

Realism and Liberalism

Third Pass

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A great way to deal with a question would be to say that realists start with a PD, how can we change this.

SUMMARY: The “Big 4” Assumptions of the Theories

1. Realism

- (a) *Analytic Unit(s)*: State is the principal actor
- (b) *View of Actor(s)*: State is unitary actor
- (c) *Behavioral Dynamic*: State is rational actor seeking to maximize its own interest or national objective in foreign policy
- (d) *Issues*: National security issues are most important

2. Liberalism

- (a) *Analytic Unit(s)*: States and nonstate actors (mostly institutions) are important
- (b) *View of Actor(s)*: State disaggregated into components, some of which may operate transnationally
- (c) *Behavioral Dynamic*: Foreign policymaking and transnational processes involve conflict, bargaining, coalition, and compromise—not necessarily resulting in optimal outcomes
- (d) *Issues*: Multiple agenda with socioeconomic or welfare issues as, or more, important as national security questions

Realism

Intellectual Precursors and Influences

1. Thucydides (400 B.C (1982 reprint) is generally regarded as the first realist author. In his telling of the history of the Peloponnesian War, he examines the struggle for political and military power. Essentially, he posits that the cause for the Peloponnesian War was *fear* associated with shifts in the **balance of power**.
2. Machiavelli (1532 (1998 reprint) was in many ways the first modern realist. He wrote of power, balance of power, the formation of alliances as well as counteralliances, and the causes of war between states. Unlike Thucydides, Machiavelli's primary focus was on what we today would call national security. **The survival of the state is paramount.**
3. Hobbes (1668 (1994 reprint) is most noted for his pessimistic view of human nature; this will turn out to be influential in realist thought, particularly the Morgenthau (1956) types. However, Hobbes developed early notions of **anarchy** and **sovereignty**; these concepts will be important for structural realists of the Waltz (1979) ilk.
4. Clausewitz (1832 (1993 reprint) believe **military strength** to be an extremely important element of a state's power. However, he thought military power was always subordinate to political power. Much of his writing is on tactical elements of war, but some of the seeds of contemporary realism find there way in.

Assumptions

1. The most basic assumptions of realism reflect an inherent pessimism in the school of thought.
2. Realists begin with a Prisoner's Dilemma. They assume that international politics is a zero sum game and each player has a strong incentive to betray the other (defect).
3. As indicated above, they also begin with the assumptions that power is the means by which a state's security is guaranteed, that power is fungable, that states are unitary and rational actors, and they are the primary units of international politics.

4. Lastly, realists assume that the international system is anarchic; there is no super-state authority to enforce rules, norms, or contracts.

Implications

1. Generally, the implication of the realist assumptions is the **security dilemma**: states cannot distinguish between power gained for defensive purposes and offensive purposes. Since they know that their loss is another's gain, they have an incentive to accumulate power themselves. This process is escalatory and is often cited as the explanation for arms races. This implication is quite complicated however, and is worthy of examination in greater detail.

The Realist System

1. *Anarchy* is very important to the realists. International anarchy refers to the lack of a super-national authority through which conflicts can be resolved. *Sovereignty* is also important in this context; realists believe that states have a right to be autonomous from other states and to exercise complete control over their territory. Buzan et al. (1993) argue that realism falls short as a systems theory because its assumptions about anarchy are too strict. They argue that a systems theory must incorporate a place for interactions among the units and realism fails to do so.
2. There is a big **difference between authority and power**. Anarchy refers to the lack of authority higher than a state; there is no higher authority. There is however, a hierarchy of power in international politics (just no hierarchy of authority).
3. International anarchy leads to a **self-help** system in international politics. In a self-help system, each state is responsible for its own security and it is dangerous to place your security in another's hands (Waltz, 1979). The self-help system is brought on by the combination of anarchy and the assumption of a zero sum game (prisoner's dilemma) in international politics.
4. This in turn leads to a **security dilemma** (Herz, 1950). "The more one state arms to protect itself from other states, the more threatened these states become and the more prone they are to resort to arming themselves to protect their own national security interests. The

dilemma is that even if a state is sincerely among only for defensive purposes, it is rational in a self-help system to assume the worst in an adversary's intentions and keep pace in any arms buildup. How can one know for certain that a rival is arming strictly for defensive purposes?" (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).

