


# DDR 2008

Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation  
and Reintegration (DDR)  
programmes in the World during 2007.



With the support of:





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

All peace-building processes related to armed conflict must go through a final stage in which, after the signing of agreements, combatants surrender their arms, demilitarise, and reintegrate into civil life. This complex process is called the **DDR of ex-combatants**. DDR is part of broader agreements over justice, police reform, the restructuring of armed forces, elections, political change, etc., as negotiated in a peace process. Therefore, DDR is part of a **wider strategy of peace building**.

This study is a **comparative analysis of active, 2007 DDR programmes**, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. The main goal of this year's report is to provide an overall vision for the active DDR programmes and, as such, widen the general and current understanding of the process. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.

**Individual analysis reports on the 19 DDR programmes** form the basis of this comparative analysis. These 19 DDR programmes are situated in various continents: two in the Americas (Colombia, within the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC, and Haiti), three in Asia (Afghanistan, Aceh, Indonesia, and Nepal), and the 14 others in Africa (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda). Regarding the **2006 version of this comparative analysis, programmes in the Philippines (Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF), Cambodia, and Guinea-Bissau** have now concluded.<sup>1</sup>

Amongst the countries looked at in this report, there were nine peace agreements; one ceasefire agreement involving the ending of combat for a specified period; three agreements for a cessation to hostilities involving, among other things, ceasefires and promises to end kidnapping and hostilities; two memorandums of understanding, in Angola and Indonesia; and two other understandings, the Conference on Reconciliation in Somalia and the Amnesty Law in Uganda, with differing procedures. As will be seen, many countries considered more than a peace agreement. We should note that Haiti has not adopted any agreement for establishing a peace process due to difficulties in identifying the rival parties amongst the country's armed combatants. It is important to point out that in **13 of these countries, peace agreements specifically contemplate the possibility for DDR**, while the remaining two countries contemplate reform for the armed forces and security system.

In relation to Transitional Justice issues, the normal outcomes of ceasefires, cessations of hostilities, and the signing of peace agreements are the offering of **amnesties**, the creation of **transitional structures**, the **distribution of political power**, and the **reform of the security sector**, among other things. This occurs in the context of an **extreme scarcity of special courts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions**, and other means connected to core concepts of truth, justice, and reparations.

Of the country programmes in operation in 2007, 13 opted for creation of a **National Commission for DDR (NCDDR)**. This commission, in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, etc., consists of a wide variety of forms, depending on the specific bodies that are responsible for carrying out programmes.

In 2007, of the 19 countries studied in this report, **1,100,000 ex-combatants** participated in one way or another in some phase of a DDR programme. Around 38% participated in programmes to diminish armed forces, while the rest participated in programmes to disarm and demobilise armed opposition groups. **Of those combatants eligible for demobilisation, 90% were from Africa, where 14 of the 19 country programmes are located.** As can be seen in the following table, the total number of estimated combatants differs from the number of persons actually demobilised, approximately 68.2%, whether this is because programmes are still active and incomplete or because of defective **planning** in the calculation of combatant numbers.

The presence of children in armed groups targeted for demobilisation is often high, on average 10.8% of total combatants. Sudan and Uganda have higher percentages and, therefore, their DDR programmes focus largely on demobilising child soldiers. Experience has shown that in nearly all cases, armed forces or armed groups, whether they are government or opposition forces, involve women and girls. Verification of

1 These reports are available at <<http://www.escolapau.org/english/programas/ddr.htm>>.

this fact has shown that in many instances women are excluded from the DDR process. Not only should the participation of women in terms of conditions be equal to that of other combatants, but also DDR programmes should incorporate women's specific needs.

The total cost of the 19 DDR programmes in 2007 was **\$1.599 billion**. The average cost per demobilised person was **\$1,434**. In 2007, there was a \$300 million budget decrease because three less programmes were operational, but this came together with a \$600 increase to the spending per person. In order to understand this last figure, we must consider that the countries looked at here have very low national incomes. Scarcely three of the countries surpass \$1,000 per annum per resident, while 11 do not reach \$500. Generally, DDR programmes run in the most impoverished countries. These countries have suffered the bulk of the world's current armed conflict. **Nine out of 19 countries count amongst the lowest in human development.** The weighted average of the 19 programmes is a **per capita DDR cost, three-and-half times that of per capita income.** However, data is greatly different from one country to the next. Extreme examples include Aceh, at 14 times the average; Burundi, 10.8 times the average; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10.2 times the average. These countries have low per capita incomes and many combatants who require demobilisation.

Of the main institutional financiers, the World Bank puts the most investment in 13 DDR programmes, whether in regional funds, as with the MDRP in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, or in direct assistance to specific countries. The UNDP, with bilateral contributions which are difficult to track, is the second largest financier of DDR. The European Union, who depends on the contributions of its member states, trails the UNDP very closely. Of countries who contribute directly, Japan has contributed the most, particularly to Afghanistan, but also in lesser quantities to four other countries. Japan has contributed a total \$107.9 million. Following Japan is the United States.

We can assume that the initial stages of disarmament and demobilisation accrue the least expenses, between 6 and 10% of total budget. The reinsertion and reintegration phases account for between 60 and 80% of total budget, though their durations are not always clear. The reinsertion phase is always more costly than the reintegration phase. As for the programmes that are specific to vulnerable groups, including children, women, and the disabled, the percentage of budgetary spending is between 5 and 10%, because some countries only count some of these persons, and depending on the country, their numbers differs widely.

Afghanistan, the Republic of the Congo, and Colombia rank above average in terms of the percent of arms surrendered per person, around one arm for every two combatants. At the other end of the scale are Angola, Aceh, Indonesia, and Liberia, with small percentages of arms surrendered. With respect to **demobilisation,**

combatants may be stationed or held in specific locations for surrendering their arms, for identification purposes, for receiving a demobilisation certificate, and for registering for later DDR phases. This may occur over a period of a few days to approximately two weeks.

Within current DDR programmes, there are two basic types of reintegration services for ex-combatants: *substitute* and *reconciliatory services*. The aim of the first is to offer certain benefits or incentives as a *substitute* for participation in armed activities. The four areas for which this "competition for benefits" may occur include the areas of economic security, physical security, political influence, and social prestige. Some countries offer initial economic compensation to persons immediately after demobilising, as well as payments or assistance later in the reinsertion phase. Though countries differ noticeably, most country programmes offer economic aid to ex-combatants who participate in the reintegration phase. Despite the variety of strategies and the difficulty in drawing comparisons between contexts of economic reconstruction, we can distinguish one group of countries, in terms of payment extent and method, which offers provisions for approximately half a year, from a second group which offers provisions for a year or more. In the former group are **Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Republic of the Congo, and Uganda.** The remaining countries are in the latter group. In terms of payment amount, there are significant differences between the groups.

In general, countries should execute DDR in an integrated manner and not only chronologically. Peace agreements must include DDR and implement it in a coordinated fashion, not separated by phases. They must incorporate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, but also integrate these into other related processes such as transitional justice and security-sector reform. For this, initiatives such as the United Nations Integrated Strategy on DDR, announced in December 2006, face the challenge of evaluating their impacts and widening their agendas in step with other initiatives. Another essential challenge for DDR is national empowerment, not only government empowerment but also of civil society.

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## GLOSSARY

- ACCD:** Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament (Catalan Development Cooperation Agency)
- AECI:** Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (Spanish Agency for International Cooperation)
- AMM:** Aceh Monitoring Mission
- AUC:** Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
- BINUB:** Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)
- BONUCA:** Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic)
- CNDD-FDD (Burundi):** Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense pour la démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
- CNR (Congo):** Comité national pour la résistance
- DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
- DDRRR (DR Congo):** Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation and Resettlement
- Dollars:** US dollars
- DPA:** Department of Political Affairs
- DPKO:** Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- ECHA:** Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
- EU:** European Union
- FARC:** Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
- FUC (Chad):** Front uni pour le changement (United Front for Democratic Change)
- HDI:** Human Development Index
- HIV/AIDS:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
- ICC:** International Criminal Court
- ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross
- IDP:** Internally Displaced Person
- ILO:** International Labour Organization
- IOM:** International Organization for Migration
- ISAF (Afghanistan):** International Security Assistance Force
- KAIPTC:** Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
- MAPP-OEA (Colombia):** Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz de la OEA (OAS Mission to the Support the Peace Process)
- MDRP:** Multi-Country Demobilization & Reintegration Program
- MILOB:** United Nations Military Observer
- MINURCAT:** Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)
- MINUSTAH:** Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation d'Haïti (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
- MNLF (Philippines):** Moro National Liberation Front.
- NCDDR:** National Commission for DDR
- OAS:** Organization of American States
- OECD:** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- ONUCI:** Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire)
- SAF:** Sudan Armed Forces
- SIDDR:** Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
- SPLA:** Sudan People's Liberation Army
- SSR:** Security Sector Reform
- UA:** Union Africaine (African Union)
- UAB:** Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
- UN:** United Nations
- UNAMA:** United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme
- UNFPA:** United Nations Population Fund (Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas)
- UNICEF:** United Nations Children's Fund
- UNIDIR:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
- UNMEE:** United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
- UNMIL:** United Nations Mission in Liberia
- UNMIN:** United Nations Mission in Nepal
- UNMIS:** United Nations Mission in the Sudan
- UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office for Somalia
- USAID:** United States Agency for International Development
- WFP:** United Nations World Food Programme
- WHO:** World Health Organization

## INTRODUCTION

All peace-building processes related to armed conflict must go through a final stage in which, after the signing of agreements, combatants surrender their arms, demilitarise, and reintegrate into civil life. This complex process is known as the **Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants**. DDR is part of broader agreements over justice, police reform, the restructuring of the armed forces, elections, political change, etc., as negotiated in a peace process. Therefore, DDR is **part of a wider strategy of peace building**.

This study is a **comparative analysis of active, 2007 DDR programmes**, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. The main goal of this year's report is to provide an overall vision for the active DDR programmes and, as such, widen the general and current understanding of the process. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.

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Generally, the **organisation** for this report is similar to the organisation for the 19 individual country reports. First, there is a presentation of **programme context** (causes for armed conflict, the peace process, international accompaniment, the justice process, security-sector reform, and other disarmament initiatives). This is followed by an explanation of **programme design** (the type of DDR, basic principles, the implementing agencies, the groups to demobilise, the budget, and the schedule), and an explanation of the **design and evolution** of the different **programme phases** (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration, depending on the country). Lastly, **conclusions with lessons** that can be extracted from a general, cross-sectional programme vision are offered. This 2007 report contains an additional appendix with a table summarising the 19 individual country programmes.

The 2007 report was developed by **Albert Caramés** and **Eneko Sanz**, researchers at the School for a Culture of Peace at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, UAB. It was completed in February 2008 thanks to the specific support of the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, AECI, and the infrastructural support of the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation, ACCD, part of the Generalitat of Catalonia. The opinions and information expressed here are of the authors only.



## WHAT ARE DDR PROGRAMMES?

All peace-building processes related to armed conflict must go through a final stage in which, after the signing of agreements, combatants surrender their arms, demilitarise, and reintegrate into civil life. This complex process is called the **DDR of ex-combatants**. DDR is part of broader agreements over justice, police reform, the restructuring of armed forces, elections, political change, etc., as negotiated in a peace process. Therefore, DDR is part of a wider strategy of peace building.

### Box 1. Definition of DDR


DDR is the process by which a quantity of combatants belonging to either the official armed forces or armed opposition groups, individually or collectively, disarm, demilitarise, and reintegrate into civil life, the armed forces, or the security forces of a country. The phases or components of DDR are as follows (quotations are from Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR [2006]’s “Glossary”):

- **Disarmament:** “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.” This part is largely symbolic, but essential to the demobilisation process. We can divide this phase into numerous steps, including study on the existence of armaments, and collection, storage, destruction, and redistribution of arms for the national security forces (Pouligny 2004).
- **Demobilisation:** “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks).” The key steps of this phase include planning and stationing, registering, disarming, and orientating ex-combatants prior to their release, as well as actually releasing them (Pouligny 2004).
- **Reintegration:** “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”. Essentially, this phase involves administering social and economic activities with open timelines, primarily within communities. The reintegration phase is part of the general development of a country. It is a national responsibility and often required long-term foreign aid. We may add reinsertion, rehabilitation, and resettlement to this phase. Initially, the reintegration phase aimed to give ex-combatants economic opportunities in the form of vocational training. Later, a social component was added to better reconcile societies undergoing post-war restoration (Nilsson 2005).

DDR is a **process**. Fulfilling any one phase of DDR is impossible without the correct planning of other phases or components. Each phase has a **specific execution period** and requires specific conditions, particularly political conditions, for success. In some instances, a DDR programme can be put into action only when one or more groups, but not all groups, are prepared to demobilise (Fisas 2004). If this demobilisation is successful, the DDR of some groups can act as an incentive to other groups to join the DDR process, even though additional difficulties may need to be resolved during times of ongoing violence in a country. The DDR process does not necessarily need to develop linearly. However, we must contemplate in its entirety. In order for DDR to work, certain principles must be in place (Ball 2006):

- Leaders of opposing sides of a peace agreement must show responsibility in implementing the agreement, including its DDR component, as well as show leadership towards it.
- There must be consensus on the structure of DDR and on as many of its points as possible.
- There must be support for DDR from the international community, in the context of the peace process. The main mechanisms for this are
  - 1) high-level security committees for supporting implementation of DDR and
  - 2) bilateral or multilateral security forces for supporting the necessary mandates and political will from the international community.
- DDR processes must arise from a sense of national responsibility and leadership, including from national actors, such as government, opposition armed groups, and members of civil society. National institutions must be involved in DDR in order to relate disarmament to social reinsertion.
- We must understand DDR as a process and not a programme. DDR involves recognition of political, subjective, and psychological aspects; it involves prioritising communication, dialogue, and debate; developing human and institutional capacities; and valuing analysis.
- We must understand DDR as part of a wider structure of state security, stabilisation, and recovery.

- All national, regional, and international counterparts must be able to learn from past experiences.



Thus far, no DDR process in the last few years has produced optimal results, due to **deficiencies in various areas**, whether defective planning, implementations that have not focused sufficient attention on the most vulnerable groups, or ineffective means for monitoring and evaluation.

**Box 2. The EU concept of support to DDR**

At the end of 2006, the European Commission and the European Council approved an *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration* (European Commission 2006). The two bodies developed this document taking into account recommendations published in a previous report by International Alert (Bell and Watson 2006).

The EU document recognises DDR to be “a key area for EU peace building” in the context of post-war reconstruction. It classifies EU activity as a complement to efforts by the United Nations and the World Bank. It also conceptualises DDR as part of security-sector reform, with both short- and long-term possibilities. While emphasising prevention of recruitment and attention to child soldiers, these possibilities range from the short-term creation of the peace process to the long-term socioeconomic development of a country.

# ACTIVE DDR PROGRAMMES IN 2007

For educational purposes, this section mimics the organisation of the individual country DDR programme reports. Generally, each programme will be analysed in terms of its context (the specific armed conflict, the peace process, the international presence, the mechanisms for transitional justice, and the security-sector reform), its structure (the precedents, the type of structure, the basic principles involved, the implementing agencies, the groups to be demobilised, the most vulnerable groups involved, the budget, and the scheduling), its development of phases (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration, depending on the country in question), and the conclusions.

## *Contexts of countries with DDR programmes*

Obviously, we cannot view DDR as an isolated process. We must understand the individual processes of DDR in terms of a much more complex framework that considers the specific contexts of countries and how a more global peace building may be possible. As such, this report identifies the main components of the DDR programme context here, while later it analyses this context. The main components of a DDR context are an **armed conflict** (the actors and motives predominantly), a **peace process** (a peace agreement for which DDR has been mentioned), **participation from the international community** (with special attention placed on peacekeeping missions and the agencies that work in DDR), mechanisms of **transitional justice** that aim to be instituted, strategies for **security-sector reform**, and other **disarmament initiatives**.

## **Conflict**

Armed conflicts that require DDR normally contain aspects of internationalised internal conflict. These are conflicts in which rival parties may be foreign and/or in which conflict spreads into neighbouring territories. To consider an armed conflict an internationalised internal conflict, participating armed groups must have military bases in neighbouring countries, with collusion from those countries, and launch attacks from there (School for a Culture of Peace 2008). Trafficking in arms and persons, recruitment in refugee camps of combatants, support from neighbouring countries with rival armed groups, and a large quantity of persons who must look for refuge abroad cause these internal conflicts to assume very important regional dimensions. Many of these sorts of conflicts may have only just ended, within the last five years. However, in some countries, such as Niger, Uganda, Eritrea, and Haiti, conflicts may have ended much earlier. In countries like Haiti, we need to understand the main motives of conflict stemming from the inexistence of analysis on the principally political motivations of conflict.

In most of these conflicts, the central motive has been the fight for political power. However, each country has its own specificities. In some countries there may be a religious dynamic to the conflict, attempts to declare autonomy or the independence of territory, or a fight to control natural resources. The armed groups who have participated in these conflicts are varied in typology. They included national armed forces and non-governmental armed groups such as guerrillas, militias, and paramilitaries.

## **Peace process**

The **peace process** is the consolidation of a negotiation scheme, once a thematic agenda, procedures, a schedule, and the facilities have been defined. Negotiation is one stage of the peace process (School for a Culture of Peace 2008). Not all DDR processes are the result of previous peace agreements, for the simple reason that many armed conflicts do not end with the signing of agreements. Frequently, the opposing sides of an agreement have agreed only to a cessation of hostilities or a ceasefire, allowing for the commencement of a process of political transition, with or without redistribution of political power. Reaching a political agreement, as sponsored by an international body or arranged by opposing sides of a process of national reconciliation involving redistribution of political power, may also occur sometimes.

One of the major new developments in 2007 was the Côte d'Ivoire Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. This agreement called for the creation of a new transitional government for Côte d'Ivoire in the five weeks following the agreement's signing, with an equitable redistribution of power, joint military command by the country's armed forces and the

Forces Nouvelles, a schedule for disarmament, the registration of voters, and the holding of elections, in addition to an agreement on the dismantlement of the security zone controlled by ONUCI and the French Force Licorne, which divided the country into north and south. Amongst the countries looked at in this report, there were nine peace agreements; one ceasefire agreement involving the ending of combat for a specified period; three agreements for a cessation to hostilities involving, among other things, ceasefires and promises to end kidnapping and hostilities; two memorandums of understanding, in Angola and Indonesia; and two other understandings, the Conference on Reconciliation in Somalia and the Amnesty Law in Uganda, with differing procedures. As will be

Table 1. Peace agreements before DDR			
Country	Type of agreement (year)	Agreement features	Mention of DDR
Afghanistan	Bonn Peace Agreement (2001)	Harmonisation agreement between victorious parties to create a transitional political structure	No
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding (2002)	Improvement of and modification to an earlier, breached peace agreement. Amnesty Law for all crimes committed.	Yes
Burundi	Arusha Peace Agreement (2000)	Ceasefire agreement forged two years after the signing of a breached peace agreement. Constitutional reforms and a three-year period of transition.	Yes
	Pretoria Protocol (2003)	Shared redistribution of political powers amongst rival groups, including defence and security of Burundi.	Yes
Chad	Peace Agreement (2006)	Emergency plan for partial integration of FUC ex-combatants in the armed forces, to be achieved within three months of signing.	Yes
AUC, Colombia	Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement (2003)	Cessation of hostilities and reestablishment of the state's monopoly on force.	Yes
Côte d'Ivoire	Ouagadougou Agreements (2007)	Creation of a new transitional government with an equitable redistribution of power, joint military command, a schedule for disarmament, registration of voters and the holding of elections, and dismantlement of the security zone dividing the country.	Yes
Eritrea	Argel Agreement to Cease Hostilities (2000)	Agreement with Ethiopia. Creation of UNMEE. Establishment of a Temporary Security Zone by the next general peace agreement.	Yes
Haiti	No peace agreement		
Aceh, Indonesia	Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (2005)	Equivalent to a formal peace agreement. Establishment of a democratic political system.	Yes
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement (2003)	Peace agreement, amongst other things, for the establishment of an Intervening Multinational Force, a Multinational Stabilisation Force, and the instituting of a rehabilitation DDR programme.	Yes
Nepal	Peace Agreement (2006)	Multiparty system of government and political restructuring to the country. Quartering of Maoists.	Yes
Niger	Ouagadougou (1995), Argel (1997), and N'Djamena (1998) Peace Agreements	Peace agreements preceded the constitution in 1999 and elections in 2000, which served to bring stability to Niger.	
Central African Republic	Bangui Agreements (2003)	Peace agreement, restoration of peace and security, reform of the armed forces, support to a transition process aiming at national reconciliation, and return of the rule of law.	Yes
D.R.Congo	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreements (1999)	Peace agreement with political transition. Starting point of a long process of reconciliation.	Yes
Republic of the Congo	Ceasing of Hostilities and Ceasefire Agreement (1999)	Cessation of hostilities agreement with political transition.	Yes
Rwanda	Pretoria Agreement (2002)	Cessation of hostilities agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the withdrawal of troops from that country.	Yes
Somalia	National Reconciliation Conference (2000)	Agreement to constitute a National Transition Assembly, which later elected a National Transitional Government.	No
Sudan	Nairobi Peace Agreement (2005)	Six-year autonomy for the south of the country, after which a referendum on self-determination is scheduled to take place.	No
Uganda	Amnesty Agreement (2000)	Amnesty for legal charges.	No

seen, many countries considered more than a peace agreement. We should note that Haiti has not adopted any agreement for establishing a peace process due to difficulties in identifying the rival parties amongst the country's armed combatants.

It is important to point out that in **13** of these countries, peace agreements specifically contemplate the possibility for DDR, while the remaining two countries contemplate reform for the armed forces and security system. However, while economic assistance is available for the stationing of communities of demobilised groups, there continues to be no process for granting funds to combatants during cessations of hostilities, which is important for entering negotiations which may result in a peace agreement.

It is not only important that peace agreements mention need for DDR, but also that they explicitly commit to carry out peace processes and, more specifically, DDR. Only in this way may we reach consensus on the structure of programmes, detailed to the highest level (Poulligny 2004). This commitment reflects the fact that we cannot understand DDR in the abstract, but must couple it tightly to political commitment in the contexts of societies in turmoil, whether in part or in full (Stalon 2006).

### International accompaniment

The presence of United Nations missions is common in countries with DDR programmes. Mission mandates differ considerably depending on the country. For missions dependant on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), it is important for DDR to play a lead role, even though this is not always the case or the reality. Missions of the Department of Political Affairs and the political missions of the DPKO tend to shy away from DDR and not to participate in it except for secondary tasks.

**Table 2. United Nations missions in countries with DDR**

Mission	Country	Office	Start	Troops	MILOBs	Police
BINUB	Burundi	DPKO (political)	01/01/2007		8	12
BONUCA	Central African Republic	DPA	15/02/2000		5	6
MINURCAT	Chad Central African Republic	DPKO	25/09/2007		3	
MINUSTAH	Haiti	DPKO	01/06/2004	7,062		1,841
MONUC*	DR Congo Rwanda Uganda	DPKO	01/11/1999	16,661	735	1,011
ONUCI	Côte d'Ivoire	DPKO	04/04/2004	7,834	195	1,130
UNAMA	Afghanistan	DPKO (political)	28/03/2002		15	3
UNMEE	Eritrea	DPKO	31/07/2000	1,464	212	
UNMIL	Liberia	DPKO	19/09/2003	13,335	199	1,183
UNMIN	Nepal	DPA	23/01/2007		157	5
UNMIS	Sudan	DPKO	24/03/2005	8,803	596	652
UNPOS	Somalia	DPA	15/04/1995			
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>55,159</b>	<b>2,125</b>	<b>5,843</b>

\* For the process of DDRRR in the Democratic Republic of Congo, no other programmes of national scope

Occasionally, in the absence of United Nations missions, the UNDP has served as the central institution for international interventions and, in many instances, for the DDR process. Bodies such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, ISAF, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, AMM, are also important. They are members of the international community and participate in DDR. We should also mention the World Bank and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), though these institutions play a more modest role compared to other international organisations. Finally, bodies such as the IOM, UNICEF, and the WFP can offer concrete assistance to post-war reconstruction and DDR, for which the world provides minimal international intervention.

Afghanistan	ISAF, UNDP, OIM, WFP, Halo Trust
Angola	MDRP, UNDP, Unicef, Save the Children
Burundi	MDRP
Colombia	OAS, Unicef
Republic of the Congo	MDRP, UNDP, ILO, IOM
Democratic Republic of the Congo	MDRP, UNDP, Unicef
Côte d'Ivoire	UNDP, Unicef, WFP
Chad	UNDP
Eritrea	World Bank, UNDP, WFP
Haiti	UNDP, World Bank, Unicef
Aceh, Indonesia	AMM, IOM, UNDP, Unicef
Liberia	UNDP, WFP, WHO, UNFPA, Unicef
Nepal	UNDP, Unicef
Niger	UNDP
Central African Republic	UNDP, MDRP
Rwanda	CICR, Unicef, WFP, UNDP, ILO, Save the Children, MDRP
Somalia	UNDP, UA, ILO
Sudan	UNDP, Unicef
Uganda	MDRP

### Transitional justice

Almost all DDR programmes start once rival groups settle a peace agreement to end armed conflict, and agree to a **cessation of hostilities and a start of a new political cycle**, normally involving joint participation in political and military matters. One of aspects of DDR that is more controversial is the legal and political treatment of ex-combatants once these actors have surrendered their arms. Generally, this involves discussion on **the criminal responsibility of armed groups who have participated in conflict** that has resulted in serious human rights

### Box 3. Mechanisms for transitional justice and DDR programmes

Mechanisms DDR programmes may utilise for transitional justice are numerous. These mechanisms have certain advantages and disadvantages. To start, **indictment** can produce confidence in citizens and public institutions for strengthening and re-establishing law. Public denunciations of criminal behaviour and fighting impunity and collective stigmatisation through the assigning of individual guilt to perpetrators of human rights violations may help. However, this approach may also breed resentment in ex-combatants, who are a source of insecurity during periods of transition. It may impede ex-combatants from surrendering their arms or may give rise to a host of other problems stemming from the inadequacy of human and economic resources.

**Truth Commissions** are great opportunities to give impartial explanations, to clarify the events of a conflict, and to provide structures of models that arise in conflict. In this way, perpetrators are able to explain their stories of victimisation, even though this may serve to reinforce stereotypes and resentment if commissions exclude ex-combatants or members of the community in which this process occurs (Duthie 2006). **Institutional reform** is a monitoring process for promoting confidence between institutions, civil society, and victims. Institutional reform must link to security-sector reform. At the same time, inadequate implementation of institutional reforms can undermine this confidence. The application of non-institutional mechanisms for **local justice** offers possibility for promoting confidence between ex-combatants and society, in ways similar to formal means. However, this can also overlap with other procedures of transitional justice and produce a lack of regular fulfilment of legal standards and international and national human rights.

Lastly, **reparations** are a main result of these measures of transitional justice. The aim of reparations is to recognise victims, strengthen trust between citizens and the state, and reduce resentment between victims and communities. We cannot consider this goal fulfilled if a perception remains that ex-combatants have obtained benefits at the expense of other affected groups, or if victims of human-rights violations have not agreed to welcome ex-combatants into their community.

Overall, mechanisms of transitional justice can have a positive impact on the security of citizens, but they can also amplify resentment in ex-combatants and increase tension between communities.

violations, including massacres, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc. The concept of transnational justice refers to judicial and extra-judicial processes that facilitate or permit transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy, or from a situation of war to a situation of peace. Transnational justice strives to clarify the identities and fates of victims and persons responsible for human rights violations, to establish the facts related to these violations, and to design the ways in which a society may deal with perpetrated crimes, as well as the reparations that are necessary for them (Rettberg 2004).

Amongst the objectives of transitional justice are the search for truth, the clarification of the identities and fates of victims, the identities of victimisers, the establishment of responsibilities, and the development of reparations mechanisms. Especially if armed conflict has been longstanding and resulted in many deaths, the psychosocial context may favour amnesty, pardon, and reconciliation, but this is never without difficulties, contradictions, and opposition from other affected individuals or groups. Reconciliation is a very long process. It involves a great deal of truth, justice, and reparation, the results of individual and collective efforts to find a higher good and a future which permits for transcendence of individual pain (Fisas 2004).

As we may verify in the table below, the normal outcomes of ceasefires, cessations of hostilities, and the signing of peace agreements are the offering of amnesties, the creation of transitional structures, the distribution of political power, and the reform of the security sector, among other things. This occurs in the context of an extreme scarcity of special courts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and other means connected to core concepts of truth, justice, and reparations.

Generally, regulatory measures do not exist for a country. Nevertheless, countries need to apply them. This is particularly true for Colombia, where the government has targeted only one group for collective demobilisation. Colombia needs to apply regulatory measures without giving thought to what will occur when other armed groups demobilise and without knowing beforehand the full details of the "civil military" network. Yet, in November 2007, MAPP-OEA stated that the institutional capacities of organisations working for peace and justice in Colombia are insufficient.

Country	Foundations of peace agreement	Political situation of demobilised persons
Afghanistan	Offering of amnesty, creation of a new transitional political structure, and holding of elections. Creation of new armed forces.	Integration into the armed forces or social reintegration. Political participation provided demobilised persons are not connected to armed groups.
Angola	Ceasefire, amnesty, demobilisation, reintegration, and restructuring of armed forces	Social reintegration. 6,500 ex-combatants employed by government. Elections postponed in 2006 without establishment of a new election date. Members of government intimidating and threatening members of opposition armed groups. Demand for protection of ex-combatants and improved dialogue between government and civil society.
Burundi	Temporary impunity, constitutional reforms, establishment of a three-year period of transition, and the holding of elections. Creation of a National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation for Rehabilitation.	Integration into new armed forces, social reintegration, and filling of positions of political responsibility after elections. New president is the former leader of the armed opposition group CNDD-FDD. 8 October 2003 Pretoria Protocol considered temporary immunity for ex-combatants.
AUC, Colombia	Cessation of hostilities, demobilisation, and compliance with Justice and Peace Law.	Unfulfilled cessation of hostilities and social reintegration. The Constitutional Court has amended Justice and Peace Law, offering demobilised paramilitaries reduced sentences for crimes in exchange for confessions of crimes and disclosure and redress of victims.
Côte d'Ivoire	General amnesty, political reforms, and formation of a united national government. Hosting of elections together with legislative reform. Creation of new armed forces.	Redistribution of political power. Slow start to DDR process due to inconsistencies in electoral roll and electoral legislation.
Haiti	No peace agreement.	General amnesty for all participants in armed violence not possible. This would not lead to reconciliation. Neither is enforcement of a clearly repressive system feasible, due to absence of institutional mechanism for this, in light of an enormously fragile government. The best alternative, though the least feasible now, is a combination of transitional justice and other transitional mechanisms.

**Table 4. Transitional justice in DDR programmes**

Country	Foundations of peace agreement	Political situation of demobilised persons
Indonesia (Aceh)	Amnesty for political prisoners, self-government, and demilitarisation of the Aceh region. Reform of the security sector. Creation of local political parties.	Social reintegration involving redistribution of land and participation in political affairs. Largest number of demobilised persons in terms of prior agreements. Problems in distribution of resources, compensated for by high degree of confidence in host communities.
Liberia	Amnesty, creation of a transitional government, and holding of elections. Establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Reform of police and military.	Social integration without specifications for political participation. Protests by ex-combatants and former members of the armed forces over lack of benefit payments, arising from scarcity in programme funding. Feeling from civil society of unbalanced treatment towards combatants. Call for greater responsibility from victimisers.
Nepal	Multiparty system of government and political restructuring of the state.	73 members of Maoist party in 330-seat parliament.
Central African Republic	Process of political transition and reform of the armed forces. National reconciliation and return of the rule of law.	Social-community reintegration. The government has considered granting amnesty as incentive to combatants to participate in DDR process. From September to October 2003, a National Reconciliation Forum occurred to establish dialogue and promote reconciliation among different religious, social, and political sectors. Currently, there is recommendation to establish a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Reconciliation, agreement involving democratic transition, and withdrawal of foreign troops. Reform of the security sector.	Social reintegration. Discontentment from combatants over lack of payments and suspension of peace process due to lack of funds. Presence of militias from Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Need to reinforce border with Sudan.
Republic of the Congo	Resumption to conflict after change of constitution. Later, cessation of hostilities and amnesty in exchange for arms surrender.	Petition from the armed opposition group CNR to form a national government in exchange for destruction of group's arsenal of weapons. Delay in distribution of payments to demobilised persons. Social reintegration via community projects.
Rwanda	Withdrawal of foreign troops and return of ex-combatants.	Lack of reforms to security sector the cause of national and regional political instability. Creation of local courts in Gacaca. These courts aim to promote participatory justice in uncovering truth, accelerating trials on genocide, eradicating Rwanda's culture of impunity, and strengthening national unity. These courts do not attempt to recuperate arms or trace their origins. Social-community reintegration. Provision of a list of leaders alleged to have committed serious crimes. Instead of imprisonment, community service for around 55,000 accused persons.
Somalia	Ceasefire, amnesty, and formation of a federal transitional government following elections.	Emphasis on rehabilitation. Social reintegration and redistribution of political power.
Sudan	Six-year autonomy for the south and a referendum on self-determination.	In June 2005, Public Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court L. Moreno-Ocampo undertook to investigate possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Uganda	Amnesty. Repatriation forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.	Creation of Amnesty Commission with ample citizen support, part of formalisation of an exiting process of "unofficial amnesty". Conflict over this and activities of the ICC. Amnesty Law.

Note: cases in which there has only been focus on reductions to armed forces have been excluded here, since these only apply to programmes of social reinsertion.

In a few countries, such as in Colombia, where demobilisation has not affected all armed groups collectively and, as a result, has led to endless conflict, a psychosocial environment favourable to amnesty and pardon cannot occur because the cycle of violence has not yet been entirely broken. This has left some with a sense that certain impunities or more favourable treatments are offered to select groups accused of crimes. However, the Peace and Justice Law that Colombia approved in 2005, along with amendments to the Constitutional Court in 2006, offer demobilised paramilitaries reduced sentences if they confess to their crimes. These confessions, in turn, will act as revelations of crimes and redress to victims. This sort of achievement is very rare at the international level.



## Security sector reform

One long-term objective for peace building in the context of post-war restoration is the realisation of a fund for peace, or the reallocation of public spending on the military sector to other economic and social areas of the budget. DDR involves security-sector reform, in many instances, through reduction of participants in the security sector, professionalisation of security institutions, and training focussed on human rights and international law.

Decisions made to reform the security sector may reverberate throughout the DDR process. These decisions may touch on the creation of a new military or eligibility criteria for ex-combatants of armed opposition groups to enter the official military. Although we should carefully consider the details of these, in reality some processes are identical, for instance, the process of absorption into new armed forces, demobilisation of child soldiers, and examination for HIV/AIDS, among others.

### Box 4. OECD security-sector reform manual

In 2007, the OECD Development Assistance Committee published a new edition of its manual on security-sector reform. The manual's objectives are to provide donors with new guidelines on understanding the relationship between security and development, as well as to illustrate certain key positions on evaluating the design, implementation, and evaluation of security-sector reform for different institutions, including the police, the armed forces, and intelligence services (OECD 2007).

Among the main weaknesses identified in the context of a society of post-war restoration, the manual highlights the absence of coherent strategy to include all human and economic resource, and how they relate to parallel processes of disarmament and justice in interconnected systems.

Other weaknesses include lack of support capacity for security-sector reform processes and an alarming need to empower local actors and provide training to government.

## Other disarmament initiatives

In the effort to prevent armed conflict and violence, as well as to fight the impact of **uncontrolled and excessive proliferation of small arms** in peace-building contexts, governments must consider control mechanisms that go beyond DDR programmes. The possession of illicit small arms by the civil population, or the discovery of territory with landmines, are clear indications that in post-war contexts, the disarmament of armed groups must combine with other types of initiatives, ranging from landmine removal and collection of arms from civil society to the strengthening of state legislation on related issues.

We should understand disarmament initiatives as **practical means for disarmament**. One basic classification for such means, which governments and peace builders need to implement in integrated fashion, allows us to see how we might divide means according to objectives: firstly, by *decreasing demand*, or influencing the motivations which generate need for arms; secondly, by *controlling the existing supply of arms* through legislation and practices which restrict their use; and thirdly, by *restraining surpluses* through the collection, reduction, and destruction of arms in the hands of the civil population, in illegal armed groups, and in government arsenals.

In 12 of the countries of this report, different options including voluntary collection of arms, Arms for Development projects in Liberia, or even stricter legislation, as in Colombia or Haiti, have worked to disarm the civil population. Programmes for removing landmines exist in several countries, but predominantly in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, and Nepal.

## Precedents

Almost all DDR programmes are the results of planning, designing pilot processes, or resuming previously failed processes. In some countries, there is prior experience with DDR, for example, in Chad, Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, and Uganda. There may be experience with other types of disarmament or demilitarisation processes, including the reduction of armed forces or the disarmament of civilians. This has been true for the Central African Republic. From these precedents we may extract certain cultural knowledge and lessons learned. At the same time, there is no clear correlation between the existence of precedents and good development of DDR. Despite previous experience, it is common to find failed programmes, or programmes experiencing difficulties. Programmes that have reproduced lessons learned from processes in other countries are not always successful either.

At the same time, results for countries whose previous experiences involved unchanged armed groups can be surprising. In Angola and Aceh, Indonesia, the same actors who failed in previous occasions, have succeeded now in a second opportunity to put in place a process with good chances for success. On the other hand, in Eritrea, a successful previous experience has not resulted in good developments for a later process with similar features and characteristics. We can blame this assortment of results on either the ability or inability of actors to extract lessons from precedents. But this assumes that both the internal and external experiences of countries are comparable. We reduce this comparability the less we see DDR as merely a technical procedure. Conversely, the more we see this comparability as dependent on context, the more it may increase. From this point of view, precedents are part of multiple factors compromising a context which can generate lessons learned and trigger unique situations. Experience has often not provided adequate knowledge of context. Hence, we may need to seek this knowledge through pilot projects targeting a reduced number of combatants. Ideally, this knowledge should reflect the variety of needs which may arise in a non-pilot process. As such, a pilot project allows for readjustment to an original DDR plan.

**Table 5. Precedents and pilots**

	Precedent	Pilot
Afghanistan		✓
Angola	Prior	
Burundi		✓
Colombia	Other	
Republic of the Congo	Prior	
Dem. Rep. Congo		✓
Côte d'Ivoire	Prior	
Chad	Other	✓
Eritrea	Prior	✓
Haiti	Other	✓
Indonesia (Aceh)	Prior	
Liberia		✓
Nepal		
Niger		✓
Central African Rep.	Different	✓
Rwanda		
Somalia	Other	✓
Sudan		✓
Uganda	Other	

Legend  
 Prior: DDR targeting same armed groups  
 Other: DDR targeting other armed groups  
 Different: Disarmament or demilitarisation process different from DDR (security-sector reform, civilian disarmament, etc.)

## DDR programme design

Beyond the context surrounding DDR, analysis is also necessary for planning in terms of the precedents, implementing agencies, the basic principles, budgeting, financing, scheduling, and the participants of programmes, giving special attention to groups with specific needs.

### Implementing agencies

As the United Nations defines it, an integrated approach to DDR requires a common programme and implementation structure, through organised and ordered contributions from different participants. This structure is fundamental to imparting a sense of responsibility and leadership as regards objectives, policies, strategies, programme design, modes of implementation, and design of three distinct levels—the strategic, technical, and operational.

Of the country programmes in operation in 2007, 13 opted for creation of a **National Commission on DDR (NCDDR)**. This commission, in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, etc., consists of a wide variety of forms, depending on the specific bodies that are responsible for carrying out programmes. The commission does not constitute spontaneously, but counts on support from international and regional bodies such as the MDRP and the UNDP, in the cases of Afghanistan and Burundi, among others. It forms part of a complex framework of agencies of all natures, particularly in the case of Colombia following the creation of the High Advisory Group on Reintegration.

Concurrently, a correct, decentralised structure is also essential. This structure must be coordinated. It may comprise regional offices in the main areas of programme execution. The predominantly international agencies that carry out the specific tasks of these programmes are diverse. They work according to their best ability and the principal dimensions of DDR, whether they be policy, technical-military, security, humanitarian, or socioeconomic dimensions (Working Group on DDR 2000). We must not overlook need for national empowerment of these processes, and not exclusively for governmental entities either.

There may be a strong military presence in Joint Commissions empowered to oversee fulfilment of peace agreements or the restructuring of armed security forces.

#### Box 6. Presence of the military in DDR

Focus of military participation in DDR must situate itself on the provision of security. However, this issue is extremely wide-ranging and its functions will vary according to capacities, implementing policies, procedures, and understandings on the aspects of peace maintenance, humanitarianism, and development for countries with active projects. Security in stationing camps and the collection, identification, storage, and possible destruction of surrendered small arms and ammunition are among the activities to be realised (KAIPTC 2005). Phases for which military intervention is necessary include the disarmament and demobilisation phases. Possibility exists also, in a long-term phase involving reinsertion and reintegration, that armed forces in the process of security-sector reform incorporate combatants receiving DDR.<sup>1</sup> We must understand that the civil population, who will carry out the bulk of integration, will lead the various reintegration processes.

There are three manners of military structure for DDR: units or contingents, whether army, aviation, engineering corps, or support units; military observers, including MILOBs and disarmed officials made available to mission member states for a period of approximately one year; and officials who are members of the military as specialists (De Coning 2006). The duty of military observers is to assist in creating preventative alertness and to provide and disseminate information. The provision and dissemination of information, which may not at first glance seem a concern of the military, is in fact of the highest importance because of the military's countrywide reach.

Lastly, with respect to relations between civilians and the military, it is recommendable to establish a Joint Operations Centre and a joint analysis centre that aim to coordinate information gathered from implementing activities, not only for managing civil and military relations but also for all other general processes as well, including relations between phases, between headquarters and regional offices, etc. In terms of control and monitoring, it is recommendable to make work the responsibility of DDR, together with the Joint Centre of Operations, in order to determine need for military intervention and its responsibilities (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

## Basic principles

The United Nations (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006) suggests DDR have the following as **objectives**:

- To contribute to security and stability, facilitating reintegration and creating an adequate environment for starting recuperation and rehabilitation.
- To return a sense of trust to relations between combating factions and the population in general.
- To help prevent or mitigate future conflicts.
- To contribute to national reconciliation.
- To free human and financial resources, as well as social capital, for reconstruction and development.

Beyond the evident goals of **demobilising** and **reintegrating** former combatants, perceptible in almost all the countries of this report, countries such as Burundi and Eritrea have proposed other basic principles to facilitate the integration of programmes into an integrated strategy of security-sector and defence reform. In addition to these strategies, some countries have put forward objectives which go well beyond expectations. These strategies focus on such aspects as the strengthening of **governmental authority** (Afghanistan), **political transition** and establishment of an **institutional structure** for it (Angola), the restoration of **populations affected by armed conflict** (Burundi), the strengthening of **socio-economic stability** (Eritrea), and the creation of stable environments for **conditions of human security** (Sudan).

Overall, DDR programmes must be decisive in consolidating **security**, or the **short-term** vision, for the peace-building process. However, DDR programmes must also serve to strengthen the process of **development**, or the **long-term** perspective. For this, the strategies DDR programmes employ are essential. The types of measures employed and the composition of participants must base themselves fundamentally on these strategies.

## Participants and beneficiaries

For a good start to implementing DDR, one fundamental area to consider must be the identification of **participants**, those who will receive direct assistance, and **beneficiaries**, those who will receive indirect benefits. Armed groups to be demobilised must be identified in peace agreements, even though transparent **eligibility criteria** which are easy to understand and unambiguous in order to avoid the perception of favouritism or victimisation, must be established in a concrete manner as well (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

Among the countries of this report, arms possession has become progressively irrelevant as criterion for incorporation into a programme. This has been the case with the DDR process in Somalia. Instead, qualitative criteria such as **affiliation with an armed group**, as determined through identification or recognition by that group, has become increasingly relevant. This was the case in Liberia and the Central African Republic. This approach can allow groups with more specific needs to enter the DDR process. Other more singular criteria such as demonstrating commitment to the DDR process and to government (Afghanistan), or possession of state nationality (Angola), may also qualify. Finally, the implementation of **monitoring mechanisms**, which may be carried out by military observers with the support of national and international civil personnel, as planned for Nepal, are also important.

In 2007, of the 19 countries studied in this report, **1,100,000 ex-combatants** participated in one way or another in some phase of a DDR programme. Around 38% participated in programmes to diminish armed forces, while the rest participated in programmes to disarm and demobilise armed opposition groups. This **diversity of actors** formed part of the complexity involved in dealing with current DDR programmes, especially when all factors and groups of actors are present in a country. DDR programmes designed exclusively for armed forces are often much easier to manage than other programmes, except when they deal with soldiers who have been out of the military for a long time and who did not receive initial assistance or benefits for reintegration into society. These persons may threaten to take up arms again. As for the DDR of militias, militias generally have less political interest compared to guerrillas, who often do not agree to disarm unless their DDR agrees to political pledges. **Of those combatants eligible for demobilisation, 90% were from Africa, where 14 of the 19 country programmes are located.** As can be seen in the following table, the total number of estimated combatants differs from the number of persons actually demobilised, approximately 68.2%, whether this is because programmes are still active and incomplete or because of defective **planning** in the calculation of combatant numbers.

**Table 6. Beneficiaries of current DDR programmes**

Country	Combatants*	Composition	Demobilised persons (%)	Situation
Afghanistan	63,000	armed forces	63,380 (100)	reintegration
Angola	138,000	105,000 militias and 33,000 armed forces	97,114 (70)	reintegration
Burundi	78,000	41,000 armed forces, 21,500 militias, and 15,500 guerrillas	23,185 (29)**	demobilisation and reinsertion
Chad	9,000	armed forces	9,000	reintegration
AUC, Colombia	32,000	paramilitaries	31,761 (105.9)	reintegration
Côte d'Ivoire	40,000	42,500 militias and 5,000 armed forces	-	demobilisation
Eritrea	200,000	armed forces	200,000 (100)	reintegration
Haiti	6,000	militias	500 (8.3)	prospecting
Aceh, Indonesia	3,000	guerrillas	3,000 (100)	reintegration
Liberia	105,000	12,000 armed forces, 93,000 guerrillas and militias	101,495 (97)	reintegration
Nepal	15,000	guerrillas	19,602 (126.6)	demobilisation
Niger	3,000	militias	3,160 (100)	reintegration
Central African Republic	8,000	militias	7,556 (99)	reintegration
Democratic Republic of the Congo	190,000	170,000 militias and 20,000 armed forces	150,000 (79)	demobilisation
Republic of the Congo	30,000	militias	17,400 (58)	reintegration
Rwanda	36,000	20,000 armed forces and 16,000 militias	26,536 (73.7)	demobilisation
Somalia	53,000	militias	1,266 (2.3)	pilot phase
Sudan	79,000	militias must integrate into armed forces prior to being demobilised	-	demobilisation
Uganda	15,000	guerrillas	21,500 (140)	reintegration
<b>TOTAL (19)</b>	<b>1,103,000</b>	<b>621,000 non-state forces and 482,000 state forces</b>	<b>776,452 (79)</b>	

\* Estimates at time of planning demobilisation

\*\* Does not take into consideration the demobilisation of armed forces.

As for **paramilitary groups**, whether as adjuncts to armed forces or to political groups in power or opposition, their treatment depends in good measure on the authority of the government leading the DDR and the incentives it offers for entering the demobilisation process. In 2007, around 5% of persons in the demobilisation phase belonged to paramilitary groups of various kinds, including pro-government militias and supporters of the former government. These groups act in accord with traditional schemes of paramilitarism. Paramilitary groups have affected **four countries** in particular, three of them in Africa—Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia—and one of them in Latin American—Colombia. Except for **Colombia**, where current DDR focuses entirely on the **AUC**, the demobilisation of paramilitary groups has operated in **conjunction with the demobilisation of militias, guerrillas, and armed forces**, as the result of **global political agreements**.

**Box 7. Demobilisation of paramilitaries in Colombia**

In 2007, one of the more celebrated events for Colombia’s demobilisation of paramilitary groups was the government’s destruction of more than 18,000 arms of the AUC. A foundry in the Department of Boyacá melted down these arms in the presence of High Commissioner for Peace Luís Carlos Restrepo and other authorities. High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank Pearl claimed the government expected a major demobilisation of members of the FARC. He also said that of the 36,000 ex-combatants monitored by the Office for Reinsertion, 20,000 were working while the remaining 16,000 were studying.

However, not all programmes developed as positively in 2007. The trimestral MAPP-OEA report (2007) warned of the continuance of “the influence of ex-paramilitary commanders not incorporated into the government’s programme and the existence of intermediate commanders in hiding”. The report also warned of clear relations between corridors and zones of illicit cultivation, and the existence of rearmed structures and paramilitary remnants. Consequently, some members of the dismantled AUC have moved into private armies with marked Mafia-like natures servicing the drug trade.

Finally, the report suggested that reintegration had begun to take on a new course with Colombia’s policy changes, as implemented by the High Advisory Group on Reintegration, though in the medium term Colombia could overcome these obstacles. These obstacles included institutional disorganisation and lack of interest in the demobilisation process by some local governments; stigmatisation of the demobilised population, with repercussions on reinsertion in communities; lack of motivation from ex-combatants, stemming from delays in policy implementation; scarce opportunities for stable jobs in regions with strong informal economies; the inactivity of employment projects; and difficulties arising from strained security for demobilised persons, who fall victim to homicide and suffer threats in some areas of Colombia.

**Groups with specific needs**

Beyond the distinction between participants and beneficiaries, we should see that some groups are more vulnerable and have certain specific needs. Such groups include child soldiers, women, and disabled soldiers.

Traditionally, peace efforts have paid little attention to the demobilisation of **child soldiers**, despite their ferocious experiences and the trauma of their direct involvement in armed conflict. The UN Secretary-General has condemned this (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2007). The writing and development of peace agreements and negotiated accords need to recognise the special rights of child soldiers. We must conduct studies on child soldiers at the beginning of the demobilisation process and develop specific programmes for reintegrating them into civil life.

Of the country programmes analysed here, the majority contain large numbers of child soldiers amongst combatants targeted for demobilisation. Exceptions include Chad, Cambodia, Eritrea, and the Central African Republic, where the DDR goal is reform of the security sector. The presence of children in armed groups targeted for demobilisation is often high, on average 10.8% of total combatants. Sudan and Uganda have higher percentages and, therefore, their DDR programmes focus largely on demobilising child soldiers.

**Table 7. Some DDR programmes with child soldiers**

Country	Child soldiers	Demobilisation TOTAL	% Child soldiers / Total
Afghanistan	8,000	63,380	12.7
Angola	6,000	138,000	4.3
Burundi	3,500	78,000	4.5
Chad	1,000	9,000	
AUC, Colombia	2,200-5,000	31,761	6.9
Côte d’Ivoire	4,000	47,500	8.4
Liberia	11,780	119,000	9.9
Democratic Republic of the Congo	33,000	150,000	22.0
Republic of the Congo	1,800	30,000	6.2
Central African Republic	1,000	7,565	13.2
Rwanda	2,500	36,000	6.9
Sudan (1)	10,000	100,500	9.9
Uganda	6,000	15,310	39.2
<b>TOTAL (13)</b>	<b>90,780</b>	<b>835,016</b>	<b>10.8</b>

(1) Currently, only persons from vulnerable groups targeted for demobilisation are known in Sudan. Estimation has been made of other adult ex-combatants who could benefit from DDR.

UNICEF projects have often taken priority in putting in place DDR for child soldiers. Beyond underage ex-combatants, the majority of DDR participants are between the ages of 15 and 24. Known as “almost adults” or “young adults”, these underage combatants are recruited as minors and demobilised as adults. They require special attention due to their lack of “conventional” family socialisation (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

#### Box 8. Machel Report, 10 years later

In 2007, the tenth anniversary of the Graça Machel Report was celebrated. This report evaluated the impact of armed conflict on children and raised the issue of youth combatants. The effect of this report was to pass legislation forbidding the forced recruitment of children, as stated in the last report of the Special Representative to the United Nations Secretary-General on the question of children and armed conflict (General Assembly of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006). In the last 10 years, two major concerns have included the need to control armaments, especially small arms, which a new document has included, and the proliferation of child soldiers in armed conflicts, especially in urban areas.

At the start of 2007, UNICEF and the French government organised a world conference, held in Paris. At this conference, 58 countries committed to putting an end to the illegal use of boys and girls in armed conflicts and to providing effective assistance to those who have been involved in violent activities or with armed groups. Those areas for which key guidelines were specified, in addition to overall guiding principles, were girls, refugee and displaced children, recruitment prevention and illegal use of children, liberation and reinsertion of children in armed groups, justice, and monitoring and evaluation of different processes (*The Paris Principles 2007*).

Experience has shown that in nearly all cases, armed forces or armed groups, whether they are government or opposition forces, involve **women and girls**. Verification of this fact has shown that in many instances **women are excluded from the DDR process**. This was true for Colombia, Nepal, and Republic of the Congo. This should result in the reformulation of many currently active programmes. Not only should the participation of women in terms of conditions be equal to that of other combatants, but also DDR programmes should incorporate women’s specific needs, including protection from sexual violence and accommodation of dependent children. Thus far, as in Burundi or Sudan, women’s associations have attempted to remedy this situation. These organisations have aimed to avoid “self-demobilisation” due to the stigma women receive, favouring instead the participation of women in all stages of the DDR process.

A similar process has occurred for **disabled soldiers**, who in countries such as Angola are very numerous. Because of their physical condition, security forces deny disabled soldiers participation. As with women, however, these soldiers require opportunities to participate in their own reintegration.

### Budget and financing

Many DDR programmes are planned without knowing exactly how many persons will benefit from them and whether they will attain the necessary resources from the international community. Therefore, programmes must adjust budgets frequently to suit reality. As part of **requirements** for efficient programming, programme financing should be attainable, flexible, and harmonious. Planning should accord with other mechanisms and activities of post-war restoration. It should be part of an indivisible process, minimising duplication of activities and focussing efforts on reintegration. This section will compare the budgets of this report’s 19 DDR programmes by looking at the main programme financiers and the distribution of funds throughout the programme phases.

