achieved and German nationalism received its final impress.

The consolidation of the German people which was consummated at Versailles on January 18, 1871, when the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor, aroused hopes of overseas expansion, ideals that had existed long before German unity was achieved but which after the events of 1870 began to take definite shape.

The creation of colonies was considered by the exponents of the policy of overseas expansion as indispensable if the prosperity of the nation were to be achieved. The causes that led to the initiation of an active colonial policy will be dealt with in due course. It is sufficient to state here that they were fourfold, and were due to (a) the desire to divert the continuous stream of emigrants who went to America and helped to build up the great republic across the Atlantic to territorial colonies under the direct control of Germany; (b) the wish to found trading settlements which would take German goods and supply the raw products necessary for German industries; (c) the hope that Germany, by becoming a maritime power, might share in the benefits to be acquired from sea-power and might in her turn dominate the ocean; and (d) the belief that the dignity and prestige of the nation would be increased by the possession of colonies.

Before considering these predominating causes it is necessary to describe the agencies through which the new doctrine of colonial expansion was made familiar to the German people. One of the earliest exponents of German expansion was the economist Friedrich List, a disciple of Adam Smith, who was born at Reutlingen in 1789. List believed that German unity would be achieved not simply

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by political means or through the agency of wars, but through an economic development that would be shared by the Germanic peoples, and would lead to the establishment of mutual interests and the forging of strong economic bonds. He believed that a nation is united by material interests rather than through any feeling of unity resulting from a common origin or a common language. At a period when List's ideas were theories only he formulated an economic programme which included the creation of a customs union for Germany; the establishment of a network of railways, and the building of a mercantile marine to be protected by a German navy; the appointment of consular representatives common to the whole of Germany; and the acquisition of German colonies and the concentration therein of the surplus German population.

List's programme was practical and comprehensive. Nearly all the ideals he put forward have since been realised, and it was abundantly proved that the bonds of commerce were quite as strong, if not stronger, than the national spirit as a unifying agent. It was the Zollverein, or Customs Union, which marked the first definite advance towards German unity and prepared for the establishment of the Empire. The Zollverein having been established, the natural sequence was the formation of a consular service representing the common interests of the states forming the customs union. The building of railways and construction of a mercantile marine were undertaken, a navy was established, and the colonies—the culmination of List's economic pyramid—were finally acquired. Other writers followed the example of List. In 1867 Ernst Friedel published a work entitled "Die Gründung preussisch-deutschen Colonien in Indischen und Grossen Ocean mit besonderer

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Rücksicht auf dem östlichen Asien,"<sup>1</sup> which set forth an ambitious programme of German expansion. This work, which when it was published attracted little attention, is in a sense prophetic. "Maritime commerce, ships of war, colonies," wrote Friedel, "are three complementary terms. The value of each is diminished if one of the three be wanting. Already two parts of List's programme have become realities. Only that portion which concerns colonies and emigration remains to be realised. The moment for action has arrived. Since the establishment of the Zollverein, Germany has become a country capable of competing successfully with England in the foreign markets. She requires open markets for her exports. Since the rich provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, of Hanover, and of Eastern Friesland have been incorporated in Germany, and as the other maritime States of Germany are politically united to Prussia and share with her in a common consular representation, there is nothing to hinder a policy of colonial expansion." Friedel, unlike those who perceived in the continent of Africa the greatest opportunity for the acquisition of territory, believed that German efforts should be directed mainly towards obtaining colonies in the Far East, where there existed opportunities for the development of an enormous German trade with China and Japan and for the commercial awakening of their vast and dormant populations. In this he anticipated the policy fostered by the present Emperor when he seized the territory of Kiao-Chau.

Friedel counselled the acquisition of Formosa owing to its vicinity to the two Chinese cities of Amoy and Fu-Chow, ports that gave access to two of the richest of the Chinese

<sup>1</sup> The establishment of Prussian-German colonies in the Indies, the Pacific Ocean, and especially in the eastern portions of Asia.

provinces, and rendered the possession of Formosa most desirable to any European nation bent upon initiating an active trade policy in China. But Friedel, like most of the German enthusiasts, overlooked one important factor that prevented any German Government from launching out in a predatory policy in the Far East. However attractive such schemes appeared to be upon paper, they were impracticable when submitted to the cold test of political investigation. Of what use were German colonies without German sea-power? The German, or rather the Prussian, navy was of no practical value as a fighting force when Friedel wrote, and but a few years earlier it had not been in existence.

It has been seen how under the Great Elector attempts were made to establish a navy, but for one hundred and fifty years nothing had been done, and it was not until the year 1848, when the whole continent of Europe was seething with democratic enthusiasm, and Prussia, caught in the prevailing unrest, had been called upon to choose between democracy and autocracy, that the first attempt was made to create a German fleet. A voluntary subscription was raised and a few small ships were got together and placed under the command of a gentleman named Blomme, who had served in the Greek navy and was made "Captain of the Imperial Marine." The attempt to create a German navy was a complete failure, and four years later the ships were sold by public auction. But in 1849 Prussia started a navy of her own which, curiously enough, like that of the Great Elector, was placed under the command of a Dutchman, Commodore Schroeder. The entire fleet consisted of two armed steamboats and twenty-seven rowing gunboats, which were served by twenty-seven officers and 1,521 men. Such was the beginning of the



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great navy which was the brilliant achievement of the present Emperor and his able lieutenant Admiral von Tirpitz. Such schemes as those suggested by Friedel presupposed the existence of a considerable naval force capable of being used as a diplomatic lever for the furtherance of German schemes. The possession of a navy, however small, would present a more potent argument than any that could be advanced by the idealists of the colonial school.

Nevertheless, the ideas formulated by List and Friedel represented the views of a considerable section of the thinking populace which was soon to acquire great influence throughout the country. The German emigration societies were an important factor in the movement. As early as 1843 a society had been established at Düsseldorf for the promotion of emigration to Brazil, and other societies were rapidly founded which, whilst they devoted their main attention to the more practical side of emigration, became centres for the exchange of opinions and for the diffusion of new ideas of *Weltpolitik* which were then taking hold of the people. The German Government, however, apparently was either hostile or indifferent to the colonial movement, though in reality it was carefully watching its progress and awaiting the psychological moment for action. Whilst colonial enthusiasts bitterly complained of its inaction and deplored Bismarck's neglect, that statesman was steadily pursuing his policy of unification and consolidation, controlling by the means he so well understood the avenues of public opinion, and establishing upon a firm basis the military and naval strength of the country; whilst noteworthy omens for the future began to appear in the form of unofficial, yet perfectly controlled undertakings in the commercial, missionary, and scientific fields. German explorers, as will be seen later, were pre-

paring the way for German expansion in Africa. German missionaries were penetrating into regions where they became instrumental not only in the introduction of the Gospel, but in the furtherance of commercial developments that were destined to give the German Government an excuse for action. German traders became ubiquitous, and were busily engaged in establishing depots in East and West Africa, as well as building up centres of trade in practically every part of the world where their agents could maintain a footing. Hamburg and Bremen houses extended their activities in South America, Africa, and Australasia. Germany's internal economic advance was matched and aided by external expansion, and the commercial activities of her merchants were largely instrumental in solidifying public opinion in favour of a forward move in Africa.

Although the movement received no official sanction, and although the Reichstag consistently opposed schemes of territorial colonisation, even after Bismarck had himself begun to advocate colonial enterprises, it made steady and consistent progress. When Bismarck said: "I want no colonies. They are good for nothing but supply stations. For us in Germany this colonial business would be just like the silken sables of the noble families in Poland who have no shirts to their backs," he was only putting the brake on the movement and expressing the obvious truth that colonies without a fleet would be so many vulnerable and undefended points that would lead to those foreign complications which it was his policy to avoid.

Three men, amongst many others, contributed at this period to the development of the colonial idea in Germany—Heinrich von Treitschke, Vice-Admiral Livonius, and Dr. Fabri. Treitschke has had not only during his life-

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time but since his death an extraordinary vogue in Germany, not because the ideas he formulated were new, for they were certainly in the main as old as the time of Frederick the Great, but because they expressed for the first time in clear and incisive language the doctrines that were being taught at the German universities to thousands of students throughout the country, and embodied in cold print the ideals that animated the governing classes in Prussia. Treitschke, who was by birth a South German, having been born in Saxony, and might therefore be presumed to have the less sympathy with the Prussian ideal of force, after making the round of the universities at Bonn, Leipsic, Tübingen, and Heidelberg, was appointed to a chair at Freiburg-im-Bresgau (1863), and subsequently went to Kiel, Heidelberg, and Berlin (1874), where he succeeded the celebrated Ranke as Prussian historiographer. His influence was enormous. Not only did he sit in the Reichstag for nearly twenty years, representing there the new school of savants who were moulding the German youth in their own intellectual image, but by reason of his professorial appointments he came into contact with the younger generation into whom he instilled the doctrine that might is right, and prepared the way for the brutal frankness of later writers such as Bernhardi, Bülow, and Von der Goltz, which culminated in the brutal action of German statesmen and military leaders. Germany is a country peculiarly susceptible to pedagogic influence. German professors not only have played a most important part in shaping the ideas of the rising generations and in formulating the hateful body of doctrine and action known under the term "Prussianism," but they have also had considerable influence over the foreign policy of their country. There are in all twenty-three universities in the Fatherland,

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attended by sixty thousand students, and it is therefore natural that the views of their professorial staffs carry great weight amongst the cultured and official and military classes.

It would be idle to suppose that Treitschke represented a small or inconsiderable section of opinion. His following was large, and his importance lies in the fact that he voiced the aspirations, and put them in print, of those who were teaching similar doctrines to crowded audiences at a period when Germany was awaking to a full knowledge of her predominating military position in Europe, and realising that its natural corollary was a dominating naval power in the larger sphere which Germans wished to conquer.

Treitschke took a wide view of German destinies and stood for the Pan-German doctrine in its greatest extent. His historical studies taught him that nations rise and fall; his philosophical studies demonstrated that they cannot remain stationary but must either advance or recede; and his survey of German progress convinced him that Britain stood across the German path and must eventually be humbled if the full measure of German greatness were to be realised. "Whatever one may think of British liberty," he wrote, "England of to-day is no doubt a power for action in the society of nations, but her power is clearly an anachronism. It was created in the olden time when the world's wars were decided by naval battles and by hired mercenaries, and when it was considered good policy to rob well situated fortresses and naval ports without any regard to their ownership and history. In this century of national states and of armed nations a cosmopolitan trading power such as England can no longer maintain itself for any length of time. The day will come and must come when Gibraltar will belong to the Spaniards, Malta to the

Italians, Heligoland to the Germans, and the Mediterranean to the nations who live on the Mediterranean. . . . England is to-day the shameless representative of barbarism in International Law.”<sup>1</sup> Holding such views it is no wonder that Treitschke taught that Germany’s most pressing need was the acquisition of German colonies, and that he supported the aims of the German colonial party for the establishment of large colonies which should eventually become centres for German culture and German trade and provide homes for German emigrants. Like others who subsequently put forward similar views, he believed that “in the south of Africa circumstances are decidedly favouring us. English colonial policy, which has been successful everywhere else, has not been successful at the Cape of Good Hope. The civilisation that exists there is Teutonic and Dutch. The policy of England, vacillating between weakness and violence, has created a deadly and inextinguishable hatred against her among the Dutch Boers. . . . If our nation dares to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is unavoidable. . . . We have made our reckoning with Austria, with France, and with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the most lengthy and the most difficult one.”

Many other quotations from Treitschke’s published writings might be made in order to show how thoroughly he was imbued with hatred of Britain. Strict logic is not

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from “Modern Germany,” by J. Ellis Barker. The author of that able exposure of German aims is to be congratulated on being one of the first writers in English to call attention to the great vogue of Treitschke. Just as the Englishman, Houston Chamberlain, who long resided in Germany and became imbued with German ideas, so Mr. Ellis Barker, who was born in Cologne and lives in this country, became an enthusiastic advocate of British Imperialism. A study of these two publicists is an interesting essay in the effect of environment.

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one of the German virtues, else he would hardly have stated that "the history of the English East India Company is the most defiled page in the annals of modern European nations, for as the shocking vampirism of this merchant-rule sprang solely from greed it cannot be excused," almost at the same time that Bismarck was stating in the Reichstag that it was his intention to found trading-settlements on the principle followed by the East India Company and other British mercantile communities. Could Treitschke have looked a little farther into the future he would not have written that "it is England's fault alone that naval war is to-day only an organised piracy, and a humane maritime international law cannot be established in the world till a balance of power exists at sea as it long has on land," nor would he have stated that "all the nations of Europe are united together by a common interest for checking the inordinate ambitions of England." It is not necessary to dwell upon Treitschke's political teaching, which has now had such remarkable results; but the fact must be insisted upon that he represented an influence that rushed Germany into colonial enterprises and, in a European sense, paved the way for her political downfall.

The second exponent of German overseas expansion was a man of different stamp, whose mental accomplishments were not of the calibre of the Prussian historiographer, but who by persistent and well directed effort kept his views before the public and helped to pave the way for the colonial coup of 1884. Vice-Admiral Livonius was naturally not in a position to present his views with the same freedom, but his official reports to the German Admiralty, although pigeon-holed owing to the fear that possessed the diplomatic authorities of creating political difficulties, were not overlooked, and one of them at least was published after German

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colonies had been established. In this communication, written in 1875, he urged the foundation of German colonies, and particularly dwelt upon the desirability of taking Zanzibar under German protection and establishing a great German protectorate in East Africa. The Chancellor, Bismarck, wise in his generation, prevented its publication, but the views expressed by Livonius accurately represented the ideals of the colonial party, and Bismarck was only awaiting his opportunity to put them into operation.<sup>1</sup>

The third exponent of German colonisation was Dr. Fabri, who exercised so great an influence upon the movement that when he died in 1891 he was referred to in the German Press as "the Father of German colonisation." Fabri's celebrated pamphlet was published at a period when even Bismarck had at last been won over to the side of the colonial enthusiasts, and when the majority of the German people were ready to support the Government in any colonial adventure.<sup>2</sup> It attracted instant and widespread attention. In it he recapitulated the favourite arguments of the colonial party and presented the case in clear and concise language. Without insisting upon the error committed by Bismarck in following a continental to the exclusion of an overseas policy, he deplored the fact that by his opposition to the movement Germany lacked an important element in her greatness, because, as he taught, colonies were necessary to the economic development of the Empire and for the growth of its commerce.

The views put forward by these writers were supported in a number of pamphlets which attracted little attention

<sup>1</sup> See his *Kolonialfragen*. (Berlin. 1885.)

<sup>2</sup> *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? Eine politische-oeconomische Betrachtung*. (Gotha. 1879.)

at the time, but now have a certain historic interest because they show the ideas that were entertained in irresponsible quarters by men who were imbued with the doctrines of Treitschke and his followers. It is to be noted that the pioneers of the colonial movement at first devoted their attention to the Far East and the South Pacific rather than to Africa, and in so doing they did not correctly gauge the value of sea-power as a force to be reckoned with. It has been seen how Friedel thought that Formosa would form an excellent basis for German colonial ambitions, and the views he put forward were sound so far as they went because at that period Africa presented no great scope for German industries, whilst the dense and civilised populations of China offered an inexhaustible market which had already been taken advantage of by Britain when she established herself at Hong Kong. Ernst von Weber, whose suggestions will be dealt with in due course, on the other hand regarded South America as a likely field for German enterprise, and suggested that Germans might acquire a preponderating influence in the South American republics. "It is not too late," he wrote, "to utilise emigration in order to facilitate German progress in South America. It is a matter of little consequence that the different states have existed for many years in their present form. All that is necessary is that German blood shall little by little be introduced into those states where Spanish and Portuguese are now predominant. The time will indeed arrive when the German element will be in the majority. North America belongs to the Anglo-Saxon, but in South America a splendid new Germany might arise." It mattered little to colonial enthusiasts that such an event would lead to a conflict with the United States, which were then strong enough to uphold the Monroe Doctrine against



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German aggression. Another writer, Patzig,<sup>1</sup> also drew attention to the possibility of founding colonies in South America, whilst Von Philippson<sup>2</sup> and others looked exclusively to the Pacific, where German mercantile interests were already considerable. Only one other writer, Moldenhauer, need be mentioned. Moldenhauer, writing in 1878, believed rightly that Africa offered the greatest scope for German enterprise. "Why should the German people," he asked, "remain inactive and refuse to take part in the civilising of Africa? Since we have become a great and united nation our citizens have commenced to realise the importance of overseas colonies. The question for us to consider is whether Germany is prepared to do anything else than send scientific missions to Africa and to strew the continent with the bones of her explorers. . . . The English and Dutch colonies in the East offer a magnificent example of what we should do. Commercial societies have exploited these territories after having secured treaties with the native princes and have then conquered them, region by region and province by province, until the extent of their possessions has exceeded the means at their disposal and they have been obliged to place the administration under the control of the Mother Country. We must, then, found a powerful company, either supported directly by the Government or by private enterprise, which will enter into commercial relations with Central Africa."<sup>3</sup>

It has been stated that the aims of the German colonial party found little favour in official quarters, but feelers were nevertheless put forward from time to time to ascertain what support there was in the country for such enterprises,

<sup>1</sup> *Deutsche Colonialen Unternehmungen und Postdampfer Subventionen.* (Hanover. 1884.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ueber Colonisation.* (Berlin. 1880.)

<sup>3</sup> *Ueber Colonien und Auswanderungswesen.* (Frankfort.)

and perhaps more especially to find out the strength of foreign opposition. The conversion of Bismarck was a slow process. In 1871 he had ridiculed the proposals of those Germans who then believed in colonies; a few years later he prohibited the publication of a report written by Vice-Admiral Livonius; but in 1879 he acquired a coaling station in the South Pacific, and in 1880 he asked the Reichstag to vote credits in support of a commercial society operating in Samoa. The progress was slow but sure, and it was accelerated by the action of the large mercantile houses having establishments in Africa and Oceania. German houses had already acquired considerable influence in West Africa as early as the 'forties, and when in 1852 the Hamburg firm of Woermann, which subsequently established a line of steamships, entered into trading relations with Liberia and founded factories along the West African coast a strong mercantile lever was applied to the schemes of the enthusiasts. Later, other Hamburg firms, notably the O'Swalds and the Hansings, successfully established themselves at Zanzibar, whilst the former also obtained a footing in Lagos and carried on a profitable trade with the interior. So great was their success that the three Hansa cities entered into a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar, which was subsequently extended (1869) to cover the North German Confederation. In the Pacific German traders had securely established themselves, particularly in Samoa, where they were soon to obtain a predominating position, in spite of British and French opposition, which had been particularly evinced when in 1842 a Hamburg company, presided over by Karl Sieveking, had bought the Chatham Islands from the New Zealand Company and had attempted to instal themselves permanently in those islands. With the establishment of

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the Empire they began to exert considerable pressure upon the Government.

The formation of the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, under the presidency of the Prince von Hohenlohe-Langenburg, in 1881 gave impetus to the movement. Meetings were organised—often enthusiastic because the promoters were entirely in earnest—which were frequently addressed by distinguished travellers and explorers who were thoroughly imbued with the colonial idea; papers were published; and steps were taken to put the torch to the slumbering enthusiasm of the public. The merchants became particularly active in support of the movement. They had everything to gain and nothing to lose through the entry of Germany into the colonial field, and the various Chambers of Commerce passed resolutions supporting the aims of the colonial party. The Hamburg Senate went exhaustively into the whole subject, and in 1883 they issued a long and interesting report, which was forwarded to the Foreign Office, drawing attention to the continuous growth of German interests in Africa, and containing a list of German houses established on the African coasts. At this period some fifteen important firms, mostly connected with Hamburg and Bremen, had founded about sixty factories on the west coast, extending from Portuguese Guinea as far as Damaraland, and all these interests were clamouring incessantly for the protection of the German flag. The memoir prepared by the Hamburg Senate dwelt specially upon the value to the Fatherland of utilising these establishments as nuclei for German trading and plantation colonies, and, after drawing special attention to the Cameroons and the mouth of the Niger as suitable regions for the hoisting of the German flag, terminated with the following recommendations :

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(a) The establishment of a German protectorate over all independent territories frequented by German merchants.

(b) The acquisition of the Bay of Biafra.

(c) The neutralisation of the mouth of the Congo.

(d) The nomination of consuls specially charged to look after German mercantile interests.

(e) The creation of German naval stations.

Bismarck had always taught that “*Die Flagge folgt dem Handel*”—the flag follows trade—and the support of the merchants at this juncture was particularly valuable in hardening public opinion and in strengthening his efforts—for his mind was now made up—for the establishment of German colonies. In fact, Bismarck’s main policy at this period, so far as overseas expansion was concerned, was to foster commercial settlements, and in conversations with German merchants he emphasised his desire for their co-operation in the “colonial business.” He was not prepared to acquire large colonial possessions before the merchant had established his footing, and still less was he ready to sanction any form of state control, or the expenditure of large sums in administration, until there was some prospect of commercial success. “No success could be hoped for,” he said, “by transplanting the Prussian Government assessor and his bureaucratic system to Africa,”<sup>1</sup> a statement which has since been abundantly justified.

<sup>1</sup> Whitman’s “Conversations with Bismarck.”

## CHAPTER III

### CAUSES OF THE COLONIAL MOVEMENT : EMIGRATION

**T**HE first predominating reason that urged Germans along the path of colonial expansion was the fact that year after year thousands of German subjects left the Fatherland to become citizens of the American republics or to settle in British colonies, where, in the course of time, they became identified with the national life of their adopted countries, and their children, or their children's children, were merged with the surrounding population. In the United States especially there had been an immense racial loss owing to the fact that many, if not the majority, of the descendants of German settlers became Americans first and foremost and ceased to take anything more than a sentimental interest in the country of their origin.<sup>1</sup> The Americans of German origin were lost to the Fatherland, and Germans believed that this national wastage of colonists, who might have been building up a new Germany across the ocean, should be averted and that steps should be taken to divert

<sup>1</sup> It is a curious fact, however, evinced by the events of the war of 1914-15, that Americans of German descent in the United States were far more German in their sympathies than citizens of German descent settled in Canada or Australia. With the exception of South Africa, this held good of all the British dominions and colonies, and the fact forms a striking commentary upon the genius of the Anglo-Saxon for assimilating foreign populations, and the value of British institutions as a factor in promoting political contentment. It would seem as though the nearer the approach to Anglo-Saxon institutions the more likelihood is there for the quiet assimilation of foreign populations. In Latin America, for example, those of German descent remain decidedly German in their sympathies, and do not readily mingle with the predominant races.

the stream of emigration to lands which might become German territorial states. It mattered little that the most desirable settlement areas were already in the possession of other countries, since enthusiasts like Von Weber believed and taught that the time might arrive when German influence would be paramount and lead to a radical change in the system of government, whilst men like Treitschke taught with brutal frankness that Germans should prepare for the eventual seizure of British colonies in order that Teutonic influence should be supreme.

The period when German emigration was at its greatest coincided with the greatest activity of the colonial party. How far this activity was really due to this fact it would be impossible to say, because with one exception the colonies that were subsequently acquired were not suited for settlement; but the extent of this emigration formed a convenient and convincing argument to use upon the platform and doubtless gained many adherents to the cause. Germans were convinced, and rightly convinced, that their compatriots made excellent colonists. They had but to review the success of Germans in the United States, Brazil, South Africa, and Australia, and to realise the enormous influence they exerted in the two former countries to be assured that Germans would be equally successful, if not more so, in colonies of their own choosing.

German emigration was not a movement of recent growth. In the first instance it was the direct outcome of the miseries inflicted upon the country by the Thirty Years War, and it was subsequently fed by distresses caused by the revolutionary and economic movements of the nineteenth century. Curiously enough, the first impetus was provided by one of our great colonial enthusiasts, the

founder of the city of Philadelphia and a philanthropist whose name is honoured in England and America alike. It was largely owing to the interest aroused by William Penn among Germans holding religious opinions not dissimilar to his own, during his visit to Frankfort in 1677, that plans were set on foot for a migration of German citizens to America. A company was formed in Frankfort in order to purchase land in the new colony that was being founded by Penn, and the first settlers who were persuaded to brave the terrors of the unknown were a band of industrious weavers from Crefeld, who belonged to the Menonite sect and were thus unwelcome citizens in a country where military service in the wars of German princes was so frequently demanded from its people. The emigrants journeyed to England and left Gravesend in the ship *Concord* on July 24, 1683, arriving at Philadelphia on October 6, a date celebrated by all Germans in the United States as the birthday of their liberties as American citizens. The little band of settlers, most of whom were religious refugees from the Palatinate, settled at Germantown, not far from Philadelphia, and were soon joined by other colonists from Mülheim, Kriegsheim, and other places, who were distributed in other settlements around Germantown, such as Krisheim, Sommerhausen, and Crefeld.

But the German emigration movement, as yet in its infancy, did not acquire any large dimensions until the first decade of the eighteenth century. It was largely due to the appalling economic situation of Germany and came almost exclusively from the Palatinate—a province that had been so devastated during the prolonged wars that it had almost ceased to exist. This unfortunate state, the scene of constant warfare during the whole of the Thirty Years

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War (1618-48), from having been the most fertile area in Germany became practically a desert. Farms were left uncultivated, the fields were untilled, commerce almost ceased, and the nightly horror of burning towns and villages broke the spirit of the people and turned what remained of the rural population into wandering outcasts who were banded together for pillage and murder. It has been computed that at least seventy-five per cent. of the inhabitants of that part of Germany perished during the war, and the horrible ravages of Tilly in 1622 and of Wallenstein, the bloody instruments of the Emperor, destroyed the means of sustenance possessed by the people of the Palatinate, which of all the German provinces suffered most during the prolonged wars. The Palatinate was slowly recovering a measure of prosperity when in 1674 the armies of Louis XIV. overran the country, and fourteen years later it suffered the most cruel devastation of all when the French monarch decided that it should no longer serve as a granary for his enemies, and destroyed the historic cities of Heidelberg, Mannheim, Speyer, and Worms, and burnt innumerable villages. To the horrors of a war in which no man was safe from murder, no woman secure from rape and murder, and the lives of numberless children were sacrificed to the insensate lust of *Le Roi Soleil*, were added the tyranny of German princes and the religious persecution of fanatical rulers, the failure and frequent destruction of such crops as the persecuted peasants were able to raise, and economic bankruptcy. A few years later, during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1707, a portion of the Palatinate was again devastated, when large numbers of the people fled to Holland and many made their way down the great German highway the Rhine, and crossed over to London, where they were succoured by the English



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Government, provided with food, and sheltered in barns, warehouses, and tents.<sup>1</sup> Each fugitive was allowed ninepence a day by Queen Anne until the problem of supporting over thirteen thousand "Palatines," as they were called, became pressing and other arrangements had to be made for their sustenance. Some of the fugitives obtained employment in England, but about 7,500 were shipped to the American colonies and Ireland.<sup>2</sup> The first contingent of "Palatines" was sent to the Carolinas, where they founded the town of Neubern, near the mouth of the Neuse River in North Carolina. Over three thousand were sent to New York and were settled on lands provided for them, along the frontiers of that province, by certain Mohawk chieftains who, having seen them in London, had been filled with pity for their deplorable condition. Here they founded a settlement at Neuburg, on the junction of the Quassaick and the Hudson Rivers, at Rhinebeck, and at other places. Such were the first considerable settlements of Germans in America.

The emigration of Germans was largely fostered by Dutch and English emigration agents, who were busily engaged in pointing out the benefits that were to be derived by settling in the unpeopled wildernesses of America. The "Neulanders," as they were termed, issued flattering pamphlets setting forth the advantages of the new countries in glowing and perhaps too expansive terms, which sometimes roused the German authorities, alarmed

<sup>1</sup> It is a curious illustration of the whirligig of time that during the wars in the Palatinate it was the Walloons who were so frequently employed in the work of devastation and the Germans who fled to Holland and England for safety; whereas at the present time the Germans are the instruments of savagery and the Walloons and, of course, the Flemish are the refugees.

<sup>2</sup> Five hundred families were sent to the province of Munster in Ireland, where they preserved for a long time their national character and language, but were eventually incorporated in the surrounding populace.

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at the emigration of the better class of peasants,<sup>1</sup> to issue replies. By the further means of house-to-house visitations these agents enticed large numbers to cross the Atlantic. The main emigration route was down the Rhine and from Dutch ports to England, and those who were unable to pay the passage-money, like British emigrants at the same period, engaged themselves to serve as farm hands for periods ranging from three to seven years in length until the amount was paid off. These emigrants were known as "Redemptioners." At a later period philanthropic societies were formed to foster the movement—such as the *Deutsche Gesellschaft von Pennsylvanien*, founded in 1764—which were instrumental in directing a stream of German emigration towards America.

It is unnecessary to follow the German emigration in detail. The vast majority of the immigrants during the eighteenth century entered America at Philadelphia, and they were mainly Protestants belonging to the Lutheran, German Reformed, and Moravian Churches, but also to certain religious sects, such as the Menonites and the Dunkards, or Tunkers, who closely resembled the Quakers in their views, because they would neither bear arms nor take oaths. They made excellent colonists because they were industrious and frugal in their habits, and at the time of the American Revolution they had acquired considerable influence, although large numbers had become merged in the English population by whom they were surrounded.

<sup>1</sup> The early *Neulanders* could not in this respect improve upon the highly coloured descriptions of British colonies published at the present time on behalf of certain emigration agents, or issued by certain cities, which shall be nameless, in the overseas British dominions. The German authorities, then as now, were not always favourable to indiscriminating emigration, and sometimes attempted to stop the natural flow of population to the New World. On this point the story related by Mr. W. T. R. Preston, who was at one time Canadian inspector of emigration agencies in Europe, of Lord Strathcona's adventures at Hamburg, may be consulted. (See the "Life of Lord Strathcona," by W. T. R. Preston.)

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Many of them took an active part in the Revolutionary War, during which German regiments were raised to fight on the side of the revolting colonists; whilst many Germans hastened to America to offer their services and subsequently settled in the country. Amongst those who took a distinguished part in the war may be mentioned Peter Mühlberg, who forsook the pulpit to become a colonel in the revolutionary army and subsequently became brigadier-general, Nicholas Herkimer, Baron de Kalb, and Baron von Weissenfels, who also became American generals, and the celebrated Baron von Steuben, who did so much for the organisation of the American forces.

But the subsequent European wars for a considerable period put a stop to German emigration, and it was not until the close of the Napoleonic era that Germans settled in the United States in any considerable numbers. From that time there was a continuous stream of emigration across the Atlantic, and German colonists began to take an important part in the opening up of the West and the establishment of the agricultural and commercial industries of America. Various causes fostered the movement, and the tide of German emigration rose and fell with the political and economic barometer in Europe. Large communities were established in Wisconsin, Ohio, and other new States, and before the close of the nineteenth century there was scarcely an important industrial centre in America that had not benefited directly from the presence of German communities who, in certain directions, performed a most important economic service to the republic.

At first, in the decade after the close of the Napoleonic period, fewer than one thousand Germans arrived each year, but the number gradually increased, and the crest of the emigration wave was in the period 1850-54, and was con-

temporaneous with the revolutionary troubles of 1848 and the succeeding years, when many Germans, imbued with the spirit of liberty and seeing little prospect of political or economic salvation in their own country, sought a new home in the great American land of freedom. During this period many Germans holding liberal and advanced views, who had taken a prominent part in the unsuccessful political upheavals that in Germany rendered the middle of the nineteenth century an era memorable in the annals of the Fatherland, arrived in America. Amongst them may be mentioned Hecker (the military leader of the revolution in Baden), Siegel, Blenker and, above all, Karl Schurz, who subsequently became Secretary of State for the Interior and an active force in literature and politics. The leaders of the liberal movement in Germany naturally brought in their wake many of the rank and file whose ideals had been shattered when Prussia definitely elected to follow the paths of autocracy; but by far the largest section of the immigrants were those who were being driven from Germany owing to the economic situation due to the destruction of many local and home industries through the introduction of machinery and the failure of crops. Thus the failure of the vintage in Würtemberg in the years 1850-53 and the failure of the potato crop in South Germany in 1846-47 were direct causes of emigration. Germany was then at the economic parting of the ways, and the hard times, which had their counterpart in England, were occasioned by the new industrial movement that had its birth amidst political and economic upheavals. Extraordinary efforts were made in America to attract the pick of the German emigrants, and the attempts of agents in all parts of the country were occasionally, but not often, seconded by the German governments, who, rightly or wrongly, sometimes

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encouraged an exodus of what was regarded as a surplus population for which the Fatherland then had no use. Moreover, the policy of the American States in offering free homesteads to agricultural settlers specially appealed to the German people.

A set-back to the tide of immigration was caused by the American Civil War, but within a few years the German national wars caused another exodus of those who wished to escape military duties, as well as of those who were ruined by the economic pressure of the period. During the decade from 1861-70 the annual immigration of German subjects averaged about 78,000, but in the decade 1881-90 it reached an average of 145,000, and the maximum was touched in the year 1882, when over 250,000 Germans left the Fatherland. From that date onwards, when the economic position of Germany had become assured, there was a continuous decrease until, at the present time, German emigration is practically a negligible quantity.<sup>1</sup>

Many estimates have been made of the total number of American citizens of German extraction in the United States, some of which are extravagant attempts to prove that America is largely Teutonic in origin in order to flatter the aspirations of the Pan-Germanic party. Certain statisticians, without taking into consideration the fact that Germans were continuously merged in the surrounding populace, and lost not only their national traits, but also, in many cases, ceased to use their own language and to read their national literature, have attempted to prove that the United States is, in fact, an offshoot of the Fatherland.

<sup>1</sup> During the last few years there has been an excess of immigration into Germany over the emigration from the country, and large numbers of labourers have been imported from Galicia to undertake agricultural work in East Prussia and other parts of the empire.

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Adopting the views of the Pan-German school, they have counted the descendants of Dutch, Swiss, Austrians, and even Danes and Norwegians, as Germans in order to swell the grand total. The only true estimate would be one founded upon the number of German-speaking families in the United States, but this, unfortunately, does not exist. Of the various estimates of Germans, those of Emil Mannhardt, Richard Brockh and Professor Faust may be quoted as typical examples. The first made an estimate (in 1903) that there were 25,000,000 persons of pure German blood in the United States, whilst the second, after an exhaustive analysis of the various elements, reduced the total to 18,000,000, an estimate that was vigorously supported by Professor Faust, who, by applying the same methods of computation to the problem as it affects the national elements, came to the following conclusion :

German element ... ..	18,400,000
English element ... ..	20,400,000
Irish and Scotch element ... ..	13,900,000
Other elements ... ..	14,290,000
	<hr/>
Total white population... ..	66,990,000
	<hr/>

But all such estimates, although flattering to the Germans, are merely of academic interest, because the elements that would really count as a serious factor, from the Pan-Germanic point of view, are those coming directly from Germany or whose parents were born in the Fatherland. There has been a continuous increase in the number of Germans born in Germany and residing in the United States, as the following figures show :

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1860	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,276,075
1870	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,690,533
1880	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,966,742
1890	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,784,894
1900	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,813,628

whilst the total number of those coming from Germany and of those whose parents were born in Germany was as follows :

1900	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,111,453
1910	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,282,618

But if nationality be taken into account, the fact is undoubted that Germans have contributed a greater number of immigrants to the United States than any other nationality. The figures for the nineteenth century are as follows :

Germany	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,009,280
Ireland	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,871,253
Great Britain	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,024,222
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,439,060
Canada and Newfoundland	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,049,939

The following is the German immigration according to decades :

1821-30	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,761
1831-40	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	152,454
1841-50	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	434,626
1851-60	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	951,667
1861-70	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	787,468
1871-80	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	718,182
1881-90	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,452,970
1891-1900	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	505,152
1900-1910	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	784,532
<b>Total</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,793,812

These figures must be received, however, with great caution, because they do not represent the true German immigration to the United States. No allowances are made for those Germans who have returned to Germany, a number that is variously estimated but which may be roughly stated to be about forty per cent. of the whole; and in later years the figures include Germans from Austria, Russia and Switzerland, as well as those from the Fatherland. This fact may be established from the returns for the year 1912. Of the 65,343 Germans entering the United States in that year, only 35,017 (including non-immigrants) came from Germany, of whom 10,236 returned to the Fatherland, leaving a net immigration of only 24,781.

But from whatever point of view the figures are regarded, they were sufficient to serve their purpose as a weapon in the armoury of the exponents of German colonisation, especially when the great influence of Germans upon the progress of the Republic was taken into consideration. The adaptability and frugality of German agricultural settlers, the facility with which they entered upon specialised agricultural work, and the success they achieved in viticulture and the management of nurseries won them a distinguished place in American agriculture. In the manufacturing world they achieved special distinction in industries requiring a high degree of technical knowledge, such as the chemical industries, and in trades requiring patient application and skilled knowledge, such as the making of furniture, wagons and musical instruments; whilst as engineers and bridge builders, Germans obtained a commanding position. Moreover, their influence was shown in a variety of ways too numerous to mention, but especially in music, literature and painting, where they brought with them and transplanted upon a new soil the old-time culture



of their German forbears. In politics alone, although their influence has been considerable, they have failed to secure any great pre-eminence.

Because of this success in closely identifying themselves with the economic life of America, they have become Americans first and foremost, and have been disinclined to take an active part in the wild Pan-German schemes that have marked the extension of German world-policy during the last twenty years. The various German societies in America are mainly concerned, not with the spread of the German ideal among their compatriots in the United States, but with philanthropic, social and general objects. Dr. Hexamer, the President of the *Nationalbund*, in an interview quoted by Monsieur Tonnelat, was careful to dwell upon the loyalty of the Germans towards America, and stated that German-Americans had no sympathy with the aims of the *Alldeutscher Verband*. During the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia, in 1902, this attitude was strikingly manifested. Although he was enthusiastically received in all the cities he visited and fêted by the German communities, the majority of German-Americans were careful to state that, whilst Germany represented their mother-country, America was the land of their choice, and that they were first and foremost Americans, whose sympathies were with the Union of which they were citizens. This fact has been so obvious that the original belief of those Germans who favoured a vigorous colonial policy because so many Germans were *lost* to the Fatherland was fully justified; whilst the ideals of the Pan-German party that the German-Americans might some day be gathered into the German orbit have been strikingly refuted.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The attitude of the German-Americans at the present time (January, 1915) may seem to be in direct contradiction to the above views; but it must be kept in mind that the pure German element in the United States is large and that the

Bismarck with his usual bluntness was inclined to stigmatise all emigrating Germans as traitors to the Fatherland, and the ideas of the Pan-German party were certainly distasteful to him. Not only were they visionary, because they took no account of such an obvious fact as that the majority of emigrating Germans soon became absorbed in the political and social life of their new country, but also dangerous because they could not fail to arouse a deep distrust of German policy in the minds of many who would otherwise be prepared to foster German aims. "I am no friend of emigration," he had once said, "and I fight against it as much as I can. A German who can put off his Fatherland like an old coat is no longer a German for me."<sup>1</sup> In pursuance of this idea he issued instructions to the Secretary of State for the Interior that emigration was to be discouraged. A communication dated May 20, 1881, sufficiently indicates Bismarck's attitude. "His Serene Highness is of the opinion that the present existing statutory and other regulations with regard to the system of emigration . . . are not in keeping with the interests of the Empire. . . . The state in particular must withhold all proofs of sympathy for those Germans who have broken their ties to the Fatherland, and must officially acknowledge

majority of those who were actually born in Germany are probably fully imbued with the Pan-German ideal. Their vigorous and unblushing tactics are but the natural result of the sensitive nationalism that they have taken with them across the Atlantic. The German-Americans born in the United States are not smitten with the same *Furor Germanicus*. Americans as a whole are fully alive to the danger that would threaten their internal stability should any national element, as such, become strong enough to dominate American policy. Professor James M. Taylor put the matter very strongly in a letter to the *New York Times* on January 24, 1915. He denounced the movement for the union of all Germans as a seditious movement for the creation "of a party of German nationalists distinctly consecrated to Teutonism and opposed to the root ideas of American liberty as a source of demoralisation and disorder in American life," and showed that though there has been space for many races in the United States there is only room for one nationality.

<sup>1</sup> Lowe's "Prince Bismarck."

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this to be the guiding principle of our emigration policy.”<sup>1</sup> Bismarck believed that Germans who had emigrated were lost to the Fatherland. “I am not anxious to know how people who have shaken the dust of the Fatherland off their feet are getting on,” he had said when requested to sanction a mission of inquiry to the province of Rio Grande do Sul, in Brazil, and it would probably have been better for German policy in the long run had irresponsible exponents of Pan-Germanism maintained the same attitude towards those of their countrymen who had emigrated, instead of endeavouring to show that certain portions of the world might be so thoroughly Teutonised that new Germanies might eventually be established in overseas countries.

Not an inconsiderable portion of the tide of German emigration flowing across the Atlantic found its way to the shores of South America. In Chile, Argentina, and particularly in Brazil, there are large German communities, and in the last-mentioned state there are whole sections of the country almost entirely occupied by Germans or their descendants. It was the presence of large numbers of Germans in Brazil which encouraged the colonial enthusiasts to express the hope that the country might soon become so thoroughly Teutonised that the time might not be far distant when a German territorial colony might be established in South America, in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine and in opposition to the vested rights of settled governments. This possible danger constituted the German question in Brazil.

Germans in particular have prided themselves upon their virility and their ability to withstand assimilation by numerically stronger races. With respect to the Anglo-Saxons this claim has not been justified. Germans of the

<sup>1</sup> Whitman's "Conversations with Bismarck."

newer races have largely become Anglo-Saxonised Teutons. But in Latin America the result has been different. In Brazil especially the large German communities have retained all their German characteristics, modified in some respects by their surroundings, but nevertheless decidedly German. This result is the more remarkable because German immigration in Brazil in any appreciable numbers has ceased for more than a generation, and the German body is largely a community born in Brazil from parents who were the original settlers. Had German immigration continued at a rapid rate, it is probable that the German question might have become acute, but with the passage of years matters righted themselves, and although the Germans in Brazil retained their language, customs, and national characteristics, they did not acquire any numerical preponderance in the country as a whole. So thoroughly have they maintained their Teutonic characteristics that, in Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul, it is a curious fact that coloured servants are often obliged to learn German instead of the alien learning the language of the country.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, some towns are entirely Teuton—mayor, councillors, police, and national guard—and small “Fatherlands” flourish under an environment so entirely different from that of Germany that it would not have been strange if the colonists had been so thoroughly modified as to lose their Teutonic individuality. “In the south,” stated Mr. F. W. Wile, “where they are thickest, they have become the ruling element. German factories, warehouses, shops, farms, schools and churches dot the country everywhere. German has superseded Portuguese, the official language of Brazil, in scores of communities. Twenty million pounds

<sup>1</sup> “Brazil in 1909,” by J. C. Oakenfull, p. 88.

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of vested interests—banking, street railroads, electric works, mines, coffee plantations, and a great variety of business undertakings—claim the protection of the Kaiser's flag. A cross-country railway and a still more extensive projected system are in the hands of German capitalists. The country's vast ocean traffic, the Amazon River shipping, and much of the coasting trade are dominated by Germans."<sup>1</sup>

German emigration to Brazil was not a spontaneous movement like that to the United States, but was the result of efforts made in Brazil to attract emigrants to the country. The first attempt at colonisation, other than that by the Portuguese, was made by John VI., king of Portugal (and then sovereign of Brazil), who, taking advantage of the fact that the country had recently been thrown open to the advent of non-Catholics, started two German villages in Bahia and a Swiss one at Novo Friburgo (State of Rio) in the year 1818-19. But it was the Emperor Dom Pedro I. who was the first to encourage immigration on a large scale, although it was not until the year 1849, when the provincial government of Rio Grande took the matter in hand, that any real progress was made. The movement was encouraged by the action of the *Hamburger Kolonisationsverein*, founded in that year, which purchased from the Prince de Joinville vast territories in the state of Santa Catharina, where, in 1850, was founded the colony of Blumenau, which to-day numbers nearly 40,000 inhabitants, of whom the majority are of German descent. Other settlements were founded at Joinville, Santo Bento, Hansa, and Petropolis, and from that period there was a constant influx of German colonists until the Prussian Government

<sup>1</sup>"German Colonisation in Brazil," by F. W. Wile. (*Fortnightly Review*, v. 79. 1906.)



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ditions exist for the development of colonisation, and the Germans who have settled there have through five generations preserved their German identity. . . . Just as the old Von der Heydt rescript once prohibited German emigration to Brazil, however, must we now pass laws making it a punishable offence for Germans to emigrate to other countries than Brazil. Within a few years we should then see the rise on the other side of the Atlantic of a vigorous German Colonial Empire." If this do not mean a territorial colony in South America it means nothing at all.

Turning to other parts of the world, it is found that, with the exception of Russia, the German communities are not sufficiently large to cause any uneasiness to the preponderating races. In Canada, for instance, there has been no systematic immigration of Germans, and the numbers have at no time been disproportionate to the surrounding population. Quite apart from the direct flow of emigration across the Atlantic, a considerable number of Germans, or those of German descent, have made their entrance into the Dominion by way of the United States, particularly from Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, and Wisconsin. But the Canadian German community has given little encouragement to the Pan-Germans, and recent events have demonstrated how thoroughly it has identified itself with its adopted country.

To South Africa there was, on the other hand, proportionately, a considerable German emigration. Soldiers of the German Legion employed in the Kafir wars were settled in the neighbourhood of King William's Town and in the border territories in British Kaffraria, whilst considerable numbers of thrifty German colonists settled in the neighbourhood of Cape Town and formed thriving communities.

There has also been a steady influx of German settlers, particularly of the mercantile community, and German Jews connected with the mining industry, and these, as will be seen later, have been a disturbing factor in South African politics and have seldom, especially those who were born in Germany, lost their strong attachment to the Fatherland. German settlers in South Africa have been specially welcome to the Pan-Germanists for reasons that will be explained hereafter. In Australia the Germans are proportionately a weak community, though of considerable influence in mercantile circles. Only a little more than 21,000 were actually born in Germany, but there is a considerable number of Australians of German descent, although these have almost entirely lost their national characteristics and, in many cases, their national speech.<sup>1</sup> In South Australia, for example, flourishing German communities were established at an early period in the history of the state. These German colonists were largely those who had determined to seek refuge from the tyranny, in religious matters, of Friedrich Wilhelm III. With the help of Mr. George Fife Angas, they settled in the neighbourhood of Adelaide in 1838 and the following years, and in the course of time flourishing German townships sprang up at Angastown, Blumberg, Grünthal, Hahndorf and Lobethal, where at the present time some thousands of their descendants are resident.<sup>2</sup> In the other Australian States there has not been any considerable German immigration, and, in any case, the German settlers are generally completely merged in the surrounding population, and form a standing example of the argument of the German colonial

<sup>1</sup> During my residence in South Australia I came across several Australians of German descent who could not speak a word of German.

<sup>2</sup> See "History of South Australia," by E. Hodder.



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party that emigrating Germans were lost to the Fatherland.<sup>1</sup>

To one other portion of the world there has also been a considerable German emigration, and this, curiously enough, has been to Russia, where, in spite of the constant expansion of the Slav races, room has been found for large numbers of German colonists. These have been entering the country ever since the time of Peter the Great, who returned from his European travels imbued with the idea that the introduction of Western civilisation would form the leaven that would make a great nation out of Holy Russia. The celebrated Empress Catherine II., herself a German princess, under whose sway the dominions and power of Russia rapidly increased, was also a factor in introducing German culture in Russia, and from that time forward there has been a constant influx of Germans, particularly of the peasant class, into the dominions of the Tsar. A map issued in the *St. Petersburg Zeitung* in 1906, and recently reproduced in the *Times* (January 13, 1915), shows the formidable extent of this German colonisation. German peaceful penetration, it appeared, was proceeding like an "avalanche," and was particularly powerful along the strategic lines to the north-east and south-west. "For what purpose this map was issued at the time," wrote M. Nikanoroff, "it is difficult to judge, but it may be recalled that the Germans, in the beginning of the war with us, reckoned upon the revolutionary movement in Russia, and made several efforts to provoke it, while at the present moment the German Press is deceiving the country with stories that barricade fighting is now going on in

<sup>1</sup> Speaking of Germans in Tasmania, Mr. T. Dunbabin, in the "Oxford Survey of the British Empire," says, "There are a considerable number of Germans and Scandinavians who in most cases become so completely anglicised that they are not distinguishable except by their names from the people around them."

Petrograd. German subjects arrested in Russia were found to have in their possession maps with similar indications of revolutionary points.”<sup>1</sup> It will be remarked in the course of this book that Germany has followed an opportunist policy, and that startling proceedings which at first sight may appear to have been unconnected with contemporary events, in reality have been dictated by time and occasion. The production of this map in the year 1906, when Russia was undergoing regeneration by fire and sword and had been heavily engaged in the Far East, doubtless served its purpose in calling attention to the possibility, in a weakened and disorganised Russia, of consolidating German influence in the country.

