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# Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America

*Terry Lynn Karl*

The demise of authoritarian rule in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, when combined with efforts at political liberalization in Mexico and the recent election of civilian presidents in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, represents a political watershed in Latin America. This wave of regime changes in the 1980s places a number of questions on the intellectual and political agenda for the continent. Will these newly emergent and fragile democracies in South America be able to survive, especially in the context of the worst economic recession since the 1930s? Can the liberalization of authoritarian rule in Central America and the possible prospect of honest competitive elections in Mexico be transformed into genuine democratic transitions? Will previously consolidated political democracies such as Venezuela and Costa Rica be able to extend the basic principles of citizenship into economic and social realms, or will they be “deconsolidated” by this challenge and revert to a sole preoccupation with survivability?<sup>1</sup>

Behind such questions lies a central concern expressed by Dankwart A. Rustow almost twenty years ago: “What conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make it thrive?”<sup>2</sup> This article addresses Rustow’s query by arguing the following. First, the manner in which theorists of comparative politics have sought to understand democracy in developing countries has changed as the once-dominant search for prerequisites of democracy has given way to a more process-oriented emphasis on contingent choice. Having undergone this evolution, theorists should now develop an interactive approach that seeks explicitly to relate structural constraints to the shaping of contingent choice. Second, it is no longer adequate to examine regime transitions writ large, that is, from the general category of authoritarian rule to that of democracy. Such broad-gauged efforts must be complemented by the identification of different types of democracy that emerge from distinctive modes of regime transition as well as an analysis of their potential political, economic, and social consequences. Before these issues and their implications for the study of Latin America can be addressed, however, a definition of democracy must be established.

## **Defining Democracy**

Defining democracy is no simple task because the resolution of a number of disputes over both its prospects and evaluation rests on how the term itself is operationalized. If, for example, democracy is defined in a Schumpeterian manner as a polity that permits the choice between elites by citizens voting in regular and competitive elections, the militarized countries of Central America could be classified as political democracies by many scholars, just as they are (with the exception of Sandinista Nicaragua) by U.S. policymakers.<sup>3</sup> But if the definition is expanded to include a wider range of political conditions—from lack of

restrictions on citizen expression, to the absence of discrimination against particular political parties, to freedom of association for all interests, to civilian control over the military—these same countries (with the exception of Costa Rica) could scarcely be classified under this rubric.

The problem is compounded when a number of substantive properties—such as the predominance of institutions that faithfully translate individual preferences into public policy through majoritarian rule, the incorporation of an ever-increasing proportion of the population into the process of decision making, and the continuous improvement of economic equity through the actions of governing institutions—are included either as components or empirical correlates of democratic rule.<sup>4</sup> Approaches that stipulate socioeconomic advances for the majority of the population and active involvement by subordinate classes united in autonomous popular organizations as defining conditions intrinsic to democracy are hard-pressed to find “actual” democratic regimes to study. Often they are incapable of identifying significant, if incomplete, changes towards democratization in the political realm. Moreover, they are cut off from investigating empirically the hypothetical relationship between competitive political forms and progressive economic outcomes because this important issue is assumed away by the very definition of regime type. While these substantive properties are ethically desirable to most democrats, such conceptual breadth renders the definition of democracy virtually meaningless for practical application.<sup>5</sup>

For these reasons, I will settle for a middle-range specification of democracy. It is defined as “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives.” Specified in this manner, democracy is a political concept involving several dimensions: (1) contestation over policy and political competition for office; (2) participation of the citizenry through partisan, associational, and other forms of collective action; (3) accountability of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representation and the rule of law; and (4) civilian control over the military. It is this latter dimension, so important in the Latin American context, which sets my definition apart from Robert Dahl’s classic notion of a “procedural minimum.”<sup>6</sup> A middle-range definition of this sort avoids the Scylla of an overly narrow reliance on the mere presence of elections without concomitant changes in civil-military relations and the Charybdis of an overly broad assumption of social and economic equality. While perhaps less than fully satisfactory from a normative perspective, it has the advantage of permitting a systematic and objective investigation of the relationship between democratic political forms and the long-range pursuit of equity.

### **The Futile Search for Democratic Preconditions**

If the questions raised by democratization remain relatively unchanged from the past, the answers that are offered today come from a different direction. This becomes evident through a brief comparison of the divergent theories about the origins of democratic regimes that have dominated the study of Latin America. The scholarship that preceded the new

wave of democratization in the 1980s argued that a number of preconditions were necessary for the emergence of a stable democratic polity.

First, a certain degree of wealth or, better said, level of capitalist development was considered a prerequisite of democracy. Market economies in themselves were not enough; a country had to cross (and remain beyond) a minimum threshold of economic performance before political competition could be institutionalized. "The more well-to-do a nation," Seymour Martin Lipset claimed, "the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."<sup>7</sup> A wealthy economy made possible higher levels of literacy, education, urbanization, and mass media exposure, or so the logic went, while also providing resources to mitigate the tensions produced by political conflict.<sup>8</sup>

A second set of preconditions that underlay traditional approaches to democracy was derived from the concept of political culture, that is, the system of beliefs and values in which political action is embedded and given meaning. The prevalence of certain values and beliefs over others was said to be more conducive to the emergence of democracy. Thus, for example, Protestantism allegedly enhanced the prospects for democracy in Europe while Catholicism, with its tradition of hierarchy and intolerance, was posited to have the opposite effect in Latin America.<sup>9</sup> Although arguments based only on the link between different religious systems and experiences with democracy have been dismissed by most scholars, more sophisticated claims sought to identify political cultures characterized by a high degree of mutual trust among members of society, a willingness to tolerate diversity, and a tradition of accommodation or compromise because such cultures were considered necessary for the subsequent development of democratic institutions. That a "civic culture" of this sort necessarily rested on a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, occupational sectors, and ethnic, religious, or regional groups was an unspoken assumption. In other words, a prodemocratic consensus and set of values was considered the main prerequisite of political democracy.<sup>10</sup>

Third, specific domestic historical conditions and configurations were said to be prerequisites of democracy. Theorists of "crises and sequences" argued that the order in which various crises of modernization appeared and were settled determined whether economic and social transformations were conducive to the development of democracy. Democratic regimes were more likely to emerge if problems of national identity were resolved prior to the establishment of a central government and if both of these events preceded the formation of mass parties.<sup>11</sup>