#### Budget

The table that follows lists the most important items in the budgets of DDR programmes. The total cost of the 19 DDR programmes in 2007 was **\$1.599 billion**. The average cost per demobilised person was **\$1,434**. In 2007, there was a \$300 million budget decrease because three less programmes were operational, but this came together with a \$600 increase to the spending per person. In order to understand this last figure, we must consider that the countries looked at here have very low national incomes. Scarcely three of the countries surpass \$1,000 per annum per resident,

while 11 do not reach \$500. Generally, DDR programmes run in the most impoverished countries. These countries have suffered the bulk of the world's current armed conflict. **Nine out of 19 countries count amongst the lowest in human development according to the HDI, calculated annually by the UNDP (2007).**

**Table 8. Important economic budget items of DDR programmes**

Country	Total cost (millions \$)	Combatants	DDR cost per person (\$)	Income per inhabitant (\$)	DDR/PCI
Afghanistan	141.2	63,380	2,278.1	-	-
Angola	255.8	138,000	1,853.6	1,980	0.9
Burundi	84.4	78,000	1,082	100	10.8
Chad	10	9,000	1,111.1	480	2.3
AUC, Colombia	302.6	31,761	9,527.4	2,740	3.4
Côte d'Ivoire <sup>(1)</sup>	40	40,000	1000	870	1.1
Eritrea	198	200,000	986	200	4.9
Haiti <sup>(2)</sup>	50.1	(6,000)	(2,625)	480	(5.4)
Aceh, Indonesia	100	5,000	20,000	1,420	4.9
Liberia	71	119,000	596.6	140	4.2
Nepal <sup>(3)</sup>	18.4	19,602	938.6	290	3.2
Niger	2.39	3,160	756.3	260	2.9
Central African Republic	13.3	7,565	1,758	360	4.8
D. Republic of the Congo	200	150,000	1,333.3	130	10.2
Republic of the Congo	25	30,000	588.2	950	0.6
Rwanda	62.5	36,000	1,736.1	250	6.9
Somalia <sup>(4)</sup>	32.8	53,000	618.8	-	-
Sudan <sup>(5)</sup>	85.4	100,500	849.7	810	1
Uganda	6.74	16,245	414.8	300	1.4
<b>TOTAL (19)</b>	<b>1,689.5</b>	<b>1,115,307</b>	<b>1,465.5</b>	<b>618.9</b>	<b>2.3</b>

(1) The real cost of DDR is not known exactly. It could be less than the number indicated in the table.

(2) The number of combatants is entirely estimated.

(3) From contributions verified thus far.

(4) Programme in planning phase.

(5) Currently, only persons from vulnerable groups targeted for demobilisation are known. Estimations have been made for other adult ex-combatants who could benefit from DDR.

There is no general pattern to the average cost per individual DDR programme, but notable differences do exist regarding overall cost. The cost per demobilised person increases the more a country's per capita income rises. The weighted average of the 19 programmes is a **per capita DDR cost, three-and-half times that of per capita income**. However, data is greatly different from one country to the next. Extreme examples include Aceh, at 14 times the average; Burundi, 10.8 times the average; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10.2 times the average. These countries have low per capita incomes and many combatants

who require demobilisation.

### Financing bodies

One difficulty in analysing DDR is to understand the details of **organisations and countries who have contributed economic resources** for development and DDR. In some cases, contributions surpass DDR, making reference to support for communities or regional development plans, for example. In other cases, the numbers or quantities countries contribute are unspecified. The breakdown by some countries of contributions to international bodies who later invest in DDR programmes can be extremely complicated. Normally, there are gaps between process phases, or other emergencies diversion funds. For these reasons, greater transparency and effectiveness towards donors is necessary (Swarbrick 2007).

Resources required depend on the numbers of participants. Resources usually come from the international community by means of the following six generic systems: rapid-reply funds, the budget of United Nations Peacekeeping, voluntary contributions by donors, other contributions, programmes and funds of United Nations agencies, and World Bank funds (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006). If funds are unavailable through these sources, countries should draw up relevant budgets based on estimated costs, in a flexible manner, always bearing in mind worst-case scenarios (Poulligny 2004). Of the main institutional financiers, the World Bank puts the most investment in 13 DDR programmes, whether in



regional funds, as with the MDRP in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, or in direct assistance to specific countries. The UNDP, with bilateral contributions which are difficult to track, is the second largest financier of DDR. The European Union, who depends on the contributions of its member states, trails the UNDP very closely.

Of countries who contribute directly, Japan has contributed the most, particularly to Afghanistan, but also in lesser quantities to four other countries. Japan has contributed a total \$107.9 million. Following Japan is the **United States**. The choice of Afghanistan and Iraq as priority intervention countries for Japan and the United States relates to strategies on combating terrorism with economic and social development in zones susceptible to terrorist activity, either currently or in the future. Amongst other contributing countries, Great Britain and Germany, with contributions between \$25 and \$50 million, are worth mentioning, as are Canada and the Netherlands, amongst others, with lesser contributions. Finally, we should not undervalue the contributions of other governments for whom there exist active programmes, including Angola, Colombia, Nepal, Niger, and Rwanda, as well as other bilateral contributions not indicated.

Also, some countries have a special preference for financing through select international agencies rather than through direct contributions. In all, an integrated system of financing offers the best guarantees, so long as national DDR structures, which incorporate an integrate structure of security, execute it. This approach allows for flexibility. It is able to tend to previous financing commitments, especially from fiduciary funds, co-finance parallel programmes, and avoid overlapping (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

#### **Budget distribution**

The absence of reliable statistics or budgetary breakdowns for many DDR programmes, or extra costs caused by delays to implementing DDR programmes or by increases to the number of beneficiaries, complicates the creation of a comparative chart which would allow us to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, due to their short durations, we can assume that the **initial stages of disarmament and demobilisation** accrue the least expenses, **between 6 and 10% of total budget**. The **reinsertion and reintegration** phases account for **between 60 and 80% of total budget**, though their durations are not always clear. The reinsertion phase is always more costly than the reintegration phase. As for the programmes that are specific to **vulnerable groups**, including children, women, and the disabled, the percentage of budgetary spending is **between 5 and 10%**, because some countries only count some of these persons, and depending on the country, their numbers differs widely. At any rate, the per capita DDR cost for persons of vulnerable groups is substantially higher than for other persons, owing to the more individualised and specialised assistance they require. Finally, **10% of budgets normally go to other needs**, such as to communications or to awareness around DDR. Regarding donors, a major challenge is to identify specific reintegration costs, both in the general phase of this and in terms of the cost per combatant.

#### **Phases of DDR**

As mentioned, DDR programmes in themselves are **processes** for which it is not possible to carry out any one phase if correct planning has not accompanied the other components. Also, DDR programmes do not necessarily follow a linear progression. They tend to adapt themselves to the specificities of context. In the material that follows, the main common features of the disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration phase are detailed.

#### **Disarmament and demobilisation**

Starting with the **disarmament** phase, programmes regularly collect small arms and ammunition. On some occasions, they receive surrendered heavy arms, as in Afghanistan. In terms of the arms-collection process, armed forces or police keep arms under their custody, though Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic destroy arms publicly for symbolic sake. However, in most countries, there is recklessness and scarce monitoring of the final destinations of surrendered arms. These arms risk diversion in the very region in which they are collected and/or into illegal markets. Without speaking properly about conventional DDR, possibility exists for combatants to surrender arms voluntarily or after a DDR process has completed in full. In this case, there must be a level of security, with awareness of and communication on the problem of light-arms proliferation and knowledge of the locations of arms possession, in the form of a map. Countries may carry out pilot disarmament projects when surrendered arms are few in relation to the number of demobilised persons. Later, in the disarmament phase, governments frequently run voluntary arms-collection programmes

through campaigns like “arms for development”. These campaigns encourage combatants to surrender arms in exchange for assistance with workplace reinsertion, educational programmes, attaining microcredit, etc. Examples of this, at least in the planning phase, can be found in the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda.

One of the more controversial aspects of DDR involves the quantity of arms surrendered by combatants. Although it may seem that every combatant possesses an arm, this is not the case with most armed groups. Many members of armed groups do not experience combat and do not carry a firearm. Nevertheless, they are prepared to demobilise as soon as DDR has begun. Also, ex-combatants normally keep an indeterminate quantity of arms hidden, or they surrender only arms that are in disuse or in very poor condition. The history of demobilisation in various countries has proved this to be true.

**Table 9. Arms surrendered by demobilised combatant in select countries**

Country	Demobilised persons	Arms surrendered	Arms / person	Period
Afghanistan	63,380	48,819	0.77	2003-2005
Angola	97,115	33,000	0.34	2002-2006
Burundi	23,185	5,400	0.23	2004-2007
AUC, Colombia	31,761	18,051	0.57	2004-2006
Aceh, Indonesia	3,000	1,018	0.34	2005
Liberia	101,495	28,314	0.28	2005
Nepal	19,602	3,475	0.18	2007
Republic of the Congo	17,400	11,776	0.68	2000-2006
Group TOTAL	356,938	149,853	0.42	

In order, Afghanistan, the Republic of the Congo, and Colombia rank above average in terms of the percent of arms surrendered per person, around one arm for every two combatants. At the other end of the scale are Angola, Aceh, Indonesia, and Liberia, with small percentages of arms surrendered. Colombia is particularly surprising. During large demobilisations in January 2007, nearly the last demobilisations in Colombia, each AUC combatant surrendered 0.57 arms, whereas in previous demobilisations, each combatant surrendered 0.7 arms.

Usually, practical means for disarmament and demobilisation only manage to gather arms deemed surplus, that is, arms that are not worth keeping as part of weapons arsenals for security reasons. To put it another way, structural and cultural transformations which mitigate the deficiencies arising in armed contexts, whether traditional conflicts or so-called “new wars”, must be a part of the practical means for DDR.

With respect to **demobilisation**, combatants may be stationed or held in specific locations for surrendering their arms, for identification purposes, for receiving a demobilisation certificate, and for registering for later DDR phases. This may occur over a period of a few days to approximately two weeks. It is common for the demobilisation phase to offer a variety of services including a medical check to evaluate physical as well as psychological wellbeing, provision of basic foodstuffs, monitoring of hygiene, provision of clothing, determination of the social-labour profile of each ex-combatant, provision of information on the status of and possibilities for reintegration, professional education and training, and even, in some cases, transport to host communities.

The number of activities offered, as well as the groups and total quantity of combatants to demobilise, depend on the number of days a combatant resides in a stationing camp. For the countries of this report, stays range from one day, as in Afghanistan, where camps provide information and advice on reinsertion and a package with shoes and food, to 15 days, as in Rwanda, where camps identify combatants, give them education on HIV/AIDS, and tell them about the benefits of reintegration.

Of course, when their numbers are high, not all combatants can be demobilised at once. Rather, the demobilisation of large numbers of combatants must be done in phases, as in Burundi, Eritrea, and Rwanda. Very large numbers of persons demobilised all at once can cause crowding in stationing camps and a deterioration to sanitary conditions there. Examples of this include Angola and Burundi, where deplorable conditions in camps have led to malnutrition, sanitary deficiencies, the spread of cholera, a climate of tension, insecurity,

etc. An opposite example to this is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where high camp maintenance costs have led to reduced numbers of demobilised persons and the closure of camps.

One main problem is the lack of knowledge on the number of combatants targeted for demobilisation. This may be due to a lack of previous planning or the extortion of high commanders of armed opposition groups. This problem has arisen in Afghanistan, where demobilising persons have exaggerated the number of declared combatants in order to receive greater benefits. Another consequence of this lack of knowledge can be an alarming lack of funds for paying former combatants. This may lead to rebellions from combatant sectors who demand payments that governments had promised them. This issue has arisen in Burundi and Liberia. Also, in terms of compensations for demobilised persons, persons who were not combatants have attempted to apply for DDR because of the incentives offered. Such persons, called "phantom combatants", became apparent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

### **Reinsertion and reintegration**

At the heart of DDR is the reintegration phase. This is one of the most complex phases. While previous phases are more precise and transitional, the reintegration phase involves lengthy debate over whether the transition phase should be strengthened or deepened in developing and reconstructing post-war society. In the event we understand reintegration as a simple transition from military to civil life, a short-term stabilisation strategy may be adopted. This may distance combatants from criminal activities until a peace mission has deployed and reform of the security and political sectors have concluded. However, a more general vision for reintegration must not base itself on this kind of transitional security strategy. Rather, reintegration must be a long-term commitment to development and transformation (Hagman and Nielsen 2002).

We can divide the reintegration phase into two chronological divisions, though some countries leave the phase as a whole. The demobilisation phase leaves combatants without regular means of income or survival. During this initial period, called **reinsertion**, ex-combatants and their families must have their basic needs met. This involves guaranteeing return of ex-combatants to their communities in the first months after they surrender their arms. Some countries offer emergency economic aid in the form of a survival kit and transportation. The **reintegration** phase begins later. Often, it lasts for approximately two years. Demobilised persons, who have been accustomed to coexisting with arms, do not have the tools necessary to reintegrate themselves into social and economic life at this point.

The reintegration phase involves providing means for a sustainable living, including occupational, educational, economic, social, and sanitary assistance. Literature on the topic classifies these means in a number of ways. The means can focus on chronology in terms of short-term reinsertion services (security and stabilisation) and long-term reintegration services (development). Means can also focus on the nature of subjects, including ex-combatants, their family members, certain private ex-combatant groups, and the community as a whole, as programmes define them. They can also focus on the type of assistance required, either social or economic. Finally, they can focus on a combination of these, as is frequently the case (Poulligny 2004).

Offering substitutes to the benefits combatants receive for armed activity is an idea based on the widespread notion that demobilised persons will retake up arms unless options for their reintegration are not perceptibly better than life as a combatant. Four possible "losses", both real and perceived, relate to this thinking: the loss of physical security, of economic security, of political influence, and of social prestige (Willibald 2006).

Within this, reintegration may centre on ex-combatants and/or community.


When countries understand reintegration to be a simple transition from military to civil life, they should adopt a **short-term stabilisation** strategy to distance combatants from criminal activities until a peace mission can deploy and/or reform of the security and political sectors can conclude. In this case, countries should provide *rapid* support for transition to resettlement, the creation of opportunities, including the generation of short-term income for all ex-combatants. Without this, insecurity may result. **Reintegration focused on ex-combatants** involves a necessity for developing individual solutions to long-term integration. This focus is especially necessary when countries perceive ex-combatants to be continuous threats to long-term security. Thus, sustainable reintegration is crucial for improving security and strengthening the peace process. Finally, **community reintegration** involves providing

communities with instruments and capacities to support the reintegration of ex-combatants. Disarmament and demobilization link directly to a broader strategy of community-based recovery. Ex-combatants stop being the specific goals of sustenance and support. At the same time, other concrete support services in terms of physical and mental-health services may be necessary. We must make a clear distinction between a reintegration in which benefits are exclusively for ex-combatants and a reintegration in which benefits are also for communities. Communities may also participate in the process of planning and identification of needs.

Currently, the most common focus for programmes has been on ex-combatants, although some programmes, such as in Chad, Niger, Aceh, the Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of Congo, have focused on community participation in the reintegration phase. We can make a clear distinction between a reintegration in which benefits are exclusively for ex-combatants and a reintegration in which benefits are also for communities and communities participate in planning and identifying needs (Muggah 2005). Community participation in the DDR process and the participation of ex-combatants in reintegration activities centred on community may also play a key role in post-conflict transition. This reintegration strategy contains the following common features (UNDP 2005):

- Well defined geographic areas.
- A participatory nature.
- Identification of the needs and demands of beneficiaries.
- Management by local actors and decentralised systems.
- Requirement for a high level of inter-institutional cooperation.

Graphic 2. Reintegration services and needs



One risk to this more general focus on reintegration is possible marginalisation of armed groups. This may occur when effective geographical and political coverage of a country falters. If we add to this the fact that benefits do not always go directly to ex-combatants, this approach may lead to insecurity. Another problem arising is eligibility. If in an individualised focus on reintegration, we must classify the kinds of combatants (arms carriers, experienced combatants, child soldiers, etc.) who may receive programming, a community-centred focus must confront the challenge of defining what community means (Baaré 2005). We must define the meaning in terms of context, whether it is rural, urban, the immediate circle of people around ex-combatants, host communities, etc.

Within current DDR programmes, there are two basic types of reintegration services for ex-combatants: *substitute* and *reconciliatory services* (Nilsson 2005). The aim of the first is to offer certain benefits or incentives as a *substitute* for participation in armed activities. The four areas for which this "competition for benefits" may occur include the areas of economic security, physical security, political influence, and social prestige. Reconciliatory services for ex-combatants, which include psychosocial assistance, aim to accommodate ex-combatants in communities while bearing in mind that substitute benefits may generate distrustfulness in non-combatants (School for a Culture of Peace 2007).

To the degree that economic reintegration can be distinguished from social integration, the aim of classifying combatants and communities is to achieve an economic reintegration for substitute services related to economic security. Other types of services, whether substitutive or reconciliatory, occur within the framework of social reintegration.

Activities for **economic reintegration** are varied. Primarily, they include the financing of micro-projects, the provision of educational and professional training, the creation of micro-businesses, the facilitation of access to employment in different sectors of the economy, and the execution of public works, predominantly for the reconstruction of state infrastructure. While preventing stigmatisation that may arise from the reintegration process, social integration includes activities for sensitisation, public awareness, provision of information and advice, analysis of conflict and reconciliation, and support for families, among others. Some countries offer initial economic compensations to persons immediately after demobilising, as well as payments or assistance later in the reinsertion phase. Though countries differ noticeably, most country programmes offer economic aid to ex-combatants who participate in the reintegration phase. At the same time, this is a controversial strategy. Some analysts support it because it is easy to implement, it can accelerate the reintegration process, it can decrease the economic burdens on host communities, and it can stimulate local economies. Other analysts argue the strategy promotes arms markets and other illegal activities, it encourages non-productive, wastefulness activities, it encourages “phantom combatants”, and it breeds resentment in communities.

**Table 10. Methods of cash payment in current DDR processes**

COUNTRY	Total payment (average)	Method and sum(s)
Afghanistan	\$990	Between \$180 and \$480 monthly over a period of two to four months
Angola	\$700	\$100 upon arrival at final destinations and the equivalent of five months of salary in the armed forces, between \$300 and \$900
Burundi	\$600	\$600 on average, depending on rank, paid in 10 instalments (militias receive an allowance of \$91)
Cambodia	\$240	One payment
AUC, Colombia	\$2750	\$155 monthly over a period of one-and-a-half years
Eritrea	\$600	\$50 monthly for a year
Guinea-Bissau	-	Payment of two allowances
Aceh, Indonesia	\$500	Three payments every two months (\$200, \$150, and \$150)
Liberia	\$300	In two instalments
Nepal	-	\$46 monthly
C.A., Republic	\$500	One payment
D. R. Congo	\$400	\$110 upon leaving an orientation centre and \$25 monthly for a year
Republic of the Congo	\$350	Loan
Rwanda	\$330	In two instalments
Uganda	\$140	One payment

This table shows different DDR payment formulas and allowances. Despite the variety of strategies and the difficulty in drawing comparisons between contexts of economic reconstruction, we can distinguish one group of countries, in terms of payment extent and method, which offers provisions for approximately half a year, from a second group which offers provisions for a year or more. In the former group are **Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Republic of the Congo, and Uganda**. The remaining countries are in the latter group. In terms of payment amount, there are significant differences between the groups. If we calculate the specific expenses an ex-combatant and his or her dependents may require, particularly for cases involving resettlement, the differences may translate into subsidies for short-term reinsertion and subsidies for reintegration services (School for a Culture of Peace 2008).

In 2007, four countries under the “umbrella” of the World Bank MDRP programme, heeded this distinction. Those countries included Angola, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, and Uganda. Generally, ex-combatants prefer rural areas for work, especially in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, and Uganda. However, alternatives may be generating resources for ex-combatants. In this, private businesses may play an essential role.

**Box 9. Role of private business in reintegration: The case of Colombia**

Thus far, private enterprise has played a secondary role in DDR. However, faced with scarce resources for reintegration because of fund diversions to prior DDR phases or because of poor planning, the private sector may be an interesting alternative for job creation.

In July 2007 in Colombia, the IOM, the Presidential High Advisory Group on Reintegration, and the company *Ethanol Consortium Board* signed an agreement to create 1,500 jobs for demobilised combatants and vulnerable persons in the ethanol industry. As a part of the IOM's public-private cooperation strategy, the *Controlsud International Group* and USAID agreed to finance the project. The project will involve hiring workers to plant sugarcane and to construct three production plants in three municipalities in the north of Colombia where armed groups are present in high numbers and unemployment is high. At the end of November 2007, in a similar initiative, the private corporation Comexa announced the purchase of 1,840 metric tonnes of chile that 320 demobilised soldiers and members of the population in vulnerable circumstances harvested. This work, carried out in the departments of Antioquia and Sucre as a first public-private initiative, together with the cement company Argos, is part of the Community Development and Reintegration Programme of the IOM.

Although Colombia, which has a much higher level of development compared to other countries, may be exceptional in terms of its DDR programme, we may still extract lessons from experiences in other places, including **Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or the Philippines** (Banfield, Gündüz and Killick 2006b).

Finally, lack of economic growth may complicate the possibility of creating new employment. In Afghanistan, for example, most ex-combatants have returned to agricultural work. Other problems of social reintegration included a lack of government involvement in the process despite the existence of abundant financing (Angola), governmental inability to carry out projects (Burundi), lack of financing for educational projects despite ex-combatants opting for professional training and educational programmes (Liberia), and a lack of work opportunities despite complaints about this from paramilitaries (Colombia).

Generally, the structure of the reintegration process must be more decentralised. Reintegration should focus efforts on work in host communities, who in turn receive support from the same executive programme body. In no way should we see DDR only as seeking benefits for ex-combatants or transition to civil life. Rather, DDR must also apply mechanisms for transitional justice, in the name of building a more complete peace process. Finally, reintegration programmes must be seen as part of security-sector reform. In this sense, we can understand demobilisation as a new means for social reintegration.

## Conclusions

When evaluating DDR programmes in terms of management and evolution, not only should we highlight improvements to country programmes, but we should also make efforts to comprehend certain lessons learned, which current or future programme implementations may apply in order to avoid repeating mistakes. We can blame variations in the results of different country programmes on the capacities or incapacities of participating actors to apply lessons learned from prior experiences. However, this assumes that both internal and external experiences of countries are comparable. We can reduce this comparability the less we see DDR as merely a technical procedure but rather a process that is dependent on context. From this point of view, precedents are part of multiple factors compromising a context which can generate lessons learned and trigger unique situations.

The **planning** of DDR programmes must begin during the peace process in order to avoid instability as much as possible and the duplication of structures and activities. We must also keep in mind existing precedents, found in the majority of active contexts, and growing tools and lessons learned, either to repeat or to avoid, from other programmes. Moreover, we must identify all necessities in terms of the groups targeted for demobilisation and their relations to host communities (School for a Culture of Peace 2006). Peace agreements should not only mention DDR, but countries should commit explicitly to carrying out a peace process, and more specifically, DDR. Only in this way can we reach consensus on the structure of programming to the highest possible level of detail (Pouligny 2004). This commitment reflects the fact that we cannot understand DDR in the abstract, but that we must couple it tightly to political commitment in the contexts of societies in turmoil, whether in part or in full (Stalon 2006).

On this last point, one of the biggest difficulties faced by programmes lies in the **mechanisms for transitional justice**. The usual results of ceasefires, cessations of hostilities, and the signing of peace agreements are the offering of amnesties, the creation of transitional structures, distribution of political power, and reform of the security sector, among other things. This comes in the context of extreme scarcity of special courts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and other means related to core concepts of truth, justice, and reparations. In view of concern over an uneven balance of matters, programmes must evaluate the types of relations that exist between mechanisms in order to determine whether tighter collaboration and relations of non-interference are possible.

**Security-sector reform** involves a similar process. Among the main weaknesses identified, in view of post-war restoration, are the absence of a coherent strategy to include all available human and economic resources, and how they relate to parallel processes of disarmament and justice in an interconnected system. Other weaknesses include lack of support capacity for security-sector reform processes and an alarming need to empower local actors and provide training to government.

In the area of **financing**, some countries have a special preference for financing through select international agencies rather than through direct contributions. An integrated system of financing offers the best guarantees, so long as national DDR structures, which incorporate an integrated structure of security, execute it. This approach allows for flexibility. It is able to tend to previous financing commitments, especially from fiduciary funds, co-finance parallel programmes, and avoid overlapping. One challenge still to overcome involves more detailed cost calculations for the reintegration phase. Beyond each country's specificity, this calculation should reflect the continuity and options the demobilisation phase makes available.

Moreover, the structure of the reintegration process must be more decentralised. Reintegration should focus efforts on work in host communities, who in turn receive support from the same executive programme body. In no way should we see DDR only as seeking benefits for ex-combatants or transition to civil life. Rather, DDR must also apply mechanisms for transitional justice, in the name of building a more complete peace process. Finally, we must see reintegration programmes as part of security-sector reform. In this sense, we can understand demobilisation as a **new means to reintegration**.

In terms of DDR programmes, despite the fact that donors and policymakers continue to advocate for the implementation of more conventional processes, in the last 20 years,

alternative approaches have emerged. These approaches are not necessarily institutionalised processes of official program design. Rather, they make possible firmer diagnoses for active country programmes. Among the initiatives, we must consider interventions for groups of ex-combatants, as well as area-based approaches which focus on affected communities with high numbers of ex-combatants, and approaches centred on communities, based often on participatory consultations with communities for return of ex-combatants through the creation of joint committees (Muggah 2006).

In general, countries should execute DDR in an integrated manner and not only chronologically. Peace agreements must include DDR and implement it in a coordinated fashion, not separated by phases. They must incorporate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, but also integrate these into other related processes such as transitional justice and security-sector reform. For this, initiatives such as the United Nations Integrated Strategy on DDR, announced in December 2006, face the challenge of evaluating their impacts and widening their agendas in step with other initiatives. Another essential challenge for DDR is national empowerment, not only government empowerment but also of civil society.



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## Annex I. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes for ex combatants

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for former combatants represent a very important part of peace-keeping operations and post-war rehabilitation processes. The main aim of this kind of initiative is to ensure the transition of former combatants (including members of both government and non-government forces) from military to civilian status.

As the following table shows, these programmes differ widely in terms of the number of troops to be demobilised and reintegrated, their budget and the bodies implementing and financing the process. The table also illustrates the broad role played by international organizations, both as implementing bodies (of a purely international character or in partnership with national institutions) and financing agencies (with bilateral, World Bank or multi-trust funds) though it should be pointed out that funding is too often allocated for the initial stages only, with rather inflexible constraints in terms of timing, duration and objectives, leaving a shortage of resources for the reintegration process. Finally, it is noticeable the common presence in these groups of child soldiers, women combatants and disabled soldiers requiring distinct approaches as collectives with specific needs.

Main ongoing DDR programmes											
Country	Implementing bodies	Period (start and end dates)	Combatants to be demobilised		Programmes for vulnerable groups			Total budget (\$ millions)	Financing formula		
			SAF	AOG	C	F	D		WB	M	C
Afghanistan	M	10/03 to 12/08	35,000	63,380	•			141.2			•
Angola	N	08/02 to ?	33,000	105,000	•	•	•	255.8		•	
Burundi	M	12/04 to 12/08	41,000	37,000	•		•	84.4	•	•	
C. African Rep.	M	12/04 to 04/07	-	7,565	•	-	-	13.3		•	
Chad	N	12/05 to 12/10	9,000	-	-	-	-	10	•		•
Colombia (AUC)	N	11/03 to 08/06	-	31,671	•			302.6			•
Côte d'Ivoire	N	12/08 to ?	5,000	35,000	•	•		40	•		
DR Congo*	M	01/04 to 12/07	23,000	127,000	•	•		200	•	•	
Eritrea	N	10/02 to ?	200,000			•	•	198	•	•	•
Haiti	M	08/06 to ?	-	6,000	•			50.1		•	
Indonesia (GAM)	N	09/05 to 12/09	-	5,000	•			170		•	
Liberia	M	12/03 to 06/08	12,000	107,000	•	•		71		•	
Nepal	M	12/06 to ?		19,602	•			18.4			•
Niger	Int	03/06 to 12/07	-	3,160		•		2.4			•
Rep. Congo	M	12/05 to 12/08	-	30,000	•	•		25	•		•
Rwanda	N	12/01 to ?	20,000	16,000	•	•	•	62.5	•	•	•
Somalia	M	12/05 to ?	-	53,000	•			32.8		•	•
Sudan	M	09/05 to 09/12	-	24,500	•	•	•	85.4		•	•
Uganda	N	01/00 to 12/08	-	16,245	•	•		6.74		•	
<b>TOTAL (19)</b>			<b>343,000</b>	<b>760,721</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1,896.4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>

Key:

Implementing bodies: N - National / Int - International / M - Mixed

Troops to be demobilised: SAF - State armed forces / AOG - Armed Opposition Groups

Vulnerable groups: C - Child soldiers / F - Female combatants / D - Disabled soldiers

Financing formula: WB - World Bank / M - Multinational funds / C - Country-specific funds

\* Several DDR programmes are underway simultaneously in DRC making difficult to determine with accuracy some data.



# Afghanistan

## Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, 2003-08

### Basic data

Population:	26.5 million (2005)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	132,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	2.1 million
GDP:	\$8,399 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$217 (2005)
HDI:	-
GDI:	0.45
Military expenditure:	-
Social / military expenditure:	-
Military population:	0.16%
Arms embargo:	UN: since 2000, EU: since 2001, both upon the Taliban

### Summary

Type of DDR	Unilateral disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of armed forces in a wartime context.
Groups to demobilise	63,000 members of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF)
Executive bodies	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)
Budget	\$145 million
Timeline	Demobilisation from October 2003 to July 2005. Reintegration extended until the end of 2008.
Status / synopsis	Concluding

### Context

#### Conflict

The country has been embroiled in armed conflict almost continuously since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, when civil war broke out between government armed forces (with Soviet backing) and anti-Communist Islamic guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992 against a background of chaos and internal fighting between the different anti-Communist factions led to the rise of the Taliban movement, which had gained control over almost all of Afghanistan by the end of the 1990s. In November 2001, after the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September, the USA invaded the country and overthrew the Taliban regime. Following the signing of the Bonn Agreements (*Agreement on Provisional Arrangements... 2001*),<sup>1</sup> a new interim government was installed, led by Hamid Karzai, and this was subsequently given a full mandate in elections. The level of violence in the country has steadily risen since 2006 as a result of the regrouping of the Taliban militias.<sup>2</sup>

#### Peace process

In May 1988, the United Nations created the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), whose mandate came to an end in March 1990. Its mission included supervising the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. As a result of the Bonn Agreement signed in December 2001, the Interim Authority was created. The process started in Bonn in 2001 culminated in September with elections for the National Assembly (Wolesi

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: ANBP (n.d.), Poulton et al. (2007) and UNDP Afghanistan (2003)

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 29)

Jirga) and the provincial councils. Nevertheless, as Amnesty International pointed out at the time, many of the candidates running in the elections – which were tarnished by a climate of intimidation prior to the voting – were factional chiefs, many of whom had been accused of committing human rights abuses, which led to widespread consternation among the citizens. Women were guaranteed at least one-fourth of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga, yet they nonetheless came upon social and administrative barriers. The low voter turnout, especially in Kabul, cast doubts on the legitimacy of the electoral process.<sup>3</sup>

### International support

Under Chapter VII of Security Council Resolution 1386 (2002), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is in charge of the international military operation in Afghanistan whilst the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is in charge of international civic activities.

ISAF is a military instrument maintained by NATO and composed of 41,000 members from 38 states, including 15,000 individuals from the United States. UNAMA is administered by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) with cooperation from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UNAMA's mandate is to supervise the achievement of objectives outlined in the Bonn Agreement and to support the government of Afghanistan in attaining these objectives. The UNAMA mission is divided into two broad areas: the first is focussed on humanitarian aid, recuperation, and reconstruction; the second on political questions, such as DDR, elections, and the promotion and oversight of political and human rights. The mission is also responsible for the economic development of the country, the rule of law, the control of drug cultivation, the empowerment of women, and police reform.<sup>4</sup>

The European Union Council has established a European police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) whose aim it is to train and reform local Afghan police and to strengthen the judicial system.

### Transitional justice

In early 2006, the Afghan government approved an Action Plan for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation and in 2007 the Wolesi Jirga approved a draft amnesty law for all the combatants who had participated in the conflict. The Taliban claimed that they were willing to begin negotiations with the Afghan government after president Hamid Karzai made a proposal to negotiate. The initial contacts took place via the National Reconciliation Commission.<sup>5</sup>

### Security sector reform

The UNDP implements security-sector reform and other related programmes, including DDR, through ANBP. This reform is financed through a “work division” for which Japan is responsible for DDR, the United States and Germany for police training, the United Kingdom for the fight against drug trafficking, Italy for judicial reform, and the United States for reform of the armed forces. ANBP has calculated that the demobilisation of 93,000 combatants (more than 60,000 through DDR) has saved more than \$120 million, which has been used to reform the Ministry of Defence and to create a “new ANA” (Afghan National Army).

The new ANA was created in December 2002 with help from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Initially, the army aimed to have 60,000-70,000 soldiers and to be “ethnically balanced”. Having reached these numbers at the start of 2008, the Afghan government has announced that it feels the numbers are insufficient to combat the insurgent Taliban and that a new ANA containing 200,000 soldiers would reduce the overall cost of the war by reducing the number of foreign personnel.

### Other disarmament initiatives

ANBP focuses on four projects:

#### On DDR.

From December 2004 to March 2008, ANBP focused on Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD), or the “Ammo Project”. In addition to dealing with landmine removal, this programme focuses on the detection, collection, and destruction of arms from DDR (and later from Disbandment of Illegal and Armed Groups, or DIAG). The project’s work is described in the Disarmament section below. Canada has financed the project with \$16 million. ANBP and the Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Halo Trust have carried out execution. In August 2007, 32,300 tonnes of ammunition were found and 15,833 tonnes destroyed and 9,443 transferred to the Ministry of Defence. Also, 496,717 anti-personnel mines and 16,125 anti-tank weapons were destroyed. With the closure of ANBP in March 2008, these activities will fall entirely to the Ministry of Defence.

From January 2004 to February 2006, ANBP focused on **Heavy Weapon Cantonment (HWC)**. In October 2005, this programme had collected 12,248 arms. It is believed that the majority of heavy weapons were removed from circulation. However, some feel the official figure of 98 percent is overly optimistic. The Halo Trust was in charge of the project’s execution whilst ISAF and ANBP oversaw the management of weapons depots.

<sup>3</sup> Extracted from Fisas (2008: 108)

<sup>4</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2005)

<sup>5</sup> Extracted from Fisas (2008: 108-109)

ANBP also focused on **DIAG**. Although we could understand DIAG as “the continuation of...DDR and CIP [Commanders Incentive Programme] processes under a new name and with different parameters”, the two processes are in fact distinct in their practices and conception, as ANBP understood them to be.

Meanwhile, under the authority of UNAMA, the United Nations runs a Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). In operation since 1989, UNMACA receives the most international donations for landmine removal (Lombardo and Mobarez 2007; Reuters 2007).

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

DDR in Afghanistan involves unilateral disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of armed forces in a wartime context. Though considered “armed forces”, the AMF resembles more a grouping of militias (IRIN 2007).

DDR in Afghanistan is designated as “Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)”. Occasionally it is referred to as “DDR-CIP” to differentiate DDR from the Commanders Incentive Programme.

### Implementing bodies

#### Coordination

The task of coordinating government and inter-ministerial functions with UNAMA and the UNDP, the principal institutional actors, is the responsibility of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, “D&RC” or “D&R Com”, presided over by Vice-President Khalili and led by a Joint Secretary’s Office. The three prior commissions to this commission, one for disarmament, another for recruitment and training of officials, and another for training of soldiers, are now part of the Ministry of Defence.

#### Implementation

Until the end of 2006, the executive body for implementation in Afghanistan was ANBP, which was created by the UNDP in April 2003. It received management support from the UNDP and different ministries of the Afghan government. UNAMA gave it political guidance. ANBP managed general security-sector reform and another three projects in addition to DDR (see **Other disarmament initiatives**). ANBP has eight regional offices and a Mobile Disarmament Unit

(MDU) for each of them. ANBP implements DDR through Implementation Partners (IPs). For example, the management and destruction of weapons was the responsibility of the Halo Trust, an NGO acting as an IP for the Ministry of Defence. Various IPs have participated in the reintegration phase. The German aid agency ARAF and the IOM have provided training and resources for small businesses. ARAF supplied resources including seeds, fertilisers, and tools for agricultural reintegration. World Vision and the IOM have developed training courses and educational programmes in different vocational fields.

The New Zealander NGO Peace Movement Aotearoa, an ANBP IP, provided demobilisation food kits, facilitated the reintegration of 4,455 women, and offered medical assistance to 153,915 dependent children of ex-combatants.

The UNDP is in charge of the implementation of the Reintegration Support Project for Ex-Combatants (RSPE), which works through the ILO and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (Christensen et al. 2007).

### Monitoring and evaluation

The embassy of Japan established an International Observer Group (IOG) in October 2003 with specific commitment to monitor the DDR process. To guarantee the group’s neutrality, JMAS, the Japan Mine Action Services, led the group with a budget of \$1 million from the United Nations (International Observer Group for DDR 2005: 3-4).

### Guiding principles

Chapter V of the Bonn Agreement specifies that all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces, and armed groups of the country must surrender themselves to the control and command of the Interim Authority and reorganise in accordance with the requirements of the state’s new armed security forces. Annex III, Point 4 urges “the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces” (*Agreement on Provisional Arrangements... 2001, cf. Decree of the President... 2002*).

<b>Body</b>	MoD Operational Group	→	ANBP Regional Verification Committees	→	8 ANBP’s Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU) and international observers	→	ANBP Regional Offices
<b>Tasks</b>	Selection of individuals and units to be demobilized		Verification		Disarmament		Demobilization and reintegration

Source: ANBP (n.d.)

A Presidential Decree (*Decree of the President...* 2002) established the creation of the ANA and a DDR programme. According to this decree, the ANA is to consist of no more than 70,000 soldiers, selected by merit and assuring an "ethnic balance". Soldiers are to be trained by a programme designed by Afghanistan and the United States. The training of the ANA is to be completed in "a few years", the Defence Commission is to supervise it, and it is to be financed through the UN ANA Trust Fund. Article 7 establishes the creation of a Demobilisation Commission to develop a DDR programme financed by Japan and to collect heavy weapons to be incorporated into the ANA.

ANBP places emphasis on two main objectives: to break the "historic patriarchal chain of command existing" between commanders and their troops and to help demobilised soldiers become economically independent. The "ultimate objective", however, is "to reinforce the authority of the government".

**Participants**

93,000 of 100,000 professional soldiers and mujahidin who had belonged to the ANA were demobilised. 62,044 of these individuals were demobilised through the DDR programme. 7,500 were child soldiers (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

**Groups with specific needs**

The number of commanders affected by the CIP varied from 350 to 550, depending on the source. Figures for disabled soldiers were very low, and only four women were identified in the AMF. At the same time, the programme in Afghanistan has run projects targeting 25,000 women and more than 150,000 dependent children of ex-combatants (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

**Eligibility criteria**

Individuals must have belonged to the AMF to qualify for assistance.

In the case of CIP, commanders may not occupy a place in government or the military, they may not possess a large business or be very wealthy, they must have shown support for the DDR process, they must be loyal to the government, and they must not be accused of any human rights violations (IRIN 2004).

**Budget and financing**

Despite the fact that the budget for the mission in Afghanistan was initially \$167 million, this figure was significantly reduced by a reduction to the estimation of combatants to demobilise. At the end of June 2006, the UNDP concluded the DDR programme with an overall final budget of \$140.9 million (ANBP 2005; CIDA 2004).

To this we must add the \$4 million budgeted for the RSPE and financed by Great Britain (UNDP Afghanistan 2007a; Christensen et al. 2007).

Distribution of funds per donors		
Donor	Millions \$	%
Japan	91.7	65%
United Kingdom	19	13%
Canada	16	11%
United States	9	6%
Netherlands	4	3%
Norway	0.8	< 1%
Switzerland	0.5	< 1%
European Commission	0.1	< 1%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>141.1</b>	

Source: ANBP (n.d.)

**Schedule**

The schedule for the mission in Afghanistan was agreed upon at a donors' conference held in Tokyo in February 2003. The ANBP was created in April 2003 and pilot projects were developed between October 2003 and May 2004. Although according to the OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the demobilisation of child soldiers had already begun in April 2003. The disarmament phase of the programme of DDR is divided into four sub-phases.

Phase	Start	Conclusion
Pilot	1 October 2003	31 May 2004
Phase I	1 June 2004	30 August 2004
Phase II	1 September 2004	30 October 2004
Phase III	1 November 2004	31 March 2005
Phase IV	1 April 2005	31 July 2005

Source: UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006)

Some put the real conclusion to both the disarmament and demobilisation processes at November 2005. The reintegration process appears to have begun in the middle of 2005. It was officially concluded in June 2006, but an extension of it means DDR will continue until the end of 2008 (IRIN 2007; *Afghan Update* 2005).

**Phases**

**Disarmament**

The Ministry of Defence provides the ANBP with the list of AMF volunteers. The individuals of this list are verified by the Regional Verification Committee and confirmed by an MDU under the supervision of an international observer. Disarmament is conducted in unit headquarters with an official ceremony. Weapons are held by MDUs until they are sent to a central weapons-collection point. At the same time, all explosives, ammunition, and arms with illegible serial numbers are destroyed. The collection and destruction of ammunition was not planned originally, but the ANBP rectified this quickly with the design and setting in motion of APMASD.



During the disarmament exercise, 36,571 small arms, 12,248 heavy weapons units, and more than nine million munitions were collected (*Afghan Update* 2005). In June 2007, the ANBP transferred control of the Central Weapons Collection Point to the Ministry of Defence. The ANBP had controlled the point since 2003. By August 2007, the ensemble of ANBP programmes (see **Other disarmament initiatives**) had collected 106,000 arms and destroyed at least 55,000 of these. The various programmes had also located almost 30,000 tonnes of munitions and destroyed half of this quantity.

Phase	Period	Disarmed	Demobilised
Pilot	10/03 - 05/04	6,271	7,550
Phase I	06/04 - 08/04	8,551	7,257
Phase II	09/04 - 10/04	7,169	3,733
Phase III	11/04 - 04/05	22,440	20,375
Phase IV	04/05 - 07/05	18,949	23,461
Total	22 months	63,380	62,376

Source: UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006)

## Demobilisation

Demobilisations are registered in a national database, which at the moment contains 62,376 ex-combatants. Regional Verification Committees, which verify combatants and *negotiate* disarmament with commanders, were formed with retired officials of the AMF. At the same time, the CIP was deliberately designed to encourage commanders to “cooperate”

demobilisation (for some “this DDR process was an unexpected bonus”), other veteran militia members and professional soldiers were more difficult to convince. The average age of demobilised soldiers was 27 years old. 11 percent of cases involved officials, who were on average 37 years old.

The demobilisation process for combatants begins the day after disarmament and last for one day. Information and counselling on the reinsertion phase is provided in regional offices. There is no stationing period. Combatants receive an introduction to the reintegration process and make an oath of good behaviour. Reintegration preferences are acknowledged and recorded, and the combatant is identified. Economic compensation, a diploma and medal in recognition of services offered, and a kit with shoes, clothing, and food are dispensed to each combatant. A medical check or any additional reinsertion activity is not conducted.

Child soldiers and other vulnerable children also receive medical and psychological attention, as well as guidance on narcotics, HIV/AIDS, and options for reintegration.

## Reintegration

Reintegration begins three weeks after demobilisation and lasts for two to four months. The main reintegration options offered are the following:

Option	Characteristics	Participants	%
Agriculture	Resources for nurseries, fisheries, cattle-raising, beekeeping, etc., depending on the region and in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture.	23,940	42.9
Vocational training	Carpentry, masonry, computers, mechanics, etc.	11,736	21.03
Small business	Training courses, small subsidies, and continued assistance.	14,251	25.54
Mine action	Community mine-action programmes with UNMACA.	843	1.51
Afghan National Army or Police	Accessible through an examination in a recruitment centre.	713	1.28
Contracting	Assistance for the creation of teams of building contractors.	1,027	1.18
Salaried work	Short-term temporary employment.	63	0.1
Teacher training	For officials, after verification of their education.	374	0.67
No participation		2,759	4.94
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>55,804</b>	

Source: UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006)

and “surrender” their militia units to DDR (IRIN 2004). The high number of demobilised individuals has led to people believing in the existence of cases of phantom soldiers and patronage promoted by commanders, probably due to the lack of an adequate preceding campaign of information and awareness-raising targeting combatants. However, as Poulton et al. (2007: 10-11) state, the high number of demobilised individuals is not a surprise given that the fundamental reason for starting DDR and reducing troop levels was that the AMF was excessively large.

The majority of AMF soldiers were members of local militias, and therefore, the MDU system for identification was very appropriate. However, whilst part-time, “half-day” combatants gladly accepted

The CIP worked through reintegration kits comprised of a Financial Redundancy Package, training in Afghanistan or abroad, or employment in administration for commanders. In entrepreneurial training, pedagogical elements on reconciliation were included. The financial redundancy package consisted of \$350-500 monthly for two years, the first year covered by ANBP and the second by the government of Afghanistan. Also, commanders had the option of receiving one-time consolidated payment to start a business. According to ANCP, the CIP assisted 320 commanders and 150 generals (IRIN 2004).

For five months at the end of 2006, ANBP also conducted training courses in primary education for 335 women of ex-combatants (*ANBP Newsletter* 2007).

The reintegration programme in Afghanistan was complex due to the numerous organisations involved in it, around 30 in total, including international agencies, national and international NGOs, and private businesses.

On 1 July 2006, ANBP announced the conclusion of the reintegration phase of DDR, "within time and within cost". However, the UNDP and ANBP, in consultation with the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, decided to extend the reintegration period another 23 months for more than 35,000 demobilised combatants through the RSPE. This decision was taken after an enquiry revealed that 35,500 ex-combatants, 56 percent of demobilised, earned less than a dollar a day. The RSPE targets both ex-combatants and their families (Christensen et al. 2007).

Another active programme in Afghanistan is the National Emergency Employment Programme - DDR / Rural Livelihood Support (NEEP-DDR/RLS), a reintegration project which began in August 2004 and targets 3,270 ex-combatants. It combines training with work in the area of infrastructure reconstruction. The programme trained 2,775 ex-combatants (an additional 1,000 civilians participated in the programme), of whom 57 have graduated from university as technical specialists. Each ex-combatant has worked for approximately a year. The programme planned to construct 350 kilometres of roads in 30 different projects and has already completed 90 percent of the work (World Bank 2008: 12; Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development 2007: 7).

### Lessons learned

In an evaluation of DDR for the Danish Institute for International Studies, Dahl Thruelsen concluded that the politicisation of the process in Afghanistan has harmed the effectiveness of other components. In summary, the document revealed the following about the process (Dahl Thruelsen 2006: 43):

which permitted the buying of time for developing a democratic political process". The report considered that these achievements, in addition to those of mine action, weapons management, etc., had not been sufficiently recognised at the national and international levels.

It also stated that opportunities were lost during demobilisation and reintegration, and therefore the UNDP should continue work for another three years through the NSP (National Solidarity Programme), RSPE, and NABDP (National Area Based Development Project) (cf. UNDP Afghanistan 2007b and CIDA 2004).

As lessons learned on the process, Poulton et al. (2007) submit the following:

- UNAMA (DPKO)-UNDP cooperation worked very well;
- The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission was an appropriate mechanisms for coordination;
- The UN should support the commission in subsequent projects (the Ammo Project, DIAG) in order to ensure fulfilment of international standards;
- Afghanistan continues to be a potential hub for weapons export in the region;
- The success of DDR has been due in great measure to the commitment of donors and government to the process;
- Disarmament was "innovative, efficient, and successful";
- ANBP implementation was excellent;
- The MDUs are an example of this;
- Demobilisation was "very efficient, although not very effective";
- Reintegration required more time; and
- The principal defect of the programme was the original design, which was carried out by a small group of specialists who overlooked several aspects which later failed.

Dimension	Criteria for success	Fulfilment
Policy / Strategy	Comprehensive policy and development frameworks	Partial
	National appropriation of the programme	Complete
	Planning based on empirical data	Partial
Operations	Sufficient and flexible financial mechanisms	Complete
	Effective coordination	Complete
	Realistic objectives and schedules for implementation	None
Tactics	Indivisible and holistic implementation	Complete
	Effective public information	None
	Detailed and transparent eligibility criteria	Complete
	Community participation	Partial

Poulton et al. (2007) offer a more exhaustive evaluation of the programme. According to this report, DDR, "the most successful aspect to the reform of the security sector", and the CIP have been the ANBP projects which have most contributed to peace and stability in Afghanistan. The CIP "created important peace-building and reconciliation initiatives, in a period

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## Glossary

AMF	Afghan Military Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army (normalmente se refiere al “nuevo ANA”, el AMF también se denominaba “ANA”)
ANBP	Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme
APMASD	Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIP	Commanders’ Incentive Programme
D&RC	Disarmament and Reintegration Commission
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal and Armed Groups
HWC	Heavy Weapon Cantonment
IP	Implementing Partner
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MDU	Mobile Disarmament Unit
NABDP	National Area Based Development Project
NEEP-DDR/RLS	National Emergency Employment Programme - DDR / Rural Livelihood Support
NSP	National Solidarity Programme (of MRRD)
RSPE	Reintegration Support Project / for Ex-combatants / Employment
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# ANGOLA

## (Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, 2002-2007)<sup>1</sup>

### Basic data

Population:	16.4 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	61,700 (2007)
Refugee population:	205,501 (2007)
GDP:	\$44 billion (2006)
Per capita income:	\$1,980 (2006)
HDI:	0.446, 162th
GDI:	0.439, 143th
Military expenditure:	5.04 % (2005)
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.89%
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral demobilisation of armed forces and armed opposition groups for security-sector reform in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilise	105,000 combatants of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, in Portuguese União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) and 33,000 members of the armed forces.
Executive bodies	General Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration (GPDR). Bilateral demobilisation of armed forces and armed opposition groups for security-sector reform in a post-war context.
Budget	\$255.8 million
Timeline	From August 2002 to an unspecified conclusion date (demobilisation concluded in the first trimester of 2007)
Status / synopsis	In October 2007, the Angolan government approved recommendations made by a technical team specialised in the reintegration of ex-combatants of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (in Portuguese, Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA. The plan that resulted included initiatives to create self-employment in cattle rearing, fishing, and civil engineering. During the first trimester of 2007, the demobilisation phase concluded with the demobilisation of 97,390 combatants, around 70% of anticipated. At the end of the 2007 year, the programme in Angola had reinserted 52,414 persons (84% of anticipated) and reintegrated 75,769 (45%), in 145 of a total 210 approved sub-projects.

### Context

#### Conflict

At the end of the fight for independence from the Portuguese in 1975, armed conflict continued in Angola, a country rich in petroleum and diamonds, in the form of a civil war dominated, on the side of government, by the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola, in Portuguese Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) and the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, in Portuguese Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), and UNITA, an armed opposition group composed of 105,000 members. Following independence in 1975, geographic control of the country split between the MPLA in urban areas and UNITA in rural areas in the east and south of Angola. The FNLA dissolved in 1976.

UNITA failed to comply with conditions set for the first peace agreements, the **Bicesse Accord in 1992** and the **Lusaka Accord in 1994**. In 1998, fighting resumed between the Angolan armed forces (around 35,000 members) and UNITA. While the armed forces pushed to control the country, UNITA held on to all rural areas with low intensity conflict. Although the conflict concluded in March 2002, numerous episodes of violence in the province of

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: MDRP (2007a, 2007b) and World Bank (2003)

Cabinda continued. It should be noted that a dimension of regional destabilisation has characterised the conflict in Angola. Governmental sides in conflicts occurring in the Republic of the Congo and the DR Congo have supported the Angolan government. Elections were planned for September 2006 in Angola, but they were postponed without a new date being set (Mateos 2005).

### Peace process

The latest agreement, in addition to the peace agreements already mentioned, is the **Luena Memorandum of Understanding** (herein LMU), signed in April 2002. This agreement modifies and improves portions of annexes of the Lusaka Accord. Essentially, the LMU grants amnesty for all crimes committed during the armed conflict, approves a ceasefire, and agrees to integrate around 5,000 UNITA combatants in the armed forces, while demobilising the remainder. In short, it puts an end to 27 years of armed conflict.

### Transitional justice

The LMU grants amnesty for all crimes committed during the course of the armed conflict.

### Security-sector reform

The Luena Memorandum of Understanding specifies integration for 5,000 UNITA officials within the Angolan armed forces and with the support of the United Nations. The task is the responsibility of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), also responsible for providing needed monitoring mechanisms, identifying paramilitary structures and units, defining itineraries, and training new security bodies.

### Other disarmament initiatives

Other disarmament initiatives include work around antipersonnel mines and war explosives remaining in Angola's provinces, calculated to contaminate a total of 1,300 km<sup>2</sup> of territory, in 2,800 areas containing 1,715 communities. To alleviate this problem, the government has coordinated efforts to oppose these weapons through the Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH, in Portuguese Comissão nacional intersectorial de desminagem e assistência humanitária), whose responsibilities are the development of policies, planning, establishing priorities, and coordinating and managing all related activities. This project is financed by the European Commission and the UNDP, with a budget of 2.1 million Euros. Handicap International, the Association of Disabled Veterans of Angola, and UNICEF manage other related activities, such as giving assistance to and rehabilitating victims, educating, and raising awareness around the topic. Moreover, because the Angolan civil population remains heavily armed, they have tended to be overlooked for reasons of personal safety. As such, the mission in Angola could put greater emphasis on establishing a programme for collecting arms from the civil population. However, the planning of demobilisation and reintegration programmes has not contemplated this.

### Background to DDR

Following the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords, unsuccessful efforts were made to demobilise combatants. This resulted in certain lessons learned and cultural experience, such as the fact that insecurity was produced after the Lusaka Accord, that there was a lacking settlement on combatants to demobilise, need for an executive agency, need for better information prior to demobilisation, a link between assistance to the reintegration of ex-combatants and community renewal efforts, and need for a better system of economic management and of information and assistance to donors.

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

General Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration (GPDR).

Bilateral demobilisation of armed forces and armed opposition groups for security-sector reform in a post-war context.