The German colonies in Russia are particularly strong in the western frontier districts, in the Baltic provinces, in the provinces on the north-west coast of the Black Sea, and in the eastern provinces of Saratov and Samara. In all these districts there are large numbers of German settlers. There are five provinces in Russia containing over one hundred thousand Germans in each, viz. : Piotrow, Volhynia, Kherson, Saratov, and Samara, and nine others, viz. : Kalisz, Lodz, Warsaw, Courland, Livonia, Petrograd, Bessarabia, Taurida (including the Crimea), and Ekaterinoslav, containing considerably over fifty thousand Germans in each. In all these provinces the German colonists have secured vast tracks of agricultural country, and one of the problems at present confronting the Russian Government is the expropriation of these lands and their settlement by Slav owners.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See note on page 145.

<sup>2</sup> The *Koloniale Abhandlungen*, Heft 31, *Deutsche Bauernkolonien in Russland*, by Adolf Lane, contains a good account of German agricultural activities in Russia.

## CHAPTER IV

### CAUSES OF THE COLONIAL MOVEMENT : EXPLORATION

**N**OT the least of the causes that finally brought Germany into the colonial sphere was the fact that for many years German explorers and adventurers had been traversing the unknown wildernesses of Africa, and with quiet and courageous persistence had penetrated into countries that had hitherto been unvisited by Europeans. Long before the rise of German sea-power German scientific explorers had established for themselves a reputation which found not only ready recognition in the Fatherland, but gained the admiration of all who were interested in the fascinating problems of geographical exploration. Germans realised with pride that their countrymen had been instrumental in solving many geographical problems, and that the explorers were active agents in the establishment of German influence in countries that were as yet unoccupied by any European Power, and where there were ample opportunities for the foundation of German plantation colonies. The greatest activity in German exploration fortunately coincided with the growth of a national spirit in Germany, and Germans were naturally anxious to reap substantial advantages from the efforts of their fellow-countrymen in Africa.

Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century Germans had done little work in exploration. The discovery and exploration of the New World had been left to the maritime nations of Western Europe. Genoese, Spanish, and Portu-

guese had been the forerunners in maritime enterprise, crossing the unknown seas and discovering new lands in America and Africa. The exploration of the African coasts had been practically confined to the Portuguese, who, after the discovery of America, became equally active along the eastern shores of North and South America, establishing their settlements in Newfoundland and Brazil, and exploring the vast interior of the latter country. The exploration of Central and South America was almost entirely undertaken by the Spaniards, who also penetrated into the Southern Ocean and attempted to monopolise the trade of the Pacific littoral. The exploration of North America was undertaken mainly by the French and English, the former exploring Canada and the valley of the Mississippi, whilst the latter pushed inwards from the eastern coasts, where their colonies were established, and gradually settled in the most desirable districts in North America. The Dutch explorations, unlike those of the other maritime nations, were in the main confined to maritime discovery, and although they formed settlements in America, South Africa, and the Far East, they never took any very active part in the penetration of the countries where they established themselves. But the explorations of all these nations were principally dependent upon sea-power. Spaniards, Portuguese, British, French, Dutch, Danes, and other Scandinavians were maritime pioneers, and their activities were due to their geographical positions upon the outer edge of the expansive movement which culminated in the activities of the Elizabethan age and was continued until the end of the eighteenth century.

In this great movement Germans took no part. There has been no German Tasman, Cook, or Bougainville in the South Seas; no German Columbus, Cabot, or Raleigh on

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the Atlantic; and no German Drake, Magellan, or Vancouver on the Pacific. Whatever part Germans played in maritime discovery was entirely subordinate, such as that taken by Forster, who sailed with Cook, for they neither fitted out nor commanded the expeditions which were constantly sailing from European harbours. Neither in America nor Australia were they fated to take any prominent part, with the solitary and brilliant exception of the ill-fated Ludwig Leichhardt, whose explorations in Northern Australia mark an epoch in the history of Australian discovery.

But Africa offered peculiar scope for German enterprise. A vast and unexplored continent, peopled by strange and unknown races, awaited the advent of the explorer. An immense territory, three times the size of Europe, remained buried in the darkness of the ages, and no effort of any moment had been made to lift the veil that covered its secrets, or to penetrate the mysteries of its physical and social conditions, since the Portuguese had ceased their work of exploration on the western and eastern littorals. Within the memory of many now living the map of Africa has presented an unbroken blank to the inquirer, for even the problematical rivers and lakes which covered the maps of the sixteenth century had been erased and Central Africa was less known than the Polar regions. On the seaboard the European nations had, within three hundred years, established scarcely any intercourse with the natives of the interior, save such as arose through the miserable trade of the slave-raiders. In the north the Sahara presented an impenetrable barrier to European enterprise, whilst in the south, at the opening of the nineteenth century, the Orange River was practically the boundary of the known portions of the sub-continent. The courses of the great waterways

were unknown. The course of the Niger, the Congo and its affluents, the Zambesi, and the Nile presented problems that baffled the inquirer, whilst the great lakes of the interior were hidden in the womb of the continent.

Germans who had been inactive spectators of exploration work in other parts of the world now began to take an active part in the opening up of Africa. So long ago as the eighteenth century, individual Germans had been fired with a desire to acquire fame in the Dark Continent. In South Africa the talented but mendacious Peter Kolbe, a German pastor in the service of the Dutch, had won renown through his excellent account of the Hottentots—a work written in the comparative safety of Cape Town, from which centre he took good care never to be far distant. At a later period, Heinrich Lichtenstein, Professor of Natural History in the University of Berlin, went to South Africa, where he wrote one of the best and most scholarly works on the country, after visiting the Kafirs and Hottentots. But neither of these writers was in any sense an explorer, and it was not until the nineteenth century was well advanced that Germans began to take an active part in the penetration of Africa. The first German to win imperishable renown in Africa was Friedrich Horne-  
mann, who entered the service of the African Association in 1796, and made a remarkable journey from Tripoli to the Niger, dying in the country of Nupe, which had not hitherto been visited by Europeans. He was followed by Heinrich Barth, a citizen of Hamburg, whose great expedition in Northern Africa was sent out under British auspices. Starting from Tripoli it crossed the Sahara by a new route, penetrated into the Sudan, and reached Lake Chad, whence Barth, after the death of his companions, journeyed to the Niger, arrived at the mysterious city of

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Timbuctoo, which was not again visited by Europeans for many years, and helped to fill up gaps in our knowledge of the Central Niger, and immensely increased our information about the Western Sudan. Vogel, following on his tracks, arrived in 1856 in the Sudan state of Wadai, but fell a victim to the hostility of the Sultan. An expedition led by Karl Moritz von Beurmann—who also lost his life—likewise reached Wadai in the year 1863. Other German expeditions performed notable work in Africa. Alexander Ziegler did much to make the northern interior of Africa known to Europeans, and Georg Schweinfurth, a German born in Russia, carried out scientific explorations in the Central Sudan, revealed to the world the extensive Bahr-el-Ghazal and other upper waters of the Nile, and afterwards performed notable work in Erythrea. Schweinfurth, who started from Khartum in 1869, travelled across the country of the Niam-Niam and Monbuttu, races which had not hitherto been visited by Europeans, and, passing the highlands separating the basin of the Nile from that of the Chad, discovered on its western side the great Welle (or Ubangi) River, which marked the farthest point of his discoveries. In Western Africa, Gustav Mann travelled in the Niger regions; Paulus Dahse, the engineer, explored the Gold Coast; and Dr. Güssfeldt carried out extensive explorations in the Loango district.

But it was in East Africa that Germans made their most profitable discoveries. In 1860 Baron Karl von der Decken made a remarkable survey of Kilimandjaro, a mountain which had been seen twelve years before by the missionaries, Rebmann and Krapf, whose remarkable journeys had attracted attention to this fertile district, and continued his explorations of the coastal regions between Cape Delgado and the River Juba. Von der Decken was

one of the first to conceive the idea of a German colony in East Africa. From the River Juba, where he lost his life, he wrote on August 14, 1864: "I am persuaded that in a short time a colony established here would be most successful, and after two or three years would be self-supporting. It would become of special importance after the opening of the Suez Canal. It is unfortunate that we Germans allow such opportunities of acquiring colonies to slip, especially at a time when they would be of importance to the navy." But although Von der Decken had stated that he would not hesitate to buy Mombasa from the Sultan of Zanzibar, it was left to others to carry out the enterprise he had suggested, and the final establishment of German East Africa was due to the unceasing labours of Count Joachim Pfeil, Dr. Karl Peters, and Hermann von Wissmann.

In South Africa also German explorers were extremely active. In 1869 Eduard Mohr undertook his journey to the Victoria Falls, and at the same time Karl Mauch travelled on the Zambesi, visited the Mashonaland goldfields, and rediscovered the wonderful Zimbabwe ruins, which had been known to the Portuguese, but had not been visited by Europeans since the sixteenth century. Mauch was one of the most active exponents of German enterprise in Africa. "Would to God," he said, on his return from the Transvaal, "that this fine country might soon become a German colony." Two names, however, stand prominently as evidence of German activity in Africa—those of Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustav Nachtigal. Both explorers were active in all parts of Africa. The former first attracted public attention by his daring and perilous journey from Morocco to Tripoli, by Taflet, Tuat and Ghadames. Travelling under the name of Mustafa, he left Tangier in March,



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1864, and cut across the Atlas Mountains, through a country peopled by the most fanatic Mohammedans in Africa. His second journey, from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea, at once placed him in the front rank of explorers. At a later period Rohlfs explored the Cameroons, and was afterwards appointed German Consul-General in Zanzibar, where he was one of the active agents in the acquisition of German East Africa. Like Von der Decken and Mauch, Rohlfs dreamt of the time when Germany would be ready to take her place as a colonising nation. "Is it not deplorable," he asked, in a lecture delivered after his return from the Cameroons, "that we are obliged to assist, inactive and without the power to intervene, in the extension of England in Central Africa?"—a sentiment which accurately represented the feelings of the then powerful colonial party in Germany.

The second great German explorer was Gustav Nachtigal, who in the year 1870 had been sent to the Sultan of Bornu with presents from the King of Prussia in recognition of the services rendered to Barth, Vogel, and Rohlfs. During the next few years Nachtigal continued his explorations in the Sudan and the states bordering upon Lake Chad, and performed a notable journey through Wadai, Darfur, and Kordofan, and thus connected his discoveries with those of the explorers of the valley of the Nile. This expedition, which extended over five years, attracted immediate attention and established the fame of Nachtigal. Other Germans, such as the celebrated philologist Dr. Bleek, whose studies in the Bantu languages, especially in the Hottentot dialects, established the study of African philology upon a firm basis; Dr. Wilhelm Peters, who travelled extensively in Mozambique; Dr. Emil Holub, who journeyed throughout central South Africa; the zoolo-

gist Fritsch; the Austrian Marno, who in 1872 visited the country of the Gallas and the White Nile; and last but not least the celebrated Emin Pasha (Eduard Schnitzer) who was born of Jewish parents at Neisse in Silesia, and performed such notable services in the region of the central lakes; served to rivet German attention upon Africa and to fan the enthusiasm of the colonial party, who now perceived that the African Continent offered immense opportunities for the initiation of their cherished schemes.

The progress of discovery had been greatly fostered by the various societies founded in Germany for the purpose of encouraging exploration. A wave of enthusiasm was passing over the country, and the intense interest aroused throughout Europe in the geographical problems of Africa, most of which were then being solved through the unceasing activities of British, French, German, Belgian, and Portuguese travellers, received a national impetus in Germany and formed an important factor in solidifying public opinion in favour of the cherished schemes of the colonial party. The movement for geographical exploration, quite apart from the political motives that animated many of its supporters, was associated with economic interests. German citizens, with a keen eye to the commercial possibilities of Africa, recognised exploration as one of the methods of fostering the economic interests of the Fatherland, and in the year 1868 Otto Kersten, the companion in East Africa of Baron von der Decken, founded one of the most important of the societies for the promotion of German interests abroad—the *Centralverein für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interesse im Auslande*. The objects of this society, which established branches in the leading cities of Germany and in the chief foreign countries in which Germans were settled, were the study of those countries in

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which organised German settlements already existed, and of their social and commercial conditions; the promotion of emigration to districts where the conditions were favourable to German settlement; the promotion of intercourse between the German settlements and the Fatherland; the fostering of trade and navigation; *and the acquisition of colonies.*

But the movement received its greatest impetus in 1876 when, through the initiative of the King of the Belgians, an International Conference was summoned at Brussels for the purpose of discussing the problems connected with the future of Africa and of establishing, if possible, concerted and co-ordinated action with respect to the immense districts covered by the term Central Africa. In its inception the movement represented by the Brussels Conference was largely philanthropic, for one of the main objects of the International Association was the suppression of the slave trade; and the action of King Leopold was mainly instrumental in the foundation of the Congo Free State which, started under the happiest auspices, afterwards degenerated into one of the most awful instruments for the degradation of mankind and the destruction of personal liberty that the world has ever seen. Germany was represented at the conference by Baron von Richthofen (President of the Geographical Society of Berlin), Dr. Gustav Nachtigal, Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs, and Dr. Georg Schweinfurth, who subscribed to the objects of the association and were active supporters of the movement in its initiatory stages.

Briefly stated, the decisions of the conference were as follows: It was decided that in order to further the objects of the association the region to be explored should have for its boundaries, eastward and westward, the two oceans;

southward, the basin of the Zambesi; and northward, the frontiers of the new Egyptian territory and the independent states of the Sudan; and that exploration should be systematically carried on by a number of separate travellers starting from different bases of operation. For this purpose it was decided that a certain number of scientific and relief stations should be established, which should be in the nature of depots capable of furnishing the travellers with the means of carrying on their explorations. To aid in this work a number of international committees was formed, of which the German African Society, which was founded in 1876, the year of the conference, afterwards assumed an almost exclusively national character, more particularly when it was amalgamated, two years later, with the German Society for the Scientific Exploration of Equatorial Africa which had been started in the year 1873. The Brussels Conference served to focus attention upon Central Africa, and from the purely utilitarian point of view it succeeded in rousing Germans to redoubled efforts. The explorations carried on under the auspices of the new German African Society paved the way, in conjunction with the work of the various colonial societies, for the ultimate entry of Germany upon the colonial sphere.

## CHAPTER V

### THE GERMANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

**L**ONG before any portion of South Africa had fallen under German domination, German missionaries had been busy in the inhospitable regions of Namaqualand, and it was largely owing to their activities that the attention of the German Government was first attracted to this portion of South Africa. The sterile coasts of Damara-land and Namaqualand presented an almost insuperable obstacle to any advance towards the interior, discouraging the attempts of traders and missionaries alike to establish friendly relations with the natives.

But another pathway into the country was found across the Orange River from Cape Colony, and it was the Moravians who, in the earliest years of British rule in the sub-continent, first led the way across that river,<sup>1</sup> settled in the last year of the eighteenth century in the country of the Griquas, and afterwards penetrated into Namaqualand. Here they were followed by missionaries sent out by other societies, notably the London Missionary Society. Under the auspices of this society Christian and Augustin Albrecht set out from Cape Colony in 1805, with Seidenfaden;

<sup>1</sup> The Orange River had of course been crossed many times in Namaqualand before that date. An exploring party had been sent out by the Governor Ryk Tulbagh in the middle of the eighteenth century. This expedition advanced through Namaqualand and reached Angra Pequena Bay. The Orange River was explored by Colonel Gordon in 1779 when he hoisted the Dutch flag in the middle of the stream (then called the Gariép, or Groote [Great] River) and named it Orange River in honour of the Stadtholder of Holland

journeyed through the difficult desert country, crossed the Orange River, and found at a place seventy-two miles north of it a spring of water near which they formed a settlement which they called Blijde Uitkempt, or Glad Support. After two years spent in this district they moved to Warmbad, but Augustin Albrecht soon died, and the settlement was destroyed. Other missionaries followed, including the Wesleyan, William Threlfall, who settled at Kamiesburg in 1817 and was subsequently killed by the bushmen, and Edward Cook, also a Wesleyan, who formed a second settlement at Warmbad, which he called Nisbet Bath. A further station was founded at Pella, a few leagues south of the Orange River, from which the missionary Schmelen set out upon his journey into Great Namaqualand and stopped at Rock Fountain (Bethany), fifteen days' journey from the Orange River, where he remained until 1828.

But the first contact of the Rhenish Missionary Society with the country in which it was afterwards to become so active did not occur until the year 1842. The Rhenish missionaries established their first settlement at Bethany, where they discovered the remains of the mission started by Schmelen and took up the work that had been abandoned a few years before. From that date onwards they were the most active missionary body in the country, and although they looked to Great Britain for the protection of their missions and regarded the country as under British influence they subsequently became a not unimportant factor in determining the attitude of the German Government in the colonial crisis of 1884.

The country in which they were settled, together with the more northern portions called Damaraland, had by no means been overlooked by European travellers. Its value as a cattle-raising country was already well known and it

was recognised that although the coastal belt was an absolutely sterile district, the interior uplands offered good pasturage and were suitable for agricultural settlement. Moreover, it was believed to be rich in minerals. The first visit to Namaqualand had been made in the year 1685 by the Dutch Governor of the Cape, Simon van der Stell, who had been attracted by marvellous tales of rich copper deposits, and since that date the country had occasionally been visited by other travellers.<sup>1</sup> In 1836, Sir James Edward Alexander, captain in the 42nd Highlanders and lieutenant-colonel in the Portuguese army, went through a large part of Namaqualand and Damaraland and succeeded in obtaining a good collection of zoological and other specimens, many of which were then unknown in the scientific world. Captain Alexander proceeded two hundred miles into the interior and did much to make the country known through the medium of his book, published in 1838, in which he described a region that "has hitherto remained a blank upon the map." Alexander visited Walfish Bay and the Swakop River. A little later, in 1850-52, Sir Francis Galton, accompanied by the Swedish traveller Charles J. Andersson, undertook a notable journey through Damaraland and Ovampoland, the most northerly portion of German South-West Africa. They entered Walfish Bay on August 20, 1850, where they had to proceed very cautiously because the passage "had never been properly surveyed; and different charts give most widely different plans of it." The travellers were most hospitably received by the missionaries and made their first head-quarters at Scheppmansdorp, travelled to the "Ghou Damap"

<sup>1</sup> An almost literal translation of Van der Stell's account of this expedition was published in the *South African Quarterly Journal* in 1829-32, translated from the Dutch by W. L. von Bouchenroder.

country, via Barmen, through regions then almost unknown, and afterwards journeyed through Ovampoland. Galton returned to England early in 1852 when Andersson commenced his journey to Lake Ngami. Both travellers wrote interesting narratives of their journeys, that of Andersson giving a full account of the country and of the wonderful fauna it then contained. About the same time Frederick Green, accompanied by the well-known Swedish naturalist A. J. Wahlberg, was also travelling in Ovampoland, whilst farther to the south the Rev. C. Hugo Hahn, of the Rhenish Missionary Society, was journeying through the Damara country and compiling his well-known grammar of the Herero language. A little later, in 1861, two of the most active of the South African explorers, Thomas Baines and James Chapman, were also in the country and travelled from Walfish Bay to Lake Ngami and the Victoria Falls. These pioneer journeys and the work of the missionaries did much to make South-West Africa better known, and paved the way for the operations of the traders who followed in their wake and established themselves at various places suitable for commerce with the natives.

But the position of both missionaries and traders was a difficult and dangerous one. The British Government were then unwilling to undertake the administration of any more territory in South Africa, unless they were absolutely obliged to do so in order to safeguard the countries that had already been taken under British control. The long series of native wars, culminating in the Kafir War of 1877-78 and the Basuto and Zulu Wars of 1879, and the bad relations with the Boers, had had an unfortunate effect upon British statesmen, who were unwilling to undertake fresh responsibilities in an immense territory, the value of which was not recognised and where there seemed to be no likelihood of



any other nation endeavouring to obtain a foothold. They believed that fresh territory should only be acquired "for strong and urgent reasons,"<sup>1</sup> and they resisted pressure from various quarters in favour of the annexation of the country to the north of the Orange River. In 1867 when the question was brought to the notice of the Duke of Buckingham by the then Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Philip Wodehouse, who urged the British Government to extend the authority of the Queen over the south-west coast as far as 22 degrees south latitude (i.e. a little north of Swakopmund and Windhuk), the former had written that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume British rights over so long a tract of country without some stronger evidence of its necessity and more information than it appears to have been in your power to communicate," and he stated that "it must be borne in mind that a great Power cannot declare its sovereignty over an extensive territory, however barren and thinly peopled, without the possibility of responsibilities that cannot at the time be foreseen"—an observation he illustrated by referring to events that had occurred at Penguin Island<sup>2</sup> during the American Civil War.

But this timid policy failed to win the approbation of the Cape Government and it was, at that time, equally displeasing to the Germans who were desirous that some stable form of government should be set up in territory in which they were acquiring considerable interests; for in the following year the Rhenish Missionary Society sent a memorial

<sup>1</sup> Lord Derby's dispatch of December 4, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> Twelve islands situated off Angra Pequena on the coast of Damaraland, named Plum Pudding, Roast Beef, Hollam's Bird, Mercury, Ichaboe, Sea, Penguin, Halifax, Long, Possession, Albatross, and Mona, which were annexed in 1867 and added to Cape Colony in 1874. It is suggested that the names of the first two of these islands being particularly pleasing to British ears had caused the Ministry of the day to depart from their generally timid policy. It was quite a pretty dish to set before the Queen

urging the intervention of the British Government and asking for the dispatch of a commissioner and two hundred troops. Prince Bismarck, then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, urged this course upon the British Foreign Office, but the desire of the missionaries that the whole of Damaraland should also be annexed frightened the British Government, who were unable to accept the views urged by the German Chargé d'Affaires, Baron von Katte, who expressed the wish of the German Government for energetic measures. The memorial of the Rhenish missionaries went exhaustively into the question and showed that there had been established twelve stations which were then frequently attacked by the natives. The war which commenced in the year 1863 between the Hereros (Damaras) and the Namaquas who had been subject to the former since the year 1845 but had recently asserted their independence, led to plundering excursions and robberies, during which several missionary stations had been destroyed and the missionaries forced to flee from the country. The lives of Europeans were unsafe, traders were killed, the storehouse of the missions at Walfish Bay was burnt, and both British and German subjects were living in a state of great insecurity and constant alarm. These events had produced a strong feeling in Cape Colony, and a man-of-war was sent to Walfish Bay in order to afford some protection to European fugitives. "In the last two years," stated the memorialists, "the prestige of the British name has been lost in the above-mentioned lands which adjoin Cape Colony"; and they urged that as there had been intervention on behalf of French missionaries in Basutoland the British Government would be well advised to adopt similar measures in Damaraland, particularly as the "Namaqua-Hereroland coast might be of greater import-

ance than Basutoland for the further development of South Africa.”

But beyond sending a commissioner to Namaqualand, under whose influence a formal peace between the warring tribes was concluded, the British Government then did nothing to meet the wishes of the missionaries and traders, and they lost an opportunity of acquiring a permanent position in the country. If they had acted at this period, German wishes would have been satisfied and the disastrous native feuds, that were subsequently to break out anew, would have been avoided. These facts must not be overlooked in apportioning any blame for the German occupation of South-West Africa.

A little later, in 1875, the Cape Parliament, in deference to public pressure, passed a resolution that the limits of the colony should be extended so as to include Walfish Bay and so much of the country as it might be found expedient to acquire. The movement had the hearty support of Sir John Molteno, who saw clearly that the extension of British territory was essential not only in the interests of the colony, but also in the interests of the British Empire generally, for in the event of foreign complications it was evident that the country, although possessed of only one good harbour, might form an important base for operations against Cape Colony. In pursuance of the resolution Mr. John Coates Palgrave, who was well acquainted with the Hereros and Namaquas, was sent in the following year as special commissioner to the tribes north of the Orange River, under a commission issued by Sir Henry Barkly on March 16, 1876.

In the instructions delivered to Mr. Palgrave he was informed that it was necessary to proceed to Walfish Bay and from thence to penetrate into the country, visit the principal tribes and explain to them “the benefit they would derive

from colonial rule and government which they had from time to time in past years expressed themselves desirous of securing." The official report of the journey presented to the Cape Parliament<sup>1</sup> contains a most interesting and exhaustive account of the mission and its results. Palgrave left Cape Town in the schooner *Themis* and landed at Walfish Bay on April 25, 1876. The white inhabitants presented him with an address, bearing twenty-three signatures, expressing their satisfaction that the Cape Government were directing attention to the country and stating that they would hail the day when the British ensign would be hoisted on that shore. This petition was signed by British, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes.

The activity of German merchants in South-West Africa was clearly demonstrated in Mr. Palgrave's report. Of the four stores at Walfish Bay, two belonging to the *Missions Handels Aktien Gesellschaft* and another to Messrs. Eriksson and Co., a Swedish firm, divided between them half the trade of Damaraland; and these two companies also possessed other stores in the country. Palgrave journeyed over the difficult desert treks leading into the interior and visited the village of Otjimbinque, about 120 miles inland, which for many years had been the chief station of the Rhenish Mission Society and, during the wars with the Namaquas, had been the head-quarters of the Hereros. Here was established the finest store in the country, and this belonged to the *Missions Handels Aktien Gesellschaft*. At the next village, Otjikango, or Barmen, nearly fifty miles away, a large trading business was also carried on by the missionaries, and at Okothondje, Messrs. Eriksson had trading establishments employing more than twenty Euro-

<sup>1</sup> Cape of Good Hope. Appendix 2 to *Votes and Proceedings of Parliament*. (1877.)

peans. At all these places Palgrave entered into negotiations with the natives, but particularly at Okahandja, a little to the north-east of Barmen, where he had several interviews with Samuel Maherero, the paramount chief of the Hereros, who asked for British protection and on September 9 entrusted Palgrave with the following letter :

“Sir,—I speak in the name of the Herero people to thank your Excellency for listening to our prayers to have a commissioner sent to us. We want to live at peace with each other and with our neighbours, and we want to have our country left for us. We want to see our children grow up more civilised than we have any chance of being; and so, after many meetings amongst ourselves, we have agreed most humbly to ask your Excellency to send someone to rule us and be the head of our country.”

Palgrave also received petitions from other chieftains asking for British protection, notably from several of the petty chieftains of the Namaquas, including William Christian, Captain of the Bondelzwaarts, Moses Witbooi, Captain of the Kowisis, and David Christian, Captain of the Amas; although Jan Jonker Afrikaaner, claiming to speak for the Namaquas generally, failed to respond to the British advances. In addition to these petitions one was received from thirty-eight Europeans in the following terms :

“We, the undersigned hunters and traders in Damara-land, do hereby humbly petition that you will in your official capacity use your utmost influence with the Colonial Government, in informing them of the urgent necessity that this country be placed under British rule and protection . . . and we on our part undertake to render all assistance in our power to carry out the views of the Government.”

Armed with this almost unanimous request for British

protection, the special commissioner returned to Cape Colony, and it would have been thought that the British Government would have listened favourably to the wishes of the inhabitants of this immense territory. But although Sir Bartle Frere, in a long and able dispatch to the Earl of Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, urged that the coast up to the Portuguese boundary should be annexed and pointed out that the traders and missionaries in Damaraland, though none of them were Englishmen or Cape Colonists by birth, "had not the slightest national or colonial bias in the matter," and subsequently renewed his urgent representations to the British Government, the latter refused to take any immediate steps for acquiring the whole country. They merely—and fortunately—annexed Walfish Bay, with a strip of territory extending forty miles along the coast and twenty miles inland, and thus secured the finest harbour in this part of the African coast.<sup>1</sup> Sir Bartle Frere's representations that in spite of German readiness to acquiesce in a British protectorate the German Government were in reality anxious to secure an entry into the country were entirely disregarded.

Before proceeding with the story of German intrigue and British vacillation in South Africa it will be well to consider the nature of the country which the British Government thus lightly threw away. Palgrave in his exhaustive report gives an excellent idea of the territory as it then existed—thinly peopled by scattered tribes of warring races, some of which, as the Damaras, recognised a paramount chief who was entitled to speak on behalf of the whole nation, whilst others were divided into numerous factions which recognised no other authority than that of their petty chieftains. From the then ill-defined Portuguese boundary

<sup>1</sup> March 12, 1878.

to the mouth of the Orange River was a distance of about one thousand miles—a sterile and inhospitable coast offering no adequate shelter for ships, save at one point; a low-lying sandy desert region stretching inland for about forty or fifty miles, presenting a succession of sand dunes to the eye of the voyager, and capable of producing nothing suitable for the sustenance of man save an edible gourd-like fruit called *nara*, which enabled the miserable tribes who lived near the coasts to eke out a precarious existence. But beyond the “edge of the sand” the land rises abruptly from the sea, isolated tufts of grass give place to country suitable for pasturage, water can be found at comparatively short intervals, and the grass veld continues inland where it is broken by highlands of considerable altitude which, in the neighbourhood of Windhuk, reach a height of about five thousand feet, and farther north are of a still greater height. To the south in Great Namaqualand the country is of a poorer quality, but the highlands are continued to the borders of Cape Colony at altitudes ranging from two thousand to three thousand feet. This considerable height makes the temperature cold in the winter, when the thermometer frequently drops considerably below freezing point. Farther to the east is the great Kalahari Desert, an absolutely sterile waste presenting no opportunities for agriculture or pasturage.

Of the tribes which then inhabited South-West Africa, the Ovampo in the extreme north had scarcely come under European influence, although certain Portuguese traders had been busy among them introducing the doubtful benefits of civilisation in the form of firearms and alcohol. They preserved complete independence and still retain a considerable amount of freedom, not having come into direct conflict with their European masters. The Hereros; the most

important of the Damara tribes, possessed considerable wealth in their cattle and sheep and having been under the direct influence of the missionaries had adopted Christianity, a religion which did not prevent them from continuing their former warlike practices and constantly raiding their neighbours. To secure support in their wars with the Namaquas they had petitioned Sir Henry Barkly, early in 1872, "that the excellent British Government will give us a hint how to govern our poor country and extend a helping hand to our people in giving good advice as to what we are to do to retain our country, because the Namaquas will not leave us in peace." They then numbered about 85,000 and the total population of their country was estimated as follows :

Hereros, or Cattle-Damaras	...	...	85,000
Houquain, or Berg-Damaras	...	...	30,000
Bushmen	...	...	3,000
Namaquas	...	...	1,500
Bastards	...	...	1,500

The Hereros, a Bantu tribe (properly Ova-Herero—Ova being the plural prefix), or Damaras as they were called by the Namaquas, had come into the country about one hundred and fifty years before from the north, where they came into contact with a negro-like people calling themselves Houquain, or "real men," who were named by their enemies the Namaquas, the Ghou-Damap, or "men made of dirt," and termed by Europeans the Berg-Damaras, supposed to be the aboriginal inhabitants of the country. On the arrival of the Hereros the latter fled to the mountains. To the south in Great Namaqualand was a number of pure Namaqua tribes, divided into the Gerkous, or Red Nation, the Bondelzwaarts, the Habobes, or Veldschoendragers, and other tribes, with a population of about



10,000; and the Namaqua-Hottentots, or Orlams, then numbering about 6,000, who had come from Cape Colony. All these tribes were Christians, nominally at least, but most of them were incorrigible idlers and many of them also unrepentant rogues. "The Gobais Namaquas," said Palgrave, "are an impudent and, I fear, incorrigible set, and my last accounts from the country inform me that their new missionary had not been long with them before he had to complain that his kraal was entered at night and his goats milked. The act was persisted in until the missionary, one Sunday morning very early, caught the thief in the very act of milking and interrupted his occupation by throwing a stone at him, when he at once made off. He was identified and a formal complaint was made by the missionary with the request that the man might be punished, and consequently the Raad was summoned to deliberate on the case and the end of it all was that they concluded to fine the missionary for 'breaking the Sabbath day by throwing a stone.'" But nevertheless in spite of little incidents of this nature the missionaries had acquired a considerable influence both in Damaraland and Namaqualand, particularly Dr. C. H. Hahn, Superintendent of the Rhenish Missions, and Dr. Theophilus Hahn, both of whom were then in favour of British intervention.

But beyond appointing Major Benjamin D'Urban Musgrave to be Resident at Okahandja, and subsequently to be Magistrate at Walfish Bay, and Mr. Palgrave to act as Special Commissioner in the Trans-Gariep, the Cape Ministry did nothing to comply with the wishes of the native tribes; and the "moral force" they exerted proving insufficient, things went from bad to worse until the outbreak of war between the Hereros and Namaquas in July, 1880, led the Cape Government to withdraw their repre-

sentatives to Walfish Bay. The Cape Government, upon whom the British Ministry wished to throw full responsibility for the administration of the country should a forward move be decided upon, were unable to undertake fresh responsibilities; although Sir J. Gordon Sprigg in a minute forwarded to Sir Michael Hicks Beach on December 13, 1879, had stated that "there is little doubt that but for the Kafir War of 1877-78 and the change of Ministry that occurred during its progress, a Bill for the annexation of Damaraland would have been submitted for the approval of Parliament. But the several recent wars had the effect of checking the readiness of the Colonial Government to comply with the request of native tribes to be taken under its care and protection." The Cape Premier further stated definitely that "the Government at present contemplates no fresh annexation of territory."

This state of affairs gave the German colonial party the opportunity they desired. It has been seen how active they were in Germany at this period. In South Africa their agents were also busy. The Foreign Office were apparently inclined to attach little importance to their manoeuvres. Subsequent events proved that they were indifferent to, or unaware of, the real aspirations of the German colonial party and underrated the strength of the German movement for overseas expansion, believing that Prince Bismarck would be unwilling to embark upon political adventures that might lead to complications with other countries. Nevertheless, statesmen in South Africa were not altogether blind to the trend of events, although unfortunately Cape Ministers, less informed perhaps than they should have been about contemporary movements in Germany, and occupied with pressing problems connected with the Boer Republics and the Dutch population gener-

ally, did not urge with sufficient firmness the desirability of an active British policy in South-West Africa. One man alone grasped the real significance of German policy, but unfortunately his warnings were unheeded and, although forwarded to the British Ambassador at Berlin, were dismissed with scant attention.

Irresponsible utterances by German travellers like Rohlfs and Mauch (*see* page 65) attracted no notice in England. But Sir Bartle Frere, whose foresight was subsequently to be triumphantly vindicated, took a serious view of German designs; and almost one of his last acts before he was recalled to England was to send to Lord Kimberley, then Colonial Secretary, a translation of an article in the *Geographische Nachrichten*, by Ernst von Weber, which was received in London eight days after Sir Bartle Frere had been recalled. "The article," stated Sir Bartle Frere, "contains a clear and well argued statement in favour of the plan for a German colony in South Africa, which was much discussed in German commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War, and which is said to have been one of the immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 1870-71. Recent events," he continued, alluding specially to events in the Transvaal, "have drawn together the Germans and the Dutch republicans in this colony, whose feeling towards the English Government is sufficiently indicated in Mr. Weber's paper." As Von Weber's article laid bare the aspirations of the German colonial party it is well to summarise the main contentions of the paper.

"A new empire," commenced Von Weber, "possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the Indian Empire, awaits, in the newly-discovered Central Africa,

that Power which shall possess sufficient courage, strength, and intelligence to acquire it. This attractive project has lately been the origin of the cry among the English of 'Africa shall be English from Table Mountain to the Nile,' a great and noble ambition. Still one must be an Englishman to be inspired by it, and it is by no means chimerical, for if our Germany still continues to hold to her former rôle of complete passiveness, England will certainly be the one to attain this great object. . . . But Germany ought not to resign all this immense spoil to England. . . . If England plants factories and missionary stations in the Congo basin, Germany must also, and this applies also to the East African coast."

"In South-East Africa," continued Von Weber, "we Germans have quite a peculiar interest, for here dwell a splendid race of people allied to us by speech and habits. The Boers or farmers there are the descendants of former Dutch settlers; and they are, as I most emphatically maintain, our kinsmen and brethren; so-called Low-Germans to be sure, but none the less of right Teutonic blood, for our Dutch neighbours who are really German, have only, in consequence of a separate historical development, acquired a separate nationality, in consequence of which they believe that they ought not to reckon themselves among the children of Germany. In appearance and character the Boers are the same as our sturdy Westphalians, Frieslanders, and Schleswig-Holsteiners. . . ." Von Weber then continues with a description of the Boers, "pious folk, with their energetic, strongly-marked, and expressive heads they recall the portraits of Rubens, Teniers, Ostade, and Van Dyck. . . . The ramifications of the Boer families run through the length and breadth of South Africa, and one may speak of a nation of Africanders or Low-German Africans, which

forms one sympathetic race from Table Mountain to the Limpopo. This is a fact which would be of great importance in any possible future rising of the Boers, having for its object the formation of a Dutch African confederation. . . . For the sake of sure and certain protection from the greed of annexation of the hateful English Government the Boers would gladly have placed themselves under the German Government in the form of two protected states, with as far as possible their own free self-government."

"The steps taken by the Boers remain, alas, without result. As to the transactions supposed to have been concluded at Berlin, they appeared in public, till again in May, 1875, the telegram purporting to be from the British Ambassador to Berlin to the Government in Downing Street went through the London journals 'Transvaal Government conferring with Berlin Government on protective alliance.'" Von Weber then suggests that South Africa should be flooded with German immigrants. "What could not such a country," he exclaims, "full of such inexhaustible natural treasures, become if in course of time it were filled with German immigrants? What people understand agricultural colonisation better than the Germans? Pennsylvania and the north and north-west of the United States of America, the German settlements in South Brazil and British Kaffraria, as well as the agricultural colonies in Southern Russia, afford striking evidence of it. A constant mass immigration of Germans would gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans over the Dutch population, and of itself would by degrees effect the Germanisation of the country in a peaceful manner. It was this free unlimited room for annexation in the north, this open access to the heart of Africa, which

principally inspired me with the idea, now more than four years ago, that Germany should try, by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay, and the subsequent continual influx of German immigrants to the Transvaal, to secure the future dominion over the country, and so to pave the way for the foundation of a *German-African Empire* of the future. . . . If we were to succeed in pushing forward, little by little, a chain of German trading stations as far as the Upper Zambesi, yet another advantage would be gained; many of the Boers probably would emigrate from the Transvaal to the north, in order to place themselves under the protection of the German colonies and to avoid the hated English dominion. . . . This instinct of freedom," stated Von Weber, with a supreme disregard for the real significance of the plans he advocated, "we Germans ought emphatically to try to further, then the sympathies which the Boers entertain for Germany will be of the greatest value to us and facilitate our getting a footing in that rich country through our emigrants, especially those of North German race."

Such was Von Weber's plan—gradual penetration into the northern country by the establishment of trading settlements, the flooding of the Transvaal by German immigrants, the establishment of a port on the east coast, at Delagoa Bay if possible, and the eventual control of the whole country. It is only of importance at the present time because it indicates what Germans were then thinking of and striving for, and because it led to the notable and fatuous declaration by the British Ambassador in Berlin that Germany did not desire the acquisition of colonies. On September 18, 1880, Lord Odo Russell, afterwards Lord Ampthill, the British Ambassador at Berlin, to whom the article was submitted, replied that "Herr von Weber's

plan will not meet with any support either at the hands of the German Government or on the part of the German people, while German emigrants feel far more attracted by a republican form of government than by that of a Crown Colony. The German Government feel more the want of soldiers than of colonies, and consequently discourage emigration. The German Parliament has marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies, however advantageous to German enterprise, by the rejection of the Samoa Bill. Under present circumstances therefore the plan for a German colony in South Africa has no prospect of success."

Such a reply coming from such a quarter lulled the Foreign Office to sleep, and yet even the man in the street might have read the signs of the times. At the very time when Lord Ampthill was writing, German emigration was reaching its highest tide, Bismarck had been practically won over to the side of the expansionists, and the Fatherland was in the full flood of the colonial movement. Only the immediate opportunity was lacking, and this was skilfully arranged and the successive steps in the drama carefully engineered. No one can blame the Germans for their action. Their intervention in South Africa was thoroughly justified, and no self-respecting nation with any pretension to sea-power could have acted differently under the circumstances in which they were placed.

In the meantime the German Government were slowly and cautiously feeling their way. On the outbreak of hostilities in 1880, the German Ambassador communicated a memorandum to Earl Granville describing the special danger that threatened German life and property in Damaraland and requesting that, since there could be "no question as to an independent proceeding on the part of

Germany for the protection of the life and property of its subjects in those regions, the British Government would direct that any measures ordered or intended for the protection of life and property of English subjects might be extended likewise to the German missionaries and traders living there." The Cape Government, however, were disinclined to use other than moral force and the Imperial Government would not sanction any direct interference. The German Government were officially informed that Great Britain would not be responsible for what might take place outside British territory, which only included Walfish Bay and a small portion of the surrounding country: and there the matter rested until Herr Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant who had spent some years in Mexico, founded his settlement at Angra Pequena. The affair was carefully and judiciously managed. The British Government believing that German official statements meant exactly what was stated in them, was completely hoodwinked.

On February 7, 1883, Count Herbert Bismarck had a conversation with Sir Julian Pauncefote in which he stated that a Bremen merchant was about to establish a factory near the coast between the Orange River and the Little Fish River and had asked for the protection of the German Government in case of need. Count Bismarck asked whether the British Government exercised any authority in that locality, and stated that if so the German Government would be glad if British protection could be extended to the proposed factory, and said that the German Government had not "the least design to establish any footing in South Africa." The British Government proceeded with the negotiations in a leisurely manner and referred the matter to the Cape, being apparently under the impression that Herr Lüderitz and his schemes might await their pleasure.



But the inner circle of the German colonial party, whom Lüderitz represented and who had doubtless put him forward as their secret, if not actual, agent, were disinclined to accept meekly the dilatory methods of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices. By the beginning of 1883 Herr Lüderitz had matured his plans fully, and he was able to ask the German Foreign Office whether he might reckon upon Imperial protection for any territory that he might acquire in South-West Africa. As the reply was favourable, he at once commenced his undertaking and sent his agent Heinrich Vogelsang, of Bremen, to the Cape to collect further information and prepare the way for the expedition. This followed in the *Tilly* which arrived at Angra Pequena, an open bay about 150 miles north of the Orange River, on April 9, 1883. Vogelsang went forward to the mission station at Bethany, and with the aid of the German missionaries there established, he secured from the chief Joseph Frederick a contract under which some 215 square miles of land at the Bay of Angra Pequena were ceded to the German adventurers. Armed with this grant the party returned to Angra Pequena, where the German flag was raised in front of the storehouse amidst the enthusiasm of the few Germans present.

The news that a German adventurer had dared to raise the German flag upon territory that was generally regarded as being under the influence, although not under the direct control, of Great Britain, was received in Cape Colony with incredulity and anger; but the action was generally regarded as an affair of little importance which would soon be settled through the usual diplomatic channels. Bismarck, it was believed, was far too wary to be caught in the colonial net. The first intimation that events were happening in South Africa that reached the British public was in the form of

a telegram to the *Daily News*, of July 12, 1883, which stated that "Angra Pequena harbour, on the west coast, between Namaqualand and Damaraland, has been bought from the natives and occupied by a German trading company, under an alleged guarantee of the German Government. Possession has been taken of some miles inland."

Curiously enough it was left to a private individual, Daniel de Pass, the lessee of the guano islands at Angra Pequena, to draw the attention of the Colonial Office to the matter, and apparently no word came from Her Majesty's representative at the Cape until September 4. The matter, however, was freely debated in Germany, for the correspondent of the *Standard* in Berlin wrote as follows: "The Bremen firm which has acquired the Bay of Angra Pequena, the first colony of Germany, has sent thither a small schooner of forty-two tons for the purpose of opening up a regular communication between the little colony and Cape Town. . . . The German Press which was disappointed by the rejection of the Samoa Bill by the Reichstag expresses great satisfaction at the consent of the German Government to protect the infant colony, and to allow the German flag to be hoisted over it. The semi-official *Post* declares that this is the most practicable kind of colonisation because it avoids international difficulties. In spite of the statement made by Count Hatzfeldt that the German Government avoids giving any encouragement to emigration, the *Post* is convinced that if Germans will promote the increase of German manufacturing industry by founding commercial colonies they will not lack the powerful protection of the German Government." The *Standard* correspondent was evidently a close student of German colonial aims to remember a statement made nearly four years before.

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But the British Foreign Office was still disinclined to take a serious view of the situation. Although it was known that Herr Lüderitz was also intriguing to obtain land at St. Lucia Bay, Zululand (*see* page 102), the British Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin (Sir John Walsham) reported on August 31, 1883, that “it would be a mistake to suppose that the Imperial Government have any present intention of establishing Crown Colonies, or of imitating, as the Press adds, the practice adopted by France of assuming a Protectorate over any territory acquired by a French traveller or explorer. The German Government,” continued Sir John Walsham, “are opposed to any plan which might hamper their foreign relations, and I believe that what Lord Amphill stated in his dispatch is as true to-day as it was in 1880.”

This assurance from Berlin was sufficient to allay any suspicions that might be entertained in London, but the Cape Ministry were more alive to the true situation and the Administrator, Lieutenant-General Sir Leicester Smyth, with the approval of the Premier, Sir Thomas Scanlen, sanctioned the dispatch of the gunboat *Starling* to Angra Pequena. Lieutenant F. W. Sanders, in command, found the German flag flying on his arrival on September 8, 1883. Without attempting to assert any definite claim to any part of the mainland, he nevertheless left an English ensign with the caretaker on Penguin Island so that the flag might be hoisted on territory that was undoubtedly British. Six weeks later in view of threatened reprisals on the part of English traders against the Germans, H.M.S. *Boadicea* went from Cape Town to Angra Pequena with orders to report on the state of affairs. In the meantime the Cape Ministers were endeavouring to make good their claim to jurisdiction over the territory, although their case was

naturally prejudiced by specific statements previously made by Sir J. Gordon Sprigg and the British Government. In an important minute dated October 31, 1883, they stated that "it is impossible to ignore the complications which may arise from the creation of a rival interest in a country which has hitherto been considered as a kind of commercial dependency of this colony," and they pointed out that as far back as 1796 Captain Alexander took formal possession of several places upon the coast in the name of His Majesty.<sup>1</sup> It has already been seen how Ichaboe and other islands were taken possession of at various dates, but unfortunately these acts did not in the least affect the main question at issue, viz. the possession of the mainland.

Whilst these inquiries were taking place the German Government were carefully preparing the way for definite action. On September 10, 1883, the German Chargé d'Affaires, Baron Plessen, stated that it was the "desire of the Imperial Government to be informed whether Her Majesty's Government claim suzerainty of the Bay of Angra Pequena." No definite reply was vouchsafed to this inquiry, and on November 16, 1883, the German Ambassador called personally and was informed by Lord Granville that "although Her Majesty's Government have not proclaimed

<sup>1</sup> Extract from "Colonial Office Records," Cape of Good Hope, 1796 :—

" America,  
" Table Bay,  
" Feb. 17, 1796.

" SIR,—

" When I had the honour to address you last, I mentioned to you that I had dispatched Captain Alexander on His Majesty's sloop *Star* to examine the coast to the northward. He returned yesterday . . . and has found several bays affording good shelter and excellent anchorage but entirely destitute of wood and fresh water. The names of those bays are St. Hellen's, Angra Pequena, Spencer's Bay, Walfish or Whalefish Bay, Wyndham's Bay, and Alexander's Bay. Wherever he landed he took possession, in His Majesty's name, by hoisting the King's colours, firing three volleys, and turning over the soil.

" J. BLANKETT."

the Queen's sovereignty along the whole country, but only at certain points such as Walfish Bay and the Angra Pequena Islands, they consider that any claim to such sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power would infringe their legitimate right." This reply naturally did not satisfy Prince Bismarck, who allowed Lüderitz to proceed with his settlement. It was too much like making a new and hitherto unrecognised claim to territorial influence far beyond the confines of any territorial settlement for the German authorities to treat it seriously. The British Government were obviously "trying it on" and Bismarck saw no reason why he should encourage them in the enunciation of a new international doctrine.

In the meantime communications had been sent to the Cape Government asking whether they were prepared to undertake the administration of the disputed territory. Unfortunately the matter did not receive the immediate attention it required. In fact the negotiations were bungled, and although Mr. J. X. Merriman had forwarded the minute of October 31, 1883, the Cape Ministry still hesitated, and the change of Ministry that occurred in the following spring still further complicated matters.

Bismarck determined to force the question to an issue. On December 31, 1883, Count Münster wrote that "the fact confirmed by your Lordship that the British sovereignty beyond the frontier of Cape Colony was limited to Whale Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena is one of the hypotheses under which the Imperial Government is entitled and bound to grant the house of Lüderitz the protection of the Empire for a settlement which this firm contemplates establishing on territory outside the sovereignty of any other Power on the south-west coast of Africa," and when Sir Hercules Robinson was at last able to telegraph on May 29,

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1884, after the new Ministry under Sir Thomas Upington had taken office, that "Ministers have decided to recommend Parliament to undertake control and cost of coast line from Orange River to Walfish Bay," the German Government had already taken steps which prevented the effective operation of the resolution. For on April 25, 1884, the Imperial German Consul at Cape Town, Herr W. A. Lippert, had announced that he had been instructed by Prince Bismarck to declare officially that Herr Lüderitz and his establishments were under the protection of the German Empire. The delay had been fatal. The Cape Ministry on September 17, 1884, naively recorded their regret "that no weight has been attached to the wishes of the colony with regard to the coast line from the Orange River northward, notwithstanding the offer of the colony to undertake all responsibility and cost in connection with the coast" and urging that the unannexed portions of Damaraland and Namaqualand should be taken over forthwith; which drew forth the reply (November 11, 1884) from Lord Derby that "it would not be in accordance with international comity to annex the territory immediately adjacent to the existing German limit."

