


AN ANALYTIC STUDY

COMPARATIVE
POLITICS

A Developmental Approach

Gabriel A. Almond
Stanford University

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
Stanford University



Boston
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY

CHAPTER I

Introduction

(DURING THE LAST DECADE an intellectual revolution has been taking place in the study of comparative government.) While it is impossible at this time to foresee in detail how this field will be reconstituted, it is possible to point to the main directions of innovation,¹ and to the dissatisfactions and criticisms which contributed to these changes. These developments are not confined to the field of comparative government, nor are they peculiar to the discipline of political science. The study of

¹ See *inter al.* Roy C. Macridis and Richard Cox, "Research in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, September, 1953; Pendleton Herring, "On the Study of Government," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1953; George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1955; Gabriel A. Almond, Taylor Cole, and Roy C. Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1955; Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955); Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, August, 1956; Gunnar Heckscher, *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957); Sigmund Neumann, "Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal," *Journal of Politics*, August, 1957; Dankwart A. Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics*, July, 1957; David Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1958. For an excellent review of this polemic, see Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

foreign political systems has been greatly influenced by an earlier revolution in the study of American politics; and this in turn was the consequence of the penetration of American political studies by sociological, anthropological, and psychological methods and theories. Now the study of comparative politics holds out the promise of repaying its debt to those fields from which it has borrowed by providing a wider sample of man's experience with political institutions and processes, thus making its contribution to the common search for more adequate theories of politics.

Three themes dominated the criticism of the approach to comparative government characteristic of the period prior to World War II.² The first of these was concerned with its parochialism. As a coherent discipline, comparative government was largely confined to the European area — Britain (and the old Commonwealth), France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Studies of the political systems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were carried on by a small group of generally isolated individual scholars, or in the context of "area studies" rather than in the context of a general discipline of comparative government. Clearly the dominant core of the field consisted of the European "great powers," and whatever there was of general theorizing about forms of government and patterns of politics was based upon this small, though salient, sample of political systems.

Secondly, the dominant approach to the study of foreign governments was configurative. It was concerned with illuminating the peculiar characteristics of individual political systems. With the exceptions of Friedrich's *Constitutional Government and Democracy* and Finer's *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, there was little systematic comparative analysis.³ Even Friedrich's and Finer's works were confined to European political systems, and comparative analysis was often little more than the juxtaposition of specific institutional pat-

² For a summary of the critical point of view, see Macridis, *Comparative Government*, *op. cit.*

³ Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937); Herman J. Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1949).

terns, rather than a way of introducing controls in the investigation of relations and causal sequences among political and social phenomena.

The third criticism was directed at the formalism of the discipline. The focus tended to be on institutions (primarily governmental ones) and their legal norms, rules, and regulations, or on political ideas and ideologies, rather than on performance, interaction, and behavior. It is a striking indication of the lack of coherence and communication in the discipline of political science that this formalism in the study of comparative government could persist in the same decades during which the study of American politics was bursting with innovation and iconoclasm. But the flowering of American political science which began in the 1920's and produced in rapid succession the searching and experimental works of such men as Merriam, Lasswell, Herring, Schattschneider, and Odegard⁴ represented a response to stimuli and opportunities peculiar to the American setting. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of America, the challenges of great power status dramatized by participation in World War I, the shocks and dislocations of the depression, and the corresponding changes in the structure and process of the American political system, drew the energies of the growing cadre of American political scientists into self-study and self-appraisal. The absorbing themes of political science research during these decades were the pathologies and shortcomings of American democracy — the "boss" and the "inachine," pressure groups and the lobby, the power of and control over the media of mass communication, judicial conservatism, and problems of politico-administrative leadership in the era of big government.

⁴ Charles E. Merriam, "New Aspects of Politics," in Heinz Eulau *et al.* (eds.), *Political Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), pp. 24 ff.; Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), and his *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936); E. P. Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1929), and his *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936); Elmer Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937); Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928).

The growth of political science in America has had a discontinuous as well as an incremental aspect. During the period prior to World War II, the bewildering variety of interrelated issues and problems of rapid internal social and political change focused attention on the domestic scene, and drew the more adventurous spirits into methodological experimentation and studies in depth of the relations between social structure and process, personality formation, and political process and behavior. Intellectual innovations such as psychoanalytic theory and the politico-sociological theories of Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, Toennies, and others, found greater receptivity in some academic communities in America than they did in their countries of origin.

The study of foreign governments during these decades continued largely along formalistic lines. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there was some real intellectual deterioration in this field of study. For historically, comparative government and political theory had been closely connected. The theme of the qualities and attributes of the various forms of polity was a central concern of political theory from the Greeks on through the nineteenth century. But in the early decades of the twentieth century the two fields separated, with political theory becoming an essentially historical subject matter, and comparative or foreign government becoming a formal and descriptive study of the great powers of western Europe.

Paradoxically, this separation in American political science of political theory and comparative government on the one hand, and the burgeoning of American political studies on the other, may have been the consequence of the Enlightenment itself. This mother of modern science, and of the skeptical secular outlook in which it flourishes, had its faith in the inevitable triumph of reason, which was assumed to bring along with it free social and political institutions. The liberal and populist currents in America were the most optimistic products of the Enlightenment faith, and it was from these sources that the growing profession of political science in America in the first decades of the twentieth century drew

much of its inspiration. If democracy was to be the inevitable political form of the future, then the investigation and exposition of the nature of democracy and of its institutional and ethical properties could become the central theme of political science. Nondemocratic systems or unstable democratic systems could be examined in terms of their deviation from democratic ideological norms, or by comparison with the two historic versions of stable democracy — British parliamentarism and the American separation-of-powers system.

This optimistic faith in the inevitability of democracy, especially strong in America, dampened curiosity and interest in nondemocratic forms of politics. They had a purely temporary or exotic significance. This view continued in the period between the two wars, when even communism and fascism were viewed as temporary disorders or political pathologies; teaching in the field of comparative government was carried on under the rubric of "Democracy and Dictatorship," with dictatorship representing error and political pathology, and democracy representing truth and political health.

This naive conception of democratic progress, and the intellectual structure of the discipline of comparative government which it had produced and supported, became untenable in the period after World War II. Three developments were primarily responsible:

1. the national explosion in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; the emergence into statehood of a multitude of nations with a bewildering variety of cultures, social institutions, and political characteristics;
2. the loss of dominance of the nations of the Atlantic Community; the diffusion of international power and influence into the former colonial and semicolonial areas;
3. the emergence of communism as a powerful competitor in the struggle to shape the structure of national politics and of the international political system.

The new situation, with all its uncertainty and threat, its confusion of political forms, its bewildering instabilities, has created a mood of doubt, of skepticism, in place of the naive

optimism of the earlier political science tradition in America. Out of it has come a trend toward intellectual innovation, efforts to master the new complexities, and an attempt to create a new intellectual order. These efforts at innovation may be summarized under four headings: (1) the search for more comprehensive scope; (2) the search for realism; (3) the search for precision; and (4) the search for theoretical order.

