



WEST AFRICA  
NETWORK FOR PEACE-  
BUILDING

Centre  
— for —  
Conflict  
Research



**fewer**  
forum on early warning  
and early response

*With indicators from the Africa Peace Forum, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, University of Maryland/CIDCM and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs/Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project.*

## CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE DEFINITION

### ABRIDGED METHODOLOGY

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this abridged methodology is to provide the analytical and action framework needed to plan preliminary responses to early warning. Through an assessment of conflict and peace indicators, as well as stakeholders, preliminary trends and scenarios can be drawn, and entry points for action identified.

The analytical assumption is that: (a) conflict trends – (b) peace trends +/- (c) stakeholder trends = overall trends. On this basis, responses to conflict and peace developments, as well as stakeholder actions can be defined.

The methodology presented below has emerged from an expert consultation on conflict analysis convened by FEWER in early 2001. It has been further elaborated by the West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP/Ghana) and the Centre for Conflict Research (CCR/Kenya) as part of a UNDESA programme on capacity building for conflict management. The appendices are drawn from the fieldwork of leading FEWER members (Russian Academy of Sciences/EAWARN, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, and the Africa Peace Forum) in the Caucasus and Great Lakes, as well as the University of Maryland/CIDCM and Norman Paterson School of International Affairs/CIFP project.

Important caveats for the use of this abridged methodology are as follows:

- As a “quick tool”, it is meant to provide ideas and a sense of response directions that should be examined further. It should not be seen as a replacement for sustained monitoring, analytical processes, and consultations required for planning purposes.
- As a methodology it is highly dependent on the quality of information inputted and the analytical expertise of the user. If either of these requirements are not of high quality, the analysis will be poor.
- The indicators listed in the appendices are provided for illustration and resource purposes only. The presence of these indicators in a given region does not mean that the potential for conflict or peace is significant. Indicators will mean different things in different settings. Furthermore, research on indicators is undeveloped. We are only now starting to understand, for example, the importance of gender-sensitive indicators.

Feed-back on this methodology is welcome. Please send your comments to the FEWER Secretariat at [secretariat@fewer.org](mailto:secretariat@fewer.org).

## 2. CONFLICT INDICATORS

Here we try to understand what are the key factors that fuel a conflict. Different aspects need to be considered, particularly the root and proximate causes of conflict, as well as its actual or potential triggers.

### *Description:*

- *Root causes.* Structural or underlying causes of conflict. Examples may be poverty, poor governance, etc.
- *Proximate causes.* Factors that accentuate and make more severe the underlying causes of conflict? Examples may be poor personal security, availability of weapons, etc.
- *Triggers.* Events that led (or may lead) to the violent escalation of the conflict. Examples may be the arrest of a key political figure, an especially violent cattle rustling episode, etc.

Please refer to Appendix 1 on sample conflict indicators.

	Political/security indicators	Economic indicators	Socio-cultural indicators
Root causes			
Proximate causes			
Triggers			
Indicator trends	What conflict indicators (root, proximate, triggers) reinforce each other?		
Possible scenarios	1. Best case scenario 2. Status-quo scenario 3. Worst case scenario		

Please consider the following five questions during the indicator analysis:

1. Have you considered indicators at all levels (local, national, international)?
2. Have you considered both the relative importance of historic, present and future indicators?
3. Are your indicators reflective only of the current phase of the conflict (pre-conflict, actual conflict, post-conflict)? If so, please consider whether other phases are relevant.
4. Are the indicators you selected important both in terms of facts and perceptions?
5. Do the indicators selected reflect the concerns of different sectors of the population (women, elderly, poor, rich, etc.)?

### 3. PEACE INDICATORS

Conflicts are complex. We need to understand not only what may fuel a conflict, but also what prevents its outbreak. As such, here we try to understand what are the key factors that sustain peace in society. Different aspects need to be considered, particularly peace systems, processes, and tools.

**Description:**

- *Systemic.* The system that upholds peace or “conflict carrying capacity” of society. How strong is it? Examples may be rules governing relations between villages and groups, a culture of tolerance, etc.
- *Processes.* The processes that are in place for dealing with conflict and that sustain peace. Examples may be inter-village meetings, a process where elders meet, etc.
- *Tools.* The tools or instruments available for dealing with conflict. Examples may be traditional courts, truth commissions, etc.