The blame for the unfortunate contretemps may be equally apportioned between the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Cape Ministers. When action was imperatively demanded all parties procrastinated and wasted time in fruitless and unnecessary inquiries which gave the Germans the opportunity they desired.

In Germany the news of the establishment of the first Germany colony was received with enthusiasm. The triumph of the colonial party in spite of the opposition of the Reichstag was complete, and Germany was at length launched upon that series of adventures which make the

year 1884 so memorable in the annals of colonial enterprise. On June 23, 1884, Prince Bismarck defined the policy that he was prepared to follow. Acting on the principle that "the flag follows trade"—a reversal of the English theory—he stated that it was his intention to place under the protection of the Empire any similarly established settlements in future and that the Government intended to issue for Angra Pequena an Imperial Letter of Protection, similar to the Royal Charters given by England to the East India Company and the British North Borneo Company. Speaking on a Bill for subsidising a line of steamships he said that the new measure was rendered expedient by the circumstance that Germany was now at last to become a Colonial Power. Not, it was true, in the style of England, France, and other countries. There would be no state colonisation; but wherever in the wide world German subjects acquired ownerless land, the ægis of the Empire would be thrown around them. The Imperial flag would not precede private colonial enterprise in distant lands but it would always follow it.<sup>1</sup> Two days later he outlined his intended procedure. "The whole question of German colonisation," he stated, "which has recently arisen was due to the acquisition of territories by certain Hanseatic merchants; and their appeal for protection to the Imperial Government had necessitated a thorough examination of the whole subject. He was entirely opposed to the creation of colonies on what he considered a bad system, namely to acquire a piece of ground, appoint officials and a garrison, and then to seek to entice persons to come and live there." His policy was not to found provinces "but mercantile settlements which would be placed under the protection of the Empire."

<sup>1</sup> See Lowe's "Bismarck."

Bismarck was well pleased with the success of his policy. Whilst certain "clever persons" subsequently advised him to cede the new possessions in exchange for Heligoland, he himself had a different opinion of the value of South-West Africa.<sup>1</sup> An informal suggestion of this character was made by Count Münster as early as 1884. In a memorandum quoted in the "Life of Lord Granville" it is stated that "Count Münster called on me this morning. Towards the close of the conversation he said he wished to have a little quiet talk with me on some future occasion. I asked him on what subject. After a little hesitation he said it was one that might startle me a little at first but would not after a little reflection. It was Heligoland. . . . Count Münster said it was as good as impossible that Germany and England should ever be at war, but the cession of Heligoland would strengthen the good feeling of Germany towards this country to an extraordinary degree. I said I supposed the cession of Gibraltar would strengthen our good relations with Spain; but the Count denied that there was any similarity between the two cases."

The British Government having failed to establish a definite claim to Damaraland were obliged to acquiesce with the best grace they could summon. On July 14, 1884, Lord Derby instructed Sir Hercules Robinson that Her Majesty's Government were not in a position to oppose the intention of the German Ministry to extend protection to German subjects who had acquired concessions or formed settlements where no British jurisdiction already existed. The attitude of British Ministers was at least understandable—that of the Cape Ministry, who had great interests at stake, was incomprehensible. The former could not pursue a dog-in-the-manger policy and attempt to exercise a species

<sup>1</sup> See Whitman's "Conversations with Bismarck."



of Monroe Doctrine over the unappropriated portions of Africa,<sup>1</sup> without bringing about a combination of maritime powers against them. The latter at least could have replied to urgent communications asking what were their intentions with respect to Damaraland.

<sup>1</sup>“This is the point on which we have not been treated fairly by England. This feeling has been strengthened by the explanations which several English statesmen have given, with the purport that England has a legitimate right to prevent settlements by other nations in the vicinity of English possessions and that England establishes a sort of Monroe Doctrine in Africa against the vicinage of other nations.”—German White Book, June 10, 1884.

## CHAPTER VI

### GERMAN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

**B**EFORE describing German progress in South-West Africa it will be well to direct our attention to the main course of German policy in South Africa. The negotiations that led to the eventual occupation of Damaraland have been described at considerable length because they serve to illustrate how carefully and systematically Germany prepared for her entry upon the colonial sphere and how the attitude she adopted was perfectly correct, inasmuch as Prince Bismarck avoided any action that might precipitate a dispute between Germany and Great Britain. But during the whole of this period German agents, fired with a perhaps commendable enthusiasm to obtain substantial advantages for the Fatherland, had been unsuccessfully intriguing in other portions of South Africa. Their action, of course, was unofficial, but it was nevertheless secretly supported in Berlin. The main object of Germany was, firstly, to secure a footing wherever she could in South Africa; secondly, to co-operate with the Boer Republics for the ultimate overthrow of British power in the sub-continent; thirdly, to acquire a predominating influence in the country; and fourthly, to undertake the suzerainty of the "independent" Boer States and eventually to gather them within the German orbit.

Three lines of advance were open to Germans in South Africa and the prize for which they were striving—the

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Transvaal and the rich country to the north of it—could be approached by any of these three converging routes that were so clearly outlined on the mental maps of the colonial enthusiasts. Bismarck's idea of peaceful commercial penetration was the official policy that cloaked the designs of the advanced colonialists. In any case all these plans were very much "in the air," but they represented the ideals of the South African Pan-Germans. The first, the construction of a railway from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal, was accomplished, but somehow the final German control failed to eventuate. The second, the construction of a railway from St. Lucia Bay, was never attempted. The third, the building of a railroad from Swakopmund or Lüderitzbucht to Johannesburg, across Bechuanaland, became impossible after the annexation of that territory.

At a comparatively early period Germans became convinced that South Africa presented a favourable field for their intrigues and that British policy in the sub-continent was likely sooner or later to end in the loss of the British colonies in South Africa. It has been seen how Sir Bartle Frere called attention to the German mission in South Africa previous to the Franco-German War (*see* page 83). Merchants of Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfort had represented to Bismarck that in South Africa there was an excellent opportunity for the foundation of a German colony, and the scientific mission that was sent out was received cordially by President Burgers. But Bismarck considered that Germany then had "too much hay on the fork" to make any large scheme of colonisation prudent.<sup>1</sup> But from the time when President Burgers visited Europe

<sup>1</sup> "How the Transvaal Trouble Arose," by Sir Bartle Frere.

in 1876,<sup>1</sup> on behalf of the South African Republic, to negotiate for a railway to the Transvaal, and went to Berlin to submit his plans in what he considered the proper quarters, up to the present, German influence has been one of the strongest factors in South Africa, and it is not too much to say that but for the encouragement given by Germany to the Boers, who were animated by the hope of German intervention, the South African War of 1899-1901 would never have taken place. In this respect the Germans proved themselves to be false friends.

In addition to Damaraland the Germans sought to establish themselves at three other points in South Africa—St. Lucia Bay, Pondoland, and Delagoa Bay. The first, a large and shallow lagoon at the mouth of the Umvolosi River in Zululand, apparently offered considerable scope for German enterprise, because the ownership of the bay was in dispute between Great Britain and the South African Republic, whilst at the same time an “independent” but unrecognised Government called the New Republic also claimed the territory. As it had not been definitely annexed, but was one of those spheres in a position somewhat analogous to that of Angra Pequena, the German colonial party thought that there might be some chance for Herr Lüderitz and his enterprises on the Zululand coast. But, on this occasion, Lüderitz was too late in the field, although he had obtained a grant of 60,000 acres from Dinuzulu; for the British Government were at length awake to the nature of the German enterprises. On November 25, 1884, Lüderitz wrote in great glee to his friend Herr

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Holland Rose, who has carefully studied this subject, states in his “Origins of the War,” 1914, that “in 1876 the Boers sent a deputation to Berlin to request protection from Germany. What passed is not known. But it is probable that their resistance to Britain’s recent decree of annexation was due, in part at least, to hopes of assistance from Germany.”

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Richard Lesser as follows: "I have to-day received a telegram from Herr Aug. Einwald, who on the 22nd of May went to Zululand on my behalf to obtain if possible a large grant of land, which ran thus, 'Mission ended successfully, details orally by Schiel.' . . . The English will be very wild about the Zululand affair. I have to-day informed Prince Bismarck and have requested protection for the new territory," and a few days later he wrote that "if only Rothschild, Erlanger, and other Frankfort bankers would take an interest in the affair, it would be very much to the purpose."<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately for Lüderitz the British Government intervened.

The history of St. Lucia Bay is of some interest but cannot be dealt with in these pages. It is sufficient to state that in the year 1840 Andries Pretorius, then describing himself as "Commandant-General of the Right Worshipful Volksraad of the South African Society of Port Natal," issued a proclamation taking possession of all the land lying between the Tugela and the Black Umvolosi Rivers. Three years later Mr. Henry Cloete, the British commissioner who had arranged for the annexation of Natal, as the outcome of a visit to Panda, King of the Zulus, made a treaty in which Panda agreed to "cede all right and title which I heretofore had to the mouth of the River Umvolosi to Her Majesty Queen Victoria" (October 5, 1843)—a proceeding which was approved by the Imperial Government on the distinct understanding that the cession was for the purpose of "obviating the possibility of interference on the part of any European Power or body of adventurers, but that it is not intended to form any settlement there." From time to time rumours reached the British Government that parties

<sup>1</sup> See *Adolf Lüderitz, der Wager, Eine biographische Skizze von Hubert Henoch. (Koloniale Abhandlungen, Heft 25.)*

of Boers were attempting to push into Zululand so as to reach the sea at St. Lucia Bay, and in order to check this movement a notice was inserted in the Natal Government Gazette (September 17, 1861) drawing attention to the fact that the bay "cannot be occupied by any other Power" than Great Britain; and in 1885 President W. M. Pretorius was informed that it was "regarded as British property and would be maintained accordingly."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the South African Republic still maintained its claims to the territory, whilst Mr. Lucas Meyer, leader of a party of Boers who founded a republic in Zululand, also attempted to establish a claim. Both these parties drew their inspiration from Berlin. The New Republic sent Mr. Esselen to Europe on a political mission to "represent the claims of the New Republic to St. Lucia Bay and (failing a satisfactory recognition) to seek the help of other Powers, especially that of the German Government, to bring the question to arbitration."<sup>2</sup>

At the same time other Germans were busy in Zululand, particularly Colonel Schiel, a German in the service of the South African Republic; Herr Einwald, one of Lüderitz's numerous agents; and the representative of Jonas Lutz & Co., a firm established in Hesse. In order to checkmate these intrigues the British Government authorised the formal annexation of St. Lucia Bay, and on December 18, 1884, Lieutenant William John Moore, of H.M.S. *Goshawk*, hoisted the British flag and took formal possession of the territory.<sup>3</sup> When, therefore, the Baron de Pestalozzi,

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch from Lord Derby, May 14, 1885.

<sup>2</sup> Dispatch from Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Derby, July 21, 1885.

\* In this connection it is interesting to read what Sir Donald Currie said before the Royal Colonial Institute on April 10, 1888. Few men were better acquainted with the inner history of German intrigues in South Africa. "Our Government," he said, "showed very little foresight as to the intentions of Germany to annex Damaraland. I introduced a deputation to Lord Derby in 1884 when his Lord-

acting as the agent of Herr Lüderitz, asked whether steps could be taken to protect his interests (July 3, 1885), the Colonial Office were able to state that no grant made by Dinuzulu could be recognised and that they were not able to acknowledge the validity of the claims of Lüderitz. Moreover the German Government, realising that the British claim to the territory could not be contested without grave danger of diplomatic complications, withdrew the protest they had made against the hoisting of the British flag at St. Lucia Bay.

Fortunately Prince Bismarck recognised that Great Britain's interests were substantial in this region, and was prepared to acquiesce in the failure of Count Herbert Bismarck's confidential mission to London. "The second mission," he stated, "should have appeared, as far as the public was concerned, merely a visit to Rosebery, with whom Herbert stayed. The object was however to negotiate respecting Lucia Bay and the Benue district, and Herbert, who was not sufficiently well acquainted with the maps, conceded too much to Lord Rosebery, who was very sharp, so that the result was disadvantageous to us. We lost Lucia Bay. The English Minister argued that they could not abandon it to us as it was impossible to allow Cape Colony to be hemmed in on both sides."<sup>1</sup> When

ship was seriously warned of what might possibly happen in that district. His Lordship, however, gave me to understand that Germany was not a colonising Power, and that Great Britain would consider it an unfriendly act if Germany should annex the territory referred to. Germany, nevertheless, did annex the south-west coast of South Africa very shortly afterwards, and Lord Derby said no more. While the Cape Colony was thus to no small extent impaired in its position in that quarter, Natal narrowly escaped feeling a similar influence on its border; for the German Government would have secured St. Lucia Bay and the coast-line between Natal and the possessions of Portugal, had not the British Government telegraphed instructions to dispatch a gunboat from Cape Town to hoist the British flag at St. Lucia Bay. *It would be easy for me to give particulars of the pressure which had to be put on the late Government to secure this result.*"

<sup>1</sup> See the invaluable Busch. "Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History."

Bismarck was asked why Germany had not been able to secure this desirable foothold he replied, "Ah, it is not so valuable as it seemed to be at first. People who were pursuing their own interests on the spot represented it to be of greater importance than it really was, and the Boers were not disposed to take any proper action in the matter. The bay would have been valuable to us if the distance from the Transvaal were not so great, and the English attached so much importance to it that they declared it was impossible for them to give it up, and they ultimately conceded a great deal to us in New Guinea and Zanzibar" —the latter place being described as "a fruit which would have fallen ripe into our lap."<sup>1</sup> This conversation, reported by the industrious Busch, sufficiently indicates the real reason why Germany desired to acquire a footing on the eastern coasts of South Africa.<sup>2</sup>

In Pondoland an attempt was made by a Dresden merchant, Herr P. Lehmann, to obtain a footing, but on January 3, 1885, Lord Derby telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson requesting him to make it known that the British Government exercised control over the whole coast of Pondoland in pursuance of Sir Bartle Frere's proclamation of 1878 and a treaty made by Sir Peregrine Maitland. The affair in Pondoland was never very serious,<sup>3</sup> but the German

<sup>1</sup> Whitman's "Conversations."

<sup>2</sup> It is worth recording as a curious instance of the persistence of German intrigues in South Africa that when the New Republic got into difficulties, Piet Joubert, a Minister of the Transvaal, came thither and suggested that its founders should give the country to the Germans on the understanding that the latter would bring pressure to bear on Her Majesty's Government to allow of this departure from the Convention. See "The Origins of the War," by J. Holland Rose.

<sup>3</sup> "It was often remarked in South Africa and, indeed, in England a short time ago, that the German Government had in view the annexation of Pondoland; and when I was in Natal it was stated that representatives of Berlin influences, either official or unofficial, were seeking to bring about close relationships between Germany and the Pondo chiefs. You can easily imagine what issues would be raised by the introduction of foreign authority in Pondoland, separating, as it



effort to secure possession of Delagoa Bay was of an entirely different character and marked a deliberate attempt to obtain a permanent and splendid naval base on the east coast. Delagoa Bay, the most valuable harbour in South Africa, forms the natural outlet of the Transvaal to the sea. The ownership of the bay had been in dispute for many years when President Pretorius finally brought the matter to a crisis by proclaiming in 1868 that it belonged to the South African Republic. Both Britain and Portugal had strong claims to the territory, but on the question going to arbitration, the decision of Marshal MacMahon, given on July 24, 1875, was against the former. For some years Germany had been endeavouring to establish herself at Delagoa Bay and there can be little doubt that she would have succeeded in this object but for the mutual treaty entered into between Great Britain and Portugal prior to the decision given by Marshal MacMahon.<sup>1</sup> Foiled in the design to establish a protectorate over the territory Germany turned her attention to the more immediate prize that seemed within her grasp—the railway which was to connect the Transvaal with the Indian Ocean to the detriment of the Cape and Natal ports—but never relaxed her efforts to secure Delagoa Bay from Portugal until Lord Kimberley informed the Portu-

would, the Cape from Natal." Address by Sir Donald Currie before the Royal Colonial Institute, April 10, 1888.

<sup>1</sup> "In 1891 Rhodes made proposals for the cession of Delagoa Bay to Cape Colony; in the early months of the following year Lord Rothschild was making advances in concert with the Cape Government for the purchase of the entire possessions of Portugal in Africa, south of the Zambesi; and in April, 1892, Mr. Rochfort Maguire went to Lisbon on a confidential mission to make advances to the Portuguese Government for the lease of the Province of Mozambique to Cape Colony. These and similar offers continued to be made to the end of 1894, when, in view of the almost menacing persistence with which the Transvaal and Germany were pressing their proposals, Lord Kimberley informed the Portuguese Government that it was not open to Portugal to part with rights which would in any way diminish the value of the preferential claims granted to Great Britain."—Quoted from "Reconstruction of the New Colonies under Lord Milner," by W. B. Worsfold

guese Government in 1894 that they could not part with "rights which would in any way diminish the value of the preferential claims granted to Great Britain." Germany was most active in this matter at the period when she was establishing her first colonies, but the only practical results of all her efforts, and the years of intrigue carried on with Boers and Portuguese alike, was the formation of the Netherlands South African Railway, the funds for which were mainly supplied from "Teutonic" sources.

It is not necessary even briefly to narrate the main facts in connection with Delagoa Bay and its bearing upon the history of South Africa. Nor need the excitement after the Jameson Raid owing to the German Emperor's telegram and the intrigues of Germans in South Africa during the South African War be alluded to, for they are too well known to need detailed treatment. The attitude of Germany at the time of the Jameson Raid was a clear proof that German "interests" were seriously threatened in South Africa; for otherwise it is inconceivable that the German people would have taken so deep an interest—for sentimental reasons only—in the affairs of a petty republic in a far-away corner of Africa. The whole of Germany was deeply stirred and the reason was clearly and injudiciously shown in *Die Grenzboten* for July 4, 1895: "For us the Boer states, with the coasts that are their due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption into the British Empire would mean the blocking of our last road towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate clime. Will England obstruct our path? If Germany shows determination, never."

This interesting statement by the fiery *Frontier-Messenger* may be matched with one equally specific in the *Koloniales Jahrbuch* for 1897: "The importance of

South Africa as a land which can receive an unlimited number of white emigrants," it was stated, "must rouse us to the greatest exertions, in order to secure there supremacy to the Teutonic race." And again on June 16, 1898, when war between the Transvaal and Great Britain seemed imminent, the impetuous *Grenzboten* again issued a full exposure of German aims in South Africa. "The existence of the Boer states," wrote the editor, "makes it, perhaps, possible to regain the lost colony (i.e. St. Lucia Bay), including Delagoa Bay. Here in the north of Cape Colony, a well-considered German policy must be pursued, and the Emperor's telegram to Kruger has already demonstrated our firm will to return the Gladstonian 'hands off' to the English. The possession of the natural harbour of Delagoa Bay is a vital condition for the Low German states in South Africa. Without Low Germanism in South Africa our colonies are worth nothing as settlements. Our future is founded upon the victory of Low Germanism and upon the expulsion of the British from South Africa. The prosperity of our South African colonies, which singly are worth as little as Kamerun or Togoland, depends upon the possibility of connecting these two colonies, whereby England will be confined to the south, and the dream of a great British colonial empire from Cape to Cairo will vanish."<sup>1</sup>

But although it is not necessary to emphasise further the well-known designs of Germany in South Africa, attention must be directed to the immediate effect of the attitude of Great Britain towards German aspirations for colonial expansion. When Bismarck was finally convinced that he had nothing to hope for in the way of cordial co-operation he was careful that his policy should lead to no misunder-

<sup>1</sup> For these quotations I am indebted to Mr. J. Ellis Barker's book, already mentioned.

standings with the next strongest colonial power—France. Great Britain by treating German ideals with supercilious disdain had deliberately driven Germany into a close colonial understanding with France, a relationship that was maintained until the exponents of *Weltpolitik* finally obtained the upper hand. In May, 1884, both Count Münster and Count Herbert Bismarck had informed Lord Granville that the German Government could not maintain a friendly attitude on Egyptian matters if Britain continued to be unfriendly in colonial matters,<sup>1</sup> and the subsequent strained relations between the two countries were entirely due to the fact that British policy was then uniformly hostile to the establishment of German colonies. Gladstone, who was then in power, did not find time to give much attention to colonial questions and left them to the control of Lords Granville and Derby, both of whom were gifted with little imagination and resented the entry of Germany upon the colonial sphere. When Gladstone finally made a belated apology in the House of Commons and stated that “If Germany is to become a colonising power, all I say is, God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind,” he was only uttering the usual sententious platitude, which had little effect because the mischief had already been done and the seeds of mutual distrust planted in a too fruitful soil. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking on January 5, 1885, was equally specific, though less sententious. “If foreign nations have determined to pursue distant colonial enterprises,” he stated, “we have no right to prevent them.”

Germany's subsequent policy in South Africa, although not actively hostile, was at all times unfriendly to Great

<sup>1</sup> Lowe's "Prince Bismarck."

Britain ; for it was recognised that the interests of the two nations clashed—the one working to expand from south to north, the other from west to east—and judging by past events there was no likelihood of mutual co-operation. The distrust had been sown during the acrimonious discussions over the *Angra Pequena* affair. Germany was not disposed to give any information as to her ultimate designs. When Lord Granville had asked Count Herbert Bismarck whether the Germans were not contemplating an ultimate expansion of territory towards the interior, the latter had replied not over politely that that was “ a question of mere curiosity ” and “ a matter that does not concern you,”<sup>1</sup> and when it subsequently became apparent that Germany’s real aim was to connect her colonies in West and East Africa by obtaining possession of the forests in the basin of the Upper Congo and the Katanga regions from the Congo Free State, and by acquiring territory from Portugal—by this means stultifying Rhodes’s great ideal of an all-British route from the Cape to Cairo—it was evident that the aims of the two nations had become completely irreconcilable.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Busch’s “ Bismarck : Some Secret Pages of His History.”

<sup>2</sup> See an article in the *Quarterly Review*, “ Our Relations with Germany,” 1898, and J. W. Gregory’s article in the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1896.

## CHAPTER VII

### GERMAN ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

**P**ERHAPS the most conclusive evidence of the failure of Germany to administer her colonies for the benefit of their native population and the most striking commentary on German methods of warfare are furnished by the fact that prior to the year 1898 the native population of German South-West Africa was estimated by Colonel Leutwein to be about 300,000, whereas in 1912 it was stated to be a little over 100,000. Possibly the former estimate was too large, but there is no doubt whatever that the native population has greatly decreased since Colonel Leutwein made his estimate. The reason for this enormous decrease in the population of a territory which, unlike the Congo regions, has not been exploited by soulless capitalistic organisations, and unlike the Sudan was not subjected to the sway of a ruthless despot, is to be found in the inability of German officials to dissociate themselves from the methods of the Prussian bureaucracy. It has been seen how Prince Bismarck foresaw the possibility of too much "iron" in Germany's relations with the dependent peoples in her new colonies, and although, as is well known, he was no exponent of sentimentalism in dealing with native peoples, he was equally opposed to severe, unrelaxing, and inflexible methods of native administration. Von Wissmann, who performed such notable services for Germany in East Africa and was a judicious administrator who got on well

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with the natives, was characterised by Bismarck as a "whole man," or in other words "a white man." "I have unlimited confidence in him," said Bismarck; "twice he traversed the Black Continent and each time the man returned with a 'white waistcoat.'"

Unfortunately the majority of Germany's colonial administrators have not been gifted with Von Wissmann's tact and ability. Had Bismarck continued at the head of affairs Germany would doubtless have been spared many of the mistakes that characterised her administrative policy in South-West Africa, but when the restraining hand was withdrawn and the careful colonial policy initiated by Bismarck was replaced by the more vigorous, but undoubtedly more dangerous, policy of his successors, those troubles commenced which retarded the progress of South-West Africa and ultimately resulted in the destruction of nearly two-thirds of the native population.

In the earlier stages of her colonising enterprises a writer in an organ of the German colonial party had stated that "Germany had nothing to learn from England or any other colonising nation, having a method of handling social problems peculiar to the German spirit," whilst several years later Professor Moritz Bonn, of Munich, speaking before the Royal Colonial Institute on January 13, 1914, showed how Germany had solved some of those problems. "We have had native risings and extremely silly European settlement schemes," he said. "Apart from South-West Africa, where we solved the native problem by smashing tribal life and by creating a scarcity of labour, we are only just now beginning to understand native administration." These two statements are the thesis and antithesis of German colonial policy. The one represents the self-opinionated doctrine of the untrained official: the

other is the matured judgment of one who has made a careful and prolonged study of both German and British methods of administration in South Africa. Unfortunately so soon as Bismarck's influence was withdrawn German administrators acted on the assumption that they had little to learn from Britain, and introduced methods of administration that in South-West Africa led directly to disaster.

Without entering into unnecessary details regarding German administration it may be stated broadly that it was altogether too inflexible and rigid to meet the requirements of a people used to considerable liberty, and that it lacked the broader instinct of compromise which has so frequently saved British administrators from errors that might have led to disastrous results.<sup>1</sup> No native war in which Britain has been engaged has been a war of extermination like that waged by Germany against the Hereros—for Britons, unlike Germans, have generally possessed the faculty of correctly gauging native feeling and have thus been able to appreciate the force of native sentiment. Germans, on the other hand, lacking the subtler psychological characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon, have failed miserably whenever they have been brought into contact with a native sentiment which they have not been able to understand. During the first years of the German occupation of South-West Africa the presence of Germans made little difference to the native population. In accordance with the policy laid down by Bismarck no attempt was made to impose upon the natives the elaborate machinery of bureaucratic administration, nor

<sup>1</sup> Germans have never shown much imagination in their administrative policy. An excellent example is their treatment of Sir Pieter Stewart-Bam, then Mr. P. C. van Blommestein Bam. Mr. Bam was on a hunting trip in Damaraland, and as an old acquaintance of the paramount chief Kamaherero, he and his friend, Mr. Ford, made the kraal their headquarters for three or four weeks. Mr. Bam and his friend were arrested and charged with inciting the natives to rebellion (1894), and were kept prisoners for ten days.



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was any effort made to overawe them by an extensive display of military force. Indeed at the outset the forces in South-West Africa were absurdly inadequate for even the smallest degree of police work in the colony, and it seemed as though Germany was content to exercise a kind of moral control through the influence of her missionaries and traders. Such administration as then existed was almost exclusively confined to the territory acquired by Lüderitz, and no military force whatever was placed at the disposal of the colonists. When in 1885 the territory passed into the possession of the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwestafrika*, an Imperial Commissioner was sent to take charge of the colony; but it was not until the year 1888 that a small police force was organised, and this consisted of only two officers, five subordinate officers, and twenty native soldiers, who were expected to look after a territory much larger than the whole of the German Empire in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Hitherto the natives had either been engaged in petty squabbles amongst themselves or had been recuperating after the long series of wars in which they had been involved. In any case they were tractable and easily managed—largely because no striking innovations were introduced—and they were left very much to their own devices. But in

<sup>1</sup> At this period the precise boundaries of German South-West Africa had not been fixed, and German administration really extended over a comparatively small territory. The successive stages of expansion were as follows: The first annexation was of territory from the Orange River northwards to the 26° of south latitude and extending twenty geographical miles inland. On September 8, 1884, the coast between Cape Frio and the Orange River was placed under German protection. On October 18, 1884, a treaty was signed by which a German protectorate was recognised over Great Namaqualand, and on September 2, 1885, a treaty was signed with the Red Nation for the extension of the German protectorate over that territory. On September 15, 1885, the Bastards accepted a German protectorate, and on October 21, 1885, the Hereros agreed to a protectorate over Damaraland. Four years later the treaty of 1890 defined the respective British and German territories in South-West Africa.

February, 1888, the Hereros, said by the Germans to have been excited by a disappointed trader named Lewis, who had unsuccessfully claimed land subsequently occupied by Lüderitz,<sup>1</sup> became so menacing that the Commissioner, Dr. Goering, was obliged to flee to British territory at Walfish Bay, and for the first time it became apparent that Germany would have to assert her influence by stronger measures. Accordingly in the next year a small force of soldiers was dispatched, which, when peace was concluded between the Hereros and Namara-Hottentots in 1892, was again increased. But the presence of the German soldiers and the introduction of military methods of administration gradually brought about a feeling of unrest amongst the natives who, no longer engaged in tribal warfare, witnessed the arrival of German colonists with dislike, and were indisposed to submit to an invasion of their pastoral lands.

In 1894, when Colonel Leutwein arrived to take up his duties as civil and military governor, the Witboois rose in revolt, but as the tribes were then disunited this rising was easily suppressed, although not before it had been suggested that it had been encouraged by agents of Cecil Rhodes, who were, it was stated, anxious to cause trouble for the German authorities. Two years later another revolt occurred of the Khaugas Hottentots, under their chief Nicodemus, and some of the Hereros; but with the aid of friendly tribes this rising was also suppressed, and for a few years the colony remained tranquil, whilst the troubles that led to the Herero rising of 1904 were simmering on the administrative hob.

The rising of the Hereros came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The garrison in South-West Africa had

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Robert Lewis, who had acquired extensive mineral rights in Damara-land from the paramount chief, was undoubtedly shabbily treated by the Germans and badly supported by our own Government. See his pamphlet on this subject, a copy of which is in the British Museum.

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been gradually increased to meet the requirements of the colony and to afford protection to the farmers who had established themselves in the interior. In the year 1903 there were thirty-four officers and 785 soldiers stationed at Windhuk, Omaruru, Keetmanshoop, and Outjo, and when the Bondelzwarts rose at the end of the year the greater number of these troops were sent to the south of the colony to suppress the rising, so that the northern districts were left unguarded. The rising of the Bondelzwarts under their chief, Abraham Christian, was easily suppressed, but a fortnight after peace had been concluded (January 27, 1904) the Hereros, taking advantage of the situation, rose in revolt and demonstrated to the Germans how precarious was their tenure of the lands they had occupied. The governor, Colonel Leutwein, was not prepared for so sudden a rising, which according to many of the colonists had been brought about by the leniency with which he had treated the natives—the colonists believing that the only way to win their respect was to treat them with severity, appropriate their lands, and compel them to work for their white masters. There can be little doubt, however, that the policy pursued by Leutwein was in the main distinguished by a thorough understanding of the needs of the natives, although marked by a lack of the psychological qualities necessary to distinguish between material wants and native feelings. That it ended in disastrous failure was due in no small measure to the action of the colonists themselves, the folly of the German agents and administrators, and the inability of the Governor to understand that his good intentions were regarded with distrust by the natives because they were frequently nullified by the attitude of the farmers.

For some years the natives had witnessed with dismay

the encroachments of the farmers upon their lands and the occupation of some of the choicest districts by the newcomers. Their chief, Samuel Maherero, generally in debt, was always ready to dispose of portions of the tribal lands to the highest bidders, whilst frequently immigrants settled where they pleased without acquiring any title to the lands they occupied. So far as the Hereros were concerned, they found that, in spite of the treaties to which they had become parties, the area of the land placed at their disposal was being continuously contracted. "We notice with dismay," they reported to the Governor, "that our lands pass one after another into the hands of the whites, and in consequence we humbly pray Your Excellency not to authorise any sale of land here, and to transfer all the lands which have not yet been sold into a great reserve; for we should then be certain, we and our children, that we should have a territory where we could live and cultivate our farms."<sup>1</sup>

The Governor was fully alive to the desirability of preserving adequate reserves for the natives, and by a series of ordinances the administration decreed that sales of land between natives and whites would not be valid without the consent of the Governor. The Government, moreover, adopted the view of the missionaries as opposed to that of the colonists, and decided that the native reserves should not be sold to white settlers.

Unfortunately, however, the Hereros were not impressed by the bona fides of the Government. They believed that in spite of regulations and ordinances their lands would shortly be occupied by strangers, and they misunderstood the attitude of the Government upon this matter. But there were other and quite as important causes which drove the Hereros into rebellion. They believed with justice that

<sup>1</sup> Leutwein's *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*.

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it was the settled policy of the Germans to compel them to work as hired labourers upon the lands they had heretofore owned. "These cattle reserves," wrote Herr Karl Dove,<sup>1</sup> "are an obstacle to the economic development of the country, for it is without doubt owing to this reason that so few of the Hereros enter the service of Europeans"; while the *Deutsche Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* stated that "the country must be inhabited by white colonists. Therefore the natives must disappear or rather put themselves at the disposal of the whites, or retire into the reserves that are set apart for them."

The natives knew that these opinions represented the settled policy of the majority of the colonists and they believed that they were secretly shared, although not openly avowed, by the administration. In any case they did not anticipate that they would be treated to tender and solicitous requests that they should help in the exploitation of the country, but expected that the process of their awakening, whatever form it might take, would be sharp and unpleasant.

A third cause of the rebellion, which undoubtedly had a great effect upon the native mind, was the unsatisfactory administration of justice and the marked disparity between sentences passed upon white men and natives. Hitherto they had been subjected to their own rough and ready code of laws and they understood their own methods of justice; but they failed to understand why severe sentences were frequently passed for what appeared to be trivial offences committed by a native whilst lenient sentences were passed upon white men for more serious crimes. Whilst there were constant petty disputes between the colonists and the natives owing to the collection of small

<sup>1</sup> See his *Deutsch-Südwestafrika*.

debts incurred by the latter, the administration of justice was marked by all the defects of Prussian militarism. The *cause célèbre* of the colony is a case in point. A member of one of the princely houses, who was serving there in 1900, was condemned at Windhuk to ten months' imprisonment for the revolting murder of a native and for violent assaults upon several native women. The case attracted so much attention and the sentence seemed so inadequate that it was again opened, and at a court martial of the 1st Guards Division the prince was condemned to death. Such an unheard-of indignity to a member of the ruling caste was not to be endured, and the intervention of the Emperor was asked for, with the result that the sentence was commuted to fifteen years' penal servitude, and at a later period to fifteen years' imprisonment. It would have been thought that the princely offender had received sufficient consideration, but the case was again reopened, and he was declared insane and finally acquitted.

This incident, and others of a like nature, are only important because they showed that the native in South-West Africa could not expect justice when confronted by the forces of German officialdom. A comparison between the sentences passed upon Europeans and natives convicted of murder abundantly justified the disbelief of the native in German methods of justice.<sup>1</sup>

It is not necessary to describe the events of the Herero War. For two years South-West Africa was the scene of a devastating and horrible war, during which many colonists and their families were cruelly murdered by the Hereros, whilst the latter were practically exterminated or driven into the fastnesses of the Kalahari Desert, there to eke out a miserable existence until many finally succumbed to

<sup>1</sup> See the table given in Tonnelat's *L'Expansion allemande hors d'Europe*.

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hunger and thirst. Much of the fighting took place amongst the gigantic Kharras Mountains which form the escarpment of the Kalahari plateau. The hatred of the Hereros was such that they could not be forced to come to terms with their German masters, and this fact is the more remarkable because they were not unfriendly to Europeans as such, and indeed drew a sharp distinction between the Germans and the Boers and British. "It was only sufficient for a trader to be English, or to pass as such, for him to be received with open arms. The natives had pacific and, indeed, amicable relations with the Boers."<sup>1</sup> But the brutal military methods of the Germans aroused the fiercest and most ineradicable hatred, and the barbarous atrocities committed by the Hereros upon defenceless women and children were fully repaid by the Germans, who were unable, or unwilling, to realise that by proceeding to the severest measures they were depleting the colony of the only available supplies of labour.

The outbreak of the war had been the signal for the recall of Leutwein. In Germany public opinion was entirely on the side of the colonists. The Governor was violently attacked for his supposed weakness (*überhumanität*) and when he was recalled General von Trotha was entrusted with the supreme command, whilst additional troops were hurriedly sent to the colony. Von Trotha's conduct in the field was marked by excessive severity. His proclamation of October 20, 1904, which at once made him famous in South Africa, sufficiently indicates German methods of warfare.

"I, the great General of the German soldiers," he wrote, "send this letter to the Herero nation. The Hereros are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and

<sup>1</sup> Tonnelat.

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robbed, they have cut off the ears and the noses and other members of wounded soldiers and they are now too cowardly to fight. Whosoever brings one of the chieftains as a prisoner to one of my stations shall receive 1,000 marks, and for Samuel Maherero I will pay 5,000 marks. The Herero nation must now leave the country. If the people do it not I will compel them with the big tube. Within the German frontier every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will not take over any more women and children, but I will either drive them back to your people or have them fired on. These are my words to the nation of the Hereros. The great General of the Mighty Emperor, Von Trotha."

At the beginning of the rebellion Dr. Stübel, then Colonial Director, had stated in the Reichstag (January 18, 1904) that the Hereros were a race always impatient of orderly government and did not appreciate the *clemency of German rule*. But Von Trotha's methods were too much even for the German Chancellor, Prince Bülow, who, bowing before the criticism of "sentimentalists," ordered the repeal of the proclamation. Von Trotha himself explained that "fired on" meant "shooting over," and at a later period in justification of his action he stated that he had issued the proclamation in order to show that he had the power to do so. Nevertheless the ruthless war of extermination went forward, and the barbarous methods of the natives were matched by the equally barbarous actions of the Germans, who did not hesitate to shoot or hang many of the Herero women. The latter fact has been vouched for by Boers, who related their experiences in the *Cape Argus* and stated that they had seen the Germans shoot or hang at least twenty-five native women.

In November, 1905, Von Trotha returned to Germany,



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where he became the object of bitter attacks by the Social Democrats because of his inhumanity towards the Hereros. He was vigorously defended by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on December 8, 1905, when it was officially stated that he had given proof of great humanity during the period of his command. He was succeeded by Herr Lindequist, who took over the civil government of the colony, whilst Colonel von Deimling, who had occupied a subordinate command during the war, was placed in supreme military command.

The Herero rebellion gave the Germans an opportunity to establish themselves firmly in South-West Africa and, by the introduction of large numbers of troops, of bringing a new factor into South African politics. For some years, as has already been indicated, they had been engaged in intrigues with the object of fomenting troubles between the British and Dutch, and the presence of a large standing army upon the flank of British territory became a menace to British interests. During the war the Germans had a force of 19,000 men in the field against probably about 40,000 Hereros, and the German troops were well equipped with machine guns, whilst vast quantities of warlike stores were imported into the country. At the conclusion of the war surprise was frequently expressed at the largeness of the garrison which the Germans considered to be essential. Attention was directed to the matter by Herr Ledebour who, speaking in the Reichstag in February, 1906, mentioned that Major von François, author of an able book, "Nama und Damara," who had formerly been in command, had declared less than three months before that fewer than one thousand troops would be a sufficient force to preserve order in the colony. For two years, said Herr Ledebour, imaginative Pan-German politicians have been dissemi-

ating the notion in Germany that a large force must be maintained in South-West Africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of *Weltpolitik* pressure upon England with the eventual object of invading Cape Colony. One of the first of such suggestions is to be found in a book by Paul Samassa, written in 1905, in which the author states "In German South-West Africa we have in our hands a strong trump card from the point of view of *Weltpolitik*. England is in consequence of this card in peril of losing South Africa. We have now about 12,000 troops in South-West Africa and half of them will remain there for a considerable time." Dr. Samassa then explains how these men were to invade Cape Colony with the help of Boer insurgents—an event that has since taken place—and it may be of interest to state that there has been at least one attempt since the Herero rising to engineer a raid into Cape Colony so as to find out the direction of the prevailing political wind, a movement that was of course disavowed by the German authorities.

To aid in this military policy a series of railways was constructed. In December, 1905, Herr Lattmann in recommending that the vote for the Kubub Railway should be passed without being referred to a committee said, "This way of passing the vote would have been of particular importance for the whole nation, since the railway would not then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning our troops or with regard to the financially remunerative character of the colony, but because a much more serious question lies behind it—what significance has the railway in the event of complications between Germany and other nations?"<sup>1</sup> Yes, this railway can be employed

<sup>1</sup> One is constantly struck by the extreme simplicity displayed by Germans in exposing their own cherished and "secret" plans to an unappreciative world.

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not only for transport from the coast to the interior; our troops can be easily transported by it from the interior to the coast and thence to other places. If, for example, a war had broken out with England, we could send them into Cape Colony." Although Prince Bülow officially characterised the statement as "an infamous calumny and sheer nonsense" there is no doubt whatever that the retention of large numbers of troops and the building of certain railways in South-West Africa were for purely strategic and political purposes.

The only possible reason ever advanced for the maintenance of so large a garrison was supplied by Colonel von Deimling who, on being consulted by the German Government as to the reasons for the maintenance of 8,000 troops, replied that it would probably be necessary in the future to reckon with the Ovampos, a warlike tribe in the north that had not yet come under German sway. The Reichstag in reality exercised very little control over the main course of German colonial policy. This was settled by the Government, and the Reichstag generally sooner or later fell into line. Colonel von Deimling made a speech in the Reichstag on May 28, 1906, which caused a great commotion. He stated that it did not matter what the Reichstag did, as he would never withdraw a single soldier "unless my Emperor issues a command to that effect." The opinion of the Reichstag was that certain troops should be withdrawn from German South-West Africa. Fortunately, however, there has been as yet no reversal of the policy initiated by Governor Leutwein, who was careful not

Herr Lattmann is another example of this peculiar German characteristic. Certainly the non-German portion of the world has derived much amusement from the numberless indiscreet utterances of more or less responsible individuals in the Fatherland. Germans seem to like making much noise, but they appear to be oblivious of the fact that the man next door may overhear them.

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to interfere with a people much less easy to subdue than the Hereros. In writing to one of the Ovampo chiefs, Leutwein had stated that he regretted that owing to lack of opportunity he had been unable to pay him a visit, and received the reply that, "all that I had written was all very well, but that he, Kambonde, nevertheless, hoped that he would never see me; for the Germans arrive with words of friendship, but once in the country, they wish to govern it, and he was quite capable of governing without outside assistance."<sup>1</sup>

The German authorities in South-West Africa had become convinced that these native wars were a costly, though not irreparable, disaster to the colonial cause. Opinion in Germany was sharply divided as to the desirability of spending more money on South-West Africa, where the Herero rebellion alone had cost the Fatherland nearly £30,000,000. But the majority of the German people fully understood and fully approved the motives that led the Germans to retain a considerable garrison in South-West Africa and to pour into the country large quantities of military stores out of all proportion to the real needs of the colony. They were quite willing to pay for a policy of preparation for future eventualities, and whilst they grudged the expenditure of much money upon South-West Africa as a German colony they were prepared to spend lavishly for the furtherance of certain schemes that were well understood in Berlin—and also by the German community at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and other South African cities. "It is evident," states Mr. O'Connor, the latest writer on the German menace in South Africa, "that the territory has not been regarded by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off ground

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for an invasion of British South Africa. From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into British territory." Recent events have proved that these views have been thoroughly justified, and there can be little doubt that German administrative blunders with regard to the natives served a useful purpose in the long run when they made it possible to turn German South-West Africa into a military settlement.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst German native administration in South-West Africa had proved a failure, comparatively little progress had been made in the real settlement of the country, that is, if such progress is to be judged from what was expected when the German colonial party were industriously propagating the doctrine that German emigrants should be directed towards German colonies. It is true that considerable numbers of immigrants, mainly of the agricultural class, had taken up farms in the country, having been directly encouraged thereto by the generous terms offered by the Government to intending settlers, but previous to the Herero rebellion the civil European population did not greatly exceed four thousand, whilst even at the present day after thirty years of occupation there are not more than fifteen thousand white inhabitants.

For some years after the country had been taken over by Germany progress was exceedingly slow. At first the German occupation was merely nominal, for Bismarck's policy of founding commercial colonies which should be under the control of chartered companies was not favourable to the rapid opening up of the country. It is true that

<sup>1</sup> The present writer prepared an article in January, 1906, fully exposing the German danger in South-West Africa, but the only review to which it was submitted considered it likely to wound the susceptibilities of the Germans—a view which the author fully shared.

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so far as South-West Africa was concerned no chartered company undertook the administration of the protectorate, because the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwestafrika* was unwilling to accept the responsibilities which the Chancellor desired to thrust upon it and remained a private trading corporation without assuming any of the rights and privileges of sovereignty. But this fact did not encourage the German authorities to initiate an active administrative policy or to undertake any but the most necessary administrative duties. Bismarck was determined that the Imperial Government should be put to no unnecessary expense, whilst the *Kolonialgesellschaft*, which had been formed to acquire from Lüderitz<sup>1</sup> his various properties in the country, and was founded on April 3, 1885, was not in a sufficiently strong financial position to do more than undertake a little exploring work and to carry on the trading ventures that had already been established.

This company, which was started with the nominal capital of 1,191,000 marks, was in reality only supplied with a capital of 313,000 marks (£15,600), a sum utterly inadequate for an active commercial policy. German merchants, in spite of the encouragement given by Bismarck, were unwilling to risk their capital upon large undertakings in a distant and practically unknown territory, and, until the discovery of minerals showed that the country offered something better than the slow but substantial returns that might be expected from agricultural and pastoral settlement, there seemed little hope of inducing German capitalists to advance the money necessary for exploita-

<sup>1</sup> Shortly after this date, on October 22, 1886, Lüderitz, who had been on a journey along the Orange River, was drowned at the mouth of that river by the capsizing of his boat.

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tion.<sup>1</sup> When on March 25, 1888, the Emperor Frederick presented the company with a valuable asset in the form of certain rights over the minerals that might be found within their territories, it seemed possible that substantial returns might be received for the money that had already been expended; but these extensive rights were found subsequently to be detrimental to the welfare of the community and were considerably modified, whilst other companies, of which the *Südwestafrikanisches Minensyndikat*, the *Deutsche Diamantengesellschaft für Südwestafrika*, and the *Siedlungsgesellschaft* were the principal, were established and became active competitors with the premier company.<sup>2</sup>

So far as South-West Africa has been concerned the outstanding feature of German policy has been its continuous and rapid changes. German commercial policy has been dictated largely by the *Kolonialamt* at Berlin, frequently without consideration for the wishes and desires of the colonists and occasionally in direct opposition to their representations. The tariffs, which have been subject to constant change, have been arranged to meet the views of interested parties in Germany rather than with any idea

<sup>1</sup> So little financial support was given to German South-West Africa that several suggestions were made in the Reichstag in the year 1890 that it would be better to part with the colony, and the Imperial Chancellor had considerable difficulty in justifying the commercial and financial policy of the German Government with regard to their South African colony. A little later in January, 1893, the *National Zeitung* took Dr. Kayser, then head of the Colonial Department, severely to task for having held any communication with Sir James Sievewright, whose journey to Berlin, it alleged, was undertaken solely for the purpose of inducing the Government to cede South-West Africa to Cape Colony. "This Cape Machiavelli," added the journal, "hoped to tempt the Imperial Chancellor with an offer of South African gold which would have solved the financial difficulties of the Army Bills."

<sup>2</sup> For an account of the companies operating in German South-West Africa see Pierre Décharme's *Compagnies et Sociétés Coloniales Allemandes*, 1903; and G. K. Anton's *La politique allemande et les diamants de l'Afrique (Bulletin de Colonisation Comparée, 1910)*.

of assisting the prosperity of the colony, and the colonists, especially after the Herero rebellion, were called upon to meet heavy charges, which fell with special severity upon the small body of merchants who were required after a change of tariff in 1907 to pay predated duties. They disputed the Governor's right to take this action, and their contention was upheld in the local courts, but the Imperial Chancellor simply altered the law and issued a decree authorising governors to levy predated duties without reference to existing customs or laws. Such an action would have been impossible in any British colony, but is symptomatic of German administrative policy with regard to her colonies, and was in full accordance with the settled policy of the German Government, which has been to impose the Imperial authority upon the colonists without allowing them any real control over their own affairs.<sup>1</sup>

The result of these manœuvres has been to cause considerable friction between the colonial administration and the merchants and colonists settled in South-West Africa, so that the governing class has always been sharply divided from the mercantile community. The failure that was apparent in native administration has been matched by a similar failure in economic policy, and such progress as has taken place in the colony has been due in no small measure to individual enterprise aided by the help extended by the Government in the carrying out of an intelligent public works policy in connection with railways, roads, and bridges. So far as German colonial administration is concerned it may be said that the German colonies have been much more popular in Germany than in the colonies themselves.

<sup>1</sup> On this matter consult *Das Zollwesen der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee*, by Dr. Karl Kucklentz, 1914.



