Political Science 61: Introduction to International Relations
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This is a glossary of key terms that arise in the lectures and the readings in Political Science 61: Introduction to International Relations. Many of the definitions below come from my personal research notes and publications. I have also included endnotes for most entries so that students can easily find additional sources on each term or category, if they so desire.

The glossary consists of four parts:
    (1) Methodological terms and concepts,
    (2) Philosophical traditions in the study of international relations,
    (3) Modern research programs and major theories in the study of international relations, and
    (4) Assorted theoretical terms and concepts.

Caveat Emptor: This is not a comprehensive list of terms and concepts introduced in PS 61. You are responsible for knowing all terms introduced in the lectures and the readings, not just those on this list. If (and only if) time permits, I may update this lexicon throughout the semester. *Those who wish to do well in Political Science 51 will use this lexicon as a supplement to, not as a substitute for, the readings and regular class attendance.*

METHODOLOGICAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Causation: Causation occurs when the change in the **dependent variable** is a *direct result* of changes in the **independent variable**. The variables not only change together, but the change in the dependent variable is due to change in the independent variable. Most of the social sciences seek to establish the causation of particular phenomena.[1]

Causal mechanism: A causal mechanism is the specific process by which the proposed cause or independent variable produces changes in the effect or dependent variable. For example, the hypothesis "higher levels of literacy causes democracy" posits a causal relationship between changes in the level of literacy and the likelihood that a state will be democratic. If this conjectured relationship were true, one should be able to identify how changes in the level of literacy produced greater democracy. For example, one might examine increases in voter registration among literate adults versus illiterate adults, or track the rate of participation in civic and political organizations over time, etc.

Correlation: A correlation occurs when changes in the dependent variable and in the independent variable happen, but one *cannot* establish a clear causal connection between the two. In other words, the values of the independent and dependent variables change together (i.e., co-vary), but one cannot establish that the change in the independent variable caused the change in the dependent variable.

Data collection (a.k.a., evidence gathering): A wide range of activities that constitute a vital stage in the research process. Without a sufficient amount of data that is relevant to the puzzle or question that the researcher seeks to answer, that researcher cannot subject rival causal hypotheses to empirical scrutiny. Data collection encompasses a wide range of activities and methods, including (but not limited to) observation, participant observation, experimentation, intensive interviews, archival research, research gathered from secondary historical sources, ethnography, large-scale surveys, and the creation and modification of quantitative data sets.

Deductive knowledge: Knowledge gained through the generalization of logical analysis.

Dependent variable (DV): (1) "A variable framing the caused phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis"; (2) the phenomenon that one seeks to explain. In the hypothesis, "higher levels of literacy causes democracy," the degree of democracy is the dependent variable.

Empirical: *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* offers the following definition of the adjective empirical: "(1) relying on experience or observation alone without due regard for system and theory; (2) originating in or based on observation or experience; and (3) capable of being verified or disproved through observation or experiment." In the IR sub field of political science, the second and third definitions are more relevant. Empirical theories relate to observable facts and seek to provide causal explanations for observable phenomena. Empirical theories seek to explain the world as it is, rather than how the world ought to be; they seek to explain how and why actors behavior, rather than proscribe how actors ought to behave.

Falsifiable and Falsifiability: Falsifiability is a desirable and necessary attribute of any causal theory or testable hypothesis. A hypothesis or theory is falsifiable to the extent that it posits a casual pattern *distinct* from those of other theories or hypotheses. A falsifiable hypothesis or theory must be stated clearly enough to be proven wrong. Three critical ingredients are necessary: (1) there must be some standard to weight the causal importance of the independent variables posited by competing hypotheses; (2) the basic casual claims must appear in the form of generalizations that other researchers can test; and (3) these generalizations should be stated as *predictions* of future patterns of evidence expected within a particular case and across different data (e.g., memoirs, archives, statistical data sets, etc.), even if such data is not yet available.[2]

Hypothesis: (1) A conjectured causal relationship between two phenomena;" (2) an explicit and falsifiable statement drawn from a theory that links variation in the proposed cause (the independent variable) to variation in or the appearance of the effect (the dependent variable). . Although many political scientists talk about testing competing theories against empirical evidence, it is more accurate to say that they test hypotheses derived from competing theories against empirical evidence. **One cannot test entire theories, let alone entire research programs**. While a good theory is in principle *falsifiable*, a single case study, a series of case studies or large N studies cannot disconfirm an entire theory. Stephen Van Evera draws a distinction among several types of hypotheses:

> *Prime hypothesis*: "The overarching hypothesis that frames the relationship between a theory's independent and dependent variables."

> *Explanatory hypothesis*: "The intermediate hypotheses that constitute a theory's explanation."

> *Test hypothesis or testable hypothesis*: "The hypothesis" that we test; the hypothesis that we subject to scrutiny against empirical evidence (see below).[3]

One can further distinguish testable hypotheses by the types of causal relationships they posit. Testable hypotheses can be deterministic or probabilistic. Please note that in the IR sub field of political science, the vast majority of theories generate **probabilistic** hypotheses. The following examples are determinate and probabilistic hypotheses come from Stephen M. Walt's balance-of-threat theory (see below):

1. *Determinate Hypothesis*: States facing an external threat will align will others to oppose the state posing the threat. (Walt defines "threat" as a composite of a state's aggregate power, offensive military capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived aggressive intentions.)

2. *Probabilistic Hypothesis*: States facing an external threat will likely align with others to oppose the state posing the threat.

3. *Determinate Hypothesis*: Bipolar systems are less prone to major war than multipolar systems.

4. *Probabilistic Hypothesis*: Bipolar systems are usually less prone to major war than multipolar systems.

Independent variable (IV): "A variable framing the causal phenomena of a causal theory or hypothesis. In the hypothesis, 'literacy causes democracy,' the degree of literacy is the independent variable."

Inductive Knowledge: Knowledge gained through the generalization of example and experience.

Intervening variable (IntV): "A variable framing intervening phenomenon included in a causal theory's explanation. Intervening phenomena are caused by the IV and cause the DV. In the theory, 'Sunshine causes photosynthesis, causing grass to grow,' photosynthesis is the intervening variable."

Model: There is no single definition of the term "model" in the IR sub field of political science. Different scholars use model to mean: (1) a formal (i.e., mathematical) representation of proposed causal relationship; or (2) the observable and measurable implications of a hypothesis; or (3) as a synonym for a theory or hypothesis. Any one of these definitions is appropriate in Political Science 51.

