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Robert Jervis

Fifty years of *International Organization* encompass both accomplishments and disappointments, as does this period of international history. The articles in this issue of *IO*, especially "*International Organization* and the Study of World Politics" by Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, also give us a lot to think about, learn from, and criticize. I will not attempt a full review but, as befitting a commentator, will concentrate on questions that the other authors have downplayed or that I would pose or answer somewhat differently, perhaps because of my greater familiarity with the work in security studies than in international political economy (IPE), a field in which *IO* and most of the authors in this issue specialize.[1]

I begin by discussing some determinants of the fates of schools of thought and research programs, noting the relationships between scholarship and contemporary international politics. I then turn to the theme presented by Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner that rationalism and constructivism will be the two points of contestation in the coming years, which will lead into my claims for the continuing relevance of realism. In closing, I will comment on the field of IPE, about which the other authors in this issue have said surprisingly little.

Research Programs, Knowledge, and Politics

If the discipline is functioning well, each school of thought enriches others as powerful research of one kind strengthens, not weakens, the alternatives. No one approach

I am grateful for comments by Richard Betts, Judith Goldstein, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Helen Milner, Jack Snyder, and Arthur Stein.

1. Another good review concentrating on IPE broadly conceived is Kahler 1997. I should also join Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner and Wæver (articles in this issue) in noting that although our subject is international politics, the relevant community of scholars is almost entirely American, with a few contributors from the rest of the English-speaking world. We do not know the impact of this condition, but I suspect it is considerable. To take just one example, the fact that during the Cold War American security scholarship was centered more on realism than was European is not likely to have been unrelated to the different roles and policies of the United States and West Europe. For earlier discussions of different national scholarly perspectives, see Hoffmann 1977; Strange 1983; Alker and Biersteker 1984; and Holsti 1985.

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consistently maintains a leading position: each of them catches important elements of international politics, and many of our arguments are about the relative importance of and the interrelationships among various factors. Thus, in their article in this issue, Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner usefully point to the dialectical nature of social science. Popular approaches inevitably are taken too far and call up opposing lines of argument; and if any important approach is ignored for too long, scholars will return to it as the picture of international politics becomes excessively imbalanced.[2]

Although it is easy to see that various kinds of research wax and wane, explaining the pattern is more difficult. Indeed, there is an element of circularity in determining what constitutes a successful research program. In the absence of some external and arguably objective measure, a research program succeeds when many scholars adopt it. Without claiming that initial incidents set off positive feedback to such an extent that success is accidental or arbitrary, we should not assume that those approaches currently most popular necessarily tell us more about international politics than do alternative approaches. Determining which research programs are "progressive" and which are "degenerating" is difficult because the relevant judgments are influenced by our perspectives and interests (in both senses of the term) and because all theories undergo change in light of empirical investigations.[3] Thus, though I would not dissent from the consensus that the democratic peace has been an extraordinarily fruitful area of scholarship, there are grounds for arguing that we have learned relatively little since the original investigations. Many of the findings hinge on definitions, debatable codings affect the results, the causal mechanisms remain unclear and have not proved readily amenable to empirical research, and it is questionable whether additional phenomena, such as the purported tendency of democracies to resolve differences short of war, can be fit under the same theoretical umbrella.

The other side of this coin is that the failure of a research program may not be primarily attributable to its lack of potential. For example, although I join many others in believing that there are great limitations to the utility of bureaucratic politics analysis because it is difficult to specify ex ante the actors' preferences and even harder to say what outcome is likely to emerge from the posited pushing and hauling among the diverse bureaucratic interests, these failings are hardly unique to this approach. Can one argue that bureaucratic politics yields fewer testable propositions than constructivism, for example? Thus, I would not dismiss four other sources of the approach's current lack of popularity. First, it resonates with, and indeed partly was developed by, those who had been in the government. As the political science discipline has separated from the practice of politics, fewer people move back and forth between the academy and the government, thereby reducing the ranks of those who are likely to produce this kind of work or find it intellectually satisfying. Second, the

2. Citing Goethe, Stephen Jay Gould notes that "some dichotomies must interpenetrate, and not struggle to the death of one side, because each of their opposite poles captures an essential property of any intelligible world"; Gould 1987, 19.

3. Lakatos 1970. For contrasting views of the status of realism in these terms, see the articles in the "Forum" section of the *American Political Science Review* 1997, 899–935.

only neighboring field that bureaucratic politics can draw on is organization theory from sociology, which, compared to the field of economics (which has lent so much weight to the rational choice school), is of little prestige or assistance. Third, although studies of foreign policymaking often produce explanations involving the details of bureaucratic perspectives and interests, the discipline now favors theories that, while admitting of many exceptions, are more parsimonious. Finally, unlike constructivism, bureaucratic politics does not hold out hope for drastic change. Although it is usually critical of the policies that have been adopted and, even more, of the way they are implemented, it does not question the decision makers' basic outlook and goals, let alone the prevailing pattern of international politics.

Both recent events and the contemporary political atmosphere influence the acceptability of theories, though this is usually clearer in retrospect than at the time. Thus, Jerald Combs has shown that interpretations of past events in American foreign policy were strongly marked by what was happening when scholars were writing.[4] In the same vein, the changing fortunes of Marxism in political science are better explained by such events as the Vietnam War (which fits Marxism badly[5]) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union coupled with the abandonment of communism in the People's Republic of China (which actually says nothing about the validity of Marxist theory) than by the ability or inability of Marxist approaches to generate propositions or account for evidence. So, not surprisingly, the relatively uncompelling nature of the international environment now facing the United States has renewed interest in how state interests are defined and in the domestic sources of foreign policy, not only currently but also in previous eras. Similarly, scholars often argue that a resurgence of violence between states would increase the popularity of realism. I have no doubt this is correct, but even if we were to accept the questionable equation of realism with violence, would we want current events to drive our research, rather than being concerned with explaining patterns over a longer span of history?[6] Contemporary events can of course be relevant here—and war among the developed countries would undermine some theories discussed later—but they usually tell us more about the popularity of various approaches than about their scholarly utility.