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE GERMANS IN WEST AFRICA

**B**ISMARCK had been thoroughly aroused by the dilatory policy pursued by the British Ministry in South Africa. The lack of consideration that had been shown to German representations and the cavalier attitude of the British Foreign Office had convinced him that Great Britain would not acquiesce with a good grace in any German plans for acquiring colonies in Africa, and he feared the extension of a species of British Monroe Doctrine (*see* page 97) to the whole continent. There can be little doubt that there was a deep-laid scheme to acquire extensive German possessions in South Africa, and although it is probable that these plans did not receive the sanction of official approval and were discouraged by Bismarck himself, it is certain that a considerable section of the German colonial party cherished the idea of a Germanic state stretching across Africa from Lüderitz Bay to Lourenço Marques. Whatever may have been the secret designs of the advanced colonisers, they were effectively checked in the autumn of 1884, when Sir Charles Warren was dispatched with a small expeditionary force to South Africa in order to drive from Bechuanaland certain parties of Boers who were establishing independent communities in the rear of the German territories. It was impossible to tolerate the foundation of so-called independent republics between the Transvaal and German territory, and the two

republics of Goshen and Stellaland, with the whole of Bechuanaland, were annexed to the British Crown. The former republic had been set up in 1882, with its capital at Rooi Grond, just outside the Transvaal frontier and close to Mafeking. The latter had been founded in September, 1883, with its capital at Vryburg. In November of that year proposals were made for the amalgamation of the two republics under the high-sounding title of the United States of Stellaland. The results of Warren's mission were epoch-making. The occupation of Bechuanaland effectively blocked any German advance towards the interior, and secured for Great Britain the highway leading northwards to the Zambesi. In this respect German policy—if policy it were—had failed; but the German colonial party secured a notable triumph in West Africa which amply compensated them for any disappointment in the south.

In view of the hostility of the British, Bismarck found it necessary to act swiftly, and above all to act secretly. He was well aware that Great Britain had at length been aroused to an appreciation of the dangers that threatened her paramount position in West Africa, and he was determined to act before his slower-moving competitor should secure all the plums in the African pudding.<sup>1</sup> Whilst he had come to the decision that Great Britain might be successfully opposed in West Africa, owing to the fact that she was fully occupied in Egypt and elsewhere, Bismarck was specially careful that German plans should not clash with any French schemes for the acquisition of territory. The relations of Great Britain and France were then any-

<sup>1</sup> A writer in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, on April 22nd, 1884, compared Africa to a large pudding which the English had prepared for themselves at other people's expense. "Let us hope," said the writer, "that our bluejackets will put a few peppercorns into it on the Guinea Coast, so that our friends on the Thames may not digest it too rapidly."

thing but friendly, and the more strained they became the more careful was Bismarck to secure the tacit support of France for his undertakings.

Germans had been engaged for many years in the peaceful commercial penetration of West Africa. Both in Togoland and the Cameroons, which they were subsequently to acquire, German merchants had successfully established themselves. In 1852 the well-known Hamburg firm of Woermann commenced its operations in Liberia, and by 1859 it had established factories at various points on the coast between the Cameroons and the Gaboop, and even as far south as Angola.<sup>1</sup> Other merchants followed in their wake, and in the beginning of 1884 there were some fifteen German firms on the west coast of Africa, controlling about sixty factories, and carrying on a flourishing trade with the interior through the intermediary of the trading tribes settled in the coastal districts. As no government was established, the affairs of the trading community were managed by a Court of Equity, representing the traders of all nations, to which were referred all disputes, and which acted on behalf of the European community, and settled disputes in connection with the "comey," or dues paid by the traders to the native kings. A German steamer called every two months, both on the outward and homeward voyage, at the Cameroon River, where the Germans claimed to have important interests; and it was computed that the total amount of products exported by German firms was 2,226 tons, as compared with 2,194 tons exported by British firms. In addition, 7,610 lbs. and 10,310 lbs. of ivory were exported by the British and Germans respectively, whilst the latter also exported a considerable quantity of cocoa.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Scott Keltie's "Partition of Africa," p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> See Memorandum by Consul E. H. Hewett, December 17th, 1883.

It will thus be seen that though the British had been first on the coast, they had been surpassed by the two German firms established in the Cameroons, whilst, unfortunately, the position of affairs was not bettered by the neglect of the British authorities to send their consular representatives to the country. "Of late years," wrote Mr. Hewett, "Cameroon has been but little visited by the consul, both my predecessor and myself having had a great deal to do on the other rivers."

So far as Togoland was concerned the trade was fairly evenly divided between British, German, and French mercantile houses. The first factories were established about the year 1880, and the rivalry between the merchants soon became so considerable that misunderstandings were frequent and, as a matter of fact, a very undesirable state of things came into existence, discreditable to the traders of all nations. The Senates of Hamburg and Bremen, which were directly interested in the trade of the west coast, demanded that German ships of war should be sent to West Africa in order to impress the natives that Germany, as well as Britain, was a sea-power and possessed the means of enforcing her will whenever she should consider it necessary to do so. The former suggested the acquisition of a naval station at Fernando Po and the occupation of a portion of the opposite littoral in order that a colony under the German flag might be there established. The latter merely suggested the making of treaties with the native chieftains so that German interests might be properly safeguarded. Accordingly on January 30, 1884, the *Sophie*, under Captain Stubenrauch, arrived at Little Popo in Togoland with the object of impressing the natives, who were hostile to the Germans, with some idea of the might of the Fatherland; and proceeding along the coast collected

hostages for their good behaviour in the future. The arrival of the German vessel created a great sensation, and the native chieftains subsequently addressed a letter to the German Emperor and requested his protection against the pretensions of the English who, it was alleged, had been instrumental in causing the troubles.

On May 19 Bismarck made an important communication to Dr. Nachtigal. The letter shows how anxious the German Chancellor was to preserve a perfectly correct attitude towards France, which also had certain interests in the same neighbourhood. Prince Bismarck informed Nachtigal that the German Ambassador at Paris had learned from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that France had concluded during the previous year certain treaties with the chieftains at Little Popo, but had not yet judged the time propitious for their publication. In order to emphasise their good relations with the French Government, Germany awaited its decision before acceding to the request of the chiefs of Little Popo, and in case the French Government decided to stand by the treaties, Germany was prepared to respect them.<sup>1</sup> The matter was easily arranged with France, for, as Dr. Scott Keltie remarks, "Bismarck's delicacy towards French susceptibilities was in all these doings and negotiations in marked contrast to his bluff and uncompromising treatment of the British Government."

In the meantime Bismarck was carefully feeling his way with regard to Great Britain. On April 19 Count Vitzthum wrote from the German Embassy in London to Lord Granville, stating that the Imperial Consul-General, Dr. Nachtigal, had been commissioned to visit the West Coast of Africa "in order to complete the information now in

<sup>1</sup> Chéradame's *La Colonisation et les Colonies allemandes*, p. 76.

the possession of the Foreign Office at Berlin on the state of German commerce on that coast," and asking that the authorities in the British possessions might be furnished with suitable recommendations on his behalf.

The real object of Dr. Nachtigal's mission was carefully concealed from the British Government, who remained in blissful ignorance of the intentions of the German mission. Communications were inserted in the German Press, particularly in the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, which, two days after Count Vitzthum's letter was written, stated that "the happy increase in the commercial relations of Germany with the West Coast of Africa, and the evident need felt that the interests of German commerce should not be left to the protection of trading consuls, have induced the Foreign Office to send out Dr. Nachtigal to those parts, a person particularly suited for such a duty, to further German interests there, and to report upon a scheme for consular appointments on that coast. It is intended at the suggestion of the Foreign Office to station permanently some war-vessels on the West Coast of Africa, and for the present the gunboat *Möwe* has been placed at the service of the commission." All this was perfectly correct, but the *Kölnische Zeitung* let the cat out of the bag by stating that the *Möwe* "will now hoist the German flag in the Bay of Biafra and is to establish a coaling and victualling station on the Spanish island of Fernando Po."

It became perfectly apparent that Germany was about to repeat her proceedings in South-West Africa, but that she was also prepared to act swiftly and without consulting the desires of the British Government. A strong and influential section of the German people had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived for vigorous action, and the feeling towards Great Britain was anything but

friendly. Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Bowdler Bell writing on April 23, 1884, stated that "a good deal of jealousy and ill-will toward England has been manifested by a considerable section of the German papers"; and it was tolerably certain that none but purely prudential considerations would prevent Bismarck from seizing such portions of the West African littoral as remained available for colonisation. He no longer feared Great Britain. Financial and military considerations alone dictated the extent of Germany's participation in the scramble for the African continent.

Yet in spite of these proceedings, and in spite of the explosive tendency of German policy, the necessity for prompt action was not realised at Downing Street, and it was not until May 16 that Consul Hewett, who was then on leave, was instructed to return to his post without delay and informed that he should lose no time in visiting the various native chiefs in order to state to them that Her Majesty "is willing to extend to them her power and protection." So far as the Cameroons were concerned, Consul Hewett was informed that "it is not proposed to accept the cession at present, as by so doing the necessity would be entailed of establishing in that particular spot a British colony, but the chiefs will be asked to undertake that they will, if required, cede such portion of their territory as it may be thought desirable to acquire."

Before this letter was written, the *Möwe*, carrying Dr. Nachtigal and his mission, was on its way to West Africa, having left Kiel on April 15; and on June 1, accompanied by the *Elisabeth*, it anchored off the Los Islands (then a British possession, having been ceded to Great Britain in 1818, but now in the possession of France) off the coast of French Guinea. Here however nothing was accomplished as there were certain French claims which demanded

respect, and Dr. Nachtigal proceeded along the coast and on July 2 anchored off the settlement at Little Popo.<sup>1</sup>

Togoland, where Dr. Nachtigal had now arrived, offered a fruitful field for the Germans. Although British explorers and merchants had been mainly instrumental in making these coasts known to Europeans—at least since the outburst of trading activity in the seventeenth century—the British Government had pursued a policy that was not consonant with our interests in the West African littoral. They had been unwilling to accept responsibilities and, doubtless but for the rude awakening of 1884, they would have preferred the continuance of the haphazard system of non-administration which resulted in profits without expenditure. What other nations did not care to seize, they were unwilling to take, and there remained many stretches of coast line that offered opportunities to a maritime and trading power. The moment was propitious for German intervention. The German traders at Bagida and Lome, professing themselves to be in some danger from the paramount chief of Togoland, who, they said, was being incited against them by the machinations of the English, implored the assistance of Dr. Nachtigal. The latter, only too pleased to have a plausible excuse for intervention, proceeded at once to Bagida, signed a treaty with M'lapa, king of Togoland, and hoisted the German flag at Bagida on July 5. On the following day the German flag was raised at Lome.<sup>2</sup> The *Möwe* then returned to Little Popo, where

<sup>1</sup> It may here be mentioned that the German flag was subsequently hoisted on the coast of French Guinea, but satisfactory arrangements were made with France regarding this and other settlements in disputed territories.

<sup>2</sup> The establishment of a German protectorate over Togoland and other places was announced to the British Government on October 15, 1884, in the following letter from Baron von Plessen:

“The Government of His Majesty the Emperor, with a view to ensuring more effectually German commercial interests in the West Coast of Africa, have taken



the chief Lawson accepted the protection of the Germans, and subsequently the small independent state of Porto-Seguro, whose chieftain had petitioned for French protection, was placed under the German flag (September 5, 1884). Prior to this event Dr. Nachtigal had sailed in the *Möwe* for the Cameroons, with the intention of placing that rich prize in the hands of his Imperial master. The matter did not brook delay, and, as will be seen, the neck-to-neck race between the British and German authorities resulted in the victory of the latter.

The district ruled over by the petty Cameroon chiefs, to which Dr. Nachtigal now turned his attention, according to an estimate made by Consul Hewett in 1883, was about sixty square miles in extent, and included the towns of Bell, Acqua, and Dido, on the left bank of the river, and Hickory on the right bank. The "kings," however, exercised some influence over the interior and acted as middlemen between the interior tribes and the European traders. Consul Hewett reported in favour of the annexation of the territory in order that the country might be opened out, white traders established in the interior, and the intervention of the royal middlemen be dispensed with. In addition to the country around the Cameroon River there was a Baptist mission station at Victoria (Ambas

certain districts of this coast under their protection. This has been effected in virtue of treaties which have been in part concluded by Dr. Nachtigal, the Consul-General dispatched to West Africa, with independent chiefs, and partly in virtue of applications for protection made by Imperial subjects who have acquired certain tracts by covenants with independent chiefs.

"Accordingly, the Togo tract, with the harbours of Lome and Bagida, the districts of Bimbia, with the Isle of Nicol, Cameroons, Malimba to its northern extremity, Little Batanga, Plántation, and Criby, on the Slave Coast, and the tract of coast-land between Cape Frio and the Orange River, with the exception of Walfisch Bay, in South-Western Africa, have been placed under the protection of His Majesty the Emperor. This has been notified by hoisting the Imperial military standard and planting frontier poles, and the engagement at the same time announced that all demonstrable existing rights of third parties are to be respected."

Bay) to the north-west of the bay, the inhabitants of which had petitioned for British protection on March 24, 1883. With respect to the native chieftains, King Acqua and King Bell apparently desired the protection of the British Government but in reality were anxious to secure the best terms available, either from the Germans or the British, so that they could wax fat upon the proceeds of the doles which they expected would be poured into their outstretched hands.<sup>1</sup> Their interests seemed at first to be more closely connected with those of the British traders, and it was to the British Government that they first made their representations. On August 7, 1879, King Acqua and four of his council wrote to Queen Victoria as follows :

“DEAREST MADAM,—We your servants have join together and thoughts its better to write you a nice loving letter which will tell you about all our wishes. We wish to have your laws in our towns. We want to have every fashioned altered, also we will do according to your Consul’s word. Plenty wars here in our country. Plenty murder and idol worshippers. Perhaps these lines of our writing will look to you as an idle tale.

“We have spoken to the English Consul plenty times about having an English Government here. We never have answer from you, so we wish to write you ourselves.

“When we heard about Calabar River, how they have all English laws in their towns, and how they have put away all their superstitions, oh, we shall be very glad to be like Calabar now.”

<sup>1</sup> The Rev. Mr. Collings, writing to Mr. Gladstone on September 27, 1883, stated that “King Bell is a fine specimen of an African native—every inch a king in bearing—uniformly courteous and affable, as though mindful of the maxim, ‘noblesse oblige.’” Missionaries, however, seldom see the faults of their protégés and King Bell was neither better nor worse than the average West African native.

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To this naive epistle no answer apparently was vouchsafed and two years later King Bell and King Acqua appealed to Mr. Gladstone, "as we heard here that you are a chief man in the House of Commons," asking to be placed under British protection and saying "Do for mercy sake please to lay our request before the Queen and to the rulers of the British Government." This letter was forwarded to Mr. Hewett who stated that "it may be found that there are more serious issues involved in the refusal of it than in compliance with it"; whilst an official reply was finally sent on March 1, 1882, that "although Her Majesty's Government are not prepared as at present advised to undertake the Protectorate of your country, they will further examine the matter and write to you again." The delay proved fatal. Consul Hewett returned home on leave and whilst the Foreign Office was considering the matter and leisurely preparing the necessary treaties,<sup>1</sup> the German authorities were acting.

The scramble for the Cameroon country was a most undignified proceeding on the part of two Powers who were presumably on good terms. Germany entered upon a piece of sharp practice that was only justified by success. Great Britain, on the other hand, proceeded more leisurely and more openly, but sacrificed the trump cards she undoubtedly held because Consul Hewett, who should have been on the spot, did not arrive on the Cameroon River until it was too late. On July 10, Captain Arthur Brooke, of H.M.S. *Opal*, then at Fernando Po, received information that a German man-of-war had passed Cape Coast Castle bound for the Cameroon River. On the receipt of this news he dispatched Lieutenant W. J. Moore in the *Goshawk* with instructions to inform the Cameroon kings that Consul

<sup>1</sup> See Foreign Office letter of November 29, 1883.

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Hewett would shortly visit them and that they were not to make any treaties in the meantime. Unfortunately Lieutenant Moore was not authorised to annex the country and when he arrived at King Bell's Town he found that, although the *Möwe* had not arrived, the German traders had not been inactive. Herr Schmidt, agent for Messrs. Woermann & Co., had arranged several meetings with the natives, at which he had told them that the German Government wished to annex the territory and make it a naval station, of course for a substantial "consideration"; whilst Herr Schultze, the German Consul at the Gaboon, had only left on the previous day after having arranged a treaty and informing them that a German gunboat would come at once.

It was reported that Kings Bell and Acqua were to receive a present of £1,000 each and that the other chiefs would obtain plentiful supplies of rum. Lieutenant Moore found that in view of these substantial rewards and the pressure exerted upon them by the Germans the chiefs were wavering. The prospects of unlimited rum and the possibility of paying off their debts to the traders proved a strong inducement to accept the German offer. But no treaty had yet been signed. Lieutenant Moore left on July 11 and Consul Hewett arrived on the 19th.

In the meantime, however, Dr. Nachtigal hurrying on from his successful mission in Togoland arrived at the Cameroon River, and on July 14 the German flag was formally hoisted over the territory and an official notification of the fact that the country had been placed under German protection was issued on the following day. When Mr. Hewett at length arrived on the scene the only action that he could take was to make a verbal protest to Dr. Nachtigal against the step that had been taken, and to annex

the territory in the occupation of the Baptist Missionary Society at Victoria, Ambas Bay.

For the loss of the Cameroon country the British authorities had only themselves to blame, and protests were speedily forthcoming from the different mercantile communities interested in the West African trade. Mr. Bond, the Chairman of the African Steamship Company, protested on September 24, and similar protests were forthcoming from the Bristol Chamber of Commerce, the African Association, the Congo District Association, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, the London Chamber of Commerce, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, and other bodies. The reproaches that were so freely heaped upon the British Ministry for their blindness, procrastination, and apparent indifference to British interests were fully deserved, but they could not atone for the bungling that had taken place, and Lord Granville, never remarkable for penetration or acumen, had to content himself with reproaching Bismarck for concealing the real purpose of Nachtigal's mission.

“It is evident,” he wrote on January 20, 1885, “that had Her Majesty's Government supposed that Dr. Nachtigal was authorised to annex territories in which they took a special interest, and over which they had then decided to proclaim the Queen's Protectorate, they would have exchanged explanations with the German Government, which must have prevented the present state of things.” To which Bismarck retorted that “English officials would have prevented German acquisitions if it had been known beforehand at what points it was intended to make them” —a remark that was probably perfectly true. Whilst Lord Granville was not unnaturally deeply chagrined at the way in which he had been hoodwinked, Prince Bismarck

was intensely annoyed at the action of the British authorities in annexing the territory of Victoria. He feared, and expressed his fears in writing, that it was the policy of Great Britain to shut in the new German colony by a ring of settlements that would prevent the expansion of Germany towards the interior and completely isolate the Cameroon country from the waterways of the hinterland and particularly from Lake Chad. Although he had been officially informed that Her Majesty's Government were "far from viewing with distrust the recent movements of German agents," but were on the contrary "confident that the views of the two countries were in harmony," he judged British professions by the actions of the British merchants in West Africa who did not accept the German protectorate in the friendly spirit that was apparently manifested at the Foreign Office. Bismarck himself stated that "our differences with England will never at any time within human ken assume such a gravity as to exclude the possibility of settlement by frank good will and able and prudent diplomacy such as we, for our part, shall certainly employ"; but he nevertheless distrusted British policy and had a hearty dislike for the Foreign Minister then responsible for it. So far as the Cameroon question was concerned he did not hesitate to speak his mind freely. "I would remark," he wrote to Lord Granville on February 5, 1885, "that we unfortunately cannot avoid the impression that the acquisitions made by England on the coast between Amba Bay and the colony of Lagos since our annexation of the Cameroons were intended, in spite of the assurances to the contrary, to prevent the possibility of an extension of our possession."

Whilst the diplomatic correspondence betrayed a certain liveliness, the position of affairs in West Africa was any-

thing but tranquil. In Togoland the Germans were unsuccessful in maintaining order, and in February, 1885, it was found necessary to relieve the king of his duties and to re-establish order by means of a certain display of force. In the Cameroons there was a considerable amount of fighting before the inhabitants of the German Protectorate acquired the peculiar calm so characteristic of African natives under German domination. It was necessary to overawe the natives, and in the process a Baptist mission station did not escape the attention of the Germans, who doubtless were not disposed to overlook the opposition of the missionaries to German rule. The German Admiral Knorr, who subsequently upheld German prestige at Zanzibar, destroyed a number of native villages, including Hickory Town and Joss Town, killed a number of the insurgents, and triumphantly vindicated German authority during the month of December, 1884. He had occasion to issue a proclamation specially aimed against the foreign, i.e. British, faction that was supposed to be aiding the rebellious natives. "In the Imperial German Protectorate of Cameroon the public peace has been disturbed apparently by foreign instigation, which very much against my wish, at last has necessitated our unfolding military power. Whereas it is the positive will of the Imperial Government to give to this territory the necessary peace and order, and to uphold it under all circumstances: I hereby declare," etc. etc.

It is evident that if the Imperial representative on the spot (Dr. Buchner) believed in the machinations of the British traders and was also able to convince the German admiral of the truth of the allegations, Bismarck himself was unlikely to accept any official denials of British complicity in the Cameroon troubles. In a debate in the Reichstag on January 10, 1885, Bismarck in alluding to

the subject stated that he held that the English Government took no part whatever in the intrigues in the Cameroons. "But," he continued, "the extent of the English colonial system stretching round the world can scarcely be supervised, still less controlled. It is more difficult for the English than for any other Government, considering the extent and the organisation of the British colonies, to exert everywhere a strong hold over men and events, and even over their own British officials. . . . Our relations with England are good. It is not to be wondered at that the English, conscious that 'Britannia rules the waves,' should look on in astonishment when 'their cousins, the land-rats,' as they hold us to be, suddenly take to seafaring; but this astonishment is by no means shared in the highest and governing circles in England. They have some difficulty in moderating at once the expression of astonishment of all their subjects, but we are still in our old traditional friendly relations with England, and both countries are well advised to maintain these friendly relations. If the British Government were to assume completely the same views with regard to German colonial policy as those of many of the English, it would scarcely be possible for us, without meeting with strong opposition in Germany, to support English policy in other matters which interest England closely. We would, perhaps, then be compelled to support those who, without wishing it, are antagonistic to England, and to establish a certain system of *do ut des*; but I believe that we live, and will continue to live, in relations with England which will render the words of the last speaker, that we are surrounded by enemies, quite inapplicable to the present situation."

Bismarck's words contained a distinct threat. The official attitude of England might be perfectly correct whilst



the unofficial attitude might be unfriendly. Well and good. But should England's official attitude change for the worse, then Germany would be prepared to reconsider her position and seek for compensations at the expense of England.

In the sphere of the Cameroons, Germany had acquired important interests, and it was her plain destiny to push forward towards the interior.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The importance of German interests in different parts of the world is clearly shown in the remarkable series of maps issued in the years 1893-1897 by Justus Perthes, of Gotha, under the title of "*Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas*," and edited by Paul Langhans. These maps were evidently published in accordance with the ideas of the Pan-German school to foster the growth of Germanism throughout the world. In addition to the excellent maps of the German colonies there is a number of special maps showing the distribution of Germans and the importance of German trade in foreign countries. The first of these maps shows the percentages of Germans in relation to population in various parts of the world, and it is to be noted that, in accordance with the extreme Pan-German view, the people of Holland and of a great part of Belgium are counted as "Germans." The second shows the amount of German commerce in the world and the percentages in different countries. The third shows German commerce in Central Europe. The fourth, one of the most interesting of these maps, illustrates the distribution of Germans in Europe and the centres in which they are most densely settled, as well as former "German" settlements, such as the Flemish "colonies" in South Wales. The fifth deals with the Germans in Australasia, shows the chief German settlements, and gives such details as German schools, churches, mission stations, and newspapers. The sixth shows all German settlements in South America, and the seventh and eighth point out the extent of German colonisation in the Middle East. The ninth is devoted to German interests in North America, whilst the tenth relates to the whole of Africa, and contains the names of German explorers as well as the usual minute details mentioned above. This atlas is typical of the work of the Pan-Germans in preparing for the present world-conflict. It is an example of German thoroughness.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE BERLIN CONFERENCE

**T**HE occupation of Angra Pequena by Germany led to that great scramble for territory on the Dark Continent generally spoken of as the "Partition of Africa." Within a few weeks Germany had established herself in Togoland and the Cameroons, and a close colonial *entente* had been engineered between Germany and France; for Bismarck had determined that, as Great Britain appeared to be hostile to Germany's designs, there should be no cause for friction with the next strongest colonial Power. Great Britain and Germany were about to advance upon converging lines, and it was apparent that questions of the greatest moment would arise when, and if, these lines of advance should cross each other. Britain was then establishing herself in Egypt, and the ideal of a great British territory stretching from north to south was incompatible with the secret intention of Germany to establish a Central African Empire, with harbours on the western and eastern coasts, and occupying the country that was then being explored in the Congo regions. The prophecy of Gladstone in 1877 that "our first site in Egypt, be it by larceny or be it by emption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire that will grow and grow . . . till we finally join hands across the Equator with Natal and Cape Colony,"<sup>1</sup> appealed with peculiar force to Englishmen and especially to Cecil Rhodes,

<sup>1</sup> *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1877.

who was then working actively for the expansion of British territory towards the Equator.

But a question of this magnitude could not be settled by the seizure of unoccupied coastal territories; for there were historical claims to be adjusted before it was possible for any of the Great Powers to make a forward move in Central Africa. Ever since the beginning of the century Portugal had been attempting to establish a claim to the region of the Congo. She had consistently maintained that the coast line from  $5^{\circ} 12'$  (to the north of the Congo) to  $8^{\circ}$  south latitude was Portuguese territory, and had exercised her right to export slaves from these territories. In particular she jealously regarded any attempt to dispute her right to the country lying immediately north of the mouth of the Congo—territories which, she maintained, had been in her possession since the year 1484. But Portugal's shadowy historical claims were based upon no effective occupation. Her explorers and navigators had doubtless occupied and taken possession of many places on the West African coast, and in the heyday of her empire had penetrated far into the interior, especially in the Zambesi region and in the negro empire of Monomotapa. But in spite of the fact that the Portuguese monarch had styled himself "King of Portugal and of the two lands of the setting sun on this and on that side of the sea in Africa, Lord of Guinea and of the conquest and navigation of Ethiopia," so far as effective occupation was concerned, his claims were not recognised to extend beyond Ambriz, a place well to the south of the Congo and not situated in the basin of that river.

Nevertheless the exploring work of Stanley, which had called attention to the extreme importance of the Congo regions, and the activities of the Congo International Asso-

ciation, served to arouse Portugal to renewed efforts. More particularly the proceedings of the Count de Brazza, an Italian in the service of France, who, although ostensibly acting on behalf of the Congo International Association, had been exploring along the Congo and placing the territory he traversed under the protection of the French flag, compelled the Portuguese, if they were to hope to establish themselves effectually in the territory they claimed, to take steps to counteract the pretensions of other nations.

In November, 1882, the Portuguese Government approached Lord Granville with a renewed claim for consideration, when the latter replied that, whilst unwilling to admit the validity of the historical claims of Portugal, he was prepared to consider an arrangement for the mutual advantage of both countries. After lengthy negotiations, a treaty was agreed upon, and signed in London on February 26, 1884, by which Great Britain agreed to recognise the sovereignty of Portugal over the mouth of the Congo and inland as far as Noki (not far from Matadi). Lord Granville further agreed that the navigation of the Congo should be under the control of an Anglo-Portuguese Commission.

This action at once roused the resentment of France and Germany : the former having acquired considerable influence in the region in question, whilst the latter was fearful lest certain plans for the acquisition of the upper reaches of the river should be frustrated by the operations of the treaty. There can be little doubt that Lord Granville's policy in so readily consenting to recognise the Portuguese claims was due to his belief that the International Association would be of short duration, and that eventually a goodly portion of the territory it was to administer would be made over to

England. In any case his action precipitated the crisis that was to follow, for the Portuguese Government, anxious to secure the support, or at least recognition, of France, approached that Government, with the result that there was a strong protest against British action and a demand for a reconsideration of the whole question. The Congo Treaty, awaiting acceptance by a new Cortes, was never ratified, and the matter was eventually referred to the Berlin Conference, which was summoned on the joint recommendation of Germany and France.

Lord Granville's action was productive also of a storm of hostile criticism in Great Britain and in other countries. There can be no doubt that the Foreign Secretary, profiting by the lessons of the past, especially in regard to Angra Pequena, was endeavouring to carry through a piece of sharp practice on his own account, believing that Great Britain would eventually fall heir to large portions of the Congo territory. But he lacked both the ability and the subtlety of Bismarck, and the clumsy diplomacy of the Gladstone-Granville-Derby administration was easily checkmated at Berlin, where Bismarck at once took bold and vigorous measures to defeat the Portuguese intrigue. He exerted sufficient pressure at Lisbon to make the Portuguese Government change its mind regarding an Anglo-Portuguese commission—a provision which, Lord Granville stated, had been agreed to with reluctance, as the British Foreign Minister believed that the commission should be international—and, acting in perfect agreement with France, he initiated a movement which was designed to bring Great Britain into accord with other Powers. His hands had been strengthened in this matter by strong representations coming from the German Chambers of Commerce, and, in common with France, he was not

“prepared to admit the possession of previous rights by any of the Powers who are interested in the Congo trade as a basis for negotiations.”<sup>1</sup>

Acting on a probably previously inspired suggestion from Lisbon, Baron Plessen, German Chargé d’Affaires, wrote on October 8 that “the extension of commerce on the west coast of Africa that has for some time past taken place has suggested to the German and French Governments the idea that it would be to the common interests of the nations engaged in this commerce to draw up . . . such conditions as would ensure its development and prevent disputes and misunderstandings,” and suggesting the summoning of an International Conference—an invitation simultaneously forwarded to Belgium, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, and the United States. Although the British Government were annoyed that they had not been consulted in the negotiations leading up to this suggestion, they adopted the proposal in principle on the same day; but Lord Granville endeavoured to delay matters by requiring more explicit information as to the nature of the discussions that might take place at the conference—fearing lest France and Germany should have already arrived at a complete understanding to the exclusion of Great Britain. This natural request met with a rather abrupt refusal from Bismarck, who had conceived the idea that the British Government were purposely causing delay,<sup>2</sup> and a somewhat acrimonious discussion took place which ended in the German Government stating that they would consider it their duty “to ensure that the principles unanimously laid down by the jurists and judges of all lands, including England, shall be practically applied”—an assurance which Lord

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch to Count Münster, June 7, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> See Lord Granville’s dispatch to Sir Edward Malet, October 19, 1884.

Granville was obliged to accept on October 22, when he notified Germany that Great Britain was prepared to take part in the conference.

So far as the International Association of the Congo was concerned, its President, Colonel Strauch, on the day after the United States had formally recognised "its flag as the flag of a friendly government" (April 22, 1884), had written to M. Jules Favre, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that "the Association, being desirous of giving a fresh proof of its friendly feeling towards France, engages to give her the right of preference if, through unforeseen circumstances, the Association were compelled to sell its possessions"—an action which apparently precluded the realisation of Granville's new aspiration that Great Britain might eventually fall heir to the basin of the Congo. The British Government, therefore, in accepting Germany's invitation, had little chance of securing a diplomatic triumph in the regions in question.

It is unnecessary to discuss the proceedings of the conference, which met in Berlin on November 15, 1884, under the presidency of Bismarck, and sat until February 26, 1885, when the General Act was agreed to by the representatives of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States,<sup>1</sup> France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Norway, and Turkey. The only portion of the General Act that is pertinent to the present book is that which defined principles for the guidance of European Powers in their scramble for Africa. It laid down the important principle that all occupations on the coast of Africa, in order to be valid, must be effective, and thus disposed of vague historical claims, such as those

<sup>1</sup> Although the representative of the United States signed the General Act, the ratification of the American Government was not subsequently delivered at Berlin.

which had been advanced by Portugal, which were not supported by subsequent and effective occupation.

“Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions,” it was agreed, “or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a protectorate there, shall accompany the respective acts with a notification thereof, addressed to the other signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own. The signatory Powers recognise the obligation to ensure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit, under the conditions agreed upon.”

It will be noticed that the agreement related to the coasts of Africa only and to certain defined districts. Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador, had indeed desired that the rules should be applicable to the whole continent, but it was generally agreed that, in view of the fact that much of the interior was unknown, any territorial delimitations in the interior would be likely to lead to, rather than prevent, disputes. It was recognised as reasonable that each Power should be left free, within certain limits, to extend its coastal occupations into the interior and to establish “spheres of influence”<sup>1</sup>—a convenient term that came into use at this period to designate territory which, whilst not precisely under the control of any European Power, was yet of importance as an area of communication to other

<sup>1</sup> I am informed by Mr. Bolton, who was present at the Berlin Conference as Geographical Adviser to the British delegation, that the term “spheres of influence” was not actually used at the Conference, but was first employed in an article in *The Times* dealing with the Partition of Africa.



regions, or whose inhabitants were more or less under European influence, commercial or missionary as the case might be.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An excellent account of the work of the Berlin Conference is contained in Dr. Scott Keltie's "Partition of Africa." I have only considered it necessary to touch upon one aspect of the conference, but Dr. Keltie deals more thoroughly with the various matters that were under consideration. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the biographer of Lord Granville, states that the Berlin Act may some day be considered the most remarkable event in Lord Granville's long tenure of the Foreign Office, and that "the Foreign Office had extricated itself with success from a difficult position, and had succeeded in effecting a permanent settlement of momentous questions without loss either of dignity or of any important national interests." In describing the personnel of the British delegation, he says: "No stronger staff of experts ever represented this country abroad, and thus it came to pass that a mission which triumphant critics in Berlin had begun by describing as an English pilgrimage to Canossa, was rescued from opprobrium and converted into something like a victory."

## CHAPTER X

### ZANZIBAR

IT has been seen how Germany in West Africa was a nation in a hurry. There was, perhaps, ample justification for the indecorous scramble that resulted in the seizure of Togoland and the Cameroons, because it was tolerably certain that if the German authorities did not bestir themselves, other Powers would be before them and garner the harvest that had been so long maturing. Damaraland had fallen like a ripe fruit into the German net; Togoland and the Cameroons had been plucked from the tree; but German East Africa was seized long before the fruit was ripe and even before the tree had been manured. There had been no long years of careful preparation, such as had been the case in West and South-West Africa, where German merchants had established themselves and had entered into commercial relations with the surrounding tribes; for, apart from the island of Zanzibar, an independent state exercising a precarious and disputed control over the opposite littoral, there were no German establishments upon the eastern coasts of Africa where Germany was subsequently to acquire her most valuable African possessions.

It is true that German explorers such as Von der Decken and Otto Kersten, and the missionaries Krapf and Rebmann, had been busy in East Africa; whilst the two former had consistently striven for the proclamation of a German Protectorate long before Germany had become a colonial power.

Nevertheless Germany had no claim to special interests in Eastern Africa. She herself forged the weapons of penetration which came hot from the anvil of patriotism—or rather they were made by a small but determined band of colonial enthusiasts who had decided that where German interests did not already exist they should be created. The fact that a conference was sitting at Berlin charged with the important duty of formulating the rules for the colonial scramble did not cause them to stay their hands, but rather led them to put their secret and cherished plans into immediate execution. They were not prepared to take any risks, and whilst they received no open encouragement from Bismarck, the Chancellor was not disposed to forbid their enterprise and probably secretly encouraged the carrying out of their plans.

The conditions on the eastern coasts of Africa differed essentially from those of the western littoral. For many centuries, and probably from the dawn of history, this side of the continent had been under various civilising influences; and there had been an almost constant, and seldom interrupted, commercial intercourse with Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and India—an intercourse facilitated by the annual recurrence of favouring winds. The seafaring peoples of the East have always been more or less addicted to sea-roving. Their maritime enterprises were generally successful, because the trade winds were so regular that the course and duration of the voyages could generally be reckoned upon and the return of the voyagers easily calculated. There was practically no difficulty in making the long voyage from Persia and India to Zanzibar—an island which for centuries has been the commercial clearing-house of Eastern Africa, the rendezvous of the Arab and Indian traders who frequented the coasts, and the head-

quarters of the slave trade. The products of Eastern Africa were conveyed easily and expeditiously to the markets of the East. All kinds of gums, ebony from Madagascar, ivory from the far interior, hides, oil-seeds, dyeing drugs, cloves, rhinoceros' horns, dried fish, coral, and, in the earlier days when the wealth of the Mashonaland goldfields was being distributed through the port of Sofala, vast quantities of gold, were to be found in the Persian, Arab, or Indian vessels homeward bound from Africa. All this commercial activity had its effect upon the negroid inhabitants of the coastal districts. They had come successively under Arab, Persian, and Indian influences, and when the Portuguese arrived on the coast they found it divided into flourishing kingdoms ruled by monarchs of various foreign dynasties, and peopled by Africans of a type vastly superior to those to be found on the opposite coasts of Africa. The capitals of these rulers were large and important towns, where was carried on a considerable trade with the wild tribes of the interior and with the kingdoms of the East.

All down the eastern coasts of Africa are to be found the ruins of the Portuguese and earlier dominations, from the vast temple-fortresses erected to protect the gold mines in Mashonaland at a period when the country must have been occupied by a highly civilised race of gold-workers, to the dilapidated Arab fortifications in Tanaland, at Siu, Pate, Lamu, and other places. It is to be hoped that some day before it is too late a comprehensive survey may be made of the many ruins of a past civilisation to be found scattered so profusely along the East African littoral. Wherever the Portuguese established themselves at the height of their power they erected great and solid fortifications, the best examples of which are to be found at Mozambique and Mombasa, where the massive fortresses

still testify to the extent and strength of the Portuguese dominion.

Although the Portuguese had established themselves at Zanzibar, they did not care for the island as a place of residence, and with the wane of their power in the seventeenth century it fell under the sway of an independent sultan, and shortly afterwards was conquered by the Yorubi, who were then the ruling family in Oman, and by the end of the century had expelled the Portuguese from all their East African settlements with the exception of Mozambique. The island was recognised as a convenient spot from which to exercise control over the neighbouring coasts, and Zanzibar became the centre of Arab domination and soon developed into the principal city of East Africa north of Mozambique, filled with closely-packed but massive Arab buildings, and presenting an aspect of solidarity and wealth that is still one of its most important features.

With the arrival of Europeans on the East African coast the great trade that had formerly been carried on with the East was seriously interfered with. The vast Indian trade seems to have been sorely crippled and in some parts extinguished,<sup>1</sup> and, when the Portuguese were finally defeated, English, Dutch, and Arab rovers, most of them buccaneers and pirates, made commercial enterprise anything but safe in the neighbouring seas. Nevertheless the Indian trade—the most important from the British point of view—gradually resumed an outstanding position as the Arab rulers of Oman and Zanzibar consolidated their power, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century had again attained considerable dimensions. British and Indian traders soon obtained a commanding position in the dominions of the Sultan, and although there had been

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere, May 7, 1873.

no attempt to interfere with the political independence of Zanzibar, the island became in reality a commercial dependency of Great Britain—Indian traders carrying on most of the commerce, while the Arab nobility sank into the position of feudal landowners who became more and more subject to the financial operations of the Indians. At the same time the slave trade, in spite of the attempts of the British Government to suppress it, continued to flourish all along the East African coasts—although, owing to the activity of British cruisers, it became more and more difficult for the Arab traders to carry their cargoes of suffering humanity to the markets of the East. Mozambique, which earlier in the century had resounded with the chains of the manacled slaves as they toiled laboriously through the streets, and in fact the whole of Portuguese East Africa, notwithstanding the determined efforts of the British Government and the half-hearted endeavours of the Portuguese authorities, was not free from the blight until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, whilst a contraband trade existed in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar until comparatively recent times. In 1873 Sir Bartle Frere, who had been sent on a mission to East Africa to negotiate “fresh and more stringent treaties with the rulers of Zanzibar and Muscat,” reported that at Mozambique and the other Portuguese ports the chief part of this trade was carried on in Arab dhows sailing to Madagascar, and he estimated that at least 10,000 slaves were exported annually from Portuguese territory. At Zanzibar he found the slave-market in full swing and flourishing under the nose of the Sultan. But the traffic was not indulged in by the Indian traders, who confined their operations to legitimate business, and at the time of Frere’s mission had practically ceased to buy or hold slaves.

“Of all the classes connected with the trade of East Africa,” wrote Sir Bartle Frere, “there is none more influential than the natives of India, generally known as ‘Banians,’” and he stated that “during the past forty years the great Indian immigration to this coast has gone on at a constantly increasing rate, which bids fair to restore the Indian trade with East Africa to more than its old proportions.”<sup>1</sup> Dr. (afterwards Sir) John Kirk, the British Consul at Zanzibar, estimated the number of Banians or Indian traders connected with Zanzibar to be 3,710 of all castes, but Frere considered their number to be much larger. Their importance consisted in the fact that each individual was generally an independent trader, or partner or managing clerk in a house of business, and that “everywhere where there is any foreign trade it passes through the hands of some Indian trader, and no produce can be collected for the European, American, or Indian markets but through him, and no imports can be distributed to the natives of the country but through his agency.” Throughout the whole circuit, from Zanzibar round by Mozambique and Madagascar and up to Cape Guardafui, Frere did not, except at Johanna (one of the Comoro Islands to the north of Madagascar) meet half a dozen exceptions to the rule that every shopkeeper was an Indian. An immense amount of money was invested in these concerns, one Indian firm alone having a capital of £430,000 invested in loans and mortgages in East Africa. Moreover, few of the larger Arab estates in Zanzibar were unencumbered by mortgages to Indian capitalists, whilst a large proportion were so deeply mortgaged as virtually to belong to the Indian mortgagee. In a word, throughout the Zanzibar coast line, extending along fourteen degrees of latitude, with numer-

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum regarding Banians or natives of India in East Africa.

ous large and fertile islands, all banking and mercantile business passed through Indian hands. Indian—and therefore British—interests were paramount in the Sultan's dominions, and it is not too much to say that Zanzibar itself was a commercial dependency of the Indian Empire—far more so than Damaraland was a commercial dependency of the Cape. These facts should be borne in mind in view of subsequent German adventures.

With regard to the political history of Zanzibar it is not necessary to enter into detail. As has been seen, the rulers of Oman and Muscat, after the downfall of the Portuguese power, established their authority over the East African coasts and appointed representatives to govern at Zanzibar. At the time of Sir Bartle Frere's visit, Zanzibar was ruled by an independent sovereign, Seyyid Burgash, generally spoken of as "the Sultan," although he was not really Sultan or Imam, the latter title being a spiritual designation which was not claimed by Burgash, who was only Seyyid or Lord, and so far as the great Arab families were concerned was merely *primus inter pares*.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan's father, Seyyid Said, having acquired supreme power in Oman by his astuteness and personal daring, extended his power in Arabia and Persia, and obtained his vast East African dominion by a curious mixture of naval, military, and commercial enterprise. On the death of Seyyid Said in 1856 a feud broke out between his sons, which was only ended by the intervention of the British Government when the family domains were divided into

<sup>1</sup> When the English towards the end of the eighteenth century first came into contact with the family, "finding Sultan-bin-Ahmed ruler of Muscat, and mistaking Sultan, his proper name, for the title of his office, they habitually called his successors Sultans, and took it for granted that they had on their accession assumed the office of Imam."—"Zanzibar and Its Sultans," by Sir B. Frere; an article in *Macmillan's Magazine*, June, 1875.



two parts, Zanzibar and the African territories becoming an independent sovereignty.

The extent of the territories under the control of the Sultan of Zanzibar was always a matter of lively controversy. On the one hand, it was Great Britain's interest to maintain that he exercised a real sovereignty over the adjacent coasts in order that the convenient *status quo* might be maintained and other nations be prevented from establishing themselves along the East African coasts; on the other hand, it was the interest of Germany that the Zanzibar territories should be confined to Zanzibar itself and the important trading ports on the opposite littoral. Whilst Portugal sprawled lazily along the littoral from Delagoa Bay to Cape Delgado, the Sultan maintained a precarious and often disputed tenure over the coast line from that point to the neighbourhood of Cape Guardafui. Sir Bartle Frere himself went exhaustively into the question. He found that "on the continent the extent to which the powers of the old ruling Suaheli families had been absorbed by the Sultan depended much on their proximity to headquarters," and that at certain places where the Sultan's authority was generally recognised he had not been entirely successful in superseding the authority of the old ruling families. Although he was represented at the chief ports by Arab governors, who were supposed to be supreme in all local matters, the neighbouring territories were in reality ruled by the Suaheli and other families, who levied their own duties upon caravans from the interior and compelled the traders to deal through a Suaheli patron. Along the Somaliland coast in particular the claims of the Sultan became more and more shadowy, and Warsheik (Uarsceich), a small port in Italian Somaliland where he maintained a garrison, marked in reality the northern limits of his

authority. But with respect to the interior districts there were still greater differences of opinion. Whilst some authorities were disposed to maintain that the ruler of Zanzibar exercised a real authority over the interior districts, even as far as Lake Tanganyika—a claim that was subsequently put forward by Burgash himself—others asserted that his power ceased within a comparatively short distance from the coast. Had “spheres of influence” been recognised at that time it is probable that the Sultan’s dominions might have been vastly extended, but unfortunately for him, when the matter finally came to arbitration, no European Power was disposed to assert the reality of the Sultan’s dominion over the greater portion of Eastern Africa.

Sir John Kirk, writing in 1885—and then fully aware of the importance of maintaining the Sultan’s claims over the neighbouring littoral—stated that “to say that at the present day the ruler of Zanzibar has authority only on the larger islands and that he has never been able to impose his government in any settled form on the coast opposite, is far from the truth, for one may walk along the coast without any weapon, from the southern extremity of his dominions to Lamu. Farther north his power is limited to a small radius around the walled towns which cover and protect trade, but up to the border of the Somali land his authority on the immediate coast, and in every town and village south of Lamu district, is absolute and supreme. On his letter anyone there is immediately arrested, and all his orders are everywhere obeyed. . . . As to the interior, it is very true the Sultan’s government is weak in this direction, and can only be said to be felt on the trade routes, though undoubtedly he has, through his subjects, a certain power in places far distant as Manyema, for

instance, where he would be obeyed as readily as anywhere a few miles inland." Dr. Kirk probably knew more about East Africa than any other living authority, and he was fully aware of the importance of upholding the Sultan's claims in view of the encroachments of the Germans which were then taking place.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE GERMANS IN EAST AFRICA

**A**LTHOUGH it was in Western Africa that Germany first obtained a permanent footing, it was East Africa that first attracted the attention of the German colonial party. It has been seen how Von der Decken and Otto Kersten were anxious that Germany should found a colony in these regions. They were not alone in this desire. Vice-Admiral Livonius, in his communication to the German Admiralty in 1875 (see page 30), had urged that Zanzibar should be taken under German protection, whilst Ernst von Weber, whose active mind also saw visions of German protectorates in South America and South Africa, in an address before the *Centralverein für Handelsgeographie* in 1879, drew attention to the River Juba and the desirability of Germany acquiring a colony in this region.<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of fact, an attempt had already been made to interest the Fatherland in this neighbourhood, for in 1867 Sultan Simba of Witu, a town to the north of the Tana River, remarkable for the size and abundance of its pineapples and mosquitoes,<sup>2</sup> and equally renowned for the reputation it acquired as a refuge for many of the bad characters of the East African coast,<sup>3</sup> had through the

<sup>1</sup> Keltie's "Partition of Africa," p. 232. 1895.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Charles Eliot's "East Africa Protectorate."

<sup>3</sup> Vice-Consul Haggard reported to Sir John Kirk on August 25, 1884, that the following of Sultan Simba was "composed chiefly of all the malcontents, bankrupts, and felons of the surrounding country, and very largely also of runaway slaves."

traveller Richard Brenner petitioned the Prussian Government to take him under its protection.<sup>1</sup> But at that time the authorities were unable to accede to such a request, although it was supported in certain quarters not without influence.

Gerhard Rohlfs and Count Joachim Pfeil were also active agents in directing special attention to East Africa as a field for German influence, and they were not unwilling to accept the German view that the trade carried on through the agency of the Hamburg merchants established at Zanzibar exceeded that of all the other European Powers, and was second only to that which passed through the hands of the Indian traders.

German commerce with Zanzibar commenced in the middle of the nineteenth century. As early as 1844 the German firm of Hertz was established there, and in 1859 the Hanseatic Consul concluded a treaty with the Sultan,<sup>2</sup> which was afterwards extended to include the North German Confederation. But although Germany carried on a considerable trade with Zanzibar, she possessed no interests there that were not shared by other countries, and certainly had no claims to special consideration. British and British-Indian interests were in reality supreme. Not only had Sir John Kirk, who after having served as chief officer in Livingstone's African expedition in 1858-64 was appointed to the political agency at Zanzibar, obtained great influence in East Africa; but British merchants, like Sir William Mackinnon, practically directed the commercial policy of the Sultan. Mackinnon had been the principal agent in the commercial development of Zanzibar, and was subsequently to become the founder of the Imperial

<sup>1</sup> Hertslet's "Map of Africa by Treaty," vol. I., pp. 308-9. 1894.

<sup>2</sup> Chéradame's *La Colonisation et les Colonies allemandes*, p. 84.

British East Africa Company. For some years he practically controlled British commerce between India, the Persian Gulf, and the east coast of Africa, through the agency of the Calcutta and Burma Steam Navigation Company, which afterwards developed into the British India Steam Navigation Company.