5. But there is disagreement on how important anarchy is as a causal factor in war. **defensive realists** argue that while anarchy is important, its importance should not be overestimated. Security is available, particularly if states adopt defensive strategies. This claim is based on the assumption that there are incentives for states to behave in cautious and restrained ways; reckless, expansionist behavior results from domestic factors, not systemic conditions such as anarchy (Glaser, 1994/1995; Snyder, 1991).
6. While different realist authors have different perspectives on the functioning of the system, there is inherent variation in realist implications. However, *given the assumptions* the inferential reasoning followed by realists is generally sound.

Types of Realism

Rose (1998) argues that there are three basic types of realism.

1. *Offensive realists* posit a Hobbesian world wherein states seek to maximize what little security they have. Foreign policy then consists of "nervous states jockeying for position within" this anarchic framework. (149) According to Rose (1998), offensive realism falls short because states in similar structural positions often behave dissimilarly. A good example of an offensive realist is Mearsheimer (2001).
2. *Defensive realists* also conceive of the system as fundamentally anarchic, but the anarchy is more innocuous. States can deal with most external threats by changing the power balance; only in certain (fear-breeding) situations, or with rogue states, is inter-state war expected to break out. Foreign policy consists of (largely peaceable) reactions to systemic factors. Waltz (1979) is a good example of a defensive realist.
3. *Neoclassical realists* reject the assumption that states' sole aim is security. Rather, states attempt to use their power to direct the international system towards their own goals and preferences. Thus, powerful states will have farther reaching foreign policies than less powerful

states. From this perspective, unit-level factors also matter: factors such as state structure and elites' psychology refract international politics and determine responses.

The Realist Notion of Power

Definitions

1. One of the great weaknesses of realism is that it does not tell us why power matters. Realism assumes that power matters because it assumes that states accumulate power to guarantee their own security. However, power may not be necessary to guarantee security. For example, Canada is not very powerful, but its security is not at risk. Same for Switzerland and most of Europe for example.
2. One of realism's great strengths is that it does tell us why power does not matter.
3. Given that power is so important to the realists, it is important to be able to define it. Basically, there are two debates. The first is between power as absolute capabilities and power as relative capabilities. The second is between power as capability and power as influence.
 - (a) "Some realists understand power to be the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic, and other *capabilities* at the disposal of the state." (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999)
 - (b) "Others see power... as capabilities *relative* to the capabilities of other states." (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999)
 - (c) The problem with both of these is that they assume power is static. A more dynamic view of power involves power focuses on the interaction of states.
 - (d) "A state's influence (or capacity to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities (or relative capabilities) but also by (1) its willingness (and perception by other states of its willingness) to use these capabilities and (2) its control or influence of other states." (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).
4. It is also worth noting the argument of Baldwin (1979): power should be evaluated in terms of potential power, probable power, and actual power.

5. Also, Keohane (1986) argues that the concepts of states “maximizing power” and states creating a “balance of power” are contradictory. He argues that “states concerned with self preservation do not seek to maximize their power when they are not in danger.” (174)

Measurement

1. Advocates of the capabilities approach to power have thinks kind of easy. They at least have good starting points with things like military spending (Waltz, 1954, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), GNP (Organski, 1968), CINC (Singer, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), and other measures. The problem then becomes how to weight different components of capabilities. For example, how much more important is military technology than military manpower? It is even more difficult to do this examining relative power.
2. One could also make the point that power depends on the issue at stake. For example, if the issue has to do with Cod fishing, Iceland will have more power than it would if the issue was the AIDS crisis in Africa.

The distribution of capabilities, balance of power, and system stability

1. **Can go a lot deeper into this topic by grabbing stuff on power balance, transition, hegemonic stability, etc. . . from the “Causes of War” outline.**
2. The major question for this section is “what keeps states from continually going to war with one another?” The realist answer is that states band together and pool their resources whenever one state or group of states appears to be gathering a disproportionate amount of power. In other words, states seek to maintain a **balance of power** to avoid the triumph of a dominant power.
3. There are three general forms possible for a balance of power (well, technically only two): (1) a multipolar balance, (2) a bipolar balance, and (3) a unipolar balance.¹

¹Obviously power is not actually balanced in a unipolar system because it is extremely unbalanced. Therefore I will not address unipolarity explicitly in this outline. See the unipolarity outline for more on this topic.

