Edward Hallett Carr: Historical Realism and the Liberal Tradition

David Freeland Duke

ABSTRACT: The works of Edward Hallett Carr represent an important contribution to the historiography of Soviet Russia and to the study of international relations in general. Yet his work is often dismissed, primarily because Carr was considered 'ideologically unsound,' that is, a Stalinist. This essay examines the validity of that charge and concludes instead that Carr was in fact firmly realistic in his writings on the Soviet Union and on international relations. In the case of the Soviet Union, this paper argues that Carr's realism produced works of balance and judgement in a period – the Cold War – when such characteristics were anathema to the historiography of the subject. In at least one of his works on international relations, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, this realism represented a novel and revolutionary approach to the the subject.

A significant characteristic of the British educational and social system of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the remarkable number of polymaths it spawned. Individuals such as Bertrand Russell, Robert Graves, and J.B. Priestley acknowledged the benefits that the liberal atmosphere of British education afforded them. Interested individuals were free to study – and more importantly, to question – any subject that attracted them, and this questioning produced an environment of freedom which greatly enriched the British intellectual climate in the early twentieth century. As the increasing complexity of the twentieth century resulted in a reaction against unrestrained free thinking, however, this freedom was soon revealed to be a double-edged sword. Both Russell and Priestley, in later life, were not only criticized but even placed under surveillance as they became more active in the peace and antinuclear movements of the 1950s and 1960s.

These are extreme examples of an undercurrent of conservatism which gradually encroached upon the sphere of British scholastics and which became particularly marked after World War Two. As the Cold War mercury fell, writing about communism, and particularly the Soviet brand, became increasingly less and less popular – or acceptable – without resorting to ideological invective and suspicion. At this time, however, a British historian published the first volumes of a truly magisterial history of the Soviet Union. Unlike other

historians, he refused to write about the Soviet Union in anything other than realist terms, and he suffered because of his conviction in this matter. But Edward Hallett Carr, who, in his own way, was a polymath, was by that point no stranger to controversy, and his convictions, founded on the seemingly irreconcilable pillars of liberalism and historical realism, were very strong.

E.H. Carr was born in 1892 to upper middle class parents, and he received the standard education of male children of that era. A secondary education at Merchant Taylor's, one of the public schools of medium prestige, led to a scholarship to study classics at Cambridge. But just as Carr completed his university degree the comfortable liberal world of Edwardian Britain was shattered by the outbreak of the First World War. He immediately volunteered for active service but was deemed physically unfit for the front. He joined the Foreign Office instead.[1] His choice of a foreign service career was, Carr recalled years later, fortuitous, for it gave him a unique position from which to observe the entrance of two new actors on the international stage.

Critics have suggested that Carr reacted in much the same way as his colleagues when faced with the appearance of the first of these actors, namely the emergence of the communist Soviet state after 1917. One author goes so far as to note that Carr held the opinion, in common with the majority of the Foreign Office, that the revolution should be "strangled in its cradle."[2] Carr recalled in an unpublished memoir, however, that he had realized at the time that the Petrograd revolution was not a historical accident, rather that it was a lasting change and that the Western reaction to the nascent Soviet Union was "narrow, blind and stupid."[3]

There is no doubt of his views on the other new institution born of the First World War. After his training at the Foreign Office, Carr's first major assignment was to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, where he was sequestered by a small British committee whose mandate was to examine "the Russian problem". While in Paris, Carr eagerly watched the birth of the League of Nations, founded, he believed, on the strong liberal values that he cherished and which he hoped would return the world to its prewar state of peace and serenity. Indeed, for a while it even seemed as if the prewar golden age was going to be successfully restored: by the mid-nineteen twenties the world economy had largely been rebuilt and even the Soviet Union seemed to be retreating back into capitalist economics

with the New Economic Policy, initiated in 1921. Yet, by the late 1920s, Carr became worried about what he felt were signs of danger. He noted some years later that the League of Nations quickly degenerated from being a force that could achieve a great deal of good to one that relied increasingly on conservatism and complacency:

> The League of Nations, more than any other institution, was overtaken by the reaction from the brief interlude of optimism of 1918-1919 to the static complacency of the 'twenties. Created in a mood of burning faith in human progress, of which it was to be the principal instrument, it was quickly perverted into a tool of the satisfied Powers...[4]

For their time, these words represent a fundamentally heterodox view of both the role of the League of Nations in interwar international affairs, and of the role of the "satisfied Powers" (namely Britain and France) in the affairs of the League itself. By 1942 Carr had tied the deficiencies of the League to the meddling of the Great Powers and not, as then was vogue to do, to the intransigence of the fascist nations. In this respect he was almost twenty years ahead of his time.[5] But what caused such a basic shift in the philosophy of an essentially liberal Victorian individual?