In a different, yet still historically grounded vein, Barrington Moore, Jr. contended that democracies were more likely to appear where the social and economic power of the landed aristocracy was in decline relative to that of the bourgeoisie and where labor-repressive agriculture was not the dominant mode of production. When this occurred as a result of the commercialization of agriculture that transformed a traditional peasantry into either a class of small farmers or a rural proletariat, the prognosis for democracy was strong indeed.<sup>12</sup> A version of Moore's approach has been used to explain the different political trajectories in Central America. Specifically, democracy is said to have emerged in Costa Rica due to the creation of a yeoman farmer class, while the persistence of authoritarian rule in Guatemala and El Salvador is attributed to the continued dominance of the landed aristocracy.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, some scholars treated external influences as another set of preconditions on the grounds that these could be decisive in determining whether a polity became democratic or

authoritarian. Dependency theorists in Latin America and the United States contended that the continent's particular insertion into the international market made democratization especially problematic at more advanced stages of import-substituting capitalist development and even enhanced the necessity for authoritarian rule under specific circumstances. In a logic that ran counter to Lipset's "optimistic equation," both Guillermo O'Donnell and Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that, as dependent economies became more complex, more penetrated by foreign capital and technology, and more reliant upon low wages to maintain their competitive advantage in the international economy, professional militaries, technocrats, and state managers moved to the forefront of the decision-making process, forcibly replacing unruly, "populist" parties and trade unions in order to establish a supposedly more efficient form of rule.<sup>14</sup>

Inversely, using an argument based on external influences of a qualitatively different sort, proponents of an aggressive U.S. foreign policy towards the region declared that the rise and decline of democracy was directly related to the rise and decline of the global power of the United States rather than to market mechanisms or accumulation processes. In Samuel Huntington's view, the dramatic increase in authoritarian rule during the 1960s and 1970s was a direct reflection of the waning of U.S. influence. Specifically, it was due to the decreased effectiveness of efforts by U.S. officials to promote democracy as a successful model of development. Concomitantly, he argued, the spate of democratic transitions in the 1980s could be credited to the Reagan administration's renewed effort to "restore American power" through the rollback of revolutions and the promotion of electoral reforms. This position, so ideologically convenient for policymakers, located the roots of democracy outside Latin America.<sup>15</sup>

The experience of Latin American countries in the 1980s challenged all of these presumptions about preconditions. The hypothetical association between wealth and democracy might be called upon to "explain" the transition to democracy in Brazil after a protracted economic boom, but it could hardly account for the case of Peru, whose transition was characterized by stagnant growth rates, extreme foreign debt, persistent balance of payments problems, and a regressive distribution of income. Nor could it explain the anomaly of Argentina, where relatively high levels of per capita GDP were persistently accompanied by authoritarian rule. If the political cultures of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil all tolerated, admittedly to varying degrees, the practice of official state terror and widespread violations of human rights, how could they suddenly become sufficiently "civic" and "tolerant" to support a democratic outcome? As the Catholic church took an increasingly active role in opposing authoritarian rule, especially in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Central America, and Panama, the argument about the so-called "anti-democratic bias" of Catholicism became increasingly implausible.<sup>16</sup>

The predictability of approaches emphasizing the influence of the international system fared little better. While the manner of a country's insertion into the world capitalist economy is now considered essential in explaining its subsequent political and economic development, as dependency theorists claimed, criticisms of other scholars plus the democratic transitions in Brazil and Chile demonstrated that there was no direct or inevitable correlation between capital deepening and authoritarian rule.<sup>17</sup> The general trends towards recession in export earnings, debt crises, diminishing U.S. support for human rights, and the frequent resort to military instruments under the foreign policy of the Reagan administration

boded ill for the emergence of democracies in the 1980s, yet emerge they did. The pattern of their appearance presented an undeniable challenge to Huntington's thesis linking democratization with the rise of U.S. power. In the southern cone, where influence from the north is not especially high, military rulers generally made way for civilian authority. In Central America, Panama, and Haiti, where the overriding historical role of the U.S. is indisputable, militaries either permitted elections to occur without limiting their own prerogatives, or they refused to leave power altogether. Indeed, where the decline in U.S. hegemony was greatest, democracy seemed to appear even though dictatorship "should" have been the more appropriate response!

These anomalies suggest the pressing need for important revisions, even reversals, in the way democratization in contemporary Latin America is understood. First, there may be no single precondition that is sufficient to produce such an outcome. The search for causes rooted in economic, social, cultural/psychological, or international factors has not yielded a general law of democratization, nor is it likely to do so in the near future despite the proliferation of new cases.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the search for a set of identical conditions that can account for the presence or absence of democratic regimes should probably be abandoned and replaced by more modest efforts to derive a contextually bounded approach to the study of democratization.

Second, what the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions of democracy may be better conceived in the future as the outcomes of democracy. Patterns of greater economic growth and more equitable income distribution, higher levels of literacy and education, and increases in social communication and media exposure may be better treated as the products of stable democratic processes rather than as the prerequisites of its existence. A "civic" political culture characterized by high levels of mutual trust, a willingness to tolerate diversity of opinion, and a propensity for accommodation and compromise could be the result of the protracted functioning of democratic institutions that generate appropriate values and beliefs rather than a set of cultural obstacles that must be initially overcome. There is evidence for this contention in the fact that most democracies in Europe and Latin America's oldest democracy in Costa Rica have emerged from quite "uncivic" warfare. In other words, what have been emphasized as independent variables in the past might be more fruitfully conceived as dependent variables in the future.

### **From Contingent Choice to Structured Contingency**

The failure to identify clear prerequisites, plus the hunch that much of what had been thought to produce democracy should be considered as its product, has caused theorists of comparative politics to shift their attention to the strategic calculations, unfolding processes, and sequential patterns that are involved in moving from one type of political regime to another, especially under conditions of nonviolence, gradualism, and social continuity. For Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, democratization is understood as a historical process with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of transition, consolidation, persistence, and eventual deconsolidation.<sup>19</sup> A variety of actors with different followings, preferences, calculations, resources, and time horizons come to the fore during these successive stages. For example, elite factions and social movements seem to play the

key roles in bringing about the demise of authoritarian rule; political parties move to center stage during the transition itself; and business associations, trade unions, and state agencies become major determinants of the type of democracy that is eventually consolidated.<sup>20</sup>

What differentiates these stages above all, as Adam Przeworski points out, is the degree of uncertainty which prevails at each moment. During regime transitions, all political calculations and interactions are highly uncertain. Actors find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents. The armed forces and the civilian supporters of the incumbent authoritarian regime are characteristically divided between “hard-line” and “soft-line” factions. Political parties emerge as privileged in this context because, despite their divisions over strategies and their uncertainties about partisan identities, the logic of electoral competition focuses public attention on them and compels them to appeal to the widest possible clientele. The only certainty is that “founding elections” will eliminate those who make important miscalculations.

