ETHNIC MOVEMENTS AND THE COMPETITION MODEL: SOME MISSING LINKS*

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The competition model of ethnic resurgence and the relevant evidence are critically examined. We note the absence of direct measures of competition in the research on ethnic movements and the mixed nature of the evidence it produced. More important, the model does not specify the links between competition and conflict. We offer a partial reformulation that stresses the necessary conditions under which ethnic competition leads to ethnic conflict: (1) competition must be perceived as unfair and (2) competitive relations must be relatively free from interdependence. The reformulation also stresses that the main objects of competition in recent ethnic movements have not been individual goods like jobs, but larger collective goods. As amended, the model is compatible with the internal colonial and the split labor market models, as well as with the so-called contact hypothesis. Some hypotheses from the model are tested using data on Québec's independence movement. Competition leads to mobilization only when competition is perceived as unfair and it occurs in a context of low ethnic interdependence. We then explore the relevance of these findings for other situations.

While many models of ethnic resurgence have been proposed, few have enjoyed as much popularity as the so-called competition model. Derived from a more sophisticated model first put forth by Barth (1969) and expanded by Hannan (1979), its recent formulation simply holds that "modernization increases levels of competition for jobs, housing, and other valued resources among ethnic groups," and that "*ethnic conflict and social movements based on ethnic (rather than some other) boundaries occur when ethnic competition increases*" (Olzak and Nagel 1986, p.2, italics in original). Thus, the resurgence since 1960 of ethnic movements in many multicultural societies is alleged to have resulted from increased ethnic competition, especially job competition, and this increased competition is viewed as the result of modernization processes, especially urbanization, the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, the expansion of the political sector and supranational organizations, and the increasing scale of organizations (Nagel and Olzak 1982; Olzak and Nagel 1986, pp. 3-4).

This elementary version of the competition model has been tested in studies of ethnic resurgence in Wales (Ragin 1979), Flanders (Nielsen 1980), Québec (Olzak 1982), in a comparison of Québec and Northern Ireland (See 1986), and in a large comparative study (Ragin 1987). It has also been tested in studies of urban racial and ethnic conflict in earlier eras (Olzak 1986, 1989), in a study of ethnic awareness (Portes 1984), and in a study of the American women's movement (Ward and Rosenfeld 1987). However, the tests bearing on ethnic resurgence present inferential problems, and the evidence does not unequivocally support the competition model. Although the theory has merits, it is underspecified. Our critique leads to a reformulation that specifies the conditions under which ethnic competition leads to conflict and the types of competition likely to have been important in recent ethnic movements. Some of these ideas are then tested through an examination of the independence movement in Québec.

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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Most earlier tests of the competition model that have focused on ethnic movements have been based on aggregate ecological data. In these studies, it was usually not possible to measure ethnic competition directly. Instead, the impact of ethnic competition was inferred from direct relationships between various measures of modernization and measures of support for ethnic parties or movements. Therefore, the key argument that ethnic competition, especially job competition, is the main mechanism linking modernization to ethnic movements could not be established empirically. Alternative mechanisms — the growth of financial or human resources, increased organizational strength, changes in beliefs, values, and culture, and/or changes in long-term political opportunities — could also account for these relationships (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Allardt 1981; Inglehart 1977).[1] The task remains of empirically assessing whether competition and/or these other mechanisms are involved in the resurgence of these movements.

Evidence for the presumed modernization/ethnic movement link is not strong. In the quantitative studies, most measures of modernization are indicators of industrial development, particularly employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors, although measures of urbanization, economic development (income), and state expansion have also been employed. For the Welsh movement, Ragin (1979) found that tertiary sector employment was positively related to support for the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. But he also found that another common measure of modernization, employment in the secondary sector (peripheral industries), did not increase nationalist support. Support for the nationalist Liberal party also did not conform to his hypothesis — support was strongest in agricultural areas. Finally, support for Plaid Cymru was strongest in areas of strong cultural traditionalism, which tended to be the *least* developed areas. Indeed, only by holding traditionalism constant could Ragin obtain a positive association between tertiary sector employment and support for Plaid Cymru. (See also the comment by Lutz [1980] and rejoinder by Ragin [1980].)

Nielsen's (1980) results for Flanders are also mixed: Two indicators of modernization — tertiary sector employment and income — were positively related to support for the Flemish nationalist party, the Volksunie, but three other indicators (industrialization, agricultural employment, and rural residence) were either unrelated or not related as expected to nationalist support. Nielsen also reported (pp. 82-83) that support for the Flemish movement during the interwar years was concentrated in rural areas, contrary to predictions.