In the mid 1920s Carr became increasingly absorbed in Russian culture and history. In 1925 he was posted to Riga, the capital of Latvia which, as one historian has pointed out, "was then to Soviet Russia what Hong Kong is to China – news from the mighty giant next door filtered through into the bridge-parties and excited endless chatter."[6] Riga was at that time a stop-off point for travellers coming to and from Moscow, and Carr picked up a great deal of news about the Soviet Union. He learned Russian, and soon began to immerse himself not in the intricacies and excesses of Soviet politics but in the elegance and sophistication of Russian literature and philosophy. Carr's first foray into this world was a comprehensive reading of Dostoevsky – in Russian – which soon led him into darker circles. In particular, Carr became fascinated with the philosophy and politics of Russians exiled by the Czars for their dangerous views. He began to study the writings of Mikhail Bakunin, the Russian anarchist and founder of nihilism, and quickly drew a parallel between the revolutionary spirit of the nineteenth century and the Revolution of 1917.

When examining the work of another Russian writer, Chernyshevsky, Carr concluded that he "came nearer than any pre-Marxist Russian writer to anticipating the doctrines which the Russian Revolution was one day to make its own."[7] This is not to say that Carr fell into the oft-repeated error of assuming that the Russian Revolution and its autocratic aftermath were simply continuations of some characteristic peculiar to Russian history that *required* the existence of autocracy. Instead, he was demonstrating an extremely important lesson, namely that the Russian Revolution did not simply "happen," nor that it was devoid of a non-Marxist philosophical background. This interpretation of the 1917 revolution was truly original, since historians had hitherto examined the origins of the Russian revolution in purely political terms; philosophy entered into their calculations only insofar as one could call Marx a philosopher.

Although Carr published a book on Dostoevsky in 1931 and another on the "Romantic Exiles," as he called them, in 1933, subsequently he was forced temporarily to abandon Russian history. In 1930 his Foreign Office career took him back to London, where he worked on German affairs. But it was not the same Carr of five years before. He was still a liberal by temperament, and would remain so until the day he died, but intellectually he had acquired an outlook based on the "exotic world of nineteenth century Russian ideas."[8] This outlook only strengthened the aura of unorthodoxy which Carr projected, and it soon became clear that the Foreign Office was just too staid and conservative for his tastes (although one suspects that the reverse was probably true – that Carr's unorthodoxy was a little too much for the Foreign Office). He entered the world of academia in 1937, accepting the Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth. He threw himself into a flurry of writing, which resulted in a book on Bakunin, published in 1937, and several books on international relations.

The "exotic world" to which he had been exposed produced a dramatic shift in Carr's political philosophy, a shift first apparent in his works on international relations. It should be pointed out that, of all Carr's work, his writings on international relations are certainly the weakest. All but one of his works on the subject are either flawed or dated, as they were written either on the eve of or during the Second World War.[9] The one exception, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* is, although flawed in its own right, still considered to be a classic textbook on the subject of international relations, and in particular

on international bargaining, and is still being used today, over fifty years after its publication. In this work, Carr began to show many of the characteristics which grew out of his work on Russian intellectual history, and which mark his later work on the Soviet Union: direct and objective argument, and, above all, uncompromising realism.

Carr's realism is not difficult to trace. There was a certain degree of contempt for the League of Nations, not only because of its absolute failure to fulfil its mandate, but also because of the ungraceful and illogical refusal of its proponents to accept any blame for its failure to avert war. Without doubt Carr was disillusioned by the failure of the League. He was also angry at those utopian thinkers, however, such as Arnold Toynbee and Sir Alfred Zimmern, who

> became embittered, seeking scapegoats for the collapse of their dream in the 'power politics' practised by the revisionist states, and themselves withdrawing into a form of moralism in which right behaviour in international relations became identified with respect for the sanctity of treaties, peace with the maintenance of the status quo, and the hopes of the League with the interests of Britain and France.[10]

In *The Twenty Years' Crisis* the central issue in the study of international relations was the conflict between utopianism and realism. Carr argued that "the exposure by realist criticism of the utopian edifice is the most urgent task of the moment in international thought."[11]