#### Basic principles

- Support for the political transition of Angola and the reintegration of half a million persons.
- Establishment of a sustainable institutional structure.
- Establishment of an explicit commitment by government to support demobilisation policies.
- Implantation of effective security measures.

#### Groups to demobilise

In total, 138,000 persons require demobilisation. Of these, 105,000 are UNITA combatants and 33,000 are members of the armed forces.

Groups with specific needs:

With regard to **child soldiers**, it is estimated that there are around 6,000 who are members of UNITA, even though they have not been registered in stationing camps. Before the 2002 peace agreements, around 10,000 minors were recruited by the armed forces, that is, 10% of all military personnel.

With regard to **disabled combatants**, it is calculated that there are around 20,631, even though a large number of these have not been registered.

#### Eligibility criteria

Eligibility criteria were established by means of joint work by government, former UNITA militants, and the Joint Military Commission. These criteria include the

- Possession of Angolan nationality
- Status as a combatant with verification of military affiliation to UNITA.

#### Executive bodies

Upon signing the LMU, two structures were created: the Joint Military Commission, responsible for seeing to the fulfilment of agreements, and the Technical Group, which gives assistance to the JMC. IRSEM (Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for Ex-combatants, in Portuguese Instituto de Reintegração

Sócio-Professional dos Ex-Militares) was also created. IRSEM is responsible for giving assistance for the reintegration of ex-combatants through the GPDR.

IRSEM is divided into three departments: the Department of Projects, Human Resources, and General Service and Administration. IRSEM has an office in each of the 19 provinces of Angola, with special reinforcements in provinces where there are a high number of persons to reintegrate, for example, in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, and Kwanza Sul. In these regional offices, project inventories and offers of employment are held, assistance for development projects is given, and reintegration activities are coordinated and supervised.


Source	Millions \$	% budget
Government	157	60.15
MDRP	48.4	18.5
World Bank	38.2	14.6
European Commission	15.7	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: MDRP (2007)

It should be noted that demobilisation has cost the government \$44 million, of which \$26 million has gone to paying five months of back salary.

**Schedule**

The demobilisation phase began in August 2002 and concluded during the first trimester of 2007. The



Source: World Bank (2003)

The organisations most involved at the international level are the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a regional agency created by the World Bank which supports the activities of IRSEM’s Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme; and regarding attention to child soldiers, the NGOs Christian Children’s Fund and Save the Children.

While UNICEF assists with child soldiers, the UNDP and FAO give assistance to the process of ex-combatant reintegration. Other more specialised spheres of activity, such as landmine removal, humanitarian assistance, and human rights are managed by various other agencies of the United Nations in Angola. The European Union in its wide array of activities to support the peace process gives support for the resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and their families.

**Budget and financing**

Initially, the World Bank calculated the total cost for DDR, not counting the demobilisation phase, to be \$180 million, an average of \$1,200 per beneficiary. The budget for this programme was \$4.3 million, with funding from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. It was put in the charge of the World Bank MDRP.

The actual cost for DDR is estimated to be \$261 million, \$157 million of this provided by the government of Angola, \$48.4 million by the MDRP, \$38.2 million by the World Bank, and \$15.7 million by the European Commission.

reintegration phase began in March 2004 and has still not concluded. The government aims to continue financing reintegration projects once World Bank funds have discontinued.

**Phases**

**Demobilisation**

An initial 27 stationing camps, plus eight additional camps spread throughout the country in 18 provinces, were provided for demobilisation. These camps are under the authority of the government and the armed forces, which are responsible for identifying and registering persons, collecting and destroying arms, paying salaries, overlooking licensing centres, and organising transportation to return areas. As compensation, payment equivalent to five months of salary in the armed forces, between \$300 and \$900, is offered. An additional \$100 worth of support materials, including resettlement packages and money for transportation, is provided by IRSEM.

The demobilisation process has consisted of the following sub-phases:

- Identification
- Verification of combatant status
- Transportation
- Provision of identity cards
- Assembling of combatants in 35 established areas
- Collection of socioeconomic statistics

- Counselling in HIV/AIDS
- Orientation prior to leaving camp
- Salary distribution for Angolan armed forces with adjustments dependent on different demobilisation modes and group of origin: for UNITA members, identification, registration, and transportation to resettlement areas. The international community distributes food aid to combatants and their families. For the Angolan armed forces, the responsibility falls to IRSEM.

Assistance to child soldiers is organised and implemented by UNICEF, Christian Children's Fund, and Save the Children. Amongst the principal activities planned for this assistance are family reunification, educational support, and vocational training. In terms of government, the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reinsertion has committed to helping with the registration of births, searching for and reunifying families, education, and training. UNICEF has stressed the need to reunify child soldiers with their families and to give psychosocial assistance for the long-term renewal of Angola. Human Rights Watch reported many child soldiers were excluded from the demobilisation process and received only an identification card and food aid (Tate 2003).

In terms of demobilising disabled soldiers, medical and economic assistance is organised in proportion to disability, as is rehabilitation assistance, counselling, training, and support activities in micro-businesses. To all this, we should add the awareness-raising and information-providing activities that the programme in Angola offers, especially as these pertain to HIV/AIDS.

Of the former members of the Angolan armed forces, 20,744 have been identified to have physical deficiencies, and 17,695 have a high degree of disability, more than 30% disability. Specialised demobilisation is not planned for these persons, even though some small projects have been organised for them.

With regard to **women combatants**, the programme in Angola must seek equity of benefits through specialised economic reintegration programmes, the inclusion of women combatants and communities in counselling activities, and monitoring and control of the impacts of these programmes. However, government aid has deprived female family members of ex-combatants this type of assistance, a fact which Refugees International has condemned.

### Reintegration

Before definitive resettlement in communities of origin or in communities elected by ex-combatants, demobilised persons are installed in transit camps, former camps for internally displaced persons and populations. IRSEM is in charge of the implementation details of the annual plans for this. The main goals of this reintegration are:

- Help with various kinds of activities for ex-combatants, whilst providing necessary information and counselling on economic opportunities. Assistance

- for ex-combatants in securing employment in their return areas, whether in the formal or informal sectors.
- Improvements in combatants' educational levels and skills. Selecting ex-combatants in relation to their level of reintegration and independent of their origins.
- Help in deciding personal preferences.
- Searching for links to community for economic recovery.
- Avoiding positive discrimination relative to other persons affected by war.
- Participating in civil society and the private sector in order to improve reintegration services.

A total of 24 distinct reintegration projects are divided amongst

- *Economic projects*, mainly agricultural in nature, but also community work, training, and the promotion and generation of new activities.
- *Social projects*, including sensitisation to communication, raising awareness around rights and responsibilities, programmes of alert around landmines, information and counselling on health matters such as HIV, information campaigns, analysis of the conflict and reconciliation, and community activities related to sports and culture.

## Evolution

### Disarmament and demobilisation

Despite not having been specifically considered for the programme of demobilisation, disarmament is still an essential component of DDR. The number of arms UNITA has surrendered is very low, despite the fact that their arms represent 90% of the total arsenal in Angola. Figures are around 33,000 light arms and around 300,000 rounds of ammunition thus far collected (Parsons 2004).

In its planning, the programme in Angola commenced with poor calculations. From April to June 2002, 85,000 members of UNITA demobilised. In August 2002, the Joint Military Commission announced processes of demobilisation and demilitarisation had concluded, even though in January 2003 not all ex-combatants had received documentation as demobilised persons and more ex-combatants and their families continued to arrive at reception points.

During the first trimester of 2007, the demobilisation phase concluded with 97,390 combatants demobilised, around 70% of anticipated. At the end of the 2007 year, the programme in Angola had reinserted 52,414 persons (84% of anticipated) and reintegrated 75,769 (45%), in 145 of a total 210 approved sub-projects.

### Integration in the armed forces

Thus far, the programme in Angola has identified 27,000 eligible soldiers of the armed forces, with a possibility of decommissioning 15,321 of them. A reduction of 33,000 soldiers occurred as a result of assistance from the government of Portugal through the Institute of Military Studies. In October 2006, United States military officials announced their intention to collaborate in training Angolan military forces, with



the aim of strengthening relations between countries.

### Reintegration

Three years after signing the LMU agreement on economic support and vocational training, 210 reintegration projects have been approved, and of these 145 are already in operation.

This phase began in March 2004 after many months of delay while ex-combatants assembled in camps with dreadful sanitary and food conditions. The problem was caused by poor ability to manage resettlement and demobilised persons' return to and reintegration in Angola's provinces. This was due to the programme's lack of presence in regional areas and the nearly inexistent coordination between NGOs, both national and international.

Another problem at the start was a disparity in previous planning, noticeable in the stationing areas where the original number of 27 areas grew to 35, which were divided into three areas: areas for ex-combatants, for female relatives of ex-combatants, and for disabled and elderly persons. Also, it was found that most demobilised combatants did not return to their communities but remained in urban areas as a result of the social stigma they received in their own communities of origin.

Initially, conditions in camps left much to be desired. There were high levels of malnutrition, and in some instances, these reached critical levels. This poor planning was compensated for with food packages, given by the World Food Programme, and agricultural tools, offered by various agencies and churches. This alleviated the emergency in the short term. A climate of tension has remained in stationing areas due to the delay of provisions and supplies, above all during the rainy season. There are also irregularities and confusion in registration and demobilisation, a continuous spread of "false alarms" over the closing of camps, and a general feeling of insecurity. In the end, patches may have partially resolved poor initial planning, but these only cover up serious structural deficiencies in the programme in a temporary fashion (Hitchcock 2006).

Currently, the programme in Angola is carrying out 145 projects. These projects reach 68,263 beneficiaries, 6,265 women (9% of total), 3,675 disabled persons (5.3% of total), and 6,542 child soldiers (9.5% of total). The government and UNITA met at the end of October 2006 in Luanda to analyse the reintegration process for ex-combatants. Government representative N. Dos Santos appealed for existing restrictions on the movement of programme beneficiaries.

According to surveys conducted on reintegration, 60% of ex-combatants possessed employment that they themselves had created, 5% worked in the formal sector, and the remaining 35% were unemployed. In terms of sector, 96% worked in the agricultural economy.

The UNDP's final report on reintegration states that programmes have reached 85% of initially identified target groups. In total, 40,716 ex-combatants have received tools and 4,300 others have received support

for economic reintegration. Herein, having been approved, the GPDR must tackle as a chief challenge the weak implementation of the programme by its associates. This has caused delays to payments and to the offering of toolkits, which has produced difficulties amongst beneficiaries (Parsons 2004).

Later, at a state-level technical meeting held in June 2007, the government pointed out the importance of reintegrating ex-combatants into civil life. Meeting participants agreed to create legislation which would enable disabled ex-combatants to access public and private businesses. In October 2007, the government approved the execution of recommendations made by a technical team specialised in reintegrating ex-combatants of the Angolan armed forces and UNITA. The plan included initiatives to create self-employment in cattle rearing, fishing, and civil engineering.

### Lessons learned

#### Planning:

- A disarmament programme for both combatants and civil society was not included in the programme in Angola. Very few arms have been collected from ex-combatants. There are between three and four million small arms in the hands of civilians.
- Lack of provisions for demobilisation as reflected in the prolongation of the programme's anticipated duration. This resulted in an interruption to the programme which lasted for more than a year.
- Poor humanitarian and health conditions in stationing camps, leading to instances of serious malnutrition. Logistical problems following the arrival of hundreds of thousands of family members at stationing centres. This resulted in a number of violent episodes (Parsons 2004).
- Exclusion of some demobilised persons from previous peace agreements.
- Lack of reintegration planning with little participation from local government.

#### Funding:

- Excessive cash payments compared to local salaries.
- Delays in World Bank financing due to lack of compliance with required guarantees.

#### Implementation:

- Excessive time, around two years, to begin the reintegration phase.
- Lack of international cooperation.
- Scarce coordination amongst NGOs cooperating in projects.
- Limitations of IRSEM.
- Women are insufficiently attended to.
- Scarcity of partnerships for implementation.
- Lack of employment.
- Insufficient understanding of projects.
- Difficulties accessing locations where programmes are being run.
- Difficulties locating former members of the armed forces.
- Reintegration of ex-combatants in urban centres rather than in their areas of origin, for fear of social stigmatisation.

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## Glossary

CNIDAH	National Inter-Sectoral Commission of Demining and Humanitarian Assistance
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
GPDR	General Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IRSEM	Instituto de Inserción Socio-Profesional de ExMilitares
JMC	Joint Monitoring Commission
MDRP	Muti-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
MPLA	Movimiento Popular de Liberación de Angola
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

# BURUNDI

## (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2004-2008)<sup>1</sup>

### Basic data

Population:	7.8 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	100,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	396,541 (2007)
GDP:	\$650 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$100 (2006)
HDI:	0.413, 167th
GDI:	0.409, 149th
Military expenditure:	6.1%
Social / military expenditure:	Military greater than social
Military population:	0.43%
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Multiple DDR with restructuring of the armed forces in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilise	78,000 ex-combatants, 41,000 of them armed forces, 15,500 armed opposition groups, and 21,400 Gardiens de la Paix.
Executive bodies	<i>National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion (NPDDR)</i>
Budget	\$84.4 million
Timeline	From December 2004 to December 2008
Status / synopsis	It is calculated that there are 23,185 demobilised ex-combatants, including 3,015 minors and 502 women. Around 5,400 small arms have been collected. 9,034 adults and all minors have received assistance for reintegration.

### Context

#### Conflict

Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been witness to a number of outbreaks of violence, particularly in 1965, 1972, and 1988. The armed forces, controlled by the minority Tutsi (13% of the population), put down these outbreaks. In 1993, a Hutu president, Mr. Melchior Ndadaye, was elected for the first time. However, he was assassinated the same year. This led to a new outbreak of violence between, on the one hand, armed Hutu opposition groups, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), and the National Liberation Forces (FNL, in French Forces nationales de libération); and on the other hand, the Tutsi-led government, with some participation as well from Hutus. Since that time, Burundi has experienced one war after another, and more than 300,000 persons have died, half of this number during the first year of the conflict. In 1996, a coup d'état brought Major Pierre Buyoya to power. He had already been the president through another coup in 1987. At the start of 2006, only the FNL, founded in 1979 by Hutu refugees in Tanzania and led since 2001 by Agathon Rwasa, and its 1,500-3,000 combatants continued to fight the government. At this point, the government of Burundi was formed by a coalition of forces who had made peace with each other in recent years.<sup>2</sup>

#### Peace process

In 1998, peace negotiations began in Arusha, Tanzania. Initially, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere facilitated these discussions, and later South African President Nelson Mandela. In August 2000, they crystallised into the Arusha Peace Accords, which entailed constitutional reforms and the establishment of a 36-month transition period. Initially, two important groups, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD, in French Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: MDRP (2003) and World Bank (2004)

<sup>2</sup> Extract from School for a Culture of Peace (2006)

de la démocratie) led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the FNL led by Alain Mugabarabona, rejected the accords and continued to fight the government. Both groups split and this complicated negotiations with each of them. Nevertheless, in October 2002 the groups signed a ceasefire agreement, and in December, the CNDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza followed suit.

In terms of DDR, the accords started the demobilisation of security and defence forces, as well as armed opposition groups. Demobilisation was to be conducted by means of the compilation of a list of combatants to be received by the programme, who would be processed for identification after having fulfilled demobilisation criteria. Also to be created was a body for managing the socio-professional reintegration of demobilised troops and a technical committee to manage the different sorts of demobilisation. Finally, the international community was to be urged to contribute to the process (*Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 2000*).

In **October 2003**, the CNDD-FDD and the Transitional Government of Burundi signed the **Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi**. This protocol stipulated that CNDD-FDD combatants had to move into areas designated by the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), under the supervision of the African Mission. The aim of this was for the CNDD-FDD to become a part of the new Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF). Ex-combatants not integrated into the armed forces would be progressively demobilised on the basis of social stability, under the supervision of the Ministries of State and Defence.

### International presence

On 21 May 2004, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided to create the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB, in French *Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi*), with its unravelling at the start of June with allowance for a maximum of 5,655 peacekeepers. In addition to guaranteeing compliance with peace agreements, overlooking security in Burundi, and contributing to the satisfactory running of elections, amongst other things, ONUB was put in charge of DDR, control and the monitoring of state armed forces, as well as control of illegal small-arms proliferation in the border regions.

In January 2007, a UN Integrated Mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB, in French *Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi*), established by Security Council Resolution 1719, replaced ONUB. BINUB's principal objectives are to consolidate peace and democracy, promote human rights, establish means to fight impunity, and coordinate United Nations agencies and donors involved in the country. BINUB's role in terms of security is to monitor the overall ceasefire agreement, assist in developing a national security-sector reform plan containing a component on training in human rights, help to implement a national programme of demobilisation

and reintegration of ex-combatants, and support initiatives to fight the proliferation of small arms (BINUB 2007).

### Transitional justice

The 2000 Arusha Accords envisioned various arrangements for transitional justice. As an initial measure, inserted into Protocol I on the Nature of the Conflict, Problems of Genocide and Exclusion, and their Solutions, the accords found it necessary to fight criminal impunity on such acts as genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity. The accords also included a need to develop national legislation to punish these sorts of serious crimes. Meanwhile, the Pretoria Protocol of 8 October 2003, considered a temporary immunity for ex-combatants.

Article 8 of the protocol specifies need to create a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a mandate to promote measures for reconciliation and pardon, establish the truth behind crimes, classify these crimes, establish responsibility for them, and identify the responsible persons and victims (School for a Culture of Peace 2006).

### Security-sector reform

Security-sector reform involves two principal areas of focus:

- Integration of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB, in French *Forces armées burundaises*) and the Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) into the BNDF.
- Reduction of the BNDF to 25,000 soldiers. For this, the government intends to demobilise 5,000 police officers in the name of streamlining expenditures. The main aim is to divert expenditures on the military to social and economic projects.

The organisational structure for defence and security forces must be composed of the armed forces, a national police, and an intelligence service, in conformity with the constitution. Defence forces need to include members of the state armed forces and ex-combatants through a technical committee with representation from all sectors. Members of the armed forces who are found responsible for acts of genocide, coups d'état, and violations of the constitution and human rights will be excluded from this restructuring, which will be conducted in a voluntary, individual, and transparent manner.

A major stumbling block in security-sector reform was the harmonisation of military rank amongst the various armed actors, though it seems this problem has been resolved recently. In terms of composition, 60% of officials were elected to the BNDF from the armed forces and 40% from the FDD. The government will determine the structure for this security body, whilst bearing in mind that command positions will be split equally between both parties.

### Other disarmament initiatives

In April 2007, the government of Burundi publicised

three types of actions to remove landmines. Until 2008, the actions consist in

- The acceleration of landmine removal activities in the most affected areas in order to reduce the number of victims and increase access to social and economic assistance.
- The development of the Agency for Action against Mines's scope in coordinating its management capabilities in Burundi.
- A link between these processes and plans for development and reduction of poverty.

Within the national government's structure and strategy for disarming the civil population and putting a halt to the proliferation of small arms, the Technical Commission on Civil Disarmament has organised a series of workshops on media awareness and on training members of the security services to understand regional and international agreements on civil disarmament. This commission has noted the lessons of the UNDP's Arms for Development programme in preparing implementation of a national strategy for reducing small arms, through modifications to national legislation, an awareness-raising campaign, and activities to collect small arms in order to reinforce security and consolidate peace. At a cost of \$500,000, this project will last for a year. Current calculations have the number of small arms in the hands of the civil population at 100,000.

In May 2005, a decree was approved on civil disarmament, aimed at strengthening national security through a reduction to the number of arms in circulation. Other measures for this included a prohibition on off-duty police officers and military personnel to carry arms and wear uniforms during electoral periods.

Anti-personnel landmines are still a major problem in Burundi, but by June 2008 some communities are expected to be largely free of mines. The UN's Mine Action Service transferred responsibilities to the government on 1 August 2006.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

*National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion (NPDDR).*

Multiple DDR with restructuring of the armed forces in a post-war context.

### Executive bodies

Burundi's planning body is the World Bank MDRP. The structure for conducting the peace process in the country is the following:

- The National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) is responsible for overall programme coordination. The NCDRR includes 17 provincial offices, one per province, and an ex-combatant who mediates in each of the 117 communes.
- The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) is in charge of monitoring ceasefire agreements,

- identifying armed groups, and the DDR process.
- UNICEF is in charge of attending to child soldiers.
- BINUB assists with the implementation of a national demobilisation and reintegration programme for ex-combatants, with the cooperation of the African Union and the World Bank.

### Basic principles

The aim of the programme in Burundi is to demobilise 80,000 ex-combatants, support their reinsertion and reintegration, assist vulnerable groups, and reduce military expenditures by 62%.

In January 2003, the government began to design a national plan for DDR with the support of the World Bank. In August that year, it established the NCDDR with the following guiding principles (NCDDR 2004):

- DDR is an integral part of the programme of security-sector reform.
- Assistance for reintegration is coordinated jointly with activities of reconstruction and renewal of towns impacted by war.
- The programme respects the amnesties granted by the Arusha Accords, except in the case of acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and participation in coups d'état.
- The programme respects the temporary immunity granted to leaders and combatants of armed opposition groups and the armed forces.

### Groups to demobilise

Estimations on the number of persons to demobilise vary, but according to one count the number is more than 78,000 persons. Scheduling for the demobilisation of these persons depends on the group they belong to. The groups, their numbers, and scheduled demobilisation are as follows:

- 41,000 members of the armed forces, 8,000 of whom are to be demobilised in the first phase of the programme and the rest in the second phase.
- 15,500 combatants of various armed political parties and movements (APPM), amongst them the CNDD, the CNDD-FDD led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU, in French Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu), the National Liberation Front (FROLINA, in French Front de Libération Nationale), and PALIPEHUTU-FNL led by Alain Mugarabona. Of these APPMs, 6,000 persons are to be demobilised in the first phase.
- 21,400 militia combatants of the Gardiens de la Paix (11,733 of 20,000 in total) and the Combatants Militants (9,668 of 10,000 in total). All of these to be demobilised in the first phase.

UNICEF estimates that there are 3,500 child soldiers in Burundi. In 2004, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) calculated that the war had engaged a total of 8,000 minors.

## Eligibility criteria

Demobilised combatants may correspond to one of the following categories:

- voluntarily demobilised,
- disabled person,
- minor, or
- a person who has not been taken in by security or defence forces.

## Finance and budget

The initial cost estimated for all the process was \$84.4 million, financed predominantly by the World Bank MDRP through the following contributions:

Donor	Millions \$	%
MDRP Fiduciary Fund(*)	41.8	50
World Bank (International Development Association)	33	39
MDRP Fiduciary Fund for Child Soldiers	3.6	4
Germany	6	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: World Bank (2004)

(\*) Funds from Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the European Union

The cost of the project in millions of dollars, broken down by year, is the following:

Year	Millions	%
2004	19.2	22.7
2005	24.6	29.1
2006	18.1	21.4
2007	16.0	18.9
2008	6.5	7.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: World Bank (2004)

Lastly, the cost broken down by phase is as follows:

Phase	Cost per persons (\$)	Total cost (million \$)	%
Demobilisation	97	4.8	6
Reinsertion	677	31.5	37
Armed forces and armed groups	586	29	34
Militias	91	2.5	3
Reintegration	468	20.9	25
Technical assistance	23	2	2
Management	103	8.8	10
Vulnerable groups	(1,583)	12.4	15
Contingencies	47	4	5
<b>Estimated total</b>	<b>1,325*</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>100</b>

(\*) Not including highly vulnerable groups

Source: World Bank (2004)

## Schedule

DDR began officially on 2 December 2004 with a delay of one year. It began with a first group of 216 combatants. It was put on hold from 23 December 2004 to 4 January 2005. The anticipated date of conclusion for DDR is 31 December 2008.

## Phases

The programme in Burundi has thus far been divided into two phases: a first phase, lasting one year, for the DDR of the FAB and the creation of the new BNDF, consisting of not more than 30,000 soldiers; and a second phase, lasting three years, for the DDR of remaining or surplus BNDF soldiers.

The African Mission in Burundi launched a pilot project for stationing persons in Muyange, province of Buzanza in order to draw lessons on the experience and plan future DDR activities. Lessons learned included the importance of understanding political conditions in order to carry out the process effectively, the importance of initiating a stationing period to set the stage for future developments, the necessity of upholding the maximum possible security in stationing camps, and the importance of making available sufficient funding. Moreover, the stationing period should not be longer than three to four weeks. Locations for these camps should be decided on the basis of political, logistical, and security considerations, as well as minimising lack of preparedness for child soldiers.

## Disarmament

The disarmament process consists of disarming former members of the armed forces in their barracks, registering them later on, and transferring them to stationing camps.

## Demobilisation

Twelve assembly points have been created. Five are for stationing and disarmament, two for members of Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD, two for other APPMs, and one for preparing the integration of ex-combatants in the national police. There are also three demobilisation centres located in Gitena, Bubanza, and Muramuya.

The main activities performed in these places are the distribution of identity cards, the collection of socioeconomic data, and the building of a database on the beneficiary population. Assembling ex-combatants is also an opportunity to counsel on HIV/AIDS and to provide information on programme benefits and civil life.

Consisting of \$3.5 million in funds, the World Bank's project for child soldiers in Burundi aims to demobilise 90% of these youth, reintegrate them into their communities in the first eight months of their demobilisation and reintegration, and establish mechanisms to prevent them from being re-recruited. As support to their families over a period of 18 months, \$20 per month is provided. Activities carried out have included preparing host communities, supporting families, sustaining educational objectives, giving special care to demobilised minors, providing psychosocial support, and sustaining rapid-impact projects for participation by youth.

## Reintegration

Ex-combatants access the reintegration process after three months of demobilisation. The NCDRR

is responsible for overseeing reintegration. The guiding principles of reintegration are the following:

- All ex-combatants receive the same assistance regardless of their rank.
- Ex-combatants may choose their reintegration locations and the activities in which they are to participate. Roughly 75% choose rural zones.
- There are special programmes for child soldiers, women, and disabled persons.
- Access to employment-creation programmes is assured.
- Programmes should also benefit the communities in which they are administered.
- Opportunities are given to start micro-projects and access micro-credit for this.

Economic reintegration into various sectors entails essentially

- employment-generating activities
- training for self-employment
- formal education
- business promotion
- employment promotion

Similarly, the NCDRR supports the realisation of business **Promotional Activities** in the following sectors:

- agriculture and fishing
- food production
- retail
- trades and crafts

Essential to all this is **community participation**, particularly the following:

- Help for reconciling ex-combatants to their communities.
- Mitigation of the impacts of perceptions held by communities and ex-combatants.
- Support for rehabilitation needs.
- Specialised support around information-sharing and awareness-raising, the family, HIV/AIDS, women, etc.

Whether armed forces or members of opposition groups, demobilised combatants receive a temporary subsistence allowance according to rank and based on a prior arrangement. The minimum allowance is \$515 whilst the average is \$600. The money is paid in cash over ten instalments. The first payment is made right before leaving the stationing camp, the second three months after being placed in a host community of choice, and the rest in payments made every three months. Additionally, the reintegration programme finances numerous associated activities related to micro-projects, seeds and tools, health, education, vocational training, and work in public administration.

Members of militias, around 30,000 in total, receive a one-off payment of \$91 following demobilisation. All payments are made via the commercial banking system, and not by hand. It was announced at a later point in the programme that all subsidies would be in the form of goods and not cash.

## Evolution

At the start of December 2002, Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD agreed to station itself, but members did not materialise at camp until many months later. This was

due to a lack of consultation on the mission led by the African Union and supported with logistical assistance from the United States, whose responsibility was to protect stationing areas.

In June 2003, the first ex-combatants arrived, and by November, a total of 200 had arrived. At this point, the mission had neither an understanding of the combatants' legal status nor a clear strategy for DDR. MONUC, the UN Mission in the DR Congo, carried out the work of repatriating Burundian combatants based in the DR Congo who were eligible for DDR.

In August 2005, leaders of Burundi's armed opposition groups surrendered their arms to ONUB in a symbolic gesture of renouncement of the country's armed violence and to show readiness for governing after elections, which, as it turned out, Pierre Nkurunziza, former leader of the CNDD-FDD, won. At the same time, in June and August 2005, members of the Gardiens de la Paix protested over payments of \$100 per person promised to them and delayed. According to government spokespersons, the funds for those payments were available but there had been problems identifying individuals who belonged to the Gardiens. This was due to the fact that their numbers, estimated initially at around 20,000, had multiplied later on. After an ex-combatant status review led by the NCDRR, an unspecified but large number of individuals were excluded from the payments. This resulted in the government establishing a new NCDRR team, whose first task it was to review the ex-combatant list.

In February 2006, the NCDRR announced that the demobilisation phase was entering its final stage with 5,000 ex-combatants to demobilise. It also assured that the armed forces had been cut down to 25,000 combatants, as per stipulation. Meanwhile, 20,000 ex-combatants, including child soldiers, returned to their families, and 11,000 former militia combatants, including 7,000 Gardiens de la Paix, received payment for demobilisation. However, the MDRP also stated that during the first trimester of 2006, 1.2% of demobilised persons had not received payment due to delays in communicating their location or bank account information.

The first stage for demobilising child soldiers concluded in 2004. In this time, UNICEF demobilised 2,260 minors found in the armed forces and the Gardiens de la Paix. In December 2004, a second stage was conducted. In this, another 618 minors belonging to six APPMs were demobilised. At the start of 2006, accusations of a lack of fulfilment of reintegration rights were made by a number of minors, which hinted at the lack of funds available for fulfilling these rights. Human Rights Watch also claimed the government continued to hold minors associated with the FNL instead of giving them aid in the form of rehabilitation. The organisation requested their release from prisons where they were found. Around 3,000 minors were calculated to have been demobilised between 2004 and 2006. Of these, 600 have returned to school

and 2,300 continue to receive vocational training.

In 2007, UN Secretary-General Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy, acknowledged the advancements made on the protection of children, but indicated nevertheless that these were not sufficient. Amongst other things required, she said, were better conditions in centres where 200-300 child soldiers were being held under detention and assistance for their reintegration into society. The special representative also urged the parliament of Burundi to enforce legislation already included in the criminal code which acknowledges the recruitment of minors less than 16 years of age to be a war crime. She reminded parliament that children continued to be recruited and called on the FNL to abandon the practice and free the minors in its ranks (School for a Culture of Peace 2008).

At the start of 2006, the NCDRR began to demobilise a first group of 103 disabled ex-combatants belonging to the armed forces. This demobilisation involved offerings of housing, medical rehabilitation, clothing, and constant monitoring. The NCDRR assured that this demobilisation would be conducted in a progressive manner and would bear in the mind the special needs of this group. Thus far, 3,687 disabled soldiers have demobilised.

In mid-April, the government decided to reopen a demobilisation camp for the FNL in the northwest of Burundi. This decision was based on an assertion that the security situation had improved in the part of the country where the FNL operated, thanks to cooperation from local residents.

It is calculated that there are 24,498 demobilised ex-combatants, including 3,041 minors and 502 women. Around 5,400 small arms have been collected. Meanwhile, 21,463 ex-combatants (39% of anticipated) have been reinserted and 13,583 (25% of anticipated) have been reintegrated. As for members of the Gardiens de la Paix, 20,144 have received reinsertion packages. The challenges remaining include completing the disarmament and dismantlement of militias, accelerating economic reintegration, giving medical attention to disabled combatants, demobilising the armed forces, and reducing the number of police.

The main reintegration opportunities are the opening of a business (56%), then agricultural activities (32%), followed by work in the construction sector. In terms of return destinations, the provinces of Bururi and Bubanza were the most common due to the fact that many ex-combatants came from those regions. The third most popular place of return was Bujumbura. This could suggest a desire for a more anonymous reintegration, though only 8% of ex-combatants chose this city. It has not been a principal location of armed violence.

### **Integration in the armed forces**

In January 2004, Hutu President Domitien Ndayizeye and Tutsi Vice-President Alphonse-Marie Kadege

formally established the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. Since then, members of Nkurunziza's former armed opposition group the CNDD-FDD have come to fill 14 of the 35 positions, or 40% of them. One principal cause for the armed conflict which began in 1993—the lack of representation of the majority Hutu in the armed forces, historically controlled by the minority Tutsi—was resolved with this decision. The other former armed opposition groups, Ndayikengurukiye's FDD and Mugabarabona's FNL, who signed ceasefire agreements with the government in 2002, were not given positions amongst the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This body will be in charge of making proposals to the government on the size and composition of the armed forces, supervising the programme of DDR for ex-combatants, and promoting confidence measures amongst members of the armed forces and the ex-combatants who have joined the unified military.

The 2005 year foresaw the start of demobilisations for 30,000 members of the armed forces. The 5,000 soldiers who demobilised in the first phase were assembled in a centre, and the 9,000 initial members of armed opposition groups were assembled in two centres. These transit centres were located in Randa, Gitega, and Muramuya. Persons remained for 10 days in these centres to be registered and to receive initial advice. Their identities were also verified; they were given a medical examination, registered, identified, oriented, and finally transported. Each demobilised person received an allowance for reinsertion within a month. These payments, offered in proportion to rank, were used for the reinsertion needs of families. It must be pointed out that conditions in these centres were deplorable due to a lack of water and clean sanitation, which produced a risk for cholera.

### **Lessons learned**

Amongst the chief errors found in the programme in Burundi, we need to highlight the four-year delay to the start of the process of demobilisation, once a peace agreement had already been signed. We can theoretically seek motives for this in the preparation of financial mechanisms. However, discussions held on the characteristics of combatants to demobilise seem a clearer motive. Although the initial number of combatants to be demobilised given by the CNDD-FDD was 80,000, a principal motive the CNDD-FDD had for giving this large number was to seek to maximise benefits. In addition to numbers, it was also important to discuss what ex-combatant meant (Alusala 2005).

On disarmament, it is important to say that the number of surrendered arms is unknown due to an absence of a disarmament phase within the programmes of the MDRP. Another controversial aspect of the programme in Burundi was the design of payments for the demobilisation and reintegration phases, above all because ex-combatants had high expectations for these payments. There were also clear signs of payment inequality. Whilst CNDD combatants received \$600, Gardiens de la Paix received \$100, and minors an average \$330. Lastly, with regard to financing, payments



by the European Union and the World Bank to rural development programmes were remarkable for their delays. This increased the feeling of inequality between communities and ex-combatants (Boshoff and Vrey 2006).

Later, amidst starts to processes of demobilisation and reintegration, there was a funding gap caused by different political and technical reasons. One of these reasons included the need for approval by the World Bank of the process designed by the National Commission. In terms of reintegration, the programme in Burundi experienced technical difficulties, including a lack of national capacity, a lack of financial infrastructure, a low number of NGOs to support reintegration at the community level, deficiencies in the primary school system,

and a depletion of funds for planning, management, and logistics (Nkurunziza and Muvira 2005).

At the end of 2007, World ORT presented an evaluation of the programme financed by the World Bank. It recommended an extension to the programme given the lack of time for reintegrating ex-combatants, due also to 18 months of delay suffered right at the start. The organisation also recommended a decentralisation of the NPDRR in the taking of decisions, the setting in motion of an informational and awareness-raising programme, the development of vocational training projects, the promotion of awareness around ex-combatants' psychological problems, and better efforts to include physically disabled persons into society (World ORT 2007).

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## Glossary

BINUB	United Nations integrated Mission in Burundi
BNDF	National Defence Forces in Burundi
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy -Forces for Defence of Democracy
FNL	National Liberation Front
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commission
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and reintegration program
MONUC	United Nations Mission at DR Congo
NCDDR	National Commission on DDR
NPDDR	National Programme for DDR
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
PALIPEHUTU	Parti pour la Libération du peuple hutu
FROLINA	Front de Libération Nationale
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

## Chad (Reinsertion, 2005-2010)

### Basic data

Population:	10 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	179,940
Refugee population:	36,300
GDP:	\$6.5 billion (2006)
Per capita income:	\$480 (2006)
HDI	0.388, 170th
GDI:	0.370, 153th
Military expenditure:	0.91%
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.25%
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral demobilisation of militias and armed forces with child soldiers in a situation of regional insecurity
Groups to demobilise	9,000 soldiers, some of whom were already demobilised in previous years
Executive bodies	National Committee for Reinsertion
Budget	The World Bank calculates a cost of \$10 million
Timeline	From December 2005 to 2010, in total 60 months
Status / synopsis	The government signed an agreement with UNICEF, in which it promised to cooperate in demobilisation tasks for hundreds of child soldiers who operate both in the armed forces (some 300 according to a study conducted by UNICEF) and in armed opposition groups.

### Context

#### Conflict

A thwarted coup d'état in 2004 and constitutional reforms boycotted by the opposition in 2005 are responsible for the insurgency whose aim is to overthrow the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby and whose activities intensified in 2006. The opposition group aggravating this is led by the volatile United Front for Democratic Change in Chad coalition (FUC, in French Front Uni pour le changement démocratique au Tchad), which is composed of diverse groups and soldiers disaffected by the regime, including the Foundation for Change, National Unity and Democracy (SCUD, in French Scôle pour le changement, l'unité nationale et la démocratie). We can add to this antagonism between Arab tribes and the black population on the border with Sudan. This tension is linked to the spread of the war in the Darfur region of Sudan, as a result of cross-border operations by Sudanese armed groups and the Janjaweed Sudanese pro-government Arab militias. The Janjaweed have attacked Darfurian refugee camps and villages in the east of Chad. This has contributed to a rise in tension between Chad and Sudan, who support the respective insurgencies which favour them.<sup>1</sup>

#### Peace process

On 24 December 2006, the government of Chad and the FUC signed a peace agreement to end all military action, free prisoners held by both sides, proclaim a general amnesty, and conduct a reinsertion and resettlement process for FUC combatants. The peace agreement specified a Joint Commission to apply the agreement.

Later, at the start of October 2007, the government and four main armed opposition groups from the east of Chad reached a peace agreement with assistance from Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi in Tripoli. Whilst the Chadian authorities assert the agreement is definitive, the armed groups consider it to be a simple declaration of principles. According to one group of signatories, the agreement is a framework containing the broad lines of a national agreement. As such, the agreement established a ceasefire lasting until the end of October 2007, which would permit time to advance negotiations, an amnesty, to gather insurgents, to have rebel leaders enter government, and to integrate combatants into the armed forces. However, technical questions and modes of application for this await negotiations (*Accord de Paix...* 2006).

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008:27).

### Transitional justice

In February 2007, the government announced a project to grant a general amnesty to militants and sympathisers of the FUC armed opposition group, who signed a peace agreement with the government in 2006. Later, the government freed more than 400 FUC prisoners (School for a Culture of Peace 2006).

### Other disarmament initiatives

In 1993, the National Commission for Disarmament was founded. However, it has not fulfilled its role of collecting small arms from the population. In 2000, the Mixed Security Committee was created to explore paths to disarmament. At the regional level, Chad denied, at the start of 2006, accusations it was equipping Sudanese armed opposition groups operating in Darfur with military materials. It said these accusations were being utilised to justify attacks by Khartoum on its national territory.

### Background to DDR

The government of Chad already has experience with DDR. In addition to demobilisations carried out from 1992 to 1997, the government conducted a pilot project in 1999 involving 2,800 demobilised persons, with \$3 million support from the World Bank and \$1.1 million from the German S, but it was interrupted before the end of its term due to malfunctioning (Dingamadji 2004).

Period	Demobilised persons	Support	Budget
1992-1996	20,000 soldiers	French cooperation	\$8.3 million
1996-1997	7,179 officials and sub-officials	World Bank	\$8.3 million
1992-97 (pilot programme)	2,800 ex-combatants	World Bank GTZ	\$3 million \$1.1 million

Source: Dingamadji (2004)

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration (NPDR)  
Bilateral demobilisation of militias and armed forces in a context of regional insecurity

#### Executive bodies

In 2003, the government of Chad asked the National Committee for Reinsertion, an affiliate of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Cooperation, to design a new partial demobilisation programme for the armed forces. This programme became the National Agency for Reinsertion at the start of 2005. Its duties are to identify groups to target, understand necessities, and identify income-generating activities, whether through orientation to job searching or through specific programmes. Its offices became the Interregional Sections for Reinsertion (ISR) and now cover all Chad (Channel Research 2005).

### Basic principles

The basic goals of the programme in Chad involve the reintegration and resettlement of members of armed opposition groups and security-sector reform.

### Groups to demobilise

There are 9,000 soldiers to demobilise, some of whom were already demobilised in previous years but who did not benefit from reintegration programmes then. Regarding the FUC and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT, in French Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad), the number of combatants to demobilise remains undetermined. Attention to dependents of these demobilised persons is being taken into account. According to reports published in May 2007, armed opposition groups contain more than 1,000 child soldiers in their ranks. Negotiations are in the works for the demobilisations of these youth.

### Budget

The World Bank calculates an expense of \$10 million. The World Bank has contributed \$5 million, according to a decision approved in June 2005. However, Chad's breaking of agreements over the management of benefits from oil triggered the World Bank to freeze all credit and donations it had approved with Chad. Japan contributed \$437,000 (World Bank 2005).

### Schedule

From December 2005 to 2010, in total 60 months (World Bank 2005).

### Phases

#### Demobilisation

Demobilisation involves a preparation phase which includes awareness-raising, advice, orientation, and training adapted to the necessities of ex-combatants, as well as offers from the market on income-generating activities. For combatants demobilised during the 1992-97 period, the initial phases of awareness-raising and orientation will be excluded (Channel Research 2005).

#### Reintegration

The reintegration phase consists of a control agency taking charge of demobilisation in accordance with the interests combatants express in the orientation phase. Once inserted into the proper regional agencies, the phase of re-adaptation to civil life commences. For this, three basic economic activities have been identified. These include

- Vocational training
- Placement in a Control Agency, in the public or private sector
- Realisation of preferably collective micro-projects for employment-generating activities

There is also a social component involved in providing assistance to demobilised persons. This is centred on sanitary services, principally awareness around HIV/AIDS, education, and accommodation via state social services (World Bank 2005).

## Evolution

### Reinsertion and reintegration

The government of Chad signed an agreement with UNICEF in which it promised to cooperate in demobilisation tasks for hundreds of child soldiers who operate both in the armed forces (some 300 according to a study conducted by UNICEF) and in armed opposition groups. UNICEF Representative in Chad Stephen Adkisson denounced the heavy use of minors in armed groups and said his task to demobilise them would not be simple, since they needed to be identified and efforts needed to be consolidated to return and reintegrate them into communities.

Human Rights Watch stated in a report on child soldiers in Chad that the government has not complied with the promise it made in May 2007 with UNICEF to demobilise and reintegrate child soldiers present in the armed forces and in paramilitary groups. Thousands can still be found in military and paramilitary ranks.

Human Rights Watch stated also that despite the demobilisation of a few hundred minors, none belonged to the armed forces but to paramilitary groups allied to the government. The government did not permit UNICEF to visit two military bases in conflict zones in the east of the country. In answer to the Human Rights Watch report, the Chadian government claimed the process is unravelling "slowly but surely" and highlighted difficulties in implementing the project, such as the large number of minors to demobilise and the lack of infrastructure for guaranteeing adequate reintegration. The government also claimed that the fact that minors had not demobilised did not mean they were "active" in the armed forces.

### Lessons learned

- Bad past experience
- Poorly defined legal framework
- Inadequate institutional framework (Alusala, 2007)

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## Glossary

FUC	Front Uni pour le Democratique Change
GTZ	German Cooperation Agency
HRW	Human Rigths Watch
ISR	Interregional Sections for Reinsertion
MDJT	Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad
NPDR	National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration
SCUD	Socle pour le Changement et l'Unite Democratique
UNICEF	United Nations Funds for Children

# Colombia (AUC)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	45.6 million (2005)
Food emergencies:	No
IDPs:	2,958,567 (2007)
Refugee population:	72,796 (2007)
GDP:	\$135,800 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$2,740 (2005)
HDI:	0.791, 75th
GDI:	0.789, 66th
Military expenditure:	3.38%
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.48%
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Unilateral demobilisation of paramilitaries in a war context
Groups to demobilise	31,671 members of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Executive bodies	Office of the High Commissioner for Peace - Reinsertion programme - Ministries of Defence, Justice and the Interior, and Taxation - Presidential Council for Social Action - Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), in charge of underage youth - SENA (National Service for Learning) - Ombudsman - Attorney General's Office
Budget	\$302 million
Timeline	Demobilisation from November 2003 to August 2006. Reintegration reinitiated in 2007.
Status / synopsis	The last trimester report of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA), published in November 2007, warned of the continued "influence of ex-paramilitary commanders who the government has not received and the presence of middle commanders in hiding".

## Context

### Conflict

Dating back to the 1960s, the Colombian conflict has deep roots that go beyond the current guerrilla insurgency. In addition to the violence which has characterised relations between the traditional liberal and conservative parties, from the 19th century until the era of the National Front (1958-1978), there has also been repression targeting any political alternative. The main causes of the conflict should be sought in the social, economic, and political exclusion of the opposition; the lack of presence of the Colombian state in large areas of the country, in the areas farthest from the main cities; and an inefficient judicial system that has been responsible for a high level of impunity with respect to human rights violations committed against Colombian civil society. The dispute has involved a seizure of power using arms and attempts to control natural resources, both traditional resources such as gold, lumber, and petroleum, and illicit forms such as drugs, which finance the armed conflict in the country. The situation has become a vicious cycle of violence due to the long duration of the conflict. For these reasons, policies that have serviced the interests of elites, social exclusion, and a lack of democratic alternatives for an opposition led to an emergence of different guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s, amongst them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both emerging in 1964. Today these groups include 17,000 and 3,000 active members respectively.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: ACR (2007), MAPP-OEA (2007) and Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (2006)

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 83)

Colombia's paramilitaries, clustered around the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) since mid-2002, comprise a wide variety of groups with diverse histories and interests. Four elements serve to unite these varied groups around the AUC. These include regional elites who are prepared to offer financial and political support; cooperation or advice from members of the armed forces of the government; leadership from groups or individuals connected to the drug trade; and sufficient political and military pressure from insurgents to maintain the unity of the group. Within the AUC, some groups are linked tightly to drug trafficking and other illicit activities, others to the defence of the interests of wealthy ranchers, etc. The first paramilitary groups formed in the mid-1980s in reaction to the military activities of guerrillas. Between 1998 and 2003, these groups managed to consolidate their political positions in many regions of the country. For this reason, the demobilisation of these groups refers exclusively to their military apparatus and not their political, economic, and social control. These groups achieved this control after many years of playing the chief role in massacres, targeted homicides, and forced displacements of the population, accumulating large quantities of land in the process.

Dismantlement of the AUC's military apparatus has occurred jointly with preliminary negotiations with the guerrillas of the ELN, begun in December 2005 in Cuba, but not with the FARC. This fact affects in a particular way the judicial component to the process and the perspectives for reconciliation.

### Peace process

In mid-2002, the European Union included the AUC in its list of terrorist groups. In August of the same year, a majority of paramilitary groups came together with the purpose of negotiating with the Colombian government. In December, with mediation from the Catholic Church, the AUC declared a **unilateral cessation of hostilities** and asked for accompaniment from the United Nations. The Colombian government appointed a commission of six persons to dialogue with several of these groups. This dialogue concluded in July 2003 with the signing of the **Santa Fe de Ralito Pact** between the federal government and the AUC. This pact included the following principles: the achievement of peace at the national level can only be achieved through the strengthening of democratic governability and the reestablishment of the state's monopoly on force; total disarmament and demobilisation of members of the AUC; commitment to the fulfilment of cessations of hostilities; commitment to abandon illicit activities; the opening of participation to third actors; the rejection of violence as a means for resolving differences; and acceptance and respect of terms for future pacts or agreements.<sup>3</sup>

### International accompaniment

Since January 2004, the OAS has been in charge of monitoring through the Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP). The task of this mission is to ensure ceasefires, disarmaments, and to work with

affected communities. In October 2005, after criticisms of the mission's inefficiency and the limitations of means available to it, the OAS decided to multiply the mission's budget by six, to \$10 million annually, and to increase its personnel from 44 persons to more than a hundred. Until then, the mission included five regional offices. The OAS has also been involved in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), who develops periodic reports on the peace process. In the beginning of 2007, the Colombian government and the OAS prolonged their agreement for another three years.

However, their trimester report published in November 2007 affirmed that,

the demobilisation and disarmament of AUC groups has opened new possibilities for Colombia. These new possibilities create three principle challenges for the country's institutions:

- a) the restructuring of the state in some regions and the weakening of illegal activity;
- b) the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities with a communitarian perspective, including those populations that paramilitaries have impacted;
- c) the application of the Justice and Peace Law, which involves a progressive unravelling of the truth, attainment of justice, reparations to victims, and opening of paths to reconciliation.

After having promoted Plan Colombia for six years, the government of the United States introduced in April 2007 a new Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development, for the 2007-2013 period. This new plan aims to support social and economic efforts in the area of human rights, and the gradual reduction of assistance to drug eradication. Later, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recognised the role of the Colombian armed forces in the area of human rights, and cleared the transfer of \$55 million to the Colombian military. The US Senate blocked these funds, amongst other reasons because of reports on military commander General Montoya's connections to paramilitary groups.

Moreover, in July 2007, the Colombian government and the United Nations signed the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This framework continues the joint programming of UN agencies, funds, and programmes for the 2008-2012 period. UNDAF programmes and projects will focus on poverty, equity, and social development; peace, security, and reconciliation; and governability and the rule of law.

### Transitional justice

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe offered non-extradition guarantees to those who could demonstrate intent to amend and collaborate in the dismantlement of all AUC military infrastructures. For their part, AUC leaders have declared from the beginning that if the legal framework approved entails humiliation or submission to them, they will abandon negotiations and return to armed combat.

In March 2005, the International Criminal Court asked the Colombian government to report on actions

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 86)



carried out against persons guilty of crimes against humanity. At the end of June, the Colombian Congress approved the Justice and Peace Law. This law fixes punishments to between five and eight years of prison for paramilitaries accused of committing atrocities, and classifies members of the AUC as political delinquents. Sentencing according to this law does not always entail confinement to prison, but can include confinement to other places such as farms or agricultural properties, as determined by the National Penitentiary Institute. The law establishes a maximum of eight years in prison for paramilitary combatants responsible for atrocities. President Uribe ratified this law at the end of March. At the end of 2005, the government concluded the procedures for applying the law. The state exempted itself from any responsibility to victims who have filed suit against the state for massacres. Victims will not be compensated for their losses by their victimisers.

In October 2005, the Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation was created. With an eight-year mandate, its mission is to monitor the processes of reincorporation, to guarantee full demobilisation of armed groups, and to evaluate reparations and restitutions to victims. At the end of 2005, it was decided that the IACHR should remain permanently in Colombia with the aim of developing transparent mechanisms for investigating accusations of ceasefire violations (NCRR 2007).

At the end of September 2006, the Colombian government took into account criticisms of the agreement proposal to implement the Justice and Peace Law and hardened the conditions for trying paramilitaries. The government made efforts to fulfil a prior judgement by the Constitutional Court in June 2006. The government does not recognise political crime and demands complete and truthful confessions while it permits victims to participate in all stages of this legal process and to question judicial decisions. In October 2006, the government discontinued guarantees of safe passage to demobilised leaders and ordered the capture of those leaders who were not secluded in areas equipped for that purpose, after warning such persons that they could lose privileges of the Justice and Peace Law. The main paramilitary leaders protested these measures and determined to stop surrendering goods until the implementation of this judgement could be clarified. In mid-December 2006, some paramilitaries began to appear before the law to confess their crimes and make amendments to victims. The cost of reparations to victims is estimated to be between \$4.68 and \$8.19 billion (NCRR 2007).

Thus far, of a total 2,914 demobilised combatants included in the Justice and Peace Law, the justice system has received 63 open judicial testimonies. Using these as a start, Colombia commenced other judicial proceedings that could implicate civil servants and domestic and foreign private businesses for having links to paramilitaries.

In the last report, published in August 2007, of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation

(NCRR), whose presence in Colombia increased in 2007, the commission stated that the justice system had only received 200 open testimonials of a possible 2,816 in the two years that the Justice and Peace Law has been in force. This state of affairs is drastic if we consider that Colombians have filed more than 70,000 denunciations against demobilised paramilitaries, denunciations which the country must investigate. The commission expressed concern over the lack of resources impeding the widening of judicial staff. It was also concerned that defendants deliberately omitted mention of crimes against freedom, the integrity of the person, and sexual violence including rape in their testimonials (NCRR 2007).

Meanwhile, the IACHR pointed out that the demobilisation process for paramilitaries is full of systemic obstacles, loopholes, and errors. Many demobilised persons were not in fact paramilitaries, but incorporated into the demobilisation process in order to receive the economic incentives and benefits offered by the government, avowed the IACHR. The IACHR also maintained that the government appointed untrained district prosecutors only hours before receiving testimonials from demobilised persons. This made the process a mere formality and the government lost an opportunity to know the truth about thousands of crimes, which will go unpunished. The IACHR report questioned the loopholes that exist in the implantation of the Justice and Peace Law, which limit participation in the legal process from victims against their victimisers, and the aspects of the law guaranteeing a high degree of impunity with poor redress of crimes.

In November 2007, MAPP-OEA highlighted that institutional ability in Colombia to respond to entities involved in the process of peace and justice was insufficient. It was difficult to determine in advance the number of potential beneficiaries of the different phases and components of this process because of its characteristics. Due to this situation, entities involved in the process stated repeatedly that their principal needs derive from the following: a) an insufficiency of human resources; b) an absence of effective protection measures for victims and civil servants; c) an absence of a centralised information system; d) a need to strengthen training programmes, especially in practical matters and legal and psychosocial counselling for victims; and e) a scarcity of technical and logistical resources for developing investigations and the processing of evidence.

#### Other disarmament initiatives

The Bogotá police announced that Colombians who own firearms with outdated permits have until August 2008 to renew their permits, without risk of incurring penalties for however much time they were in this situation. Owners of arms not registered by the Ministry of Defence (some two million persons according to various studies) and of homemade weapons also have until August to surrender weapons to the military in exchange for \$25-42, depending on the state of the weapon. In early 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, and the Colombian government oversaw the destruction of 14,000 arms

to commemorate International Gun Destruction Day, on 9 July. Around 77% of these arms were illegal.