The kinds of theories we find attractive are influenced not only by events but also by our general political orientations. As usual, seeing these forces operating in others is easier than seeing them in one's self, and though I agree with the description of the evolution of the subfield of international organization presented here by Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, I see normative considerations playing a larger role. To oversimplify, the field moved from analyzing the United Nations, to studying regional integration, to looking at the role of transnational and transgovernmental organizations, to examining the causes and effects of foreign economic policies and ac-

4. Combs 1983.

5. Krasner 1978.

6. During the Cold War, the field of security studies was criticized for being preoccupied with contemporary issues at the expense of more abstract arguments that would apply to a wider sweep of history. So it is a little odd to hear many of the same people now say that the end of the Cold War makes security studies less important.

tivities. The first three phenomena, and to a lesser extent the fourth, are ones in which the use or threat of force is in the background, if not absent, and each appeared to hold out hope for a more peaceful world, perhaps even a more humane and just one. The subfield has been guided by the beliefs that such changes are possible, that greater areas of world politics can be governed by law rather than by force, and that universalistic criteria should and can become increasingly important.

The normative agenda is even more apparent with social constructivism. The obvious desire is to see world politics transformed by the spread of appropriate norms, identities, and concepts of world politics. Intriguingly, constructivists pay little attention to norms and ideas that are both revolutionary and evil. This oversight has been at the cost of ignoring perhaps the strongest argument against materialist claims: one cannot understand Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, the two most destructive states of the twentieth century, without understanding the norms, identities, and ideas held by the dominant elites.[7] Both regimes were driven by the desire to remake first their societies and then the world. Neither took the state as the unit whose interests were to be served; no narrow self-interest or considerations of national security or even national gain could have led to such domestic slaughter and dangerous expansion.[8] Perhaps constructivists slight these cases because they indicate that realism can be a force for moderation, that new ideas can make the world worse, and that those who seek radical change may be monsters. Recent civil strife has increased constructivists' (and everyone else's) interest in nationalism, but it will be a challenge to deal with desired and undesired ideas in analytically similar ways.

Normative impulses also account for much of the passion in the attacks on realism. Robert Gilpin's claim that "no one loves a political realist"[9] is only a bit exaggerated: those who are committed to the need for and possibility of radical change in international politics find what they believe to be realism's deep pessimism on this score not only incorrect but also a major obstacle to progress.[10] Similarly, liberal reformers have long argued that those who describe the world in terms of the utility of the use, or even the threat, of force are teaching incorrect and dangerous lessons and that realism partly is a self-fulfilling prophecy.[11]

This is not to say that realists like war, although in earlier eras many intellectuals believed that armed conflict was the main motor of human progress—a proposition that should not be dismissed out of hand. Indeed, many realists study the causes of war in the hope of reducing the chances of future conflict. What I find interesting is

7. Lumsdaine 1994. See also Mearsheimer 1994, 42–44.

8. Relevant here is the general topic of passions and interests: Hirschman 1977. In this connection, the association between constructivism and "left" political preferences is significant. This commitment gives the work much of its drive and, for many, its appeal. But it also raises doubts as to whether the approach can produce answers—or even ask questions—that have unpalatable political implications.

9. Gilpin 1996.

10. Although realism sees the possibility of cooperation and peace, as I will discuss later, there is much to K. J. Holsti's comment that "many of the theoretical arguments about the fundamental contours of our discipline are really debates about optimism and pessimism, our very general outlooks toward the world in which we live"; Holsti 1986, 356.

11. See, for example, Rapoport 1973.

that nonrealists have been slow to develop and test arguments about the conditions they consider conducive to peace. A large literature exists on the effects of threats and arms increases, but even leaving aside the questionable relevance of the answers to these crucial questions for realism and its alternatives,[12] this research is plagued by almost insurmountable endogeneity problems, especially when decision making is not closely examined. Classical liberalism was founded on the idea that unfettered international intercourse would produce peace, but only recently have scholars reexamined the correlations between high levels of trade and conflict,[13] and neoliberal institutionalists have not looked at whether peace has historically been associated with a high density of international institutions. (Of course, we need to consider that causation can run both ways and that peace and its purported causes may be the products of third factors.[14]) Thus, I think it is the hope for a better world more than the results of investigations of the causes of conflicts that has led many scholars to reject realism.

In summary, then, we should not adopt the Whiggish stance that the fate of a research program is predominantly determined by the extent to which it produces propositions that anticipate and fit with empirical facts. Programs—and, even more, their first cousins, paradigms—are notoriously difficult to confirm or disconfirm. Not only do they shape what counts as a fact at all, but there are so many steps between the assumptions and outlooks on the one hand and empirical findings on the other that neither in social nor in natural science can the evidence ever be unambiguous. If this were not the case, competing theories of political life could not have survived over several centuries. Granted, they rise and fall and undergo permutations (and, we hope, improvements), but the basic schools of thought of realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism have been around for a very long time. Any that could have been disconfirmed would have gone extinct long ago.

Constructivism and Rationalism: Necessarily Incomplete

Leaving for the next section the question of whether rationalism and constructivism will be the major points of contestation in the coming years, here I want to note that they are even less complete than realism, liberalism, and Marxism. As approaches or styles of thought they need to be filled with content in order to become theoretical statements, and much of their explanatory power must come from auxiliary assumptions about the identities of actors, their goals, and their beliefs. This is most obviously true for rationalism, which argues that behavior can be understood as the actors' attempts to maximize some consistent utility function. But this claim says nothing

12. The view that arms increases and deterrence can preserve the status quo is clearly realist, but the claim that these postures will set off a spiral of increasing conflict is not necessarily nonrealist: Jervis 1976, chap. 3.

13. See Oneal and Russett 1997; and Kim 1998. For more skeptical views, see Copeland 1996; and Ripsman and Blanchard 1996.

14. Blainey 1973, chap. 2.

about what actors value and what behaviors they believe will produce maximum benefit. To move beyond a "thin" version of rational choice, a great deal must be added, which means that there can be no single rational choice theory of politics.

Rationalism then should not be contrasted with liberalism or realism. Indeed, it needs theories like these to do any explanatory work. Debate over the merits of assuming utility maximization has obscured the crucial nature of the suppositions about what goals actors seek and how they believe they can best reach them. Glossing over these questions in IPE is perhaps easier than in security because both goals and understandings of means-ends relationships are more widely shared in the former area than in the latter. But even when applied to IPE, rationalism cannot successfully bracket people's ideas about how the economy functions: actors who believe the theory of mercantilism will behave very differently from those who have been schooled in neoclassical economics.