Carr allowed his realism free rein in *The Twenty Years' Crisis.* He argued that the Locarno Treaty of 1925 was simply the result of power politics between France and Germany. He wrote that:

> [By 1925] the Ruhr invasion had brought little profit to France, and had left her perplexed as to the next step. Germany might one day be powerful again. [But] Germany... still feared the military supremacy of France, and hankered after a guarantee. It was the psychological moment when French fear of Germany was about equally balanced by Germany's fear of France; and a treaty which had not been possible two years before, and would not have been possible five years later, was now welcome to both.[12]

There may seem to be nothing particularly profound in these observations. Nevertheless, this passage is extremely important, for no one, historian or political scientist, had written in these terms before, especially about something as honour-bound as a treaty. Diplomatic historians had examined treaty diplomacy from one point of view only, usually from the standpoint of their own country. If their own country had gained some advantage from a treaty, the result could usually be found in the skill of their negotiators. If, however, disadvantage resulted, it was due to some nefarious hoodwinking scheme on the part of the other party. No previous historian had adopted Carr's realist method of drawing up a "balance sheet" and determining the interests of each party and weighing them against the other, a technique which considerably advanced and refined the field of international relations study.

But Carr made even greater contributions to international studies. He was the first writer to emphasize the importance of economic analysis in the study of international relations: "economic forces are in fact political forces... Much confusion would be saved by a general return to the term 'political economy,' which was given the new science by Adam Smith himself and not abandoned in favour of the abstract 'economics' even in Great Britain itself, till the closing years of the nineteenth century."[13]

The other advance Carr initiated in the study of international relations was an insistence that the area now known as "strategic studies" also played a very important role in diplomatic history. Carr summed up this point in his characteristically incisive fashion: "if every prospective writer on international affairs in the last twenty years had taken a compulsory course in elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained unwritten."[14] Strategic studies, which today forms a veritable branch of study in its own right, owes its genesis to the work of E.H. Carr. *The Twenty Years' Crisis* thus remains a highly relevant work, both for the practice and theory of international relations history. Indeed, as Roger Morgan has pointed out, Carr's development of a theoretical framework to explain the bargaining process between states still remains not only valid but also acts as "a powerful and lasting stimulus for students of international relations."[15]

Despite its relevancy, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is still a fundamentally limited work. While Carr successfully demolished the utopian conception of international relations he was unable to replace it with

a tenable realist framework. In particular, he was unable to construct a moral structure upon which such a conception could rest. According to Carr, the development of a moral construct was not simply an intellectual problem limited to the *study* of international relations; it limited the *practice* of international relations as well. If, as he admitted, the consistent application of realism excluded moral judgment, then the only basis of international relations would be power: political, economic, or military.[16] As Hans Morgenthau points out, although Carr desperately attempted to solve this problem, he failed, in the end, because he was forced to recognize that the most powerful international actors created and defined the practice of international relations. Morgenthau argues that the "search for principles which can give moral meaning, and set normative limits, to the struggle for power on the international scene [brought] Mr. Carr back to where he started from: to power itself."[17] This problem, unresolved in Carr's work on international relations, persisted in his great work on the Soviet Union.

Even as his output of material on international relations peaked, Carr began to think of writing a history of the Soviet Union. The Soviet history, he realized, would be no small task, especially as he had taken on duties in addition to his post at Aberystwyth, accepting an assistant editorial position with the London *Times* in 1938. Although Carr had been considering the history for a number of years, not until late 1944 did he discuss the subject with another person. In his diary of 17 October, Carr recorded that he "[s]aw Daniel Macmillan and broached the Russian project," and, when Macmillan (of the publishing house) expressed support, Carr began to work seriously on the project.[18]

Carr's methodology, while by no means unique, deserves some attention, for it is a reflection of the historian's scholarly habits. His Foreign Office training stood him in good stead, since he was forced to use official Soviet documents for much of his primary source material. Many historians, both then and now, were ambivalent as to the usefulness of Soviet primary source material. Carr, however, was able to put his editorial talent, learnt at the Foreign Office, to good use. He could scan a pile of press clippings and Soviet government releases and quickly separate the wheat from the chaff.[19] He could do so thanks to an encyclopaedic memory. He often determined the acceptability of a series of figures by mentally comparing them with another, memorized set. If the figures did not

coincide, Carr more often than not discarded them. But occasionally he would pursue the matter further: Why were the figures, or facts, incompatible? What was the motivation for producing incorrect figures? By using this method Carr often followed leads to considerable lengths, using tell-tale signs as his guide, signs that other scholars simply failed to notice.

