

REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND PEACE-BUILDING IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

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Abstract: Africa's conflicts are diverse in their causes and consequences, and they are increasingly interrelated as well as regional in character. Their economic and non-state features are undeniable, leading to some promising possibilities in terms of diplomacy, involving think tanks and NGOs in addition to formal institutions, both on and off the continent, such as the 'Kimberley Process' around 'blood' diamonds. Development corridors and trans-frontier peace-parks may also constitute innovative ways to moderate and contain conflict. As so often, changeable African cases challenge established assumptions, analyses and policies, such as those around civil society and governance as well as regional and security studies. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The turn of the century in Africa was distinguished by three interrelated yet rather divergent sets of issues which swirled around the conflict (theory and policy) nexus. First, although most contemporary conflicts start within one particular country, all spill-over at least one border, and in the cases of conflicts around, say, Congo, Liberia or the Sudan, over several. Second, and controversially, a novel genre of analysis (the political economy of violence approach) was advanced which asserted that there were strong economic forces behind current wars (see for instance Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Forcese, 2001; Reno, 1998; Smillie *et al.*, 2000). But third, and somewhat in contradiction to the first and second sets of issues, there was also a growing awareness that not all the continent's conflicts are the same. Rather, there is an increasing recognition that Africa's conflicts—all of which have pronounced 'regional' dimensions—have considerable vintage and difference. For example, the political economy of violence approach may have more relevance to Angola and Sierra Leone than the continuing struggles in the Horn—most recently between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Moreover, conflicts are rarely static, so any investigation of such ongoing struggles has to appreciate that there are distinctive periods in all the continent's continuing battles (pre- and post-cold war, pre- and post-apartheid, in particular). All of this poses profound dilemmas for even well-intentioned

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'humanitarian intervention' as well as the injunction that we have a 'responsibility to protect' (Ayoob, 2001; ICISS, 2001; Weiss, 2002).

After an overview of Africa's interrelated conflicts and policy responses to them, I turn to the conflicts in Angola and Congo. This leads into a discussion of the 'discovery' of, and myriad responses to, 'blood diamonds', and the 'Kimberley Process'. I conclude with a set of possible futures for Africa, each with analytical and policy implications. Such an analysis in part consists of a juxtaposition of regional (integration/interaction/competition) with security (causes and responses to conflict) literatures and genres, with an emphasis on prospects for non-state activity, both NGO and think tanks, leading to regional peace-building/tracks two and three/policy networks/communities (from the 'Kimberley Process', to 'humanitarian intervention' to 'responsibility to protect').

1 OVERVIEW

1.1 Conceptual Frameworks

Just as Africa is heterogeneous, so likewise are the causes and characteristics of its ubiquitous conflicts especially if the analysis stretches over time, particularly during and after the cold war and/or apartheid. Notwithstanding the power of the 'new' political economy of violence perspective, the apparent diversities in causes and courses, scale and spill-over of both conflicts and peace-building partnerships, suggest the need to reconsider whether there can ever be one singular continental perspective or rather a group of regional forms. Africa has had a varied set of historical experiences, in terms of imperial connections and economic relations, let alone ecological contexts. Just as Samir Amin proposed distinguishing an analytic trio of Africas in the early-1970s so, today, we can identify three distinct regions in terms of both types of conflict and peace-making responses, informed by insights drawn from the embryonic perspectives termed 'new regionalisms' (Shaw, 2000). These are (i) *orthodox inter-state/-regime* conflicts and responses (e.g. Ethiopia and Eritrea); (ii) *semi-orthodox*, semi-state (economic) conflicts and responses (Angola, Congo and Sudan); and (iii) *non-orthodox*, largely non-state, conflicts and responses (Somalia and West Africa).

