




[UN-PROGRAMME]

Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions

– A Norwegian Perspective

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Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions

– A Norwegian Perspective

Cedric de Coning

[Summary] This report analyses the coherence and coordination dilemma in peacebuilding systems, with special reference to the UN integrated missions concept. It argues that all peacebuilding agents are interdependent in that they cannot individually achieve the goal of the overall peacebuilding system. Pursuing coherence helps to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together, and coordination is the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are connected to the overall strategic framework process that binds the peacebuilding system together. The report is focussed on two areas where the lack of coherence holds the most promise for improving peacebuilding coherence. The first is the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy. The second is the need to operationalise the principle of local ownership. The report argues that without meaningfully addressing these shortcomings peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success.

Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions – A Norwegian Perspective

Cedric de Coning

It is estimated that approximately a quarter of all peace agreements fail in the first five-years after they have been signed.¹ There are many reasons why some peace processes are not sustainable.² Some relate to the role of spoilers³ and the dynamics of post-conflict settlements⁴ whilst others are associated with shortcomings in the support provided by the international community⁵. This report is focused on one of the aspects that contribute to the lack of sustainability in the latter context, namely the coherence and coordination dilemma that continue to stress international peacebuilding systems.

Despite a growing awareness that the security, development, political, human rights, humanitarian and rule of law dimensions of peacebuilding systems are interlinked, the agencies⁶ that implement programmes in these dimensions are finding it extremely difficult to

¹ Collier, P. et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 2003, New York. The approximately 50% figure cited generally has been demonstrated by Suhrke and Samset to be a misrepresentation, with a more correct finding of the Collier et al. study being approximately 23%. See Suhrke, A. and Samset, I., 'What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 195-203, May 2007.

² For a quantitative analysis of the factors that have influenced the outcome of peacebuilding operations since 1944, see Doyle, M.W. & Sambanis, N. 2000, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, World Bank, Washington D.C.

³ Stedman, Stephen J. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security*, 22 (2), 1997, pp. 5-53; Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, United Nations University Press, 2006, Tokyo, and Gueli, R. Liebenberg, S. & van Huysteen, E., *Developmental Peace Missions Theory*, CSIR, Pretoria, 2005, p. 11.

⁴ Pierre du Toit, "Why Post-Settlement Settlements?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14 No. 3, July 2003, pp. 105 and *South Africa's Brittle Peace - The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence*. Palgrave, 2001, New York.

⁵ Stedman, S.J, Cousens, E. & Rothchild, D. (eds.) 2002, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Chesterman, S. 2004, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Fukuyama, F. 2004, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and Paris, R. 2004, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

⁶ In this paper 'agents', and 'agencies' in the plural, are used as a collective term for all peacebuilding actors, i.e. those that execute programmes or otherwise undertake activities with the intent to engage in peacebuilding action, as defined in this paper. This includes international military forces, peace operations, development and humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes, operational donor agencies, States engaged in bilateral peacebuilding actions, etc.

meaningfully integrate them. The goal of this report is to analyse the coherence and coordination dilemma in United Nations (UN) peacebuilding and integrated missions, with the objective of generating findings and recommendations that can be of assistance to the Norwegian Government. The aim is to assist the Government of Norway: (a) to improve coherence and coordination within and across Norwegian state and civil agencies engaged in peacebuilding action, and (b) to initiate, encourage and support initiatives that will improve coherence and coordination in the international, including especially the UN, peacebuilding system.

The report is presented in three parts. The first defines and analyzes UN peacebuilding and integrated missions in the context of the coherence and coordination deficit. The second identifies two key priority areas where improved coherence and coordination are likely to have the most meaningful impact. The third generates specific policy and practise recommendations for improving coherence and coordination in both the national and international spheres.

Peacebuilding

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change⁷. The nexus between development, peace and security have become the central focus of the international conflict management debate⁸, and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which these peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level⁹. These developments culminated, as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

For the purposes of this report a complex peacebuilding system is defined as a post-conflict¹⁰ intervention¹¹ that provides for parallel, concurrent and interlinked short-, medium- and long-

⁷ Espen Barth Eide, presentation delivered at the 'DDR from a Peacebuilding Perspective' Course, 19-24 January 2004, Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC).

⁸ Uvin, Peter. 2002, "The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.5.

⁹ See for instance the 2005, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (www.un.org/largerfreedom), and the 2006, *Delivering as One*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence, United Nations, New York (www.un.org/events/panel).

term activities¹² that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or avoid a relapse, into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system. The peacebuilding intervention starts when a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement, which calls upon the international community to support the peace process, enters into force. It typically progresses through three stages, namely a stabilisation phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase¹³. The peacebuilding intervention ends when the host society has developed the capacity to manage and sustain its own peace process without external support.

A complex peacebuilding system requires a wide range of internal¹⁴ and external¹⁵ actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort. These peacebuilding agents undertake a broad range of activities that span the security, political, development, human rights, humanitarian and rule of law dimensions¹⁶. Collectively and cumulatively, these activities address both the causes and consequences of the conflict system, and builds momentum over time that facilitates the transformation of the system and increases its resilience to violent conflict and its ability to sustain peace. In the short term the goal of peacebuilding interventions are to

¹⁰ The UN distinguishes between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. This report is focussed on post-conflict peacebuilding.

¹¹ Intervention in this context is not meant to imply the use of force, but is rather used in the broad sense to refer to taking action aimed at bringing about change.

¹² ‘Activities’ are used throughout this article as an umbrella term for policies, programmes and projects and all other related actions taken by peacebuilding agents to pursue their respective objectives. It is defined by the OECD as action taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs. See OECD (2002) *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, Paris: OECD, pp. 15.

