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Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

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ABSTRACT. Why do conflicts between states and national movements continue to be "nationalist," concerned almost exclusively with self-determination and control over territory, rather than crusades on behalf of faith? Our basic claim is that the nature of the present international system bolsters the dominant position of nationalists in a given conflict with an opposing political entity, as well as within their own constituency. For this reason, the Palestinian leadership has never entered a power-sharing arrangement with the Islamists, and in Israel, the consociational arrangement with the national religious camp floundered when this internal arrangement threatened Israel's relationship with its key ally, the USA, and jeopardized its standing in the international community. Religion expresses, however, important primordial values, particularly in Palestinian society, and is often a crucial dimension of collective identity. It is only natural, then, that nationalists use religious groups and their symbols as a means in the struggle to achieve their national or state-centered goals.

Keywords: • International system • Islam • Judaism • Israeli–Palestinian conflict

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Many studies in the recent literature on the role of religion in interstate or inter-ethnic conflict try to understand how religion contributes both to the emergence and persistence of conflicts. We argue that the more fundamental question, even in the post-9/11 era, should more appropriately concern why ethnic and interstate conflicts, however infused with religious substance, remain essentially national or state centered. Why do so many conflicts, such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Cyprus, inevitably focus on self-determination and control over territory rather than turn into crusades on behalf of a faith? In the following article, we claim that while religion expresses prominent primordial values, the points of contention continue to be territorially centered and the dominant

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discourse, especially in the international arena, is usually more nationalist or statist than religious and theocratic.

To prove these claims and explain them, we analyze a case in which religion played a most important role—the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The importance of religion is indicated by the very title given the present outbreak of hostilities beginning at the end of September 2000: the "al-Aqsa intifada" (Khatib, 2002). Al-Aqsa is the name of the mosque situated on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, holy both to Jews and Muslims, where the first acts of violence took place. Most Palestinians claim that the visit by then-Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount (al-Harm al-Sharif) provoked the violence. However, Israel and some Palestinians, including some close to Arafat, claim that the violence was pre-planned ("Roundtable," 2001: 44).

There may be at least two other reasons behind this choice of name. First, in the negotiations between Israeli Prime-Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat at the Camp David summit in July 2000, the issue of sovereignty over the Temple Mount was purportedly one of the key bones of contention between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators (Malley and Agha, 2001). Second, the aforementioned violence on the Temple Mount led to the most widespread demonstrations and riots among Israel's Arab citizens since the establishment of the state. In the course of four days of violence, 13 Arab citizens were killed.[1] Even the Palestinian Arab "nationalist" press, which usually downplays the religious overtones of the conflict, had to report that the chants heard during the riots and demonstrations were mostly religious in nature. In fact, they deplored one of the most popular slogans: "Haibar, Haibar, Ya Yahud, Jaish Muhammad saYa'ud" ("Haibar, Haibar, oh Jews recall, the army of Muhammad will return") (*Kull al-Arab*, 2000). The chant refers to a battle in 628 between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jewish tribe of Haibar, in which the Muslim army utterly defeated the tribe. In addition, few can deny the importance of the suicide bombers in the current wave of violence, and, initially at least, the religious sentiments motivating them (Luft, 2002: 2).

Nevertheless, we contend that the conflict is nationalist or state-centric rather than theocratic. The dominant actors on both sides focused on issues of security, sovereignty, and self-determination rather than on theocratic claims such as creating the Sharia or halachic state. Most importantly, not only do the statist elements remain politically dominant, but they refuse (in contrast to the religious forces) to perceive the conflict as being essentially religious in nature.

This article is divided into three parts. The first part provides the historical context of the current conflict, commencing with the Zionist and Israeli–Palestinian struggle since the beginning of the British Mandate. The second concentrates on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (or "Oslo Accords") by Yitzchak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993 and the Palestinian Authority a year later. In the third part, we explain why the conflict has consistently remained nationalist rather than theocratic, even though religious aspirations have played an important role in dictating its course.

In our analysis, we differentiate between the state-centric level in which the political elite formulates claims and goals and addresses them to the international community and the domestic political level where it mobilizes support through alliance politics. On the state level, we show that even though religious claims and symbols were important on both sides, they were consistently eclipsed by

"nationalist" or realist discourses, claims, and symbols. We illustrate how this was true for both the era prior to the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the period since then and extending into the present round of hostilities. On the domestic level, we show that in Israel, whenever religious parties tried to replace statist and national claims with theocratic claims, power-sharing (consociational) arrangements (Lijphart, 1977) between the secular and religious political forces broke down and attempts to voice such claims to the international community failed. In Palestinian politics, the alliance with the religious camp never reached the level of power sharing on the strategic level. Instead, the Palestinian nationalist elite continues to use religious symbols to mobilize the people behind nationalist goals and objectives.

Our basic claim, presented in the third part, is that both the norms of the international system and the actions of the major states articulating these norms hardly tolerated theocratically mobilizing states. It tolerates even less the emergence of a theocratic state. This was true during the period of superpower rivalry and is all the more so in a world system characterized by US hegemony. Pressure from the international system favors the nationalists in the local conflict, as it helps them to maintain the essentially secular character of the conflict and nature of the claims made against the opponent.

This is not to imply that religion is unimportant in international affairs. To the contrary, the attention religion has received in the current literature is very much in order (Huntington, 1993, 1996; Juergensmeyer, 1993; Fox, 2001). The attempt by the nationalist elite to mollify religious sentiment, particularly, as we shall see, in the Palestinian arena, demonstrates the vitality of religion in domestic politics, which even the secular nature of the international system cannot alter. In fact, much of Palestinian or Israeli nationalism, as with many other nationalisms, is imbued with religion. We argue only that the key forces within the international system impose territorial and secular values in a manner that bolsters the nationalists in their struggle against religious forces and compels even the religious to adopt a nationalist discourse as much as nationalists adopt a religious one.