Please refer to Appendix 1 on sample peace indicators.

	Political/security indicators	Economic indicators	Socio-cultural indicators
<b>Systemic</b>			
<b>Processes</b>			
<b>Tools</b>			
<b>Indicator trends</b>	What peace indicators (systemic, processes, tools) reinforce each other?		
<b>Possible scenarios</b>	1. Best case scenario 2. Status-quo scenario 3. Worst case scenario		

Please consider the following five questions during the indicator analysis:

1. Have you considered indicators at all levels (local, national, international)?
2. Have you considered both the relative importance of historic, present and future indicators?
3. Are your indicators reflective only of the current phase of the conflict (pre-conflict, actual conflict, post-conflict)? If so, please consider whether other phases are relevant.
4. Are the indicators you selected important both in terms of facts and perceptions?
5. Do the indicators selected reflect the concerns of different sectors of the population (women, elderly, poor, rich, etc.)?

## 4. STAKEHOLDERS

Conflicts involve people and interests. It is critical to understand the potential and actual motivations of different stakeholders and what actions they take to further their respective interests. As such, we need to consider the agendas/power, needs, and actions of different groups.

### *Definitions/description:*

- *Agendas/power.* The agendas of key stakeholders for conflict and for peace. What is the cumulative power of stakeholders promoting peace or conflict? Examples include labour unions wanting a change in government, allied with student groups who have the same agenda. Their combined power for strikes and demonstrations may be significant.
- *Needs.* The needs of different stakeholders may include access to land for pastoralist groups, or the need medical supplies for guerillas (e.g. Burundi). Critically, what needs are opposing and overlapping among different stakeholders?
- *Actions.* What actions are the different stakeholders undertaking to promote peace or conflict? What is the cumulative power of actions for peace or conflict? For example, local NGOs and women's groups may be advocating for justice and key donors may seek to fund the special courts (e.g. Sierra Leone). There may be "irreconcilable" armed groups (e.g. Chechnya) driven by a wish for personal power and profit that may seek to undermine any overtures to peace.

	Political/security stakeholders	Economic stakeholders	Socio-cultural stakeholders
<b>Agendas/power</b>			
<b>Needs</b>			
<b>Actions</b>			
<b>Stakeholder trends</b>	What stakeholder agendas, needs, actions reinforce each other?		
<b>Possible scenarios</b>	1. Best case scenario 2. Status-quo scenario 3. Worst case scenario		

Please consider the following five questions during the indicator analysis:

1. Have you considered stakeholders at all levels (local, national, international)?
2. Have you considered both the relative importance of historic, present and future stakeholders?
3. Are your stakeholders reflective only of the current phase of the conflict (pre-conflict, actual conflict, post-conflict)? If so, please consider whether other phases are relevant.
4. Are the stakeholders selected important both in terms of facts and perceptions?
5. Do the stakeholders selected reflect the concerns of different sectors of the population (women, elderly, poor, rich, etc.)?

## 5. SUMMARY ANALYSIS

<b>(a) Conflict Indicators</b>	<b>(b) Peace Indicators</b>	<b>(c) Stakeholders</b>	<b>Summary conclusion</b>
<i>Trends summary</i>	<i>Trends summary</i>	<b>Trends summary</b>	(a) – (b) +/- (c)
<p>Overall scenarios:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Best case scenario</li> <li>2. Status-quo scenario</li> <li>3. Worst case scenario</li> </ol>			

## 6. ENTRY POINTS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

To define potential programmatic entry-points, please consider the following questions:

1. What are the critical conflict indicators (root causes, proximate, triggers) that can be mitigated programmatically?
2. What are the critical peace indicators (systemic, processes, tools) that can be supported programmatically?
3. What are the key stakeholder groups and their agendas/power, needs, actions that should be addressed?
4. What plans should be made to support a best case scenario and counter-act a worst case scenario?

Once the entry points has been defined, each have to be looked at in terms of:

- (a) the facets of the problem and related issues;
- (b) the objective for the response;
- (c) envisaged measures and activities at different levels; and
- (d) who should be involved.