A commission headed by the mayor of Bogotá, Luis Eduardo Garzón, and the mayor of Pereira, Juan Manuel Arango, presented a proposal, supported by a million and a half signatures, to the Colombian Congress at the end of 2007. This proposal recommended that only adults older than 25 who fulfil certain requirements, such as a medical and psychological examination, be permitted to carry a gun. Those who disobey this order could have their arm seized from them and be issued a fine of two legal minimum salaries. Those who disobey this order for a second time would lose the right to carry a gun indefinitely. This proposal faces challenges from governmental attitudes which argue that the right to carry an arm must continue to be a prerogative of the armed forces rather than the general population because of conflict with armed opposition groups.

Finally, in June 2007, the national government created a new presidential programme whose goals were to formulate and execute plans, programmes, and projects to counter anti-personnel landmine use. The main functions of this programme are to elaborate and apply a national strategy to counter anti-personnel landmine use; to act as a source for making decisions in accordance with information collected on different programmes; to create and adopt national standards for activities related to landmines while overlooking their fulfilment; and to promote and manage international technical cooperation.

### Background to DDR

Through different peace agreements signed by the Colombian government, demobilisation and reincorporation processes, which have led to the dismantlement of the structures of armed groups and the demobilisation and reincorporation of their members, have a long history in Colombia. Good examples of this history are the demobilisations of the 19 April Movement (M-19) in 1990; the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia (PRT), and the Quintín Lame Movement in 1991; and the Ernesto Rojas Commandos in 1992, amongst many others. From these precedents, the legal framework for current processes has arisen, both their collective and individual DDRs. Amongst others, current processes have benefited from Law 77 of 1989 and Decree 213 of 1991. Political recognition from government has subordinated both dialogues and the granting of benefits, particularly those of a legal nature.

The first demobilisation occurred in November 2003, while in May 2004 the Colombian government and the AUC signed an agreement over standards for governing the Placement Zone of Tierralta, Córdoba. The purpose of this latter was to facilitate consolidation of the peace process, to contribute to the fulfilment and monitoring of cessations of hostilities, to define a timeline for the gathering and demobilisation of armed persons, to give time to all interested sectors to intervene at the bargaining table, and to facilitate the participation of citizens. The Placement Zone received only leaders of the AUC. The zone, 368

km<sup>2</sup> in area, did not count collection or gathering areas for all other AUC members. From July 2004 onwards, negotiations with the principal three groups have been held at a collective bargaining table.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

Disarmament, demobilisation, and social reintegration of the AUC military structure. Although this strategy is not analysed in this report, the Colombian government gives incentives to individual combatants belonging to any armed group who wish to demobilise.

According to government figures, the government has demobilised 10,000 persons in this way between 2002 and 2006. In 2005, the government paid \$4.5 million in allowances to 1,671 members of armed groups who, when they demobilised, surrendered war material and information. These allowances amounted to an average of \$2,700 per informant. At the end of this individual demobilisation, each beneficiary received around \$3,500 for employment projects.

### Executive bodies

Predominantly, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. However, the following bodies also collaborate:

- Programme of Reinsertion
- Ministries of Defence, Justice and the Interior, and Revenue
- Presidential Council for Social Action
- Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), in charge of underage youth
- SENA (National Service for Learning)
- Ombudsman
- Attorney General's Office

Other complementary entities:

- Vice president's Human Rights Programme
- Government and city halls of demobilising areas
- Ministry of Social Protection
- Catholic Church
- OAS Mission to the Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA)
- Registry Office.

The High Advisory Group on Reintegration formed in September 2006. Its main functions are to counsel the High Commissioner for Peace, design, execute and evaluate government policy aimed at social and economic reintegration, define the National Action Plan, and promote participation from civil society, amongst other functions. More specifically, three fundamental elements comprise its policies: the design and implementation of long-term policy, participation from society as an integral part of the solution to armed conflict, sustainable planning to eliminate dependency on aid, and promotion of employment solutions from demobilised persons themselves. High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank Pearl has announced the creation of 30 service centres in affected regions to attend to all demobilised persons before 15 May.

### Groups to demobilise

Demobilisation of 31,671 paramilitaries of the AUC, in addition to demobilisation carried out on an individual basis.

### Groups with specific needs:

The Colombian government and various NGOs estimate the number of **child soldiers** in the ranks of the AUC to be between 2,200 and 5,000, though not all of these are combatants. Some groups surrendered underage youth before official demobilisations as acts of good faith. In a declaration of cessation of hostilities at the end of 2002, the AUC promised to surrender the underage youth in their ranks to UNICEF.

The AUC made similar promises for **women and young female combatants**, who represented only 6% of persons demobilised in a collective manner.

### Budget

The exact cost of the demobilisation of the AUC is unknown because there are various and contradictory estimations. In May 2004, for example, the High Commissioner for Peace declared that Colombia needed around \$150 million in international aid to deal with the full demobilisation of between 15,000 and 20,000 paramilitaries, at a cost per person of \$7,000. However, a year later, in 2005, the Colombian government stated that the demobilisation programme for the 20,000 members of the AUC would require 200 billion pesos (\$87 million). The government calculated that it would need double this amount for 2006 (\$174 million). Of this quantity, 75% would come from the national budget and the rest from international contributions. In total, the government put 677.8 billion pesos (**\$302.6 million**) into DDR between 2003 and 2006, which amounted to an average of **\$9,567.10 per person demobilised in a collective manner**.

Regarding the distribution of yearly funding by governmental organisations for the DDR process, the sources vary, making it difficult to provide exact calculations. Although the National Department of Planning estimates total spending to be \$245 million, the High Commissioner for Peace offered a total budget approximation of \$302 million. The breakdown of this budget is as follows:

Organism	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTAL	%
Office of the High Commissioner	-	26	22	62	110	36
Ministry of Justice and the Interior	8	35	35	44	122	41
Ministry of Defence	8	3	12	16	39	16
ICBF	1.3	2	2.2	3	8.5	3
Ministry of Social Protection	-	-	1	8	9.1	3
SENA	0.3	0.2	2	1	3.5	0.9
Department of Security	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>64.8</b>	<b>72.3</b>	<b>131.4</b>	<b>302.6</b>	

Source: High Commissioner for Peace

\* Figures expressed in millions of dollars, even though the official document is expressed in millions of Colombian pesos.

We must also include resources invested by the international community:

Donor	Value (\$ millions)	%
USAID	8.3	64.6
UNICEF	1.6	13.1
Netherlands	0.9	6.9
ILO	0.5	4.2
Japan	0.4	3.1
EU	0.4	2.8
Italy	0.3	2.8
Germany (GTZ)	0.2	1.5
Canada	0.1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12.9</b>	

Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2007)

USAID supports the process of demobilisation and social reintegration through the following activities: support for the control, monitoring, and legal processing of ex-combatants (\$14.9 million); support for the OAS (\$4.5 million); reparations to and reconciliation of victims (\$3.6 million); social reintegration of ex-combatants (\$24 million); and support for former child soldiers (\$5.5 million).

From 2006 to 2010, estimates of resources needed for the processes of demobilisation and reincorporation are proportional to the situation and desire for peace amongst armed opposition groups. Figures for the four-year period range from \$328 to \$610 million (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2007).

Other known data is the cost of gathering and demobilising ex-combatants, an average cost of \$290 per person, which totals another \$5.8 million to cover all the members of the AUC. Of the \$290 per person, \$70 is for accommodation, \$58 for food, \$38 for clothing, and \$30 for relocation expenses.

At the end of September 2005, the World Bank approved a wide-ranging assistance programme for Colombia which included studying national and international DDR experiences. This could translate into direct assistance to DDR in later years under the umbrella of the Peace and Development Adaptable Program Loan. In October 2005, the Netherlands committed to increasing its aid for the demobilisation of the AUC and for supporting the tasks of the Commission for Reparation.

At the end of October 2005, the US Congress authorised up to \$20 million of economic support for negotiations with the AUC and "other terrorist groups" of Colombia, under the condition that Colombia extradite persons demanded by the US justice system for drug trafficking. These funds may be used for "monitoring, integrating, examining, investigating, processing, and recovering goods that serve to redress victims". In December 2005, the European Union gave \$1.5 million to strengthen local activities of reconciliation, reinsertion, the elaboration of strategies for communities hosting demobilised persons, and the offering of assistance to victims ("Unión Europea autorizó..." 2005).

At the beginning of May 2006, the US Congress approved \$15.4 million for the demobilisation of the AUC, pending on cooperation from Colombia in extraditing paramilitary leaders. Resources for this are meant to strengthen the judiciary, redress victims, and reinsert the combatants of the AUC into society. In August 2006, USAID financed the OAS with \$1.9 million for demobilising the AUC, while in November the Argos Foundation and USAID paid out \$1.2 million each for the reintegration of 320 demobilised persons, with assistance from the private sector and technical assistance from the IOM (IOM Colombia 2007).

Finally, in January 2007, Spain committed 61 million euros (\$79.4 million) to employment projects that further the reincorporation of demobilised persons. In order to calculate the global financial contribution to DDR in Colombia, we must determine the sum thus far of contributions by the Colombian government and the sum of bilateral contributions. Later, the European Commission ratified a contribution of 12 million euros for carrying out projects in host communities of demobilised persons.

The latest calculations in December 2007 by High Commissioner for Peace Luís Carlos Restrepo, stated that the Colombian government had spent around \$108 million on the process of military demobilisation. Breaking down this figure, the government spent \$9.36 million on gathering and demobilising combatants, \$94 million on resources, and nearly \$2 million of security matters. On average, we calculate a cost of approximately \$286 per demobilised combatant, in addition to \$17 per person per month on humanitarian aid spent over a period of 18 months. The country invests roughly \$6 million more on a process to equip special reclusion centres under the Justice and Peace Law. At the same time, the government claims a scarcity of funds for these centres, while various paramilitary groups declare they will not surrender more goods. High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank Pearl has stated the preliminary budget for 2008 is \$130 million.

### Schedule

Originally, demobilisation from November 2003 to December 2005, though the last demobilisation occurred in August 2006, for a total of 33 months altogether. Social reintegration reinitiated in 2007.

The peace process in Colombia has experienced numerous crises which have led to considerable setbacks for AUC demobilisation. The process was supposed to have demobilised the AUC by the end of 2005. Demobilisations thus far have occurred in three stages, which we can verify in the tables that follow. In October 2005, almost half of AUC members were not yet demobilised.

### Phases

#### Disarmament and demobilisation

Disarmament and demobilisation occurs in designated spots, or Areas of Concentration, and within a limited timeframe of one to two weeks, depending on the number

of demobilised persons. The collective demobilisation process is divided into two stages. The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace overlooks the first stage, which consists of three phases:

1. Awareness-raising, preparation, and equipping (15-30 days).
2. Gathering, demobilisation, and verification (2-10 days).
3. Initiation of reincorporation into places of origin (approximately 8 days).

In the third phase, assistance centres located in the different regions where the demobilisations occur start to attend to and accompany the demobilised population. These centres provide four types of assistance: legal, social, humanitarian, and employment assistance. The Colombian government provides \$155 per month of humanitarian aid for a maximum period of 18 months. It provides this money, in addition to a monthly allowance of \$25 for transportation in necessary cases, to persons receiving training or starting businesses. The government also gives a one-time \$45 payment to each person for return to their place of origin.

Following this, units to be demobilised march to a reception point where they wait for a lorry to bring them to an Area of Concentration. These units spend a couple of days in these areas. Area personnel register them, verify their criminal record, have them confess to their crimes, select a place for their social reinsertion, and identify training and work programmes of their choice. Digital camera equipment, iris scanners, fingerprinting machinery, and electronic devices for collecting signatures enable quick issuance of identity cards and other related documents. Members of these units are also given a supply of toiletries and civilian clothing. Those persons wanted by the law for atrocities are sent to a location in Santa Fe de Ralito, where they are made to await trial.

During this period, an official demobilisation ceremony is held at which the combatants surrender their arms, which are brought to a military base for safekeeping. Explosives are destroyed immediately. MAPP-OEA verifies the list of demobilised persons and the arms surrendered by them.

For the demobilisation of child soldiers, IOM Colombia, with \$9 million of funds from USAID, \$2 million from Canada, and \$1 million from Italy, carries out a series of projects for attending to these youth on behalf of the ICBF. This programme to attend to child soldiers began in 2001. Initial projections were for the project to end in 2008, but current estimates project it to extend until 2010. Its activities include giving technical assistance to the ICBF, giving logistical support, promoting community and family reintegration, and implementing national strategies for recruitment prevention. More specifically, the model of attention to these youth contains three different phases, with a duration and itinerary proportional to their age and origins. Youth Opportunity and Reference Centres

(CROJs) are orientation centres for underage youth at risk of recruitment. The social and psychological assistance provided at these centres is comprehensive and specialised. The centres help admitted youth identify appropriate income-generating opportunities. Since their implementation in 2001, these programmes have received 3,577 persons, 74% male and the rest female. They have come from very different places and more than half have originated from the FARC. Amongst the more demanded services are vocational training, access to education, and sanitary services (IOM Colombia 2007).

War Child Holland also intervenes in this process. It collaborates with the Juan Bosco Corporation, the Workshop of Life, and Shooting Cameras for Peace. These organisations focus on social reintegration and youth recruitment prevention.

### Reintegration

Reintegration covers a period of 18 months starting from the arrival of demobilised persons at a place of their choosing. The social reintegration programme is managed by the Ministry of Justice and the Interior through its Programme for Reincorporation into Civilian Life. This programme operates through Opportunity and Reference Centres (CROs). The basic structure of the programme consists of providing assistance for relocation, providing a personal monthly allowance of \$155 for 18 months (for a total of \$2,790), supplying a \$45 allowance for return to originating communities, offering psychosocial and legal aid, and imparting academic and technical training. In order to receive the monthly payments, demobilised persons are required to participate in 80% of programmed activities in the first three initial months of their demobilisation. Activities might include sessions on social psychology or activities involving family or community. The demobilised persons receive an additional \$75 for this participation. The effort and commitment of the demobilised person, in the form of study and assistance at workshops and sessions, determines the level of support for social reintegration after the third month. Because of this, the money that demobilised persons receive after the third month is variable.

The Colombian government, through the President's Office, the Programme for Reincorporation into Civilian Life of the Ministry of Justice and the Interior, and eight other institutions, encourages participation in "employment projects for peace" for members of the AUC

who demobilise in a collective manner and for persons displaced from areas where demobilisations occur.

In advocating for decentralisation, the High Advisory Group on Reintegration created a National Network for Attention to Demobilised Persons in 2007. This network consists to 37 Service Centres whose purpose it is to give assistance to demobilised persons and their families. It aims to coordinate the payments of the different benefits and allowances with the input of local authorities as well as private institutions involved in DDR. Financing for creation of this network comes from USAID, while the IOM provides technical support.

The mission in Colombia sees the High Advisory Group's focus on regional work as positive. This focus allows the group to remain close to and dialogue with local authorities and civilian organisations, who are trained and can contribute to the social reintegration of ex-combatants, and to assist in creating local plans for social reintegration. For this reason, the mission has created Committees for Regional Monitoring. The National Policy for Economic and Social Reintegration (PNRSE) is divided into a component focused on the reintegration of individuals and a component focused on communities.

The High Advisory Group on Integration has identified 37,287 combatants, both individuals and collectives, who qualify for reintegration. Of this amount, 19,860, or 53%, are currently working.

### Evolution

#### Disarmament and demobilisation

By March 2006, at the end of the demobilisation process for the AUC, the process had managed to demobilise 41,026 members, 31,671 in 36 separate collective demobilisations. Roughly 6% were women. In terms of location, 32% of demobilised persons were from Antioquia, 14.5% from Córdoba, 10.5% from Cesar, 8.6% from Magdalena, and 6.8% from Santander. There were 28,751 men and 2,920 women.

A total **18,051 arms** were collected, a ratio of 0.57 arms per person. In order to avoid possible losses or thefts from arsenals, as occurred in previous demobilisation processes, these arms were stored and destroyed towards the end of 2006. Various NGOs warned that destruction of these arms could impair investigations of crimes committed by the AUC.

Bloc	Date	Comb	Arms	Arms / comb.
Cacique Nutibara	09/12/03	868	497	0.57
Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Ortega	11/12/03	167	49	0.29
Bananero	25/11/04	451	351	0.78
Self-Defence Forces of South Magdalena and the San Fernando Island	04/12/04	48	38	0.81
Self-Defence Forces of Cundimarca	10/12/04	148	156	1
Catatumbo	10/12/04	1,434	1.114	0.78
Calima	11/12/04	564	451	0.8

Self-Defence Forces of Córdoba	18/01/05	925	393	0.42
Southwestern Antioquia Front	30/01/05	126	103	0.82
Mojana Front	01/02/05	109	103	0.93
Heroes of Tolová	15/06/05	464	256	0.55
Mountains of Mary	14/07/05	594	365	0.61
Liberators of the South	30/07/05	689	596	0.86
Heroes of Granada	01/08/05	2,033	1,120	0.55
Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Meta and Vichada	12/08/05	209	232	1.1
Pacific	23/08/05	358	144	0.4
Rings of Security <sup>1</sup>	27/08/05	300	195	0.65
Centauros	03/09/05	1,134	705	0.6
Northwestern Antioquia	11/09/05	222	153	0.69
Vichada Front	24/09/05	325	282	0.87
Tolima	22/10/05	207	51	0.25
Northeastern Antioquia, Bajo Cauca, and Magdalena Medio Fronts	14/12/05	1,922	1,386	0.72
Guática Martyrs Front	15/12/05	552	351	0.63
Victors of Arauca	23/12/05	548	399	0.73
Miners	20/01/06	2,789	1,433	0.51
Self-Defence Forces of Puerto Boyacá	28/01/06	742	316	0.43
Central Bolívar-South of Bolívar	31/01/06	2,519	1,094	0.43
Tayrona Resistance	03/02/06	1,166	597	0.51
Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Magdalena Medio	07/02/06	990	757	0.76
Heroes of Caguán, Heroes of Andaquíes, and Heroes of Florenia of the Central Bolívar Bloc	15/02/06	552	341	0.62
South Putumayo Front	01/03/06	504	292	0.58
Julio Peinado Becerra Front	04/03/06	251	179	0.71
North Bloc	08/03/06	2,215	625	0.71
North Bloc	10/03/06	2,544	835	0.32
Heroes of Llano and Guavire Front	11/04/06	1,765	1,024	0.33
Coastal Front	12/04/06	309	220	0.58
Pavarandó and Dabeiba Fronts of the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc	30/04/06	484	360	0.74
Mid-Northern Salaquí Front of the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc	15/08/06	743	488	0.66
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12/03 - 08/06</b>	<b>31,671</b>	<b>18,051</b>	<b>0.57</b>

Source: MAPP-0EA (2007)

Year	Combatants	Arms	Arms / combatants
2003	1,035	546	0.53
2004	2,645	2,110	0.8
2005	10,417	6,834	0.66
2006	17,573	8,561	0.49
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>31,671</b>	<b>18,051</b>	<b>0.57</b>

Source: MAPP-0EA (2007)

These demobilisations have occurred in the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, Bogotá, Cesar, Magdalena, Santander, Atlántico, Meta, Valle del Cauca, Bolívar, Cundinamarca, Santander north, Sucre, Boyacá, Tolima, Risaralda, Chocó, and Casanare.

Numerous crises have arisen in Colombia during the peace process. The incorporation of wanted drug traffickers in the negotiation team of the AUC, demands for extradition of some leaders, divergence of views between the AUC and the Colombian government

over the Justice and Peace Law, and violations of cessations of hostilities have motivated these crises. At the start of October 2005, a new crisis emerged over the incarceration of a leader of the AUC who the United States sought for extradition. This caused a temporary suspension of demobilisations that remained for processing, and affected some 12,000 AUC members.

The OAS claimed that at least 4,000 demobilised paramilitaries had returned to their criminal activities and had become involved again in drug trafficking and the control of territory for exporting cocaine and contraband arms. The OAS identified 22 new armed groups. According to the media, new armed groups called the Black Eagles have infiltrated 226 municipalities in 24 departments of Colombia, and particularly in the departments of Valle, Cauca, and Nariño.

The OAS also claimed that stigmatisation of the demobilised population was a major obstacle hindering the social reinsertion process. Despite the fact that

most ex-combatants have returned to their communities and faced the challenges of returning to civilian life, participation by a minority in criminal activities has created a negative image which has impeded full inclusion into community, family, and social life.

### Reintegration

Between 2002 and 2006, the Colombian government administered 48,907 training courses in different fields. The Ministry of Justice and the Interior offered these courses. Of the total demobilised persons, 11,023 participated in courses run by SENA, 2,883 participated in courses held at university, while 14,309 had permanent employment. At the end of 2006, High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank Pearl stated the intention of this training was to facilitate transition from the reinsertion phase to the reintegration phase.

The report on control and monitoring of the process of demobilisation of paramilitaries, published by the Colombian police in September 2007, stated that from 2003 to today, 737 ex-paramilitaries have died in varying circumstances, but mainly in acts of violence, and 251 of these deaths occurred in Antioquia. The report added that police arrested 1,553 demobilised persons for criminal actions after the surrendering of their arms in the demobilisation process.

At the start of March 2007, representatives for 15,000 demobilised persons criticised the reintegration process before the High Commissioner for Reintegration. Ex-combatants criticised the lack of work and training opportunities available to them, and more generally, the fact that they did not participate in creating alternatives. These representatives also warned that new paramilitary groups were emerging and causing insecurity, and that some ex-combatants found it more appealing to pick up arms again. Frank Pearl has recognised the government's delay in equipping demobilised persons and has made known public figures which show basic services have reached only a minority of people.

In relation to this, a new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) indicated that although the Colombian government considers the demobilisation of the AUC positive, the lingering existence of groups who did not participate in negotiations between the government and the AUC, in addition to the rearmament of some demobilised paramilitaries, is troublesome. The report stated that new armed groups, containing a total of at least 3,000 combatants, had strong links to criminal organisations and drug trafficking, as well as business dealings with the FARC and ELN. Nevertheless, Frank Pearl stated in July 2007 that 95% of ex-combatants are committed to the reintegration process. As general recommendations, the ICG suggested a comprehensive strategy be implemented to combat these new armed groups. Under control of the military, the Colombian government should combine intelligence services whilst emphasising the law, respecting human rights, and holding up exemplars of demobilised paramilitaries who have managed to reintegrate into civil society.

This comprehensive strategy should incorporate larger infrastructures in rural areas and more development programmes. Lastly, the ICG report made concrete recommendations for the government, the armed forces and police, the attorney general and the Supreme Court, the OAS Verification Mission, the EU, the OAS, and the government of the United States (ICG 2007).

The trimester report of the MAPP-OEA, published in November 2007, warned of the continuance of "the influence of ex-paramilitary commanders who did not participate in the peace process started by the government and the presence of middle commanders in hiding," as well as the existence of a direct link between areas of illicit cultivation and corridors containing rearmed structures and groups.

Consequently, some members of the dismantled AUC have made their way into private armies with marked Mafia-like natures, servicing the drug trade. Finally, this trimester report also suggested that social reintegration has begun to take on a new course with changes to policy in Colombia, as implemented by the High Advisory Group on Reintegration, though the policy should be able to overcome some obstacles in the medium term. These obstacles include a lack of interest from some local governments; institutional dismantlement; stigmatisation of the demobilised population, which has repercussions on social reinsertion; a lack of motivation from ex-combatants, stemming from delays to policy implementation; scarce opportunities for permanent employment in regions with large informal economies; the non-operability of employment projects; and a difficult security situation for demobilised persons, who are victims to homicide and threats in certain areas of the country.

The IOM, the Presidential High Advisory Group on Reintegration, and the Ethanol Consortium Board signed an agreement in July 2007 whose goal it was to create 1,500 jobs for demobilised combatants and vulnerable persons in the ethanol industry. The Controlsud International Group and USAID will finance this project, as part of the IOM public-private cooperation strategy. The project will hire workers to plant sugarcane and to construct three production plants in three municipalities in the north of the country where armed groups are present in high numbers and unemployment is high. In a similar initiative, the private corporation Comexa announced at the end of November 2007 the purchase of 1,840 metric tonnes of chilli, collected by 320 demobilised soldiers and members of the population in vulnerable circumstances. This plantation is a part of the Community Development and Reintegration Programme of the IOM, carried out in the departments of Antioquia and Sucre as a first public-private initiative, together with the cement company Argos (IOM Colombia 2007).

At the end of the year, the Colombian government destroyed more than 18,000 arms collected from the AUC in its process of demobilisation. These arms

were melted down in the foundry of the Department of Boyacá, in the presence of High Commissioner for Peace Luís Carlos Restrepo, as well as other authorities. High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank Pearl said the government expected the majority of FARC members to demobilise. He also assured that of the 36,000 ex-combatants in the charge of the Office of Reinsertion, 20,000 were working while the remaining 16,000 were studying.

### *Lessons learned*

#### **AUC:**

- Paramilitary groups preserve structures of political control
- Internal fighting in the AUC and with other paramilitary groups
- Control of the process by the AUC themselves
- Lack of pressure on the AUC to redress victims through the return of land and property confiscated during the conflict
- Interference from the United States in demanding extradition of AUC leaders accused of drug trafficking
- Demobilisations inflated by persons outside of the AUC
- Insufficient government investment for areas controlled by the AUC
- Formation of new paramilitary groups with demobilised persons

#### **Violence:**

- Violations of cessations of hostilities with assassinations of hundreds of persons over the process
- Assassination of more than a hundred ex-combatants

#### **Planning:**

- Excessive time for demobilisation, due to the specific features of the AUC
- Absence of resources for the redress of victims
- Lack of clear rules on the process
- Scarce means from the OAS to fulfil its verification commitment
- Little clarity on the budgets of the overall peace process
- New conception for the reintegration process through the High Advisory Group

#### **Other aspects:**

- Lack of state recognition of historic links and responsibility for the general uprising and development of the paramilitary phenomenon
- Lack of social and political consensus on the application of justice
- Existence of procedural blanks in the Justice and Peace Law
- Absence of negotiation and DDR prospects with guerrillas
- Role of private enterprise in the social reintegration of ex-combatants.



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## Glossary

ACR	Alta Consejería para la Reintegración Social y Económica de Personas y Grupos
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CRO	Centro de Referencias y Oportunidades
CROJ	Centro de Referencias y Oportunidades Juveniles
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EU	European Union
FARC	Frente Armado Revolucionario de Colombia
ICBF	Instituto de Bienestar Familiar
ICG	International Crisis Group
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MAPP-OEA	OAS Mission to the Support the Peace Process
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
PNRSE	Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica
PRT	Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Colombia
SENA	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# Republic of the Congo (PNDDR, 2005 – 2008)

## Basic data

Population:	4.1 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	7,800 (2007)
Refugee population:	20,609 (2007)
GDP:	\$3.8 billion (2005)
Per capita income:	\$950 (2006)
HDI:	0.548, 139th
GDI:	0.540, 120th
Military expenditure:	1.15%
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.27%
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral demobilisation of militias for security-sector reform in a post war context
Groups to demobilise	30,000 ex-combatants of different militias
Executive bodies	High Commission for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants, created by the National Programme of DDR (PNDDR)
Budget	\$25 million
Timeline	From December 2005 to December 2008
Status / synopsis	According to the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the programme in the Republic of the Congo has completed registration of self-demobilised ex-combatants whilst awaiting start of payments for the social reintegration phase and negotiations linking reintegration to agricultural projects.

## Context

### Conflict

The Republic of the Congo has suffered four consecutive conflicts, in 1993-94, 1997, 1998-99, and 2001-03. Essentially, these conflicts resulted from the fight for political power and general instability in the country since independence in 1960. Dennis Sassou Nguesso ruled the Republic of the Congo from 1979-92. In 1992, Pascal Lissouba won elections for the presidency, but in 1997 Sassou Nguesso returned to government in a violent manner with help from Angola. The fight for control of the government developed into a cycle of conflict with confrontations occurring between political factions. In the latest conflict, 15,000 persons died, predominantly from the Pool region in the south. The Ninja militias, who have fought the government, reside in the Pool region (Gonsolin 2006).

### Peace process

In November 1999, through mediation from the president of Gabon, the Republic of the Congo signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and a month later, a Ceasefire Agreement. In January 2002, the country approved a new constitution, and in March of the same year, fighting resumed between the armed forces and the Ninja militias for a year. In August 2002, a transitional government was created. In April 2003, 2,300 Ninjas surrendered their arm after signing a peace accord in March.

### International presence

In 2005, the United Nations opened an office of Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs in the Pool region, where the majority of the Ninja militias reside, to participate in the renewal of the area. Other institutions including the UNDP (support for the National Programme of DDR and implementation of Arms for Development) and the IOM (youth employment initiatives) also participate.

### Transitional justice

In November 1999, after signing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the government of the Republic of the Congo offered a general amnesty for all the war activity which occurred in different conflicts throughout the country since 1993. In August 2003, the National Assembly approved an amnesty for the Ninjas, militias, and mercenaries who had participated in these conflicts, with the agreement that human rights abuses committed after 2000 would not be investigated.

### Security-sector reform

Security-sector reform is part of the peace agreement, but it has still not been implemented. For elections held in April 2006, 18 brigades were supposed to be deployed, but only six were available for this. Both in economic and strategic terms, security-sector reform has been abandoned. A clear example of this can be found in the fact that \$410 is offered to leave the armed forces, whilst only \$10 in monthly salary is provided to remain in the armed forces. In terms of international accompaniment, both EU Police (EUPOL) and EU Security Sector Reform (EUSAC) have not shown much support for this (ICG 2006).

### Other disarmament initiatives

In November 2006, the UNDP temporarily postponed its arms collection programme, Arms for Development, in order to aid supply difficulties, which had delayed distribution of equipment to persons surrendering their arms.

Minister of Defence General J. Yvon stated in April 2007 that the large number of illegal arms in circulation in the Republic of the Congo constituted a security risk for the country, particularly for elections scheduled in June and July of the year. There are between 34,000 and 40,000 illegal arms in the country, mainly found in the Pool region. The PNDDR is responsible for their collection. At the same time, the second Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programme (PCAD II) was set to commence in January 2008, and will last until June 2009.

The arms collection process is set to resume in January 2008 with collaboration from the PNDDR and \$2 million of financing from Japan. The first arms collection occurred prior to June 2006 and received \$2 million from the European Union for it.

### Background to DDR

Since 1999, various initiatives linked to phases of DDR have been launched, and at times have overlapped.

1. In January 2000, after the 1999 Ceasefire Agreement, the newly created Committee for Monitoring Agreements conducted a wide-ranging initiative to buy back arms and register some of the numerous combatants. At that time, the government of the Republic of the Congo proposed to register and demobilise as many as 22,000 ex-combatants, mainly Ninja, Cocoye, and Cobra militias, and collect some 71,500 arms. In 2000, however, only 6,500 arms were collected, and

some 15,000 ex-combatants registered themselves but neither demobilised nor reintegrated. These persons each received \$20, at a total cost of \$300,000.

2. In the 18 months between July 2000 and December 2002, the UNDP and the IOM developed a new disarmament project for ex-combatants involving the collection and destruction of arms, but also with a reintegration component and development of micro-projects. With a budget of \$4.37 million provided by the UNDP (\$1.3 million), Sweden (\$1.0 million), the European Union (\$700,000), Norway (\$600,000), and the government of the Republic of the Congo itself (\$400,000), the project's goal was to collect 15,000-20,000 arms. At the end of 2002, around 11,000 ex-combatants had received some kind of partial assistance for social reintegration, though in January 2003 the demobilisation programme had to attend to another 5,570 ex-combatants. Resumption of fighting between the government and the Ninjas led to a disruption of the DDR programme in 2002 for a year's time. At the end of this, the disarmament initiative had collected 11,140 arms, 3,100 small arms, and 8,000 grenades and explosives, which were all destroyed. As part of reintegration, the UNDP gave an average of \$350 to each ex-combatant for their arms surrender, depending on the quality of the arm. By the end of the programme, at the end of 2002, 8,019 ex-combatants had benefited officially from reintegration services. At \$3.6 million, \$448 per ex-combatant, these integration services involved the financing of 2,610 micro-projects. In 2001, 2,500 ex-combatants joined the armed forces.
3. After its creation in October 2001, the High Commissioner for Ex-Combatants launched a new reintegration project for three militias containing 3,800 ex-combatants, with a \$5 million contribution from the World Bank. The High Commissioner opened an office in the capital and five regional branch offices, which finance 1,505 micro-projects for 3,732 ex-combatants, at an average of \$270 per person. Other sources cite 2,417 projects for 6,658 ex-combatants, of which only 1,130 were from the conflictive Pool region. The World Bank credit was supposed to be the first of two devices to reintegrate a total 10,000 ex-combatants and their families over a three-year period from September 2001 to August 2004. More recent government sources state that 8,500 ex-combatants received support for social reintegration in this stage, which between the second and third phases amounts to 16,500 reintegrated persons. The World Bank cites this figure in an October 2004 report.
4. In April 2003, the EU awarded 730,000 euros to a DDR programme for a group of 1,000 Ninja militias in the Pool region. The programme commenced formally in 2004 with the surrender of a cannon by Ninja leader Pastor Ntoumi. However, shortly afterwards Ntoumi placed new conditions on the disarmament of his troops, which the government

did not accept. After a year without any progress, the EU ended up withdrawing funds for this programme. This occurred in the months July-August 2005, after the demobilisation of 478 combatants and the surrender of 478 arms and 3,632 munitions, which were destroyed. The beneficiaries of this programme decided on training, transfer to their communities of origin, or development of micro-projects.


5. In August 2004, the UNDP launched a second DDR programme for the Ninja militias called "disarmament for development" with a budget of 2 million euros. It is calculated that there are 16,000 militia combatants in this group who have not participated in any DDR programme.
6. In February 2005, donor countries for development in the Congo met in Paris to examine the Republic of the Congo's new PNDDR. According to the government, five components must be borne in mind: disarmament, demobilisation and social and economic reinsertion, child soldiers (currently financed by the United States with \$352,000), conflict prevention, and security-sector reform. The DDR programme aims to disarm and reintegrate all ex-combatants, 25,000 according to the World Bank, who have not participated in previous DDR attempts. The government of the Republic of the Congo requested \$25 million for this programme, which would be financed by the World Bank MDRP.
7. In March 2005, a special DDR programme for 450 Ninja ex-combatants was initiated. Responsibility for this programme was assumed entirely by the government at a cost of \$430,000 for a period of three months. Despite the fact that a joint commission of the government and Ninja militias already exists for dealing with disarmament and the social reintegration of combatants, start to DDR has suffered repeat setbacks, generating a climate of insecurity which has endangered the already weakened peace process.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

*National Programme of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reinsertion (PNDDR)*

Bilateral demobilisation of militias for security-sector reform in a post-war context.



Source: World Bank (2005a)

### Executive bodies

The executive body is the High Commissioner for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants (HCREC), created in 2001, though the UNDP, the HCREC, the ILO, and the IOM have organised some initiatives. At the operational level, four units have been established:

- An Information and Communication Management Unit
- A Finance and Accounting Management Unit
- A Contracts Adjudication Unit
- An Evaluation and Control Unit

Offices will be located in Dolisie, Sibiti, Nkayi, Kinkala, Brazzaville, Gamboma, and Owando.

The national structure is the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reinsertion (CONADER). It performs varied functions, which include determining the policies and strategies of the government around the monitoring of programme implementation, adoption of programme activities, and approval of the budget by the High Commissioner (World Bank 2005a).

For the implementation of this process, the MDRP decided to apply the experiences acquired from other DDR programmes in the Great Lakes region of Africa, in order to comprehend political commitments, the necessity for effective demobilisation, to combat the precariousness of the reintegration phase, to understand the necessity for focussed assistance, to create long-term employment, to promote social reintegration as facilitated by the extended family unit, to attend to the prevention of violence and stigmatisation of ex-combatants, to reunify underage minors with their families, and to manage institutional coordination and decentralisation (World Bank 2005b).

### Basic principles

The National Programme of DDR will develop in accordance to the components that follow. Its chief objectives are to contribute to the peace process, to promote political stability in the country, to promote national security for the region, to advance national reconciliation, and to support social and economic reconstruction. More concretely, its specific objectives are:

- Disarmament of holders of illegal war arms.
- Disarmament and social and economic reinsertion of ex-combatants.
- Prevention of new mobilisation by self-demobilised ex-combatants.
- Promotion of integration of child soldiers and youth disabled by war.
- Prevention and regulation of conflicts for redirecting violence.
- Contribution to defence and security-sector reform.

The first three of these points are the responsibility of the High Commissioner, the disarmament process is responsibility of the UNDP, and security-sector reform is the responsibility of the state's armed forces. This programme is focused on a regional outlook which takes into account the insecurity that plagues the entire Great Lakes region through illegal cross-border circulation of arms.

### Participants

Figures for passed and potential future beneficiaries are contradictory, though a realistic figure is around 30,000 ex-combatants, namely 19,000 ex-combatants in the two programmes implemented between July 2000 and August 2004, and ex-combatants of the new programme created in 2005, amongst them 5,000 rebels in the Pool region and 6,000 members of the armed forces (Gonsolin 2006).

Five types of combatants exist:

- Regular forces
- Irregular forces (Ninjas, Cocoyes, and Cobras)
- Self-defence and auxiliary units
- Regular foreign forces (Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DR Congo). It is estimated that there are around 4,000 soldiers of the DR Congo and more than 1,000 Rwandans in the country.
- Irregular foreign forces (Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DR Congo)

The United Nations estimates that around 1,500 youth may have joined the ranks of armed groups, whilst the World Bank MDRP calculates this number to be 1,800. According to official numbers, 5% combatants are women, though experience suggests that this percentage is higher.

### Eligibility criteria

- Participation in armed combat or provision of logistical support during the civil war.
- Having indicated certain preference for a type of training or micro-project to create employment.
- Not having other remunerative employment.
- Not having benefited from the UNDP-IOM Collection and Reintegration programme carried out from 2000 to 2002, or the HCREC's Reintegration Programme.

### Budget and financiers

In 2006, a budget of \$25 million, \$17 million from the World Bank, was put to implementing a new programme of integration for 30,000 combatants. The average

benefit received by combatant was \$613 per \$833 in costs. The budget was distributed by phase as follows:

Phase	Millions \$	%
Demobilisation and transition	2.4 (1.5)	9.6 (6)
Socio-economic reintegration	16.5 (10.8)	66 (43.2)
Reintegration support for communities	1 (0.65)	4 (2.6)
Assistance to special groups	1 (0.65)	4 (2.6)
Prevention of violence	0.5 (0.33)	2 (1.3)
Other	3.6 (2)	14.4 (8)
<b>Estimated total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100</b>

*Note:* The quantity contributed by the MDRP is indicated in parenthesis

*Source:* World Bank (2005b)

The government of Japan and the UNDP signed an agreement in February 2007 in which Tokyo agreed to finance the disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants with \$2 million. This process of disarmament is part of the Project for the Collection of Arms, which thus far has collected some 1,000 arms and expects to collect as many as 15,000 arms by the end of 2008. This project also counts on \$17 million of financing from the World Bank and another \$2.6 million from the European Commission.

### Schedule

Since 2000, various initiatives, some occurring over months and others lasting for several years, have been developed. The current World Bank programme, PCAD I and II, was planned to begin at the end of 2005 and end in 2008, for a total of 36 months.

### Phases

#### Demobilisation

Demobilisation will occur in conjunction with payment of \$150 monthly for three months to cover the necessities of demobilised persons. Regular armed forces will be stationed in military barracks whilst armed opposition groups will be placed in designated stationing centres. Identification in the form of identity cards will be issued and other information will be processed. Material on sanitary care and the prevention of HIV/AIDS will also be provided (UNDP Congo, 2006).

#### Reintegration

With regard to national residents, the following in reference to social and economic reintegration must be mentioned:

*Social:* The High Commissioner for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants allocates \$25,000 to each community for rehabilitation initiatives within social or cultural projects as part of a preparative process that includes representatives of civil society.

*Economic:* Through assistance from the HCREC and the ILO, macro-projects will be developed to create opportunities in sectors such as agriculture, fishing, cattle, and crafts.

## Evolution

In January 2004, some 1,875 child soldiers, 375 or 20% of which were girls, were registered for demobilisation. In September 2005, Japan awarded \$1 million to the UNDP for setting in motion a project called "Community Action for the Reintegration of Youth Ex-Combatants", which would benefit 15,000 at-risk youth, whilst the German Technical Cooperation announced support, until 2009, for the reintegration of child soldiers in the country.

In October 2005, preparations commenced for the PNDDR, which counts on financial support from the World Bank and is geared at 30,000 ex-combatants, the majority of which belong to the Ninja armed group. Of this number, 3,600 are child soldiers and 1,000 are disabled persons. According to the High Commissioner for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants, 9,000 combatants had demobilised before November 2005 and 3,222 micro-projects, of which 75% continue to be operational, had been financed. In 90% of these micro-projects, officials have given medical and psychological support.

In March 2006, the government of the Republic of the Congo initiated a pilot project to reintegrate 115 former child soldiers in the capital, Brazzaville. The Office of Government Work runs this project, which lasts one month. It consists in providing youths with access to formal education and promoting prevention of HIV/AIDS. The project is financed by the government of the United States, with a total amount of \$312,000.

In April 2007, the government and representatives of the old rebel movement the CNR (National Council of Resistance), better known as the Ninjas, led by Frédéric Bintsangou, alias Pastor Ntoumi, signed an agreement to appoint Mr. Bintsangou Minister of Humanitarian Affairs for the country. This agreement was the result of

negotiations held since 2005 between the government and the CNR. The new agreement also called for the destruction of arms in the hands of Pastor Ntoumi's militias, as well as the integration of 250 members of his militia into the armed forces.

In 2007 according to the MDRP, the project completed registration of self-demobilised ex-combatants, whilst it awaited start of payments for the reintegration phase (only 2,417 of the 7,778 beneficiaries identified had received subsidies), in addition to negotiations linking this programme to other agricultural projects. In 2007, the programme focussed on reintegrating 10,000 ex-combatants but only achieved this for 2,417 ex-combatants, though 9,160 persons received medical and psychosocial assistance (MDRP 2007).

The PNDDR intends to remain active in the country until August 2009 with prolongation to the three projects it is implementing.

## Lessons learned

- Planning:
- Absence of an authentic DDR programme.
- No realisation of security-sector reform.
- Presence of soldiers and militias from other countries, including Gabon and the Central African Republic.
- Interruption to the programme with the Ninjas for one year.
- Lack of knowledge on the real number of ex-combatants.
- Very long delay to start of the demobilisation of already registered militia combatants
- Weak vocational training.
- Lack of control, monitoring, and evaluation.

## Funding:

Failure in credit systems for micro-business

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## Glossary

CNR	National Council of Resistance
CONADER	National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration
EU	European Union
EUPOL	EU Police
EUSAC	EU Security Sector Reform
HCREC	High Commissioner for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants
ICG	International Crisis Group
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for the Migrations
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
PCAD	Projet de collecte des armes de guerre pour le développement
PNDDR	National Program on DDR
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# DR Congo

## (DDRR and NDDRP, DDR in Ituri, 2002 - ...)¹

### Basic data

Population:	59.3 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	1.4 million (2007)
Refugee population:	402,000 (2007)
GDP:	\$8,543 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$130 (2006)
HDI:	0.411, 168 <sup>th</sup> (2005)
GDI:	0.398, 147 <sup>th</sup> (2005)
Military expenditure:	1.98% (2006)
Social / military expenditure:	Military greater than social
Military population:	0.08%
Arms embargo:	UN: since 2003 (for "armed movements and groups"); EU: since 1993

### Summary

Type of DDR	
Groups to demobilise	
Executive bodies	
Budget	
Timeline	
Status / synopsis	

### Context

#### Conflict

The current conflict originated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which eventually caused the latter to hand over power in 1997. During the following year, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with a number of armed groups, attempted to overthrow Kabila, who in turn received help from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has left around four million people dead. Control over the country's natural resources and their exploitation contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and the continuing presence of foreign troops. The signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1999 and various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the formation of a transitional government. This was followed by the introduction of an elected government in 2006, though this has not meant an end to violence in the country, given the presence of factions of groups that have not yet demobilised, as well as the FDLR, which was responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.<sup>2</sup>

#### Peace process

The first stage in the peace process was the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, which was signed in July 1999 by the different countries and armed groups involved in the conflict. This agreement was reached with the facilitation of the regional organisation SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) and primarily South Africa. It enabled the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in November 1999 (UN Security Council Resolution 1291) to monitor the ceasefire and promote the disarmament of the militias. Its mandate is divided into four phases: enforcing the ceasefire agreements signed in Lusaka; monitoring any violation of the agreements; organising the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants; and facilitating the transition in order to organise credible elections. However, the conflict continued

1 This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: Amnesty International (2007), Bouta (2005), UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2008), MDRP (2008), UNDP DR Congo (2007).

2 Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 26)



in the east of the country. Laurent Desiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, took over. It was only then that J. Kabila revitalised and promoted the Inter-Congolese Dialogues (ICD) held in South Africa. The ICD led to negotiations between the belligerent parties in Sun City, which led to the signing of agreement at the end of these negotiations, called the Global and Inclusive Agreement, signed in Pretoria in December 2002. The Sun City Final Agreement was reached in April 2003, bringing together and summarising the previous agreements. The Mai-Mai militias participated in the Inter-Congolese Dialogues, but they later divided into several groups, some of which are still active. The Ituri and Mai-Mai militias in the north of Katanga did not sign the Pretoria agreement. In parallel, between 2000 and 2002, other peace agreements were reached on the withdrawal of several foreign troops from Congolese territory. However, subsequently, some countries, in particular Rwanda, have been accused of continuing military intervention within the DR Congo. The Sun City Final Agreement led to the integration of the government and the armed opposition groups into the Transitional National Government (TNG). Joseph Kabila kept his office as president of this government and four vice-presidents were appointed, representing the government, the MLC, the RCD/Goma and the unarmed opposition. The agreement called for a two-year transitional phase, after which general elections would be held and new Congolese armed forces would be formed, which would be made up of the different armed opposition groups. Despite this, confrontations have persisted in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Katanga and the Ituri district (Orientale province, in the northeast of the country). These clashes are between local armed groups and they protest the presence of the MONUC.<sup>3</sup>

### International accompaniment

MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in French Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) was established by Resolution 1279 (S/RES/1279) of 30 November 1999, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Supporting the government of the DR Congo and administered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the mission comprises four phases: the first involves establishing peace; the second involves supervising ceasefire; the third (still in force) entails DDRRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reconciliation); and the fourth and current phase, deals with supporting the DR Congo's political transition and organisation of elections. The mission includes 17,030 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police instructors, and 750 members of constituted police units. The last phase of the mission, extended until 31 December 2007, was established by Resolution 1756 (S/RES/2007) of 15 May 2007. This resolution cites the importance of reintegrating ex-combatants and of security-sector reform for

stabilising the country.<sup>4</sup>

The European Union, backed by Council Joint Action 2005/355/PESC of 2 May 2005 and within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, retains a technical-support operation for security-sector reform which is composed of two missions: EUSEC DR Congo (EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DR Congo), created in June 2005 and composed of 40 persons dedicated to the reform of the armed forces; and EUPOL DR Congo (EU Police Mission in DR Congo), composed of 39 members dedicated to police reform. On 1 July 2007, EUPOL DR Congo took over from EUPOL-Kinshasa which had operated in the country since 2005. The mission plans to continue EUPOL DR Congo until June 2008.

## DDRRR (2002 - ...)

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

DDR in the DR Congo is designated as DDRRR.

This involves disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement of foreign combatants. On occasions it is known simply as "MONUC's programme (of repatriation)".

### Executive bodies

MONUC disarms combatants, guarantees their security, and transfers them to their countries of origin where they are assisted by national reintegration programmes of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, MDRP (MONUC 2007).

### Participants

MONUC's programme targets foreign "armed elements and their families". In 2007, the UN mission calculated that it had dealt with a total of 20,000 to 25,000 persons (MONUC 2007). The involved armed groups, organised by country of origin, are the following (Swarbrick 2003; Hendricks and Kisiangani 2007; Young 2007a):

**Rwanda:** Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, in French Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda), including former Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR, in French Forces armées rwandaises), former Interhamwe, and former Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR, in French Armée pour la libération du Rwanda), amongst others. Numerous factions out arisen out of the FDLR.

**Uganda:** Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II), Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA), and West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB).

**Burundi:** Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and National Liberation Forces (FNL, in French Forces nationales de libération).

**Angola:** National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, in Portuguese União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola).

<sup>3</sup> Extracted from Fisas (2006: 76-77)

<sup>4</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2005)

## Eligibility criteria

Eligibility criteria are determined to a certain extent by the receptor country since it is responsible for reintegration activities. However, coordination on this matter still does occur between governments, MONUC, and other implicated agents. For example, the criteria determined for Burundian ex-combatants were as follows:

- Surrender of a specific quota of arms and ammunition;
- Identification by the corresponding commanding official;
- Affiliation prior to the signing of the ceasefire to a known armed group which participated in military actions;
- Demonstration of basic military knowledge; and
- Burundian nationality (World Bank 2004: 17; cf. for Rwanda, World Bank 2002: 17).

## Budget and financing

The budget for DDRRR is an integral part of MONUC. MONUC is the UN mission with the greatest current scope, but the funds MONUC spends specifically on DDRRR are not known (IRIN 2004).

## Schedule

The mission began in 2002 and is still currently active (MONUC 2007).

## Phases

### Demobilisation and repatriation

Most Ugandan and Burundian armed groups voluntarily left the DR Congo after the peace agreement there. However, a good number of combatants remained in the country, particularly in the east. These individuals are the core of the 20,000 to 25,000 persons who DDRRR will target. The figure includes 10,000 ex-combatants and 5,000 families repatriated by MONUC up to the present, around 7,000 or 8,000 combatants still to demobilise (chiefly of the FDLR, three quarters of them in North Kivu and the rest in the south), and an unknown number of combatants who have returned to their countries of origin on their own (Mobekk 2006: 9; MONUC 2007).

In 2008, MONUC announced a figure of more than 6,000 Rwandan ex-combatants effectively repatriated since 2002 (Young 2007a). One approximate interpretation of the jostling of numbers published in the last few years might be the following classification of MONUC individuals repatriated to the present:

	Ex-combatants	Civilians	Total
Rwanda	35%	31%	66%
Burundi	1%	1%	2%
Uganda	30%	1%	31%
Total	66%	33%	100%

Source: own elaboration

## NDDRP (2004 – ...)

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

The national programme for DDR in DR Congo is known as NDDRP, National DDR Programme.

It involves demobilisation and civil reintegration or military integration with a combined core of disarmament and identification.

National Programme of DDR. The World Bank has referred to this programme as "DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] Demobilization and Reintegration Program" or "DRCDRP". The activities of the programme in Ituri are known also as Phase II of DDR in Ituri.

#### Executive bodies

The plan for DDR was designed by an Inter-Ministerial Committee on DDR, responsible for the understanding on and guidance of disarmament, demobilisation, and reinsertion. CONADER (National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, in French Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion) was established in December 2003 with the aim of coordinating and implementing the civil demobilisation and reintegration part of the programme. The SMI (Military Integration Structure, in French Structure militaire d'intégration, part of the General Staff composed of former members of the Congolese Armed Forces, FAC, and signatories to the Sun City Agreement) is responsible for military integration. Both organisations coordinate the activities of the combined core (see [Phases](#)). The DDR Financial Management Committee (CGFDR, in French Comité de gestion des fonds de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion) was responsible for financial matters before being incorporated into CONADER. MONUC limits itself to participation in the disarmament phase and to the provision of security and logistical support. UNICEF and the International Red Cross work to reunite child soldiers with their families. UNICEF and numerous international and local NGOs are involved in reintegration (Perlmutter 2007; Coello 2007). CONADER, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the UNDP, MONUC, and UNIFEM have implemented diverse initiatives for women associated with armed forces and groups.

#### Guiding principles

The aims of the mission in the DR Congo are to substantially reduce the number of illegal weapons in the country, to reintegrate demobilised combatants as well as their dependents, and to professionalize and modernise the national army by regrouping troops from the former Congolese army and rebel forces.

#### Participants

At the start of the mission, it was believed there were more than 200,000 combatants belonging to the former FAC, Congolese armed forces, and to a variety of armed groups, including the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC, Mouvement de libération du Congo), Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-

Goma, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma), Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani / Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani/Movement de libération), and Rally for Congolese Democracy-National (RCD-N, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National). The Mai-Mai militias, the Dar es Salaam Agreement militia signatories in the Ituri region (see DDR Ituri Phase II), and isolated armed groups and Congolese combatants located outside of the country are also included in this. Currently, the MDRP aims to target 150,000 combatants (Swarbrick 2003; Alusala 2004; MDRP 2004; Kasongo and Sebahara 2006; *Stockholm Initiative on DDR* 2006).

### Groups with specific needs

The MDRP believes that the NDDRP should target 30,000 minors. However, the number of child soldiers for which a demobilisation and/or reintegration programme could be necessary approaches a figure of 50,000 (see **Demobilization**). The Coalition to Stop of the Use of Child Soldiers maintained at the beginning of 2008 that child soldiers still remained in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), National Congress for People's Defence in Nkunda, FDLR, and militias in the east generally (Coalition to Stop... 2008: 108-110).

At the same time, the MDRP has assumed the goal of attending to 9,000 disabled individuals within the NDDRP, in a specialised capacity.

### Eligibility criteria

- Congolese nationality,
- Possession of a weapon,
- Proof of affiliation to a known armed group, and
- Proof of having participated in the armed conflict between October 1996 and May 2003.
- To be eligible as a member of the FARDC, additional requirements of age, fitness, and health also exist (Malan and Weir 2007).

### Budget and financing

The World Bank pledged with CONADER a contribution of \$208 million, \$108 million from the bank itself (International Development Association, IDA) and the rest from donors via the MDRP, including Germany, Belgium, Canada, the EU, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Up to and including 2007, \$100 million has been paid out by the IDA and \$89 million by the MDRP.

### Schedule

Planning began in 2003 at the same time that the UNDP provisionally initiated a Rapid Reaction Mechanism, RRM. By the end of 2003, the institutional framework for DDR which began in 2004 had been designed and established.

### Phases

#### Disarmament

Disarmament is conducted in regrouping centres (RC). According to the Ministry of Defence, 104,455 arms had been collected by July 2007. In April 2007, the FARDC and the NGO Dan Church Aid announced the destruction of six tonnes of munitions collected from demobilised combatants since 2003. Previously, two and half tonnes had been destroyed. This was composed of 2,000 grenades and shells, more than 400 missiles, and 16,000 rounds of ammunition, amongst other materials (Young 2007b).