Even less do we claim that a state's official position on religion has no impact on its foreign policy. As Juergensmeyer (1993: 186) notes, the premise of secular nationalism in a state's constitution predetermines the role of religion in its political order. Also, Fox (2001) argued that whether a state has an official religion is an effective measure of the legitimacy of the use of religion in political discourse. In general, the distinction between a theocratic and a secular state depends on whether it legislates its official religion as law. But even among secular states, it is possible to approach the question of religion and state as a spectrum that runs from an established church (such as in Britain) through states that separate church and state (the USA) to a regime that is hostile to any religious manifestation.[2] But even this spectrum cannot take account of all the official relationships between church and state. There can be states that do not officially designate a particular religion, but in effect behave as if they have one. Similarly, states without official religions may still ban some minority religions. On the other hand, there can be polities which have official religions that may or may not ban some or all other religions within their borders. The case in hand is one in which both parties to the conflict did not define clearly the relationship between religion and the state and were very careful not to present their goals in religious terms. Nevertheless, religion played a role in their identity and hence could influence

their foreign policy. Why both the Palestinians and Israel inhibited themselves from expressing religious sentiments and convictions in their foreign policy lies in the secular norms of the international system.

For a full understanding of the current conflict, it is pertinent to start with its evolution from its outset. As we shall see, the role of religion in shaping foreign policy has been evident since the early stages of the Jewish–Palestinian confrontation.

Religious and Statist Themes in the History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

When politicians, journalists, and commentators began characterizing the latest round of violence between Palestinians and Israelis as the al-Aqsa intifada, thus wedding a uniquely religious term ("al-Aqsa") with a political term ("intifada"), they were hardly being original in the context of the overall conflict. Many previous stages of this bi-communal struggle have crystallized over religious sites as well as on various religious occasions. In fact, the first Arab riots against the Jews in Mandate Palestine erupted in April 1920 as participants returned to Jerusalem from the burial site of al-Nabi Musa (Moses the Prophet), which according to Muslim tradition is situated on the road leading to Jericho (Porath, 1974).

The next and far more intensive and persistent wave of violence, in the summer of 1929, focused on what Arabs perceived as Jewish attempts to change the traditional status quo along the Wailing Wall. This religious site covers part of one of the four walls surrounding the Temple Mount, upon which the al-Aqsa mosque is situated. Jewish worshippers, supported by the right-wing Zionist Betar movement, whose members bore flags with the Star of David, massed along the length of the wall on the fast day commemorating the destruction of the Second Temple, bringing with them an ark for the Torah scrolls and seats for the worshippers. The Palestinian Arab community, led by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the President of the Supreme Muslim Council, had for years been trying to mobilize the Arab population against what he perceived as Jewish attempts to wrest control of the Temple Mount. He used reports of the waving of nationalist flags and the bringing of furniture to stir anti-Jewish sentiment (Porath, 1974: 269). Hostilities against both Zionists and the anti-Zionist ultra-orthodox resulted in the murder of 133 and wounding of 339 in a community numbering approximately 200,000 souls. Some 116 Arabs were killed and 232 wounded, mostly in the course of British police and paramilitary efforts to quell the violence (Sykes, 1967: 119). Because of the intensity, geographical distribution, and organized nature of the violence many scholars view the "Wailing Wall" riots of 1928–29 as the first real major confrontation in the bi-communal struggle in Palestine between Jews and Arabs.

After the violence abated, Hajj Amin al-Husayni recast Jewish attempts to change the status quo as an attempt to destroy the Muslim sites on the Temple Mount and rebuild the Temple. He then went on to try to rally the Muslim world, calling for it to save al-Aqsa. In 1931, he succeeded in convening an international Islamic conference attended by representatives from 22 countries (Frisch, 1994: 47).

The cry to save al-Aqsa was heard once again when Israel took over the West Bank in 1967 and, with greater intensity, with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Arab Palestinians

viewed an attempt by an Australian citizen to set fire to the al-Aqsa mosque in August 1969 as yet another attempt to rebuild the Temple even though the perpetrator was a Christian (Mishal, 1998: 155). In September 1996, the security organs of the recently constituted Palestinian Authority and other Palestinian irregulars reacted violently in response to the opening of a siteseeing tunnel that runs along the foundations of the western wall of the Temple Mount (Hammami and Tamari, 2001: 13). Palestinians, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but members of the PA as well, accused the Israelis of digging the tunnel with the aim of undermining the foundations on the Temple Mount in order to destroy the Islamic holy sites. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are the two major Palestinian fundamentalist movements in the territories. Hamas, by far the larger, is an acronym of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic, which appropriately makes up the word "zeal" in the same language.

Holy sites, both under Israeli rule and in areas under the Palestinian Authority's jurisdiction, have continued to be arenas of intense intercommunal violence. The killing of five yeshiva (religious seminary) students in Hebron (al-Khalil) in May 1980 by Fatah members, who were also students of the department of religion at Hebron University, reflected, among other things, the homogeneous religious background of the settlers and the settlement drive in general (Rekhess, 1981). On October 8, 1990, 17 Arabs were killed on the Temple Mount during the holy month of Ramadan after pelting stones at hundreds of Jewish worshippers celebrating the Feast of the Tabernacles at the Wailing Wall 60 feet below (Kristianasen, 1999: 34). Four years later, a Jewish physician, Baruch Goldstein, murdered 29 Arab worshippers in the Cave of the Patriarchs, a site considered holy to both religions in the now partitioned city of Hebron (Kristianasen, 1999: 34).

The latter event reflected the fact that a number of burial sites in the West Bank have become contested territory since Israel occupied it in 1967. Israeli state building and settlement in the West Bank is accompanied by making claims and "settling" burial sites. Kever Yosef, Joseph's assumed burial site and home to a yeshiva, became an Israeli enclave after Israeli withdrawal from the city of Nablus in 1996. It was overwhelmed in October 2000 by Palestinian irregulars, at the beginning of the present hostilities (Hammami and Tamari, 2001: 13). Contention over the holy site has hardly been settled since. Jewish worshippers have attempted repeatedly to pray at the site whenever Israeli troops have re-entered the city to conduct search and destroy missions against guerrillas (*Haaretz*, 2002). The yeshiva, formerly based at the holy site, continues to function in a nearby Jewish settlement and vows to return at the first opportunity. A third burial site, Rachel's tomb, at the entrance to Bethlehem, has also been the scene of intense military and political rivalry between Israel and the PA, as each claims jurisdiction over it. According to the Torah, these three burial sites formed the axis of the Jewish patriarchs' peregrinations in the land of Canaan. Despite the sacredness of Joseph's tomb, when the Israeli Defense Forces reoccupied Nablus more or less permanently in June 2002, they did not permit Jews to return (Israel Radio, 2002).

