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SALW Proliferation Pressures, The Horn of Africa and EU Responses

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NOTE

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SUMMARY

The Horn of Africa has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. Scarce resources at the state, local, and individual levels are being spent on weapons rather than development, helping to maintain the Horn's place as one of the world's poorest regions. As it seems counterintuitive that such investments are being made, it is important to account for the various causes for the proliferation and diffusion of small arms and light weapons in the region. This paper will address these various pressures according to the societal level at which they occur.

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SALW PROLIFERATION PRESSURES, THE HORN OF AFRICA AND EU RESPONSES

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THE STATE OF THE SALW PROBLEM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

THE HORN OF AFRICA

The region of East Africa typically known as the Horn of Africa (HoA) consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. The Horn is 5.2 million km² and has a population of more than 160 million people. Like much of Africa, state frontiers are more reflective of the colonial era than of distributions of similar tribal populations. In the case of the greater Somali nomadic community for instance, the partition of Africa spread the tribe across parts of four states.¹ As a result of “cross-border kinship” the HoA region experiences a high degree of population movement among countries. The large number of pastoralists² in the HoA region further heightens interstate migration, as weather, water, and available grazing lands dictate movement more often than political borders. The movement of populations increases the regional interconnectedness already experienced as a result of the close proximity of the seven states in the HoA.

SALW IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. In Somalia alone, some estimates place the number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the millions.³ Research in north-eastern Kenya has found that every second household had a gun and that 60% of the patients in field hospitals were being treated for gunshot wounds.⁴ The *2003 Small Arms Survey* identified Kenya and Uganda as two countries in the region that had a domestic SALW manufacturing capacity, and that the two countries have utilized this production to each amass a national stockpile of up to a million weapons.⁵ Scarce resources at the state, local, and individual levels are being spent on weapons rather than development, helping to maintain the HoA’s place as one of the world’s poorest regions. As it seems counterintuitive that such investments are being made, it is important to account for the various causes for the proliferation and diffusion of SALW in the HoA region. This paper will group the various pressures based on the societal level at which they occur.

REGIONAL SALW PROLIFERATION PRESSURES

The **international arms trade** can be seen as a regional SALW proliferation pressure in the HoA as arms dealers are desirous of making sales and finding new markets for their products. The fact that globally there are at least 1,249 companies manufacturing SALW spread among 90 countries creates a highly competitive marketplace where prices are kept as low as possible. Many millions of dollars of SALW have been exported to the HoA from European Union (EU) member states. While exports did drop from a yearly high of US\$ 700 million in 1985 to US\$ 50 million in 1995, the durability of these weapons sees many of them in continued use today.⁶ Furthermore,

while many SALW sales are documented and follow international conventions, research has found that the bulk of weapons transfers to the region are conducted illicitly.⁷ The international arms trade is a significant cause of SALW proliferation pressures in the HoA.

A further regional cause of SALW proliferation pressure in the HoA is the **collapse of Somalia**. When the Somali government led by Siad Barre fell in 1991, tremendous stockpiles of weapons that had been amassed for the creation of a “greater Somalia” were dispersed into the region.⁸ As many Somali soldiers and militia had been sent into the border regions of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, the collapse of the Somali state saw many of these weapons traded for safe passage home, food, or shelter. Furthermore, the scores of leaderless soldiers in the area caused a heightened level of insecurity and led to many armed clashes in the border regions.⁹ In this manner, the collapse of the Somali state increased the level of proliferation pressure in the HoA region.

In the 14 plus years since the collapse of the Barre government, there has not been a centralized authority in the country. This **prevailing state of political anarchy in Somalia** has created further SALW proliferation pressures in the region. Aside from Somaliland in north-western Somalia, which has seen some success with a semi-autonomous government, the Somali political situation has been characterized by violent clashes among the various clans and warlords.¹⁰ A number of failed attempts have been made to establish a transitional government in Kenya, but as of yet none of these attempts have been able to reconcile the various conflicts among the Somali actors. The situation in Somalia has allowed illicit SALW to flow into the region unchecked. Ibrahim Farah argued that “the illegal trade in SALW has become a way of life ... and a source of livelihood [for many Somalis].”¹¹ Studies by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the International Crisis Group, Saferworld, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) have all traced major SALW trade routes in the region to arms traders in Somalia.¹² Clearly, the existence of a lawless state in the region creates major SALW proliferation pressures.