The model finds even less support in Olzak's (1982) analysis of Québec's independence movement. None of the many conventional measures of modernization were positively and significantly related to ethnic mobilization. In the case of state expansion, the relationships were negative. Only bilingualism, posited as an indicator of linguistic competition, was positively related to separatist support.

Finally, in a recent comparative test examining 36 linguistic minorities in Western Europe, Ragin (1987, pp. 133-49) found that the competition perspective could account only partially for some types of ethnic mobilization, and was inappropriate for others (for which the internal colonial model, although incomplete as well, was better suited). He suggested some preliminary amendments to the competition model (which differ from those we propose).[2] The inability of the ethnic competition model to account for so much of the evidence implies some theoretical difficulties.

The theory has merit: It is a dynamic model ultimately linking ethnic upsurges to changes in levels of modernization. While modernization is

[1] The argument that modernization leads to ethnic conflict through an increase in ethnic resources and organization sometimes appears with the more common competition argument. At other times, resources and organization are simply additional independent variables added to the modernization/competition link. (Cf. Olzak 1982, p. 254; Nagel and Olzak 1982, pp. 136-37; Olzak 1986, p.77; Olzak and Nagel 1986, p. 3; see also Hannan 1979, pp. 270-72; Ragin 1987.) Notice, however, that a high level of organization within an ethnic group should increase segmentation and thus *reduce* interindividual competition.

[2] Beer's (1980, chap. 3) ecological analysis of regionalist resurgence in France, cited as supporting the model, also presents contradictory results. Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier (1989) found no support for the competition model in their study of Québec's non-Francophones' mobilization. See's (1986) comparative-historical evidence on Northern Ireland and Québec has been critically evaluated elsewhere (Pinard 1987). Olzak's (e.g., 1989) positive evidence concerning earlier ethnic confrontations in American cities is discussed below.

undoubtedly related to such ethnic upsurges, the specific dimensions of modernization and the intervening mechanisms have not been adequately identified; however, this question cannot be examined here. In addition, while the competition argument is certainly relevant, it requires some important specifications.

Hannan (1979, p. 268) explicitly stated that the phenomenon to be explained was "ethnic . . . collective action, either institutional or noninstitutional . . ." Paradoxically, while the model may be more appropriate for institutionalized collective action, it has primarily been used to account for noninstitutionalized, contentious collective action involving open clashes and manifest conflicts. We claim that, in its present form, the model is unsuitable for that purpose.

First, we question the basic hypothesis of a direct link between competition and conflict. If conflict over the appropriation of scarce goods implies, by definition, competition, the reverse is obviously not true: Competition can occur — and often does occur — without conflict. Hence the important question that the theory ignores: Under what conditions does ethnic competition break into conflict, i.e., open, noninstitutionalized confrontation? We attempt to answer this question.

Second, if ethnic conflict — or conflict in general — often involves competitive striving for scarce goods (e.g., economic goods, status, or power resources), it can also result from disagreements over the desirability of certain goals, e.g., the maintenance of cultural differences. In the latter situation, groups do not compete for the same goods, but for different rewards (Kriesberg 1973, pp. 28-55). Although any conflict may involve both types of claims, the second type, which is central in some ethnic conflict theories (e.g., Smith 1969), is ignored in the competition model.

Finally, proponents of the competition model — Barth being a notable exception — have failed to take into account the fact that ethnic groups, even in developed societies, often reside in different geographical areas and/or participate in segmented institutions and organizations, particularly in the labor market. Such segmentation decreases the likelihood of *individual* competition across ethnic lines and hence, according to the model, decreases the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Indeed, Barth (1969, p.19) saw territorial separation as promoting "stability." Consider Flanders, the site of Nielsen's (1980) test: With a population that is approximately 95 percent Dutch-speaking (McRae 1986, pp. 280-81), there is little opportunity for contact with French speakers, let alone for job competition. This case is not exceptional: High levels of concentration and overall segmentation prevail in many multicultural societies and are certainly typical of the groups studied in Britain and Canada as well as in Belgium (see McRae 1974). Indeed, Horowitz (1985, pp. 105-35) rejected economic competition as a major source of ethnic conflict precisely because of the segmentation prevalent in various markets and the ensuing relative absence of such competition. Thus, it is not surprising that job competition did not appear to be an important factor in the research reviewed above.