The Zionists and Israelis

National and State-Centric Claims and Objectives. The Zionist movement from the beginning implemented the ideas of the founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl. Throughout his celebrated book *Der Judenstaat*, published in 1896, Herzl made it clear that the future Jewish state should follow a western liberal model of

religion and state. Indeed, he dedicated a whole section to the theme. He asked "will we end by having a theocracy?" to which he responded "No, indeed. Faith unites us, knowledge gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks" (Herzl, 1946: 146).

Hence, while understanding the power of religion in mobilizing support in parts of the Christian world, the Zionists were very careful not to allow the religious factions within them to either dominate the movement or to become a formidable opposition force. It was a mechanism for co-opting the religious forces that allowed the Zionists to present a prudent stance on the international scene. The official leadership of the World Zionist Organization was not alone in refraining from presenting its demands in theocratic terms. The religious elements themselves agreed to accept this decision when making international compromises that ultimately assisted in state building.

Religious Zionism justified this compromise by arguing that the Zionist movement, and later the State of Israel, was a first and necessary step toward divine redemption. Thus, the implementation of the theocratic vision was delayed to a distant and undefined future. Agudat Israel, the small ultraorthodox party, rejected the norm that secular Jews could achieve redemption and therefore stayed out of the Yishuv's (Jewish Mandatory Palestine) national institutions, and later, out of the government. Since God, not man, decided the implementation of the theocratic vision, the Agudah was even more politically quiescent than the National Religious Party (NRP) on foreign policy issues.

A main theme in the political philosophy of David Ben-Gurion was statism, or the doctrine of Mamlachtiyut, namely, putting the state at the center of Zionism (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1983). Ben-Gurion first formulated this doctrine in 1936 when he complained about the lack of political realism among the Jews in the past. "We want to build a state, and we shall not build one without political thought, political talent and political prudence," he noted (Yanai, 1987: 171). On two occasions, the Zionist movement, following a very intense debate, decided to accept proposals put before it by the international community that mandated giving up territory considered sacred. On both occasions (the acceptance of the 1937 partition proposal of the Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel and the UN Partition Plan of November 29 1947), the Zionist movement acceded to surrendering parts of what Zionists considered the historic Jewish homeland.

Even more significantly, the Zionists agreed to compromise over Jerusalem (Katz, 1992; Katz and Sandler, 1995). While not relinquishing Jerusalem formally, on both occasions the Zionist movement affirmed indirectly that Jerusalem would become part of a British (1937) or international (1947) enclave. Facing the choice between a state without Jerusalem to no state at all, they clearly preferred the former (Brecher, 1974: 14–15). The strategy of the 1948 war demonstrated that the Israeli leadership did not make a special effort to conquer Jerusalem. It preferred to concentrate military efforts on the Negev, a large strategic area, rather than on the Old City in which the Temple Mount was located (Sandler, 2000).

The right-wing Revisionists and the religious parties (Mizrahi and Agudat Israel) objected to this decision as early as 1937. Religious leaders objected less strenuously in 1947 to the decision to internationalize Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the religious camp, unlike the Revisionists, cooperated on both these issues with

Ben-Gurion, who was able to impose his will on the Zionist movement for the sake of creating a state.

Alliance Politics and Power Sharing. By cooperating with the religious Zionists, Ben-Gurion continued a tradition that had started almost at the outset of the movement. In 1902, Theodor Herzl reached a compromise with Rabbi Jacob Reines, founder and leader of the Mizrahi section in the Zionist Organization, on the question of secular–religious educational activity in the Zionist movement (Vital, 1982: Ch. 7; Don-Yehiya, 1987). With the ascendance of Labor in the Zionist movement in the early 1930s, Ben-Gurion succeeded in taking over the Zionist movement by cementing a coalition that included the Mizrahi movement.

The special relationship between MAPAI (Israeli Laborers Party) and the NRP (previously, Mizrahi and the Hapoel Hamizrahi Party) was termed by both parties the "historic alliance." Political scientists described it as a form of consociational politics (Don-Yehiya, 1975: 260–4; Horowitz and Lissak, 1977: Ch. 7; Lijphart, 1977: 129–34). According to this arrangement, the NRP preserved its autonomy over religious education while accepting the overall authority of the state, its institutions and its symbols. The power-sharing arrangement with the Labor camp excluded foreign policy. Until 1967, security and foreign affairs remained the exclusive domain of Labor (Akzin, 1979: 93–4).

All this changed, however, after 1967. The NRP, instead of continuing its traditional alliance with Labor and the left by advocating "land for peace," began, under pressure of its young guard, to demand the annexation of the historic parts of the Land of Israel. Influenced by rabbis from the Mercaz Harav yeshiva, the young guard established the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) movement (Don-Yehiya, 1987: 215–34). In general, the Labor governments followed a restrictive policy of allowing settlements only in strategic areas of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, with some exceptions. In 1976, then-Prime-Minister Rabin allowed the establishment of a number of settlements in relatively populated areas of the West Bank.

In 1977, the Labor–NRP alliance was replaced by a new nationalist–religious partnership between the Likud, the NRP, and (for the first time after more than 25 years of nonparticipation in the Israeli government) Agudat Israel. Power sharing between a nationalist ruling party and the religious parties proved both more natural and politically potent. Prime-Minister Begin encouraged Gush Emunim's settlement drive. Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria (the West Bank), and Gaza increased from 27 in 1977 to 77 four years later (Sandler and Frisch, 1984: 139). The settlers were overwhelmingly religious. The NRP, it seemed, finally had a voice in determining foreign policy.

Yet, despite considerable affinity between Likud and the NRP, there was a limit to the Likud's willingness to accommodate the NRP's goal of annexing the territories. Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon confronted the Gush in 1981, when it objected to the removal of settlements in the Sinai as a result of the Israeli–Egyptian peace agreement. In addition, a Likud government, under Prime-Minister Yizthak Shamir, dealt severely with two underground groups that opposed government policy. One of them attempted to assassinate Arab mayors in the West Bank. The second, more extreme, movement planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount. Many rabbis, as well as members of Gush Emunim, condemned the underground, albeit for different reasons (Shragai, 1995: 130–1). Gush Emunim condemned it for rupturing relations between the state and the people.

