Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict

Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan

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Occasional Paper Series: Volume 3, Number 1, 2008

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

The *Occasional Paper Series* is published by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ACCORD is a non-governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa. ACCORD is constituted as an educational trust.

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List of Acronyms

ABC	Abyei Boundary Commission
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
APCP	African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme at ACCORD
ASF	African Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
AU PSOD	African Union Peace Support Operations Division
BSF	Basic Service Fund
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CAF	Country Assistance Framework
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy / Civil Affairs Section
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPIA	*Comités Provinciaux Inter-Agences* (Provincial Inter-Agency Committees)
CNONG	*Conseil National des Organisations non Gouvenmentales de Development du Cong*o (National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations for Development of the Congo)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CST	County Support Teams
DED	*Deutscher Entwicklungs Dienst* (German Development Agency)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
EU	European Union

GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GNU	Government of National Unity (Sudan)
HAC	Humanitarian Action Committee
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HC / DSRSG	Humanitarian Coordinator / Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General HCRRR Humanitarian Coordination - Relief Recovery and Rehabilitation
HCS	Humanitarian Coordination Section
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HRR	Humanitarian Response Review
IASC	United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
iPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JDT / O	Joint Donor Team / Office
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
LGRP	Local Government Recovery Programme
LINNK	Liberia NGOs' Network
LRDC	Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (Liberia)
MSG	Management Steering Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAD	Political Affairs Division
PAP	*Programme d'Action Prioritaire* (Priority Action Programme)
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REC / s	Regional Economic Community / ies
RFTF	Results Focused Transitional Framework
RIMCO	RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee
RoL	Rule of Law
RRR	Return, Reintegration and Recovery
RWC and	Results Focused Transitional Framework Implementation Monitoring Committee Working Committee
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPLA	Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement
SRF	Southern Sudan Recovery Fund
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSPC	Southern Sudan Peace Commission
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNDPKO - AUPST	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations – African Union Peace Support Team
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coor dination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Development Agency
WB	World Bank

About The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme at ACCORD

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a civil society organisation working to bring creative African solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD's primary aim is to introduce and promote conflict resolution, dialogue and institutional development as alternatives to armed violence and protracted conflict. In a bid to improve the planning and coordination dimension of African peacebuilding operations, ACCORD established the African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP) in 2007. The APCP is generously supported by the government of Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The APCP addresses peacebuilding as a holistic concept, which can be utilised simultaneously for short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, or relapsing into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. The APCP also focuses on enhancing coherence across the peace, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions of African peacebuilding operations through training, capacity-building, research and policy development activities.

Executive Summary

This Occasional Paper, *Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict,* addresses some strategic, operational and tactical elements of peacebuilding experiences in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia and South Sudan. ACCORD's African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme carried out a study on this subject between July 2007 and February 2008. The study consisted of desktop research, field visits and interviews with peacebuilding actors, agents and stakeholders in these countries. Peacebuilding was defined as a holistic concept that encompasses simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes designed to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to consolidate sustainable peace.

Various local, national and international actors are engaged in peacebuilding in post-conflict situations. The evaluations conducted in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan highlighted the need for enhanced coordination among external actors such as donor governments, peacekeeping missions, United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs); among internal actors such as governments, local administrations and civil society; and along the internal–external nexus. Without enhanced and deepened levels of coordination, peacebuilding activities will overlap, duplicate, and have limited impact upon the conflict systems they are attempting to transform. The research further found that peacebuilding coordination along the political, security, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law (RoL) and development dimensions in the countries studied, remained largely *ad hoc*, reactive and sectoral, as opposed to planned, coordinated, proactive and holistic.

Sustainable peace processes can be undermined if peacebuilding mechanisms do not develop the capacity of, and give ownership to, local agents (government and civil society). While this study found that much progress has been made toward the coordination of peacebuilding, internal actors, for a variety of reasons, were not the drivers or owners of their own national peacebuilding frameworks. The field studies shed light on a general need for

capacity development among local actors to engage in, and take full ownership of, peacebuilding efforts.

Common challenges

While much progress has been made, and notable successes can be identified, the research conducted in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan yielded main conclusions and recommendations. These are summarised below as five common challenges to peacebuilding coordination efforts:

(1) **A need for local ownership, capacity and cooperation with external actors:** National ownership of peacebuilding as an undertaking and peacebuilding coordination structures appears in all cases to remain driven largely by external actors. While peacebuilding coordination is at comparatively high levels among external actors in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan, coordination levels among internal actors appears to be lower in all three cases. Thus, developing the capacity of local authorities, civil society actors and government agents to engage with one another is important. Dialogue forums which can bring such actors together and allow for the creation of shared vision and mandates, as well as the allocation of tasks and responsibilities, could stimulate greater levels of cooperation along the internal–internal nexus.

(2) **A need for dedicated peacebuilding coordinating structures:** In some instances, peacebuilding is relegated as a sub-theme within coordination and implementation structures. Here the establishment of a peacebuilding steering mechanism in South Sudan represents a break with the past, and embodies coordination and implementation, as well as monitoring dedicated solely to peacebuilding efforts. The creation of coordinating or steering mechanisms which bring together those actors and stakeholders from the UN, government, donor, INGO and NGO communities engaged in peacebuilding activities elsewhere, could serve greatly to enhance coordination.

(3) **A need for inclusive coordination:** In the three case studies, some stakeholders (both internal and external) felt fully included in national

peacebuilding frameworks, while others felt excluded. The latter were uncertain of the roles and mandates of the other actors within the system. Inclusive mechanisms that provide for information sharing, clarity of roles and mandates, and clear division of labour and responsibilities should be supported.

(4) **A need for coordination that accommodates various needs:** While the coordination of peacebuilding efforts is desirable, the exact levels of coordination will vary between cases. In some cases certain actors will prefer not to coordinate, or be coordinated, so as to preserve their independence or impartiality. Thus, while greater coordination is ideal, peacebuilding coordination structures and national peacebuilding frameworks should at the same time remain flexible enough to accommodate varying needs under the banner of a national vision for peacebuilding.

(5) **A need to be both reactive and proactive:** Finally, peacebuilding structures in all three countries have displayed both reactive and proactive aspects. They have reacted to developments that threaten to compromise peacebuilding efforts, and proactively engaged with stakeholders in the peacebuilding process under shared national visions. Mechanisms that serve both as reactive and proactive "peacebuilding hubs" appear to enjoy the most success, and their structures and operations could be further investigated to aid in the development of peacebuilding mechanisms elsewhere.

The APCP study calls for urgent attention to building common strategies and enhanced peacebuilding coordination. The study recognised the challenge of coordinating external and internal actors with varied mandates and capabilities. The findings underscore however, that it is vitally important to find commonalities across and within the UN system, governments and civil society. Coordinated effort and vision are necessary if true conflict transformation is to take place, and a just and durable peace is to be achieved.

Research Aims and Objectives

One of the first activities of ACCORD's APCP was to undertake an evaluation of peacebuilding coordination in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan between July 2007 and February 2008. The study and its findings, captured in this Occasional Paper entitled *Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict*, will contribute toward the design and implementation of the Programme throughout its operations and activities, and generate insight into peacebuilding coordination in Africa. The research in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan served the following *five*, inter-linked objectives:

(1) To conduct an initial investigation into peacebuilding coordination in each of the selected countries;

(2) To identify the primary actors / stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding initiatives in each country;

(3) To identify challenges to peacebuilding coordination in each of the countries;

(4) Through the use of a comparative evaluation of the findings generated in each country, to identify the major *common* challenges faced by peacebuilding actors and stakeholders; and

(5) To generate possible recommendations on how to overcome these challenges.

This Occasional Paper is based on the research undertaken to meet these objectives and covers the scope of the APCP study, its findings and its recommendations.

Research Methodology, Limitations and Delimitations

Research Methodology

A focus of this study is the coordination of peacebuilding actors and stakeholders. A differentiation is made between the different roles, responsibilities and challenges faced by "internal" and "external" actors to the peacebuilding process. Internal actors are the domestic peacebuilding agents from the country or conflict system hosting a peacebuilding system. They include the parties to the conflict, the government of the day, political parties, civil society and the private sector. External actors are the foreign peacebuilding agents. They include donor agencies, foreign governments, multilateral organisations, the international private sector, foreign contractors, international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). This interpretation offers conceptual differentiation in the analysis of actors, roles and responsibilities within a peacebuilding framework, as well as in the identification and location of challenges within a peacebuilding system. While not exclusive or exhaustive, this conceptual tool proves useful when identifying and analysing the roles of peacebuilding stakeholders in a country transitioning from conflict.

Qualitative research for this study was conducted in phases. The first phase involved preliminary desktop research conducted from June to August 2007. Desktop research consisted of the use of primary and secondary data as available. The second phase of the research consisted of a field visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2007 to conduct interviews with representatives of:

- The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD); The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – African Union Peace Support Team (UNDPKO – AUPST); and
- Representatives of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) who are engaged in the establishment of the African Stand-by Force (ASF), the Regional Stand-by Brigades and the Rapid Reaction Capabilities of the AU.

The third phase of the research took place in the form of the field visits to the DRC, Liberia and Sudan from mid-August to early September 2007. While purposive sampling was utilised for the interview processes, only a select group of individuals could be interviewed for the purpose of this research, due to operational field constraints. In meeting the objectives of the research, it was considered both sufficient and valid for the researchers to obtain information on, and an understanding of, the relevant issues from a limited number of participants, provided that these research participants reflected the strategic, operational and tactical levels of peacebuilding engagement in the countries of interest. One ACCORD researcher was allocated per country, and the field visits were conducted simultaneously, so that research findings could be combined and analysed concurrently. Research was conducted in the form of unstructured and semi-structured individual interviews, and semi-structured group interviews.

The fourth phase followed the field visits, whereby a draft research report was generated, which was shared with research participants and experts at a Consultative Stakeholders Forum, hosted by ACCORD in November 2007 in Durban, South Africa. Finally, and based on the feedback received at the Consultative Stakeholders Forum, the research report was amended and additional desktop research was conducted from December 2007 to February 2008.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study provides a departure point for future investigations into peacebuilding activities in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan. It should be noted that this study does not represent a longitudinal analysis of peacebuilding efforts in these countries. Rather, it is an overview of current peacebuilding activities underway, and the evaluation of such efforts by those engaged in peacebuilding activities, Moreover, the research presented does not account for all peacebuilding activities currently underway in the DRC, Liberia or South Sudan; nor was this ever the intention of the researchers. Rather, the study represents a snapshot of the peacebuilding processes in each country, and of the roles that different stakeholders have to play in these processes.

Several factors including the seasons, short field duration, operational considerations and physical security hampered several planned interviews and visits to certain locations of interest. This limited the scope of the research. While extrapolations are made on the basis of the research conducted, it should be noted that representivity could not be optimised, and therefore the possibility exists that research findings may have been skewed. The authors acknowledge that further and more representative research is needed.

Lastly, the individual country sections of this Occasional Paper follow their own distinct logic and, therefore, distinct structure. While similar approaches guided the researchers in their initial investigations into peacebuilding coordination, no uniform peacebuilding mechanisms exist. Therefore each of the country reports highlights the most salient and, for the purposes of this Occasional Paper, interesting facets of peacebuilding coordination in the country at issue. Effort has been made not to "fit" the findings to a specific, pre-determined structural approach for the purposes of the overview, but rather to present the findings of the research within its own reference framework.