The emerging political economy of violence perspective relates more to types (iii) and (ii) than (i), in that it suggests that at least some of these resilient wars are more about economic resources/survival than, say, ethnicity, ideology, region, religion etc. Nevertheless, all three types of conflict are profoundly affected by changes in the nature of the African state itself, which has been downsized and redefined by two decades of neo-liberal conditionalities (MacLean *et al.*, 2001). William Reno (1998) argues that as weak(ened) African states began to lose control of agendas, armies, identities, media, resources, and territories so conflicts multiplied over the shrinking national cake (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.). Effective authority for 'governance' came to reside elsewhere, leading to an inability to contain either the causes or consequences of conflict. Such a 'regime vacuum' presents profound dilemmas for the prospects of efficacious 'humanitarian intervention' (Shaw, 2001, 2002; ICISS, 2001). In turn, the expectations of, and pressures on, not only private security companies (PSCs) but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including think tanks, are intensifying as surrogates of effective national regimes. But the latter confront troubling questions about their own attitudes and practices in conflict situations (Bryans *et al.*, 1999; Spearin, 2000).

External actors (mining companies, international financial institutions etc.) have come to sanction the hiring of private security forces in tough times/places, such as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone (Howe, 2001; Mills and Stremlau, 1999). Given restrictive limits on the terms of any commitment of statutory forces from the North—at least prior to 11 September 2001—and reflective of the new revisionist/realist mood, informed analysts like Herbert Howe (2001, pp. 187–241) have begun to countenance *mercenary interventions when necessary* if other actions/sanctions have been insufficient. But perhaps even more surprisingly, NGOs engaged in peace-building have likewise come to consider the possibility/necessity of such contracts. In ‘Mean Times’, a report for CARE Canada and related Canadian and global NGOs Bryans *et al.* (1999) recommend that: ‘NGOs should consider the privatization of security for humanitarian purposes’. Such hitherto unthinkable possibilities pose profound challenges for both analysis and practice.

The diminished African state can no longer afford much of a regular military establishment if it ever could. However, at least until 1990, the logic of the cold war helped to keep both regimes and armies in business. But the post-bipolar era has posed challenges to the sustainability of the political economy of armies as well as mafias (Howe, 2001). As military budgets decline so statutory forces have had to learn to fend for themselves; hence the apparent willingness of some African governments to ‘sell’ statutory forces to UN and other PKOs, even if some/all of the ‘off-budget’ proceeds go into private pockets rather than national exchequers. Moreover, men in uniform have learned to pursue private gain as bandits and demobilized soldiers have few life skills other than using their weapons (Kingma, 2000). As militaries become more autonomous, so their relationships with the state and companies change. Hence the imperative of recognizing that the military acts in a manner increasingly independent of the state in both economic and security (and hence political) matters, leading towards the imperative of ‘reform’ of the military sector (Howe, 2001).

1.2 Policy Responses

Regional conflicts in Africa have increasingly become a global concern. This is particularly so for diasporas and for crisis or developmental NGOs, now stretching to include consumer groups sanctioning particular offending companies (see Klein, 2000). So unlike the cold war period before the 1990s, Western involvement is no longer an echo of broader bipolar tensions. Yet, as suggested already, the internal causes of wars cannot be separated from international contexts, particularly neo-liberalism as an ideology and globalization as a condition. In short, the characteristic mixture of economic stagnation and growing inequality is a flammable one, even if it has not always lead to overt antagonism and confrontation, in part because of some authoritarian reactions as well as anarchic conditions (Dunn and Shaw, 2001).

The emergence of regional arms races as well as conflicts—rather than any anticipated ‘peace dividend’ (which was restricted to a few cases like Mozambique)—has profound *developmental implications* as human and financial resources get diverted into the military. Prospects for regional development recede as conflicts both escalate and proliferate and ‘off-budget’ incomes and expenditures become priorities for regimes and leaders alike. And such negative consequences increase with the proliferation of short-term peace-keeping operations for both militaries and NGOs. Such negative developmental implications of civil wars are further magnified if parallel private sectors and

interests are also recognized. And the longer-term implications of protracted conflict for both civil-military relations as well as the corruption of civic culture/civil society are equally worrisome, tending to undermine any apparent progress towards formal democratic processes (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003; Howe, 2001).