In the year 1873 he established a mail service between Aden and Zanzibar, and so successful was the venture that he gained the entire confidence of the Sultan, Seyyid Burgash, who four years later offered him a concession under lease for seventy years of the customs and administration of a territory extending over one thousand miles along the coast and inland as far as the eastern boundaries of the Congo Free State. This immense district comprised at least 600,000 square miles, and included Lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika, and Victoria Nyanza. It mattered little to the Sultan that the greater portion of this territory was not under his direct control, if British capital were only rendered available for the exploitation of so rich a prize; but unfortunately Sir William Mackinnon was unable to conclude the negotiations because the Foreign Office, fearing that complications would ensue, was unwilling to sanction the concession.<sup>1</sup> They feared, and probably rightly

<sup>1</sup> "This concession was not limited to the restricted ten miles coast line, subsequently acknowledged as the limits to the Sultanate, but to an empire extending along the uninterrupted coast line from Tungi to Warsheik, a distance of, say, 1,150 miles inland, as far as what has now become the eastern province of the Congo Free State ruled over by Tippoo Tib, and including Lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika, and the Victoria Nyanza, and reaching the confines of Uganda, throughout which vast territory, embracing 500,000 square miles, the name and authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar were known and respected. This far-seeing and far-reaching concession was of necessity submitted to Her Majesty's Ministers of the day, but unfortunately for lack of encouragement and support at their hands, it was not carried into effect. Had at that time the influence and power which such a concession could not fail to create throughout the heart of Africa been secured in favour of England and English enterprise, how altered would be the circumstances we are reviewing to-night, how changed the situation at Khartum and along the whole valley of the Nile, as well as in Abyssinia. Even at that late date the influence

feared, that the occupation of so vast a country would give rise to difficult diplomatic questions, but it is to be regretted that they had not sufficient courage to take a country which they could then have had for the asking, and which was afterwards secured by the Germans almost at the point of the sword.

When the British Government finally availed themselves of Sir William Mackinnon's services in 1886, in order to obtain the coast line from Wanga to Kipini for the Imperial British East Africa Company, it was too late to secure what is perhaps the more valuable portion of Eastern Africa. Sir William Mackinnon died in 1893, but not before he had been instrumental in adding vast provinces to the British Empire. His enterprise, "ever directed to the extension of British commerce and civilisation, was indeed measurable by parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude."<sup>1</sup> "Look out for a little Scotsman called Mackinnon," said Sir Bartle Frere when sending Sir Lewis Pelly to the Persian Gulf in 1862, "you will find him the mainspring of all British enterprise there."

At this period British interests were practically paramount along the East African coasts. The peculiar relations between Muscat (Oman) and Zanzibar had been a fruitful source of worry and anxiety to the Indian Government, but so fully was the special interest of Great Britain recognised by the two sultans that the Indian Government exercised a kind of paternal control over the contending parties, and at the period when the dispute between the

of our distinguished Consul-General, Sir John Kirk, was supreme throughout the whole coast and far into the interior, nor was any German or other European rival present to pluck the golden fruit then offered to us, and which was well within our reach."—Address by Sir George Mackenzie before the Royal Colonial Institute, November 11, 1890.

<sup>1</sup> McDermott's "British East Africa," p. 291.

two brothers Majid and Thuwainy as to the limits of their respective territories seemed likely to have disastrous results, Lord Canning exercised a moderating influence, and by his award of 1861 declared the Arabian and African dominions independent of each other. The Sultan of Zanzibar under the award was to pay to the ruler of Muscat an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns by way of compensation, and when the subsidy fell into arrears it was paid by the Indian Government.

When Germany entered upon the scene the German Foreign Office was naturally unwilling to recognise that Great Britain possessed any paramount or even peculiar influence. Count Münster in a note to Lord Granville (February 6, 1885) stated that he was "unacquainted with the amount of direct influence which the United Kingdom and the Indian Government have exercised over Zanzibar during the present century," and, as will be seen later, the German Government claimed precisely the same rights in Zanzibar as were exercised by Great Britain, and went considerably farther than the British Government had done in bringing pressure to bear upon the unfortunate Sultan.

As was the case in South-West Africa, the German colony on the east coast owed its foundation to private and individual enterprise. But there was a considerable difference between the initial steps that led to the hoisting of the German flag. In South-West Africa, Lüderitz had obtained the support of the German Foreign Office for his undertakings. In Eastern Africa, Dr. Karl Peters, the prime mover in the enterprise, was received coldly by Bismarck, who at first was not altogether disposed to give him the support of the Imperial Government, partly because the Berlin Conference was about to assemble, and it seemed inopportune



tune at such a moment to sanction an undertaking which might lead to entanglements. But, as will be seen, the views of the German Government underwent a radical change, and whilst at first they had been prepared to disavow Peters and his associates should their actions result in serious difficulties, they were only too ready to give them instant and efficient support so soon as it became apparent that their venture seemed likely to be crowned with success.

This change was in reality brought about by the difficulties with which Great Britain was confronted in the Sudan, where the troubles that had been threatening had led to serious differences in the Cabinet and had encouraged Russia to intrigue in Afghanistan. "If the Russians mean to advance on the Afghan frontier now is their time whilst we have Egypt on our hands and an army locked up in Africa," wrote Lord Derby to Lord Granville on January 5, 1885. This also was Germany's opportunity, and the diplomatic tension in Europe explains much of Germany's success in acquiring colonies at this critical period. On May 26, 1884, Berbera fell into the hands of the Mahdi, and General Gordon, shut up in Khartum, was confronted with the formidable power of the fanatical prophet. Khartum was taken on January 26, 1885, and the garrison put to the sword.

In the previous November Prince Bismarck had assured the British Government that Germany was not endeavouring to obtain a protectorate over Zanzibar—a statement which Lord Granville assumed "as meaning that she considered that country beyond the sphere of her political activity,"<sup>1</sup> but a few days before the fall of Khartum, Herr Gerhard Rohlfs, who had been appointed German

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Granville to Sir Edward Malet, January 14, 1885.

## The Germans and Africa

Consul-General at Zanzibar, left for East Africa charged with a confidential mission and directed to bring pressure upon the Sultan should German claims be resisted. Germany had in the meantime determined that the moment was opportune for another colonial *coup*, and in this connection it must not be forgotten that the Berlin Conference was still sitting and had not finally agreed upon the famous General Act. The occupation of German East Africa was mainly due to the initiative of Dr. Karl Peters. That individual, who was subsequently to earn notoriety for infamous deeds that could not even be tolerated in Germany, and who after a dishonourable retreat in England repaid the hospitality of this country by a campaign of slander and falsehood during the war of 1914-15, was determined to carve out a fresh province for the Fatherland in Africa. Fired with a quite commendable patriotic zeal, not untinged with personal vanity and the hope of immortal renown as an empire-builder, he approached Bismarck with his projects. His ideas were not such as to inspire the German Foreign Office with a belief in his discretion. He suggested to Bismarck that Germany should acquire the Comoro Islands and South-Western Madagascar, and when the Chancellor had remarked "that is the French sphere of interests and I must not meddle with it," Peters calmly suggested that as the French had not fought for the recovery of Metz and Strassburg they were not likely to do so for the Comoros or Sakalavaland, which drew the blunt and characteristic reply, "Do you manage European politics or do I?"

Nevertheless, Peters was not to be discouraged. His plans were well and carefully laid. Dissatisfied with the attitude of the German Colonial Society, he set about founding an association of his own, which would be more

subservient to his ideas. Early in 1884 a number of his supporters assembled in Berlin and founded under the presidency of Count Behr-Bandelin the Society for German Colonisation, of which Peters, Count Joachim Pfeil, and Dr. Lange were the most active supporters. The objects of the society were to translate into active practice the theories of the German Colonial Society—a body which was not active enough for the younger bloods of the colonial party. Peters immediately issued an appeal to the German people. “The German nation,” he wrote, “finds itself without a voice in the partition of the world which has been proceeding since the fifteenth century. Every other civilised nation of Europe possesses in other parts of the world territories on which they are able to impose their language and culture. The German emigrant, after he has crossed the frontiers of the Empire, becomes a stranger in a foreign land. The German Empire has been rendered great and strong by the unity obtained by the outpouring of German blood. The great stream of German emigration has been lost for many years in foreign countries. . . . To remedy this deplorable state of affairs a society has been founded at Berlin which will resolutely and energetically undertake the execution of colonial projects and will support the efforts of associations having the same aim.”

The *Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation*, and particularly Dr. Peters, met with considerable opposition from the older-established societies, which resented the intrusion of more energetic competitors, and in particular were unwilling to support some of the schemes of colonisation suggested by its members. Whilst some wished to organise a large scheme of emigration to Argentina and Brazil, and some proposed to annex the regions to the east of Mossamedes in Portuguese West Africa, and even went so

far as to prepare for an expedition to this quarter in the summer of 1884, others wished to enter Africa at Sofala—but in both the latter cases the German Government intervened, and finally the scheme advocated by Count Pfeil and Dr. Peters was adopted, and Zanzibar was made the base for German operations. It was believed that here, owing to the weakness of the Sultan and the entanglements of the British Government in the Sudan and elsewhere, was to be found the greatest chance of ultimate success. Zanzibar was the most convenient centre from which to direct exploring and trading expeditions, whilst the adjacent coast offered many and excellent lines of advance towards the interior.

Peters and his associates proceeded with great secrecy. They were aware that Sir John Kirk, whose influence was supreme at the Court of Seyyid Burgash, would offer the most strenuous opposition to their plans should they be prematurely divulged, and they also knew that expeditions were contemplated by the Congo Association, under Lieutenant Becher, by the Italians, under Captain Cecchi, and by British, French, and Portuguese explorers. Moreover, there was considerable opposition to Peters himself in Germany, where he was the object of violent attacks in the Press. Accordingly Peters, with two companions, Dr. Jühlke and Count Joachim Pfeil, the last only having had any experience of African exploration, announced that they were proceeding from Liverpool to *West* Africa. On their arrival at Hanover, however, they assumed false names, took train for Trieste, where as third-class passengers they secretly embarked for Zanzibar, and arrived there on November 4, 1884. At Zanzibar they lost no time. Supported by the local German community, but officially discountenanced by the German Consul, they left that port

six days later, crossed to the mainland, landed at Sadaani, and on November 19 concluded the first of the "treaties" by which the German Colonisation Society obtained a footing in East Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Rapidly advancing into the interior by way of the River Wami towards the highlands of Usagara, they successively made arrangements with the chieftains of Mvomero (November 26), Msovero<sup>2</sup> (November 29), Mkondogwa (December 2), and other places, which gave them "rights"

<sup>1</sup> See Keltie's "Partition of Africa," p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> The treaty concluded with the chieftain of Msovero may be quoted as a sample of the treaties secured by Dr. Peters :

"Mangungo, Sultan of Msovero in Usagara, and Dr. Karl Peters, Sultan Mangungo simultaneously for all his people and Dr. Peters for all his present and future associates, hereby conclude a Treaty of eternal friendship.

"Mangungo offers all his territory with all its civil and public appurtenances to Dr. Karl Peters, as the representative of the Society for German Colonisation, for the exclusive and universal utilisation for German colonisation.

"Dr. Karl Peters, in the name of the Society for German Colonisation, declares his willingness to take over the territory of the Sultan Mangungo with all rights for German colonisation, subject to any existing suzerainty rights (*Oberhoheitsrechte*) of Mwenyi Sagara.

"In pursuance thereof, Sultan Mangungo hereby cedes all the territory of Msovero, belonging to him by inheritance or otherwise, for all time, to Dr. Karl Peters, making over to him at the same time all his rights. Dr. Karl Peters, in the name of the Society for German Colonisation, undertakes to give special attention to Msovero when colonising Usagara.

"This Treaty has been communicated to the Sultan Mangungo by the Interpreter Ramazan in a clear manner, and has been signed by both sides with the observation of the formalities valid in Usagara, the Sultan on direct inquiry having declared that he *was not in any way dependent upon the Sultan of Zanzibar, and that he did not even know of the existence of the latter.*

"(Signed) DR. KARL PETERS.

*Signature of MANGUNGO.*

"This contract has been executed legally and made valid for all time before a great number of witnesses, we testify herewith.

"KUNGAKIMGA, *his mark.*

SULTAN MANGUNGO'S SON, OF GALOLA, *ditto.*

SULTAN MANGUNGO'S SECOND SON, OF DRAMAN, *ditto.*

GRAF PFEIL.

AUGUST OTTO

(*And marks of the Interpreter RAMAZAN and others.*)

DR. KARL JÜHLKE.

"Msovero, Usagara, November 29, 1884."

over the countries of Nguru, Usagara, Ukami, Umvomero, and Mukondokiva, a solid block of territory upwards of 60,000 square miles in extent lying almost due north of the port of Bagamoyo. Armed with these precious documents, which had been easily obtained from the complacent chieftains who had no idea of their meaning,<sup>1</sup> and in any case preferred unlimited spirits to legal documents, Peters hastened to Berlin. Here, as has already been indicated, a change had come over the scene. Bismarck had suddenly become complacent, and although Peters was still the object of vigorous attacks in the Press, he persuaded the Emperor to grant a charter of protection to the German Colonisation Society for "certain acquisitions of territory made by it on the south-east coast of Africa between the territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar and Lake Tanganyika." This charter (*Schutzbrief*)<sup>2</sup> was granted by the Emperor on

<sup>1</sup> A German merchant residing at Zanzibar asked pertinently whether it would not be well to reflect before attaching importance to these treaties. The interpreter, he stated, was so ignorant that he could not even sign his name, "and it is thus extremely doubtful whether even he is capable of translating the contents of the treaties to the various chieftains."—*Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, p. 247. 1885.

<sup>2</sup> The following is the translation of the text of this Charter contained in Hertslet's "Map of Africa by Treaty":—

"Charter of Protection granted to the German Colonisation Society for certain Acquisitions of Territory made by it on the South-east Coast of Africa between the Territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar and Lake Tanganyika. Berlin, 17th February, 1885."

"We, William, by the Grace of God, German Emperor, King of Prussia, make known and ordain as follows:

"The present Presidents of the Society for German Colonisation, Dr. Karl Peters, and our Chamberlain Felix, Count Behr-Bandelin, having sought our protection for the territorial acquisitions of the Society in East Africa, west of the Empire of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and outside of the suzerainty of other Powers, and the Treaties lately concluded by the said Dr. Karl Peters with the Rulers of Usagara, Nguru, Useguha, and Ukami in November and December last, by which these territories have been ceded to him for the German Colonial Society with sovereign rights over the same, having been laid before us, with the Petition to place these territories under our Suzerainty, we hereby declare that we have accepted the Suzerainty, and have placed under our Imperial protection the territories in question, reserving to ourselves a right of deciding hereafter respecting any further

February 17, 1885, almost coincident with the signing of the Berlin Act, and it is noteworthy as the first document of the kind issued by the Imperial Government. The Emperor granted to the German Colonisation Society (soon to become the German East Africa Company) sovereign rights (*Landeshoheit*) over the territories they had acquired and placed them under the suzerainty and protection of the Imperial Government.

Peters had taken the bull by the horns. Ignoring the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar to jurisdiction over the immense country lying between the coast and Lake Tanganyika, he had established his society in the rear of the coastal districts, hoping at some future date to secure a harbour upon the coast and to overcome the difficulties connected with the acknowledged sovereignty of the Sultan over the littoral. The treaties had been obtained undoubtedly by fraudulent methods, but were probably as "valid and as valuable as most of those that have been made with native chiefs by 'pioneers' of all nationalities."<sup>1</sup> The main point was that they served their purpose and opened the way for German enterprise in a most promising

acquisitions in the same district which may be proved to have been obtained by legal contract by the Society or by their legitimate successors.

"We grant unto the said Society, on the condition that it remains German, and that the members of the Board of Directors or other persons entrusted with its management are subjects of the German Empire, as well as to the legitimate successors of this Society under the same conditions, the authority to exercise all rights arising from the Treaties submitted to us, including that of jurisdiction over both the natives and the subjects of Germany and of other nations established in those territories, or sojourning there for commercial or other purposes, under the superintendence of our Government, subject to further regulations to be issued by us, and supplementary additions to this our Charter of Protection.

"In witness whereof we have with our Royal hand executed this Charter of Protection, and have caused it to be sealed with our Imperial seal.

"Given at Berlin the 17th February, 1885.

"WILLIAM."

"v. BISMARCK."

<sup>1</sup> Keltie's "Partition of Africa."

country. In England the report of these proceedings was received with dismay. British merchants having interests in East Africa were incensed at having been so easily deceived, and within a few weeks the British East Africa Association was founded to acquire the rights obtained by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Harry Hamilton Johnston, who had concluded "treaties" with several chieftains in September, 1884, in the Kilimandjaro district at Taveta. Lord Granville, in a communication on May 25, 1885, called the attention of the German Government to this enterprise. "You will explain," he wrote to the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, "that some prominent capitalists have originated a plan for a British settlement in the country between the coast and the lakes which are the sources of the White Nile, and for its connection with the coast by a railway. In order to obtain fair security for their outlay, they propose to endeavour to procure concessions from the Sultan of a comprehensive character. Her Majesty's Government have the scheme under their consideration, but they would not support it unless they were fully satisfied that every precaution were taken to ensure that it would in no way conflict with the interests of the territory that has been taken under German protectorate, nor affect that part of the Sultan's dominions lying between that territory and the sea."

Moreover, Seyyid Burgash, as will be seen, took immediate steps to vindicate his authority in the same district, and there seemed every prospect of a pretty diplomatic duel and misunderstandings such as had occurred on the West Coast of Africa a few months previously. The die had been cast, and Seyyid Burgash seemed likely to lose much of the territory over which he claimed jurisdiction.



## CHAPTER XII

### THE FOUNDING OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA

**T**HE recognition of the German East Africa Company by the Imperial Government led to increased efforts to acquire territory in East Africa. Explorers, who were traversing the country in every direction, seemed to be engaged in some fascinating game that required initiative, daring, and skill, as well as the quality of being able to hoodwink successfully the potentates with whom they came into contact, or at least to convince them of the danger of opposing their demands. There was a scramble for "treaties," and these illuminating documents became as plentiful as mining concessions in any South American state, with the advantage decidedly in favour of the former, for the native chieftains generally parted with such sovereign rights as they possessed and gave over their territories to the European interlopers. In these cases the pen was mightier than the sword. The "treaties" were in reality the pitiful legal symbols of the doctrine that might is right. They were obtained from ignorant chieftains quite unversed in the subtleties of European legal practices and unable to understand that by putting a mark upon a piece of paper they were in reality disposing of their birthright.

The manner in which the chieftains were deceived would be ludicrous were it not so pitiful an example of the flagrant misuse of legal forms in connection with a people totally incapable of appreciating the meaning of international law.

Morally the treaties were quite indefensible, and from the moral point of view it would have been much better if those in search of new territories had said: "We have come to take your country: hand it over or bear the consequences." In reality the action of Europeans in taking possession of native territories was but the exercise of *la force majeure* under the polite observances and customs which are the vaneer of any civilised nation.

During the year 1885 no fewer than eleven German expeditions were organised at Zanzibar. When Peters returned to Berlin elated at the success of his journey to the Usagara country, Jühlke organised a second expedition into the interior, which left Zanzibar at the commencement of May in order to acquire territory in the Kilimandjaro district, where he concluded nine treaties with native chieftains in Usambara and throughout the district now served by the railway from Tanga to Moschi. Among these treaties was one arranged with the chieftains at Taveta (now in British East Africa). Here he had been preceded by Sir Harry Johnston and by General Lloyd Matthews (subsequently Sir William Matthews), who had been placed in command of an expedition organised by the Sultan of Zanzibar to vindicate his authority in the Kilimandjaro district. General Matthews, by hoisting the flag of the Sultan at Kilima Kiboma, a mountain station at the commencement of the Masai plain, emphasised his claims over the surrounding territory.

Sir John Kirk had been instructed by telegraph on May 27, 1885, that Prince Bismarck had spoken of the dispatch of troops by the Sultan to the territory taken under the protection of Germany, and had observed that "unless those troops were withdrawn he might be compelled to use force against Zanzibar, and had particularly referred to the

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fact that the commander was General Matthews, an Englishman," and he was directed to use his influence with the Sultan to induce him to withdraw his troops from the territory in question. The British Consul was placed in a cruel position. After having been engaged for many years in strengthening British influence in Zanzibar, he was suddenly called upon to stay his hand and to use his best endeavours on behalf of a rival nation. Nevertheless Sir John Kirk obeyed his instructions, but he could not refrain from pointing out in a dispatch to Lord Granville (June 24) that "German claims to the coast opposite, now advanced by Dr. Rohlfs by including the coast in Usugua, undermine every title the Sultan can have anywhere on the whole of the Zanzibar coast, for it was in this very district that, only a few months ago, a general arrest was made by His Highness's orders of all land slave-traders, against whom proof was brought by General Matthews on his recent visit." "It is notorious," he continued, "that everywhere on the coast, south of the Equator, the Sultan's authority is as fully represented and his rule as universally acknowledged as that of Great Britain or France on the shores of many of their tropical dominions."

The two expeditions under Jühlke and Matthews met at the lake of Jipe (Djipe), when the Sultan's general learned that various potentates who had recognised his authority a few days before had been equally complacent with the Germans, with whom they had entered into treaty relations by duly placing their marks on a mystic document. Dr. Jühlke returned to Zanzibar with his documents, but by this time the question of the respective Zanzibari, German, and British interests was under consideration; for on June 30 the German Government had

expressed its readiness to the appointment of an impartial commission to determine the respective claims.

For the time being, therefore, Dr. Jühlke's treaties were inoperative. Jühlke had been specially careful to get the chieftains with whom he dealt to disclaim the sovereignty of the Sultan, which they had a few days before so readily acknowledged. "Some days ago," declared Muongo, the ruler of Taveta, "Matthews, the Sultan of Zanzibar's general, appeared here in my town with an armed force. The same proposed to me in the name of his master to enter into friendship with the Sultan of Zanzibar, and in token thereof to permit that his flag should be set up here on my place of residence. Hereupon, however, I merely declared that I desired to live in friendship with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Only in this sense did I give my signature. . . . I will very gladly allow the white people to come into my country, and will permit them to take as much soil and land as they at any time need and to plant their own flag and to live undisturbed."

Such a declaration was quite sufficient for Dr. Jühlke. The inevitable treaty followed under which the country was ceded for ever to "Dr. Carl Jühlke, as the rightful representative of the German East Africa Company." These ludicrous proceedings are only dwelt upon to emphasise the expedients that were resorted to in the fight for territory in Africa.

The third expedition for East Africa left Berlin on March 24, 1885, under the command of Herr Hörnecke. The party arrived at Zanzibar on May 5 and proceeded to Lamu, an important island town to the north of the Tana River in British East Africa and the head-quarters of Arab civilisation on that part of the coast, which they intended should serve as a base for an expedition to Mount Kenia.

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At Lamu, Herr Hörnecke met Herr Denhardt and went with him to Witu, where the two brothers Gustav and Clemens Denhardt had already obtained from the so-called Sultan of Suaheliland a cession of territory from Kipini to Witu (May 5, 1885). The Hörnecke expedition met with considerable opposition from the Zanzibaris, who on hearing of the arrival of a German squadron at Zanzibar allowed them to proceed up the Tana River, where Hörnecke acquired certain territories between the Kilimandjaro district and that river, and was thus able to speak of "a solid block of German territory offering a barrier against progress of the English in these parts of Africa." The Denhardts in the meantime obtained other concessions from the alleged Sultan of the Somalis of the East African coast from Kismayu to the River Juba, whilst Hörnecke, not to be outdone, visited the "Sultan of all the Somalis," Osman Halulé, who signed a treaty giving the Germans "rights" over the whole coast from Berbera (British Somaliland) to Warsheik (Italian Somaliland), the most northerly station of the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>1</sup>

The fourth expedition, under Major von Devivere, left Zanzibar on June 4, but owing to the illness of the leader was obliged to return. The fifth, under Lieutenant Schlüter, also left Zanzibar in June and journeyed to the south, where they met Count Pfeil and concluded treaties with native chiefs in Uhehe, Ubena, and other territories in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyasa and the River Rovuma. The sixth expedition was of a scientific character, whilst the eighth, under Lieutenant Schmidt, continued the work of treaty-making, and concluded no fewer than fourteen treaties with native chieftains in the interior districts. The other expeditions, not so active in the treaty-making business,

<sup>1</sup> Chéradame's *La Colonisation et les Colonies allemandes*, p. 93.

nevertheless performed useful work in opening up a large portion of German East Africa, and by the end of the year 1885 the main part of the work undertaken by the German East African Company had been accomplished, because they were able to point out that some of the interior had been effectively occupied, whilst treaties had been concluded with all the more important native chieftains.

In the meantime the German Government was actively supporting the work undertaken by the company and vindicating at Zanzibar the prestige of Germany and the authority of the German Emperor. Towards the end of the year 1884 it became known that Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs was going to Zanzibar, where he had been appointed Consul-General, and was proceeding thither in a German man-of-war. Mindful of the proceedings of the *Möwe* in West Africa, Lord Granville called the attention of Sir Edward Malet to the mission. "It appears from a telegram in the public papers," he wrote on January 14, 1885, "that a German vessel of war has been ordered to Zanzibar with the German Consul-General on board, and considerable uneasiness is shown in the Press of this country lest the German Government should have intentions in regard to that country which would be detrimental to the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar and the interests of Great Britain and India."

Sir Edward Malet accordingly drew the attention of the German Government to the matter, and expressed Lord Granville's conviction that "these apprehensions were not shared by Her Majesty's Government," and hoped that "the Imperial Chancellor will readily recognise the spirit in which the communication has been made." Prince Bismarck was not to be drawn into making any definite statement as to German aims, and concluded a somewhat acrimonious letter with the remark that he was "unable

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altogether rightly to appraise the scope of the remark that he would appreciate the spirit of the communication of the 16th January, and would feel obliged to Lord Granville if he would give him a further explanation of 'the spirit' in which the communication in question was made by Her Majesty's Government."

These diplomatic bickerings presaged the storm that was to follow. When Sir John Kirk was able to telegraph from Zanzibar on March 19 that "the German Consul has been empowered to negotiate a fresh commercial treaty,"<sup>1</sup> he was informed by the Foreign Office that he was to "cultivate friendly relations with Dr. Rohlfs, and to co-operate with him in all matters in which the views and interests of the two Governments are identical" (March 31), and this harmless instruction was supported by the statement of Count Herbert Bismarck on April 28 that it was "the continued intention of his father to permit no attempt at protection along the coast." But matters had so far advanced by May 25 that the Foreign Minister, by then fully aware of the colonising activities of the Germans in East Africa and unwilling to proclaim a British Monroe Doctrine over the Zanzibar littoral, even if he had been able to do so, wrote that "Her Majesty's Government have no intention of opposing German schemes of colonisation in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar and view with favour these schemes, the realisation of which will entail the civilisation of large tracts over which hitherto no European influence has been exercised."

In the meantime the Sultan of Zanzibar, unable to accept the German view that he had no rights beyond the coastal districts, appealed directly to the German Emperor (April 27), whilst Bismarck, acting on information sup-

<sup>1</sup> This was concluded on December 20, 1885. See Hertslet.

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plied by Dr. Rohlfs, complained that this telegram was sent under the advice of Sir John Kirk; but the latter replied that "the protest was spontaneous" and that the Sultan wished to follow in person "but was dissuaded from this course." Owing to the attitude of the Sultan the position was rapidly becoming serious, and there was considerable risk of an armed conflict between the contending parties. The Sultan wishing to vindicate his rights resented the action of the German authorities. A German squadron was sent to Zanzibar in order "to show the Sultan the power of the German Government," and the Sultan, giving way before this visible sign of German power, promised the withdrawal of his troops and acknowledged the protectorate over the territories occupied by the German East Africa Company.

Thus the crisis was safely passed, and for the time being at least the development of German interests in East Africa was assured. The Sultan, less complacent than Great Britain, was at length obliged to acknowledge the superiority of German power and to abandon to the tender mercies of an "impartial" commission his claims to suzerainty over the interior districts of Eastern Africa.

Lord Salisbury, who succeeded Lord Granville at the Foreign Office on the change of Ministry in June, 1885, was disposed to adopt a thoroughly conciliatory attitude towards German claims, and in October, 1885, Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener, now Earl Kitchener of Khartum, was appointed British Commissioner to proceed to Zanzibar to represent Great Britain on a joint commission, on which Dr. Schmidt, German Consul at Cairo, and Monsieur G. Lemaire were the respective German and French commissioners appointed to determine the precise extent of the Sultan's dominions. The commissioners had considerable



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difficulty in coming to a decision on this point. Whilst the French and British representatives were willing to recognise his title to the whole of the coast line that had been claimed, the German commissioner only acknowledged his rights to certain points in it and did not admit the intervening coast.

The findings of the commission were embodied in a Procès-Verbal on June 9, 1886. In an agreement between the British and German Governments (October 29—November 1, 1886) the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and the small islands geographically dependent upon them, with the islands of Lamu and Mafia, were recognised as the Sultan's territory. On the mainland Zanzibar was held to include the coast line from Cape Delgado and the Rovuma River to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana River, with an internal depth of ten miles. To the north of Kipini the stations of Kismayu, Brava, Merca, Mogadiscio, and Warsheik were recognised to form part of the Sultan's dominions. Whilst Great Britain engaged to support the negotiations of Germany for the leasing of the customs duties at Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani, both Powers agreed to a delimitation of their spheres of influence and fixed the boundaries of their respective territories practically at their present frontiers, and both agreed not to make acquisitions of territory or accept protectorates within the respective spheres of influence.<sup>1</sup>

The Germans thus obtained the greater part of the magnificent Kilimandjaro district, where they had been most active but where Sir Harry Johnston certainly had been before them, and there seemed some cause for dissatisfaction for the decision upon this point—particularly as the British

<sup>1</sup> The line of demarcation started from "the mouth of the River Wanga or Umbe," and ran direct to Lake Jipe. The Germans subsequently claimed that the port of Wanga was within their territory—a claim they were unable to substantiate.

had been requested to refrain from action in this district and had honourably kept to this undertaking. Nevertheless Great Britain obtained substantial advantages in East Africa, but the position was complicated and rendered somewhat dangerous owing to the fact that the Sultan's sovereignty had not been recognised at all points along the coast of British East Africa, and because the limits of territory referred to in the agreement were in the north defined by a line starting from the mouth of the Tana River and followed that river or its affluents to the point of intersection of the Equator and the 38th degree of east longitude, and thence direct to the point of intersection of the 1st degree of north latitude with the 37th degree of east longitude. This gave Great Britain access to the north-eastern shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza. Moreover, the question of Witu remained undecided, and German claims in this region were not disposed of until four years later. With this base of operations still available it was possible for Germany, by advancing to the north of the Tana River and establishing posts in the interior, to shut out the British East Africa Company from the upper waters of the Nile—a move that was probably foreseen and intended but fortunately never officially accomplished.

It cannot be said that Lord Iddesleigh, who had been responsible for the negotiations, had been altogether successful in upholding British interests. But the Sultan of Zanzibar was the chief sufferer—at least territorially. Instead of possessing the magnificent African domain stretching almost indefinitely into the interior that he had claimed, his territories had been reduced to a mere coastal strip, some six hundred miles long, over which he was subsequently to exercise nominal sovereignty. His “independence” was indeed recognised, but he was forced to lease

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his ports to the contending parties, and though he did not suffer financially his suzerainty was really a thing of the past, and not so real as was the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey over Egypt. He accepted the agreement on December 6, 1886, but expressed the pious hope "with regard to our accepting that this part of our kingdom should be taken from us and given to Germany that the two Governments will do what is just according to this agreement, namely, to protect our kingdom from being divided among them by other nations." Poor Burgash had little faith in German promises, and his belief in British power had received a rude shock.

On August 16, 1888, the German East Africa Company finally received charge of that portion of the East African coast line which lies between the rivers Uмба and Rovuma, when the flag<sup>1</sup> of the company was hoisted at the principal ports along the coast under a royal salute. Under an agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar, signed on April 28, 1888, the company undertook the administration of the whole of this territory "in His Highness's name and under his flag and subject to His Highness's sovereign rights" for a period of fifty years, subject to certain payments in lieu of the customs dues hitherto collected at the East African ports.<sup>2</sup> But the Germans were no sooner assured of the control of the littoral and of the ports giving access to the interior districts than they became involved in hostilities with the natives, who were unwilling to abandon their old-time relations with Zanzibar. At Pangani the Germans were fired upon by the townspeople; at Tanga the boats of a German war vessel were also fired upon; and within a short time

<sup>1</sup> The flag of the company was white, bearing a black cross, with one corner red, upon which was the Southern Cross.

<sup>2</sup> In 1890 this coast was permanently ceded to Germany—a much more honest proceeding.

the whole of the coastal districts were in a state of active rebellion against the Germans, and it seemed possible that the rising might spread to the territory assigned to the British.

The entry of Germany into her colonial possessions has generally been marked by native rebellions, usually provoked by the indiscretion of the Germans and their lack of consideration for native feelings and customs. The mailed Teutonic fist was unwelcome amongst peoples unused to methods of German culture, and in East Africa it appeared as though the work initiated by Peters and his companions was to be rendered useless within a short period of its commencement. Trading settlements and stations were burned and destroyed, the plantations were uprooted, and the Germans were obliged to retire and to evacuate their territory with the exception of the two ports of Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam. In Kiloa Krindshe the officials of the company were murdered, and the insurrection, mainly instigated by the Arabs, who were unwilling to see their trade pass into other hands and were fearful lest the traffic in slaves should become too difficult to be remunerative, appeared likely to tax the resources of the company to the utmost. The rebellion in East Africa gave the German opponents of Peters—and they were many—an excellent opportunity of renewing their opposition to German colonisation schemes in East Africa, and the fact that the German White Book published in January, 1889, severely criticised the conduct of the company supported the allegations of those who believed that Peters was not a competent person to have charge of undertakings requiring tact as well as daring.

But the Reichstag wisely decided to support the undertaking, and on January 30, 1889, passed a vote of two

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million marks for the suppression of the slave trade and the protection of German interests in East Africa.<sup>1</sup> The officials of the company, of whom more than thirty had been placed at various stations in the interior and on the coast at Tanga, Pangani, Saadani, Bagamoyo, Lindi, Mikindani, Kilimandjaro, and Mpapua, were placed under the control of Captain Hermann von Wissmann, who was nominated Imperial Commissioner and had under his control about one thousand native troops, well armed with the newest weapons, and a force of sailors from German war vessels in the adjacent waters. Bushiri, a native chieftain of Pangani, who was the ringleader of the rebellion, was finally overcome and executed, but it was not until the middle of 1890 that the country was pacified. The failure of the German East Africa Company to administer their territory without the support of the Imperial authority led to the administration being taken out of the hands of the company, which in May, 1889, was incorporated as a purely commercial undertaking.

The revolt in German East Africa did not discourage the indefatigable Dr. Karl Peters from pursuing his schemes

<sup>1</sup> "The German company, as a self-dependent commercial and administrative body, ceased to exist almost immediately after taking over the concession which had been secured to it. Troubles superseded, which compelled the Imperial Government to assume the obligations which the company was no longer in a position to discharge. When the British company is taxed with over-caution and niggardliness in exercising its proper functions, it is only just to it to consider whether like causes in its case would have produced like results at the cost of the British taxpayer. Even now, tested by results, I maintain the British company has no reason to shrink from the comparison. The facts speak for themselves. There have been voted by the Reichstag from time to time an aggregate sum of £600,000 in connection with military operations, £40,000 annually voted as a subsidy for a German line of steamers, £5,000 annual subsidy for the cable which has been laid to connect Bagamoyo with the island of Zanzibar, and a further advance of £200,000 to capitalise rents payable by the company to the Sultan of Zanzibar. These payments are provided for what is called the German 'company' by the Imperial Treasury."—Address by Sir George Mackenzie before the Royal Colonial Institute, November 11, 1890.

for the aggrandisement of Germany in East Africa. In spite of the fact that he had been largely instrumental in adding so immense a territory to the German Empire he was not a *persona grata* with the Imperial Government, and the reason for this official unpopularity is not far to seek. Imbued as he was with the ideas of the most advanced section of the Pan-German school, he was impatient of official control and by no means willing to await the slower processes of governmental action in Eastern Africa. His attitude towards England was marked by a bitter and unconcealed hatred, which led him to adopt methods that were not in accord with international usage, and to enter upon transactions that laid him open to charges of "not playing the game" according to the prescribed standards.

Prince Bismarck was at this period disinclined to push matters to extremes, and although he was now favourable to the extension of German colonisation wherever possible, he nevertheless kept in constant view the larger processes of Germanic policy, which consisted in the fostering of German sea-power and the preservation of amicable relations with neighbouring countries until Germany was strong enough to insist upon her demands.

Peters with his slap-dash methods and fiery intolerance of control was a perpetual thorn in the side of the German Foreign Office, but when Bismarck was succeeded by Caprivi and the old "Pilot" was dropped by his impetuous master, it became evident that the new Chancellor was also prepared to walk warily and was not willing to risk solid advantages for unsubstantial promises. Caprivi was rather a bureaucrat than a diplomatist, and he was not gifted with the keenness of vision that had enabled the old Chancellor to foresee the future possibilities of Central Africa. During the time that he had directed the Navy Department, Caprivi had

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been disinclined to accept the enthusiastic views of the colonial party, and he feared that "this colonial policy would make of honest, calm, and easily managed Germany one of those restless adventurers like the Anglo-Americans, who, fond of their individuality and of their liberty, were disinclined for a tranquil development and a regularised administration."<sup>1</sup> Under these circumstances Peters was not likely to get very much support from the German Government, and in the event he acted without official sanction.

The opportunity for a bold stroke of policy worthy of the adventures of a less prosaic age presented itself in Central Africa, where the Equatorial Provinces of Egypt had become the prey of the forces of the Mahdi, and where their German Governor Emin Pasha was supposed to be surrounded by hostile forces and to be in imminent danger from the fanatical hordes who were ravishing the whole of the Sudan. An expedition under H. M. Stanley had been sent out in 1886, when he landed at the mouth of the Congo and proceeded overland to the relief of Emin. Reports of the disaster which overtook the rear column under Major Barttelot having reached Europe suggested to Peters that in the event of Stanley's failure there was an excellent opportunity for the succour of one of his countrymen by means of a German expedition operating from the east coast, and incidentally for the extension of German influence in Central Africa. Filled with this idea and desirous of again playing a prominent part on the colonial stage, Peters, who had returned to Europe in February, 1888, consulted with his friends, and in connection with Karl von der Heydt, the chairman of the German East Africa

<sup>1</sup> Caprivi's dislike of colonial adventures is well illustrated in his remark, "No greater misfortune could befall us than to be presented with the whole of Africa."

Company, set about organising a German Emin Pasha Expedition. The fate of their countryman in Wadelai had "gradually awakened the purely human interest in large circles of the German people," and the succouring of Emin was represented "as a duty that touched the honour of the German people."<sup>1</sup>

A committee was formed with Dr. Peters as provisional chairman, an appeal was issued, and active steps were initiated to secure the funds necessary for the organisation of an expedition upon a scale commensurate with the difficulties that were likely to be met with in so arduous an undertaking.

The appeal, dated September 17, 1888, stated that Emin Pasha was in urgent need of help. "Shall our heroic countryman," it was asked, "left without succour, be abandoned to destruction, and his province, won to civilisation by German energy, become the prey of barbarism? The attempts to reach Emin from the Congo have failed; but from Eastern Africa the best and safest way leads to the Upper Nile, and there is German territory that gives the safest points of departure and support for an Emin Pasha Expedition. May each man contribute his share to the accomplishment of an undertaking, which not only *aims to advance our transmarine position and open new paths to German commerce*, but is pre-eminently calculated to fulfil a duty of honour incumbent upon the bold German pioneer."

Peters knew well how to appeal to German sentiment, but he did not know how to hide successfully the ulterior aims of an expedition which, as the sequel proved, was unnecessary and uncalled for so far as Emin himself was concerned.

<sup>1</sup>"New Light on Dark Africa," by Dr. Karl Peters. 1891.



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Before taking any definite steps to proceed to the help of Emin, the Relief Committee asked the approval of Prince Bismarck for their undertaking. The Chancellor expressed the opinion that the committee should enter into relations with the German East Africa Company and endeavour to agree upon a plan for a common advance and mutual support. It was also decided that Hermann von Wissmann should start with a small column to march as far as Lake Albert Nyanza, whilst Peters was to be in charge of the main column.

But at this juncture the threatening state of affairs in East Africa, and the establishment by Great Britain and Germany of a joint blockade of the mainland "against the importation of arms and the exportation of slaves," and the possibility of a colonial agreement being negotiated between the two countries, led to a modification of the plans and a complete change in the attitude of the German Government, who were only too glad to welcome the co-operation of the British Government in East Africa. It was pointed out that whilst the Germans would be blockading the ports from which they had been driven, the British fleet would be "in the anomalous position of blockading territory where no disturbances have taken place, and where we are cordially welcomed by the native population." Nevertheless the blockade was initiated on November 29, 1888.

In spite of the difficulties of the situation, Peters was determined to proceed with the expedition. "It was, of course, altogether alien," he wrote, "from our intention to undertake anything whose accomplishment might be obstructive or even inconvenient to the Imperial procedure. We had indeed planned the German Emin Pasha Expedition solely with the object of thereby doing service to

our German East African colonial undertakings." In pursuance of this policy the original idea had been to start from Pangani, march through the German sphere to the south of Lake Victoria Nyanza, and proceed between that lake and Lake Albert Nyanza to Wadelai, founding permanent German stations on the way; but on February 25, 1889, Dr. Peters left Berlin for Zanzibar, having announced his intention of leading an expedition through the British sphere, although permission to do so had been refused to him.

On his arrival at Zanzibar, Peters endeavoured to evade the blockade. Cases which had been labelled provisions and merchandise were found to contain firearms and ammunition, and the character of the expedition being fully understood, a careful watch was set upon his movements. He "took it for granted that in English quarters there would be consideration for an expedition organised by a nation with whom the English were then, as it seemed, working together in a friendly manner in Africa," but his ulterior objects were too well known to admit of any doubt. After an attempt to land at Merca (in Italian Somaliland), where the travellers were vigorously repulsed by the local Arabs, and an endeavour by telegraph to secure the mediation of the Imperial Foreign Office, which refused all support, Peters was thrown back upon his own resources. But he "considered it more consonant with our national honour and our national interests to perish, on the sea or on the land, with my whole expedition than to retreat before this paltry mass of obstacles and intrigues," and finally, in the little steamship *Neoera*,<sup>1</sup> he succeeded in evading the blockade and in landing at Pasa, in Kwaihu Bay, where

<sup>1</sup>The *Neoera* was subsequently captured in Lamu harbour by the British blockading squadron and condemned by the Zanzibar Prize Court.

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“the inhabitants took us for Englishmen, as the *Neoera* sailed under the English flag. I saw no reason to undeceive them,” adds Peters in his narrative. Here they outwitted Admiral Fremantle, who was watching a neighbouring bay, and within a short time Peters and his companions were started upon their expedition to the interior, by way of Witu and the Tana River.

There is reason to believe that the German Government, although outwardly opposed to Peters' proceedings, were not unwilling to let him advance along a route to the north of the British sphere of influence. The fact that they did nothing to prevent the expedition from starting is sufficient evidence that under certain circumstances, which happily did not arise, they would have been prepared to adopt Peters as their official protégé. “It is quite true,” wrote Mr. P. L. McDermott, the Acting Secretary of the Imperial British East Africa Company, “that the German Government does not directly encourage these lawless and predatory enterprises on the part of its subjects. But it does not appear to be in any hurry to discourage them. In fact, we are witnessing the process known in private life as ‘trying it on,’ and described in the language of diplomacy as ‘officious’ in contradistinction to official activity. If trying it on comes to nothing, the German Government has nothing to do but maintain a virtuous placidity of demeanour.”

Peters' behaviour on this memorable expedition gave a clear indication of his character and designs. It was his primary object to hedge in the British sphere of influence by a series of settlements stretching from Witu, along the Tana River, to Lake Victoria Nyanza and Uganda, and thus to prevent the British company from having access to the upper waters of the Nile. Accordingly he entered into

a series of treaties with native chieftains along his line of route, and hoisted the German flag at Malalulu on the north side of the Tana, in order "to make it clear to the English that the sphere of their interests extended only to the southern side of that river," at Oda-Boru-Ruwa, at a camp not far distant from Mount Kenia, at the southern end of Lake Baringo, in Kavirondo, at Kwa Sakwa, near the Victoria Nyanza, and at other places. One of these treaties may be quoted as an example of Peters' diplomatic methods. It ran as follows :

"The following Treaty is this day concluded between Dr. Karl Peters and the Galla Sultan Hugo. Dr. Peters acknowledges as Sultan's territory the land on the Tana, from Massa to the Kenia. Sultan Hugo places himself, with all his territory, under the protection of Dr. Peters. Dr. Karl Peters will endeavour to obtain for the Galla Sultanate the friendship of His Majesty the German Emperor. Nevertheless, this Treaty is not dependent upon the granting of the protection of the German Empire or upon its ratification by any European Power. Sultan Hugo cedes to Dr. Karl Peters the right of working the country above and below the ground in every direction. This right especially includes the exclusive commercial monopoly, the right of establishing plantations, and the exclusive mining monopoly. If gold is found, Sultan Hugo is to have a quarter of the net profits from the production of it. *Dr. Karl Peters is to be supreme lord in the country of the Gallas, to command the armed forces, and to judge the people. This is done for the blessing and welfare of the Galla land.*"

The new Supreme Galla Lord, after concluding this treaty, exercised his authority by shooting the chief of the Gallas at Bokore, when "he felt the proud intoxication of

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the victor," by destroying the stations of the British company and publicly burning their official papers, and by shooting down all who opposed his proceedings.<sup>1</sup> In Uganda, whither he now advanced, he openly identified himself with King Muanga and the Catholic party and worked "for the furtherance of the special national interests of Germany in Uganda."

The proceedings of Peters have been dwelt upon at some length as they afford some indication of the processes of German colonisation in East Africa. It was Peters who, by means of his treaties, had first opened the way for Germany in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and there can be little doubt that, but for the action of Lord Salisbury and Count Caprivi in coming to a mutual understanding upon African affairs, it would have been Peters who would have prepared the way for another German state, reaching from the coast between the Tana River and Somaliland to Lake Victoria Nyanza and the upper waters of the Nile. But when Peters finally returned to Europe it was to find that diplomatists had been busily at work whilst he was touring in the African wilds, and to realise that the game of colony grabbing had at length been played out.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Writing in the Copenhagen paper *Politiken*, six years later, in March, 1896, the Danish explorer Scavenius stated: "In the year 1894 I undertook an expedition up the River Tana. A few years before Dr. Peters had made practically the same journey. No Europeans had in the meantime been through the desolate region. On every side I came across traces of war. The natives were terrified at my white face, for the last white man they had seen was Dr. Peters, who had committed all these atrocities." Peters was called by the natives Mkonon-wa-damu, i.e. "the man with the blood-stained hands."

<sup>2</sup> The subsequent adventures of Peters will not be dealt with in these pages. It is sufficient to state that he was one of the not inconsiderable band of German officials who, by acting in defiance of moral law and by excessive severity towards the natives, brought the German colonial system into such discredit and caused a reaction in the Fatherland against the schemes of the German colonial party. As a reward for his exploring activity, Peters was nominated Imperial Commissioner for German East Africa, and whilst serving in an official capacity in that colony he so misused his office that there arose a great outcry against him in

Germany. On April 24, 1897, he was brought to trial before the Disciplinary Court for German Colonial Officials under various charges of cruelty and causing natives to be hanged. It was found that he had been guilty of an offence against his official duty, and he was dismissed from the colonial service. He appealed, and the case was re-heard on November 15, 1897; but he did not put in an appearance, and the decision of the Court was upheld and other charges substantiated.

The conduct of Dr. Peters received severe reprobation in the Reichstag on several occasions, particularly on March 13, 1896, when only one Deputy ventured to defend him. Speaking of his conduct, the *Vossische Zeitung* used words that might well be applied to the action of Germans at the present time, "Herr Peters," it was stated, "is one of those latter-day 'superior beings' who shrug their shoulders at the traditional conceptions of ordinary morality and imagine that they may be a law to themselves. Filled with consuming ambition, unscrupulous in their choice of means, these gentlemen thought that it was their business on the Dark Continent not so much to disseminate Christianity and civilisation as to taste life to its dregs. Champagne for themselves, the whip of rhinoceros hide for the blacks, were the principles of the colonial policy of these conquerors of the world."

It should be added that Peters quarrelled with most of his former associates. Dr. Friedrich Lange, with whom he had been closely connected at one time, wrote various articles in 1896 attributing all kinds of extraordinary projects to Peters, of which not the least remarkable was one for arming the German Social Democracy and placing himself at its head. Another was stated to be the incitement of the German population in the United States to assert their nationality against the English element. At the libel action which followed, Count Pfeil, who had been associated with Peters in the treaty-making campaign in East Africa, testified to the truth of these allegations.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1890

**W**HATEVER may be the defects of the present German Emperor, he cannot be accused of want of foresight so far as the preparations for the great world-struggle of 1914-15 are concerned. Bismarck, the old Chancellor through whose genius the German Empire had been built up and consolidated, although accepting the colonial policy of the Pan-Germanists, and to a certain extent enthusiastically supporting their plans, had not been persuaded to take the wider view of Germany's Imperial destinies that was maturing in the young Emperor's brain. He was cautious and he was not prepared to work openly for world-empire, however much he was ready to work secretly for the same object. In other words, he was a diplomatist. To him a naval war with Great Britain was unthinkable. He watched from his retirement at Friedrichsruhe with cynical amusement, but doubtless with secret satisfaction, the attempts of those who now had charge of German destinies to build up a great navy capable of disputing the command of the sea with this country, and he regarded the plans for the acquisition of a great naval base on the North Sea with amused tolerance. He believed that the time was not yet ripe for this enterprise, and that Germany should, for a generation at least, dissemble her real intentions. Like Moltke, who so long and so successfully opposed the con-

struction of the North Sea Canal, by which Germany was to transport her fleets from the Baltic to the North Sea and vice versa, he had little sympathy with the tactics of those who so industriously taught that the future of Germany was upon the ocean, except in so far as those views coincided with his own theories of mercantile expansion.