Table 1 serves as an example and can be used for each entry point identified.



**Table 1: Entry-point: Availability of small arms**

Issues / Problems	Objectives What should be achieved	Options for response			Actors
		<i>Regional Level</i>	<i>National level</i>	<i>District level</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Small arms trading leads to violent crimes throughout the country</li> <li>• Cross border spread of small arms</li> <li>• Role of small arms in escalating conflicts</li> <li>• Role of small arms in turning conflict into deadly confrontations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reducing the flow of small arms in Kenya and in the region</li> <li>• Increasing ability to detect small arms</li> <li>• Increase security in regions where small arms are a problem</li> <li>• Reduce the security dilemma that leads to the proliferation of small arms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lobby for the reduction of small arms</li> <li>• Develop legal frameworks for regional response to the small arms problem</li> <li>• Train police and law enforcement authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demobilisation</li> <li>• Offer alternative sources of income generation among communities who rely on livestock</li> <li>• Offer incentives for surrendering of arms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programmes for arms surrender</li> <li>• Improve security</li> <li>• Empower community leaders to monitor transportation of arms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• United Nations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPKO</li> </ul> </li> <li>• African governments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Arms exporting governments</li> <li>• Multilateral, bilateral agencies, international and national NGOs,</li> <li>• Subregional organisations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EAC; IGAD</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## **APPENDIX 1: CONFLICT AND PEACE INDICATORS (CAUCASUS AND GREAT LAKES)**

*Introduction.* In 1998, FEWER members launched pilot early warning systems in the Caucasus and the Great Lakes. These efforts were led by EAWARN/Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (Georgia) for the Caucasus, and the Africa Peace Forum (Kenya) for the Great Lakes. Following an eighteen month pilot in each region, this review of indicators is drawn from reports produced by the Caucasus and Great Lakes networks. It forms part of work on "lessons learned" undertaken by the FEWER network.

An understanding of conflict as well as peace generating factors is critical for early warning analysis. Further, it is now clear that a factual approach to early warning is flawed. Different indicators could be interpreted in a number of ways by people in conflict affected areas. Perceptions, therefore, are as important as facts. The value of FEWER's emphasis on locally led and managed early warning networks has been underscored.

Three directions can be seen in the practice of early warning: (i) unstructured qualitative and context specific situation assessments; (ii) generic indicator-based analyses; and (iii) quantitative model-based studies. All three directions have value, and inform the approach which FEWER member organisations take in their early warning efforts. This overview of indicators from the Caucasus and the Great Lakes aims to serve as a resource for practitioners seeking to understand conflict dynamics in the regions. It provides perspectives on the types of indicators to draw on for qualitative, generic and quantitative analyses of conflicts in the region.

Some gaps in the early warning field, however, have become visible through the preparation of this resource document. First, indicators need to be measured in quantitative terms, be policy relevant, and have associated information sources. The indicators listed below do not necessarily meet these criteria. Secondly, we need to find ways of ensuring that we adequately understand the perceptual nature of indicators used for analysis. This part of our work remains underdeveloped. Thirdly, conflict early warning has by and large focused on "conflict indicators". However, an analytical approach to peace, the other side of the coin, remains elusive. Hence, the peace indicators listed below are not as many as the conflict indicators. Fourthly, early warning has emerged from the international relations discipline. However, both conflict and peace take on a broader meaning for people than what can be contained within a given discipline. Gender perspectives on early warning can provide a useful insight to our understanding of conflict/peace indicators, but is only now beginning to be applied.

FEWER members will continue to re-assess and draw lessons from their practice of early warning. Hence, this document should be viewed as a dynamic product. It will be revised and change as we continue to learn how to engage in early warning more effectively.

### ***Methodological notes***

The conflict and peace indicators for the Great Lakes region in Africa and the Caucasus region have been developed by applying qualitative content analysis on regional reports. The data set covered forty regional reports between 1998-1999 for the Great Lakes including Country Reports, Region Reports, Thematic Reports and Policy Briefs. The data set for the Caucasus covered twenty-six reports between 1998-2000 including Early Warning reports, Thematic Early Warning reports and Policy Briefs.