The absence of predictable “rules of the game” during a regime transition expands the boundaries of contingent choice. Indeed, the dynamics of the transition revolve around strategic interactions and tentative arrangements between actors with uncertain power resources aimed at defining who will legitimately be entitled to play in the political game, what criteria will determine the winners and losers, and what limits will be placed on the issues at stake. From this perspective, regime consolidation occurs when contending social classes and political groups come to accept some set of formal rules or informal understandings that determine “who gets what, where, when, and how” from politics. In so doing, they settle into predictable positions and legitimate behaviors by competing according to mutually acceptable rules. Electoral outcomes may still be uncertain with regard to person or party, but in consolidated democracies they are firmly surrounded by normative limits and established patterns of power distribution.

The notion of contingency (meaning that outcomes depend less on objective conditions than subjective rules surrounding strategic choice) has the advantage of stressing collective decisions and political interactions that have largely been underemphasized in the search for preconditions. But this understanding of democracy has the danger of descending into excessive voluntarism if it is not explicitly placed within a framework of structural-historical constraints. Even in the midst of the tremendous uncertainty provoked by a regime transition, where constraints appear to be most relaxed and where a wide range of outcomes appears to be possible, the decisions made by various actors respond to and are conditioned by the types of socioeconomic structures and political institutions already present. These can be decisive in that they may either restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors attempting to construct democracy.

For example, certain social structures seem to make the emergence of political democracy highly improbable; inversely, it is reasonable to presume that their absence may make accommodative strategies more viable and reinforce the position of democratic actors. Political democracies have lasted only in countries where the landed class, generally the most recalcitrant of interests, has played a secondary role in the export economy, for example Venezuela and Chile, or where non-labor-repressive agriculture has predominated, for example Costa Rica, Argentina, and Uruguay. Thus the survivability of political democracy does seem to depend on a structural space defined in part by the absence of a

strong landowner elite engaged in labor-repressive agriculture or its subordination to interests tied to other economic activities.<sup>21</sup>

The cases of Venezuela and Chile better make the point. In Venezuela, dependence upon petroleum as the leading source of foreign exchange had the (unintended) effect of hastening the decline of that country's already stagnant agriculture and, with it, the landowning elite. Faced with overvalued exchange rates that hurt agro-exports and abundant foreign reserves for importing cheap foodstuffs, landowners sold their property to oil companies and converted themselves into a commercial and financial urban bourgeoisie. This largely voluntary self-liquidation removed the incentive for them to commercialize rural areas, to subordinate the peasantry through repressive means, and eventually to maintain authoritarian rule. It also removed the social base for an antisystem party of the right. Thus, actors designing pact-making strategies in Venezuela during the regime transition in 1958 did not face powerfully organized antidemocratic rural elites.<sup>22</sup> Social dynamics in Chile, though different, had the same effect. Conservative elements based in a system of labor-repressive agriculture eventually supported the expansion of the suffrage in the nineteenth century as a means of combating the rising power of industrialists and *capas medias*, who were tied to the state and supported by revenues from copper.<sup>23</sup> In effect, the social impact of the dominant presence of mineral exports meant that, when compared to the cases of Central America, both Venezuela and Chile were able to institutionalize democratic agreements with relative ease.

These cases illustrate the limits, as well as the opportunities, that social structures place upon contingent choice. If the focus in explaining the emergence of democracy had been solely on the forging of institutional compromises, that is, conceptualizing the establishment of democracy as only the product of strategic interactions, the pact-making that characterized the Venezuelan transition and the gradual expansion of the suffrage in Chile would appear to be simply the result of skilful bargaining by astute political leaders.<sup>24</sup> Instead, by focusing on the internal social dynamics produced by a mineral-based insertion into the international economy, it becomes evident how oil- or copper-induced structural change makes such "statecraft" possible. This is not to argue that individual decisions made at particular points in time or all observable political outcomes can be specifically and neatly linked to preexisting structures, but it is claimed that historically created structures, while not determining which one of a limited set of alternatives political actors may choose, are "confining conditions" that restrict or in some cases enhance the choices available to them. In other words, structural and institutional constraints determine the range of options available to decision makers and may even predispose them to choose a specific option.

What is called for, then, is a path-dependent approach which clarifies how broad structural changes shape particular regime transitions in ways that may be especially conducive to (or especially obstructive of) democratization. This needs to be combined with an analysis of how such structural changes become embodied in political institutions and rules which subsequently mold the preferences and capacities of individuals during and after regime changes. In this way, it should be possible to demonstrate how the range of options available to decision makers at a given point in time is a function of structures put in place in an earlier period and, concomitantly, how such decisions are conditioned by institutions established in the past. The advantages of this method are evident when compared to a structural approach alone, which leads to excessively deterministic conclusions about the



origins and prospects of democracy, or to a sole focus on contingency, which produces overly voluntaristic interpretations.<sup>25</sup>

### **Modes of Transition to Democracy**

Once the links between structures, institutions, and contingent choice are articulated, it becomes apparent that the arrangements made by key political actors during a regime transition establish new rules, roles, and behavioral patterns which may or may not represent an important rupture with the past. These, in turn, eventually become the institutions shaping the prospects for regime consolidation in the future. Electoral laws, once adopted, encourage some interests to enter the political arena and discourage others. Certain models of economic development, once initiated through some form of compromise between capital and labor, systematically favor some groups over others in patterns that become difficult to change. Accords between political parties and the armed forces set out the initial parameters of civilian and military spheres. Thus, what at the time may appear to be temporary agreements often become persistent barriers to change, barriers that can even scar a new regime with a permanent "birth defect."

These observations have important implications for studying democracy in Latin America. Rather than engage in what may be a futile search for new preconditions, they suggest that scholars would do well to concentrate on several tasks: (1) clarifying how the mode of regime transition (itself conditioned by the breakdown of authoritarian rule) sets the context within which strategic interactions can take place; (2) examining how these interactions, in turn, help to determine whether political democracy will emerge and survive; and (3) analyzing what type of democracy will eventually be institutionalized.

Thus, it is important to begin to distinguish between possible modes of transition to democracy. First, we can differentiate cases in which democracies are the outcome of a strategy based primarily on overt force from those in which democracies arise from compromise. This has been displayed on the horizontal axis in Figure 1. Second, we can distinguish between transitions in which incumbent ruling groups, no matter how weakened, are still ascendant in relation to mass actors and those in which mass actors have gained the upper hand, even temporarily, *vis-à-vis* those dominant elites. This can be seen on the vertical axis in Figure 1. The cross tabulation of these distinctions produces four ideal types of democratic transition: reform, revolution, imposition, and pact.