International criminal and terrorist organizations operating both within Somalia and in the region as a whole are a further example of SALW proliferation pressures in the HoA. The widespread underdevelopment in the region has made it attractive to the international drug trade and other criminal organizations. Poverty has led many to participate in either the cultivation or transport of drugs for their livelihood. Furthermore, according to the EU country overview, Somali logistical support was given to the terrorist bombing of a Mombasa hotel and a missile attack on an Israeli plane.¹³ This same report cites the “increasing talibanization of Somali public opinion” as a “progressive threat”.¹⁴ Terrorist cells in the Horn have also been attributed with the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.¹⁵ The presence of these groups gives two-fold SALW proliferation pressure. Firstly, these groups further aid the spread and sale of illicit SALW in the region. Secondly, the presence of terrorist and criminal groups has led to incidences of security sector abuses as they seek information from civil populations.¹⁶ Further, Djibouti has seen a noted militarization of society as thousands of American, French, and German troops have established an ‘anti-terrorist’ command post in that country.¹⁷ The international criminal and terrorist organizations have added to the SALW proliferation pressures by aiding the illicit trade and by adding to the human security threats in the region.

The **conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea** has also been a significant cause of SALW proliferation pressure in the region. This conflict erupted in 1998 as a result of a border dispute and continued sporadically until June 2000 when a ceasefire was finally signed.¹⁸ The conflict saw

both states investing significant levels of state funds in armaments, including SALW. Further, the war spilled into neighbouring states as clans friendly with one side or the other were armed in an attempt to break the stalemate in the main conflict area.¹⁹ As in the Somali experience, the armed irregular forces were largely leaderless and caused a great deal of instability within the civilian populations of the region. The SALW proliferation pressures caused by the Ethiopian–Eritrea conflict are a good example of the entangled nature of supply and demand factors as conflict was both cause and result of SALW proliferation and diffusion.

The large numbers of internally displaced persons (**IDPs**) and **refugees** in the HoA can be seen as a further SALW proliferation pressure. While this is not to suggest that these victims of conflict are to be attributed the blame for the SALW problem, it is a certainty that their very existence creates a human security risk that is often coupled with the proliferation of arms. When one considers that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were nearly 800,000 refugees in the HoA,²⁰ it is reasonable to assume that there is likewise a substantial number of IDPs.²¹ As refugees are often seen as a burden, they are seldom granted protection by the host-state security forces. As a result, many turn to arms as a measure of self-help. The pressures of these migratory flows not only bring arms across borders but also spread the insecurity born of conflict to the outlying regions.

A final regional cause of SALW proliferation pressure is the **porous borders** in the region. Being the result of many factors discussed above, such as the illicit trade, underdevelopment, refugees, and the presence of many nomadic groups in the region, it is extremely difficult to control all border areas between the countries. SALW are often able to flow between countries quite easily. Some studies have shown that arms cross the borders in large numbers, for instance by the truckload, or in much smaller but by more frequent numbers, such as by camel.²² With the large number of weapons in circulation in the HoA region, the porous borders allow for the quick and easy diffusion of supplies of weapons to any area where there might be a demand.

STATE-LEVEL SALW PROLIFERATION PRESSURES

One often seen example of a state-level SALW proliferation pressure is the **transfer of SALW from state to non-state actors**. Such transfers of weapons have occurred in the HoA region when states were unable to provide for the security of certain parts of their country. As a sort of decentralization of security, SALW are used to allay fears and act as a ad hoc solution to human security questions. Examples of this can be seen in the previously mentioned cases of armed militias in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, but also can be seen in the arming of nomadic pastoralists in Kenya and Uganda. In one case in Uganda, insecurity in the eastern district of Moroto led to the arming of many reservists known as “the Vigilantes”. Promised both arms and payment, these informal security forces did initially provide for a measure of safety along roadways in the area. When the payment of the forces began to wane, they began to extract financial compensation from the travellers they were expected to protect and accepted bribes from the criminals they had once arrested.²³ In many cases of state to non-state arms transfers, local imbalances are created that ultimately lead to greater insecurity. As argued by Kennedy Mkutu, “the arming of one community, by whatever means, has inevitably lead to others demanding arms for protection, resulting in further proliferation across the region.”²⁴ Such transfers are a key way that SALW are proliferated in the HoA region.