A kaleidoscopic array of inter-regime and regional 'alliances' has come to characterize African inter-state relations since independence. In addition to continental coalitions around the founding of the OAU, a series of sub-continental networks emerged in Eastern and then Southern Africa in the post-colonial era over regional integration and national liberation (Clapham, 1996). But definitions of regions remain fluid and problematic. As the *Strategic Survey* from the IISS (2000) suggests, both the Horn and the Great Lakes Region are at present characterized by 'interlocking wars' based on tactical rather than continuing patterns of alliance. The succession of Kabila I by Kabila II indicates how fluid are these tactical arrangements as the kaleidoscope of interrelated intra-African armies, parties, regimes and extra-African associates shifted again over 2001–2002.

Given the complexities as well as protractedness of contemporary peace-building, let alone constraints on governments' budgets and roles, we can expect non-state actors to play increasingly central roles in peace operations in the new century. Almost all state and inter-state institutions are under pressure to coordinate with a variety of non-state agencies in both specific and general policies and practices over peace support measures, and this forms an emerging 'Global Compact' (see www.unglobalcompact.org). Kofi Annan in his millennium review characterizes these as 'complex peace operations' (Annan, 2000, p. 48) rather than 'complex political emergencies' (Cliffe, 1999); responsibility to protect rather than humanitarian intervention. Such continuous forms of communication and coordination among the trio of actor types at all levels can be regarded as a novel variety of governance. I propose the notion of *track two and three governance* to embrace such processes and policies, where track two involves semi-state participants (or state appointees in their private capacity) and track three is entirely non-state (tracks two and three therefore contrast with track one which covers formal actors only).

During the 1990s, a set of non-state think tanks emerged within and around Africa as partial responses to its conflicts. These often play regional rather than just national roles and tend to be concentrated in Southern Africa rather than elsewhere. Moreover, the regional salience of such embryonic analytic and/or advocacy communities (Mbabazi *et al.*, 2002) varies considerably; i.e. progress towards any regional 'security community' (Adler and Barnett, 1998) is uneven and certainly not unilinear. These may also be involved in direct 'track two' type confidence- and peace-building activities in addition to engaging in informed analysis and creative policy inputs (Mbabazi *et al.*, 2002; MacLean and Shaw, 2001). Such not-for-profit institutions have become especially well-developed in post-apartheid South Africa but are also to be found elsewhere. They have come to reflect growing continental and global concerns such as peace-keeping, small arms/landmines etc. And, typically, they connect with national NGO networks and have begun to engage in training for indigenous capacity in peace-building, both military and NGO.

But in the context of declining states, the demand for interventions by (preferably indigenous) tracks two and three far outstrips their ability to respond, given their meagre resources which are out of proportion to the pressures. Clearly an effective continent-wide network of such indigenous as well as international human security think tanks/NGOs would be an essential first step towards a sustainable track two and three capability (Mbabazi and Shaw, 2000). But their roles are likely to be more circumscribed in inter-state rather than less formal conflicts as indicated in the next sections.

2 ANGOLA, CONGO AND THE GREAT LAKES

The Congo (the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire) has been one of Africa's most complex and regional conflicts. The quagmire of Congo—'one of the world's most complicated wars . . . one of the world's most troubling . . .' (Seybolt, 2000, p. 59)—soon dragged down the embryonic grouping of 'new Africans'. The Congo has always confounded its rulers, from Leopold II to Mobutu, who both ran it as a personal colony or fiefdom. Kabila I likewise soon succumbed to illusions of grandeur even while his idiosyncratic rule consisted of selling off whatever remained of the family jewels to fellow African presidential 'protectors'.