The indicators used in the early warning reports produced by both these regional networks were analysed with the objective of determining a more region-specific list of indicators for the network.

Qualitative content analysis is a classical method for structuring and categorising written material of any origin. This method is particularly useful when we have to work with a largely unstructured and narrative text.

We have chosen qualitative analysis as the most open method for reducing the complexity in the content of these reports available in different formats and languages. The current classification includes as much detail as possible. We have avoided using a constructed code as in the case of model-derived categories used earlier in similar case studies. Instead, we have extracted our categories using the *in-vivo* code. Use of this code has meant a reduction in the material used in favour of more abstract generalisations. Such an open categorisation helps combine inductive with deductive thinking. The categories used are being developed and refined until a clear and unambiguous cluster pattern can be defined.

We have tried to uncover the underlying peace and conflict indicators, as perceived by local information-gathering sources. Our intention was not to quantify the data, though some of the indicators (eg, crime rates, external support) could be seen as quantifiable.

Information gathering and the construction of indicators should be viewed as a reflexive process. This assumption means that the indicators are dynamic and need to be revised. Structural changes in situations of conflict are unavoidable. As a result, early warning capacities are adapted through employing local empirical findings as a basis for more inductive methodologies for developing indicators. Such inductive methodologies can then be used in creating models for forecasting trends as the conflict develops. The focus remains on local reality rather than on theoretical models about conflict-generating variables.

FEWER reports are able to retain their credibility by using this applied method of indicator building. Our aim is to provide greater transparency in information processing in order to facilitate greater objectivity and value in the reporting process.

*Conflict Indicators: Caucasus*

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<p><b>REGIONAL / INTER-STATE INDICATORS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problematic relations with Federal centre</li> <li>• External support for opposition groups (or perception of)</li> <li>• Historical rivalries</li> <li>• Antagonistic behaviour</li> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Exploitation of divisions/tensions (political / media propaganda)</li> <li>• Persecution of or discrimination against state nationals in neighbouring states or Russia</li> <li>• Inability to maintain territorial control</li> <li>• Threat of external intervention</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Deterioration of relations between state and external actors</li> <li>• State or region in the process of political or economic transition</li> <li>• Rivalries over control of region's resources</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction or resentment relating to the activities or legitimacy of the Federal government</li> <li>• Recent history of changes in territorial borders and status</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Demographic changes</li> <li>• Mistrust of major mediating powers, including Federal centre</li> <li>• Uncertain stance of major external powers / stakeholders on key issues</li> </ul>
<p><b>STRATEGIC AND MILITARY INDICATORS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Negotiations on key security issues deadlocked or failing to produce results (missing deadlines, superficial results only)</li> <li>• Public support for military resolution of existing conflicts</li> <li>• Deterioration of relations between state and external actors</li> <li>• Insufficient control over the military</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Forced conscription into non-state security forces</li> <li>• Government legitimacy tied to conclusive military victory</li> </ul>