When Labor regained power in 1992, Prime-Minister-elect Rabin, in order to diminish the role of religion in Israeli foreign policy, abstained for the first time in the history of the state from inviting the NRP into the government. Rabin chose instead to continue a consociational arrangement with the new ultraorthodox party, Shas, whose spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, ruled that territorial compromise was religiously acceptable for the sake of peace and security. Like the NRP in the first decades of statehood, Shas acquiesced on issues of foreign policy, provided it was granted benefits in the domestic arena. Accordingly, Rabin also agreed to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hoping to thwart the ascendance of religious elements in Palestinian society and thus prevent the conflict from becoming a conflict between two religions.

The Palestinian Arabs

National and State-Centric Claims and Objectives. Like the Zionists, the Arabs of Palestine did not present their aspirations to the international community in religious terms. Hajj Amin's religiously inspired appeals were never the dominant trend, nor did they reflect the key political aspirations and demands up to the outbreak of the latest round of conflict. When Arab delegates presented their claims to an outside body for the first time, at the King-Crane commission in 1919, both the reasoning and the language they employed was deeply infused with the 14 principles articulated by President Wilson (Porath, 1974: 42). They called for a Palestine whose autonomous and potentially independent political bodies would be based on majoritarian rule that reflected the culture and proclivities of the vast majority of its inhabitants.

Even though the Islamic-Christian Committees (ICCs), the first organizations formed, reflected the denominational basis upon which former Ottoman rule was based, they preached interdenominational amity. In the 1930s, political parties that emerged as a result of conflicts between personalities or ideologies replaced the ICCs, thereby discarding all allusions, at least in titles and positions, to denominational differences within the Arab population of Palestine (Porath, 1977: 118–27). Throughout their negotiations with the British regarding self-governance or the status of the Jewish community, religious motifs and issues remained a relatively minor matter. Nationalist issues, Arab claims versus Jewish nationalist claims over the character of the ruling bodies, Jewish immigration, control over land, and future statehood, became the cardinal issues.

This was just as true in violent activities as it was in politics. Few can deny the mobilizing potential of Islam during the latter half of the Mandate. After all, the spark that set off the Arab Riots (in Zionist historiography) or the Great Rebellion (in Arab) was the confrontation in November 1935 between a guerrilla group headed by Syrian-born Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the British (Porath, 1977: 136). Some 50 years later, the military arm of Hamas (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) were to bear his name.[3] Nevertheless, the basic ideology, insofar as any coherent ideology prevailed in the 1936–39 rebellion, was Arab nationalism. No wonder the report presented by the Peel Commission during a temporary lull in the rebellion, rightly diagnosed the problem as being essentially between two national communities rather than between two religions or even civilizations (Moore, 1974: 153). Religion was important no doubt, but it was not, according to the writers of the report, the core of the conflict.

The marginalization of religion intensified with the growing involvement of

Arab state actors in the affairs of Palestine in the wake of the failure of the Arab Palestinian community to secure their own state against the British. Their presence, first as negotiators on behalf of Arab Palestinians, both in 1938 and 1939, and later as the major military protagonists against the newly declared State of Israel, intensified the perception that the issue of Palestine was first and foremost an Arab national commitment (Porath, 1977: 275). The claims they made to the international community had to be national and secular. Again, this is not to say that the religious dimension was not important. The major irregular forces among the Arab Palestinians were called al-Jihad al-Muqaddas, or the Holy Jihad. Many of the irregulars from outside Palestine who joined them belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Yet when Hajj Amin belatedly succeeded in setting up the all-Palestine Government in Gaza in October 1948, the declaration of independence he issued was little different from most declarations of independence that have been publicized by fledgling states (Shlaim, 1990: 43). The document reflected the aspiration for a territorial state (albeit linked to the Arab world) ruled by a popular government. The traditional salutation of thanks to Providence at the end of the proclamation was the only allusion to anything religious. Obviously, Hajj Amin al-Husayni realized that a claim for a theocratic state would not be acceptable, regionally or internationally.

This became even more apparent when Palestinians turned to a Palestinian-centered territorial nationalism, rather than to an ideology grounded in theocratic thought, when they established the PLO in 1964. The PLO national covenant (especially the revised 1968 version) struck a careful balance between the overwhelming desire to assert Palestinian nationalism and pan-Arabism, and the desire to justify its goal to destroy the State of Israel on the basis of international norms (Articles 18 and 19 of the PLO Covenant of 1968). The only reference to Islam in the document clearly reflected the primacy the movement gave to international norms over any theocratic claims. Article 16 assured equal access to the holy sites to members of all religious faiths. Most Islamic fundamentalist movements are willing only to tolerate a subordinate and protected status for members of the other monotheistic faiths. It is no coincidence that the Hamas covenant, publicized in 1988, drew its legitimacy from the Koran and the Sharia, rather than from international norms as in the case of the PLO (*Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement*, 1988: Article 1).

Alliances and Power Sharing. Since the Palestinians in 1948 ceased to exist as a political community, it is impossible to talk about power-sharing mechanisms among Palestinians until the establishment of the PLO in 1964. Religious groups were so weak that they did not even have an organizational body able to join the PLO. What can be analyzed is the political behavior of the Palestinians in their new places of residence in Arab states. The vast majority joined political parties that advocated some variant of Arab nationalism. In the relatively free elections in October 1956 in Jordan, where Palestinians form a majority of the population, the Muslim Brotherhood, the only religious party to contest the elections, secured four out of a total of 40 seats ("Chronology: Jordan," 1957: 145). The remaining 40 percent of those who voted for candidates affiliated to parties rather than independents, identified with political platforms of a distinctly Arab nationalist hue. In all, eight seats went to parties that were distinctively secular and nationalist.