Poor security of national SALW stockpiles has also added to SALW proliferation pressures. Given that states in the HoA region have been major recipients of arms exports from around the world, and the occurrence of transfers to militias and armed forces defeated in the field, as in

both the Somali and Ethiopian/Eritrean examples, the insufficient control of national stockpiles has led to the further dissemination of SALW in the HoA. Further to these examples are the fall of the “Dergue” regime in Ethiopia,²⁵ the frequent capture of arms caches during the Sudanese civil war,²⁶ and the often cited occurrence of security forces leasing their weapons to criminals.²⁷

Poorly coordinated disarmament initiatives in the HoA have actually been found to increase the SALW proliferation pressures in the region. Such has been the result in the case of the attempt at forcible disarmament in the Karimojong region of Uganda in 2002. In this case, the local pastoralists refused to relinquish their weapons fearing neighbouring tribes would take advantage of their weakness. When Ugandan forces moved in, armed violence erupted resulting in many deaths on both sides.²⁸ In some documented cases, the national forces gathering the weapons later traded them to others as a means of supplementing their income or even simply in order to trade for food.²⁹ Many well-intentioned attempts at disarmament have failed as a result of poor coordination and control.

A further factor of SALW proliferation pressure at the state level has been the **domestic manufacturing capabilities** within the region. As mentioned above, both Kenya and Uganda have such capabilities. A further example however, has been the ability of small-scale operations to make crude firearms known as *Ngamatidae*. In spite of their poor quality, the exceedingly low cost of these weapons has led to their widespread circulation.³⁰ The presence of such weapons adds to the proliferation pressure as it allows almost any individual to purchase a firearm.

A final example of SALW proliferation pressure seen at the state level is the reaction to **repressive state practices**. In several cases in the HoA region, governments have precipitated SALW proliferation by taking policy stances viewed as repressive by certain segments of their populations. A good case in point would be Sudan, where the government, reflecting an Islamic majority in the North, has repeatedly clashed with the Christian minority population in the South. After coming to the negotiation table intermittently since 1994, hostilities re-escalated after Sudanese President General Al-Bashir suspended parliament and declared a state of emergency in 1999.³¹ A further example can be seen in Eritrea where males are frequently pressed into military service. A country of 3.6 million, Eritrea possesses an army of well over 300,000.³² With poverty rampant, few families feel they can spare their able-bodied males and resistance is not uncommon. Such cases of government repression are a further way that SALW proliferation pressure is increased.

LOCAL-LEVEL SALW PROLIFERATION PRESSURE

The first of these pressures is the **mistrust between clans or groups**. This pressure manifests itself in many different forms across the HoA region. In Somalia for instance, Thania Paffenholz argues that in many ways violent conflict among clans “has always been a part of daily life”.³³ In the anarchy that has followed the collapse of the Somali government, the power struggle among the various clans has resulted in near constant armed conflict. In the absence of any common security- or confidence-building measures, individuals and clans seek to arm themselves in an attempt to provide for their own security. Another way that this mistrust can manifest itself is in the form of armed political opposition from groups who feel excluded from the process of government. An example of this form of mistrust can be seen between the followers of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Uganda. The LRA staged repeated incursions into northern Uganda throughout the 1990s. As a result, many in these areas sought SALW as a means of protecting themselves and their families.³⁴ A further example of mistrust in the region exists among the various pastoralist groups in the Rift Valley. An important grazing zone in north-western Kenya

and eastern Uganda, the Rift Valley is home to a number of nomadic groups. As is the case in Somalia, these groups have a long history of inter-group conflict. In recent years however, the conflicts have escalated as a result of the availability of SALW.³⁵ As indicated in Mkutu's study, many groups have abandoned the idea of coexistence and have instead sought to gain superiority through arms.³⁶ The resulting inter-group arms race is a further example of how security concerns at the local level are driving SALW proliferation in the HoA.

A further threat to human security in the region is the long-standing tradition of **cattle rustling**. Once a practice where pastoralist groups fought with bows or spears and experienced limited loss of life, rustling has become a bloody affair as groups are now armed with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades.³⁷ Increasing population numbers have further strained the available resources and therefore given added urgency to many of the group conflicts. Rather than heeding the traditional methods of inter-tribal reconciliation, individuals are seeking to arm themselves first and then negotiate from a position of strength.³⁸ The proliferation pressures caused by the desire of these individuals to seek an armed solution has then led to many of the state to sub-state actor arms transfers discussed in the previous section. Ultimately the pressures caused by rustling have reduced many of the grazing areas to fierce battle zones, thereby undermining the ability of many people to lead sustainable lifestyles, causing even greater threats to human security in the region.³⁹