A PARTIAL REFORMULATION

Our reformulation addresses only the crucial competition/conflict relationship. We argue that for ethnic competition to lead to ethnic conflict, two previously ignored conditions must be present and a third factor is often relevant.

(1) *Ethnic competition leads to ethnic conflict and ethnic movements if, and only if, the competition is perceived to be unfair.* In principle, if competition proceeds according to accepted rules, it will tend to be perceived as fair and ethnic relations will tend to remain harmonious, as in the classic instances of competition between sports teams or between business entrepreneurs in a free market. In such instances, competition will at most lead to institutionalized collective action, as when competitors with a common ethnic background form an association to lobby for their interests through routine channels.

The notion of fairness is absent from the competition model, even in Barth's (1969) and Hannan's (1979) formulations. By assuming that "claims of injustice and inequality follow from ethnic mobilization rather than cause it," Nagel and Olzak (1982, p. 136n) can only consider the fairness or unfairness of competition as irrelevant. We assume first that collective action will not produce feelings of unfairness if there is no objective basis for them; second, if feelings of unfairness precede the action, which is not unusual, they will tend to lead to conflict. Most authors adopting a more general competition perspective also fail to specify unfairness as a condition of conflict, even if it is sometimes implicit in their discussions (e.g., Melson and Wolpe 1970; Wilson 1980; van den Berghe 1981; Brass 1985; Breton 1988).

Ethnic competition will tend to be perceived as unfair when it is seen as violating accepted

norms (e.g., when discriminatory practices prevail), when it is seen as involving unjustified threats to claimed rights and possessions (e.g., infringing on one's turf), or when the rules of the game themselves are contested or the outcomes of competition are seen as unduly unbalanced (e.g., the same ethnic region wins government allocations more often than others).

But the main determinants of perceptions of unfairness are *structural*. Even if ethnic competition is "objectively" fair, it is likely to be perceived as unfair whenever it occurs within structures that generate grievances that spoil relations between competitors. This is likely to occur whenever the competition takes place within a larger context of ethnic inequality, subordination, or disadvantage of a class/economic nature (as in Hechter's [1975] internal colonial and Bonacich's [1972] split labor market models), a status nature (as in Horowitz's [1985] differential group worth model), a political nature (e.g., the Catholics in Northern Ireland), or a cultural nature. Empirically, these disparities often occur together, but not always (e.g., the Basques in Spain).

Our proposition is diametrically opposed to a central argument of the competition model — that interethnic competition *and conflict* increase with interethnic (economic) *equality*. We recognize that as ethnic disparities increase, the likelihood of competition and conflict decreases because of shortages in the disadvantaged group of resources, especially leadership, and of motivational factors like incentives and expectations of success. However, *moderate* structural disadvantage, which is more common in ethnic relations than in class relations, does not entail serious shortages of these elements and thus does not prevent competition and conflict.[3]

We believe that including unfairness in the competition model and stating its structural determinants resolve its alleged incompatibility with both the internal colonial and split labor market models. Both a cultural division of labor and a split labor market are among the structural conditions of disparity most likely to lead to perceptions of unfair competition (see Laczko 1986). Our position is also consistent with the views of other competition theorists who, despite not stating explicitly that unfairness is a condition of conflict, nevertheless insist that the basic motives of conflict are found in competition occurring within a structural context of hierarchy, domination, coercion, or exploitation (see especially van den Berghe 1981, chaps. 3 and 4).

(2) For unfair ethnic competition to lead to conflict, *the competitors' relationships with each other must also be as purely competitive as possible or, to put it another way, as uncomplementary as possible.* If high levels of complementarity or interdependence (or even dependence) are present, relationships are likely to be perceived as mutually beneficial and will therefore tend to be peaceful (although not necessarily friendly).