<p><b>STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND MONOPOLY OF POWER</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inability, on the part of the state, to deliver security and stability, and / or public perception of this inability</li> <li>• Systemic instability</li> <li>• Unconsolidated power</li> <li>• Human rights abuses</li> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Increase in number of private security firms, clan-, family- or politically-based security systems, or semi-legal security forces, in competition with or opposition to the state security forces</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Increase in non-state military / security forces</li> <li>• Increase in terrorism</li> <li>• Perception that terrorist activities are related to / supported by elements in neighbouring states</li> <li>• Perception that Federal government encourages and manipulates internal conflicts</li> <li>• Uncertain distribution of powers between the centre or Federal government and 'autonomous' regions</li> <li>• Linguistic isolation from centre of power</li> <li>• Weak sense of citizenship</li> <li>• Weakness of state institutions</li> <li>• Weakness of political institutions</li> <li>• Weak state legitimacy</li> <li>• Non-state actors taking traditional state roles</li> <li>• Insufficient control over the military</li> <li>• State or region in the process of political or economic transition</li> <li>• Recent history of changes in territorial borders and status</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Uncertain period of political transition (upcoming elections, newly autonomous region establishing self-government etc.)</li> <li>• Recurring violence in border areas (external support for resistance groups, increased likelihood of 'spillover' etc.)</li> <li>• Open combat (in some areas, re-escalation of, etc.)</li> </ul>
<p><b>POLITICAL OPPOSITION</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disillusionment with security apparatus</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs</li> <li>• Dysfunctional judiciary or lack of respect for judicial system (due to corruption, mal-administration, politicisation etc.)</li> <li>• Censorship</li> <li>• Recent history of successful (ethno-nationalist) irredentist movement in the region</li> <li>• Corruption, (institutional, commercial, political)</li> <li>• Increased tension between regime supporters and opposition groups</li> <li>• Political violence (assassinations, coups, hostage-taking etc.)</li> <li>• Constitutional abuses</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs</li> <li>• Radicalisation of traditional institutions (eg, radicalisation of mainstream religious institutions as a result of activities of extremist religious movements)</li> <li>• Ethnic tension/violence</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Historical rivalries</li> <li>• Antagonistic behaviour</li> <li>• Institutionalised persecution, or perception of (economic, political etc.)</li> <li>• General despair (linked to justice, economic welfare, personal/family security)</li> <li>• Abuses of power</li> <li>• Increased opposition activity</li> <li>• Increase in size and cohesion of opposition groups</li> <li>• Repression of political opposition</li> <li>• Radicalisation of opposition (militarisation, rise in ethno-nationalism, increasingly irredentist agenda, more violent or conflict-generating activities undertaken etc.)</li> <li>• Protest action (strikes, picketing etc.)</li> <li>• Militarisation (of society or political groups)</li> <li>• Recent history of political instability and violence (coups, assassinations etc.)</li> <li>• Uncertain period of political transition (upcoming elections, newly autonomous region establishing self-government etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>FRAGMENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR OF MAIN ACTORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governing elite has no coherent policy on key conflict-generating issues</li> <li>• Factionalism within opposition</li> </ul>
<b>IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflicting ideological systems (European vs. Islamic norms and values)</li> <li>• Recent history of successful (ethno-nationalist) irredentist movement in the region</li> </ul>
<b>SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF CONFLICT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civilian movement across border</li> <li>• Restriction of movement into and out of the state</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> </ul>
<b>DISPLACED POPULATION / REFUGEES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Influx of refugees / IDPs (conflict over the return of displaced people or influx of refugees)</li> <li>• Emigration, particularly of minorities or elites</li> </ul>

<b>VIOLENCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in terrorism</li> <li>• Human rights abuses</li> <li>• Increase in organised crime</li> <li>• High or increasing crime rate</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Militarisation (of society or political groups)</li> <li>• Proliferation of arms</li> <li>• High numbers of suicides</li> </ul>
<b>EXCLUSION / ETHNIC TENSION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutionalised persecution, or perception of (economic, political etc.)</li> <li>• Exploitation of divisions/tensions (political / media propaganda)</li> <li>• Emigration, particularly of minorities or elites</li> <li>• Political institutionalisation of ethnicity or religion</li> <li>• Political under-representation (minority groups, regions)</li> <li>• Growing economic disparity perceived to be related to ethnicity</li> <li>• Recent history of minority group forced migration / expulsion (due to inter-ethnic conflict or political resettlement)</li> <li>• Lack of clear legislation governing distribution / ownership of land</li> <li>• Conflict or competition over land (land distribution, scarcity of arable land, competing claims etc.)</li> <li>• Artificial population movement (resettled groups demanding return, proposed resettlement of ethnic minority, etc.)</li> <li>• Persecution of or discrimination against state nationals in neighbouring states or Russia</li> <li>• Demographic changes</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> <li>• Non-inclusion of all actors in negotiations / agreement</li> <li>• Language related disputes</li> <li>• Increase in influence or majority of dominant ethnic group (due to migration, deportation of ethnic minorities etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>ECONOMIC FACTORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing poverty/ economic disparity</li> <li>• Agricultural stagnation or failure</li> <li>• Economic collapse</li> <li>• High or increasing unemployment (particularly in rural areas, among youth)</li> <li>• State not meeting basic health care needs</li> <li>• Economic dependence on Federal centre</li> <li>• Economic isolation</li> <li>• Large budget deficit</li> <li>• Increase in or strong shadow economy</li> <li>• Population movement (labour migration, urban migration, 'brain drain' etc.)</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> <li>• Economic recession</li> <li>• Economic support from Federal centre not delivered (due to economic recession in Russian Federation, aid absorbed by intermediaries etc.)</li> <li>• Lack of post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>