4. One issue of contention for realists is **whether balances of power emerge naturally**, or whether they are created by statesmen. Kissinger feels they are made by statesmen (probably because he was one and wants to feel important). In this situation, statesmen exercise their judgment as to how much power each state has and when power is balanced in the system. If power is thought to be unbalanced, they take corrective action (alliances, war, etc. . .). Waltz (1979) on the other hand believes that power balances emerge naturally. He sees the balance of power in a system as an attribute of a system: when power is balanced, there will be no war or conflict, when it is unbalanced, there will be war and/or conflict.²
5. Then there is the issue of **system stability**. Waltz (1964, 1979) argues that the system is more stable under bipolarity because there is less uncertainty about the intentions and capabilities of one's adversary. Conversely, Deutsch and Singer (1964) argue that uncertainty breeds caution on the part of states (via their decisionmakers) and, since a multipolar system has more uncertainty, multipolar systems should be more stable. Schweller (1994) posits that states have an incentive to join the stronger side of a conflict in order to get perks from the expected victory; clearly, this argument is in stark opposition to Waltz's argument.
6. One of the major problems with the analysis of realists such as Waltz (1979) is that the dimension of change is missing (Ruggie, 1986).
7. Power transition (Organski, 1968; Organski and Kugler, 1980) and hegemonic stability theory Gilpin (1981) support the unipolar argument. . . **see the outline on unipolarity.**

Truth in Assumptions and Implications?

Assumptions

1. *Inherent pessimism*: While this assumption is more definitional than functional, it seems unrealistic. While war certainly happens, it happens in less than one percent of dyad years since 1916. Such an empirical reality does not lend credit to the assumption that the security dilemma cannot be overcome.

²Take conflict to include things like an alliance forming explicitly against a state or group of states.

2. *Prisoner's Dilemma*: This is an assumption which is flatly incredible. At face value, this assumption should imply that there is never a situation in international politics in which states value absolute gains. The evolution of the EU demonstrates this assumption to be false.

3. *Power is the means by which a state's security is guaranteed*: This assumption implies that power is the *only* means by which a state's security may be guaranteed. This assumption is (at the very least) demonstrably false in the lower limit of power and internally contradictory at the upper limit. At the lower limit, Costa Rica and Switzerland both lack militaries and have for some time; neither of their security's seem to be threatened nor do either of them seem to be concerned with a lack of security. Thus, the assumption is false in the lower limit.

At the upper limit, realists cannot agree on the extent to which power guarantees security. Realists such as Waltz (1954, 1979) argue that when one state accumulates much more power than others, a balancing coalition will form against it, thus reducing the security of the state in the upper limits of power. Conversely, hegemonic stability theory (i.e. Gilpin (1981)) argues that when one state possesses more power than others (by a sufficiently large, but ill defined margin), no state or coalition will be willing to challenge the hegemon; by implication, the hegemon will be assured of its security in such a case. Thus, the assumption is theoretically contested at the upper limit of power.

So, while we cannot conclusively demonstrate that the assumption about the primacy of power is universally false (evidence in the mid-range is less clear), we can indeed demonstrate that the assumption about the primacy of power is not universally true.

4. *Power is fungable*: This is one of the less problematic assumptions of realism. While the claim that all power is fungable is clearly false, the argument can be easily modified to read "many types of power are fungable" without seriously crippling the theoretical argument.

5. *States are unitary actors*: With regard to this assumption, the question is not whether states are unitary actors (clearly they are not), but rather "to what degree can states be treated as unitary actors without compromising the explanatory and predictive power of the theory?" Organization theory, as well as a basic understanding of foreign policy decision making, provides a compelling argument to suggest that realism loses much of its explanatory power with this assumption. In

certain cases, it seems that the state can be treated as unitary without a significant loss of predictive power.