#### Demobilisation

Up to December 2007, a total of 124,000 combatants had demobilised in verification and orientation centres.<sup>5</sup>

	Men	Women	Total
Adults	99,538	2,610	102,148 (82%)
Minors	19,971	2,075	22,046 (18%)
Total	119,509 (96%)	4,685 (4%)	124,194

Source: MDRP (2008: 17)

In the following chart, we can see the evolution of the demobilisation process, as classified by gender, from the end of 2004 to 2006.



Source: CONADER (2007: 15)

<sup>5</sup> The figures of the MDRP (2008: 4) are the most recent but should be considered as only provisional due to changes in the system of registration and accounting in the DR Congo. In June 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a number of "more than 130,000" demobilised (Xinhua 2007), whilst a month later the Ministry of Defence estimated a number of less than 100,000 (Young 2007b). Confusion also arises between the numbers of combatants processed in orientation centres and the numbers demobilised (not integrated into the FARDC). In another example, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2008) in September 2006 tallied 27,300 demobilised minors whilst the MDRP (2008: 18), one page after offering the number of 22,046 used in this report, gave a figure of 30,594.

### Child soldiers


The demobilisation of child soldiers began in 2003 and the NDDRP launched in May 2004 the *Cadre operationnel pour les enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés* (Operational framework for children associated with armed forces and groups). Estimations on the numbers of child soldiers hover at around 30,000. In the end exactly 30,594 child soldiers were demobilised. In 10-15 percent of cases, the children are girls, although it is estimated that as many as 40 percent of CAAFGs, children associated with armed forces and groups, were girls, which suggests a higher level of total child soldiers. It is believed that the vulnerable situations in which female child soldiers find themselves is such that the girls do not participate in DDR and, at the same time, are overlooked by the process (Coalition to Stop... 2008: 110; UN Security Council 2007b). The demobilisation of minors, as with other individuals, has been slow. The process has run from 2003 to 2006. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers believes that 7,000 minors can still be found in the ranks of Congolese and foreign armed forces and

groups. The organisation notes that in addition to those officially demobilised, perhaps more than 11,000 minors escaped, were abandoned, or demobilised spontaneously. In many instances, child soldiers have avoided disarmament centres and have looked instead to centres which work to protect minors. Through the *brassage* process (training for ex-combatants in the DR Congo in order to form integrated FARDC brigades), many child soldiers who became part of FARDC have also managed to demobilise. In other instances, child-protection agencies have had to directly negotiate with armed groups (Coalition to Stop... 2008: 106-110; HRW 2007; Perlmutter 2007; Baldauf 2007; UN Security Council 2007b).

### Reinsertion and reintegration

The two basic options after demobilisation were integration into civic life or integration into the recently created FARDC. In the diagram which follows, Amnesty International (2007a: 3) points out the activities pertaining to the so-called combined core and the moment in which the two processes diverge.

DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army



Aid for civic reinsertion consisted of a "resettlement allowance" of \$110, received by each demobilised individuals upon leaving a transit centre, and a transitory assistance payment of \$25 monthly for a year. The MDRP targeted 120,000 beneficiaries for this allowance. Additionally, \$400 per ex-combatant was budgeted for reintegration assistance and the creation of micro enterprises for 90,000 beneficiaries.

According to the MDRP (2008: 4-7), 102,000 demobilised individuals received or are receiving resettlement allowances (amongst these, 2,600 women) whilst 47,000 (1,000 women) are receiving long-term reintegration support. The UN Secretary-General's Report (2007c: 9) which refers to 54,700 Congolese receiving long-term support possibly includes beneficiaries in Ituri.

### Child soldiers

The mission in DR Congo has managed to demobilise the majority of minors in the FARDC, but in other groups such as the Mai-Mai militias, the percentage of minors continues to be very high, reaching as high as possibly half or even more of troops (Baldauf 2007; Camerini 2007). Reenlistment of minors has been a recurrent problem in DR Congo. In the opinion of Amnesty International, this is due to inadequacies in the reintegration programme:

The majority of children released and reunited with their communities were poorly supported and protected on their return to civilian life, and were not given adequate educational or vocational opportunities. There was no mechanism to ensure their protection once returned to their communities and many children remained at risk of being recruited again. (Amnesty International 2007b: 101)

The following are the figures provided by the MDRP on reintegration activities for minors:

Total "certified" minors	30,594
Reunited with family	22,929
Receiving formal schooling	6,066
Receiving vocational training	10,662

Source: MDRP (2008: 18)

### Disabled individuals

The MDRP has only registered 242 disabled persons who are currently receiving specialised support. The objective of the MDRP is to offer support to 9,000 such individuals.

## DDR in Ituri (2004-07)

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

DDR in Ituri is basically the same as for the NDDRP (see above), but it is a differentiated process. DDR in Ituri is divided in three phase as follows:

**Ituri I (DCR):** DCR and its variants, DCRP and IDCRP, refer to the Ituri Demobilisation and Community Reinsertion Plan, Programme, or Process. It is also known as Phase I of DDR in Ituri.

**Ituri II (NDDRP):** The so-called second phase of DDR in Ituri is an integral part of the NDDRP. For this reason, it often refers to the national plan, without further specification.

**Ituri III:** The third phase of DDR in Ituri.

#### Executive bodies

**Ituri I (DCR):** Planned by the government of DR Congo with assistance from various associates, amongst them the UNDP. Right from the start, implementation of this phase was the responsibility of the UNDP RRM (transit sites) and MONUC, with support from UNICEF and national and international NGOs. CONADER joined later and played an increasingly important role in the programme. Reinsertion was the responsibility of the SMI and CONADER.

**Ituri III:** Planned by the DR Congo's Ministry of Defence and War Veterans and, jointly since June 2007, by the UNDP and MONUC. Implementation is the responsibility of the Executive Unit of the NDDRP with participation from the UNDP, UNICEF, MONUC, the FARDC, and local NGOS (IRIN 2007a).

#### Guiding principles

The goals laid out in the Operational Plan (see Amnesty International 2007a: 14) were the demilitarisation and pacification of Ituri, the disarmament of combatants, and the fight against arms proliferation.

#### Participants

The first two phases focus on group signatories of the Dar es Salaam Agreements (around 16,000 combatants), that is, groups which did not sign the agreement in Pretoria, including the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC/RP, Union of Congolese Patriots), Parti de l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité de Congo (PUSIC, Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo), Front des nationalistes intégrationnistes / Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri (FNI/FRPI, Front of Nationalist Integrationists / Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri), Front populaire pour la démocratie du Congo (FPDC, Popular Front for Democracy in Congo), and Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC, People's Armed Forces of Congo). Isolated combatants are also included in this. The third phase is for remaining groups, including Peter Kharim's FNI, "Cobra" Matata's FRPI, and Mathieu Ngudjolo's Mouvement révolutionnaire congolaise (MRC, Congolese Revolutionary Movement), in total, 4,505 members. The final number of demobilised

individuals was 27,000 (Alusala 2004; *Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion* 2004).

**Budget and financing**

For the first phase, the budget was \$10.5 million: \$4.5 million for building transit centres and \$6 million for support to reintegration. In October 2005, USAID committed to \$6.4 million for the reintegration of 11,200 demobilised combatants. The third phase is financed by Norway, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, the United States, and Spain.

**Schedule**

**Ituri I (IDCRP):** Demobilisation from September 2004 to June 2005. Ituri I includes three phases: preparations (information and awareness-raising), transiting and operations (disarmament, identification, demobilisation, orientation), and community reinsertion (return and support for reintegration over a period of six months). Later, whilst reintegration followed its course, the disarmament that took place was compulsory until the start of the second phase.

**Ituri II (NDDRP):** From June to September 2006. Spontaneous demobilisations later occur until the next phase (IRIN 2007b; 2007c).

**Ituri III:** Signed on 7 April 2007 with the FNI and on 1 June 2007 with the FRPI and MRC. Awareness-raising began in July 2007 and the programme inaugurates officially on 4 August 2007. The mission planned to close disarmament centres on 13 September and transit centres five days later. However, the final dates were delayed and Ituri III meanwhile did not conclude until 15 October 2007 (UN Security Council 2007c; AFP 2007).

**Phases**

**Disarmament**

**Ituri I (DCR):** By May 2005, 4,225 arms had been collected. According to Amnesty International (2007a: 28), 6,200 arms including rifles, grenades, and anti-personnel mines were finally surrendered. Seventy percent of these weapons were unusable.

**Ituri II (NDDRP):** In May 2007, “thousands” of arms and munitions collected were destroyed in Bunia in the first two periods of disarmament. By this time, NDDRP had collected 11,000 firearms, 1,500 bombs, 1,000 landmines, 4,300 cartridges, and 715,000 munitions and other types of military materials, for example, 600 radios (IRIN 2007b, 2007c).

**Ituri III:** Disarmament is conducted in approximately ten disarmament/transit centres. The first two of these centres were inaugurated in Bunia and Kwandroma in August 2007. The UNDP is in charge of making an inventory of and destroying unusable arms whilst MONUC is responsible for transferring usable arms to the FARDC. 1,851 of a total 4,665 combatants included in lists of groups to disarm were recorded to have disarmed (UN Security Council 2007c).

**Demobilisation**

**Ituri I (DCR):** Amongst armed groups, the FNI was the group which participated most actively. Bouta (2005: 18) states that the first demobilised individuals

were minors and “deserters”, however in the last three months, the number of adult combatants grew considerably. He also points out that many of these turned up at transit centres that were different from those to which they had been assigned according to the group to which they belonged, perhaps to avoid reprisals. Amnesty International (2007a: 15-17) gathers accounts of intimidation and assassination of potential participants in the programme and of CONADER workers. Despite this all of this, 15,941 combatants had demobilised by June 2005 as follows:

	Adults	Minors	Total
Men	11,156	3,963	15,119 (95%)
Women	263	559	822 (5%)
Total	11,419 (72%)	4,522 (28%)	15,941

Source: own elaboration based on UNDP DR Congo (2007: 6)<sup>6</sup>

Upto the start of the second phase, MONUC and the FARDC compulsorily disarmed and demobilised “hundreds” of combatants (Amnesty International 2007a: 17).

**Ituri II (NDDRP):** In Ituri, 6,500 combatants were demobilised as part of the general NDDRP.

Up to the start of the third phase, the FARDC and MONUC conducted joint military operations, applying pressure “to induce remaining elements of the armed groups to undergo disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and *brassage*” (UN Security Council 2007a: 5). This seems to suggest that voluntary disarmament programmes and DDR in general are undertaken in an ad hoc manner and only if the context permits them, or, that is, if armed groups consent to them. On the other hand, the mission continues to “apply pressure” militarily to the point that new groups or factions agree to disarm themselves.

At least 10,000 of the child soldiers demobilised in DR Congo in the period from September 2004 to May 2007 were located in the province of Ituri (Camerini 2007).

**Ituri III:** The system of identification (see **Eligibility**) had problems with registered combatants who turned up without arms and with combatants who had arms but were not registered. By August 2007, 3,505 combatants of 4,500 previously calculated individuals had been officially validated in lists, broken down as follows (UN News 2007):

Armed group	Validated combatants
FRPI	2,335
FNI	602
MRC	568
Total	3,505

Source: UNDP DR Congo (2007: 2)

**Reinsertion and reintegration**

**Ituri I (DCR):**

The plan for civic reintegration provides for reinsertion via micro-credits and projects of community

<sup>6</sup> Other similar counts can be found in Amnesty International (2007: 15-17) and Bouta (2005: 17-18)

reintegration. For the first of these, loans of up to \$600 are offered to each ex-combatant in small groups which develop business proposals and put them in action in six months. Community reintegration is projects which have been developed over one to three years by groups composed of 70 percent ex-combatants. These projects can have a budget of up to \$30,000.

The disarmament and demobilisation phases have achieved satisfactory results in relation to expectations created of them. Reintegration, however, has had serious difficulties. More than 10,000 ex-combatants were found awaiting the start of the reintegration process a year after having been demobilised. As a temporary measure, the UNDP established various short-term work projects in infrastructure building, for example, COMREC, Community Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. Only when USAID got involved after much delay did the reintegration programme start. The programme included payment of an allowance, training activities, and work on infrastructure. In any event, reintegration plans arrived very late, and this produced tension amongst ex-combatants (UN Security Council 2007c: 9). One account of a demobilised individual picked up by the BBC illustrates the problems which the delays caused:

We are disappointed, because when we disarmed, they promised to help us with projects and finding some work. But up until now, we haven't been helped.

And this is risky because we have friends who are still in the bush. They are watching what happens to us.

They are waiting to see if we are helped before they decide whether to disarm or not. (Quoted in Ross 2005)

Another ex-combatant clearly demonstrated to Amnesty International the danger of the situation:

These people have tricked us. We risked our lives to hand in our weapons, because our chiefs who owned these weapons are angry with us. Some of our friends have been killed because they joined the programme. Now, we can no longer live in our villages, because people are looking for us to kill us. We are incapable of feeding our families and cannot even pay the rent. The solution is for these people to give us our weapons back. If we have these weapons, people will respect us. (Quoted in Amnesty International 2007a: 19)

### Ituri III

Possibility for integration in the FARDC remains open for Ituri III. For those who opt for reintegration into civic life, a resettlement allowance of \$50 is offered upon leaving a transit centre, a training allowance of \$60 is given three months later, and the possibility is provided also, for \$50 per month, of working in the Community Reconstruction Service, which involves three months of intensive labour in infrastructure rebuilding. The UNDP also mentions an allowance of \$600 per ex-combatant which seems to be for micro-projects. In addition, the programme includes a "community reconstruction package" of approximately \$25,000 for locations with higher concentrations of ex-combatants. This money is for investment in social services such as water, sanitation, education, etc (UN News 2007; IRIN 2007d).

## Integration in the FARDC

The process of integration in the new Congolese armed forces was called *brassage* and consists in the creation of "integrated brigades" with members from diverse belligerent forces. Candidates present themselves to the SMI after an evaluation in transit camps. The FARDC deals with military integration and training once the soldiers are settled in barracks with cooperation from MONUC.

According to a report of the UN Secretary-General (UN Security Council 2007a: 9), 62,900 combatants, approximately 36 percent, of those who had passed through orientation centres, chose this option. Ex-combatants who participated in the Ituri first phase (DRC) could access the NDDRP once operative, that is to say, integration in the FARDC was also an option for them, as indeed it has been since the Ituri DDR second phase. Only 780 of a total 11,286 adult ex-combatants chose this option.

The process of integration which is still operational was not planned in detail, rather it was conceived as an emergency plan before elections in 2006. At the start of the process, six Integration and Training Centres (CBRs, in French Centres de brassage et recyclage) were established. In Ituri, during the first phase, serious misunderstandings arose on the exact procedure for disarmament-transit-*brassage*. Eligibility criteria were not applied with sufficient rigour and there was not an authentic evaluation process for candidates, as a result of which the FARDC grew to as many as 164,000 soldiers. Of these, 77 percent held a rank of official or sub-official and it is believed 30,000 were phantom soldiers. In December 2007, an estimated 80,000-90,000 additional individuals awaited participation in the process (Malan and Weir 2007). A report of the UN Secretary-General mentioned 34,800 members of the Kinshasa garrison and the Republican Guard who had to be integrated too (UN Security Council 2007a: 9). At the same time, the training period needed to create an integrated brigade was limited to 45 days (Malan and Weir 2007).

Leaders of militias were nominated generals or given responsibility of important duties in the FARDC. Various analysts have questioned this strategy of accommodating commanders of armed groups in order to attract to the programme a greater number of rank-and-file soldiers. They argue, amongst other things, that once sent to Kinshasa from, for example, Ituri, ex-commanders lose contact and possibly authority over their former recruits. Amnesty International (2007a) argues that the integration of commanders, possibly responsible for war crimes and serious abuses of human rights, does not serve to facilitate the process and can create major long-term problems.

### CNDP-Nkunda's "mixage" process

At the start of 2007, the dissident general Laurent Nkunda reached an agreement with the government in Kinshasa involving a different integration model for his troops. This model is known as "mixage".

Unlike *brassage*, new integrated brigades are to remain in North Kivu with the explicit aim of fighting the FDLR. "Complete integration" is left for a later time. With assistance from MONUC, Nkunda's two brigades and three brigades of the FARDC, a total of five all together, began to be fused in February 2007. However, following threats from the FARDC in August that the new brigades would have to complete the regular process of *brassage*, General Nkunda's men left the programme. Many observers argue that

the genera used the mixage process to re-strengthen militarily and politically. Not only did Nkunda manage to keep the chain of command intact in his original battalions, but in the new brigades as well. Moreover, a very deficient process of identification and registration allowed Nkunda to inflate his numbers of supporters in these brigades so that, according to estimations by the FARDC, around 2,200 followers at the start of the process may have turned into 8,000-8,500 at the end (Bavier 2007; Malan and Weir; HRW 2007: 16-23).



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## Glossary

ADF/NALU Uganda	Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AFP	Agence France-Presse
ALiR	Armée de Liberation du Rwanda
CBR	Centres de brassage et recyclage
CGFDR	Comité de gestion des fonds de DDR
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
COMREC, ComRec	Community Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
CONADER	Commision Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion
DCR	Demobilization and Community Reintegration
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EUPOL DR Congo	EU Police Mission in DR Congo
EUSEC DR Congo	EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DR Congo
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises
FAPC	Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
FNI	Front des Nationalistes Intégrationnistes
FPDC	Front Populaire pour la Démocratie au Congo
FRPI	Front de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri
FUNA	Former Ugandan National Army
GR	Garde Républicaine
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogues
IDA	International Development Association
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Muti-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en DR Congo
MRC	Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais
NDDRP	National DDR Programme
PUSIC	Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo
RC	Regrouping Centres
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SMI	Structure Militaire d'Intégration
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNRF II	Uganda National Rescue Front
UPC/RP	Union of Congolese Patriots
WNBFB	West Nile Bank Front

# ERITREA (Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, 2002-...)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	4.5 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	32,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	194,000 (2007)
GDP:	\$1,085 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$200 (2006)
HDI:	0.483 – 157th (2005)
GDI:	0.469 – 136th (2005)
Military expenditure:	19.32% (2003)
Social / military expenditure:	Military greater than social
Military population:	4.21%
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Mass disarmament and reintegration of armed forces via security-sector reform in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilise	200,000 soldiers
Executive bodies	National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NCDRP), with assistance from the UNDP and World Bank.
Budget	\$197.2 million
Timeline	From April 2002
Status / synopsis	Process of neutralised demobilisation for continued recruitment of troops and personnel to the armed forces. Currently, efforts are centred on the reintegration of decommissioned officers.

## Context Conflict

Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993, though the border between the two countries was not clearly defined, leading to fighting between the two sides from 1998 to 2000 in which more than 100,000 people died. A cessation of hostilities agreement was signed in 2000 and the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE peace-keeping mission to supervise the arrangement. The year ended with the signing of a peace agreement in Algiers. This stipulated that both sides would abide by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), which was charged with establishing a definitive border on the basis of the relevant colonial agreements (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law. In April 2002, the EEBC issued its decision, which assigned the disputed border village of Badme (the epicentre of the conflict which was at that time administered by Ethiopia) to Eritrea, a decision rejected by Ethiopia. As of 1 December, the border was established virtually on the basis of the colonial treaties. As a result, concern increased over the volatility of the situation and the risk that it would descend into a new outbreak of violence. However, both governments rejected the EEBC's suggestion that it should suspend its functions and establish the border demarcation solely on paper, and reiterated that they did not want a return to hostilities.<sup>2</sup>

## Security-sector reform

As part of security-sector reform, the Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DRP) in Eritrea is a strategy to reduce the number of military officers in the country and generate significant savings to state budgets.

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: World Bank (2002, 2007), Healy (2007), Mehreteab (2007), UNDP Eritrea (2004, 2006a, 2006b) and Pretorius et al. (2006)

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 52)

## Background to DDR

Eritrea has been called "a mobilised nation" (Healy 2007: 6). In 1993, on the eve of independence from Ethiopia, 95,000 guerrilla combatants became members of the armed forces, whilst in 1997 around 54,000 soldiers demobilised. The demobilisation and reintegration process was considered a success, though later war with Ethiopia reversed this process.

Mehreteab (2007; cf. European Commission 2002: Annex I, 16) offers a list of the lessons learned and not learned in this demobilisation exercise.

Lessons learned:

- The need to consider social reintegration;
- The need of a clear definition of structure and institutional responsibilities;
- The necessity to incorporate a gender dimension in the programme;
- The necessity for training in accordance with the labour market;
- The need for participation from NGOs and the private sector (more in theory than practice); and
- The necessity to carry out a survey on soldier profiles.

Lessons not learned:

- The need to design a general framework for rehabilitation and renewal;
- The necessity to incorporate reconstruction, renewal, rehabilitation, and reintegration programmes; and
- The need for participation from beneficiaries, e.g. ex-combatants and communities.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

Mass demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration of armed forces via security-sector reform in a post-war context. DRP, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. Financed by the World Bank, the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project - Emergency Recovery Loan (EDRP-ERL) is almost synonymous with DRP and is sometimes referred to as the DRP for Eritrea.

### Executive bodies

The body responsible for the programme in Eritrea is the NCDRP, created by the government of Eritrea in April 2001. The NCDRP has carried out programme planning with technical assistance and training from the UNDP from 2002 to 2006, and cooperation from the World Bank. The execution of projects falls to government bodies, private consultants, and NGOs.

### Guiding principles

According to the European Commission (2002: Annex I, 19), the guiding principles of the programme in Eritrea are the following:

- An integrated approach to demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration;
- Increased attention paid to psychosocial needs and support services for demobilised soldiers and their families;
- Inclusive reintegration support programmes so as to promote social cohesion;
- Professional training designed according to labour market analysis;

- Counselling and training in the development of micro-enterprise;
  - Gender awareness and sensitivity to the needs of disabled persons; and
  - An implementation of components by existing institutions and organisations.
- The EDRP-ERL includes within its demobilisation project the following objectives:
- The transfer of economic resources from the military to social sector, and
  - The strengthening of institutional capabilities and reinforcement of macroeconomic stability.

### Participants

Around 300,000-350,000 soldiers were mobilised during the war in Eritrea. Around 40,000 had already formed part of the armed forces before the war, another 40,000 were reincorporated ex-soldiers (see Background), and the rest were new recruits. The government proposed a demobilisation of 200,000 soldiers ("Assisting Eritrea..." 2002).

### Groups with specific needs

According to one survey (Mehreteab 2007: 46), the composition of the armed forces reflects a certain set of characteristics:

54% of soldiers are between the ages of 20 and 29, 16% are considered to be disabled, and 13% are considered to have psychological problems.

Given that the minimum age for recruitment to the armed forces is 18, there are no child soldiers in the military; nevertheless the programme in Eritrea identifies soldiers under the age of 25 as belonging to or in need of specialised programming.

### Budget and financing

In April 2002, the World Bank budgeted a total of \$197.2 million for EDRP. This works out to an average of \$985 per soldier for the 200,000 soldiers planned for demobilisation. The distribution of resources for this budget was the following:

Component	\$ Millions	%
Demobilization	9,2	4,7
Reinsertion (cash)	105	53,2
Reinsertion (in kind)	15	7,6
Reinsertion (NCDRP)	35	17,7
Reintegration (sector programs)	15	7,6
Special target groups	2	1
Institutional strengthening	1,2	0,6
Executive Secretariat	5,4	2,7
Contingencies	9,4	5
<b>Total (estimado)</b>	<b>197,2</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: World Bank (2002: 6)

It is important to note that reinsertion packages count for more than 60% of the budget, whilst reintegration projects, chiefly micro-credit, counts for a fourth of it. The project is financed with an Emergency Recovery

Loan, with contributions from the following three sources:

1. An initial pledge from the World Bank, through the African Infrastructure Fund, of \$60 million for the period from 2002 to 2008, though currently more than \$64 million has been paid out.
2. A contribution of \$15 million from the WFP in the form of food subsidy.
3. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the World Bank to cover outstanding budgetary costs. At a conference of donors held in October 2001, the World Bank pledged \$37 million to the MDTF. Of this, \$24 million has already been paid out. The European Commission, expressly mentioning demobilisation as a priority for cooperation with Eritrea, pledged 47 million euros (\$42 million in 2001) through the European Development Fund, and of this amount, 27 million euros had been paid by 2005. The other 20 million euros are allotted for post-conflict renewal. The Netherlands gave 4 million euros to a pilot programme designed for 5,000 ex-combatants and pledged an additional 12.5 million euros. Denmark pledged 2.5 million euros and Norway 1 million euros. Other donors who pledged funds, according to the World Bank, include Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland (European Commission 2002, 2007).

The World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund also contributed \$700,000 as support to the government of Eritrea in preparation for a post-conflict project.

The UNDP's Technical Assistance Programme (TAP) was financed in part by USAID (\$580,000) and by the UNDP itself (\$200,000) (USAID 2004).

The Japan International Cooperation Agency allocated approximately 1.5 million euros to the vocational training of around 500 ex-combatants over the 2005-07 period (JICA 2007).

### Schedule

Initially, the government of Eritrea planned a demobilisation period of a year or a year and a half, and programmes of reintegration for five years. A pilot project designed for 65,000-70,000 participants was planned for November 2001 after the NCDRP was created earlier that year. Earlier that autumn, the government announced it had already demobilised 20,000 persons (IRIN [2001], Mehreteab [2007: 57] offers a detailed schedule).

The EDRP as a project was completed by the World Bank. The project consisted of 18-24 months of demobilisation and reinsertion, which began in April 2002, and three to four years of reintegration, which was to be completed by the end of 2007. In both broad areas, the programme has not been able to keep to schedule. Demobilisation was carried out from July 2002 until June 2006. The reintegration of ex-combatants should have occurred over a period of three to four years following demobilisation. The World Bank fixed December 2008 as its conclusion date for EDRP. The UNDP's Technical Assistance Programme and USAID, originally planning to run from April to December 2002, wound up prolonging their operations until December 2006.

### Phases

According to the UNDP (2006b: 1), "the demobilisation programme for Eritrea is arguably one of the best planned programmes of its kind." However, Mehreteab (2007) argues that there is considerable difference between what has been planned and what has been executed.

### Disarmament and demobilisation

Initially designed in 2002 to demobilise 200,000 combatants over a period of 18 to 24 months, disarmament and demobilisation has involved the return of military equipment such as arms and uniforms, identification, transport to decommissioning centres, information on the process, a medical review, and later transport to reinsertion centres. A pilot project was organised for the disarmament and demobilisation of 5,000 soldiers, for a larger process divided over three phases with demobilisations of 60,000-70,000 soldiers per phase. In the first of these three phases, priority is given to "special groups", that is, women, disabled persons, veterans, and economically productive persons, as well as re-mobilised soldiers (World Bank 2002: 8-10). The decommissioning process is supposed to last for approximately a week and for each week, at each centre, the process will decommission 500 soldiers. A pilot project was conducted from April to September 2002. According to the UNDP, 104,400 soldiers had demobilised by the end of 2006, whilst the World Bank took stock of 65,000 demobilised soldiers within its programme by the end of 2007. In addition to being slow, the demobilisation process was frustrated by two processes running in parallel: continued recruitment of combatants and reintegration of combatants within a "militarised work service" (see the Reintegration section below). As a result of this, the number of soldiers in the military rose from 300,000 at the end of the war in Eritrea to 350,000-420,000 soldiers by the end of 2007, with half this number in active military service and the other half in the "militarised work service" (Mehreteab 2007).

Mehreteab (2007: 34) argues that there is no "political will to demobilise soldiers/combatants" and claims that most demobilised combatants are disabled, chronically ill, or pregnant or nursing women. The military, additionally, has recruited "nearly the same number" of youth. Viewed in this light, the priority to demobilise "special groups" has been little more than a substitution of these groups by male youth. Mehreteab sees in these facts the cause behind donors' withdrawal of support for the demobilisation process, starting in 2005, and their transfer of primary interests to, initially, reintegration projects for already demobilised soldiers, and later, general programmes for development.<sup>3</sup>

### Reinsertion

A grant under the Transitional Safety Net (TSN) supports reinsertion efforts in Eritrea. Salary for demobilised soldiers is based on the \$50 monthly salary that a regular soldier receives, a sum in theory

<sup>3</sup> See also Pretorius et al. (2006: 88 and Annex II, 54)

sufficient to support a family. TSN consists of cash payments of an average \$525 per demobilised soldier, though each individual amount depends on rank and time served in the military. If we add the WFP's food contribution, the average payment works out to \$600 per person on average. Some disabled combatants receive additional aid of between \$300 and \$450. Payments are made in two instalments: during the first three months of decommissioning and between the fourth and sixth months.

In terms of implementation of this component, the UNDP talks about a monthly payment of around \$33 over six to 12 months for (140,400?) ex-combatants, whilst the World Bank claims to have already paid out \$330 per capita in allowances to 65,000 ex-combatants.

### Reintegration

The reintegration process slowed down at the end of 2006 but recuperated in 2007. By October 2007, assistance for integration had reached 44,432 ex-combatants and other community members of a final total goal of 83,868.

### Employment reintegration

In 2006, 1,722 demobilised soldiers received a total \$1.47 million as part of a Microcredit and Loan Plan. Some of these demobilised soldiers were assigned to "militarised work service" as part of a government development and reconstruction campaign called Warsai Yekaalo. In exchange for nominal remuneration for an unspecified amount of time, or until the border with Ethiopia settled, the government requested a promise from soldiers to work for the country's reconstruction. Meanwhile, demobilisation and reintegration rhetoric covered up the real character of this campaign. At the start of 2003, for example, 3,000 soldiers employed in civil roles were considered "demobilised", but under a promise to continue as employees for two more years in the same institutions. The Eritrean government justifies the recruitment of new soldiers and this type of reintegration in the military on the grounds that it is stabilising the situation with Ethiopia.<sup>4</sup>

### Training

The Ministry of Education runs rural-development activities and vocational training programmes for creating micro-enterprise, although there tends to be a lack of material resources and specialists for training teachers. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has financed and given technical support for a project to train ex-combatants for employment. The Ministry of Education oversees this project. From 2005 to 2007, the ministry ran 23 courses in construction, hairdressing, agriculture, plumbing, etc., with participation from around 500 ex-combatants. 98.9% of participants finished their course and more than 60% found employment, 45% in the first five months after

completion and in the field in which they had received training. From this project, with cooperation from the Savings and Microcredits Program, ex-combatants have also opened businesses (JIAC 2007).

The National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) has organised training courses for women ex-combatants in tailoring, craftsmanship, and hairdressing. Designed for 230 participants, NUEW plans to offer these women the necessary equipment and resources for income generation after training (Seyoum 2007).

### Psychosocial assistance

The NCDRP acknowledges the importance of psychosocial assistance for ex-combatants returning to their communities of origin and for community reintegration. As such, the UNDP's TAP has worked to train 500 psychosocial counsellors. However, Mehreteab considers this initiative to be insufficient and warns of the amount of psychological problems, high levels of disorientation, and a rise in suicide and alcoholism amongst ex-combatants.

### Vulnerable groups

Differentiated assistance is offered to disabled persons in the form of counselling, vocational training, loans, employment, grants, and access to housing. Specific orientation is provided for persons with HIV/AIDS. In 2006, the Ministry of Employment proposed allocating \$2.6 million, funded by the World Bank, for offering loans to disabled demobilised soldiers (Seyoum 2006).

### Lessons learned

Reports by Healy (2007), including the conference paper by Mehreteab, and Pretorius et al. (2006) record the evaluations of and lessons learned from the programme in Eritrea.

<sup>4</sup> A discussion on the positive and negative aspects of the socio-economic function played by these oversized armed forces, both as a source of employment for youth and as a place of ideological indoctrination, for instance, can be found in Healy (2007: 8) and Mehreteab (2007: 58)

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## Glossary

DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
EDRP-ERL Recovery Loan	Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project - Emergency
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NCDRP Programme	National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration
TA(P)	Technical Assistance (Programme/Project to Demobilize Soldiers)
TSN	Transitional Safety Net
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



# Haiti (Community Security, 2007 - )<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	8.6 million persons (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	-
Refugee population:	20,837 (2007)
GDP:	\$5 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$480 (2006)
HDI:	0.529, 147th
GDI:	-
Military expenditure:	-
Military / social expenditure:	-
Military population:1	-
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Multiple reintegration of armed groups with organisational fragmentation
Groups to demobilise	Between 4,000 and 6,000 members of armed groups
Executive bodies	National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (CNDDR) under the auspices of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Budget	Initial calculation of \$50.1 million
Timeline	
Status / synopsis	Start of multifaceted strategy in 2007. Currently, 200 arms and 6,000 rounds of ammunition have been surrendered to the CNDDR. MINUSTAH has made it public that 75 former members of armed groups in the Cité Soleil neighbourhood of the capital

## Context Conflict

Essentially, the current situation in Haiti suggests that conventional armed conflict has not occurred in the country. The cause of insecurity in the country has arisen mainly from the absence of social and economic alternatives, because of ("non droit" zones), political corruption, the limited capacities of local governments, and the inefficiency of basic services by the government offered to the population. It is also important to factor in the presence of drug trafficking, smuggling, and arms trafficking. Violence and the presence of small arms are a structural fact and increasingly recurrent features of the society, so much so that Haiti has become a country of urban armed violence. At the same time, one must not overlook rural violence produced over the fight for land, in addition to the absence of efficient police and a legal system. The situation began to worsen in 2004 when President Jean Bertrand Aristide fled the country, following a rise in social protest, and handed the country over to an interim government. Since then, Aristide's supporters, organised predominantly in the Fanmi Lavalas political party, and in fragmented urban gangs with neither a concrete political programme nor ideology, have enlarged the number of violent acts committed against the MINUSTAH United Nations Mission, the transitional government, and amongst one another.

Likewise, the gradual freeing of markets has led to a loss of consumer power for Haitian workers, who work predominantly in single-family units. It has also led to overcrowding in urban areas which lack any sort of urban planning, yet another cause for the country's armed violence. Amongst these urban areas are the neighbourhoods of the capital, Port-au-Prince, Bel Air, Cité Soleil, Martissant, Delmas, and Carrefour Feille, as well as other population centres such as Gonaïves, Les Cayes, and Cap Haitien.

As for the various armed groups, it is important to identify their structures and political and criminal motivations, in many instances intermingled, and the relationships

<sup>1</sup>This report draws extensively on fieldwork research conducted in Haiti by the author (Caramés 2007)

they have established with the communities in which they operate. Each armed group comprises a leader accompanied by three to six seconds-in-command, with the total number of members reaching as high as fifty. If a scale from the most political to the most criminal were established, the *organisations populaires* would tend towards the political end of this scale, the *baz armés* would tend towards the centre, and the organised criminal gangs would tend towards the criminal end, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that apparent political claims are nothing more than pretexts for criminal activities. Finally, it is important to identify the hardcore of each armed group in order to differentiate these persons from other members, including youth and women, who although situated on the peripheries of these groups, are not exempt of responsibility either. Relations between armed combatants and civilians of neighbourhoods where these combatants operate can be extremely complex. These relations mix together offerings of generosity with protection. The armed groups provide food and services whilst creating a climate of threats and using the population as armed participants when rival groups attack.

**International accompaniment**

United Nations Resolution 1542 established the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission. Currently, the mission involves 7,064 soldiers and 1,923 police officers. It operates at an annual cost of \$535 million. The main role of the mission is to maintain security in Haiti, support the transitional government in its work to ensure the electoral process, implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), and establish a new legal system. The mission’s mandate ends on 15 October 2008 (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

Together with UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, MINUSTAH is a pilot project of the Integrated Missions of United Nations Peacekeeping. It is an attempt to establish better channels of communication between distinct sections and agencies of the United Nations operating in Haiti. However, although the idea of integrating missions has been in place since the beginning of the mission, the Department of Peacekeeping Missions, in a visit to Haiti on March 2007, claimed a lack of communication and mutual implementation of distinct policies of UNICEF and MINUSTAH. For this reason, the department recommended establishing a strategic operational line between the agencies, under an integrated structure and budgetary management by MINUSTAH and the UNDP.

**Transitional justice system**

One cited aspect of the conflict is the lack of a system of transitional justice. Currently, it is impossible to apply a general amnesty to all participants in the armed violence because this would not contribute to reconciling Haitian society. Neither does the application of a strongly repressive system appear feasible, owing to the absence of institutional mechanisms for this, in the context of an enormously fragile government system. Dealing

with the absence of institutional mechanisms is key to consolidating any sort of transitional system of justice. Although the least feasible now, the best alternative would be a combination of mechanisms for transitional justice, along with other transitional mechanisms.

Action Aid has recommended supporting the creation of a Special Chamber and *Ad Hoc* Courts, a body specialised in overseeing judges, and the construction of legal institutions. Recommendations on legal reform include deployment of correctional officers, establishment of a specific budget for criminal reform, reconstruction of prisons, and adopting a coordinated approach to criminal reform as part of legal reform.

A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in January 2007 warned of the debility and dysfunction of the legal system in Haiti, characterised by high levels of corruption when faced with the threat of violence and organised crime. With antiquated legal codes, the Haitian state is unable to guarantee security for its citizens, execute fair legal judgements, and manage the growing overcrowding of prisons. However, the ICG appreciated the initiative of MINUSTAH and the elected government of René Préal in implementing a profound renewal of the judicial system (ICG 2007).

With respect to judicial reform, it makes little sense to argue for judicial transparency when workable alternatives are inexistent because corruption has penetrated even the judicial level, for which a monitoring process is required in addition to an increase in resources. A good example of this is the phenomenon of pre-trial detention. Of the approximately 5,000 detained persons, only around 3% of them are tried, another reason for lack of trust in the legal process. Other detained persons are either freed or kept in situations of pre-trial detention. Faced with threats of violence and organised crime, this judicial dysfunction is characterised by high levels of corruption. With an antiquated criminal code, the Haitian state is unable to guarantee security for its citizens, execute fair trials, and improve conditions in prisons.

Thus, a new ethical code needs to be enacted for judges and a new independent judicial council created, together with special courts for more serious crimes and a system of witness protection. Salaries for judges should also be increased. In the long term, the Constitution requires amendment in order to create more rational and effective processes for appointing senior judges, modernising proceedings of the criminal code, and promoting support from civil society for judicial reform. The start of a period of decentralisation is a sign that reform of the judicial system has begun, though only time can tell whether the judiciary has truly achieved the necessary legitimacy and relevance in the eyes of the public. To achieve this legitimacy in the eyes of Haitians, the Superior Council of the Magistrates and the School of Magistracy are crucial, even though there is no information currently regarding the five-year plan that will define the

structures and responsibilities of these legal bodies. Efforts being carried out to resolve this situation are rooted in the creation of judges of peace and *Ad Hoc* Courts to mitigate pre-trial detention for crimes such as money laundering, drug trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping, and corruption, amongst other things. The creation of new legal positions is also possible.

### Security sector reform

Security reform is difficult mainly due to opposition from armed groups with political and criminal interests, who have been condemned for their persistent use of violence. In October 2006, the government urged the UN Secretary-General to initiate a plan of reform for the Haitian National Police (PNH). This plan, developed jointly by the Haitian government and Minustah, had amongst its chief demands the professionalisation of the PNH. According to United Nations sources, the PNH currently consists of 7,000 members, the majority of whom lack the necessary training and equipment.

The transition strategy for the PNH includes three key priorities. These priorities include strengthening of the PNH as an organisation; strengthening operational capacities in order to better cover all of the country (the PNH aims to increase its members to 20,000 by 2015, after having already increased numbers from 3,000 to 6,000 in 2006, including 10% women); and professionalizing the police forces by providing human and material resources to fight corruption, impunity, and other problems.

With regard to police reform, there are 7,000 police officers in the country now, a ratio of one police officer for every 1,100 citizens, one of the lowest percentages in all of Latin America. The Haitian government has estimated that for 2008 this number will reach 9,000 officers, and by 2010, 14,000 officers, which approaches a percentage close to that of developed countries. The current low number and lack of trust from civil society because the government has traditionally used violence, has caused a great proliferation in private security companies.

Finally, it is important to add that reform of both the magistracy and police requires a high degree of coordination. Thus far, there has been a great deal of distrust between both institutions. The magistrates have reproached the police for their arrogance, insubordination, and collusion with drug trafficking and kidnapping, whilst the police have viewed the justice system as corrupt, accusing it of freeing members of armed groups and effectively annulling their efforts to fight insecurity. In order to alleviate this problem, a joint organisation was created recently. This organisation is composed of two members of the police, three attorneys, and three judges. Its job is to greatly improve the degree of coordination between the institutions. As has been mentioned already, the establishment of the rule of law once the electoral cycle has completed depends on the creation of a national-level structure and strategy for such areas as public administration. For

this, assistance from the international community to the government of Haiti must be coordinated and made more institutionally sustainable.

### Other disarmament initiatives

Even though Haiti is a signatory to a number of instruments for controlling the illegal traffic in small arms, the country's legal framework grants permission to citizens to possess an arm at home. Of the 200,000 small arms in circulation, some 170,000 are in the hands of civilians and only around 30,000 in the hands of armed groups. The strategy to reduce armed violence must be comprehensive and not only centred on armed groups. One of the more evident proofs for this lies in the implantation of the Law on Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, which aims to reduce the quantity of small arms in the Haiti and bring the country up to international standards. Currently, the Ministry of Justice, with support since 2004 from the OAS and CARICOM, is reviewing this law.

It is also necessary to fight other forms of violence production in Haiti, stemming mainly from transnational crime in its various forms, predominantly the trafficking in arms, drug trafficking, money laundering, and the trafficking of persons and organs. For this the Haitian government must ratify the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and increase land, maritime, and air border control.

### DDR precedents

Between 1994 and 2000, the role of the United States took on heightened relevancy when it led efforts by the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to re-establish a legitimate government. With an investment of \$70 million, a good deal of these efforts were focussed on the creation of a professional police body, but the effort was scarcely successful. If the United States managed to demobilise members of the Haitian Armed Forces, it did not manage to reintegrate these persons into civil society. Instead, many of these persons found their way into various private-security forces.

The MINUSTAH DDR programme, in the same way as other programmes in other countries, began in 2004. It has not managed to reduce the level of armed violence in Haiti. The primary reasons for this must be sought in the inexistence of analysis on Haitian armed conflict that is largely politically motivated. MINUSTAH claims ex-soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces are its priority for demobilisation because, immediately after President Aristide's fleeing of Haiti, they threatened to reinstate themselves as official Armed Forces despite efforts to the contrary (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

Lack of understanding on the various motives has led to an "importation" of experiences and lessons from other DDR processes in African countries, particularly Burundi and Sierra Leone. To all of this, one must add MINUSTAH's priority to implement an electoral process and to strengthen the Haitian National Police.

## Programme design

### Type and name of DDR

Multiple reintegration of armed groups with organisational fragmentation.

### Implementing organisations

The DDR National Commission, under the auspices of MINUSTAH. Technical assistance from the UNDP and a programme divided into two distinct phases: an internal preparatory phase to establish programme strategy and a nationwide implementation phase. Establishment of an Integrated DDR Section. The technical team had grown from 16 to 60 persons by the end of 2005.

The CNDDR was set up in September 2006 under the direction of A. Fils Aimé. It included a representative of the PNH, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Women Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The main election criterion for members to the commission was not experience in DDR matters but rather political connections and representativeness. In keeping with the paradigmatic changes to violence in Haiti today, it is important to note that the second "D" of the acronym CNDDR has changed from meaning Demobilisation, during the time of the Transitional Government Commission, to Dismantlement. This change can be explained by the shift in strategy of negotiating with armed groups to a strategy of dissuasion, given these groups' mainly criminal nature. The matter that has generated the most controversy is the background of the CNDDR Spokesperson, J.B. Philippe "Samba Boukman", one of the key instigators of "Operation Baghdad", although other aspects also merit special attention, particularly those related to the CNDDR national-strategy document.

This strategy, approved in December 2006, contains two basic objectives, including the reestablishment of security and development for communities affected by Haiti's violence. These objectives are spelled out in nine intervention points, involving support for legal reform of the security sector; strengthening of capabilities of counterparts; diagnosis of community action plans; disarmament and rehabilitation of former members of armed groups; reintegration of at-risk groups; rapid-action plans for employment creation; violence prevention; research into security and development; and public information. The parts of the strategy which could generate the most controversy are its lack of public visibility, especially around the operational means to negotiate with armed groups, and demands for a large budget (\$117.8 million), with large sums like those for diagnosis of the situation or creation of a community plan, which are matters already being seen to by MINUSTAH. Other questions also arise, such as a proposal to create a youth rehabilitation detention centre with capacity for 1,000 to 5,000 underage persons, which one could consider an attack on youth human rights.

### Basic principles

The MINUSTAH Integrated DDR Section has established a multifaceted approach for reducing armed violence

in Haiti. This approach is rooted in five complementary points which aim to cover all security (short term) and development (long term) objectives, as follows:

- Negotiation with, disarmament of, and reintegration of armed groups (MINUSTAH and the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement, and Reintegration, CNDDR).
- Community security and conflict (UNDP).
- Prevention, disarmament, and reintegration of armed youths and those associated with armed groups (led by UNICEF).
- Reintegration of women associated with armed groups and the strengthening of their role as agents of peace (MINUSTAH Department of Gender).
- Strengthening of political and legislative structures for the control of small arms proliferation (cross-institutional approach) (Integrated DDR Section, 2006).

### Participants

In terms of numbers, 30,000 members of armed groups, as previous studies have calculated, is probably too high a number. MINUSTAH puts the actual number at 4,000 to 6,000. The structure and natures of these armed groups are extremely varied, but amongst themselves the groups are highly related or interconnected to one another.

The current focus of attention on underage persons is especially relevant if one takes into account the high percentage of youth, who comprise the bottom half of the Haitian population pyramid. This group experiences a high level of violence in the form of deaths, kidnappings, rapes, being used by armed groups, and being attacked in hospitals and schools. Thus, attention to underage persons, especially through psychosocial monitoring, must be clearly defined when an underage person has been victim to armed violence through membership in an armed group or through exposure to such structural and cultural violence as poverty, illiteracy, or lack of access to education, amongst others.

As far as attention to women is concerned, women linked to armed groups are usually dependents of those groups, that is, they become sexual slaves, though they also take up arms to defend their property, families, and communities, in percentages much lower than victims of violence. There is a high degree of sexual abuse, half of which is of underage women. Victims often keep silent and are even stigmatised for this abuse.

### Budget

The initial estimated budget for the mission in Haiti is \$50.1 million, including funds for strengthening institutional capacity. The cost for DDR is \$28.2 million. This budget breaks down by objective as follows:

Objective	Quantity (millions \$)
Strengthening of institutional capacity	21.9
Awareness	4.9
Disarmament and demobilisation	2.2
Rehabilitation and reinsertion	21.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50.1</b>

Source: UNDP, 2006

## Schedule


Programme scheduling had the DDR programme in Haiti begin in 2004. The programme was supposed to continue until 2008. However, a new schedule pending changes to strategy more focussed on community security, awaits completion.

## Phases

As a reflection of this paradigm change, the MINUSTAH Integrated DDR Section has established a multifaceted approach to reducing armed violence in Haiti. This approach is rooted in five complementary points which aim to cover all

security (short term) and development (long term) objectives, including the following:

- Negotiation with, disarmament of, and reintegration of armed groups (MINUSTAH and the CNDDR).
- Community security and prevention of conflict (UNDP).
- Prevention, disarmament, and reintegration of armed youth and those associated with armed groups (led by UNICEF).
- Reintegration of women associated with armed groups and the strengthening of their roles as agents of peace (MINUSTAH Department of Gender).
- Strengthening of political and legislative structures for controlling the spread of light arms (cross-institutional approach).



Source: UNDP, 2006

With regard to work focussed on community, identified as a central theme of the mission in Haiti, the mission has favoured a belief in the skilfulness of society in identifying and avoiding threats to members of the community. This approach which counts on the ability of many different actors to identify potential threats to their communities, gives regular people a part to play in increasing human security and the management of conflict at the community level. A network of community organisations called Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (CPVDs) aim to implement this approach. These committees comprise democratically elected representatives from small administrative areas. The overall desired result is a reduction of armed violence in Haiti. However, the approach also has other more specific objectives, including

- Creation of specific committees for the prevention of violence and management of conflicts.
- Empowerment of community as an essential actor in the fight against armed violence.
- Realisation of community agreements for reducing armed violence and disarming armed groups.
- Establishment of grassroots activities for conflict prevention and peace building.

- Application of lessons learned and good practices arising from experiences of violence reduction.
- Involvement of state institutions in reducing short-term armed violence as it relates to long-term security.

Initially, the CPVDs were to be composed of representatives of youth groups, women, the elderly, and adults. Added later was government representation in the form of a representative of the Haitian National Police and another representative from the local authorities. The CPVDs added this government representation to secure a higher degree of consensus within the committees. After members have been elected to the CPVDs, conflict resolution projects should be initiated via training programmes in conflict negotiation, which will allow the most competent members in this area to emerge.

Most of the Haitian population's vital necessities are so severely unmet that security and development, as distinct entities, are not viable as one without the other. The need to homogenise the strategy to reduce violence requires defining what type of projects the mission must carry out. These projects range from projects of awareness, peace


# Community Platform for Conflict Management

## Geographical Area

(Department in provinces and Neighborhood in large urban centers)

### Role & Responsibilities

- Policy decision
- Liaison with local administration
- Implementation of activities in the commune.
- Sensitization,
- Implementation of community project.



### Composition of the Committee

(Elected democratically from members of the CDC)

- Youth Representative,
- Male adult Representative,
- Female adult Representative,
- Wiseman,
- Elected community leader of opinion.

## Zone

(Commune in provinces and in large urban centers)

### Role & Responsibilities

- Support CPVD in the implementation of disarmament and community project
- Sensitization,
- Participation to the decision process.
- Labor intensive projects
- Community arms collection in exchange for development



### Composition of the Committee

(Elected democratically from members of the communal section)

- Youth Representative,
- Male adult Representative,
- Female adult Representative,
- Wiseman,
- Elected community leader of opinion.



Source: UNDP, 2006

education, and conflict negotiation to development and physical reconstruction in affected zones (for example, clearing of rubble, water sanitation, and reconstruction of infrastructure). This approach should be the focus of adoption of the processes of disarmament in peace building, because the collective benefits which could be reaped will serve to empower communities. This in turn is part of a much *wider programme of community reconciliation and recuperation*.

UNICEF's strategy, in the face of a lack of response from government, has been to give immediate attention to underage persons through several projects that serve 5,000 underage persons in a variety of urban zones, with a budget of \$250,000 per year. Participation from families and communities, the putting in motion of a specialised judicial system, and the creation of necessary security conditions are essential for this. Lastly, one must also take into account the choices of underage persons in attending to their own basic psychological, educational, and recreational needs.

On another hand, the organisations working with women are primarily *Solidarite Famn Aytian* (SOFA) and the *Réseau de Solidarité des Femmes Haitiennes*. In an individualised manner, these organisations monitor women affected by violence and gather information in a database. Their different needs and methodologies make it so their databases are incompatible with a homogenised record of women affected by violence in Haiti. Attention given to women, stemming from the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH, is rooted in a community approach which involves working with women in groups of 100. These women identify victims of violence and participants in armed violence. In Haiti, the final goal of this strategy is to strengthen the capacities of women's organisations and, for individuals, to develop projects of economic and social sustainability for women. There

are also efforts to create awareness programmes that aim to regularise relations between men and women. Although women lead these efforts almost entirely, work on gender issues also concerns men.

## Evolution

Despite the fact that the idea of DDR has been present since the beginning of the establishment of MINUSTAH, the mission has only implemented DDR at the local level. Local implementation, under the auspices of the UNDP, has involved the creation of a stationing camp, though without any activities of reintegration due to a lack of funds and a clear structure for it. This shows a lack of coordination in the peacekeeping operation between the areas of security, humanitarian affairs, and development.

In April 2005, MINUSTAH tried to convince ex-soldiers to participate in a voluntary disarmament process, after the death of the soldiers' military leader, Ravix Rémissainthe. However, these soldiers, in light of promises made by the transitional government, continue to await monies, pensions, and offers of public employment, particularly with the Haitian National Police but also in a possible reconstructed military. Concerning payment of indemnities, the transitional government created an Office for the Administration of Demobilised Soldiers. This office has paid the first of three payments to 90% of recognised ex-soldiers, though it claims to not have the funds to pay remaining amounts.

In July 2006, Action Aid published a report with recommendations for the DDR process in Haiti and suggestions for reform of the police, judicial system, and correctional system, under the current mandate of MINUSTAH. The report recommended support to victims, urging the new government to strengthen the National Disarmament Commission, establishing an arms registry and providing technical support for it, promoting

new legislation for controlling light arms, looking for better cooperation with civil society, and assuring implementation of a DDR process for reducing violence and securing support from donors (Mobekk 2006).

In the pilot phase of this project, executed in various neighbourhoods of the capital, the CPVDs were urged to develop a preliminary analysis of the conflict in their respective areas, in addition to identifying specific areas where armed violence could be reduced. This pilot phase has accentuated the gaps in the traditional understanding of DDR. Currently, the process is set to begin in the middle of 2007, with the objective in the short term (first year of operation) of creating eight priority centres, and in the medium-to-long term (the second year) of establishing six more.

Thus far, the only focus the mission is carrying out is negotiation with and dismantlement of armed groups, the responsibility of MINUSTAH and the CNDDR. This core focus, the closest to a DDR in terms of post-war rehabilitation, has scarcely managed to demobilise 130 combatants and collect some 400 arms. It has also begun to create reinsertion centres in the Bel Air, Delmas 2, and Cité Soleil neighbourhoods of the capital. In order to maintain this focus, the mission anticipates implementation of an orientation process lasting one month, as well as an individualised process for gathering the most precise possible socioeconomic data focussed on community-action planning. As a result, the mission will introduce, in the reinsertion phase, an offering of microcredit for subsidising access to education and professional training.

The President of the CNDDR, Alix Fils-Aimé, assured in October 2007 that members of armed groups would not surrender their arms voluntarily if a more decent living were not first offered. In addition to recognising the importance of MINUSTAH in Haiti's reconstruction, and the government's inability to create jobs, Fils-Aimé assured that the CNDDR had considered how former members of armed groups would be able to open businesses with credit awarded for the purchasing of equipment and facilities. Lastly, Fils-Aimé indicated a need to put a stop to problems of internal corruption in order to contain criminal behaviour. A preventative policy based on social agreement, security and conflict management, which is not repressive in nature, could fight this.