As many areas of the HoA are quite arid, **famine or the fear of famine** is a real concern. In the case of Eritrea, drought in recent years has caused failed harvests, the loss of livestock, and food insecurity in many parts of the country.⁴⁰ Not only does drought and famine increase the likelihood and intensity of rustling activities, but it also increases societal breakdowns in the form of crime and rioting. As argued by the Institute for Security Studies, "the connection among drought, famine, [and] guns ... is a reality."⁴¹

A SALW proliferation pressure that is quite specific to the HoA region is the phenomenon of acquiring an adequate **bride price**. Related to cattle rustling, many pastoralist groups require men to pay a dowry of cattle to the family of the girl he intends to marry.⁴² As famine, drought, and scarcity have increased in recent years, so has the intensity of conflicts begun by men seeking to amass the needed dowry. In the Karimojong tribe of northern Kenya, men and women can marry while deferring the bride price. Although the two are committed to each other, the woman is unable to leave home until the bride price is paid in full, giving her an uncertain and vulnerable status in society. As a result, women tend to encourage their husbands to go on raids, going so far as to wear special clothes while the men are on raids and taunting those men who refuse to go.⁴³ Such social pressures add a deeper dynamic to the armed violence that has become associated with pastoralism in the HoA.

An undercurrent of many of the proliferation pressures discussed thus far is the threat to security caused by **crime**. Economic marginalization, illicit trade, drought or famine, corruption, and other social pressures can lead people to break customary or state laws by committing crimes. Not only do such activities typically require the use of arms, the threat of crime is often reason enough for many in society to attempt to provide themselves additional protection by seeking out a firearm of their own.

A final local-level SALW proliferation pressure is the increasing role of guns in **ascribing status** to individuals in society. As a result of the tremendous pressures faced to human security in the HoA, owning a weapon is increasingly a way to affirm one's status as a provider.⁴⁴ Weapons are increasingly carried openly in society and can be seen as a sign of prestige, power and

authority.⁴⁵ While less directly reflective of a response to threatened human security, the increasing status of gun ownership is a testament to tremendous social pressures faced in the HoA region.

REGIONAL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE SALW PROBLEM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

As a result of the multiple regional-, state- and local-level SALW proliferation pressures, the SALW problem in the HoA is quite severe. Having now drawn attention to the various factors, and before addressing the various EU responses, it is important to note the significant number of regional and local initiatives aimed at addressing the SALW problem in recent years.

At the regional level, chief among the responses has been the Nairobi Declaration of 2000 and the subsequent Protocols of that agreement. Originally crafted by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the HoA and Great Lakes countries, the Nairobi Declaration laid out a plan for ensuring political action, legislative measures, and civil society involvement in the struggle to combat the challenges posed by SALW. These steps have, “given new impetus to address the problem [of SALW] and provided the requisite platform and political good will to combat the menace of small arms proliferation”.⁴⁶ Through the Declaration, a regional intergovernmental mechanism, the Nairobi Secretariat (now the Regional Centre for Small Arms of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, or RECSA), was formed in order to coordinate the responses of the governments in the region. As of 2005 only Kenya and Uganda had taken steps to implement the national plans of action as addressed within their Nairobi Declaration commitments. This aside, these regional initiatives are important steps and offer a solid platform for future action.

While the regional initiatives are an important demonstration of a political will to address the SALW problem, it is the multitude of local initiatives that may show the most promise for the future. Clearly tiring of the armed violence that has come as a result of rampant SALW proliferation, there has been an increase in support for traditional methods of community-based dispute resolution in many areas within the HoA. In the Kuria region of Kenya, the process of *sungusungu* has had tremendous success in addressing grievances from cattle rustling. An evolution of a centuries-old method of non-violent dispute resolution, *sungusungu*, or ‘ants,’ has many communities turning first to tribal elders to solve disputes rather than to armed aggression.⁴⁷ This reinvigoration of a traditional method has found particular success as it is anchored in cultural familiarity rather than a legal system that is often only selectively applied. Migratory pastoral communities have therefore been able to use their own resources and ideals, rather than having to rely on security forces whose dependability may fluctuate depending on the area. Comparable examples can be seen in Uganda where several inter-clan conflicts have been peacefully resolved through the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP). Similar to the other traditional methods, the KISP draws together the elders of various communities into peace-building dialogue. In the case of the KISP, the communities in question actually span across the Ugandan–Kenyan border and include four separate clans.⁴⁸

Somaliland is another case that deserves special attention. This region in the northwest of Somalia has managed to avoid most of the chaos that continues to grip the rest of that country. Ulf Terlinden believes that the main cause for this different experience has been the ability of the traditional chiefs and clan elders to maintain authority among their people and to work together among themselves.⁴⁹ Inter-clan treaties, or *xeer*, have set very high fines, known as *diya*, for the open use of SALW or even their threatened use. As clans must pay these fines collectively, there is a significant degree of internal policing and pressure to solve disputes through non-violent means.