But the young Emperor had other views. With his Chancellor Caprivi, he regarded colonies as a means towards an end and not as an end in themselves. They were so many diplomatic assets to be used in the furtherance of a world-policy, and were to be employed as levers with which to secure for Germany the exact position she required. When the Fatherland was strong enough, it could take what it wanted, but in the meantime colonies could be used with the best advantage if by their means the diplomatic as well as the commercial strength of the country were increased.

The negotiations that led to the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 resulted in a notable triumph for Germany as a sea-power. Although the fact was not recognised at the time, either by the German or the British peoples, it has since become abundantly clear that Germany was fighting for the key to the naval situation so far as her own sea-power was concerned. Heligoland, a tiny islet in the North Sea, forty miles from the mouth of the Elbe, was in reality worth more to Germany than her African possessions, but few recognised that fact, and least of all the British Government. With short-sighted complacency, Lord Salisbury, otherwise so brilliant in his foreign policy, was prepared to place in German hands a weapon that would assuredly serve Germany well whenever the opportunity for action should occur and whenever she should be sufficiently strong to emerge from her European retirement.



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The only excuse for his action is that he did not believe that Germany would ever be strong enough to take naval action against this country: a view that, as we have seen, was shared by Bismarck, Moltke, and other makers of modern Germany, as well as by the bulk of the German people themselves. Whatever plans were maturing in the mind of the Emperor, he foresaw the immense strategical importance of the tiny British dependency, and took the opportunity of acquiring it in the general redistribution of territory that occurred during the year 1890.

It has already been stated (*see* page 96) that certain far-sighted Germans looked upon the possession of Heligoland as essential to the progress of German sea-power as early as the year 1884—that is, long before the genius of Von Tirpitz had created the present German navy; and it will be of interest to examine the events that strengthened this by no means general belief. In the year 1848—the revolutionary year of modern Europe—when Prussia started her tiny navy, it required the eye of faith to see German war vessels sailing proudly upon the North Sea, for Prussia was then practically shut off from all naval intercourse with the outer world. At the best she was a Baltic Power, much inferior in naval strength to little Denmark; and at the worst a country that could be absolutely disregarded so far as sea-power was concerned. Denmark, Hanover, and Oldenburg shut her off from the North Sea, and the sole Prussian outlet was through the Sound, or the Great Belt and the Skager Rack, which could be blocked with ease by Denmark in conjunction with the other Scandinavian kingdoms. She was enclosed in a cul-de-sac from which there was no escape. This fact must be fully appreciated before it is possible to understand the real significance of German naval expansion.

## The Germans and Africa

With the acquisition of Wilhelmshaven in the year 1852, Prussia secured a naval base on the North Sea. This event, which pre-shadowed the probable expansion of Prussia as a naval power, had been rendered possible by the action of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg in ceding the piece of marshy land that has since been converted into so formidable a naval fortress, in return for the sum of 500,000 thalers and an agreement on the part of Prussia that she would undertake the protection of the sea coast of the duchy. Sixteen years passed before the new harbour was opened by the Prussian King, years that had been spent in strenuous efforts to adapt the small territory to the requirements of naval warfare. Hanover, intensely jealous of the rise of Prussia, had refused to allow the construction of a railway across her territory, so that the undertaking was complicated by the necessity of bringing all stores and materials by sea; but Hanover, like other small Powers, was to be swept away before the rising tide of Prussian Imperialism. Even at this period suggestions had been made for the construction of a ship canal from the Baltic to the North Sea, based upon the belief that Schleswig-Holstein would soon become a Prussian territory, but it was not until Denmark had been defeated that the latter event became possible.

The war of 1864, which resulted in the defeat of Denmark and the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein, marks a decisive point in the history of Germany and Great Britain alike. The former, by overwhelming her neighbour, was able to secure a vantage ground to be used in the ultimate struggle for sea-mastery. The latter, by allowing Denmark to be crushed, facilitated the expansion of Germany and made possible the growth of her navy. British statesmen were indeed aware that the possession of Kiel and of the opposite littoral bordering upon the North Sea would enable

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Germans to pursue their secret, if not openly avowed, project of "turning towards the open sea." Both Palmerston and Granville were prepared to support the Danish cause, but Queen Victoria, who always exercised a real, and not nominal, control over foreign policy, refused to be drawn into a war with Prussia. Always swayed by strong German sympathies, and desirous of maintaining the most friendly relations with the father-in-law of her eldest daughter, she decisively rejected proposals for British intervention, and thus indirectly facilitated the growth of German sea-power. When Prussia annexed the two duchies, by right of conquest, Queen Victoria was disillusioned. "Prussia should at least be made aware," she wrote to Lord Granville, "of what she and her Government and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had given which Prussia has been guilty of."

As soon as the war was concluded, Prussia made her future naval policy abundantly clear. "For the present," it was stated in a memorandum drafted by the Prussian Government, "Prussia is unable to enter into rivalry with the first-class naval Powers, but she must occupy a position commanding esteem among those of the second-class."<sup>1</sup> But Prussia was not for long content to rank with the second-class naval Powers.

When the cession of Heligoland was first mooted officially in 1884 there was not the same compelling reason for its acquisition as was the case, three years later, when the construction of the North Sea Canal (Kaiser Wilhelm Canal) was commenced. Then the possession of Heligoland by a foreign Power became a menace to the extension of the Germanic idea, and Bismarck became anxious to secure

<sup>1</sup> See "German Sea-power," by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle.

the rock because "for the security of the canal it would be necessary to give a good and fortified harbour to Heligoland." "This could only be done at a great expense," Count Münster had stated to Lord Granville,<sup>1</sup> "which England could not be expected to undertake, but for which Germany would be prepared." The idea that the canal was for the mutual benefit of the two countries was industriously fostered, and Great Britain fell into the trap.

The extraordinarily complacent attitude of Germany with regard to her possessions in East Africa, after she had secured such a strong diplomatic weapon as her protectorate over the coast from Witu to Kismayu, which was officially notified on October 22, 1889, and the right to spheres of influence in the interior which that action justified, coupled with the withdrawal of all opposition to a British protectorate over Zanzibar, may be explained easily by her anxiety to secure Heligoland at almost any sacrifice. It is extremely probable that much greater concessions would have been made by Caprivi, in spite of the opposition of the German people as a whole, had Lord Salisbury maintained a firm attitude with regard to Heligoland. But, most unfortunately, he was under the impression that the island was of little practical importance—a belief that was not shared by the naval experts who had been consulted, but was the general view of the military authorities, who naturally looked upon the possession of Heligoland from a different standpoint. In a dispatch to Sir Edward Malet, British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Salisbury wrote on June 14, 1890, that "Her Majesty's Government are prepared to propose a Bill in Parliament which shall transfer the island of Heligoland to Germany. It was probably

<sup>1</sup> See Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice's "Life of Lord Granville," vol. II., p. 425.

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retained by this country in 1814 because of its proximity to Hanover, the Crown of which was then united to England. It has, however, never been treated by the British Government as having any defensive or military value, nor has any attempt or proposal been made to arm it as a fortress. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would constitute a heavy addition to the responsibilities of the Empire in time of war, without contributing to its security. There is no reason, therefore, for refusing to make it part of a territorial arrangement, if the motives for doing so are adequate." Lord Salisbury did not, and probably could not, foresee the strategic importance of this islet, but the great anxiety of Germany to secure the possession of a barren rock without "defensive or military value" should at least have warned him as to the purposes they had in view.

The cession of Heligoland forms the keynote to the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, and it has therefore been dwelt upon at some length. It explains the anxiety of the German Emperor to secure good diplomatic cards, which on this occasion he was able to use with good effect. "The cards of Providence," as Bismarck termed them, were well played by Caprivi and his Imperial master, and although the result of the game was received with some dismay in Germany, it was nevertheless exactly what the players desired. Claims were adjusted in Africa; Germany secured Heligoland; and the two parties were mutually pleased. Seldom has a diplomatic duel been fraught with such tremendous consequences.

The negotiations for the Anglo-German Agreement were carried on by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and Dr. Krauel, the Privy Councillor in the Foreign Office, acting in conjunction with the Imperial Chancellor, General von

Caprivi, on the one side, and Sir Henry Percy Anderson, chief of the African Department of the British Foreign Office, on the other. In his preliminary dispatch of June 14, 1890, Lord Salisbury stated that the claims of the German Government were based chiefly on the contention that where one Power occupied the coast, another Power might not, without consent, occupy unclaimed regions in the rear. This contention had been a generally accepted principle since the Berlin Act of 1885, but naturally it had been impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to the precise operation of so elastic a principle. The contention of the German Government that the whole of the territory between their sphere of influence and the Congo State naturally fell to them as the "hinterland" of their possessions would have carried the German boundary along latitude  $1^{\circ}$  south on the north and along latitude  $11^{\circ}$  south on the south, up to the frontiers of the Congo Free State. It was naturally impossible to acknowledge the justice of a southern boundary of this nature, because it would have included a considerable portion of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia, where the British were already firmly established.

Lord Salisbury pointed out that this country was already occupied by Englishmen, and that there were English missions and stations of the African Lakes Company upon Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika and along the Stevenson Road which connected the two. So far as Nyasaland was concerned the position was clear. In the northern portion above the seventh degree of latitude the Livingstonia Mission, which had been established in the year 1874, had commenced active work, whilst out of the Church of Scotland Mission, which had been established at Blantyre in 1876, there was evolved a small company for trade and

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transport, subsequently styled the African Lakes Company, with headquarters at Mandala, near Blantyre. This company, moreover, had obtained a footing at Karonga, on the north-west coast of the lake, for the purpose of opening up communication with Lake Tanganyika, and had come into active conflict with Zanzibari-Arab slave traders, who had consolidated their position at the northern end of the lake and claimed to be representatives of the Sultan of Zanzibar. A project for connecting the two lakes by a permanent road was entertained and financed by Mr. Stevenson, a director of the African Lakes Company, and the preliminary surveys had been made, but the work was not completed. This was the well-known Stevenson Road, an important line of communication between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika, and Lord Salisbury rightly insisted that the German boundary should be drawn to the north and not to the south of this avenue of traffic. Thus, fortunately, was secured to the Empire one of the main links of communication on the proposed Cape to Cairo route.

With regard, however, to Lake Tanganyika, which fell naturally within the conventional basin of the Congo, as well as a considerable portion of what is now German East Africa, Lord Salisbury was not so successful. It would, in fact, have been extremely difficult to have denied Germany's claims to this region. Lord Salisbury therefore wrote that he was prepared to agree that the German boundary should extend to Lake Tanganyika, whilst to the north German territory was to extend to the Congo State, and thence northward to the first degree of south latitude, and thence across Lake Victoria Nyanza. This decision effectually blocked an all-British route from north to south, but it was agreed that freedom and immunity from all transit dues should be secured to British subjects traversing this region.

Negotiations with respect to this block of territory had been in progress when the war of 1914 broke out. "The delimitation of the spheres," wrote Sir Percy Anderson on June 28, "may not correspond with the desire which has been expressed in some quarters that an uninterrupted British sphere should extend through Central Africa, but it must be remembered that the realisation of this idea was already impracticable throughout the large territory comprised in the eastern and western shores of Lake Tanganyika."

So far as German East Africa was concerned, these were the main points of the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890. But other and important rearrangements of territory were made. The German protectorate over Witu, which had proved so strong a card in the hands of the German players, was withdrawn, and all danger of the British East Africa Company being surrounded by German territory was removed. This concession was of the greatest value to Great Britain, but it, and the willingness of Germany to recognise a British protectorate over the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, were scarcely a satisfactory *quid pro quo* for the abandonment of Heligoland. Nevertheless, both parties were pleased, and Lord Salisbury appeared to have secured a notable diplomatic triumph.

In South-West Africa he was not so successful, for yielding to the desire of the Germans for some means of access to the upper waters of the Zambesi, he allowed them to occupy a strip of territory nearly three hundred miles in length, stretching from the northern boundary of the colony to the junction of the Rivers Chobe and Zambesi. This wedge of territory, generally known as the "Caprivi Strip," was in reality intended to provide a wedge against British expansion in Barotseland, and to prevent direct



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communication through the Bechuanaland protectorate with the Portuguese colony of Angola, because German access to the Zambesi at any point above the Victoria Falls could be of small commercial value.<sup>1</sup>

In West Africa, Great Britain secured the mouths of the Volta River, but this river was made the boundary of the German colony farther to the north so as to give Togoland access to the upper waters of that important highway. In the Cameroons a provisional boundary line was adopted so as to prevent collision between the authorities of the two countries; whilst on the difficulties connected with the administration of the Niger Company, which for some years had been a fruitful cause of dispute, full explanations were exchanged which would, it was hoped, remove causes of misunderstanding. Two minor points should be mentioned. The settlement of Wanga to the north of the Umba River was recognised to be within the territory of the British East Africa Company, and the German Government agreed that the boundaries around Walfish Bay should be settled by negotiation—a proceeding which did not take place until 1910.

A review of these rearrangements of territory reveals one important point: the desire of both Governments to secure free and unimpeded access to the important waterways. With the exception of the Cameroon colony, this object was achieved on the part of Germany. In East Africa, Germany obtained full access to the unique system of lakes that forms the most wonderful feature of the centre of the continent. In South-West Africa, Germany secured access to the only waterway that was of the slightest use for the development

<sup>1</sup> The best account of this territory is contained in *Koloniale Abhandlungen*, 27-28: *Die wirtschaftsgeographischen und politischen Verhältnisse des Caprivizipfels*, von Franz Seiner.

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of that colony. In Togoland she had access to the Volta. But in the Cameroons the result was different, and this was one of the main causes that led to the strenuous endeavours of Germany to extend this territory both to the Congo and its affluents in the south-east and to Lake Chad and the waterways of Nigeria on the north-west. The difficulties of communication in the north-west of the Cameroon colony were not lessened by the agreement, for—owing to Great Britain's strong position in Nigeria, where, although both the Niger and the Benue were open to the unrestricted commerce of all nations, the great waterways passed almost exclusively through British territory, and the fact that British merchants had long been in occupation of the coastal districts—there seemed no possibility of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement. The means of communication along the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary were difficult, and Germany was prepared to seek compensation whenever the opportunity should arise.

But on the whole, so far as Africa was concerned, there was ample cause for satisfaction. Sir Percy Anderson, upon whom had fallen the greater part of the work in connection with the negotiations, expressed the hope "that in the future British and German subjects will not be content with operating, each in their own sphere, in a spirit of reciprocal exclusiveness, but that they will take advantage of the improved situation in which constant friction of interests, with the consequent acrimonious discussions, should disappear, to join hands in developing the commerce of Central Africa, in civilising the natives and protecting Europeans, and in putting an end for ever to the existence, in any shape, of the Slave Trade."

With this pious aspiration the Anglo-German Agreement may be left. It certainly cleared the way for a better

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and more cordial understanding between Germany and Great Britain, and removed the many causes of dispute that had so long embittered the colonial relations of the two countries. But it was for Great Britain a costly diplomatic mistake, because she gave away the one possession that she should have retained.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE GERMANS AND THE CONGO

UNTIL the outbreak of the Great War there was a general tendency to regard the utterances of the Pan-German writers and speakers as so much irresponsible talk unworthy of the attention of British statesmen. It was believed that they represented the froth of German nationalism and were the opinions of an utterly insignificant minority who, in the prosecution of their fantastic dreams, were prepared to set the world in arms. No one paid much attention to the bombastic vapourings of the Pan-German school. But with the outbreak of war the opinion gained ground that these utterances were only the somewhat indiscreet expression of ideas that were shared by the great majority of the German people—ideas that had been repressed beneath the great stream of German nationalism pressing onwards towards its appointed goal. They had occasionally risen as bubbles to the surface to reveal to the world the pent-up forces moving beneath the waters. The writings of Treitschke, Bernhardi, Von der Goltz, Bülow, Reventlow, Rohrbach, Frobenius, and a host of lesser authors assumed a new importance and were seen to be symptomatic of a deep-seated national consciousness of an imperial destiny far exceeding the present limits of the Fatherland.

The outbreak of war came as a rude awakening to the millions of Englishmen who had complacently shut their ears against the warnings of those who understood the

German temperament and deliberately closed their eyes to the written evidences of German designs. It has been questioned whether there can be such a thing as a national consciousness common to the whole nation as the mind of man is common to his whole body, and it has been doubted whether a settled national plan can exist in a nation subject to a constant change of personnel amongst rulers and ruled. Seeley, taking the purely materialistic conception of the British Empire, has contended that it was built up in a fit of absence of mind, or, in other words, without any coordinated or settled plan. But a more correct view seems to be that there is somewhere inherent in the national life the sum of the national consciousness or the conglomeration or concentration of the national thought; call it what one will, an essence, an individuality, a settled purpose, for the fulfilment of which statesmen and people are but the human agents. As the tree bends to the storm or suits itself to external circumstances whilst the sap of its life enables it to fulfil unconsciously its preordained end, so the nation advances along the paths of destiny to an end of which its members are but dimly conscious. From this standpoint must the utterances of the Pan-German enthusiasts be regarded. They have been the outward expression of the sap of German mentality, and by their means the true inwardness of German policy and the plan of German imperialism inherent in the sum of the national life must be studied.

It is absolutely certain that, so far as Africa is concerned, the Germans had a great and far-reaching plan of absorption by which the territories of other nations should be gathered finally into the German fold. The tentative beginnings of this great scheme have been shown in the preceding pages. The small and apparently insignificant

attempts to obtain a foothold on the African coasts were but the prelude to a mightier effort to dominate the whole African continent by advancing with irresistible growth towards the interior. We have seen this movement checked in various quarters. We have witnessed the disappointment of German statesmen at the apparent failure of plans to carry the tide of Germanism across the continent from the Cameroons to the Indian Ocean. But the movement has nevertheless gone forward, and the trend of German thought and endeavour has been to acquire new territories and to overcome the opposing forces that stood across the national path. This ideal has been a perfectly natural one, and its accomplishment would but have been the legitimate expression of the triumph of might and vigour over senility and decay. Germanism aimed at dominating Central Africa, and it has always been a motive, conscious or unconscious, of German thought to acquire the basin of the Congo, from which eventually to control the greater part of the continent.

This design was clearly understood by British statesmen. During the Morocco crisis Sir Edward Grey stated that if Germany were to be compensated in Africa for her temporary set-back in Morocco, it should not be "at the expense of the Belgian Congo." The suspicion lurking in the minds of well-informed Englishmen that Germany had such designs then obtained its first responsible utterance, but if the inner history of African diplomacy were revealed, it would become apparent that long before this date there was ample evidence of the inevitable tendency of German African policy. "Long before Sir Edward Grey's declaration the authorities in Brussels had become alive to the fact that the friendship of Berlin was insincere, and that Germany hoped to compensate herself for disappointments in East Africa by filching the prizes of Belgian

effort and enterprise in that vast country which forms the centre of the Black Continent. From not one, but a hundred Belgians—men of competence to speak with authority—have I received the same tale as to their German friends and business acquaintances giving them assurances in confidence that a victorious Germany in the next European war would not annex Belgium, but would content herself with appropriating the Congo." Thus wrote Dr. Demetrius Boulger in the *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1914, in an article that had been prepared long before the catastrophe of August. The words of these German traders were symptomatic of the national mood.

Germany's first active interference in Congo affairs commenced with her opposition to the unfortunate Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 1884 (*see* page 148), under which Great Britain and Portugal had agreed to share the spoils of this region. Unfortunately, attention was directed for many years to the internal condition of the great state that had been built up by King Leopold, to the exclusion of an appreciation of the greater outside forces that were operating against its continuance as an independent state. The evils of the administrative policy carried out under the Belgian monarch, the long and perfectly justifiable campaign against the appalling loss of life in the tropical forests, the knowledge that every pound of rubber exported from this portion of Central Africa was stained red with the blood of hapless natives, diverted men's thoughts from the silent diplomatic fight proceeding between Great Britain and Germany. Germany's great and far-reaching aim to secure for herself not only the whole of the Congo regions but the vast African colonies of France and Portugal, and thus to erect a mighty Germanic Empire in Africa which would eventually absorb the British colonies also, was so great a conception that it

was believed merely to be the dream of a few hare-brained enthusiasts and not the settled policy of a whole nation. "We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial territory," wrote General von Bernhardt, "so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our population. Very recent events have shown that under certain circumstances it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa by pacific negotiations—a financial or political crash in Portugal might give us the opportunity to take possession of the Portuguese colonies. Other possible schemes *may be imagined* by which some extension of our African territory would be possible. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a successful European war." Authorities rise up everywhere. "We need not regard the (Morocco) Convention as definite," says another writer; "it is as liable to revision as the Algeiras Treaty, and indeed offers in this respect the advantage that it creates new opportunities for friction with France."<sup>1</sup>

It seems a far cry from Bagdad to the Congo, yet the Bagdad Railway, the darling project of Germany for securing predominance in the East, was intimately connected with the plan for acquiring territory in Africa. On this point it is only necessary to quote a long and significant passage contained in a book by Dr. Paul Rohrbach,<sup>2</sup> one of the most advanced of the German Imperialists. According to his estimate of the defensive powers of the British Empire, the Dominions, the Colonies, and India would fall asunder at the first attack.

"Reverting to Rohrbach,"<sup>3</sup> writes Dr. Holland Rose, "we note his estimate of the defensive power of Australia. He declared that she could not resist if her four chief towns,

<sup>1</sup> "The Origin, Causes and Object of the War," by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Bagdadbahn*. 1911.

<sup>3</sup> "The Origins of the War, 1914." (J. Holland Rose.)



all of them near the coast, were occupied by the invader. As for Canada, she was sparsely populated and had no military force worthy of mention. India was discontented. Egypt, the keystone of the imperial arch, could easily be dislodged by the Moslems of the Holy War." The true inwardness of the Bagdad Railway, so far as Africa is concerned, is revealed in the following passage: "One factor and one alone will determine the possibility of a successful issue for Germany in such a conflict, whether or not we succeed in placing England in a perilous position. A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question: the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination to hit England in a vulnerable spot—and here we come to the point where the relationship of Germany and Turkey and the conditions prevailing in Turkey become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England. England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would probably entail *also the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa*" (and, though he does not say so, the loss of the Congo to Belgium). "The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. . . . The policy of protecting

Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object than the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England." The Bagdad Railway, therefore, running through Asia Minor to the head of the Persian Gulf, with a branch through Syria to Damascus and past the Dead Sea and the Sinai Peninsula to Mecca and the Red Sea, would have been a formidable weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous Power bent upon seizing Egypt, acquiring the Sudan, and continuing its policy of advance to the head-waters of the Congo. Military issues of great moment were at stake. The new line would double the military strength of the Ottoman Empire; but the scheme in its entirety fortunately did not commend itself to British statesmen who knew that both India and Egypt were threatened; and when the railway might have proved its strategic qualities much of it remained unconstructed.

In considering the Congo question it is necessary to take the larger view of German policy. The formation of the Congo Free State was in reality one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's genius, for it was largely owing to his ready recognition of the international status of the Congo that a great buffer state was created for the main purpose of preventing a clash of European interests in Central Africa until Germany was strong enough to make her demands openly. The tendency of British policy at the period when the Congo question first became acute was an unfortunate one. Great Britain was endeavouring to secure by different means the same ends that Bismarck had in view. Both Germany and Britain had awakened to the peculiar value of the great tropical storehouse contained within the basin of the great waterways stretching from Angola and Barotseland in the south to Uganda and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan on the north, and including the drainage system of Lake Tanganyika. Great

Britain, however, pursued a policy that was bound to arouse the antagonism of other nations; whilst Bismarck, more subtle and less open in his schemes, hid his aims under the disguise of establishing a neutral and independent state in a region that was sure, sooner or later, to be grabbed by the colonising Powers. By reversing her traditional policy and recognising Portugal's claim to the mouth of the Congo, Britain hoped to establish a weak power along the coasts, and by pushing up from the southwards to secure for herself the head-waters of the river. It was a weak and opportunist policy, and could only have been successful if carried out in defiance of the wishes and claims of other Powers. Bismarck, on the other hand, saw clearly the drift of British aims. He realised that with the establishment of Germany in the Cameroons and of France in the coastal regions to the north of the Congo, there was every prospect of a clash of interests so soon as the three rival Powers should converge in the centre of the continent; and it was apparent that, in the imperfect state of geographical knowledge, no definite lines of advance could be laid down which would prevent the almost inevitable conflict. There should be no war over African territory until Germany was thoroughly ready to secure what she desired by force. In any case, England must be prevented from using Portugal as her stalking-horse and from obtaining from the Portuguese what she was not then prepared to seize openly.

The formation of the International Congo Association, primarily the work of King Leopold, was not unpleasing to Bismarck. Two astute minds were at work for widely different ends, and the ultimate triumph of one or the other will only be known after the settlement of the present war. In a previous chapter it has been seen how the Conference at Brussels, convened by King Leopold in 1876, initiated

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the policy of founding an internationalised state in Central Africa, and it is germane to our subject to describe briefly the steps by which this policy was carried out. The discovery of the Upper Congo by Stanley in 1877 increased the interest already aroused in these regions; and a branch of the association, taking the name of the Comité d'Études du Haut-Congo, was organised at Brussels at the end of 1878 for the purpose of establishing some practicable means of communication between the upper and the lower stream. The Comité d'Études adopted the flag of the association—a blue flag with a gold star—and engaged itself to erect stations similar to those already founded by the expedition sent from the east coast to Lake Tanganyika. Although the Comité d'Études appeared as a separate body, it was in reality the same as the International Association. “Where the affairs of the whole region were concerned, the name International Association of the Congo appears; and the government of the stations on the lower and upper Congo was differentiated into two committees, the Comité du Haut and du Bas Congo, but the personnel in all three was the same, and the differences in title were merely for convenience. It was not long before the International Association of the Congo was used to the exclusion of the other two.”<sup>1</sup>

Stanley, acting as the agent of the association, left for Africa early in 1879, and arrived before the mouth of the Congo River “to peacefully conquer and subdue it in harmony with modern ideas into National States, within whose limits the European merchant shall go hand in hand with the dark African trader.” He stayed in the Congo Valley for four years, established twenty-two stations, and

<sup>1</sup> “The International Beginnings of the Congo Free State,” by J. S. Reeves. (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 1894.)

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made upwards of three hundred treaties with the native chiefs by which their lands were ceded to the International Association of the Congo. International jurists argued as to the validity of these treaties. Sir Travers Twiss, who acquired fame during the Berlin Conference for his able exposition of the doctrines of international law, held that they were perfectly valid, and in this view he was supported by Professor Arntz; but De Martens, on the other hand, held that individuals could not acquire territory with a public title except by virtue of a mandate, delegation, or at least a ratification of existing powers.<sup>1</sup> No one argued the question from the native standpoint or pointed out that treaties to be valid should be perfectly understood by both parties. In any case the question was of small importance, because the establishment of stations in the interior became the surest pledge of the ability of the association to fulfil its obligations. The treaties as treaties were merely the convenient expression of the intention of a powerful body to obtain and occupy lands that were not as yet within the occupation of any other European Power.

Whilst Stanley had been busy, treaties were being made in the name of the French Government by De Brazza, who had made an overland journey from Cabinda (which was claimed by Portugal) to the Congo, and had thus established the right of France to enormous tracts of territory with the right bank of the Congo as a boundary. It was at this period (Stanley returned in August, 1884) that Portugal and Great Britain came to an agreement regarding the Congo territory, and for a time it seemed as if the efforts of the International Association were doomed to failure, or at least as if immense difficulties would have to be overcome, if the new state, as yet unrecognised as such, were to acquire

<sup>1</sup> Reeves.

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an international status. But as has already been pointed out (*see* page 146), Germany, finding that she was likely to be shut out of the Congo regions, initiated the aggressive policy that changed the course of events. German colonial experts had devoted considerable attention to the subject, and German explorers, such as Captain Hohmeyer and Dr. Bastian, had not been altogether inactive in the Congo regions. Moreover, attention had already been directed to East Africa, and it was then the prevailing opinion that the development of the Congo basin would lead to a considerable and ever-increasing traffic across East Africa to the Indian Ocean. Bismarck was not prepared to see the greater part of this region fall into the hands of Britain and the feeble states of Portugal and Zanzibar, whilst the excellent relations he then maintained with France enabled him to secure the help of that Power for the schemes he proposed to support. The Portuguese treaty was abandoned,<sup>1</sup> and the celebrated Conference at Berlin was summoned. Previous to that date the United States, in April, 1884, recognised the flag of the International Association "as that of a friendly Power," and was thus the first, from a purely disinterested motive, to set its approval upon the proposal for the neutralisation of the basin of the Congo. This recognition of the territory of the International Association as an independent state was a most important step, and paved the way for the action subsequently taken by other Powers.

When the national committees were first formed as

<sup>1</sup>" We are not in a position to admit that the Portuguese or any other nation have a previous right there. We share the fear which, Lord Granville admits, has been expressed by merchants of all nations, that the Portuguese officials would be prejudicial to trade, and . . . we cannot take part in any scheme for handing over the administration, or even the direction, of these arrangements to Portuguese officials."—Bismarck, through Count Münster, to Granville (June 7, 1884).

branches of the International Association, Great Britain held aloof, and was the only one of the great Powers which did not co-operate in the work initiated by the King of the Belgians. The reasons are obvious. Not only were British interests entirely opposed to the idea underlying the ostensible objects of the association, but it was feared, as afterwards proved to be the case, that the association might be used for other purposes than those for which it was founded. In the case of France, De Brazza, for instance, whilst apparently carrying out the designs of the association, was in reality the emissary of his adopted country, and outwitted King Leopold by placing his stations under the protection of the French flag. It was apparent that in the game of grab the association might be used as a convenient tool, and Great Britain prepared to act independently and to secure her own interests in her own way. As time passed the undertaking gradually became more and more Belgian in character, and although in reply to a very natural inquiry from the Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society at Lisbon, Colonel Strauch answered on behalf of the association that "Belgium as a state does not wish to possess either a province or even an inch of territory in Africa," it was evident that the proceedings were becoming national in character and that a crisis was approaching that would require the most careful handling.

The Conference at Berlin settled the whole question. When the Berlin Conference opened, the International Association of the Congo had been recognised as a territorial Power by the United States, France, and Germany. Before it closed, Great Britain, Italy, Austria, Holland, Spain, Russia, Norway and Sweden, and, perhaps most important of all, Portugal had entered into conventions or made declarations recognising the territorial character of the

association, and it only remained for the Berlin Conference as a whole to signify its approval of the steps that had been taken. This was accordingly done at the session on February 23, 1885, and on the following day Bismarck announced that the association, acting in its sovereign capacity, adhered to the General Act of the Conference. Thus the Congo Free State took its position as an independent power under the sovereignty of King Leopold, and a private body was transformed into a sovereign state by a "truly international investiture."<sup>1</sup>

It is not necessary here to follow the administrative policy initiated by King Leopold, because the results are too well known to need specific mention. The open buying and selling of slaves was indeed done away with, but a system far worse in its ultimate effects upon the natives of the Congo basin took its place; and there is always to be remembered "the damning fact that the very state which claimed to be a great philanthropic agency has, until very recently, refused to institute any full inquiry into the alleged defects of its administration."<sup>2</sup>

Both British and German aims with respect to the Congo regions were understood fully by King Leopold. At an early period he became aware that Germany was only supporting his undertakings in order to counteract any British advance and, as it were, to hold the fort for the advent of Germanism. Although he was a German by descent, his sympathies were almost entirely French, and it was to Paris rather than to Berlin that he eventually turned for support—and, shall it be said, for consolation. With great astuteness he perceived the aggressive tendencies of German policy, and whilst he no longer feared that Great

<sup>1</sup> G. Rolin Jacquemyns, *Revue de Droit International*, p. 170. 1889.

<sup>2</sup> "Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900," by J. Holland Rose



Britain intended to annex the immensely valuable territories which soon became his personal domain, he knew that Germany, then on the high road of colonial expansion, had no scruples in the matter. His first step to counteract German policy had been to make France the reversionary heir of the Congo region in the event of the disruption of the territory.<sup>1</sup> His second step was to cultivate the most friendly relations with France and to endeavour to win over Great Britain to his side. In spite of the way in which he flouted British public opinion, King Leopold was a great admirer of this country, and his diplomatic policy was designed so as to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. His intentions in this respect were fully manifested in the Anglo-Congo Agreement of 1894, which, if it had been carried out, would have set the coping-stone on British policy in Central Africa. Although it may not always have been apparent, the mainspring of British policy in Africa since the date when Rhodes first dreamed of the Cape to Cairo railway has been the linking-up of British territories from north to south. Rhodes was the greatest opponent of German schemes in Africa. He foresaw the inevitable clash of interests and fully understood the opinions expressed in the *Tägliche Rundschau*. That journal, speaking of the Cape to Cairo railway, stated that "the completion of the communication of British South Africa with the Egyptian Sudan by means of a railway *implies the certain ruin* of our

<sup>1</sup> In his will of August 2, 1889, King Leopold designated Belgium as the sole heir to all his sovereign rights in the Congo State, and declared that the territories were inalienable. But the right of France to the reversionary interest still held good. Mr. E. D. Morel, whose anti-Leopoldian proclivities are well known, and whose sympathies with Germany are sufficiently indicated in his "Morocco in Diplomacy," says in that book, when speaking of Germany's need for new markets: "That is why Germany insisted last autumn that if Belgian rule in the Congo should ultimately become impossible, France must so far modify her reversionary claim to the Congo State as to consent to the problem being carried before the signatory Powers which created the Congo State."

Colonial Empire in Africa. Such a railway would be of no economic advantage to our colony. It would only lead to our territory becoming a British protectorate; and if ever the project were realised it would give such an extraordinary impulse to British influence that soon there would be nothing left for us to do but to pack up and go.”<sup>1</sup> It is only necessary to refer to this matter to show the true meaning of the Anglo-Congo Agreement of 1894. King Leopold, out for all he could get, entered into an arrangement with Lord Rosebery that was entirely satisfactory from his own point of view as well as being of peculiar advantage to Great Britain. It was decided that Britain should lease to the Congo the territory comprised between 25° east longitude and the Nile and 10° north latitude and Lake Albert Nyanza, a great block of territory which would give the Congo Free State access to the upper waters of the Nile and the control of the Bahr-el-Ghazal province of the Sudan, which France was coveting and England was not then in a position to occupy effectively. Of this territory, the strip between 30° east longitude and the Nile was to revert to England on Leopold’s death, and the rest was to continue on lease “so long as the Congo territories, as an independent state, or as a Belgian colony, remain under the sovereignty of His Majesty or his successors.” It was again a case of holding the fort, but this time against the advance of France and on behalf of Great Britain. To Leopold the arrangement was perfectly satisfactory, but not to France. The latter protested vigorously and joined with Germany, whose interests were threatened by the further arrangement to be mentioned.

For some time German policy had been directed against the Congo Free State. It had been discovered that much

<sup>1</sup> See my short article in the *African World*, May 6, 1911.

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of the trade of the interior, instead of finding its way across German East Africa to the Indian Ocean, as had been confidently expected, was being carried down the Congo waterways to the Atlantic Ocean, and for this reason Germany was seeking for an opportunity to extend her territory westwards in order to tap the rich regions that were within the boundaries (as yet but ill-defined) of the Congo Free State. To prepare the way for this move, German exploring expeditions had been busy within Congo territory. The main object of German explorers was to show that the Belgian occupation of the disputed territory was not effective, and the travellers were instructed to observe particularly whether the Belgians were effectively administering or utilising the territories beyond the German borders. Count von Götzen, during one of these journeys, discovered Lake Kivu, situated between Lakes Tanganyika and Albert Edward and forming one of the chain of waterways between the upper waters of the Nile and Lake Nyasa. The region in which this lake is situated was found to be one of the most extraordinary in Central Africa. To the north of it is the remarkable volcanic country recently traversed by the Duke Adolf of Mecklenburg, whilst its immediate neighbourhood is extremely fertile. The lake was declared to be within the imaginary line then forming the boundary of the Congo Free State, and King Leopold took steps to establish two stations on its eastern shores so as to make effective his claims to this district. German activities therefore were modified by the desire to avoid any actual collision on the spot. The Anglo-Congo Agreement of 1894 was directly concerned with this territory. Great Britain, as has been shown, made important concessions in the Bahr-el-Ghazal province and in addition agreed to lease to the Congo Free State a strip of territory between

Lakes Bangweolo and Tanganyika, which would have included a portion of what is now North-Eastern Rhodesia. In return for these concessions, King Leopold agreed to grant to Great Britain a strip of territory twenty-five kilometres broad extending from the most northern port on Lake Tanganyika to the most southern point of Lake Albert Edward. A glance at the map will reveal the importance of this arrangement. The possession of this country would have enabled Great Britain to proceed with the construction of a line running through British territory and connecting the two waterways, and thus to build the most important link in the proposed route from the Cape to Cairo. Germany was furious. The realisation of the great plan conceived by Rhodes and for which he had consistently worked seemed about to be rendered possible, and it became a paramount German interest to join with France in opposing the ratification of such an iniquitous treaty. Opposed by France and Germany, the British Government backed down, and the opportunity was lost of constructing a direct north to south route by means of railways and waterways between Cape Town and Alexandria.

In the autumn of 1898 Rhodes had been to Brussels to press the claims of his railway upon King Leopold, but the latter did not see his way at that juncture to make anything but vague statements regarding his appreciation of a vigorous railway policy in the Congo territory. With peculiar and characteristic astuteness he saw that Rhodes was, in a measure, between the devil and the deep sea, and it appeared to King Leopold as highly probable that Germany would only support Rhodes's schemes if the proposed railway were to be so constructed that it would pass through German territory, so that it would act as a feeder to the

German ports on the east coast. On the other hand, the Congo waterways offered excellent connecting links, and it was Leopold's settled policy that the Congo and not Germany should benefit from the railway policy of Rhodes. "My part," said Leopold in an interview with Dr. Demetrius Boulger, "is to build railways to replace those gaps or breaches in water communication. Believe me, for a long time the main communications must be jointly by rail and water. I have no doubt that the first English railway will terminate on the southern shore of Lake Tanganyika."<sup>1</sup> Rhodes went off in dudgeon to Berlin, secured lavish promises of assistance for the construction of the railway through German territory, but, as we know, nothing came of his proposed agreement. The German terms were too hard.

The designs of Germany upon the Congo, like those of Great Britain, were successfully thwarted by the diplomacy of King Leopold. Whatever may be said of his administration of the great territory with which he had been entrusted, no one can deny that by his subtle opposition to the desires of both nations he managed to preserve intact the domains which were eventually handed over to the Belgian people. But through his action he gained the undying enmity of German officialdom. It is only necessary to quote his own words to show that he thoroughly understood the position. "As for England and Germany," he said to Dr. Boulger, "they are irreconcilable rivals, and very possibly they will fight over the body of the Congo State." The opinions of Dr. Boulger coincided with those of the Belgian monarch. "If the Central African situation, then, is to be correctly judged," he wrote, "it is necessary to remember that Germany is a

<sup>1</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. XCVI., p. 495. 1914.

thoroughly discontented participant and spectator. . . . Her main idea is that others have what she covets. In Africa the Belgian Congo is for her a Naboth's vineyard."

English writers also have recognised the true position of affairs. "At the fitting moment," wrote the Rev. William Greswell,<sup>1</sup> "the whole of the Congo Free State, whether French or Belgian, was ear-marked long ago to be seized when France and Belgium could be struck down with a felon's blow in Europe," whilst Sir Percy Fitzpatrick has said that "Belgium, like France and England, like Portugal and Holland, fell into the category of those who were worth robbing." The opinion of Mr. J. K. O'Connor, who made a journey through German South-West Africa a few months prior to the outbreak of war for the express purpose of learning something about German designs, is worth consideration. Mr. O'Connor stated that "It was evident that the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire of the Teutons, and it is this desire more than any other that has caused Germany to apply the torch to Europe." Authorities might be multiplied, such as Mr. E. D. Morel, who has already been quoted. But from German sources it is only necessary to quote Bernhardt, who stated that "when Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not *ipso facto* a breach of neutrality."

At the outbreak of the war in August, 1914, the Congo question had not been solved. In fact, it never could be definitely decided until one or other of the Great Powers had planted itself firmly in the Central African regions, or all had agreed to recognise, without any *arrière pensée*

<sup>1</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, September, 1914.

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or secret reservations, the permanence of the arrangement by which the Congo State had been placed under the control of the Belgian Parliament. It was certainly to Great Britain's interests to maintain the *status quo*, but the same could not be said for Germany, and it became only too apparent that nothing less than the occupation of this great territory would satisfy the growing appetite of her citizens for territorial expansion. Even during the war the spirits of her soldiers have been kept up with lavish promises of compensations in Africa. "A victorious war will enable us," stated a newspaper issued for the benefit of the army operating in Poland, "by the seizure of the Belgian and French Congo and the Portuguese colonies, to create a German colonial empire such as our fathers, who used to ridicule our first colonial beginnings, could never have conceived. Between Egypt and East Africa and the Anglo-Boer South Africa there will stretch the endless girdle of our gigantic colonial possessions, from the Indian Ocean to the Central African lakes and down the Congo to the Atlantic."<sup>1</sup> It is a long way from Poland to Africa, yet German ambitions, never modest, seem to grow with adversity.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from *Vorwärts*.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE GERMANS AND MOROCCO

**I**N the preceding chapters the clash of British and German interests has been dealt with and no space has been devoted to the relations between Germany and France. The reason is obvious, for during the Bismarck régime there was in reality no conflict between the colonial policies of the two Governments, and such disputes as did arise were capable of easy and satisfactory settlement. The main aim of Bismarck's colonial policy was to cultivate satisfactory relations with his most formidable territorial neighbour and to prevent anything in the form of a *rapprochement* between Great Britain and France. In this respect he followed a policy that was calculated to smooth away all difficulties and to preserve a cordial and close understanding upon all matters relating to Africa that affected mutual German and French relationships.

But with the fall of Bismarck a change came over the scene, and gradually, through the folly of his successors, the edifice he had so carefully erected was undermined and a period of distrust was initiated that soon developed into open and unconcealed hostility between the two countries. It is now necessary, therefore, to examine briefly the events that led up to the dramatic and tempestuous visit of the German Emperor to Tangier and the deep underlying causes that provoked the crises of 1905-6 and 1911 and helped to bring about the present war. At the outset it



may be remarked that France made two huge diplomatic blunders that gave Germany the opportunity she secretly desired, but these blunders and the lack of international courtesy shown by M. Delcassé are nothing compared with the tortuous and insincere policy pursued by successive German Chancellors.

With the growth of German sea-power and the concomitant ascendancy obtained by the Pan-German party who, acting as pioneers, so frequently forced the German Government to dance to their piping, there arose new desires with regard to Africa amongst the German people. It was towards Morocco as well as towards the Central African regions that German eyes were covetously turned, and when the Pan-German party began to realise the supreme importance of this Gateway of the West, they forced upon the Government a new policy that was directly opposed to the careful and conciliatory attitude of Bismarck. It is well known that the Iron Chancellor was anxious to see France firmly established on the Moroccan coast. He knew that sooner or later the Shereefian Empire, hitherto almost entirely closed to European influence and almost as completely isolated from Western ideas as China had been before the capture of the Pei-ho forts, would fall under Western control. He was anxious that France should become involved in Moroccan adventures rather than Germany, and desired that Great Britain should be prevented from establishing a footing in this portion of Africa. His policy was sound, but it took no account of the growth of German maritime interests and the increase of the territorial appetite brought about by the early successes of German policy in Africa.

The importance of Morocco had been recognised at an early date, but the difficulties of the internal situation had

prevented any European Power from attempting to obtain a permanent foothold in the country, and thus it was that its territorial integrity and the independence of its sultan had been preserved in spite of the fact that other portions of Northern Africa had fallen under direct European influence. In the golden age of Portuguese sea-power Tangier had been a Portuguese possession, and had subsequently passed under the control of England as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza. England retained this important possession until the year 1683, but with the withdrawal of European forces, Tangier, in common with other Moroccan ports, became a nest of pirates, and the whole Moroccan littoral played an unenviable part in the notorious adventures of the Moorish buccaneers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Morocco became practically a closed house, and with the exception of occasional visits from European travellers, of whom Lenz and Rohlf represented the Germans, there was little intercourse with the Shereefian Empire. So far as Germany was concerned, so little influence had she obtained in the country that a German Resident was not appointed at the Moroccan Court until the year 1873.

The importance of Morocco lay in the fact that not only might its northern ports, if properly fortified and provided with suitable harbours, prove a strong factor in commanding the entrance to the Mediterranean, but its western ports, if similarly developed, would command the main sea route to South Africa and, before the construction of the Suez Canal, to India and the Far East. So fully was this fact realised that none of the Great Powers was prepared to risk the adventure of establishing itself in this region; for it was well understood that, entirely apart from the internal difficulties to which even a partial occupa-

tion of the coast might lead, such an occupation would also provoke an international crisis for which none of them was prepared in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. France fully occupied in Algeria and Tunis was unable to risk the difficulties of a situation that might lead to endless complications, whilst Great Britain was content that, so long as her maritime interests were not threatened, the *status quo*, unsatisfactory as it was, should be maintained. A glance at the map will reveal the importance of the Moroccan seaboard. In the case of Germany, as her maritime commerce increased and her navy attained a standard of perfection undreamed of in the early days of German naval expansion, its importance continuously increased, and it became evident that Morocco would form a strong card in the hands of any Continental Power prepared to play for the control of the Atlantic. On this point it is only necessary to quote Professor Fischer, one of the most active upholders of German intervention in Morocco, who wrote that "after thirty years occupation with Moroccan affairs, and after three journeys through that country, I have arrived at the conviction that the world-political position of Morocco is so great that that state which succeeds in taking it will, through its possession, receive such an enormous increase in power that all the other states, especially Great Britain, Spain, and Germany, will feel it as an unbearable hardship";<sup>1</sup> the assumption being, of course, that any Power which secured an entry into Morocco would establish a strong naval base on the south-western coast, either at Mogador or Agadir, in order to threaten the shipping passing down the Atlantic.

After the establishment of the German colonies in Africa the possession of such a naval base became of

<sup>1</sup> *Die Seehäfen von Marokko*, by Professor Fischer.

supreme importance to Germany, for it would not only command one of the main routes of British and French commerce by providing a convenient sally-port, but would, in conjunction with German ports in Africa, afford an excellent coaling-station to enable German vessels to proceed round the African coasts and even to threaten British shipping in the Indian Ocean. In this respect the distances between the German stations in Africa should be studied attentively. They are as follows. From the German base at Wilhelmshaven to Mogador the distance is 1,750 miles, from Mogador to Togoland 2,700 miles, from Togoland to the Cameroons 550 miles, from the Cameroons to German South-West Africa 1,650 miles, thence to Kilwa in German East Africa 3,200 miles, and from Kilwa to Aden 1,950 miles; a series of convenient stepping-stones that would have enabled a German fleet to continue its voyage to the East without the expedient of coaling at sea. The failure of the German attempt to secure a base at Madeira made the acquisition of a Moroccan port even more desirable, whilst the fact that such a base would be within easy reach of South America, and particularly Brazil, made it so essential in the Pan-German plan that when the crisis came the Press was almost unanimous in its desire for the possession of southern Morocco.

It is not proposed to deal fully with the events that led up to the Algeciras Conference and the crisis of 1911. The German point of view may be studied in Mr. E. D. Morel's book, "Morocco in Diplomacy," whilst the British and French standpoint may be read in almost all of the articles that appeared in the British Press at that time. But the matter must be briefly dealt with because, although it was officially denied, it is abundantly clear that the possession of southern Morocco formed one of the main planks of

German African policy. It has already been indicated that the object of Bismarck's policy was to force or attract the Powers to gather round Germany and, whilst preserving friendly relations with this country, to keep Great Britain in the position of "splendid isolation" which she had voluntarily chosen. His successors, by their indifference to European opinion and by their cynical inconsistencies, soon produced a deep distrust of Germany everywhere, and the most conspicuous result of their diplomatic blunders was to render the accomplishment of a friendly understanding between Great Britain and France a comparatively easy matter.

For many years France and Great Britain had been sharply antagonistic upon African matters generally, and particularly with regard to Egypt and the Sudan. The masterly diplomacy of King Edward who, foreseeing the trend of German policy, took a conspicuous part in the cultivation of Gallic friendship, seconded by Lord Lansdowne, who was then Foreign Minister, and by M. Théophile Delcassé, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, brought about the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904. This treaty ushered in a new era in European affairs. The main matters dealt with were connected with Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, and Siam. In Egypt the French Government recognised the predominant position of Great Britain and promised not to impede her work by any suggestion that the occupation was only temporary.