There are several affinities between rationalism and realism, however. Most formulations of the latter rely on an assumption of rationality,[15] though to a less demanding degree than does the former. Self-interest is usually seen as quite narrow, although rationalists are more prone than realists to see the interest being maximized as that of the individual rather than the country being led, a topic to which I will return. Neither approach pays much attention to differences among individuals or biases in the way people think, leaving them vulnerable to criticisms rooted in individual and cognitive psychology. Furthermore, both approaches are simultaneously normative and descriptive because they run together what actors should do to serve their interests and how they actually behave. Thus, rationalist accounts of institutions tend to resemble the functionalist approach that was originally a target of rationalism; that is, the institutional arrangements that have developed are seen as those that best serve the interests of powerful actors.[16] But when realists and rationalists confront policies they see as misguided, if not disastrous, their theories as well as the country are in trouble: Hans Morgenthau not only said that countries follow their national interests, he also lectured Americans on the need to do so—a task that would have been unnecessary had his descriptive argument been without flaws.

Constructivism, too, is an approach or a style. It is one thing to argue that material factors and the external environment do not determine a state's behavior and to point to the importance of regulative and constitutive norms, shared understandings, and common practices; it is quite another to say how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests become defined as they do. Leaving aside the question of what evidence would bear on the claims being made, my point is that although constructivism says something about the processes at work in political life, it does not, by itself, tell us anything about the expected content of foreign policies or international relations.

Constructivism does, however, have an important affinity with realism in its skepticism about the universality, if not the sincerity, of the ideas and rationales expressed

15. Morgenthau does not do so consistently, however; Morgenthau 1978.
16. Sometimes microfoundations can be developed for this account.

by national leaders. Realists are often accused of too readily adopting the perspectives of those in power, but scholars of this persuasion often argue that the beliefs articulated by statesmen (and other people as well) are reflections of their historical and personal circumstances, that elites tend to universalize the concepts and values that are particular to their own situation or era, and that leaders are likely to convince themselves that worldwide interests are served by policies that mainly benefit their countries and perhaps only themselves. There is a valuable cynicism to both constructivism and realism in the appreciation of the self-righteousness of powerful actors.[17] E. H. Carr's analysis is best known in this regard, but Morgenthau similarly stressed that liberal elites attributed objective and universal validity to the ideas that accompanied the rise to power of their countries and social strata.[18] Subsequent realists have also been quick to point out that the justifications offered by the dominant powers typically clothe national interests in broader terms; Kenneth Waltz continues this tradition when he argues that Americans fail to recognize that although inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed good for the United States, it disadvantages nonnuclear countries that face threats, including threats from the United States.[19]

Interestingly, liberal IPE scholarship has less in common with constructivism on this score in that its arguments parallel those made by dominant elites who espouse the benefits of an open economic system. Because these scholars see greater common interests among actors and perhaps because they are less focused on the multiple effects of power, including its influence on the intellectual frameworks of powerholders, they tend to accept the claims of liberal leaders to be serving interests extending beyond those of the leading actors.

In many of their variants, rationalism and constructivism share a valuable focus on the importance of interaction. But, contrary to the claims of their proponents, the extent of their difference from realism is not clear. For rationalism, interaction is treated through game theory, which leads to an understanding that outcomes often diverge from intentions and that actors set their behavior on the basis of their expectation of how others are going to act and with the knowledge that others are doing likewise. This contrasts with the error common to much formal decision theory—that is, the assumption that although the actor that is the focus of attention will maximize his or her utility, others will not anticipate this and react accordingly. But the basic outlook of game theory does *not* contrast with realism and sophisticated diplomatic histories, which have been deeply concerned with interactions as well as with actors' anticipations, strategies, and estimates of others' strategies and anticipations.

Constructivism has a large place for the ways in which norms and practices not only restrict what actors can do but also enable them to act and, indeed, shape their identities and constitute the fundamental nature of the prevailing international relations. By contrast, constructivists argue, neorealism, if not realism, assumes the iden-

17. There is a tension in constructivism here: to argue that ideas largely are rationalizations is to locate major causality in preexisting interests, whose existence constructivists usually deny. If ideas are to have any autonomy, they cannot be mere reflections of actors' experiences and interests.

18. See Carr [1946] 1964; and Morgenthau 1946, 20–53, 153–67.

19. Waltz and Sagan 1995.

tities and existence of the states and does not see how the units and the international system mutually form each other. But Waltz's conception of the relations between the units and the system is not so different from theirs: "B's attributes and actions are affected by A, and vice versa. Each is not only influencing the other; both are being influenced by the situation their interaction creates. . . . The behavior of [a pair of units in a system] cannot . . . be resolved into a set of two-way relations because each element of behavior that contributes to the interaction is itself shaped by their being a pair."[20]

Although rationalism does not see the interactive process operating as profoundly as this, far from being starkly opposed to constructivism, in a related area the two need to be combined. Game theory rests on assumptions about each actor's expectations about how the other will behave—expectations that form socially, both through establishing conventions about the meaning of behavior and by actors trying to convince others to accept their explanations of their past behavior.[21] The centrality of interactions and anticipations leads actors to seek to shape their informational and interpretational environments; meanings and expectations are sources of influence and sites of cooperation and contestation. In understanding these processes, strategic rationality and deductive logic can be—indeed, need to be—coupled with an appreciation of how actors attribute meaning to behavior. Rationalism cannot supply this knowledge, but constructivism is one of the approaches that can guide the required empirical research.

Any diplomatic history or newspaper provides examples of these processes and shows that meanings are both central and problematic. Let me just mention three cases that occurred in a two-day period in January 1998 as I was drafting this article: the Ulster Protestants "wanted any concessions [from Britain and Ireland] to be part of the negotiating process rather than 'sweeties' passed out by the British and Irish governments outside the talks"; Iran's president proposed cultural exchanges with the United States, whereas the latter would accept only government-to-government talks; and the United States, Israel, and Turkey staged joint naval operations to improve their abilities to coordinate rescues at sea, an act that called up strong protests from Syria and Egypt.[22] People here are concerned with the political and psychological significances of these acts, not their physical consequences. Most behavior has influence only as it is interpreted by others who hold their own (often implicit) theories about how the world works and who are trying to discern the implications of acts for future behavior, while keeping in mind that the actor and other audiences are engaging in similar attributions and projections of meaning. There is no objective way of specifying the significance people will attach to these acts, and indeed they may be read differently by different audiences. The concerns are rational and fit well

20. Waltz 1979, 74–75.

21. See Jervis [1970] 1989a; and Kreps 1990b.

22. Warren Hoge, "Protestant Threat Imperils Peace Talks in Ulster," *New York Times*, 7 January 1998, 4; Elaine Sciolino, "Seeking to Open to U.S., Iranian Proposes Cultural Ties," *New York Times*, 8 January 1998, 1; and Serge Schmemann, "Unusual Naval Alliance Shows Off, and Arabs Glare," *New York Times*, 8 January, 3.

with strategic logic, but the crucial interpretations that people are making and trying to get others to make must come from elsewhere and can only be understood within frameworks that are social, psychological, and cultural.