¹³ There are a number of different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essential progression. See for instance the Association of the U.S. Army & Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework*, Washington D.C., 2002, in which they identify three stages, namely: the initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability. For a more detailed explanation of the three stages referred to here, namely stabilization, transitional and consolidation, see de Coning, C.H. “Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations”, in Langholtz, H. Kondocho, B. and Wells, A. (eds), *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, Volume 11, 2007, Koninklijke Brill N.V. Brussels.

¹⁴ Internal actors are all local actors in the country or conflict system where peacebuilding activities take place.

¹⁵ External actors are all international actors engaged in undertaking peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict system.

¹⁶ There is broad consensus on these dimensions. See, for instance the African Union’s *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework* (2006) that comprises of six constitutive elements, including gender as a self-standing element. The UN Secretary-General’s *Note on Integrated Missions* (footnote 20) lists 7 dimensions, namely: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security. Note that humanitarian assistance is included as one of the peacebuilding dimensions in the UN Integrated Mission concept. The *Utstein Report* (Smith, footnote 26) and NEPAD’s *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa* (2005) include humanitarian assistance as part of the socio-economic development category. Many in the humanitarian community argue that humanitarian assistance fall outside the scope of peacebuilding, and should not be included in any such peacebuilding categorization. See for instance Weir, E.A. *Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative*, KAIPTC Monograph No. 4, May 2006. The humanitarian dimension is included as one of the peacebuilding dimensions throughout this report as per

assist the internal actors with stabilising the peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to support them in transforming the causes of the conflict and laying the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development¹⁷.

Integrated Missions

The UN system recognised the need to increase cooperation among its agencies working in the peace, security and development dimensions at country level. It commissioned a series of high-level panels and working groups¹⁸ and experimented with a number of coordination models over the last decade.¹⁹ These efforts culminated in the development of the Integrated Missions concept in 2004/2005. Integrated Missions refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN System.

The UN Secretary-General released a *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*²⁰ that describes the concept as follows: “An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.” The integrated missions concept thus refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level²¹.

the UN concept, but with due regard for the principle of the independence of humanitarian action, as recognized in paragraph 10 of the *Note on Integrated Missions*.

¹⁷ This definition was initially developed by the author and Senzo Ngubane in *Peacebuilding in Southern Africa*, an ACCORD (www.accord.org.za) report commissioned by JICA in 2004, and was further elaborated by the author in *A Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa*, a draft policy framework facilitated by ACCORD for NEPAD (www.nepad.org) published in May 2005. For a thorough overview and discussion of peacebuilding definitions, see Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell and Laura Sitea, 'Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?' *Global Governance*, Vol. 13 No. 1 Jan.-Mar. 2007, pp. 35-58.

¹⁸ Amongst others, the Panel on Peace Operations in 2000; the Working Group on Transition Issues in 2004; the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2005; and the Panel on System-Wide Coherence in 2006.

¹⁹ For example, the Integrated Mission Task Force concept for mission planning, the Strategic Framework concept in Afghanistan and the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) in Liberia.

²⁰ United Nations, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4.

²¹ United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, page 3.

The UN Integrated Missions concept should, however, be contextualised in an even broader international system, that pursues coherence aimed at promoting, for any given conflict system, harmonization among the external actors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system. The UN Integrated Missions concept should thus be understood as an initiative to achieve system-wide coherence across the UN System²². The UN is, however, part of an even larger international system involving a wide range of internal and external stakeholders, such as donor countries, regional organisations, neighbouring countries, international NGOs, etc. that are also engaged in various ways in the peacebuilding system, and the UN Integrated Missions concept thus need to be seen as part of an even broader effort aimed at achieving country, or in some cases regional conflict system, coherence. Whilst the UN Integrated Missions concept should be the centre of gravity of the larger system, it cannot be a closed system, and nor can it assume that others will simply fall into step with its approach. The UN System thus face the triple challenge of: (i) facilitating its own internal coherence, (ii) supporting and encouraging coherence among all the international or external actors, and (iii) facilitating and supporting coherence between the external and internal actors.

Coherence and Coordination

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity for delivery²³. There are, however, a considerable gap between the degree to which the benefits of coherence are held to be self-evident and operational reality. The lack of coherence among field activities in the humanitarian relief, development, political and security spheres have been well documented in a number of evaluation reports and studies²⁴, and is acknowledged in a number of recent UN reports²⁵.

²² The UN pursues system-wide coherence in the development context through its 'One UN' initiative that aims to encourage coherence among the various UN agencies that make up the UN Country Team in any given country. Once a UN peacekeeping operation is deployed, however, coherence is broadened to include the peace and security dimensions, and the focus shifts to the Integrated Missions concept as the locus for fostering coherence and coordination among the members of the UN System at country level.

²³ See 'Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development', *OECD Observer*, 2003, available on www.oecd.org accessed on 10 May 2007.

²⁴ Amongst others: Dahrendorf, N. 2003, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, King's College, London; Porter, T. 2002, *An External Review of the CAP*, OCHA, New York; Sommers, Marc. 2000, *The Dy-*

For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway in the 1990s, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a ‘strategic deficit’, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding²⁶. The *Utstein* study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. The evaluation studies cited have consistently found that the peacebuilding interventions undertaken to date have lacked coherence, and that this has undermined their sustainability and ability to achieve their strategic objectives.

It is possible to distinguish between four elements of coherence²⁷ in the peacebuilding context, namely: (1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency²⁸ among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme; (2) whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country²⁹; (3) external coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various external actors in a given country context (harmonization³⁰); and (4) internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context (alignment³¹). The degree to which a spe-

namics of Coordination, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40, Providence; Stockton, N. 2002, *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan*, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul; Donini, A. 2002, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Occasional Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence; Reindorp, N. & Wiles, P. 2001, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*, A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, and Duffield, M., Lautze S. & Jones, B. 1998, *Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York.

²⁵ See footnotes 9 and 18.

²⁶ Smith, D. 2003, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding*, PRIO, Oslo, p.16.