Whilst there has been a series of largely African state-led efforts in regional, continental and global fora to negotiate and implement cease-fires, such as the mid-1999 Lusaka Accord and April 2002 Sun City talks, in reality Congo has been partitioned by a group of neighbouring leaders who have paid for their statutory forces by allowing access to the loot, with profound long-term implications in terms of casualties (3–4 million deaths thus far), civil-military relations, and corruption. Just as the Congo was initially the possession of the King of Belgium rather than the Belgian state so, by the end of the last century, Congo was again divided among African regimes and party leaders.

Angola's war has been one of the most divisive and intense on the continent. Canada's then-Ambassador to the UN in New York, Robert Fowler, served as Chair of the UN's Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA. He prepared the first, critical report for the UN on the causes of Angola's conflict (Fowler Report, 2000) which identified UNITA's high-level accomplices in Africa and Europe. Diamonds (and oil) kept the civil strife alive for both sides, at least until the death of Jonas Savimbi in early 2002. Both these regional conflagrations, however, reveal the ubiquitous corrosive character of diamonds and related high value products like oil and gas: the states that control their production can import the material (and operatives) that keep them in power (Campbell, 2002; Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Howe, 2001). Thus, UNITA transformed itself after the end of the cold war into a 'regime' which controlled the alluvial diamond fields, which became more important to it than Western, especially US, assistance. But as its territorial reach shrank by the end of the 1990s, especially with the loss of access to the Cuango Valley, its diamond income declined: by the end of the century, while the MPLA secured an annual income of US\$1 billion from diamonds, that for UNITA was down to US\$100 million.

Three types of external (intra-African) military involvement can be seen in both the DRC and Angola conflicts. First, external military assistance, including either arms sales or direct military support to a government (e.g. Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC). Second, direct military intervention of foreign troops directed against a government (e.g. Rwanda's and Uganda's intervention in the DRC). Third, indirect external intervention, that is, support of various kinds to rebel groups operating against a government (e.g. Sudan's support of the LRA and the ADF in Uganda in the form of arms and logistic assistance).

A fourth type of external involvement, that by countries outside Africa, has become less explicit since the end of the cold war, although it still exists. The latter increasingly involves private extra-continental economic and strategic interests rather than those of states. The trio of authoritative UN reports in 2000/1 as well as criminal investigations in Paris reveal private links between African oil and precious metals and arms suppliers in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Russian, Ukrainian and Bulgarian, in

particular). Two Israeli-based East European entrepreneurs are especially engaged in the triangular trade involving diamonds to Tel Aviv: Lev Leviev's Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp) and Arkady Gaydamak's Africa-Israel Investments. As *Africa Confidential* (9 February 2001, p. 1) cautioned: 'The political cost of the arms-for-oil scandal is growing fast in Luanda and Paris. It reaches right across the power elite in the two countries.' But if Congo/Great Lakes/Angola are complicated conflicts, their complexities pale by contrast to those in West Africa, the least formal or traditional set of wars.

3 WEST AFRICA, 'BLOOD DIAMONDS' AND THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

Other than the long-standing and destructive conflict around Angola—hopefully now at an end—the most controversial and resilient contemporary struggle has been in West Africa (Cockburn, 2002): the interrelated conflicts in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, concentrated around the confluence of their three borders. At the turn of the century, *Partnership Africa Canada* (PAC) commissioned Ian Smillie and others to research and write a report on the real economic causes of the continuing conflict in the unhappy country and region of Sierra Leone (Smillie *et al.*, 2000). Their report was a primary catalyst in shifting attention to the production chain of 'dirty' or 'conflict' diamonds and the possibilities of sanctioning the informal/illegal sector and its official/formal associates/allies at certain choke-points.

Sierra Leone's downward spiral was accelerated by structural adjustment conditionalities as well as corrupt regimes, and the established diamond sector became informalized and criminalized under the Siaka Stevens regimes. Thus the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) was superseded by the so-called National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) with its Lebanese connections, and the country's national income, infrastructure and integrity rapidly declined.