As a result, Somaliland has had a much greater degree of success controlling SALW abuses when compared to other parts of Somalia.⁵⁰

EU AND EU MEMBER STATE RESPONSES TO THE SALW PROBLEM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

EU AND MEMBER STATE RESPONSES

EU and member states have had a wide array of policy responses to the SALW problem in the HoA. In order to better understand the differences in the programmes they will be divided into three clusters based on the proliferation pressures discussed in section two. As was the rationale for dividing the proliferation pressures based on their societal occurrence, dividing the responses in this manner puts greater focus on the actors at the grass-roots levels who are so often overlooked

CLUSTER ONE: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION

In this first cluster one sees a number of initiatives by the EU and member states that have very broad implications. In all cases the policy in question is aimed at addressing the SALW issue as a whole or else the HoA from a regional perspective.

The creation of EU standards on the export of arms is an example of policy that has had broad implications for the SALW problem in the HoA. While article 223 of the Treaty of European Union excluded matters relating to the production and procurement of arms from community involvement, increasing pressure from within many member states resulted in a number of important initiatives coming to the fore in recent years.⁵¹ Beginning with recommendations for criteria to consider before issuing arms export licenses, and so far culminating with the establishment of a EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, EU involvement in the international arms trade has increasingly been a matter discussed before the European Council. Such policies have brought greater scrutiny to the export of SALW and made the sale of weapons to areas involved in conflict much more difficult. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct requires member states to assess the security situation in potential arms recipient states and notify other member states of findings prior to any sale.⁵² EU stances on these matters have shed increased light on arms transfers and brought political pressure to bear on arms transfers.

Shortly after adopting the Code of Conduct in 1998, further progress was made with the adoption of a Joint Action on Small Arms. This policy established common views on the role of SALW as a destabilizing force requiring heightened international attention. The Joint Action has been annually updated and expanded to include different dimensions of the arms trade as well as the role of ammunition.⁵³

While the EU Code of Conduct and Joint Action on Small Arms have taken measures to address the practices of EU member states, the lack of corresponding global policy has allowed arms transfers to conflict prone regions to continue. As a result, steps have been taken to draft a comprehensive Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that would see the creation of a legally binding mechanism to control the international transfer of arms. This treaty, while remaining in the initial stages of international discussions, has received a significant boost from the United Kingdom who has pledged to put the matter on the agenda during the course of its presidency of the Group of

Eight. With the backing of a number of EU member states, the ATT is a further example of an international policy that would help curb the flow of SALW to the HoA region.

One measure that can be seen to address the links between underdevelopment and SALW proliferation pressure is the Cotonou Trade Agreement signed in 2000 between the EU and 78 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. While this agreement, which built upon the numerous Lomé Conventions that have been signed starting with Lomé I in 1975,⁵⁴ is mainly about trade and aid, the differences between Cotonou and its predecessors in regards to the mainstreaming of peace-building and SALW related issues is quite noticeable. Whereas the Lomé Conventions aimed at providing free or preferential entry for the products of former European colonies, the Cotonou Agreement desires to deepen the relationship and provide aid in order to address the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, and violent conflict.⁵⁵ The agreement lays out plans to develop Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in coordination with state governments, civil society groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that would allocate Commission funds for development opportunities.

In a more regionally specific example, the EU has had an impact upon the SALW problem in the HoA through its support of the activities of the Nairobi Secretariat. As the Secretariat is charged with coordinating the national action plans enshrined within the Nairobi Declaration, it is an important regional mechanism for addressing the SALW problem. Both the United Kingdom and Germany have provided funds and expertise to the enhancement of the Secretariat's ability to oversee the implementation of the national action plans in the region.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the United Kingdom has sponsored the NGO Saferworld's project entitled "Strengthening Small Arms Controls". This project, which analysed small arms control legislation across the HoA, aimed at demonstrating best practice and remaining challenges for future initiatives of the Nairobi Secretariat.⁵⁷

The EU and member states have also worked alongside other regional actors in the HoA. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional body aimed building cooperation on a wide range of policy areas in the HoA, has formed a partnership with BICC in order to create the SALIGAD project, aimed at "Capacity Building for Tackling the Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the IGAD Countries". This project will be discussed in further detail below. The EU has also worked alongside the African Union (AU) on a number of initiatives aimed at increasing that organization's capacity to respond. Joint training in areas of mine clearing and peacekeeping has increasingly been seen as member states have invited representatives of the AU to participate.⁵⁸ France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom all currently have agreements with the AU or AU member state militaries for training exchange programmes.⁵⁹ By working alongside existing regional and continental frameworks, the EU and member states have been able to further address the SALW proliferation pressures in the HoA.