Over-determination: An over-determined phenomenon is for which that are too many possible independent and intervening variables, thus making it very difficult establish a causal relationship with any degree of confidence. In such situations, any theory at any level of analysis can find some empirical support. For example, many IR scholars (although not all) consider the absence of war among the major Western European states since 1945 to be an over-determined phenomenon. In other words, there are *too* many potential causes for the absence of war, including the bipolar international system that existed from 1945 to 1990; the unipolar international system that has existed since 1990-91; nuclear weapons; the forward presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe; the integration of the German armed forces into NATO's military command structure; elite and popular memories of the devastation wrought by the First and the Second World Wars; the emergence of multilateral institutions such as the European Union (EU), etc.

Predictions: Predictions or observable implications tell us what the world would look like if a hypothesis were true. Predictions tell us what types of evidence would support a particular hypothesis. Please note:

1. Predictions <u>ARE NOT</u> about the distant future or the weather. In the social science, there is a distinction between *predictions*—the observable implications of hypotheses—and *forecasts*—conjectural inferences about events that have not yet happened.

2. In the social sciences, it is perfectly acceptable to speak of predictions regarding *past events* (e.g., Offensive realism predicts that the Truman administration would expand its Korean War aims in August and September <u>1950</u>, given battlefield opportunities created by the UN coalitions victories in the south and the diminished likelihood of Soviet and Chinese Communist intervention.)

<u>Example:</u>

Testable Hypothesis: The greater the threatening state's aggregate power the greater the tendency for others to align against that state.

If this hypothesis derived from Walt's balance-of-threat theory were correct (in any particular case) we should see the following:

- Empirical evidence that national leaders were cognizant of changes in the relative distribution of power among states.

- Evidence that national leaders became increasingly alarmed about the projected growth of another state's capabilities. In other words, one should find indications that national leaders saw the rising state as threatening.

- Evidence that national leaders both considered and actually tried to forge an alliance with another state (or states) directed at containing the threatening state and, if necessary, defeating that state in war.

Research programs (a.k.a. paradigms or schools): Research programs are families of related empirical theories that proceed from the same core assumptions and antecedent conditions. Different philosophers of science (e.g., Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn, etc.) posit different ways to group theories, acquire empirical knowledge, and access theoretical progress. Different IR scholars offer competing classifications of research programs and assign different theories to different programs.[4] Please remember that each research program encompasses many different theories and that these are not hermetically sealed categories. The major empirical research programs in the IR sub field of political science today are:

- Contemporary Realism (a.k.a., structural realism)

- Contemporary Liberalism (a.k.a., neoliberalism)

- Marxism and Neo-Marxism (including world systems theory)

- Constructivism

Spurious factor: (or relationship): A factor which merely appears to cause behavior because it is also related (or caused) by the true causal factor.

Theory: A hypothesized causal statement (*A* causes *B*), together with an explanation of the causal law or hypothesis that explicates how *A* causes *B*. More generally, a theory is a hypothesized pattern of behavior for individuals, groups, states, and/or the international system. At minimum, a theory consists of a set of un-testable core assumptions (about how the world works, the nature of actors, etc.), a set of scope conditions that tell us the circumstances under which one such expect the theory to operate, and a core (or general) hypothesis. Every theory (or at least every good theory) generates many specific testable hypotheses. The testable hypotheses actually do the work of explaining real world phenomena.

PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Classical Realism

Classical realism is a philosophical tradition that sees international politics as a perpetual struggle for power and resources in a world of scarcity. The state or political community, not the individual or economic class, is the primary unit of analysis in classical realism. Classical realists wrote over the course of some three millennia and for vastly different purposes. Moreover, it is incorrect to say that all classical realists identified human nature as the root cause of conflict in history. Some, such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr, saw human nature, specifically human being's inherent lust for power or sin, as the root cause of warfare (the so-called "evil" tradition). Others, such as Thomas Hobbes, Arnold Wolfers, John Herz, and Raymond Aron, saw anarchy, the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government, as the permissive cause war (the so-called "tragic" tradition). Yet others, such as Thucydides, Winston Churchill, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and E. H. Carr, stressed the combination of human nature, anarchy, and the ambitions of individual statesmen as the root causes of warfare. All classical realists created their theories through induction, not deduction. The notion of a balance-of-power is one the major themes in classical realism. Please note, that modern IR theorists coined the term "classical realism" to distinguish the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and others, from the structural or neorealism of Kenneth Waltz and his followers.[5]

Classical Liberalism

Classical liberalism is a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the ability of human reason to create a world of peace and harmony. Thus, this school presents a fundamentally optimistic view of human history, in contrast to the pessimistic view presented by classical realism. Classical liberalism was largely an outgrowth of the Age of Enlightenment in late seventeenth and eighteenth century Western Europe (although Hugo Grotius wrote in the sixteenth century). In general, adherents of classical liberalism (a.k.a., *idealism*) hold that the international system tends strongly toward peace and cooperation among states. Classical liberals identified different mechanisms for this trend: (1) economic interdependence among states resulting from free trade (i.e., economic liberalism); (2) transnational ties among individuals and privately organized interest groups within society (i.e., transnational liberalism); (3) the emergence of a "pacific union" of states with republican or liberal democratic political systems (i.e., Kantian liberalism); (4) the emergence of a society of states bound by common rules, customs, and norms (i.e., Groatian tradition); and (5) the creation of formal international organizations and collective security mechanisms (i.e., Wilsonian internationalism). To classical liberals, warfare is not the result of the anarchic nature of the international system, but rather the result of human folly or the defective political systems of individual states. The carnage of World War I (1914-18) and the Twenty Years' Crisis (1919-39) largely discredited the several variants of classical liberalism. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism and the modern literature on the democratic peace are the intellectual descendants of classical liberalism.[6]

Marxism

Marxism is a school of thought inspired by the writings of Karl Marx, and refined by V. I. Lenin and others. Marxism identifies the causes of war as class conflict especially conflict between and within the capitalist class. Class, not the state or the individual, is the major unit of analysis in Marxist theory. Marxism presents a dialectical conception of human history: contradictions inherent in each historical epoch eventually lead to the rise of a new dominant class. The bourgeoisie or capitalist class dominates the era of capitalism, according to Marx. This era of capitalism will inevitably produce a proletarian, or working class, revolution. An era of socialism will follow, in which workers own the means of production. Eventually, there will be a classless, communist society in which the state, historically a tool of the bourgeoisie, will wither away. A number of contemporary theorists have drawn on Marxist insights and categories of analysis, particularly in the study of on imperialism, dependency, and the world capitalist system.[7]

MODERN IR RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND MAJOR THEORIES

Balance-of-power theory

The balance-of-power is a major concept in classical realism and in contemporary realism. In general, balance-of-power theory holds that an extreme concentration of material power in the hands of single state or attempts by a state to conquer a region will provoke countervailing actions. These countervailing actions, called balancing, can take the form of alliance formation (external balancing) or efforts by individual states to increase their own relative power, generally through arms racing and military innovation (internal balancing). While balancing does not always operate efficiency to prevent the outbreak of war, it does help to maintain the stability of relations among states in the long-term. Two variants of balance-of-power theory are important in Political Science 51:

- ***Classical Realist Balance-of-power theory:*** Classical realists, such as Morgenthau, Gulick, Kissinger, and Carr, saw the balance-of-power as a system consciously created by the great powers of the day. The balance-of-power functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when they are easily formed or broken based on expediency, regardless of values, religion, history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. From the wars of Louis XIV (1688-1714) until World War II (1939-45), Great Britain played the role of balancer in Western Europe. The United States has played a similar role in Western Europe since World War I (1914-18). *Classical realist balance-of-power theory holds that major war is less likely in a multipolar international system with fluid alliances among the great powers. Conversely, major war is more likely in bipolar international systems or in multipolar systems with rigid great power alliances.* Note, that classical balance-of-power theory is an inductive theory. Morgenthau, Gulick, and others developed the theory by drawing upon their reading of modern European diplomatic history. Major criticisms of the theory centered on its relevance to the non-European world and the difficulties of measuring power.[8]

- ***Neorealist Balance-of-power theory:*** Kenneth Waltz sought to recast balance-of-power theory as a deductive framework by drawing upon microeconomic theory. Unlike the classical realists, Waltz sees the balance-of-power as a naturally recurring equilibrium, not a system consciously created by the great powers. Neorealist balance-of-power theory focuses on two enduring structural features of the international system—anarchy and polarity. *In contrast to the classical realist variant, neorealist balance-of-power theory holds that bipolar systems are less likely to experience major wars than multipolar systems.* Under multipolarity, great powers balance by forming alliances. However, this raises the risk of major war through miscalculation of other's resolve; fear of abandonment by allies; incentives to neglect military spending; and incentives to pass the cost of mutual defense on to other states (buck-passing). By contrast, bipolarity is more stable because each great power recognizes that the other is the only serious threat to its survival. Since the addition or defection of weaker allies has little impact on the systemic balance-of-power, the great powers can rely on internal balancing. At the same time, each great power knows that because there are only two of them, each must block the other throughout the world. Major criticisms of neorealist balance-of-power theory include a static conception of power, an inability to explain international change, an inattention to the role of international institutions and non-state actors, and the contradictory explanation for bipolar stability.[9]

Balance-of-threat theory
Balance-of-power theory is a refinement of neorealist balance-of-power theory (see above) developed by Stephen M. Walt in the mid-1980s. Walt, a former student of Waltz, contends that states balance against threat, not aggregate levels of material power. Threat is a composite of (1) a state's aggregate power, (2) its geographic proximity; (3) its offensive military capabilities; and (4) the perceived aggressive intentions of its leaders. Balance-of-threat theory holds that states facing an external threat will generally balance *against* the state or coalition posing the threat. In general, states prefer not to *bandwagon* that is to form alliances *with* the threatening state or coalition, since doing so often places their long-term security in jeopardy. Weak and isolated states, however, may have no alternative but to bandwagon with stronger aggressors to avoid absorption. *NOTE*: Balance-of-threat theory is a variant of defensive realism because it assumes that the international system does not generally provide incentives for aggression and expansion.[10]

Complex Interdependence Theory
Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. coined the term 'complex interdependence' in reference to various, complex transnational connections (interdependencies) between states and societies. Interdependence theorists note that such relations, particularly economic ones, have increased since World War II. Conversely, the incidences of military force and power balancing among advanced industrialized states have decreased during the same period. Writing in the late 1970s (in the aftermath of the United States' withdrawal from the Vietnam War and the 1973 OPEC oil embargo), Keohane and Nye argued that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. One can see the complex interdependence framework as an attempt to synthesize elements of realist and liberal thought. Finally, anticipating problems of cheating and relative gains raised by realists, interdependence theorists introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and facilitate cooperation. Here one can see that complex interdependence theory was the precursor to *neoliberal institutionalism*.[11]

Constructivism (a.k.a. social constructivism)
Constructivism is a broad school of thought that emphasizes the impact of *ideas, identities, norms, and culture* in world politics. Constructivists downplay material variables, such as the relative distribution of power or levels of trade between states, and instead focus on shared understandings and norms. For example, instead of taking the "state" for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, as realists and liberals do, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as the highly malleable product of specific historical processes. Constructivists focus on the capacity and will of people to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it *significance*. This capacity leads to certain social facts that depend on human agreement that those facts do exist and which typically require human institutions to sustain their existence. John Gerard Ruggie writes, "Social facts include money, property rights, sovereignty, marriage, football, and Valentine's Day, in contrast to such brute observational facts as rivers, mountains, population size, bombs, bullets, and gravity, which exist whether or not that there is agreement that they do."[12] Constructivism is especially attentive to sources of international change. In the 1990s, constructivism largely replaced Marxism as the major radical perspective in IR. Stephen Walt, a leading [defensive] realist observes: "The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Constructivists had an explanation: Specifically, former [Soviet] president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as "common security."[13] *There is no single constructivist theory of international relations and constructivists disagree among themselves about ontology and methodology.* Prominent constructivist IR scholars include Ted Hopf, Nicholas Onuf, Thomas Risse, and Alexander Wendt.[14] I would also place various cultural theories of foreign policy in the constructivist camp.[15]

Contemporary Realism (a.k.a., structural realism)
This is an umbrella term that I use for the post-1980 realist research program in its *entirety*. [16]
The year 1979 saw the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, which
many IR scholars (both self-described realists and non-realists) saw as a clean break with the
classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, Arnold Wolfers, and Henry Kissinger. *In general,
contemporary realism emphasizes the influence of anarchy and uncertainty in the international
system rather than the assumption of innate conflict or other innate characteristics of human
nature.* All variants of contemporary realism begin with the assumption that the international
system—that is anarchy and the relative distribution of material power among the states that
comprise the system—shape the broad parameters of international outcomes and the likely
foreign policies of individual states. There are several different *sub-schools* or *sub-research
programs* within the contemporary realist research program:
- Defensive realism
- Offensive realism
- Neoclassical realism
- Hegemonic realism (e.g., hegemonic, power transition and long cycle theories, etc.)