Despite his large capacity for detailed research, Carr was not some kind of superhuman encyclopaedia; he could be pedantic when he wanted to be. Later in his career he employed the daughter of his longtime friend Isaac Deutscher as a research assistant, a relationship which quickly developed into one of equal collaboration. Tamara Deutscher remembers the other side of Carr's research, where determining the veracity of a single footnote could take a day or more.[20] So Carr was, when necessary, extraordinarily painstaking and indeed perhaps a little overzealous when researching his work. But he believed that his greatest quality was his ability "for cutting through a load of nonsense and getting straight to the point," which, with characteristic modesty, Carr claimed he had learned by observing A.E. Housman, whom he felt possessed "the most powerful intellectual machinery" he had "seen in action."[21] And in terms of Soviet history, there was a great deal of "nonsense to cut through."

As the Cold War deepened, the intellectual climate of Soviet studies deteriorated correspondingly. Carr travelled to the United States to examine the vast repository of documents there, but in the paranoid climate which McCarthyism produced, he was unable to gain a grant from the Ford Foundation and instead had to rely on funds generated by a lecture tour.[22] The cause of Carr's persona non grata status was his insistence on divorcing ideology from Soviet history. He was attacked for demonstrating that there was a philosophical – as opposed to a merely ideological – basis to the Soviet system. At this time the Korean War was raging, and the United States (and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the Western world) desperately needed an entrenched position of moral rectitude from which to battle the communist menace. It was easier for historians of the Soviet Union at this time to show that the Russian Revolution was an aberration, an accident of history. The Bolsheviks were no more than an unhappy mischance which could, by diligent pressure from the United States, be rectified.

Carr's three-volume history, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, published between 1950 and 1953, swept away the notion that the revolution

was accidental. Carr argued that the revolutionary tradition in Russia harkened back to the philosophy of the nineteenth century and that Marxism, while to a large degree supplanting that tradition, by no means eradicated it. But Carr really parted company from received wisdom when he insisted that "parliamentary democracy" was never a goal of even the most liberal revolutionary. Many Westerners believed that the Russian Revolution had begun by embracing democratic principles, only to be hijacked by the autocratic Bolsheviks.

Carr pointed out that to accept the standard interpretation of the revolution meant that the Russian revolutionaries would have had to have embraced, or at least acknowledged, Western democratic principles. But this was clearly not the case. In the preface to a collection of his essays he wrote:

> Several of these essays relate to the incompatibilities existing before the Revolution between the Russian and Western traditions. The Russian revolution reflected these incompatibilities. It was an event in Russian history, but it was also an event of worldwide significance. The balance is important. If we overemphasize its Russian aspect, we treat it as an event in a faraway country with no lessons, or no positive lessons, for the West. If we underemphasize its Russian characteristics, we assume that a Western revolution pursuing aims akin to those of the Russian revolution would necessarily have taken the same course and incorporated the same elements of a specifically Russian background. Both these views seem to me fallacious.[23]

He refused to apply a Western standard to the revolution, arguing instead that the mass movement created by the February Revolution was "inspired by a wave of immense enthusiasm and by Utopian visions of the emancipation of mankind from the shackles of a remote and despotic power. It had no use for the Western principles of parliamentary democracy and constitutional government proclaimed by the Provisional Government."[24] Carr then went on to demonstrate that the "Utopian visions" were not born of the writings of Voltaire, Marat, or Franklin, but were instead rooted in the works of Bakunin, Belinsky, Nechaev and Chernyshevsky, who advocated an entirely different (and non-Marxist) version of Utopia.