Rationalism and Constructivism as Central?

Although I believe that constructivism and rationalism will play large roles in the future, to predict that they will be points of contestation may be an exaggeration. Much research is too eclectic to be readily classified, which I think is a sign of healthy diversity. I find it difficult to fit many of the articles in *IO* under the theoretical headings used in this issue. Looking at other journals, especially *International Studies Quarterly* and *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, reinforces this impression. Here we see empirical research using large-scale data sets that is less closely tied to strong theories. Put another way, the articles in this issue are strongly "bicoastal." Quite different work tends to be done in the rest of the country (Chicago is an honorary coastal university, perhaps by virtue of being on Lake Michigan). I do not want to exaggerate this distinction, but neither should it be dismissed. Without rehearsing the familiar arguments about induction versus deduction, the value and frequency of approaches that do less to elaborate general theories and more to detect patterns in events should not be underestimated.

It is also telling that two of the major debates in the field and one of the major points of focus have been only marginally influenced by rationalism and constructivism. To start with the latter, the past decade has seen a resurgence of attention to the domestic sources of foreign policy.[23] Many of the articles in this issue discuss this research, and I need only note that though some of it is grounded in rationalism or constructivism, most is not. Although constructivism attends to the role of domestic processes in forming identities, interests, and norms, much work with a domestic focus either brackets these subjects or analyzes them quite differently. Whereas rationalism linked to methodological individualism sees foreign policy as the product of the narrow self-interests of domestic actors and focuses on how domestic political institutions influence policy outcomes, much of the domestic sources literature is more diverse—and also shares with bureaucratic politics the difficulty of estimating how the domestic bargaining processes will work themselves out, which coalitions will form, and how the national leaders will balance internal and external pressures and values. Thus, the renewed attention to "second image"[24] should not be equated with the triumph of either constructivism or rationalism.

So it is not entirely surprising that the theory of the democratic peace, probably the most vibrant theory drawing on domestic sources, cannot be readily classified as either rationalist or constructivist. Both styles have contributed to this topic, but

23. For interesting discussions, see Sterling-Folker 1997; and Fearon 1998.
24. Waltz 1959. For recent statements of the liberal version of the domestic sources of foreign policy, see Doyle 1997 and Moravcsik 1997, neither of which presents a rationalist or a constructivist account.

neither has dominated it. What is arguably the most important challenge to one of realism's central precepts did not arise from a strong methodological vision but instead from a renewed sense of the validity of the liberal ideas that democracies are different from autocracies and that foreign policy reflects domestic habits and values, coupled with intensive analysis of data and case studies.

Similarly, the contending arguments concerning the purported rise of globalization are not dominated by rationalism and constructivism.[25] Instead, the range of analytical tools and approaches remains broad and the basic questions addressed fit well with traditional realism, particularly in the focus on the extent to which the external environment disciplines the behavior of states and other actors. The argument that high levels of economic interaction impose severe limits on states' abilities to choose their economic policies parallels Waltz's claim that states that do not conform to the necessary modes of international behavior will "fall by the wayside".[26] The causal mechanisms are a bit different with globalization and involve a greater role for nongovernmental actors, but the underlying relationships between competing actors and the resulting constraints are much the same.

Realism: Alive and Well

Related to my doubts about the centrality of constructivism and rationalism is my belief that realism is not likely to disappear. Neorealism may become less important not only because many people are becoming tired of it, but also because its concern with the differences between bipolar and multipolar systems, especially in terms of stability, appears less interesting with the declining fear of major war and the end of bipolarity.[27] As Waltz notes, realism, in contrast to neorealism, is more of an approach than a theory—it points to a set of actors that are important, makes claims about the considerations that decision makers weigh, and describes sets of outcomes that can result from particular combinations of national policies.[28] Although it does not readily yield specific propositions, it has continually generated new questions, insights, and arguments.

Realism has many versions, but the assumptions that states can be considered the main actors and that they focus in the first instance on their own security are central to most. They are, of course, descriptively inaccurate. But, as almost all social scientists agree, this is not the point. Rather, we ask whether these assumptions yield a wider array of better confirmed propositions than do alternative approaches. Without claiming that realism is appropriate for all questions, I would like to advance the

25. This subject has been treated extensively in the pages of *IO* and is examined in Garrett's essay in this issue.

26. Waltz 1979, 71, 91, 118–19.

27. For the differences between realism and neorealism, see Gilpin 1984; Waltz 1991; Shimko 1992; and Schweller and Priess 1997. For recent discussions of the utility of both, see the special issues of *Security Studies*, winter 1995 and spring 1996; and the "Forum" section of *American Political Science Review* 1997, 899–935.

28. Waltz 1991.

weaker but still not trivial argument that these assumptions are often of great utility and that it is unlikely that we will see highly productive theories that abandon all of them or that start from their opposites.

Let me begin with the assumption that states seek a high measure of security.[29] This is not to claim that security is unambiguous or that it is the only value.[30] Indeed, rather than pay the price of destruction in war, states have surrendered in the hope of regaining their autonomy later (partly through the efforts of others). They have also peacefully (and not so peacefully) submerged their political units into those of others or joined together to form larger units in the belief that doing so would better serve a variety of political, social, and ideological goals. But if security is rarely the only objective, even more rarely can it be ignored. Of course security has been defined differently by different actors, and the routes to it can be multiple and contested, but the desire for security is part of the bedrock explanation for why international politics exists at all. That is, though it is easy to take for granted the fact that no unit has come to dominate the entire international system, this outcome needs to be explained. The desire for security, coupled with the knowledge that one's current allies may be one's adversaries in the future and that current adversaries may provide future support generates many of the constraints that maintain the international system because self-protection dictates that states do not want their allies excessively aggrandized or their adversaries excessively diminished.

Is the security assumption relevant today? As the developed states fear each other much less and have come to form what Karl Deutsch called a pluralistic security community,[31] other values come to the fore. But these states still worry about security threats from elsewhere (including nonstate actors), and other countries remain deeply concerned about their neighbors. Nevertheless, if it is true that the most powerful states in the world no longer think they may have to fight each other, the change in world politics will be very great, a topic to which I will return. Note, however, that the importance of this development is apparent only when we see that throughout history states have focused on their security concerns.