A defeat of the magnitude of the 1967 Six Day War obviously led to much soul-searching in the Arab world. Pan-Arabism, the ideology espoused by the leaders of

the defeated Egyptian and Syrian regimes, was one of the war's additional casualties. By contrast, the Islamic currents offered an alternative that had yet to be tested. Surprisingly, the Palestinian diaspora where the PLO was making its greatest impact, was palpably unaffected by these currents. To be sure, Arafat appointed the aging Alim, an Islamic scholar and former senior official in the Jordanian Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, to the presidency of the Palestinian National Council, the PLO's general but otherwise ineffectual body (Johnston, 1982). He chose him to contain the power of the radical leftist organizations as much as to appease Islamic currents.

The situation started changing in the early 1980s with the ascendance of religious political groups in Palestinian society. So powerful had Hamas and Islamic Jihad become that they consistently rebuffed attempts by the PLO to enter power-sharing arrangements with them. In part, the reason had to do with different stances regarding Israel. The PLO at the time became increasingly committed to a two-state solution, a plan it implicitly accepted when it declared the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in November 1988. The document based its claim to Palestinian statehood on the same United Nations Partition resolution (181) that recognized the establishment of a Jewish state (Pipes, 1989: 249–52). Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad adamantly rejected the acceptance of the resolution and continuously made their membership in PLO institutions conditional on its rejection by the PLO (Kristianasen, 1999: 19). The PLO, anxious to placate international actors such as the USA and conform to international norms, consistently refused to meet these and other conditions. As a result, both Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not participate in PLO forums outside the territories, or in the United National Command of the Intifada, the coordinating body between the various Palestinian factions that operated in the West Bank and Gaza.

II. From Oslo to Intifada 2000 and Beyond

The Oslo process was the most profound demonstration of the statist goals of both Israel and the Palestinians. From the outset it was clear that in exchange for the end of conflict and Palestinian recognition of Israel, the Israeli government was ready, in accordance with UN resolutions 242 and 338, to withdraw from biblical land in Judea and Samaria. It was also implicit that at the end of the process the Palestinians would establish a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Two issues were left for final discussion: the question of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of return. The Israeli–Palestinian mutual recognition in Washington and the signing of the DOP in 1993 induced King Hussein to sign a peace treaty with Israel a year later, on October 26, 1994. The treaty between Hussein and Rabin assigned a special role to the Hashemites in managing the holy places in Jerusalem, especially the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque. The major issues comprising the Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty (for which the USA acted as a guarantor) were classically state-centric: borders, water, and security. In the two years that followed the DOP, Arafat arrived in Gaza and installed a new Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho.

Israel

National and State-Centric Claims and Objectives. Negotiations between Israel and the PA continued, and produced the Oslo II Agreement in 1995. In this agreement,

Israel contracted to transfer eight Arab cities designated as "Area A" to the PA, with the exception of the Jewish part of Hebron that included the Tomb of the Patriarchs. The agreement also created "Area B": Arab villages under PA civilian control, but remaining under Israeli security authority. The rest of the West Bank remained under Israeli jurisdiction ("Area C"). Within four years, the two sides were to reach a final settlement.

Both sides confronted forces which tried to derail the peace process because of nationalist or religious reasons. On the Jewish side, the two most extreme cases were the Goldstein massacre in Hebron on February 25, 1994 and the assassination of Israeli Prime-Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir on 4 November 1995. On the Palestinian side, Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombings in the heart of major Israeli cities in the winter of 1996 led to the defeat of Shimon Peres in May 1996 and the election of the hardliner Binyamin Netanyahu.

If one needs ultimate proof of the impact of international norms on Israel's behavior, Netanyahu's government can provide it. Recognizing that it was bound by the international agreements signed by its predecessor, the Netanyahu government, in coalition with all three religious parties, implemented a Labor agreement giving up control of 80 percent of the city of Hebron to the PA. In October 1998, after consulting with his foreign minister, Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu agreed, as part of the Wye River memorandum, to transfer 13 percent of Judea and Samaria to exclusive Palestinian control. In March 1999, unable to implement the Wye agreements, the Netanyahu government fell. In May, Ehud Barak was elected in a landslide victory on a platform promising peace with the Palestinians (Elazar and Molov, 2001: 4).

The Camp David summit in June 2000 may serve as another illustration. The Israeli offer included 95 percent of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and the Arab parts of Jerusalem, including partition of the old city, as well as Palestinian shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount (Drucker, 2002: 206–17, 373). Furthermore, on December 23, 2000, Clinton presented his decision on the compromise and the final settlement in which Israel was to relinquish sovereignty of the Temple Mount and retain the Jewish Quarter of the old city as well as 3 percent of territory in the West Bank. While Israel accepted this proposal, Arafat ultimately rejected it because of three elements: the Israeli *security* presence in the Jordan Valley, lack of clarity on the fact that Israel is forbidden to dig in the area adjacent to the Western Wall (a religious issue), and the right of return (a national issue) (Drucker, 2002: 379). Undoubtedly, the difficulties stemmed from competing national, state-centric, and religiously grounded claims.

International norms not only influenced government decisions, but the religious right as well. Since the exposure of the Jewish Underground in the 1980s, the religious right has tried to distance itself from its messianic image. Leaders of the religious national right also began to realize that most of the public no longer perceived the settlement movement as the vanguard of modern Zionism, but as an obstacle to peace. Some rabbis from the national religious Yeshivot, who gave birth to the land of Israel ideology, became increasingly skeptical of the ideology in the wake of the Lebanon war and after the outbreak of the 1987 intifada. Thus, a leading rabbi, Yehuda Amital, established a centrist religious movement that competed in the 1988 elections. Another, Yoel Bin-Nun, argued for a new approach for the Gush, defining this as "to settle in the hearts of the people before settling the Land of Israel." The image problem of the settlers grew with the election of Prime-Minister Rabin, who differentiated between security and

political settlements. Many settlers perceived Rabin's brutal oral attacks on the settlers as an attempt to delegitimize their enterprise. It was this mutual animosity that implicated them in Yigal Amir's assassination of the prime minister in 1995. Paradoxically, the turning of the national religious movement into a "pariah" by the left resulted in its electoral ascendance in the 1996 elections (Elazar and Sandler, 1998: 14).