In compensation for the virtual withdrawal of French opposition and the deletion of the unpleasant word "Fashoda" from the diplomatic slate, Great Britain promised to acknowledge the predominance of French interests in Morocco, and agreed that if that archaic country were

to be regenerated by European influence the main agency must be that of France. The position was perfectly clear. France was to pursue a policy of peaceful penetration; she was not to fortify or indeed to occupy any portion of the coast opposite Europe; and the territorial integrity of Morocco was to be carefully preserved. The French Government having declared that they had "no intention of altering the political status of Morocco," there could be no question of the establishment of a French protectorate over the country. Nevertheless there were certain secret articles attached to the treaty that were not made public, and these gave the German Government an excuse for action. The most important of these articles (published for the first time in *Le Temps* in November, 1911) recognised the possibility of the engagements being modified by "force of circumstances," and it was clear that such modifications might eventually affect the territorial integrity of the Shereefian Empire should the Sultan be unable to maintain his position. As a matter of fact, the internal affairs of Morocco went from bad to worse, and it became evident that a sovereign who had ceased to be a ruler could no longer claim as a matter of international right that the territorial integrity of his country should be rigorously respected. Apart from France and Great Britain, the only Government which really had any permanent interests in Morocco was Spain, and Spanish interests were subsequently recognised in the Franco-Spanish Agreement of October 3, 1904, by which Spain signified her adherence to the Anglo-French Agreement.

It is apparent at the outset that French interests were really paramount in Morocco. Not only was her Algerian territory so closely contiguous with the Moroccan borderlands that it was essential that public order should be

maintained in these districts, but her commercial interests were almost as great as those of Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, French banking and financial interests were considerable, whilst those of Germany were so small as scarcely to require special consideration. Nevertheless, it was the initial mistake of not consulting the German Foreign Office that led to the unfortunate and prolonged crises with regard to Morocco.

Germany was so completely ignored that it became necessary for her to inquire what was really taking place with regard to the negotiations proceeding between Great Britain and France. On March 23, 1904, some days before the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement, the German Ambassador in Paris asked M. Delcassé whether it was a fact that a treaty was about to be signed between France and Great Britain with regard to their respective colonial possessions. A clear statement was then made as to the position of France, and the German Ambassador is supposed to have found the explanations that were given him to be "*très naturelles et parfaitement justifiées.*" But—and here M. Delcassé demonstrated his hostility towards Germany—no official communication was made as to the contents of the treaty. Although German statesmen were apparently satisfied at the course of events, and although the Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag on April 12 and 14, 1904, stated on both occasions that from the point of view of German interests there was no

<sup>1</sup> The following table, contained in a Report by M. André Tardieu, entitled "La politique marocaine de la France" (Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, 1909), gives the percentages of British, French, German, and Spanish commerce as follows :

				1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907
Great Britain	..	..		41	41	40	29	28	33
France	..	..	..	31	31	30	46	56	45
Germany	..	..	..	9	10	11	9	8	12
Spain	..	..	..	8	7	7	4	4	4

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objection to French policy in Morocco, there was in reality deep and concentrated anger at the *rapprochement* between Great Britain and France; but at that period France had made only one diplomatic blunder, and Germany was not then prepared to act as the tribune of Europe. As a matter of fact, the Russo-Japanese War had scarcely commenced and the balance of power in Europe was decidedly unfavourable to Germany. So soon, however, as Russia became involved in the Far East, Germany commenced to move with regard to Morocco. The coincidence of these events is too remarkable to escape notice. The surrender of Port Arthur took place on January 1, 1905, three weeks before M. Saint-René-Taillandier, the French Minister at Tangier, went to Fez to lay his plans for reform before the Sultan (January 29, 1905). On February 21, Abdul Aziz, acting under German inspiration, complained to the German Consul that France was apparently proceeding as the mandatory of Europe, and although the accusation was untrue it was the first sign of the coming storm with regard to Morocco. Why did the Moroccan sultan complain to Germany? The coincidence of these dates seems a sufficient answer.

As soon as Russia became heavily involved the German Government decided to act, ostensibly as the protector of the weak and the upholder of the territorial integrity of a country with which they had in reality little concern. In the light of after events the pretension seems almost ludicrous. The probability is that had France followed up the Franco-British Agreement of the year before with vigorous action, Germany would have been too late to intervene; but at the time for action French statesmen hesitated and committed the second and perhaps the most serious of their blunders, by allowing time to pass before they brought pressure to bear upon the Sultan of Morocco.



They could not, of course, foresee the Russian complications in Manchuria, and probably thought that there was plenty of time during which to inaugurate their scheme of reforms, but the delay gave Germany a further opportunity for intervention. In the month of February, 1905, the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, Herr von Kühlmann, set the ball rolling by stating to the Comte de Cherisey, then representing France, that as the German Foreign Office was not informed of the arrangements that had been made concerning Morocco any decisions that might be arrived at were not binding upon German agents. From the diplomatic point of view he was probably perfectly correct. Germany having been ignored in the first instance could ignore France whenever she felt herself strong enough to do so. A little later Prince Bülow stated in the Reichstag (March 29) that Germany, aiming at the maintenance of the open door in Morocco, intended to open direct communications with the Sultan. The way was being prepared for the dramatic incursion of the Kaiser at Tangier.

That event occurred on March 31, 1905, three weeks after the Russian retreat from Mukden (March 10), when the *Hamburg*, with the Emperor on board, escorted by the cruiser *Friedrich Karl*, arrived off Tangier. The visit, it has been stated, was no sudden whim, as it had been planned earlier in the year, but it set the seal upon German policy and revealed to the world the real intention of the German Government. The Emperor arrived to vindicate the independence of a brother monarch and to demonstrate that the German star was in the ascendant. There have been various accounts of the speech that he delivered on this occasion, but the following is the generally accepted version :

“The reason for my visit to Tangier is to make it known

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that I have decided to do all that lies within my power to safeguard effectively the interests of Germany in Morocco. I regard the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign, and it is with him that I am anxious to come to an understanding. With regard to the reforms which the Sultan intends to introduce into his country, I consider that he should proceed with great caution."

It will be seen that during his two hours' visit the Emperor issued a direct challenge to France. He completely ignored the Anglo-French Agreement and openly encouraged the Sultan to oppose French influence. He was to be in fact, as well as in principle, an absolutely independent sovereign. Public opinion in France and in Britain was astonished and incensed, but in Germany the greatest enthusiasm was aroused, and there ensued an insistent clamour for the summoning of an international conference to settle the Moroccan question. At the same time the ostensible reason for the Kaiser's dramatic intervention was conveniently forgotten in Pan-German circles, from which articles emanated in which it was suggested that Germany should acquire a port in southern Morocco. The Kaiser had expressly informed King Alphonso XIII. during his visit to Vigo that Germany did not desire any territorial compensations in Morocco, but in spite of the official German attitude the impression, true or false, got about that she did. Nor was this impression unjustified. It may be safely asserted that the Pan-German party have frequently acted as the Teutonic tail that has wagged the German dog. Let us examine, therefore, the attitude of the colonial party before and after the Anglo-French Agreement. "Some years ago," wrote Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, "I remember a number of men of influence desired the possession of Mogador, a place which from its situation

would, in the hands of a Great Power, mean the reduction of Morocco to a vassal state.”<sup>1</sup> That was before the Agreement. After the Agreement was concluded, German opinion was equally explicit. At a great Pan-German meeting held at Esslingen a resolution was carried calling upon the Imperial Government to take immediate steps for the purpose of developing German interests in Morocco. A month later, at a meeting of the German Colonial Society, held on May 27, Count Pfeil stated that it was high time for the German Government to acquire overseas territory where it would be possible for German colonists to settle and prosper, and he said that German emigration should now be directed to Morocco, and that even at the risk of war Germany should be prepared to seize that country. Count Pfeil, it must be remembered, was a man of some influence. Some days later at a meeting held at Lübeck similar sentiments were openly expressed.

But so far as the Kaiser and the German Government were concerned, it may be taken that their real intention was to show France that Germany was now too formidable to be disregarded, and to drive her by threats whither they could not lead her by blandishments—into the German fold. The warlike speeches made by the Kaiser, especially when Russia was suffering serious reverses in the Far East, were directed against the Anglo-French entente. They sufficiently indicate the real purpose of his solicitude for the Sultan of Morocco and his intention to take full advantage of the unsatisfactory political position of France and the disorganisation of her army whilst her ally was engaged in the Far East. If Moroccan ports could be acquired, well and good, but they were not the only object of his manœuvres.

<sup>1</sup> “German Policy in Morocco,” by Sir R. Blennerhassett (*Fortnightly Review*, vol. 84, 1908.)

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The demand for an international conference became more and more clamorous after the visit, on April 13, of Baron Tattenbach, the German Minister at Lisbon, to Fez. Here he was received as the saviour of Morocco. In consultation with a council of Moorish notables, an international conference, suggested by the Germans, was called for; and on May 30, three days after the Russian fleet had been destroyed at Tsu-shima (May 27, 1905) the Sultan of Morocco wrote his demand for a meeting of the Powers. The story of the prolonged and bitter diplomatic struggle during which M. Delcassé was forced to resign cannot be told in these pages. The French Foreign Minister was bitterly opposed to the proposal that Morocco should be thrown into the European melting-pot, but the French Cabinet, under M. Rouvier, bowing before the storm, refused to support their colleague, and the proposal for a conference having been accepted by Italy and Austria, it was finally agreed to by France and Britain. The fall of M. Delcassé was the most important event in European politics since the conclusion of the Dual Alliance, and the first patent result of the impending collapse of Russian power in Europe. It was the anti-climax of a nation's policy.

The result of the pressure exerted by Germany was the summoning of the celebrated Algeciras Conference, which met on January 7, 1906, and after prolonged deliberations and frequent deadlocks came to a decision on April 7 in that year.<sup>1</sup> The attitude of the German delegates was at first so uncompromising that an arrangement seemed hopeless. Germany's policy during the conference seemed to

<sup>1</sup> In January and February, 1906, I was travelling on a German steamer, and I well remember the tense feeling that existed on board with regard to the conference sitting at Algeciras. The climax was reached when the captain received unexpected orders to call at Tangier.

be dictated by the course of events in Russia, where the revolutionary movement was occupying the full attention of the Government. So frequent were the deadlocks and so serious did the position become owing to the inactivity of Herr von Radowitz, that on March 5 Count Cassini, one of the Russian representatives, brought things to a head by announcing his intention of moving at the next sitting that the labours of the conference should be suspended and the sittings adjourned *sine die*. That threat stirred up the Germans. The results of the conference were generally regarded as a distinct diplomatic victory for France; for in spite of Germany's solicitude for the Sultan her ulterior aims were only too manifest—and they were defeated. The points in dispute need not be discussed, but it must be mentioned that German attempts to secure a voice in the control of the police force were frustrated; for it was arranged that it should be under the joint command of French and Spanish officers, with a Swiss military officer in the supreme command. France was obliged to renounce her monopolistic tendencies in Morocco, but Germany, on the other hand, was not called upon to exercise any control whatsoever over Moroccan affairs. The honest broker remained outside the house. It may be said in effect that France accepted a temporary but renewable trust to act as the mandatory of Europe to see that reforms were carried out in Morocco. The full independence of the Sultan was recognised in principle but not in effect.

The result of the Algeiras Conference was not pleasing to the Germans. At the annual congress of the Pan-German League held at Dresden on August 31, 1906, a report submitted by the secretary described the Algeiras Conference as a defeat for Germany, and declared that “the manifest isolation of the German Empire, combined with

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M. Delcassé's revelations and the active hostility of influential circles in England" had served to open the eyes of the nation to the fact that for the future Germany's position as a Great Power would be precarious. The president asserted that the Triple Alliance was now merely waste paper, and that "the German people ought not to contemplate with equanimity the annihilation of the German element in Russia." It may be added that this element had been one of the most active factors in stirring up the revolution in that country.

But in course of time a new situation arose. The nominal independence of the Sultan became a thing of the past, not because he was threatened by the French, but because he ceased to rule over his own subjects. An almost complete state of anarchy prevailed in Morocco, and it became necessary for France to act quickly if she were to retain her privileged position in the country. As a matter of fact, so soon as the Sultan became a virtual prisoner in his own capital the Algeiras Act which recognised his independence became a farce, and it was necessary for France either to intervene in order to re-establish his authority or to tear up boldly the Algeiras Treaty. She adopted a course that might have been construed in both senses. By an agreement between Germany and France, signed on February 9, 1909, both Powers declared themselves "equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeiras" and "fully and firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire." The independence having degenerated into anarchy it became a question whether the integrity could be maintained.

The position of affairs at Fez was menacing. In April, 1911, it was reported that the lives of Europeans were in

danger, and General Moinier, at the head of a large force, set out for the relief of the European inhabitants, whilst his Government announced that he would withdraw to the coast after succouring the menaced community. The march to Fez was generally regarded as warranted by the critical position of affairs, but the question remained in the background, would the French intervention lead to French occupation? Spain, encouraged by the French adventure, asserted her position in northern Morocco—possibly being urged to take this course by German agents—and sent strong bodies of troops to the Riff. In Great Britain the attitude of France received open support. Sir Edward Grey stated in the House of Commons that the march on Fez had his approval, and that if the French Government had not acted as it did, His Majesty's Government would have requested it to render that service to the cause of humanity. But in Germany the presence of a large French force at Fez raised the bitterest feelings, and it at once became evident that if France were about to sit down firmly at the Moorish capital, Germany would be only too ready to squat upon the south-western coast. In fact, the outcry and clamour became so insistent that it was impossible for the German Government not to take some kind of action. The form of this action was a distinct menace to the peace of the world.

On July 2, 1911, the German papers contained the following official announcement :

“The German firms interested in the south of Morocco have requested the Imperial Government, having regard to the dangers which threaten the important German interests in these parts in view of the possible spread of the disorders prevailing in other portions of Morocco, to take measures to protect the lives and property of Germans and German

protégés in these regions. The Imperial Government, with this object in view, thereupon decided to send His Majesty's ship *Panther*, which happened to be in the neighbourhood, to the harbour of Agadir, and apprised the Powers of this fact."

The sending of the *Panther* to the closed harbour of Agadir was a direct challenge to France. It meant that Germany handed in her claims to the liquidation of Morocco, and that her seconds had left their cards on France with the intention of provoking a diplomatic, or perhaps martial, duel. In any case it was a violation of the Algeciras Act more serious than the French action, which had not yet been proved to be a violation of the agreement. The presence of a German warship at Agadir caused intense excitement throughout Europe. It seemed to be a case of "*J'y suis, et j'y reste.*" The German Press published demands for the partition of Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, and stated that it was essential for Germany to secure southern Morocco with the ports of Mogador and Agadir. In particular the German Press violently attacked Great Britain, and not for the first time was the doctrine industriously circulated that Great Britain and not France was the real enemy. Matters were hardly improved by Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House, though a calm survey of later events can only lead to the conclusion that it was thoroughly justified and caused the German Government to modify their demands. In what Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter subsequently called "an after-dinner speech," Mr. Lloyd George gave utterance to a grave warning. "If a situation were to be forced upon us," he said, "in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position which Great Britain has won . . . by allowing Britain to be treated



where her interests are vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." With the necessary changes this speech might have been made by the German Chancellor.

The tension increased daily and a general European war seemed imminent. The tone of the German Press was almost entirely warlike, and the redoubtable Herr Maximilian Harden put the real data of the case with brutal frankness before the public. He called upon Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to appeal to the five million bayonets behind his countrymen and to inaugurate a great German Empire beyond the seas. But the time for action had not then arrived.

Opinions differed as to German aims. What she wanted is not entirely obvious: what she accepted is well known. "What Germany really wants," wrote Dr. Dillon, "is a matter of guesswork. My belief is that she is endeavouring to separate Great Britain from France, and to hug the latter country in a lasting and fatal embrace."<sup>1</sup> In any case, Germany was prepared to throw overboard the independence of the Sultan of Morocco if by so doing she could secure compensations for herself elsewhere. "We cannot barter Morocco's rights for territory," said Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter in 1908 to M. Jules Cambon, "or indeed for anything else. Honour obliges us to respect the independence and maintain the integrity of the Sultan's dominions; and we are fully determined to obey the dictates of honour. His Majesty the Kaiser particularly announced his resolve to consider Morocco as an independent state, to evince his friendship for her Sultan whom he regarded as

<sup>1</sup> *Contemporary Review*, V. 100. 1911.

an independent monarch, and to negotiate directly with him; and *Germany's plighted word, as you know, is as immutable as the laws of the Medes and Persians.*" But *tempora mutantur*. German honour now went into the melting-pot, and the integrity of the Sultan's dominions was no longer the mainspring of German policy so long as she could obtain "compensations" there or elsewhere.

The agreement that followed affords a remarkable instance of the persistence of German policy in Africa. Unlike the previous affair this was entirely a matter between France and Germany, and it was settled by a Convention signed on November 4, 1911. The agreement provided for a rearrangement of territory in the Congo regions, although nothing is said in the actual document as to this rearrangement being in the nature of "compensation" to Germany for her withdrawal from Morocco. But in a letter of the same date to the French Foreign Minister the position is made abundantly clear. "I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to assume the Protectorate of Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way."

The "rearrangement" of territory in the French Congo meant in reality the addition of about 100,000 square miles to the German colony of Kamerun,<sup>1</sup> so that it might be extended to reach the Ubangi and Congo rivers. The persistent policy pursued in the German colonies of pushing towards the waterways had now been achieved, so far as the south and south-east of their Kamerun colony was concerned; but the agreement, or the documents accompanying

<sup>1</sup> In speaking of the Cameroons as a German colony I think it better to use the official German name. The word Cameroons is derived from the Portuguese *Camarões*, and means "River of Prawns."

it, provided in reality for further extensions of German territory. It is believed that during the course of the negotiations attempts had been made to secure from France her reversionary interest in the Belgian Congo. This fact has been officially denied. Whether this were so or not, Germany secured a further triumph in the last article of the Convention, which stated that in the event of the territorial status of the Conventional basin of the Congo being modified through one or other of the contracting parties, the latter must confer between themselves as also between the other Powers signatory to the Act of Berlin. This meant that should France be called upon at any time to exercise her reversionary rights, the matter would be referred to an international congress. But a further important result of the Convention has generally been overlooked. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to the German Foreign Minister that he confirmed the statement that "should the German Government wish to acquire from Spain, Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France is prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise of her preferential rights, which she holds by virtue of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and Spain." The intention was plain. The new German territory had been so arranged that not only did it stretch out towards the Ubangi and the Congo, but it completely -- surrounded the comparatively small Spanish colony on the north, east, and south.

The agreement by which France secured a free hand in Morocco and Germany a large block of territory in the Congo regions naturally did not evoke much enthusiasm in France, whilst in Germany the Imperial Chancellor had a stiff fight to justify his abandonment of German claims for territory in Morocco. For, in spite of his official assurances that Ger-

many had not asked for territorial advantages in Morocco, the general opinion in Germany seemed to be that if she had not, she should have done so. In the Reichstag on November 11, 1911, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had considerable difficulty in justifying his diplomacy. He had returned with so very little after rattling the sabre. "The assertion that the *Panther* was sent to Agadir with the object of acquiring territory in Morocco is incorrect. . . . In the negotiations with France the leading idea was that it had been shown to be impossible for the Moors to re-establish or maintain order in their country by their own efforts, and that the intervention of a foreign Power was required. As regards the greater part of Morocco this Power could only be France. . . . Southern Morocco was not a desirable country for us, as its acquisition, protection, and defence would have entailed upon us sacrifices out of all proportion to the value of the country. . . . Morocco was like a continual festering wound in our relations not only with France but also with England. The French expedition to Fez led to an acute stage and rendered an operation necessary. We have performed this operation in order to heal the wound."<sup>1</sup> Whether German interests in Morocco were sufficiently large to justify a policy of international piracy may well be doubted. The filching of French territory had a profound and disturbing effect in France, and the national feeling was ably expressed by M. Hanotaux, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Germany, by prosecuting a design that aimed simultaneously at Great Britain, France, and Belgium, he said, "has stirred up alarm in the heart of Europe. For the first time in the century the

<sup>1</sup> It may be mentioned that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Lindquist, the Director of the Colonial Department, differed sharply on the question of "compensations," and that the latter resigned his office rather than acquiesce in the Imperial Chancellor's policy.

neutrals and the weak feel themselves directly jeopardised. . . . The French Congo has its loins shattered and its throat tightly gripped; it will perish by paralysis or strangulation. We possessed an Empire : they have left us corridors.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Revue Hebdomadaire*, November 4, 1911.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE FUTURE OF THE GERMAN COLONIES

**T**HE progress of the territories occupied by Germany in Africa was not at first sufficient to warrant the assumption that Germans were heaven-born administrators. It had been Bismarck's intention to found a number of mercantile settlements which should form the nuclei of territorial colonies, and to grant charters to commercial companies operating in the territories placed under the protection of the German flag.

With this object, as has been seen, charters granting certain sovereign rights were conferred upon the *Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation*, subsequently the *Deutsche Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft*, whilst other companies received rights which, whilst not being exactly sovereign in character, were yet of an extensive and important nature. The *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwestafrika*, the *Witu-Gesellschaft*, the *Gesellschaft Süd-Kamerun*, and the *Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun*, were the principal of these non-sovereign bodies, and they possessed extensive tracts of territory over which they exercised more or less effective control. But on the whole the colonial commercial policy initiated by Bismarck was not a success.

The reason for this lack of success is to be found mainly in the fact that the colonial companies were provided with a very insufficient capital, for neither the mercantile bodies, which might have been expected to afford adequate financial

support, nor the general public were prepared to risk their money in colonial adventures that did not afford any certain prospect of an adequate return on the invested capital. Men like Lüderitz and Peters were regarded as visionaries, and they did not appeal to the public which is in the habit of putting its hands into its pockets for the purpose of furnishing the necessary wherewithal. Nor was the Reichstag in the early days of the colonial movement prepared to support an active policy of exploitation in the German colonies.

There was a considerable body of public opinion consistently opposed to the policy that had been initiated, and this made itself felt in a variety of ways that were detrimental to the progress of the German colonial empire. With regard to South-West Africa, for example, so little progress was really made up to the year 1890 that it was frequently suggested that the colony should be sold, as it appeared likely only to be a drain upon the Imperial resources and never likely to be a financial success. A wave of reaction against the colonial movement swept over Germany, and the tide of enthusiasm that had passed over the country when Germany first asserted her position as a colonising nation was succeeded by a period of depression, during which it was freely asserted that the colonies were no good, and were only a burden to the Empire.

Nevertheless, after the first few years of disappointment and reaction had been safely passed, considerable progress was made, and it eventually became evident that the German colonies in Africa were a valuable heritage which only required a vigorous administrative and commercial policy to make them extremely useful to the Fatherland. Railways were projected and constructed, roads were made, bridges

were built, and a vigorous public works policy was initiated;<sup>1</sup> the settlement of agricultural colonists was encouraged, plantations were established, tropical products were cultivated; and commercially the colonies made rapid progress under the not too liberal commercial policy favoured by the Imperial Government. Difficulties with the natives and the lack of true administrative ability caused constant set-backs, but in spite of these occurrences and the sometimes savage and pitiless procedure of the administrators towards the native races, the four German colonies became firmly established as commercial depots of the Fatherland. Before the outbreak of the war of 1914-15 it is not too much to say that they were quite as valuable and had quite as great possibilities attaching to them as any similarly situated French or British colony, whilst their value as tropical storehouses was fully recognised in the Fatherland.

At the present juncture the question naturally arises: what is to be the future of these colonies in Africa? Will they be handed back to Germany or will they be occupied by some other Power or Powers? From the British point of view they are certainly of great importance. It will be well to examine therefore their economic possibilities. The value of these African territories is enormous. Although until the commencement of the twentieth century it was the fashion to underrate their importance as economic reserves whence will be exported a goodly proportion of the tropical products needed to feed the European industrial machine, it is now generally conceded that when Germany

<sup>1</sup> Those who have visited any of the German colonial possessions must have been impressed by the admirable public buildings erected in the principal towns, and by the contrast these towns present when compared with those of neighbouring British colonies. The writer has visited Swakopmund, Dar-es-Salaam, and Tanga, and was specially struck by the fine public buildings and the order and cleanliness that existed.



entered upon the colonial scramble of the early 'eighties, Bismarck and those associated with him had an eye upon the main chance. The colonial movement in Germany, which was fostered and directed by a band of enthusiasts who were the pioneers of German expansion overseas, was almost unknown and certainly completely misunderstood in Britain. What British statesmen of the period failed to understand and even many British commercial pioneers did not realise was that Africa was the storehouse of industrialism, and presented opportunities for economic exploitation that had never occurred in the history of mankind. Whilst we were slowly and laboriously building up our great heritage in Africa, adding province by province to our African empire because circumstances compelled a continuous advance in order that we might safeguard the lands that we already possessed, Germans were working upon a systematic and well conceived plan for the acquisition of territory. They required plantations for the supply of the raw material necessary for their growing industries. Neither strategy—at least to no large extent in the first years of their colonial enterprise—nor philanthropy entered into their motives.

Previous to the entry of Germany upon the colonial sphere we had acquired little territory in tropical and sub-tropical Africa. Rhodesia, an empire in itself, was then under the sway of the native races who had only recently come into contact with European civilisation. The Transvaal and Orange Free State were practically independent Boer republics. The Orange River and Bechuanaland formed the north-western boundaries of Cape Colony. Neither Nyasaland, Uganda, British East Africa, nor Somaliland had been added to the Empire; and in West Africa we possessed a few coastal settlements in the Gambia,

Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos, whilst the hinterland, with the exception of Ashanti, could only be regarded as a "sphere of influence." German statesmen and German merchants realised that a great portion of Africa was available for Germanic enterprise, and they laid their plans accordingly. The statement of Bismarck that Germany desired no colonies seemed to the unintelligent to represent the inner mind of Germany. But whilst Bismarck temporised he in reality directed the movement which was to end in the extension of German influence into tropical countries. In the struggle for African possessions which followed the establishment of Germany at Angra Pequena we fortunately acquired invaluable territories; for the entry of Germany upon the colonial sphere had roused to an appreciation of the dangers of delay those who fondly believed in the permanence of the *status quo* and who were loath to extend British territory into the interior. British and colonial statesmen at length realised that action was imperatively demanded. But Germany also obtained a considerable and valuable share of the spoil—a share that no one could then properly begrudge to an active and enterprising nation.

Before considering the possible future of the German colonies in the event of Germany being permanently disabled as a result of the war that is now raging, it will be well to examine the map of Africa and to determine the reasons that make the acquisition of a portion of these territories a matter of importance for Great Britain. The German African colonies are divided into three groups—those in West, South-West, and East Africa. To the first belong the two colonies of Togoland and Kamerun. The former is a compact and narrow wedge of territory having an area of 33,000 square miles and an estimated

population of one and a half million. To Great Britain it is of importance because it is conterminous with the Gold Coast Colony, from which it is divided by the Volta, a navigable river rising in the Kong highlands and falling into the Bight of Benin at Addah in British territory. But France has some claim for consideration so far as Togoland is concerned, because her colony of Dahomey forms its eastern boundary, and the acquisition of this valuable territory would not only give her a longer coast line on the Gulf of Guinea, but would also add largely to the importance of her West African empire. Although the coast line is only about 32 miles in length, it possesses a good open port at Lome, the capital city, which is served by two railways running towards Palime and Atakpame and by another along the coast from Lome to Anecho. The hinterland is reached, moreover, by a network of roads which for cheapness and excellence of construction are unsurpassed anywhere in West Africa, and act as important feeders to the railways. The trade of Togoland has shown a continuous increase in recent years, and the exports during the year 1912 were valued at £477,000, a not inconsiderable proportion of which was due to the cultivation of palm kernels and oil, rubber, and cotton. Togoland would form, therefore, entirely apart from its value as a tropical plantation, a most important highway into the interior and would be a colony of great value to any industrial nation. The latter—Kamerun—forms the eastern boundary of Nigeria, and with the exception of that colony and the small Spanish possession of Rio Muni (Spanish Guinea) is almost entirely surrounded by French territory. The Kamerun colony, which extends north-eastwards to the shores of Lake Chad and southwards as far as the Congo, had, previous to the readjustment of territory with France, an area of 191,000

square miles, with a population variously estimated at from three and a half to four millions. As a result of the action taken by the German Government during the Agadir crisis, Germany filched from France a block of territory consisting of another 100,000 square miles, which was added to the colony and gave access to the Congo in the south and to the Ubangi, its tributary, in the middle east. Any rearrangement of territory would premise, therefore, either the return of this territory to France or a considerable modification of the present boundaries. The value of exports from the Kamerun protectorate is considerably over £1,000,000, of which rubber, palm products, and cocoa are the principal. The Cameroons form a portion of that great Central African Empire of which Von Weber dreamed in 1879. As in Togoland, railways have been established. These consist of a short line from Victoria to Soppo, one from Duala to the Manenguba Hills, and another from Duala to Edea and projected to Mbalmaja on the Njong River. These railways, however, only serve a small portion of the immense country occupied by Germany.

In South Africa the important colony of German South-West Africa, the first of Germany's colonial possessions, may be said almost to form a natural extension of our South African possessions. It is the principal German colony which has offered a permanent home for any considerable number of German emigrants, and although, owing to a too rigid system of administration which resulted in disastrous native wars, its progress has been considerably retarded so that, after an occupation of thirty years, there are fewer than fifteen thousand Europeans in the country, it is nevertheless a territory of great and increasing value. The only safe harbour, at Walfish Bay, is in British hands, but from the commercial capital at Swakopmund, an open roadstead

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which the Germans have been forced to use for the want of a better, two lines of railway run into the interior, the first towards the north-east to the Otavi and Tsumeb mines—copper, lead, and silver—and to Grootfontein, the second to the capital at Windhuk, whence it runs southwards to join with the railway from the coast at Lüderitz Bay to Keetmanshoop, where it has been continued towards the Cape frontier. Although German South-West Africa is cursed with one of the most forbidding and desolate coastal regions on the face of the globe, the interior of the country has great agricultural and pastoral possibilities, whilst the whole country, especially in the north, is full of mineral riches and in the south there are extensive diamond deposits. The total area of the colony is 322,000 square miles, or more than half as large again as the German Empire in Europe, and the exports, which show a continuous increase, are well over one million pounds sterling in value.

Germany's fourth colony in Africa is perhaps her most valuable possession, because not only does it contain immense forests and vast stores of fibrous products, but it has, now that the railway to Lake Tanganyika is completed, an important highway into the interior of Africa that is destined to rival the Uganda Railway and probably to compete with the latter for the traffic from Central Africa. The building of this railway from Dar-es-Salaam, the excellent and beautiful harbour on the Indian Ocean, through Tabora to Kigoma (near Ujiji), on Lake Tanganyika, is one of Germany's most notable colonial achievements, for not only was the railway built with great celerity, but it taps, by means of the unrivalled north to south waterway of Lake Tanganyika, the riches of the Congo region and forms a natural avenue for trade from Central Africa to the

eastern coasts. In addition to this railway, another (the Usambara Railway) has been constructed from the safe land-locked harbour at Tanga to Moschi, at the foot of Mount Kilimandjaro, a region that offers great opportunities to the planter and agriculturist. Here again is a colony which Britain could occupy with the best results to the Motherland. In the north-east the mineral wealth of Ruanda offers a tempting bait, whilst the network of waterways from Lake Nyasa in the south, through Lake Tanganyika, to Lakes Kivu and Victoria Nyanza, half of the last being in German territory, afford means of communication that are almost unrivalled. But above all German East Africa appeals with great force to all those who believe that Cecil Rhodes's great ideal of a Cape to Cairo railway is a possibility of the near future, for with the Central African lake region in British hands a route through British territory from Cape Town to the Mediterranean would be assured. The trade of German East Africa has more than trebled during the last four years, and in 1912 the exports reached a total of £1,570,000. The total population of the colony was seven and a half millions, of whom only 3,500 were of German nationality, whilst the area is about 384,000 square miles, or nearly twice as large as that of Germany.

It might at first seem that Britain, with a quarter of the habitable surface of the globe in her possession, has no need for further colonies. But the conviction must be borne upon us, after a careful survey of European countries and European conditions, that there is little likelihood of any other European nation entering upon the colonial sphere. It would appear as if the first qualification for any nation that aspires to the possession of territory in Africa is either sea-power or some form of international guarantee such as is possessed by Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, whilst

the second is the ownership of great industrial concerns which are capable of assimilating and utilising the raw products of tropical lands. Emigration and permanent settlement hardly enter into the question. Let us examine, therefore, the qualifications for plantation colonising possessed by the different European nations. Germany may naturally be ruled out of our survey because she has forfeited all claims for consideration as an enemy with which we as an empire are now actively engaged. Austria, for similar reasons, has no claims upon Africa, even if her hands were not likely to be sufficiently full with the reorganisation and preservation of her own empire. Italy, on the other hand, has many claims for recognition, although it is probable that her enterprise in Tripoli and possible extensions on the Adriatic are likely to keep her fully occupied. However, if compensation were required, some modification of the Somaliland boundaries might possibly be considered by responsible statesmen. Spain has already lost the remains of her overseas empire, after muddling along for centuries in the New World as the guardian of vast territories which she was neither able to utilise nor govern. Portugal has more territory than she can adequately manage, possessing as she does vast colonies in East and West Africa which will some day attain an importance that is now hardly dreamt of. Russia is never likely to attempt the governance of overseas possessions until she has secured unimpeded access to the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or the North Sea, and in any case will probably prefer a conterminous empire than any system of scattered colonies. Belgium has already a vast territory in Central Africa which is eighty times larger than the mother country. Holland possesses important and highly valuable colonies in the Far East and South America, whilst Denmark is

unlikely to desire or to be able to utilise other colonies than the islands she now owns.

Of all European countries, therefore, there remain only Norway, Sweden, and France that need to be taken into consideration. The two former are never likely to desire territorial extensions in Africa, whilst the claims of the last have already been briefly indicated. It would seem, therefore, after a rapid survey of the political sphere, that Britain is the predestined owner of a great part of African soil and as if the destinies of the larger portion of the negro race will eventually be worked out under the Union Jack. But there remains one other great and powerful nation that has as yet taken no part either in the regeneration or exploitation of Africa—a nation that sooner or later will be compelled to obtain new sources of tropical supplies and to extend her influence over other portions of the globe than those now under her sway. The future of the United States as a plantation Power has so far scarcely been considered. The entry of America upon the African continent would involve a reversal of traditional American policy, though not so great an upheaval as would have been the case before the Philippines, some of the Samoan islands, Porto Rico, and Cuba had come under the American flag or had fallen under American influence. Yet even were America desirous—and there is no present evidence of such a desire—of undertaking fresh responsibilities (in Africa), and even were Great Britain anxious to assist, it is hardly probable that such assistance would be forthcoming without some substantial compensation in the form of a rearrangement or exchange of territory. But such a possibility may well occur within the present or next generation. America, if she is to continue triumphantly in the future along the paths of progress she has trodden in the past, can hardly



afford to deny herself the opportunity of acquiring tropical possessions from which she might gather the products that will be needed for her own enterprises. The vast stores of rubber, cotton, and other fibres, vegetable oils, copra, tea, coffee, and other tropical products that are consumed by her population or utilised in her factories will doubtless, if her progress is to be assured, be obtained from American territory outside the boundaries of the United States. Where, then, is she to obtain sufficient territory so that a part, at any rate, of her raw products may be assured to her? The answer seems evident. The South American republics, restless under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, would seem unlikely to become an appanage of their more powerful neighbour, and Africa alone is capable of offering scope for the aspirations—for there will be such aspirations long before the end of the present century—of those who will desire the entry of America upon new tropical lands. If, owing to the eventual triumph of British sea-power, Germany loses her colonies, Britons should welcome rather than resent the entry of a new competitor. The establishment of America in Africa would, far from leading to friction or jealousy, result in a healthy rivalry in methods of administration. Americans would introduce new ideas, and although doubtless they would freely admit that they would have much to learn from us, and would not adopt the attitude of the organ of the German colonial party, which asserted that “Germany has nothing to learn from England or any other colonising nation, having a method of handling social problems peculiar to the German spirit,” they would carry on their administrative work upon new and vigorous lines. The experiment from our own point of view would be invaluable. From that of America it would quicken and establish an interest among the

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Americans in the problems that confront white people in dealing with vast masses of uncivilised races. Moreover, in the distant future the presence of America in Africa might be of inestimable value to the Britannic peoples.

It has been suggested that such an event might be facilitated by an exchange of territory. It is not the writer's intention to suggest what portion of Africa might be acquired by America, but the established British colonies can be ruled out of the discussion, not only because we as a nation are under definite obligations to the native races, but also because the British people would be unlikely to regard favourably a rearrangement of territory. Of the four German colonies, each has its peculiar value from a British point of view. But such an exchange should and could be arranged, and so far as America is concerned there is one strip of territory that would offer an excellent basis for negotiation. I allude to that portion of Alaska which extends from Yakutat Bay to the Portland Canal and shuts off Northern British Columbia from access to the sea. The territory in question may be described as a perpetual sore on the back of the Canadian people. The diplomatic quarrel which resulted in the permanent occupation of the "Panhandle" by America is to be deeply deplored, because it has undoubtedly caused ill-feeling between Canadians and Americans, and from the British point of view has resulted in an idea amongst Canadians that British diplomacy was at fault and that Canadian interests were sacrificed to the interests of the Empire at large. However wrong historically the latter assumption may be, there can be no doubt that it really exists, and any step that will remove this impression would be welcome as a move tending to consolidate and solidify Anglo-American friendship. But it is more than probable that the programme here suggested

will appeal neither to the American nor the British peoples for reasons that cannot be discussed in the present volume.

Two other points may well be considered in connection with the colonial settlement after the war. Suggestions have been made that German East Africa would form a most suitable colony for the Japanese, and this idea has been met by the further suggestion that the country should be thrown open to immigration from India and might be placed under the administration of the Indian Government. These two suggestions, admirable in themselves, affect a variety of considerations that need not here be entered upon. But two remarks may be made. Japan, it is certain, will require compensation for the part she has taken in the support of British sea-power, for help she afforded in the destruction of such portions of the German fleet as managed to keep on the high seas, and for the assistance rendered in the capture of the German colony in the Far East. Either Japan will expect to retain Kiao-Chau or she will look for some form of compensation elsewhere. With a steadily increasing population seeking for new territory in which to settle, it is evident that before many decades have passed Japanese statesmen will be forced to initiate a vigorous colonial policy. Is such a policy to be confined to the Far East—that is, Korea, Manchuria, and the islands in the Pacific—or to include the possibility of establishing a footing in Northern Australia, or is it to be directed towards Africa, where there undoubtedly exist territories extremely suitable for Japanese colonisation? The question will sooner or later force itself upon public attention, and it is essential that in the coming colonial rearrangement the claims of Japan shall not be ignored.

On the other hand the problem of Indian immigration into our own overseas Dominions urgently requires settle-

ment. Not only is the present position a menace to the future of the British Empire, but it is felt by the Indian peoples as an intolerable hardship that they should be debarred from settling in the unpeopled wastes of our vast self-governing Dominions. The problem at present seems insoluble. But the possession of German East Africa by Great Britain would at once enable a satisfactory and perhaps permanent solution to be arrived at. Indians have already settled in considerable numbers on the East African coasts, where for centuries they have exercised great influence as traders and merchants. There seems no adequate reason why Indian emigration on an extensive scale to German East Africa, should it eventually fall into our hands, should not be initiated under the direct control of the Indian Government. These three solutions of the coming colonial problem—American, Japanese, and Indian—will certainly have to be considered, and the possibility of utilising fully under sufficient guarantees the vast resources of these territories will become one of the most pressing questions of the future.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF GERMAN POLICY

**I**N a debate in the Reichstag on January 14, 1893, Dr. Kayser, then head of the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office, stated that South-West Africa had always been a bugbear to Germany. "Had it not been for the Colonial Association, the English would have secured the whole country. . . . All the former hopes cherished by English politicians and speculators that Germany would abandon her South-West African possessions have proved delusive, for the English were now ready to live on friendly terms with their neighbours." A few days later, on March 1, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Caprivi, speaking on the colonial question that was then agitating the country, admitted that "the Government had waited ten years to see what German capital would make of South-West Africa," and said that "the total failure of German enterprises had induced him to grant concessions to English capital in order to make something out of German South-West Africa which would be worth while protecting." Since that date much has happened in connection with the German African colonies. They have advanced greatly, and previous to the outbreak of the war in August, 1914, they had attained a state of prosperity that seemed likely in future almost to justify the expenditure of money and lives that had been lavished upon them.

But in reviewing the progress of the German colonies

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four questions are constantly arising : How far the Germans have succeeded in making the best use of their tropical and semi-tropical possessions? Whether the policy they have pursued has been instrumental in bringing about the economic prosperity of their colonies? Whether the colonies would not have advanced far more rapidly under other control? and, above all, whether Germans have justified their self-appointed guardianship over the native races by bringing to them the blessings of civilisation and introducing amongst them the benefits of peace and progress? With regard to the last question, there can be very little doubt as to the nature of the answer that will be returned by any unbiased and well informed onlooker. The Germans have not only failed in their native policy, but they have failed because they have been unwilling to learn from other nations and have initiated methods of their own, "peculiar to the German spirit," that have been quite unsuitable when dealing with native races. The mailed fist methods and sledge-hammer proceedings of the military; the unimaginative operations of the bureaucratic officials who have set forth light-heartedly to govern provinces by means of the ruler and red-tape; the dry scientific investigations of the learned professors who have wandered over the German colonies in search of anthropological measurements; the unbending legal codes imposed upon the natives by purblind jurists; and, above all, the entire disregard of native customs, manners, and "rights," have produced a deep resentment amongst the native races that has too often resulted in revolt and has sometimes led to their almost complete annihilation. In the preceding pages some account has been given of these revolts and of the causes that led to them, but it may here be said briefly that military undertakings, either defensive or aggressive, have been the constant

accompaniment of colonial "progress." It has never been a question—or, at least, to no large extent—of the white settler displacing the aboriginal inhabitant, as was the case in North America and other portions of the world, for the native life that has been so ruthlessly destroyed was essential to the industrial welfare of the devastated districts. The native wars in the German colonies have been brought about almost entirely by the inability of the German colonial official to understand the people among whom he has been placed. In certain colonies the revolts have been incessant. Not to mention the disastrous wars in German South-West Africa, which have been dealt with in a former chapter, it may be stated that the record of the Kamerun colony has been stained by needless bloodshed and that the years from 1891 to 1903 were filled with constant warfare. There were no fewer than twenty-nine punitive expeditions during this period, and though these were spread over an immense territory, they are eloquent of the inability of German administrators to impose their will on subject peoples without the aid of the gun and bayonet. A similar state of affairs existed in German East Africa during the same period. The military expenditure as a result of these expeditions has naturally been enormous and out of all proportion to the results that were achieved by industrial operations in the colonies. To raise a colonial system upon a foundation of blood can only be justified should there be no other alternative and should success ultimately attend the sacrifice of the potentially valuable life. From the financial point of view it can only be justified in the event of the industrial output being increased owing to the "removal" of the native population; but no one has been bold enough to assert that this has been the case in the German colonies, for it would seem that such success as has been achieved

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has been attained in spite of the dragooning of the natives, and not because of it.

According to an estimate submitted to the Reichstag in 1906 the cost of the German colonies had been £32,000,000, but this amount did not include the steamship subventions, the telegraphs, the railways, and other necessary public works, nor the £30,000,000 expenditure that was due to the Herero rebellion. Since that date the colonial expenditure has, of course, greatly increased, and it is significant that a large portion of this outlay has been devoted to purely military objects, either in connection with preserving order amongst the natives or with other ulterior motives which, in the case of South-West Africa, have been only too apparent. In this respect the sum of 14,928,000 marks expended on the army of occupation or upon military preparations in German South-West Africa during the year 1913-14 is specially significant.

When the Germans light-heartedly shouldered their colonial burdens and entered without preparation upon their task of governing immense tropical and semi-tropical territories, containing diverse races of differing civilisations and varied manners and governing themselves by strange laws and customs, the greater portion of the German people had been worked up to an enthusiastic belief in their genius as a colonising nation, able to administer and control all races that might come under their sway. A few years of unsuccessful experiment produced a reaction in the Fatherland, where in the early 'nineties and until well into the present century there were many who questioned the utility of colonies and were bitterly opposed to what was regarded as unnecessary expenditure upon them. The German people did not respond generously to the demands made upon them. Without exception the necessary funds for the



proper exploitation and administration of their territories were withheld ; merchants, bankers, and the investing public did not readily finance undertakings in the new national possessions, and little interest was really taken in the colonial movement after it had once been set going. The immediate result of this administrative parsimony, so characteristic of the German people, was that the colonies were neglected, the wrong class of officials was appointed to their control, abuses of all kinds were introduced into the colonial administrations, and for some years it seemed as if German plantation colonisation was an utter failure. Moreover, this apparent failure was emphasised and made more conspicuous owing to the system of administration that was introduced by incompetent and self-satisfied officials who were not prepared to learn from other nations and had had no training in the arts that go to the making of a successful administrator in Africa. Administrative tradition was entirely lacking, and what Bismarck feared in the first instance—the imposition of the Prussian bureaucrat upon the native races—actually took place, with its inevitable result of disastrous wars and rebellions.

It would not be difficult to point out many instances of the abuse of power on the part of German colonial officials, especially in the early days of the colonies. “The causes of our colonial fiasco are various,” said a deputy speaking in the Reichstag ; “the choice of officials has been unfortunate. The colonies are regarded as relief institutions for the benefit of individuals who have failed to make their way at home.” As a matter of fact, service in the German colonies was not eagerly sought after, and it frequently happened that the least reputable class of officials sought relief from the tedium of life in a Berlin office by seeking excitement and adventure amidst new and unfamiliar surround-

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ings. The long fight between the two schools of colonial enthusiasts—those who regarded even the African colonies as suitable for white colonisation upon an extensive scale, and those who looked upon them as economic reserves and plantation colonies—had not been favourable to any settled administrative policy, and the emigration question which agitated the minds of the exponents of the former school led to perpetual differences between officials and settlers. The policy of the German Government in this matter was only really indicated at the time of the Morocco crisis, when the then Colonial Secretary was forced to resign owing to his fearless exposition of the policy of settlement as opposed to the policy of exploitation. “The German Government,” said Professor Bonn, “have shown clearly enough that their ideal of colonisation is not a policy of settlement, but one of commercial exploitation. The fact that a Colonial Secretary who had advocated the impossible policy of white settlements in Africa with unflinching courage sent in his resignation before the bargain was concluded (i.e. the acquisition of a portion of the French Congo) can be looked upon as a dramatical end of the fight between two schools of colonial ideas.”<sup>1</sup> This uncertainty regarding German colonial policy naturally had a bad effect in the colonies themselves, but so far as the officials were concerned the real trouble arose owing to the inefficient control exercised by the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office. In spite of the centralisation of administration, there was really no effective supervision over the proceedings of colonial officials until a special Court of Discipline was instituted to inquire into abuses and to inflict punishments wherever necessary. What Bismarck had regarded as one of the difficulties in connection with British tropical administration, viz. the

<sup>1</sup> *United Empire*, vol. V., p. 123.

difficulty of supervising officials scattered over immense territories, was intensified in the case of the German colonies, where there was no body of tradition to lead the official to a balanced judgment and where the idea that the European had certain obligations towards the native races which needed honourable fulfilment was not understood by the rank and file and often not practised by those high in authority. Brutality and maladministration in high places were of not infrequent occurrence. "In one of the most notorious cases," states Mr. W. H. Dawson in an interesting chapter upon this subject,<sup>1</sup> "a colonial governor was found guilty of brutality, of taking lives unjustifiably, and of being prompted by sensual motives to acts of vindictiveness, and he was deprived of office and titles. Another governor more lately was fined and reprimanded—he had already been relieved of office—for forging a passport for a paramour whom he had audaciously set up by his side in the place of administration. A third governor has, under Herr Dernburg's régime, been dismissed from the service for torturing a native chief to death by flogging him and chaining him to a flagstaff for thirty-six hours without food or water."

Such crimes, states Mr. Dawson, "are typical of the worst crimes which have been committed by high officials, but the entire record makes a terrible story of obliquity and moral deterioration." Without appearing pharisaical, it may be asserted that such crimes by a British colonial governor would be impossible, because during the long course of our tropical administration there has been evolved amongst British officials a sense of proportion and of fitness that has been almost entirely lacking in the German system. In other words, a sense of *noblesse oblige*

<sup>1</sup> "The Evolution of Modern Germany," chap. xviii.

even towards native races has been brought about during generations of service.