Latin America, at one time or another, has experienced all four modes of transition. To date, however, *no* stable political democracy has resulted from regime transitions in which mass actors have gained control, even momentarily, over traditional ruling classes. Efforts at reform from below, which have been characterized by unrestricted contestation and participation, have met with subversive opposition from unsuppressed traditional elites, as the cases of Argentina (1946–1951), Guatemala (1946–1954), and Chile (1970–1973) demonstrate.<sup>26</sup> Revolutions generally produce stable forms of governance (Bolivia is an obvious exception), but such forms have not yet evolved into democratic patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation, rotation in power, and free associability, although developments in Nicaragua and Mexico may soon challenge this assertion.<sup>27</sup>

Thus far, the most frequently encountered types of transition, and the ones which have

Figure 1 Modes of Transition to Democracy

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<u>STRATEGIES OF TRANSITION</u>		
	Compromise	Force
Elite Ascendant	PACT	IMPOSITION
<u>RELATIVE</u> <u>ACTOR</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>		
Mass Ascendant	REFORM	REVOLUTION

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most often resulted in the implantation of a political democracy, are “transitions from above.” Here traditional rulers remain in control, even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force—or some mix of the two—to retain at least part of their power.

Of these two modes of transition, democratization by pure imposition is the least common in Latin America—unless we incorporate cases in which force or the threat of force is applied by foreign as well as domestic actors. This is not the case for both Europe and Asia, where democratization through imposition often followed in the wake of World War II. In Figure 2, the cell labeled imposition includes Brazil and Ecuador, where the military used its dominant position to establish unilaterally the rules for civilian governance. Cases on the margin include Costa Rica (where in 1948 an opposition party militarily defeated the governing party but then participated in pact-making to lay the foundation for stable democratic rule), Venezuela (1945–48) and Peru (where the military’s control over the timing and shape of the transition was strongly influenced by a mass popular movement),<sup>28</sup> and Chile (where the military’s unilateralism was curbed somewhat by its defeat in the 1988 plebiscite).<sup>29</sup>

Where democracies that have endured for a respectable length of time appear to cluster is in the cell defined by relatively strong elite actors who engage in strategies of compromise, as Figure 2 demonstrates. This cell includes the cases of Venezuela (1958–), Colombia (1958–), the recent redemocratization in Uruguay (1984–), and Chile (1932–1970).<sup>30</sup> What unites all of these diverse cases, except Chile, is the presence of foundational *pacts*, that is, explicit (though not always public) agreements between contending actors, which define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those involved. Chile appears to be an exception because there was no explicit pact or agreement among elites in 1932, when the democratic regime was simply “restored” on the basis of preexisting constitutional rules left over from the first democratic transition in 1874. While

Figure 2 Modes of Transition to Democracy in Latin America

Compromise	- - - - -	Force
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<u>PACT</u>		<u>IMPOSITION</u>
Venezuela (1958-)	Costa Rica (1948-)	Brazil (1974-)
Colombia (1958-)		Ecuador (1976-)
Uruguay (1984-)	Mexico (1988-)*	
- - - - -		- - - - -
Chile (1932-1970)		Guatemala (1984-)*
	Chile (1988-)	El Salvador (1982)*
-----		
		Peru (1978-)
	Argentina (1983-)	Venezuela (1945-48)
<u>REFORM</u>		<u>REVOLUTION</u>
Argentina (1946-1951),		Mexico (1910-1929)*
Guatemala (1946-1954)		Bolivia (1952-)
Chile (1970-1973)**		Nicaragua (1979-)*

\* These cases cannot be considered democracies in the definition used here. They are included because they are in periods of transformation and thus illustrate possible modes of transition in the future.

\*\* See footnote 26.

the Chilean case suggests that elite-based democracies can be established in the absence of foundational pacts, this may be more difficult in the contemporary period, which is characterized by more developed organized interests, the presence of mass politics, stronger military capabilities, and a tighter integration into the international market. Under such conditions, *pactismo* may prove to be essential.<sup>31</sup>

Foundational pacts are well exemplified by the case of Venezuela. Here a series of agreements negotiated by the military, economic, and party leaders rested on explicit

institutional arrangements.<sup>32</sup> The military agreed to leave power and to accept a new role as an “apolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative body” in exchange for an amnesty for abuses committed during authoritarian rule and a guaranteed improvement of the economic situation of officers. Political parties agreed to respect the electoral process and share power in a manner commensurate with the voting results. They also accepted a “prolonged political truce” aimed at depersonalizing debate and facilitating consultation and coalitions. Capitalists agreed to accept legal trade unions and collective bargaining in exchange for significant state subsidies, guarantees against expropriation or socializing property, and promises of labor peace from workers’ representatives. This arrangement changed what could have become potentially explosive issues of national debate into established parameters by removing them from the electoral arena.

The foundational pacts underlying some new democracies have several essential components. First, they are necessarily comprehensive and inclusive of virtually all politically significant actors. Indeed, because pacts are negotiated compromises in which contending forces agree to forego their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each other’s vital interests, they are successful only when they include all significantly threatening interests. Thus, the typical foundational pact is actually a series of agreements that are interlocking and dependent upon each other; it necessarily includes an agreement between the military and civilians over the conditions for establishing civilian rule, an agreement between political parties to compete under the new rules of governance, and a “social contract” between state agencies, business associations, and trade unions regarding property rights, market arrangements, and the distribution of benefits.

Second, while such pacts are both substantive (about the main tenets of policy) and procedural (about the rules of policymaking), they initially emphasize rulemaking because “bargaining about bargaining” is the first and most important stage in the process of compromise. Only after all contending forces have agreed to bargain over their differences can the power-sharing which leads to consensual governance result. This initial bargain can begin to lay the basis for mutual trust if only by building up reserves of familiarity between opposing groups. Subsequently, the very decision to enter into a pact can create a habit of pact making and an accommodative political style based on a “pact to make pacts.”