Barth (1969) attended to interdependence when he argued that stability may obtain when ethnic groups "provide important goods and services for each other, i.e., occupy reciprocal and therefore different niches but in close interdependence" (p. 19). For Barth, this was an ideal-type situation leading to stability, opposed to the ideal-type situation in which competition and instability prevailed. However, Barth also argued that, in reality, mixed situations are likely to obtain, so that "only quite gross simplifications can reduce them to simple types" (p. 20). Unfortunately, oversimplification has prevailed in the competition model. Neither the ideal type of interdependence nor the mixed empirical situations have been addressed in studies of ethnic movements. This neglect is particularly problematic because interdependence tends to increase with modernization (Barth and Noel 1972; van den Berghe 1981, p. 42). Indeed, one of Hannan's (1979, p. 267) central claims is that modernization increases "connectedness" between small ethnic groups, but he did not draw out the implications of this for the competitive relationships between such enlarged groups and others. The potential effect of interdependence has not, however, escaped notice from other theorists. Van den Berghe (1967, pp. 138-40; 1981, chap. 3), for instance, sees complementarity as a concomitant of competition in all stages of ethnic relations. (See also Lieberson 1970, pp. 12-15; Barth and Noel 1972, pp. 340-43; Brass 1985.) Therefore, competition cannot be considered independently of complementarity, and we hypothesize that *ethnic competition translates into nonroutine mobilization only among ethnic groups or individuals that*

[3] This implies a curvilinear relationship between ethnic inequality and nonroutine collective action: Groups must be disadvantaged enough to be dissatisfied (the deprivation theorists' argument), but also resource-rich enough to be able to challenge dominant groups (the resource mobilization argument). The latter argument is central in Hannan's (1979) formulation and was important in Jenkins and Kposowa's (1990) research (in which relative parity in resources is *the* measure of competition). Both, however, fail to fully appreciate the first argument.

perceive competition as unfair and are not highly interdependent.

With these two conditions, our reformulation is consistent with the so-called contact hypothesis, which holds that interracial contacts breed tolerance and harmony only if they are equal status contacts and are contacts over common and interdependent goals (Allport 1958, chap. 16; Pettigrew 1971, pp. 274-78).

In line with previous work (Pinard and Hamilton 1986), we further hypothesize that perceptions of unfair competition and ethnic interdependence are likely to produce effects independently of competition. Perceptions of unfair competition produce a sense of ethnic grievance, whereas ethnic interdependence produces negative collective incentives. Specifically, we hypothesize an interaction effect between these two factors, although previous work has indicated additive effects as well (Pinard and Hamilton 1986).

(3) A third element is also relevant to ethnic conflict, although it is not a necessary condition. While individual experiences of unfair competition over some private goods may be a motivating factor for some, we believe they do not account for most current ethnic movements. *For conflict to be widespread and intense, it must be social rather than interpersonal, and the competition must be intergroup rather than interindividual. Above all, the objects of competition must involve collective goods rather than individual goods* (Rose 1971, pp. 300-301 and 445-46). Proponents of the competition model are ambiguous in this regard. While some insist that the competition be over political resources, which are clearly collective goods (e.g., Nagel 1984; see also Nagel and Olzak 1982, pp. 136-37), others stress job competition, with unspecified "other resources" sometimes mentioned (e.g., Nielsen 1980, pp. 79-80; Olzak 1985, p. 76; Ragin 1979, pp. 622, 627; Olzak and Nagel 1986, p. 2). But even in confrontations in which job competition has been the central issue, what was at stake was each group's share of the *labor market*, a collective good, not particular individuals' jobs. Hence, not only did the individuals actually competing for jobs become concerned and mobilize, others did too.

The recent resurgence of ethnic conflict has, however, generally involved competition over a much wider set of collective goods, e.g., political rights and regional-ethnic power, regional or group ethnic parity in the economy, group status including the status of the group's culture, and language. In addition, these conflicts have not been rooted only in competitive strivings, but also in disagreements over the promotion of cultural differences. (See, for example, Lorwin [1973] and McRae [1986] on Belgium; Rose [1971] and Urwin [1982] on Great Britain; Linz [1973] and Greenwood [1977] on Spain; Breton and Stasiulis [1980] and Pinard and Hamilton [1986] on Canada.) Wilson (1980, chaps. 5 and 6) explicitly rejects job competition as an important source of black/white conflict in the post-World War II period and claims instead that conflict was increasingly related to "competition for power and privilege . . . in the sociopolitical order " (p. 116). Breton (1988) makes a similar argument about French-English relations in Canada, examining a whole set of collective goods over which competition and conflict developed over the last two centuries.