It is unfortunate, but nevertheless true, that the worst side of an administrative policy has the greatest effect upon the native mind, whilst the benefits—and they are many—that are to be experienced under a strong and settled government are overlooked and ignored. Excesses are remembered and the memory of wrongs is secretly nourished. The baleful effects of the actions of the black sheep—and at one period they were not few—amongst the German colonial officials are to be seen in the German African colonies to this day, because the natives have never learned to respect their German masters, although they have learned to fear and obey them. The Herero War had a cooling effect upon German colonial policy, but the cost was great. German officials began to learn that the native, in order to be ruled, must be understood, and that his habits, customs, ideas, and desires must be carefully studied. “What I have for years repeatedly declared,” stated Professor von Luschan, one of the leading German anthropologists, in a lecture given in 1906, “has been told me by several high British colonial officials as the result of their many years’ experience—that all European officials in the protected territories will sooner or later come to grief if they treat the natives badly, that is, roughly, disparagingly, cruelly, and unjustly; while, on the other hand, genuine success in colonial enterprise can only be achieved by those Europeans who interest themselves personally in the natives. . . . I am entirely convinced that our late war in South-West Africa might easily have been avoided, and that it was simply the result of the disparagement that ruled in the leading circles regarding the teachings of ethnology. Taught by bitter experience, we shall now be compelled to study the native

in our colonies, simply because he is the most important product of the soil, which never can be supplanted by any substitute, and must therefore be regarded as absolutely indispensable.”<sup>1</sup> Yet one of the main effects of German colonial policy has been to deplete the labour reserves upon which the prosperity of the colonies has depended. “We succeeded in breaking up the native tribes,” said Dr. Bonn in a lecture before the Royal Colonial Institute, “but we have not yet succeeded in creating a new Germany,” whilst Dr. Rohrbach, the Imperial Commissioner for South-West Africa, wrote with conscious or unconscious irony, “The land question is solved. The Hereros have lost their land, which is now fiscal land and is settled by whites. The cattle question is also solved. The whole of the live-stock of the Hereros has been destroyed: there are hardly any cattle left. Yet that does not appear tragic when one remembers the wonderful fertility of the country.”

The effect of the administrative policy in Germany itself was certainly disastrous, because, as has been stated, a reaction took place during which the colonial system was attacked root and branch. The colonies produced no tangible results save battle, murder, and sudden death. The faith of the colonial enthusiasts who had urged Bismarck along the thorny paths of colonialism did not appear to have been justified or likely to be realised within the lives of those then living. Moreover, as well as being an economic burden to the Fatherland, the colonies were so constant a source of discord with neighbouring nations that the more timid among the Germans feared that the expenditure upon them was unjustified and unjustifiable. But, like all reactions, the unpopularity of the colonies came to an end, and with the growth of prosperity due to better administration and

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Dawson's "Evolution of Modern Germany."

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an enlightened policy of establishing public works, such as railways, bridges, and harbours, there arose a belief that the German colonies were one of the greatest of the national assets and were but the beginning of that greater Germany beyond the seas that had always been the dream of the colonial enthusiasts. Much of this new reaction against the gloomy forebodings of men of little faith was due to the enthusiastic work of Herr Bernard Dernburg, who at a critical period in German colonial history was made responsible for the administration of the Colonial Department.

Previous to the appointment of Herr Dernburg as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1907, German colonial affairs were managed by a special department of the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Minister was constitutionally responsible for the administration of the colonies. This system, although considerable latitude had been allowed to the director of the Colonial Department, had not worked satisfactorily. In spite of the fact that the centralisation of authority was due to Bismarck's initiative, and was designed to overcome the inconvenience that was so frequently experienced in connection with the British system when communications had to be passed between the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and had thus led to delay, it had broken down under the test of practical work. With the growth of German colonial interests it was found expedient to adopt the system of separate departments, and the opportunity occurred at the end of 1906, when Prince Bülow quarrelled with the Centre Party over a vote of £400,000 for the South-West Africa colony and appealed to the people. He rallied to his support a "block" consisting of Conservatives, National Liberals, and Radicals, and with the aid of the Emperor, who addressed an election crowd at midnight

from the balcony of his palace at Berlin, secured a notable triumph for the policy of imperialism and expansion which he had set before the people. Previous to the election of 1907 the newspapers had been full of complaints against colonial scandals and the waste of public money upon the German colonies, but the triumph of the Government gave them a free hand, not only to pursue their aggressive policy, but to carry through a reform of the whole colonial system. The man who was placed at the head of the Colonial Office is, perhaps with the exception of Bismarck, the most notable figure in Germany's colonial history. Herr Dernburg took the colonial question vigorously in hand. He infused new life into the colonial party. In and out of season he insisted upon the great value to Germany of her colonial possessions. He stumped the country on behalf of his pet schemes. He painted everything in the most rosy colours, convinced the wavering that the colonies were a real asset, and initiated sweeping reforms in the administration. By a personal visit to the British and German colonies in South and East Africa, Herr Dernburg made himself thoroughly acquainted with colonial conditions, and he was not above adopting from other nations whatever he thought might be applied with advantage to the colonial needs of Germany. He shook the dead bones of officialdom and breathed into them his own spirit of enthusiasm.

As a man of business Dernburg took the most practical view of his duties. "Will Germany," he asked, "in regard to its colonial possessions abdicate the position which it has won, in stern, strenuous, and noble contest, of primacy in the mental sciences and in applied technics?" and again in impressing upon German merchants the value of the German colonial empire, he said that "German colonial policy signifies nothing more or less than a question of the future

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of national labour, a question of bread for many millions of industrial workers, and a question of the employment of domestic capital in trade, industry, and navigation." There can be no doubt that the new Secretary of State took too rosy a view of the future of the German colonies, particularly with regard to South-West Africa, and that he overloaded his colonial palette with colours of too brilliant a hue; but it must be remembered that he was fighting against the gloomy and despondent views that had been prevalent.

The potential wealth of the German colonies is, of course, immense, and Dernburg made the best use of it in the commercial sermons which he addressed to the German people. That his policy of advertisement was fully justified is proved by the striking revival that followed his colonial pilgrimages. Within the last few years the prosperity of the German colonies in Africa has increased by leaps and bounds, and this result is due in no small measure to the activity displayed by the first Secretary of State for the Colonies, who seemed to vie with Mr. Chamberlain in preaching the colonial doctrine to his countrymen. An examination of the export figures for the past few years reveals the remarkable progress since Dernburg took charge of the Colonial Office. The following are the figures :

	1907 <i>Marks</i>	1909 <i>Marks</i>	1912 <i>Marks</i>
German East Africa . . . . .	12,500,000	13,120,000	31,418,000
Kamerun . . . . .	15,891,000	15,701,000	23,336,000
Togo . . . . .	5,916,000	7,372,000	9,959,000
German S.W. Africa . . . . .	1,616,000	22,071,000	39,035,000
	35,923,000	58,264,000	103,748,000



It will be seen that the export trade more than trebled within six years—an achievement of which the Germans might well feel proud. But Dernburg's activities were not confined to the commercial side of German colonial policy. During his visit to Africa he inquired thoroughly into the reasons for the comparative failure of German colonisation, and he was able to put his hand upon one of the chief causes—the hostility between officials, planters, and natives. “The planters,” he said, “are at war with everybody—with myself, with the Government, with the local officials, and finally with the natives. Their only object is to make as much money as possible and to keep wages as low as possible. . . . On the coast it makes a very unfavourable impression on one to see so many white men go about with negro whips. I even found one on the table of the principal pay office in Dar-es-Salaam.” And he criticised unfavourably the expenditure of money upon expensive and handsome buildings before the foundations had been laid for an effective policy, pointing out that in the British colonies the officials were able to carry on the necessary administrative work in temporary or inexpensive buildings in order that funds might be available for the construction of railways, roads, and bridges for the opening up of the country.

Since Dernburg first uttered his criticisms the Germans have pursued an intelligent public works policy. Less money has been spent upon the trappings of officialdom: more money has been devoted to providing avenues of trade, such as the magnificent Tanganyika Railway, completed in 1914, and upon agricultural and experimental work. During the time that he acted as Secretary of State, Herr Dernburg exercised a revivifying influence upon German colonial policy, and the effect of the reforms he initiated and the practical expansive policy he pursued has been

specially apparent in the German African possessions. When he took office the German colonies were not a success. Their potentialities were immense, but little practical work, save of a scientific nature, had really been achieved. But at the outbreak of the war, when Africa was thrown into the melting-pot, the German colonies had attained a great measure of success. The exports had trebled—and it must be remembered that Dernburg had claimed that within five years they could be raised from £3,000,000 to £10,000,000—the railway mileage had increased from a paltry 1,448 kilometres in the year 1906, of which 1,102 kilometres were in German South-West Africa, to 4,536 kilometres; the productive capacity of the colonies had been greatly improved; and a new spirit had been infused into the officials responsible for their administration. German colonial policy was at length justified, and there were few in Germany who had not become convinced that the colonies were precious possessions not to be lightly parted with. This belief was fostered not only by their growing prosperity but by the national desire to be independent of outside sources of supply. Rubber, cotton, and all kinds of fibres and other products necessary for the manufactures of the Fatherland would be supplied by the German colonies at prices, it was believed, that would enable German manufacturers to undersell those of every other nation. Economically false as this assumption must necessarily be, it nevertheless, through the persuasive eloquence of Herr Dernburg, served to impress upon the German people the economic importance of their colonies, and the lesson once driven home there was no longer any talk about the failure of German colonial enterprise. From the scientific point of view it had always been a success and every encouragement had been given to the scientific appli-

cations of agriculture, the study of tropical products and agricultural experiments upon broad and practical lines, the utilisation of the indigenous fauna,<sup>1</sup> experimental work in the eradication of tropical diseases, the study of practical hygiene, and the study of native languages—to the exclusion not infrequently of the more practical work of exploitation and colonisation. If a scientific foundation be requisite in a modern colony, then there can be no possible doubt that such a basis was prepared in the German tropical possessions, but to adopt a homely simile, it is no good for a labourer to know how to use the theodolite if he cannot also handle a pick and axe.

Of late years too there has been a considerable change in the German attitude towards the natives. Not only has the stupidity of the former policy been realised but great efforts have been made, especially in East Africa, to bring to the natives the benefits of education. There is, of course, no compulsory education, though native children who have once commenced going to school are compelled to go through the course. Only a very small proportion of children ever attend school—in the Government schools there were only 4,650 pupils in East Africa at the commencement of the year 1913—but a good beginning has been made and the foundation of an excellent educational system is being well and effectively laid.

In conclusion one notable point in connection with the German colonies must be touched upon. Unlike the British colonies, the German African colonies have been in the nature of close corporations—with the possible exception of German South-West Africa, where British capital was

<sup>1</sup> At Dar-es-Salaam, for instance, there is, or was, an aquarium well stocked with the fishes of that part of the world. There was also an experimental farm where breeding experiments were carried on with zebras, asses, and ponies, with the object of producing a new hybrid for use in traction.

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welcomed by the authorities—not because foreign enterprise has been deliberately shut out, but owing to the fact that the German “spirit” has been opposed to the entry of competitors and because Germans have resented the intrusion of British merchants on their own peculiar preserves. In German East Africa, for instance, there is no British trading firm, nor is there a single British merchant in either of the chief cities. The German firms were so well established that it would have required very keen competition to obtain a foothold. The difference in this respect between German and British East Africa is sufficiently remarkable to form the basis of a sermon on British and German economic methods. On the other hand, in Togoland, British products—especially cotton goods—were able to compete fairly successfully with German manufactures.

## APPENDICES

IN view of the possibility that at the end of the present war there may be a rearrangement of colonial territory under which Great Britain might conceivably benefit considerably by the addition to her present Empire of portions of the German colonies, it seems desirable that steps should be taken to organise and co-ordinate the system of colonial education at present existing in this country. The probability that a considerable number of trained officials will be required in these new colonies, and that mercantile houses will also establish depots there, points to the necessity for initiating a teaching Colonial Institute upon the lines suggested in the article which I contributed to *United Empire* in June, 1913. It should not be overlooked that there has already been organised a strong committee dealing with the question of Imperial studies, and that this committee has arranged a series of lectures connected with Imperial topics. But these lectures are at present academic rather than practical in character, and deal with only one side of the question considered in the accompanying paper.

### APPENDIX I

#### THE CO-ORDINATION OF COLONIAL STUDIES<sup>1</sup>

Two years ago there appeared in these pages an article, by Mr. Louis Hamilton of the Berlin University, on Colonial Education in Germany. After exhaustively surveying the facilities for education at the three principal Colonial institutions in Germany, Mr. Hamilton suggested that the time had arrived for the establishment in this country of a

<sup>1</sup> Reproduced from *United Empire*, the monthly journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, by permission of the Council.

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British Imperial Colonial University upon the lines so successfully inaugurated at Hamburg. Since the appearance of Mr. Hamilton's able and suggestive article two or three plans have been put forward for the organisation of Colonial studies. In view of the reorganisation of the London University and educational reforms that are likely to be introduced in this country, the present opportunity seems peculiarly appropriate for again directing attention to the lamentable lacuna in the educational system of this the richest and most enterprising of the colonising nations. Year by year thousands of young men are sent overseas, some to take up responsible official positions in partly developed countries ; some to enter upon commercial careers in the Dominions, Crown Colonies, and India ; some to undertake planting in tropical and semi-tropical countries, or agriculture in one or other of the Dominions ; but nearly all only partly equipped for the career they have chosen and not trained to cope with the difficulties and problems of their new environment. It has been urged as some mitigation of our national neglect in these matters that a young man's best master is experience and that he is more likely to learn in the rough-and-tumble of Colonial life than in the most highly equipped schools of Europe. This is, of course, partly true. In the past our administrative and economic victories have been gained on the fields of immediate operation—in India, in Africa, and in the many diverse possessions which add so great a lustre to the British Crown. But conditions are changing. New nations employing new methods have entered upon a fierce competition in Colonial development. The tropical products of the world, the resources of the immense partly developed areas of America, Africa, and Australasia, the natural products of the sea and the land, are being studied and exploited not only on the spot, but are also being investigated in the laboratories and schools of Europe. The economic prize is more and more likely to fall to those who have fitted themselves by a preliminary training before undertaking the rougher work of actual exploitation. Moreover, however much we may be prepared to swear by our own administrative methods and our own commercial, industrial, and planting enterprises, it is at least apparent that other countries by superior training may equal, if not surpass us, in the actual work of making the most use of the opportunities offered by their at present more restricted spheres of enterprise—that is if we are unable to realise that in a world of change old methods must give way to new. Much is of course being done in this country not only to foster an intelligent interest in the Overseas Empire, but also to fit for their future careers those who are entering upon administrative work. It is unnecessary to specify here what has already been accomplished, but the fact remains that there is no co-ordination, that much of the effort is misdirected, and that it does not really affect those who will be concerned chiefly in the efficient management and development of the British possessions.

Before suggesting a plan for the co-ordination of Colonial studies it would be well to consider what is being accomplished in Germany and France. In the former country there exist three institutions well fitted for the special work they undertake—the *Hamburgische Kolonial Institut*, affiliated to other Hamburg institutions, the *Deutsche Kolonial Schule* at Witzhausen, and the *Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen* at Berlin. The first has only recently been organised, but is already taking its place amongst the great German educational establishments and makes a special feature of training business and commercial men as well as Colonial officials. It thus bears a distinctly commercial stamp, and should form a model for any teaching Colonial Institute that may be established in London. The second gives a practical Colonial education, especially in all that concerns agriculture, forestry, and technical training. The third attends to the purely theoretical side of Colonial studies—the teaching of languages, the economic and administrative conditions of the German Colonies, and advanced technical science. But in all three cases the curriculum, within its own limitations, is thorough and effective, and the administrative officials are fully alive to the ever-changing conditions of educational work.

“Germany leads the world in education,” wrote Mr. Louis Hamilton of the Berlin University,<sup>1</sup> “taking the word as meaning mainly cultivation of the intellectual powers. It is, therefore, perhaps hardly surprising that her Colonial education should be so good. But, seeing that it is so good and extensive, it is a matter of wonder that the results shown in the Colonies are out of all proportion insignificant and unsatisfactory as compared with what the quality and opportunities of Colonial education might have led one to expect. Whether it is not in the character of the German to convert theory into practice, or to grasp the fact that without common sense it is of little value; whether members of a nation still deeply stamped with the impress of a century’s red-tapism and militarism find it difficult to shake off such characteristics when out in the Colonies, and thus start at a disadvantage, need not be considered here.

“Nor is this the place to speculate on the problem whether the colonising genius and ‘art’ is a talent or only acquired in the Colonies themselves after generations of experience, often purchased with rivers of blood and streams of gold. But one thing is clear, the more opportunities given in the Mother Country to study things Colonial the better for those going out to the Colonies. And it is irrelevant from this point of view to inquire why one country (Germany), with all Colonial educational advantages shows comparatively so little grasp of the subject, and why another country (Britain), providing few opportunities for Colonial education at home, shows a good deal of sense. Theory and practice can

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from an article entitled “Colonial Education in Germany” in *United Empire* for January, 1911.

always be pitted against one another, and to little advantage of either. But this is certain. We Britishers know to our cost that where Germans have outstripped us they have done so by virtue of superior educational methods. And we should do well to consider and apply the lesson. . . . Let us admit that the Germans have stolen a march upon us, and let us take the hint. . . . Once we decide in England for an Imperial Colonial University we shall find the means and the 'how.' There are the Colonial Institute, the Schools of Tropical Medicine in Liverpool and London, the Colonial and India Offices, the Boards of Education and Agriculture, and various other bodies from which an advisory and governing Council could be collected to draw up a scheme."

In France there are three institutions that make a speciality of Colonial education.<sup>1</sup> And here let me remark that contrary to the general impression, France is thoroughly convinced of the great value of her African and Asiatic possessions. Of late years there has been a great Colonial revival which may be directly traced to the national awakening brought about by the sudden shock of the Fashoda incident. Administrative and commercial efficiency are fully appreciated in the great commercial centres of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Havre, whilst in the capital there is a constantly growing body of opinion which closely follows Colonial questions as is testified by the publication of a daily and tri-weekly newspaper<sup>2</sup> dealing exclusively with Colonial news. The growth of the French Colonial Empire has been continuous since the year 1871, when the overseas possessions of the Republic, not including Algeria, had an area of 750,000 kilometres with about 5,000,000 inhabitants. In 1912 the total area, again excepting Algeria, was 8,000,000 kilometres with a population of more than 40,000,000. In Paris the *École Coloniale* performs a real service to the State. But whilst it is not suggested that either the constitution or the methods of the *École Coloniale* at Paris would be appropriate in London, it is well to understand its aims and methods. The *École Coloniale*, admission to which is only gained by means of examination, was founded in 1885 for the purpose of providing a suitable education for natives from French Colonies who might be sent to Paris either at the expense of the Colony or by their parents. In performing this work the French authorities recognised an obvious duty they owed to those native races who claimed the protection of the Tricolour—a duty which we in this country have as yet only ineffectively undertaken. By bringing to the capital promising young students the Government were able to prepare them for useful work in their own countries, and by the natural tact and ability of the French for

<sup>1</sup> In this connection the excellent free lectures on colonisation and on Colonial subjects delivered at the Sorbonne, Paris, or the lectures delivered in the principal commercial cities under the auspices of the chief French colonial societies, should not be overlooked.

<sup>2</sup> *La Dépêche Coloniale* and *Les Annales Coloniales*.



maintaining cordial relations with coloured French subjects to convince them that the rule of the Republic was on the whole just and generous. But in the year 1889 the school underwent a considerable extension and became in fact a training institute, with both resident and non-resident pupils, for all suitable candidates who, being French subjects, desired to enter upon a Colonial career. The *École Coloniale* is maintained by the State and by subventions from the French Colonies. It is under the control of the Government and is not connected with the University of Paris. The course of studies is spread over two years and consists of practical administrative and juridical subjects, languages, history, geography, ethnology, hygiene and medicine, colonisation and other subjects—the administration and constitutions of each Colony being studied in separate classes. At Havre, the *École Pratique Coloniale* attends to the more practical and commercial side of Colonial education—and was founded in 1908 under the auspices of the *Association Cotonnière Coloniale*, with the support of the Ministries of Commerce and Colonies, the Colonial Governments in Africa and Asia, and the Municipality and Chamber of Commerce of Havre. Like the Colonial Institutes at Hamburg and Marseilles, its organisation offers several practical suggestions towards the foundation of a similar institution in London. Its object is to complete and supplement education acquired elsewhere, in order that the pupils going to the French Colonies may become “bons dirigeants dans toutes les sphères d’activité.” Instruction is entirely gratuitous and special bursaries are provided by the Governments of Western Africa and Indo-China. Unlike the Colonial School at Paris, that at Havre is not a residential College, and the lectures are open to those who do not follow the entire course. Moreover, it is almost entirely practical in its curriculum, the course being divided into three portions—Industrial, Commercial, and Agricultural—whilst lectures are also delivered upon hygiene and medicine and in history, geography, and administration. The feature which will appeal to English educationists is the practical lectures in agriculture and tropical products (which cover such diverse subjects as the study of cotton, cocoa, rubber, fruits, and forestry) and in all the chief economic products of the French Colonies. The third institution engaged in the work of Colonial education is the *Institut Colonial de Marseille*, a most active and useful organisation closely connected with the commercial life of the city. The institute is a private organisation affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce, by which body it was founded. It receives subventions from the *Ministère des Colonies*, the *Marseilles Chamber of Commerce* (45,000 francs), the *City of Marseilles*, the Governments of Indo-China, Western Africa, Algeria, and Tunis, the *Chamber of Agriculture of Réunion*, and other bodies, amounting in all to 69,400 francs per annum; whilst a further 16,000 francs is received from donors. For the encouragement of Colonial education a further sum of 30,000 francs is allotted by the Chamber of

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Commerce and a Colonial course extending over two years is arranged in co-operation with the *École Supérieure de Commerce de Marseille*. The Professors are appointed by the Institute and the Chamber of Commerce from the staff of the *Université d'Aix-Marseille*. Admission to the classes, which are open to both French subjects and foreigners, is obtained by examination, and students are admitted who do not desire to follow the whole course. A diploma is granted to those who have successfully passed the final examinations, and this forms a valuable recommendation for those taking up administrative positions or entering commercial or planting enterprises in the Colonies. The Colonial course consists of the study of the vegetable, animal, and mineral products of the French Colonies, the study of commerce and colonisation, Colonial legislation, hygiene, and climate, agriculture and botany, and public works. In addition to these activities the Colonial Institute is also a social centre for Colonists, maintains a commercial and Colonial museum, and speaks with great authority on all matters relating to commerce and industry.

Having briefly examined what has been done in other countries, it would be well to see upon what basis a teaching Colonial College could be established in this country. Whatever may be the ultimate form of such an institution, two points must be kept clearly in mind. Firstly, it should be constituted so as to render the greatest possible assistance to those students in the United Kingdom who desire to take up some appointment or to enter upon some career in the Overseas Empire, including India, or to make themselves familiar with the conditions and resources of the British Empire. For this purpose the curriculum must be theoretical and practical, and, moreover, capable of expansion in the directions likely to be of most use to particular classes of students. It must therefore be free from pedagogic conventions. There must be no opportunity for the administration of the institution to pass into the hands of a professorial staff out of sympathy with modern tendencies and modern ideas. Liberality of thought and elasticity of administration are above all things essential for the successful management of such an institution. Ideas and principles that would pass muster at Oxford or Cambridge will not necessarily be acceptable in a teaching Colonial College, the main aim of which will be to give instruction in those subjects which cannot be easily learned elsewhere. The educational Mrs. Grundy must be entirely eliminated from the methods and scope of the curriculum. Secondly, the college must be constituted so as to render assistance to students from the Overseas Empire who have come to London in order to complete their education. In this respect we owe much more than a pious duty to Indian and African students, and there must be no suspicion of any attempt to exclude such students from the benefit of a central College in London. The tendency for coloured students to drift to Berlin or Paris, where in many respects there is not only more liberality in educational methods but also in the reception accorded to

the coloured races, or to America, where negroes have their own educational establishments, must be checked if the loyalty and co-operation of the educated sections amongst the coloured subjects of the King-Emperor are to be retained. The question of whether it would be better to establish a University for Africans in West Africa or at Cape Town does not enter into our consideration. Since it is undoubted that both Indians and Africans will seek the advantages of advanced education coupled with the broadening influences of travel, it is our manifest duty to provide more liberally for their education in the Mother Country. In practice, however, it will be a matter of some difficulty to adjust the conflicting claims of British students who are taking up a career in the Dominions and Colonies, of students of European race who are spending a portion of their time in the centre of the Empire, and of coloured students who desire to familiarise themselves with certain aspects of Colonial study.

A College of Colonial Studies could be established in one of three ways. It might either be an entirely separate institution, granting its own diplomas, and entirely free from University control; or it might be a constituent college of the London University, with a newly-created Faculty of Colonial Studies; or an attached college in which whilst the subjects would be optional one at least should be made a compulsory subject for the attainment of a degree, say in the Science (Economics) course. In any case the College must be open to unattached students who are unfitted to take or not desirous of taking a degree at the University. Let us examine these three alternatives.

A separate Colonial College, unconnected with but supplementary to the University of London, would necessarily involve a large initial expenditure and a larger annual income for its maintenance than if it formed one of the departments of the University. But it would have this great advantage. Under a progressive and well constituted governing body its administration would be capable of great elasticity, and it would be able to meet varying conditions and new demands with greater freedom of action and consequently with a larger radius of initiative. The curriculum would naturally include lectures on subjects that would not necessarily fall within any rigid system of education, contributed by experts who would not of necessity be attached to the permanent staff of the College, and forming no part of the general curriculum, to which they would be complementary. By this means students might be attracted who would not in the ordinary course care to attend the full course of lectures, but would rather desire to attend lectures in special subjects outside the range of the general studies. It will, of course, be urged that there is at the present time one institution which fulfils—and admirably fulfils—some of the functions of such a College. The London School of Economics under its present progressive management provides lectures on certain subjects which fall within the scope of the work that should

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be carried on by a Colonial College. For instance, during the present session lectures are being delivered by Professor Sargent on the Trade of the British Empire, with special reference to the self-governing Dominions and the more important Crown Colonies, whilst Dr. Seligmann is to lecture on Ethnology and Dr. Rivers on Social Organisation and Kinship. But the work of the School of Economics should be confined to the subjects that are indicated by the title of the school, whereas the work of a Colonial College would be of wider application and greater scope and would only be limited by the fact that it would include subjects connected with the history, resources, and progress of the overseas British Empire. The two institutions would in reality be supplementary to each other, and there need be no clashing of interests or overlapping of the curriculum.

The curriculum of a Colonial College should be divided into two main divisions—Theoretical and Practical—with additional lectures in any subject that might seem desirable. The first would provide the student with information on subjects that would lay the foundation of an adequate theoretical knowledge of the history, geography, ethnology, and political status of the British Empire. The second would fit him to take his part as an active worker in the great army that is fighting the economic battles of the Empire in Great Britain or the Overseas possessions of the Crown. In suggesting any scheme for the curriculum of such a College, due care must be exercised that it shall not unduly interfere with the work carried on by institutions already established. With one or two exceptions (which are marked with an asterisk) the following tentative list of studies fulfils this condition. The classes in the theoretical side might be divided into seven divisions, as follows :

1. British Colonial History.  
History of Foreign Colonies.
2. Colonial Law.  
Commercial Law of the Overseas Dominions and Colonies, and India.  
Native Law and Custom.  
Administration of the Empire.
3. \* Ethnology of the Empire : Distribution of Races, etc. }  
Comparative Religion. }  
\* Languages (African and Oriental).
4. Geography of the Empire (including separate courses on the different colonies).  
Climate.
5. Sociological and Political Conditions in the Dominions and Colonies.  
Tendencies of Legislation, etc.  
Colour Question : Position of Asiatics in the Empire : Slavery.

Labour and Labour Supply.

Communications and Transport : Cables, Steamships, Railways.

Migration and Colonisation.

\* Statistics and Finance.

6. Theory of the Empire : Comparison with other Empires : Closer Union, etc. etc.

Imperial Defence.

7. Colonial Literature and Bibliography.

The practical side of the curriculum would, in my opinion, be the most important part of the work of the College. Not only would it attract students who wish to obtain an accurate knowledge of the practical application of modern science to the cultivation of colonial products, the distribution and marketing of such products, and the conditions of their production, but it would draw a large body of students who desire to enter either upon a commercial career in the Overseas Dominions and Colonies or to take up practical planting in tropical countries. But here several difficulties are obvious. It would be inadvisable, for instance, for the college to give instruction in practical technology, for these subjects should rightly be left to existing institutions, such as the Imperial College of Science and Technology at South Kensington. The teaching of Tropical Medicine, which would, at least in theory, fall within the scope of its work, should doubtless be left to the excellent research institute at Liverpool and to the London School of Tropical Medicine. Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Mining should form no part of the curriculum. But even with the elimination of these highly technical subjects enough remains to render the practical course attractive to students. It should consist of four branches, as follows :

1. Tropical Hygiene and Sanitation.

2. Agriculture.

Tropical Agriculture : Rubber, Cotton, and all Tropical Products.

Practical Forestry.

Commercial Botany.

3. Commerce and Industry of the Empire.

Resources of the Empire.

4. Conservation of Natural Resources—Forests, Mines, Fisheries.

An examination of the suggested curriculum will reveal two subjects in the theoretical side that are provided for elsewhere, but which should be dealt with by the College—Ethnology and Statistics—and one subject—African and Oriental languages—which will be taught at the new School of Languages which is to take the place of the old London Institution. In this special study, therefore, there must be close co-operation between the two bodies in order to prevent overlapping, and in practice

## Appendix I

it would probably be found preferable to leave languages to the newly established institution in the City of London. But whilst we already possess some of the elements of a scheme of Imperial studies, it is important to remember that one of the main reasons that make a Colonial College so desirable is that it is becoming more and more necessary to gather together these diverse elements in one central building, partly because the instruction to be of the greatest utility to the largest body of students should not be distributed among diverse authorities, some of which have little experience in educational work, and partly because these different classes should be gathered under the control of a central and properly organised body, understanding the aims and functions of higher education and, moreover, willing to experiment upon new lines and to adopt new ideas. For this reason it would not be wise to labour the idea that because certain existing institutions are performing, perhaps in an inadequate manner, certain of the functions that could be well performed by a Colonial College the latter should be debarred from entering upon what might be considered the peculiar province of other institutions. One great factor must be kept in mind. A teaching Colonial College would be a school of Imperial research, in which trained educationists and investigators would become the visible embodiment of the Imperial idea; whilst the College itself would bring together students from all parts of the Empire interested in closely related subjects, and would form a visible token of the greatness and wealth of the British Empire. It would also be a central meeting place for the increasing number of conferences which meet annually in London—such perhaps as the Institut Colonial International, which has met during the past month in London, or the Congress of the Universities of the Empire, which assembled last year.

With respect to historical work, it is impossible to over-estimate the importance of having a central institute where historical research could be carried on. Hitherto the teaching of Imperial history has neither received the support nor the attention that is due to so important a subject. University students having to devote their energies to what are considered more important subjects have not the time, even if they have the inclination, to study the interesting and romantic history of the Dominions and Crown Colonies. But the teaching of colonial history would at once take its proper place in any well devised educational scheme, at a College of Colonial Studies, especially if a Faculty were created in which Imperial history were made one of the compulsory subjects. It is the bed-rock upon which the foundation of a sound colonial education should be laid. In France and Germany considerable attention is devoted to the history of the development of their colonial empires. In America thousands of pounds are spent annually in the subvention of State historical societies, the upkeep of historical libraries, and the collection and study of historical documents. It is only in England,

the greatest colonising nation of modern times, that the subject is deemed unworthy of support.

Mr. Sidney Low recently addressed an eloquent plea to the British Academy<sup>1</sup> for the better organisation of Imperial studies in London, in which the suggestions were confined to the academic rather than to the practical side of Imperial studies. Mr. Low asked for a modest £3,800 per annum in order to carry out his scheme, which, admirable as it is, does not seem to meet the real needs of the case. The widened basis of Imperial teaching which I have indicated would require a sum more nearly approaching £10,000 per annum, with a building or endowment fund of at least £100,000. The provision of this large sum should not be a difficult matter. Without in any way forming an estimate as to the probable sums that would be obtained from students in the shape of fees, it is only natural to suppose that they would form an appreciable proportion of the annual income. The Imperial Government, too, would doubtless recognise the value of a central college at which those taking up official appointments in the Crown Colonies or India would be able to undergo a training in the subjects likely to be of most use to them, and the governments of the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and India would also recognise the value of a sound commercial and economic training for all who are likely to proceed to the overseas Empire to engage in commercial or agricultural pursuits. But in the main the largest amount of support would naturally come from the heads of great mercantile houses, whose interests are primarily concerned with the progress of British commerce in the overseas possessions of the Crown. The establishment of a Colonial College should therefore offer no insuperable difficulties. Nor need the choice of a site be a difficult matter. Either an existing building must be adapted to the needs of the College, a building sufficiently noticeable to attract attention—for a Colonial College must be no hole-and-corner affair—or an entirely new building must be erected. In the first alternative the seat of the College would obviously be at South Kensington, in the portion of that magnificent building at present occupied by the University of London. If this plan were adopted the work of the College might be co-ordinated with the excellent experimental work that is at present carried on by the Imperial Institute under the auspices of the Colonial Office, the India Office, and the Board of Trade, and with that undertaken by the Imperial College of Science. The adjacent laboratories and collections of Indian and colonial exhibits would be an invaluable adjunct to such a school, and the only possible objection to this suggestion seems to be that the College might not be considered sufficiently central to attract those students—who doubtless would form the largest proportion of the pupils—who would be unable to devote their whole time to the study of Colonial

<sup>1</sup>“The Organisation of Imperial Studies in London,” 1913.

## Appendix I

subjects—men engaged in mercantile houses and those who are employed in the City during the daytime. The second alternative that I would suggest is the erection of a building, either as an adjunct to the Dominions Building which has been proposed by Lord Grey or in close proximity to it. This would round off and complete the scheme that Lord Grey is so vigorously promulgating, and the buildings would form a magnificent object-lesson in the new ideal of practical Imperial patriotism that is likely before long to assume some definite shape. In either case the co-operation of bodies like the Royal Colonial Institute, the Royal Geographical Society, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Royal Anthropological Institute, and the London Chamber of Commerce, could hardly be withheld. The library of the first, with its unique collections of books and official reports relating to the Overseas Empire, its library of Colonial Law, and its Proceedings of Colonial and British learned societies, would form an admirable nucleus for, or addition to, the larger collection of educational works that a Colonial College would ultimately require. In a word, the library of the Royal Colonial Institute might be made available for the use of all bona fide students of the College and be worked in co-operation with the special library that would doubtless be necessary at the College itself.

Having examined the proposal for an entirely separate Colonial College—that is, a College in its own building, granting its own diplomas, and unconnected with the University of London—it is necessary briefly to consider the claims of a College connected with that University and under its immediate control. It is obvious that in this case ordinary university students would have to be attracted to it, and the only means to achieve this end would be to create either a separate Faculty of Colonial Studies, or to make one or more subjects compulsory in the taking of a degree in arts or science. At the present time a number of institutions, with different educational aims and standards, are connected with the University, but have complete financial independence of each other and of the University. In their recent report<sup>1</sup> the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the working of the University state that this arrangement has created difficulties which have prevented the University from carrying out the duty of organising the higher education of London that is imposed upon it by the Statutes. The University has representation upon only eight out of the twenty-nine schools attached to it, and stress is laid not only upon the unnecessary duplication of departments and institutions, but the necessity for the University having control over the policy and methods of the institutions connected with it. If a Colonial College were established, would the ideals and aims of the University adequately correspond with the ideas and aims of a College that would certainly be in the nature of an educational experiment? That is a most important consideration. The academic and the lay mind do not necessarily look at educational matters in the same light,



and the question must be asked whether the ideals of a purely academic body would be sufficiently wide and elastic to permit of the educational experiments that would be necessary in such a College. It is obvious that if the University, as a University, is to grant degrees in Colonial studies and to make certain subjects compulsory, it would, as a matter of right, require the determining voice in the management and perhaps the financial control of the institution. Whether in the long run the advantage of a University degree, which would probably only be taken by a small minority of the students, would outweigh the advantage of free and unfettered control, would have to be seriously debated. Having stated the point, the whole question may be left to the decision of those best qualified to judge.

In conclusion, the necessity for an extension of the educational facilities at present offered to those whose future work will be connected with the administration and development of our Colonial Empire must be urged upon those whose interests are connected with Imperial commerce, and King George's stirring message, "Wake up, England!" must be seriously taken to heart by the commercial and educational authorities in the chief city of the Empire.

<sup>1</sup> "Royal Commission on University Education in London: Final Report of the Commissioners" (Cd. 6717), 1913.

## APPENDIX II

### STATISTICS OF THE GERMAN AFRICAN COLONIES

#### POPULATION, 1913 <sup>1</sup>

COLONY	AREA <i>sq. miles</i>	ADULTS		CHILDREN		TOTAL
		<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	
German East Africa . . .	384,000	3,536	1,075	374	351	5,336
Kamerun . . .	290,000	1,560	230	40	41	1,871
Togo . . .	33,700	300	66	1	1	368
German South-West Africa .	322,450	8,530	3,058	1,617	1,625	14,830
Total . . .	1,030,150	13,926	4,429	2,032	2,018	22,405

<sup>1</sup> European population only.

#### IMPORTS, 1900—1912 (IN MARKS)

COLONY	1900	1901	1904	1905	1907
German East Africa . . .	12,031,000	9,511,000	14,339,000	17,655,000	23,806,000
Kamerun . . .	14,245,000	9,397,000	9,378,000	13,467,000	17,297,000
Togo . . .	3,517,000	4,723,000	6,898,000	7,760,000	6,700,000
German South-West Africa	6,968,000	10,075,000	10,057,000	23,632,000	32,396,000
COLONY	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
German East Africa . . .	25,787,000	33,942,000	38,659,000	45,892,000	50,309,000
Kamerun . . .	16,789,000	34,713,000	25,481,000	29,317,000	34,242,000
Togo . . .	8,509,000	11,235,000	11,466,000	9,620,000	11,428,000
German South-West Africa	33,179,000	17,723,000	44,344,000	45,302,000	33,499,000

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## EXPORTS, 1900—1912 (IN MARKS)

COLONY	1900	1901	1904	1905	1907
German East Africa	4,294,000	4,623,000	8,951,000	9,950,000	12,500,000
Kamerun	5,886,000	6,264,000	8,021,000	9,315,000	15,891,000
Togo	3,059,000	3,691,000	3,551,000	3,957,000	5,916,000
German South-West Africa	908,000	1,242,000	299,000	216,000	1,616,000
COLONY	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
German East Africa	10,874,000	13,120,000	20,805,000	22,438,000	31,418,000
Kamerun	12,164,000	15,701,000	19,924,000	21,251,000	23,336,000
Togo	6,893,000	7,372,000	2,222,000	9,317,000	9,959,000
German South-West Africa	7,795,000	22,071,000	34,691,000	28,573,000	39,035,000

## RAILWAYS

	<i>Length in kms.</i>	<i>Year of opening</i>
<b>GERMAN EAST AFRICA</b>		
Tanganyika Railway (Dar-es-Salaam — Kigoma)	1,252	1914
Usambara Railway (Tanga—Moschi)	352	1911
Sigi Railway	23	1910
Projected Railway (Tabora—Kageraknie)	531	—
<b>KAMERUN</b>		
Northern Railway (Manenguba Railway)	160	1911
Midland Railway (Duala—Njong River)	293	—
<b>Togo</b>		
Coast Railway	44	1905
Lome—Palime	119	1907
Lome—Atakpame	167	1911
<b>GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA</b>		
Otavi Railway	578	1906
Swakopmund—Windhuk	382	1902—11
Otavi-Grootfontein	93	1909
North to South Railway (Windhuk—Keetmanshoop)	528	1912
Southern Railway (Lüderitzbucht — Keetmanshoop, with extension Seeheim—Kalkfonteln)	545	1909

## Appendix II

## PRODUCTION

	1906 <i>Marks</i>	1909 <i>Marks</i>	1912 <i>Marks</i>
<b>RUBBER AND GUTTA-PERCHA</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	2,386,000	2,768,000	8,390,000
Kamerun . . . . .	4,677,000	7,552,000	11,472,000
Togo . . . . .	1,161,000	969,000	976,000
<b>COTTON (INCLUDING KAPOK)</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	179,300	440,000	2,110,000
Togo . . . . .	165,000	417,000	522,000
<b>SISAL . . . . .</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	1,368,000	2,333,000	7,359,000
<b>COPRA</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	1,087,000	798,000	1,563,000
Togo . . . . .	8,000	34,000	61,000
<b>PALM KERNELS AND PALM OIL</b>			
Kamerun . . . . .	2,958,000	3,708,000	6,027,000
Togo . . . . .	862,000	2,547,000	4,792,000
<b>COFFEE</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	531,000	886,000	1,903,000
<b>COCOA</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	—	—	14,000
Kamerun . . . . .	1,167,000	2,854,000	4,242,000
Togo . . . . .	22,000	94,000	243,000
<b>MAIZE</b>			
Togo . . . . .	433,000	979,000	231,000
<b>TIMBER</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	40,000	128,000	248,000
Kamerun . . . . .	119,000	177,000	696,000
Togo . . . . .	2,000	4,000	—
<b>COPAL</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	118,000	152,000	120,000
Kamerun . . . . .	4,000	2,000	—
<b>LIVE CATTLE</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	150,000	97,000	44,000
Kamerun . . . . .	56,000	5,000	—
Togo . . . . .	78,000	242,000	610,000
German South-West Africa . . . . .	—	81,000	35,000

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### PRODUCTION (continued)

	1906 Marks	1909 Marks	1912 Marks
<b>HIDES AND SKINS</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	2,030,000	2,030,000	4,067,000
Kamerun . . . . .	2,000	5,000	—
Togo . . . . .	8,000	14,000	—
German South-West Africa . . . . .	137,000	180,000	306,000
<b>IVORY</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	433,000	1,026,000	361,000
Kamerun . . . . .	904,000	879,000	536,000
Togo . . . . .	64,000	46,000	42,000
<b>GOLD</b>			
German East Africa . . . . .	22,000	240,000	531,000
<b>DIAMONDS</b>			
German South-West Africa . . . . .	—	15,436,000	30,414,000
<b>COPPER</b>			
German South-West Africa . . . . .	47,000	4,655,000	6,523,000
<b>LEAD</b>			
German South-West Africa . . . . .	—	982,000	228,000

### GENERAL STATISTICS

#### GERMAN EAST AFRICA

*Area.*—384,000 sq. miles (twice the size of the German Empire in Europe).

*Population.*—5,336 Europeans (of whom about 4,107 are Germans), 7,500,000 (about) natives, 8,800 Indians, 4,100 Arabs.

*Products.*—Cotton, fibres, coffee, rubber, coco-nut and copra, tobacco, rice, banana, pineapple, hides, ground-nuts, sesame, sorghum, maize, sugar, sisal, cocoa, timber, copal, ivory, gold, mica, waxes.

*Tonnage of Vessels entering Ports.*—1,801,020 (of which 1,651,441 tons belonged to the German East Africa Line) (1911).

*Value of Total Imports.*—£2,294,581 (1911).

*Value of Total Exports.*—£1,121,888 (1911).

*Revenue.*—£966,050 (including imperial subsidy of £180,900) (1912).

*Expenditure.*—£966,050.

*Hut Tax.*—£186,350 (1912).

*Newspapers.*—*D. O. A. Zeitung* and *Usambara Post*.

*Seat of Government.*—Dar-es-Salaam.

*Governor in 1914.*—Dr. Schnee.

#### KAMERUN

*Area.*—290,000 sq. miles.

*Population.*—1,871 Europeans, 4,150,000 natives.

*Products.*—Cocoa, rubber, tobacco, oil-palm, timber, copal, hides, ivory, kola-nut, banana, coffee.

*Tonnage of Vessels entering Ports.*—1,291,000 (1911).

*Value of Total Imports.*—£1,250,000 (1911).

*Value of Total Exports.*—£1,000,000 (1910).

*Revenue.*—£320,000.

*Expenditure.*—£480,000.

*Seat of Government.*—Buea.

*Newspaper.*—*Amtsblatt*.

*Governor in 1914.*—Dr. Ebermaier.

#### Togo

*Area.*—33,700 sq. miles.

*Population.*—368 Europeans (of whom 327 are Germans), 1,032,000 natives.

*Products.*—Oll-palm, coffee, ground-nuts, copra, rubber, cotton, cocoa, maize, cattle, ivory.

*Tonnage of Vessels calling at Lome.*—575,486 (of which 380,810 was German) (1911).

*Value of Total Imports.*—£571,391 (1912).

*Value of Total Exports.*—£497,945 (1912).

*Revenue.*—£169,229 (1913).

*Expenditure.*—£202,856 (1913).

*Hut Tax.*—£33,677 (1912).

*Newspaper.*—*Amtsblatt*.

*Seat of Government.*—Lome.

*Governor in 1914.*—Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg.

#### GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

*Area.*—322,450 sq. miles.

*Population.*—Europeans: 8,213 (1908), 9,410 (1909), 12,936 (1910), 13,962 (1911), 14,816 (1912), 14,830 (1913) (of whom 12,292 were German). Natives: 140,000 (about).

*Products.*—Wool, ostrich feathers, hides, cattle, sealskins, diamonds, copper, lead.

*Tonnage of Vessels entering Ports.*—1,200,340 (of which 1,113,575 was German) (1911).

*Value of Total Imports.*—£1,674,950 (1912).

*Value of Total Exports.*—£1,951,175 (1912).

*Revenue.*—£901,486 (excluding £737,782 Imperial advance in respect of military expenditure) (1913).

*Expenditure.*—£897,836 (excluding £742,437 on account of military expenditure) (1913).

*Newspapers.*—*Zeitung* (Lüderitzbucht), *Deutsch Südwestafrika Zeitung* (Swakopmund), *Südwest* (Windhuk), *Nachrichten* (Windhuk), *Amtsblatt* (Windhuk).

*Seat of Government.*—Windhuk.

*Governor in 1914.*—Dr. Seitz.

## APPENDIX III

### “DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES!”

THE Pan-German League, which has been mentioned in these pages, is a formidable organisation started in the year 1891 under the title of *Allgemeiner deutscher Verband*, and its immediate popularity was due in no small measure to the opposition of the extremists of the colonial party to what they conceived to be the virtual withdrawal of Germany from a large portion of East Africa. The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 gave the organisers of the League the opportunity they desired, and after three or four years spent in propagating the idea that Germany was destined to be a world-power, the League acquired a commanding influence throughout Germany. In 1894 its name was changed to *Alldeutscher Verband*, and its activities were greatly extended by the publication of a weekly journal entitled *Alldeutsche Blätter*.

One of the great objects of the League was to attract into the Germanic fold all those diverse Teutonic elements which had been only “lent” to other nations, as well as the refractory elements included within the political boundaries of the German Empire. For this purpose the Germans of Austria, Switzerland, Russia, the United States and other countries, Poles, Danes, Dutch, Alsatians, Flemings, and even Swedes and Norwegians, were specially appealed to in order that Germanic influences might be solidified throughout the world and become of irresistible importance. In connection with the Pan-German League are a number of subsidiary societies, such as the *Deutschbund*, founded in 1890; the *Hammerbund*, named after the hammer, the emblem of Thor, or in other words the modern “mailed fist”; the Odin Society; and the *Allgemeiner deutscher Sprachverein*. It is specially significant that a number of these societies, in their propagandist work on behalf of a Greater Germany, appealed specially to the historic sense of the Germanic peoples by adopting names from the old Norse mythology—a reversion to type that is at least interesting, if not impressive. Germany is pre-eminently the land of societies, and it is scarcely too much to say that every German is a member of one or other of the numerous leagues for the propagation of the Germanic idea. Amongst these societies may be mentioned the *Deutscher Flottenverein*, which has



nearly four hundred thousand members; the *Deutscher Wehrverein*, with nearly three hundred thousand adherents; the *Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland*, specially charged with the duty of looking after emigrants; the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein*, which is engaged in looking after German interests in Poland and eastern Prussia, the *Bund der Deutschen in Boehmen*, one of the most active of the many German societies in Austria; and, of course, the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*.

The activities of these societies have been apparent in every department of German national life. They have "nobbled" the Press and imposed a species of terrorism over all who would not fall into line with their plans by exercising a real but unseen influence against them in the realm of business and commerce. They have led the German Government by the nose like a stroller with a dancing bear. In foreign countries they have gathered thousands of Germans within their inviting and ever-open portals by direct pressure on the part of leading German merchants and manufacturers; they have organised German schools and churches, and have helped generally to control the social life of the German communities scattered throughout the world. In fact, the activities of the Pan-German societies have for many years formed an ominous cloud on the political horizon that only the blind have been unable to see. Of the special organs of the Pan-German party, the *Berliner Post* and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* are the most noteworthy, although the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, and the semi-official *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, which was supposed to be backed by the Crown Prince, have run them very closely in methods of scurrility, especially at the present time. Nor must the Leipzig review, *Die Grenzboten*, quoted in these pages, be overlooked, because it has frequently been the medium through which Prince Bülow has expressed his opinions. The German Government has been well- and ill-served by the Pan-German party, which, whilst ever ready to push the Germanic idea, has never been too responsive to official pressure. In fact, the Pan-Germans have always driven the Government along the paths they desired.



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