Such foundational pacts must be differentiated from smaller, more partial “managerial” accords.<sup>33</sup> These include the neofunctional arrangements frequently found in social democratic polities in Europe, for example, the annual corporatist negotiations among capital, labor, and the state in postwar Austria for setting wages and social policy, as well as the frequent mini-accords hammered out between political opponents in Latin America. Unlike foundational pacts, managerial accords are partial rather than comprehensive, exclusionary rather than inclusionary, and substantively oriented rather than rule making in content. These characteristics of comprehensiveness, inclusion, and rule making are critical in identifying the presence of a foundational pact. They help distinguish between basic agreements, like those present in Venezuela in 1958, and more transitory political deals, like the Pact of Apaneca which was forged in El Salvador in 1983 between the Christian Democratic Party and ARENA.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, these pacts serve to ensure survivability because, although they are inclusionary, they are simultaneously aimed at restricting the scope of representation in order to reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests will be respected. In essence, they are

antidemocratic mechanisms, bargained by elites, which seek to create a deliberate socioeconomic and political contract that demobilizes emerging mass actors while delineating the extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future. They may accomplish this task by restricting contestation (as Colombian parties did in 1958 by agreeing to alternate in power regardless of the outcome of elections), by restricting the policy agenda itself (as Venezuelan parties did in 1958 by agreeing to implement the same economic program), or by restricting the franchise (as Chilean elites did beginning with the electoral law of 1874). Regardless of which strategic option is chosen, the net effect of these options is the same: the nature and parameters of the initial democracy that results is markedly circumscribed.

### **Types of Democracies and Their Prospects in the Contemporary Period**

What are the implications of this excursus into preconditions and modes of transition for the prospects of democratization in contemporary Latin America? To begin with, the notion of unfolding processes and sequences from regime breakdown to transition to consolidation and persistence is fundamental in understanding the two concurrent realities of democratization in Latin America today. On the one hand, most of the newly emergent civilian or militarized civilian regimes—Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua—face the overwhelming problem of sheer survivability. What threatens their survival is the omnipresent specter of a military coup, a coup which may be provoked by intense partisan political disagreements, by the inability of political parties to manage the current profound economic crisis of the region, by the actions of antisystem elites, by a mass mobilization of labor, peasants, or the urban poor that escapes the control of traditional dominant classes, by the actions of a foreign power, or by threats to the vital corporate interests of the military itself. Significant uncertainty over the rules of the game still prevail in these fragile democracies.

What becomes important in maintaining civilian rule is to find mechanisms—other than rigged or unpredictable elections—that can limit this uncertainty, especially by reducing incentives for civilians on the losing end to appeal to the military for salvation. This suggests that there are two critical tasks initially facing Latin American democratizers: first, to arrive at a sufficiently strong consensus about the rules of the game (including institutional formalities guaranteeing respect for certain crucial but minoritarian concerns) so that no major elite is tempted to call upon the military to protect its vital interests and, second, to begin to design conscious strategies for the establishment of qualitatively new civil-military relations appropriate to future stable civilian rule. This is probably easier to accomplish in the more developed regions of the continent, where the armed forces have learned the importance of cooperating with capitalist and managerial elites, than in the less developed ones (Bolivia, Central America, and the Caribbean), where the military still retains relatively confident notions of its ability to manage the economy and polity or is simply too corrupt to worry about such matters.<sup>35</sup>

On the other hand, other types of democracies in the region—Venezuela, Costa Rica, and, more recently, Brazil and Uruguay—are relatively consolidated in that actors are not so preoccupied by the overriding concern with survivability. Rather, the challenge that

confronts most of these polities (and that will certainly confront newer democracies as preoccupation with mere survivability recedes) is providing some new and better resolution to the ancient question of *cui bono*. This issue of “who benefits” from democracy is singularly problematic in Latin America, where the pattern of dependent capitalist development has been especially ruthless in its historic patterns of exploitation.<sup>36</sup> This means that the extension of citizenship and equal political rights must take place in a context of extreme inequality, which is unparalleled even in Africa or Asia.<sup>37</sup> It must also take place during *la década perdida*, that is to say, in the midst of the most severe and prolonged economic crisis since the Depression.<sup>38</sup>

The relationship between the problematics of survivability and *cui bono* may well represent the central dilemma of democratization in Latin America. The choices taken by key political actors to ensure the survivability of a fragile democracy—the compromises they make, the agreements they enter into—will necessarily and even irrevocably affect who gains and who loses during the consolidation of a new regime. Subsequent “populist” decisions to redistribute gains without regard for losses may affect the durability of the regime itself, regardless of how consolidated it may appear to be. At the same time, decisions *not* to redistribute or inaction on this front may also influence regime durability because the commitment to democracy in part rests on the widely held (if sometimes inaccurate) conviction that economic benefits will be more fairly distributed or the welfare of the general population improved under this type of polity. Hence the current concern with both survivability and “who benefits” merely underlines the significance of choices made during the founding moments of democracies and highlights some potential relationships between political democracy and economic outcomes for future research. It also produces some not-so-promising scenarios for the emergence of different types of democracies.

First, political democracy in Latin America may be rooted in a fundamental paradox: the very modes of transition that appear to enhance initial survivability by limiting unpredictability may preclude the future democratic self-transformation of the economy or polity further down the road. Ironically, the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short run may constrain their potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and inequality that continue to characterize the continent. Indeed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that what occurs in the phase of transition or early consolidation may involve a significant trade-off between some form of political democracy, on the one hand, and equity, on the other. Thus, even as these democracies guarantee a greater respect for law and human dignity when compared to their authoritarian predecessors, they may be unable to carry out substantive reforms that address the lot of their poorest citizens. If this scenario should occur, they would become the victims of their successful consolidation, and the democratic transitions of the 1980s that survive could prove to be the “frozen” democracies of the 1990s.

Second, while this may be the central dilemma of elite-ascendant processes of democratization, there may be important differences between countries like Uruguay, a pacted transition, and Brazil, a unilaterally imposed transition. Pacted democracies, whatever their defects, have been honed through compromise between at least two powerful contending elites. Thus, their institutions should reflect some flexibility for future bargaining and revision over existing rules. In Uruguay, for example, while the agreed-upon rules made it very difficult to challenge agreements between the military and the parties on

the issue of amnesty for crimes committed during authoritarian rule, the left opposition, excluded from this agreement, was nevertheless able to force the convocation of a plebiscite on this major issue, which it subsequently lost. It is difficult to imagine that anything similar could occur in Brazil. Because the military exerted almost complete control over the transition, it never curtailed its own prerogatives nor fully agreed to the principle of civilian control, and it has not been compelled to adopt institutional rules reflecting the need for compromise.