²⁷ See Robert Picciotto, *Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective, Introduction: Key Concepts, Central Issues*, OECD, Paris, 2005, pp 13-14, where he identifies: (1) internal coherence, (2) whole of government coherence, (3) donor coherence and (4) country-level coherence.

²⁸ Consistency in this context is not necessarily ethical, i.e. doing like under like circumstances with respect to any one rule or norm, i.e., avoiding double standards; instead it refers to one agency, government, or system working at cross-purposes with itself in a more general sense. This does not imply that there is no room for differences and debate during the policy formulation and review process, but once a policy or intervention has been agreed on it needs to be implemented in such a way that all the different elements of the agency, government or system contribute to the overall objective in a complementary fashion. I am grateful to Ramesh Thakur (The Centre for International Governance Innovation) for pointing out this difference (e-mail correspondence, 15 May 2007).

²⁹ Note for instance the Canadian approach aimed at combining Diplomacy, Defence & Development, the so-called ‘3D’ approach.

³⁰ Note the ‘Rome Declaration on Harmonization’ of 25 February 2003. See www.aidharmonization.org, accessed on 12 May 2007.

³¹ Note in this context the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ of 2 March 2005. See www.oecd.org, accessed on 12 May 2007.

cific peacebuilding system can be assessed to be more, or less, coherent will be a factor of all four elements of coherence.

In this report ‘coherence’ is understood as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system towards common strategic objectives³². It is important to recognise, however, that the dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems means that coherence can never be fully attained³³. It is possible, however to distinguish between systems where there is less, or more, coherence, and coherence is thus about degree, not end states. Coherence also need to be understood in the context of the natural tensions, and therefore trade-offs, between the four elements of coherence. In the real world, peacebuilding agents, more often than not, have to settle for ‘second best’ or ‘partially coherent’ solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for cooperation.³⁴

A number of potential negative effects of pursuing coherence have been identified. First, in some cases short-term political and security considerations may over-ride longer-term development considerations and this may undermine the very socio-economic rehabilitation on which sustainable peacebuilding depends. Second, undue pressure on internal actors may materialize when external actors form a coherent block on certain issues. Third, the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action may be negatively affected when integrated with political and security activities.³⁵ Whilst these three examples can be said to be examples of poor coherence trade-offs, rather than inherent negative effects of pursuing coherence per se, the more important point is that pursuing coherence can generate unintended consequences. When evaluating the impact of coherence, one should consider with care the balance that has been struck among the four elements of coherence, the transaction

³² For alternative definitions, see for instance ‘Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development’, (footnote 23), that defines policy coherence as “...the systematic promotion of mutual reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives.”

³³ Cilliers, P. 2002, “Why We Cannot Know Complex Things Completely”, *Emergence*, 4 (1/2), 77-84.

³⁴ I am grateful to Robert Picciotto (Kings College) for adding the notion of trade-offs between the four coherence vectors. He argues that it is important to stress that coherence only leads to unintended and poor results if the tradeoffs among its four dimensions are badly struck. When this is acknowledged alternative coherence solutions becomes possible, and this may allow for gradual repositioning of imperfect or partial coherence. For instance, the capacity building of local actors may allow gradual upgrading of domestic institutions so that they exercise their voice option with greater vigor and improve the alignment of internal and external goals (e-mail correspondence, 14 May 2007).

³⁵ See *An Approach to DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict prevention and peacebuilding Activities*, CDA Collaborative Learning Project: Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 24. This report was prepared for the OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation and the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC), as part of an ongoing initiative to develop the ‘OECD/DAC Draft Guidance for the Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities’.

cost in terms of the time and resources invested in coordination, as well as any unintended consequences that may have come about in the process.³⁶

If ‘coherence’ is the aim, then ‘coordination’ is the activity through which coherence is pursued. Whilst coordination seems to be the most obvious and logical of pursuits, especially in the highly dynamic and fragmented complex emergency context, empirical evidence suggests that it is, in reality, a highly controversial and dysfunctional activity. Barnes report, in the context of her experiences in Mozambique, that the meaning of coordination often varied depending on which of the stakeholders employed it at a given moment, and that the various stakeholders competed to place their agencies at the forefront of the process to enhance their own legitimacy and subsequent fundraising capacities.³⁷ Uvin provides a useful list of reasons why effective coordination appear to be so elusive: “The lack of co-ordination is partly due to widely recognized factors: the multitude of actors, often numbering in the hundreds...; the high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for maneuver by the discipline of coordination.”³⁸ Donini argues that the effective provision of assistance requires that duplication, waste and competition among agencies be avoided, but he cautions that the objectives and organisational cultures of the development, humanitarian and peacekeeping communities are essentially irreconcilable within a single centralised structure.³⁹ Paris cautions that coordination can create a sense of ‘false-coherence’ where fundamental tensions and differences are glossed over for the sake of operational expediency, only to re-surface and undermine cooperation at the critical moments when cohesion is most needed.⁴⁰

From these and many other reports it is clear that coordination is not a ‘good’ in and off itself. There is a limit to the added value of coordination. The time and resources devoted to coordination necessarily increase the administrative costs of delivering assistance.⁴¹ There is a point at which the cost benefit ratio will become negative, and coordination activities

³⁶ Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, United Nations University Press, 2007, Tokyo.

³⁷ Barnes, S. 1998, *Humanitarian Aid Coordination During War and Peace in Mozambique*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.

³⁸ Uvin, 1999, p. 29, footnote 8.

³⁹ Donini, A. 2002., *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Occasional Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence.

⁴⁰ See the progress report of ‘The Research Partnership on Post-War Statebuilding’ (www.statebuilding.org).