Defensive Realism
Defensive realism is an umbrella term for several theories of international politics and foreign
policy that build upon Robert Jervis's writings on the *security dilemma* and to a lesser extent
upon Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory (*neorealism*). Defensive realism holds that the
international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions. The security
dilemma causes states to worry about one another's future intentions and relative power. Pairs of
states may pursue purely security seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of mutual
hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, pursue expansionist policies because their
leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the only way to make their state secure. Defensive
realism predicts great variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought
to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security. Under most circumstances,
the stronger states in the international system should pursue military, diplomatic, and foreign
economic policies that communicate restraint. Examples of defensive realism include: offense-
defense theory, balance-of-power theory, balance-of-threat theory, and domestic mobilization
theories.[17]

Democratic Peace Thesis (a.k.a., liberal peace)
The democratic peace thesis is the empirical observation that, since 1815, pairs of democratic
states have rarely gone to war with each other. This is not to say that democratic states are less
war prone. Rather, the claim is that pairings of democracies enjoy inherently more peaceful
relations than other regime pairings (i.e., democracy versus non-democracy and non-democracy
versus non-democracy). The democratic peace literature finds its inspiration in Immanuel Kant's
1795 essay, "Toward Perpetual Peace." Strictly speaking, the claim that democracies do not fight
democracies is a proposition or hypothesis, not a theory. There is no single theory of the
democratic peace. Rather, there are several different theories that claim a causal relationship
between a state's domestic political system and ideology and its likelihood to go war with states
with identical or similar domestic systems. Since the 1960s, the democratic peace has emerged
as major body of theory within neoliberalism. Criticisms of the democratic peace literature
include: the subjective and elastic definitions of democracy, a tendency to test democratic peace
hypotheses against weak realist alternatives, incomplete data sets, omitted variable bias, and
over-determination in case studies.[18]

Hegemonic Theory (a.k.a., power preponderance or hegemonic stability theory)
Hegemonic theory is a variant of structural realism that holds that the international system is
most stable when <u>one state</u> enjoys a preponderance of power. Concentrations of power decrease
the likelihood of major war, whereas a more even distribution of power among the first and

second ranked states increases the likelihood of major war. At any given time, the distribution of territory, material resources, and privileges within the international system reflects the interests of the most powerful state, generally the victor in the last major war. The core hypothesis of hegemonic theory is that the probability of major war is highest when the power of the rising challenger roughly matches that of the dominant state. According to the theory, the rising challenger, not the declining hegemon, is more likely to initiate a major war to receive the status and rewards denied by the existing international system. Hegemonic theory is closely related to (although not identical to) power transitional theory. Two points are worth noting. First, hegemonic theory is not necessarily inconsistent with neorealist balance-of-power theory, since the two theories purport to explain slightly different phenomena and focus on different structural attributes of the international system. Second, the term "hegemonic stability theory" originated in the international political economy (IPE) literature and entails a very different conception of hegemony.[19] In the security studies literature, however, hegemonic theory is generally associated with Robert Gilpin, although William C. Wohlforth, Stephen Brooks, Randall Schweller, and others have made important contributions.[20]

Institutionalism

Thomas Risse writes, "Institutionalism as a theoretical approach can be differentiated from other approaches in international relations in terms of the substantive claim that institutions matter, that is, that they exert clearly identifiable and independent effects on political life."[21] Institutionalism is not a theory; per se. Rather it is a broad category that encompasses many different theories, not all of which share the same assumptions or even the same ontology. [See neoliberal institutionalism]

Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism refers to a diverse set of contemporary realist theories that seek to explain the specific foreign policy decisions of major states, not broad patterns of international behavior or systemic outcomes. *Neoclassical realist theories are theories of foreign policy.* Some critics of neorealism contend that Waltz's quest for parsimony sacrificed much of the practical wisdom and policy relevance found in the classical realist writings of Morgenthau, Carr, Wolfers, and others. As a response, a number of younger scholars have sought a synthesis of classical realist thought with neorealist rigor. In an influential 1998 review essay in *World Politics*, Gideon Rose, the managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, coined the term "neoclassical realism" to describe the work of these scholars. Please note: neoclassical realism is more of a methodological approach than a distinct variant of realist theory. Indeed, two of the authors that Rose cites as being neoclassical realists, Fareed Zakaria and Thomas Christensen, explicitly situate their work in the offensive realism/defensive realism debate. Another neoclassical realist, William Wohlforth, sees his work as extension of hegemonic theory. Neoclassical realists are interested in theorizing, as well as in policy and diplomatic history. They eschew a mono-causal focus on domestic or systemic variables, in favor of richer historical narratives.[22]

Neoliberalism (a.k.a., Contemporary Liberalism)

Neoliberalism is a branch of liberalism that emphasizes the influence of democracy, free trade, and international institutions in promoting international cooperation and economic prosperity, rather than ability of human reason. Neoliberalism, which emerged in the aftermath of World War II, rejects the classical liberal (or idealist) notion that there is an automatic harmony of interests among individuals or states. One can think of neoliberalism as a research program that encompasses several different strands of theories:
- The democratic peace (or liberal peace) thesis
- Neoliberal institutionalism (see below)
- Complex interdependence theory (see above)
- Economic liberalism (globalization theory)

Neoliberal Institutionalism (a.k.a., Liberal Institutionalism or Regime Theory)
Neoliberal institutionalism is a branch of contemporary liberalism that focuses on the role of international institutions in facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation among states. International institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations."[23] Institutions can range from formal international organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and NATO, to more informal agreements such as the Law of the Seas Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Neoliberal institutionalists believe that realists overstate the potential for international conflict and suggest that there are countervailing forces, such as repeated interactions, that propel states toward cooperation. They regard anarchy as the absence of a mechanism above the levels of states to enforce agreements and they regard cheating as the greatest threat to cooperation. One weakness of neoliberal institutionalism is the absence of a baseline of expectations against which to judge its claims. Institutionalist hypotheses are difficult to test because the theory says little about how much international cooperation to expect in the absence of institutions. Another major criticism is the tendency of the theory's proponents to study over-determined cases of international cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalism is mainly associated with the writings of Robert O. Keohane and his disciples.[24]

Neoliberal-Neorealist Debate
This was a major debate between proponents of neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism (specifically Waltz's balance-of-power theory) that dominated the IR sub field of political science from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The debate centered largely on whether anarchy compels states to be more concerned with securing absolute gains or relative gains. In other words, do states seek to be rich and powerful or do they seek to be richer and more powerful than everybody else? This question had broad implications for the likelihood of cooperation and conflict among states across a range of issue areas in security and international political economy. *However, it is easy to exaggerate the level of disagreement between the two schools.* Neorealists never claimed that mutually beneficial international cooperation was impossible, that international politics is a purely zero-sum game, or that states never relied on institutions. For their part, neoliberal institutionalists never claimed that international cooperation was ubiquitous or easy to achieve. Rather, as Robert Jervis, a leading defensive realist, notes, "Neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather, neoliberalism believes that there is more *unrealized* or *potential* cooperation than does realism, the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world politics is *unnecessary* or *avoidable* in the sense that actors failing to agree even though their preferences overlap."[25]

Neorealism (a.k.a., Structural realism)
Neorealism is a generic term used alternately in reference to:
- The specific balance-of-power theory developed by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Addison Wesley, 1979), see above; or,
- A broad family of realist theories that emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system and the relative distribution of power among states as the permissive causes of war, rather than an assumption of innate conflict or human nature (e.g., Professor Eichenberg's definition from his version of PS 51; also see contemporary realism above); or,
- A branch of realism that seeks to explain international political outcomes (e.g., phenomena resulting from the interaction of two or more states) but not the foreign policy behavior of individual states.