1. Introduction

The shift in emphasis since the end of the Cold War from state to human security has changed the international community's conceptualisation and operationalisation of peace and security interventions. The attainment, development and sustainability of peace and security in conflict zones has been divided broadly into concepts of peacemaking, peacekeeping (peace enforcement where necessary), and peacebuilding. The UN, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other inter-governmental organisations and regional actors — such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) — have gained valuable experience and expertise in the fields of peacemaking and peacekeeping. However, peacebuilding is a relatively new addition to the international and the African peace and security architecture.

The UN established the Peacebuilding Commission at the end of 2005 and commenced its work in mid-2006. Similarly, the AU has developed a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, and has plans to establish a Standing Committee within its peace and security structures. A common agreement has been reached that peacebuilding is an essential element of the peace and security equation. However, there appears to be little consensus on precisely what constitutes peacebuilding; when peacebuilding commences and when it ceases; who is responsible for peacebuilding; the actors who are to be involved in peacebuilding; and what peacebuilding is meant to achieve. These levels of conceptual confusion have created problems of coherence and coordination in peacebuilding operations.

Furthermore, the interface between peace, security, relief and reconstruction objectives is crucial if complex peacebuilding operations are to have a holistic impact on the conflict systems they are attempting to transform. In the peacebuilding context, coherence can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions of a peacebuilding intervention in a particular crisis are directed toward a common objective.[1]

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For the purposes of this study, peacebuilding is defined as a holistic concept that encompasses simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes designed to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to consolidate sustainable peace. Peacebuilding requires a *coherent* and *coordinated multidimensional response* by a broad range of role players, including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies. These actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society. Collectively, they address both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establish the foundations for social justice, sustainable peace and development.[2]

Peacebuilding occurs between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to a normal development process. It seeks to prevent future outbreaks of violent conflict.[3] However, peacebuilding is different from preventive diplomacy in that it emphasises long-term solutions. The UN now distinguishes between *preventive peacebuilding*, which refers to measures aimed at preventing future outbreaks of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict, and *post-conflict peacebuilding*, which refers to measures aimed at re-establishing state authority, political institutions, rule of law, social services and physical infrastructure.

Peacebuilding was first introduced in Boutros Boutros Ghali's An *Agenda for Peace* in 1992, and is still emerging as a distinct form of international action. Indications so far show peacebuilding as an endeavour fraught with the risk of failure. Research undertaken by Roy Licklider over the period 1945 to 1993 suggests that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed.[4] There are many reasons why some peace processes are not sustainable. Some relate to the motives of the warring actors while others are associated with limited support from the international community.

Despite a growing awareness that the security, socio-economic, political and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding operations are interlinked, the agencies that implement peacebuilding operations face difficulties in integrating these different dimensions into coherent country or regional operations.

Approximately 20 peacebuilding operations have been implemented over the last decade, yet no generic model has emerged.[5]

The international response to conflict, as developed in the context of the UN, is the prevention of violent conflict and peacemaking through negotiations among the conflicting parties. If a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached through a third party mediator, the UN or an organisation authorised by the Security Council deploys a peacekeeping mission to monitor the cease-fire and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. In some cases it becomes necessary to enforce peace to stabilise a situation. The international community shifts its focus to post-conflict reconstruction once the situation has been stabilised, emergency humanitarian needs are being addressed, and a peace process has been embarked upon.[6]

The nexus between development, peace and security has become a central focus of peacebuilding thinking and practice over the last decade. The focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which is about maintaining the *status quo*, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change.

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence are widely accepted today. Coherence can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security and development dimensions of an intervention in a particular crisis are directed toward a common objective.[7] According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) "there is a better understanding today of the fact that inconsistent policies entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity to govern".[8] However, the disparity between acknowledged best practice and operational reality is still a major challenge.

The lack of coherence between programmes in the humanitarian and development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres have been highlighted by various evaluation reports and best practice studies.[9] For example, the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade. The 2003 report of the study identified "strategic

deficit" as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding and found that more than 55 per cent of the programmes it evaluated showed no link to a larger country strategy.[10]

The findings of the Utstein Study and other projects lead to the conclusion that peacebuilding operations have been less coherent than expected. This lack of coherence has undermined peacebuilding operational capacity to achieve the strategic objective of assisting post-conflict societies to lay the foundation for sustainable development and a just peace. Finally, while research on peacebuilding operations has been emerging in a generic format, very little information is available on peacebuilding operations in Africa. Theoretical research on peacebuilding as a concept and on its implementation is available. However, comparatively little material exists in the way of practical research that can serve as a basis for a "lessons learned" analysis, for a comparative peacebuilding study, or to assist policy-makers and practitioners. Thus, while peacebuilding as an endeavour is fraught with challenges, there is little knowledge available on how, where and when to build durable peace.

2. Peacebuilding Coordination in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2.1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War led to dwindling international support for Mobutu Sese Seko's autocratic rule in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Internal resistance to his regime was thus strengthened. However, politicisation along ethnic lines re-emerged, particularly in the Kivu provinces of the Eastern DRC. During the mid 1990s conflict dynamics in the Eastern DRC were complicated by an influx of Hutu extremists along with refugees from Rwanda following the genocide of 1994. The arrival of refugees - coinciding with a time of heightened insecurity in the Kivus - also witnessed a flood of arms, and new armed movements came to be created in the Eastern DRC, further complicating an already complex conflict system.

By 1997 Laurent Kabila had succeeded in overthrowing Mobutu's regime, however the conflict's regional dynamics again overwhelmed the country, A division between Kabila and Rwanda and Uganda (former allies) led to a new armed rebellion and a conflict that would also involve Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Between 1998 and 2004 the war would claim the lives of close to four million people[11] through violence, hunger and disease, and be dominated by competition for the DRC's vast mineral wealth. The Lusaka Peace Agreement of 1999 was signed by the then government in Kinshasa and the key rebel movements, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Among others, it called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and a joint military commission of the belligerents; and it established the early parameters for the deployment of UN peacekeepers, However, the agreement did not hold. Joseph Kabila – son of the assassinated Laurent Kabila – would sign four other ceasefire agreements.[12] It was the inter-Congolese Dialogue which began in Sun City, South Africa in 2002 that allowed for the signing of the Sun City Accords in 2003 and internal processes that would lead to peacebuilding inside the DRC.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo faces many post-conflict challenges. The complexities of the country's post-conflict reconstruction are influenced by many factors such as its size and wealth of natural resources[13]; number of internal and external actors and regional differences; and basic humanitarian and development needs. There were hopes that the 2006 elections which mandated Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC, would lead the country to stability. However, the tensions in the east in late 2006 and 2007 showed that greater efforts needed to be made in order to achieve peace. In January 2008 two peace agreements for the Kivus were signed, however conflicts continue in the DRC. The country is host to the UN's largest peacekeeping mission, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was established by the UN Security Council in 1999.[14]

It has not been an easy task to create efficient mechanisms that create sustainable peace. The DRC's government, local and international NGOs, as well as the UN, donors and others actors have sought to establish peacebuilding mechanisms and processes. How, then, do these mechanisms operate? Are these mechanisms succeeding? What is the role and relationship between internal and external actors in the country? How do they work as a *process* – in terms of efficiency and coordination among peacebuilding actors? These are some of the questions that this section intends to answer.

2.2. The Structure of Peacebuilding Coordination in the DRC

A series of innovative programmes have been launched in the DRC, aiming to improve the effectiveness of overall peacebuilding. Many of these programmes are directly related to improving coordination among actors. Mechanisms have changed constantly in terms of approach, scope, and the roles of main actors. Consequently, peacebuilding is still an ongoing process and the coordinated activities are currently being implemented and are constantly modified. Additionally, since peacebuilding activities are not conducted in a homogenous manner, coordination differs according to the various geographical regions. Peacebuilding coordination is reflected by different levels of effectiveness in the implementation of a coherent approach. While some areas benefit from an

integrated and coordinated approach, others do not have a complex structure or are still initiating greater levels of coordination. In each of the analysed areas, the level of coordination and participation from the differing actors varies. In the following sections, the Humanitarian, Development and UN coordination approaches[15] will be analysed in greater detail. In addition, other coordinated activities that occur in the DRC, but outside of a complex coordination structure, will be presented.

Humanitarian Coordination

The humanitarian area probably presents the most comprehensive and developed coordination structure in the DRC. It reflects the nature of the activity that, due to the large number of actors involved, humanitarian programmes require more complex structures that can support the heterogeneous activities performed by diverse actors. Humanitarian coordination was thus used as a pilot programme for an innovative mechanism that has been implemented and whose lessons have been used as examples internationally.

The basis for humanitarian coordination in the DRC is an annual document called the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP).[16] This document sets a series of humanitarian scenarios and necessary responses that the humanitarian community should take in order to effectively deliver humanitarian services. In order to implement the activities efficiently, the plan uses a cluster system that is divided by ten activity sectors (such as health or early recovery) and is part of a whole humanitarian reform process proposed by the Humanitarian Coordinator / Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (HC / DSRSG) in the DRC.[17]

The cluster approach is divided into national and local levels. This cluster approach works in a decentralised structure and at the local level the clusters are known as *Comités Provinciaux Inter-Agences* (CPIA – Provincial Inter-Agency Committees). These levels aim to strengthen the humanitarian responses through increasing the share of information, identifying priorities, filling gaps, and creating accountability and mutual responsibility toward specific undertakings.[18] This cluster approach shows a complex level of coordination

that, in spite of being driven by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), has its responsibilities shared with other actors.

At both the national and local levels, the clusters are lead by UN funds, programmes and agencies, the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC – *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo*) government officials and NGOs. Although the participation of government and local NGOs is still developing in some cases, many clusters are willing to create better linkages with them.[19]

The differences among the regions made the CPIAs adapt as well, according to its decentralised implementation. This reflects the heterogeneity of the DRC, in which the east is considered more in a humanitarian stage of a post-conflict environment, while the west is in the developmental stage. In some cases, CPIAs were created in some western provinces, but it was found that in some of these cluster areas there was no humanitarian community to coordinate.[20] As a consequence, most of the CPIAs are still concentrated in the east of the country. In provinces where no CPIA exists, Crisis Committees led by the Governorates are in place.

Regarding the funding of coordinated activities, the DRC was also the pilot case for the implementation of a pooled fund, which aims to improve coordination through a more centralised funding process (managed by UN OCHA). The needs for each area and region, as identified by the clusters are then allocated. This, together with ongoing bilateral funding, aims to create more efficient ways of financial support. The cluster approach and the pooled fund have had a positive impact on overall humanitarian coordination.[21] The cluster system brings many relevant actors to the same forum, creating channels of discussion and improvement of the activities conducted. It also provides actors with the needed information to act in a more efficient way and avoid duplication. However, these positive results differ between clusters and some are more efficient than others.[22] Also, some observers have criticised the cluster approach, commenting that since it is mostly linked to the pooled fund issue, it creates a scramble for money within the cluster.[23]

Development Coordination

Another area in which innovative mechanisms were created through aid harmonisation is the development approach. The World Bank (WB) and the UN, through its integrated office, took a decision to merge their strategic frameworks of development.[24] The WB's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the UN' Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) formed the Country Assistance Framework (CAF). Sixteen donors, the WB, the UN and the Congolese government were included within this structure that consists of 90 per cent of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) that the DRC receives.[25]

The CAF document lists priorities, based on the Country Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and ultimately aims to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be implemented from 2007 to 2009. This prioritised list focuses on peace consolidation and state building, as presented in the PRSP[26], giving the UN and the WB a shared responsibility and allowing an easier handover of MONUC, with secured financing. The CAF aims to ensure that there is a shared diagnosis of the main problems faced by the country, improves aid harmonisation around key national development priorities, and reduces the bureaucratic transaction costs.[27] In that regard, it identifies major areas for donor focus as well as aiming to create the environment for coordinated funding in the development sphere.[28]

In order to apply these priorities, an 18–month programme was created, called the *Programme d'Action Prioritaire* (Priority Action Programme - PAP). The CAF is comprised of the DRC government, the WB, the UN and donors; civil society groups are excluded.[29] The process is still in its early stages. Therefore it is difficult to evaluate its impact in enhancing coordinated activities in DRC. However, the process is an important step in unifying developmental activities within an established structure that determines common targets, shared responsibilities and financial means.