Although grievances and demands are formulated in somewhat specific terms and packages in each country at each time, they are usually subsets of the general types of issues mentioned. Moreover, not only competing individuals, but competing groups or organizations, express such grievances and demand relevant collective goods. Therefore, competition arguments ought to be cast in the wider terms usually found in general competition theories (e.g., Park 1950; Melson and Wolpe 1970; van den Berghe 1967, 1981).[4]

The positive evidence reported in Olzak's (1986, 1989) recent work on early racial and ethnic conflicts in American cities is consistent with our reformulation. In that research, the previous modernization argument is largely ignored and direct measures of labor market competition are developed, e.g., racial and ethnic group internal migration and immigration. The historical evidence also suggests that, unlike contemporary ethnic movements, older, local ethnic confrontations were (1) more likely to involve labor market competition than competition over a broad set of collective goods, and (2) the competition tended to be perceived as unfair both by members of the indigenous population whose "acquired" rights were threatened and by migrants, who were exposed to discriminatory practices.

[4] Our reformulation deals mainly with problems of motivation; a more general model of nonroutine ethnic collective action should consider other determinants, such as ethnic segmentation or other conducive factors, ethnic beliefs and ideologies, material and human resources, opportunities, and social control or facilitation. (On political conduciveness, see Nielsen 1986).

Finally, there was little interdependence between these early groups. Hence the more positive results obtained in these studies, despite the missing links in the original model.

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Our test relies on cross-sectional, individual-level data that are better-suited than ecological data to assess competition arguments. Unfortunately, these data lack a direct measure of our third factor — group competition over collective goods. Since we do not regard it as a necessary factor and since we posited that unfair competition over jobs or other private goods could be a motivating factor for some, we proceed with a partial test of our theory. While not ideal, this test is better than none.[5] Although we consider only job competition, we can evaluate our arguments concerning the impact of the two necessary factors — the fairness of competition and the degree of interdependence present. This is an important task in itself since these two factors are relevant for competition over any types of goods.

The data are from a study of the movement for the independence of Québec (S.M.I.Q.) carried out by the second author during the winter of 1970-1971. A stratified proportional sample of 1,982 Québec residents aged 18 and over were interviewed at home.[6] The analysis is restricted to full-time Francophone labor force participants. We seek to explain the ethnic mobilization of Francophones, who are the moving force behind the independence movement in Québec. Since job competition is an important variable, only Francophones in the labor force on a full-time basis, i.e., those in a position to compete with Anglophones for jobs, are included in the analysis.[7]

The ethnic mobilization of Francophones is measured by their support for the separation of Québec. Respondents were asked: "Personally, are you for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?" Respondents who were undecided were asked if they "would be more inclined to be for or against" it. Twenty percent of Francophone workers favored separation or were inclined to favor separation. This attitudinal measure is a good indicator of mobilization behind the independence movement because it identifies the movement's core supporters and eliminates those favoring milder options, such as a sovereign Quebec remaining economically associated with Canada. Furthermore, it is a better indicator than support for the Parti Québécois (P.Q.), the political arm of the movement: Although most supporters of separation voted for the P.Q., many P.Q. voters were not in favor of separation, but preferred milder options or voted P.Q. for different reasons (Pinard and Hamilton 1977, 1978; for similar arguments, see also Nielsen 1986, pp. 173-74; Studler and McAllister 1988, pp. 53, 57).

Interethnic job competition is measured by the presence of English Canadians at the same and/or at higher levels in the Francophone respondent's workplace.[8] Francophones who work alone or in places where there are no English Canadians at similar or higher levels are considered to be not in job competition with them. We assume that Francophones with Anglophones at similar or higher levels in the workplace may have been and/or may still be competing for higher-level positions or job transfers.

The perceived fairness of this competition is measured by the respondent's evaluation of the relative chances of French and English Canadians obtaining job offers or promotions.[9] Compe-

[5] The third factor has been examined indirectly in another study (Pinard and Hamilton 1986). Although not explicitly cast in terms of competition over collective goods, its examination of the strong impact of grievances regarding collective goods implies competition.

[6] Details of the study are given in the S.M.I.Q. codebook (revised edition), April 15, 1976, which can be obtained from the authors.

[7] Actually, the analysis includes all male labor force participants (the majority of whom work full-time) and full-time female participants because the measure of current job competition was available only for these groups. Unemployed, retired, and voluntarily inactive respondents were excluded because job competition was measured with respect to previous jobs. Other respondents (housewives, part-time female workers, students, and persons unable to work) were omitted because only husbands' or fathers' job competition was measured.

[8] The questions asked were: "Among these people who work at the same place as you, how many are French-speaking Canadians: all, nearly all, about three quarters, about half, or less than half?" (For answers other than "all" or "works alone," ask: "What is the proportion of English-speaking Canadians among the people working at the same level as you: are there none, only a few, about a quarter, about half, or more than half?" and "What is the proportion of English-speaking Canadians among the people working at a higher level than you: are there none, only a few, about a quarter, about half, or more than half?")