Richard Ashley, a critic of realism, coined the term "neo-realism" in 1983, specifically in reference to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Since that time, the term "neorealism" has expanded to include definitions #2 and 3. Any of these definitions are valid.[26]

Offense-Defense Theory

Offense-defense theory is a term for several theories that link the severity of the security dilemma, and therefore the likelihood of war, to the types of military technology available to actors and the ease of conquest. In his classic article, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," Robert Jervis argued that the security dilemma is most severe and the international system is less stable when offensive weapons systems enjoy an advantage over defensive weapons systems. By contrast, when the defense is more potent, status quo actors find it easier to adopt compatible security policies, and the pernicious effects of the security dilemma are greatly diminished. The relative advantage of offensive or defensive weapons systems is called the "offense-defense balance." The extent to which actors can differentiate between offensive weapons and defensive weapons is called "offense-defense differentiation." Although different theorists offer competing definitions and measurements of the offense-defense balance, Jervis referred to the modalities of battlefield conquest: military tactics, strategy, technology, and a state's geography. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, Sean Lynn-Jones, Stephen Van Evera, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, and others have refined and expanded Jervis's original conception of the offense-defense balance. All versions of offense-defense theory see nuclear weapons (and particularly secure, second-strike nuclear arsenals) as the ultimate defense-dominant weapons system. Offense-defense theory is one variant of *defensive realism*. Nonetheless, offense-defense theory is controversial even among self-described realists, because of the difficulty in defining and objectively measuring the theory's explanatory variable—the offense-defense balance.[27] ***Please note that offense-defense theory and offensive realism are not the same.***

Offensive Realism

Offensive realism is an umbrella term for several theories of international politics and foreign policy that give analytical primacy to the hostile and unforgiving nature of the international system as the cause of conflict. Like defensive realism, some variants of offensive realism build upon and depart from Kenneth Waltz's neorealism. Offensive realism holds that anarchy provides strong incentives for expansion. All states strive to maximize their relative power because only the strongest states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them. This compels them to improve their relative power positions through arms build-ups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion. Ultimately every state in the international system strives to become a regional hegemon – a state that enjoys a preponderance of military, economic, and potential power in its part of the globe. Offensive realists however, disagree over the historical prevalence of hegemonic regional systems and the likely responses of weaker states to a would-be regional hegemon (e.g., balancing or bandwagoning).[28]

Power Transition Theory

Created by the late A.F.K. Organski and originally published in his textbook, *World Politics*, power transition theory describes international politics as a hierarchy with: (1) a "dominant" state or system leader, which enjoys the largest proportion of power resources (population, productivity, and political capacity meaning coherence and stability); (2) "great powers," a collection of potential rivals to the dominant state and who share in the tasks of maintaining the system and controlling the allocation of power resources; (3) "middle powers" of regional significance similar to the dominant state, but unable to challenge the dominant state or the system structure, and (4) "small powers," a category that encompasses all other states in the international system. War is most likely, of longest duration, and greatest magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system. Similarly, alliances are most stable when the parties to the alliance are satisfied with the system structure. There are further nuances to the theory: for instance, the sources of power transition vary in their volatility, population change being the least volatile and political capacity

(defined as the ability of the government to control resources internal to the country) the most volatile.[29]

ASSORTED THEORETICAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Alliances: An alliance is an explicit or implicit agreement between two or more states to lend military assistance to one or more of the contracting parties under a specified set of circumstances. The primary function of an alliance is to aggregate the relative capabilities (military power, economic power, and potential power) of its members. However, alliances can and do serve other functions as well. Alliances appear in a variety of forms, ranging from highly institutionalized and permanent bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to ad-hoc war-fighting coalitions such as the grand alliance of World War II and the 1990-91 Persian Gulf coalition. Alliances may consist of two states (such as the U.S.-Japan alliance) or several states (such as the 1940 Tripartite Pact and the various coalitions among Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, and Austria during the Napoleonic Wars). An alliance need not entail mutual or collective defense provisions. For example, the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan in exchange for the right to station American ground, naval, and air forces on the Japanese home islands. Japan has no obligation to defend the United States.[30]

Anarchy: Anarchy is the defining characteristic or ordering principle of the international system. The term anarchy simply means the absence of a worldwide government. There is no authority above states to enforce contracts, adjudicate disputes among states, or prevent the outbreak of war.

Balancing: Balancing refers to a range of responses that states undertake in response to imbalances of power and/or increasing levels of international threat. In general, the aim of balancing is to augment a threatened state's relative power. Doing so may enable the threatened state to deter a potential adversary or to defeat that adversary should war come. The initial goal of balancing is to deter potential aggressors. If that fails, the balancing state (and its allies) will fight the aggressor. Classical realists and contemporary realists draw a distinction between two types of balancing:

> *External balancing*: involves forging an implicit or explicit alliance with other states directed against an adversary state or coalition. According to classical balance-of-power theory and neorealist balance-of-power theory, states prefer to forge alliances *against* more powerful and aggressive states or coalitions. If two alliances or coalitions already exist, other states will flock to the weaker side, in order to tip the balance. According to balance-of-threat theory, states prefer to align *against* a threatening state or coalition (where threat is a composite of a state's aggregate power, offensive military capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived aggressive intentions).

> *Internal balancing*: involves an effort by a state to augment its relative capabilities through various unilateral strategies, including (but not limited to) arms buildups, changes in military doctrine, the emulation of the military technologies, organization, and practices of the most powerful states in the international system, or the development of new technologies and weapons systems.