(1) *The search for more comprehensive scope.* This is the effort to break out of (parochialism and ethnocentrism). In not much more than a decade the pattern of publication in the field of comparative government has changed. Studies of non-Western governments and political processes have appeared in larger numbers than those dealing with the European area. It may also be that these non-Western studies have more frequently broken new ground in a theoretical and methodological sense than have European studies.⁵ Furthermore, non-Western specialists no longer work in isolation from the discipline of political science and comparative government. The dominance in the political science profession by Americanists and Europeanists has given way to a more balanced representation of area specialists in the discipline. The modern non-Western-area specialist views himself as a political theorist carrying on research in his particular area on aspects of politics which have significance for the general theory of political systems. More recently the impulse toward sampling more completely the universe of man's experience with politics has led to the study of political systems of the past, based on available historical and ethnographic studies or on original historical research.⁶

⁵ See *inter al.* David Apter, *The Gold Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), and his *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Lucian W. Pyc, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁶ See, for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964).

(2) *The search for realism.* If by "the search for more comprehensive scope" we mean the escape from parochialism and ethnocentrism, then by "the search for realism" we refer to (the escape from formalism, and from the dominant concern with law, ideology, and governmental institutions, into an examination of all the structures and processes involved in politics and policy making.) There is now a growing library of studies of governmental processes, political parties, interest groups, electoral processes, political communication, and political socialization processes dealing with the European and non-Western areas.⁷ The attainment of depth and realism in the study of political systems enables us to locate the dynamic forces of politics wherever they may exist — in social class, in culture, in economic and social change, in the political elites, or in the international environment. The slogan under which this realistic-empirical tendency goes is "the behavioral approach." What it means, very simply, is the study of the actual behavior of the incumbents of political roles, rather than of the content of legal rules or ideological patterns. It does not mean a disregard of legal norms, ideologies, and formal institutions, but rather a concern with them insofar as they reflect or influence political action.

(3) *The search for precision.* This is a response in political studies to the general diffusion of the scientific and technological attitude in Western societies. This tendency has influenced psychology and economics for some time, and has already

⁷ Some of the recent monographic studies of interest groups in foreign countries are Henry Ehrmann (ed.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958); Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); S. E. Finer, *Anonymous Empire* (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1958); Allen Potter, *Organized Groups in British National Politics* (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1961); Henry W. Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Jean Meynaud, *Les Groupes de Pression en France* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1958); Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison (eds.), *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957); Rupert Breitling, *Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik* (Mieschenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1955); Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Weiner, *op. cit.*; James Payne, *Labor and Politics in Peru* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

penetrated sociology and anthropology. The search for precision has affected all the fields of political science and has produced studies of electoral trends based on voting statistics; studies of factors affecting voters' choices based on sample surveys; studies correlating quantitative social data and the characteristics of political systems; studies of political culture and socialization based on sample surveys, clinical case studies, and anthropological field observation; quantitative studies of political elite recruitment; quantitative content analyses of political communications; observational studies of experimental or natural small-group processes; quantitative studies of judicial decisions; and the development of mathematical models for the analysis of political processes. These methods have been, or soon will be, applied in American political studies wherever precise measurement and controlled observation are possible, and they are spreading into European and non-Western political studies.

(4) *The search for intellectual order.* The first three tendencies — the search for comprehensiveness, for realism, and for precision — have strained our theoretical frameworks and conceptual vocabularies beyond their capacity to codify and assimilate the new insights and findings of political science research. Concepts such as the state, the constitution, representation, and the rights and duties of citizens cannot effectively codify the activities of political parties, pressure groups, the media of mass communication, and child-rearing and educational practices. Theoretical experimentation, relying primarily on sociological, psychological, and anthropological concepts and frameworks, has become common; and new concepts such as political culture, political role, and political socialization have already acquired currency in the field. Among the chief influences in the development of theoretical experimentation have been the works of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Harold Lasswell.

What we have described are different aspects of a great ferment within the study of politics. It is premature to try to anticipate the structure of the discipline ten years from now, but one point should be stressed. These new developments have

implications not only for the subdiscipline of comparative politics, but for the discipline of political science as a whole. Carried through to their logical conclusions, these trends point in the direction of a unified theory of politics. Thus, the classic relationship between comparative government and political theory is in process of being re-established. The world community of national political systems is now being viewed as a political system in itself, and the same theoretical categories are being applied in studying it and in comparing it with national political systems. Furthermore, as the role of the international political system in shaping the structures and processes of domestic politics is becoming more widely appreciated, the artificial separation between comparative government and international politics is being removed.⁸ Similarly, there is now some systematic study of the effects of the characteristics of national political systems upon the functioning of the international political system. Finally, the structural subdisciplines of political science — the study of bureaucracies, legislatures, political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and the like — are becoming broadly comparative and, as a partial consequence, more theoretically sophisticated.

What we have described above are to be viewed as long-run trends and not as completed accomplishments. The most important work, both empirical and theoretical, is still to be done.

The publications program to which this book is an introduction represents a contribution in this broad stream of intellectual activity. It is a response, within the limits of available knowledge, to the challenges of comprehensiveness, realism, precision, and intellectual order. In its selection of countries to be included, it seeks to represent the variety of political systems which are of significance in the contemporary world and which will be helpful in studying and constructing theories of the political system. The approach to be followed in the country studies and stressed in the analytical series is realistic. That

⁸ James Rosenau, *Theories and Pre-Theories of International Politics*, unpublished manuscript, 1964; Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963).

is, we are concerned with the interrelationships between social structure and process, and political structure and process, and we will stress attitude and performance rather than ideology and norms. Wherever quantitative and precise information is available, we will use it; and where it is lacking, we will point to these significant research areas and qualify our inferences accordingly. Finally, this introductory volume spells out a conceptual framework which is employed in our country studies but which we hope will be elaborated and refined in our analytic series and eventually replaced.

The approach followed in this book has come to be called "the functional approach to comparative politics." It is only one among a number of innovative tendencies in the study of comparative politics. Its intellectual origins are of interest and deserve a brief treatment. This particular version of functionalism grows directly out of the classic tradition of political theory; in particular, out of that part which has been concerned with analyzing the political process, and with distinguishing the subprocesses or phases of political decision and action. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this concern led to the formulation of the theory of *separation of powers*, the doctrine that political action involved the distinguishable processes of legislation, administration, and adjudication. Those political systems which provided for specialized institutions to handle these particular functions, or powers, were said to be more likely to protect liberty, property, and justice. And those political systems which provided for the effective representation of the major social and economic strata within such separation-of-powers systems were more likely to be stable and libertarian.⁹

The political theory of the *Federalist Papers* is pre-eminently a functional theory. Among its central concerns are the nature of legislative, executive, and judicial power; the question of

⁹ See *inter alia* Aristotle, *Politics*, Rackham translation (London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1932), pp. 345 ff.; Charles de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Nugent translation (New York: The Colonial Press, 1899), Vol. I, pp. 151 ff.; John Locke, *Of Civil Government* (London: J. M. Dent, 1926), pp. 191 ff.; *The Federalist*, Beloff Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), Nos. 9 and 47-51, pp. 48 ff., 245 ff.

how best to maintain their separateness; the values resulting from such separation; and the problem of how best to mesh these separate institutions of government with the structure of society. The authors of the *Federalist Papers* were systems theorists as well for they dealt with the interaction and equilibrium of the other social systems with the political system, and with the interaction of the subsystems of the polity one with the other. That they were in some measure self-conscious systems theorists is reflected in the influence of Newtonian mechanics on their model of a stable libertarian polity: their primary concern was to provide for an equilibrated system of interaction among the three principal institutions of executive, legislature, and judiciary. To maintain this equilibrium they provided for a regulated system of "multifunctionality" (checks and balances), a mixture of functions which, by preventing the aggrandizement of any institution at the expense of the others, maintained the balance of power.