6. *States are rational actors:* With regard to this assumption, the question again is not whether states are rational actors from top to bottom (clearly they are not), but rather “to what degree can states be treated as rational actors without compromising the explanatory and predictive power of the theory?” Again, much explanatory power is lost by treating states as rational actors, but it is unclear how much predictive power is lost by this assumption. A preponderance of the IR literature makes this assumption and seems to have been (and be) making progress in understanding international relations, so it may be that rationality is a useful approximation in many cases.
7. *States are the primary units of international politics:* This assumption seems to be becoming less true over time. NGOs, International organizations, transnational corporations, terrorist groups, and a variety of other nonstate actors are proving to be non-trivial elements of international society. While this fact does not necessarily invalidate realist analyses, it provides realists the need to justify the assumption based on the subject and context of the given analysis.
8. *International system is anarchic:* This assumption is largely true. There is, in plain fact, no super-national enforcer in the world. However, it seems to me that international anarchy may be becoming less important over time. Specifically, international institutions, domestic structure, and both international and domestic norms, many have argued (**see the democratic peace**) constrain the behavior of states. It seems more appropriate in today’s world to assume a form of “constrained anarchy,” but the assumption of international anarchy is not blanketly false.

Implications

1. I have just examined the validity of the realist assumptions and found that all of them are at least partially false. While it is true that inference from incorrect assumptions can result in robust and accurate predictions (obviously not explanations), the probability of correct predictions is diminished compared to that of a theory with correct assumptions.

2. Given that the range of implications of realist theory are far too wide to examine comprehensively here, the primary task is to evaluate the degree of truth in the general implication that the security dilemma cannot be overcome.
3. The fact that war exists in approximately one percent of dyad years, as well as empirical findings such as the democratic peace, strongly suggest that in fact the security dilemma can be overcome.

Evaluation

Description

1. Realist theory makes very little effort to describe the state of the world. The closest it gets is the observation that the international system is anarchic (which, as I have discussed above, may be becoming less relevant over time). The rest of the foundation for realism is based on assumptions rather than observations.

Prediction

1. Given its structure, predictive power is the only area in which realism *has the capability* of being a useful theory. According to authors such as Bennett and Stam (2004), traditional realist approaches do a rather poor job of predicting international events such as war. While the data are far from conclusive in this regard, there is reason to be skeptical that the realist framework yields accurate predictions.

Explanation

1. Realism fails almost entirely to explain events and processes in international politics by virtue of the fact that it begins with largely untrue assumptions; thus, it cannot explain international political phenomena.

Power

1. Despite (or perhaps because) of its shortcomings in other areas, realism is a very powerful (in the sense that the ratio of assumptions to implications is large) theory. Realism begins with just a few assumptions, and arrives at a broad range of conclusions via deduction.

Liberalism

What is Unique About Liberalism

1. Liberalism is not the opposite of realism. Rather, liberalism is an optimistic version of realism with fewer assumptions constraining the implications.
2. There is an intrinsic optimism in Liberalism; Liberals feel that security fears are not constant and can be overcome. Liberalism makes the positive statement that security fears are not static, they are a product of certain conditions, they are malleable, and can be overcome. Constrictivists take this to an extreme (so much so that they are outside of this debate). Liberals say you can change the situations.
3. Liberals say that there are no immutable concerns of states, only what they create. This is what most clearly distinguishes Liberalism from Realism.

Some History (In case it is useful)

1. First major try at an international institution: Versailles Treaty in 1919 - Failed
2. Until about the 1960's institutions are mostly analyzed as formal international organizations such as the UN.
3. By the end of the 1960's it is apparent that other institutions (i.e. the nonproliferation treaty) are used by governments as a means of setting international rules and standards.
4. By the 1980's institutional analysis moves from attempts to describe interdependence and international regimes to a closer analysis of the conditions under which countries cooperate. This is when the study of institutions broke with the legalism tradition it had had until then. Scholars accept that relative power and interests are important components of international politics. Institutions are now seen as a way to help states cooperate.
5. Cooperation: institutions help states cooperate by reducing transaction costs. Uncertainty, credibility, and private information are critical

concepts. Institutions work (help states cooperate) by reducing uncertainty over many iterations of interactions; specifically, they promote negotiations with transparency by dealing with a series of issues over many years and under similar rules. This is thought to encourage honesty in order to preserve future reputation.