Already in February 2007, the MINUSTAH DDR programme had announced procurement of reinsertion packages for former members of the Armed Forces who demobilised voluntarily in March 2006. CNDDR Director A. Fils-Aimé announced that thus far 200 arms and 6,000 rounds of ammunition have been surrendered. In light of this low figure, Fils-Aimé accused private companies of irresponsibility in retaining and not surrendering their own weapons arsenals. A number of sectors of civil society, such as the National Commission for Human Rights, deemed this number insufficient. The commission also commented

that the programme was not very transparent (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006).

In September, Alix Fils-Aimé stated that armed groups would not surrender their arms voluntarily if a more decent living were not first offered. In addition to recognising the importance of the role MINUSTAH plays in reconstructing Haiti, and the government's inability to create jobs, Fils-Aimé assured that the CNDDR had thought about how former members of armed groups would be able to open businesses with credit awarded for the purchasing of equipment and facilities.

In terms of evaluation, lack of a coordinated strategy at various levels requires major improvement. In the first place, homogenisation within the United Nations system is crucial for responding to recommendations made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which include creation of a Commission for the Reduction of Violence (CRV) in order to follow more precisely UN Security Council Resolutions 1702 and 1743. This is to be done with only one budgetary structure and with formalisation of the role of UNICEF in the commission.

Another area in need of better homogenisation, also recommended by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is coordination between the MINUSTAH Integrated DDR Section and the government of Haiti, in this case with CNDDR and MINUSTAH. Altogether, these weaknesses in the structure and functioning of CNDDR are accurate reflections of the many assistance needs of the Haitian government in creating a genuine rule of law. In order to evaluate the relations between the government, represented by the CNDDR and MINUSTAH, it is important to mention the persistence of a long tradition of national embezzlement and distrust towards the outside world, in addition to a degree of distrust by donors of foreign aid, due in part to the fact that after many years of intervention, money used in the country has been proportionally higher than results achieved on the ground. International organisations have identified the lack of impact of projects driven by the international community and the waste of funds, for a country with such pressing needs as Haiti. A strengthening of communication and transparency would help immensely to dissipate doubts about the objectives of the CNDDR and, by extension, the government it represents.

This state debility is also reflected in a need to coordinate the initiatives national and international organisations are already carrying out, which could be resulting in the duplication of efforts and the minimising of results on the ground. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the clearest example of this. With financing from the United States through the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, the organisation is carrying out a series of projects under the Program of Revitalization and Promotion of Mutual Understanding and Peace (PREPEP). More than 900 projects are being implemented in the country's main urban hot spots at a cost of \$18 million. These projects

have four essential objectives: strengthening of the Haitian government's ability to satisfy community needs; enabling the population and the government to respond to priority community needs; implementing cooperation frameworks between governmental organisations and citizens; and lessening the harmful conditions that favour violence and instability in the hearts of the urban hot spots. These projects respond mainly to the rebuilding of public goods, though they also tackle environmental problems, problems of governability and civil education, amongst others.

Although it seems division of activities can be well defined in theory (the IOM, for instance, is carrying out physical rebuilding whilst the UNDP is working on reconciliation), differences between project implementation schedules (the IOM has been in operation since 2004) and major financial sources (the United States for the IOM and Canada for the UNDP), as well as similarities in objectives, can lead to an unhelpful duplication of efforts. This is detrimental to communities, or the beneficiaries of these projects. Even though it may seem that cooperation exists between these institutions at a practical level, clear political understanding does not exist. From a macro perspective, this damages the determination of a common strategy.

Lastly, relations between international institutions, chiefly the United Nations, and local organisations are also in need of much greater coordination. Although a long tradition of community organising does not exist in Haiti, many local organisations have demanded to receive more attention and better communication of strategies and results from the international community. Wide understanding of the context could help generate an overview of the main initiatives arising in Haiti. One of the initiatives with most prestige is the *Campagne pour la Réduction de la Violence en Haïti*. This campaign involves the grouping together of diverse organisations at the state and international level, whose objectives divide into three core areas: awareness work, mobilisation, and training around the dimension, causes, and consequences of armed violence in Haiti.

## Lessons learned

### Planning:

- The approach to DDR in Haiti has not been a traditional one.
- Lack of determination of the groups to be demobilised.
- Need for insistence on cooperation between MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police.
- Lack of MINUSTAH DDR section communication with the National Commission for Disarmament and civil society.
- Scarcity of resources for a new approach to DDR.
- Absence of a multifaceted strategy for reducing armed violence, with better coordination at various levels, within the United Nations system, with the Haitian government, and with international and national organisations.
- Need to the strengthen gender dimensions in the reduction of armed violence.
- Absence of relations between initiatives to reduce violence and development.

### Context:

- Persistent state of insecurity.
- Lack of a peace agreement specifying the implementation of a DDR programme.
- MINUSTAH's position is to prioritise elections.
- Need for reform of the Haitian National Police.
- Weak existing legal framework for the control of light arms.
- Lack of recognition of the role of Haitian civil society (School for a Culture of Peace 2007).



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## Glossary

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CNDDR	National Commission on DDR
CPVD	Committees for Violence Protection and Development
CRV	Commission pour la Réduction de la Violence
ICG	International Crisis Group
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MINUSTAH	UN Mission in Haiti
OAS	Organisation of American States
PNH	Police National d'Haití
PREPEP and Peace	Program of Revitalization and Promotion of Mutual Understanding
SOFA	Solidarite Famn Aytian
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti

# Indonesia (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration in Aceh, 2005-2009)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	223 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	200,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	35,000 (2007)
GDP:	364.5 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$1,420 (2006)
HDI:	0.728, 107th (2005)
GDI:	0.721, 94th (2007)
Military expenditure:	1.22%
Social / military expenditure:	Yes
Military population:	200,000 (2007)
Arms embargo:	35,000 (2007)

## Summary

Type of DDR	Disarmament and reintegration of the armed opposition group the Free Aceh Movement (GAM in Indonesian) and redeployment of state security forces.
Groups to demobilise	3,000 members of GAM
Executive bodies	Government of Indonesia
Budget	
Timeline	Decommissioning and redeployment: September 2005 to June 2006 Reintegration: until 2009
Status / synopsis	

## Context

### Peace process and conflict

After almost 30 years of armed conflict between the Indonesia armed forces and the GAM separatist group, both sides signed a peace agreement in August 2005, a few months after the Tsunami completely devastated Aceh province and prompted the arrival of hundreds of NGOs. The peace agreement which established wide-reaching autonomy for Aceh, disarmament of the GAM, and deployment of an international mission to oversee the implementation of this agreement implied a significant reduction to the level of violence and permitted for the first time in the history of the region the holding of regional elections, for which a former leader of the GAM resulted victor. Despite a good start to the peace process and to reconstruction, various strains linked to the reintegration of combatants, demands to create new provinces, or accusations of corruption and incompetence directed at public authorities have been recorded in the last few years.<sup>2</sup>

### International accompaniment

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is a joint effort of the European Union, Switzerland, Norway, and five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN. Its objective is to act as a facilitator and build trust between the parties to the conflict in Indonesia. The AMM's mandate involves overseeing the DDR of GAM troops and the relocation of Indonesian security forces. It is also responsible for monitoring human rights, legislative reform, the regulation of amnesty cases, and the supervision and management of possible violations to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The mission is civil in nature and falls within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. It is the first European Union mission to Asia. The mission concluded on 31 December 2006 without a clear exit strategy, since many of its objectives, such as the reintegration of GAM ex-combatants, had not been accomplished.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: World Bank (2006), Beeck (2007) and ICG (2007).

<sup>2</sup> Extracted from Barómetro (2008: 60)

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2005)

## Transitional justice

The MoU includes a provision, number 2, on human rights. This provision includes a commitment by the government of Republic of Indonesia to ratify the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. It proposed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Court of Human Rights. However, the jurisdiction that would be granted to this court has been an object of controversy over the years.

Despite the fact that courts and truth and reconciliation commissions created through peace agreements are mostly used to settle responsibilities and to grant compensation to victims for abuses committed during specified conflicts, since the start the Indonesian government has said its intension for the courts is that they have only authority to judge matters subsequent to the date of the signing of the agreements. Infringements of human rights committed over thirty years of conflict remain, for the time being, unpunished.<sup>4</sup>

## Other disarmament initiatives

Coinciding with a disarmament process for GAM, an amnesty effective until 31 December 2005 was declared for the surrender of arms in the hands of civilians.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

Disarmament and reintegration of the Free Aceh Movement armed opposition group and redeployment of state security forces.

Normally, "DD&R" is used to designate the process for the GAM, however, the AMM uses "Decommissioning and Redeployment", applicable to both the GAM and the police and Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI in Indonesian), for the first component of DDR.

### Executive bodies

The government of Indonesia is in charge of implementing the MoU. The National Development Planning Agency, BAPPENAS, composed of the Ministries of Information, the Interior, Justice, and Human Rights, designs DDR and short-term reinsertion processes, as well as coordinates donors.

The MoU established the AMM's constitution on behalf of the European Union and ASEAN with the objective of overseeing implementation of the memorandum. After the memorandum's signing, an international monitoring presence, from 15 August 2005 to 15 September 2005, fulfilled the need for immediate international supervision and paved the way for the AMM. The AMM deployed from 15 September 2005 to 15 December 2005. Its duties included the supervision of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the GAM; the relocation of irregular troops and police; the monitoring of the human rights situation; and the resolution of disputes, for example, certain controversial amnesty cases (*Memorandum of Understanding...* 2005).

The Commission on Security Arrangements, COSA,

was created at the local and provincial levels by representatives of both parties to the conflict, with AMM presence, to discuss and resolve problems such as the interpretation of some ambiguous MoU passages. However, at the time of the signing of the MoU, it was unclear which agency would be in charge of supervising the reintegration of ex-combatants. The Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA in Indonesian) was created by the governor of Aceh in February 2006 for this. A few months after the board's creation, civil society groups and the GAM withdrew from the organisation. The BRA receives 80% of the government's financing for reintegration. It plans to remain in operation until December 2009, though from the end of 2007 on it is supposed to begin transferring its responsibilities to local government. As for the GAM, its Majelis Nasional, its National Council or highest representative body, designed the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA) in December 2005 to oversee demobilisation and reintegration. The IOM is involved in executing reinsertion and reintegration.

## Guiding principles

Section 4 of the MoU stipulates the demobilisation of 3,000 GAM combatants and the surrender of at least 840 arms between 15 September 2005 and 31 December 2005, under the supervision of the AMM. In the same period, the government of Indonesia has agreed to decommission all "irregular" forces (those specifically located in the Aceh region to combat the GAM), reducing total numbers of soldiers to 14,700 and of police officers to 9,100. Section 3 of the MoU also states that the government must allocate sufficient arable land, employment opportunities, and subsidies to ex-combatants, amnestied individuals, and victims of the conflict as a reintegration measure. Former GAM members must also have the right to solicit employment with the "regular" police and armed forces in Aceh without being discriminated against (*Memorandum of Understanding...* 2005).

## Participants

Participants targetted by the mission are members of the GAM, a total of 3,000 individuals plus around 32,000 soldiers from Indonesia's security forces and bodies to be redeployed. Reintegration is also to be made available to other non-combatant groups (see **Eligibility criteria**) (*Memorandum of Understanding...* 2005; Aceh Monitoring Mission 2006).

## Groups with specific needs

According to the *GAM Needs Assessment* (World Bank 2006), more than 75 percent of GAM combatants are between 18 and 35 years old. Less than 4 percent are women. There are no figures on child soldiers, though it is estimated that there were few of them.

## Eligibility criteria

Although the MoU maintains a figure of 3,000 for GAM members, all analysts agree that the real number is much higher and that the number given is restricted by the definition utilised for combatant (IOM Indonesia 2006b).

<sup>4</sup> Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2006)

The MoU defines three groups eligible for reintegration: ex-combatants, amnestied political prisoners, and civilians affected by the conflict.

In reaction to a demand by the GAM and recommendations made by the World Bank, the BRA widened the eligibility of beneficiaries to six different groups in this manner:

- 3,000 ex-combatants of the GAM;
- 2,035 amnestied prisoners;
- 3,204 GAM activists who surrendered prior to the signing the MoU;
- around 6,500 members of pro-government militias or "anti-separatist groups"; and
- civilians affected by the conflict and host communities of ex-combatant.

The majority of women were excluded from the definition of "combatant", which did not include individuals associated with the conflict through other functions. At a later stage, there was an agreement for which 800-1,000 ex-combatants of the GAM were eligible so long as they were women (IOM Indonesia 2006b). After a show of opposition, the GAM submitted a list to the AMM of 3,000 names of combatants eligible for reintegration upon petition of the government of Indonesia, even though this was not foreseen in the MoU.

**Budget and financing**

The government of Indonesia officially finances the process in the country. Its latest payment should have been made in the 2007 fiscal year. Starting in 2008, local governments

are to finance the process with their own budgets. Independently, the IOM develops "unofficial" reintegration projects (ICG 2007: 13). Japan has supported these programmes since March 2006 with funds of \$8.74 million (IOM Indonesia 2006a).

The German GTZ finances a Vocational Training Project.

**Schedule**

The period for disarmament and demobilisation was from September 2005 to June 2006. Reintegration programmes will take place until December 2009.

**Phases**

**Decommissioning and redeployment**

The agreement between the government and GAM stipulates that the decommissioning of the GAM and redeployment of the TNI was to be conducted in four stages from 15 September 2005 to 31 December 2005, in the accordance with the following process: the GAM was to surrender at least 25 percent of 840 agreed upon weapons to AMM Mobile Disarmament Units between the 10th and 20th of each month; after verification and destruction of these weapons, the government was to withdraw a proportional number of troops and police until their presence in Aceh was reduced to 14,700 soldiers and 9,100 police officers, that is, 25,890 and 5,791 less from each force respectively. This process was conducted without any noticeable difficulty except for the granting of an extension in the third stage. The final figures were the following:

Phase	Disarmament (GAM)			Redeployment		
	Arms surrendered	Disqualified	Accepted	TNI	Police	Total
I (September 2005)	279	36	243	6,671	1,300	7,971
II (October 2005)	291	58	233	6,097	1,050	7,147
III (November 2005)	286	64	222	5,596	1,350	6,964
IV (December 2005)	162	20	142	7,628	2,150	9,778
Total	1018	178	840	25,890	5,791	31,681

Source: Aceh Monitoring Mission (2006)

**Demobilisation**

On 25 December 2005, the GAM announced the dissolution of its military wing the TNA, Tentara Negara Aceh ("Gerakan Aceh Merdeka" 2006). Beeck (2007: 31), however, questioned talk of "demobilisation" in the case of the GAM. Combatants were neither registered nor licensed and the military chain of command was left intact. The KPA, according to Beeck, was merely a reincarnation of the TNA.

**Reinsertion and reintegration**

According to the World Bank, nearly 90 percent of ex-combatants returned to their places of origin without experiencing any problems. Three quarters of former members of the GAM claimed they had participated in some kind of welcoming or reconciliation ceremony upon their arrival. Normally, ex-combatants had remained in contact with their communities of origin during the conflict. Indeed, in some cases they never left them. "Re-integration" may not be the most precise term to describe this component of the process for these cases.

Also, good development of the decommissioning and redeployment phase, as well as the IOM's work with 1,900 amnestied prisoners through its Information, Counselling and Referral Service, ICRS (IOM Indonesia 2006b), resulted in initial thinking that the reintegration phase would progress without major obstacles. For this reason, according to a report of the International Crisis Group, problems with ex-combatants did not arise until after December 2006 elections in Aceh. This report outlined various examples of corruption and extortion implicating the KPA and suggested that the rise in crime was also related to ex-combatants. The GAM rejects the interpretation that the responsible individuals for these activities were ex-combatants "embittered by an opaque, unaccountable reintegration process and still without employment", and claims the real perpetrators were members expelled from the organisation (ICG 2007: 8a).

In any event, the MoU did contain "very vague provisions for reintegration" (Beeck 2007: 6) and this resulted in delays and varied problems linked

to misinterpretations on both the beneficiaries of reintegration assistance and the meaning of this more precisely. The government also delayed participating in the reinsertion and reintegration phase and its coordination of actors was not optimal.

Initially, the governor of Aceh paid out \$900,000 in three instalments (October 2005, November 2005, and January 2006) via the BRA and KPA. In November 2006, around 1,000 ex-GAM had begun to receive payments from the BRA. However, by the end of 2006, many GAM members had not received anything. Only amnestied prisoners who had been registered immediately after leaving prison had received subsidies for reintegration. The GAM opposed the government's requirement at this time to submit a list the 3,000 ex-combatants eligible to receive help for reintegration. Beeck (2007: 35) suggests two explanations for the behaviour of the GAM: distrust of the government's intentions and, probably, its intention to distribute those resources amongst more groups of people such as widows and orphans of combatants. In the end, the GAM gave the list to the AMM and the AMM to the BRA. Although three payments of \$100 per ex-combatant had been agreed upon, actual payments were much less than this, approximately a fourth of the total all together. A report of the World Bank maintains that this was due to the GAM dividing payments

amongst no-combatant members of the GAM, as well as vulnerable community members such as widows and orphans. This interpretation denies the existence of a corruption problem and contrasts with views of other reports which attribute the payment issue to bad practices. In the end, these payments impacted matters in the short term but did not assist the reintegration process because they can be seen to have been of more assistance to reinsertion.<sup>5</sup>

In mid-2007, Beeck (2007: 38) stated that the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants had not yet commenced. However, around the same time, the IOM claimed to have assisted around 5,000 ex-combatants and ex-prisoners create small businesses such as kiosks, cafeterias, brick works, etc. through the ICRS. According to an IOM survey in July 2007, ex-combatants were paid appreciably more than the minimum wage in Aceh of \$90 per month. They were paid an average monthly salary of \$105 in the north and \$195 in the south (IOM Indonesia 2007).

At the same time, a report of the ICG concluded that reintegration efforts were "plagued by unclear objectives", suffered from "poor implementation", and showed "a lack of transparency which appeared to have produced both polarisation and reconciliation" (ICG 2007: 85b).

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<sup>5</sup> Beeck (2007: 36), but cf. ICG (2007: 9)

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## Glossary

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
BRA	Aceh Reintegration Board
COSA	Commission on Security Arrangements
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral Service (IOM)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KPA	Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh Transition Committee)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Defence Forces)

# Côte d'Ivoire (DDR, 2007 - )<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	18.5 million persons (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	709,900
Refugee population:	26,315
GDP:	\$17.5 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$870 (2006)
HDI	0.432, 166th
GDI:	0.413, 146th
Military expenditure:	1.55% (2003)
Social / military expenditure:	-
Military population:	0.1%
Arms embargo:	United Nations

## Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral demobilisation of armed forces and armed opposition groups for security- sector reform in a post-war context
Groups to demobilise	35,000 members of the Forces Nouvelles and 5,000 of the armed forces
Executive bodies	Integrated Command Centre (ICC) and the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Renewal (NPRRC), under the responsibility of the prime minister
Budget	Thus far, the World Bank has committed \$40 million, but it has subsequently repealed these funds
Timeline	Begun in December 2007 with a planned duration of three months
Status / synopsis	In the mid-2007, President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro presided over a "Flame of Peace" ceremony, involving a symbolic destruction of arms and serving as a start to a disarmament process in Côte d'Ivoire. Later, after political agreements following the Ouagadougou Agreement, a disarmament process was started on 22 December which aimed to conclude on 30 January 2008.

## Context Conflict

In 2002, a grouping of dissident soldiers who would later come to form the Forces Nouvelles (FN), attacked the city of Abidjan in an failed attempt to depose President Laurent Gbagbo. Since that time, the Forces Nouvelles have held control of the northern portion of the country. One cause for their of the rising was the exclusion of the population in the north from political decision-making and the social and economic discrimination they faced. In 2003, Côte d'Ivoire signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement with France. A security zone, patrolled by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French Forces Licorne, was created to prevent confrontations and to comply with the ceasefire. Lack of agreement implementation in successive years has made it impossible to reunify the country. In March 2007, a new political agreement signalling the conclusion of the conflict was signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.<sup>2</sup>

## Peace process

The 24 January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement recognised, as regards DDR and the formation of a new national government, a need to disarm and demobilise clashing groups under the supervision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the French Forces Licorne. More specifically, the agreement recognised the national-reconciliation government's role in ensuring social reintegration of military personnel through programmes of repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration, and also of restructuring the armed forces (*Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 2003*).

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on a forthcoming issue of Quaderns de Construcció de Pau, School for a Culture of Peace (see <http://www.escolapau.org>)

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 23)

Later, President Laurent Gbagbo and leader of the Forces Nouvelles armed opposition coalition Guillaume Soro, in view of not fulfilling their prior agreement and after various periods of negotiation, signed the **4 March 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement** in Burkina Faso, after a month of negotiations with mediation from then head of ECOWAS and president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. The new agreement stipulated, in the five weeks following the signing of the agreement, the creation of a new government of transition with an equitable division of power, joint military command to unify the armed forces and the Forces Nouvelles, a schedule for disarmament, voter registration, and elections. It also agreed to dismantle the security zone controlled by UNOCI and the Force Licorne, which divided Côte d'Ivoire into north and south. The agreement stipulated a gradual withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from the security zone, and a replacement of them by an impartial security force which would facilitate the free movement of persons and goods through the country (School for a Culture of Peace 2008).

The decisive element of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) was stabilisation of the security situation in order to carry out successive processes of population identification and to conduct elections for concluding the crisis. In the way it is conceived in the OPA, the notion of "stabilisation of security" depends on security-sector reform, which affects both former members of the armed forces and members of the Forces Nouvelles. This notion aims to be a new process of DDR of ex-combatants and a process of disarmament and dismantlement of militias (DDM) located in the west of the country.

### International accompaniment

Following the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the deployment of an Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention force (ECOFORCE) commenced, comprising 1,200 troops in addition to 3,000 French troops responsible for supervising the ceasefire. A month later, the first agreements for demobilising troops of the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI, in French Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire) were reached, and in July 2003 conclusion to the conflict was officially declared.

Later, UNOCI was established through 27 February 2004 Security Council Resolution 1528. Its mandate runs until 15 January 2008. Currently, this mission contains 9,162 military personnel, including 200 military observers, at an annual cost of \$470.86 million. UNOCI's mandate stipulates the realisation of control and monitoring of cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups, and support to development of the peace process (UNOCI 2007).

### Transitional justice

In August 2003, once an official end to the conflict had been declared, an amnesty law was approved for imprisoned members and members of armed groups who

had opposed the government, but had not committed serious violations of international humanitarian law or human rights, or carried out economic crimes.

At the same time, the signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement committed to establishing a new amnesty law, excluding war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as economic crimes, for the period from 17 September 2000 to the date of the entering in force of the agreement. Likewise, the Ouagadougou Agreement stipulated the creation of a monitoring body for implementation of the agreement and a body for permanent dialogue with opposition groups.

### Security-sector reform

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement referred to the need to unify and restructure the armed forces. This restructuring would be accomplished via a rejuvenation of military personnel and an allocation of budgetary funds for boosting equipment, activities, and investments.

The government also created a workgroup for restructuring and refounding the armed forces. The main goal of this workgroup, understood to be a place for reflection, was to put forward a general framework for organisation, composition, and functioning of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS, in French Forces de Défense et Sécurité). This process has involved the quartering or returning to military barracks of the FDS, regrouping the FN, and dismantling militias in the west of the country. The different strategies employed for demobilising armed groups has accentuated or marked groups' idiosyncrasies and characteristics.

### Other disarmament initiatives

Other problems identified include the proliferation of small arms in the country. At the time of the initial ceremonies for DDR, designated "Flamme de la paix" or Flame of Peace, poor-condition armshad scarcely been registered, whilst quality or functional arms had disappeared. As such, one possible new force for insecurity stems from the uncontrolled proliferation of arms, for which a process of collection of arms from civil society must be outlined. This idea is already being proposed by the UNDP, at the moment under the Arms for Development programme, as previously undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This aspect or consideration is intimately related to the arms embargo in force in the country. President Laurent Gbagbo questioned the persistence of the arms embargo at the UN General Assembly after the war had concluded and urged a partial lifting of it whilst maintaining it on Charles Goudé Ble, Eugène Djue, and Kouakou Fofie, high military commanders of the Jeunes Patriotes and the Forces Nouvelles, accused of destabilising the peace process. Thus far, the UN has ignored this request.

Later, the FDS denied accusations by the United Nations of conducting training sessions with materials from outside the country, thus violating the embargo. The FDS said it was committed to the existing peace process. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) inspectors



stated in their latest report that they were impeded from visiting bases controlled by the Forces Nouvelles.

### Background to DDR

Following the conclusion of the conflict, DDR was postponed numerous times due to political disagreements between signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements. In December 2003, both the armed forces and armed opposition groups began to dismantle some military outposts and their heavy artillery, but disagreements between the government and the UN over the cost of DDR remained. After a new period of negotiations, the process was scheduled to reinstate on 14 May 2005 and to conclude on 31 July. However, negotiations were suspended as a result of exigencies imposed by the Forces Nouvelles, which said militias had to be disarmed in the west of the country before negotiations could continue. Afterwards, a period from 27 June to 10 August 2005 was arranged for implementing the DDR programme, though uncertainty as to how to deal with a demand of \$960 payment per person for the reintegration of many ex-combatants caused further postponement. Altogether, the process has had to be postponed numerous times: first as a result of conducting the process jointly with the process of census and identification, and later because of rejections from groups close to government to participate in the reintegration process at the same time as the Forces Nouvelles.

In mid-July 2006, militias located in the southwest of the country asked for the constitution to be respected. They asked for consideration and compensation, with logistical support and assistance to victims, for persons who had defended the republic, as a means towards helping them surrender their arms. The process for this was also suspended weeks later as a result of a low percentage of arms collected relative to the number of demobilised combatants. Thus far, 981 combatants have demobilised, but only 110 arms and 6,975 rounds of ammunitions have been surrendered, at a cost in cash of \$970 per combatant over three months, for assistance with reintegration.

In August 2006, the Forces Nouvelles announced a suspension to their participation in disarmament negotiations in protest to established rule changes to the project of census and identification. At the end of the provisional government's term, faced with the impossibility of elections due to a lack of DDR and completion of the census process, the mandate of the current prime minister was extended until 31 October 2007 through UN Security Council Resolution 1721.

Nonetheless, if something was achieved it was the demobilisation of child soldiers, through meetings with General Philippe Mangou of the general staff of the armed forces and General Soumaïla Bakayoko of the Forces Nouvelles. These men signed action plans promising not to enrol additional minors in their ranks. By means of family-regroupment interventions, 3,000-4,000 child soldiers were accounted for

at the conclusion of the armed conflict, of which UNICEF received a total 2,800 in its programmes, 1,300 from the Forces Nouvelles and 1,000 girls. Currently, 1,300 of these minors participate in a formal schooling phase, in which they will remain until they have reached adulthood, whilst the remaining 1,500 are receive vocational training, around 930 as apprentices in the informal sector and around 600 in the agro-pastoral sector, with collaboration from the National Agency for the Support to Rural Development in Côte d'Ivoire (ANADER, in French Alliance nationale des démocrates pour la reconstruction).

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

##### *National Programme of DDR*

Bilateral demobilisation of armed forces and armed opposition groups for security-sector reform in a post-war context.

#### Executive bodies

As regards DDR, the OPA specified a need to continue with recommendations followed since the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement for creating a Joint Operations Plan on DDR, implementing a National Programme of DDR, and accelerating the Disarmament and Dismantlement of Militias (DDM) process in the west of the country. Later, in December 2007, new political agreements complementary to the March agreements were signed. These agreed to create an Integrated Command Centre (ICC) under the responsibility of the prime minister, with cooperation from the ministries of reconstruction and reconciliation and commanded by the general staff of the armed forces, state security, and the Forces Nouvelles in carrying out disarmament and demobilisation tasks. The main objectives of the ICC consist in contributing defence and security policy, putting in place a National Programme of DDR, training new Defence and Security Forces, protection, and the free movement of persons throughout the country.

For implementation of the reintegration of ex-combatants who have not been inserted into the new armed forces, a National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (NPRRC) was created, also under the responsibility of the Office of the Prime Minister. The NPRRC aims to "contribute to the restoration of a climate of security and peace through assistance to and strengthening of ex-combatant capabilities, at-risk youth, and populations in crisis, so that they can move on to being the subjects of development" (NPRRC 2008). More specifically, programme's objectives are the following:


- Social reinsertion and economic reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants.
- Contribution to the renewal of community infrastructure in zones affected by conflict.
- Contribution to the renewal of organisational capabilities in communities affected by war.
- Contribution to the renewal of the population's productive capabilities.

- Facilitation of access to basic social and economic services of vulnerable groups.
- Reintegration of minors who have experienced conflict into their families, and their reincorporation into basic education.
- Contribution to the construction and consolidation of social cohesiveness.

By way of three cells—a support cell, a reinsertion cell, and a community renewal cell—distributed in turn through 19 regional offices, three activity project lines can be laid out: one social reinsertion, another economic reintegration, and final community rehabilitation.

As regards international accompaniment, both UNOCI and the Forces Licorne cooperated in the preparation and application of the programme through a section of DDR. Likewise, UNOCI heads an interagency coordination group created informally, together with the World Bank, the EU, Japan, and France, to debate the state of the process and to harmonise international accompaniment. The UNDP is in charge of certification tasks and management of outstanding funds, or a basket fund, from chiefly the EU, Japan, Norway, Denmark, and France. Cooperation also comes from the United Nations Population Fund, UNOCI, the EU, GTZ, and USAID. Tasks of the international community involve certification and giving economic and logistic support.

The following diagram summarises the process:



### Groups to demobilise

Estimations on numbers to demobilise are situated around 35,000 members of the Forces Nouvelles (5,000 for the new FDS, 6,000 for the NPRRC, 20,000 for community service, and 4,000 for the police) and 5,000 FDS (ICG, 2008). However, various international observers claim the total number of members of armed opposition groups to be between 8,000 and 10,000 (ICG, 2008). The OPA requires as a condition for reception into the process that these persons must have been recruited by the armed forces or the Forces Nouvelles sometime after 19 September 2002, the conflict's official start date.

Thus far, UNOCI has identified five groups or types of militias, comprising a total of around 5,600 combatants. These militias are the Union patriotique de résistance du Grand Ouest, Forces de libération du Grand Ouest, Mouvement ivoirien de libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire, Alliance patriotique de l'ethnie Wê, Forces spéciales LIMA, and Congrès panafricain des jeunes patriotes. Each group has very different characteristics, whether due to their regional location, their numbers, or their type of armaments.

### Eligibility criteria

Combatants must have been recruited by the

armed forces or the Forces Nouvelles after 19 September 2002, the official start date to the conflict, in order to qualify for demobilisation.

### Budget

In May 2007, the World Bank approved a grant of \$40 million to finance the "economic (re)integration" of ex-combatants, youth in armed groups, and at-risk youth. In theory, these funds were intended for use by the Office of the Prime Minister. However, after attempting to write a memorandum of understanding on reintegration in November 2007, the World Bank disassociated itself from a possible agreement. The bank claimed it detected certain opaqueness and signs of corruption, which shed doubts on the advisability of continuing this funding and on the high economic cost involved in reintegrating ex-combatants. The bank claimed possible fiscal problems could be generated if the number of military personnel was not properly considered when the military reunified. Instead, the World Bank's programme of economic reinsertion was directed to "at-risk" youth, within which demobilised persons were also included.

The ICC estimated the cost for regrouping the Forces Nouvelles to be around 8 billion CFA francs, or \$18.9 million.

## Schedule

In the absence of a start date, the initial forecast was for disarmament and demobilisation to last four months and reintegration to last little more than two years. For the disarmament process, 22 December 2007 was settled as the start date, with a foreseen duration to the process of three months.

## Phases

### Disarmament and demobilisation

Six regroupment centres—distinguished between regroupment zones, disarmament and encampment zones, and demobilisation zones—have been created in zones of the former FDS, in Abidjan, Bondoukrou, Daloa, Guiglo, San Pedro, and Yamoussoukro. In the north, six additional centres have been created. Of these, Bouaké, Korhogo, and Man were reformed and submitted to the government by UNOCI in mid-March 2008. According to official figures, 4,000 ex-combatants of the FDS were quartered in barracks from 20 December 2007 to 25 January 2008. Yet, it was speculated that only 700 ex-combatants were actually quartered, notwithstanding the official data. Therefore, after approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1795, UNOCI, the international community's top representative, has been consigned to certification and validation tasks, thereby reducing its powers in relation to prior stages.

Activities for child soldiers are based on community awareness around the protection of the child and the dangers of participating in armed groups, advocacy towards the ICC so the needs and wants of underage minors are taken into account, the putting in place of technical support and a verification commission, providing material and economic support, reinforcing local capabilities (NGOs), and realising psychosocial, professional, medical, and educational tasks. Today, we cannot rule out that in the next regroupments, child soldiers will continue to be identified. In 2006, under the framework of the Child Protection Forum, a Verification Committee on the Status of Child Soldiers was struck. It was composed of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross (as observer), Save the Children, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCI, and UNICEF.

### Reintegration

With regard to **social reinsertion**, understood as a transition stage from demobilisation to reintegration, we can see it as necessary psychological and social assistance in facilitating social and economic integration. The principal activities of reintegration are the organisation of transit and orientation centres for a limited number of regular and irregular youth associated with armed groups, registration in regional offices, orientation counselling, medical and psychological support, and support for the reinstatement of awareness-raising by local authorities. In short, these activities are similar to those for demobilisation.

They focus on the ex-combatant and not on the needs of communities, as is the case in the majority of processes of this nature. Lack of socioeconomic studies for identifying the needs of society in relation to the economic reintegration of ex-combatants could lead to new sources of insecurity (NPRRC 2008).

**Economic reintegration** looks to allow target groups to acquire skills and to conduct economic activities which give them sustenance. We can divide economic reintegration into various intervention themes, including the reintegration of certain demobilised ex-combatants into initial activities or into self-employment, training in different areas in relation to need (literacy training, vocational training, training in management, etc.), placement of qualified demobilised persons into existing employment, signing of partner agreements with existing financial systems, putting in place of systems of accompaniment and evaluation of activities for demobilised beneficiaries, and support for the creation of income-generating activities. For all this, sector development policies must be carried out beforehand. These involve the renewal of public infrastructure, support to the production and commercialisation of agricultural products, and support to small business, amongst others (NPRRC 2008).

Finally, **community rehabilitation** is designed as an emergency measure for the most disadvantaged communities impacted by the current crisis. These communities are the hosts of ex-combatants and those displaced by war. Community renewal endeavours to renew public infrastructure, create income-generating activities, restore social cohesion, and train persons in participatory methods. Target groups are displaced populations returning to their regions of origin, populations affected by crisis, communities that have suffered a high rate of displacement, and the most vulnerable groups, including women, youth, the disabled, widows and widowers, and orphans. Diagnosis of needs by these projects is participative in nature, meaning the target population itself identifies its needs at the community level. As such, we must define what is meant by community, in this case, the host collective of the target groups mentioned here. We must also describe the decision-making process, since it is linked in particular ways to the process of national reconciliation (NPRRC 2008).

Lastly, the mission in Côte d'Ivoire intends to create a **community service** consisting of additional training in civic and vocational education. This service, aimed at the reinsertion of militias in the west of the country and those ex-combatants who require this type of training before joining the NPRRC, will involve three months of civic training and another six months of vocational training. Currently, basic guidelines for this have not been established.

### Evolution

In mid-2007, following design of the current DDR programme, President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime

Minister Guillaume Soro presided over a "Flame of Peace" ceremony, consisting of a symbolic destruction of arms and serving as a start to a disarmament process in Côte d'Ivoire. This ceremony, as a symbolic event, was also historic. It was the first time since 2002, when the armed conflict broke out, that the president travelled to Bouaké in the north of the country, a zone dominated in the last few years by the Forces Nouvelles.

At the end of 2007, the disarmament process commenced with two ceremonies, both essentially symbolic and part of pilot processes. In these ceremonies, detachments from both sides of the conflict withdrew from the front lines to stationing points in Tiebissou and Bouaké. The head of the general staff of the FDS acknowledged that the logistical and infrastructural problems faced by the Forces Nouvelles were more difficult than those faced by the FDS, and thereby announced slight delays to the process of stationing the Forces Nouvelles. With regard to the ceremony held in Bouaké, 2,121 arms were registered prior to the ceremony, but only 1,606 were surrendered. It is felt that the remaining 515 arms were recuperated by the Forces Nouvelles.

In March 2008, the signatories of the OPA met to debate the progress of the agreement. In terms of the disarmament and demobilisation of the Forces Nouvelles and the DDM process in the west of the country, these only commenced in mid-March with UNOCI's submission to the government of three regroupment or stationing centres in the north. Reintegration was not promising either. The NPRRC claimed an alarming lack of funds for reintegration. According to the worst estimates, there was a gap of around 70%, whilst design of the entire community service remains to be completed.

At the start of May 2008, the regroupment process for the Forces Nouvelles resumed with a ceremony in Bouaké. At this ceremony, 1,000 members of the Forces Nouvelles were attended to and an assistance package of 90,000 CFA francs (\$210) was offered to those who had decided to leave the group, in this case 100 soldiers. It is estimated that 34,678 combatants will participate in the regroupment of the Forces Nouvelles, and that this will take a total of approximately five-and-a-half months to complete, until mid-October. Regroupment will take place in four principal identified areas, including

- Bouaké and Seguela
- Katiola and Mankono
- Man, Touba, and Odienné
- Korhogo, Bouna, and Boundiali

DDM has not yet begun, but 981 persons who were demobilised have demanded a "filet de sécurité" (safety net) of around 742 euros. In a ceremony held in May 2007, only 555 of 1,027 arms that had previously been registered were surrendered according to UNOCI, and none of these had an identification number. The *filet de sécurité*, valued at around 760 euros, is one reason for the doubling of candidates in these programmes.

Therefore, the different structures in charge of the process, including the National Commission for DDR, the National Programme for DDR, and the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Renewal, have been mainly in charge of awareness-raising activities, with unfulfilled promises that could lead to insecurity.

### *Lessons learned*

The current balance of affairs is unsatisfactory. Processes in the north and west of Côte d'Ivoire have barely begun, whilst the regroupment of state armed forces has officially concluded even though only 700 of 12,000 soldiers have been demobilised. The government attributes this to logistical problems. Other problems include the proliferation of small arms in the country. At the time of the initial *Flamme de la paix* ceremonies for DDR, poor-condition arms were scarcely registered, whilst functional arms had disappeared. For this reason, one possible new source of insecurity may stem from the uncontrolled proliferation of arms, for which the mission in Côte d'Ivoire must outline a process of collection of arms from civil society. This idea is already being proposed by the UNDP, at the moment under the Arms for Development programme, as previously undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

This consideration is intimately related to the arms embargo in force in the country. President Laurent Gbagbo questioned the persistence of the arms embargo at the UN General Assembly at the war's end. He urged a partial lifting of the embargo, whilst it be kept on Charles Goudé Ble, Eugène Djue, and Kouakou Fofie, the high military commanders of the Jeunes Patriotes and the Forces Nouvelles, accused of destabilising the peace process. Thus far, the UN has ignored this request. Later, the FDS denied accusations by the United Nations of conducting training sessions with materials from outside the country, thus violating the embargo. The FDS said it was committed to the existing peace process. In their most recent report, UNOCI inspectors stated they were impeded from visiting bases controlled by the Forces Nouvelles.

With respect to reintegration, an enormous gap in the financing of activities for the NPRRC programme can be discerned, especially following the World Bank's renunciation of funds. Although the NPRRC claimed it was fully capable of managing its designated programmes, it is not clear that it only had to receive 8,150 ex-combatants as per its initial planning. Figures remain to be determined. According to some calculations, there is a budgetary gap of around 60%.

Neither has the community service process begun. This means that thus far criteria for the selection of candidates have not been established. This presents other problems. Although programme characteristics are basically civil in nature, they are managed by military structures, who are responsible for civic training in the first three months. Another problem is the estimations on the number of ex-combatants to

demobilise, which are much lower than actual figures. Then there is the issue of the perpetuation of centres for demobilised minors, which could produce insecurity if these minors are not reinserted into their communities, the far more recommendable thing to do, rather than kept in these centres. Other problems include the lack of socioeconomic studies and unfulfilled promises of civil or military public employment for ex-combatants at the end of 18 months. This latter could result in violent recriminations by beneficiaries.

An optimal process would involve dispersing projects to communities via a real and detailed approach to market necessities in creating employment, to the needs of partners in the public and private sectors, and to building micro-businesses. According to this approach, local authorities represented in Côte d'Ivoire through the prefecture and sub-prefecture, would work to negotiate and manage development projects. Decentralisation projects of this sort are being developed currently only in a bilateral fashion by the German Technical Cooperation, GTZ. These projects are being developed throughout the country, but particularly in the southwest where pro-government militias operate (*Securité et «ex-combattants»...* 2008). More specifically, projects of crisis prevention and peace consolidation, conflict management, employment creation and creation of opportunities for the most vulnerable groups (predominantly women and children), and training for women have been developed (GTZ 2005).

One of the main starting-point errors for DDR has been to begin the process from the national framework of the peace agreement, or to hope that disarmament will be effective simply because there has been significant political progress. The fact that disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles has begun as many as six times has led to the politicisation of all technical categories of the process. This has also generated distrust between parties. In short, disproportionate attention on external actors in areas such as regroupment camps has concealed fundamental concerns, including a lack of political will by leaders and only a semi-reintegration of troops. The approach to the dismantlement of militias is even more impoverished because militia bosses have been empowered in their role through the granting to them of programme management.

The current approach to DDR needs to be modified because it attempts to conduct disarmament and demobilisation in an akin or parallel manner for all groups. However, we should bear in mind that the FDS, Forces Nouvelles, and the various militias are different and were created in distinct circumstances. Their main differences lie in the degree of their organisation. Whilst the Forces Nouvelles are quite structured, the militias are organised more loosely (*Securité et «ex-combattants»...* 2008).

We need to advocate for a revision of the traditional understand of DDR, for a different interpretation which goes beyond the current design of it, because

the armed parties to it continue to expect a possibility of reintegration in exchange for disarmament. As an alternative, regroupment camps could be transferred to the NPRRC when combatants surrender their arms. Power could also be redistributed to the north and south of the country in order to conduct Quick Impact Projects, which permit for the creation of community-centred pilot projects. Visible in the centres of communities, these projects would run for around six to nine months with the aim of building community capabilities and controlling threats to security during electoral periods.

To improve the security situation, a much more targeted approach, with involvement from all responsible actors, is needed. This would allow for the integration of security-sector reform and the reinsertion of demobilised persons, since from one zone to the next many aspects differ, for instance levels of insecurity, actors and dynamics, and numbers and characteristics of ex-combatants and ex-militia fighters (*Securité et «ex-combattants»...* 2008). Many obstacles exist to overcome. These obstacles are predominantly security-sector reform and the poor ratio of surrendered arms to combatants, particularly with regard to the militias in the west. If we resolve these obstacles, DDR will become key to building peace in Côte d'Ivoire, for the simple fact that it is the process with the greatest chances of success in the country. Stabilisation in terms of security and the creation of new armed forces, who represent the contenders of the conflict, will facilitate enormously implementation of a census process for the population and an electoral process that is as democratic and transparent as possible.

The most important aspect of the programme in Côte d'Ivoire that remains to analyse is the content of the OPA. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement is based on a restructuring of the security and defence forces, which proves to have been done in a simplistic and problematic manner. Beyond the numbers of Forces Nouvelles to integrate, relations between ranks remain to be defined. This complicates the entire process. The approach is simplistic because it overlooks, as a remainder, the number of ex-combatants to demobilise, around 20%. These persons become potential dangers to communities, who feel obliged to accept groups considered to be "high risk". Thus far, security building has been conceived solely as the collection of arms. However, we must also advocate for a process of critical treatment and security-sector reform, which has yet to be agreed to. The most flagrant example of this ineffective approach is the continuous checkpoints on highways, especially in urban zones where the practice of extortion is commonplace. If the process continues as it is, the Forces Nouvelles will not only not disarm and demobilise, but their numbers will double. The process of security-sector reform must begin to involve civilians who can give their opinion on this and to design strategies for long-term security, above all on budgetary matters.

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## Glossary

ANADER	Alliance nationale des démocrates pour la reconstruction (National Agency for the Support to Rural Development in Côte d'Ivoire)
DDM	Disarmament and Dismantlement of Militias
ECOFORCE	ECOMOG Intervention Force
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG)	
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EU	European Union
FDS	Forces de Défense et Sécurité (Defence and Security Forces)
FN	Forces Nouvelles
GTZ	German Cooperation Agency
ICC	Integrated Command Centre
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire du Grand Ouest
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPRRC	National Programme for Reintegration and Community
Rehabilitation	
OPA	Ouagadougou Political Agreement
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Fund for Children
UNOCI	United Nation Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

# Liberia (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration, 2003-08)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	3,4 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	15,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	160,000 (2007)
GDP:	\$631 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$140 (2006)
HDI:	-
GDI:	-
Military expenditure:	7.5% (2002)
Social / military expenditure:	Military higher than social
Military population:	0.08%
Arms embargo:	ONU: since 1992; EU: since 2001

## Summary

Type of DDR	Multiple and massive disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) targeting various groups of combatants, with special attention paid to child soldiers and the redistribution of political power.
Groups to demobilise	More than 100,000 members of different armed groups and militias.
Executive bodies	National Commission for DDRR (NCDDRR)
Budget	A minimum of \$110 million
Timeline	Disarmament and demobilisation from December 2003 to November 2004. Reinsertion and reintegration from November 2004 to June 2008.
Status / synopsis	The process has been long and full of difficulties involving financing, corruption, etc. Currently, it is in the last stage of reintegration.

## Context

### Transitional justice<sup>2</sup>

On 18 August 2003, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana between the government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and Liberia's registered political parties. The agreement stipulates the creation of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) to oversee fulfilment of the rights guaranteed by the agreement, the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), free access for vulnerable groups to all humanitarian agencies, and the opening of a process of stationing, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Although created in 2006, implementation of the TRC has been very slow, in part because the commission has not had the funds it requires and because support from the international community has been minimal. A budget of 1.1 million euros for the commission's operations came almost entirely from the government. This financing was exorbitant for a country with a national budget of less than 100 million euros. The TRC held its first hearing to clarify the crimes committed during 14 years of civil war in the country in January 2008. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, president of Liberia and the TRC, maintained that the commission did not aim only to achieve the reconciliation and healing of Liberian society but also to deal with the realm of justice. Public hearings will continue until the end of July 2008.

Liberian ex-President Charles Taylor is currently on trial in a Special Court for Sierra Leone at The Hague. He is accused of crimes against humanity and for having directed and financed civil war in Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone with the sale of so-called blood diamonds.

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: Alusala (2007), UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2008), Nichols (2006) and UNMIL Focus (2007).

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2006)

## Security-sector reform

### Police

A training programme for the Liberia National Police (LNP) started in July 2004 with help from the United Nations Police and the Transition Government of Liberia. In July 2007 it reached its aim of training around 3,700 agents, 350 of them women. Of these, a group of 500 will form an Emergency Response Unit and receive additional training in 2008 and 2009. The United States, Great Britain, Nigeria, China, the European Commission, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ghana, Egypt, Interpol, and various UN agencies have contributed to this initiative.

### Armed Forces

Through the private security firm DynCorp and a grant of \$200 million, the United States has led the process to restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) includes cooperating in this reform process as part of security-sector reform. Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Ghana, China, and France also cooperate. The objective is to train 2,000 soldiers. Comprising

around 500 soldiers, the first three companies of the new AFL became active in December 2007 (APA 2007).


### Other disarmament initiatives

Other disarmament initiatives are conducted within the Arms for Development programme. From the end of the disarmament component of DDR in January 2006, the UNDP has managed this programme. It is financed by Japan. UNMIL is responsible for managing and controlling arms. By November 2007, it had only collected 500 arms and 45,000 munitions. A total of 19 community projects have been implemented. These projects include, for example, rebuilding administrative buildings, hospitals, and schools. A National Commission on Small Arms, with contributions from eight government secretary's offices, has also been established, whilst the 1956 law on firearms is being revised.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

Multiple and massive DDR targeting various groups of combatants, with special attention paid to child soldiers and the redistribution of political power.



### Executive bodies

The NCDDRR is responsible for the overall process in Liberia. The commission includes 400 staff and representatives from the Liberian government, armed groups, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the United Nations, the African Union, and the International Contact Group for Liberia. It relies on support from the UNMIL DDR Unit and the UNDP. The NCDDRR has also established a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) to be operationally responsible for planning and coordination. The JIU works in coordination with a Technical Coordination Committee in which various bodies of the UN participate. The unit oversees four areas:

- Disarmament and demobilisation, the responsibility of UNMIL. Although UNMIL was responsible for managing disarmament, stationing, and

complementary operations, other participating organisations included the WFP (provision of foodstuffs), UNDP (orientation and transport), WHO (medical examinations), UNPFA (reproductive health and gender violence), UNICEF (minors), and the UNDP/Fast Intervention Telecommunications and Information Technology - FITTEST (communications).

- Information and awareness-raising, the responsibility of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The NCDDRR has also been active in this area, above all during the start of the programme.
- Supervision and evaluation, the responsibility of the UNDP.
- Rehabilitation and reintegration, implemented until April 2007 by the UNDP when responsibility for the area was transferred to the NCDDRR, although



the UNDP did not conclude its DDR programme until October. Since 2003, UNICEF has developed reintegration programmes for child soldiers in cooperation with more than 700 community organisations, including child welfare committees, clubs, and youth groups, as well as the Ministry of Education. The UNFPA has been involved with reintegration projects for women and young female ex-combatants. (UNDP Liberia 2008)

### Participants

The total number of combatants varies from 103,000 to 107,000, depending on the source. These combatants are split amongst different armed groups and militias, including 35,000 members of LURD, 14,000 members of MODEL, 16,000 pro-government paramilitaries or militia members, and 12,000 soldiers of the armed forces. The percentage of combatants relative to the total population, around 4 percent, is the second highest after Eritrea of the programmes studied in this report, and the highest amongst intra-state conflicts.

### Groups with specific needs

The programme in Liberia recognises both women and child soldiers as groups with specific needs. The number of women and children after the disarmament phase were as follows:

	Men	Women	Total
Adults	69,281	22,456	91,737
Child soldiers	8,771	2,511	11,282
Total	78,052	24,967	103,019

Source: Joint Implementation Unit (2003)

Donor	Project	Recipients	Participants (Goal/attained)	Contribution in millions \$	Period
European Commission	Vocational training and job placement	NGOs CESD and LOIC	2,940/1,030	3.8	2003-2006
USAID	Contingency projects, training	DAI-LCIP, World Vision, IRC, SC-UK	21,000/10,739		2004 -
UNICEF	CEIP, ALP		7,000/?	4.1 <sup>1</sup>	2006 - ...

Sources: Joint Implementation Unit (2003), USAID (2005:5), UNICEF (2006: 11), Christian Children's Fund (2007), European Commission (2004: 4.2.2.), Republic of Liberia (2007).

### Eligibility criteria

To participate in DDR, a combatant must have surrendered an arm in good condition or 150 rounds of ammunition. Women and child soldiers associated with arms groups are not required to fulfil this condition. Given that the *a priori* criterion was not very strict, there was a verification process to complement it, but it turned out to be ineffective.

### Budget and financing

#### Summary

**Disarmament and demobilisation:** at least \$12.4 million.

**Rehabilitation and reintegration:** \$68 million from the Trust Fund, at least \$8 million from parallel reintegration programmes, and \$20 million for the final phase.

**Total:** a minimum of \$110 million.

Disarmament and demobilisation, including TSA (Transitional Safety Allowance), fell under the

ordinary budget of UNMIL. Some have criticised the lack of transparency in UNMIL's management of budget. However, it is also known that the UNDP had to advance UNMIL \$12.4 million to defray the costs of disarmament and demobilisation. UNMIL later returned \$6.4 million of this (Ball 2005: 21).

The Trust Fund for DDR has financed the bulk of reintegration, which has been implemented by the UNDP.

DDRR Trust Fund 2004-07 Contributions (millions \$)		
European Commission	22.2	33%
United States	19.9	29%
Sweden / AIDS	6.8	10%
UNMIL (devolution)	6.4	9%
UK DFID	5.4	8%
Denmark	3.5	5%
Ireland	1.2	2%
Norway	1.2	2%
Switzerland	0.8	1%
CPR-Small Arms Reduction	0.6	1%
Iceland	0.01	>1%
TOTAL	68	

Source: own elaboration based on Pugel (2007: 44)

Various other initiatives are funded by the European Commission and USAID, and yet others are implemented by UNICEF. Other of these initiatives include the following:

The NCDRR estimates that an additional \$18 million is required to reintegrate 23,000 "residual" ex-combatants. Finally, the last stage of rehabilitation and reintegration for 9,000 ex-combatants began in January 2008. It relied on \$20 million contributed by Norway (Office of the Vice President 2008; IRIN 2007; APA 2008).

### Schedule

Initially, the programme in Liberia was to run from December 2003 to June 2007. It was subsequently extended for another year by a presidential executive order, thereby bringing the total time of the programme to 55 months. (Republic of Liberia 2007; Office of the Vice President 2008; Sonpon 2007).

The programme was split into two phases, one from December 2003 to November 2004 for

disarmament and demobilisation, and the other from November 2004 to June 2008 for rehabilitation and reintegration. The last stage of rehabilitation and reintegration began in January 2008.

### Phases

A Draft Interim Secretariat comprised on the UNDP, UNMIL, the World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, and World Vision designed a plan for approximately five months to demobilise 38,000 combatants in three phases and reintegrate them over a period of three years (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003). In the end, the secretariat took a year to disarm and demobilise more than double the combatants, whilst reintegration has already been extended to four years (Paes 2005; IRIN 2003).

### Disarmament and demobilisation

Phase I, a pilot phase centred on Monrovia, began on 7 December 2003. Logistical and infrastructural problems caused the programme to be suspended temporarily on 27 December for redesign. Many more ex-combatants than anticipated turned up for disarmament and demobilisation, which resulted in rioting and nine deaths brought about by individuals who did not immediately receive an initial allowance of \$150 as they had expected (Amnesty International 2008: 24; *Liberia Needs Assessment* 2004).