⁴¹ See Stockton (footnote 24) and the argument he makes that coordination is in effect a levy on the scarce resources allocated to beneficiaries.

should thus be proportional to the overall effort. At the same time, it is clear that no one is advocating that there should be no coordination. In fact, to the contrary, and as Peter Uvin points out: “all documents on peace-building stress the need for improved co-ordination: there is no single need more emphasized.”⁴² There seems to be a tension between the need for improved coordination on the one hand, and the potential limiting effects coordination may have on the ability of individual agents to exercise control over their own programming and allocation of resources.

Coordination can entail developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources⁴³. It should be recognised, however, that not all the agents in the system need to be engaged in all coordination activities. And those that are, do not need to be engaged at the same level of intensity. There will typically be a core network that is well connected, of which the senior leadership team of the Integrated Mission is a good example, an intermediate group that is regularly connected, and a periphery that is infrequently connected, if at all. The development of an overall strategic framework would, for instance, usually take place among a relatively limited network at the outset, but it could then be refined through various participatory and consultative processes that could inform and shape the overall direction of the system, and serve to build a wider base of ownership and accountability. Whilst there should be coordination between the humanitarian and the peace and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system, this level and intensity of that link does not have to be of the same quality as the link between the other dimensions of the system. It is thus possible to accommodate a range of appropriate levels of coordination within one larger system.

Thus, whilst coherence and coordination are interlinked, one should not assume a linear or causal relationship, as the one does not necessarily lead to the other. Each needs to be independently considered in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the interlinkages between the two.

⁴² Uvin, P. 1999, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthesis and Commentary on the Lessons Learned from Case Studies on the Limit and Scope of the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations*, DAC, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, OECD, Paris, p.18.

⁴³ Minear, L. & Chellia U. 1992, *UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis*, Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, p.3.

The Logic of Coherence and Coordination in Peacebuilding Systems

A peacebuilding system consists of a large number of independent agents that collectively carry out a broad range of activities across the dimensions of the system. These agents are independent in that they are each legally constituted in their own right, have their own organizational goals and objectives, have their own access to resources, and are in control of those resources, i.e. they have the power to make decisions about the allocation of those resources. Some of these agents are linked together in networks or sub-systems. The humanitarian community can be recognized as a distinct network within the larger peacebuilding system, in that they have broadly similar aims, operate on the same principles, and consciously try to work together in a networked pattern at country-level through the humanitarian coordinator system, cluster approach and joint resource mobilization. Another example is the various members of the UN family that, at country-level, form a unique sub-system in that they have a common identity, they employ various mechanisms to pursue a common objective, and they actively strive to be seen to be acting as one System, with the slogan ‘delivering as one’.⁴⁴ However, each UN agency within the UN system, even when it is organized at country-level into a ‘UN System’, remains a separate and independent agency with the ability to control its own resources.

A distinguishing feature of a peacebuilding system, however, is that all the agents and their activities are interdependent, in that no single agency, network or sub-system can achieve the ultimate goal of the peacebuilding system – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. Each agency independently undertakes activities that address specific facets of the conflict spectrum, but a collective (combined) and cumulative (sustained over time) effect is needed to achieve the overall peacebuilding goal. The peacebuilding system thus consists of all of the agents that are necessary to achieve the overall peacebuilding goal, and the system effect is brought about by their interdependence.

Each agent is only contributing a part of the whole, and it is the overall collective and cumulative affect that builds momentum towards sustainable peace and development. If the peace process fails and the conflict resumes, the time and resources invested has been wasted. It is only if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long-term that the in-

⁴⁴ “Delivering as One” was the title of the Report of the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence (footnote 18), and has subsequently become shorthand for pursuing coherence within the UN Country Team system. During 2007, eight countries will pilot different models to deliver as “One”, looking at common elements, such as “One Programme”, “One Budgetary Framework”, “One Leader” and “One Office”. See www.undg.org for more details.

vestment made can be said to have been worthwhile. The success of each individual activity is linked to the success of the total collective and cumulative effect of the overall undertaking.⁴⁵ It is thus in the best interest (rational choice) of each individual peacebuilding agent to ensure that the activities it undertakes are coherent with the overall peacebuilding strategy, because doing so will greatly increase the likelihood that the overall peacebuilding goal will be achieved, and thus, that the individual activity would be successful.

When the need for coherence between each individual activity, the agents that undertake them, and the overarching peacebuilding goal is established, coordination emerges as the tool with which to pursue this logic. In this context, coordination is the process that ensures that an individual peacebuilding agent is connected to the larger peacebuilding system of which it is a part, and without which it has no meaning.

Pursuing Coherence

In order to pursue coherence in a given peacebuilding system, agents would have to work on all four elements of coherence, using all the tools of coordination (developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources). It is not possible to address all these vectors in this report. Instead, this report will focus on two areas where the lack of coherence has had the most damaging effect on achieving sustainability, and which; correspondingly, hold the most promise for improving peacebuilding coherence, once addressed.

The first is the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference which it can use as a benchmark for coherence, i.e. the framework with which it should be coherent. It is impossible to achieve coherence if the framework, with which individual agents have to be coherent, has not been developed and shared with all the agents in the system.

The second is the need to operationalise the principle of local ownership. The inability of the external actors to give meaning to their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. It is also one of the most challenging, with few obvious solutions and extensive entrenched practises and established relationships. It would thus require considerable political will and focussed attention to adjust, but the report argues that without meaningfully addressing this shortcoming peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and suc-

⁴⁵ Smuts, J.C. 1926, *Holism and Evolution*, N&S Press (1987 edition), Cape Town, p. 78.

cess. It is inconceivable that a peacebuilding system can achieve sustainability if either of these two aspects – an overarching peacebuilding strategy and local ownership - are lacking.