*Peace Indicators: Caucasus*

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>STRATEGIC INDICATORS / SECURITY / STABILITY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some agreement on key issues (territorial status, refugees) reached between conflicting parties</li> <li>• Economic contacts between conflicting parties strengthening</li> <li>• Recent history of violent conflict means public reluctant to jeopardise peace</li> <li>• Improvement in regional relations (co-operation on economic development, resources etc.)</li> <li>• Initiatives to address conflict (or the consequences of conflict)</li> <li>• Progress in negotiations</li> <li>• Negotiation and contacts between conflicting parties</li> <li>• One or all parties want to prevent violent conflict</li> <li>• Little public support for military solution</li> <li>• Economic improvement a political and public priority</li> <li>• Limited mobilisation on ethnic issues</li> <li>• Decreasing numbers of refugees / IDPs</li> </ul>
<b>INCLUSIVE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Return of Refugees</li> <li>• Ruling party has support of some opposition groups from both left and right</li> <li>• Decrease in radical opposition</li> <li>• Decrease in conflict within political / economic elite</li> <li>• Small political-ethnic groups forming alliances</li> <li>• Progress towards democratisation (establishment of democratic institutions, adherence to international norms on human rights etc.)</li> <li>• Election in accordance with international standards</li> <li>• Reduction in demands of opposition groups (eg, previously separatist groups now demanding autonomy)</li> <li>• Minority languages used by state institutions (government, education system, civil service etc.)</li> <li>• Institutionalised religious freedom</li> <li>• Ethnic minority representation in government institutions</li> <li>• Efforts to deal with refugee / IDP problems</li> <li>• Decrease in support for nationalist irredentist groups</li> <li>• Decrease in inter-denominational tension</li> <li>• Increase in legitimacy / popularity of government</li> <li>• Increase in social cohesion (external threat)</li> </ul>
<b>CO-OPERATION OF EXTERNAL ACTORS WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional power / IGO involved as mediator</li> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Economic support from Federal centre or neighbouring countries</li> </ul>



**PROMISING ECONOMIC FACTORS**

- Signs of economic regeneration
- Development of infrastructure
- Economic contacts between conflicting parties strengthening
- Measures taken to encourage economic regeneration
- Efforts at post-conflict reconstruction

## Conflict Indicators: Great Lakes

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>REGIONAL/ INTER-STATE INDICATORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Shifting inter-African alliances;</li> <li>- Tensions of one state transferred across borders;</li> <li>- Division of ethnic communities across borders (in time of crisis people tend to join their ethnic group; in times of crisis ethnicity has continued to play a major role);</li> <li>- Resurgence of ethnic relations between borders (money flows, reference to each other, people movements, arms flows);</li> <li>- External support of rebels (because of national interest, such as border security, religious/ethnic solidarity or economic interest);</li> <li>- Tit for tat strategies (interdependent rebel support, eg, Ugandan rebels receiving support from DRC/Sudan, as Museveni continues rebel support in these countries);</li> <li>- Changes in the power "balance" (eg, withdrawal of Angolan troops);</li> <li>- Splitting in international alliances (such as SADC: Mugabe versus Mandela); and</li> <li>- Rebel bases outside country borders.</li> </ul>
<b>STRATEGIC AND MILITARY INDICATORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Threats of attacks;</li> <li>- Low morale or disorganisation or receiving inadequate training in the government's army;</li> <li>- Soldiers and/ or rebels changing sides;</li> <li>- Hiring of mercenaries to guard commercial installations (eg, mines);</li> <li>- Distribution of arms to civilians;</li> <li>- Military training given to citizens;</li> <li>- Presence of foreign troops and/ or soldiers and/ or mercenaries;</li> <li>- Licit and/ or illicit arms transfers;</li> <li>- Ineffective arms embargoes (eg, lax customs and border control and/ or rent seeking opportunities);</li> <li>- Weapons stocks;</li> <li>- Laying of mines;</li> <li>- Coups ousting governments, forcing defeated armies to retreat to regions with ethnic support;</li> <li>- Rebels acquiring arms by raiding military posts, prisons, police stations;</li> <li>- Call in the media for population to defend their homes;</li> <li>- Expanding army recruitment (eg, among the youth);</li> <li>- Forceful conscription of people into the army;</li> <li>- Increase in numbers in rebel groups;</li> <li>- Increasing use of children (former child soldiers easily turn to activities of armed gangs);</li> <li>- Rebels lacking funds (ie, rebels fight over resources);</li> <li>- Popular support to rebel groups;</li> <li>- No side being strong enough to win a decisive military victory;</li> <li>- Use of international aid to fuel conflict; and</li> <li>- External military assistance enabling intensified military campaigns.</li> </ul>