The tripartite approach to political function seemed to be an adequate theory for purposes of political analysis and institution building at a time when the politically active class was limited and socially homogeneous. However, much has happened since the eighteenth century. The development of universal suffrage, the emergence of mass political parties intended to mobilize the electorate, the rise of organized interest groups intended to express the interests of the component parts of a complex society and influence the course of political decision, and the development of the media of mass communication, have sensitized us to political functions which were not fully appreciated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, we argue in this book that we need to complicate the separation-of-powers model (legislation, administration, adjudication) by adding three other functions which enable us to compare and describe the distinctive processes which precede or impinge on the original three. We speak of these as *interest articulation*, *interest aggregation*, and *communication*, and refer to what is now a sixfold classification of functions as the *conversion processes* of the political system — the processes which transform the flow of demands and supports into the

political system into a flow of *extraction, regulation, distribution*, and the like, out of the political system into the society or international environment.¹⁰

In this study we go considerably beyond the systems theory of the *Federalist Papers* in other ways than simply in the number of functions. Our concept of "system" is more explicit. Here we have been influenced by recent sociological, anthropological, and communications theories which stress the concept of the social system. The advantages of thinking of politics as a system are elaborated in the chapters which follow. Here we need only say that much of the criticism of the applications of systems theory to politics has real merit. Those of us who have worked along these lines have been too much under the influence of mechanical and biological analogies, and surely this book does not escape from such analogistic thinking.¹¹

Among the principal criticisms of functional-systems theories are the arguments that they imply an equilibrium or harmony of parts and that they have a static or conservative bias. The conception of "political system" which we follow in this book is one of interdependence, but not one of harmony. Perhaps we might speak of it as *probabilistic* functionalism. In other

¹⁰ The approach followed in this book differs from the "systems" approach followed in David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), and Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), in that it grows directly out of separation-of-powers theory and the stream of empirical research critical of that theory; from this base it treats the functions of the political institutions which emerged after the broadening of the suffrage and industrialization—political parties, pressure groups, and the mass media. Both Easton and Deutsch—but particularly Deutsch—apply a communication, or cybernetic, model to politics. The approach followed here grows out of the tradition of political theory and reaches into sociological and communication theory for useful conceptual tools. The approaches in Easton and Deutsch grow out of sociological and communications theory and move toward the theory and data of politics. Both emphases have their uses and will no doubt converge in later theoretical work.

¹¹ See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, Chap. I, and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 241-271.

words, if trade unions develop in a political system, there is a high probability that political parties, the electoral process, the legislature, and bureaucracy will be affected by these trade unions. The system of interaction which ensues may be anything but harmonic and stable, but it *will be* interdependent. And it is the task of political science research to ascertain how change in any one of the parts of a political system affects other parts and the whole.

The second criticism—that of the static and conservative implications of systems theory—has greater cogency and has produced substantial modification in our approach to the political system and its functions. Our earlier formulation¹² was suitable mainly for the analysis of political systems in a given cross section of time. It did not permit us to explore developmental patterns, to explain how political systems change and why they change. This static cross-sectional bias of the earlier formulations of the functional approach and, indeed, of much of the grand tradition of political theory and of contemporary political science research, raises some intriguing questions.

Political science as an empirical discipline has tended to concern itself with the problems of power and process, with the *who* and *how* of politics—*who* makes decisions and how they are made. The *what* of politics, the content and direction of public policy, has generally been treated in terms of what political systems ought and ought not to do, or has been inferred from structure and process. Nowhere is this approach to the outputs of the political system, or the identification of output with structure and process, more clearly formulated than in Aristotle's *Politics*, where the *what* of public policy is inferred from the number, the identity, and the virtue of the political rulers—whether they be one, few, or many; and whether they are concerned with the collective interest of the polity or with their own self-interest.

We need to take a major analytical step if we are to build political development more explicitly into our approach to the study of political systems. We need to look at political systems

¹² See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

as whole entities shaping and being shaped by their environments. For example, the development of a specialized bureaucracy and a professional army in a political system may be the consequence of the interaction of one political system with other nations in its environment. The rulers of the first nation may develop expansive ambitions, or they may be forced into developing its military capabilities by threats or actual invasions from its environment. Or the rulers of a political system may respond to changes which are initiated within their own societies: the growth of commerce, the accumulation of wealth, or famine or similar disasters. Such internal developments may increase the pressure on the political system, forcing it to develop if it is to survive. Unless our conception of the political system enables us to deal with the interaction of the political system with its domestic and international environments, we cannot come to grips with the processes of political development.

What we do in this book is to consider the activities, or *functions*, of political systems from three points of view. The first of these we have already referred to — the (conversion functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication.) The second consideration is (the operation of the political system as an "individual" in its environments. We refer to this aspect of the functioning of a political system as its *capabilities*.) Finally, we will need to consider the way in which (political systems maintain or adapt themselves to pressures for change over the long run. We speak here of *system maintenance and adaptation functions* — *political recruitment* and *political socialization*.)

The various terms and concepts which we have briefly introduced above are dealt with in detail in the chapters which follow. In Chapter II we provide an overview of our theoretical framework. In Chapter III we discuss the system maintenance and adaptation functions of political recruitment and socialization. Chapters IV through VII deal in some detail with the conversion functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule appli-

cation, and rule adjudication. Chapter VIII considers the interaction of political systems with their environments — their capabilities. In Chapters IX and X we use this theoretical framework in presenting a developmental classification of political systems, giving examples of some of the principal varieties. And in Chapter XI we conclude with some thoughts on the question of *levels of political development*, and the problem of *investment in political growth*.

CHAPTER II

An Overview

IT MAY BE USEFUL at the outset to introduce the principal concepts and terms we use in this book. They will be elaborated and illustrated in later chapters. But here they are presented in compact form and in a logical order so that they may serve as a guide to what follows, as a way of relating the various chapters one to the other. The principal concept that we use is that of "system."

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The term "political system" has become increasingly common in the titles of texts and monographs in the field of comparative politics. The older texts used such terms as "government," "nation," or "state" to describe what we call a political system. Something more is involved here than ^{apresent}mere style of nomenclature. This new terminology reflects a new way of looking at political phenomena. It includes some new names for old things, and some new terms to refer to activities and processes which were not formerly recognized as being parts or aspects of politics.