CLUSTER TWO: MID-LEVEL ACTION

In this cluster of EU and member state actions on SALW in the HoA one sees policies that are targeted at specific national projects. At this level of engagement there is a large number of similar programmes across the states of the HoA, so rather than providing an exhaustive list, an attempt will be made to offer examples of the different approaches.

While the Cotonou Agreement mentioned in the previous section can be seen as an example of a broad policy approach to addressing the SALW proliferation pressure of underdevelopment, the actual projects taken on within that programme by the Commission can

be seen as examples of mid-level action. Within the Djibouti CSP, the European Commission allocated €29 million in funds for various development projects.⁶⁰ Of these funds, 45% are allocated to water and sanitation activities, 44% to macro-economic support, 9% to peace and reconciliation initiatives, and 1% to support initiatives of non-state actors.⁶¹ While such initiatives on their own may not reduce the number of SALW in circulation, they do address many of the pressures that ultimately lead to SALW proliferation. In Eritrea, funds directed from the CSP went also toward demobilization and rehabilitation of former combatants.⁶² Similar programmes have been seen in Ethiopia since the 1970s. In fact, between 1976 and 1994 the EU provided approximately €2 billion in various development projects.⁶³ Within the scope of these projects, aid flowed to most sectors of the national economy, including the provision of agricultural assistance, infrastructure development, financial programme aid, food aid, and emergency aid. More recently, funds were also directed toward peace-building projects as well as aid to those involved in the conflict with Eritrea. The examples of Djibouti and Ethiopia are indicative of the CSPs across the HoA that have come as a result of the Cotonou Agreement and the previous Lomé conventions.

EU action can also be seen in the HoA through the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO). Through this organ, the Commission provides emergency assistance and relief to the victims of armed conflict.⁶⁴ From 2000–2002, DG ECHO provided €16.8 million to support the victims of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁶⁵ DG ECHO has also been an annual donor to Somalia. In this latter case, funds have been largely targeted toward “the victims of insecurity and climatic hazards in Somalia”.⁶⁶ Finally, DG ECHO has responded in recent years to the regional stresses caused by severe drought. Receding ground water has caused great disruption in an area covering parts of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, and has caused many pastoral groups to travel outside of their traditional migratory grounds. These disruptions have been a cause of many conflicts in the region and have resulted in a drastic increase in rustling and inter-clan struggles. DG ECHO funds have gone toward providing food aid for both the pastoral groups as well as their herds. Further, these funds have been invested in upgrading existing infrastructure in such a way that similar problems might be avoided in the future.⁶⁷ These and other initiatives by DG ECHO provide needed aid to many of the groups whose security concerns were shown to drive the SALW proliferation pressures in section two.

The EU and member states have also been donors as well as active participants in a number of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes in the HoA. DDR is seen as vital in many HoA countries as there are a number of former combatants who have little training other than in the area of warfare. As discussed in section two, there have been many cases of conflicts ending with soldiers remaining in the field, armed, and left leaderless or outside of the control of post-conflict structures. DDR missions have been one attempt to both collect weapons in post-conflict environments as well as to prepare former combatants to be contributing members of society. In the case of Ethiopia for instance, the EU financed 25% of the total DDR budget.⁶⁸ The Commission has also supported similar efforts in Eritrea and worked with the World Bank to draft a programme that hopes to ultimately see 200,000 soldiers demobilized.⁶⁹ In Uganda, the EU provided over 70% of the overall DDR budget.⁷⁰ SSR initiatives have been undertaken across the HoA in a hope of combating the corruption that so often leads to the SALW proliferation pressures discussed in section two.

CLUSTER THREE: GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL ACTIONS

The third grouping of actions by EU and member states can be seen at the grass-roots level. In this cluster one finds the work of a multitude of NGOs, community-based organizations, and

traditional elements of HoA society working to address the problems brought on by the proliferation of SALW.