[9] The question asked was: "In the case of job offers or promotions, do you think that a French Canadian and an English Canadian who are equally competent

Table 1. Coding Coefficients Assigned to Subgroups for Seven Orthogonal Contrasts Used As Independent Variables

	Subgroup			Orthogonal Contrast (Independent Variable)						
	Competition	Fairness	Interdependence	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1)	No	No	No	-1	0	0	0	1/4	-1/4	-1/16
	Yes	No	No	1	0	0	0	1/4	-1/4	-1/16
(2)	No	Yes	No	0	-1	0	0	-1/4	-1/4	1/16
	Yes	Yes	No	0	1	0	0	-1/4	-1/4	1/16
(3)	No	Yes	Yes	0	0	-1	0	-1/4	1/4	-1/16
	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	0	1	0	-1/4	1/4	-1/16
(4)	No	No	Yes	0	0	0	-1	1/4	1/4	1/16
	Yes	No	Yes	0	0	0	1	1/4	1/4	1/16

Note: Fractions are used in contrasts 5 and 6 so that positive values add to 1 and negative values add to -1.

tition is presumed to be unfair if Francophone respondents believe that an English Canadian has a better chance of obtaining a job offer or promotion than an equally competent French Canadian. Although some would argue that the perception of unfairness is a consequence and not a cause of mobilization, we believe that argument does not hold in this case. Repeated surveys since the early 1960s have shown that a high (over 50 percent) and relatively stable proportion of Francophones claim that Anglophones have better chances in the job market, while mobilization for separation has remained at lower levels over that period and, until recently, increased only gradually. Hence, for most the perceptions of unfairness could not have followed mobilization. (For a fuller discussion of this point and the evidence see Pinard and Hamilton 1986, pp. 235-41, 246.)

Finally, interdependence is measured indirectly as concern about the overall consequences of separation.[10] While we would prefer a stronger measure, this is the only one available. It is strengthened by data gathered through open-ended questions in which these concerns were often expressed in terms of interdependence, e.g., a belief that Québec and the rest of Canada need one another or that at least the former needs the latter, particularly for economic reasons (Pinard 1975, pp. 87-90). Respondents who worry "somewhat" or "a lot" about the consequences of separation perceive this option as costly and we assume that they perceive a high degree of interdependence or complementarity between Québec and the rest of Canada.

Our analysis employs a logit model, with support for the separation of Québec as the dichotomous dependent variable. The independent variables included in this model are coded contrasts that reflect the predicted effects of job competition, perceived fairness of competition, and perceived interdependence on support for the separatist option.

Table 1 shows how the independent variables were introduced into the statistical model. Seven different contrasts were coded to correspond to our hypotheses. The first four contrasts are for the evaluation of the effect of job competition on the probability of supporting separatism within each possible combination of perceived fairness and perceived interdependence. Each contrast compares the "no competition" group to the "competition" group within one of the four possible combinations of fairness and interdependence. If job competition leads to separatism only under conditions of unfair competition and in the absence of perceived interdependence, only the first of these contrasts should be significant.

Our second hypothesis is that both perceived fairness and perceived interdependence have separate and direct effects on support for separation in Québec, regardless of the other variables. The fifth and sixth contrasts test these two "main" effects, respectively. The seventh contrast tests the combined (interactive) effect of perceived fairness and perceived interdependence.

Other control variables were examined as possible sources of spuriousness (occupation, industrial sector, income, education, age, ethnicity of management, size of workplace, self-employment, region, and religious attendance). Occupa-

have the same chances of getting them, that the French Canadian has a better chance, or that the English Canadian has a better chance?"

[10] The question asked was: "When you think of all the consequences that independence could have, does it worry you or not?" (If yes) "Does it worry you a lot, somewhat, or just a little?"

tion and region were significantly related to both job competition and support for separation at the zero-order level and were considered for the final logit model. However, statistical tests revealed an increment in explanatory power only for workers and farmers (coded as 1) compared to all other occupations (coded as 0), so that only this dummy variable was included in the final logit model (for more details, see Bélanger 1988).

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of the logit model predicting support for separatism as a function of the seven contrasts and the worker/farmer dummy variable. The goodness-of-fit test for the overall model reveals that, as a group, the independent variables have a significant effect.