Despite Carr's emphasis on the particularly Russian character of the Revolution of 1917 and his perceptive conclusions concerning the intellectual well-springs of the revolutionaries, his history remains curiously glacial and distant when it deals with the individuals involved. A sympathetic critic notes that "from a moral point of view it denotes the absence of sympathy and compassion, even of humanity. And to disregard moral considerations and judgments may not be the ideal approach to writing history."[25] This criticism is completely valid but perhaps somewhat harsh if one recalls the difficulties Carr previously encountered when attempting to derive a moral basis for realist history. It is quite possible that Morgenthau's description that Carr had been trapped in an Odyssean search for that moral basis, always leading back to the simple exercise of power, is indeed correct. In *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Carr gave up on the lesser lights and focused his study on those wielding power. The powerbrokers were, in fact, very few in number: the Bolsheviks initially attempted to govern through a series of newly-established committees and state organs, and individual leaders, apart from a very small group — most notably Lenin and Trotsky — remained in the background. If Carr was interested in the loci of power as a means to explain the course of the revolution, then it is not surprising that he concentrated on Bolshevik organizations rather than Bolshevik leaders in the first volumes of his history. Indeed, not until the fourth volume of the history, *The Interregnum*, which covers the period immediately following Lenin's death, did individual Bolshevik leaders assume any importance for Carr. Not until this period, moreover, did *individual* leaders begin to vie for position in the succession struggle and hence become *individual* factors in the overall struggle for power.

Despite the obvious problems this approach engendered, Carr insisted in proceeding along purely realistic lines of inquiry. This insistence was galling to many American historians, who accused him of being an "apologist for Stalin."[26] But any thoughtful reading of Carr's work quickly demonstrates the fallacy of this charge. While it is true that Carr occasionally over-reached himself in attempting to balance the bad with some good, he never became apologetic. When Stalin died in 1953, Carr wrote an obituary for the journal *Soviet Studies*, in which he noted that Stalin "was the most ruthless despot that Russia had known since Peter, and [was] also a great Westernizer."[27] He later wrote of the costs of Stalin's drive for industrialization that "to anyone reared in the liberal tradition, there

is something mechanical and rather repugnant in this weighing of human lives against material advantage. One would like to believe that the costs of progress can be measured in less brutal terms."[28]

These are not, one suspects, the words of an apologist. But the issue of apologetics was probably not the real concern of the historians who questioned Carr's objectivity. Through his entrenched realism, he attacked not only his critics' work, which consisted of little more that propaganda pieces against the Soviet Union, but the very basis upon which their work was founded. Carr argued that it was unacceptable to hate Stalin simply because he was Stalin. Indeed, Carr argued convincingly that it was wrong for a historian to harbour emotions about any historical figure and still produce good, analytical work on the subject.[29] In historiographical terms, Carr was merely arguing for – unusually for a British historian of the period – the primacy of historicism over morally judgmental history. Carr's sympathy towards the achievements of either Stalin or the Stalinist system, coupled with his refusal to amplify the murderous excesses of both system and leader, are simply reflections of this historicism and moral neutrality.

This point is important, for, since his death, several scholars have wondered about the nature of Carr's politics. Although he called himself an "amateur Marxist," a statement which was quickly seized upon, it is quite clear that Carr made this remark in jest.[30] Early in his career, at least, Carr had very little time for Marxist theory. In his *Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism*, published in 1934, Carr set out to demolish Marx as a political thinker, referring to him as "the genius of destruction, not of construction."[31] And yet, in his 1961 Trevelyan lectures, subsequently reprinted as the historiographical work *What is History?*, Carr devoted great effort to a defence of Marx; Karl Marx the historian, though, not Marx the political thinker. In particular, Carr attacked Karl Popper's and Isaiah Berlin's arguments against historicism on very specific grounds and for very specific reasons. Regarding Berlin's thesis, Carr objected especially to the view that historicism, "by explaining human actions in causal terms .., implies a denial of human free will, and encourages historians to evade their supposed obligation ... to pronounce moral condemnation on the Charlemagnes, Napoleons, and Stalins of history."[32] Carr's defence of Marx, then, is not necessarily reflective of any sympathy with Marxism politically, but it is reflective of his shared sympathy with Marx historically; i.e., that historical realism must

take precedence over moralistic and judgmental history. Carr could therefore be classified as a Marxist historian – but only in the very narrowest sense of the term.