This analysis assumes that states are the main actors, which is most appropriate when the values at stake are widely shared or, if they are not, when the top decision makers are motivated and able to support policies that will serve the country as a whole. But even in other circumstances the state is not likely to lack importance and autonomy. For all our discussion of the roles of bureaucracies, economic sectors, multinational corporations, and transnational interests, in most cases it is the state that is the target of their activities and it is mainly through national policies that these groups can have influence. For further evidence of the continuing centrality of states

29. One can, of course, talk of the security of individuals, societies, or of the international system as well as of states (Buzan 1991), but it is interesting to note that aggressive states are also likely to oppress their own populations.

30. Wolfers 1962, chap. 10.

31. Deutsch et al. 1957. The countries I have in mind are the United States, West Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The question of why these states but not others are so included, important as it is for many analyses, fortunately can be put aside here.

we need only look to countries undergoing bloody internal struggles in which the objective is to gain control of whatever national machinery there is or to secede and establish an independent state. Even if states are never the only actors on the scene, can we write history or current analysis without them? Vulgar Marxists, pluralists, or transnationalists would see the state as merely registering and implementing the views of powerful societal actors. If these perspectives could be maintained, we should dispense with the names of the states and their leaders, which serve as ventriloquists' dummies, and write our accounts in terms of the groups and interests determining the behavior.

The state has proven remarkably resilient in the face of multiple social forces and the insistence of scholars that its importance is rapidly waning. Assertions to the contrary by realists are less important than the actions by national leaders to reassert their control, often supported by nongovernmental actors who see great value in central authority. Of course the fact that previous obituaries of the state were premature does not mean that they are not warranted now. In the 1960s the state was indeed obstinate rather than obsolete, as Stanley Hoffmann argued,[32] but the European Union may yet supplant its members—in which case it would form a state of its own, and though the process by which it formed may violate some realist assumptions, many of the constraints and incentives that it would face will be familiar. The claims that globalization has hollowed out states may be similarly overstated in part because they overestimate the implications of the economic flows and in part because they fail to appreciate the way in which new forces call up new incentives and instruments for state action.[33]

Arguing that states are the central actors does not tell us which interests and policies they pursue. This question looms particularly large in the security field: even though it may be true that all states want a high measure of security, some strive for others goals, especially expansion of various kinds, in addition to or even at the expense of security.[34] Furthermore, even if security is the prime objective, this does not tell us—or statesmen—what behavior will reach it.[35] For example, belligerent policies are likely to decrease rather than increase the state's security when other

32. Hoffmann 1966.

33. See Huntington 1973; Haskel 1980; Gilpin 1996; and Garrett 1998a. For a parallel discussion of the relations between states and transnational actors, see Krasner 1995b. For a strong claim that we are witnessing "the retreat of the state," see Strange 1996.

34. Disagreements over the prevalence of expansionism is perhaps the main issue between "offensive" and "defensive" realism; see, for example, Snyder 1991; Zakaria 1992; Glaser 1994; and Schweller 1996. See also Brooks 1997; Labs 1997; and Kydd 1997. For further discussion, see pp. 986–87.

35. See, for example, Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984b; and Rhodes 1996. It is also worth noting that studies of the conduct of war, a topic that has been pushed to the margins of scholarship, have bitterly debated the extent to which the outcomes of battles and wars are determined by material forces (for example, equipment, firepower) as opposed to morale or moral factors (for example, faith in one's cause and comrades). Many military leaders have stressed the latter—and it is not without interest that they use the terms *moral* and *morale* interchangeably—which is contrary to the common academic view that the military regards anything nonmaterial as inconsequential, if not nonexistent. In fact, nations are rarely literally destroyed in a war, and victory does not automatically go to the side that inflicts more deaths than it suffers.

states are satisfied with the status quo; conciliatory policies, effective under those circumstances, will decrease the state's security if others are striving to expand.[36] This would not be a problem if statesmen could tell whether others were—or will become—expansionist. But they cannot, in part because realism and other theories of foreign policy offer insufficient guidelines on this score. It is therefore not surprising that students of security policy have been quick to see that realism needs to be supplemented by an understanding of the ideas that decision makers use to guide them to their goals.[37]

Subjective as some security interests are, realism argues that their importance means that they provide the crucial context for everything else. Although convenience often dictates bracketing security politics when they remain constant in a period when economic behavior changes,[38] I doubt if many foreign economic policies and outcomes are untouched by broad security concerns. Certainly it would be foolish to try to explain the economic relations among the advanced industrialized countries after 1945 without taking into account the Cold War.[39] Indeed, the need to bolster the strength of its allies required the United States to give much consideration to their economic needs, especially if it was to limit their trade with the Soviet Union or China. U.S. policies to alleviate poverty and increase stability in the Third World (misguided or not) also cannot be seen apart from the perceived fear that only economic progress could forestall revolutions and the establishment of anti-American if not pro-communist regimes.

American security policies also conditioned other countries' economic relations with each other. European economic integration was facilitated if not made possible by the American security guarantee that assuaged British and French fears of Germany and allowed these countries to develop an unprecedented division of labor. The expectation of a continued U.S. presence meant that they did not have to worry about going to war with each other in the foreseeable future and so did not have to behave in typical realist fashion. The other side of this coin is that economic relations are often set with at least one eye on their implications for security. Recent progress in European integration is not unrelated to the unification of Germany as all parties—including current German elites—want to see that Germany will not have the incentives or the easy ability to menace its neighbors in the future.[40] (This is not to say that

36. Jervis 1976, chap. 3.

37. The situation is different, at least in degree, in IPE: the pursuit of wealth, either by subnational actors or by states, involves less need to estimate how others will behave and fewer difficult choices about which instruments to employ. Differences over how to pursue wealth often are easier to trace to differences in interest, and the sources—and validity—of beliefs about how the economy functions tend to be taken for granted by actors and observers. Thus, the discovery of the importance of ideas comes as more of an innovation in IPE; see Odell 1982; Rothstein 1984; Goldstein 1993; Ikenberry 1993a; and Halpern 1993. For a cultural explanation of political and economic underdevelopment, see Harrison 1985. For an interesting discussion of economic cultures, see Rohrlich 1987.

38. See, for example, Keohane 1984, chap. 3, 137.

39. See, for example, Pollard 1985; Jentelson 1986; and Gowa 1994.

40. A high German official explained his country's support for an expanded NATO in similar terms: "We wanted to bind Germany into a structure which practically obliges Germany to take the interests of its neighbors into consideration. We wanted to give our neighbors assurances that we won't do what we don't

even an extremely high degree of economic integration guarantees continued unity and peace, as the division of Czechoslovakia, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia remind us.)