Of greater interest is the significance of the individual contrasts corresponding to the proposed hypotheses.[11] As predicted, job competition has a significant effect on support for separation only when the competition is perceived as unfair and the consequences of independence are not worrisome. Under the three remaining alternatives, job competition does not increase support for separation by a statistically significant amount.[12] Therefore, our central hypothesis is supported.

The main effect of perceived fairness is statistically significant, which supports our second hypothesis. The main effect of perceived interdependence is also statistically significant and the negative value of the logit coefficient indicates that those who worry about the consequences of separation are less likely to support it than those who are not worried. However, the effects of both perceived interdependence and perceived fairness on support for separation are independent of one another, since the interaction between these two exogenous variables is not statistically significant. This is mainly due to the fact that when competition is fair and interdependence is not perceived, support for separation is still relatively strong (see Table 3).[13]

The dummy variable for workers and farmers is also statistically significant and negative, indicating that workers and farmers are less likely to support separatism than those in other occupations (e.g., see Pinard and Hamilton 1989, p. 91).[14]

Table 2. Unstandardized Logit Coefficients Predicting Support for Quebec Separation: Full-Time Francophone Workers, 1970-1971

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Logit Coefficients	χ^2
Intercept	1.490***	
Effect of job competition when		
(1) Competition unfair/ No interdependence	.350 (.151)	5.38*
(2) Competition fair/ No interdependence	.267 (.267)	1.00
(3) Competition fair/ Interdependence	-.033 (.455)	.01
(4) Competition unfair/ Interdependence	-.023 (.245)	.01
Main effect		
(5) Fairness	1.907 (.602)	10.01**
(6) Interdependence	-3.955 (.606)	45.56***
(7) Interaction effect: fairness × interdependence	.339 (2.404)	.02
(8) Worker/farmer	-.851 (.229)	13.86***
Number of cases	659	

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Log-likelihood at convergence (-2 ln [L_0]) = 515.22; χ^2 for full model = 104.52; degrees of freedom = 8; $p < .001$.

[11] Whereas the chi-square significance tests for these coefficients are revealing, the coefficients themselves are not easily interpretable as they represent the effect of each exogenous variable on the log of the odds of supporting separation. Of central interest are the predicted probabilities of supporting separatism, presented in Table 3. These probabilities, while slightly different from the actual percentages obtained by a cross-tabulation, reveal the magnitude of the differences between the various subgroups.

[12] The logit model was also run using a more restrictive measure of competition, i.e., the presence of Anglophones at the *same level* in the workplace. It was also run controlling for self-employment vs. being employed, to ensure that the effect of competition was not being enhanced by the absence of job competition among self-employed respondents. In both instances, the results were the same as those described except that in each case the first contrast was significant at $p = .10$ instead of $p = .02$.

[13] This is a special case whereby, in the absence of perceived costs, grievances can be replaced by aspirations as alternative internal motives (Pinard and Hamilton 1986, pp. 255-58).

[14] Many factors may account for the low level of support among workers and farmers, e.g., a weaker concern for cultural, status, and political ethnic issues, stronger materialistic concerns, lesser exposure to nationalistic beliefs, weaker ethnic loyalties, a lower degree of political involvement, or dependence on fewer ethnic institutions (for data, see Pinard and Hamilton 1981).

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Support for Québec Separation: Full-Time Francophone Workers, 1970-1971

Subgroup	Workers/Farmers		Other Occupations	
	No Job Competition	Job Competition	No Job Competition	Job Competition
(1) Competition unfair/ no interdependence	.22	.37	.40	.58
(2) Competition unfair/ interdependence	.06	.05	.12	.12
(3) Competition fair/ no interdependence	.11	.18	.23	.33
(4) Competition fair/ interdependence	.02	.02	.05	.05

Note: Values are predicted probabilities calculated from the equation for the final logit model.

This is expected because the tests for its incremental contribution revealed the necessity of retaining this variable.

Table 3 translates the effects of the independent variables into the predicted probabilities of supporting independence for each category of respondents. The first row reveals that when there are *no worries* concerning the consequences of independence and a perception of *unfair* competition, job competition produces a significant increase in the probability of supporting separation. Among workers and farmers, the increase in probability is .15 (.37 -.22), whereas among those in other occupations, the difference is .18 (.58 -.40). For all other combinations of perceived fairness and perceived interdependence, the effects of job competition are weaker (and not statistically significant) or altogether absent. These results support our reformulation.