Accordingly, when the religious right expressed its opposition to Barak's compromises, it increasingly employed the language of security rather than a Jewish biblical rhetoric.[4] On July 16, 2000, while Barak was negotiating with Arafat at Camp David, the settler movement organized a demonstration of 250,000 people in Rabin Square, Tel-Aviv. The slogans at the demonstration were "You don't abandon brothers" and "This agreement will obliterate the state." Appearing in the headlines of the NRP daily *Hatzofe* (2001: 1) next day was a quote from the NRP leader, Rabbi Yitzhak Levi: "A secure future for our children is in the entirety of the Land of Israel under Israeli sovereignty."[5] (The use of "our children" was also a take on Barak's campaign slogan "For the future of our children.") A week later, the NRP newspaper warned that Barak was turning Jerusalem into another Sarajevo, emphasizing the city's security situation rather than its religious significance (*Hatzofe*, 2000b: 2).

Barak's failure at Camp David absolved the right of its image of being an obstacle to peace. To some extent their position that Arafat was not ready for compromise over the Land of Israel/Palestine was proven by Arafat's refusal to accept Barak's proposals at Camp David in 2000. Even though during the latest wave of violence, the settlers became a prime target of Palestinian violence, they have hardly taken revenge against Palestinians, in part, to avoid negative international reaction. According to *B'Tselem*, more than 135 Israeli civilians were murdered as a result of Palestinian violence between September 2000 and July 6, 2002, while Israeli civilians (not necessarily settlers) have killed 13 Palestinians in unclear situations. Israeli settlers had been involved in the premeditated killing of three Palestinians up to that date and only one small vigilante group has been uncovered so far (*B'Tselem*, 2002).

A similar pattern could be detected in the attitude of the religious right during the debate over the erection of the fence separating Israel from the West Bank in order to combat infiltration by suicide bombers. To minimize the antagonism of the majority of Israelis who want a fence, the settlers decided to support it, provided that it be placed as far away from the Green Line as possible. Meanwhile, in an attempt to influence public opinion, they have been collecting and disseminating evaluations from military circles that claim that the fence and various electronic devices will not prevent the penetration of suicide bombers and attackers (Huberman, 2002: 4–5).

Alliances and Power Sharing. Like his predecessor Yitzhak Rabin, Barak was unwilling to compromise with the national religious camp over foreign policy or domestic issues. For both leaders, Shas seemed an adequate substitute for the NRP that would allow them a free hand in foreign affairs. When it became clear that Barak was ready to negotiate over Jerusalem, Shas had to follow the lead of the NRP and the Russian immigrants' party and leave the government. No religious party was willing to compromise over Jerusalem's status as Israel's eternal capital in order to maintain a consociational arrangement (Drucker, 2002: 172–85). Barak was left with a minority government as he headed for Camp David. The religious

parties were doing peacefully what the fundamentalists in the Palestinian camp achieved through violence—obstructing progress in the peace process.

The most compelling proof of the unwillingness of a government to give in to religious maxims in foreign affairs can be found in the formation of the Sharon government. After his victory in 2001, Likud Prime-Minister Ariel Sharon, one of the architects of the massive settlement drive in the 1980s, formed a broad coalition without the NRP. The division in Israel over the peace process, as well as the need to substantiate Israel's position internationally, obligated Sharon to form a coalition and share power with Labor. Sharon preferred Labor, whose positions were acceptable abroad, to the NRP, whose policies were not acceptable internationally. The inclusion of the National Union Party (a right-wing, but not exclusively religious, party) rounded out this broad political coalition. It took more than a year until, in April 2002, the NRP joined the government, under conditions Sharon set. In this way, the Israeli government marginalized the NRP's influence on policy intended to contain Palestinian violence. Sharon was the first Likud head of government to break with the established practice of forming a consociational partnership with the NRP.

Yet no sooner did the NRP join the government than it was forced to acquiesce to the establishment of a security fence that will be erected most probably on, or close to, the armistice lines that served as Israel's unofficial borders until the Six Day War. Sharon denied the political implications of the fence, and insisted on calling it a "security fence" rather than a "separation line," which connotes the potential of it being transformed into a future border delineating Israel from Palestinian-controlled territory. The NRP learned its lesson and did not leave the government over the issue of the fence even though the fence's construction is likely to place its dreams for a greater Israel outside the national consensus.

The Palestinians

National and State-Centric Claims. The marginalization of religious claims in the course of the outbreak in the latest round of violence in late September 2000 is perhaps the best indication that the conflict, even in its latest stage, is essentially a national one. If at the beginning, the Palestinians focused on control over the Temple Mount, this focus has long since shifted to territorial-nationalist issues—"the right of return, the establishment of the Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital" (*Al-Ayyam*, 2001). The first two are basically secular and nationalist. The third issue, Jerusalem, is acknowledged by most Palestinians and Arabs to be religiously salient, yet as Musa Abu-Marzuq (a Hamas leader in Jordan) noted, the demand for Arab control of the city should by no means be regarded as an exclusively religious claim ("Interview with Musa Abu-Marzuq," 2001). All three claims are based on what Palestinian officials call "international legitimacy" (*al-shar'iyya al-dawliyya*), that is, the sum total of all the resolutions dealing with the Palestinian issue reached by the United Nations (Khatib, 2002). Virtually every statement or speech by any Palestinian official, including Arafat, mentions this term at least once (*Al-Ayyam*, 2001).

The right of return refers to the insistence that Palestinian refugees living both in diaspora and in the territories be allowed to return to their original places of residence within the borders of Mandate Palestine. The basis for this claim is a clause in UN Resolution 194 from December 1948 (Moore, 1974: 37). Palestinians

debate among themselves whether for the sake of peace, the actual return to Israel within the 1967 armistice line (as opposed to the right itself, which Palestinians overwhelmingly agree Israel must recognize) should be limited in numbers. So far, the PLO leadership and the overwhelming percentage of the population have rejected any limitation of what they perceive to be an indelible right sanctioned in international law and custom. Even Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not anchor the legitimacy of this claim in religious norms or institutions in their publications (*Filastinal-Muslima*, 2000). Hamas had made such a claim in the Islamic Constitution it distributed in the territories in 1988.

Secular norms embedded in international documents also, from a Palestinian perspective, justify establishing a sovereign state on at least all the area Israel occupied in the Six Day War. Even though the Hamas constitution developed a claim to all of Palestine based on the idea that all of Palestine forms an Islamic endowment and is therefore eternally inalienable, this has not been its major line of argument during the latest round of violence (Mish'al, 2001). Despite the fact that Jerusalem is pregnant with Islamic religious meaning and connotations, most Palestinians, nevertheless, address the issue in territorial and functional terms (Khatib, 2002).[6] Once again, religion serves as a mobilizing trigger whose effect then decreases as the protagonists try to make concrete political gains after the outbreak of violence.