The older terms—state, government, nation—are limited by legal and institutional meanings. They direct attention to a particular set of institutions usually found in modern Western societies. If one accepts the idea that the study of such

institutions is the proper and sole concern of political science, many problems are thereby avoided, including the thorny question of limiting the subject matter of the discipline. However, the costs of such a decision are very high. The role played by formal governmental institutions such as legislatures and courts in different societies varies greatly; in many societies, particularly in those outside the Western world, their role may not be so important as that of other institutions and processes. In all societies the role of formal governmental institutions is shaped and limited by informal groups, political attitudes, and a multitude of interpersonal relationships. If political science is to be effective in dealing with political phenomena in all kinds of societies, regardless of culture, degree of modernization, and size, we need a more comprehensive framework of analysis.

The concept of "political system" has acquired wide currency because it directs attention to the entire scope of political activities within a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be located. What is the political system? How do we define its boundaries? What gives the political system its special identity? Many political scientists have dealt with these questions; while the precise language of their definitions varies considerably, there is some consensus. Common to most of these definitions is the association of the political system with the use of legitimate physical coercion in societies. Easton speaks of ^{authoritative} *authoritative allocation of values*; Lasswell and Kaplan, of *severe deprivations*; Dahl, of *power, rule, and authority*.¹ All these definitions imply legitimate, heavy sanctions; the rightful power to punish, to enforce, to compel. We agree with Max Weber² that legitimate force is the thread that runs through the action of the political system, giving it

¹ David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 130 ff., and his *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 50 ff.; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 5 ff.

² See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in his *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-78.

its special quality and importance, and its coherence as a system. The political authorities, and only they, have some generally accepted right to utilize coercion and command obedience based upon it. (Force is "legitimate" where this belief in the justifiable nature of its use exists.) The inputs which enter the political system are all in some way related to legitimate physical compulsion, whether these are demands for war or for recreational facilities. The outputs of the political system are also all in some way related to legitimate physical compulsion, however remote the relationship may be. Thus, public recreation facilities are usually supported by taxation, and any violation of the regulations governing their use is a legal offense. When we speak of the political system, we include all the interactions which affect the use or threat of use of legitimate physical coercion. The political system includes not only governmental institutions such as legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, but *all structures in their political aspects*. Among these are traditional structures such as kinship ties and caste groupings; and anomic phenomena such as assassinations, riots, and demonstrations; as well as formal organizations like parties, interest groups, and media of communication.

We are not, then, saying that the political system is concerned solely with force, violence, or compulsion; rather, that its relation to coercion is its distinctive quality. Political elites are usually concerned with goals such as national expansion or security, social welfare, the aggrandizement of their power over other groups, increased popular participation in politics, and the like; but their concern with these values as politicians is related to compulsory actions such as law making and law enforcement, foreign and defense policy, and taxation. The political system is not the only system that makes rules and enforces them, but its rules and enforcements go all the way to compelling obedience or performance.

There are societies in which the accepted power to use physical compulsion is widely diffused, shared by family, by clan, by religious bodies, or other kinds of groups, or taken up privately, as in the feud or the duel. But we consider even

these as political systems of a particular kind, and still comparable with those polities in which there is something approaching a monopoly of legitimate physical coercion.

If what we have said above defines the "political" half of our concept, what do we mean by "system"? A system implies the interdependence of parts, and a boundary of some kind between it and its environment. By "interdependence" we mean that when the properties of one component in a system change, all the other components and the system as a whole are affected. Thus, if the rings of an automobile erode, the car "burns oil"; the functioning of other aspects of the system deteriorates, and the power of the car declines. Or, as another example, there are points in the growth of organisms when some change in the endocrine system affects the over-all pattern of growth, the functioning of all the parts, and the general behavior of the organism. In political systems the emergence of mass parties, or of media of mass communication, changes the performance of all the other structures of the system and affects the general capabilities of the system in its domestic and foreign environments. In other words, when one variable in a system changes in magnitude or in quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed; the system changes its pattern of performance, or the unruly component is disciplined by regulatory mechanisms.

A second aspect of the concept of "system" is the notion of boundary. A system starts somewhere and stops somewhere. In considering an organism or an automobile, it is relatively easy to locate its boundary and to specify the interactions between it and its environment. The gas goes into the tank, the motor converts it into revolutions of the crankshaft and the driving wheels, and the car moves on the highway. In dealing with social systems, of which political systems are a class, the problem of boundary is not that easy. Social systems are made up not of individuals, but of roles. A family, for example, consists of the roles of mother and father, husband and wife, sibling and sibling. The family is only one set of interacting roles for its members, who also may have roles outside the family in schools, business firms, and churches. In the same sense a

political system is made up of the interacting roles of nationals, subjects, voters, as the case may be, with legislators, bureaucrats, and judges. The same individuals who perform roles in the political system perform roles in other social systems such as the economy, the religious community, the family, and voluntary associations. As individuals expose themselves to political communication, form interest groups, vote, or pay taxes, they shift from nonpolitical to political roles. One might say that on election day as citizens leave their farms, plants, and offices to go to the polling places, they are crossing the boundary from the economy to the polity.

Another example of a shift in the boundary of the political system might occur when inflation reduces the real income of certain groups in the population. When such a change in the economic situation of particular groups gets converted into demands for public policy or for changes in political personnel, there is an interaction between the economy and the polity. Certain psychic states resulting from changes in the economic situation are converted into demands on the political system. Demands are made on trade-union or other pressure-group leaders to lobby for particular actions by the legislature or by executive agencies. Somewhere in this process a boundary is crossed from one system to another — from the economic system to the political system.

The boundaries of political systems are subject to relatively large fluctuations. During wartime the boundaries become greatly extended as large numbers of men are recruited into military service, as business firms are subjected to regulations, and as internal security measures are taken. In an election the boundaries again are greatly extended as voters become politicians for a day. With the return to more normal conditions, the boundaries of the political system contract.

The problem of boundaries takes on special significance because systems theory usually divides interaction processes into three phases — input, conversion, output. Any set of interacting parts — any system — which is affected by factors in its environment may be viewed in this fashion. The inputs and outputs, which involve the political system with other social

systems, are transactions between the system and its environment; the conversion processes are internal to the political system. When we talk about the sources of inputs, their number, content, and intensity, and how they enter the political system, and of the number and content of outputs and how they leave the political system and affect other social systems, we shall in effect be talking about the boundaries of the political system.

STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

The terms "structure" and "culture" are also of central importance in our analytical scheme. By "structure" we mean the observable activities which make up the political system. To refer to these activities as having a structure simply implies that there is a certain regularity to them. Thus, in a court one can speak of the interactions between the judge, the jury, the prosecuting and defense attorneys, witnesses, the defendant, and the plaintiff. This example should make clear that when we speak of political activity, we are not referring to the total activities of the individual who may be involved in it, but just to that part of his activities which is involved in the political process. Judges, lawyers, witnesses, defendants, and plaintiffs are all men who have a variety of other spheres of activity. That particular part of the activity of individuals which is involved in political processes we refer to as the role. The units which make up all social systems, including political systems, are roles. The individual members of a society usually perform roles in a variety of social systems other than the political system — for example, in families, business firms, churches, social clubs.