Realism, Change, and Cooperation

Realism's assumptions lead to a focus on continuity, and John Ruggie has argued that this approach, particularly in security studies, has been egregious in its failure to recognize the possibilities for "epochal" change.[41] But this is not the whole picture. Much depends, of course, on the kind and degree of change that one is looking for. Realists have argued that the last half-century has witnessed as many as three enormous shifts in international politics—changes, furthermore, that most of them have seen as making the world more peaceful. First, realists argued that the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity in the aftermath of World War II was extremely important. Although disagreeing about the consequences of this change, they concluded that dangers, opportunities, and state policies were all effected by the new international structure. Ironically, it was Waltz, who placed great stress on continuity, who most persuasively argued that bipolarity was unprecedented (contrary to the previously prevailing view that the pre-1914 system was bipolar) and that it made the world, or at least the major states, much safer. To those who believed that the bipolarity made the world more war-prone because the great powers were tied to their smaller allies for whom they might have to fight,[42] Waltz and those who reasoned similarly replied that this dynamic actually characterized multipolarity and that under bipolarity small allies could defect at will because the superpowers relied on internally generated resources, thereby giving them unprecedented freedom of action.[43] The substance of the debate is important for theory and policy, but all that is crucial here is that both sides agreed that bipolarity significantly changed world politics.

Realists similarly differed on whether nuclear weapons made the world more or less safe, but again agreed that they brought important changes in state policies, bargaining tactics, alliance relationships, and opportunities to change the status quo. In the end, most scholars came to the conclusion that nuclear weapons decreased the chance of war and coercive change at the center of the international system (but not in the periphery). Bernard Brodie and his colleagues saw this as early as 1946, arguing that atomic bombs were "absolute weapons" that radically changed the fundamental character of military power, which had previously been relative.[44] With rea-

intend to do anyway" (quoted in Jane Perlez, "Blunt Reasoning for Enlarging NATO: Curbs on Germany," *New York Times*, 7 December 1997, 18; see also Feldstein 1997, 68–69). For the worries of British, French, and Soviet leaders at the time of German unification, see Zelikow and Rice 1995, 137–38, 345; Maier 1997, 249, 252; and Powell 1992, 235.

41. Ruggie 1993, 143.
42. See, for example, Deutsch and Singer 1964; and Hoffmann 1968, chap. 2.
43. See Waltz 1979; and Snyder and Diesing 1977, chap. 6.
44. Brodie 1946. This point of view never convinced decision makers, however. Some U.S. presidents felt that nuclear weapons had made their country less rather than more secure and sought to abolish them,

son, then, many realists referred to the "nuclear revolution." As with bipolarity, what changed here was the external situation: not what states sought, the prevailing normative principles, or the ideas people held, but rather incentives, especially the punishments that statesmen believed would be incurred by dangerous and expansionist policies.[45]

More than this is at work in the third candidate for major change that realists—as well and some nonrealists—have seen, which is the decline of war among the developed states and even the creation of a security community among them.[46] The fear of punishment operates here as well in that everyone realizes that a major war, even if it did not involve nuclear weapons, would be extraordinarily destructive. But rewards may be equally important, since states can gain much of what they want by peaceful means. Of course, high levels of economic interaction would be viewed with alarm if states feared that others would use their increased strength to menace the state or might threaten to sever the valuable ties in the event of a dispute. Thus, a reciprocal relationship exists between expectations of peace and the development of a high degree of economic integration. But this dynamic is not foreign to realism.

This cannot be said of the third element that many people, myself included, see as creating the current security community. This element involves a change in outlooks and even values among general populations, elites, and national leaders. Rabid and competitive nationalism has greatly declined, war is seen as a brutal necessity if not a crime rather than a glorious activity, and control of historically disputed territories such as Alsace and Lorraine is of greatly decreased concern, in part because the developed countries are democratic and share most values. Realism cannot readily explain these developments. It can argue that they were brought about at least in part by the increased costs of war, but the causal links involve psychological processes of attitude change outside the focus of most international politics theories. Realism is not alone in struggling here, however: changes in values are beyond the scope of rationalism; and though they are, in principle, central to constructivism, it is not clear whether this approach can provide more than a post hoc redescription. Classical liberalism might be more relevant.

Even if changes in values do not fit well with realism, the other shifts discussed in the previous paragraphs do. Although this analysis cuts against the most dramatic and far-reaching claims for continuity, it shows that realism not only is compatible with significant alterations in international politics but also points to the powerful motors of change in what states can do to help and, especially, to hurt others. A focus on the threat and use of force does not imply that behavior remains uniform.

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albeit on terms that strongly favored their side. (Gorbachev and Reagan were abolitionists, which was one of the bonds between them.) Furthermore, almost no statesmen, with the exception of Gorbachev and at times Khrushchev and Eisenhower, thought that the weapons were absolute. Instead they felt it was necessary to seek greater capability than the other side and pursued targeting doctrines that were designed to gain military advantage or at least to deny such advantage to the adversary.

45. Some analysts argued that modern technology would have produced this result even without nuclear weapons; Mueller 1989.

46. See Mueller 1989; Van Evera 1990; Jervis 1991; and Singer and Wildavsky 1993. For dissents, see Mearsheimer 1990; and Layne 1993.

Realism similarly does not imply unremitting conflict. To conceive of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature means not that warfare is constant, but only that it is always a possibility and that actors understand this. Although the anticipation of conflict may make it more likely, it can also lead actors to take measures to reduce the danger. Three facets of realist thought are particularly relevant here and lead to policy prescriptions. First, realism is well known for arguing that power must be mustered in order to reach the state's possible goals; Morgenthau's "interest defined in terms of power" is its most familiar formulation.[47] But for realists it is equally important that goals have to be trimmed to fit within the possibilities created by the configuration of power. Thus, the first edition of Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* applauded Britain's appeasement policy. We now know this to have been in error because Hitler could not have been satisfied short of world domination, but realist statesmen faced by more reasonable adversaries have been able to avoid conflict by appeasing them.[48]

Just as understanding the limits of the state's power can reduce conflict, so in protecting what is most important to them states must avoid the destructive disputes that will result from failing to respect the vital interests of others. Realists have long argued that diplomacy and empathy are vital tools of statecraft; conceptions of the national interest that leave no room for the aspirations and values of others will bring ruin to the state as well as to its neighbors.[49]