6. 1989-1995: the argument goes: “Rather than imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes. By reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international institutions help states achieve collective gains.”
7. Nowadays, bargaining is a major theme in the institutional literature. The question is how international institutions affect international negotiations (which obviously involve a mixture of discord and potential cooperation). This new focus in the literature has also raised the importance of ideas, norms, and information.
8. The argument goes: the procedures and rules of international institutions create informational structures. They determine what principals are acceptable as the basis for reducing conflicts and whether governmental actions are legitimate or illegitimate. Consequently, they help shape actors’ expectations.

Assumptions

Given the similarity and the desire to compare the two paradigms, I will evaluate the assumptions of liberalism in terms of the assumptions of realism.

1. The most basic assumptions of liberalism reflect an inherent optimism in the school of thought.
2. Liberals, as well as realists, begin with a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Liberals, however, assume that the prisoner’s dilemma is non-constant because it is a product of conditions and can be overcome.
3. Liberals also begin with the assumptions that states are unitary and rational actors. However, liberals do not share the realist assumptions that power is the means by which a state’s security is guaranteed, that states are the primary units of international politics. Liberals believe security can be guaranteed by other means (to be discussed below) and they provide for the possibility that non-state actors (mostly institutions and corporations) play an important role in world politics.

4. Lastly, Liberals, like realists, assume that the international system is anarchic, but do not assume that a super-national authority is the only means by which to enforce rules, norms, or contracts.

Implications

Implications, are they valid (to what degree is the inferential reasoning sound) There are three types of liberal thought: institutions, economic, and democratic peace.

Institutions

1. Institutions can help with communication and iteration to overcome prisoner's dilemmas.
2. **Insert the entire institutions outline here.**

Economic (Commercial)

1. Commercial peace: changes the nature of the PD if you add the cost to both sides of lost economic advantage; if this is the case, the worst outcome is not to be the sucker, but the worst outcome is mutual defection; then this becomes a game of chicken rather than a PD.
2. Aside from the "purely rational" aspect of the commercial peace (bullet point above), there is a good degree of overlap with institutional and democratic peace explanations.
3. Economic institutions further interdependence in both a "purely institutional" manner, but also in an economic manner: such institutions make free trade easier by lowering transaction costs, the result to greater amounts of trade.
4. Constructivists (and probably neo-functionalists too) would argue that the social interactions which occur in economic institutions creates shared meaning among participants in such institutions. This could place normative constraints on force between nations with shared meaning. Also, certain domestic structures are often required for membership in international economic institutions. These structures can constrain governments a-la democratic peace.

5. The argument that increased international trade lowers the probability of conflict is closely related to **liberalism** and the **democratic peace**. Most of the material for such an argument should come from those outlines.
6. Briefly, Russett and Oneal (2001) argue that an interaction of democratic institutions, interstate trade, and international organizations contributes powerfully to international cooperation and the reduction of international conflict. The intuitive argument is that when countries are interdependent, they have incentives to avoid conflicts that may result in a costly disruption of trade. Trading countries may also learn about one another, lowering conflicts of interest and misconceptions about one another.
7. There is also a lot of controversy about the data used for such analyses: the trade data is notoriously bad and contentions exist about how the variables should be measured (Bennett and Stam, 2004).
8. *Results:*
Bennett and Stam (2004) find supportive results. Both initiator and target trade dependence decreases conflict. The effect on disputes escalating to war is the largest.
9. A few other, semi-peripheral theories exist. Krasner (1976) posits that systems with a single dominant state will be most likely to have free and open trade. Further, he posits that when states are at similar levels of development, they will be more likely to have open trade.
10. Milner (1988) argues that international economic interdependence has increased over time. The result, she argues, is that the domestic preferences of state actors have been altered to make protectionism a less likely policy option.
11. In a similar line of argumentation, Milner and Yoffie (1989) posit that strategic trade theory, and the notion of *specific reciprocity* in particular, is useful because it relaxes some of the problematic assumptions (i.e. perfectly competitive markets) of traditional trade theory and is better at predicting the preferences of states.
12. Gowa (1989) posits that military alliances are the basis for opening international markets. However, alliances in a bipolar world will be more likely to encourage free trade than alliances in multipolar systems. Since this was written before the Cold War ended, an interesting

question to ask is how this argument behaves under unipolarity. My guess is that unipolarity greatly encourages free trade as Krasner (1976) would predict.