The number of NGOs working within the HoA who take funding from either the EU or member states is quite substantial. Some, such as Saferworld, BICC, Africa Peace Forum, and the Life & Peace Institute (LPI), have developed extensive links with local groups in the HoA. Through these links NGOs have been able to create peace-building programmes at the community level. LPI has run several such programmes, in some cases even reaching across religious divides and bringing together leaders of different churches. Such has been the case in repeated efforts in Eritrea, where LPI has run several workshops with leaders of Orthodox, Evangelical, Catholic, Lutheran, and Muslim faiths. Efforts such as these provide local leaders an opportunity to meet and open channels of communication. In this manner, if conflicts do later arise, a basic level of familiarity between groups has already been established and reconciliation is able to take place much sooner.

Further action that has taken place at the grass-roots level can be seen with the involvement of EU and member states in the financing of community-based organizations with the HoA. In section two, the KISP elders were mentioned as an example of a traditional conflict-mediation mechanism that had witnessed a renaissance in recent years. A true success story, the KISP receives its modest funding from Commission contributions to the Kenyan CSP and through additional funds given by Italy.⁷¹ Another example from the Karamoja region of Kenya can be seen with the UK- and EU-funded Karamoja Project Initiative Unit (KPIU). KPIU has emphasized long-term community support initiatives such as micro-credit programmes, tree nurseries, schools, and the building of dams and water tanks for the many pastoralist groups in the area.⁷² By targeting donations to community-based organizations, traditional structures have been given a chance to reassert themselves as viable options for local problem solving.

A further way that EU and member state funding has been able to have an effect at the grass-roots level is through the substantial research and local policy support that is provided by NGOs. Already in section three several examples have been given of how NGOs have coordinated with regional, state, and local actors. In terms of the SALW problem in the HoA, the support given to the Nairobi Secretariat and the SALIGAD programme are perhaps the two most important examples. NGOs receiving research grants from EU member states have been able to provide expertise in the way of policy options to these organizations that in turn are able to make better use of development aid. In the case of SALIGAD, a project that received a large amount of funding from the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), numerous projects and conferences relating to indigenous capacity for peace-building were created.⁷³ EU member states have made particular use of this policy approach as it has the dual benefit of engaging the domestic research sector as well as having a benefit abroad.

The creation of awareness and education programmes at the grass-roots level is a further way that the EU and member states have had an impact on the SALW issue in the HoA. Once again primarily driven by NGOs and local community-based organizations, these programmes have attempted to not only give individuals an understanding of the challenges caused by SALW in their region but also to ultimately involve these individuals in the solutions. One common example of this sort of initiative is the "training of trainers". In the case of SALIGAD and BICC, a community workshop was held in Garissa, Kenya on the proliferation and effects of SALW in the area. By the end of the day, participants had developed ideas to address the problem in their community and had made suggestions that were taken by facilitators back to the IGAD and Nairobi Secretariat.⁷⁴ A further example of this sort can be seen with the LPI training of trainers for

the Sudan Council of Churches in 2004. In this two-week programme, participants engaged in discussions on a number of topics related to community-based problem solving and peace-building. At the end of the programme, it was hoped that participants would be able to return to their communities and conduct similar activities on their own. Through financing projects such as these, the EU and member states have been able to begin to address some of the SALW proliferation pressures in the HoA.

ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

When one examines the various policy responses to the SALW problem in the HoA a number of concerns become apparent.

While the Council has taken steps to make the SALW issue a priority, responding initiatives have often lacked coherence. For instance, while in recent years policy initiatives on SALW are often reported in concert within the updated Joint Action on Small Arms, the policies themselves originate from a diverse range of budget lines and actors. As a result, there is a disconnect between the high-level political stances taken by the EU and the programmes these stances ultimately encourage.

The lack of coherence due to the disconnect among the high-level positions of the Council and the multitude of policy responses seen from the Commission and member states has furthermore resulted in a case where there is one group of doctors diagnosing a patient and then another set of doctors treating the symptoms. While the Joint Action policy draws links between SALW proliferation and underdevelopment, aid is given out through mechanisms that long pre-date this document. As a result, one must question whether some of the actions taking place in the field are doing so through the SALW lens, or if they are simply being reinterpreted through that lens after the fact.

A further challenge that has arisen stems from the fact that SALW proliferation pressures are incredibly multidimensional. As they cut across a broad grouping of human and state security concerns it has presented a challenge to the EU that has yet to come to terms with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. The policy tools available to the Commission in order to address the SALW problem have been limited to the “aid and trade”-type solutions of the first pillar. In some areas of the HoA where open conflict is ongoing, such policy tools are insufficient.