One of the basic units of political systems, then, is the political role. We refer to particular sets of roles which are related to one another as structures. Thus, judgeship is a role; a court is a structure of roles. The reason we use the terms "role" and "structure" rather than "office" and "institution" is that we wish to emphasize the actual behavior of the individuals who are involved in politics, and the actual performance of the particular institution with which we may be concerned. Both

"office" and "institution" may refer to formal rules, such as those presumed to govern the behavior of judges and juries, or to some ideal mode of behavior toward which we might wish them to aspire. "Role" and "structure" refer to the observable behavior of individuals. Legal rules and ideal norms may affect that behavior, but they rarely describe it fully.

Beginning with the concept of role as one of the basic units of a political system, we may speak of a subsystem (for example, a legislative body) as consisting of related and interacting roles; and of the political system as a set of interacting subsystems (for example, legislatures, electorates, pressure groups, and courts).

We need to introduce two other concepts before we leave this discussion of role and structure. (If this book is to have a developmental emphasis, we have to deal with those processes which maintain or change political systems over time. The incumbents of political roles are superseded or die. ^{biological} New sets of political roles are established, and old ones may be abolished or may atrophy. Every political system is continually involved in recruiting individuals into political roles. We speak, then, of the *recruitment function*, which must be performed in all political systems if its roles are to be manned and if its structures are to function. A principal aspect of the development or transformation of the political system is what we call *role differentiation*, or *structural differentiation*.) By "differentiation" we refer to the processes whereby roles change and become more specialized or more autonomous or whereby new types of roles are established or new structures and subsystems emerge or are created. When we speak of role differentiation and structural differentiation, we refer not only to the development of new types of roles and the transformation of older ones; we refer also to changes which may take place in the relationship between roles, between structures, or between subsystems. Thus, for example, courts were established as separate structures long before they acquired independence or autonomy from the other structures of the political system. In speaking of the *developmental aspect* of role and structure then, we are interested not only in the emergence of new types of roles

or the atrophy of old ones, but also in the changing patterns of interaction among roles, structures, and subsystems.

There is another principal dimension which runs throughout this book, the concept of political culture. We all know that there is more to a man than what shows on the surface. In the same sense, there is more to a political system than may be clearly manifested over a given period of time. For example, Italy under Fascism appeared to be a quite formidable and powerful political system. It repressed opposition, held massive and impressive parades, and defeated the Ethiopians. But then it had great difficulty coping with the Greeks, and it began to collapse in Africa when whole army divisions retreated and surrendered without much of a fight. A simple observational study of Italian politics during this period would not have helped us predict the capacity of the Italian political system to carry out its policies. Had we known more of the mood and the attitude of the Italian population, more of the morale and the commitment of its soldiers, more of the resoluteness of its officers and of the capacity for policymaking of its political elites, we might have been able to predict the viability of this political system when confronted with unusual pressure and opposition.

(In studying any political system, therefore, we need to know its underlying propensities as well as its actual performance over a given period of time. We refer to these propensities, or this psychological dimension of the political system, as the *political culture*. It consists of attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills which are current in an entire population, as well as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population.) Thus, regional groups or ethnic groups or social classes which make up the population of a political system may have special propensities or tendencies. We refer to these special propensities located in particular groups as *subcultures*. Similarly, there may be traditions and attitudes current in the different roles, structures, and subsystems of the political system. Thus, French military officers or bureaucratic officials may have a special culture which differentiates them from French politicians, for example.

Thus, the analysis of the political system must consist not only of observation of the actual patterns of behavior and interaction over a period of time, but also of those subjective propensities located in the political system as a whole and in its various parts. As we learn about the *structure* and *culture* of a political system, our capacity to characterize its properties, and to predict and explain its performance, is improved.

We need also to speak of two concepts that are related to political culture. The propensities, attitudes, beliefs, and values to which we have referred are the consequence of *political socialization*. This is the process whereby political attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and as adults are recruited into roles. Finally, we need a concept to deal with the developmental aspect of political culture, a concept comparable to that of differentiation in the dimension of political structure. The term commonly used here is *secularization*. Secularization is the process whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action. We may illustrate this concept by comparing a political leader in a modern democracy with a political leader in a traditional or primitive African political system. A modern democratic political leader when running for office, for instance, will gather substantial amounts of information about the constituency which he hopes will elect him and the issues of public policy with which that constituency may be concerned. He has to make estimates of the distribution and intensity of demands of one kind or another; he needs to use creative imagination in order to identify a possible combination of demands which may lead to his receiving a majority of the votes in his constituency. A village chief in a tribal society operates largely with a given set of goals and a given set of means of attaining those goals which have grown up and been hallowed by custom. The secularization of culture is the processes whereby traditional orientations and attitudes give way to more dynamic decision-making processes involving the gathering of information, the evaluation of information, the laying out of alternative courses of action, the selection of a course of action from among these possible courses, and the

means whereby one tests whether or not a given course of action is producing the consequences which were intended.) (When we use the developmental concepts "structural differentiation" and "cultural secularization," we do not imply that there is any inevitable trend in these directions in the development of political systems.³ If we examine the histories of political systems, it becomes quite clear that regressions, or reversals, occur commonly in the development of political systems. Thus, the Roman Empire reached a very high level of structural differentiation and cultural secularization, and then fell apart into a large number of less differentiated and less secularized political systems. Whatever the direction may be in a given period of time and in a given political system, we may still speak of development in terms of the degree of differentiation and secularization.

INPUTS AND OUTPUTS

We have described the political system as consisting of interacting roles, structures, and subsystems, and of underlying psychological propensities which affect these interactions. Such a process may be viewed as consisting of inputs from the environment or from within the political system itself, the conversion of these inputs within the system, and the production of outputs into the environment. Outputs may produce changes in the environment, which in turn may affect the political system (feedback).

David Easton, the first political scientist to analyze politics in explicit system terms, distinguishes two types of inputs into the political system: *demands* and *supports*.⁴ Demands may be subclassified in many ways. The following classification illustrates the range and the variety of demands made upon the political system: (1) demands for allocations of goods and services, such as demands for wage and hour laws, educational op-

³ See S. P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, April, 1965.

⁴ David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, April, 1957, pp. 383-408. For a full elaboration of Easton's approach, see his *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965).

portunities, recreational facilities, roads, and transportation; (2) demands for the regulation of behavior, such as provisions for public safety, controls over markets, and rules pertaining to marriage, health, and sanitation; (3) demands for participation in the political system — for the right to vote, to hold office, to petition government bodies and officials, and to organize political associations; (4) demands for communication and information, such as demands for the affirmation of norms, the communication of policy intent from policy elites, or the display of majesty and power of the political system in periods of threat or on ceremonial occasions. A political system may face these sorts of demands in many combinations, forms, and degrees of intensity.

A second type of input is supports.