The Need for a Clearly Articulated Overall Peacebuilding Strategy

The importance of an overall strategic process is widely recognised and accepted but poorly applied in practise.⁴⁶ As the *Utstein* and other recent studies cited⁴⁷ have pointed out, however, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is, in fact, a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peacebuilding systems. The first prerequisite for coherence in any peacebuilding system or UN integrated mission is the development of an overall strategic framework. Without it the various peacebuilding agents have no benchmark against which they can judge the degree to which they are coherent with the overall peacebuilding strategy.

A strategic framework should reflect a common understanding of the problem, i.e. the root causes of the conflict and the more immediate triggers that have caused the outbreak of violent conflict, and that may be continuing to stress the peace process. It should be grounded in a shared long-term vision of the future path the country or conflict system wish to realize, and it should contain a clearly articulated multi-dimensional and integrated strategy for the short to medium future direction of the peace process.

A strategic framework is not an operational and tactical implementation plan. Implementation planning is best done by those agents that have the responsibility for allocating their resources, and although such plans should be coordinated with partners, shared within sector and cluster coordination processes, and aligned with overall strategy, it would be impossibly complex to design one overall system-wide operational and tactical implementation plan. In fact, attempts aimed at controlling operational and tactical implementation planning at some central point, either in the broader context, or even in the UN integrated mission context, is likely to cause dysfunction as the result of the simplification that any such central planning process would have to impose. It is thus important to distinguish between a strategic framework on the one hand, that identifies common goals and objectives, milestones and benchmarks, and the broad processes through which they should be pursued, coordinated and integrated, and operational and tactical implementation planning on the other.

For an overall peacebuilding strategy to be a meaningful vehicle for system-wide coherence, it needs to be transparent, readily available to all agencies, open for input and con-

⁴⁶ Paris, 2004, footnote 5.

⁴⁷ As listed in footnote 24.

sultation, and regularly revised and updated. It is also critical that the overall effect of the strategy needs to be closely monitored. If every peacebuilding agency has access to the strategic framework, and information related to the effect it is having on the peace process, they would be able to use this information to inform and adjust their own strategic processes and implementation planning.

Unfortunately, we have very few examples of successfully applied strategic frameworks to date⁴⁸ This is the most critical shortcoming in international peacebuilding systems, and one of the key challenges of the UN integrated missions model. What we do have at this stage is various partial processes. For instance, there is the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) that is a vehicle for aligning the strategies of the various UN development agencies and the host government for a specific period at country-level. The humanitarian community has developed the humanitarian Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), but this is more of a resource mobilization tool than a strategic planning tool. In the context of the UN integrated missions model the UN has developed the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). It is still being refined and piloted, but it is primarily a UN System planning tool and its link with the need for an overall strategic framework that goes beyond the UN family is still unclear. It could become the catalyst for such a larger strategic process, but there is also a danger that it may generate such internal momentum, and becomes so wrapped-up in its internal planning processes, benchmarking and reporting, that it neglects the need to connect the UN planning process with the wider peacebuilding strategic framework.

The most broad and pervasive process to date is probably the Poverty Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, facilitated by the World Bank and aimed at aligning the overall development strategy of the external actors and the host Government. The PRSP process was, however, developed in the development context and thus tends to focus on macroeconomic and financial issues. It is not designed specifically for managing post-conflict transitions in fragile states. There has been attempts to develop system-wide strategies that goes beyond the development realm in a post-conflict setting, such as the Strategic Framework process in Afghanistan and the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) in Liberia. However, in both these experiments the linkages with the UN peace operation, and thus the UN Security Council mandates, were weak. The lessons learned from these experiments are that for any overall peacebuilding strategy to be meaningful it needs to be firmly grounded in the political peace process that lies at the core of the international conflict management intervention, i.e. it

should focus on those areas that build peace.⁴⁹ This does not mean that the developmental, humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law dimensions should be subsumed to the political and security dimensions, but rather that the overall effect of the integrated approach needs to facilitate and support the peace process. It is the focus on the conflict management aspect that gives peacebuilding its unique identity, and the overall strategy during the peacebuilding phase needs to reflect this emphasis on supporting the peace process.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission has been mandated to address this challenge, and it has, in its first year of existence, facilitated the development of integrated peacebuilding strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone. According to the Commission's annual report the purpose of an integrated peacebuilding strategy is 'to ensure coherent, prioritized approaches that involve international donors and agencies.'⁵⁰ It is still too early to judge these Peacebuilding Commission facilitated integrated peacebuilding strategies but whilst they look promising on the grounds that they are clearly focused on those areas that could threaten the consolidation of peace, they are also hamstrung by the UN's internal division of responsibilities that limit the focus of the Peacebuilding Commission to those post-post-conflicts no longer under the UN Security Council spotlight. As a result, the Peacebuilding Commission's integrated peacebuilding strategies are designed around the demands of the consolidation phase of peacebuilding systems. It would thus appear as if a division of responsibilities has emerged where the stabilization and transitional phases, in the UN system context, and as long as a UN peacekeeping operation is deployed, should be managed by the UN integrated mission concept, and from a planning perspective, the new Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), whilst the consolidation phase, or that part of it that follows the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation, is the purview of the Commission's integrated peacebuilding strategy. This is a field experiencing rapid innovation. The Peacebuilding Commission's integrated peacebuilding strategies have been developed in 2007. The UN integrated mission concept was developed in 2005 and is still being refined. The IMPP was developed in 2006 and 2007, and will be rolled-out in 2008. These new developments need time to be refined through practice before they can be meaningfully analysed.

Whilst it is critical that the strategic coherence of the UN system should be enhanced, we should not neglect the need to also develop the concepts, policies and processes that can

⁴⁸ Patrick, S. & Brown, K. 2007, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts: Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States*, International Peace Academy (IPA), p.130.