This is not to say that Arafat and the PA consider Islam to be a minor issue. It seems that one of the reasons why nonofficial Islam has become vibrant in the territories is the fact that official religion exists and is curtailed (Wald, 1992: 18).[7] Perhaps this is why Arafat's speeches are suffused with quotes from the Koran, religious terms and symbols, and occasionally oral teachings imputed to Muhammad (*hadith*). Liberating the mosque in Jerusalem like Salah al-Din during the Crusades is one of the dominant themes in his rhetoric.

The name given to Fatah's new nationalist fighting organization reflects the growing Islamic challenge to the nationalist elite. Immediately after the outbreak of violence, a new fighting arm called the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigades was formed in Fatah and has virtually replaced the Tanzim (organization). The logo of this new force is the al-Aqsa mosque combined with a verse from the Koran. Video clips of Fatah suicide bombers featured would-be martyrs with a gun in one hand and the Koran in the other. Their announcements, most of which focus on attacks leveled against Israelis and a tribute to the martyrs that were responsible for them, are deeply imbued with religious symbols and verses from the Koran (see www.fateh.tv). By calling the new fighting arm, the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, Fatah was clearly responding to popular pressure. A poll conducted in March 2000 showed that an overwhelming percentage of the respondents (85.8 percent) felt that the PA should be more religious than it was (JMCC Poll, 2000). It is important to note that the al-Aqsa Brigades are responsible for more acts of violence than either Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Power Sharing and Alliances. Repeated attempts by the PLO and Hamas to enter power-sharing arrangements failed after the establishment of the PA for the very same reasons they did before. The PLO was unwilling to compromise its international position and challenge international norms by reverting to a position calling on the destruction of Israel. To the contrary, it claimed in opposition to Israel that its demands were based on "international legitimacy." The PLO and PA were clearly not ready to give up "international legitimacy" in

order to enter a power-sharing agreement with Hamas. Hamas, in turn, refused to give up the idea of the liberation of the whole of Palestine (Kristianasen, 1999: 22).

The PA, in an attempt to meet the challenge of the Islamic opposition, has also marginalized the role of religious institutions within its own governmental structure. For good reason, the Ministry of Endowments of Religious Affairs, a basic institutional feature of every Arab state, is headed by officials who are most often graduates of Islamic institutions of higher learning, such as al-Azhar University in Egypt (Abd al-Qadir, 2001). Judging by the ministry's insistence on placing advertisements in newspapers affiliated to Hamas and Islamic Jihad as a means of supporting them, these officials are sympathizers of these organizations as well. Arafat has no intention of building up their power base. For this reason, they are given little access to the larger and more important ministries and the institutions under their jurisdiction, which they would like to influence, such as the ministries of education, higher education, and justice. The ministry's influence on the several high schools specializing in religious law throughout the territories is an exception that proves the rule. It is therefore hardly surprising that officials of the ministry complain bitterly that they have been marginalized in the government apparatus that Arafat established (Abd al-Qadir, 2001).

While making sure that power sharing did not compromise international norms, Arafat has fine-tuned Islam's role to mobilize guerrillas and suicide bombers by cementing the alliance between Fatah Tanzim, an organization he formally heads, and the Islamic organizations (Abu Bakr, 2002). This alliance is responsible for an overwhelming proportion of guerrilla acts and suicide bombings against Israelis in the latest round of violence (Abu Bakr, 2002).

The nationalists' attempt to mollify the international community has been achieved only at significant domestic political cost. Polls conducted by Palestinian research centers in the past have consistently shown a wide gap between support for Arafat and Ahmad Yassin (the leader of Hamas), and on the "party" level, much wider support for Fatah than for Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined (Shikaki, 2002: 91). Before the conflict, 40 percent on average supported Fatah, compared to 16–18 percent for Hamas. During the recent outbreak of violence, the gap in support between Fatah and Hamas has virtually closed (29 percent compared to 27 percent). Support for Arafat declined from a similar percentage before the outbreak of violence to 24.5 percent as of June 2002 (JMCC Poll, 2002). The growing clout of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the weakening of both the PA and the nationalist factions, is also reflected in their political behavior. In late July and early August 2002, both Hamas and Islamic Jihad refused to heed calls by the PA to stop the suicide bombings.

III. Explaining the Persistence of the Pre-eminence of Nationalism in the Conflict

One of the reasons for the persistent hegemony of nationalism and national elites in the creation of new states and why fundamentalists have yet to construct any state has to do with the nature of the international system. Since the 19th century, if not since Westphalia, the international system has been dominated by states, which, for all the variation they have shown in the relationship between religion and the public weal within their domestic structures, were adamantly opposed to the creation of theocratic states (Caporaso, 2000). By theocratic states we mean those in which religious law is constitutionally supreme. Such states propagate the

faith in a way that might potentially undermine existing nation-states. If some tolerance toward theocracy and fundamentalism was countenanced in the early part of the 20th century, in the creation of Saudi Arabia, for example, it has attenuated considerably since then.

The norms these core states have created and propagated are not only territorially centered, but man-made and secular. From Wilson's 14 principles to the United Nations Charter, the ideas and values expressed in these documents relate to republican and liberal ideas, which for the most part, clash with the basic propositions articulated by Islamic, Jewish, and perhaps Christian political fundamentalists. Consider the following: whereas in the international system, territorial sovereignty of the state was considered, until recently at least, exclusive and all religions equal and to be tolerated, in theocratic thought, the religious identity of the state is seen as exclusive and dominant. Other religions must, by definition, be discriminated against. In the international system, however, a people living on a certain piece of land may make a claim to self-determination on the basis of being ethnically or nationally different, but not on the basis of religious differences. Religious sects can demand tolerance, but not political satisfaction.