Inputs of demands are not enough to keep a political system operating. They are only the raw material out of which finished products called decisions are manufactured. Energy in the form of actions or orientations promoting and resisting a political system, the demands arising in it, and the decisions issuing from it must also be put into the system to keep it running.⁵

Examples of support classifications are: (1) material supports, such as the payment of taxes or other levies, and the provision of services such as labor on public works or military service; (2) obedience to law and regulations; (3) participatory supports, such as voting, political discussion, and other forms of political activity; (4) attention paid to governmental communication, and the manifestation of deference or respect to public authority, symbols, and ceremonials. If the political system and the elites acting in its roles are to process demands effectively, supports must be received from other social systems and from individuals acting in the political system. Generally speaking, demands affect the policies or goals of the system, while supports such as goods and services, obedience, and deference, provide the resources which enable a political system to extract, regulate, and distribute — in other words, to carry out its goals.

We do not wish to leave the impression, of course, that in-

⁵ Easton, *World Politics, op. cit.*, p. 390.

puts necessarily come only from the society of which the political system is a part. It is typical of political systems that inputs are generated internally by political elites — kings, presidents, ministers, legislators, and judges. Similarly, inputs may come from the international system in the form of threats, invasions, controls, and assistance from foreign political systems. The flow of inputs and outputs includes transactions between the political system and the components of its domestic and foreign environments, and inputs may come from any one of these three sources — the domestic society, the political elites, and the international environment.

On the output side of the process we may speak of four classes of transactions initiated by the political system. These usually correspond closely to the supports we have listed; they may or may not be responsive to demands, depending on the kind of political system which is involved. These are: (1) extractions, which may take the form of tribute, booty, taxes, or personal services; (2) regulations of behavior, which may take a variety of forms and affect the whole gamut of human behavior and relations; (3) allocations or distribution of goods and services, opportunities, honors, statuses, and the like; (4) symbolic outputs, including affirmations of values, displays of political symbols, statements of policies and intents.

THE FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

This discussion of flows of inputs and outputs leads logically to a consideration of the *functions* of political systems. We have already suggested that *functionalism* is an old theme in political theory. In its modern form, the stress on functionalism is derived from anthropological and sociological theory. The chief social theorists associated with functionalism are the anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown and the sociologists Parsons, Merton, and Marion Levy.⁶ Although these

⁶ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954); A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957); Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959) and *The Social Sys-*

men differ substantially in their concepts of system and function, essentially they have said that the ability to explain and predict in the social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as performing functions in systems. By comparing the performance of structures and the regulatory role of political culture as they fulfill common functions in all systems, we may analyze systems which appear very different from one another.

The functioning of any system may be viewed on different levels. One level of functioning is the system's *capabilities*, that is, the way it performs as a unit in its environment. Animals move while plants do not. Some machines process data; others produce power. An economy produces and distributes physical goods and services. Families produce children and socialize them into adult roles and disciplines. At this level we are focusing on the behavior of the system as a unit in its relations to other social systems and to the environment.

When we speak of the capabilities of a political system, we are looking for an orderly way to describe its over-all performance in its environment. The categories of capability which we use grow directly out of our analysis of types of inputs and outputs. Some political systems are primarily *regulative* and *extractive* in character. Totalitarian systems suppress demands coming from their societies and are unresponsive to demands coming from the international environment. At the same time, they regulate and coerce behavior in their societies, and seek to draw maximum resources from their populations. Communist totalitarianism differs from fascist totalitarianism in having a strong *distributive* capability as well. This means that the political system itself actively shifts resources from some groups in the population to other groups. In democracies outputs of regulation, extraction, and distribution are more affected by inputs of demands from groups in the society. Thus we may

tem (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951); Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957); Marion Levy, *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).

speak of democracies as having a higher *responsive* capability. These concepts of *regulative*, *extractive*, *distributive*, and *responsive* capability are simply ways of talking about the flows of activity into and out of the political system. They tell us how a system is performing in its environment, how it is shaping this environment, and how it is being shaped by it.

The second level of functioning is internal to the system. Here we refer to *conversion processes*. Physiological examples would be the digestion of foods, the elimination of waste, the circulation of the blood, and the transmission of impulses through the nervous system. The conversion processes, or functions, are the ways systems transform inputs into outputs. In the political system this involves the ways in which demands and supports are transformed into authoritative decisions and are implemented. Obviously the capabilities and the conversion processes of a system are related. In order for an animal to be able to move, hunt, and dig, energy must be created in the organism, and the use of the energy must be controlled and directed.

The conversion processes of one political system may be analyzed and compared with those of other systems according to a sixfold functional scheme. We need to look at the ways in which (1) demands are formulated (interest articulation); (2) demands are combined in the form of alternative courses of action (interest aggregation); (3) authoritative rules are formulated (rule making); (4) these rules are applied and enforced (rule application); (5) these applications of rules are adjudicated in individual cases (rule adjudication); and (6) these various activities are communicated both within the political system, and between the political system and its environment (communication).

Finally, we shall speak of *system maintenance and adaptation functions*. For an automobile to perform efficiently on the road, parts must be lubricated, repaired, and replaced. New parts may perform stiffly; they must be broken in. In a political system the incumbents of the various roles (diplomats, military officers, tax officials) must be recruited to these roles and learn how to perform in them. New roles are created and new

personnel "broken in." These functions (in machines, maintenance and replacement of parts; in political systems, *socialization* and *recruitment* of people) were discussed earlier in this chapter. They do not directly enter into the conversion processes of the system, but they affect the internal efficiency and propensities of the system, and hence condition its performance.

THE COMPARISON OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

When we compare classes of political systems with one another, or individual political systems with one another, we need to compare *capabilities*, *conversion functions*, and *system maintenance and adaptation functions*, and the interrelations among these three kinds, or levels, of functions. When we talk about political development, it will also be in these same terms. A change in capability will be associated with changes in the performance of the conversion functions, and these changes in turn will be related to changes in political socialization and recruitment.

While the individual categories of functions which we use may turn out to be inappropriate when fully tested in empirical cases, this threefold classification of functions is important for political analysis; we believe it will hold up under testing and examination. The theory of the political system will consist of the discovery of the relations between these different levels of functioning — capabilities, conversion functions, and system-maintenance and adaptation functions — and of the relation of the functions at each level.

In our series of country studies we deal with a wide variety of political systems. If we extend our perspective to include the whole of man's experience with politics, we are overwhelmed by the variety of forms, the differences in size and structural pattern, and in kinds of public policy and performance. It may be useful to suggest several common dimensions and characteristics so that we can begin to think about how we can compare, classify, and characterize these systems.

The first common characteristic can be stated concisely: All

political systems can be compared in terms of the relationship between functions and structures. That is, in a particular political system at a particular interval of time, there is a given probability that function *A* will be performed by structure *X* (e.g., that political demands will be made by associational interest groups). This proposition assumes that all the political functions can, *in some sense*, be found in all political systems, and that all political systems, including the simplest ones, have political structure.

(There is no such thing as a society which maintains internal and external order without a political structure of some kind. In very simple political systems the interactions, or the structures, may be occasional or intermittent. They may not be clearly visible, but to say there are no structures would be to argue that the performance of the political functions is random. We may find that in some systems one or a very few structures perform all political functions. The leader of a primitive band may occupy such a dominant position. At the other extreme, in a highly differentiated system, such as that of the United States, political functions may be performed by a very large number of highly specialized structures: communication is dominated by the mass media; political recruitment, by the electoral and party structures; interest articulation, by a large variety of interest groups. (However, the great differences between the United States and the primitive band merely represent extreme cases of the range of differentiation of structures. Both systems possess political structures performing political functions, and may be compared in such terms.)