Phase II began on 15 April 2004 following an information campaign carried out by UNMIL starting in January. The phase concluded on 14 September and occurred in four stationing camps built close to Monrovia. Phase III began on 17 August in four more remote stationing camps and concluded at the end of November (Amnesty International 2008).

Various aspects of the verification process have been criticised: UNMIL's poor preparation and execution; the inappropriateness of the eligibility criteria (see **Eligibility**); the use of non-standard verification criteria, which allowed some commanders to manipulate lists of eligible individuals and include non-eligible individuals whilst excluding eligible ones; as well as other distortions to the process. It has been suggested that as many as 40,000 persons who did not comply with eligibility requirements participated in disarmament and demobilisation. Although the existence of these "illegitimate" participants has been generally acknowledged, different interpretations exist as to who these participants were and who remained outside of the programme in their place. The high number of unaffiliated participants (roughly a fourth - see the table below) could suggest that civilians managed to get a hold of arms to enter the programme. Nichols (2006: 120) argues that many women and children, if they were not able to qualify as combatants by presenting an arm, whether theirs or not, were able to benefit from lax criteria on being associated with armed groups. However, according to Amnesty International (2008: 25) and Specht (2006: 82-83), the manipulation of lists and the lack of prior information disproportionately harmed women combatants, perhaps a majority of whom were left

out of the process. Nichols also cites male soldiers who were left out, possibly for not having cooperated in the corruption of their commanders. At the same time, a study by the UNDP/JIU (Pugel 2007: 4) claims 12 percent of combatants failed to participate in the programme, which does not seem anomalous.

The final figures given by UNMIL and NCDDRR/UNDP on disarmed and demobilised combatants varied slightly. These are the figures published by the NCDDRR on disarmament:

Group	Disarmed combatants per group			
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	TOTAL
AFL	4,164	6,830	1,260	12,254
LURD	48	19,721	14,504	34,273
MODEL	11	2,854	10,283	13,148
Government/militias	12	5,107	10,476	15,595
Other	8,890	16,957	1,902	27,749
TOTAL	13,125	51,469	38,425	103,019

Source: Joint Implementation Unit (2006)

In total, 28,314 arms, 33,604 projectiles and explosives, and 6.5 million of rounds of ammunitions were collected. The ratio of arms surrendered per combatant is very low, a little more than one per four combatants or associated individuals. The final figure for demobilised individuals is slightly less. According to UNMIL, 101,495 combatants were considered demobilised on 15 February 2005.

	Disarmed	Demobilised
Phase I	13,125	11,805
Phase II	51,469	51,341
Phase III	38,425	38,349

Source: own elaboration based on Joint Implementation Unit (2006)

To this figure we need to add, on the one hand, 612 foreign combatants, principally from Sierra Leone and Guinea, 127 of them child soldiers, and on the other hand, 379 more combatants demobilised after 2005.

In stationing camps, disarmed combatants received basic orientation, food, training in peace and human rights, and a medical examination. Also, each demobilised individual received a Transitional Safety Allowance of \$300 paid in two instalments.

From the very beginning, women and child soldiers were separated from the rest, in particular from commanders who could abuse them,<sup>3</sup> and their demobilisation was prioritised and had to be done in less than three days. Yet even though the programme declared its intention to provide for women and children, in practice the work of both UNMIL and JIU in reference to women has been criticised for a lack of authentic desire to incorporate a gender emphasis. This was reflected in the lack of participation by women in the planning and implementation of the programme. Specht moreover highlighted the little information that was given to possible participants during the disarmament and

<sup>3</sup> See Specht (2006: 14), who argues that it was not always in the best interests of women and child soldiers to separate from their commanders because this could also increase their vulnerability.

demobilisation phase, and the lack of flexibility of integration projects in the reinsertion and reintegration phase (Amnesty International 2008; Specht 2006).

### Reinsertion and reintegration

NCDDRR statistics show that the median age of participants was 26 years old and the majority were between 18 and 34. The educational level of participants was very low. The majority had not had any education or only elementary education, whilst 38 percent had created a family and almost all had some sort of access to farmland (Joint Implementation Unit 2005).

Reinsertion and reintegration developed irregularly, stagnating due to the lack of financial resources. Various sources speak of 40,000 or more ex-combatants left unattended to by the programme and an incidence of 60-70 percent abandonment of the programme. In April 2007, various recommendations by the NCDDRR and the Concerned Ex-combatants Union of Liberia (CECUL) managed, through an executive order issued by President Johnson-Sirleaf, to prolong the reintegration process in order to accommodate a "residual quantity" of around 22,000 demobilised individuals (IRIN 2007; Republic of Liberia 2007). The different programmes targeting this group concluded with a remaining count of "residuals" estimated at 9,000, which the most recent phase of reinsertion and reintegration is now targeting (Office of the Vice President 2008).

Reintegration programmes began in June 2004. Within reinsertion and reintegration ex-combatants receive \$30 per month over 6-8 months covering the length of the training period. Demobilised combatants had the following training option from which to choose (Paes 2005):

- Formal education 40%
- Vocational training
  - o Automobile mechanics 14%
  - o "Generic" skills 11%
  - o Driving 7%
  - o Tailoring 7%
  - o Bricklaying 3%
- Agriculture 4%

Notwithstanding these preferences, a UNMIL survey revealed that in December 2006 around 23 percent of ex-combatants worked in the agricultural sector, 19 percent were unemployed, and only 17 percent were students. According to one ex-combatant, the subsidy of \$30 per month received during the training period is equivalent to one or two weeks of salary in a rubber plantation. It is also believed that many reinsertion kits were sold. In any case, 30,000 ex-combatants registered for formal education in 2006 according to UNDDR. Participants received an allowance for two years and others help with uniform and enrolment expenses.

Several programmes in vocational training, developed by a variety of organisations with prior approval from JIU and some still active, were offered. Approximately two thirds of beneficiaries were served by programmes of the DRR Trust Fund. The rest were served by projects funded by the European Commission, USAID, and UNICEF.

UNICEF, for instance, provided different specialised programmes for minors, such as CEIP, which includes basic primary education and vocational training, as well as psychosocial counselling. Vocational training courses last for six to nine months. Specialisations include cosmetics, bricklaying, carpentry, and bread making. A box of tools is provided to each student. Likewise, a training programme is being developed for teachers so that they can give psychosocial support to minors. UNDDR offered a figure of 60,000 participants in various reintegration programmes at the end of 2006. Half of these individuals had already completed their programmes.

Participants in reintegration programmes October 2006			
	Men	Women	Total
Completed	25,597	7,279	32,876
Underway	21,238	5,717	26,955
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,835</b>	<b>12,996</b>	<b>59,831</b>

Source: UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2008)

UNMIL claimed in August 2007 that at least 78,000 ex-combatants had passed through the reintegration and reinsertion process (Chea-Annan 2007).

According to a survey conducted in 2006 by Pugel (2007: 64ss), a quarter of ex-combatants claimed to have work. This is considered a good proportion given that 80 percent of Liberians are without employment. Nevertheless, the economic situation for the majority of ex-combatants continued to be poor, so that more than half approach or are under the poverty line. As for social reintegration, the same study indicated that 94 percent of ex-combatants had not had major difficulties reintegrating socially in their current communities, which in 58 percent of cases was the community of origin of the ex-combatant.

In the final phase of reintegration and reinsertion, emphasis is to be placed on psychosocial counselling and gender equality (Office of the Vice President 2008).

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## Glossary

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
APA	Agence de Presse Africaine
CECUL	Concerned Ex-combatants Union of Liberia
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FITTEST (UNDP)	Fast Intervention Telecommunications and Information Technology
INCHR	Independent National Commission on Human Rights
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
LNP	Liberia National Police
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TSA	Transitional Safety Allowance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPFA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1 UNICEF's budget is for the Child Protection Programme, which includes other programmes in addition to CEIP (Community Education Investment Programme) and ALP (Accelerated Learning Programme, which benefits ex-combatants, civilians, and children affected by AIDS).

## Nepal (AMMAA, 2007 - ...)

### Basic data

Population:	27.1 million (2005)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	60,000
GDP:	\$7,346 million (2005)
Per capita income:	\$270 (2005)
HDI:	0.527, 138 <sup>th</sup> (2004)
GDI:	0.52, 127 <sup>nd</sup> (2005)
Military expenditure:	2.05% (2006)
Social / military expenditure:	Social higher than military
Military population:	0.24% (2006)
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Stationing and identification of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with debate on military versus civil reintegration, in a context of political transition.
Groups to demobilise	Around 20,000 members of the PLA.
Executive bodies	Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC)
Budget	
Timeline	Stationing from the start of January 2007. Verification from August to December 2007.
Status / synopsis	Process of reintegration pending political decisions by a Constitutional Assembly, once it is established.

### Context

#### Peace process and conflict

In February 1996, the Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-Maoist) commenced armed struggle against the Nepalese government with the aim of overthrowing King Birenda's constitutional monarchy and replacing it with a popular republic. Nepalese society is an unequal system based on ethnicity and castes. At the root of the conflict are also institutional corruption and a malfunctioning party system. In June 2001, the king and various members of the royal family were assassinated and, consequently, a state of emergency was declared and the political crisis worsened. At the end of August 2001, a first meeting between the government and CPN-Maoist took place, but months later the Maoists returned to the offensive and the government declared the state of emergency, responding with a large military offensive of its own.

The political situation in Nepal changed entirely in 2006 after massive and prolonged popular demonstrations in April which forced the king to restore parliament. The vice prime minister declared a definitive ceasefire by the government and withdrew the classification of terrorist applied to the PLA. From this point, a process of dialogue with the PLA was launched and culminated in June 2006 with an historic meeting between Prime Minister Koirala and PLA leader Prachanda and the signing of an eight-point agreement between the sides. Prachanda had previously claimed he would not oppose his troops' integration into new armed forces. In May, the government announced that elections would be held for a Constituent Assembly within a year and that it hoped the PLA would be disarmed by then. In September, the government and CPN-Maoist agreed on a draft interim constitution in which sensitive political questions such as the role of the monarchy were not included. In the second half of November, the government and CPN-Maoist signed a peace agreement and formally declared an end to the armed conflict.<sup>1</sup>

#### International accompaniment

The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was created through Security Council Resolution 1740. UNMIN is administered by the Department of Political Affairs. It

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from Fisas (2007: 96-99)

contains unarmed military inspectors, electoral experts, and teams of police and civil administrators. The mission's mandate includes the supervision of ceasefire and disarmament, the provision of technical assistance to an Electoral Commission, the monitoring of elections for the Constituent Assembly, and observation of the human rights situation (Karki 2007).

### Security-sector reform

Security-sector reform is a highly charged political topic in Nepal. It has been included explicitly or implicitly in the peace negotiations. In the "three pronged" conflict between the government, Maoists, and monarchy, the Nepal Royal Army (NRA) has traditionally been aligned with the king, thereby the democratisation of security forces is a fundamental part of the agreements between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN-Maoist (Kumar and Sharma 2005; Pathak and Niraula 2006). As such, the AMMAA (Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies), in conformity with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), designates an Interim Council of Ministers to "prepare and implement the detailed action plan of the Nepal Army's democratization by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the Interim Parliament/legislature. Under this to carry out activities like assessing the appropriate number of the Nepal Army, to train the army in democratic and human rights values while developing democratic structure, national and inclusive character" (*Agreement on Monitoring...* 2006: 6; see also the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement...* 2006: 5).

### Other disarmament initiatives

The CPA obliges the parties to the conflict to contribute data on the location of landmines and IEDs, or improvised explosive devices. The disarmament process has typically centred on firearms, but perhaps we need to also consider the particular role other weapons have played in Nepal (see [Disarmament](#)). At the same time, the disarmament process for armed groups has not been utilised to promote a policy on small arms control, a situation some activists deem grave given the history of the conflict and the porousness of the border with India (IRIN 2007).

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

DDR in Nepal involves the stationing and identification of the PLA with debate on military versus civil reintegration, in a context of political transition.

**DDR, AMMAA, or CMR?** A Nepalese former military advisor for the DPKO wrote: "In Nepal, we haven't used the term 'DDR' because neither side wanted it to look like surrender. The model used here is: camping, UN monitoring, and reintegration (CMR) but can essentially have the same long-term goal (Gurung 2006). The term CMR has not been widely used at least in the English literature on the process in Nepal, but it is true that CMR or AMMAA are used consistently within the country, whilst DDR is more commonly found in references outside of it.

This is not only an erudite discussion on terminology. In fact, between the CPN-Maoist and UNMIN, the question generated controversy which was key to paralysing the verification process in July 2007. Prachanda said that DDR was not an appropriate model for the restructuring of the Maoist army and that, since the PLA represented popular sovereignty, DDR "should rather be applied to the state army" ("Reintegration of armies" 2007). The CPN-Maoist went even further in their statements, which assume DDR is equal to surrender, accusing UNMIN of adopting the "Sudanese model" of DDR for the verification process, with the goal of "dissolving" the PLA. Ian Martin, who disagrees that UNMIN followed such a model, clarified that both the CPA and AMMAA, which establish the boundaries for the mission, never spoke of "disarmament" but of "separation" and "monitoring" of arms, and recognised that the Maoists were "allergic" to the term DDR. Not only is it evident that the Maoists, who have adopted the term CMR or security-sector reform (depending on the source), see this as an eminently political problem, but we should not forget that some terms used by the international community can be politically charged, even if their use is intended to be merely technical (Pudasaini 2007; "Press Conference..." 2007; Lee 2007; "DDR model not adopted..." 2007; "Intentional obstacle?" 2007; "Resumption of verification..." 2007).

### Guiding principles

The government of Nepal and the CPN-Maoist signed a series of agreements in which gradually they settled certain aspects of what was to be the disarmament process. The sequence of agreements was the following: the 12-point Understanding (12 November 2005) and the 8-point Accord (16 June 2006) agreed that combatants and arms of the NRA and PLA would be monitored by the United Nations. The 25-point Code of Conduct (26 May 2006) added a prohibition on mobilisations and other shows of force by the armed parties to the conflict. The 5-point Agreement (9 August 2006) assigned supervision of the truce and verification of stationing and quartering to the UN. Finally, the 6-point Political Agreement (8 November 2006) and the 10-Point Comprehensive Peace Accord (21 November 2006) stipulated the details for stationing, quartering, storage, etc. (Pathak and Niraula 2006). The fourth section of the CPA is titled "Management of Armies and Arms" and is the basis of the process for both elections in the short term and democratisation and restructuring of the armed forces in the long term. The CPA outlines seven main stationing areas for the PLA, the system of arms storage for both parties to the conflict, the obligation of government to provide for the PLA whilst it is stationed, the responsibility of the Interim Government to create a Special Committee on "adjustment and rehabilitation" of Maoist ex-combatants, and the responsibility of the Interim Council of Ministers to design and implement an action plan for the democratisation and restructuring of the armed forces. The CPA also mentions the United Nations as verifier of combatants and arms

(*Comprehensive Peace Agreement...* 2006: 4ss). Later, on 28 November 2006, the government and CPN-Maoists signed the AMMAA (*Agreement on Monitoring...* 2006), which in addition to reaffirming the commitment of both sides to a restructuring of the state based on democratic governance, resolved again to entrust the United Nations with the monitoring and management of arms and the stationing of both armed forces. It is important to note that neither the CPA nor the AMMAA has made mention of the "DDR" formula (*Agreement on Monitoring...* 2006; Pathak and Niraula 2006).

### Executive bodies

Coordination and supervision at the national level is the responsibility of the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee, JMCC. The committee is comprised of more than 100 members, representatives of government including Nepalese armed forces and the CPN-Maoist including the PLA. Representatives of the United Nations (UNMIN, the UNDP, and UNICEF) preside over the committee, which is divided into 10 groups.

These 10 Joint Monitoring Teams (two per sector) are composed of a UN observer, a member of the armed forces, and a member of the PLA. The teams monitor cessations of hostilities at the regional and local levels. Verification teams are composed of members of UNMIN, the UNDP, and UNICEF.

SGCMIC, the Special Government Committee on Monitoring and Integration of Combatants, is in charge of designing and implementing security-sector reform and the reinsertion of ex-PLA in the armed forces.

The UNDP's Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program, meanwhile, collaborated in sending 10 experts to Nepal to support the AMMAA in providing training on armament registration over a period of approximately two weeks.

### Participants

The participants of the programme in Nepal are more than 32,250 potential PLA members, 19,602 of whom (15,756 men and 3,846 women) have been classified as eligible as current members of the PLA, as well as 2,973 minors. The CPN-Maoist proposed that its militias also be included in the AMMAA, but the suggestion was rejected (Martin 2007b, Pathak and Nirauli 2006).

### Eligibility criteria

The AMMAA defines "combatants of the Maoist army" to be "regular active duty members of the Maoist army who joined service before 25 May 2006, who are not minors and who are able to demonstrate their service, including by CPN-Maoist identity card and other means agreed by the parties" (*Agreement on Monitoring...* 2006). The agreement left open the later determination of the verification mechanism to be used by the parties. This has created difficulties (see [Demobilisation](#)).

### Budget and financing

The government is responsible for financing the core of the process, that is, stationing and future reintegration options. Information on government expenditures is scarce. The Ministry of Finance declared in December 2007 that it had spent around 25 million euros on stationing centres.

Other figures known are the budgets of NGOs working with children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFGs). UNICEF mentions around \$3.5 million targeting 7,500 minors, 4,500 of them CAAFAG; Save the Children, \$3 million; the International Rescue Committee, \$400,000 for 4,000 minors, 1,000 of them CAAFAG; and \$1.2 million between Search for Common Ground, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, and Partnerships for Protecting Children in Armed Conflict. For mine action and awareness around landmines, UNICEF has contributed \$500,000, whilst the Nepal Red Cross and Save the Children have contributed \$150,000 each.

### Schedule

The AMMAA stipulates that the process in Nepal is to commence the moment an agreement is signed. However, the establishment of a detailed schedule of implementation which different committees (or political bodies with greater scope) will have to determine once they have been created is being left for later. The first phase, "disarmament" (registration of arms for the NRA and of arms and combatants for the PLA), began in mid-January 2007 and concluded three months later. The second phase, verification of PLA combatants, began in August 2007 (Pathak and Niraula 2006; Himalayan News Service 2007; UNMIN 2007; Xinhua 2007b).

### Phases

#### Management of arms

Both the Peace Agreement and in large part the AMMAA specify that Maoist combatants be stationed in seven main campments and 21 satellite campments under UN supervision. As part of this process, arms are registered and deposited in containers which are closed with a key held by the Maoists, as is stipulated in the peace agreement, whilst the Nepalese army deposits an equal quantity of arms in warehouses. In these campments, military training is prohibited. The CPN-Maoist arms are held in 70 metal containers monitored by the UN. The first phase of registration of PLA arms and combatants was conducted from 10 to 12 April 2007. 31,350 combatants showed up at stationing centres. These individuals surrendered 3,476 arms ("Verification cannot be conditional" 2007; AFP 2007). An incident in March 2007 revealed a peculiarity to the conflict in Nepal which partially explains the low ratio of the arms surrendered per combatant: after stationing and arms surrender, Prachanda declared that the PLA held thousands of armed combatants outside of stationing camps, which aroused great unease amongst the government and UNMIN. Later, the PLA specified that Prachanda had not referred to *firearms* and *troops* but to thousands of Maoists who could "make bombs and fight a war". He reminded his followers that their "insurgency was fought mainly with bombs, not firearms". The PLA added that their explosives were under UNMIN's supervision but, as stipulated in agreements, they were not in the warehouses of stationing centres, but in other faraway areas (Haviland 2007).



### Stationing and verification

In May 2007, verification of combatants stopped after protests by Maoists over the poor living conditions in stationing centres. The Maoists cited as problems water, electricity, transport, and communication, which were the government's responsibility. The CPN-Maoist demanded, moreover, that the government give some kind of remuneration to registered individuals who awaited verification and that a committee be struck to decide on the new Nepalese army, as Article 146 of the Interim Constitution stipulated. UNMIN agreed that improvements to the conditions in stationing centres were urgent. At the end of May 2007, the government announced that it would give an allowance of \$46 to stationed combatants and improve conditions in centres. The SGCMIC was set up at the end of May as well ("Verification cannot be conditional" 2007; Reuters 2007). After various false starts for the JMCC at the time of determining a new date for the start of the second phase of stationing and verification, the committee finally began work on 19 June 2007. The first stage was in the eastern district of Llam where 100 UN workers conducted a verification process for more than 3,000 Maoist combatants which concluded on 27 June 2007 (*NepalNews* 2007; Xinhua 2007a; Martin 2007a; *The Rising Nepal* 2007; OCHA 2007). The process stagnated again at this point. Amongst the topics disputed and reflected in the media were the disqualification of many combatants (1,300 out of 3,200, including minors, combatants recruited late in the conflict, and combatants who did not show up at stationing camps, though these numbers have not been confirmed by UNMIN) and an accusation of the government not fulfilling agreements, all framed within a discussion on whether the process was about DDR or CMR/security-sector reform. The Maoists demanded a "political" agreement before continuing with the verification process, reminding

the government that both the security-sector reform process and possible compensation for ex-combatants had still not been agreed to (Dhakal 2007; "Intentional obstacle?" 2007; "PLA verification to resume" 2007; "Resumption of verification..." 2007; Xinhua 2007c). The International Crisis Group warned that the low numbers of supervisors responsible for registration hindered independent work and permitted the Maoists to debate the numbers (ICG 2006). UNMIN stated that the terms of verification were those signed in the AMMAA and demanded the PLA immediately free the minors in its ranks ("Martin urges Maoists..." 2007). At the end of July, the JMCC reached an agreement on taking up again the verification process. UNMIN agreed to a review of its several ineligibility decisions on combatants and to retrain its personnel because the CPN-Maoist complained that during verification the JMCC staff asked "unplanned" questions. At the same time, it was agreed not to demobilise identified combatants until all centres were verified (Dhakal 2007; Xinhua 2007d). Due to delays in the verification process and the poor conditions in stationing camps, a high number of registered combatants left camp before being verified. Debate rages over the numbers. In the Nawalparasi District, for example, 1,000 combatants of a total 5,000 left their camps. Combatants argued sanitary conditions in camps were poor; also that they had not received their subsidy from the government, apparently because the CPN-Maoist had not given it to them, or that they had received the subsidy only erratically. Sources claimed the subsidy had been received for only one month, and then only half of what was promised. The Maoists noted that 12 percent of combatants enjoyed a monthly permit so that later they could not be qualified as "deserters" (FAST International 2007; *The Rising Nepal* 2007b; Tripathi 2007; UN News 2007). The final figures for the verification phase held in December 2007 are as follows (Martin 2007b):

	19,602 verified as adult combatants of the PLA	15,756 men 3,846 women
32,250 registered in phase 1	8,640 did not turn up for the verification process	
	4,008 disqualified	2,973 minors 1,035 incorporated into the PLA after 25/05/06

### Reintegration

Reintegration of the Maoists will depend on the political configuration of the Constituent Assembly. The CPN-Maoist advocates for integration into the Nepal Army whilst the army directly opposes this. Other actors had intermediate positions advocating differing proportions of civil, military, and/or security-sector integration.

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## Glossary

AFP	Agence France-Presse
AMMAA	Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies
CAAFGs	Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
CMR	Camping Monitoring and Reintegration
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-Maoist	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
JMCC	Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee
NRA	Nepal Royal Army
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PLA	People's Liberation Army
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal

## Niger (PCPAA, 2006 – 2007)

### Basic data

Population:	14,4 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
GDP:	\$3,544 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$260 (2006)
HDI:	0.374, 174th (2005)
GDI:	0.355, 155th (2007)
Military expenditure:	1.11% (2004)
Social / military expenditure:	Social higher than military
Military population:	0.04%
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Unilateral, small-scale reintegration of organisationally fragmented armed opposition groups with partial reinsertion into the armed forces, in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilise	3,160 former members of 13 <i>fronts</i> and <i>mouvements</i> of self-defence.
Executive bodies	Office of the High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace (HCRP), Ministry of Territorial Management and Community Development (MATDC, in French Ministère de l'aménagement du territoire et du développement communautaire), and the UNDP
Budget	\$1.7 million
Timeline	First phase from March to December 2006. Second phase from January to December 2007.
Status / synopsis	Concluded

### Context

#### Peace process and conflict

After Niger's independence, the Tuareg in the north of the country led a number of revolts which in the 1990s escalated into armed conflict. In 1992, nomadic Tuareg groups and Toubou in the east rebelled against Niger, demanding greater economic and political participation in the state in addition to the development of their regions, which were strongly affected by growing drought and the practical disappearance of trans-Saharan trade. Numerous and disperse movements arose in the Tahoua Department of the Azawakh Valley, the Aïr Mountains, Kawar/Bilma in Agadez, and Manga in Diffa. The Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA, in French Front de libération de l'Aïr et l'Azaouad) formed in the first two of these regions and later on split into 13 distinct factions.

Despite the signing of three agreements—in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in April 1995, in Algiers, Algeria in April 1997, and in N'Djamena, Chad in August 1998—different armed groups remained active. The approval of a constitution and elections in 1999 brought certain stability to the country. In Nigerien political discourse, the development of DDR is part of "the fulfilment of clauses signed in peace agreements", on which enduring peace depend (*Inforapide* 2006, May).<sup>1</sup>

#### Security-sector reform

The peace agreements intend to integrate ex-combatants into the armed forces. Therefore, 2,074 ex-combatants followed a reinsertion plan within the Unités sahariennes de sécurité (Saharan Security Units).

#### Background to DDR

On September 2002, more than 1,200 arms were destroyed in a ceremony called the "Flame of Peace" within the framework of the 1995-98 agreements. Through small

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following works, from which only direct quotations will be cited: *Inforapide* (2006) and UNDP Niger (2007a, 2007b).

arms-collection programmes, hundreds of arms more were withdrawn from Niger in the following years. Meanwhile, after the agreements, more than 7,000 combatants enrolled in DDR programmes. The UNDP developed its own projects to strengthen peace in Diffa (called PCPD, *Projet de consolidation de la paix dans la région de Diffa*) and Kawar (*Réinsertion des ex-combattants dans la région de Bilma*), targeting a total of around 890 ex-combatants. The Peace Consolidation Program in Aïr and Azawak (PCPAA, in French *Consolidation de la paix dans l'Aïr et l'Azawak*) will conclude what these projects began and the model they extended to the Aïr and Azawak areas (Florquin and Berman 2005: 321; UNDP Niger 2003; IRIN 2007).

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR

Unilateral, small-scale reintegration of organisationally fragmented armed opposition groups with partial reinsertion into the armed forces, in a post-war context.

### Executive bodies

The HCRP is responsible for programme planning and developing a public information campaign. Programme design was done in cooperation with the UNDP (Coulibaly 2007; *Accord établissant...* 1995).

The PCPAA is supervised by the HCRP and is implemented by the UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, BCPR. The UNDP relies on governmental support from the MATDC. UN volunteers lead the Steering Committee of this programme and are responsible for execution on the ground. The project's regional offices, in Agadez and Tahoua, are institutionally linked to offices of the High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace and the MATDC (Coulibaly 2007: 5).

### Guiding principles

The PCPAA contains three priority objectives: the integration of ex-combatants, the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns to promote a culture of peace, and support to socio-economic activities and local development in areas affected by the conflict.

### Participants

The participants in the programme in Niger are 3,160 former members of 13 *fronts* and *mouvements* of self-defence.

### Budget and financing

The budget in Niger is managed by the UNDP. In November 2006, it stood at a total of \$2.4 million, split in the following manner:

Item	Quantity (\$)	%
Staff costs	107,472	4.5
Fund for reintegration	1,042,000	43.5
Training	688,000	28.7
Equipment	58,000	2.4
Operational costs	376,896	15.7
Monitoring and evaluation	118,800	4.9
TOTAL	2,391,168	100

Commitments by donors in November 2006 satisfied only three quarters of the amounts budgeted:

Donor	Quantity (\$)	%
UNDP/BCPR	580,000	24.2
France (Coopération Française)	390,000	16.3
Libya	324,000	13.5
Niger	240,000	10
United States	225,000	9.4
TOTAL	1,759,000	73.5

Currently, the sum published on the website of the UNDP is \$1,728,000. Final figures available on sources of funding and costs are not entirely clear (see Coulibaly 2007).

### Schedule

The programme in Niger is split into two phases. The first phase ran from February to December 2006, though it hit the ground in March, and the second phase ran for all of 2007.

### Phases

#### Reintegration

The reintegration project began in October 2005. Until January 2006, it focussed on preliminaries such as informing ex-combatants about the philosophy of the project and determining the functions of each participating organisation. It also updated a list of ex-combatants in Tahoua and Agadez. By February 2006, the deployment team and regional infrastructure was prepared. The PCPAA's official launch was on 3 March 2006 with information workshops for authorities and collaborators and the planning of concrete activities. In April, it gave specialised training to an implementation team. Members of the UN volunteer team are trained in the regulations of associations, techniques for starting micro-projects, the non-violent management of conflict, and themes related to the decentralisation of power (Coulibaly 2007: 8). The method followed by the programme involves three basic stages. In the first, ex-combatants are organised into cooperatives. In the second, productive projects are identified and developed for them. The PCPAA regional office studies the viability of these projects and evaluates them. Lastly, cheques valuing \$330 are given to ex-combatants. First 80 percent of the total is offered. The rest is given later after an evaluation of results. Examples of micro-projects developed can be found in *Inforapide* (2006) and UNDP Niger (2007a). In September 2006, the first 1,067 ex-combatants, grouped into 106 cooperatives, received the first round of cheques for their projects in Agadez.

The UNDP offers the following provisional results:

- 3,160 ex-combatants reintegrated,
- 298 cooperatives established, and
- 298 micro-projects financed.

These projects, at a total approximate cost of \$840,000, were developed in the local commercial sector, cattle raising, agriculture, and craftsmanship.

Twelve cooperatives were comprised of women. As regards social reintegration, the PCPAA has developed several projects, predominantly centred on awareness-raising. Amongst these are the writing of a communication strategy on peace culture and local development, the commemoration of the National Day of

Concord, the organisation of intercommunity reunions, the participation in joint initiatives with Mali, such as the Mali-Niger Forum on Cross-Border Peace, etc. At the same time, although minors were not found amongst former combatants, projects on peace culture also looked at this group and operated in schools.

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## Glossary

BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
FLAA Liberation Front)	Front de libération de l'Aor et l'Azaouad (Aïr and Azawak)
HCRP	High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
MATDC	Ministère de l'aménagement du territoire et du développement communautaire (Ministry of Territorial Management and Community Development)
PCPAA	Projet de Consolidation de la Paix dans l'Aïr et l'Azawak (Peace Consolidation Program in Aïr and Azawak)
PCPD	Projet de consolidation de la paix dans la région de Diffa
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# Central African Republic (DDR, 2004 – 2007)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	4.1 million persons (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	212,000 (2007)
Refugee population:	71,685 (2007)
GDP:	\$1.5 billion (2006)
Per capita income:	\$360 (2006)
HDI	0.384, 171th
GDI:	0.368, 153th
Military expenditure:	1.12%
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.07%
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral demobilisation of armed opposition groups in a post-war context
Groups to demobilise	7,565 members of armed groups in opposition to current President François Bozizé
Executive bodies	National Programme of DDR
Budget	\$13.3 million
Timeline	From March 2004 to April 2007
Status / synopsis	The DDR process will be completed in February of this year after provision of support for the reinsertion of 7,556 of 7,565 ex-combatants, or 99% of anticipated. Of this figure, 5,514 ex-combatants were fully reinserted into family, social, and economic life.

## Context Conflict

After 35 years of relative stability, uprisings against then President Ange-Félix Patassé, facilitated by thefts of small-arms held in arsenals, led to a civil war in 1996. These uprisings called for improvements to living conditions, the payment of overdue salaries, and the restructuring of military command. The civil war concluded after six months with the dismissal of the president and the naming of a new president, the head of the armed forces, François Bozizé. In short, the country was dogged by years of political instability, inefficient governance, insecurity, vandalism, and deterioration to the economy. At the end of 2005, the Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa (CEMAC, in French the Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale) deployed troops to the northeast of the country to contribute to improving the security situation. The United Nations warned that the country could enter a new period of violence if the international community did not provide assistance needed to tackle the existing humanitarian crisis and insecurity (MDRP 2007).

During the 2006 year, the situation in the country worsened because of the increase in activity of various insurgent groups, who denounced the lack of legitimacy of François Bozizé's government, which rose to power through a coup d'état against President Ange-Félix Patassé in 2002-03. Bozizé's government was accused of poorly managing public funds and dividing the country. The insurgency involves two fronts or forces. The first, located in the populous centre and northeast zone of the country, is the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD, in French Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la démocratie), led by Bedaya N'Djadder. The APRD has clashed with the government of Bozizé and demanded a new division of political power. The second is the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR, in French Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement) coalition, whose insurgency operations have grown in the northeast of the country. The government has aggravated the situation by blaming the civil population for collaborating in the insurgency (School for a Culture of Peace 2008).

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on MDRP (2007), from which only direct quotations are cited.



### Peace process

In 1997, the Bangui Agreements were signed. These agreements call for a restoration of peace and security, reform of the armed forces, support for the transition process with an eye to national reconciliation and a return to the rule of law, supervision and control of arms arsenals and the disarmament process, and demobilisation of ex-combatants. It is important to add that at the 3 June 2003 Libreville Summit, attendees agreed to the formation of a new government and maintenance of the armed forces in the Central African Republic (Commission Defense et Sécurité, 2003).

In April 2007, the government and the UFDR armed opposition group signed a peace agreement granting amnesty to members of the UFDR, agreeing to integrate members into the armed forces, and recognising the armed group as a political party (School for a Culture of Peace 2008).

### International accompaniment

In 1998, after the 1996 uprisings, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) installed a peacekeeping force in the country. The mandate of this mission was to assist in establishing security and stability, particularly in Bangui; to supervise and control arms arsenals and the disarmament process; to train the national police; and to provide technical support for legislative elections. Later, MINURCA was put in charge of supervising confiscated arms. In February 2000, the United Nations Peace-Building Office for the Central African Republic (BONUCA) substituted MINURCA. Its mandate is to help the government to consolidate peace, to reconcile the nation, to strengthen national institutions, and to mobilise political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery at the international level, as well as to carry out awareness-raising tasks around human rights (MINURCA 2001).

### Transitional justice

The government studied the possibility of granting amnesty to combatants as an incentive to participate in DDR. President François Bozizé held a Forum of National Reconciliation in September-October 2003 upon recommendations made by the National Transition Council. The forum aimed to establish dialogue and reconciliation between different political, social, and religious sectors, and to create recommendations for post-conflict reconstruction of the country.<sup>2</sup>

### Security-sector reform

Officials suggested a Comprehensive Defence Policy based on an all-inclusive security and defence vision, broad consensus, an evaluation of technical capabilities, personal preferences, an identification of distinct categories of persons (those affected by HIV/AIDS, disabled persons, women combatants, and veterans), and technical support needs.

### Other disarmament initiatives

Other activities related to disarmament conducted in the year involved the reduction of small arms via the provision of economic alternatives to mitigate the use of arms. There was no direct provision of money in order not to fuel the illicit market. The UNDP also adopted a plan of logistical, technical, and operational support, with an eye to civil society, in order to execute interventions for improving community as a whole. In this way, the UNDP was able to provide certain stability and promote better development, whilst avoiding incentives of money (UNDP RCA 2004).

### Background to DDR

The Central African Republic has already had previous experience with programmes of arms collection. In 1997, the UNDP started a programme to reduce members of the armed forces by a thousand. Different United Nations missions, including MISAB in 1997 and its successor, MINURCA, have administered arms collection in the country.


### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

Ex Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project (PRAC, in French *Projet de réinsertion des ex-combattants et d'appui aux communautés*)  
Bilateral demobilisation of armed opposition groups in a post-war context.

#### Executive bodies

The government created the National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (NCDDR), which depends on the National Defence Council. The NCDDR has received technical assistance from the World Bank MDRP and the UNDP for the execution of the national programme. The NCDDR includes two sub-commissions, one in charge of disarmament and demobilisation and the other in charge of reintegration and "community support". The NCDDR has also established Regional Commissions for DDR.



The composition of the NCDDR reflects the need to represent diverse organisations of the country, including the Ministries of National Defence, Agriculture, the Interior, Mines, Communications, Youth, the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Committee for Monitoring Acts of National Dialogue, religious groups, and women's organisations.

<sup>2</sup> Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2006)

### Basic principles

The programme is centred on the most affected communities, in the so-called "red zone". This zone includes four prefectures: Kemo, Nana Grévizi, Ouham, and Ouham Pendé.

The World Bank MDRP contains four components in the programme which hope to relate to other aspects of post-war restoration in the country. These are:

1. Disarmament and reduction of the estimated 50,000 -100,000 small arms in the hands of the population.
2. Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.
3. Strengthening the capabilities of ex-combatant communities, including the renovation of social and economic infrastructure destroyed in the war, such as schools, health centres, bridges, etc.; the creation of economic activities; and the adoption of initiatives for reconciliation.
4. Security and development, including technical logistical and operational support for identifying interventions that help to better security in all communities.

The expected impact of programmes of this kind is comprehensive renewal and the socioeconomic reinsertion of ex-combatants, reconciliation between ex-combatants and their host communities or communities of origin, and improvement to human security and the perception of security within communities.

### Groups to demobilise

A group to demobilise includes 7,565 members of armed opposition groups opposed to current President François Bozizé, including 200 women, and their families. Once disarmed, these persons will receive support for their reinsertion into socio-economic activities. This group of persons is composed of members of different armed groups: 35% mutineers of the armed forces, 25% Libérateurs from Chad, 13% SCPS (in French, Société Centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance), 11% the Karako militia, 7% the Sarawi militia, 5% the Balawa militia, and 4% the Special Presidential Unit.

Breakdown of ex-combatants eligible for DRR, by armed group		
Patriotes/libérateurs	950	539
USP	1,000	230
SCPS	850	798
Parallel police	820	N/A
Karako militia	593	408
Balawa militia	510	51
Sarawi militia	600	1,015
Mutineers (1996/97, 2001)	1,992	1,880
Foreign elements	250	N/A
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,565</b>	<b>4,921</b>

Source: MDRP (2007)

Families of ex-combatants, comprising a total 42,000 persons who aim to find lasting work, may also benefit from the programme. Also, despite not being

direct beneficiaries, some 1,675,000 inhabitants of communities and prefectures delimited by the PRAC will benefit from improvements to their surroundings so they can initiate new economic, social, and cultural activities.

### Groups with specific needs

UNICEF estimates that there are a thousand or so underage youth in the ranks of various armed groups of the Central African Republic.

### Eligibility criteria

Criteria for defining an ex-combatant according to the NCDDR are as follows:

- An armed person pertaining to and identifiable in a known group.
- An armed person with an identifiable military number.
- An armed person without identification or documentation but recognised by the community as an ex-combatant.
- A former member of the Central African armed forces.
- An unarmed minor under the age of 18 who can justify his or her connection to a known armed group.
- An unarmed woman who can justify her connection to a known armed group.

### Budget

The total programme budget is \$13.3 million, with an average cost of \$1,758 per demobilised person. Contributions are as follows:

Donor	Millions \$	%
MDRP	9.8	74.8
UNDP	3.3	25.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: MDRP (2007)

Phase	Total cost (million \$)	%
Disarmament and demobilisation	3.0	22.8
Reintegration	10.1	77.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.22</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: MDRP (2007)

### Schedule

From March 2004 to April 2007, for a total 37 months.

### Phases

#### Disarmament

The disarmament phase involves three distinct phases. These include information and education on disarmament for ex-combatants; voluntary disarmament; and forced collection of firearms and legal action against arms bearers. More specifically, activities involve preparing and approving lists of persons to be disarmed, meeting at assembly or gathering points, registering persons and their surrendered arms, storing these arms, and destroying them publicly.

#### Demobilisation

To ensure the sustainability of the process, the peace mission strives to dismantle the hierarchies and

structures of the group to be demobilised. Demobilisation camps are located in Bossangoa, the principal camp, and in Bozum, Sibut, and Bangui. Ex-combatant sympathisers of current President François Bozizé are demobilised or reintegrated into the armed forces.

Activities to be carried out include:

- Awareness and information on programme beneficiaries, both ex-combatants and communities.
- Identification and registration of ex-combatants.
- Advice on reintegration options, both for individuals and families, and evaluation of reintegration in micro-projects.

### Reinsertion and reintegration

Criteria for ex-combatants to access reinsertion and reintegration include having surrendered working arms and munitions in their possession, demonstrating a desire to return to civilian life, denouncing military activities against the population and state institutions, and agreeing to the pertinent regulations of this process. The process followed involves registration of ex-combatants before agents of the PRAC, surrender of arms and munitions, verification of the condition of the arms and munitions, signing of a voluntary disarmament agreement and a promise not to use arms, issuance of demobilisation documentation, issuance of a kit of utensils and other basic materials (buckets, pans, plates, cups, soap, condoms, and information pamphlets on sexual responsibility), and conduction of information sessions on DDR. At the end of this, each individual receives \$500 to begin a new profession. Special attention is put on programmes related to agriculture, cattle rising, and the creation of small business (Alusala 2007).

The chief objective of initiatives to support the reintegration of ex-combatants is to create a stable environment for renewal, recuperation, and reconciliation of all the population, connecting socially to host communities in order to ensure proper conditions for security and development. Community reintegration mechanisms are also provided through activities of reconciliation and community dialogue, and the rebuilding of infrastructure.

For this, special mechanisms, including a voucher for community development, have been created in communities for the return of ex-combatants. Ex-combatants must present this voucher to regional commissions in order to obtain financing for specific projects, such as community security, income-generating activities, or the strengthening of local conflict-resolution devices, amongst others.

### Evolution

In February 2003, a World Bank mission visited the country to prepare a DDR programme, though it had to postpone its recommendations due to the coup d'état in March. The current DDR programme began in December 2004 with a pilot demobilisation programme in the city of Bossangoa, which was followed by an awareness-raising campaign conducted by radio throughout the country. Essentially, the programme

helped to unearth lessons learned on DDR and small arms. The programme brought about the transition from the National Programme on Disarmament and Reinsertion (PRDR, in French the Programme National de Désarmement et de Réinsertion), initiated in January 2002 and concluded in March 2003 because of General Bozizé's coup d'état, to the PRAC (March 2004 to February 2007), by way of the National Support Programme (August 2003 to February 2004). In this way, the DDR programme achieved national scope.

The initial implementation of the programme was delayed mainly because of the slowness involved in verifying ex-combatants to be demobilised, in addition to an absence of effective communication means and lack of involvement from the government at the onset. A medium-term review of the programme showed considerable acceleration to the process, which permitted officials to achieve objectives within established timeframes. At the end of 2006, 2,000 ex-combatants remained to be received by the process.

In December 2004, the PRAC began work, with a ceremony of arms surrender by ex-combatants and the later destruction of these arms in Bossangoa.

The arms-collection process concluded with the collection of 134,000 units of munitions, 1,361 grenades, 27 mortar rockets, 54 missiles, and an antipersonnel mine, at an expense of \$62,756. Some of these arms were destroyed in a public event held in Bangui in July 2003. In addition to this, training began for 220 ex-combatants who had voluntarily surrendered their arms in 2002. These 220 combatants were selected for the pilot phase of the programme from a group of 1,500 civilians who had surrendered arms. Despite the initiation of this process, the government warned of threats to stability attributable to the presence of 50,000 small arms in circulation illegally in the country. At the end of September 2006, 706 combatants began to receive their demobilisation packages in Bangui. These packages were given at the start of the second phase of the DDR process, organised by the PRAC and the NCDHR.

At the start of February 2007, Popular Defence Force leader Abdoulaye Miskine, urged his followers to surrender their arms and demobilise, after having reached an agreement with President Bozizé in Libya at the start of February. Miskine warned members located in Chad, Cameroon, the DR Congo, and the Sudan that there would be grave consequences for those who failed to comply with this order.

The DDR process concluded at the end of February 2007, after provision of support for reintegration to 7,556 of 7,565 calculated ex-combatants, or 99% of anticipated. Of this figure, 5,514 ex-combatants were fully reinserted into family, social, and economic life. As part of community renewal, 44 micro-projects were identified, 20 of these executed, whilst 14 await financing from the UNDP.

Regarding child soldiers, UNICEF announced a start to negotiations with armed opposition groups on the demobilisation of underage youth. The UFDR agreed to release at least 400 child soldiers and has already submitted a list of 220 names. It is expected that the first demobilisations of these persons will commence on 1 June. UNICEF has organised a community-reintegration strategy for demobilised child soldiers, for which their host communities and all the minors of the north-eastern region of the Central African Republic will benefit from the renovation of social services.

The UFDR demobilised 200 child soldiers in mid-June 2007 as part of an agreement signed with UNICEF that would have 500 underage youth in the UFDR's ranks reintegrate into civil life. In a demobilisation ceremony attended by the Minister of Social Affairs, the youth received textbooks and school materials to facilitate their incorporation into the upcoming academic term in September. UNICEF committed to support the reestablishment of social services in communities that host these minors.

#### Integration in the armed forces

The World Bank MDRP began a broad study on the relationship between the DDR process and security-sector reform in mid-November 2006. The study was published in May 2007. World Bank MDRP experts have travelled to the country, have made a series of preliminary recommendations, and have identified assistance opportunities. The study supports the premise that DDR and security-sector reform are inextricably linked, and from this certain observations and recommendations can be derived (MDRP 2006):

- The apparatus of the state is unable to respond to the security needs of the country, and indeed, has done very little in this respect.
- Security-sector reform must be part of an overall strategy that combines national empowerment and the effective coordination of partners.
- Thus far, the country has only focused on technical and political dimensions to avoid policies.
- Development partners need to clarify their relation to development in order to avoid past ambiguities.
- Currently, the country experiences a unique opportunity to initiate this reform.
- Security-sector reform must be as inclusive as possible and include groups from civil society.
- A national workshop on this material should be organised, starting with an analysis of current institutions.
- A national defence and security strategy needs to be articulated.
- This must be linked to the DDR process.
- International support for this from France.
- Need for a restructuring of the national police.

#### *Lessons learned*

There are still numerous problems to resolve, including monitoring the last group of reintegrated persons and community initiatives in the long term. There is also still a lot of analysis to do, beginning with a study on the absence of a national communications system. The role of community in assisting with support infrastructure also remains to be evaluated (MDRP 2006).

#### Planning

- Repurchasing of arms via economic incentives.
- Stabilisation of impact of combatants returning from the DR Congo.
- Disparities between lists prepared by commissions and those given by ex-combatant leaders. Problems with the identification and validation process (MDRP 2006).
- Poor communication, poor orientation, and absence of representative leaders.
- Delays between several phases.
- Lack of training and poor distribution of reinsertion kit.
- Lack of community participation and a low level of awareness-raising and communication on the process.

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### Glossary

- APRD Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la démocratie  
 Popular (Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy)
- BONUCA Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine (United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic)
- CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
- MDRP Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
- MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
- NCDDR National Commission for DDR
- PRAC Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-combatants et d'Appui aux Communautés (Ex Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project)
- PRDR Programme National de Désarmement et de Réinsertion (National Programme on Disarmament and Reinsertion)
- SCPS Société Centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance
- UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
- UNDP United Nations Development Programme
- UNICEF United Nations Children Fund

# Rwanda (Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2001-)<sup>1</sup>

## Basic data

Population:	9.2 million persons (2006)
Food emergencies:	No
IDPs:	-
Refugee population:	92.966 (2007)
GDP:	\$2.5 billion (2006)
Per capita income:	\$250 (2006)
HDI:	0.452, 161th
GDI:	0.450, 140th
Military expenditure:	2.74%
Social / military expenditure:	Social greater than military
Military population:	0.34%
Arms embargo:	No

## Summary

Type of DDR	Demobilisation of armed opposition groups and security-sector reform
Groups to demobilise	Total demobilisation of approximately 36,000 ex-combatants of the armed forces (20,000) and of armed groups (16,000)
Executive bodies	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
Budget	\$62.5 million
Timeline	Begun in December 2001, but without a specified completion date
Status / synopsis	The Rwanda programme continued to demobilise armed persons, including some 38,731 ex-soldiers of the armed forces (100 percent of anticipated) and 6,423 adults of armed opposition groups (27 percent of anticipated). The Executive of the MDRP visited the country in February to evaluate the progress of the programme.

## Context Conflict

Following Rwanda's 1994 genocide, amongst the more than two million displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (herein DR Congo) were members of the former Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR, in French *Forces armées rwandaises*) and the Interahamwe militia belonging to the Hutu ethnic group. This situation enabled armed combatants to regroup and launch new attacks on Rwanda, with consent from the government of the Congo. In the DR Congo, both armed factions formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, in French *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*). On numerous occasions, the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF, in French *Forces rwandaises de défense*) intervened in the DR Congo in efforts to dismantle the FDLR, which led to a rise in tensions in both countries.<sup>2</sup>

## Peace process

Following the Arusha cessation of hostilities agreements (1993) and the Lusaka ceasefire agreements (July 1999, cessation of hostilities in the DR Congo, regularisation of borders, Joint Military Commission, etc.), Rwanda and the DR Congo signed the **30 July 2002 Pretoria Accord**. Amongst other promises, the Rwandan government committed to withdrawing its troops from the DR Congo and adopting effective measures to return its combatants, with collaboration from MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo) and different UN agencies. The agreement also agreed to a later dismantling of active members of the FDLR. Both countries agreed to stabilise security on their common border.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: MDRP (2007) and RDRC (2007)

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 52)

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 45)

## International accompaniment

A newly created Joint Reintegration Planning Unit, consisting of a variety of theme-based groups, worked to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals. Also, a newly created Development Partners Coordination Group brought together bilateral donors and the World Bank, and worked to achieve collaborative and cross-cutting objectives.

We can split the Rwandan government's priorities for political transition, with support from the United Nations, into five key areas. These are

1. Resettlement and social reintegration
2. Governability, security, and peace
3. Poverty reduction, economic growth, and management
4. Development of the social sector and human capabilities
5. Environmental, agricultural, and rural development

## Transitional justice

The new government of national unity in Rwanda has striven to establish mechanisms for trying 100,000 persons suspected of participating in the 1994 genocide. The **Gacaca court** attempts to combine traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms. It conducted its first trials at the beginning of 2005. Gacaca courts have jurisdiction over suspected planners, organisers, and leaders of the genocide. One major challenge for Gacaca is the disconnect that exists between the reconciliation process and the DDR programme, which should be an essential component of Rwanda's post-war rehabilitation strategy. Human rights organisations have questioned the adequateness of Gacaca. They argue that the courts are unable to offer guarantees of just sentences because court officials lack training and are susceptible to being used to seek out revenge.

In September 2006, the Rwandan government supplied a list of wanted leaders presumed to be responsible for serious crimes in Rwanda and collaborated with MONUC in expanding a list of identified FDLR leaders. Around 55,000 persons accused of having participated in the 1994 genocide will be sentenced to community service rather than imprisoned, according to official sources linked to the Gacaca traditional justice system.

Gacaca courts claim to be a participatory justice system for uncovering truth, accelerating judgements on genocide, eradicating Rwanda's culture of impunity, and strengthening the unity of Rwandans. In no way do these courts aim to recover armaments or trace their origins.

## Security-sector reform

The lack of real reconciliation between the different actors of the country complicates a great deal the transformation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability on a regional and national scale. The main problem is the mass proliferation of private security companies. For this reason, at the start of 2007 the Rwandan government announced completion of research into private security agencies, after growing worry about their use of weapons. This research ended with the government passing prohibitions on a number

of companies. The government demanded greater guarantees from these companies on the use of arms in accordance with national legislation. This strict attention to legislation came as part of the commitment that the Rwandan government made towards the United Nations Program of Action for Small Arms and Light Weapons.

## Other disarmament initiatives

At the end of March 2007, the UN Security Council decided to lift its arms embargo on non-government forces in recognition of recent and positive developments both in Rwanda and in other countries of the region.

## Background to DDR

The Demobilisation and Repatriation Programme has occurred over two phases. The first phase took place from September 1997 to February 2001 and represented the demobilisation 18,692 soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR, in French *Armée patriotique rwandaise*). Of this number, 2,364 were child soldiers. Despite the efforts realised, both persistent insecurity on the border with the DR Congo and military operations conducted in the Congo impeded a reduction of military expenditures and a diminution of the bulk of APR combatants. Moreover, a lack of economic recourses limited the ability of the programme in Rwanda to provide assistance on social reintegration. Meanwhile, technical and managerial limitations frustrated many of the expectations held by ex-combatants. The budget for Phase I (1997-2001) was \$19.4 million, an average of \$1,036 per beneficiary.

Some of the lessons adopted by the Rwandan government were the establishment of a Technical Secretary, counselling prior to demobilisation in order not to generate false expectations, economic assistance on social reintegration, provision of information and counselling, specific assistance for disabled combatants, a centralised system of information management, and better assistance and coordination.

## Programme design

### Type and designation of DDR


Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)  
Demobilisation of armed opposition groups and security-sector reform.

### Executive bodies

Created in 1997, the highest responsibilities of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) at the national level are to counsel the government, identify the main problems related to the social reintegration of ex-combatants, and to guide the Technical Secretary. The Technical Secretary, as an implementation unit of the programme in Rwanda, is responsible for calculating the costs of annual implementation units, coordinating programme phases, administering resources and control, and overlooking evaluation. At the provincial level, it provides assistance to 12 provinces in social reinsertion and reintegration. Community Development Committees have been created to carry on this work.

**Draft Organisation of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)**

(Revised January 2006)



Source: RDRC (2007)

The governments of the DR Congo and Rwanda have decided to put in place strategies for raising awareness and exchanging information, in light of the presence of Rwandan armed groups in the DR Congo.

The RDRC and its counterparts created a Technical Coordinating Committee whose goal it is to bring together all participants of the RDRP, both national and international. Participants include the International Committee of the Red Cross, MONUC, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, and the Ministries of Health, Local Administration, Youth, Finance and the Economy, and Defence. Numerous NGOs and donors including the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the World Bank, and the Embassies of the Netherlands, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and France, amongst others, also participate.