The coordination of responses to the SALW problem in the HoA can be seen as a further challenge. As the EU and member states have had a large number of policy responses to this problem, both in terms of programmes and financial commitments, there is a very large number of actors engaged. As the EU lacks an internal unit for the regional issue area, these actors have had to rely on external bodies for their coordination. In some cases this has been through efforts with the Nairobi Secretariat, or through IGAD, or through other coalitions of their own creation. Unlike the EU programme in Cambodia, wherein the EU exists both as a prime donor and coordinator, efforts in the HoA have resulted in actors having to turn in one direction for funding and in another direction for coordination.

The lack of a central coordinating mechanism, or even of central reporting of results beyond the annual update of the Joint Action, has created a missed opportunity for potentially productive inter-cluster cooperation. As the activities at the grass-roots level are often best equipped to detect early warning signs of conflict, the inability for these groups to effectively communicate fluctuations in SALW proliferation pressures to the clusters engaged in drafting policy at the EU

level is cause for concern. While funding has flowed down to these groups as a result of EU-adopted policies, feedback and reporting typically finds a much more arduous return. NGOs and community-based organizations, funded by the EU or member states, are more apt to report findings and early warning signs to the state or regional apparatuses that are located in the HoA.

A further challenge in addressing the SALW problem in the HoA has come from a lack of international cooperation on a mechanism to control the flow of SALW. While arms export controls have increasingly been brought to the fore on the international agenda, there is as yet no legal mechanism for their enforcement. While the EU and member states advance policies addressing their own exports, the result in the HoA has seen little change as arms continue to be purchased from other sources. In this instance, the EU needs to further examine the ATT as a means of addressing international arms flows. By adopting the provisions of that treaty, and then by convincing other international actors of the ATT's importance, the EU can concretely address the problems caused by the international and the illicit arms trade.

EU and member state responses to the SALW problem in the HoA have also faced the challenge of policy sensitivity. In this case, policy sensitivity refers to the manner in which SALW proliferation pressures are often a reaction to other stimuli. In some cases, projects aimed at economic development have ultimately had a negative impact upon the migratory patterns of some pastoralist communities. When coupled with recent drought and disease, the SALW proliferation pressures in the surrounding area have actually intensified as a result of the EU development efforts. While the initial project may not have been aimed at addressing the SALW problem, its impacts reveal the need for EU programmes to conduct assessments of their impact on SALW pressures prior to their implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The EU should establish a regional programme for the HoA on the basis of the EU Joint Action on Small Arms. This regional programme would play a key role in the coordination of all remaining recommendations;
- The EU should develop a comprehensive cross-pillar strategy on the SALW problem in the HoA;
- The EU should conduct SALW proliferation pressure assessments before beginning new projects in areas where SALW have been known to be a significant factor;
- The EU should decide to establish closer and more direct links with an existing regional coordinating mechanism that would be able to ensure coherence of policy responses;
- When drafting future Commission policy related to arms transfer controls, the EU should be sensitive to the perspectives of the recipient parties. This would include an audit of alternative sources of these weapons, the impacts these weapons have on the human security concerns in the region, and the ultimate impact of EU policy on addressing the problem of SALW proliferation;
- Address loopholes in existing EU policy on arms exports that allow for the practice of brokering or unreported small-scale SALW transfers;
- The EU and member states should embrace the ATT as a legally enforceable mechanism for control of the arms trade, and move to adopt the policy elements of that treaty into an expanded Joint Action;
- The EU should continue to support the UN Programme of Action on SALW and actively promote restrictive practice on SALW proliferation in the upcoming review process in 2006;

- Broaden the involvement of civil organizations within the Cotonou-related CSPs;
- Promote enhanced participation of parliamentary structures through increased cooperation of organizations like AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Africa), The Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the EU parliament, the AU parliament, and regional structures in the HoA; and
- Establish regular conferences with European civil society actors engaged in the SALW issue and have special working groups on the HoA region.

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ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
AWEPA	European Parliamentarians for Africa
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DG ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
EU	European Union
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency
HoA	Horn of Africa
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority of Development
KISP	Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace
KPIU	Karamoja Project Initiative Unit
LPI	Life & Peace Institute
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NGO	non-governmental organization
RECSA	Regional Centre for Small Arms of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SSR	security sector reform
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research