Bandwagoning: (1) According to classical and neorealist balance-of-power theories, bandwagoning refers to the practice of forging an alliance with a more powerful adversary or joining the stronger of two coalitions; and (2) according to balance-of-threat theory, bandwagoning is the practice of aligning *with* a threatening state or coalition. Balance-of-threat

theory and both variants of balance-of-power theory suggest that, all other things being equal, states prefer not to bandwagon.[31]

Buck-passing: Buck-passing refers to one states' efforts to pass the cost of opposing a potential adversary onto other states. By buck-passing, states hope to get others to bear the cost of providing a common good (namely, security) while at the same time minimizing the expenditure of their own economic and military power. Different realist theories disagree over the prevalence of buck-passing and the circumstances under which this type of behavior becomes more likely. Most variants of defensive realism, especially balance-of-power theory and offense-defense theory, see buck-passing as ultimately counter-productive strategy that states pursue when they misperceive the actual balance-of-power or the offense-defense balance. In particular, buck-passing among the great powers is more likely in multipolar international systems than in bipolar international systems. John Mearsheimer's version of offensive realism, however, suggests that states actually prefer to buck-pass, not balance, in response to rising threats. The classic examples of buck-passing are the attempts by Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to pass the cost of opposing Nazi Germany off to one another between 1936 and 1941.[32]

Chain Ganging: Chain-ganging refers to unconditional and unlimited support to an ally, especially in a crisis setting. Providing such support can increase the risk of war through inadvertent escalation. Like buck-passing, many defensive realists see chain-ganging behavior as more likely under multipolarity than under bipolarity. Furthermore, like buck-passing, defensive realists see chain-ganging behavior as an ultimately self-defeating strategy. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder write, "Given the anarchic setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it."[33] The classic example of chain-ganging behavior was unconditional support that Germany gave to its ally Austria-Hungary in the July 1914 crisis.

Coercion: Coercion refers to a range of strategies designed to get an adversary to act in a certain way, but without having to use brute force to secure compliance. The adversary must have the capacity for organized violence, but *choose* not to exercise it. Coercion generally relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making, but may also entail the limited use of force. Coercive strategies stand in opposition to what Thomas Schelling termed 'brute force." Brute force often succeeds when used, whereas the power to hurt will most likely succeed when held in reserve. Schelling writes, "It is threat of damage, or more damage to come, that can make someone yield of comply."[34] Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman write, "The *limited* use of actual force may form a key component of a coercion strategy if its purpose is to enhance credibility or demonstrate the type of price that continued defiance will bring."[35] For example, in late 1998, the Clinton administration initiated a limited bombing campaign ("Operation Desert Fox") against Iraqi air defense sites in an effort to persuade President Saddam Hussein to allow UNSCOM inspectors to continue their work. *Deterrence* and *compellence* are both forms of coercion. Please note: Rather than simple cost-benefit calculation, coercion is more useful thought of as a dynamic process between adversaries, with opportunities for continuous feedback.

Compellence: Compellence is a form of coercion. In his classic work on coercive diplomacy, Thomas Schelling distinguishes between "between threats intended to make an adversary do something and a threat intended to keep to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the time and in the initiative, in who has to make the first move, in whose initiative is put to the test."[36] In the abstract, compellence involves the use of threats and promises to persuade an adversary to reverse an action that has already occurred or to otherwise overturn the status quo, such as evicting an aggressor from territory it has just conquered or convincing another state to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Compellence requires an adversary to change its behavior, whereas deterrence requires an adversary to refrain from action. As a practical matter, however, the distinction between deterrence and compellence often breaks down.[37] States

attempt to compel and to deter adversaries simultaneously. For example, in the four months preceding the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the George H.W. Bush administration sought to compel Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to withdraw his army from neighboring Kuwait through the use economic sanctions and the threat of military force. At the same time, the administration sought to deter Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons against American and allied forces through an opaque threat of nuclear retaliation.

Credibility: the perception on the part of an opponent or partner of the probability that a threat will in fact is implemented.

Deterrence: Deterrence is another form of coercion. The term refers to the use of threats and promises in effort to persuade a target state not to undertake a particular action that the deter finds objectionable. In the abstract, deterrence involves attempts to prevent an as yet un-materialized action for occurring in the first place, such as dissuading an adversary from attacking its neighbors or convincing a state not to begin a nuclear weapons program. The defender (the state that attempts to deter) seeks to alter the cost-benefit calculations of a target state by convincing that the pain of punishment will exceed any potential benefit that may result from undertaking an action. Deterrence theorists make distinctions among various types of deterrence relationships:

> *General deterrence:* involves the use of contingent threats and promises to prevent an action, regardless of whether a potential adversary actually plans to undertake it or not; general deterrence threats are always present to some degree. An example of general deterrence would be the United States' nuclear posture since the late 1940s. The implicit threat of nuclear retaliation dissuades other states from attacking the U.S. homeland.

> *Immediate deterrence:* involves efforts to persuade an adversary not to undertake a specific, planned event. The main distinction between immediate deterrence and general deterrence stems the likelihood of an adversary undertaking an undesirable action. An example of immediate deterrence is the 1970 Israeli warning to Syria not to escalate after the initial failure of its invasion of Jordan: the warning prevented a particular, imminent Syrian invasion from materializing.[38]

> *Extended deterrence:* involves efforts by one state to defend an ally against attack by a third state. An example of extended deterrence would be the 1961 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This treaty obligates the United States to come to the defense of Japan if that a third state attacks the Japanese home islands. The threat of American military intervention in defense of Japan, however remote, deters that country's potential adversaries—the former Soviet Union, and now the Peoples' Republic of China and North Korea.

> *Extended immediate deterrence:* involves efforts by one state to defend an ally against an attack by a third state viewed as highly likely in the near future. Arguably, the current crisis on the Korean peninsula (October 2002-present) is a case of extended immediate deterrence.

Empire: "A relationship of control imposed on the sovereignty of other states, societies, or territories." Empires differ greatly in geographic scope, internal governance, and in the degree of effective control that center or imperial state exercises over the periphery. They also differ greatly in duration. Formal empires include the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the British Empire (1700-1960), the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary. More informal empires would include the Athenian empire during the Peloponnesian War (the former Delian League), the Japanese sphere of influence in Manchuria and northern China in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet empire in Eastern and Central Europe during the cold war (1945-90), and the American forward military presence in Western Europe and East Asia since 1945.

Failed state: In general, a failed state as is a sovereign political community that has little or no ability to provide basic public goods to its populace. Chief among those public goods are: basic security from external and internal threats (e.g., military defense, control of borders, and the suppression of insurgencies), law and order, physical infrastructure, education and human services, and economic stability. State failure and state stability are not dichotomous. Instead, one might conceive of the state failure phenomenon as a continuum—failed states, failing states, weak states, and recovering states—depending on their relative ability to provide public goods. Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Somalia are examples of states currently experiencing state failure. Conversely, post-Taliban Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone are examples of states recovering from failure.[39]

Feudalism: (1) a system of authority based on the negotiation of obligation; or (2) a highly de-centralized form of political organization based upon personal ties, wherein leaders secure armed forces through private contracts. Feudalism was the predominate type of political order in Western Europe from the collapse of the Carolingian empire in the A.D. 800s until the emergence of dynastic state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Feudalism was type of political order in Japan from the end of the Heian period in the mid-twelfth century until the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and the Meiji Restoration in the mid-nineteenth century.