Realism also can speak to the conditions under which states are most likely to cooperate and the strategies that actors can employ to foster cooperation. This line of theorizing is sometimes associated with neoliberalism, but the two are hard to distinguish in this area.[50] Making a distinction would be easy if realism believed that conflict was zero-sum, that actors were always on the Pareto frontier. This conclusion perhaps flows from the view of neoclassical economics that all arrangements have evolved to be maximally efficient, but realists see that politics is often tragic in the sense of actors being unable to realize their common interests. Although "offensive realists" who see aggression and expansionism as omnipresent (or who believe that security requires expansion) stress the prevalence of extreme conflict of interest, "defensive realists" believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners' Dilemma or a more complex security dilemma.[51] The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft consists of structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The ever-present fear that others will take advantage of the state—and the knowledge that others have reciprocal worries—leads

47. Morgenthau 1978, 5–8.

48. See Kennedy 1983, chap. 1; and Schroeder 1976.

49. See Morgenthau 1978; Calleo 1978; Kennan 1967, 127–30; and Kennan 1968.

50. Keohane 1984, 67. This is not to say there are no disputes between these two schools of thought: most centrally, they disagree about the importance and fungibility of force, the typical balance between conflicting and common interests, and the extent to which cooperative arrangements among states can unintentionally alter their preferences; see, for example, Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1989, chap. 7; Baldwin 1993; Nye 1990, chap. 6; and Art 1996.

51. For the former, see, for example, Gray 1992; and Schweller 1996; for the latter, see Schelling and Halperin 1961; Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979; and Snyder and Jervis forthcoming.

diplomats to seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concerns. Even if international politics must remain a Prisoners' Dilemma, it can often be made into one that is more benign by altering the pay-offs to encourage cooperation, for example, by enhancing each state's ability to protect itself should the other seek to exploit it and increasing the transparency that allows each to see what the other side is doing and understand why it is doing it. The knowledge that even if others are benign today, they may become hostile in the future due to changes of mind, circumstances, and regimes can similarly lead decision makers to create arrangements that bind others—and themselves, as previously noted.

But, in parallel to the earlier discussion of the kinds of changes that realism cannot explain, deeper forms of cooperation exist that are more problematic from this perspective. Thus, though realism can account for the dramatic growth in cooperation when the balance of power (narrowly conceived) is transformed into a concert regime, the more profound alterations in attitudes, identities, and values that perhaps surrounded the original Concert of Europe in 1815 is beyond the reach of this approach.[52] The basis and forms of cooperation after the Napoleonic Wars may have rested on conceptions of common interests and shared responsibilities that are alien to realism, although realists would not be surprised that these beliefs and arrangements eventually decayed.

Extensions of Realism

Much criticism has been leveled at realism for the linked assumptions that states exist in a condition of anarchy and that they follow their narrow self-interests. Interestingly, rationalism as applied to international politics and the current work in American and comparative politics that inspired it adopt a similar approach. As Helen Milner's article in this issue shows, these studies see domestic actors as uninhibited by norms, worried (with good reason) that unenforceable promises and threats will prove empty, and seeking ways to avoid the suboptimal outcomes that can result from unnecessary conflict. Thus, many recent arguments about the U.S. Congress are more familiar to students of international politics than to those who had seen this institution as governed by rules serving the interest of the institution as a whole and populated by individuals seeking the good of the collectivity, if not of the country at large. Of course, this perspective is not entirely new in the fields of domestic politics and society. But the "amoral familism" that Edward Banfield saw as making life in an Italian village so miserable was considered pathological, and Richard Neustadt's discussion of presidential power in terms of the interests the president did *not* share with others was unsettling, if insightful.[53] Now this kind of behavior is taken as normative in one if not both senses of the term.

52. See Schroeder 1992 and 1994; and Jervis 1992a. For a realist view of the Concert, see Kagan 1997.

53. See Banfield 1958; and Neustadt 1960.

This perspective not only draws the subfields of political science together but also points to a basic tension in traditional realist thought. There, national leaders are ruthless for their states but selfless as individuals. The utilities they maximize are those of the country as a whole, not of themselves personally; they respect no restraints on the acts necessary for their countries but never put their own interests first. People of this type can exist and perhaps have come to power. Realists are fond of quoting Cavour's remark to a colleague that "if we were to do for ourselves what we have done for our country, we should indeed be very great rogues,"[54] but they have not explored why he did not advance his personal interests in this way. Although such behavior is compatible with "thin" rational choice theory that does not specify people's utility functions, rationalism does direct us to the idea that political leaders, like many people, will put their own interests first. This perspective leads us to expect that leaders are prone to exploit their societies for their material good and to adopt foreign policies that maximize their own power. Such behavior is antithetical to the precepts of realism, but follows from many realist assumptions and indeed can be seen as removing a major inconsistency in realism's conception of human nature.

Realists pay little attention to the formation and maintenance of ethnic and national identity, a topic crucial not only for current world politics but also for much of the past. This observation, however, does not mean that realism is of no use here. Indeed, consistent with the logic in the previous paragraph, many scholars are now stressing the extent to which identities are manipulated, if not created, by self-serving elites who see that power is to be gained by convincing a large segment of the population that they form a community—one, furthermore, that is threatened by people who are different from them. Realism points to the reciprocal relationship between identities and conflict, arguing that conflict both grows out of and stimulates the perception of differences among groups. Thus, a realist would not be surprised by the fact that the breakdown of the state is as much a cause as a consequence of ethnic conflict. Not only does the absence of central authority mean that people and groups are less protected against their neighbors, but, through a security dilemma, fear as well as rapaciousness and rationality as well as psychology lead to the strengthening of available group identities.[55]

The process, of course, is not entirely one of free choice. Identities are often forced on people, as in Northern Ireland when Catholics are attacked because they are Catholic and Protestants because they are Protestant. As a nineteen-year-old said recently in Sarajevo, "I was sitting in my classroom the other day and the teacher handed out a form where we had to write down whether we were a Serb, Muslim, or a Croat. We were told that we would be segregated into different classrooms according to our ethnicity. It's not what any of us asked for."[56] Social psychologists have long known that perceptions—and misperceptions—of what people have in common often grow

54. Quoted in Palmer and Palmer 1976, 37.

55. For the application of the security dilemma to civil conflicts, see Posen 1993a; Walter 1994; and Walter and Snyder forthcoming.

56. Quoted in Chris Hedges, "In Bosnia's Schools, Three Ways Never to Learn from History," *New York Times*, 11 November 1997, 4.

out of conflicts as internal unity is gained by seeing others as the Other.[57] Groups and identities can be created through such processes: the "Bosnians" did not exist until the recent war, which also led many "Muslims" to become Muslims by turning to Islam. Similarly, recent scholarship argues that the identity of Indians as having "red" skin came not from European colonialists but from Indians who were in conflict with them or who wanted to set themselves apart from black slaves. The Native Americans were not passive recipients of a color designation, but formed it through struggles with others.[58] Related processes of differentiation help to explain why black female high school students smoke much less than either their white female or their black male counterparts: they see smoking as white and male.