In terms of a political label, Carr could be defined as an economic socialist. He was profoundly disturbed by the increasing gulf between rich and poor in capitalist society, and continually advocated the establishment and expansion of a social "safety net" – free education, health care and welfare – to protect the poor. But even this description is inadequate. In the final analysis, Carr's politics were simply those of the outsider. He positively relished his position as "wild man in the wings," but this political orientation did not make him eccentric or remote. Tamara Deutscher recalls that he was extremely enthusiastic about the younger generations as they arrived at Cambridge (where he held a fellowship from 1955 until his death almost thirty years later). Indeed, he was very progressive in his views. Deutscher notes that Carr "was enthusiastic about the admission of women to his college – a measure long overdue in his judgement ... He did not think the young were either more or less 'moral' or 'serious' than they had been in his days, and all bemoaning of 'our permissive society' he treated as nothing but cant."[33]

In the final years of his life, Carr began to reminisce more about the past. He wrote to Deutscher a few weeks before he died: "9 August 1982. 80th anniversary of the Coronation of King Edward VII, postponed from June for the removal of his appendix. I was on a family holiday at Exmouth, and remember the decorations and fireworks. Why could we not go on living forever in that innocent world?"[34] This charming and somewhat wistful sentiment provides a highly revealing insight into Carr's character. He longed for the simplicity and the certainty of his youth, and for the strong Victorian liberal values with which he associated. Carr could be a ruthless realist in his work, but the apolitical character of his work on Soviet history, which his realist approach helped produce, guarantees him a position of greatness as a historian. Nevertheless, he was a liberal at heart, a fact which he successfully concealed from his readers for over fifty years. This curious mix of values and beliefs – the master of *realpolitik* on the one hand, the yearning for the certainty of liberalism on the other – is all the more remarkable when one considers how successful Carr was at divorcing each element from the other in his work.

NOTES

[1] Jonathan Haslam, "'We Need a Faith': E.H. Carr, 1892-1982," *History Today* 33 (August 1983), 36
[2] Ibid.
[3] Tamara Deutscher, "E.H. Carr - A Personal Memoir," *New Left Review*, 137 (January-February 1983), 80
[4] E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (New York, 1942), xv-xvi
[5] Not until the publication of A.J.P. Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War* in 1961 did a historian examine the role of the League of Nations in contributing to the outbreak of the second World War. Taylor's conclusions were much the same as Carr's. See Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London, 1985), 127-29; 135-36.
[6] Jonathan Haslam, "E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia," *Historical Journal* 26 (1983), 1022
[7] E.H. Carr, "The Pan-Slav Tradition," in Carr *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays* (London, 1980), 51
[8] Haslam, "'We Need a Faith': E.H. Carr, 1892-1982," 37
[9] The books in question are *Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy From Versailles to the Outbreak of War* (London, 1939); *International Relations Since the Peace Treaties* (London, 1937); *Conditions of Peace* (New York, 1942); and *Nationalism and After* (New York, 1945)
[10] Hedley Bull, "*The Twenty Years' Crisis* Thirty Years On," *International Journal* 24 (Autumn 1969), 626
[11] E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York, 1939), 303
[12] Ibid., 135-6
[13] Ibid., 149
[14] Ibid., 142
[15] Roger Morgan, "E.H. Carr and the Study of International Relations," in C. Abramsky, ed., *Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr* (Hamden, Connecticut, 1974), 179
[16] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Surrender to the Immanence of Power: E.H. Carr," in Morgenthau ed., *Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago, 1962), 37
[17] Ibid.
[18] Haslam, "E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia," 1021
[19] Ibid., 1022
[20] Deutscher, "E.H. Carr - A Personal Memoir," 82-3
[21] Ibid., 84

[22] Haslam, "E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia," 1022
[23] Carr, "Preface," in *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, viii
[24] E.H. Carr, *The Russian Revolution From Lenin to Stalin, 1917-1929* (London, 1979), 3. Despite the different title, and the latter date of publication, this work is merely a synopsis of Carr's fourteen-volume history. The views represented in this work are no different form those he expressed in the first edition of volume one, published in 1950.
[25] Walter Laqueur, *The Fate of the Revolution,* rev'd ed. (New York, 1987), 120
[26] Haslam, "E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia," 1024
[27] E.H. Carr, "Stalin," *Soviet Studies* 5 (July, 1953), 2
[28] Carr, "The Legacy of Stalin," in *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, 101-102
[29] E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York, 1964), 97-100
[30] This remark was, as is so often the case, taken out of context. The full statement was: "I am very much an amateur Marxist, and soon get out of my depth. Also, I may have a hidden preference for the English idiom in which I grew up, over the German-American." - hardly the words of an avowed revolutionary. See Deutscher, "E.H. Carr - A Personal Memoir," 84.
[31] E.H. Carr, *Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism* (London, 1934), 301
[32] Carr, *What is History?*, 120
[33] Deutscher, "E.H. Carr - A Personal Memoir," 85-6
[34] Ibid., 86