The PAC report helped inform and generate parallel debates in a variety of organizations, including the US Congress, Canadian Parliament and the UN, centred on the remarkable 'Kimberley Process', inaugurated in May 2000 in the South African city where the industry began. The latter brought together the crucial elements in an attempt to contain the negative impacts of informal sector extraction and distribution particularly in Southern Africa: these ranged from capital to labour, environmental and women's groups to non-violent and local communities and formed the bases of a new form of governance appropriate to local to global interests (*Other Facets*, 2001–2002). Symbolically, coinciding with the Kimberley deliberations and as the war in Sierra Leone heated up again, De Beers and Debswana opened the extension of the Orapa mine in Botswana. The contrast between growth levels and standards of living and human development/security in two small diamond-producing African states—Botswana and Sierra Leone—could not be starker, with profound implications for analysis and praxis (Parpart and Shaw, 2002; 'Other Facets', 2001–2002). As Ralph Hazelton (2002, p. 1) suggests:

South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have been at the forefront of the campaign to halt conflict diamonds and to create a certification system which would assist in this. They, along with the diamond industry, have also been the most vocal champions of 'prosperity diamonds' and 'diamonds for development'. NGOs focusing on conflict diamonds have been accused of neglecting this side of the coin and of endangering the entire diamond industry.

4 DIVERGENT CORPORATE AND REGIONAL INTERESTS

Corporate, inter-regional and other responses to the 'blood' diamonds campaign have been illustrative of a wider process of private sector reactions to such increasingly frequent and articulate allegations of inappropriate and/or illegitimate or illegal operations: threats of consumer and other boycotts or sanctions (Klein, 2000). Following the turn of the century revelations from intra- as well as extra-continental sources (Campbell, 2002; Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000) of diamonds as a primary cause of conflict (Global Witness, 2000a, 2000b; Smillie *et al.*, 2000), De Beers undertook a series of interrelated defensive or preemptive corporate strategies. This involved negotiations at multiple levels with, and initiatives by, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, especially their new *World Diamond Council* (see www.worlddiamondcouncil.com) as well as intense discussions about corporate and (inter)national regulations. The objective was to contain the threat to the industry from blood diamonds—but also to advance De Beers as a (very profitable) consumer *brand* (Klein, 2000; Stein, 2001) rather than a diamond explorer or miner. In late 2000, De Beers created a 'strategic alliance' with the leading luxury goods brand in the world, LVMH (Moët Hennessey Louis Vuitton). Together with LVMH the De Beers intends (if the EU and US authorities permit) to establish a network of upmarket retail outlets to sell its own brand of diamond jewellery, which it is to source from anywhere, not just from its own mines.

In summary, the threat to the De Beers' oligopoly posed by the trans-national controversy over informal or illegal diamonds as a cause of conflict has led to a series of preemptive measures. Once the monopoly and myth of diamonds 'being forever' are broken (see www.forevermark.com), the market and price could collapse with profound implications for the relatively successful local economies of southern Africa (Hazelton, 2002). Hence the possibility of new entrants/technologies and logistics, especially given novel sectors, exists.

The potential and cumulative impacts of 'dirty diamonds' on De Beers and other formal sector producers (particularly Southern African states and companies as well as labour and communities) cannot be minimized, hence De Beers' corporate plan. Furthermore, the global diamond industry created the World Diamond Council which moved to improve corporate and (inter)national regulation to outlaw the 4 per cent of 'rough diamonds' which it claims is the only source of the controversial conflict diamonds, indicating willingness to negotiate with all-comers including (I)NGOs (see www.worlddiamondcouncil.com, www.diamond.net).

The May 2000 to mid-2002 multi-stakeholder 'Kimberley Process' is symptomatic of the complexities of state and non-state 'foreign policy' in the new century, for a diversity of actors in Canada, South Africa etc. The participants from states and interstate institutions, companies and (I)NGOs worked through a variety of channels to advance effective sanctions: G8 (including Russia), OAU, World Diamond Council, World Federation of Diamond Bourses as well as the UN ('Other Facets' 2001–2002), even if some INGOs continue to express scepticism or reservations.¹ Sanctions on any remaining uncertified blood diamonds are intended not only to deter conflict but also to support legitimate enterprises and governments: a delicate balancing act if sanctions are to be really 'smart'.