The statistically significant main effect of perceived unfairness can also be observed in Table 3 by comparing row (1) to row (3) and row (2) to row (4). In line with our argument stating that what is at stake is the group's share of the labor market, not only the jobs of those individuals actually in competition, we find that perception of unfairness in the job market has an effect on support for separatism whether or not one is actually involved in job competition.

In accordance with the results of the logit analysis, worries about the consequences of separation show the strongest independent effects, as revealed by the comparison between row (1) and row (2) and between row (3) and row (4). A lack of concern about the consequences of separation increases the probability of support for separation regardless of the presence of job competition, the fairness of competition, or occupation. In the absence of perceived interdependence, the probability of supporting separation depends on the joint presence of perceptions of unfairness and job competition itself, as well as on occupation. However, perceived interdependence greatly reduces the probability of supporting separation and virtually eliminates the effects of the other three explanatory factors.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The theory of ethnic competition suggests a direct causal link between occupational competition and ethnic mobilization. Two conditions were posited as necessary for such a relationship to hold: Competition had to be perceived as unfair and it had to take place within a context of low interdependence. These arguments were evaluated with survey data on the independence movement in Quebec. The analysis confirmed our expectations. Job competition between Francophones and Anglophones in Quebec leads Francophones to support separation only when competition is seen as unfair and there is no perception of interdependence with the Anglophone group. If these two conditions do not hold, job competition will not produce a significant increase in ethnic political mobilization.

Under the posited conditions, however, the significant positive effect of job competition on separatist support is not strong. This is not surprising given our argument that in recent ethnic movements, and in Québec in particular, the main objects of competition have not been individual jobs, but more general collective goods. Indeed, grievances regarding these more general issues exert stronger effects than those observed with job competition, even under specified conditions (Pinard and Hamilton 1986).

Our reformulation of competition theory can account for the otherwise puzzling case of Switzerland. Switzlerland is a multicultural society that exhibits a high level of ethnic harmony at the national level, especially between its two largest groups, the French- and German-speaking Swiss. According to the original competition model, Swiss politics at the national level should be characterized by high levels of *conflict*, not harmony. Unlike corresponding groups in other countries that have been studied, the French- and German-speaking Swiss are virtually equal on various socioeconomic dimensions (McRae 1983, pp. 80-92; Schmid 1981, pp. 33-36), and the model pre-

dicts that "the more alike are the occupational distributions of two [ethnic] groups, the greater the competition between them," and, hence, the greater the conflict (Hannan 1979, pp. 272-73). How can the ethnic harmony in Switzerland be explained? Competition theorists are silent on this issue.

Our hypothesis is that job competition between these groups — to the extent that it occurs under the prevailing high level of linguistic territorial concentration — is unlikely to be seen as unfair because of their basic socioeconomic equality and the unlikely presence of pervasive and one-sided linguistic job discrimination under such equality. Moreover, these groups are unlikely to perceive other forms of competition as unfair, especially competition over collective goods, because of the overall socioeconomic parity, status equality, and regional economic balance (McRae 1983, pp. 80-92), and because of the way political power is distributed and exercised. While political power is unequal, given that the number of German-speaking Swiss citizens is much larger than that of their French-speaking counterparts (74 percent vs. 20 percent), this is partly compensated for by the slightly higher prestige of the French language, which "effectively counterbalances [their] numerical weakness" (McRae 1983, p. 73; also pp. 59-68). Moreover, power is decentralized through federalism and the distribution of power goes beyond simple proportionality in the national government (McRae 1983, pp. 126-31). Above all, given the prevailing conditions of equality and balance, power can easily be exercised in a consociational manner, that is, through grand coalition governments and informal mutual veto powers that ensure that no group is a disproportionate loser. Switzerland is recognized as a prototype of consociational politics (Lijphart 1977, chap. 2) so that, despite divergent interests, there are few grievances over economic, status, political, or cultural issues. To the extent that linguistic competition occurs, it is likely to be harmoniously carried out through institutionalized channels in a consociational framework. Competition and harmony can go hand-in-hand.

Our reformulation is also consistent with another empirical generalization: the high propensity of intellectuals and the low propensity of managers and businessmen to support and lead current ethnic movements (Pinard and Hamilton 1989), despite the fact that intellectuals are less likely to be involved in individual interethnic competition compared to managers and businessmen. Intellectuals, in contrast with businessmen, are especially sensitive to unequal opportunities in the competition for collective economic position, status, and power, are particularly concerned with the preservation of cultural differences, and are less exposed or sensitive to material interdependence.

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