The contrast between the cases of Uruguay and Brazil raises a hypothesis that merits investigation: to the extent that transitions are unilaterally imposed by armed forces who are not compelled to enter into compromises, they threaten to evolve into civilian governments controlled by authoritarian elements who are unlikely to push for greater participation, accountability, or equity for the majority of their citizens. Paradoxically, in other words, the heritage left by "successful" authoritarian experiences, that is, those characterized by relatively moderate levels of repression and economic success which has left the military establishment relatively intact, may prove to be the major obstacle to future democratic self-transformation.<sup>39</sup> This danger exists, albeit to a lesser extent, in civilian-directed unilateral transitions, for example, Mexico, because the institutional rules that are imposed are likely to favor incumbents and permit less scope for contestation.

Third, the attempt to assess possible consequences of various modes of transition is most problematic where strong elements of imposition, compromise, and reform are simultaneously present, that is to say, where neither incumbent elites nor newly ascendant power contenders are clearly in control and where the armed forces are relatively intact. This is currently the case in Argentina and Peru, as Figure 2 demonstrates. Given the Argentinean military's defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war, the high level of mass mobilization during the transition, and the absence of pacts between civilian authority and the armed forces, on the one hand, and trade unions and employers, on the other, Argentina combines elements of several modes of transition. Such a mixed scenario, while perhaps holding out the greatest hope for political democracy and economic equity, may render a consistent strategy of any type ineffectual and thus lead to the repetition of Argentina's persistent failure to consolidate any type of regime. The prospects for failure are even greater in Peru. Given the absence of explicit agreements between the leading political parties, the possibility of mass mobilizations in the midst of economic depression, the presence of an armed insurgency, and a unified military, Peru is currently the most fragile democracy in South America.


Fourth, because political democracies generally arise from a compromise between contending organized elites that are unable to impose their will unilaterally or the unilateral action of one dominant group, usually the armed forces, this does not bode well for democratization in situations in which the armed forces are inextricably tied to the interests of a dominant (and antidemocratic) agrarian class. Guatemala and El Salvador in particular are characterized by a landowning elite whose privileged position is based on labor-repressive agriculture and on a virtual partnership with the armed forces, thereby making it unlikely that their militaries (as currently constituted) will tolerate comprehensive political competitiveness, civil liberties, or accountability. Regardless of the profound differences between these two Central American countries, the extraordinary pressure of U.S. intervention as well as international diffusion means that, at minimum, they can be expected to adhere to "electoralism," meaning the regularized holding of elections, even as

they continue to restrict the other political rights and opportunities of their citizens. This hybrid mix of electoral forms and authoritarianism, which has been dubbed “electocratic rule” by one observer,<sup>40</sup> is likely to emerge in other developing areas wherever the spread of elections under foreign inspiration either precedes or is intended to coopt strong domestic pressures for democratization.

These observations can be distilled into types of democracies, which, at least initially, are largely shaped by the mode of transition in Latin America, as Figure 3 illustrates. They suggest that democratization by imposition is likely to yield conservative democracies that can not or will not address equity issues. To the extent that imposition originates from outside, however, the result is likely to be some form of electoral authoritarian rule, which can not be considered democracy at all. Pacted transitions are likely to produce corporatist or consociational democracies in which party competition is regulated to varying degrees determined, in part, by the nature of foundational bargains. Transition through reform is likely to bring about competitive democracies, whose political fragility paves the way for an eventual return to authoritarianism. Finally, revolutionary transitions tend to result in one-party dominant democracies, where competition is also regulated. These types are characterized by different mixes and varying degrees of the chief dimensions of democracy: contestation, participation, accountability, and civilian control over the military.

Such predictions are discouraging, but they may be offset by more hopeful observations that affect the contingent choices of contemporary democratizers. On the one hand, the Cold War features of the international system have changed remarkably, and this may offer new opportunities for the reformist mode of transition in Latin America. The failure of two of the three cases cited in this category, Guatemala (1946–1954) and Chile (1970–1973), was profoundly affected by U.S. intervention, motivated in large part by the ideological identification of mass-based reforms with the spread of Soviet influence in the western

**Figure 3** Modes of Transition and Types of Democracy





hemisphere. U.S. intervention against peasant-based movements in Central America has been justified in the same manner. To the extent that the global state system loses its "bipolarity," the credibility of such accusations becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, thus potentially creating more space for mass ascendant political movements. The fact that this mode of transition failed in the past in Latin America does not mean that it will not succeed in the future.<sup>41</sup>

On the other hand, this discussion of modes of transition and varying probabilities for survival has not presumed that democracies will benefit from superior economic performance, which is fortunate given the state of contemporary Latin American economies. Most observers assume that crises in growth, employment, foreign exchange earnings, and debt repayments necessarily bode ill for the consolidation of democratic rule, and few would question the long-run value of an increasing resource base for stability. But austerity may have some perverse advantages, at least for initial survivability. In the context of the terrible economic conditions of the 1980s, the exhaustion of utopian ideologies and even of rival policy prescriptions has become painfully evident. Neither the extreme right nor the extreme left has a plausible alternative system to offer—to themselves or to mass publics. Though populism, driven by diffuse popular expectations and *desencanto* with the rewards of compromised democracy, is always a possibility—witness the experience of Peru and the recent elections in Argentina—it can not deliver the immediate rewards that have been its sustenance in the past.

To the extent that this situation diminishes both the expected benefits and rewards from antisystem activity, it enhances the likelihood of democracies to endure. This suggests a possible hypothesis for future exploration. The relationship between democratization and economic performance, rather than rising or falling in tandem, may be parabolic. Conditions to strike bargains may be most favorable in the midst of protracted austerity, as well as in the midst of sustained plenty. They may be worse when the economy is going through stop-and-go cycles or being hit with sudden windfalls or scarcities. If true, this provides a ray of hope for the otherwise unpromising decade ahead.

Finally, there is no a priori reason why one type of democracy can not be transformed into another, that is to say, why electoral authoritarian regimes, for example, can not evolve into conservative or competitive democracies, or corporatist democracies into more competitive ones. Given the frequency of *pactismo* and the gravity of the equity problem in Latin America, the latter scenario is especially important. While pacted transitions establish an improvisational institutional framework of governance that may become a semipermanent barrier to change, this framework is subject to further modification in the future. Such modification may be brought about preemptively when some ruling groups, having experienced the advantages of democratic rule, become more inclined over time to seek to accommodate potential pressures from below rather than suppress them, or it may occur through the direct pressure of organized social groups.<sup>42</sup> In either case, democratization can prove to be an ongoing process of renewal.