The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

The effort to create a more homogeneous structure within the UN has been a global goal, and the DRC has been used as one of the pilot countries to implement the IMPP. This process consists of an attempt to improve integration and coordination within the UN system, through reducing duplication and increasing cooperation. In order to increase the clarity and efficiency of the overall process, the IMPP has changed since its creation. There was the attempt to generate better coordinated and integrated activities within the UN system, including the UNCT and the peacekeeping mission. While peace operations, like MONUC, have (or at least should have) a short-term presence in a specific country, the UNCT presence in a country is of an extended nature. The difference between the UNCT and the mission approaches (long- and short-term) is one of the challenges faced by the IMPP.

It is important to add that despite all the developments in the IMPP, the integration process of the UN in the DRC has not been completed. Much of the collaboration among actors is made on an *ad hoc* basis. Some of the UN personnel interviewed noted that while information was easily accessible and willingly shared in the higher echelons, at the operational level, roles and responsibilities were not always clear and information sharing was difficult.[30] Also, the divisions between the mission and Agencies are not clear in the country.

MONUC is presently creating a Stabilisation Programme, which represents a new integrated concept for the immediate delivery of security, return and reintegration, and the restoration of state authorities by both the UNCT and MONUC. The Stabilisation Programme has a Civil Affairs Section (CAS) that aims to utilise its field presence to identify conflicts that can be addressed by specialised NGOs, implement proximity outreach initiatives, and promote reconciliation initiatives in high risk areas. This aspect of the Stabilisation Programme serves as an early warning tool.

Other Forms of Peacebuilding Coordination

Although the coordination in the humanitarian development areas, and within the UN system occurs in a complex way, many other, simpler coordinated projects are also being implemented. What differentiates these is that their less complex structures. Examples include:

- In the security area, there has been constant coordination between MONUC and the Congolese Army with physical patrolling. However, these activities are limited by the Security Sector Reform (SSR) challenges.
- The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process is being conducted in partnership with the government, the UNCT – notably through the work of the UN
- Development Programme (UNDP) – the WB, NGOs and MONUC. This programme is currently in its third phase.
- In the field of human rights, coordination can be seen through the integration between the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the Human Rights Division of MONUC since 2006. This integration has occurred because both agencies had overlapping activities. Integration is still not complete, however, and overlap continues to occur. Each agency still maintains a separate budget, creating difficulties in terms of funding.

2.3. The Role of Internal and External Actors in Peacebuilding Coordination

After presenting some of the coordinated peacebuilding structures in the DRC, it is important to reflect on the overall conditions that serve as challenges to enhanced coordination in peacebuilding activities. Those interviewed opined that "everything is a priority" in the DRC.[31] The DRC requires a huge amount of resources and effort, given its size. Therefore, improving peacebuilding coordination is one way in which resources and effort can be harmonised.

Further, results are not uniform even in the coordinated responses. On the one hand, there is a better functioning humanitarian coordination structure,

which is the most complex in the country. On the other hand, there are reactive and *ad hoc* coordination activities that do not always yield efficient results. This dichotomy is important within the context of the intended draw-down of MONUC, which, to be successful, needs to occur in an environment of clear task allocation and stakeholder responsibility in the creation and maintenance of sustainable peace in the DRC.

In general, some actors understand the overall coordination structures while others do not share such an holistic view. The latter seem to understand their own role in the peace process, but do not understand the specific or differentiated roles of others. Also, while some level of coordination is certainly desirable, viewing coordination as compulsory at all levels, in all situations and among all stakeholders should be discouraged. Some organisations deliberately remain outside of coordination structures, as they believe they enjoy greater levels of impartiality and independence working by themselves.

Overall, peacebuilding in the DRC is fraught with many challenges including the size of the country, disparities between urban centres and rural areas, difficulties in defining peacebuilding priorities, limited resources, an uncoordinated funding approach, over-concentration of funds in specific regions, unclear division of tasks and responsibilities between central and provincial authorities, confusing roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, partial information-sharing, bureaucratic and institutional constraints and inefficient political structures.[32]

External–External Coordination

Among the actors and stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding activities, the UN system contains the most advanced coordination mechanisms in the DRC, even with the many challenges presented. This can be seen through the creation of structures such as the humanitarian or the development coordination mechanisms. Also, the UN's creation of the IMPP aims to enhance the capacity of the organisation. The secretariat and senior management of the mission are willing to implement a more coherent structure, but bureaucratic constraints

and lack of clarity over the process are challenging the implementation of more coordinated responses in the IMPP.

External actors such as INGOs also have a leading role in coordinated activities, especially in the humanitarian arena. They often serve as implementers of government or UN activities. Among INGOs, while no formal overall coordination structure exists, they often serve as implementers of government or UN activities. Also, many INGOs, preferring impartiality, want to remain neutral and avoid participating in deeper, coordinated structures.

Donors are other vital external actors. Although they have been part of integrated responses such as the pooled fund and the implementation of the CAF, their specific interests still challenge the success of a unifying funding system. While they are creating funding structures that enhance coordination and avoid duplication (like the pooled fund, or the use of clusters as a way to identify needs), much still remains to be done. In this regard, the development and humanitarian structures do not encompass all the funding in the country, which is still regulated by bilateral agreements.

Furthermore, the funding structure is criticised for being directed mostly to more "popular areas". While humanitarian activities in the east do not suffer funding problems, the not so popular western region of the country faces more difficulties in financing some of its developmental activities. These financial constraints occur not only through the funding of external actors like UN agencies or INGOs but also through local NGOs and local government.

Internal–External Coordination

Concerning internal–external relations, the implementation of humanitarian and development strategies are important examples. While internal actors strive to improve communication between themselves, they are heavily dependent on external funding and therefore donors have an expressive role in determining priorities. This raises issues around the country's internal capacity in setting its own priorities. This dependency relation is not to say that local actors play no role in these coordinated activities. These actors to some extent are even increasing their role in many peacebuilding activities, especially

after the 2006 elections. The MONUC CAS and the Political Affairs Division (PAD) have launched initiatives that aim to support civil society platforms both at the local and national level. However, local actors such as the government and civil society, acting in humanitarian or development coordination, for example, are clearly not taking full ownership of the process in terms of power in negotiating, implementing and evaluating these processes.

Internal–external relations are guided by challenges in accountability of mutual interaction. From both sides, there are challenges in sharing results and giving transparency to the internal–external relations, thus trust among different actors is undermined.

Internal–Internal Coordination

In terms of peacebuilding, internal–internal coordination faces a significant challenge, which may have its origins rooted in the war itself. While civil society was relatively organised and represented a strong component during the 1990s, it has, since 2003, suffered to some extent from internal conflicts, segmentation and politicisation. Such disagreement presents challenges to the improvement of internal coordination. Also, lack of capacity exists among government and civil society, particularly at the provincial level. After the 2006 elections, there were expectations that the government would take the lead role in coordination activities. However, the government is dependent on the initiatives of external stakeholders. Hence, it does participate in coordinated activities with other stakeholders in the humanitarian and development fields.

Indeed, there is clear lack of inter-ministerial coordination within the government. The finance, planning and humanitarian ministries do not share a common view on their actions, thus creating duplication and even confusion with governmental activities.[33] Further challenges in the coordination and delivery of the programmes are increased in turn.

The problem is compounded by the local NGOs lack of capacity and accountability. The association of local NGOs contributes toward building their capacities in a coordinated manner, and assists in fundraising and representation.[34] The *Conseil National des Organisations non Gouvernementales*

de Dévelopement du Congo (National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations for Development of the Congo – CNONG) leads in networking local NGOs.

2.4. Findings and Recommendations

The DRC confronts many challenges. Although the country elected a new president, a bicameral parliament and provincial assemblies in 2006, violence in the eastern region presents a major challenge to consolidation of democracy. Further, there is no national ownership of the peacebuilding process. Although an attempt to make local actors more central to the process is under way, the government, civil society and local NGOs are hampered by lack of capacity. That, in addition to dependence on international aid and the distrust of the donor community, has led to coordination structures being created and driven by external actors.

There is a need, therefore, to create more efficient peacebuilding structures. Although local institutions are still being developed, there are critical challenges to implementating coherent structures. Sustainable peace will only be achieved when peacebuilding coordination structures and activities are owned and driven by the Congolese people.

3. Peacebuilding Coordination in Liberia

3.1. Introduction

Research in Liberia was conducted in two phases and was aimed at assessing the peacebuilding coordination mechanisms, and identifying their strengths and weaknesses. In the first phase that occurred in June 2007, primary and to a greater extent secondary data was reviewed on the coordination mechanisms and structures that have been established. The second research phase that was undertaken from July to August 2007 involved a number of unstructured interviews with key informants in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UNCT and a small number of local NGOs. The actors that were targeted in the second phase of the research were few, due to the short duration of the field visit. The research also focused on coordination between primarily external actors, based in Monrovia. Key areas outside Monrovia were not easily accessible due to seasonal factors. Therefore, this report forms the foundation for a more comprehensive research project on peacebuilding coordination in Liberia.

Liberia was engulfed in a vicious and brutal cycle of conflict that lasted 14 years (1989 - 2003) and resulted in the deaths of 270 000 people, the displacement of 800 000,[35] and the devastation of the economy and national and civil machineries. Destabilisation of the entire West African region occurred as Liberia's neighbours, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire also became embroiled in conflict. While it was hoped that elections in Liberia in 1997 would restore order to the country (indeed, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia – UNOMIL – withdrew from the country on this basis), violence continued unabated and between 2000 and 2003 a new wave of conflict gripped the region.

The key actors to the conflict signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)[36] in Accra, Ghana, in August 2003, and a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was established in October 2003. The CPA was a comprehensive peace agreement intended to address the civil war within Liberia as well as the regional conflict dynamics, and to firmly place Liberia and the region on the path to post-conflict recovery and sustainable peacebuilding.

In 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president in the first post-conflict elections, and a unity government took power in 2006. While the elections marked an important milestone toward the attainment of peace, the critical challenge of the post-conflict building processes still dogged the country.

The UN Mission in Liberia was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and was deployed in October 2003.[37] UNMIL was a wholly integrated mission which, practically, meant that all key components of the mission were located under a unified command structure. Some in the humanitarian sector doubted this integration and feared that the mix of the humanitarian with political and security imperatives would compromise core humanitarian principles. Others in the humanitarian and NGO sector, however, did not object to working with UNMIL. Generally, there was a positive attitude toward UNMIL in the country.[38] A public opinion survey on UNMIL in 2006[39] found that, "The majority of the people surveyed agreed that UNMIL has done a good job in making them feel safe and in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement… [they felt that]… the peacekeepers had fostered goodwill and trust among the population."[40]

3.2. The Structure of Peacebuilding Coordination in Liberia

The research found that there was a complex coordination structure established largely due to the big number of external actors that moved into Liberia. The actors stayed after the elections as they had learnt that elections in and of themselves are not the end point of a peace process. Hence, elections need to be followed by a comprehensive strategy that promotes peacebuilding by addressing the structural causes of conflict to prevent a war reoccurring, as happened in 1997. The multiplicity of actors not only underscores the complex nature of post-conflict peacebuilding, but also the need for good coordination and cooperation among them.

The Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) and the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO)

The RFTF was a needs-based strategy that was adopted at the February 2004 Liberia Reconstruction Conference, led by the NTGL together with the UN, United States Government, the WB, and with the support of others in the International Community.[41] The RFTF strategy was undoubtedly ambitious when placed against the enormity of the political, economic and other challenges facing the country. The strategy consists of 10 thematic structures[42] that determine the priorities and strategies to help Liberia transition through the long-term political, economic and social challenges. The Framework had several verifiable milestones and accountability mechanisms. International development partners supported the framework and disbursed US$522 million through it.[43]

A key principle of the RFTF was national ownership, which involved including as many actors as possible. The NTGL, supported by the UN and the WB led the agenda through the RTFT RIMCO. RIMCO[44] was established at a 2005 meeting of key stakeholders. Its focus was to review the progress that had been made and it was the highest policy body responsible for Liberia's reconstruction and aid coordination mechanism. RIMCO was responsible for giving policy guidelines for the coordination of external assistance to Liberia and for managing the implementation of the activities as specified in the RFTF, each of which were led by a RIMCO Working Committee (RWC), chaired by NTGL line ministries. These line ministries supervised the progress of each of the clusters and gave feedback to RIMCO.

The RFTF was a positive mechanism for facilitating communication among stakeholders across both the development and humanitarian spectra. However, there were inconsistencies relating to the coordination of the various stakeholders. These inconsistencies frustrated the ability of local stakeholders to monitor and manage the progress that had been made. Local ownership was also compromised by coordination difficulties between local and external actors. The RFTF was revised in early 2005 under the leadership of the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary

General, Mr. Abou Moussa.[45] The new RFTF was endorsed as the strategy for Liberia's reconstruction for the remainder of the transitional period.

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP)

The RFTF expired in March 2006 and was followed by the iPRSP for a period of two years (after which a medium term Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) based on the MDGs will be launched from 2008 to 2012). The iPRSP was aimed at being a mechanism through which the Liberian government was able to articulate the country's development agenda and the coordination of international assistance. It defined the framework for recovery and reconstruction as a means of achieving and consolidating the relationship between peace and development in a way that was consistent with the needs and aspirations of all Liberians.[46] The Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC) and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA) were therefore responsible for implementation. The Paper was developed through a consultative and participatory process, involving stakeholders from all 15 Liberian counties, and development partners including the WB and International Monetary Fund (IMF).[47] Some of the interviewees, however, felt that the iPRSP consultative process was not exclusive enough. For example, a former senior representative of the Federation of Liberian Youth — an umbrella organisation for youth and students — felt that the organisation was left out of the consultations.[48] Others averred that "there [was] a difference between attending a meeting about a process, and being actively involved in the process…the process was [mostly] a top-to-bottom approach [as opposed to] the other way around."[49]

Given the complexities in post-conflict settings such as Liberia, determining the extent of participation or indeed even achieving broad and thorough participation can be challenging. However, the process of developing iPRSPs provided an opportunity to raise awareness among people on the various aspects of poverty and their contribution toward its reduction.

The UNMIL Humanitarian Coordination Section (HCS)

In late 2004, an agreement was reached in which UN OCHA was transitioned to an HCS which was located within UNMIL's Humanitarian Coordination, Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation (HCRRR) Department[50] and reported directly to a Humanitarian Coordinator. Initially, INGOs opposed this transition, citing lack of consultation and compromise of humanitarian principles. INGOs also raised concerns over potential conflict between the mission's political, security and humanitarian mandate. The HCS strived to build relations with INGOs, and the arrival in 2005 of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Alan Doss, further improved the relationship.[51]

The HCS functions mainly as an intermediary between the Liberian population and governmental and international actors concerned with humanitarian issues. The structure is the conduit between the military operation and civilian actors and agencies. It manages information, coordinates, plans, assesses, analyses and monitors humanitarian activities.[52] The HCS plays the essential role of coherently coordinating actors in the humanitarian sector. For instance, in Gbarpolu County, challenges related to coordination among the various actors led to unnecessary duplication of effort and wasteful usage of resources by NGOs. A meeting was held, which was attended by 24 representatives, 16 of which were from NGOs and the rest from UN agencies, government ministries and UNMIL. The meeting proposed methods to promote effective coordination and reduce overlap and suggested consultation with local authorities before the implementation of an activity. It resolved that HCS would be compiling a monthly report, detailing the activities of agencies, for the County Development Superintendent and the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission; and would provide adequate notification to local authorities when activities were being wound up.[53] This shows how important it is for information sharing to be replaced by effective coordination. It also shows that all organisations' outputs are inter-connected and contribute to a larger system.

In order to serve as a more effective coordinator, the HCS has developed a number of functions and mechanisms including:

- A country-wide presence through the establishment of five offices across Liberia;
- A Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) which channels need-to-know information to the humanitarian community;
- The facilitation of meetings for both UNMIL internal and external actors, including briefings for new humanitarian actors on the latest security and humanitarian situation in the various counties;
- The establishment of a Humanitarian Action Committee (HAC) that is led by the Humanitarian Coordinator and serves as a forum of exchange, consultation and decision making on pressing issues among the various security and development facets.[54]

The HCS also established the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Humanitarian Clusters which were intended to promote harmony of action in the conduct of humanitarian interventions.

The Consolidated Appeals Process

The HCS established the CAP as the primary vehicle for coordination, planning, programming, and facilitating close cooperation between host governments and their various donors and partners. CAP enhances the coordination of humanitarian assistance through regular meetings and common strategies and provides a tool for the joint mobilisation of resources through a consultative process. The consultation involves NGOs, UN Agencies and others, and over US$70 million was raised and channelled for priority humanitarian needs.

In 2007, a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) was developed, in which the various stakeholders discussed a common understanding of context, needs assessment, roles and responsibilities, and articulated their long-term goals and objectives. This articulation took into consideration the Liberian government's identified priorities as highlighted in the iPRSP. The UNDAF and the Common Country Assessment (CCA) were two further key documents. The CCA informed the preparation of the UNDAF, which is a strategic programme

framework for the UNCT and describes their collective response to the national priorities and needs of Liberia within the commitments of the Millennium Declaration.[55] These documents bring together the UN at country level to support the government to achieve the MDGs through constant dialogue.

Humanitarian Clusters

The humanitarian clusters approach was the outcome of the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), which highlighted a number of gaps in the international response and recommended adopting a lead organisation to bridge these gaps in the protection and assistance of survivors of conflict and natural disasters. In September 2005, the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) established nine clusters.[56] These clusters are responsible for accountability; predictability and effectiveness of the humanitarian response during times of emergency for areas traditionally receiving a weak and/or ill-coordinated response; improving coordination, and prioritisation of activities at the field level; and enhancing coordination and collaboration among the actors both within and across clusters. The implementation of the cluster approach implies a grouping of UN Agencies, NGOs and other international organisations around a pre-assigned area of responsibility, both under a lead organisation or agency as well as under the broad coordination and leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator.[57]

The cluster approach has developed at the global and country level. The main objective of the global level has been to develop and consolidate the system-wide preparedness and capacity for addressing humanitarian crises. The key objective of the country level is to strengthen coordination and bring together the array of country-level actors to identify and determine suitable responses for effective humanitarian assistance. Field research, however, indicates that there is disconnection between the two levels.

Liberia was one of four countries (including the DRC, Uganda, and Somalia) in which the cluster approach was piloted. The structure was overseen by the Country Team of the Interagency Standing Committee.[58] The pilot was rolled out in Liberia in 2006 when the country was already in a transitional phase. Because the cluster approach was concerned with the application of

emergency humanitarian assistance, Liberia's selection was criticised because it already had structures and mechanisms, and the humanitarian coordination function had been absorbed into UNMIL.[59]

It was quite apparent in Liberia that the question of whether or not the cluster approach has enhanced coordination and collaboration is dependent upon the perspective of the interviewees. Some perceived the clusters as improving the effectiveness of the existing coordination matrix and they provided insight into the appropriateness of the introduction of clusters in the post-emergency phase. Others perceived the cluster approach as supporting UN political aspirations, and they thought the clusters did not adequately reflect the interests of all parties concerned.[60] There is also lack of sufficient interaction and collaboration between the various clusters, so joint planning is not ensured.

An important aspect of the successful implementation of the cluster approach in Liberia was the participation of the government and other local actors. However, participation was not trouble-free. Interviewees shared that the government lacks a capacity to absorb, utilise and implement the various activities undertaken by international development partners operating in a post-conflict context. Over time, the government's capacity improved and more government ministries are able to assume the necessary responsibility. Today, several of the clusters are chaired by members of government, but their effectiveness has been limited and improving upon this will be important, considering the clusters will in future be absorbed into national structures.

3.3. County Support Teams (CSTs)

In 2006, County Support Teams were established as a mechanism to support administration in the 15 counties of Liberia. The teams are composed of representatives from UNMIL, the UNCT, the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Operations, county administration, line ministries of the government and NGOs. The main objective of the CST mechanism is to help the government to identify, analyse and ensure a coordinated response addressing local challenges and needs, and to develop appropriate strategies for development.[61] The Teams are also a tool to ensure the operationalisation of the UNDAF in the counties

by enabling the UN to respond in a coherent and mutually supportive way to the challenges facing the counties. CSTs also have the potential to contribute to coherence between the policies and actions at the national and county levels, and to serve as tools for achieving greater coordination among actors. The CSTs integrate UNMIL and the UNCT at the country level to provide coordinated support to local government, and as such are reflective of the intention of the UN to "deliver as one".

3.4. Mechanisms for Coordination Among Civil Society Organisations

The field research phase of this study included an exploration of peacebuilding coordination among civil society organisations in Liberia. A national NGO network — the Liberia NGOs Network (LINNK) — was established in 2003[62] as a coordinating arm. LINNK undertook several activities, including promoting coordination, collaboration and cooperation among national NGOs; networking; capacity-building; information dissemination and resource mobilisation.[63] LINNK operates five regional programmes, each headed by appointed regional coordinators. At county level, LINNK programmes are coordinated by county coordinators.[64] According to the Chairman of LINNK, through such a network it becomes possible to "reduce crowding of NGOs" at functions, facilitate meetings to discuss common concerns, and share information that can be disseminated to the counties and also to international actors.[65]

Local NGOs recognise the necessity for cohesion and cooperation with international NGOs, which are quite prominent in Liberia, as a means of tapping into their much needed expertise and capacity. It has, however, been difficult for LINNK to penetrate the Management Steering Group (MSG), which is an informal forum for cooperation and information exchange among INGOs. Issues include, *inter alia*, security, cooperation with UN and Government or Government agencies.[66]

The level of coordination between LINNK and the MSG has been minimal. While LINNK was invited to observe meetings of the UNCT, and has hosted meetings with UNMIL, the MSG has not invited LINNK and MSG

representatives to LINNK meetings. However, several INGOs do indeed enlist national NGOs as partners.