Any particular structure may perform more than one function. Just as we must be aware of the presence of political structures in relatively undifferentiated societies, we must also be cautious about assuming that a structure will perform only those functions which the formal rules lead us to expect. Political structures, in short, tend to be *multifunctional*, although the degrees of multifunctionality depends on many factors.

A simple example of multifunctionality can help to illustrate the problem. Typically, public schools are viewed in relation

to the political system in terms of their effect on the formation of attitudes and the development of skills among the young. This is, unquestionably, a major impact which the educational structures may have upon the political system. However, schools also affect the recruitment of political elites by expanding or limiting the society's reservoir of skilled manpower. Schools give rise to informal, inter-elite communication patterns through the formation of "old school ties," and play a key role in communications processes in general, especially in nations with no powerful and independent mass media. Finally, they play important "input" roles in the political system by giving rise to special communities of interest and laying the basis for interest-group organization. Teachers' unions are an example. Student riots, which have played such an important role in such countries as Turkey, Indonesia, and Korea, illustrate the impact of another school or university-based group.

One can infer from this example that in a nation with relatively few formal and differentiated structures, such organized structures as do appear are likely to be quite multifunctional. While multifunctionality is more obvious in simple, less differentiated societies, it is a universal phenomenon, and is a characteristic of modern bureaucracies and courts as well as of kingships and chieftainships in primitive and traditional societies.

In the discussion of cultural patterns, too sharp a line is often drawn between societies characterized by traditional cultures and those characterized by modern cultures. The modern societies have been presented as secular and rational. Their cultures have been represented as embodying attitude patterns which treat individuals in universalistic fashion, according to their formal and relevant roles rather than according to personal relationships and attributes. The bureaucrat looks with equal favor upon all applicants for services; he does not favor his brother or his cousin. Traditional societies, on the other hand, have been viewed in terms of ascription of particular statuses, and diffuse and particularistic relationships. That is, individuals attain position according to criteria other than their merit (such as status of parents), and personal relation-

ships and informal communication patterns permeate the political process.

However, modern social science research has demonstrated the continuing significance of primary groups (*e.g.*, families, peer groups) and informal organizations in the social processes of Western societies. The first attitude-survey studies of voting provide a classic example.⁷ The researchers expected to find that political voting attitudes in modern America were shaped by the modern media of mass communication and by the opinions of those with expertise in relevant areas. Such would be the expected rational pattern. But these studies showed how exaggerated and oversimplified our conception of modern political culture was. We now know that face-to-face communication channels have a continuing vital role in opinion formation, in spite of the presence of the mass media. The typical opinion leader, moreover, is not an expert in a relevant field, but a trusted individual whose political influence is often a diffuse consequence of other roles. (For example, the opinion of a wealthy member of the leading social circle is likely to have great weight with individuals in certain strata, quite apart from any qualifications of special knowledge or even proven judgment.)

Thus, while one cannot question the fact that important differences do exist in the cultural characteristics of traditional and modern systems, any analysis of modern political systems must take account of the continuing importance of the informal and traditional relationships which shape the attitudes and actions of individuals. Therefore, our second major characteristic is: All political systems have mixed political cultures. The most primitive societies have threads of instrumental rationality in their structure and culture. The most modern are permeated by ascriptive, particularistic, and informal relationships and attitudes. They differ in the relative dominance of one against the other and in the pattern of mixture of these components. Secularization is a matter of degree and of the distribution of these "rational" aspects.

⁷ See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1944).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The events which lead to political development come from the international environment, from the domestic society, or from political elites within the political system itself. A political system may be threatened by a rival nation, or be invaded by it. In confronting this challenge it may find that it needs more resources and more effective ways of organizing and deploying its resources — a standing army, for example, or an officialdom to collect taxes. It may have to adapt itself structurally, that is, develop new roles, if it is to survive. If the international threat continues over a long period of time, it may have to adapt itself culturally, inculcating attitudes of militance and acquiring the skills and values associated with warfare.

The challenge may come from internal change in the society of which the political system is a part. Thriving commerce and manufactures may create a middle class which demands that it be heard in the making and implementation of public policy. The political elites themselves may confront the political system with a challenge as they seek to increase the resources available to them for the purpose of constructing impressive buildings or monuments, or for creating a military force capable of conquering neighboring political systems.

(The impulses for political development consequently involve some significant change in the magnitude and content of the flow of inputs into the political system. *Development* results when the existing structure and culture of the political system is unable to cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization. It should also be pointed out that a decline in the magnitude or a significant change in the content of the flow of inputs may result in "development" in the negative or regressive sense. The capabilities of the political system may decline or be overloaded; roles and structures may atrophy, the culture may regress to a more traditional pattern of orientation. History is full of cases of the decline of empires and their breakup into less differentiated and less secularized com

ponents.⁸ Transitional and developed societies also may exhibit the collapse of differentiated modern structures and the dominance of irrational appeals and attitudes when the strains become too great.

(We need some way of talking about these challenges which may lead to political development, these changes in the magnitude and content of the flow of inputs which put the existing culture and structure under strain. As a beginning we may suggest four types of problems or challenges to a political system. The first of these is the problem of penetration and integration; we refer to this as the problem of *state building*. The second type of system-development problem is that of loyalty and commitment, which we refer to as *nation building*. The third problem is that of *participation*, the pressure from groups in the society for having a part in the decision making of the system. And the fourth is the problem of *distribution*, or welfare, the pressure from the domestic society to employ the coercive power of the political system to redistribute income, wealth, opportunity, and honor.)

The problem of state building may arise out of a threat to the survival of the political system from the international environment. It may also arise out of a threat to the political system from the society in the form of revolutionary pressure challenging the stability or the survival of the political system. Or, it may result from the development among the political elite of new goals, such as national expansion or the creation of an extravagant court life. State building occurs when the political elite creates new structures and organizations designed to "penetrate" the society in order to regulate behavior in it and draw a larger volume of resources from it. State building is commonly associated with significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political system, with the development of a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy related to the increase in these capabilities, and with the development of attitudes of obedience and compliance in the popu-

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, April, 1965; S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

lation which are associated with the emergence of such a bureaucracy.

While it is an oversimplification to put it this way, we might view the problem of state building and its successful confrontation by a political system as essentially a structural problem. That is to say, what is involved is primarily a matter of the differentiation of new roles, structures, and subsystems which penetrate the countryside. Nation building, on the other hand, emphasizes the cultural aspects of political development. It refers to the process whereby people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, or petty principalities to the larger central political system. While these two processes of state and nation building are related, it is important to view them separately. There are many cases in which centralized and penetrative bureaucracies have been created, while a homogeneous pattern of loyalty and commitment to the central political institutions has never emerged. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and even modern Italy represent cases in point. In fact, there are examples, particularly among the great empires such as Imperial Rome, in which the elite never sought to create a common national culture of loyalty and commitment, but were content to develop a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy, while at the same time permitting culturally distinct component units to survive and retain some autonomy.