Democratic Peace (Normative and Structural)

1. The democratic peace. Normative: you know that both you and the other side have norms about peaceful conflict resolution and are likely to generalize these to international interactions. Structural: there are structural constraints on the leadership of both states which make it more difficult to go to war.
2. **Insert the entire democratic peace outline here.**

Liberals and Integration

1. **Lots more on this in the Institutional outline.**
2. Creating vested interests. Two haydays of neo-functionalism: right after WWII and in the 1970's. The EU is an example of this theory applied. The premise is as follows: you can't initiate cooperation and expect it to go very far if you do it at the level of visible political decisions; there are too many vested interests and too many belief systems at work to start from the top with things like this. So you have to start small, start with areas of functional and technical problems (non-political things) and eventually one thing will lead to another and soon interdependence will rise. You then increase bit by bit until full integration is a reality. The up side here is that you create strong interests which are dependent on cooperation but you do it in a very non-visible way so there is no political opposition in the starting stages; by the time full coordination exists, there will be too much vested in cooperation to generate any political opposition at later stages.
3. Mitrany (1948, 1966) was interested in how transnational ties might lead to integration and less war. He basically pioneered **functionalist** theory: if states can farm out technical cooperation issues to (non-political) speciallists, there is the possibility for cooperation on some small level. When that works, cooperation is gradually and gradually expanded. Eventually, this can result in large scale cooperation.
4. Hass (1958) adapted Mitrany by looking at integration as a *process* "whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are per-

sueded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.” (page 16). This conceptual approach came to be called **neofunctionalism**. Essentially, what Hass tried to do was specify the conditions and processes whereby individuals find it in their own rational self-interest to collaborate for mutual gain, which results in the potential for peaceful transformation of international politics.

5. The literature on integration accomplished four major things for the liberal school of thought:
 - (a) It downplayed the role of the state as the unit of analysis in international politics.
 - (b) The neofunctionalist literature (in particular) disaggregated the state into its component parts: bureaucracies, elites, etc. . .
 - (c) Integration theorists looked at what forms of international organization, other than the nation state, are possible.
 - (d) They analyzed conditions under which international cooperation is facilitated.

Truth in Assumptions and Implications?

1. The first thing to note is that liberal assumptions are probably *more true* than realist assumptions simply by virtue of the fact that they are not as strict.
2. *Inherent Optimism*: While too much optimism leads to naivete, the infrequency of war is probably more grounds for optimism than pessimism.
3. *The prisoner’s dilemma is non-constant because it is a product of conditions and can be overcome*: This is the specific manifestation of the inherent optimism of liberalism. The empirical rarity of war suggest that the PD can be overcome *provided the PD is an appropriate starting place for theory!* The assumption of a PD seems reasonable though, so I don’t see this as terribly problematic.
4. *States are unitary and rational actors*: Same gripe as with realism.

5. *Security can be guaranteed by means other than power:* One of the strengths of liberalism is that it provides for a mechanism other than power to guarantee security. One of the weaknesses of liberalism is that it does not specify what the other mechanism(s) is(are). So while it is easy to claim that this assumption is not false, it is more difficult to claim that any particular flavor of liberalism (i.e. those which favor institutions, trade, norms, etc...) are correct.
6. *Non-state actors matter:* This is clearly the case. Consider the role of non-state actors such as the WTO, EU, Al-Qaida, etc...
7. *The international system is anarchic:* Same gripe as with realism.

Evaluation

Description

1. Like realism, liberalism does not make much of an effort to describe the world. Liberals base their theory off assumptions. Granted, the assumptions upon which liberalism is built are more reasonable than those of realism, they are assumptions rather than facts.

Prediction

1. Given its structure, predictive power is the only area in which liberalism *has the capability* of being particularly useful. By arguments such as the democratic peace, liberalism certainly seems to do a better job predicting than realism does.

Explanation

- 1.

Power

1. Liberalism makes a better attempt to explain than realism does. However, the explanatory power of liberalism is restricted because of the manner in which liberal theory has been developed and tested...the school of logical positivism is still much more prevalent than scientific realism.

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