¹See 'Kimberley process report card on conflict diamonds, Valentine's Day 2002' in *Other Facets*, 5 March 2002: 4.

There are, then, emerging inter-regional tensions between the formal, industrial diamond, sector in Southern Africa and the informal, non-industrial, sector elsewhere on the continent, notably around Angola/Congo and Sierra Leone (see Cockburn, 2002). The former have tried to dissociate themselves from any notion that all diamonds are tainted, as any negative impact of such a global campaign on their capital- and technology-intensive production would have profound developmental implications, especially for Botswana and somewhat for Namibia. Such differences exacerbate, for example, tensions around Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC which has accelerated the enrichment of the Mugabe elite. Distinctive patterns of alliance have become quite apparent around the issue of conflict diamonds in West Africa (and Angola) with profound implications for policy and practice: African states like Botswana and Namibia as well as South Africa along with mining capital and organized labour concentrated in Southern Africa (Hazelton, 2002) versus warlords and informal traders, certain transnational mineral entrepreneurs centred on Congo and Sierra Leone, even Antwerp versus Tel Aviv or other emerging centres for polishing in the Gulf and Ukraine. Such distinctive patterns of production, distribution and accumulation, let alone conflict, should come as no surprise as they were precisely the focus of Samir Amin's tentative typology of the continent's several political economies over 30 years ago. 'African capitalism' may differ from that on other continents, but in turn there are pronounced inter-regional differences within the continent, especially Southern African capital, labour, technology and infrastructure and those elsewhere (Dunn and Shaw, 2001).

In short, the real causes of and responses to conflict on the continent remain problematic in the new century, in part because of outmoded analytic and policy assumptions and approaches and, in part, because of a growing diversity of real interests (for example diamond (re) exports from countries entrenched in the DRC like Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe). Intra- and extra-continental, state and non-state responses to Africa's continuing crises will necessitate a mixture of diplomacy and pressure, economics and politics, positive and negative sanctions, tracks two and three and so forth if there is to be any prospect of a genuine and sustainable African renaissance/initiative/partnership in the first decade of the new century as the intra-continental alliance of heavyweights—Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa—continues to advocate at the World Economic Forum (see www.weforum.org) and elsewhere.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

The actualities of African state and non-state foreign policy/international relations/political economy are in great flux as both global and local contexts continue to evolve (Dunn and Shaw, 2001). Neither analyses nor policies have really kept pace with the actual shifts in the relationships among states, companies and civil societies (Shaw, 2001). And, as indicated below, such trilateral relations can lead backwards to authoritarian or anarchic regimes as well as forwards to peace-keeping/-building, let alone human security or development, as indicated in the following section on sub-regional peace initiatives.

5.1 Regionalisms: Onto Zones of Peace?

Therefore, distinctions need to be made to indicate the importance of pragmatic and flexible varieties of peace-making interventions from both intra- and extra-regional

sources as well as the imperative of informed and nuanced analyses if policy responses (state and non-state) are to be as appropriate as possible. This argument also implies that a series of distinct 'security communities' on the continent (Adler and Barnett, 1998), i.e. one singular African renaissance, is unlikely.

We must therefore look to other ways forward, such as the interesting evolution and implementation, concentrated to date in Southern Africa, of a set of *corridors*, notably that from Maputo, which constitute potential sub-regional zones of peace. As they involve a range of heterogeneous partners in their governance or development, notably local-to-national governments and companies, they can be compared to a diverse range of 'triangles', often Export-Processing Zones (EPZs), in Southeast and East Asia.

Similarly, the diplomacy and development associated with *trans-frontier or cross-border peace-parks* offer alternatives to regional conflict, even if they all include South Africa as a partner. The first, between Northern Cape and Botswana—Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park—was inaugurated in mid-May 2000 (Tevera, 2002).