The problem, or challenge, of participation commonly has to do with rapid increases in the volume and intensity of demands for a share in the decision making of the political system by various groups and strata in the domestic society. Such increases in demands for participation are usually associated with, or have the consequence of producing, some form of political infrastructure — political groups, cliques, and factions, and representative legislative assemblies. Demands for participation may also challenge a political system to develop political competence and the attitudes associated with it among groups in the society, and responsive attitudes and bargaining skills among the elite.

Finally, the problem of distribution, or welfare, occurs when

there is a rapid increase in the volume and intensity of demands that the political system control or affect the distribution of resources or values (for example, opportunity) among different elements of the population. A positive response to such a challenge by the political elite may produce fundamental changes in bureaucratic organization, and in the political attitudes of both the political elite and the general population.

(We have listed these problems of system development in the sequence in which they have occurred in the emergence of the political systems of Western Europe. By and large, state and nation building occurred before the nations of Western Europe had to confront the problems of participation and welfare. But our purpose is to develop an analytical scheme which will enable us to explain the characteristics of any political system. In our efforts to account for the peculiar patterns of performance of political systems, we must examine the ways in which they have encountered these system-development problems in the past or are encountering them in the present.) Relating system challenges to system responses is the way to explanation and prediction in the field of political development. In the broader sense, it opens up for us the whole of man's history of experimentation and innovation in politics as a source for the creation of a useful theory of political change. If we can relate the structural and cultural characteristics of political systems to the ways in which they have confronted and coped with these common system-development problems, we have taken the first steps in the direction of a theory of political growth which, for example, can help us explain why French and British politics differ in particular ways. Such a theory may also be helpful to people who are concerned with the question of how to influence political development — our own governmental officials and the elites of the new nations.

We will discuss these questions in detail at various points in later chapters. Here we need only stress a number of general points. First, the way in which a political system responds to the four types of challenges, or problems, has to be described

in terms of the three functional levels to which we have already referred. Thus, the confrontation of a system-development problem may be related to the changing patterns of political-system capabilities — *i.e.*, growth or decline in *regulative, extractive, distributive, symbolic, and responsive* capabilities. The manner in which a system responds to these problems must also be described in terms of the consequences for the performance of the conversion functions of the political system. Thus, when we say that Britain was confronted with the challenge of participation in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we must describe her response to this challenge in terms of what happened to the conversion functions and to interest groups, political parties, media of communication, Parliament, and Cabinet which performed these conversion functions. Finally, the response of the political system to a challenge must also be described in terms of the system-adaptation processes of role differentiation and secularization.

If a political system centralizes and nationalizes — in other words, if it successfully confronts the challenges of state and nation building — how is this reflected in the development of new political roles and structures and in its recruitment processes to these roles and structures; and how does it create the attitudes and propensities appropriate to the new pattern of operations of the political system? As we examine the interaction between challenges to the system and the cultural and structural and performance responses to these challenges, we may begin to develop a theory which will tell us how a particular pattern of challenge-and-response at a certain stage in the development of a political system affects and conditions the future capacity of that system to respond to other challenges and problems. A good illustration of this is the experience of Prussia and Germany with the problem of state building. The degree of bureaucratization, centralization, and militarization which entered into the response of the Prussian elite in the eighteenth century is said to have created a cultural and structural pattern which prevented the German political system from responding effectively in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to demands for increased participation. In general

this kind of analysis will direct our attention to the question of how the solution to one problem affects the capacity of the system to solve other problems of development.

There are at least five major factors which must be considered in the analysis of political development. First, there is no doubt that the stability of a system is heavily dependent upon the types of problems it faces. Much of the stability and success of the gradual development of the political systems of the United States and of Great Britain may be attributed to their relative isolation during long periods of their formative history. In comparing the British experience with the Italian and German, one can hardly avoid noting how in the latter cases the systems were subjected to many diverse and intense pressures simultaneously. Demands for unification, participation, and welfare appeared suddenly. The effect was cumulative and reinforcing. It is generally recognized that a major problem in the new nations today is the cumulative revolutions they must face. People demand participation, national unity, economic betterment, law and order — simultaneously and immediately.

A second factor is the resources the system can draw upon under various circumstances. Support as well as demand can fluctuate, and may descend to critical levels. For example, the French Fourth Republic collapsed in 1958. Although a cumulation of demands, from the Algerians, the army, and various internal groups, was the immediate cause, the Republic fell so quickly and so easily because few people bothered to try to save it. The rate of tax evasion and of general civil disobedience, as well as popular statements and the findings of opinion polls, had long hinted at the low support level; the change in the system was no surprise to most observers.

Developments in other social systems constitute a third factor which may affect political development. The extent to which the political system is loaded or overloaded will vary with the capabilities of other social systems in the domestic society and the international system. When an economy develops new capabilities — new systems of production and distribution — the loading of the political system with demands for welfare may be significantly reduced, thereby affecting political

development. Or a religious system may develop regulative capabilities, reducing the flow of innovative demands on the political system. Or the international political system may develop a regulative or distributive capability which reduces the pressure on the domestic political systems. A case in point is the international military or technical assistance units of the United Nations, which may reduce the pressure for the development of extractive and regulative capabilities in some of the new nations. Thus, the existence or the development of capabilities in other social systems may affect the magnitude of the challenges confronting political systems, keep the flow at an incremental and low-intensity level, and, perhaps, help avoid some of the disruptive consequences of cumulative pressures. On the other hand, a breakdown in family, religious, or economic systems may create discontent, disorder, and new demands which load and perhaps overload the polity.

A fourth factor to consider is the functioning pattern of the system itself. Some kinds of political systems can withstand demand and support fluctuations better than others. In general terms we may note that a system with a developed and differentiated bureaucracy can accommodate demands for new regulations and services much more readily than can a less differentiated system. Law and order can be maintained much more easily if an organized army or police force is available. And a system geared to a high level of responsiveness to inputs from many sources can cope with demands from new groups and with loss of support from some old ones. Some systems are geared for change and adaptation; others are not.

A final factor is the response of the political elites to political-system challenges. Such responses cannot be predicted, at least not entirely, from the system's cultural patterns. In a given system some sorts of responses may lead to accommodation of new demands without changes of the political system or with a minor level of such change, while other responses may lead to disaster. Elites may misjudge the seriousness and intensity of input fluctuations, and either radically modify the system or fail to respond until it is too late. The arguments about how important such responses are have long occupied the attention

of historians. What sort of responses by Louis XV and Louis XVI could have averted the French Revolution? At what point had the demands become so intense that no response would have resulted in peaceful accommodation?

Political change is one of the most pervasive and fundamental concerns of our analysis. We shall return to it, by different routes, in every chapter. The world of politics has never waited for the observer to finish his quiet contemplation. In the present century political development seems to be proceeding at an ever-accelerating rate, overwhelming our comparative "snapshots" by making them obsolete before we finish our books and articles. It is increasingly obvious that the study of politics must be a dynamic system-and-process analysis, and not a static and structural one.