⁴⁹ See Special Research Report No. 2 of 2007, on the *Peacebuilding Commission* by the Security Council Report, dated 5 October 2007, p.7 (www.securitycouncilreport.org)

⁵⁰ See the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission, S/2007/458-A/62/137 of 25 July 2007.

facilitate the development of peacebuilding strategies that goes beyond the UN to involve all stakeholders in a given peacebuilding system. Without a clear country strategy, and without feedback on the progress made in achieving that strategy, individual agents are unable to position, adjust and monitor the degree to which they may be making a contribution to the achievement of the overall peacebuilding goal. The process of developing and adjusting a common country strategic framework, and continuously sharing this information with all the agents in the system, thus acquires a critical role in the complex peacebuilding systems approach. The degree to which such a strategic planning system is currently absent goes a long way to explaining the lack of coherence evident in past and present peacebuilding systems.

The Need to Ensure the Primacy of Internal Actors in the Peacebuilding System

There is wide recognition that externally driven post-conflict peacebuilding processes are unsustainable.⁵¹ Peacebuilding activities need to be need-based, and the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery need to be informed by the dynamics of the conflict system, through local ownership and meaningful internal/external coordination. It is also widely understood that peacebuilding activities that are not grounded in the socio-cultural belief systems that shape the worldview of the internal actors cause dysfunction. Achieving a balanced and meaningful partnership between internal and external peacebuilding agents is thus one of the most important success factors for any post-conflict peacebuilding system. It is also one of the most difficult to achieve.

The principle that peacebuilding systems should be locally owned and led is well established in the policy realm. For instance, the February 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization has generated the following four principles of harmonization: (1) recipient countries coordinate development assistance, (2) donors align their aid with recipient countries' priorities and systems, (3) donors streamline aid delivery and (4) donors adopt policies, procedures and incentives that foster harmonisation.⁵² The Rome Declaration, and related policies are aimed at addressing the core structural inequality of the international assistance regime, namely that the external agency is empowered by virtue of being the benefactor. If left unchecked, external agencies tend to dominate the internal/external relationship. The most effective counterweight to this structural imbalance is the recognition that peace processes can only be sus-

⁵¹ See *Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries*, Peacebuilding Forum Conference, 7 October 2004, New York, p.2.

tainable when owned and led by internal actors. In this context donors have come to accept the moral principle, and operational reality, that assistance has to be needs based and locally owned.

However, this is easier said than done and external actors have reported that they have encountered a number of obstacles when trying to implement policies that encourage local ownership, especially in the fragile state and post-conflict contexts. External actors find it difficult to identify credible internal actors with whom they can enter into a meaningful partnership with, especially in the stabilisation and transitional phases before elections are held. This is because the parties emerging out of conflict typically represent ambiguous constituencies, and there are often conflicting claims of ownership and support. The internal actors also typically lack the time, resources, technical expertise and support systems to engage meaningfully with the external actors. In fact, the concept of fragile states was initially developed in the donor context to refer to countries where the Government is unable or unwilling to establish a meaningful relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors.

The internal peacebuilding agents report that they typically feel intimidated by the momentum, scope and depth of the external intervention. They are overwhelmed by the pressure to engage with all the assessments, proposals and plans generated by the sudden influx of external actors, and they are frustrated that despite all this activity there is typically little to show, in terms of immediate delivery, for their time and effort. Whilst this is especially the case in the stabilisation and transitional phases, before or whilst the necessary capacities have been developed, it remains a problem long thereafter. The work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Burundi is a case in point. The development of the integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi put considerable additional strain on the Government of Burundi, and in June 2007 the UN Country Team had to ask the Peacebuilding Commission not to further burden the Government of Burundi, and as a result the Commission decided to postpone the work on monitoring mechanisms.⁵³

External actors also point to the dysfunction caused by their own institutional cultures that emphasise output rather than impact. The pressure to rapidly respond, achieve planned outputs and to disburse funds within fixed time-frames (donor budget cycles) often result in external actors compromising on the time and resources needed to invest in identifying credible internal counterparts, generate consultative processes and develop meaningful local own-

⁵² Rome Declaration on Harmonization, footnote 30.

⁵³ *Peacebuilding Commission*, footnote 49, p.6.

ership. Consultations undertaken under pressure, for instance during rapid needs assessments, often serve to legitimise pre-conceived perceptions rather than add value by generating independent and objective opinions and analysis, and thus fail to reflect the true needs and priorities of the internal actors. Under pressure from the internal/external power imbalance, internal actor representatives make the common mistake of telling the external actors what they think the external agents would like to hear, rather than sharing with them their own perceptions and opinions of what kind of support they think they need, and the priorities as they perceive them.

There are two areas within the internal/external tension that have the potential to transform the inherent tensions in the relationship. The first builds on the fact that external actors have already recognised the principle, both for moral and functional reasons, that the peace process needs to be locally owned and led, and the second gives meaning to the principle that the support generated by the external agencies needs to be needs based rather than supply driven.

The first is the need to establish a new basis for the internal/external relationship, namely a rights based approach that recognises that the internal actors have the human right to determine their own future. Meaningful sustainability requires that the internal actors should not just own the problem, but also the solutions. This rights based approach implies that there should be processes in place, controlled by the internal actors, that generate the needs-based information needed to assess, design, plan, coordinate and implement assistance programmes. Where such processes are not in place, the external actors should invest in facilitating them. Whilst external partners can facilitate such processes, they need to be truly locally owned and have meaningful power. This will be particularly challenging in post-conflict environments and fragile states, and both internal and external agents will need to invest considerable resources to developing processes and mechanisms that can generate meaningful local ownership. Without it, however, any investments made in peacebuilding systems are unlikely to be sustainable.