International Political Economy

Oddly, the articles in this issue say little about the state of the IPE subfield.[59] Striking by their absence are the old but still central topics of the existence and shape of mutual causation between economic intercourse and peaceful relations;[60] the linkages among economic and political issues; the determinants of the degree of openness of international economic systems;[61] the causes and prospects of the current consensus among less developed countries that economic development is positively associated with exposure to the international economy rather than negatively associated, as once believed; and the relationships between states, both rich and poor, on the one hand, and nonstate actors, especially labor and multinational corporations, on the other.

How much progress have we made in understanding the crucial questions of whether, when, and how economic frictions lead to political conflict and vice versa? It was once commonly accepted that economic competition drove allies apart and heightened, if not created, deadly enmities: "Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table," as a high government official put it at the end of World War II when explaining why the United States needed to reconstruct the international economic system.[62] Is this correct? Is the relationship conditioned by people's economic and political beliefs? The sources of stability and

57. See Sherif and Sherif 1953; Sherif 1966; and Mercer 1995. The basic arguments from sociology are Simmel 1955; and Coser 1956.

58. Shoemaker 1997.

59. I am also struck by the claim of Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner in their article in this issue that "ideas originally developed in IPE have been redeployed to a wider range of issues, including questions of national security." Although this is true for some concepts recently borrowed from economics, to its credit IPE has learned much from other subfields of international politics. Thus, recent discussions of salient solutions, issue linkages, credibility, commitments, and reputation follow the treatments by students of diplomacy and security. Of course much of the credit here goes to an economist who supplied many of the key concepts: Schelling 1960 and 1966.

60. Much of what recent literature there is on some of these subjects is summarized in Mastanduno this issue. See also McMillan 1997.

61. Discussed in Webb and Krasner 1989; Lake 1993; and Keohane 1997.

62. Clayton 1945, 979.

change in the international political economic system also have received less attention than was the case in the 1970s and 1980s.[63] Ruggie's important application of Karl Polanyi's "embedded liberalism," though often cited, has not been adequately developed despite some treatment in the context of globalization.[64]

It is also striking that we do not have many constructivist accounts of European integration, which is an obvious arena in which to explore the causes and effects of changing identities.[65] Similarly lacking are discussions of the implications for individual lives and national policies of the changing value and indeed the meaning of wealth. Ronald Inglehart's research on shifts in Europeans' values could be a good starting point,[66] but it has not attracted much attention from constructivists or the IPE community. More fundamentally, constructivist IPE theorists have not challenged economists on their own ground by exploring what it is that individuals and collectivities seek to maximize, how economic well-being is construed, and the interrelationships among capitalist ideas, individual identities, and the activities of economic actors.

To put it bluntly, the IPE subfield, after a marvelous period of development in the 1970s and 1980s, seems to be stagnating. At the start, realism, liberalism, and Marxism vigorously contended in the process of carrying out well-grounded empirical research.[67] This flow has slackened without being replaced by sustained constructivist and rationalist accounts. Indeed, most applications of constructivism or rationalism have been to security or general international politics, with less attention to IPE. The internal workings, incentives, self-identities, and cultures of the organizations involved in international political economy similarly have been studied less than those in diplomacy and security.[68] Also noteworthy is that economists more so than political scientists have shaped the public debate about international economic policies.

The Future of IPE, War, and Realism

It will be hard to construct powerful theories of the international economy without keeping in mind the political relationships among countries, the ways economic ties can ameliorate conflict or create exploitable vulnerabilities, the actors' expectations about what alliances are likely to form and how long they are likely to last, and their beliefs about which technologies will be most useful if armed conflict occurs.[69] In

63. See, for example, Krasner 1983b; and Keohane 1984.
64. Ruggie 1983b. For Ruggie's more recent analysis, see Ruggie 1996b, chap. 5–6.
65. For work partially along these lines, see Englemann et al. 1997; and Spirtas 1998.
66. The most recent study is Inglehart 1997.
67. See, for example, Gilpin 1975 and 1987; Katzenstein 1984 and 1985; Krasner 1976, 1978, and 1985; Keohane and Nye 1977; and Keohane 1984.
68. For examples, see Demchak 1991; Posen 1984; Sagan 1993; Avant 1994; Rosen 1991 and 1996; Legro 1995; and Kier 1997.
69. Of course, the patterns here may not be constant, and we need to understand the changes. In many eras, for example, states sold arms to their potential enemies and carried on economic intercourse during warfare; see Stevenson 1996, chap. 1; and Kennedy 1983, chap. 3.

other words, the study of IPE must remain political, and international politics has always taken place in the shadow of war.

But, as noted earlier, I do not think this is any longer true for the developed countries. The consensus among scholars and, more importantly, elites is that the most powerful states will not fight each other. This situation represents a truly revolutionary change in world politics and makes particularly relevant the path-breaking analysis of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.[70] This does not mean the end of conflict and the struggle for advantage, let alone the end of the state.[71] Thus, I do not believe it means the end of realism; although, since this approach stressed the pervasive influence of the fear of inter-state war, it will have to be reshaped if it is to explain, let alone guide, a world in which security threats are of a very different nature and probably much less important.[72] It will also be a challenge for other schools of thought to explain and predict how states within the security community will manage their relations. Particularly interesting and important is the question of how and whether the security community will be transformed into a real community—for example, whether the European countries will seek or be able to maintain their separate identities if they are perceived to lose the ability to manage their individual economies and, conversely, whether the belief that one country is suffering so that another can prosper will decrease the EU's unity even if war remains unthinkable. We should not, however, neglect the relations among countries that are not in this community (that is, most of the world), the relations between states in the community and those outside it, and the possibility that armed conflict elsewhere will influence relations within the community. In all these areas the relations between wealth and power are likely to remain central.

I wonder what the next fifty years of international politics will bring; I also wonder what will appear in the centennial issue of *IO* and what the relationship between the two will be. The study of international politics will be impoverished if it is totally divorced from contemporary events and hopes and fears for the future, but if it is to mature, it will have to develop some distance from them.

70. Keohane and Nye 1977. See also Rosecrance 1986.

71. For the argument that the changed international environment will affect different kinds of states in different ways, see Desch 1996.

72. For a discussion of realism in such a world, see Kapstein and Mastanduno 1998; and Waltz 1998.