International institution: International institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations."[40] Institutions can range from formal international organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and NATO, to more informal agreements such as the Law of the Seas Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

International system: (1) Kenneth Waltz defines an international system as "the spontaneous product of the co-action of similar units in an anarchic environment. Just as the competition between different producers in a domestic setting spontaneously generates a market, so the interaction of states spontaneously generates an international system." An international system differs from a domestic political system because of (a) the ordering principle of the system (anarchy versus hierarchy), (b) the nature of the units that comprise the system, and (c) the distribution of capabilities among those units; (2) Robert Gilpin defines an international system as system as the aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control.

Liberal democracy: Tony Smith defines a liberal democracy as "a political system institutionalized under the rule of law, wherein an autonomous civil society, whose individuals join together voluntarily into groups with self-designated purposes, collaborate with each other through the mechanisms of political parties and establish through freely contested elections a system of representative government."[41]

Major war (a.k.a., hegemonic war or world war): A major or hegemonic war has three defining attributes: (1) the conflict involves all the great powers in the international system; (2) the combatants fight at the highest level of intensity; and (3) there is strong possibility that one or more of the great powers could face extinction as a sovereign unit. Major wars are vastly destructive conflicts in which the very leadership of the international system (that is, the distribution of territory, rights, and privileges) is at stake. Classical realism, neorealist balance-of-power theory, and hegemonic theory disagree over which international system is more prone to the outbreak of major war. Major wars that occurred in multipolar systems include: the Thirty Years' War (1618-48); the wars of Louis XIV (1688-1714); the Seven Years' War (1756-63); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15); the First World War (1914-18); and the Second World War (1939-45). Major wars that occurred in bipolar systems include: the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.); the second Pubic War between Rome and Carthage (218-202 B.C.); and the French-Habsburg War (1521-56).

Nation: A society in which people identify with one another on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, or other commonalties. C*ontrary to the conventional usage, in the IR sub field of political science the terms "nation" and "state" are NOT SYNONOMOUS.* There are many stateless nations throughout the world, most notably the Kurds, the Palestinians, and Chechens. There are several states that actually contain several nations, including the former Soviet Union (and now Russia), the Peoples' Republic of China, the former Yugoslavia (and its successor states), the United States, and Iraq. Properly speaking, the United States is a state, not a nation.

Nation-state: A sovereign state whose borders roughly correspond to the demographic patterns of the nation.

Nationalism: Nationalism is a political movement wherein individuals give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national group or to the political community in which they reside. This loyalty supersedes their loyalty to other groups (e.g., those based on common kinship or political ideology).

Polarity (a.k.a., structure of the international system): The number of first-tier great powers within an international system at any given time. Three types of international systems are unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity.

Power: Power refers to the material resources that are available to a state. There are several ways to measure power and different IR scholars break the broad concept of power into different components. For ease of exposition, I prefer Dale Copeland's tripartite classification of material power: (1) military power, (2) economic power, and (3) potential power.[42] Realists, of all stripes, posit a vital role for the *relative* distribution of power among states. In other words, the absolute level of material capabilities that each state possesses is less important that the states' level of material of capabilities vis-à-vis other states.

Power Oscillation: A power oscillation is a short-term, adverse shift in the relative balance-of-power created by the success an adversary's arms racing and/or alliance formation.[43]

Prestige: A state's reputation for having power, particularly military power. A state enhances its prestige through the successful application of power, especially through victory in war. Over time, however, an inconsistency may arise between the established hierarchy of prestige in the international system and the actual distribution of power among states. That is, perceptions of prestige can lag behind actual capabilities. The relative distribution of prestige among states (particularly between the first-ranked and second-ranked great powers), play a vital role in classical realism, as well as hegemonic theory and some neoclassical realist theories.

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD): The prisoners' dilemma is an analytical abstraction that IR scholars use to understand several dynamics in international politics, such as arms races and international economic cooperation. In these situations states have a strong incentive to cooperate with each other, but are unable to do so since there is no mechanism to enforce an agreement and/or to protect states. Ideally, if the two sides could agree, both would be better off. However, the two states do not trust each other and each has a strong incentive not to cooperate, in the hope that the other side will. Developed in the 1950s, PD is one of earliest (and simplest) "games" developed in game theory. The technical aspects of PD may seem daunting. However, the essence of PD is as follows:

Classic PD: Single Play

Imagine that the police arrest two suspects, Homer and Crusty, in a robbery.[44] The district attorney (DA) is certain that she has enough evidence to convict both Homer and Crusty of robbery, but she suspects both of conspiracy to commit murder as well. Due to lack of evidence, however, the DA cannot obtain a conspiracy to murder conviction for either suspect without the implicating confession of the other. The DA asks the police to put Homer and Crusty in separate jail cells so that they cannot communicate with each

other. The DA then tells each suspect the following: "Both of you face a certain robbery conviction and a prison sentence of 5 years (cooperate), UNLESS, you confess your part in the murder conspiracy and implicate the other (defect). If you confess to conspiracy to murder (defect), but your friend does not (cooperate), you will get *immunity* from prosecution and your friend will receive a *life sentence* in prison. If, on the other hand, you and your friend both confess to conspiracy to murder (defect), you will both be convicted but receive a reduced sentence of 10 years."

	![Crusty] Defects	![Crusty] Cooperates
![Homer] Defects	H: 10 years; C: 10 years	H: free; C: life sentence
![Homer] Cooperates	H: life sentence; C: free	H: 5 years; C: 5 years

Note: That the terms "cooperate" and "defect" refer to the choices of Homer and Crusty vis-à-vis each other.

Game theory is a way of understanding "strategic interactions"—situations in which actors make choices based upon their expectation of what other actors will likely do. In this single play prisoner's dilemma, the best possible outcome for both Homer and Crusty would if each *refused* to turn states' evidence against the other and receive the minimum sentence of 5 years. This would be mutual cooperation, depicted in the lower right-hand corner of the above table. However, neither Homer nor Crusty can be sure that the other will not strike a plea bargain with the DA. The worst possible outcome would be if both Homer and Crusty turned states' evidence on the other; each would go to prison for 10 years. Yet, in this scenario, both Homer and Crusty have an incentive to turn states' evidence on the other (defect), regardless of what the other does. What is remarkable is that both prisoners rationally chose defection, an option that makes each worse off in an absolute sense since both will surely spend 10 years in prison!

Modified CD: Iterated Plays

The outcome of the Prisoners' Dilemma changes depending on the number of times the game repeats. Over successive rounds, each prisoner learns that it is to his advantage to cooperate (that is, not turn states' evidence), in the expectation that the other prisoner will do the same in the next round. Proponents of neoliberal institutionalism use iterated PD as both a metaphor and a theoretical underpinning for their central claim that institutions facilitate cooperation among states.