In terms of collaboration with national institutions, NGOs in Liberia were invited to participate in the drafting of NGO guidelines. Similarly, LINNK has been working with the government on issues such as food security, agriculture, health and education.[67]

While challenges to coordination and cooperation exist, the current government is friendly toward the NGOs. However, the interaction between the government and the NGOs needs to be enhanced. Such enhancement should involve capacity-building and resources and logistics mobilisation. The international NGOs have a role to play in this regard. It is also important to note that the benefit of cooperation is not one-way, because local NGOs have comparative advantages to offer, such as local knowledge, which assists in determining proper utilisation of resources.

3.5. The Role of Internal and External Actors in Peacebuilding Coordination

In Liberia, a commendable amount of effort has been expended by a mix of different actors ranging from the political and security realms to those of relief and development. The various actors have their own objectives, mandates and ideas about how best to contribute to change. These differences challenge cooperation and understanding, but the work of the various actors in support of peace, security and development is both complementary and deeply linked. A good deal of cooperation and unity of effort is necessary.

As discussed above, "national ownership" was a key principle of the RFTF and all efforts were made to ensure coordination supported the Liberian government to achieve its national development priorities. This national ownership is critical because without it, it will be difficult, if not impossible, in the long run effectively to operationalise and sustain the various plans and frameworks. The attention and involvement of the international community should focus on developing national capacity to build institutions accountable to the general populace.

Coordination for peacebuilding was quite structured, considering the various frameworks and mechanisms put in place. The government of Liberia had an overseer's role from the outset, and controlled implementation of the various assistance projects. Initially, the Government institutions were extremely weak, but they have improved over time. The government relied quite heavily on the support of the international community in all spheres of the implementation of government mandates. Thus clear channels of communication and coordination are critical between the external actors and the national government.

3.6. Findings and Recommendations

There have been significant efforts to improve peacebuilding coordination in Liberia. Such coordination should help the government achieve its national development priorities, and ultimately strengthen its capacity to assume ownership of all peacebuilding processes. A complex coordination structure was established and consisted, broadly speaking, of a wide array of security and development actors. The various actors brought to the table different organisational principles, objectives, and resources and different strategies and approaches to implementing their work in supporting the Liberian people. These differences constituted one of the main challenges to achieving effective coordination.

Another observation is that there seemed to be an absence of emphasis by the international actors on the purpose of their work, with the result that an unclear vision was pursued in the country and it was difficult to achieve proper coordination. Indeed, coordination was acceptable to some actors who discussed and shared information. However, coordination did not occur to the extent that it facilitated strategic analysis and planning, or the identification of common approaches. The coordination structures could not overcome various institutional, policy, territorial and other barriers.

The multiplicity of external actors also caused confusion regarding understanding who the international actors were, what exactly they were trying to achieve, and their limitations. It not being immediately clear to the public what a specific organisation was trying to achieve was particularly true of

medical care — and 80 per cent of medical services in the country are provided by INGOs.[68] However, decentralisation, in the form of the CSTs, contributed to creating a greater understanding and unified image of the UN.

Lastly, due to the limited amount of research time, this study was not able to determine the role of regional organisations in peacebuilding coordination in Liberia.. But from the preliminary research, it seems there was not a good integration of the regional organisation in the coordination processes established by the international actors. Yet, regional organisations play a key role in fostering dialogue between the internal and external actors. Indeed, regional organisations could undertake one or more of the following tasks:

•   Create and/or facilitate opportunities for the various actors involved in peacebuilding regularly to consult with one another on a common strategic vision for Liberia, in line with the government of Liberia's priorities. Such dialogue sessions should also align strategies and approaches in a complimentary way.

•   Improve the coordination with and among national actors by strengthening mechanisms that promote open exchange of information, dialogue, and the fostering of common and / or complementary approaches to mutually agreed objectives.

•   Build and support local NGOs with skills and resources to enhance their capacities and put them on a par with the international actors. Such capacity-building will assist the local NGOs consolidate their internal networks.

•   Considering potential tensions in peacebuilding coordination, institutions and individuals facilitating coordination need to be equipped with communication and conflict management skills to be more effective in their work.

4. Peacebuilding Coordination in South Sudan

4.1. Introduction

Following five decades of conflict between the northern and southern regions of the Sudan, The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 to end the most recent war in the Southern part of Sudan, which lasted from 1983-2005. Known as the second Sudanese Civil War, the conflict resulted in an estimated two million deaths and displaced and estimated four million persons.[69] The signing of the CPA allowed, among others, for the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) for Sudan, the conduct of a census during 2008; planned national elections in 2009; and the hosting of a referendum on secession for the southern regions in 2011.

This section focuses on peacebuilding efforts and activities along the North – South axis in Sudan. Specifically, focus is placed on peacebuilding coordination in relation to activities being undertaken in Southern Sudan. While the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) of 2006 have been signed, sustained peacebuilding efforts in Sudan have been most advanced within the framework of the CPA. Thus, when analysing peacebuilding coordination, the role of internal and external actors in peacebuilding coordination, and the impact peacebuilding frameworks are having on the consolidation of a sustainable peace, the CPA merits the greatest level of attention. A further point of interest in the CPA is that peacebuilding efforts centre around the concepts of national unity and secession for the south, as both are possible within the coming three-year period, and peacebuilding strategies need to take account of, and prepare the Sudanese people for, both possible outcomes.

Peacebuilding efforts in Southern Sudan are cross-cutting and interdisciplinary. In particular, activities relating to DDR, SSR, the return, reintegration and recovery (RRR) of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers, and the provision of basic services are all key cross-cutting thematic areas of operations. In

addition, given the already high number and expected increase of returnees since the signing of the CPA, the upward pressure on land and the resultant tensions relating to grazing rights and access to water sources are important areas in which peacebuilding efforts need to be coordinated.

The DDR process for former combatants and SSR are also key areas in which peacebuilding coordination is required. While the CPA makes provision for the disarmament of large numbers of combatants, and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) supports the disarmament of large numbers of former SPLA combatants, only small contingents of combatants have been disarmed (no accurate figures could be obtained however). The UN has been requested to disarm 25 000 former combatants by the end of 2008, and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration. SSR is also commencing with the restructuring of the armed forces; the creation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs); and reviews of the judicial, prison, wildlife protection and police services. However, there is a need for reconciliation processes between communities, confidence-building and support for community security, and arms control. In addition, while the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) supports police and prisons infrastructure, it does not directly support the courts and the judiciary. An holistic approach to supporting access to justice is needed.

Though numerous actors are engaged in peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan, and visible progress can be seen within the conflict transformation spectrum, peacebuilding efforts generally remain uncoordinated and *ad hoc*. Certain peacebuilding actors focus on the development of sustainable and holistic approaches to peace at the micro (local and grassroots) level, yet others tend to engage at the macro (national) level. Although this itself is not problematic, and indeed is essential for the success of peacebuilding efforts, coordination between actors engaging at the micro and macro levels is not particularly developed. Duplication and overlap of activities have resulted. However, efforts are currently underway to reduce this overlap and to coordinate support and capacity-building roles. For example, in Southern Sudan, internal and external actors have as of January 2008 collaborated on the creation of a peacebuilding matrix that allocates responsibilities when engaging with the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC).[70] While attempts at peacebuilding

coordination are being made at strategic, tactical and operational levels, there is room for improvement in overall peacebuilding coordination.

4.2. The Structure of Peacebuilding Coordination in South Sudan

Due to the complexities of political and governance structures in Sudan, numerous overlapping peacebuilding mechanisms and structures have been established to support the implementation of the CPA, to promote post-conflict recovery, and to lay the groundwork for the construction of sustainable peace. Peacebuilding activities are coordinated in different ways by a variety of mechanisms. The actors, including the UN, GoSS and donors employ different methods to support peacebuilding projects and activities. A range of interpretations about the nature of peacebuilding have thus arisen in Sudan, and various activities have been broadly combined under the peacebuilding banner. Who undertakes the peacebuilding initiative, therefore, determines how peacebuilding is both conceptualised and operationalised, and with which other actors peacebuilding activities are coordinated. Peacebuilding coordination will therefore be investigated within the context of the UN, the GoS, INGOs, NGO, and donors, each of which employ different mechanisms to coordinate and operationalise their peacebuilding goals.

While peacebuilding remains segmented and fractured, stakeholders strive for enhanced levels of coordination. An agreement has been reached on the establishment of a second window alongside the MDTF (South) – to be called the Southern Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) – which will assist the transition from a humanitarian response to longer-term recovery activities aligned behind a government strategy. This will allow for the GoSS and its development partners to produce a more coordinated peacebuilding strategy as the central pillar of the overall recovery strategy for Southern Sudan. The concept of the SRF recognises that the MDTF and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) are not adequately providing support for security, reconciliation and justice. The SRF is anticipated to provide additional resources for these areas, coordinated around a strategy that is to be both led and owned by the GoSS.[71] The MDTF will, however, be added to a host of other coordination structures and mechanisms, and efforts

will need to be made to link it with structures already in place and with newly-created structures and mechanisms that will come into place.[72]

UN Coordination Structures

At present the UN is employing three planning and coordination mechanisms for South Sudan. These are the UN and Partners Work Plan, the Common Country Assessment and the UN Development Assistance Framework, and Budget Sector Working Groups.[73] In 2006, the UN commenced with an innovative mechanism to coordinate the activities of its agencies and programmes, and the governments of Sudan and INGOs operating throughout Sudan, by launching the United Nations and Partners Work Plan for the Sudan. A similar Work Plan was employed in 2007 and one for use in 2008 was also drafted. The Work Plan recognises the ultimate responsibility of the Sudanese people and their governments in bringing peace and prosperity to Sudan. It identifies a significant opportunity for strengthened partnership between Sudan, the UN and partners to accelerate the shift toward recovery and development. The Work Plan, as an expression of this strengthened partnership, outlines integrated planning, programming and funding requirements for humanitarian, recovery and development interventions throughout Sudan.

The Work Plan is a reflection of the diverse nature of the challenges faced in Sudan. It focuses on the implementation of the CPA and expanded recovery and development activities and emphasises reintegration initiatives for returning populations, particularly the continued provision of humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Work Plan supports governance and the rule of law, the strengthening of basic services, and capacity-building for the GoSS. As claimed by the UN, the 2007 and 2008 Work Plans are the culmination of broad-based consultative processes between the UN and its partners in the Sudan. Following lessons learned in 2006, the 2007 Work Plan highlighted state-level planning and prioritised consultation with the governments and partners. Consequently the Work Plan was both state-based and supported by a broad range of actors, laying the foundations for a more consultative and unified approach to the implementation of programming throughout 2007. The

Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan was extended from 2006 into 2007 and focused on the coordination of funding responses to humanitarian challenges, while the Work Plans focused more on long-term developmental needs and supporting the overall peace process.[74]

The Common Humanitarian Fund spending is based on the needs which have been identified in the UN and Partners Work Plan. However, the manner in which the Fund's spending is prioritised remains contentious, and in extreme cases is argued to be potentially conflict exacerbating. In Abyei, which lies between the Northern and Southern regions, for example, spending is prioritised for communities where there are high volumes of returnees. In practice this has meant that Dinka Ngok receive most of the support allocations, while Misseryia communities have received relatively little. This has considerably increased tensions, and has led to major frustration in Misseryia communities.[75]

While the United Nations and Partners Work Plan for the Sudan has been extended into 2008, the UN is at present undergoing preparations for a CCA and UNDAF which will extend from 2009 to 2012. The UNDAF is expected to be more comprehensive in nature than the Work Plans utilised to date, and as the UNDAF utilises peacebuilding as one of its four overarching focus areas, it is expected to enhance peacebuilding coordination overall.[76]

Finally, the Budget Sector Working Groups are aimed at supporting the GoSS in the planning and implementation of its budgetary allowances. One of the core areas of engagement of the working groups is to remedy the current budgetary instability faced by the GoSS (for example, the largest proportion of GoSS expenditure at present is on salaries and not on services or infrastructure development).[77]

While the UN utilises three overall planning mechanisms for South Sudan, peacebuilding as a core activity is dispersed to some degree between all three planning mechanisms, and no central peacebuilding mechanism appears to have been established. Peacebuilding efforts, therefore, remain *ad hoc* and not optimally coordinated. While the DDR components of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) appear to be operating as integrated units as per the integrated mission concept, other units do not appear to be coordinating their activities

in equal measure. In addition, challenges remain in relation to the lack of capacity and mandate of the UN DDR Unit to work directly on matters of SPLA transformation, and with the UNDP and the UN Civilian Police components to support rule of law programmes. Thus, there is integrated support across the broad security sector as conceptualised by the OECD, while the linkages between DDR and SSR and between SSR and a broader peacebuilding framework and vision remain tentative.