<p><b>STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND MONOPOLY OF POWER</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Weak police and/ or state control, ie, insufficient security guarantee;</li> <li>- High crime rate;</li> <li>- Low border security;</li> <li>- Jurisdiction not in hands of the state;</li> <li>- No law enforcement capability of the state;</li> <li>- Rebels undertaking social and administrative tasks;</li> <li>- Impunity for crimes against humanity, especially genocide;</li> <li>- Individuals guilty of atrocities and criminal activities remaining in power (ie, weakening the state's legitimacy and authority);</li> <li>- Illegitimate government and subsequent regional revolts;</li> <li>- Army disloyal to the state (when a shift in power occurs, there is a problem of loyalty and unemployed soldiers);</li> <li>- Unconstitutional state and lack of common laws/ rules (anomie);</li> <li>- Unresolved border questions;</li> <li>- Incoherent government behaviour (eg., Kabila allowing political parties but dissolving government);</li> <li>- Poorly planned changes in Constitution and/ or the political system; and</li> <li>- Large numbers of prisoners.</li> </ul>
<p><b>FRAGMENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR OF MAIN ACTORS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Changing alliances of military actors;</li> <li>- Political splitting;</li> <li>- Political and personal rivalry (disputes among key personalities);</li> <li>- Party political exclusion of groups;</li> <li>- Public accusation of conspiracies;</li> <li>- Mutual mistrust;</li> <li>- Partisan army joining a coalition;</li> <li>- Loyalty of soldiers to persons (strong men) rather than to the state;</li> <li>- Divisions internally over power struggles/ leadership wrangles;</li> <li>- Lack of transparency in internal organisation of parties/ main actors' organisations;</li> <li>- Dissent within and about administration; and</li> <li>- Power struggles among charismatic leaders without institutionalised power sharing options.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ethnic and/ or national polarisation (at all levels: from families up to political parties);</li> <li>- Local traditional leaders and/ or media and/ or opinion-makers fuelling ethnic and/ or racial and/ or national discourse;</li> <li>- Minority groups promoting hatred;</li> <li>- Media used for national propaganda (eg, Kabila's ethnic hate campaign against the Tutsis)</li> <li>- Introduction of ethnic and/ or national symbols and/ or myths referring to past-oriented collective identity;</li> <li>- Increasing religious intolerance;</li> <li>- Clashes between two or more communities;</li> <li>- Government exploiting ethnic differences;</li> <li>- Leaders referring to non-democratic ideals and/ or authors, and/ or historical persons; and</li> <li>- Genocide as a slogan and/ or political weapon.</li> </ul>