The notion that one type of democracy may gradually evolve into a qualitatively different type suggests that the dynamics of democratic consolidation must differ in important ways from the transition if "freezing" is to be avoided. Because the overriding goal of the transition is to reach some broad social consensus about the goals of society and the acceptable means to achieve them, successful transitions are necessarily characterized by

accommodation and compromise. But if this emphasis on caution becomes an *overriding* political norm during consolidation, democracies may find it difficult to demonstrate that they are better than their predecessors at resolving fundamental social and economic problems. Thus, consolidation, if it is to be successful, should require skills and commitments from leading actors which are qualitatively different from those exhibited during the transition. In this latter phase, these actors must demonstrate the ability to differentiate political forces rather than to draw them all into a grand coalition, the capacity to define and channel competing political projects rather than seek to keep potentially divisive reforms off the agenda, and the willingness to tackle incremental reforms, especially in the domains of the economy and civil-military relations, rather than defer them to some later date. If the cycle of regime change that has plagued Latin America is to be broken and replaced by an era of protracted democratic rule, democratizers must learn to divide as well as to unite and to raise hopes as well as to dampen expectations.

## NOTES

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1. These questions underlie a number of new studies on democracy. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985* (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, 1986); Enrique A. Baloyra, *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); Carlos Huneeus, *Para Vivir La Democracia* (Santiago: Editorial Andante, 1987); and Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 4 vols. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988–90).

2. See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (April 1970).

3. This statement requires some qualification. J. A. Schumpeter defines democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 269. Under this definition the competition for leadership through free elections is the distinctive feature of democracy. But Schumpeter, unlike Jeane Kirkpatrick and other U.S. policymakers in the 1980s, considered civil liberties a necessary condition for the operation of democracy. Thus, it can not be assumed that he would have shared the current emphasis on the mere presence of elections, which I have elsewhere referred to as "electoralism," that is, "the faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners in these contests." See Terry Lynn Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador," in Drake and Silva, eds. p. 34.

4. For an example of this approach, see Suzanne Jonas, "Elections and Transitions: The Guatemalan and Nicaraguan Case," in John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, eds., *Elections and Democracy in Central America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Jonas and Stein argue against separating political democracy from socioeconomic equity and support "a broader view that meaningful 'transitions' to democracy' [in Central America] involve more sweeping social change on the scale of the major bourgeois and socialist revolutions historically." See Suzanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, "Democracy in Nicaragua," in Suzanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, eds., *Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1990), p. 43.

5. In examining the problem of constructing institutions that can translate the preferences of majorities into public policy, for example, social choice theorists have demonstrated the difficulty of designing decision-making procedures that give equal weight to the preferences of all citizens and that permit the aggregation of these preferences into

governmental policies without violating any of the other basic tenets of democratic theory. See, for example, William H. Riker, *Liberalism versus Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982), and the review by Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, "Democracy and Social Choice," *Ethics*, 97 (October 1986). Theorists of democracy have long grappled with other dilemmas involving notions of social justice and equity. See, for example, Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980); and Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

6. I have drawn the first two dimensions and, to some extent, the third from Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). But Dahl, like other democratic theorists, does not emphasize the establishment of civilian control over the military through the limitation of military prerogatives. Indeed, this dimension often appears to be an assumed condition or even an unstated prerequisite in other definitions of democracy. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), is an important corrective in this regard. Stepan defines the military's institutional prerogatives as "those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society" (p. 93). The clear determination and limitation of these areas are a measure of civilian control and, in my view, are also a measure of democratization.

7. This formulation originally appeared in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (March 1959).

8. Some proponents of this view often measured the prospects for democracy by per capita gross domestic product, leading the occasional political observer to await the moment when a particular country would cross "the threshold" into democracy. This supposed threshold has varied from country to country. Spain's Lopez Redo once predicted that his country would not become democratic until it reached a per capita income of \$2,000. More recently, Mitchell Seligson has argued that Central America needs to approach a per capita income of \$250 (in 1957 dollars) and a literacy rate of over 50 percent as a necessary precondition for democratization. See James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pp. 7-9.

9. For example, Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," in Howard Wiarda, ed., *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1981), argued that Latin America possessed "a political culture and a sociopolitical order that at its core is essentially two-class, authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, hierarchical and corporate." A similar argument can be found in Richard N. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Howard Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).

10. The notion of "civic culture," first introduced by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), sought to analyze the relationship between the political attitudes of a population and the nature of its political system. It was the forerunner of the works on Latin America cited above.

11. This was the basic argument put forward by Leonard Binder et al., eds., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), and by Eric Nordlinger, "Political Development, Time Sequences and Rates of Change," in Jason L. Finkle and Robert W. Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change*, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1971).

12. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

13. See John Weeks, "An Interpretation of the Central American Past," *Latin American Research Review*, 21 (1986); Enrique Baloyra-Herp, "Reactionary Despotism in Central America," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 15 (1983); and Jeffrey Paige, "Coffee and Politics in Central America," in Richard Tardanico, ed., *Crisis in the Caribbean Basin* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987). In a more recent work, Paige seeks to differentiate his argument from that of Moore. He correctly contends that there is no collision between an industrial bourgeoisie and a landed class in either Costa Rica, El Salvador, or Nicaragua and that the agrarian aristocracy has successfully transformed itself into a modern capitalist class, both conditions that belie Moore's argument. Nonetheless, in Guatemala and El Salvador a landed class continues to exercise domination, and the commercialization of agriculture has not replaced a labor-repressive mode of production, thus providing some important confirmation of Moore. See Jeffrey Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 8, 1989.

14. See Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of

California, Institute for International Studies, 1973), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 142–178.

15. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly*, 99 (1984).

16. Furthermore, through the church's active promotion of "base communities," it could even be argued that contemporary Catholicism contributes to the creation of a uniquely democratic culture by encouraging participation among previously unorganized groups of the urban and rural poor. See Philip Oxhorn, "Bringing the Base Back In: The Democratization of Civil Society under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989).

17. For criticism of the O'Donnell hypothesis linking capital deepening to authoritarian rule, see David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Karen Remmer and Gilbert Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *Latin American Research Review*, 17 (1982).

18. Albert Hirschman has even claimed that this search can be pernicious. In his view, to lay down strict preconditions for democracy—"dynamic growth *must* be resumed, income distribution *must* be improved, . . . political parties *must* show a cooperative spirit . . ."—may actually encourage the deconsolidation of existing democracies. Hirschman argues that this will almost certainly obstruct constructive thinking about the ways in which democracies may be formed, survive, and even become stronger in the face of and in spite of continuing adversity. See Albert Hirschman, "Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation in Latin America," unpublished notes for the Sao Paulo Meeting on Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, 1986.