The degree to which the various elements of the UN operating in Sudan adhere to a national country strategy or coordinate their activities in relation to peacebuilding appears to fluctuate and rely more on individual leadership and ability than on a harmonised approach. The peacebuilding activities are interspersed between the planning and coordination mechanisms; no central mechanism dedicated to peacebuilding has been established. Peacebuilding also forms one of the central components of the UN Development Assistance Framework which is being drafted, yet the linkages between the Framework and a broader national peacebuilding vision have not been established. The difficulty here, however, concerns precisely which framework the UN System in Sudan should address. This relates both to the complexities of the CPA Protocols, and to the complicated governance structures which have emerged in Sudan as a result of the implementation of the CPA.

Coordination Structures of the Governments of Sudan

Various overlapping structures and mechanisms aimed at facilitating and coordinating peacebuilding in Sudan exist within the Governments of Sudan. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and the GoSS have various structures in place to facilitate and coordinate humanitarian interventions, processes supporting the CPA, and recovery and peacebuilding. The GNU has created an assortment of mechanisms to oversee peacebuilding efforts, including the various commissions aimed at supporting the implementation of the CPA, and a national office in charge of peacebuilding. In this study, however, we focus on the peacebuilding structures of the GoSS.

The GoSS has established a working mechanism which is characterised by presidential advisors, state governors, independent commissions and chambers and ministries, which are responsible to varying degrees for the activities of the government at the national (South Sudan), state and local levels. Under the peacebuilding rubric, several overlapping structures exist. At the level of the presidential advisors, separate advisors deal with development, security affairs, gender and human rights, peace and reconciliation, political affairs and border conflicts and their resolution. Separately, commissions and chambers are in place that deal with human rights, reconstruction and development, relief and rehabilitation, de-mining, land affairs, peace, DDR, the war disabled and widows and orphans. At the ministerial level, separate ministries are tasked with internal affairs, rural development and co-operatives, health, water resources and irrigation, gender, social welfare and religious affairs, finance and economic planning, legal affairs and constitutional development, and agriculture and forestry, among others.[78] A Special Commission on Peace has also been established in the National Assembly of Southern Sudan, and mirroring the GNU structure, the position of Special Adviser on Peace has been created to serve the President of the GoSS.[79]

Presently, not all these structures are operating at full capacity. In addition, considerable overlap in terms of areas of responsibility can be identified, and as mandates have not been clearly established in all cases, some of the commissions, ministries and chambers operate without high levels of coherence, coordination or shared understanding of roles and responsibilities. This is due to the fact that the GoSS has only been in existence for three years, and is still very much in its infancy. Nonetheless, clear mandates, roles and responsibilities, both in relation to other government agents and external actors such as the UN, donors and other stakeholders, are not uniformly established. In addition, the relations between the GoSS structures and similar GNU peacebuilding structures often lack definition of working relationships or institutional co-operation. Further, while the structures have been planned and are in various stages of creation and implementation, capacity within government structures is not equally balanced. Some peacebuilding mechanisms are well staffed, while others lack skilled staff.[80]

To address this shortcoming, a National Steering Mechanism on Peacebuilding has been proposed. The Steering Mechanism, supervised by a GoSS National Policy Body, would be co-chaired by a senior government representative, probably from the SSPC. A senior UN representative would plan and coordinate international and national efforts at peacebuilding in South Sudan, and the mechanism would aim to coordinate all activities relating to DDR, SSR, mine action, judicial reform, the police and prison services, peace and security and the rule of law, among others. The Steering Mechanism, to date, remains to be implemented. In addition, a coordination group is developing around the SSPC, which aims to coordinate activities aimed at strengthening the SSPC and supporting its work. This group consists of UN representatives, NGOs and INGOs, and the SSPC. The coordination mechanism serves to support and strengthen the SSPC, which forms a part of the broader peacebuilding coordination framework being established.[81]

INGO and NGO Coordination Structures

A host of INGOs and NGOs operate throughout Sudan. Most of these deal with humanitarian relief. A range of coordination mechanisms, both formal and informal, exists to coordinate the activities of NGOs operating in Sudan. A Peacebuilding Working Group for South Sudan, which serves as an information-sharing node, meets every two weeks to coordinate activities. Participation in this working group is, however, relatively small, due to the limited number of organisations operating in the peacebuilding sector in South Sudan.

Two prominent organisations working in peacebuilding in South Sudan are Pact Sudan and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Sudan, each with numerous operational programmes pertaining to people-to-people peacebuilding, conflict mitigation, community security, training initiatives, capacity-building and recovery and rehabilitation. In addition, CRS, Pact and the UNDP operate a joint initiative aimed at local government recovery. The Local Government Recovery Programme (LGRP) broadly aims to strengthen the GoSS, establish local government structures, and to build confidence in local governance. The programme is jointly implemented by the three partners throughout South

Sudan, with overall responsibility for management and reporting assigned to the UNDP. Pact Sudan is also a supporting partner for the SSPC and builds the capacity of the Commission and its staff.[82]

Another joint programme has recently been launched by Pact Sudan, Saferworld and UNDP. The partners in this programme work together with support from donors on a Community Security Arms Control Programme. The recent appointment in the Office of the Presidency of a focal point on community security provides the local involvement in the project.[83] While such projects must be mentioned, joint projects relating to peacebuilding between NGOs and between NGOs and the government appear limited in nature and number.

Donor Coordination Structures

Coordination among donor states and agencies in Sudan appears fragmented, particularly at the level of the European states. The European Commission (EC) is responsible for the management of the EU's budget in Sudan, done under the auspices of a Development Co-operation Framework. However, some of those interviewed noted that coordination among the activities of member states and the EC is lacking, and that activities are conducted in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner.[84] At present the EC's focal areas are education, food security and the promotion of human rights and democracy. A new country strategy paper for the period 2008 to 2013 is being completed, and the EC is looking to redefine its role in Sudan, possibly incorporating peacebuilding as a focus. The EC also intends to increase coordination among its member states.

Delays have been experienced in the provision of effective development support by the MDTF during the key post-conflict phase. The MDTF (South) has been waiting for effective financial systems to be put in place, which, given the lack of capacity within the GoSS, has delayed the provision of development support. This led to the creation of other mechanisms, such as the Basic Service Fund (BSF), to deliver support faster in core areas.[85]

A point of contention relates to the establishment in South Sudan of a Joint Donor Team / Office (JDT / O) consisting of Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, and (recently) Canada. The JDT was formed as a response to the Paris Declaration, which seeks to increase harmonisation between donor practices and to increase local participation in recovery and development initiatives, including the building of local capacity in target countries.[86] The JDT was established to avoid duplication of effort and to harmonise and streamline activities between donors. However, there are problems for the JDT and partner states that are not part of the JDT. Some EU member states and other donors are reluctant to join and there are also a lack of capacity, a narrow mandate,[87] divergent working practices and non-harmonised monitoring and evaluation standards and practices. The JDT serves as a central focal point for member states and implementation partners, and indeed represents an innovative approach to donor coordination aimed at reducing duplication, harmonising funding and implementing joint projects, but those interviewed argued that the JDT provided an example of harmonisation at the expense of delivery. Practitioners noted that the JDT is burdened with staff capacity difficulties, budgetary constraints and unwieldy governance structures. The JDT model does appear to make sense in situations where donors provide direct budget support to a government-led strategy or PRSP, but in Sudan the JDT provides support to the MDTF (South) and to bilateral programmes, and therefore its impact has been controversial and confused.

In addition, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the German Development Agency (DED), and the United States Development Agency (USAID) all operate individual peacebuilding funds or initiatives, while the French, German, Japanese and Swedish Embassies oversee their own peacebuilding efforts. A degree of donor overlap and duplication is obvious. Indeed, a broad-based criticism of a lack of peace dividends in relation to monies spent, and of a lack of local capacity-building prevails, both from within and outside these institutions. Nonetheless, most donors have taken up the challenges of peacebuilding and coordinate programmes incorporating various aspects of it, or operate programmes dedicated solely to it. Moreover

while criticism persists, it should be noted that peacebuilding is an inherently long-term process. Enhanced coordination on the part of donors could greatly impact on the delivery of peace dividends in Southern Sudan and throughout Sudan as a whole.

4.3. The Role of Internal and External Actors in Peacebuilding Coordination

The United Nations Mission in Sudan operates as an integrated mission. Therefore, relatively high levels of attempted coordination along the peacebuilding spectrum can be seen within the mission and the UN Country Team. For example, UNMIS and UNDP staff work closely on matters relating to DDR, SSR, RRR and other aspects of peacebuilding. Similarly, donor agencies have adopted innovative approaches to reducing overlap, harmonising funding, and launching joint programmes. The EC and DFID, for example, work closely on matters of coordination, while the JDT represents an innovative approach that brings donors together, in an attempt to harmonise both funding and effort, so as to deliver more effective and efficient programmes. Yet problems persist with the JDT, in terms of its limited budget and programming constraints, having been initially established to oversee the MDTF and CHF, as well as the multilateral funding mechanisms.

International NGOs operating in Sudan display high levels of coordination and programme harmonisation. UN OCHA in Sudan has also coordinated relief, humanitarian and development efforts throughout Sudan. While the UN and Partners Work Plan has managed to bring a host of UN programmes and agencies, donors and INGOs together within the rubric of one common country work plan, it is anticipated that the coming UNDAF will bring even more actors and stakeholders in peacebuilding into a common work plan, sharing unity of vision and the allocation of tasks and responsibilities. Overall, then, it can be argued that coordination efforts among external actors engaged in peacebuilding activities in Sudan are, on the whole, comparatively high.

Such coordination levels are not, however, mirrored among internal actors. Local NGOs and government representatives engaged in numerous

peacebuilding structures noted that they were not fully engaged in the creation and implementation of coordination structures and peacebuilding programmes. Internal stakeholders in peacebuilding noted that they are often presented with "ready-made" plans of action. In addition, coordination of peacebuilding activities appeared to be higher among external than internal actors. This, in part, can arguably be attributed to lack of resources and the lack of capacity to engage actively with other internal actors and with external actors on a host of issue areas across the peacebuilding spectrum.

Along the external–internal nexus, peacebuilding coordination is still in the initial stages. To date, much of the international and domestic response in Sudan has been focused on humanitarian relief and is only slowly gearing toward peacebuilding activities. Thus, deeper coordination is still being developed between internal and external actors around issues such as the provision of basic services, training and capacity-building, dispute resolution, DDR and SSR. While the UN, donors and INGOs have already adopted relatively coordinated approaches to such matters, local NGOs and government agencies are still developing their coordinated approaches.