Both of these two types of sub-regional governance architectures for human development/security—corridors and peace-parks—may have significant longer-term implications for human security/development, in part because they have broader and deeper roots among a diversity of actors (communities, economic, ecological, infrastructural, functional, political etc.) than merely presidential agreements. In that way they may constitute the real foundation of any sustainable renaissance on the continent.

5.2 Implications for Established Analyses/Policies

The profound challenges posed to established analyses and policies by the variety of causes of conflict on the continent make creative and revisionist perspectives imperative for minimizing the possibilities of inappropriate idealistic or cynical reactions. This is increasingly recognized inside as well as around the continent, even if more by inter- or non-state agencies like the UN and World Bank or Global Witness and PAC, respectively, than the academy. Happily, extra-continental concerns are now being reflected and balanced by continental groupings like CODESRIA and the ECA as reflected in NAI/NEPAD. This leads to five final points.

First, for both '*new*' and '*old*' regionalism(s) alike, the proliferation of both conflicts and conflict actors/agents needs to be recognized, in Europe as well as in Africa and elsewhere. Classic regional studies still concentrate largely on economic and functional structures and relationships rather than on more uncomfortable patterns of conflict, which now involve myriad non-state as well as state actors. Yet, just as seeking to outlaw another world war was a catalyst for European integration, so contemporary conflicts have generated regional movements and momentum for human security/development around civil societies, corridors, peace parks, think tanks, track two/three etc. as indicated above (Hettne *et al.*, 2001).

Second, for *security or strategic studies*, the growing focus on the 'real' political economy of violence has profound implications that not only lead away from notions of 'national' towards 'human' security (Axworthy, 2001) but also to analysis of novel issues and coalitions. Some of these are related to Africa's current concerns like AIDS, landmines and other small arms, migrations, track two diplomacy, demilitarization (Lamb, 2000), demobilization (Kingma, 2000) etc. while others are somewhat longer-term, such as ecological sustainability, viruses, even post-conflict redevelopment etc. (UNDP, 1999).

Third, *development studies/policies* can no longer overlook awkward factors like the political economy of conflict, peace-building and reconstruction. In the emerging post-neoliberal era, rather than concentrate on self-congratulatory comparisons about 'external' 'competitiveness', they need to incorporate the inconvenient critiques of established policies that have failed to address underlying 'internal' social inequalities: onto emulation of UNDP's (1999) not uncontroversial advocacy of a 'human security' perspective: onto the real political economy of child soldiers, private armies etc. (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Braathen *et al.*, 2000; Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000).

Fourth, in such unenviable contexts, any discovery and advocacy of *civil society* groupings is to be encouraged, given their exclusion (even repression) in the continent's initial post-independence state socialist dispensation. They are important not only in terms of programme delivery but also in relation to advocacy; i.e. from human development to human security—and onto 'partnerships' with the other pair of actor types (i.e. corporations and states) (Mbabazi and Shaw, 2000; Mbabazi *et al.*, 2002).

And, finally, fifth in terms of these somewhat 'interdisciplinary' perspectives, issues of *governance* among myriad non-state as well as state actors cannot be separated from questions regarding the causes and containment and resolution of conflicts: onto sustainable forms of 'peace-building governance'? And such post-conflict governance must involve a range of interested stake-holders, including a variety of think tanks, that would lead towards policy/security communities. But how sustainable and representative are such networks/partnerships, given the palpable jealousies of some African presidents? (Mbabazi *et al.*, 2002; Thomas, 2000).

In short, as I have already suggested elsewhere (Shaw, 2001), even before the political economy of conflict genre became so popular, the dynamics/ambiguities of the continent's wars have served to challenge a variety of analytic and policy prescriptions, with implications for a range of assumptions/assertions, for state and non-state actors alike. Hence the imperative of informed but modest new analytic suggestions or directions for the first decade of the new century at least, not just for African Studies but also for Development even Global Studies. And if security policies are thereby challenged, so likewise should be development policies: *ex Africa semper aliquid novi!*

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