After consultations with governments of the region, donors, and agencies of the United Nations, and given the variety of initiatives around Demobilisation and Reintegration at the national level in the Great Lakes region, a World Bank MDRP programme began with the aim of establishing a centralised structure of support for programmes at the national level and, particularly for Rwanda, advising the Rwandan government on implementing a programme of this nature. Agencies of the United Nations, such as UNICEF, and various international NGOs, focussed particular attention on the social reintegration of child soldiers. It is important to note that there is no specific United Nations peacekeeping force for Rwanda, though MONUC plays a key role in the regional context. MONUC

has developed a series of methods for improving communication of information on the situation in Rwanda amongst combatants in the DR Congo and their families, with the end of returning these combatants to their countries of origin (World Bank 2002).

**Basic principles**

- Total demobilisation of approximately 36,000 ex-combatants of the armed forces (20,000) and of armed groups (16,000), with support for transition to civilian life.
- Reinsertion support for ex-FAR members and help in reducing government military expenditures and redirecting funds to social and economic sectors.
- Social and economic reintegration support for ex-combatants demobilised in the previous phase, in compliance with the Arusha agreement, leading to an expected social reintegration of 57,000 ex-combatants.
- Consistency in providing support to ex-combatants, reintegration assistance for communities, and promotion of confidence in governmental structures.
- Provision of social security and pensions for ex-combatants not attended to by the RDRC.

**Participants**

The programme in Rwanda anticipates a demobilisation of 36,000 ex-combatants, 20,000 of them former members of the armed forces and 16,000 former members of armed groups. In fulfilment of Phase I of demobilisation, the programme in Rwanda expects to reinsert 47,400 and reintegrate 57,000 ex-combatants.



It foresees the demobilisation of 20,000 members of the APR in Phase II, 6,500 more from Phase I (around 35% of demobilised persons), 25,000 of a total 30,000 members of armed groups (the remaining 5,000 will be incorporated into the armed forces and will not receive benefits for reintegration), and 15,000 former members of the armed forces who remain in the country.

### Eligibility criteria

To identify a member of a Rwandan armed group it was necessary to demonstrate:

- Rwandan nationality
  - Identification of combatant status
  - Proof of affiliation to an armed group
- Military combat against the APR in Rwanda or in the DR Congo
- Proof of military ability (e.g. use of a weapon)

### Budget and funding

According to the MDRP, the total budget for Phase II of the demobilisation and repatriation programme is \$62.5 million. Although this phase focuses on a new group of 45,000 persons, in the reinsertion and reintegration phases another 21,650 persons will also benefit, at an approximate cost of \$7 million.

Donor	Millions \$	%
World Bank	28.7	45.9%
MDRP	14.4	23%
United Kingdom, DFID	8.8	14%
Germany, GTZ	7.9	12.6%
Government of Rwanda	2.7	4.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: MDRP (2007)

The estimated budgets for individual phases are as follows:

Phase	Millions \$	%
Demobilisation	3.3	5.3
Reinsertion	17.4	27.8
Reintegration	29.9	47.8
Most vulnerable groups	5.6	8.9
Other	6.3	10.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62.5</b>	

Source: MDRP (2007)

### Schedule

Phase I began in September 1997 and ended in February 2001, for a total of 42 months. Phase II began in December 2001 and aims to end in December 2008, according to the World Bank (MDRP 2007).

### Phases

#### Demobilisation

Key activities include transferring identification documents, assembling socioeconomic profiles, and establishing a database of the beneficiary population. The gathering of ex-combatants is a good opportunity to provide counselling on sanitation and education on HIV/AIDS. It is also an opportunity to disseminate

information on programme and the benefits of civilian life prior to leaving camp and transport to host communities for reinsertion.

The demobilisation of 20,000 ex-combatants of the APR will occur in four phases, 5,000 combatants per phase, over a period of 18 months. No single combatant will remain more than 15 days in a phase. The demobilisation of returning Rwandan combatants will occur the moment these combatants return. Since the demobilisation of armed groups within Rwanda will require additional counselling for group members during the reconciliation phase, each returning group will be demobilised in 45 days.

For each armed faction prior to discharge, there is an awareness-raising phase centred on aspects of the national economy, unity and reconciliation, economic opportunities during return, voluntary counselling, and information.

#### Reinsertion

This phase is a transition phase for ex-combatants, though it is also necessary in this phase to provide the families of ex-combatants with basic necessities. The main objective of social reinsertion is to return ex-combatants to their communities and find means of sustainability for the ex-combatants themselves and their families for a limited period.

Ex-combatants receive a kit of basic necessities which includes food for three months and basic survival items worth \$110. They also receive counselling upon arrival and a national identity card. Demobilised persons from Phase I are kept in mind during reinsertion.

Without specifying their numbers, special attention to women combatants in Rwanda, like in other regional contexts, entails balancing an equity of benefits through specialised economic reintegration programmes, the inclusion of women combatants and communities in counselling, and monitoring and controlling the impacts of these programmes. Regarding *disabled combatants*, we can distinguish between disabled persons (economic and medical attention in proportion to disability) and chronically ill persons (specific medical needs). This component involves medical rehabilitation and treatment for chronic illnesses.

#### Reintegration

The main activities of social reintegration involve providing money comparable to that received prior to military enrolment, assisting with reintegration proportionate to the degree of vulnerability, offering choice in deciding the location for reintegration, minimising market distortions, and involving host communities. Former members of the APR will receive an allowance of \$220 six months after their demobilisation and special attention will be paid to vulnerable groups. Other main activities of social reintegration are offering counselling, financial aid, professional training, formal and informal education, and advocacy. Reintegration, like other phases, is divided into two sub phases.

*Economic reintegration:* support centred on the creation of sustainable living conditions for a limited period in order to avoid creation of dependency. The possibility of creating employment in the long term is related closely to the role played by the private sector. Ex-combatants can play an important role as resources and contributors to the civilian economy. Economic reintegration involves providing counselling, financial support, and formal and informal professional education.

*Social reintegration:* support to the family network and the possible creation of informal networks such as discussion groups, associations of ex-combatants, etc., which benefit ex-combatants' social reintegration. Another objective of social integration is to prevent the stigmatisation that comes with having had previous military status.

### Evolution

The evolution of the second phase of the demobilisation and reintegration process is marked by two key principles. The first of these deals with the return of combatants from the DR Congo. Part of the demobilisation process in the DR Congo involves returning combatants to their countries of origin for social reintegration there. However, the government of the DR Congo has impeded this option since October 2003, when it rejected voluntary repatriation by MONUC and commanded regional bodies to drive out members of the FDLR as soon as possible. Paul Rwarakabije, the leader of the Interahamwe, decided to return to Rwanda at the end of November 2003.

The second of these principles involves the programme in Rwanda itself. From the beginning, as early as March 2003, the Rwandan government has asked for help from NGOs and public and private institutions in the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, because it viewed the Community Development Committees to be insufficiently competent. The government placed particular emphasis on the demobilisation of child soldiers, with specific funding from the ILO, Save the Children, and UNICEF. From November to December 2005, the MDRP organised three repatriations efforts in the DR Congo. Around 300 ex-combatants demobilised and returned with their dependents in these efforts.

However, accusations continue of remaining leaders of the FDLR threatening ex-combatants to impede demobilisation efforts, raising doubts about the demobilisation programme itself. In August 2004, as a means to achieving regional stability and a solution to the problem, the government of the DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda committed to disarming armed groups in their countries over a one-year period with collaboration from the African Union. As part of the fulfilment of this aim and its promise to reduce violence in the region, the Rwandan government destroyed 6,000 small arms at the end of 2004. However, functioning very slowly and with very little participation from actors, the repatriation process has

not gone as well. On 13 October 2005, a first group of only 24 FDLR combatants and 46 civilians were repatriated in Rwanda.

In May 2006, the UN Secretary-General insisted on supplying more information on incentives offered to the FDLR. For this, MONUC set up six temporary gathering zones, three in north Kivu and three in south Kivu, with capacity to receive around 400 persons. Ex-combatants remained in these zones for 48 hours and were overlooked by MONUC, who provided all matter of humanitarian assistance, transmitted data to the Mixed Commission, and worked in coordination with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission.

Although the child soldiers of the APR were demobilised in Phase I, some 2,500 underage persons still linger in armed groups. The demobilisation and reintegration of these persons, conducted separately, involves unifying them with family members, providing attention to trauma and psychosocial factors, and facilitating their access to education and recreation in host communities. Save the Children UK, UNICEF, the Ministry of Gender and Promotion of the Family, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World Bank MDRP work with MONUC. These groups attend an orientation centre where underage ex-combatants receive medical attention and basic training until they can be reunited with their families, after a stay of two or three months. Social assistants of the Rwandan government, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross, locate families and distribute orphans to hosting centres. Thus far, 624 child soldiers have demobilised, and of these 534 have reunited with family.

Meanwhile, 372 women ex-combatants have demobilised through a programme of the RDRC. Currently, the Ndabaga Association, which advocates for the rights of highly vulnerable groups, is working with these women. Also, the programme in Rwanda has received 8,094 disabled ex-combatants.

The Rwanda programme continued to demobilise armed persons in 2007, including some 38,731 ex-soldiers of the armed forces (100 percent of anticipated), 6,423 adults of armed opposition groups (27 percent of anticipated), and 662 child soldiers (24 percent of anticipated). In terms of social reinsertion, 12,969 persons have already benefited from financial assistance, and 11,800 ex-soldiers of the Rwandan army have benefited from supplementary aid for reintegration.

Phase	Anticipated	Actual number (%)
Demobilisation	36,000	26,536 (73.7)
Reinsertion	47,400	38,846 (81.9)
Reintegration	57,000	40,094 (70.3)

Source: RDRC (2007)

The World Bank and the MDRP conducted a mission in Rwanda in February 2007 to evaluate the progress

of the programme in the country. They agreed that any demobilisation of the RDF would have to occur before the end of 2007 in order for the reintegration phase to have sufficient time to be implemented. In terms of regional considerations, the slowness of the disarmament process for Rwandan ex-combatants in the east of the DR Congo is worrisome. The main problem is the continuing low percentages of returned persons of members of armed groups, even though plans for conducting mass repatriation are still on the table. The demobilisation of ex-members of the RDF is one goal that has achieved success.

In December 2007, 1,645 additional RDF combatants demobilised, adding to the 21,684 total of demobilised combatants since the start of the second phase in 2002.

### *Lessons learned*

#### **Planning:**

- Lack of specification on the disarmament process, which some see as voluntary and without guarantees for reduced violence and instability.
- Coercion by high commanders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, urging subordinates not to demobilise (Alusala 2005).

#### **Other aspects:**

- Regional consideration: presence of members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in the DR Congo and the voluntary character of its repatriation leading to persistent instability in the region.
- Disinterestedness from the international community: as during the events in 1994, absence of a United Nations peacekeeping force shows the international community's lack of interest. Despite this, though, MONUC's presence in the DR Congo plays an important role in Rwanda.
- Social reintegration remains a challenge despite positive advances. It requires better previous planning (Rutsinda 2005).

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### Glossary

APR	Armée Patriotique Rwandaise Rwandan Patriotic Army
DFID	UK Department for International Development
FAR	Forces armées rwandaises (Armed Forces of Rwanda)
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda
GTZ	German Cooperation Agency
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en DR Congo
RDF	Forces Rwandaises de Défense (Rwandan Defence Forces)
RDRRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme

## Somalia (UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I, 2003-2007)

### Basic data

Population:	8.5 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	1 million (2007)
Refugee population:	463,000 (2007)
GDP:	-
Per capita income:	-
HDI:	-
GDI:	-
Military expenditure:	-
Social / military expenditure:	-
Military population:	-
Arms embargo:	ONU: since 1992; EU: since 2002

### Summary

Type of DDR	In Mogadishu: modest disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of diverse, organisationally fragmented militias in a context of armed conflict. In Somaliland and Puntland: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of security forces as part of a security-sector reform process in a context of low-intensity armed conflict between the two Somali regions.
Groups to demobilise	More than 50,000 members of militias
Executive bodies	The UNDP with cooperation from the National Demobilisation Commission (NDC) in Somaliland, the Puntland DDR Unit (PDDRU) in Puntland, and various NGOs acting as partners in programme execution.
Budget	\$3 million
Timeline	Pilot project in Mogadishu from 2003 to 2004. Other programmes in Mogadishu, Somaliland, and Puntland from 2005 to 2007.
Status / synopsis	The programme in Somalia has developed fragmentary and tentative projects due to the security situation in the country. These initiatives have turned out positively but have been limited in the absolute numbers of combatants demobilised, less than 1,500 in total, a number appropriate for pilot programmes awaiting opportunity for an expansion of work.

### Context Conflict<sup>1</sup>

The armed conflict and the absence of any effective central authority dates back to 1988, when a coalition of opposition groups rebelled against the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre, finally succeeding in bringing him down three years later. This situation led to a new struggle within the coalition to take advantage of the power vacuum, which has caused the destruction of the country and the deaths of more than 300,000 people since 1991, despite failed attempts at intervention by the international community at the beginning of the 1990s. The different peace processes aimed at creating some form of central authority have come up against various obstacles, a significant one being the particular nature of Somali society, which is divided into a number of clans. Other factors include interference from Ethiopia and the power wielded by the warlords. The last peace initiative in 2004 led to the formation of the TFG, which has looked to Ethiopia for support in its attempts to recover control of the country. The situation in Somalia worsened considerably after fighting broke out at the end of December 2006 between the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops, and UIC militias, who were rapidly defeated. This led to a new period of violence and insecurity, mainly in Mogadishu.

<sup>1</sup> Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 25, 52)

Meanwhile, the regions of Somaliland and Puntland have been involved in a dispute over control of the Sool and Sanaag border regions since 1998. Sool and Sanaag fall geographically within the borders of Somaliland, but the majority of clans living in the region are linked with those in Puntland. In December 2003, forces from Puntland took control of Las Anod, capital of the Sool region. Previously, both authorities had been officially represented in the city. Since then there have been sporadic confrontations and attempts at mediation. Before coming to power in Puntland in 2005, General Muse came up against the then Puntland warlord, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, now president of Somalia, whose militias defeated Muse's forces, which withdrew to the western region of Sanaag where they were taken in by Somaliland forces, a fact that reflects how difficult it will be to resolve this dispute.

### Other disarmament initiatives

#### Arms embargoes

Through Security Council Resolution 733, the United Nations proclaimed an arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992. Resolution S/RES/1725 of 2006 lifted this embargo for member states of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and for interventions by the African Union in order to assist the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In 2002, the European Union adopted Resolution 733, Council Common Position, 2002/960/CFSP (SIPRI 2007).

#### Mine action

UNDP/ROLS in cooperation with UNMAS, the UN Mine Action Service, UNICEF, and other national and international organisations coordinates an Anti-mine Action Plan. The main aim of this plan is to remove landmines currently located in the south and central regions of Somalia. UNDP/ROLS also cooperates with Mine Action Centres in Somaliland and Puntland, where anti-mining activities in those regions have controlled the situation for many years (UN Mine Action Service, n.d.).

### Background to DDR

We can view Somalia as an experiment in initiatives for demobilising combatants, though by looking at the current security situation, the amount of success that several programmes have had is questionable. A brief review of the different initiatives carried out from the 1990s until 2005 can be found in Morse (2005: fig. 7).

### Programme design


#### Type and designation of DDR

DDR in the capital Mogadishu involves the small-scale disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of diverse, organisationally fragmented militias in a context of armed conflict.

In Somaliland and Puntland, DDR includes disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of security forces as part of a security-sector reform process, in a context of low-intensity armed conflict between the two Somali regions. All programmes are part of phase one of the DDR component for the UNDP's Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS), known as UNDP/ROLS DDR, Phase I. The most recent programme in Mogadishu is called the UNDP DDR Programme for Mogadishu, Phase II, whose first phase, conducted in 2003-04, was a pilot programme. When dealing with the programme in the capital, it is common to find reference to activities in the south-central region of the country.

Given their limited reach, implicit goal of extending activities to all parts of the country, and goal of expanding the numbers of militia combatants in the programme (at least to 50,000), we can also view programmes in Somaliland and Puntland as pilot projects. In addition to the multitude of projects in Somalia, Morse (2005: 13ss) warns of the numerous different ways in which DDR is understood as a result of, amongst other things, the diverse nature of militias.

#### Executive bodies



## Mogadishu

UNDP/ROLS is in charge of the financing of Mogadishu and the Somali-Australian NGO SAACID is in charge of implementation (Saacid 2007a).

## Somaliland

The National Demobilisation Commission, NDC, is responsible for planning and execution in Somaliland with cooperation from UNDP/ROLS. Four local NGOs manage the reintegration component (*Mission Report... 2005*; UNDP Somalia 2008).

In its project Strengthening Somali Civil Society, Phase III, the Dutch NGO Oxfam Novib encourages participation from civil society in DDR processes (Oxfam Novib 2007).

## Puntland

The Puntland DDR Unit, PDDRU, and UNDP/ROLS administer planning and execution in Puntland. According to the UNDP's *2005 Policy Framework for DDR*, PDDRU is a technical unit of the Department of Mine Action, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, a dependent of the Ministry of Interior, Security, and DDR (UNDP Somalia 2005: 7-8). Three local NGOs are responsible for the execution of reintegration (UNDP Somalia 2008). UNESCO's Programme of Emergency Education and Rehabilitation, or UNESCO/PEER, provides education to former militia combatants, amongst others (OCHA Somalia 2007a).

## Basic principles

According to the UNDP, DDR in Somalia involves reducing the armed forces "to levels that are sustainable to government in order to free up resources for utilisation in productive sectors". The agency puts emphasis on "sustainable and realistic" reintegration programmes which contribute to larger development goals (UNDP Somalia 2007).

## Participants

Estimates vary on the number of militia combatants in Somalia. The World Bank (2005: 38) gathers data from six organisations and different reports, which put numbers at anything from 45,000 to 200,000. Both the UNDP and the World Bank contend the chief objective for DDR in Somalia to be the demobilisation of around 53,000 militia combatants, perhaps a third of these active in Somaliland and Puntland (*Mission Report... 2005*).

## Eligibility criteria

In Mogadishu, DDR Phase II, community leaders choose militia combatants to participate in the demobilisation process. These combatants are required to surrender a machine gun in good working condition (Saacid 2007a).

In Puntland according to a draft proposal (*Mission Report... 2005*), combatants are required

- To be on the payroll of the country's security forces;
- To formally commit to a complete demobilisation without the possibility of rejoining the armed forces;
- To surrender an arm and its ammunition;
- To participate in all obligatory programme activities; and
- To not commit any criminal act whilst participating in the programme.

## Budget and financing

By the end of 2007, the UNDP, within the 2005 Contracts, Assets and Procurements Committee, or CAP, had asked for \$3.8 million for UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I, of which the programme had received almost \$3 million, or 80 percent. At the same time, UNESCO required \$1.2 million for the basic education and vocational training of demobilised youth, but the record does not show the agency receiving any of the UNDP's funds. In the 2008 CAP, UNESCO has re-requested funding, this time for to \$800,000 (FTS 2007, 2008). A detailed breakdown of funding has not been made available. Known data include an agreement with the government of Puntland consisting of the UNDP contributing three times more to programming than to local administration, or the government of Somaliland contributing 20 percent of NDC salaries.

## Schedule

Lacking a comprehensive DDR project in Somalia (World Bank 2005), there is no real concrete programming but rather an administration of diverse processes, depending on what the political and security situations in the different regions of the country permit.

The schedule in Mogadishu has been the following:

DDR Phase I (pilot phase): from August 2003 to July 2004.

DDR Phase II: registration and disarmament, conducted in December 2005. The arms collected were destroyed in April 2007. Reintegration occurred from January 2006 to January 2007.

**In Somaliland:**

Registration occurred in July 2005. DDR in the proper sense aimed to conclude in 2005, but only started in 2006 and then concluded in December 2007 (UNDP Somalia 2005, 2008).

**In Puntland:**

Registration occurred in June 2005, demobilisation in 2006, and reintegration began in April 2007 (OCHA Somalia 2007b).

## Phases

### Mogadishu

From August 2003 to July 2004, the UNDP financed a pilot DDR programme designed for 150 militia combatants and 150 civilian youth in the reintegration phase from six districts of the capital. Executed by SAACID, the programme was called the **UNDP/SAACID DDR Programme for Mogadishu, Phase I**. It offered literacy courses, practical training in local enterprise, vocational training, and support for training in small business. The current **Phase II** of the programme is a "widening" of the pilot project (Saacid 2007a, UNDP Somalia 2007).

The following is a description taken from a variety of SAACID evaluative reports (Saacid 2007a, 2007b; International Aid Services 2006). **DDR Phase II** began with workshops on programming for community leaders, who act as guarantors of the process, and on criteria for selecting militia combatants. Registration and disarmament took place in December 2005. Combatants surrendered 512 arms. SAACID notes that the requirement to surrender a machine gun

instead of a small arm caused the market price for machine guns to rise from \$30 to \$150 in only a month. Arms destruction should have occurred in an official ceremony at the end of the programme, but SAACID decided to expedite the event and hold it in April 2007 due to the insecurity situation in the capital and after having received a number of threats.

In January 2006, basic training and literacy began. This lasted for three months with 100 percent of ex-combatants enrolled in the training. One of the additional goals of these courses was to discourage participants from consuming *khat*, a widespread habit amongst militia combatants. Participants received payment in cash according to the number of days they attended courses. In the first few months, only a small percentage of participants abandoned their studies. Other individuals substituted them. In January 2006, the UNDP undertook a socioeconomic survey of participants. In terms of specific training within this programme, 75 percent enrolled in 11 months of Vocational Enterprise Business Training, or VEBT. This contradicted a forecast which said two months of business training and an allowance in cash for the creation of a business was a better incentive (Business Principles and Practice, or BPP). According to this forecast, 190 ex-combatants were anticipated to participate in the VEBT training and 312 in the BPP. According to SAACID, the reasons for this choice had to do with the following:

The climate of insecurity in Mogadishu, which did not lend itself to opening a business.

The quantity of allowance, \$440, which was insufficient for opening a business, particularly if a portion of this amount had to go to loans to family members.

Fear of failure and thus losing the allowance, paid out in three instalments. The salary given to continue training was more secure.

Belief that training was more useful in the long term. These reasons, as well as the fact that vocational training of this sort was more expensive than giving grants for creating businesses, for it was based on apprenticeships in small businesses for which the business owner was remunerated for the training he or she provided, forced the UNDP to increase financing to the programme. VEBT and entrepreneurial training through BPP, began in April 2006. Three quarters of participants chose automobile mechanics, tailoring, or electrical work. Assistance normally exceeds 95 percent. Community leaders ("guarantors") are informed at every moment on the progress of ex-combatants and they organise regular visits to see them.

In June 2006, the UNDP paid out a \$200 per capita allowance with one month of delay. Only one of the 126 participants left the training after receiving the money. Various surveys on the conditions of businesses created were conducted up to November 2006. The rest of the allowance was paid out in two instalments of \$150 and \$90. At this time, 12 participants forsook their business. SAACID, who anticipated that 85 percent of participants would take their allowance and disappear, considers the more than 90 percent who continue with their project a success. Throughout all of the process, armed confrontations in

the south of Mogadishu affected the normal progress of the programme, which had to be cancelled a few days each month. Three participants died from gunshots in this period. Nevertheless, in December 2006, 505 of 512 participants from both training options completed all aspects of their programme. SAACID considers the success of the programme to be due in large part to the fact that community, including all clans, participated in it. For this reason, it is a model for DDR in the rest of Somalia. In its evaluation, SAACID recommended for future programmes lengthening training periods, giving subsidies to community and political leaders who collaborate in the selection of militia combatants and who do not have other independent sources of income, and including micro-credit for VEBT and BPP.

Since during fighting between the Transitional Federal Government and Islamic Courts Union in 2006-07, there was no remobilisation of militia combatants, the UNDP also considered DDR Phase II to have been successful (UNDP Somalia 2008).

In May 2007, UNDP/ROLS promoted a United Nations Working Group on DDR, however, this group did not provide any solutions due to the situation in the country. In September 2007, UNDP/ROLS partnered with the Somali Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, which was created in June as a part of the new National Security and Stabilisation Plan. The agency developed a roadmap for DDR as part of a short-term agreement (UNDP Somalia 2008; UN Security Council 2007: 15).

### Somaliland

The design of the strategy in Somaliland concluded in May 2005 and by July all "security personnel" had registered, except in the Sool-Sanaag region. In 2006, UNDP/ROLS initiated a voluntary DDR programme together with the NDC as its governmental counterpart and four local NGOs responsible for the reintegration of 494 demobilised combatants (UNDP Somalia 2005, 2008). There is not much information on the process, however, according to the UNDP, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery evaluated the programme at the end of the 2007 and in its report recommended that the project become more transparent (UNDP Somalia 2008).

### Puntland

There is even less information available on the programme in Puntland. We know that 272 former members of security forces were demobilised in 2006 and that their reintegration began in April 2007 (OCHA Somalia 2007b).

The UNDP feels that despite the current challenges in the Somaliland and Puntland programmes, DDR can still guarantee demobilised combatants are not kept on the state's payroll and document both how much money is being saved through the reduction of security personnel and on what areas the money is later spent (UNDP Somalia 2008).



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## Glossary

BPP	Business Principles and Practice
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
NDC	National Demobilisation Commission in Somaliland
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDDRU	Puntland DDR Unit
PEER	Programme of Emergency Education and Rehabilitation
ROLS	Rule of Law and Security Programme (UNDP)
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# Sudan (DDR, 2006 - ...)¹

## Basic data

Population:	37 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	4.7 million
Refugee population:	686,000 (2007)
GDP:	\$37,565 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$810 (2006)
HDI:	0.526, 147th (2005)
GDI:	0.502, 131th (2007)
Military expenditure:	2.24% (2003)
Social / military expenditure:	Military higher than social
Military population:	0.25%
Arms embargo:	ONU: since 2004 on Darfur; EU: since 1994

## Summary

Type of DDR	Bilateral disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration occurring at the same time as the reintegration of fragmentarily organised armed groups and the reconstruction of the armed forces.
Groups to demobilise	79,000 members of the armed forces, armed groups, and militias.
Executive bodies	National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC), and Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC)
Budget	
Timeline	Six months of preparation, six months of an Interim Programme, and three years of DDR.
Status / synopsis	Programme has yet to take off, though it has achieved some preliminary advances in planning, with child soldiers, etc.

## Context

### Peace process and conflict

In 2005, the SPLA armed group and the Sudanese government signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) which brought an end to a 20-year armed conflict that had pitted the north of the country against the south. A lack of detail in several parts of the agreement has made any progress in the peace process difficult. In addition, the end of the conflict on a national level led to the resurgence of resentments and disagreements between the various ethnic groups and clans who have to co-exist and compete for the scant resources in the north of the country. The opposing stances of the elites in Khartoum and the Upper Nile states, which control all of Sudan's economic wealth, and the remaining states that make up the country are at the heart of the tension threatening peace in Sudan.<sup>2</sup>

### International accompaniment

In June 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1547 to establish UNMIS, the UN Mission in Sudan, with support from the government of Sudan and under the coordinated responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The mission is a classic multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Its mandate includes the promotion of good will amongst parties, supervision of the ceasefire between Northern and Southern Sudan, supervision of withdrawal of armed groups, DDR, reorganisation of the police, observation of the human rights situation, promotion of the rule of law, facilitation of the return of displaced individuals, and preparation for elections and a referendum. The mission's principle difficulty arise from having to work with a strong centralised government and an emergent alternative government in the south, with neither

<sup>1</sup> This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations will be cited: Assessment and Evaluation Commission (2007), UN Sudan (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) and Small Arms Survey (2008).

<sup>2</sup> Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 53)

wanting the United Nations to interfere in the management of relations between them.<sup>3</sup>

### Other disarmament initiatives

From 2007 onwards, various projects called Community Security and Arms Reduction Control (CSAC) have got underway in Southern Sudan. In 2007, 2,406 arms were collected and destroyed. Both government and the United Nations consider these programmes instrumental to the strengthening of DDR and indeed include them in the DDR annual plan under "operations" (UN Sudan 2007a: 40). The United Nations also works in the area of mine action.

### Programme design

#### Type and designation of DDR

DDR is known simply as DDR.

The programme in Sudan involves bilateral disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration occurring at the same time as the reintegration of fragmentarily organised armed groups and the reconstruction of the armed forces.

The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) was designed and started whilst the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) were being relocated.

#### Executive bodies

Two commissions are responsible for implementation: the NSDDRC in Northern Sudan and the SSDDRC in Southern Sudan. The NSDDRC was established at a later date through a presidential decree. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Resolution 1590 stipulated that the United Nations was to assist in the design and implementation of DDR. The UN assists with the technical assistance, training, and coordination of the NSDDRC and SSDDRC. It works with a variety of "collaborating partners", including the government of Southern Sudan, Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Youth-Sport and Guidance, UNMIS, the UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNICEF, ILO, IOM, Southern Sudan HIV/AIDS Commission (SSAC), Save the Children, Sudan Education Network and Development (SENAD), CARE, Pact, and Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW).

During the registration process, the SSDDRC also praised the cooperation extended by other commissions, such as the War Veterans Commission; the War Disabled, Widows and Orphans Commission; and the Demining Commission (UNMIS 2007a).

#### Guiding principles

The UN's objectives for the programme in Sudan are to "strengthen security by implementing programmes for forces identified in the GPA, Darfur Peace Agreement, and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement [and] enhance peace and security in communities, and develop the capacity of DDR Commissions, national NGOs and institutions" (UN Sudan 2007a: 39).

### Participants


The United Nations aims to demobilise 79,000 ex-combatants. For the first phase, the UN has targeted 58,800 combatants related to the General Peace Agreement and 1,500 related to the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.

### Groups with specific needs

It is estimated that there are "a few thousand" minors amongst armed groups. The United Nations cites around 3,000 within the SPLA, SAF, Eastern Front, and in Darfur.

### Budget and financing

The UN budget for Sudan is as much as \$129 million, used to finance 11 projects over the 2006-08 period. The 2008 Work Plan for Sudan (UN Sudan 2007a: 39) subdivides this funding into the spending areas of "humanitarian" (\$700,000), "early recovery" (\$16 million), and "recovery and development" (\$113 million). Broken down by year:



Source: UN Sudan (2007a: 39)

Broken down by region:

Region:	Quantity
National programmes	99,990,279
Abyei	950,000
Blue Nile	2,644,000
Darfur	3,000,000
Eastern states	9,206,280
Khartoum and other Northern areas	1,425,202
Southern Kurdufan	3,318,000
Southern Sudan	8,911,533

Source: UN Sudan (2007b)

The UN anticipates that in 2008 the two commissions will start to be financed by their respective governments. The Government of National Unity depends on a budget of \$55 million to establish and maintain Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).

### Schedule

The GPA set the schedule for Sudan based on a set day for programme launch called "D-Day". This schedule

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2005)

stipulates a half year for preparations, one year for the functioning of the Interim DDR Programme, and three years split into four phases for DDR proper. Intended to begin in July 2005, the first steps of the programme did not commence until the end of that year (UNMIS 2008).

## Phases

### Disarmament and demobilisation

Start to DDR has been considerably delayed. Some analysts believe the commissions lack the means to carry out DDR, especially the SSDDRC. The NSDDRC has started some activities in transitional areas. Small Arms Survey claims that "a wide range of ex-combatants find themselves in a kind of administrative limbo, at varying levels of 'integration' and 'demobilisation'" (Small Arms Survey 2007: 1).

In 2007, pre-registered adult ex-combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups faced the obstacle of insufficient information reaching them on eligible groups. When at mid-year registration was completed in the north, the process commenced in the south. The SAF registered 25,000 adults. In August 2007, the SPLA announced that it would demobilise 25,021 soldiers, but these were only "identified". In September 2007, only 13,209 had been registered. At this time, SPLA troops were estimated at 170,000, following the integration of 31,000 militia combatants in June and after having demobilised only minors (Reuters 2007; UNMIS 2007a).

The disarmament and demobilisation of South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) members who were not incorporated into the SAF or SPLA, was done rashly and without the participation of the commissions. No reintegration programme was planned for these individuals.

Of the 798 minors identified by the SPLA initially, 331 were demobilised, in almost all cases by the minors themselves ("self-demobilisation"). However, in February 2007, UNMIS noted existing difficulties involved in really demobilising minors and the numerous occasions in which minors returned to the SPLA even after they had been reunited with family. UNMIS believes an incentive for the occurrence of this is the fact that the SPLA provides salaries and schooling (UNMIS 2007b: 3).

The Blue Nile regional government estimated that 4,000 adult combatants required disarmament in its territory and demobilised this number by the end of 2007. 2,227 minors enlisted in the SPLA were in the process of being demobilised. Around 6,000 members of the SAF and PDF (Popular Defence Force) are expected to participate in DDR from 2007 to 2008.

### Reinsertion and reintegration

For now, little has been done in the area of reintegration, particularly with respect to comprehensive reintegration programmes. The two commissions wrote a draft of the National DDR Strategic Framework at the start of 2007 to be approved by the NDDRCC. Other partial initiatives include, for example, a study in Blue Nile on understanding the socioeconomic situation of the region, or an initiative to involve 80 percent of children

associated with armed forces and groups in Southern Kurdufan in training activities and psychosocial support.

### Integration of armed groups

The GPA states that "no armed groups allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside of the two forces" (*Comprehensive Peace Agreement* 2005: chap. 6) and requires other armed groups (OAGs) which are not signatories to the agreement to incorporate within the SAF or SPLA before 9 March 2006. An extension beyond this date was granted for "special cases". This incorporation implied relocation to Northern Sudan (SAF) or Southern Sudan (SPLA), or temporarily belonging to a JIU.

The majority of SSDF were incorporated in the SPLA after the Juba Declaration in January 2006, although some groups took longer, until the beginning of 2007. Some also remained in the SAF. A portion of these combatants and some other minor groups continued to remain active in Southern Sudan. By March 2007, 47,440 SSDF had been integrated in the SPLA and 10,400 in the SAF. Later, leaders of the SSDF created a political party called the South Sudan Democratic Front. As regards the integration of OAGs, Small Arms Survey (2008: 5) offers six possible reasons for the difficulties encountered in Southern Sudan:

- The SPLA does not have sufficient resources to integrate "tens of thousands" of new members;
- Rank designations and promotions of new members create internal tensions;
- Many enrolled individuals refuse to leave their communities of origin;
- There are mutual jealousies between old and new members of the SPLA;
- New members who have not received positions of responsibility or higher status experience frustration in the new context; and
- A lack of trust in possibilities to be reintegrated into civil life generates "fear of DDR".

Small Arms Survey (2008: 3-4) doubts official claims that by mid-2007 OAGs aligned with the SAF had been incorporated and demobilised. They claim the "demobilised" SAF troops previously of the SSDF could have constituted militias in the south under the control of the SAF. Small Arms Survey estimates that there are around 4,000 members of the SSDF and around 6,000 additional OAGs aligned with the SAF and SPLA. In "Transitional Areas" the situation is even more delicate, with "tribal" armed groups determining the balance of force through alliances with the SAF and SPLA, in a problematic region.

Small Arms Survey concludes that the majority of former members of OAGs are "only marginally integrated" (2008: 6).

The original deadline for the withdrawal of the SAF and SPLA, the integration of OAGs, and the creation of JIUs was July 2007. However, these processes had not concluded on that date. The SAF, SPLA, and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee disagree on the number of withdrawn or demobilised troops, on deadlines, and on the procedures for continuing in the future.

### **Joint Integrated Units**

JIU are mixed military units located in Southern Sudan and composed of members of the SAF and SPLA. They constitute a core for future armed forces if, in the end, Sudan is held together as a unified state. Advances in the composition of these units have been slow. Of the 39,000 members planned for these units, 82.5 percent of troops corresponding to the SAF and 77.7 percent to the SPLA were mobilised by August 2007.

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## Glossary

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Reduction and Control
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
IDDRP	Interim DDR Programme
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
NDDRCC	National DDR Coordination Council
NSDDRC	Northern Sudan DDR Commission
OAGs	Other Armed Groups
PDF	Peace Defence Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SENAD	Sudan Education Network and Development
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSAC	Southern Sudan HIV/AIDS Commission
SSDDRC	Southern Sudan DDR Commission
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan

## UGANDA (Amnesty Act, 2000-08)<sup>1</sup>

### Basic data

Population:	29,9 million (2006)
Food emergencies:	Yes
IDPs:	1.3 millio (2007)
Refugee population:	22,000 (2007)
GDP:	\$9,322 million (2006)
Per capita income:	\$300 (2006)
HDI:	0.505, 154th (2005)
GDI:	0.501, 132th (2007)
Military expenditure:	2.09% (2006)
Social / military expenditure:	Social higher than military
Military population:	0.15%
Arms embargo:	No

### Summary

Type of DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation, and reinsertion programme targeting several armed opposition groups with large numbers of women combatants and child soldiers.
Groups to demobilise	22,000 members of several militias
Executive bodies	National Amnesty Commission
Budget	\$6 million
Timeline	From January 2000 to May 2008
Status / synopsis	Concluded

### Context Conflict

Since 1986, the north of Uganda has been afflicted by an armed conflict in which the LRA armed opposition group, motivated by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, has tried to overthrow the government of Yoweri Museveni and install a regime based on the Ten Biblical Commandments. The violence and lack of security caused by the LRA's attacks on the civilian population, the abduction of children to swell its ranks (around 25,000 since the conflict began) and confrontations between the armed group and Ugandan armed forces (together with pro-government militias) has left around 200,000 people dead, with some two million forcibly displaced at the height of the conflict. The LRA extended its activities into southern Sudan, a country that had offered it support, though in 2002 it allowed Ugandan armed forces to enter its territory to pursue the armed group. A peace process has been underway since 2006 and a cessation of hostilities has now been established.<sup>2</sup>

### Transitional justice

All of DDR in Uganda revolves around the Amnesty Act. In its judicial aspects, the amnesty is immediate and complete for private combatants. According to a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) survey, 99% of "reporters" (individuals associated with rebel groups who renounce and abandon involvement in armed rebellion and apply to the government of Uganda for amnesty) declared that the conditions of the amnesty "fully met their expectations" (MDRP 2008: 2-3). For leaders of armed groups, the amnesty has yet to be approved by parliament, pending the request of the Ministry of the Interior or the Amnesty Commission. Meanwhile, the Amnesty Act conflicts with activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Whilst the law has come to be known as the formalisation of an already existing "unofficial amnesty" (Hovil and Lomo 2005: 13), and reflects an apparently problem-free process of reconciliation, the ICC in 2005 declared its intention to try Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the chief commanders of this group, who are accused of committing 33 war crimes and crimes against humanity.

<sup>1</sup>This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006b), Hovil and Lomo (2005) and MDRP (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008)

<sup>2</sup> Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 28)

Approved in 2000, the Amnesty Act has included two amendments. The first, in 2002, establishes that a reporter may receive amnesty only once. A second amendment in 2006 involves extending the act until 2008.

**Other disarmament initiatives**

In August 2006, the Ugandan government and the LRA reached an agreement in Juba, southern Sudan. This agreement settled a cessation of hostilities between parties to the conflict and the assembling of LRA in the south of Sudan prior to a definitive signing of a peace agreement to begin a programme of DDR.

**Background to DDR**

The background to DDR in Uganda involves a reduction, from 1992 to 1996, of around 37,000 of a total 90,000 members of the National Resistance Army (NRA). From this experience, various lessons learned have served to facilitate similar programme design in the country (Coletta et al. 1996).

**Programme design**

**Type and designation of DDR**


DDR in Uganda comes in the form of the Amnesty Act, or less commonly, the Amnesty Integration Programme. It involves multiple disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of armed groups containing high levels of child soldiers and women combatants, and repatriation of some combatants who are active in

one hand, there is no “willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR”, one of the prerequisites for DDR together with the existence of a peace agreement, according to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2006: 2.10, 1). That is, Ugandan armed groups have not agreed to resign themselves to disarmament and demobilisation regulations, unlike, at best, reduced groupings of individuals, who receive ad hoc guarantees on the terms of the act. Instead, the programme has focused on receiving in an orderly manner what we can essentially consider fugitives (see Phases). On the other hand, there are signs that the Amnesty Act has been “primarily a tactical device for ending conflict rather than based on a genuine desire to end conflict through peaceful means” (Hovil and Lomo: 19-20). This is exemplified by, for example, the period for which the act originally meant to be in force—that is, six months, though subsequently renewed in the seven years of the act’s existence—or its scarce fulfilment of pledges to “reporters”.

**Executive bodies**

Approved by parliament, the Amnesty Act founded an Amnesty Commission and Demobilisation and Resettlement Team.

The **Amnesty Commission** is composed of seven members who the president designates and the parliament approves. The commission has the following functions:



Source: own elaboration, based on Hovil and Lomo (2005)

foreign countries. DDR’s reach in the country is partial because it commenced previous to and in parallel with the peace process of the government and LRA. It is debatable whether the Amnesty Act adequately serves as a substitute for a negotiated peace agreement and as a legal framework for authentic DDR. On the

- To supervise demobilisation, reintegration, and resettlement programmes, that is, to supervise the Demobilisation and Resettlement Team (DRT);
- To coordinate a programme of public awareness; and
- To study and promote reconciliation mechanisms.



Another objective of the commission includes creating a network with other significant actors in the country, such as with governmental institutions, national and international NGOs, and international agencies. National NGOs include GUSCO (Gulu Support the Children Organisation), KICWA (Kitgum Concerned Women's Association), PRAFOD (Participatory Rural Action for Development), and Give Me A Chance. International NGOs include World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, the International Rescue Committee, Caritas, the Save the Children Alliance, and Save the Children Denmark. International agencies are the UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, and WFP.

The **DRT** is comprised of a maximum of seven members, appointed by the president and approved by the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Security. Under the direct supervision of the Amnesty Commission, the DRT's role is to design and execute programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and resettlement. The team works at a regional level out of six offices and receives support from governmental agencies, NGOs (particularly World Vision and GUSCO), and community organisations such as religious missions (Uganda 2000: III).

The **UNDP's Action Plan 2006-2010** contains areas of action on the conflict which coincide with the commission's various areas of work. The action plan established Community Coordinators who act as links between the different local-level offices of the Amnesty Commission. As part of its programme of human security and peace building, the UNDP supports the DDR of LRA ex-combatants, as well as other activities in Karamoja and involving small arms. The UNDP also participates in the community reintegration of ex-combatants and internally displaced persons, and introduces a gender dimension to the programme in Uganda. It acts as an intermediary between the Ugandan Amnesty Commission and the DR Congo Amnesty Commission in repatriating ex-combatants and other displaced persons (UNDP Uganda 2006). Other UN agencies that play a part in Uganda are **UNICEF**, which gives support to the reintegration of child soldiers, and the **WFP**, which provides foodstuffs to reception centres.

The **IOM** has cooperated with the Amnesty Commission since 2002 in the identification, documentation, and registers of reporters outside of Uganda, largely in Sudan and Kenya, and implementation of repatriation.

The NGOs involved in the development of major work as associates to programme execution are **World Vision** and **GUSCO**. Both assist the Amnesty Commission in reception centres and psychosocial work. They also run vocational training courses.

### Guiding principles

According the handbook of the Amnesty Commission, the basic objectives of the commission are "To persuade reporters to take advantage of the amnesty and to encourage communities to reconcile with those who

have committed the offences; and to consolidate the progress so far made in amnesty implementation and ensure that more insurgents respond to the amnesty and that the community is ready to receive them" (quoted by Hovil and Lomo 2005: 7).

### Participants

Initially, the programme in Uganda aimed to demobilise 15,310 combatants, but in January 2006 amnesty was guaranteed for 19,000 combatants. In the end, the programme received more than 21,000 combatants, though the MDRP has occasionally offered a figure of 16,256 in reference to the number of persons it has demobilised since 2005 in its programme.

Although the wording of the act is broad (see **Eligibility**), amongst the main benefiting groups are the LRA, more than half of participants, the ADF/NALU (Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), the WNBFB (West Nile Bank Front), and the UNRF II (Uganda National Rescue Front II). Reporters can be found in numerous small groups.<sup>3</sup>

### Groups with specific needs

The breakdown of figures for demobilised individuals is as follows:

	Men	Women <sup>1</sup>	Total
Adults	8,561	2,141	10,702 (66%)
Minors	3,776	1,778	5,554 (34%)
Total	12,337 (76%)	3,919 (24%)	16,256

Source: own elaboration based on MDRP (2007)  
UNICEF has estimated that 25,000 minors were kidnapped over the 19 years of the conflict. Of these, 7,500 were teenage women who have given birth to around 1,000 babies (ICG 2006: 7b; see also Coalition to Stop... 2004).

### Eligibility criteria

According to the Amnesty Act, amnesty "is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by a) actual participation in combat; b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed rebellion; or d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion". That is, the act targets both combatants and non-combatants, such as collaborators, dependent, and kidnapped persons. Later, the Amnesty Commission concluded that only children over 12 years old may qualify for amnesty, since this is the age of criminal responsibility in Uganda (Uganda 2000: II.1.1).

### Budget and financing

Until 2004, the major financiers of the Amnesty Commission were the government of Uganda and various bilateral donors, whilst beginning in 2005 the World Bank became the principal source of funding. The Amnesty Act says that all expenses incurred by the

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, those listed in HURIPPEC (2003: 108)

Amnesty Commission and the DRT be financed by a Consolidated Fund. Apparently (*Humanitarian Update* 2003) NUSAF, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, created in February 2003, contributed funds for reinsertion, until the Amnesty Commission secured its own resources. The government gave around \$1 million to finance local offices of the Amnesty Commission and various countries in efforts to aid the UNRF II process cooperated in this through direct contributions from 2002 to 2004. These countries included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In the same period the IOM, USAID, UNICEF, and the United Kingdom contributed \$649,004. In 2003, assistance from the UNDP amounted to \$300,000. Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) gave funds and technical counselling to the Amnesty Commission from 2001 to 2005, as well as financed UNICEF and Save the Children in Ugandan economic and psychosocial reintegration programmes for child soldiers. It was one of the main contributors to MDRP (Ginifer 2006: 10-11).

In 2004, having demobilised 14,000 combatants but overwhelmed by the numbers and without resources to deal with them all, the commission looked for greater external financing and found it in the World Bank, which in May 2005, through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, gave \$4.2 million for reintegration over the period 2005-07. This economic assistance, which rescued the Amnesty Commission from its critical financial situation starting in 2004, was used principally on ex-combatants of the LRA, who had still not up until that point received any form of assistance. The MDRP added to this an additional \$1.5 million in 2005, \$2.2 million in 2006, and \$321,000 in 2007. Meanwhile, the UNDP spent \$553,744 in 2005-06.

### Schedule

The Amnesty Act was approved on 1 January 2000 and was ratified on 17 January 2000, but a good part of its reintegration activities did not start until the 2002-04 period. Even though the act remains in force until May 2008, the MDRP considers the programme to have concluded on 30 June 2007.

### Evolution

#### Communication and Awareness

The Amnesty Commission ran intensive activities to inform combatants, ex-combatants, and civilians about the process. As regards combatants, the commission made use of formal channels, such as radio and the press, and informal ones, such as meetings and community workshops. The MDRP calculates that two thirds of reporters heard about the Amnesty Act on the radio. However, according to the commission, this approach faced three obstacles:

- That LRA and AFD (French Development Agency, in French Agence française de développement) leaders did not transmit information on the Amnesty Act to combatants;
- That the lack of transportation and communication infrastructure in northern Uganda made

information transmission in the north difficult; and

- That in negotiations between the LRA and the government, both parties pledged to not spread propaganda; thus, the Amnesty Commission has had to be very careful its information campaigns were not interpreted as propaganda.

#### Disarmament and demobilisation

Although reporters were not required to surrender an arm in order to be accepted into the demobilisation programme, disarmament was managed by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), whilst the DRT managed demobilisation. The UPDF received more than half of demobilised combatants and an NGO a third, whilst 6% were captured and only 5% were allowed to leave their group freely. The MDRP claims 99.8% of combatants surveyed were kidnapped, the majority of them minors, therefore "leaving the LRA" for the vast majority of reporters meant "escaping" it (MDRP 2008: 2). Reporters spent time in a reception centre managed by NGOs before returning to civilian life. The demobilisation process consists of 1) detention and interrogation in military quarters, 2) continued interrogation by the UPDF Child Protection Unit, and 3) rehabilitation in reception centres run by NGOs (HURIPEC 2003: 107).

In the first years of the disarmament and demobilisation process, members of the UPDF committed a number of abuses against reporters, in particular minors, because there was no external supervision of the process. However, this situation seems to have improved over time. At the same time, the UPDF has been accused of using abuse to recruit demobilised individuals to their ranks, even though the high frequency of "re-kidnapping" by the LRA acts as an incentive for ex-combatants to voluntarily join the UPDF (HURIPEC 2003: 107). Once ex-combatants moved to a reception centre, they became the responsibility of NGOs under the supervision of the DRT. In these reception centres they were identified, vocational information was gathered, and a minority of reporters were given a medical check in the first years of the programme. An Amnesty Certificate and a basic assistance kit were also provided (see Reinsertion and Reintegration). MDRP estimates that 85% of combatants received psychosocial counselling. Most also received reproductive education and education on HIV/AIDS.

In 2005, 2,500 ex-UNRF II members demobilised thanks to mediation from the Amnesty Commission. Through the UN Mission in DR Congo and the IOM, the Amnesty Commission had also directly contacted ADF/NALU combatants in the DR Congo. At the end of 2006, the MDRP had demobilised 16,133 combatants, 105 percent of anticipated. In 2007, the total number of demobilised individuals was 60. The MDRP concluded the demobilisation process in mid-2007 with an overall programme total of 16,256 demobilised individuals. Altogether, it is estimated that 21,000-22,000 individuals have demobilised since the proclamation of the Amnesty Act.

## Reinsertion and reintegration

Upon leaving reception centres, ex-combatants received as help for reinsertion the following:

- a basic personal assistance kit, including cooking utensils, a mattress, bedclothes, flour, seeds, and fuel;
- cash equivalent to three months of the salary of a police officer or teacher, around \$150;
- \$10.50 for medical expenses and \$10 for transportation expenses; and
- information and counselling on available reintegration options.

The MDRP reports that "more than 21,000" ex-combatants have received support for reinsertion from the Amnesty Commission. The World Bank, meanwhile, reports that 14,816 demobilised individuals received assistance in cash and 16,256 in kind.

However, the ICG (2006: 14a) maintained that even with reinsertion kits, this support was limited because it was distributed too late on the ground (two years after the promised time in some cases), which discouraged other combatants from demobilising. At the same time, HURIPPEC (2003: 107) mentions ex-combatants' routine practice of remaining in IDP camps, though figures are not provided for this.

DFID (Ginifer 2006: 17) claimed that "during the last 2-3 years there has been virtually no credible reinsertion". This opinion is shared by ICG (2003), MDRP (2008: 7) and Hovil and Lomo (2005). DFID laid blame for the "serious" delay of MDRP action and the limited reach of its programme on the Amnesty Commission. It calculated that in July 2005, 10-12,000 ex-combatants were waiting to be received by a reintegration programme. As for the reintegration of child soldiers, DFID was even more critical, pointing out the proliferation of agencies dedicated to this activity without sufficient capacity and a lack of material resources and time.

The MDRP programme carried out a preliminary study of 2,000 reporters to determine their demographic, social, and economic profiles in 2005. This helped the commission plan, execute, and evaluate the rest of the reinsertion and reintegration programme. In economic terms, unemployment amongst reporters was the same as the rest of the population in northern Uganda. Around 5 percent of reporters had work and more than 50 percent did not. The remainder were students, housekeepers, or ill individuals. More than half of male reporters and a third of women began formal or vocational education. Of those already employed, the MDRP found a marked tendency amongst the women of this group to have professional positions as teachers, healthcare workers, administrators, or employees of NGOs, and the men to work in the security sector, a third of them in the military or police force. At the start of 2005, for instance, 800 ex-LRA had already been recruited by the armed forces. The MDRP estimates that amongst unemployed reporters, three fourth depend on their families to supply them with food, a quarter on NGOs, and a tenth on the

government. Generally, there have been little long-term economic reintegration initiatives. In April 2005, the Ugandan government spoke of "thousands" of LRA ex-combatants receiving free land to cultivate in the Gulu district. Meanwhile, Hovil and Lomo (2005: 11) mention the UPDF practice of absorbing "some" reporters in the army. Some ex-combatants work in community coordinating committees.

The MDRP (2008: 3-4) and HURIPPEC (2003: 107) contend that the social integration of ex-combatants in their communities has been generally good, though perhaps not as positive for women reporters. Almost half of ex-combatants resettled in a rural context similar to their contexts of origin prior to the country's conflict. A third took refuge in displacement camps and a fifth migrated to urban areas. The majority remained in northern Uganda. The MDRP found a disparity between a relatively good social integration and a deficient economic integration, data which is consistent with a report of the Refugee Law Project (Hovil and Lomo 2005: 15). In 2005, this report claimed that in western Uganda (location of the ADF) and West Nile (location of the WNB and UNRF II) both reporters and host communities welcomed the Amnesty Act, even if they criticised it for its lack of economic and employment reintegration assistance.

## Repatriation

MONUC, although not part of the process of DDR, repatriation, and resettlement in the DR Congo, has repatriated more than 500 Ugandan ex-combatants located in the DR Congo and Sudan since the end of 2003.

## Lessons learned

The MDRP feels its participation in the Amnesty Act is a useful antecedent for the next demobilisation of combatants of the LRA. Through this experience, it has noted lessons learned and made various recommendations for future demobilisations of the LRA. These include:

- a recommendation to execute community reintegration programmes and not only reinsertion programmes geared to ex-combatants and associate individuals, in order to reduce the economic vulnerability of reporters and communities;
- an understanding that war and the post-conflict experience differ depending on gender;
- an understanding that whilst social integration was not bad, awareness-raising and reconciliation activities could have improved it; and
- an awareness that counselling in the demobilisation phase was very positively received by the reporters.

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## Glosario

ADF/NALU	Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AFD	Agence française de développement (French Development Agency)
DRT	Demobilisation and Resettlement Team
GUSCO	Gulu Support the Children Organization
HURIPEC	Human Rights and Peace Centre
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards ()
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KICWA	Kitgum Concerned Women's Association
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Muti-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRA	National Resistance Army
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRAFOD	Participatory Rural Action for Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRF II	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
WFP	World Food Programme
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front

### (Footnotes)

1 Figures broke down by different aspects and gender in MDRP (2008)