The external actors appear to have the capacity to engage in coordinated approaches to peacebuilding, while local government is still in the process of establishing itself. Much could be done to assist with developing the capacity of local actors and stakeholders to engage meaningfully in and take ownership of, the peacebuilding process. Positive progress here is the development of a peacebuilding support matrix that is currently being produced for the SSPC by both internal and external actors. Such examples of coordination are few and far between.

4.4. Findings and Recommendations

Numerous actors and stakeholders are engaged in peacebuilding activities in Sudan, Importantly, the situation is complicated by the political and operational realities of Sudan; numerous overlapping conflicts being dealt with by various political structures with separate mandates; a host of organisations

operating from across the conflict spectrum from conflict prevention to conflict transformation; and a lack of capacity to drive the peacebuilding process.

Given these operational realities, peacebuilding coordination in Sudan appears fragmented, ad hoc, uncoordinated and inconsistent. In addition, efforts aimed at conflict transformation appear to enjoy limited success due to an uncoordinated response and the limited success of strengthening local and internal capacities. Much of the international responses are of a humanitarian nature, and limited resources have been shifted from this humanitarian response to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This is due, in part, to practical difficulties, and the incentives and disincentives involved in moving from a humanitarian response to recovery, and on toward a developmental phase. This transition needs to be underpinned by an effective and coordinated approach to peacebuilding which is adequately resourced. The shift is now underway with the creation of the Southern Sudan Recovery Fund, which formed a central component of the Sudan Consortium discussions held in Paris in March of 2008.

The creation of the UN / AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) threatens to draw international attention, as well as financial and human resources, away from UNMIS. Therefore the CPA and the North–South conflict may be overshadowed by a growing international response to the Darfur crisis. Similarly, tensions in the east of Sudan may be sidelined with the establishment of UNAMID. In 2009, Southern Sudan will hold general elections, and in 2011 a referendum is due. Given the ever-changing socio-political situation in Sudan, the importance of peacebuilding coordination and of developing and strengthening both external and internal capacities for conflict transformation is critical.

The interface between peace and security and relief and reconstruction objectives in Sudan requires greater coordination and support if the conflict system is to be transformed. In the peacebuilding context, greater coherence is needed if the peace, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions of the peacebuilding intervention are to be directed toward a common objective and to yield peace dividends. To date, peacebuilding coordination in Sudan has principally lacked coherence, and this has undermined the assistance provided to lay the foundations for sustainable development and just peace.

However, progress toward the development of sustainable peace is being made, and could, for instance be supported by:

(1) Strengthening the capacity of internal actors to drive the peacebuilding process;

(2) Supporting the internal actors and stakeholders and institutions mandated to deal with peacebuilding;

(3) Creating and developing fora that engage not only agencies and organisations but also civil society initiatives in dialogue on building peace; and

(4) Ensuring that all stakeholders in the peacebuilding process share an understanding of their mandate, roles and responsibilities in the creation of a national peacebuilding framework.

Attempts are currently underway to strengthen local capacities in peacebuilding, and to enhance peacebuilding coordination. Further skills development, strengthening the capacity of internal actors, and improving the coordination of peacebuilding activities could greatly contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a sustainable peace in Sudan.

Specifically, several issue-areas threatening to hamper the implementation of the CPA require enhanced and deeper levels of coordination on the part of both internal and external actors, if advances made to date toward the development of a sustainable peace are to be consolidated. Four of these have been highlighted below.

First, Abyei remains fundamental to the implementation of the CPA as it is a key risk area or flash point for conflict along the North–South line. Abyei is currently without civil administration and suffers from a critical lack of delivery of an effective peace dividend. Abyei, in many ways, is at the heart of the CPA, and potential points of conflict are extraction of oil and the allocation of oil revenues, the special status of Abyei for the upcoming referendum, returning refugees and IDPs, the marginalisation of conflicts at the local level, conflict between ethnic groups and between pastoralists and settled farmers, and access to limited natural resources. The National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum has rejected the binding Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report,

and negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/A are stalled on the issue, with both sides reportedly building up military forces on the region's borders. A consolidated, coordinated and serious effort on the part of all stakeholders, both internal and external, is required to diffuse tensions, to engage the NCP and the SPLM/A in dialogue, and to support peacebuilding efforts in Abyei, if the CPA is not to be derailed.

Second, while the CPA has provided for the establishment of the GNU and the participation of the GoSS in this national unified governance structure, in reality the GNU is not working as effectively as could be desired. This resulted in the GoSS walking out of the unity government in late 2007. The current status of the GNU threatens seriously to undermine the implementation of the CPA and to reverse any peace dividends which have been attained. While the working of the GNU poses a challenge to the CPA, much bilateral and multilateral assistance is channelled to the GoSS, and not the GNU. This lowers incentives and the need for proper functioning of the GNU. Both internal and external actors appear to be treating the outcomes of the scheduled 2011 referendum as a forgone conclusion in favour of Southern independence, and are structuring peacebuilding activities on this presupposition. While the South may indeed choose independence in 2011, the allocation of peacebuilding resources on this basis alone has the potential for exacerbating conflict rather than mitigating it in certain situations.

Third, the CPA mandates the holding of a national census in preparation for national elections to be held in 2009. The census was to be conducted in 2007, but funding and operational constraints have delayed the process, which commenced in May 2008. This may result in the 2009 elections being pushed back as well. While both internal and external actors are pressing for the census, the elections and the referendum are highly controversial and politicised, and hold enormous potential for conflict increase. A coordinated approach by all actors and stakeholders in the run-up to the elections and the referendum is essential to ensure that these processes prevent escalation of conflict.

Fourth, Sudanese societies are highly militarised and large numbers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferate around the country.[88] The DDR, SSR and peacebuilding programmes in Sudan must recognise this.

Disarmament requires a conflict-sensitive, gender-sensitive and holistic approach that considers specific socio-cultural contexts and has community security as its central pillar. Without such considerations, and without a coordinated approach among internal and external stakeholders, the disarmament process could easily escalate existing conflicts and spark new ones.

As this section has highlighted, several initiatives have already been undertaken to enhance levels of peacebuilding coordination. Yet deeper levels of cooperation and coordination are required if peacebuilding efforts are to yield sustainable peace dividends. More conflict-sensitive approaches to recovery and development are required. Such approaches should take into account the practicalities of moving toward an effectively coordinated approach to peacebuilding aligned with a government-led strategy that supports the implementation of the CPA and the entrenchment of long-term peace, stability and development. Further, sustainable peace can only be attained if it is both driven and owned by the Sudanese people themselves.

Finally, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is one element of a larger peacebuilding strategy for Sudan. The CPA represents a framework within and around which peacebuilding programmes can be located, but is not a panacea for conflicts in Sudan. Rather, it is a building block which can be used within a broader peacebuilding framework.

5. Main Conclusions and Recommendations

This project on peacebuilding coordination in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan has yielded varying insights. The multiplicity in peacebuilding processes and the resulting range of observations, to some degree, is to be expected, as these countries are at different points in the peacebuilding and conflict transformation spectrum. Conflict transformation is not a linear process. Peacebuilding coordination is thus not easily compared, as every peacebuilding structure entails the creation, development and refinement of configurations, processes and mechanisms considering a variation of actors and stakeholders, cultural-historical factors, geographical facts, limitations on resources and differing levels of prioritisation. Peacebuilding coordination is by necessity both proactive and reactive, and tailored to the unique needs of the country and society in which a sustainable peace is to be developed.

Nonetheless, certain commonalities and differences can be drawn from the investigation. By identifying areas of commonality, and the challenges identified in each of the country profiles, it is possible to generate recommendations which could serve to strengthen and support peacebuilding processes. Recommendations can however only be generic, and would need to be located within overall peacebuilding structures, differently based on the specific structure, needs and strengths of the peacebuilding system.

Stakeholders engaged in conflict transformation settings have used multiple tools and mechanisms to feed into the peacebuilding system:

- In the DRC, three mechanisms - Humanitarian Action Plans (HAPs), Country Assistance Frameworks (CAFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) - were utilised to coordinate peacebuilding activities, while an innovative Priority Action Programme (PAP) was instituted to add unity of effort to the peacebuilding equation. Yet all of these were UN-created or -dominated structures.

- In Liberia there were seven key structures - a Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) and an RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) were institutionalised, and an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) employed, while a Poverty Reduction

Strategy (PRS) was being developed. In addition, Humanitarian Coordination Sections (HCSs), Humanitarian Clusters (HCs) and Country Support Teams (CSTs) were created to harmonise peacebuilding efforts and to decentralise peacebuilding activities from the centre to the periphery, with positive results.

· Finally, in South Sudan the UN-created United Nations and Partners Work Plan created unity of vision, mandate and effort until such a time when a more detailed and inclusive Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) could be developed. In addition, the UN has established numerous budget sector working groups that facilitate and support peacebuilding activities. Donors have similarly launched creative responses to the challenges of duplication, overlap and inefficiency, by establishing the Joint Donor Team (JDT) based in South Sudan. The NGOs, on their part, have created joint ventures such as the Local Government Recovery Programme (LGRP), administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and PACT, which clearly allocated tasks and responsibilities in a larger programme in which the participant organisations and the government of South Sudan each have a stake. Finally, recognising that peacebuilding remained at the periphery of many of the interventions, the UN and the GoSS are in the process of establishing a dedicated peacebuilding steering mechanism, which will bring many of the actors engaged in peacebuilding activities under one unified structure.

Each of these responses has creatively targeted national and local challenges to the development of a sustainable peace, and has attempted to create mechanisms and structures that would adequately respond to these challenges. While much progress has been made, and notable successes can be identified, the research conducted in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan identified certain common challenges to the further development, and ultimately the success, of peacebuilding coordination efforts.

This paper concludes with some main conclusions and recommendations:

- Each of the field reports noted that *internal actors appear to suffer from a lack of capacity to absorb, take ownership of and drive peacebuilding structures and activities*. Institutional capacity-building, training and skills development, among other actions, could be directed at supporting local stakeholders to engage with external actors in peacebuilding structures and activities. Such capacity-building could be focused on, for example, the development of skills relating to DDR, SSR, conflict resolution mechanisms, and mechanisms of civil society engagement and participation. Skill-sets in areas of joint planning, implementation and monitoring on the part of internal actors need to be developed and enhanced. In addition, external actors need increasingly to become aware of and sensitised to the needs of internal actors, and of creative ways of not only engaging with internal actors, but providing them with the space and the means to drive peacebuilding processes.

- While peacebuilding coordination is at comparatively high levels among external actors in the DRC, Liberia and South Sudan, *coordination levels among internal actors appears to be lower in all three cases*. Thus, developing the capacity of local authorities, civil society actors and government agents to engage with one another is important. Dialogue forums which can bring such actors together and allow for the creation of shared vision and mandates, as well as the allocation of tasks and responsibilities, could stimulate greater levels of cooperation along the internal–internal nexus.

- In some instances, dedicated peacebuilding structures have been established. In other cases, *peacebuilding is relegated as a sub-theme within coordination and implementation structures*. Here the establishment of a peacebuilding steering mechanism for South Sudan represents a break with the past, and embodies coordination and implementation, as well as monitoring dedicated solely to peacebuilding efforts. The creation of similar structures which bring together those actors and stakeholders from the UN, government, donor, INGO and NGO communities engaged in peacebuilding activities elsewhere, could serve greatly to enhance coordination and information-sharing, and indirectly also build the

capacity of all those engaged in the structure. The creation of dedicated peacebuilding mechanisms, which assist in the creation, articulation and implementation of national peacebuilding frameworks, therefore, appears to be of great importance to the sustainability and success of conflict transformation initiatives.