Whilst the first emphasis is thus on generating the processes that will serve to realise the human rights of the internal actors to determine their own destiny, the second emphasis is on ensuring that the combined and cumulative effect of the assistance offered has a positive effect on the internal actors, and that it is delivered at a rate that can be absorbed. If the ultimate aim of the post-conflict reconstruction system is sustainable peace and development then the overall strategy, and the pace of its implementation, should reflect the optimal balance be-

tween delivery and absorption. The legacy of violent conflict typically results in the internal actors having a much lower capacity to absorb assistance than the external actors anticipate. Post-conflict peacebuilding activities are typically planned at the outset, as intense short- to medium-term interventions and the bulk of the money theoretically available for these activities are made available in the early phases of the transition. Although well intended, the result is that large amounts are spent on activities that the internal actors simply cannot absorb.

There is a need to synchronise the rate of delivery with the rate of absorption. In general, this translates into programming those elements of the assistance package that are not aimed at emergency relief and early recovery over a longer-term, and directing more of the earlier assistance to building the capacities that would be required to absorb downstream assistance. Internal actors will be best placed to absorb assistance towards the end of the transitional period when some basic capacities have been restored or newly established, and in the consolidation phase, when a newly elected government is in place that have the constitutional legitimacy to determine national priorities. The short- to medium-term high-impact approach currently favoured is not conducive to sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding and ultimately results in higher costs to both the internal and external actors.

Recommendations

On the basis of the analysis and findings of this report, the following recommendations are presented along the lines of the four elements of coherence introduced earlier, namely: (1) agency coherence; (2) whole-of-government coherence; (3) external coherence (harmonization); and (4) internal/external coherence (alignment).

Agency Coherence

The Government of Norway should take steps to ensure that each individual governmental agency's contribution to peacebuilding policy in general, and to each specific peacebuilding system where Norway plays an active role in particular, is coherent with its own policies, and with that of the Government as a whole. It can do so by increasing internal coordination and by institutionalizing a coherence criteria as part of the normative function of each agency.

It should become standard practise within each agency that all relevant stakeholders within the agency, and elsewhere in government and civil society, including internationally where relevant, be consulted when developing specific policies or plans, and that every such policy and plan, shall include a short record of those that have been consulted in its development. There is a qualitative difference between an unspecified expectation that consultations and coordination should take place, and an explicit requirement that each agency report on the steps it took to ensure coherence when policies and plans have been developed. Every such product should also make reference to the international and national policies with which the product has pursued coherence. It should thus become standard practise that each such policy or planning product includes, in whatever form becomes the norm, a record of the steps taken to ensure coherence and, where relevant, should include a note on controversial or contested aspects of the product.

Internal agency monitoring and evaluation should add coherence as an important factor when evaluating the performance of the agency, or its units and individual personnel, and it should introduce incentives and sanctions that encourage coherence and discourage unilateral and uncoordinated activities. Agencies should periodically evaluate its own attempts to pursue coherence, and engage its stakeholders in that process.

Whole-of-Government Coherence

The Government of Norway should take steps to ensure that it has a coherent approach to peacebuilding in general, and that it has a coherent whole-of-government peacebuilding strategy for each specific post-conflict country or conflict system it is engaged in. It can do so by ensuring that it has an overall policy in place, and that there are inter- and/or supra-agency processes and mechanisms in place to ensure coordination, encourage connectedness and pursue coherence.

Many governments now have specific whole-of-government policies in place for pursuing peacebuilding coherence. The Canadian ‘3D’ concept (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) is probably the best known, but the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, France, Germany and Sweden all have explicit whole-of-government policies in place.⁵⁴ A Norwegian whole-of-government policy for peacebuilding coherence should clarify the broad principles Norway wishes to pursue with regard to peacebuilding coherence and should provide guidelines to its agencies as to how to pursue, monitor and evaluate coherence. It should

⁵⁴ Patrick & Brown, footnote 48, page 3.

also specify a specific inter- or supra-agency process or mechanism for pursuing coherence. If such a policy it adopted it should be regularly evaluated and compared to international best practises to ensure that Norway is at the forefront of international best practise in this area.

Inter-agency refers to processes and mechanisms that involve more than one agency, and the Government should issue guidelines, as part of its whole-of-government peacebuilding coherence policy, as to what kind of inter-agency coordination it expects in the peacebuilding context. For instance, it can establish an inter-agency task force for each, or a selected group, of peacebuilding systems where it is engaged in, and expect such a task force to develop a whole-of-government policy for engagement with the specific peacebuilding system. It can appoint a lead agency, or it can opt for other coordinating processes such as a rotational system.

Supra-agency refers to the establishment of a specific mechanism for ensuring whole-of-government peacebuilding coordination. It can be an inter-agency mechanism, hosted by one agency but staffed by all, or it can be a new agency that exists either independently or in a supra-agency, such as in the office of the Prime Minister. Prominent examples are the United Kingdom's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), and the United States' Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), both of which were established in 2004 and resided in their respective Foreign Ministries. There are a range of other supra-agency mechanisms that can be employed alongside or instead of such a specific unit or office. Some countries, like the United Kingdom and South Africa make use of cabinet committees, or a cluster of cabinet portfolios, to develop and oversee whole-of-government policies. The United Kingdom has linked the establishment of the PCRU with a new pooled funding resource that brings together funds from the Defence, Development and Foreign Ministry budgets. Such mechanisms have also been used to arrange inter-agency assessments and a number of countries have replicated their policy-level whole-of-government cooperation approaches at the operational level, most notably in the context of the national Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept in Afghanistan.

Norway should undertake a comparative study of the international best practise in this field to date. The study should form the basis for a comprehensive Norwegian whole-of-government peacebuilding coherence policy.

External Coherence

The Government of Norway has played a leading role in supporting and encouraging coordination among donors, and has gained considerable recent experience in the context of the leading role it has been playing in the Panel on System-wide Coherence and the UN Peacebuilding Commission, with particular focus on Burundi. Much remains to be done. Norway should continue to, and even further intensify, its efforts to encourage peacebuilding coherence and coordination. One way in which these efforts can be further intensified, is for Norway to take a decision to place donor coherence, in the context of the 8th Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and the Rome Declaration on Harmonization, at the center of its approach to peacebuilding.