Security Dilemma: The security dilemma is an intractable feature of the international system (and indeed, any anarchic environment). The dilemma is essentially this: steps that state A takes to increase its security have the perverse and often unforeseen consequence of diminishing the security of state B. This is because as state A buys additional weapons or acquires new allies, the relative power of state B decreases. The security dilemma is not a theory, per se. Instead, the security dilemma is concept that plays a central role in several variants of contemporary realism, particularly defensive realism. Defensive realists, such as Robert Jervis, Charles Glaser, and Joseph Grieco, use the Prisoners' Dilemma (see above) to illustrate the dynamics of the security dilemma for arms races and crises.

Spiral Model and Deterrence Model: In the mid-1970s, Robert Jervis introduced the spiral model and the deterrence model to describe the dynamics of coercive diplomacy between states. Specifically, Jervis sought to explain the circumstances under which threats of punishment (i.e., sticks) or positive inducements (i.e., carrots, rewards, or appeasement) are more likely to produce compliance on the part of an adversary. The spiral and deterrence models both seek to

explain the outbreak of war. However, the two models posit different types of misperceptions on the part of the defending state and the target state. Consequently, the two models suggest different strategies for avoiding war. Jervis's spiral model and deterrence model foreshadow his later work on the security dilemma and offense-defense theory.[45]

Spiral Model: The spiral model holds the war becomes more likely when punishment applied in the hope of eliciting more cooperative behavior from an adversary, instead has the opposite effect. The target state responds by becoming more aggressive. This might entail adopting wider war aims, conquering additional territory, or adopting a more intransigent diplomatic stand. The first side responds by applying more punishment, in the mistaken belief that the initial punishment was too mild. The target becomes even more belligerent. The dispute spirals out of control, and generally ends in a war that neither side wanted. In this model <u>both</u> the defending state and the target state have security-seeking preferences. Neither side necessarily wants a conflict with the other. The substantive issues that separate the two sides may be quite minor. Both sides, however, are driven toward conflict because of uncertainty about the other's future intentions and fear of relative power loss.

Policy Prescription from the Spiral Model: When dealing with would be adversaries, reassurance strategies will work better than coercive strategies. Promises of future rewards will more likely elicit an adversary's compliance than will threats.

Classic examples of Spiral Models: The July 1914 crisis and the crisis between the United States and Japan in 1940-41.

Deterrence Model: The deterrence model holds that war is more likely to occur when a defending state tries to appease a would-be adversary, instead of applying punishment. Appeasement instead elicits worse behavior from the target state. The target state, assuming that is initial threats or aggression caused the defending state to make concessions, continues, or even escalates its belligerent posture in the hope of gaining additional concessions. The target may also dismiss any threats from the defending state, after the defending state has changed course and adopted a deterrent posture. Consequently, the target state will push to far, triggering a war. Unlike the spiral model, the deterrence model assumes that the defending state and the target state have fundamentally different preferences. The defending state would be content to remain at the status quo. The target state, on the other hand, is an opportunistic aggressor. It will continue to make demands, including the seizure of territory, as long as the costs and risk of doing so are manageable.

Policy prescription from deterrence model: When dealing with would-be adversaries, coercive strategies work better than reassurance strategies. Appeasement of an adversary rarely works.

Classic examples of deterrence models: the outbreak of World War II in Europe

Sovereignty: The legal principle, established through recognition by other states, that a state is the legitimate highest authority within its boundaries. The Treaty of Westphalia, one of the treaties that ended the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), enshrined the principle of sovereignty in international law. In practice however, sovereignty, has never been absolute. Great powers have routinely violated and/or limited the sovereignty of weaker states.[46]

State: (1) A generic term for the main units in any international system over history, regardless of those units' internal composition or territorial scope. Thus, speaking in the broadest possible terms, political communities as diverse as the Greek *polis*, the warring kingdoms of ancient China, tribes in Meso-America, feudal entities in medieval Europe, multinational empires of the Persians, the Ottoman Turks, and the Mongols, and modern territorial nation-states, all fall under

the general category of states; (2) a specific form of political community that originated in Western Europe during fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which later became the predominate form of political community throughout the globe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this definition, the "state" differs from other forms of political organization in that there is clear hierarchy within the political community, defined territorial borders, some extractive capacity vis-à-vis civil society, and where the government claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its own territory; (3) a synonym for the government or administrative apparatus of a state, as distinguished from civil society.

State-to-Nation balance: Benjamin Miller defines the state-to-nation balance as the "extent to which the current political boundaries in a region reflect the national affiliations of the main groups in that region, and the aspirations of these groups to establish states or revise existing boundaries." A state-to-nation imbalance "prevails when there are nationalist challenges to the existing states in a region either from within states (that is, sub national ethnic groups aspiring for secession from the state), or from without (that is, pan-national movements of unification, or irredentist-revisionist claims to territories held by other states, on grounds of national affiliation of the population or national-historic rights to the territory)."[47] Note that large portions of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa currently suffer from state-to-nation imbalances.

NOTES

[1] Adapted from James M. Carlson and Mark S. Hyde, *Doing Empirical Political Research* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), p. 128.

[2] Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," *Security Studies* 9, no. 3 (summer 2000): 60-107, at p. 67.

[3] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 10-12.

[4] For example, Andrew Moravcsik classifies neoliberal institutionalism, a body of literature generally associated with the writings of Robert O. Keohane and his followers, as its own research program separate from liberalism and realism. See, Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: Toward a Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (autumn 1997): 513-33. However, almost every other IR theorist (particularly self-described realists) would classify neoliberal institutionalism as a single theory within the broader contemporary (or neo) liberal research program.

[5] Some major twentieth century classical realist works are: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1946); John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); and Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Praeger, 1966).

[6] Major classical liberal texts include: Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), pp. 107-43; Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace Including the Law of Nature and of Nations*, trans. A. A. Campbell (Ontario: Batoche, 2001, 1901); Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London: Heinemann, 1910); Woodrow Wilson, "Speech on the Fourteen Points," *Congressional Record,* 65th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 680681; and Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

[7] See, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Viking, 2002); V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917; reprint, New York: International Press, 1939); Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4 (September 1974): 387-415; and Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

[8] Three treatments of the balance-of-power in classical realist thought are Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance-of-Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in Alan James, ed., *The Bases of International Order* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973).

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[44] This Homer and Crusty example of the prisoner's dilemma draws upon web page that Professor Mark Rupert of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University prepared for his international political economy course. See, http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/maxpages/faculty/merupert/Teaching/GAME.HTM

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