Nor is the issue only a matter of who wields power in the system and structures its norms. The secular nature of the international system is also reflected in the values propagated by the international organizations and the types of projects and institutions they foster. Even in a day and age when the diaspora of vast numbers of Muslims and other members of non-European-centered religions fosters the growth of international religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the overwhelming bulk of financial resources are still in the hands of liberally minded organizations. Because these core states and NGOs, motivated by liberal or republican values, are ultimately responsible in most instances for bequeathing the territorial state, movements aspiring to create states must play according to *their* rules. This is also true for most states in the system. Even an oil-rich state such as Iran bears the brunt of its theocratic claims and constitution.

This is all the more true for the Palestinians, who were in any case latecomers to state building and must play by the secular norms international actors impose upon them. No state actor, with the possible exception of Iran, will support the Palestinian cause in the international arena based on the claim that Palestine was ruled by Muslim rulers in the past, and has therefore become an Islamic endowment that is inalienable and not negotiable. By contrast, a Palestinian claim to self-determination on the basis that Palestinians form the majority of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and that their claim from this perspective had been recognized by the United Nations in the past, does carry political weight. This is especially true when the normative territorial claim is backed by a certain degree of political power. The Palestinians argue, with some degree of credibility, that even if they cannot force Israel to withdraw, they can continue to punish it and place the larger region in a state of tension that makes it worthwhile for the international community to explore ways to meet their national aspirations.

This, of course, does not imply that Islam was not important in Palestinian strategy. To the contrary, the Palestinian nationalist elite realized that Islam was an integral part of the Palestinian identity and a means of mobilizing support and harnessing guerrilla capabilities. Cooperation could not exist on the level of claims addressed to the international community or the objectives aired abroad. This explains why neither the PA nor the Islamic movements were ready to enter power-sharing agreements. The PA knew that the inclusion of the Islamic

movements in government and acceptance of their positions would be unacceptable in the international community. The Islamic movements for their part were not ready to give up what they felt to be positions mandated by Islamic faith for the sake of achieving international legitimacy. In any event, they felt due to their widespread popularity that they could at some point in the future prevail over the nationalists, even if international forces were arrayed against them.

While Palestinian nationalist elites strenuously avoid giving the impression that the conflict is essentially religious, they do emphasize the importance of the support of the Islamic states and "nation" in supporting the Palestinian cause (*Al-Ayyam*, 2001). Clearly, Palestinian leaders have a vested interest in seeking their support. There are at present 57 predominantly Muslim states which are members of the Islamic International Conference. At least half of them do not maintain relations with Israel. The potential power of the Islamic bloc, states as well as people (estimated at more than one billion souls), may equally explain why Israeli leaders deny persistently that their conflict with Palestinians reflects in any way on Islamic–Jewish relations or relations between the State of Israel, Islam, and its adherents.

Similarly, Jewish religious claims to a historical and religious heartland in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) have not received support from the international community. Prime-Minister Menahem Begin realized the potential of religion in mobilizing settlers when he initiated his settlement drive in Judea and Samaria (the biblical names of the West Bank) in 1979. However, when the consociational formula in Israel stood in the way of international negotiations during the 1992 Rabin government, or even threatened a greater degree of unity within the Israeli electorate, it was unceremoniously scuttled. Parties that adopted a theocratically oriented foreign policy, such as the NRP, lost their place in power-sharing arrangements even in a right-wing coalition, as was the case of the Sharon 2001 unity government. The best reflection of the power of international norms, institutions, and state actors is the increasingly security-oriented or national discourse among the religious parties and organizations themselves. Extra-parliamentary actors such as Gush Emunim disguised their yearnings to annex the biblical heartland to Israel under the cloak of security concerns.

To conclude, any mobility into more exclusive institutional settings means discarding the more particular and parochial for the more "acceptable," general, and universal. No matter how much globalization has arguably made the world more heterogeneous at the base, at the elite and core institutional levels, particularly within the community of nations, norms and practices have become more universal, standardized, and secular. To become part of the exclusive club of states requires making claims and organizing internally in ways appropriate to the norms that the profoundly secular core states propagate. Obviously, there are global challengers to this order. Bin Laden and other international Islamic guerrilla movements are certainly some of the major examples. Equally obvious is the presence of forces within individual societies and states that oppose this order. Potential state elites might, as in the Palestinian case, use these radical religious movements to promote their national struggle, but they will not empower them in a way that will threaten their collective candidacy in the exclusive club of territorial nation-states.

Notes

1. This series of events eclipsed by far the violent events of Land Day on March 30, 1976, in which six of Israel's Arab citizens were killed in demonstrations that lasted a single day.
2. Durham (1996) provides a framework for accomplishing this. He posits that regimes can be divided into seven categories with respect to the connection between religion and the state: (1) "established churches," where the state endorses one or more official churches; (2) "endorsed churches," where regimes fall short of endorsing a particular church, but "acknowledge that one particular church has a special place in the country's traditions" (1996: 20); (3) "cooperationist regimes," where certain religions benefit from state support, but no religion is endorsed; (4) "accommodationist regimes," which have official separation of church and state, but behave with a benevolent neutrality toward religion; (5) "separationist regimes," which have separation of church and state and are slightly hostile toward religion; (6) "inadvertent insensitivity," which describes regimes which make little distinction between the regulation of religious and other types of institutions; and (7) "hostility and overt prosecution," which describes regimes which are hostile to all religions.
3. In Article 7 of the Hamas covenant (of 1988), Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his armed group are perceived as a source of inspiration and pride.
4. An association of rabbis calling itself "Pikuach Nefesh," identified with the settlers, distributed its halachic decision against territorial withdrawal. It was based primarily on the security threat to Israel posed by such a move (*Hatzofe*, 2000a). "Pikuach nefesh" is a halachic term permitting violations of Jewish law in order to save lives.
5. In the same issue of *Hatzofe* (2001), the Mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert, is quoted as suggesting that if Barak's plan was accepted, 80,000 Jews would be surrounded by 80,000 Arabs.
6. Ghassan Khatib is presently Minister of Labor in the Palestinian Authority.
7. Wald attributes the vibrancy of religion in the USA (compared to the sorry state of religion in Europe) to the civic and privatized nature of the denominations in the USA. He writes: "The wall of separation between church and state, Thomas Jefferson's metaphor for the independence of churches from government support and patronage, may well have strengthened the position of religion in the United States" (Wald, 1992: 18).

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