As highlighted above, the major shortcoming in this regard has been the inability of the international community to develop a commonly agreed upon process that will generate an overall peacebuilding strategy for each specific peacebuilding system. The challenge is to develop and institutionalise a process that goes beyond any of the current dimensional trapped initiatives, so that a truly multi-dimensional, system-wide and integrated peacebuilding strategy can emerge. Norway has led the initiative to develop a peacebuilding strategy for Burundi, in the context of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and has been a leading proponent of the UN Integrated Mission concept. It is thus well placed to facilitate an initiative to develop such an overall peacebuilding strategy process, both within the context of UN Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions, and beyond. Norway is also a member of NATO and is closely engaged in a number of related international initiatives, such as Multi-National Experiment 5 (MNE 5)⁵⁵, and is thus well placed to link the UN, NATO and other initiatives in the context of the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ to peacebuilding coherence.

Closely linked to the need for the development of an overall peacebuilding strategy at country-level, are the need to develop a matching monitoring and evaluation system, and related mechanisms aimed at sharing both the strategy and its progress and setbacks, with the agencies that constitute the peacebuilding system, and the international community in general. Norway has been closely engaged with the development of guidelines for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities through its support to the OECD/DAC⁵⁶ process in this regard, and is well placed to facilitate and support international efforts to de-

⁵⁵ Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5) is a multi-national and multi-agency experiment, initiated by the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), in cooperation with NATO and several member states, including Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The objective of MNE5 is to improve cooperation between civilian and military actors in multinational and interagency operations, with a view to develop a comprehensive approach to such interventions.

velop appropriate monitoring and evaluation guidelines, standards, techniques and processes that can serve the peacebuilding context.

Internal/External Coherence

The most challenging aspect of the peacebuilding record to date has been the inability of the external actors to operationalise its stated principles and policies in the context of the alignment of international assistance with the needs of the internal actors. At the same time, this area holds the most promise, as the failure to correct this aspect is probably, more than any other, to blame for the poor sustainability of international development and peacebuilding assistance. Norway has shown international leadership in the area of wanting to ensure that its development assistance is effective and efficient, avoid unintended consequences, are transparent and most importantly, that it has a meaningful impact. In this context Norway could play a leading role in generating international focus on operationalizing the principle of local ownership.

Norway could support research and related initiatives to explore new and innovative ways of generating the participation of internal actors in peacebuilding systems, especially in the stabilization and transition phases, prior to there being an elected government in place that have the legitimacy and credibility to represent its peoples.

Norway could support research and related initiatives to search for alternatives to the current practise of external actors employing many of the very people that are desperately needed in the internal sectors.

Norway could support research and related initiatives into the dysfunction caused by the lack of synchronization between the rate of delivery of external assistance, and the ability of internal agencies to absorb, manage and meaningfully distribute such assistance. Such research can focus on both the factors that cause external actors to pressurise the supply side to provide inappropriate assistance, as well as the factors that would better enable internal actors to optimise the management and distribution of external support.

Norway could support initiatives and activities aimed at empowering internal actors to play a leading role in the coordination of peacebuilding systems, and such support could include research aimed at developing new innovative ways of building capacity and otherwise empowering internal agencies, as well as research aimed at identifying current external

⁵⁶ See footnote 35.

agency policies and practises, including unintended consequences, that undermine the stated objectives of alignment and local ownership.

Conclusion

This report analysed the coherence and coordination dilemma in UN peacebuilding and integrated missions, with the objective of generating findings and recommendations that can be of assistance to the Norwegian Government: (a) to improve coherence and coordination within and across Norwegian state and civil agencies engaged in peacebuilding action, and (b) to initiate, encourage and support initiatives that will improve coherence and coordination in the international, including especially the UN, peacebuilding system.

The report was presented in three parts. The first defined and analyzed UN peacebuilding and integrated missions in the context of the coherence and coordination deficit. The second identified a few priority areas where improved coherence and coordination are likely to have the most meaningful impact. The third generated specific policy and practise recommendations for improving coherence and coordination in both the national and international spheres.

This report started out by pointing to the fact that one of the reasons why coherence has proven elusive is because the agencies that undertake peacebuilding activities lack a shared understanding of the role of coherence and coordination in peacebuilding system. The report suggested that there is a core logic for coherence in peacebuilding systems, namely that all peacebuilding agents are interdependent in that they can not individually achieve the goal of the overall peacebuilding system – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace and development. In this context, the role of coherence and coordination is to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together.


The report focussed in on two areas where the lack of coherence has had the most damaging effect on achieving sustainability, and which; correspondingly, hold the most promise for improving peacebuilding coherence, once addressed. The first was the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference which it can use as a reference point for coherence, i.e. the framework with which it should be coherent. The report argued that it is impossible to achieve coherence if the framework, with which individual agents have to be coherent, is missing. The report also stressed the need to monitor, on an ongoing basis, the

effect the overall peacebuilding strategy is having on the host system, so that the strategy can be continuously adjusted to the dynamic environment, and so that the individual peacebuilding agents can independently make course directions to their own activities, and in so doing contribute to the synchronization of the overall peacebuilding system.

The second was the need to operationalise the primacy of the principle of local ownership. The report argued that the inability of the external actors to give meaning to their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. It is also one of the most challenging, with few obvious solutions and extensive entrenched practises and established relationships. It would thus require considerable political will and focussed attention to adjust, but the report argues that without meaningfully addressing this shortcoming peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success.

The desire to improve the current poor record of sustainability and success in the field on peacebuilding is, however, an important and meaningful incentive, around which the Government of Norway can generate the necessary political will, both domestically and internationally. The stakes are high, especially for the 'bottom billion' born into the least developed and failed states periphery of the world system, but the potential rewards, for a more stable, secure and developed world system, are significant, and worth pursuing.

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