19. See especially Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., vol. 3, and Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Rune Slagstad and Jon Elster, eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

20. See Philippe Schmitter, "Democratic Consolidation of Southern Europe," unpublished manuscript.

21. Evelyne Huber Stephens makes a similar observation in "Economic Development, Social Change and Political Contestation and Inclusion in South America," paper prepared for the Latin American Studies Association, New Orleans, 1988.

22. See Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming), and "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review*, 22 (1986).

23. See Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela, "Los Origenes de la Democracia: Reflexiones Teóricas sobre el Caso de Chile," *Estudios Públicos*, 12 (Spring 1983).

24. This is the general thrust of Daniel Levine's analysis of Venezuela, which attributes the emergence of a democratic regime primarily to statecraft and the ability of political actors to compromise. See Daniel Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

25. An approach of this sort treats regime changes as critical junctures and carries an implicit assumption of patterns of political change characterized by gradualism punctuated by sharp discontinuities. It has a long tradition in the study of politics, but it is especially important in recent work on the "new institutionalism." See, for example, J. G. March and J. P. Olson, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, 78 (September 1984), 734–749, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies*, 21 (April 1988), 66–94. Krasner, though emphasizing political institutions alone rather than the combination of social structures and institutions, also argues that institutions established in the past constrain present choices, that the preferences of individual actors are conditioned by institutional structures, and that historical trajectories are path-dependent. The most recent comparative analysis of patterns of South American and Mexican development adopts a similar framework. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), is the most ambitious effort to utilize this sort of path-dependent approach. In their comparative analysis, they examine the different trajectories that result from the initial patterns of incorporation of the labor movement into political life.

26. Strictly speaking, the case of Chile from 1970 to 1973 is not an effort of regime transition from authoritarian rule in the sense considered here. Rather, it is better understood as an attempt to move from one type of democracy to another, that is, a move down the vertical scale of the classification scheme in Figure 1 towards a reformist democracy.

27. There are interesting moves in this direction in the processes taking place in both Nicaragua and Mexico. Nicaragua is the first revolutionary regime on the continent to hold national elections in which a number of political parties have been able to compete. In 1984, the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties and several small leftist parties competed with the FSLN and won almost 35 percent of the vote. In 1990, the UNO, a coalition of fourteen anti-Sandinista parties, defeated the Sandinistas, who promised to respect the mandate of the electorate. In Mexico, the PRI has begun to permit greater contestation at the municipal and regional level, but these elections are still characterized by numerous restrictions, fraud, and localized violence.

28. There is little information on the dynamics of regime transition in Costa Rica. See Jacobo Schifter, *La fase oculta de la guerra civil en Costa Rica* (San Jose: EDUCA, 1979), and Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq, "Explaining the Origins of Democratic Regimes: Costa Rica in Theoretical Perspective" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, forthcoming), which applies the notion of democracy as a contingent institutional compromise to this case. On the transition in Peru, see Cynthia Sanborn, "Social Democracy and the Persistence of Populism in Peru" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, forthcoming).

29. Even where the military retained control over the transition, however, it systematically engaged in a process of consultation with civilian parties. See Anita Isaacs, "The Obstacles to Democratic Consolidation in Ecuador," paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21-23, 1989; Francis Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, "Democracy in Brazil: Origins, Problems and Prospects," *World Policy Journal* (Summer 1987), 485-514; and Manuel Antonio Garretón, "El Plebiscito de 1988 y la transición a la democracia" (Santiago: FLACSO, 1988).

30. On these cases, see Charles G. Gillespie, "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds.; Jonathan Hartlyn, "Democracy in Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Accommodation," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., vol. 4; Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Linz and Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*; Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts."

31. I am grateful to Samuel Valenzuela for this point. See Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización via Reforma: La Expansión del Sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones IDES, 1985).

32. The roots of these arrangements can be found in the *Pacto de Punto Fijo* and the *Declaración de Principios y Programa Mínimo de Gobierno*, which were signed prior to the country's first elections by all contending presidential candidates. These agreements bound all signatories to the same basic political and economic program regardless of the electoral outcome. These pacts are described more fully in Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts."

33. This distinction was originally drawn by Philippe Schmitter at a conference on "Micro-Foundations of Democracy," University of Chicago, March 1988.

34. This agreement served primarily as a mechanism for partitioning state offices and establishing other temporary forms of power-sharing. Because it excluded powerful, well-organized forces on the left and was never aimed at establishing permanent rules of the game, it does not meet the criteria for a foundational pact.

35. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.

36. Most observers locate the roots of this exploitation in colonial and postcolonial landholding patterns that, slowly or abruptly, concentrated property ownership and dispossessed the majority. Specific social processes not conducive to democratization accompanied these landholding patterns. For example, unlike the reciprocal forms of feudalism which developed in Europe and which may have eventually contributed to widespread norms of reciprocity and community at the local level, the penetration of capitalism altered traditional clientelist relations between landlords and peasants in Latin America from a two-way to a one-way affair. As Paul Harrison, *Inside the Third World: The Anatomy of Poverty* (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 105, remarks, "in Latin America the peasant has only duties, the landowner rights." Such social relations have left little residue of notions of mutual obligation or reciprocity between the rich and the poor.

37. I am referring to indicators of inequality here, not absolute poverty. While most of southern Asia and Africa is far poorer than Latin America, their colonial past, patterns of land tenure, and relations of production are quite different. Parts of Asia that have experienced capitalist commercialization of agriculture are now beginning to approximate these same indicators of inequality, but Asia in general has not reached the regional scale of inequality that marks Latin America.

38. One statistic eloquently demonstrates the depth of the crisis. By 1987, Latin America's debt represented 46 percent of the region's GNP and more than four times the value of its exports. See IDB, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1988 Report* (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1988), p. 541.

39. The notion that especially "successful" authoritarian regimes paradoxically may pose important obstacles for

democratization can be found in Anita Isaacs, "Dancing with the People: The Politics of Military Rule in Ecuador, 1972–1979" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1986), and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil," *World Policy Journal*, 5 (Spring 1988), 281–300.

40. I am grateful to Charles Call for this label.

41. There are important differences here, however, between South America and the Caribbean basin. Military interventions, which have been confined to this latter region in the past, predated the Cold War and are likely to continue after its demise. As the case of Panama shows, the rationale may simply change.

42. Paul Cammack has argued that a ruling coalition might make strategic concessions in its own long-term interest to help sustain democracy, especially after having experienced the failure of militaries to act as reliable allies. See Paul Cammack, "Democratization: A Review of the Issues," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 4 (1985), 39–46. There seems to be little evidence for this predicted behavior in the current period, however, and further democratization through mass pressure seems to be more likely.