- *National ownership of peacebuilding as an undertaking and peacebuilding coordination structures appears in all cases to remain driven largely by external actors.* Ownership of peacebuilding structures by internal actors has remained at lower levels. This is due to capacity shortage on the part of internal actors. However, for durable peace to be attained, local ownership of the peacebuilding process is essential.[89]

- In the three case studies, some stakeholders (both internal and external) felt fully included in national peacebuilding frameworks, while others felt excluded. The latter were uncertain of the roles and mandates of the other actors within the system. Inclusivemechanisms that provide for information sharing, clarity of roles and mandates, and clear division of labour and responsibilities should be supported.

- *While the coordination of peacebuilding efforts is desirable, the exact levels of coordination will vary between cases.* In some cases certain actors will prefer not to coordinate, or be coordinated, so as to preserve their independence or impartiality. Others will view coordination and national frameworks as threats to their core mandates. In some cases common, and in other cases, *complementary* frameworks are preferable. Peacebuilding coordination structures and national peacebuilding frameworks should remain flexible enough to accommodate varying needs and interests, while still uniting individual actors and stakeholders under the banner of a national vision for peacebuilding.

- Finally, *peacebuilding structures in all three countries have displayed both reactive and proactive aspects.* They have reacted to developments that threaten to compromise peacebuilding efforts, and proactively engaged with stakeholders in the peacebuilding process under shared national visions. Mechanisms that serve both as reactive and proactive "peacebuilding hubs" appear to enjoy the most success, and their structures and operations

could be further investigated to aid in the development of peacebuilding mechanisms elsewhere.

It is clear that various actors bring to the table different organisational principles, objectives and resources, and different strategies and approaches to implementing their work in support of peacebuilding processes in Africa. Reconciling the differences among a large diversity of actors is by no means an easy task. However, finding the commonalities and pooling resources, effort and vision are necessary if true conflict transformation is to take place, and a just and durable peace is to be achieved. Finally, it should be noted that in all cases, the signing of a peace agreement is the first step in a long peace process.

A peace agreement represents one pillar of a larger peacebuilding undertaking, and the implementation of a peace accord is no guarantee that sustainable peace will be achieved. Peace dividends cannot be delivered overnight, and a peacebuilding framework that operates on the basis of a five-year cycle is arguably narrow in vision. It is for this reason that a shared understanding between both internal and external actors in a peacebuilding process is important. Similarly, peacebuilding efforts can only be considered successful if the peace which is being created and supported is both owned and rigorously defended by those for whom it is intended. Without national ownership, no peacebuilding process can be considered successful.

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9   Among others: Dahrendorf, N. 2003. *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change,* London: King's College; Porter, T. 2002. *An External Review of the CAP*, New York: UN (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); Sommers, M. 2000. *The Dynamics of Coordination*, Occasional Paper No 40, Providence: Brown Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs; Stockton, N. 2002. *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan*, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU); Donini, A. 2002. *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda,* Occasional Paper No 22, Providence: Brown University Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies; Reindorp, N. and Wiles, P. 2001. *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*, A study commissioned by OCHA and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London; and Duffield, M., Lautze S. and Jones, B., 1998. *Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997*, New York: OCHA.

10   Smith, D. 2003. *Toward a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, p.16.

11   Coghlan, B. et al., 2006. "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Nationwide Survey" *Lancet*, 367(9504): 44 – 51.

12   ACCORD, 2008. 'Summary of Peace Agreements in Africa 1997-2007', *Overview of Key Peace Agreements*, Available from: <http://www.accord. org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351&Itemid=1 63> [Accessed: 2 October 2008].

13   Natural resources include timber, diamonds, cassiterite, gold and coltan.

14   UN, 1999. UN Security Council Resolution 1279, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4076th meeting, S/RES/1279, 30 November.

15   Through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).

16   Plan d´Action Humanitaire.

17   The ten activity sectors relate to water and sanitation; nutrition; food

secrity; education; health; protection, logistics; early recovery; emergency shelter and non-food items; and emergency telecommunications.

18   Interview, UN Country Team, 13 August 2007.

19   Interview, UN Country Team, 14 August 2007.

20   Interview, UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 22 August 2007.

21   Interview, UN Country Team, 23 August 2007.

22   Interview, MONUC, 22 August 2007.

23   Interview, UN Country Team, 23 August 2007.

24   Interview, UN Country Team, 14 August 2007.

25   Interview, UN Country Team, 14 August 2007.

26   The DRC's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) pillars are: Good Governance; Pro-Poor Growth; Basic Social Services; HIV/AIDS; and Community Recovery.

27   UN, 2007. 'Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks Since the Late 1990s', Peacebuilding Support Office Briefing Paper: Working Group Lessons Learned, 19 September, Available from: <http://www.un.org/spanish/peace/peacebuilding/WorkingGrouponLessonsLearned/StrategicFrameworksMeeting(19.09.2007)/WGLL-PBSFBriefingPaper-14Sep07.pdf> [Accessed on 27 April 2008].

28   The five Country Assistance Framework (CAF) Strategic Objectives related to the PRSP Pillars are: Removing the governance obstacles that inhibit the DRC from reaching the MDGs; achieving both a high rate and a high quality of economic growth in line with PRSP objectives; improving social indicators in line with PRSP objectives by increasing access to effective; efficient and equitable social services; limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS and improving the conditions of persons living with HIV/AIDS; and stabilising highly volatile and marginalised communities and strengthening the implementation of PRSP programmes.

29   Interview, UN Country Team, 14 August 2007.

30   Interview, UN Country Team, 23 August 2007.

31   Interview, MONUC, 22 August 2007; Interview with International NGO,

21 August 2007.

32 Interview, International NGO, 21 August 2007; Interview, MONUC, 18 August 2007.

33 Interview, MONUC, 22 August 2007.

34 Interview, National NGO, 15August 2007.

35 UN, 2007. *UN Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012: Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development*, Monrovia, p. 9.

36 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) would serve to form the basis for all international efforts to support Liberia's post conflict recovery process.

37 UN, 2003. UN Security Council Resolution 1509, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th meeting, S/RES/1509, 19 September.

38 Interview, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) / Humanitarian Coordination Section (HCS), 1 August 2007.

39 The Survey was conducted by Dr. Kranso of the City University of New York in response to a request of the UN DPKO Best Practices Unit.

40 UNMIL, "Public Opinion Survey Shows Positive Ratings for UNMIL's Work in Liberia", UNMIL/PIO/PR/48, Available from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr48.pdf>[Accessed: 4 November 2007].

40 Including the European Commission and a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

42 Including security; disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR); refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs); governance and the rule of law; elections; basic services; productive capacities and livelihoods; infrastructure; economic and development strategy; and coordinated implementation of the transitional framework.

43 National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), UN and World Bank, 2005. "Results Focused Transitional Framework", Revision April, Available from <http://www.lr.undp.org/docs/RFTFRevision.pdf> [Accessed: 14 January 2008], p. 9.

44 Is comprised of top representation from donor countries, international financial institutions and organisations and NTGL

ministries and agencies.

45   NTGL, UN, WB, op.cit. 2005.

46   Republic of Liberia, 2006. "*Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy: Breaking with the Past, from Conflict to Development*", Monrovia: Government of the Republic of Liberia, December. There are namely four areas of priority within the iPRSP framework including, enhancing national security revitalizing economic growth; strengthening governance and the rule of law; and rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services – all of which were targets in the "First 150 Day Action Plan" (an initial approach to kick star the recovery process) and all of which will be critical to the national Millennium Development Goals (MDG)-based development.

47   Ibid.

48   Email communication, 16 January 2008.

49   Email communication, 28 January 2008.

50   The HCS consists of an NGO Liaison Unit, IDP Unit, Civil-Military Coordination Unit (CMCU), a Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) and all other functions previously performed by UN OCHA.

51   Email communication, 8 February 2008.

52   See UNMIL, Humanitarian Coordination Section, Available from: < http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=humanitarian> [Accessed: 2 October 2008].

53   UNMIL, 2007. "Liberia: UNMIL Humanitarian Situation Report No.96". 12 - 17 March. Available from: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/YSAR-6ZFPUL?OpenDocument> [Accessed: 2 October 2008].

54   NTGL, UN, WB. op.cit. pp. 67-68.

55   UNDAF *Framework for Liberia*. op. cit. p. 11.

56   These clusters are Camp Coordination and Management; Early Recovery; Emergency Shelter; Emergency Telecommunications; Health; Logistics; Nutrition; Protection; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene.

57   OCHA, 2006. *Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: Cluster 2006*, New York: OCHA, 3 March, pp. 1-4.

58   Consisting of the UN, government representatives, donors and NGOs.

59   Interview, UNMIL Protection Cluster, 1 August 2007.

60   Ibid.

61   UNMIL, 2006. "The UN Country Team meets with County Support Team in South-eastern Liberia; Deputy SRSG Ryan Pledges UN Support to Revive Liberia County by County". UNMIL/PIO/PR/110, Press Release, 20 September. Available from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr110.pdf> [Accessed: 2 October 2008].

62   Has a membership of 225 NGOs operating within all fifteen counties.

63   See the Liberian NGOs Network, Information/Updates, Available from: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/NGO/doc/THE%20LIBERIA%20NGOS%20NETWORKINFORMATION.doc> [Accessed: 30 October 2007].

64   Ibid.

65   Interview, Liberian NGO Network (LINNK), 2 August 2007.

66   See the Humanitarian Information Centre for Liberia, Available from: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/NGO/index.asp> [Accessed: 1 November 2007].

67   Ibid.

68   Interview, UNMIL HCS, 1 August 2007.

69   See the International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Sudan', Available from: < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1230&l=1> [Accessed: 27 August 2008.]

70   Electronic communication, January-May 2008.

71   Electronic communication, 17 February 2008.

72   Interview UNMIS, 26 August 2007.

73   Interview, UNMIS, 04 September 2007.

74   UN, *UN and Partners 2006 Work Plan for the Sudan*, Office of the Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary-General and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Khartoum, p.1 ; and *UN and Partners 2007 Work Plan for the Sudan*, Office of the Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary-General and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator,

Khartoum, p.1.

75   Electronic correspondence, 14 January 2008.

76   Interview, UNMIS, 04 September 2007.

77   Ibid.

78   Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Structure, prepared by UN OCHA IMU, Version 17 July 2007.

79   Electronic correspondence, 14 January 2008.

80   Interviews, GoSS, 3 September 2007 and INGO 4 September 2007.

81   Interview, 2 September 2007. Personal discussions, UNMIS 26 November 2007.

82   Interviews with INGOs, September 2007.

83   Electronic correspondence, 14 January 2008.

84   Interviews with donor agencies, August 2007.

85   Electronic correspondence, 14 January 2008.

86   OECD, 2005. *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectivenes, Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability*, Paris: OECD, 2 March. Available from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351. pdf> [Accessed: 2 October 2008].

87   Initially the Joint Donor Team (JDT) possessed a broad mandate, which it was unable to meet. The mandate was therefore narrowed to its present format.

88   McCallum, J and Okech, A. 2008. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Community Security in Southern Sudan: The Links between Gender Identity and Disarmament", in *Regional Security, Gender Identity, and CPA Implementation in Sudan.* A Joint Ploughshares and Africa Peace Forum Publication.

89   For a somewhat different argument, see Joseph, E. P. 2007, "Ownership is Overrated", *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 27(2), pp. 109- 123.