<b>SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF CONFLICT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil versus military elite, with the option of a military solution (militarization of political conflicts);</li> <li>- Collectivisation of elite conflict;</li> <li>- Call to population in media to defend their homes;</li> <li>- Integration of new actors (ie, expansion of conflict);</li> <li>- Rebels using existing resistance structures (eg, ADF using the ethnic liberation movement);</li> <li>- Neighbouring conflicts enabling spread of arms and/ or refugees (often in collusion with rebels in the camps) and/ or ideologies (religion is often used as an ideology); and</li> <li>- Arresting people for "their own safety".</li> </ul>
<b>DISPLACED POPULATION/ REFUGEES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Indicator for already existing conflicts;</li> <li>- Indicator for forthcoming tensions (a. Among the refugees because of poverty, hunger, diseases; b. Between refugees and the local population); and</li> <li>- Rebels using camps to hide, recruit, train, raise funds (corruption), and/ or secure aid.</li> </ul>
<b>VIOLENCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mistreatment and/ or torture and/ or killing of non-combatants;</li> <li>- Battles;</li> <li>- Revenge and anticipated revenge (eg, ousted soldiers of a regime may retain their weapons, fearing revenge for their former atrocities);</li> <li>- Increasing violence in society (not only by military actors, but including criminals and others); and</li> <li>- Fear of increasing violence (increasing need for self defence).</li> </ul>
<b>EXCLUSION/ ETHNIC TENSION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exclusion of important actors in mediation forums;</li> <li>- Unequal power distribution among ethnic groups (eg, Tutsi overrepresentation in power structures);</li> <li>- Lack of charismatic leaders for the moderate majority (but charismatic leaders for extremists); and</li> <li>- Dissatisfaction and/ or grievance in population about unequal distribution.</li> </ul>
<b>ECONOMIC FACTORS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Questions around land resource and distribution;</li> <li>- Unclear property rights (eg, a problematic situation is arising in Rwanda as many men have been killed, but women lack property and inheritance rights);</li> <li>- Decline in foreign investments;</li> <li>- Foreign capital flows encourages rent-seeking;</li> <li>- Poverty after genocide creates new conflicts (between survivors, refugees, repatriated, prisoners);</li> <li>- Open and unresolved questions about heritage and/ or succession;</li> <li>- Disrupted agricultural activity;</li> <li>- Increase in food prices;</li> <li>- Contested mineral resources; and</li> <li>- Strong shadow economy.</li> </ul>

*Peace Indicators: Great Lakes*

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>STRATEGIC INDICATORS/ SECURITY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Withdrawal of foreign forces;</li> <li>- Peacekeeping forces;</li> <li>- Overwhelming strength of one party that leads the opposing group to withdraw or negotiate;</li> <li>- Climate of social peace and security over the whole territory;</li> <li>- UN arms embargo;</li> <li>- Laws and recommendations about disarmament; and</li> <li>- Reduction of external rebel support.</li> </ul>
<b>INCLUSIVE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Inclusive national debates and/ or Roundtables (communication between different actors, stakeholders);</li> <li>- Peace talks (eg, Arusha, Lusaka);</li> <li>- Inclusion of rebel groups in peace talks;</li> <li>- The emergence and strengthening of political parties not based on ethnicity or religion;</li> <li>- Democratic institutions (such as parties);</li> <li>- Integrated services for refugees and local population;</li> <li>- Media coverage of peace efforts;</li> <li>- Government response in setting up commissions to investigate religious clashes (impartiality);</li> <li>- Creation of ministries responsible for areas in conflict;</li> <li>- Amnesty to all rebels who surrender;</li> <li>- Emphasis on universal primary education;</li> <li>- Assurance of social peace and security over the whole territory;</li> <li>- Fighting against impunity (ie, justice and condemnation of the guilty); and</li> <li>- Implementation of reform programmes (army, police, justice, education, work, economy, administration).</li> </ul>
<b>STRONG CIVIL SOCIETY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preparation of reform programmes (army, police, justice, administration, etc.);</li> <li>- Population forcing the government to abandon the support of rebels in other countries;</li> <li>- Population not supporting military solutions; and</li> <li>- Reintegration of returning rebels (NGOs/ religious groups helping the local population to reintegrate returning combatants).</li> </ul>
<b>CO-OPERATION OF EXTERNAL ACTORS WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International attention;</li> <li>- Effective campaigns against human rights abuses;</li> <li>- NGOs promoting dialogue and/ or supporting ongoing negotiation process;</li> <li>- Removal of economic sanctions (while the threat of re-imposition remains);</li> <li>- Creation of human rights commissions; and</li> <li>- Foreign aid linked to progress in peacebuilding (G7 summit).</li> </ul>